NOTE 1 – See [ITU-T Y.2111] for further details on the corresponding RACF reference points.
NOTE 2 – This reference point is the same as the S-TC2, S-TC3, S-TC4 and S-TC5 reference points in the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
NOTE 3 – This reference point is the same as the TC-T2, TC-T5, TC-T6 and TC-T9 reference points in the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
NOTE 4 – This reference point is the same as the TC-T3 and TC-T4 reference points in the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
| | |
+
+### 9.3.1 RACF-related interface framework as per [ITU-T Q.3300]
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3300].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3300] specifies a concrete implementation of the functional architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2111], including the specification of physical entities involved in resource control signalling, interfaces across which signalling takes place, and the mapping between these entities and interfaces and the corresponding functional entities and reference points in [ITU-T Y.2111].
+
+Detailed aspects of the framework are specified in [ITU-T Q.3300].
+
+### 9.3.2 Rs interface as per [ITU-T Q.3301.1]
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3301.1].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3301.1] provides the stage 3 specification of the protocol at the interface between service control entities (SCEs) and the policy decision physical entity (PD-PE). Functional requirements and stage 2 specifications for this interface are contained in clause 8.1 of [ITU-T Y.2111] and in Supplement 51 to ITU-T Q-series Recommendations. This interface is used to control session-based policy.
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3301.1].
+
+### 9.3.3 Rp interface as per [ITU-T Q.3302.1]
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3302.1].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3302.1] defines the resource connection initiation protocol (RCIP), for signalling control information between peer TRC-PEs (Rp interface) in a single operator's network. Requirements for the Rp interface are defined in clause 8.6 of [ITU-T Y.2111] and in Supplement 51 to ITU-T Q-series Recommendations.
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3302.1].
+
+#### 9.3.4 Rw interface as per ITU-T Q.3303.x
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3303.0].
+
+Interface Rw defines an interface between a policy decision physical entity (PD-PE) and a policy enforcement physical entity (PE-PE), see also [ITU-T Q.3300]. There are multiple signalling alternatives for Rw defined in the protocol-specific Recommendation in the ITU-T Q.3303.x subseries; see [ITU-T Q.3303.1], [ITU-T Q.3303.2] and [ITU-T Q.3303.3].
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3303.0], [ITU-T Q.3303.1], [ITU-T Q.3303.2] and [ITU-T Q.3303.3].
+
+#### **9.3.5 Rc interface as per ITU-T Q.3304.x**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3304.1].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3304.1] and [ITU-T Q.3304.2] provide the stage 3 specifications of the Rc interface. Functional requirements and the stage 2 specifications of the Rc interface are contained in [ITU-T Y.2111]. The Rc interface is the interface between a transport resource control physical entity (TRC-PE) and a transport physical entity (T-PE).
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3304.1] and [ITU-T Q.3304.2].
+
+### **9.3.6 Rt interface as per [ITU-T Q.3305.1]**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3305.1].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3305.1] provides the stage 3 specification of the Rt interface. Functional requirements corresponding to this interface are contained in clause 8.5 of [ITU-T Y.2111] and in Supplement 51 to ITU-T Q-series Recommendations. The Rt interface protocol operates between the policy decision and transport control functional elements of the resource and admission control function (RACF) and is used to control network transport resources required to convey the media flow.
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3305.1].
+
+### **9.3.7 Rd interface as per [ITU-T Q.3306.1]**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T Q.3306.1].
+
+[ITU-T Q.3306.1] specifies the protocol used between intra-domain policy decision physical entities (PD-PEs) in the resource and admission control functional block. This interface operates across the Rd reference point as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. It is used for inter-communication between PD-PEs that can optionally be deployed in larger domains for scalability reasons.
+
+Detailed aspects of the interface are specified in [ITU-T Q.3306.1].
+
+## **9.4 IPTV-related specifications**
+
+Most protocols used in IPTV services can use existing protocols. IPTV-related specifications defined in ITU-T are as follows, and IPTV-related specifications defined in other SDOs are provided in the bibliography.
+
+### **9.4.1 IPTV metadata**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T H.750].
+
+[ITU-T H.750] gives the high-level specification of the metadata for IPTV services, its elements and delivery protocols.
+
+The IPTV metadata provides a descriptive and structural framework for managing IPTV services. The IPTV metadata is the information on services and content processed by the service and content delivery infrastructure.
+
+### **9.4.2 IPTV terminal specification**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T H.721].
+
+[ITU-T H.721] describes and specifies the functionalities of the IPTV terminal devices for IPTV basic services defined in [ITU-T H.720] over a dedicated content delivery network, which takes into consideration such conditions on content delivery as QoS. The expected types of terminal devices are set-top boxes and digital TV sets with embedded IPTV capabilities.
+
+### **9.4.3 IPTV multimedia framework**
+
+NOTE – The following text is based on the text in clause 1 of [ITU-T H.760].
+
+[ITU-T H.760] identifies and describes the relevant standards for interoperability and harmonization among IPTV multimedia application frameworks. Some detailed aspects are identified by [b-ITU-T H.761] and [b-ITU-T H.762].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Table of documents related to NGN capability set 2
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+Table I.1 shows documents related to NGN capability set 2. It includes ITU-T Recommendations and other relevant SDO documents as NGN capability set 2 arranged by item. In Table I.1, shaded boxes indicate documents which are part of NGN capability set 1 [ITU-T Y.2006].
+
+**Table I.1 – Documents related to NGN capability set 2**
+
+| Category | Sub-category | Items | | Stage 1 | Stage 2 | Stage 3 |
+|-------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Environment | Access transport network | xDSL | ADSL | [ITU-T Y.2201] | [b-ITU-T G.992.1]
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 access border gateway** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A packet gateway between an access network and a core network.
+
+**3.1.2 address** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation only uses the term "address" in the case where it does not specifically refer to a locator or an identifier.
+
+**3.1.3 identifier** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects). Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization. They can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private IDs are normally not disclosed to third parties).
+
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, this identifier is referred to as "NGN identifier". We define a new term "Node ID" that would be used in transport and upper layers in the ID/locator separation architecture.
+
+**3.1.4 seamless service** [ITU-T Q.1706]: A service that is implemented such that it will ensure that users will not experience any service disruptions while changing the point of attachment.
+
+**3.1.5 service continuity** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for a moving object to maintain ongoing service over including current states, such as user's network environment and session for a service.
+
+**3.1.6 session** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A temporary telecommunications relationship among a group of objects in the service stratum that are assigned to collectively fulfil a task for a period of time. A session has a state that may change during its lifetime. Session-based telecommunications may, but need not be, assisted by intermediaries (see mediated services). Session-based telecommunications can be one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, or many-to-many.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 ID/LOC mapping:** ID/LOC mapping is an association between a node ID and one or more LOCs.
+
+NOTE 1 – A single node ID or several node IDs can be associated with many LOCs associated with a single terminal. The node ID to LOC mapping can have the one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one relationship.
+
+NOTE 2 – ID/LOC mapping is also called ID/LOC binding.
+
+**3.2.2 ID/LOC mapping function:** An ID/LOC mapping function gets mapping information from an ID/LOC mapping storage function and uses the corresponding node ID and/or LOC in packet headers. The ID/LOC mapping function works in a close correlation with the transport user profile associated with the transport control function.
+
+NOTE – ID/LOC mapping functions can be physically located in an NGN terminal, an access border gateway, or any other NGN components.
+
+**3.2.3 ID/LOC mapping storage function:** An ID/LOC mapping storage function stores the mapping of NGN identifiers, node IDs and LOCs. This function also updates mapping information, as well as provides mapping information to other functions on request. The mapping storage function can be physically located in an NGN terminal or with other NGN components.
+
+**3.2.4 ID/LOC separation:** ID/LOC separation is decoupling the semantic of IP address into the semantics of node IDs and LOCs. Distinct namespaces are used for node IDs and LOCs so that they
+
+can evolve independently. LOCs are associated with the IP layer whereas node IDs are associated with upper layers in such a way that ongoing communication sessions or services shall not be broken by changing LOCs due to mobility and multi-homing.
+
+NOTE – In the context of this Recommendation, a completely new namespace for node IDs can optionally be created that would leave the IP address space more or less intact for LOCs, allowing routing technologies to be developed independently of end-host mobility and end-host multi-homing implications.
+
+**3.2.5 locator (LOC):** A locator is the network layer topological name for an interface or a set of interfaces. LOCs are carried in the IP address fields as packets traverse the network.
+
+NOTE – IP addresses can gradually become pure LOCs. However, on the contrary, it cannot be said that a LOC is an IP address. An IP address may associate with the IP layer as well as upper layer protocols (such as TCP and HTTP), whereas a LOC will associate with only the IP layer and be used in IP address fields.
+
+**3.2.6 node:** A node is defined as a connection point that may be a network device, a user terminal or a process where data can be transmitted, received or forwarded. In general, a node is identified by its NGN identifier by the user, and by its node ID by the protocol stack.
+
+**3.2.7 node ID:** A node ID is an identifier used at the transport and higher layers to identify the node as well as the endpoint of a communication session. A node ID is independent of the node location as well as the network to which the node is attached so that the node ID is not required to change even when the node changes its network connectivity by physically moving or simply activating another interface. The node IDs should be used at the transport and higher layers for replacing the conventional use of IP addresses at these layers. A node may have more than one node ID in use.
+
+NOTE – Unless otherwise specified, the term "ID" used in this Recommendation represents a node ID, not an NGN identifier specified in this or any other Recommendations.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|---------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CPN | Customer Premises Network |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| GERAN | GSM EDGE Radio Access Network |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| ISP | Internet Service Provider |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| LOC | Locator |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| POA | Point of Attachment |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| UTRAN | UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network |
+
+WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
+WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
+
+# 5 General overview of ID and LOC separation
+
+This clause provides background information to assist the development of this Recommendation. The following clauses describe a general reference model for ID/LOC separation.
+
+### 5.1 General environment under IP based network
+
+According to the definition of NGN [ITU-T Y.2001], the NGN framework is expected to support advanced architectural objectives over a unified IP network. NGN Release 1 assumes IPv4 or IPv6 networking at packet interconnection points and packet network interfaces [ITU-T Y.2201]. NGN is an IP-based network and keeps all features of the IP protocol, although some features are counterproductive to the NGN objectives.
+
+Figure 1 presents the reference framework of an IP-based network, illustrating IP-based services and IP transfer capabilities [ITU-T Y.1241]. An IP-based service is a set of functions and facilities that utilize IP transfer capabilities offered by NGN to a user. The IP transfer capability is a set of network capabilities provided by the IP layer. NGN decouples IP-based services and transport, allowing them to be offered separately and evolve independently [ITU-T Y.2001].
+
+We assume that an IP-based service is provided to end users or nodes. In the current IP network, even if the service is started between end nodes through their NGN identifiers such as E.164 [ITU-T E.164], SIP ID [IETF RFC 3261], or URL, these nodes' IP addresses, which are obtained by translating the NGN identifiers from a mapping function storage such as DNS, are directly used for establishing a communication session and transferring data between the end nodes. The IP address not only describes the location of the end node or user within the IP-based network topology but also uniquely identifies the end node in the transport and higher layers.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the general architecture of an IP-based network. It shows two end-node systems connected via a network. Each end-node system consists of an IP Application, TCP/UDP, and IP protocol stack. The IP-based services are provided to the user, who interacts with the CPN (Core Packet Network). The IP transfer capabilities are provided by the IP Core Network, which is connected to the IP Access Network and the CPN. The diagram also shows the Services, Application layer, and Network layer components.
+
+| Layer | Description |
+|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Services: | Distribution service, retrieval service, conversational service, messaging service |
+| Application layer: | Application sessions for providing IP services are identified by socket API that contains end-node IP addresses. |
+| Network layer: | IP transfer capabilities using IP address as physical point of attachment |
+
+Figure 1: General architecture of IP-based network. The diagram illustrates the flow of IP-based services and IP transfer capabilities between two end-node systems. Each end-node system consists of an IP Application, TCP/UDP, and IP protocol stack. The IP-based services are provided to the user, who interacts with the CPN (Core Packet Network). The IP transfer capabilities are provided by the IP Core Network, which is connected to the IP Access Network and the CPN. The diagram also shows the Services, Application layer, and Network layer components.
+
+Figure 1 – General architecture of IP-based network [ITU-T Y.1241]
+
+### 5.2 General concept of ID/LOC separation
+
+An IP address assigned to a node has overloaded semantics in the conventional IP-based network. It is a node ID that uniquely identifies the node; it is a locator that uniquely locates the node in the network topology; and it also can be used for determining path to reach the node. Thus, the IP address provides or helps provide answers to the following three questions about the node: who the node is, where the node is, and how to get to the node. These semantics embedded into every IP address are causing serious problems in supporting seamless services in a mobile or multi-homed networking environment, where a node is allowed to change its locator while maintaining the same node ID. Thus, separating the role played by the conventional IP addresses into the roles of node IDs and LOCs solves these problems.
+
+#### 5.2.1 ID/LOC separation in IP-based network
+
+ID/LOC separation is a mechanism which decouples the transport and higher layers from the network layer so that an end-to-end communication session is not bound to IP addresses as it is conventionally shown in Figure 2-a. The new architecture with ID/LOC separation distinguishes a node ID, which is a semantic name to recognize the endpoint of a communication session, from a LOC, which is a semantic name of an IP address, through a binding between the ID and LOC as shown in Figure 2-b. By doing so, IP addresses no longer directly associate with the communication session, but only with the network layer.
+
+
+
+a) Conventional IP architecture b) ID/LOC separation architecture
+
+End-to-end communication session
+
+Packet routing and node location
+
+**Transport layer**
+(IP address as identifier)
+
+IP address
+
+Identifier
+
+Locator
+
+**Network layer**
+(IP address as locator)
+
+**Transport layer**
+(NodeID as identifier)
+
+NodeID
+
+**Mapping function**
+(NodeID ↔ LOC)
+
+LOC
+(IP address)
+
+**Network layer**
+(IP address as locator)
+
+Figure 2: Comparison between conventional IP architecture and new ID/LOC separation architecture. The diagram shows two architectures. Architecture (a) 'Conventional IP architecture' shows an 'End-to-end communication session' at the top and 'Packet routing and node location' at the bottom. A box labeled 'Transport layer (IP address as identifier)' is connected to a box labeled 'Network layer (IP address as locator)' by a vertical line. A horizontal line labeled 'IP address' branches off this vertical line, with an arrow pointing up to the 'Identifier' label and an arrow pointing down to the 'Locator' label. Architecture (b) 'ID/LOC separation architecture' shows the same top and bottom labels. The 'Transport layer' box is labeled '(NodeID as identifier)'. A 'NodeID' label has an arrow pointing up to the transport layer and a downward arrow pointing to a 'Mapping function (NodeID ↔ LOC)' box. This mapping function box has an upward arrow pointing to a 'LOC (IP address)' label, which in turn has an arrow pointing down to the 'Network layer (IP address as locator)' box.
+
+**Figure 2 – Comparison between conventional IP architecture and new ID/LOC separation architecture**
+
+#### 5.2.2 ID/LOC separation in NGN
+
+##### 5.2.2.1 Identification and location in NGN
+
+The NGN has the fundamental characteristic of supporting a variety of identification schemes. The following are examples of the identification schemes [ITU-T Y.2001].
+
+- E.164 [ITU-T E.164] numbering scheme;
+- Unified resource locator (URL) scheme;
+- Unique name system;
+- Other naming conventions such as H.323 [ITU-T H.323], SIP [IETF RFC 3261], telephone and mail uniform resource identifier (URI).
+
+The location of a telecommunication object (i.e., user or device) can be represented by the physical point of attachment (POA), where the object may be reached or found [ITU-T Y.2011]. The location in the IP-based transport network is represented by an IP address.
+
+When a user or device initiates a communication session with another one, one of the above-mentioned identifiers is translated into a routable IP address through a network internal database or an external database such as the domain name system (DNS).
+
+##### 5.2.2.2 Architectural model
+
+The advent of mobility, multi-homing, and their interworking has increased network complexity and challenges to maintain service and session continuity when end nodes change their locations or network associations [ITU-T Y.2012]. For instance, an NGN terminal with dual interfaces can attach to two different points of the same access network or of different access networks, such as GERAN/UTRAN and WiMAX/WLAN, simultaneously. In this case, the terminal or end node is permitted to have two IP addresses (i.e., locators) belonging to the same access network or two different access networks as shown in Figure 3. In such a multi-homing case, there should be no fixed relationship between the node ID and locator in order to enable the end node to change its locator when it changes the association point in the access network, while keeping the same node ID. Thus, new transient relationships between node IDs and LOCs are required to be supplemented in NGN.
+
+ID/LOC mapping information can be stored in one or more ID/LOC mapping storage function located anywhere in the NGN core, access network, or end node. The mapping is updated by end nodes or access networks when they detect changes in ID/LOC relationships. Since the ID/LOC binding changes that occur due to end node mobility or multi-homing are primarily detected by the end nodes or by the access network, it is recommended that the end nodes or access networks implement ID/locator mapping functions to format and process data packets by utilizing the ID/LOC binding information. Therefore, for faster adaptation to the changes, it can be beneficial to keep the scope of the mapping function local to the end node or the access network as shown in Figure 3. Data packets are transmitted through the core network by using LOCs only, i.e., IP addresses. A LOC used by the end node in packet headers is allowed to be replaced with another LOC by the access network for traffic engineering or other purposes.
+
+The advantages of the ID/LOC separation architecture are as follows.
+
+- Allow node IDs to be used in the long-term security and trust relationship.
+- Allow LOCs to reflect the network topology and facilitate topological aggregation.
+- Allow node IDs to be persistent even when LOCs change due to mobility or multi-homing.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the general concept of ID/LOC separation in NGN. It shows a Core Network (blue oval) connected to three Access Networks (yellow ovals). End Node A (blue square) is connected to the first Access Network, and End Node B (red square) is connected to the third Access Network. Solid blue arrows show data transport from the Core Network to the Access Networks. Dashed red arrows show the mapping function between End Nodes and their respective Access Networks. Brackets on the right indicate 'Data transport using LOCs' for the Core Network and 'Scope of ID/LOC mapping function' for the Access Networks.
+
+Diagram illustrating the general concept of ID/LOC separation in NGN. It shows a Core Network (blue oval) connected to three Access Networks (yellow ovals). End Node A (blue square) is connected to the first Access Network, and End Node B (red square) is connected to the third Access Network. Solid blue arrows show data transport from the Core Network to the Access Networks. Dashed red arrows show the mapping function between End Nodes and their respective Access Networks. Brackets on the right indicate 'Data transport using LOCs' for the Core Network and 'Scope of ID/LOC mapping function' for the Access Networks.
+
+**Figure 3 – General concept of ID/LOC separation in NGN**
+
+## **6 General requirements for ID/LOC separation**
+
+The NGN access transport functions are required to be capable of providing IP connectivity. The IP protocol may be carried over various underlying transport technologies in the IP access and core portions of the transport stratum [ITU-T Y.2201]. That is, IP is a key feature to support NGN services. However, the conventional IP architecture has some problems to support NGN services efficiently as mentioned in clause 5.
+
+This clause provides general requirements related to ID/LOC separation.
+
+### **6.1 Requirements for survivability**
+
+Survivability is provided by many functions that are necessary to realize highly reliable networks. NGN is required to support switching protection, re-routing, and service resiliency for survivability [ITU-T Y.2201]. However, the ID/LOC separation specific survivability mainly focuses on communication session continuity.
+
+The following are general requirements for survivability related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- Upper layer sessions identified by node IDs are required to survive when switching the lower layer transport between different LOCs.
+- ID/LOC separation is recommended to provide the capability to immediately detect a link or end-to-end path failure.
+- ID/LOC separation is recommended to provide the capability to change data transport to an alternative link or end-to-end path within an acceptable time to recover from a failure.
+- After recovery from link failure or quality degradation, ID/LOC separation is recommended to have the capability to switch data transport to the previous path by considering the network performance or quality of service.
+- ID/LOC separation is recommended to provide the capability to detect an imminent link or path failure and avoid communication session discontinuity by moving the traffic load to other less-loaded link or path.
+
+### **6.2 Requirements for node ID persistency**
+
+ID/LOC separation is required to provide the capability to manage node ID persistency in such a way that a node ID used to identify the endpoint of a communication session remains unchanged during a service or application operation.
+
+The following are general requirements for node ID persistency related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- The transport and higher layers are required to use the same node ID for a particular application service or transport session.
+- The node ID is required to facilitate the continuation of an application service or transport session regardless of LOC changes.
+- The node ID is required to be long-lived, i.e., it is required that the node ID used for a session does not have to be replaced before the session terminates. However, the node ID may or may not be permanent. Its lifetime may depend on the user's willingness, network support, or privacy and security requirements.
+
+### **6.3 Requirements for multi-homing**
+
+NGN terminals are allowed to have two or more network connections through the same or different access networks with multiple network interfaces and multiple addresses [ITU-T Y.2052]. NGN is required to have the capability to allow terminals to choose one of the network providers or change network providers without incurring service and/or session discontinuity. Therefore, the architecture is required to support multi-homing when one or both of two peer nodes are multi-homed.
+
+The following are general requirements for multi-homing capability related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- An NGN terminal is required to have the capability to associate one node ID with multiple network interfaces or locators at the same time.
+- An NGN terminal is required to have the capability to associate one node ID with different locators without incurring service and/or session discontinuity.
+- An NGN terminal, even when it is single homed, can optionally choose network providers if the access network's policy allows.
+- An NGN terminal can continuously maintain application services and communication sessions without any extra efforts while the access network changes or switches between upstream links to the core network.
+
+### **6.4 Requirements for mobility**
+
+Generalized mobility means providing the ability to use different access technologies at different locations while the user and/or the terminal equipment itself may be in movement allowing users to use and manage consistently their applications/customer services across existing network boundaries [ITU-T Y.2001]. However, the ID/LOC separation specific mobility is only concerned with service and session continuity, not with seamless mobility or seamless services as specified in [ITU-T Q.1706].
+
+The following are general requirements for mobility related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- An NGN terminal is required to maintain transport layer connectivity continuously while moving within the same access network.
+- An NGN terminal is required to maintain transport layer connectivity continuously while moving across heterogeneous wireless and/or wired access networks.
+- An NGN terminal is required to maintain transport layer connectivity continuously even when the access network or customer premises network is moving.
+
+### **6.5 Requirements for locator renumbering**
+
+Basically, an NGN terminal in the conventional NGN (i.e., where ID/LOC split has not been yet implemented) is assigned with one or more IP addresses from the access network. If the network's IP address block is changed, all terminals connected to the provider's network also have to change their IP addresses to the new ones belonging to the new IP address block. In this environment, ID/LOC separation is required to provide the capability that changes in the network's locator block do not influence communication session continuity.
+
+The following are general requirements for network address renumbering related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- A customer premises network can optionally be associated with different access networks.
+- A customer premises network can optionally change the access network without affecting communication session continuity.
+- An access network can optionally associate with different core networks.
+- An access network can optionally change the core network without affecting communication session continuity.
+- The network locator renumbering is required to be efficient so that it does not take much time and effort of the administrator.
+
+### **6.6 Requirements for traffic engineering**
+
+Traffic engineering provides the ability to direct traffic along non-default links. Multi-homing is a prerequisite for traffic engineering. Corresponding to multi-homing, either one or both of end host-
+
+based traffic engineering and site-based traffic engineering are required to be supported by ID/locator separation.
+
+The following are general requirements for traffic engineering related to ID/LOC separation:
+
+- Either the terminal or the access network is allowed to monitor the traffic status of multiple available upstream links for latency, throughput, and service charge, in order to switch links intelligently.
+- Either the terminal or the access network is required to be permitted to change the transmission path for load balancing, load sharing, failure avoidance or recovery by allowing the use of alternate LOCs from the available ones.
+- An NGN terminal can optionally choose an appropriate LOC by dynamically monitoring the network condition in order to change the transmission path.
+- An NGN terminal can optionally change its LOC for traffic engineering without discontinuing communication sessions.
+
+## **7 Functional requirements for ID/LOC separation**
+
+This clause describes functional requirements for the ID/LOC separation organizational components, without intending to describe the functional requirements for general NGN components.
+
+The aim of ID/LOC separation is to eliminate the overloaded semantics of IP address from the NGN architecture. Node IDs are used in the transport and higher layers while IP addresses are used for forwarding data packets through underlying transport technologies in access and core portions of the transport stratum. Therefore, the functional entities related to ID/LOC separation may handle some operations of the NGN transport stratum to exclude using IP addresses as node IDs in communication sessions.
+
+### **7.1 Requirements for node ID**
+
+NGN is intended to provide an efficient, secure, and trustworthy identity like numbering, naming, and addressing for end users, network providers, and service providers [ITU-T Y.2201]. Basically, the identity has some capabilities for user identification, in order for network providers and service providers to authenticate and authorize users for NGN services.
+
+In the ID/LOC separation architecture, the meaning of node ID is somewhat different from the identity mentioned above. In this Recommendation, the newly defined node ID is used at the transport and higher layers to identify the end node or endpoint of communication sessions.
+
+The following are general requirements for node ID capabilities:
+
+- The node ID namespace is required to fully decouple the network layer from the higher layers. That is, the node ID is required to replace all occurrences of IP addresses within the transport and higher layers.
+- The node ID is required to uniquely identify the endpoint of a communication session from the aspects of transport and higher layer protocols.
+- During a communication session, the node ID is required not to change due to changes in LOCs.
+- The node ID is required to be associated with one or more LOCs. The association may change without disconnecting an ongoing communication service.
+- The node ID can optionally have a hierarchical structure for scalability of mapping systems.
+- A terminal is required to have one or more node IDs. The node ID is allowed to be long-lived until the user, terminal, or network decides to replace it. Node IDs can have a local or global scope.
+
+- A node ID can optionally be assigned permanently to an NGN terminal or be generated by the terminal itself or assigned by some other entity on demand.
+- The node ID namespace is required to be authenticated. A node ID may be generated from the public key of an asymmetric key pair or from an NGN identifier, which may self-assert or get authentication from a third-party.
+
+### 7.2 Requirements for LOC
+
+The LOC of an NGN terminal represents the physical point of attachment of the terminal in the NGN access network. The LOC is used to find/reach the terminal.
+
+At the transport stratum, NGN is required to support IPv4, IPv6, or both, so the LOC may take the form of an IPv4 address or an IPv6 address.
+
+The following are general requirements for LOC capabilities:
+
+- LOCs must be globally or locally routable.
+- LOCs can optionally represent a strict network topology. That is, LOCs can optionally be typically assigned based on the structure of the network provider. LOCs can optionally be allocated by using an addressing scheme specific to the access network.
+- LOCs can optionally have an aggregate structure for scalability.
+- LOCs are recommended to be globally unique in order to represent a unique location in the global network topology. LOC collisions are required to be strictly forbidden within the scope of the LOC namespace.
+- LOCs are required to be assigned or authorized by the access network.
+- LOCs can optionally be resolved into the corresponding node IDs or NGN IDs by the ID/LOC mapping storage function.
+- Different LOCs can optionally be used for different communication sessions between two terminals in a multi-homing environment.
+
+### 7.3 Basic functionalities
+
+Conventionally, an NGN identifier such as an URL or a SIP identifier is translated into an IP address when starting an application service. The IP address is then used as an identifier in the transport and higher layers to identify the endpoint of the communication session and as a locator in the network layer to locate the endpoint and route packets in the network topology. However, in mobility and multi-homing environments, it is not necessary that there exists a permanent relationship between the NGN identifier and the IP address.
+
+In Figure 4, to eliminate the permanent relationship, the conventional mapping function of the NGN that maps between NGN identifiers to IP addresses is augmented with an additional function to map from NGN identifiers to node ID, node IDs to locators. As usual, the end user starts an end-to-end communication service using its NGN identifier. The mapping function residing in the user terminal translates the NGN identifier into the node ID, which is used at the transport stratum to uniquely identify the endpoint of the communication session. The mapping function, residing either in the end user terminal or in the network, would translate the NGN identifier or node ID into LOCs, which are used for media transport. Alternatively, the mapping between NGN identifiers to node IDs as well as to LOCs may take place in a single operation of the ID/LOC mapping function. The introduction of the new mapping function separates transport functions, which are composed of IP access as well as IP core transport functions, from services and applications for supporting end-to-end transparency. The end-to-end communication session does not break even when the user terminal changes its LOCs.
+
+
+
+Figure 4: Overview of functionalities for ID/LOC separation in NGN. The diagram shows a layered architecture. On the left, 'Management functions' (dashed green box) and 'End-user functions' (solid blue box) are shown. The 'End-user functions' box contains an 'NGN Identifier' box, which is connected to 'Node IDs' and 'LOCs' via double-headed arrows. Below this is a 'Mapping function' box. The 'NGN Identifier' box is also connected to a 'Service user profile' box (red text) within the 'Service stratum'. The 'Service stratum' also contains 'Application support functions and service support functions' and 'Service control functions'. Below the 'Service stratum' is the 'Transport stratum', which contains a 'Transport user profile' box (blue text), 'Network attachment control functions', and 'Transport control functions'. At the bottom is a 'Transport functions' box. A legend at the bottom left indicates: solid blue lines for Media, dotted lines for Control, and dashed green lines for Management.
+
+**Figure 4 – Overview of functionalities for ID/LOC separation in NGN**
+
+NOTE 1 – Figure 4 represents an abstract view of the NGN architecture referenced from [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+NOTE 2 – To implement ID/LOC separation, the mapping function depicted by the shaded box is added in the conventional NGN architecture to introduce node IDs between NGN identifiers and IP addresses (i.e., locators).
+
+NOTE 3 – The mapping from an NGN identifier to a LOC may take place in two stages, i.e., from the NGN identifier to a node ID in the first stage and from the node ID to the LOC in the second stage. In an alternative approach, it may be possible to map the NGN identifier to the node ID as well as to the LOC in a single stage. Or mapping may not be required at all if the NGN identifier is routable as a LOC.
+
+NOTE 4 – The mapping can involve functional components, such as the ID/LOC mapping storage function and the ID/LOC mapping function, as given in clause 8. However, specific descriptions of these functions are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE 5 – The mapping function works in close correlation with the service user profile and the transport user profile.
+
+## 8 General architecture for ID/LOC separation in NGN
+
+General architectural functions for ID/LOC separation and their allocation to different functional components are covered in this clause. The basic requirements for the general architecture are also outlined here.
+
+### 8.1 General considerations of ID/LOC separation
+
+The objective of the architecture for ID/LOC separation is to support efficient multi-homing and mobility management by separating the role played by IP addresses in the current IP architecture into the roles of node IDs and LOCs.
+
+The IDs, in general, should be location-independent and valid for a long time. On the other hand, LOCs are considered to be location-dependent, i.e., associated with the network, and are allowed to change frequently to support mobility or multi-homing. A node ID is required to associate with more than one LOC at any instant to support multi-homing or with different LOCs at different instants as the end node moves to different networks. The ID/LOC mapping data is assumed to be stored in an ID/LOC mapping storage function.
+
+### 8.2 Architectural components
+
+The components involved in the ID/LOC separation architecture are shown in Figure 5. Note that although the ID/LOC mapping storage function and ID/LOC mapping functions are shown separately in the figure, they can physically be collocated in an NGN terminal or a border access gateway. ID/LOC mapping storage functions and ID/LOC mapping functions are the main components of the architecture. The ID/LOC mapping storage functions maintain ID/LOC mapping data. The ID/LOC mapping functions communicate with each other to distribute, update and retrieve mapping information. The ID/LOC mapping storage functions are also recommended to communicate with other network elements that originate/update ID/LOC mapping information (not shown in the figure).
+
+The ID/LOC mapping function requests the ID/LOC mapping storage function to get mapping information corresponding to a node ID. The ID/LOC mapping storage function searches its database for the requested node ID. If it is found, the ID/LOC mapping storage function responds to the ID/LOC mapping function with the mapping information. Otherwise, it forwards the request to other ID/LOC mapping storage functions. This process is repeated until the mapping is found in the system. The ID/LOC mapping function uses the mapping information to implement mapping functions and communicate with other ID/LOC mapping functions. In between two ID/LOC mapping functions, there can be additional ID/LOC mapping functions to support multi-level mapping for routing data through better paths in terms of security, reliability, QoS, etc.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ S1[ID/LOC mapping storage function] <--> |Mapping maintenance| S2[ID/LOC mapping storage function]
+ M1[ID/LOC mapping function] <--> |Communication using ID/ LOC separation| M2[ID/LOC mapping function]
+ M1 -- Mapping request --> S1
+ S1 -- Mapping response --> M1
+ M2 -- Mapping request --> S2
+ S2 -- Mapping response --> M2
+```
+
+Figure 5: ID/LOC separation architectural components in NGN. The diagram shows four components arranged in a 2x2 grid. The top row contains two 'ID/LOC mapping storage function' boxes, and the bottom row contains two 'ID/LOC mapping function' boxes. A horizontal double-headed arrow labeled 'Mapping maintenance' connects the two storage functions. A horizontal double-headed arrow labeled 'Communication using ID/ LOC separation' connects the two mapping functions. On the left, a 'Mapping request' arrow points from the mapping function to the storage function, and a 'Mapping response' arrow points from the storage function to the mapping function. On the right, a 'Mapping request' arrow points from the mapping function to the storage function, and a 'Mapping response' arrow points from the storage function to the mapping function. The identifier 'Y.2015(09)\_F05' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 5 – ID/LOC separation architectural components in NGN**
+
+### 8.3 Architectural requirements
+
+This clause presents requirements for maintaining the ID/LOC mapping storage function, implementing ID/LOC mapping functions, detecting mapping changes and recovering from failures:
+
+The following are requirements for maintaining the ID/LOC mapping storage function:
+
+- Mapping information is required to be kept distributed in the system to avoid any bottleneck and single point of failure at the ID/LOC mapping storage function.
+- The overhead in maintaining mapping databases is required to be low.
+- Mapping updates are required to propagate to ID/LOC mapping storage functions in a due course of time, while keeping the update frequency within some limit so that the network does not get congested by the mapping information.
+- The mapping information retrieval time is required not to exceed the given limit of connection setup time.
+- Mapping information stored at different ID/LOC mapping storage functions is required to be consistent.
+
+- Security mechanisms are required to prevent a malicious entity from corrupting the mapping database.
+- Irrespective of their location in the access network or the core network, ID/LOC mapping storage functions are required to be accessible from any other locations in NGN.
+- It is required that mapping information take account of user and device location privacy issues.
+
+The following are requirements for the ID/LOC mapping function:
+
+- The ID/LOC mapping function is required to use an appropriate security mechanism while retrieving mapping information from the ID/LOC mapping storage function.
+- The ID/LOC mapping function is recommended not to use the same mapping information for ever. The ID/LOC mapping function is required to refresh mapping information from ID/LOC mapping storage functions after a certain period of time.
+- An end node supporting the ID/LOC mapping function is also required to be able to communicate with other nodes that do not support the ID/LOC mapping function.
+- An end node is required not to use the ID/LOC mapping function if the peer node does not support the function.
+
+The following are requirements for failure detection and recovery from ID/LOC mapping changes:
+
+- Mapping changes are required to be propagated to concerned ID/LOC mapping functions and ID/LOC mapping storage functions in a due course of time such that ongoing communication services and sessions are not disconnected by the changes.
+- ID/LOC mapping functions or any other network components are required to implement a mechanism for recovering from the ID/LOC mapping failure.
+
+## **9 Capability from ID/LOC separation**
+
+The application of ID/LOC separation in the NGN architecture provides the following capabilities to end users, network providers, and service providers.
+
+- a) End user capabilities
+ - i) An end user becomes able to support services seamlessly even when the terminal changes its point of attachment within the same access network or across various access networks.
+ - ii) The ID/LOC separation allows end users to change network providers easily.
+- b) Network provider capabilities
+ - i) Since node IDs have the characteristic of being location-independent, and since LOCs are used to specify the topological location in the network, network providers can focus on providing scalable routing using the topologically aggregate LOCs and can establish the better routing policy for traffic engineering and reliability.
+ - ii) ID/LOC separation can play a role in supporting load sharing.
+ - iii) ID/LOC separation can play a role in making network renumbering easier.
+- c) Service provider capabilities
+ - i) An NGN service provider becomes able to deliver application services continuously even when the user terminal changes its point of attachment to the network.
+ - ii) The process of session management for supporting uninterrupted connectivity in a mobility or multi-homing environment becomes simpler.
+
+## **10 Security consideration**
+
+ID/LOC separation is expected to deal with dynamic conditions where LOCs are allowed to change frequently due to mobility or multi-homing. In such cases, the secured and authenticated mapping between node IDs and LOCs is highly required to prevent any malicious entity from corrupting mapping information and diverting traffic to some unwanted places.
+
+Specifically, the following entities/tasks are required to be secured:
+
+- a) ID/LOC mapping storage function: The ID/LOC mapping database is required to be secured.
+- b) ID/LOC update mechanism: Only authenticated entities are recommended to update the mapping database. That is, an NGN terminal or ID/LOC mapping storage function is required to accept an ID/LOC update only when it comes from an authenticated ID/LOC mapping storage function or terminal.
+- c) ID/LOC retrieve mechanism: An NGN terminal is required to use secured mechanisms to retrieve ID/LOC mapping data from authenticated ID/LOC storage functions. No any entities in the middle are allowed to alter mapping data.
+- d) NGN terminal cache: In case an NGN terminal uses ID/LOC mapping stored in its cache while initializing communication sessions, the cache is required to be secured enough against the possible alteration by software bugs or virus.
+
+No new security implications are introduced in data transport or routing because locators provide a subset of the functions of IP addresses in the current NGN architecture.
+
+## **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1251] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1251 (2002), *General architectural model for interworking*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2007), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2031
+
+(09/2006)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2031
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **ITU-T Recommendation Y.2031**
+
+# **PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation describes the functional architecture, interworking with other components, and reference point requirements of the PSTN/ISDN emulation service component (NGN component of the service stratum) including call server based approach and IMS-based approach.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2031 was approved on 13 September 2006 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 PSTN/ISDN emulation in NGN ..... | 4 |
+| 6 Call server based PSTN/ISDN emulation functional architecture ..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Description of functions ..... | 5 |
+| 6.2 Service architecture ..... | 7 |
+| 6.3 Reference points ..... | 8 |
+| 6.4 Relationship between functional entities in CS-based PSTN/ISDNIMS-PES functional entities | NGN functional entities |
+|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| S-CSCF | S-CSC-FE |
+| P-CSCF | P-CSC-FE |
+| I-CSCF | I-CSC-FE |
+| MGCF | MGC-FE |
+| MRFC | MRC-FE |
+| MRFP | MRP-FE |
+| BGCF | BGC-FE |
+| AS | AS-FE |
+| UE | Terminal functions |
+| IM-SSF | SSF |
+| SCIM | APL-SCM-FE |
+| SIP-AS | SIP AS-FE |
+| OSA AS | OSA AS-FE |
+| OSA SCS | OSA APL-GW-FE |
+| AGCF | AGC-FE |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI TS 123 260] ETSI TS 123 260 V6.7.0 (2006), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Telecommunication management; Charging management; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) charging.*
+- [b-ETSI TS 182 012] ETSI TS 182 012 (2006), *Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); IMS-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem; Functional architecture.*
+- [b-ETSI ES 282 002] ETSI ES 282 002 (2006), *Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); PSTN/ISDN Emulation Subsystem (PES); Functional architecture.*
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2063-201207-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2063-201207-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3daec9ebb079e02637fb641b1ae61096d5ebe8a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2063-201207-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,790 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2063
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- Framework of the web of things
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2063
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+## CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2063**
+
+# **Framework of the web of things**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2063 provides a framework of the web of things (WoT). As the use of various devices has become so widespread, it is difficult to access data on these devices in a unified way. The WoT allows physical devices to be accessed as resources of both the web and services/applications based upon a web-based service environment, as well as through legacy telecommunications.
+
+This Recommendation describes the overview of the WoT and identifies the requirements to support the WoT. In addition, this Recommendation specifies the functional architecture including a deployment model for the WoT.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2063 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Web, web of things, WoT.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Term defined in this Recommendation ..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Overview of the web of things..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Requirements for the web of things..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 General requirements for the WoT..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Functional requirements for the WoT ..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Conceptual and deployment models of the web of things..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 Conceptual model..... | 5 |
+| | 8.2 Deployment models..... | 7 |
+| 9 | Functional architecture for the web of things..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Overview of the WoT architecture ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.2 Functional architecture of the WoT broker ..... | 9 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix I – Use cases and scenarios of the web of things ..... | 14 |
+| | I.1 Home control services using WoT ..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix II – WoT broker service information flows ..... | 16 |
+| | II.1 Service discovery..... | 16 |
+| | II.2 Service execution..... | 17 |
+| | II.3 Service composition ..... | 18 |
+| | II.4 Agent registration ..... | 19 |
+| | II.5 Service registration..... | 20 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 22 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2063
+
+# Framework of the web of things
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides a framework of the web of things (WoT). The Recommendation covers the followings:
+
+- overview of the WoT
+- requirements to support the WoT
+- deployment models of the WoT
+- functional architecture for the WoT.
+
+This Recommendation demonstrates how physical devices can interact with web resources. This Recommendation also includes WoT use cases in Appendix I and information flows in Appendix II. The detailed web technology including the semantics and ontology is beyond the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation only addresses physical devices within a broad scope of "things" [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2002] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2002 (2009), *Overview of ubiquitous networking and of its support in NGN*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2060] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 client** [b-W3C WACterms]: The role adopted by an application when it is retrieving and/or rendering resources or resource manifestations.
+
+**3.1.2 device** [b-W3C dig loss]: An apparatus through which a user can perceive and interact with the web.
+
+NOTE – In the IoT, a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+**3.1.3 Internet of things (IoT)** [ITU-T Y.2060]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE 2 – From a broad perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications.
+
+**3.1.4 resource** [b-IETF RFC 3986]: The term "resource" is used in a general sense for whatever might be identified by a URI.
+
+NOTE – Familiar examples include an electronic document, an image, a source of information with a consistent purpose (e.g., "today's weather report for Los Angeles"), a service (e.g., an HTTP-to-SMS gateway), and a collection of other resources. A resource is not necessarily accessible via the Internet; e.g., human beings, corporations, and bound books in a library can also be resources. Likewise, abstract concepts can be resources, such as the operators and operands of a mathematical equation, the types of a relationship (e.g., "parent" or "employee"), or numeric values (e.g., zero, one, and infinity).
+
+**3.1.5 server** [b-W3C WACterms]: The role adopted by an application when it is supplying resources or resource manifestations.
+
+**3.1.6 the World Wide Web (WWW, or simply the web)** [b-W3C web arch]: An information space in which the items of interest, referred to as resources, are identified by global identifiers called Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI).
+
+**3.1.7 thing** [ITU-T Y.2060]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is an object of the physical world (physical things) or the information world (virtual things), which is capable of being identified and integrated into communication networks.
+
+**3.1.8 URI** [b-IETF RFC 3986]: A simple and extensible means for identifying a resource.
+
+**3.1.9 user agent** [b-W3C dig loss]: A client within a device that performs rendering. Browsers are examples of user agents, as are web robots that automatically traverse the web collecting information.
+
+**3.1.10 web resource** [b-W3C WACterms]: A resource, identified by a URI, that is a member of the web core.
+
+## **3.2 Term defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 Web of things (WoT):** A way to realize the IoT where (physical and virtual) things are connected and controlled through the World Wide Web.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------------|
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| HTTP | Hyper Text Transport Protocol |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| JINI | Java Intelligent Network Infrastructure |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| REST | Representational State Transfer |
+| UPnP | Universal Plug and Play |
+| URI | Unique Resource Identifiers |
+
+| | |
+|-----|----------------|
+| WoT | Web of Things |
+| WWW | World Wide Web |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation,
+
+- The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+- The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview of the web of things
+
+From the perspective of the creation of applications, the development of applications that run on top of physical devices is a difficult process that requires expert knowledge and time. In this context, many efforts are being veered towards networking to devices. There are a number of solutions to expose the functionality of devices upon which to build applications; for example, JINI and UPnP are a set of open protocols for allowing devices to collaborate in a peer-to-peer fashion. However physical devices are still dedicated to particular systems/applications. They cannot be controlled and managed without using dedicated protocol and proprietary interfaces due to the following reasons:
+
+- a lack of interoperability across open and proprietary platforms: there are many hardware platforms, operating systems, databases, middleware and applications.
+- Many heterogeneous networks: they cannot exchange content and information easily.
+- Different data type: All systems worldwide have their own data representation formats and it is difficult to ensure compatibility between them.
+
+The Internet of things (IoT) tries to find a way interconnecting things based on interoperable information and communication technologies. Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst maintaining the required privacy [ITU-T Y.2060]. Although the WoT has a similar viewpoint to the IoT, the WoT is intended so that physical devices can be accessed as resources of the web and services/applications can be provided based upon a web-based service environment as well as legacy telecommunications.
+
+The World Wide Web (WWW) is used as a platform to deliver services to an end-user, the web enables business entities and applications to intercommunicate openly with each other over a network. The web has program language independent properties, uses message driven communications and easily bounds to different transport protocols. As a result, web technology allows the exposure of physical devices as resources on the web using a WoT approach. Therefore, users can interact with the devices using web interfaces. The WoT can provide capabilities of device reusability, portability across several heterogeneous networks and accessibility based on web with web standards.
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the general concept of WoT. The physical devices are mapping the services into the web and those are considered as web resources so that service developers and/or service providers can easily create web applications for the physical devices.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the general concept of the web of things. A central yellow cloud labeled 'Web' contains several blue boxes labeled 'Service'. These services are connected to various physical devices including a mobile phone, a printer, a fax machine, a desktop computer, a laptop, a CD/DVD burner, a stack of books, and a VCR. Lines connect the services to the devices, showing how the web integrates physical objects.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – General concept of the web of things**
+
+# **7 Requirements for the web of things**
+
+This clause specifies the requirements to support the WoT. The requirements are needed to consider general aspects and functional aspects.
+
+## **7.1 General requirements for the WoT**
+
+The followings are the requirements in the general aspects:
+
+- WoT is required to access physical devices.
+ - ✓ The WoT user (e.g., service developer, service provider, applications and user agent, etc.) can access device capabilities on the web.
+ - ✓ The service developer and the service provider can create new web services using web technologies. They do not need to know the technical details of a physical device such as a physical device's interfaces and their protocols. They do not waste time and human resources for the physical device application development.
+- WoT is required to provide the means that make physical devices accessible to web resources.
+- WoT is required to support interoperability among different networks and operating systems.
+ - ✓ The user can use WoT services on the web regardless of networks and operating systems.
+ - ✓ The service developer can create services across heterogeneous networks with different types of devices and different service providers.
+ - ✓ Services can be created regardless of the operating system and programming languages for devices.
+- WoT is required to support location transparency.
+ - ✓ Devices can be accessed by a user from anywhere on the network without knowing where the devices are located.
+
+- WoT is required to support the compatibility between different data representation formats.
+
+## **7.2 Functional requirements for the WoT**
+
+The following are the requirements for the functional aspects:
+
+- The WoT is required to support service profile management to discover and register services through a web interface.
+- The WoT is required to support service control for executing and managing WoT services.
+- The WoT is required to support service composition for creating new WoT services.
+- The WoT is required to support service access control for protection against unauthorized request/user/access.
+- The WoT is required to support an agent that can make physical devices accessible to the web.
+- The WoT is required to support resource management for supporting agent control, agent registration/deregistration and agent profile management.
+- The WoT is required to support resource ID management for supporting mapping information between devices and agents.
+
+# **8 Conceptual and deployment models of the web of things**
+
+### **8.1 Conceptual model**
+
+Figure 8-1 shows the conceptual model of the WoT. Applications can access and use physical devices on the web through a WoT broker or directly. A WoT broker has several agents which have adaptation capabilities to make a physical device's interface work with a web interface. Each agent is dedicated to a specific interface of the subnetwork (e.g., Wi-Fi, Zigbee and Bluetooth).
+
+In a WoT environment, three services can be used. The characteristics of these three services in the WoT are as follows:
+
+- **WoT service:** a service which has 1:1 mapping with services and/or functions in a physical device through the adaptor.
+NOTE – If WoT services are integrated with each other in a WoT broker, it is a composite WoT service.
+- **Mash-up service:** combined services which integrate WoT services in a WoT broker with web services outside of the WoT broker.
+- **Web service:** services that can be accessed on the web.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Conceptual model of the web of things. The diagram illustrates a multi-tier architecture. At the top is a blue box labeled 'Applications'. Below it is a large yellow cloud labeled 'Web' containing several blue ovals labeled 'Mash-up service' and pink ovals labeled 'Control service', 'Sensor service', 'Light control service', 'Monitoring service', 'IP phone service', 'Data cloud service', and 'TV control service'. In the center is a green box labeled 'Web of things broker' containing blue boxes for 'Wi-Fi agent', 'Zigbee agent', 'Agent-n', and 'Bluetooth agent'. At the bottom are two groups of devices: 'Constrained devices' (Wi-Fi device, Zigbee device, Zigbee device, Bluetooth device) and 'Fully-fledged devices' (refrigerator, phone, server, TV). Arrows show data flow: Applications connect to Mash-up services; Mash-up services connect to various services; services connect to the Web of things broker; the broker connects to constrained devices via agents and to fully-fledged devices directly.
+
+Y.2063(12)\_F8-1
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Conceptual model of the web of things**
+
+#### 8.1.1 Two types of devices
+
+There are several kinds of physical devices in the physical world (e.g., Wi-Fi, Zigbee device, Bluetooth device, TV, phone, data server). Among them, some devices can neither connect to the Internet nor fully respect the web (or REST architectural style). Regarding the physical devices on the WoT, they are divided into two categories: constrained devices and fully-fledged devices.
+
+*Constrained device:* A constrained device cannot connect to the Internet and it has no functionality of the web. The device interacts with an agent of the WoT broker.
+
+*Fully-fledged device:* A fully-fledged device has the functionalities of the web. The device can interact not only with the WoT broker but also with the services on the web.
+
+#### 8.1.2 WoT Broker
+
+The WoT broker has a role for integrating and exposing the devices to the web. This broker has responsibility for communicating between the user of the WoT (e.g., web clients, applications) and fully-fledged devices as well as constrained devices. In the case where a device is communicated with by dedicated software and proprietary interfaces, the device cannot be exposed and integrated on the web directly. The WoT broker enables the seamless integration of the device onto the web. The agent of the WoT broker has a role to control and communicate with physical devices. If a request is received from an application to access physical devices, the WoT broker adapts the request to a proprietary interface of the physical device through an agent.
+
+### 8.2 Deployment models
+
+#### 8.2.1 WoT deployment model for fully-fledged devices
+
+This deployment model represents the pure essence of physical devices accessing and consuming services in the web. In this model, each physical device can have a web server. Therefore each physical device and its capabilities can be linked to the web and it can be discovered by user agents or applications without any other external element (e.g., WoT broker). Additionally those devices can be linked to the web through the WoT broker as necessary. For example, some capabilities of a fully-fledged device can be needed to composite with other physical devices within the WoT broker and/or a fully-fledged device needs to help some functionality of the WoT broker.
+
+In Figure 8-2, there are four parts according to their communicating methods. Basically each part can communicate using the HTTP protocol. However the WoT broker can optionally communicate with devices using each proprietary interface.
+
+The WoT broker has the role of intermediation between physical devices and applications. The WoT broker can create a new service using the services of each physical device. From the perspective of applications, applications can access the physical devices on the web directly or through the WoT broker. In addition, applications can access mash-up services which are combined or aggregated with existing services on physical devices.
+
+
+
+Y.2063(12)\_F8-2
+
+Figure 8-2: WoT deployment model for fully-fledged devices. The diagram is divided into two main sections. The top section is a conceptual diagram showing a 'Web' cloud containing 'Fully-fledged devices' (represented by small cubes), a 'WoT broker' (a blue box with yellow squares), 'Mash-up services' (orange circles), and an 'Application' (a blue rounded rectangle). Lines indicate connections between these components. The bottom section is a detailed communication flow diagram showing the interactions between the 'Fully-fledged device', 'WoT broker', 'Mash-up service', and 'Application'. Arrows indicate the direction of communication, with labels for the protocols used: '(HTTP or proprietary interface)' between the device and broker, and '(HTTP)' for all other interactions. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: a green and grey cube for 'Fully-fledged device', a blue box for 'WoT broker', a yellow square for 'Agent', an orange circle for 'Mash-up service', and a purple circle for 'WoT service'. The text 'Y.2063(12)\_F8-2' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – WoT deployment model for fully-fledged devices**
+
+#### 8.2.2 WoT deployment model for constrained devices
+
+The key factor of this model is how applications can use constrained devices. This deployment model is implemented by the WoT broker, which performs as an intermediation between physical devices and applications. The resources of devices can be exposed on the web through the WoT broker.
+
+In Figure 8-3, there are also four parts according to their communicating methods like the model for fully-fledged devices. However each device communicates with the WoT broker using their proprietary interface. Applications can access mash-up services in a similar way to the model for fully-fledged devices.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-3 – WoT deployment model for constrained devices. The diagram is divided into two main sections. The top section is a visual representation of the system components and their interactions. It shows three clouds on the left, each containing a grey cube representing a 'Constrained device'. These devices are connected via lines to two blue rectangular blocks representing 'WoT broker' units. Each broker unit contains a yellow square ('Agent') and a pink star ('WoT Service'). The brokers are connected to a yellow cloud labeled 'Web' which contains orange circles representing 'Mash-up service'. Finally, the 'Web' cloud is connected to a stack of blue rectangles labeled 'application'. The bottom section is a flow diagram showing the communication paths: 'Constrained Devices' connect to 'WoT Broker' via a '(Proprietary interface)'. The 'WoT Broker' connects to 'Mash-up service' via '(HTTP)'. The 'Mash-up service' connects to 'Application' via '(HTTP)'. There is also a direct '(HTTP)' connection from 'WoT Broker' to 'Application'. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: a grey cube for 'Constrained device', a blue rectangle for 'WoT broker', a yellow square for 'Agent', a pink star for 'WoT Service', and an orange circle for 'Mash-up service'.
+
+**Figure 8-3 – WoT deployment model for constrained devices**
+
+# 9 Functional architecture for the web of things
+
+## 9.1 Overview of the WoT architecture
+
+The WoT architecture is divided into three layers: service layer, adaptation layer and physical layer.
+
+- Service layer
+ - ✓ The service layer provides a common function for service capabilities. It is the entity responsible for making a service available and for managing it.
+- Adaption layer
+ - ✓ The adaption layer is where agents reside. In this layer, each agent interacts with physical devices for the translation of different protocols and message formats. According to the type of physical device (e.g., Bluetooth, Zigbee) the correspondence agent in the adaptation layer can be connected. Also, all the resource management on the agent is conducted in this layer.
+- Physical layer
+ - ✓ The physical devices are in the physical layer. All constrained devices can be accessed by an agent in the adaptation layer. Also, it is possible that a fully-fledged device in the physical layer can be directly accessed by the mash-up service or applications.
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- Mash-up service
+- (dashed) WoT service
+- (blue textured) Composite WoT service
+- (light gray) WoT Agent
+- (light gray) Constrained device
+- (brown) Full-fledged device
+
+Figure 9-1: Overview of the web of things architecture. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top is the 'Applications' layer. Below it is the 'Web' layer, which contains 'Mash-up services' (solid circles) and 'Web services' (dashed circles). The 'Web' layer is part of the 'Web service' group. Below the 'Web' layer is the 'WoT Broker' box, which contains the 'Service Layer' and the 'Adaptation Layer'. The 'Service Layer' contains 'Composite WoT services' (blue textured circles) and 'WoT services' (dashed circles). The 'Adaptation Layer' contains 'WoT Agents' (light gray rectangles). Below the 'WoT Broker' is the 'Physical Layer', which contains 'Constrained devices' (light gray cubes) and 'Full-fledged devices' (brown cubes). Arrows indicate data flow: from 'Applications' to 'Web' and 'Physical Layer'; from 'Web' to 'WoT Broker'; from 'WoT Broker' to 'Physical Layer'; and from 'Physical Layer' to 'Web'.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Overview of the web of things architecture**
+
+### 9.2 Functional architecture of the WoT broker
+
+Figure 9-2 shows the functional architecture of the WoT broker. The WoT broker functional architecture is divided into the service layer and adaptation layer and it consists of six functional entities (FEs) and several WoT agents. The service layer consists of the service profile management FE, service control FE, service composition FE and service access control FE. The adaptation layer consists of the resource ID management FE, resource management FE and WoT agents.
+
+
+
+Y.2063(12)\_F9-2
+
+○ Mash-up service ○ WoT service ● Composite WoT service □ WoT agent
+
+▣ Constrained device ■ Fully-fledged device
+
+Figure 9-2: Functional architecture of the WoT broker. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top is the 'Applications' layer. Below it is the 'Web' layer, which contains 'Mash-up services' (pink circles) and 'Composite WoT services' (blue circles). The 'WoT broker' is a central component that includes the 'Service layer' and the 'Adaptation layer'. The 'Service layer' contains 'WoT services' (pink dashed circles). The 'Adaptation layer' contains 'WoT agents' (pink rectangles). At the bottom is the 'Physical layer', which contains 'Constrained devices' (light pink cubes) and 'Fully-fledged devices' (dark brown cubes). Arrows indicate the flow of information and services between these layers. A bracket on the right side of the diagram labels the 'Web' layer and the 'WoT broker' as the 'Web service'. The identifier 'Y.2063(12)\_F9-2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Functional architecture of the WoT broker**
+
+Based on the functional architecture of the WoT broker, it is possible to describe five service information flows: service discovery, service registration, service execution, service composition and agent registration. These information flows are described in Appendix II.
+
+#### 9.2.1 Service profile management functional entity
+
+The service profile management FE contains service information which is supported by the WoT broker and this FE is responsible for registering WoT services. This FE interworks with the service control FE for the discovery of services. It also interworks with the service composition FE which has the ability to composite new services using registered services.
+
+This FE has the following information:
+
+- type of service (e.g., power control service, monitoring service, sensing service, printing service);
+- service category name (e.g., personal WoT service, public WoT service, company WoT service);
+- service name;
+- service provider information.
+
+The service profile is updated by requests from the service control FE and service composition FE.
+
+#### **9.2.2 Service control functional entity**
+
+The service control FE is responsible for the access, execution and management between resources and applications. The service control FE interworks with the service profile management FE to discover registered services and it interworks with a service access control FE to check whether the service requester has the right authentication and authorization or not.
+
+In addition, the service control FE has responsibility for service registration/deregistration with the service profile management FE. In order to provide a service, the service should be registered with the service profile management FE. When a new service is created or deleted, the service control FE sends a service registration/deregistration request to the service profile management FE. The service control FE also helps the service composition FE to find services which are using new composite services.
+
+#### **9.2.3 Service composition functional entity**
+
+The service composition FE provides the capabilities to compose existing services to create new services. Service composition is accomplished by service providers. New composition services are registered at the service profile management FE.
+
+NOTE – The service logic of a composite service is not defined in this Recommendation because it depends on the implementation.
+
+#### **9.2.4 Service access control functional entity**
+
+The service access control FE is responsible for access control of the user (e.g., application provider, service provider). It checks and controls user authentication, authorization, accounting and user-related information. For example, if an unauthorized user requests to access/use services, this FE rejects to access the services. This FE interworks with the service control FE to support access control.
+
+#### **9.2.5 Resource management functional entity**
+
+There are many agents in the WoT broker to support physical devices belonging to heterogeneous networks. The resource management FE is able to control each agent and it can register/deregister agents and maintain the information of each agent.
+
+##### **1) Agent control function**
+
+This function is responsible for controlling each agent. It can identify resources (device/service) and execute the requested service by interworking with the resource ID management FE.
+
+##### **2) Agent registration function**
+
+The agent registration function is responsible for the registration and deregistration of agents. When a new agent appears, the service provider can register the new agent using the agent registration function. Information related to the new agent is registered through the agent profile management function.
+
+##### **3) Agent profile management function**
+
+The agent profile management function is responsible for checking and storing agents with agent-related information. It checks the agent's authentication, authorization and types of agent.
+
+The agent profile management function has the following information:
+
+- types of agent (e.g., Wi-Fi agent, Bluetooth agent)
+- location of agent.
+
+#### 9.2.6 Resource ID management functional entity
+
+The resource ID management FE is responsible for storing the identifiers of resources (e.g., resource ID, agent ID) and maintaining mapping information between the resource ID and agent ID. This FE can optionally maintain mapping information using the mapping table. When a service requester wants to use a resource, this FE can provide related information (e.g., agent ID, resource ID). The resource ID management FE is also recommended to maintain the latest mapping information. This FE has the following additional information:
+
+- physical information related to the service (e.g., subnetwork ID, subnetwork type and service location).
+
+#### 9.2.7 WoT agent
+
+A WoT agent is a bridge between the WoT service and the physical devices residing in a subnetwork. The WoT agent has the role of communicating and translating between the adaptation layer of the WoT broker and the physical devices in a subnetwork. If a WoT agent receives a request from a resource management FE in the WoT adaptation layer, the WoT agent translates the request for the proprietary interface of the device and sends the translated request to a device in the subnetwork using the communication protocol so that the device can recognize the request and execute it. If the WoT agent receives results from the device in the subnetwork using its communication protocol, the WoT agent also translates the results in order to understand on the web and send the translated results using the web interface and web protocol.
+
+NOTE – There are different subnetworks. Therefore, the WoT broker may have many agents to support those subnetworks because an agent is dedicated only one subnetwork.
+
+
+
+### WoT Agent
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph WoT_Agent [WoT Agent]
+ WAF[Web Adaptation Function]
+ subgraph RMF [Resource Management Functions for sub-network]
+ RPM[Resource Profile Management Function for sub-network]
+ RCF[Resource Control Function for sub-network]
+ RMo[Resource Monitoring Function for sub-network]
+ end
+ SI[Sub-network Interface]
+ WAF --- RMF
+ RMF --- SI
+ end
+ SI <--> SN[Sub-network]
+ subgraph SN [Sub-network]
+ D1[Device]
+ D2[Device]
+ D3[Device]
+ end
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a WoT Agent. The agent is represented as a large rounded rectangle containing three main functional blocks stacked vertically and connected by lines. The top block is the 'Web Adaptation Function'. The middle block is the 'Resource Management Functions for sub-network', which contains three sub-functions: 'Resource Profile Management Function for sub-network', 'Resource Control Function for sub-network', and 'Resource Monitoring Function for sub-network'. The bottom block is the 'Sub-network Interface'. Below the agent, a cloud labeled 'Sub-network' contains three 'Device' icons. A double-headed vertical arrow connects the 'Sub-network Interface' block of the agent to the 'Sub-network' cloud, indicating bidirectional communication.
+
+Functional architecture of WoT agent diagram
+
+**Figure 9-3 – Functional architecture of WoT agent**
+
+##### **9.2.7.1 Web adaptation function**
+
+The web adaptation function is responsible for adapting the dedicated device interface to the web interface which can be accessed and used by the WoT service. It has two main capabilities as follows:
+
+- adaptation of a subnetwork protocol to the web protocol in order to communicate between the physical device and the WoT service;
+- supporting the description method and status of resources status based on the web.
+
+##### **9.2.7.2 Resource management functions for the subnetwork**
+
+Resource management functions for the subnetwork have responsibility for controlling and managing physical devices. The functions consist of the resource profile management function, resource control function and resource monitoring function for the subnetwork.
+
+###### **1) Resource profile management function for the subnetwork**
+
+The resource profile management function for the subnetwork keeps and maintains information of the physical devices which are located in the subnetwork. This function interworks with the resource monitoring function for the subnetwork to maintain the latest status of the physical devices.
+
+The resource profile management function for the subnetwork has the following information:
+
+- physical devices status (e.g., availability, capability)
+- sub-network ID
+- physical devices ID.
+
+###### **2) Resource control function for the subnetwork**
+
+This function is responsible for controlling the physical devices in the subnetwork. It can directly control and manage the physical devices in the subnetwork and provide registration/deregistration of devices in the subnetwork through interworking with the resource profile management function.
+
+###### **3) Resource monitoring function for the subnetwork**
+
+The resource monitoring function for the subnetwork checks and monitors the status of the physical devices (e.g., physical devices' availability, response time). If the status of the physical devices has changed, this function informs the resource profile management function for the subnetwork about it so that it can update the information of the physical device.
+
+##### **9.2.7.3 Subnetwork interface**
+
+Each subnetwork has a dedicated communication interface which is used for the interconnection of network elements (e.g., physical devices, agents).
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+Security is an important issue for WoT services because WoT services are built upon various kinds of physical devices. Some physical devices can provide strong security features themselves but others cannot provide all security features because they have many limitations (e.g., bandwidth, computing power). Thus, the WoT service provider should support the security of the physical devices, especially constrained devices (e.g., sensor). Additionally WoT service providers should verify the identification of users which access physical devices and WoT services, to protect against the unauthorized use of WoT services/physical devices and unauthorized access to applications.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases and scenarios of the web of things
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Home control services using WoT
+
+This appendix describes a use case of how an owner of a home can control devices in his home on the web using the WoT. The scenario is outlined in Figure I.1. In this scenario, we can see seven physical devices (a rice cooker, an air-conditioner, a robot cleaner, a heater, a light controller, a temperature sensor, a TV) and we can see nine services which can be accessed by the web user. These services are classified as follows:
+
+- WoT services: cooking service, home-cleaning service, home-light control service, home-heating service, home-cooling service, home-temperature-monitoring service;
+- pure web service: TV control service;
+- mash-up services: home temperature control service, home automation service.
+
+Most of the devices (e.g., a cooker, an air-conditioner, a robot cleaner, a heater and a light controller) can be accessed and used on the web through the WoT broker. However the TV contains an embedded web server. Therefore it can be exposed and used on the web directly without the help of a WoT broker. In this scenario the WoT broker has three agents (i.e., a WoT agent for Bluetooth, WoT agent for Wi-Fi, WoT agent for Zigbee). Each agent can communicate with each device using its own dedicated interface and it performs adaptation roles to make each device accessible to web services. The WoT services can be used to make new composite services, i.e., mash-up services. In this scenario two mash-up services are shown. The home temperature control service is composed of a home-temperature-monitoring service, a home-heating service, and a home-cooling service. The owner of the home can easily maintain the desired temperature using this service on the web. The home automation service is composed of a home-cleaning service, a cooking service, a home-light control service and a TV control service.
+
+If the owner of the home has devices connected to the web with a web agent (e.g., web browser), he can control and manage devices which are located in his home remotely. Based on these capabilities, we can consider the following scenarios:
+
+- Scenario 1: If the owner wants to clean his home when he goes out, he simply commands the robot cleaner located at home to clean his home using a web browser. He can do it from his office or even while walking on the street using devices with web capabilities.
+- Scenario 2: When an owner is about to leave his office on a very hot summer's day, he wants to return to a cool house. He can set the temperature through the web before he leaves his office.
+
+
+
+Diagram of a home control service using the WoT (Web of Things) architecture. The diagram shows a central 'WoT service' box acting as a 'WoT broker' between two web-based interfaces and physical home devices. The left interface, 'Web-based home control service' (http://home.temputure.person/myhome-Temp), includes controls for Heating, Rice cooking, Light control, TV on/off, Temperature monitoring, and Cleaning. The right interface, 'Mash-up service' (http://myhome.wot.com/home1), includes 'Home temperature control service' (Cooling, Heating, Temperature monitoring) and 'Home automation service' (TV on/off, Home cleaning, Rice cooking, Light control). The central 'WoT service' box contains various services (Cooking, Cleaning, Light control, Heating, Cooling, Temperature monitoring) and 'Web adaption' agents for Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and Zigbee. These connect to physical devices in a kitchen: a Robot cleaner, Rice cooker, TV, Heater, Air-conditioner, Temperature sensor, and Light controller. Colored arrows trace the data flow from devices through the WoT broker to the web interfaces.
+
+Y.2063(12)\_F1.1
+
+Figure I.1 – Home control service using the WoT
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## WoT broker service information flows
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix describes information flows related to the operation of a WoT broker which includes service discovery, service registration, service execution, service composition and agent registration. This appendix is helpful for understanding how applications can use WoT services.
+
+### II.1 Service discovery
+
+Figure II.1 shows the information flows describing how the applications can discover WoT services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow for service discovery within a WoT broker. It is divided into two main layers: the Service layer and the Adaptation layer, separated by a dashed blue line.
+
+**Service layer:**
+
+- Applications:** Interacts with the Web interface via arrows 1 (request) and 6 (response).
+- Web interface:** Connects Applications to the Service Control FE.
+- Service Control FE:** Receives request 1, sends request 2 to Service Access Control FE, receives response 3, sends discovery message 4 to Service Profile Management FE, and receives search results 5.
+- Service Access Control FE:** Checks authentication/authorization and sends response 3 to Service Control FE.
+- Service Profile Management FE:** Returns search results 5 to Service Control FE.
+- Service Composition FE:** Connected to Service Control FE.
+
+**Adaptation layer:**
+
+- Resource ID Management FE:** Connected to Service Profile Management FE.
+- Resource Management FE:** Contains Agent Control Function, Agent Registration Function, and Agent Profile Management Function. It is connected to Service Control FE.
+- WoT agents:** WoT agent 1, WoT agent 2, WoT agent 3, ..., WoT agent N, all connected to the Resource Management FE.
+
+Diagram of WoT broker service information flows for service discovery.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Information flow of service discovery in a WoT broker**
+
+- (1) The application requests a WoT service using a web interface to a service control FE.
+- (2) The service control FE sends a request message to a service access control FE to check whether the application has authentication and authorization for the requested service.
+- (3) The service access control FE checks the authentication and authorization for the application. It sends a result to the service control FE.
+- (4) If the application has the right authentication and authorization, the service control FE sends a discovery message to a service profile management FE.
+- (5) The service profile management FE returns the search results of the service to the service control FE.
+
+- (6) The service control FE returns the information about the service to the application.
+
+### II.2 Service execution
+
+Figure II.2 shows the information flows describing how to execute services in the WoT.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow of service execution in a WoT broker, divided into two layers: the Service layer and the Adaptation layer.
+
+**Service layer components:**
+
+- Applications:** Interacts with the Web interface.
+- Web interface:** Acts as the communication bridge between Applications and the Service Control FE.
+- Service Control FE:** The central component in the Service layer, coordinating service requests.
+- Service Profile Management FE:** Manages service profiles.
+- Service Composition FE:** Manages service composition.
+- Service Access Control FE:** Manages service access control.
+
+**Adaptation layer components:**
+
+- Resource ID Management FE:** Manages resource IDs.
+- Resource Management FE:** Contains three sub-functions: Agent Control Function, Agent Registration Function, and Agent Profile Management Function.
+- WoT agents:** Multiple agents (WoT agent 1, WoT agent 2, WoT agent 3, ..., WoT agent N) that execute services.
+
+**Information Flow (Numbered Arrows):**
+
+- Applications request a service through the Web interface to the Service Control FE.
+- The Service Control FE sends a request message to the Service Access Control FE to check authentication and authorization.
+- The Service Access Control FE checks authentication and authorization and sends the result to the Service Control FE.
+- If authorized, the Service Control FE sends a discovery message to the Service Profile Management FE.
+- The Service Profile Management FE returns the search result to the Service Control FE.
+- The Service Control FE sends a message to the Resource ID Management FE to find the managing agent.
+- The Resource ID Management FE returns the search result to the Service Control FE.
+- The Service Control FE requests service execution from the Resource Management FE, providing a resource ID and agent ID.
+- The Resource Management FE checks the request and commands the agent to execute the service.
+- The agent returns the result to the Resource Management FE.
+- The Resource Management FE returns the result to the Service Control FE.
+- The Service Control FE returns the final information about the service to the Applications.
+
+Figure II.2: Information flow of service execution in a WoT broker. The diagram illustrates the interaction between Applications, WoT Broker components, and WoT agents across two layers: Service layer and Adaptation layer.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Information flow of service execution in a WoT broker**
+
+- (1) The application requests a WoT service through a web interface to a service control FE.
+- (2) The service control FE sends a request message to a service access control FE to check whether the application has authentication and authorization for the requested service.
+- (3) The service access control FE checks authentication and authorization for the application. It sends the result to the service control FE.
+- (4) If the application has the right authentication and authorization, the service control FE sends a discovery message to a service profile management FE.
+- (5) The service profile management FE returns the search result of the service to the service control FE.
+- (6) The service control FE sends a message to the resource ID management FE to find which agent manages and controls the requested services.
+- (7) The resource ID management FE returns the search result of the service to the service control FE.
+- (8) The service control FE requests to execute the service to the resource management FE with a resource ID and an agent ID.
+- (9) The resource management FE checks the requested service and command the agent to execute the services.
+
+- (10) The agent returns the results of the service execution to the resource management FE.
+- (11) The resource management FE sends the results to the service control FE.
+- (12) The service control FE sends the results to the application.
+
+### II.3 Service composition
+
+Figure II.3 shows the information flows describing how to composite services in the WoT broker.
+
+
+
+Figure II.3: Information flow of service composition in a WoT broker. The diagram illustrates the interaction between various components within a WoT Broker, divided into a Service layer and an Adaptation layer. The Service layer includes Applications, Service provider, Web interface, Service Profile Management FE, Service Control FE, Service Composition FE, and Service Access Control FE. The Adaptation layer includes Resource ID Management FE, Resource Management FE (with Agent Control, Registration, and Profile Management Functions), and multiple WoT agents (1 to N). Numbered red arrows indicate the sequence of information flows: (1) Service provider to Web interface; (2) Service Control FE to Service Access Control FE; (3) Service Access Control FE to Service Control FE; (4) Service Control FE to Service Composition FE; (5) Service Composition FE to Service Profile Management FE; (6) Service Profile Management FE to Service Composition FE; (7) Service Composition FE to Service Control FE; (8) Service Control FE to Service Profile Management FE; (9) Service Profile Management FE to Service Control FE; (10) Web interface to Service provider.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Information flow of service composition in a WoT broker**
+
+- (1) A service provider requests service composition to a service control FE.
+- (2) The service control FE sends a request to a service access control FE regarding whether the service provider has authentication and authorization for the request.
+- (3) The service access control FE checks authentication and authorization for the application. It sends the result to the service control FE.
+- (4) The service control FE requests service composition to a service composition FE.
+- (5) The service composition FE sends a discovery message to the service profile management FE to find related services which will use the service composition process according to the request.
+- (6) The service profile management FE returns the results to the service composition FE.
+- (7) The service composition FE performs a composition process and it sends the result to the service control FE.
+- (8) The service control FE requests to register the new service to the service profile management FE.
+
+- (9) The service profile management FE returns the result to the service control FE.
+- (10) The service control FE sends the result to the service provider.
+
+### II.4 Agent registration
+
+When there is a new agent, the new agent should be registered to the resource management FE to access and be used through the WoT broker. Figure II.4 shows the process of how to register an agent.
+
+
+
+Figure II.4: Information flow of agent registration in a WoT broker. The diagram illustrates the interaction between various components within a WoT Broker, divided into a Service layer and an Adaptation layer. The Service layer includes the Web interface, Service Profile Management FE, Service Control FE, Service Composition FE, and Service Access Control FE. The Adaptation layer includes the Resource ID Management FE, Resource Management FE (with Agent Control, Registration, and Profile Management Functions), and a group of WoT agents (1 to N) plus a New agent. The process is numbered 1 through 8: (1) Service provider requests registration from the Service Control FE; (2) Service Control FE requests authentication/authorization from the Service Access Control FE; (3) Service Access Control FE returns results to the Service Control FE; (4) Service Control FE instructs the Resource Management FE to register the agent; (5) Resource Management FE interacts with the New agent for registration details; (6) New agent provides the requested information; (7) Resource Management FE sends the registration result back to the Service Control FE; (8) Service Control FE informs the Service provider of the result.
+
+**Figure II.4 – Information flow of agent registration in a WoT broker**
+
+- (1) A service provider is responsible for registering an agent. The service provider requests that the service control FE registers a new agent.
+- (2) The service control FE sends a request to a service access control FE regarding whether the service provider and the new agent have authentication and authorization for the request.
+- (3) The service access control FE checks authentication and authorization about the service provider and the new agent. It sends the result of the request to the service control FE.
+- (4) The service control FE instructs the resource management FE to register the new agent.
+- (5) The resource management FE interworks with the new agent to register the agent. It requests information related to the agent (e.g., service category, network characteristics, number of services belonging to the new agent).
+- (6) The new agent sends the requested information.
+- (7) The resource management FE registers the new agent and sends the result to the service control FE.
+- (8) The service control FE informs the service provider of the result.
+
+### II.5 Service registration
+
+A new service is registered through an agent that the service belongs to. An agent recognizes a new service in the subnetwork. The agent tries to register the service in the WoT broker.
+
+Figure II.5 shows the process for how to register a service.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow for service registration in the WoT broker. It is divided into two main layers: the **Service layer** (top) and the **Adaptation layer** (bottom), separated by a dashed blue line. **Applications** are at the top, connected to a **Web interface** within the **WoT Broker**. The **Service layer** contains the **Service Profile Management FE**, **Service Control FE**, **Service Composition FE**, and **Service Access Control FE**. The **Adaptation layer** contains the **Resource ID Management FE** and the **Resource Management FE** (which includes **Agent Control Function**, **Agent Registration Function**, and **Agent Profile Management Function**). Below these are **WoT agent 1**, **WoT agent 2**, **WoT agent 3**, and **WoT agent N**. A cloud icon labeled **New service** is connected to **WoT agent 2**. Numbered red arrows indicate the flow: (1) from **WoT agent 2** to **Agent Registration Function**; (2) from **Agent Registration Function** to **Resource ID Management FE**; (3) from **Resource ID Management FE** to **Agent Registration Function**; (4) from **Agent Registration Function** to **Service Control FE**; (5) from **Service Control FE** to **Service Profile Management FE**; (6) from **Service Profile Management FE** to **Service Control FE**; (7) from **Service Control FE** to **Resource Management FE**; (8) from **Resource Management FE** to **Service Control FE**.
+
+Diagram of the information flow for service registration in the WoT broker.
+
+**Figure II.5 – Information flow of service registration in the WoT broker**
+
+- (1) An agent requests that the resource management FE registers a new service.
+- (2) The resource management FE checks the request and it sends a message to register the new service with information to the resource ID management FE.
+- (3) The resource ID management FE registers the new service with the resource ID and agent ID, and it returns the result to the resource management FE.
+- (4) The resource management FE tries to register the new service to the upper layer (service layer). It sends a message to register the new service to the resource control FE.
+- (5) The service control FE checks and requests to register the new service to the service profile management FE.
+
+- (6) The service profile management FE registers the new service and it returns the result to the service control FE.
+- (7) The service control FE returns the result to the resource management FE.
+- (8) The resource management FE informs the result to the agent.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-W3C dig loss] W3C (2005), *Glossary of Terms for Device Independence*
+<Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2080
+
+(06/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Functional architecture for distributed service networking**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080**
+
+# **Functional architecture for distributed service networking**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080 specifies the functional architecture for distributed service networking (DSN), taking into account the requirements and capabilities for DSN as described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2206.
+
+The main objective of this Recommendation is to provide guidance regarding the design of networks, services and applications making use of DSN.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2080 | 2012-06-15 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Distributed service networking, DSN, functional architecture, functions, reference points.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Characteristics of the DSN functional architecture ..... | 4 |
+| 7 DSN functional architecture ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 DSN architectural functions ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Reference points ..... | 10 |
+| 8 Security considerations..... | 25 |
+| Annex A – Relationship between the DSN functional architecture and the NGN functional architecture ..... | 26 |
+| A.1 Functional mapping between DSN functions and NGN functions ..... | 26 |
+| A.2 Relationship between the DSN functional architecture and NGN functional architecture ..... | 27 |
+| Appendix I – Information flows for DSN service..... | 29 |
+| I.1 General information flows..... | 29 |
+| I.2 Content delivery ..... | 30 |
+| I.3 Information flows for MMTel ..... | 35 |
+| Appendix II – DSN model ..... | 39 |
+| Bibliography..... | 41 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080
+
+# Functional architecture for distributed service networking
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the functional architecture of distributed service networking (DSN) and its relationships with next generation networks (NGNs). This Recommendation provides a description of functions required for the support of the DSN and reference points between DSN functions.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2206] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2206 (2010), *Requirements for distributed service networking capabilities*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+- 3.1.1 control plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+- 3.1.2 distributed service networking** [ITU-T Y.2206]: An overlay networking which provides distributed and manageable capabilities to support various multimedia services and applications.
+- 3.1.3 DSN node** [ITU-T Y.2206]: A node used in DSN providing distributed functionalities, including distributed routing and distributed storage.
+- 3.1.4 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+- 3.1.5 hash function** [b-ITU-T X.810]: A (mathematical) function that maps values from a (possibly very) large set of values into a smaller range of values.
+- 3.1.6 management plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to manage entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this management.
+
+**3.1.7 overlay network** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.10]: A network of nodes and logical links that is built on top of the underlying, e.g., transport, network with the purpose of providing network service that is not available in the underlying network.
+
+**3.1.8 peer-to-peer (P2P)** [ITU-T Y.2206]: A system is considered to be P2P if the nodes of the system share their resources in order to provide the service the system supports. The nodes in the system both provide services to other nodes and request services from other nodes.
+
+NOTE – Peer is the node in a P2P system.
+
+**3.1.9 reference point** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A conceptual point at the conjunction of two non-overlapping functional entities that can be used to identify the type of information passing between these functional entities.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 bootstrap node:** The first node of the overlay network to which an enrolling node can connect.
+
+**3.2.2 buffer map:** A map indicating the availability of chunks in a DSN node, which can be shared between DSN nodes.
+
+**3.2.3 chunk:** A basic unit of data resulting from partitioning content into defined component parts.
+
+NOTE – A DSN node may use a chunk as a unit of storage, advertisement and exchange among peers.
+
+**3.2.4 content delivery:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, the operation of sending and receiving content between the requested peer and the requesting peer or client.
+
+NOTE – A client is a service consumer external to DSN. A peer is a node within DSN.
+
+**3.2.5 content distribution:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, the whole process of content sending from one or more content sources, and sharing among DSN nodes.
+
+NOTE – During the content distribution process, content is often sent to appropriate intermediate nodes to enable subsequent delivery.
+
+**3.2.6 content ID:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, a global unique content name for identifying the content.
+
+**3.2.7 content node:** A DSN node which can be used for media content distribution, storage and/or caching.
+
+**3.2.8 control node:** A DSN node which provides service control functionalities.
+
+**3.2.9 distributed hash table (DHT):** A hash table which is stored across a set of distributed peers.
+
+**3.2.10 hash table:** A data structure that uses a hash function for mapping input values to their associated attributes. A hash function is applied to map the input values (typically a large range of them) to a smaller range of index values that are spread in an equal probability distribution in its range statistically. The resulting index values point to the tables which manage the attributes associated to the original input values.
+
+NOTE – In a common implementation, the first step (index calculation) is installed in any nodes enquiring for the associated attributes and the second step (attribute table) is installed in a dedicated node.
+
+**3.2.11 overlay algorithm:** An algorithm which forms and maintains a topology of interconnections among the peers, and determines the peers for storing a particular piece of data in the overlay (i.e., independent from the underlying network) and locates the peers in order to find a piece of data.
+
+**3.2.12 relay node:** A DSN node which relays data packets in order to improve node reachability and QoS by changing the original route of the packets. The data can be voice data, video data, etc.
+
+**3.2.13 resource:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, data or an instance of service logic residing in DSN nodes. A resource in DSN is accessible by authorized DSN nodes only.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of resource in DSN include user profile data, content, relay, session control or other service capability.
+
+NOTE 2 – In the DSN environment, resources can have multiple replicas residing in different DSN nodes.
+
+**3.2.14 user profile:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, a collection of information that specifies the subscribed services and access privileges related to a DSN service user. The data in the user profile is called user profile data.
+
+NOTE – A user profile may include the following attributes: user ID and other data related to authentication and authorization, user preferences, service status, service class, usage and/or contribution information, or subscriber accounting characteristics, etc.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|---------------------------------------|
+| AF | Application Function |
+| CDF | Content Delivery Function |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+| CSAF | Content Service Application Function |
+| DHT | Distributed Hash Table |
+| DSN | Distributed Service Networking |
+| EF | End-user Function |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| MF | Management Function |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NEF | Node Enrolment Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| RF | Relay Function |
+| RLF | Resource Location Function |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| TOCF | Traffic Optimization Control Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+The following conventions apply:
+
+- 1) The meaning of functions is as follows.
+
+**functions:** In the context of the DSN functional architecture, "functions" are defined as a functional group composed of functional entities. It is represented by the following symbol:
+
+## Functions
+
+2) In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" and "**is prohibited from**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus adherence to this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term means the vendor may not choose to provide the feature (and an operator may choose not to offer it) but still claim conformance with the Recommendation.
+
+In the main body of this Recommendation and its annexes, the words "shall", "shall not", "should", and "may" sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as "is required to", "is prohibited from", "is recommended" and "can optionally". The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+3) In this Recommendation:
+
+DSN network means the network constructed based on DSN.
+
+DSN service means the service provided by the DSN network.
+
+DSN service provider means service provider that makes use of the DSN network in order to provide services and applications to its users.
+
+# 6 Characteristics of the DSN functional architecture
+
+In a DSN environment, resources, including data and instances of service logic, are distributed throughout the whole network. In addition, DSN nodes may or may not be active at any given time.
+
+The DSN functional architecture supports the following characteristics.
+
+- Multiple services: The DSN functional architecture supports the capabilities to construct an overlay network for each service. DSN nodes participating in the same service constitute an overlay network. A DSN node may participate in more than one overlay network.
+- Dynamic self-organization of nodes: The DSN functional architecture provides mechanisms that ensure the stability and robustness of DSN service by supporting self-organization by the DSN nodes even when a node providing a resource or service joins or leaves the DSN network.
+- Distributed resource management: The DSN functional architecture defines capabilities to locate, manage and utilize the distributed resources which are spread across the DSN network.
+- Traffic optimization: The DSN functional architecture provides functions for network status monitoring and reporting, which supports traffic optimization. Traffic optimization is based on the monitored network information and the policies of the DSN service provider.
+
+Implementing the DSN functional architecture is beneficial for avoiding single points of failure, deploying resources to optimal locations and utilizing the capabilities of various nodes, including user DSN nodes.
+
+# 7 DSN functional architecture
+
+This clause describes the DSN functional architecture by defining its functions and their logical interfaces called "reference points". The reference points are required to support both resource management, including resource location and selection, and traffic optimization, which is required to maintain the quality of service. Clause 7.1 describes the functions of the DSN functional architecture while clause 7.2 provides details about relevant reference points of the DSN functional architecture. The relationship of the DSN functional architecture with the NGN functional architecture can be found in Annex A, while detailed information flows explaining how to use the DSN functions and reference points are provided in Appendix I.
+
+## 7.1 DSN architectural functions
+
+Figure 7-1 shows the functions and reference points of the DSN functional architecture.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the DSN functional architecture, divided into a control plane (blue background) and a management plane (orange background). The control plane contains several functional blocks: EF (End User Function), SCF (Service Control Function), RLF (Resource Location Function), RF (Resource Function), CSAF (Control Service Access Function), TOCF (Traffic Optimization Control Function), NEF (Node Enrolment Function), and CDF (Control Data Function). The management plane contains the MF (Management Function). Reference points (A1-A5 and C1-C10) are indicated by dashed lines for control plane interfaces and dotted lines for management plane interfaces. A legend at the bottom right indicates that dashed lines represent Control plane interfaces and dotted lines represent Management plane interfaces.
+
+Figure 7-1: DSN functional architecture diagram showing functions and reference points.
+
+NOTE – This figure shows the interfaces for the control plane only. Media data transmission and transmission control are conducted through media interfaces depicted in Figure A.1.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – DSN functional architecture**
+
+As shown in Figure 7-1, the DSN functional architecture covers functions in the control plane and management plane.
+
+The DSN functional architecture consists of several functions that interwork to provide DSN related services and capabilities. These functions include:
+
+- node enrolment functions (NEFs);
+- resource location functions (RLFs);
+
+- relay functions (RFs);
+- content delivery functions (CDFs);
+- traffic optimization control functions (TOCFs);
+- service control functions (SCFs);
+- end-user functions (EFs);
+- management functions (MFs);
+- application functions (AFs).
+
+This Recommendation only specifies the content service application functions (CSAFs), which is one kind of AF.
+
+The descriptions of these DSN functions are provided in the following subclauses.
+
+### **7.1.1 Node enrolment functions (NEFs)**
+
+When DHT is used to construct a DSN network, every DSN node is required to enrol in the DHT-based DSN network. In the DHT-based DSN network, the NEF checks the validity of the enrolling DSN node, provides initial configuration information for the DSN node and tracks the registered DSN node.
+
+NOTE – In some service scenarios, the DSN node can join a DSN network which is not based on DHT, so it does not need to interact with the NEF. In content service, for example, only resource registration of content is needed. Enrolment for a DSN network which is not based on DHT is implementation specific and not specified in this Recommendation.
+
+NEF allocates a globally unique node ID to each enrolling DSN node, provides bootstrap information for the DSN node to join to the DHT-based DSN network, and maintains the node profile.
+
+NEF performs the following functions.
+
+- Authenticate and authorize a new enrolling DSN node for the DHT-based DSN network. The NEF then establishes the identity and starts a profile of the enrolling node in the DHT-based DSN network.
+- Assign a globally unique node ID to the enrolling DSN node. The ID value may be at random, based on the physical location of the node or based on the load situation of DHT-based DSN network. The node ID describes the logical position of the DSN node in the DHT-based DSN network and the resources it is responsible for.
+- Configure the enrolling node with parameters and information for enrolling the DHT-based DSN network, including the algorithm for network construction and maintenance, and the position of the bootstrap node.
+
+### **7.1.2 Resource location functions (RLFs)**
+
+In order to execute services, required resources residing somewhere in the DSN network must be located. The RLF maintains resource-related information and finds the required resources when enquired. RLF performs the following functions.
+
+- Resource registration: Based on resource registration procedure activated by resource-holding DSN nodes, the RLF accepts the resource registration and maintains locations of the resources. Besides the location, the RLF stores resource information reported during registration.
+
+NOTE 1 – Resource location is the DSN node ID or address where the required resource resides.
+
+NOTE 2 – Resource information is the meta-data of the resource.
+
+- Resource locating: Resource locating is the procedure to find the required resource in the DSN node(s). When enquired, the RLF locates the enquired resources.
+
+- Resource location maintenance: Resource location maintenance is the procedure to update the location of a resource when a new DSN node joins or a resource-holding DSN node leaves the DSN network.
+ - Resource information maintenance: Resource information maintenance is the procedure to update the resource information when there is any change.
+ - Node status information maintenance: Node status information maintenance is the procedure to record status of the DSN nodes which have resources registered in the RLF.
+ - Retrieve optimization information from the TOCF for optimal resource selection in the RLF.
+ - Provide candidate node list to the TOCF for optimal resource selection in the TOCF.
+- NOTE 3 – Optimal resource selection can be executed either in the RLF or in the TOCF.
+
+### 7.1.3 Relay functions (RFs)
+
+When a DSN node or UE is behind a NAT/firewall or is affected by traffic overloads, it may not be able to use or provide DSN services. In order to handle such cases, the DSN functional architecture is required to provide functions for NAT/firewall traversal or redirection to avoid the congested point of the network. The RF relays particular application traffic for the DSN nodes to achieve NAT/firewall traversal and QoS improvement.
+
+RF performs the following functions.
+
+- NAT or firewall traversal: The RF can be used for traversing the NAT and firewall. DSN nodes and UE can send and/or receive packets over NAT/firewalls using intermediate DSN nodes with the RF.
+- Traffic relay: The RF relays traffic for DSN nodes and UE when a direct data path does not provide the required QoS.
+- Relay node status monitoring and report: The RF maintains status information of the relay node in which it resides for further reporting to the RLF.
+NOTE 1 – Status information includes CPU usage, memory usage, disk usage, network interface usage, etc.
+- Event monitoring and report: The RF reports event related information (e.g., the node status) to the RLF when an event occurs.
+NOTE 2 – Examples of events monitored by the RF include the case where the load of the relay node in which the RF resides reaches a given threshold.
+- Flow monitoring and report: The RF maintains and reports the flow statistics information of the relay node in which the RF resides to the management functions (MFs) for accounting or node/resource contribution statistics.
+
+### 7.1.4 Content delivery functions (CDFs)
+
+CDF stores, processes, and delivers content to DSN nodes or UE. It performs the following functions.
+
+- CDF caches, stores and processes (e.g., transcoding, encryption) content.
+- CDF delivers content to other CDFs or end-user functions (EFs).
+- CDF initiates content registration to the RLF.
+- CDF maintains and reports content related information to the RLF (which includes but is not limited to: content availability, content popularity, etc.).
+- CDF requests the RLF for content location information when it needs to pull content from other CDFs.
+- CDF provides buffer map information to other CDFs and EFs.
+
+- CDF supports content access check.
+NOTE 1 – Access check means verifying whether the content requestor has the authority to download the content.
+- CDF provides content chunking and reassembly of chunks.
+- CDF provides integrity check and error recovery in content delivery.
+- CDF provides delivery of content with flow control.
+- CDF maintains status information of the content node in which it resides to be reported to the RLF.
+NOTE 2 – Status information includes: CPU usage, memory usage, disk usage, network interface usage, etc.
+- CDF reports event related information (e.g., the node status) to the RLF when an event occurs.
+NOTE 3 – Examples of events include that the load of the content node in which the CDF resides reaches a given threshold.
+- CDF optionally maintains and reports the flow statistics information to the MF for accounting or contribution statistics.
+
+### **7.1.5 Traffic optimization control functions (TOCFs)**
+
+TOCF monitors and analyses network information and provides guidance to DSN nodes in order to make the delivery and distribution of application traffic in the DSN network more efficient and cost-effective.
+
+TOCF performs the following functions:
+
+- network information (including topology and traffic information) collection;
+- traffic policy enforcement;
+- provides location service to the DSN nodes (DSN nodes can query the TOCF about its geographic location in the network. DSN nodes can also query the TOCF for its network topology information, when necessary);
+- provides network topology and traffic related information to the RLF and CSAF;
+- provides preferred DSN node(s) from a set of candidate nodes that provide desired services (the TOCF provides a ranking service of DSN nodes based on the traffic information or topology information for traffic optimization; candidate nodes are provided by the RLF);
+- provides specific traffic event notification function (the applications can subscribe to specific events such as the change of access bandwidth).
+
+#### **7.1.6 Management functions (MFs)**
+
+In order to use resources more efficiently and to manage services based on DSN, management functions for the DSN network and for the DSN service are needed. The MF inherits the functions of the MF in [ITU-T Y.2012], including:
+
+- fault management;
+- configuration management;
+- accounting management;
+- performance management;
+- security management.
+
+Specifically, the MF performs the following functions:
+
+- records the statistics and accounting information generated by the RF and CDF which relates to usage and contribution of DSN services;
+
+- supports scalable network management;
+NOTE 1 – The DSN network may contain tens of thousands of network entities in a single administrative domain and the number of network entities may continuously increase after initial deployment. This requires a scalable and distributive design of the MF in the DSN. The capacity of the MF should increase as the network size increases.
+- minimizes the impact of DSN node churn;
+NOTE 2 – DSN nodes may frequently join and leave the DSN network. Maintaining long-term links from the MF to every DSN node becomes impossible. Therefore, a mechanism for dynamically setting up relationships between DSN nodes and the MF is needed. The mechanism enables the MF to discover the right DSN node and the DSN node to discover the right MF when a given management task needs to be performed. Furthermore, ungraceful leave (i.e., leave without normal leaving procedure) of DSN nodes may incur management information inconsistency. Thus, the management information should be stored in multiple MF/DSN nodes and synchronized when DSN nodes leave or join the DSN network.
+- supports the redistribution of resources and functions.
+NOTE 3 – DSN resources and network functions are no longer tied to specific nodes. Resources may move between DSN nodes and the role of a DSN node may change dynamically. Therefore, management tasks may need to be attached to the target resource or functions instead of specific DSN nodes so that management tasks can move with the resources or functions between different DSN nodes.
+
+#### 7.1.7 Service control functions (SCFs)
+
+In the DSN, the SCF defined in NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] is reused for service control.
+
+NOTE – the DSN SCF interacts with DSN functions which are not defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] for resource location, application support, etc. The specification of reference points between the DSN SCF and other DSN functions may not be identical to that of the NGN.
+
+### 7.1.8 End-user functions (EFs)
+
+EF is a function of the DSN UE, which supports access to a DSN network and service.
+
+NOTE – Besides the EF, UE may include other functions, such as the CDF and RF. When UE provides the capabilities of those functions, the contribution of the UE to the DSN network may be recorded and taken into account in the accounting. Which functions UE can support depends on the capability of the UE and the decision of the end user and DSN service provider. Refer to Appendix II for further information.
+
+### 7.1.9 Content service application functions (CSAFs)
+
+CSAF is an application function responsible in the DSN functional architecture for the provision of content-related services to the EF.
+
+NOTE 1 – As shown in Figure 7-1, AFs different from the CSAF can be defined in the future for the provision of services other than content-related services.
+
+CSAF performs the following functions:
+
+- executes service logic based on the user profile and other information such as terminal capability, etc.;
+- interacts with the SCF for user authentication and service authorization;
+- interacts with the RLF to locate content resources for UE/applications;
+- enables the EF to discover, select and purchase content;
+- content preparation, which includes content naming, advertisement insertion, content slicing, trans-coding, encryption, etc.;
+- pushes content to CDFs for distribution.
+
+NOTE 2 – The CSAF pushes content to the root CDF. After content pushing, content can be distributed from the root CDF to other CDFs or end users.
+
+## 7.2 Reference points
+
+NOTE – Procedures described in this clause are intended to help the reader better understand the DSN functional architecture and the use of the reference points. The information flows are intended to be protocol agnostic, i.e., independent of any particular protocols.
+
+### 7.2.1 Reference point C1
+
+The C1 reference point is between the NEF and RLF.
+
+This reference point is used by the RLF to request enrolment of a DSN node in which the RLF resides in the DHT-based DSN network.
+
+This reference point is used by the NEF to provide configuration and bootstrap information to the RLF regarding a DSN node that newly joins the DHT-based overlay in the DSN network.
+
+NOTE – The configuration information may contain the algorithm for the DHT-based overlay construction and maintenance. The bootstrap information may contain the location (for instance, IP address) of the bootstrap node.
+
+Figure 7-2 shows the general procedures of a DSN node (with the RLF) enrolling to the DHT-based overlay.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF
+ participant NEF
+ RLF->>NEF: 1. Enrolment request
+ Note over NEF: 2. Authentication, assign node ID and generate configuration and bootstrap data
+ NEF-->>RLF: 3. Enrolment response
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the enrolment process between the RLF (Registration Location Function) and the NEF (Network Element Function). It consists of three steps: 1. The RLF sends an 'Enrolment request' to the NEF. 2. The NEF performs 'Authentication, assign node ID and generate configuration and bootstrap data'. 3. The NEF sends an 'Enrolment response' back to the RLF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the enrolment process between RLF and NEF.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – DSN node (with the RLF) enrolling to the DHT-based overlay**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-2 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF sends an enrolment request to the NEF. The enrolment request contains the identification of the requestor and information by which the NEF can authenticate the requestor.
+2. NEF authenticates the RLF and assigns the node ID for the node in which the RLF resides. It also generates the configuration and bootstrap information for the RLF.
+3. NEF returns the configuration and bootstrap information in the enrolment response to the RLF.
+
+### 7.2.2 Reference point C2
+
+The C2 reference point is between RLFs.
+
+This reference point is used to exchange the information that constructs and maintains the DHT-based overlay in the DSN network.
+
+This reference point is also used to forward resource location requests or resource location update requests to RLFs.
+
+Figure 7-3 shows the general procedure for constructing and maintaining the overlay network. This procedure is mainly used in the DHT-based overlay formed by the RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF_A as RLF A
+ participant RLF_B as RLF B
+ RLF_A->>RLF_B: 1. Overlay network construct/maintain message
+ Note over RLF_B: 2. Update overlay connection/routing information
+ RLF_B-->>RLF_A: 3. Response
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between RLF A and RLF B. RLF A sends a message labeled '1. Overlay network construct/maintain message' to RLF B. On the RLF B side, a box indicates the action '2. Update overlay connection/routing information'. Finally, RLF B sends a message labeled '3. Response' back to RLF A.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the exchange of information to construct and maintain the overlay between RLF A and RLF B.
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Exchanging information to construct and maintain the overlay**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-3 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF A sends an overlay construct message (for instance, join, leave, connection messages) or an overlay maintain message (for instance, update messages) to RLF B. The selection of RLF B depends on the type of the message and on the overlay algorithm in use.
+2. RLF B updates the overlay routing or connection information accordingly.
+3. RLF B sends a response message to RLF A for acknowledgement.
+
+Figure 7-4 shows the procedure for exchanging information between different RLFs to update resource location information.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF_A as RLF A
+ participant RLF_B as RLF B
+ RLF_A->>RLF_B: 1. New resource location/location update request
+ Note over RLF_B: 2. Update resource location information
+ RLF_B-->>RLF_A: 3. Location information update response
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between RLF A and RLF B. RLF A sends a message labeled '1. New resource location/location update request' to RLF B. On the RLF B side, a box indicates the action '2. Update resource location information'. Finally, RLF B sends a message labeled '3. Location information update response' back to RLF A.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the exchange of information to update resource location between RLF A and RLF B.
+
+**Figure 7-4 – Exchanging information to update resource location**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-4 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF A sends a new resource location information message or a resource location update message to RLF B.
+2. RLF B updates the resource location information.
+3. RLF B sends a response message to RLF A to indicate the location information update result.
+
+Figure 7-5 shows the procedure of an RLF sending a resource location request message to another RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as RLF A
+ participant B as RLF B
+ Note over A: 1. Receive resource location request
+ A->>B: 2. Forward resource location request
+ Note over B: 3. Resource location or forward to other RLF
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates a sequence between two entities, RLF A and RLF B. RLF A first receives a resource location request (Step 1). Then, RLF A forwards this resource location request to RLF B (Step 2). Finally, RLF B performs a resource location lookup or forwards the request to another RLF (Step 3).
+
+Sequence diagram showing RLF A sending a resource location request to RLF B.
+
+**Figure 7-5 – RLF sending a location request message to another RLF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-5 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF A receives resource-locating request, and the location information of the requested resource is not stored in RLF A.
+2. RLF A forwards the resource-locating request to RLF B. In the DHT-based environment, RLF B resides in the next hop node.
+
+NOTE – In the DHT-based environment, to arrive at a destination, one message needs to pass one or more nodes decided by the DHT routing algorithm; the next hop node is the node to which the message will be sent from the node it is now residing in.
+
+3. RLF B looks up the resource location information; if RLF B stores the information, it will respond to the requestor with the location information; if RLF B does not store the information it will forward the locating request to another RLF.
+
+### 7.2.3 Reference point C3
+
+The C3 reference point is between the RLF and CDF.
+
+This reference point is used by the CDF:
+
+- to register content to the RLF;
+- to request the RLF for content location information;
+- to report to the RLF the status of a node in which the CDF resides; the status information includes: CPU usage, memory usage, disk usage and network interface usage, etc.;
+- to report event related information to the RLF, for instance, the event may be that the load of the node in which the CDF resides reached threshold;
+- to report content related information to the RLF, for instance, the content availability or content popularity, etc.
+
+Figure 7-6 shows the general procedure of content registration.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF
+ participant RLF
+ CDF->>RLF: 1. Content registration
+ activate RLF
+ RLF: 2. Stores content location/buffer map/meta-data
+ RLF-->>CDF: 3. Registration response
+ deactivate RLF
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the content registration process. It features two lifelines: CDF and RLF. CDF sends a message '1. Content registration' to RLF. RLF then performs an internal action '2. Stores content location/buffer map/meta-data'. Finally, RLF sends a message '3. Registration response' back to CDF.
+
+Sequence diagram for content registration to the RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-6 – Content registration to the RLF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-6 are as follows.
+
+1. CDF initiates a content registration request to the RLF. The request message contains at least the content ID and the location of the content. It may also contain the buffer map and the meta-data of the content, including the format of the content and the size of the content.
+2. When the RLF receives the content registration request, it stores the content location, buffer map and meta-data.
+3. RLF sends a response to inform the CDF of the result of content registration.
+
+Figure 7-7 shows the general procedure of the CDF requesting the RLF for content location information.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF
+ participant RLF
+ CDF->>RLF: 1. Content location request
+ activate RLF
+ RLF: 2. Locate content
+ RLF-->>CDF: 3. Response to the content location request
+ deactivate RLF
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the content location request process. It features two lifelines: CDF and RLF. CDF sends a message '1. Content location request' to RLF. RLF then performs an internal action '2. Locate content'. Finally, RLF sends a message '3. Response to the content location request' back to CDF.
+
+Sequence diagram for CDF requesting the RLF for content location information.
+
+Y.2080(12)\_F7-7
+
+**Figure 7-7 – CDF requesting the RLF for content location information**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-7 are as follows.
+
+1. When the CDF needs to download content from other CDFs, it sends a content location request to the RLF; the request message contains content ID.
+2. RLF locates the requested content.
+3. RLF sends a response to the CDF with the location of the requested content.
+
+Figure 7-8 shows the general procedure of the CDF reporting to the RLF the status of the node in which it resides.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over CDF: 1. Status report is triggered
+ CDF->>RLF: 2. Status report
+ Note over RLF: 3. Status information update
+ RLF-->>CDF: 4. Response to status report
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for CDF reporting status to RLF. Step 1: Status report is triggered at CDF. Step 2: Status report message from CDF to RLF. Step 3: Status information update at RLF. Step 4: Response to status report message from RLF to CDF.
+
+**Figure 7-8 – CDF reporting the status of the node in which it resides**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-8 are as follows.
+
+1. The status report is triggered either by the request of the RLF, or as a periodic status report performed by the CDF.
+2. CDF reports to the RLF the status information of the node in which it resides.
+3. RLF updates the node status information based on the status report received from the CDF.
+4. RLF sends a response to inform the CDF of the status report result.
+
+Figure 7-9 shows the general procedure of the CDF reporting an event to the RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over CDF: 1. Event occurs
+ CDF->>RLF: 2. Event report
+ Note over RLF: 3. Dealing with the event
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for CDF reporting an event to RLF. Step 1: Event occurs at CDF. Step 2: Event report message from CDF to RLF. Step 3: Dealing with the event at RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-9 – CDF reporting an event to the RLF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-9 are as follows.
+
+1. An event occurs in the node in which the CDF resides, for instance, the load of the node has reached a given threshold.
+2. CDF reports the event to the RLF. The event report message may contain the node ID and the event description.
+
+3. RLF receives the event report and deals with the event. For instance, if the node is overloaded, the RLF may stop sending the location of this node to content requestors.
+
+Figure 7-10 shows the general procedure of the CDF reporting content related information to the RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over CDF: 1. Report the content-related information
+ CDF->>RLF
+ Note over RLF: 2. Content-related information update
+ RLF-->>CDF: 3. Response with result
+```
+
+Y2080(12)\_F7-10
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of CDF reporting content related information to the RLF. The diagram involves two entities: CDF and RLF. Step 1: CDF sends a message '1. Report the content-related information' to RLF. Step 2: RLF performs a self-action '2. Content-related information update'. Step 3: RLF sends a message '3. Response with result' back to CDF.
+
+**Figure 7-10 – CDF reporting content related information to the RLF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-10 are as follows.
+
+1. CDF sends a content related information report message to the RLF. This message should contain the content ID as well as content related information such as the availability of the content or the popularity of the content, etc.
+2. RLF updates the content related information.
+3. RLF sends a response to inform the CDF of the result regarding the content-related information update.
+
+### **7.2.4 Reference point C4**
+
+The C4 reference point is between the RF and RLF.
+
+This reference point is used by the RF to register with the RLF the relay node in which it resides.
+
+This reference point is used by the RF to report to the RLF the status of the node in which it resides; the status information includes: CPU usage, memory usage, disk usage, network interface usage, etc.
+
+This reference point is used by the RF to report event related information to the RLF, for instance, the event may be that the load of the node in which RF resides reached threshold.
+
+This reference point is used by the RF to report the QoS measurement message to the RLF.
+
+This reference point is used by the RLF to reserve resources on the RF.
+
+Figure 7-11 shows the general procedure of relay node registration.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RF
+ participant RLF
+ RF->>RLF: 1.Registration request
+ Note over RLF: 2.Relay node list update
+ RLF-->>RF: 3.Registration response
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of three messages between an RF (Radio Function) and an RLF (Relay Function).
+ 1. The RF sends a '1.Registration request' to the RLF.
+ 2. The RLF performs a '2.Relay node list update' (represented as a self-message).
+ 3. The RLF sends a '3.Registration response' back to the RF.
+
+Sequence diagram for Relay node registration between RF and RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-11 – Relay node registration**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-11 are as follows.
+
+1. RF sends a registration request to the RLF. The registration request includes whether the RF is active or not, the address of the relay node in which the RF resides and the type of access network that the relay node is connecting to.
+2. RLF updates the relay node list information based on the registration request it received.
+3. RLF returns the registration response to the RF to indicate the result of the relay node registration.
+
+Figure 7-12 shows the general procedure of relay node status information report.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over RF: 1. Status report is triggered
+ RF->>RLF: 2. Status report
+ Note over RLF: 3. Node status information update
+ RLF-->>RF: 4. Reponse to status report
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of four messages between an RF and an RLF.
+ 1. A box on the RF side indicates '1. Status report is triggered'.
+ 2. The RF sends a '2. Status report' to the RLF.
+ 3. The RLF performs a '3. Node status information update' (represented as a self-message).
+ 4. The RLF sends a '4. Reponse to status report' back to the RF.
+
+Sequence diagram for Relay node status information report between RF and RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-12 – Relay node status information report**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-12 are as follows.
+
+1. The status report is triggered either at the request of the RLF, or as a periodic status report performed by the RF.
+2. RF reports to the RLF the status information of the relay node in which it resides.
+3. RLF updates the relay node status information based on the status report it received.
+4. RLF sends a response to inform the RF of the status report result.
+
+Figure 7-13 shows the general procedure of the RF reporting an event to the RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over RF: 1. Event occurs
+ RF->>RLF: 2. Event report
+ Note over RLF: 3. Dealing with the event
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing RF reporting an event to the RLF. The RF node sends an event report to the RLF node, which then deals with the event.
+
+**Figure 7-13 – RF reporting an event to the RLF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-13 are as follows.
+
+1. An event occurs in the relay node in which the RF resides, for instance, the load of the relay node reached a given threshold.
+2. RF reports the event to the RLF; the report message may contain the node ID of the relay node and the event description.
+3. RLF receives the event report and deals with the event. For instance, if the relay node is overloaded, the RLF may stop sending the location of this relay node to the relay service requestors.
+
+Figure 7-14 shows the relay node resource reservation procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RF
+ participant RLF
+ Note over RLF: 1. Selection of relay node
+ RLF->>RF: 2. Resource reservation request
+ Note over RF: 3. Resource reservation
+ RF->>RLF: 4. Resource reservation response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the relay node resource reservation procedure. The RLF node sends a resource reservation request to the RF node, which then reserves resources and sends a response back to the RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-14 – Relay node resource reservation**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-14 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF has selected one proper relay node for performing network traffic relay.
+2. RLF sends a reservation request to the RF residing in the relay node to reserve relay resources, e.g., bandwidth, port of relay node.
+3. RF reserves necessary resources.
+
+4. RF returns information about reserved resources.
+
+Figure 7-15 shows the procedure for measurement implementation.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RF
+ participant RLF
+ RLF->>RF: 1. Measurement task assignment
+ RF->>RF: 2. Measurement task implementation
+ RF-->>RLF: 3. Measurement result feedback
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the measurement implementation procedure between the Radio Function (RF) and the Radio Link Function (RLF). It consists of three steps: 1. Measurement task assignment from RLF to RF, 2. Measurement task implementation performed by RF, and 3. Measurement result feedback from RF to RLF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the measurement implementation procedure between RF and RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-15 – Measurement implementation**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-15 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF sends a measurement task assignment to the RF. The task assignment may include the address of measurement destination (which is the destination of the link to be measured, while the source is the RF), connection parameters, the type of requested QoS measurement information, desired measurement methods and requested measurement times, duration and frequency, etc.
+2. RF performs the requested measurement task. The RF may connect to measurement destination and send measurement packets to gather measurements.
+3. RF sends back the measurement results to the RLF.
+
+#### **7.2.5 Reference point C5**
+
+The C5 reference point is between the TOCF and RLF.
+
+This reference point is used by the RLF to enquire from the TOCF about network information.
+
+This reference point is used by the RLF to request a traffic optimization result from the TOCF.
+
+Figure 7-16 shows the general procedure for enquiring network information.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF
+ participant TOCF
+ RLF->>TOCF: 1. Network information request
+ TOCF-->>RLF: 2. Network information response
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the network information enquiry process. It features two entities, RLF and TOCF, each represented by an oval at the top. Below each entity is a vertical line representing its timeline. A horizontal arrow points from the RLF timeline to the TOCF timeline, labeled '1. Network information request'. A second horizontal arrow points from the TOCF timeline back to the RLF timeline, labeled '2. Network information response'.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the network information enquiry process between RLF and TOCF.
+
+**Figure 7-16 – Network information enquiring**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-16 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF sends a network information request to the TOCF to obtain network topology information and traffic information regarding the overlay network and the underlying network.
+2. TOCF feeds back network information to the RLF, including network map, cost map and QoS map between different DSN nodes.
+
+Figure 7-17 shows the general procedure related to the traffic optimization information request.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF
+ participant TOCF
+ RLF->>TOCF: 1. Traffic optimization request
+ TOCF-->>RLF: 2. Traffic optimization result
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the traffic optimization information request process. It features two entities, RLF and TOCF, each represented by an oval at the top. Below each entity is a vertical line representing its timeline. A horizontal arrow points from the RLF timeline to the TOCF timeline, labeled '1. Traffic optimization request'. A second horizontal arrow points from the TOCF timeline back to the RLF timeline, labeled '2. Traffic optimization result'.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the traffic optimization information request process between RLF and TOCF.
+
+**Figure 7-17 – Traffic optimization information request**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-17 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF sends a traffic optimization request to the TOCF for optimization concerning the routing of signalling messages, content node selection, control node selection or relay node selection.
+2. TOCF replies the optimization result to the RLF according to its optimization policy, including the control node priority list, control node priority list or relay node priority list.
+
+#### 7.2.6 Reference point C6
+
+The C6 reference point is between the EF and SCF. This reference point is used to exchange service control related information between the EF and SCF (for instance, registration information or service request information). Since the flows at the C6 reference point may differ depending on the services, detailed procedures are not specified in this Recommendation.
+
+#### 7.2.7 Reference point C7
+
+The C7 reference point is between the RLF and SCF.
+
+This reference point is used by the SCF to request resource location from the RLF.
+
+Figure 7-18 shows the general procedure for the SCF requesting resource location.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SCF
+ participant RLF
+ SCF->>RLF: 1. Request for the location of resources
+ Note over RLF: 2. Locate resource in DSN network
+ RLF-->>SCF: 3. Reply SCF with the resource location
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the procedure for the SCF requesting resource location from the RLF. It shows two lifelines: SCF and RLF. The SCF sends a message '1. Request for the location of resources' to the RLF. The RLF then performs an internal action '2. Locate resource in DSN network'. Finally, the RLF sends a message '3. Reply SCF with the resource location' back to the SCF. The diagram is labeled Y.2080(12)\_F7-18.
+
+Sequence diagram for SCF requesting resource location from RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-18 – SCF requesting resource location**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-18 are as follows.
+
+1. SCF sends a request to the RLF for locating resource for service control. The request message should include the identification of the resource.
+2. RLF locates the resource in the DSN network.
+3. RLF replies to the SCF with the location of the requested resource.
+
+#### 7.2.8 Reference point C8
+
+The C8 reference point is between the RLF and EF.
+
+This reference point is used by the EF to request resource location from the RLF.
+
+Figure 7-19 shows the general procedure of the EF requesting the location of a resource.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant RLF
+ EF->>RLF: 1. Resource location request
+ Note over RLF: 2. Locate resource in DSN network
+ RLF-->>EF: 3. Resource location response
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the procedure for the EF requesting resource location from the RLF. It shows two lifelines: EF and RLF. The EF sends a message '1. Resource location request' to the RLF. The RLF then performs an internal action '2. Locate resource in DSN network'. Finally, the RLF sends a message '3. Resource location response' back to the EF.
+
+Sequence diagram for EF requesting resource location from RLF.
+
+**Figure 7-19 – EF requesting resource location**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-19 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a resource location request to the RLF; the request message contains the information that identifies the resource.
+2. RLF locates the resource in the DSN network.
+3. RLF replies to the EF with the resource location.
+
+#### 7.2.9 Reference point C9
+
+The C9 reference point is between the EF and CDF.
+
+This reference point is used by the EF to query a buffer map from the CDF.
+
+This reference point is used by the EF to request content from the CDF.
+
+Figure 7-20 shows the general procedure of the EF requesting a buffer map and downloading content from the CDF.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CDF
+ EF->>CDF: 1. Buffer map request
+ CDF-->EF: 2. Buffer map response
+ EF->>CDF: 3. Trunk request
+ CDF-->EF: 4. Data transfer
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the interaction between EF and CDF at reference point C9. The EF sends a '1. Buffer map request' to the CDF. The CDF sends a '2. Buffer map response' back to the EF. The EF sends a '3. Trunk request' to the CDF. Finally, the CDF sends a '4. Data transfer' (represented by a large blue arrow) back to the EF.
+
+**Figure 7-20 – EF requesting and downloading content**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-20 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a buffer map request to the CDF; the message contains the content ID.
+2. CDF sends the buffer map to the EF, indicating the content chunks it contains.
+3. EF sends a request to the CDF to download the selected content chunks.
+4. The content is transferred from the CDF to the EF.
+
+#### 7.2.10 Reference point C10
+
+The C10 reference point is between CDFs.
+
+This reference point is used by the CDF to query a buffer map from another CDF.
+
+This reference point is used by the CDF to request content from another CDF.
+
+Figure 7-21 shows the general procedure of the CDF requesting a buffer map and downloading content from another CDF.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CDF_A as CDF A
+ participant CDF_B as CDF B
+ CDF_A->>CDF_B: 1. Buffer map request
+ CDF_B-->>CDF_A: 2. Buffer map response
+ CDF_A->>CDF_B: 3. Trunk request
+ CDF_B-->>CDF_A: 4. Data transfer
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates a four-step interaction between CDF A and CDF B. Step 1: CDF A sends a 'Buffer map request' to CDF B. Step 2: CDF B returns a 'Buffer map response' to CDF A. Step 3: CDF A sends a 'Trunk request' to CDF B. Step 4: A large blue arrow indicates 'Data transfer' from CDF B to CDF A.
+
+Sequence diagram showing CDF A querying CDF B for a buffer map and requesting content transfer.
+
+**Figure 7-21 – CDF querying buffer map and requesting content from another CDF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-21 are as follows.
+
+1. CDF A sends a buffer map request to CDF B; the buffer map request contains the content ID.
+2. CDF B returns the buffer map to CDF A, indicating the content chunks it contains.
+3. CDF A sends a request to CDF B to download the selected content chunks.
+4. The content is transferred from CDF B to CDF A.
+
+#### **7.2.11 Reference point A1**
+
+The A1 reference point is between the EF and CSAF.
+
+This reference point is used by the EF for accessing content service.
+
+This reference point is used by the EF for requesting content location.
+
+Figure 7-22 shows the procedure of the EF accessing content service.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CSAF
+ EF->>CSAF: 1. Content service access request
+ CSAF-->>EF: 2. Reply with content service information
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a two-step interaction between EF and CSAF. Step 1: EF sends a 'Content service access request' to CSAF. Step 2: CSAF returns a 'Reply with content service information' to EF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing EF accessing CSAF content service.
+
+**Figure 7-22 – EF accessing content service**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-22 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a content service access request to the CSAF to get the content service information (including the available contents, the price of the contents or the introduction of the contents, etc.). The ID and device type of the EF are included in the content service access request. The content service access request may also include information about the types of contents requested and the authentication information of the user.
+2. CSAF replies to the EF with the content service information. EF may present the information to the user.
+
+Figure 7-23 shows the procedure of the EF requesting the location of content from the CSAF.
+
+There are two options for this procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CSAF
+ EF->>CSAF: 1. Content location request
+ Note over CSAF: 2. Interact with RLF to get content node location.
+ CSAF-->EF: 3. Location of available content node(s)
+ Note right of CSAF: Option1
+ CSAF-->EF: 2. Reply with RLF location
+ Note left of EF: 3. Interact with RLF to get content node location.
+ Note right of CSAF: Option2
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of EF requesting the location of content from CSAF. The diagram involves two entities: EF (End User Equipment) and CSAF (Content Service Access Function). The process starts with EF sending a '1. Content location request' to CSAF. CSAF then has two options: Option 1 involves CSAF interacting with the RLF to get the content node location and then replying to EF with the '3. Location of available content node(s)'; Option 2 involves CSAF replying to EF with the '2. Reply with RLF location', and then EF interacting with the RLF to get the content node location.
+
+**Figure 7-23 – EF requesting the location of content**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-23 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a content location request to the CSAF to get the location information of available content node(s). The content ID is included in the request. The request may also include the ID of the EF and authentication information.
+Option 1:
+2. CSAF interacts with the RLF to get the location information of available content node(s).
+3. CSAF replies to the EF with the location of available content node(s).
+Option 2:
+2. CSAF replies to the EF with the location of the RLF.
+3. EF interacts with the RLF to get the location of available content node(s).
+
+#### 7.2.12 Reference point A2
+
+The A2 reference point is between the SCF and CSAF.
+
+This reference point is used for user authentication and authorization.
+
+Figure 7-24 shows the general procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CSAF
+ participant SCF
+ CSAF->>SCF: 1. Authentication request
+ SCF->>SCF: 2. User authentication and service authorization
+ SCF-->>CSAF: 3. Authentication and authorization reply
+ CSAF->>CSAF: 4. Retrieve control policy
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of user authentication and authorization. It involves two main entities: CSAF (Content Service Access Function) and SCF (Service Control Function). The process follows these steps: 1. CSAF sends an 'Authentication request' to SCF. 2. SCF performs 'User authentication and service authorization' internally. 3. SCF sends an 'Authentication and authorization reply' back to CSAF. 4. CSAF then performs 'Retrieve control policy' internally.
+
+Sequence diagram for User authentication and authorization between CSAF and SCF.
+
+**Figure 7-24 – User authentication and authorization**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-24 are as follows.
+
+1. When a user logs into the CSAF through the EF, the CSAF sends an authentication request to the SCF. In the authentication request, the CSAF includes the ID of the EF and the authentication information sent by the EF.
+2. SCF performs procedures for user authentication and then service authorization.
+3. SCF sends back the authentication and authorization results to the CSAF.
+4. CSAF retrieves the control policy, e.g., content access rights, from the authorization results for a user's service access control.
+
+#### 7.2.13 Reference point A3
+
+The A3 reference point is between the CSAF and RLF.
+
+This reference point is used by the CSAF to request the RLF for the available content node.
+
+Figure 7-25 shows the general procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CSAF
+ participant RLF
+ CSAF->>RLF: 1. Content location request
+ RLF->>RLF: 2. Locate content
+ RLF-->>CSAF: 3. location of available content node(s)
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of CSAF requesting the RLF for content location. It involves two main entities: CSAF (Content Service Access Function) and RLF (Radio Location Function). The process follows these steps: 1. CSAF sends a 'Content location request' to RLF. 2. RLF performs 'Locate content' internally. 3. RLF sends the 'location of available content node(s)' back to CSAF.
+
+Sequence diagram for CSAF requesting the RLF for content location.
+
+**Figure 7-25 – CSAF requesting the RLF for content location**
+
+Steps shown in Figure 7-25 are as follows.
+
+1. CSAF sends a content location request to the RLF; the request message should contain the content ID.
+2. RLF locates the requested content.
+3. RLF replies to the CSAF with the location of available content node(s).
+
+#### 7.2.14 Reference point A4
+
+The A4 reference point is between AFs and the TOCF.
+
+This reference point is used by AFs to query and subscribe to specific traffic related information.
+
+NOTE – The A4 reference point is used by the TOCF to open its network information to third-party applications for traffic optimization.
+
+The detailed information flows on the A4 reference point are for further study.
+
+#### 7.2.15 Reference point A5
+
+The A5 reference point is between the CDF and CSAF.
+
+This reference point is used by the CSAF to direct the CDF to process (e.g., transcoding, encryption) content.
+
+Figure 7-26 shows the general procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CSAF
+ participant CDF
+ CSAF->>CDF: 1. Content processing request
+ activate CDF
+ CDF->>CDF: 2. Content processing
+ deactivate CDF
+ CDF-->>CSAF: 3. Content processing response
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between the CSAF and the CDF. The CSAF (Content Selection and Access Function) sends a '1. Content processing request' to the CDF (Content Distribution Function). The CDF then performs '2. Content processing' internally. Finally, the CDF sends a '3. Content processing response' back to the CSAF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the interaction between CSAF and CDF for content processing.
+
+**Figure 7-26 – CSAF directs the CDF to process content**
+
+1. CSAF sends a content processing request to the CDF; the request message should contain the content ID, the operations to the content, etc.
+2. CDF processes the content according to the content processing request.
+3. CDF returns the processing result and the processed content information (e.g., the new content ID or meta-data) in a content processing response message to the CSAF.
+
+# 8 Security considerations
+
+Security considerations are not addressed in this Recommendation.
+
+# Annex A
+
+## Relationship between the DSN functional architecture and the NGN functional architecture
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+As described in [ITU-T Y.2012], the NGN architecture is a general service- and technology-independent architecture that can be later instantiated in customized architectures that can respond to specific contexts in terms of the services offered and the technologies used.
+
+DSN is based upon the use of a collection of DSN nodes (organized in a peer-to-peer, P2P, or other distributed fashion) and links between DSN nodes for the purpose of enabling multimedia services and applications.
+
+This annex describes the mapping of DSN functions and NGN functions as well as the relationship between the DSN functional architecture described in this Recommendation and the NGN functional architecture.
+
+### A.1 Functional mapping between DSN functions and NGN functions
+
+Although DSN is an extension of NGN, it does not inherit all the functions of the NGN. There are three main points when addressing the differences between DSN and NGN functions. First, the DSN network supports multimedia services and it does not impact the functions in the transport stratum of the NGN. Second, some functions of the NGN are extended to cover additional functionalities in order to support the distributed characteristic of the DSN. Finally, there are some newly defined functions introduced for the DSN which do not exist in the NGN [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+Table A.1 provides the mapping of DSN functions described in this Recommendation to NGN functions [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+**Table A.1 – Functional mapping between DSN
+and NGN functions**
+
+| No. | DSN functions | NGN functions [ITU-T Y.2012] | Remarks |
+|-----|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1 | End-user functions | End-user functions | The DSN EF is an extension of the NGN EF with additional functions defined in the DSN. |
+| 2 | Service control functions | Service control functions | The DSN SCF inherits some functionalities of the NGN with additional functions defined in the DSN. |
+| 3 | Content delivery functions | Content delivery functions | The DSN CDF inherits some functionalities of the NGN CDF with additional functions defined in the DSN. |
+| 4 | Management functions | Management functions | The DSN MF is an extension of the NGN MF with additional functions defined in the DSN. |
+
+**Table A.1 – Functional mapping between DSN
+and NGN functions**
+
+| No. | DSN functions | NGN functions [ITU-T Y.2012] | Remarks |
+|------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 5 | Content service application functions | Application support functions and service support functions | The DSN CSAF inherits some functionality of the NGN ASF & SSF to run the content-based services (e.g., live streaming, VoD). |
+| 6 | Traffic optimization control functions | No equivalent | New functions in the DSN to provide traffic optimization capabilities. |
+| 7 | Resource location functions | No equivalent | New functions in the DSN to provide distributed resource location functions. |
+| 8 | Relay functions | No equivalent | New functions in the DSN to provide network traffic relay capabilities. |
+| 9 | Node enrolment functions | No equivalent | New functions in the DSN to enrol a node to the DSN network as a DSN node. |
+
+## **A.2 Relationship between the DSN functional architecture and NGN functional architecture**
+
+As described in clause A.1, DSN functions can be mapped to five NGN-based functions and four newly defined functions. This clause shows the relationship between the DSN and NGN in the functional architecture aspect. Figure A.1 illustrates the relationship between the DSN functional architecture and NGN functional architecture.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of the DSN and NGN. At the top, 'Applications' connect to the DSN via the ANI (Application Network Interface). The DSN is composed of several functional blocks: 'Original Functions of DSN' (including Traffic Optimization Control Functions, Resource Location Functions, Relay Functions, and Node Enrolment Functions), 'Management Functions' (Management Functions for DSN), 'End-User Functions' (End-User Functions for DSN), and the 'Service Stratum' (containing Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions, and Service Control and Content Delivery Functions). The NGN is shown below the DSN, containing the 'Transport Stratum' (Transport Control Functions and Transport Functions). The interface between the DSN and NGN is the UNI (User Network Interface). The DSN also interacts with external entities: 'Functions from other Service Providers' via SNI (Service Network Interface) and 'Functions from Other Networks' via NNI (Network Network Interface). A legend indicates that dashed lines represent Control, solid blue lines represent Media, dashed pink lines represent Management, and solid orange lines represent Media (Applied for DSN only).
+
+Figure A.1: Relationship between the DSN and NGN from a functional architecture view. The diagram shows the DSN (Digital Service Network) and NGN (Next-Generation Network) functional architectures and their interactions.
+
+**Figure A.1 – Relationship between the DSN and NGN from a functional architecture view**
+
+The DSN functional architecture consists of the functions in the service stratum of the NGN, management functions, end-user functions, and four newly defined functions for the DSN. The DSN has reference points for interaction between functions. The detailed descriptions of the functions and reference points of the DSN are described in clause 7.
+
+The DSN can interact with functions of other service providers as well as functions of other networks such as PSTN/ISDN, the public Internet, and so forth. This interaction can be provided through the gateway functions of NGN in transport stratum, which can be controlled by the SCF. However, the description on the way to interact with other networks is not covered in this Recommendation because the operation of functions in the transport stratum of the NGN is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Information flows for DSN service
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix is intended to help readers better understand the DSN functional architecture. The messages and flows used in this appendix are representative and are not meant to indicate any particular protocol.
+
+### I.1 General information flows
+
+#### I.1.1 Control node enrolling to the DHT-based overlay in the DSN network
+
+Figure I.1 shows the flows for a control node (taking node with the RLF as an example) enrolling to the DHT-based overlay in the DSN network. It assumes that the first entry point address (i.e., address of the node with the NEF) is already configured in the control node.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLFBS as RLF of the bootstrap node
+ participant RLFJN as RLF of the joining node
+ participant NEF as NEF
+
+ RLFJN->>NEF: 1. Enrolment request
+ Note over NEF: 2. Authentication, assign node ID and generate configuration and bootstrap data
+ NEF-->>RLFJN: 3. Enrolment response
+ RLFJN->>RLFBS: 4. Enrolling to the overlay
+ Note over RLFBS: 5. Update overlay connection/routing information
+ RLFBS->>RLFJN: 6. Response to the node join
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the control node enrolment process. It involves three main entities: the RLF of the bootstrap node, the RLF of the joining node, and the NEF. The process follows these steps: 1. The RLF of the joining node sends an enrolment request to the NEF. 2. The NEF performs authentication, assigns a node ID, and generates configuration and bootstrap data. 3. The NEF sends an enrolment response back to the RLF of the joining node. 4. The RLF of the joining node sends an enrolling message to the RLF of the bootstrap node. 5. The RLF of the bootstrap node updates the overlay connection/routing information. 6. The RLF of the bootstrap node sends a response to the node join back to the RLF of the joining node.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the control node enrolment process between the RLF of the bootstrap node, the RLF of the joining node, and the NEF.
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-1
+
+**Figure I.1 – Control node enrolment to DHT-based overlay in the DSN network**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.1 are as follows.
+
+1. RLF of the enrolling node sends an enrolment request to the NEF. The enrolment request contains the identification of the requestor and information by which the NEF can authenticate the requestor.
+2. NEF authenticates the RLF of the enrolling node and assigns the node ID to the RLF. It also generates the configuration and bootstrap information for the RLF.
+NOTE – The configuration information may contain the algorithm for the DHT-based overlay construction and maintenance. The bootstrap information may contain the location (for instance, IP address) of the bootstrap node.
+3. NEF returns the configuration and bootstrap information in the enrolment response to the RLF.
+4. RLF of the enrolling node sends an enrolling message to the RLF of the bootstrap node.
+5. RLF of the bootstrap node updates the overlay routing or connection information accordingly.
+
+6. RLF of the bootstrap node sends a response message to the RLF of the enrolling node for acknowledgement.
+
+#### I.1.2 Reporting of DSN node status/event
+
+Figure I.2 shows the flows related to the reporting of node status (for instance, relay node status or content node status) to the RLF. There are three types of reports. The first type is a periodic report where the RF/CDF is responsible for reporting the node (in which RF/CDF resides) status periodically to the RLF to which it is registered. The second type is an on-demand report for which the RLF can request the RF/CDF to report the node (in which RF/CDF resides) status. Upon receiving the request, the RF/CDF should report the requested information. The third type is an event-driven report: when a critical event occurs, the RF/CDF should report the event to the RLF.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RLF
+ participant RF_CDF as RF/CDF
+
+ Note over RF_CDF: Periodic report
+ RF_CDF->>RLF: 1. Status report
+ RF_CDF->>RLF: 2. Status report
+
+ Note over RLF, RF_CDF: On demand report
+ RLF->>RF_CDF: 1. Status request
+ RF_CDF->>RLF: 2. Status report
+
+ Note over RF_CDF: Event-driven report
+ Note over RF_CDF: 1. Event occurs (e.g., load threshold reaches)
+ RF_CDF->>RLF: 2. Event report
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates three scenarios of status reporting from the RF/CDF to the RLF. In the 'Periodic report' scenario, the RF/CDF initiates two sequential status reports. In the 'On demand report' scenario, the RLF requests a status report, which the RF/CDF then provides. In the 'Event-driven report' scenario, an event occurs at the RF/CDF (e.g., a load threshold is reached), and it then reports this event to the RLF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing three types of reports from RF/CDF to RLF: Periodic report, On demand report, and Event-driven report.
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-2
+
+**Figure I.2 – Reporting of DSN node status/event**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.2 are as follows.
+
+##### The periodic report
+
+1. RF/CDF sends the status report to the RLF.
+2. After a predefined interval, the RF/CDF sends the status information again to the RLF.
+
+##### The on-demand report
+
+1. RLF requests status information of relay node or content node.
+2. Upon receipt of the report request from the RLF, the RF/CDF responds with the requested information.
+
+##### The event driven report
+
+1. A critical event occurs.
+2. Upon recognizing the event, the RF/CDF reports the event to the RLF.
+
+### I.2 Content delivery
+
+Content delivery service is one of the DSN services that provide content in a distributed manner for efficient content sharing between multiple DSN nodes.
+
+To better understand the content delivery flows, two assumptions are made.
+
+- One receiver can receive chunks for the same contents from multiple content nodes. This does not mean that content nodes send the same data.
+- Content nodes can send partial or full content regardless of their location. Content nodes can reside within a service provider's domain or user's domain.
+
+#### I.2.1 General flows
+
+Figure I.3 illustrates the message flows for providing content delivery services in the DSN. There are two options for this information flow.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CSAF
+ participant TOCF
+ participant RLF
+ participant CDF
+
+ CDF->>RLF: 1. Content registration
+ RLF-->>CDF: 2. content registration response
+ EF->>CSAF: 3. Content request
+ CSAF->>RLF: 4. Content location request
+ Note over RLF: 5. Selecting optimized content node(s)
+ RLF-->>CSAF: 6. Content location information
+ CSAF-->>EF: 7. Content location information
+ Note over CSAF, RLF: Option 1
+ RLF-->>EF: 4. RLF location and content ID
+ CSAF->>RLF: 5. Content location request
+ Note over RLF: 6. Selecting optimized content node(s)
+ RLF-->>CSAF: 7. Content location information
+ Note over CSAF, RLF: Option 2
+ RLF-->>EF: 4. RLF location and content ID
+ CSAF->>RLF: 5. Content location request
+ Note over RLF: 6. Selecting optimized content node(s)
+ RLF-->>CSAF: 7. Content location information
+ CDF-->>EF: 8. Content delivery
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the message flows for providing content delivery services in the DSN. The diagram shows four main entities: EF (End User), CSAF (Content Service Access Function), TOCF (Content Transfer Optimization Function), RLF (Routing Location Function), and CDF (Content Delivery Function). The flows are as follows: 1. Content registration from CDF to RLF. 2. Content registration response from RLF to CDF. 3. Content request from EF to CSAF. 4. Content location request from CSAF to RLF. 5. Selecting optimized content node(s) (internal to RLF). 6. Content location information from RLF to CSAF. 7. Content location information from CSAF to EF. Option 1: 4. RLF location and content ID from RLF to EF. 5. Content location request from CSAF to RLF. 6. Selecting optimized content node(s) (internal to RLF). 7. Content location information from RLF to CSAF. Option 2: 4. RLF location and content ID from RLF to EF. 5. Content location request from CSAF to RLF. 6. Selecting optimized content node(s) (internal to RLF). 7. Content location information from RLF to CSAF. 8. Content delivery from CDF to EF.
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-3
+
+**Figure I.3 – Providing content delivery services**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.3 are as follows.
+
+1. CDF registers the content to the RLF.
+2. RLF answers the CDF to notify the result of the registration.
+3. EF sends a message to the CSAF to request content.
+
+Option 1:
+
+4. CSAF sends a message to the RLF to retrieve the location of the contents.
+5. RLF interacts with the TOCF to select the optimized content node(s).
+6. RLF sends the location information of the selected content node(s) to the CSAF.
+7. CSAF forwards the location information to the EF.
+8. Content delivery is conducted from the CDF to the EF.
+
+Option 2:
+
+4. CSAF responds to the EF with the location of the RLF and ID of the content that the EF requests.
+5. EF sends a request message to the RLF to retrieve the location of the content.
+6. RLF interacts with the TOCF to select the optimized content node(s).
+7. RLF sends the location information of the selected content node(s) to the EF.
+8. Content delivery is conducted from the CDF to the EF.
+
+#### I.2.2 Selecting optimized content node(s)
+
+Figure I.4 shows the flows related to selecting optimized content node(s). There are two options for this information flow.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF/CSAF
+ participant RLF
+ participant TOCF
+
+ Note over EF/CSAF, RLF: 1. Content location request
+ EF/CSAF->>RLF:
+
+ rect rgb(200, 220, 240)
+ Note right of RLF: Option 1
+ RLF->>TOCF: 2. Network information request
+ TOCF-->>RLF: 3. Network information response
+ Note over RLF: 4. Select content node(s) based on network information
+ end
+
+ rect rgb(220, 240, 200)
+ Note right of RLF: Option 2
+ RLF->>TOCF: 2. Optimization request with candidate content nodes information
+ Note over TOCF: 3. Select content node(s) based on network information
+ TOCF-->>RLF: 4. Optimization response with information of the selected content node(s)
+ end
+
+ Note over RLF, EF/CSAF: 5. Content location response
+ RLF->>EF/CSAF:
+
+```
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-4
+
+Sequence diagram showing two options for selecting optimized content node(s) between EF/CSAF, RLF, and TOCF.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Selecting optimized content node(s)**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.4 are as follows.
+
+1. EF/CSAF requests for the location of content nodes that can provide the requested content.
+
+Option 1:
+
+2. RLF requests for network information from the TOCF.
+3. TOCF responds to the RLF with the network information.
+4. RLF selects optimal content node(s) based on the network information.
+5. RLF sends the location of the selected optimal content node(s) to the EF/CSAF.
+
+Option 2:
+
+2. RLF sends candidate nodes and requests for selecting the optimal content nodes to the TOCF.
+3. TOCF selects the optimal content node(s) based on the network information.
+4. TOCF responds to the RLF with the selected content node(s).
+
+5. RLF sends the location of the selected optimal content node(s) to the EF/CSAF.
+
+#### 1.2.3 Providing DSN services through relay node
+
+Figure I.5 shows the flows for providing DSN services, especially NAT traversal, through the relay node. It is assumed that when the UE sends the request, the relay node has already registered and the UE has received content node information from the control node.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CSAF
+ participant RLF
+ participant RF
+ participant CDF
+
+ EF->>CSAF: 1. DSN service request (NAT traversal)
+ CSAF->>CSAF: 2. Analyse the status of UE
+ CSAF->>RLF: 3. Relay request
+ CSAF->>RLF: 4. Relay node location and selection
+ RLF->>RF: 5. Resource reservation request
+ RF-->>RLF: 6. Resource reservation response
+ RLF-->>CSAF: 7. Relay response
+ Note over CSAF, RLF, RF: 8. Control node sets up the connection between UE and relay node
+ CDF-->>RF: 9. DSN service data
+ RF-->>EF: 9. DSN service data
+ CSAF-->>RLF: 10. Relay session information update
+ RLF-->>RF: 10. Relay session information update
+
+```
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-5
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for providing DSN services through a relay node (NAT traversal based on the RF). The diagram involves five entities: EF, CSAF, RLF, RF, and CDF. The process starts with a DSN service request from EF to CSAF, followed by analysis of UE status, relay request, and relay node selection. Resource reservation is handled between RLF and RF if needed. Finally, DSN service data is sent from CDF to EF via RF, with session information updates between CSAF, RLF, and RF.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Providing DSN services through the relay node (NAT traversal based on the RF)**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.5 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a DSN service request to the CSAF.
+2. CSAF processes the service request. Based on the service profile and the status of the UE and content node, the CSAF determines that relay nodes are needed in the data path.
+3. CSAF sends a relay request to the RLF, which includes the address of the UE.
+4. Depending on the addresses of the UE and the requested service, the RLF locates and selects suitable relay node(s) for the received request.
+5. Optionally, the RLF may send a resource reservation request to the RF in the selected relay node(s) to reserve resources for relay, e.g., bandwidth, port of relay node(s). The address and port number of the CDF and the address of the UE are included in the resource reservation request.
+6. RF reserves necessary resources and responds to the RLF with the information about reserved resources.
+7. RLF returns the relay node(s) information to the CSAF.
+8. CSAF helps the connection set-up by informing the UE and content node of the addresses that they should be connected to. One or more relay nodes could be inserted along the data path.
+
+9. EF can exchange data packets with the CDF using the relay node(s) selected by the RLF.
+10. During the relay service or after the relay service has finished, the RF sends relay session information and measurement results to the RLF for accounting. The RLF may forward the relay session information to the CSAF.
+
+#### I.2.4 Retrieving content
+
+Figure I.6 shows the flow for retrieving content from content nodes. It assumes that the EF has received the location of content nodes which contain the requested content.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant CDF1 as CDF 1
+ participant CDF2 as CDF 2
+ participant Dots as ...
+ participant CDFn as CDF n
+
+ EF->>CDF1: 1. Buffer map request
+ EF->>CDF2: 1. Buffer map request
+ EF->>CDFn: 1. Buffer map request
+ Note over CDF1: 2. Retrieve buffer map for the content
+ Note over CDF2: 2. Retrieve buffer map for the content
+ Note over CDFn: 2. Retrieve buffer map for the content
+ CDF1->>EF: 3. Buffer map response
+ CDF2->>EF: 3. Buffer map response
+ CDFn->>EF: 3. Buffer map response
+ EF->>CDF1: 4. Content request
+ EF->>CDF2: 4. Content request
+ EF->>CDFn: 4. Content request
+ CDF1-->>EF: 5. Content delivery
+ CDF2-->>EF: 5. Content delivery
+ CDFn-->>EF: 5. Content delivery
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of retrieving content from multiple Content Distribution Functions (CDFs). It involves an Entity Function (EF) and several CDFs (CDF 1, CDF 2, ..., CDF n). The process follows five steps: 1. The EF sends a 'Buffer map request' to each CDF. 2. Each CDF performs an internal action 'Retrieve buffer map for the content'. 3. Each CDF sends a 'Buffer map response' back to the EF. 4. The EF sends a 'Content request' to each CDF. 5. Each CDF sends 'Content delivery' back to the EF. The diagram uses arrows to show the flow of requests and responses, and a large double-headed arrow for the final content delivery from all CDFs to the EF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for retrieving content from multiple Content Distribution Functions (CDFs).
+
+**Figure I.6 – Flows for content retrieving**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.6 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a buffer map request to different CDFs in different content nodes.
+2. Each CDF retrieves a buffer map of the requested content separately.
+3. Each CDF responds to the EF with a buffer map.
+4. EF sends a content request to the CDF to download chunks of the content. The EF requests different chunks from different content nodes.
+5. Each CDF sends different chunks of the content to the EF.
+
+#### I.2.5 CDF reporting flow statistic information to the MF
+
+Figure I.7 shows the procedure of the CDF reporting flow statistic information to the MF.
+
+NOTE – CDF may reside in the equipment of the service provider or user equipment itself; when residing in the equipment of the service provider, the flow statistic can be used for flow based accounting; when residing in user equipment, the flow can be recognized as the user's contribution to the network, and the flow statistic information can be used in encouraging or rewarding the user.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF_CDF as EF/CDF
+ participant CDF
+ participant MF
+ CDF->>EF_CDF: 1. Content delivery
+ CDF->>MF: 2. Flow statistic information
+ MF->>MF: 3. Stores/Updates the flow statistic information
+
+```
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-7
+
+Sequence diagram showing CDF reporting flow statistic information to the MF. The diagram involves three entities: EF/CDF, CDF, and MF. Step 1: Content delivery from CDF to EF/CDF. Step 2: Flow statistic information from CDF to MF. Step 3: MF stores/updates the flow statistic information.
+
+**Figure I.7 – CDF reporting flow statistic information to the MF**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.7 are as follows.
+
+1. The content is delivered from the CDF to the EF or to another CDF.
+2. After content delivery is finished, the CDF sends the flow statistic information to the MF.
+3. MF stores or updates the flow statistic information.
+
+### **I.3 Information flows for MMTel**
+
+#### **I.3.1 User registration**
+
+Figure I.8 illustrates the message of user registration.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF
+ participant SCF
+ participant RLF
+ participant RLFs
+ participant RLF_SCF as RLF/SCF
+ EF->>SCF: 1. Register request
+ SCF->>RLF: 2. Serving node location request
+ RLF->>RLF_SCF: 3. Procedure of locating serving node in the overlay
+ RLF->>SCF: 4. Serving node location response
+ SCF->>RLF_SCF: 5. Register request
+ EF->>RLF_SCF: 6. User authentication and authorization
+
+```
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-8
+
+Sequence diagram showing user registration in MMTel. The diagram involves five entities: EF, SCF, RLF, RLFs, and RLF/SCF. Step 1: Register request from EF to SCF. Step 2: Serving node location request from SCF to RLF. Step 3: Procedure of locating serving node in the overlay (involving RLFs). Step 4: Serving node location response from RLF to SCF. Step 5: Register request from SCF to RLF/SCF. Step 6: User authentication and authorization (involving all entities).
+
+**Figure I.8 – User registration in MMTel**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.8 are as follows.
+
+1. EF sends a registration request to a proxy SCF to register in the DSN MMTel service.
+2. The proxy SCF sends the serving node location request to its associated RLF for the location of the user's serving node.
+3. RLF looks up the location of the serving node through the overlay.
+
+4. RLF returns the serving node location to the proxy SCF.
+5. The proxy SCF forwards the registration request to the serving SCF.
+6. The serving SCF authenticates and authorizes the user and returns the registration result.
+
+#### I.3.2 Session establishment
+
+Figure I.9 illustrates the message flow for providing MMTel service in DSN. It assumes that EF A and EF B have already registered to their respective serving nodes.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EFA as EF A
+ participant SCF1 as SCF
+ participant RLF1 as RLF
+ participant RLFs as RLFs
+ participant RLF2 as RLF
+ participant SCF2 as SCF
+ participant EFB as EF B
+
+ EFA->>SCF1: 1. Service request
+ SCF1->>RLF1: 2. Destination serving node location request
+ Note over RLF1, RLF2: 3. Procedure of locating destination serving node in the overlay
+ RLF1->>SCF1: 4. Destination serving node location response
+ SCF1->>SCF2: 5. Service request
+ SCF2->>EFB: 6. Service request
+ EFA->>EFB: 7. Call set-up procedure
+ EFA<->EFB: 8. Media transfer
+
+```
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-9
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for MMTel service. Participants from left to right: EF A, SCF, RLF, RLFs, RLF, SCF, EF B. 1. Service request from EF A to SCF. 2. Destination serving node location request from SCF to RLF. 3. Procedure of locating destination serving node in the overlay between RLF and RLFs. 4. Destination serving node location response from RLF to SCF. 5. Service request from the first SCF to the second SCF. 6. Service request from the second SCF to EF B. 7. Call set-up procedure between EF A and EF B. 8. Media transfer between EF A and EF B.
+
+**Figure I.9 – General message flows for providing MMTel service**
+
+Figure I.9 shows the session initiation procedure. Steps shown in Figure I.9 are as follows.
+
+1. EF A sends a request to its serving SCF (via its proxy SCF) to initiate an MMTel call to EF B.
+2. The serving SCF of EF A receives the request and sends a location request message to its associated RLF for the location of EF B's serving node.
+3. RLF looks up the location of the serving node of EF B in the overlay.
+4. RLF returns the serving node location of EF B to the serving SCF of EF A.
+5. The serving SCF of EF A connects to the serving SCF of EF B and sends the request to the serving SCF of EF B.
+6. The serving SCF of EF B receives the request and then forwards the request to EF B (via the proxy SCF of EF B).
+7. EF A and EF B set up the media connection through the SCF.
+8. Media data are transferred between EF A and EF B.
+
+#### I.3.3 Session establishment with relay
+
+Figure I.10 shows the session initiation procedure when a relay node is needed.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the session initiation procedure for MMTel service with a relay node. The entities involved are EFA, SCF, RLF, TOCF, RLF, SCF, RF, and EFB. The steps are as follows:
+
+1. Service request: EFA sends a request to its serving SCF.
+2. Destination serving node location request: The serving SCF of EFA sends a location request message to its associated RLF for the location of EF B's serving node.
+3. Procedure of locating destination serving node in the overlay: RLF looks up the location of the serving node of EF B in the overlay.
+4. Destination serving node location response: RLF returns the serving node location of EF B to the serving SCF of EF A.
+5. Service request: The serving SCF of EF A connects to the serving SCF of EF B and sends the request to the serving SCF of EF B.
+6. Service request: The serving SCF of EF B receives the request and then forwards the request to EF B (via the proxy SCF of EF B).
+7. Service response: EF B sends back the service response to indicate its contact information.
+8. Service response: The serving SCF of EF B forwards the service response to the serving SCF of EF A.
+9. Relay node request: The serving SCF of EF A determines that a relay node is needed for this session. It sends a relay node request to the RLF to locate a relay node. The addresses of EF A and EF B are included in the request.
+10. Relay node location and selection: RLF returns the location and selection of the relay node to the serving SCF of EF A.
+11. Resource reservation: The serving SCF of EF A sends a resource reservation request to the RF.
+12. Relay node response: The RF returns the relay node response to the serving SCF of EF A.
+13. Call set-up procedure: The call is set up between EFA and EFB.
+14. Media transfer: Media transfer occurs between EFA and EFB.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the session initiation procedure for MMTel service with a relay node. The diagram involves several entities: EFA, SCF, RLF, TOCF, RLF, SCF, RF, and EFB. The steps are: 1. Service request from EFA to SCF; 2. Destination serving node location request from SCF to RLF; 3. Procedure of locating destination serving node in the overlay (RLF to SCF); 4. Destination serving node location response from RLF to SCF; 5. Service request from SCF to SCF; 6. Service request from SCF to EFB; 7. Service response from EFB to SCF; 8. Service response from SCF to SCF; 9. Relay node request from SCF to RLF; 10. Relay node location and selection (RLF to SCF); 11. Resource reservation from SCF to RF; 12. Relay node response from RF to SCF; 13. Call set-up procedure (EFA to EFB); 14. Media transfer (EFA to EFB).
+
+Y.2080(12)\_FI-10
+
+**Figure I.10 – Providing MMTel service with a relay node**
+
+Steps shown in Figure I.10 are as follows.
+
+1. EF A sends a request to its serving SCF (via its proxy SCF), to initiate an MMTel call to EF B.
+2. The serving SCF of EF A receives the request and sends a location request message to its associated RLF for the location of EF B's serving node.
+3. RLF looks up the location of the serving node of EF B in the overlay.
+4. RLF returns the serving node location of EF B to the serving SCF of EF A.
+5. The serving SCF of EF A connects to the serving SCF of EF B and sends the request to the serving SCF of EF B.
+6. The serving SCF of EF B receives the request and then forwards the request to EF B (via the proxy SCF of EF B).
+7. EF B sends back the service response to indicate its contact information.
+8. The serving SCF of EF B forwards the service response to the serving SCF of EF A.
+9. The serving SCF of EF A determines that a relay node is needed for this session. It sends a relay node request to the RLF to locate a relay node. The addresses of EF A and EF B are included in the request.
+
+10. RLF interacts with the TOCF or other RLFs to locate and select a suitable relay node for this session.
+11. Optionally, the RLF may send a resource reservation request to the RF in the selected relay node to reserve resources for relay, e.g., bandwidth, port of relay node(s).
+NOTE – The addresses of EF A and EF B are sent to the RF in a resource reservation message and the RF returns the addresses and port numbers allocated for this session.
+12. RLF returns the relay node information to the serving SCF of EF A.
+13. Under the control of serving SCFs, EF A and EF B set up the media connection through the relay node.
+14. Media data are transferred through the relay node between EF A and EF B.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## DSN model
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In order to locate and fetch DSN services and contents among distributed DSN nodes in a scalable and reliable manner, DSN performs:
+
+- distributed service control with load balancing and resource registration/locating;
+- distributed content/media delivery with traffic optimization.
+
+Within the DSN network, UE can easily obtain the locations of one or more DSN nodes which provide services logic (control node), hold the required content (content node) or relay the traffic data (relay node).
+
+As shown in Figure II.1, DSN nodes are classified into three different types according to their roles.
+
+- The content node holds the content by managing content storages or cache, and delivers the content when it is queried.
+- The relay node can relay traffic data for DSN nodes or UE.
+- The control node provides service control functions. Consequently, UE can request and access DSN service in the DSN network.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the DSN model with three main functional areas and a legend. The legend identifies three types of nodes: Core Node (represented by a server icon), User Node (represented by a laptop icon), and UE (represented by a mobile phone icon).
+1. **Content Delivery**: A green oval containing three 'Content node' icons (server with storage). A 'User Node' (laptop) is shown outside, with arrows indicating data flow to and from the content nodes.
+2. **Data relay**: A green oval containing two 'Relay node' icons (server). A 'UE' (mobile phone) is shown outside, with arrows indicating data flow to and from the relay nodes.
+3. **Call session control**: A yellow oval containing four 'Control node' icons (server). Two 'UE' (mobile phones) are shown outside, with arrows indicating control flow to and from the control nodes.
+A legend at the top left shows a dashed double-headed arrow for 'Control' and a solid double-headed arrow for 'Data'.
+
+Figure II.1 – DSN model diagram showing three functional areas: Content Delivery, Data relay, and Call session control, with a legend for Core Node, User Node, and UE.
+
+Figure II.1 – DSN model
+
+The DSN node can also be classified into core node and user node by deployment.
+
+Core nodes are deployed by service providers. DSN functions except EFs can be implemented in the core node. The deployment issue is outside of the scope of this appendix. The user node is a DSN node as well as UE. UE can work as follows:
+
+- as a pure DSN client that accesses DSN services but never contributes;
+
+- as part of the DSN service providing equipment where the user node (e.g., being a content node, relay node or control node) provides its resource to others.
+
+The role of UE in the DSN network depends on the capability of the UE; it also depends on the decision of the end user and the DSN service provider. UE can implement one or more DSN functions, e.g., CDF, RF, SCF and RLF.
+
+Figure II.2 shows three examples of UE with different compositions of DSN functions.
+
+
+
+The diagram consists of three rectangular boxes representing User Equipment (UE) types, labeled (a), (b), and (c) below them. Each box has a light blue header with the text 'User Equipment (Type 1)', 'User Equipment (Type 2)', and 'User Equipment (Type 3)' respectively. Inside each box, there are rounded rectangular shapes representing DSN functions. In (a), there is one function labeled 'EF'. In (b), there are three functions stacked vertically: 'EF', 'CDF', and 'RF'. In (c), there are five functions stacked vertically: 'EF', 'CDF', 'RF', 'SCF', and 'RLF'. Each box also has a thin light blue bar at the bottom.
+
+Figure II.2: Three diagrams showing User Equipment (Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3) with different compositions of DSN functions. Type 1 contains only EF. Type 2 contains EF, CDF, and RF. Type 3 contains EF, CDF, RF, SCF, and RLF.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Example of UE with different compositions of DSN functions**
+
+The UE (Type 1) in Figure II.2 acts as a simple DSN client with only the EF. It could be a mobile phone with limited hardware capability and access bandwidth that cannot offer any services to others.
+
+Figure II.2 shows UE (Type 2) that can work as a content node or/and relay node in the DSN network while accessing DSN services. This kind of UE could be a laptop or normal PC which has the capability to store, distribute or relay content for others.
+
+If the UE is powerful enough (e.g., a high-performance and trustworthy PC with broad bandwidth and high availability) it may implement multiple DSN functions, e.g., CDF, RF, SCF and RLF as shown in Figure II.2 as UE (Type 3), to work in the DSN as both control node and content/relay node.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.810] Recommendation ITU-T X.810 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Overview.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.10] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 10 (2010), *ITU-T Y.2000 series - Supplement on distributed service network (DSN) use cases.*
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,935 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2081
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Distributed service networking traffic optimization control functions**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2081
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2081**
+
+# **Distributed service networking traffic optimization control functions**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2081 specifies the functional architecture for traffic optimization control functions (TOCFs), in support of steering traffic distribution according to certain optimization objectives in the environment of DSN described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080.
+
+The main objective of this Recommendation is to specify the functional entities of the TOCF and reference points, including information flows, between these functional entities.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2081 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Distributed service networking, DSN, functional architecture, functional entities, functions, reference points, traffic optimization control function, TOCF.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at 1 , ... POP i | Identification of each interested POP; if POP is not specified, it means all POPs. |
+
+#### 8.1.2.2 Response information flow
+
+The Response information flow is sent from STIC-FE to OPP-FE to provide the required static network information. It includes the IP address field information of every requested POP, node property information and metric between POPs whose information is included in the Response message.
+
+Table 8-2 provides the description of the information components included in the Response information flow.
+
+NOTE – When deployed, the concrete node property name and value need to be defined.
+
+**Table 8-2 – Response information components**
+
+| Information components | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i ; IP_field1, IP_field2, node property list ...)i , POP j , metric) | POP i : identification of each requested POP.i and POP j .i , POP j ) | POP i , POP j : A pair of identification of POPs. Notification of the cost between two POPs will be sent from the STIC-FE, if the subscription request is accepted. |
+
+#### **8.1.2.4 Notify information flow**
+
+The Notify information flow is sent from STIC-FE to OPP-FE, to request the updated static network information. Once there is any change within the information components in STIC-FE, STIC-FE will send a Notify information flow (including POPs) about which metric values or properties have been changed.
+
+Table 8-4 provides the description of the information components included in the Notify information flow.
+
+**Table 8-4 – Notify information components**
+
+| Information components | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i ; IP_field1, IP_field2, node property list ...)i , POP j , metric) | POP i : identification of each requested POP.i and POP j .1 , ... POP i | Identification of each requested POP; if POP is not specified, it means all POPs. |
+| Cthreshold | Congestion threshold value defined by the OPS-FE. A link will be labelled as "congestion" when the load percentage of the link exceeds the value of Cthreshold. |
+| HQthreshold (delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | High quality threshold value defined by the OPP-FE. A route will be labelled as "high quality" when its QoS parameters (delay, delay jitter, packet loss rate) are lower than the value of HQthreshold. |
+| QoS value request | If this component is 1, it means that the query message is requesting the original QoS value between the interested POPs. Otherwise, it means no detailed QoS value is requested. |
+
+#### 8.2.2.2 Response information flow
+
+The Response information flow is sent from DTIC-FE to OPP-FE to provide the required dynamic network information. It includes the congestion status and traffic quality between every two requested POPs whose information is included in the Response message.
+
+Table 8-6 provides the description of the information components included in the Response information flow.
+
+**Table 8-6 – Response information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , POP j , congestion) | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs to which the network information belongs.i , POP j , high quality) | High quality: high quality (true)/low quality (false) |
+| (POP i , POP j , delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | Delay, delay jitter, loss rate: the QoS parameters between every two different POPs and measurement of specific execution policy. |
+
+#### 8.2.2.3 Subscribe information flow
+
+The Subscribe information flow is sent from the OPP-FE to the DTIC-FE to request notification on the modification of cost between specific POPs to reflect the timeliness of the carrier's management and optimization policies.
+
+Table 8-7 provides the description of the information components included in the Subscribe information flow.
+
+**Table 8-7 – Subscribe information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , POP j ) | A pair of identification of POPs. Notification of the cost between two POPs will be sent from the DTIC-FE, if the subscription request is accepted. |
+
+#### 8.2.2.4 Notify information flow
+
+The Notify information flow is sent from DTIC-FE to OPP-FE, to provide the updated dynamic network information. Once there is any change within the information components in DTIC-FE, DTIC-FE will send a Notify information flow (including POPs) about which congestion status or QoS parameters have been changed.
+
+Table 8-8 provides the description of the information components included in the Notify information flow.
+
+**Table 8-8 – Notify information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , POP j , congestion) | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs to which network information belongs.i , POP j , high quality) | High quality: high quality (true)/low quality (false) |
+| (POP i , POP j , delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | Delay, delay jitter, loss rate: the QoS parameters between two POPs and measurement of specific execution policy. |
+
+## 8.3 Reference point T3 between OPS-FE and OPP-FE
+
+The T3 reference point uses the PolicyProcessRequest information flow to provide the specific execution policies.
+
+NOTE – The recommended transfer protocol is HTTP, or other transport protocol (e.g., TCP) that can provide reliable transfer of the defined messages.
+
+### 8.3.1 Information flows across the T3 reference point
+
+Figure 8-3 shows the procedures supported across the T3 reference point.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant OPS-FE
+ participant OPP-FE
+ OPS-FE-->>OPP-FE: PolicyProcessRequest
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing a PolicyProcessRequest message flow from OPS-FE to OPP-FE.
+
+Figure 8-3 – Information flows of T3
+
+### 8.3.2 Description of information flows
+
+#### 8.3.2.1 PolicyProcessRequest information flow
+
+The PolicyProcessRequest information flow is sent from the OPS-FE to the OPP-FE to provide the specific optimization policy.
+
+Table 8-9 provides the description of the information components included in the PolicyProcessRequest information flow.
+
+Table 8-9 – PolicyProcessRequest information components
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| P-int 1 , P 2 , P 3 ... P n > |
1 , P 2 , P 3 , ..., P n > represent a policy sequence in the order of priority with P 1 having the highest priority.n can be any type of the following: preference given to inter-area traffic-localization, preference given to inter-operator traffic-minimization or preference given to application-performance. |
+| Cthreshold | Congestion threshold value defined by the OPS-FE. A link will be labelled as "congestion" when the load percentage of this link exceeds the value of Cthreshold. |
+
+## 8.4 Reference point A4 between AF and OPP-FE
+
+The A4 reference point uses the Query/Response/Subscribe/Notify information flow to transfer the specific information.
+
+NOTE – The recommended transfer protocol is HTTP, or other transport protocol (e.g., TCP) that can provide reliable transfer of the defined messages.
+
+### 8.4.1 Information flows across A4
+
+Figure 8-4 shows the procedures supported across the A4 reference point.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant OPP-FE
+ participant AF
+ Note over AF: Query/
+Response
+(for network
+information)
+ AF->>OPP-FE: NetworkQuery
+ OPP-FE-->>AF: NetworkResponse
+ Note over AF: Query/
+Response
+(for PoP
+property)
+ AF->>OPP-FE: PropertyQuery
+ OPP-FE-->>AF: PropertyResponse
+ Note over AF: Query/
+Response
+(for QoS
+value)
+ AF->>OPP-FE: CostQuery
+ OPP-FE-->>AF: CostResponse
+ Note over AF: Query/
+Response
+(for PoP
+ranking)
+ AF->>OPP-FE: RankingQuery
+ OPP-FE-->>AF: RankingResult
+ Note over AF: Subscribe/
+Notify
+ AF->>OPP-FE: Subscribe
+ OPP-FE-->>AF: Notify
+
+```
+
+Y.2081(12)\_F8-4
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flows between OPP-FE and AF. The diagram consists of five rows of message exchanges. Row 1: AF sends NetworkQuery to OPP-FE, and OPP-FE returns NetworkResponse to AF. Row 2: AF sends PropertyQuery to OPP-FE, and OPP-FE returns PropertyResponse to AF. Row 3: AF sends CostQuery to OPP-FE, and OPP-FE returns CostResponse to AF. Row 4: AF sends RankingQuery to OPP-FE, and OPP-FE returns RankingResult to AF. Row 5: AF sends Subscribe to OPP-FE, and OPP-FE returns Notify to AF. Each row is enclosed in a light blue box. The labels 'OPP-FE' and 'AF' are at the top of their respective columns. The reference 'Y.2081(12)\_F8-4' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-4 – Information flows of A4**
+
+### 8.4.2 Description of information flows
+
+#### 8.4.2.1 NetworkQuery information flow
+
+The NetworkQuery information flow is sent from AF to OPP-FE to request information on which POP has the listed IP addresses. A NetworkQuery message can include multiple IP addresses.
+
+Table 8-10 provides the description of the information components included in the NetworkQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-10 – NetworkQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
+| IP 1 , IP 2 , IP 3 ... IP i | IP address of the requested POP. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.2 NetworkResponse information flow
+
+The NetworkResponse information flow is sent from OPP-FE to AF to provide information on which POP has the required IP address. A NetworkResponse message can include multiple mappings between the requested IP address and the corresponding POP.
+
+Table 8-11 provides the description of the information components included in the NetworkResponse information flow.
+
+**Table 8-11 – NetworkResponse information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , IP i ) | The mapping of the IP address to the identification of POP. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.3 PropertyQuery message
+
+The PropertyQuery information flow is sent from AF to OPP-FE to request the property of the POP. A PropertyQuery message can include identifications of multiple POPs.
+
+Table 8-12 provides a description of the information components included in the PropertyQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-12 – PropertyQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
+| POP 1 , ... POP i | Identification of the requested POP. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.4 PropertyResponse information flow
+
+The PropertyResponse information flow is sent from OPP-FE to AF to provide the property of the requested POPs.
+
+Table 8-13 provides the description of the information components included in the PropertyResponse information flow.
+
+**Table 8-13 – PropertyResponse information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , node property list) | A mapping between the requested POP and its node property. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.5 CostQuery information flow
+
+The CostQuery information flow is sent from AF to OPP-FE to request the cost or QoS values between different POPs.
+
+Table 8-14 provides the description of the information components included in the CostQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-14 – CostQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Source POP i i i , POP j , cost) | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs to which network information belongs.i , POP j , delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | The QoS parameters between every two POPs and measurement of specific execution policy. |
+
+#### **8.4.2.7 RankingQuery information flow**
+
+The RankingQuery information flow is sent from AF to OPP-FE to request the ranking list of candidate POPs from the OPP-FE.
+
+Table 8-16 provides the description of the information components included in the RankingQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-16 – RankingQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| POP 1 , ... POP i | An identifying list of candidate POPs sorted in the order of the HQthreshold. |
+| HQthreshold (delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | HQthreshold: the AF wants to achieve the preferred POPs according to QoS parameters, which are defined by the high quality threshold value. |
+
+#### **8.2.4.8 RankingResult information flow**
+
+The RankingResult information flow is sent from OPP-FE to AF to provide the ranking result of candidate POPs to the AF.
+
+Table 8-17 provides the description of the information components included in the RankingResult information flow.
+
+**Table 8-17 – RankingResult information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| POP a , POP b , POP c ... POP m | List of the requested POPs in the order of preference, with POP a having the highest preference. |
+
+#### **8.4.2.9 Subscribe information flow**
+
+The Subscribe information flow is sent from AF to OPP-FE to request the information flow about modification of cost between specific POPs to reflect the timeliness of the carrier's management and optimization policies. Once there is any cost change between the requested POPs, the AF can obtain the notification in time.
+
+Table 8-18 provides the description of the information components included in the Subscribe information flow.
+
+**Table 8-18 – Subscribe information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (Application identification) | Application identification is used to inform the OPP-FE who has subscribed for notification. |
+| (POP i , POP j ) | A pair of identification of POPs. Notification of the cost between two POPs will be sent from the OPP-FE, if the subscription request is accepted. |
+
+#### **8.4.2.10 Notify information flow**
+
+The Notify information flow is sent from OPP-FE to AF to reflect the changed cost between the interested/subscribed POP. Once there is any change in the cost, the OPP-FE will send this Notify information flow.
+
+Table 8-19 provides the description of the information components included in the Notify information flow.
+
+**Table 8-19 – Notify information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , POP j , cost) | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs.1 , ... IP i | IP address of requested POP. |
+
+#### 8.5.2.2 NetworkResponse information flow
+
+The NetworkResponse information flow is sent from OPP-FE to RLF to provide information on which POP has the required IP address.
+
+Table 8-21 provides the description of the information components included in the NetworkResponse information flow.
+
+**Table 8-21 – NetworkResponse information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , IP i ) | The mapping of the IP address to the identification of POP. |
+
+#### 8.5.2.3 PropertyQuery information flow
+
+The PropertyQuery information flow is sent from RLF to OPP-FE to request the property of the POP.
+
+Table 8-22 provides the description of the information components included in the PropertyQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-22 – PropertyQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
+| POP 1 , ... POP i | Identification of the requested POP. |
+
+#### 8.5.2.4 PropertyResponse information flow
+
+The PropertyResponse information flow is sent from OPP-FE to RLF to provide the property of the requested POPs.
+
+Table 8-23 provides the description of the information components included in the PropertyResponse information flow.
+
+**Table 8-23 – PropertyResponse information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , node property list) | A mapping between the requested POP and its node property. |
+
+#### 8.5.2.5 CostQuery information flow
+
+The CostQuery information flow is sent from RLF to OPP-FE to request the cost or QoS values between different POPs from the OPP-FE.
+
+Table 8-24 provides the description of the information components included in the CostQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-24 – CostQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Source POP i i | Identification of requested source POPs.i , POP j , cost) ... | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs to which the following cost information belongs.i , POP j , delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | Delay, delay jitter, loss rate: the QoS parameters between every pair of POPs and measurement of the specific execution policy. |
+
+#### **8.5.2.7 RankingQuery information flow**
+
+The RankingQuery information flow is sent from RLF to OPP-FE to request the ranking list of requested POPs from the OPP-FE.
+
+Table 8-26 provides the description of the information components included in the RankingQuery information flow.
+
+**Table 8-26 – RankingQuery information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| POP 1 , ... POP n | A list of identification of candidate POPs sorted in the order of the HQthreshold. |
+| HQthreshold (delay, delay jitter, loss rate) | High quality threshold value used as criterion in sorting the listed POPs. |
+
+#### **8.5.2.8 RankingResult information flow**
+
+The RankingResult information flow is sent from OPP-FE to RLF to indicate the ranking result of candidate POPs to the RLF.
+
+Table 8-27 provides the description of the information components included in the RankingResult information flow.
+
+**Table 8-27 – RankingResult information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| POP a , POP b , POP c ... POP m | List of the requested POPs in the order of preference, with POP a having the highest preference. |
+
+#### **8.5.2.9 Subscribe information flow**
+
+The Subscribe information flow is sent from RLF to OPP-FE to request the information flow about modification of cost between specific POPs to reflect the timeliness of the carrier's management and optimization policies. Once there is any change in cost between the requested POPs, the RLF can obtain the notification in time.
+
+Table 8-28 provides the description of the information components included in the Subscribe information flow.
+
+**Table 8-28 – Subscribe information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (Application identification) | Application identification: to tell the OPP-FE which application subscribes to the notification information flow. |
+| (POP i , POP j ) | A pair of identification of POPs. Notification of the cost between two POPs will be sent, if the subscription request is accepted. |
+
+##### **8.5.2.10 Notify information flow**
+
+The Notify information flow is sent from OPP-FE to RLF to provide the changed cost between requested POPs. Once there is any change in the cost, the OPP-FE will send this Notify information flow.
+
+Table 8-29 provides the description of the information components included in the Notify information flow.
+
+**Table 8-29 – Notify information components**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| (POP i , POP j , cost) | POP i , POP j : a pair of identification of POPs.Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2211
+
+(10/2007)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services over NGN**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2211
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue. To the right of the globe, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue, sans-serif font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| AVAILABLE | Y.1–Y.99 |
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| Available | Y.900–Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| Available | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Available | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Available | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.2211**
+
+# **IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services over NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+NGN release 1 makes provision for a category of services which are referred to as real-time conversational multimedia services, as shown in Supplement 1 to the ITU-T Y.2000-series Recommendations. These include PSTN/ISDN simulation services and other services. When these real-time conversational multimedia services are provided by using an IMS-based service environment, the implementations will use SIP protocol between the application/service support functions and the service control functions within the service stratum of the NGN architecture. IMS-based NGNs which meet these service requirements will be capable of supporting real-time conversational multimedia services with enhanced service features, as well as allowing for enhanced implementation scenarios. This Recommendation defines the service requirements, service features, service architecture and implementation scenarios of IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2211 was approved on 7 October 2007 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Implementation scenarios, IMS, real-time conversational multimedia services, service feature.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU [had/had not] received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 General requirements for IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services... | 5 |
+| 7 IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services architecture details..... | 5 |
+| 8 Service features for IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services..... | 6 |
+| 9 PSTN/ISDN simulation services ..... | 9 |
+| 9.1 Introduction ..... | 9 |
+| 9.2 General ..... | 10 |
+| 9.3 Interworking considerations ..... | 10 |
+| 9.4 Originating identification presentation (OIP)..... | 11 |
+| 9.5 Originating identification restriction (OIR)..... | 12 |
+| 9.6 Terminating identification presentation (TIP)..... | 13 |
+| 9.7 Terminating identification restriction (TIR)..... | 13 |
+| 9.8 Malicious communication identification (MCID)..... | 13 |
+| 9.9 Anonymous communication rejection (ACR)..... | 14 |
+| 9.10 Communication diversion (CDIV) ..... | 16 |
+| 9.11 Communication hold (HOLD) ..... | 21 |
+| 9.12 Communication barring (CB)..... | 21 |
+| 9.13 Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS) ..... | 22 |
+| 9.14 Communication waiting (CW) ..... | 23 |
+| 9.15 Message waiting indication (MWI)..... | 24 |
+| 9.16 Conference (CONF) ..... | 24 |
+| 9.17 Advice of charge (AOC) ..... | 25 |
+| 9.18 Explicit communication transfer (ECT) ..... | 26 |
+| 9.19 Reverse charging (RC) ..... | 27 |
+| 9.20 Use of authorization option in relation to PSTN/ISDN simulation services.. | 27 |
+| 10 Universal personal telecommunication (UPT) ..... | 28 |
+| 11 Customized ring-back tone (CRBT)..... | 28 |
+| 12 Customized ringing tone (CRT) ..... | 29 |
+| 13 Additional services and service features..... | 29 |
+| 14 Security consideration ..... | 29 |
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Appendix I – Multimedia conference (MultiCONF) ..... | 30 |
+| Appendix II – IP Centrex ..... | 31 |
+| Appendix III – Mappings between IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia4 , A-S3 , A-S6 and A-U1 respectively to deliver various service-related information.
+
+- A-S4 is used to deliver information related to service control, including service triggering information and call control-related information. This is identified as the ISC reference point in [ITU-T Y.2021].
+- A-S3 is used by application/service support functions to notify the MRC-FE of media resources control information.
+
+NOTE – A-S3 is shown within NGN environment [ITU-T Y.2012]. This is used for media resources control. A set of implementation scenarios including information flow on A-S3 is shown in Appendix IV.
+
+- A-S6 is used to transfer user profile information from SUP-FE to the application/service support functions, e.g., user service-related information. This is identified as the Sh reference point in [ITU-T Y.2021].
+- A-U1 is used for self-management of service profiles by subscribers. This is identified as the Ut reference point in [ITU-T Y.2021].
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services functional architecture. The diagram shows a functional architecture within a dashed box. At the top is a box for 'Application support functions and service support functions'. Below it are three boxes: 'SUP-FE', 'S-CSC-FE', and 'MRC-FE'. These are connected to a top-level box via reference points A-S6, A-S4, and A-S3 respectively. Below these are three more boxes: 'AGC-FE', 'P-CSC-FE', and 'BGC-FE'. These are connected to the middle-level boxes via dashed lines. To the right of these is a box for 'MGC-FE'. Below the middle-level boxes is a box for 'Service stratum'. Below the 'Service stratum' is a box for 'Transport stratum'. To the left of the 'Transport stratum' is a box for 'End-user function'. To the right of the 'Transport stratum' is a box for 'Other networks'. A dashed line labeled A-U1 connects the 'End-user function' box to the 'Application support functions and service support functions' box. The diagram is labeled Y.2211(07)\_F01 at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services functional architecture**
+
+# 8 Service features for IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services
+
+This clause describes service features of IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services. A service feature is a key aspect of communication services and forms a general and primitive component to compose specific communication services. Specific communication services characterized by service features are described in clauses 9 through 12.
+
+### Authorization code (AC)
+
+This service feature allows the served user to override calling restrictions of the terminal from which the communication is made. Different sets of calling privileges can be assigned to different authorization codes and a given authorization code can be shared by multiple users.
+
+### Automatic communication back (ACB)
+
+This service feature allows the called party to automatically initiate a communication back to the calling party of the most recent communication directed to the called party.
+
+### Customized announcement (CA)
+
+This service feature allows a served user to send customized announcements during the establishment of a communication session or during an established communication session, for example, to explain the reason for rejecting a communication request, to notify of a diversion or a hold, to indicate a message waiting, or to provide a ring-back tone or media in place of a ring-back
+
+tone. The announcement may use any type of media, e.g., it may be an audio announcement, a video clip or a text message.
+
+### **Customized background music (CBM)**
+
+This service feature allows playing background music during a communication, e.g., music.
+
+The background music could be configured in advance by the user. The user could insert a song during a communication.
+
+### **Communication distribution (CDIST)**
+
+This service feature allows the served user to specify the percentage of calls to be distributed among two or more destinations. Other criteria may also apply to the distribution of calls to each destination.
+
+### **Communication forwarding (CF)**
+
+This service feature allows the called party to forward his incoming communication to another party depending on conditions specified by the called party, including busy, no reply, not logged in or unconditional. A notification of diversion may be provided to the calling party and the diverting user. As part of this service feature, when a served user attempts to initiate the call forwarding feature, the system will review the proposed "forwarded to identifier" against a disallowed forwarded to identifier database. If the identifier is found, the request to call forward to that party will be rejected (i.e., the emergency service identifier could not be set as the forwarded to identifier).
+
+### **Communication hold (HOLD)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to suspend one or more media within a session, and resume that/those media at a later time. A notification may be provided to the held party.
+
+### **Communication logging (CL)**
+
+This service feature allows for a communication detail record to be prepared each time a communication is received to a specified communication number.
+
+### **Customized routing (CR)**
+
+This service feature enables the subscriber to accept or reject a call and, in case of acceptance, to route this call, according to a set of rules which may be based on: the calling party geographical location, the time of day, the day, and/or presence information.
+
+When this feature is applied, the service (e.g., UPT service) queries the subscriber's routing rule to obtain an appropriate terminating identifier, and routes the communication to the appropriate terminal.
+
+### **Customized ringing (CRG)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to set the media provided by the media server for ringing which may be different depending on the called party, special day, etc. When the user equipment receives a communication, it detects whether the ringing is networked or local. If the ringing is networked, the user equipment activates the service by initiating a request to connect to the media server and then the user equipment plays the media stream received from the media server. The customized ringing media could be a specific song, an image, or a multimedia stream.
+
+### **Communication transfer (CT)**
+
+This service feature enables a user to transfer an established (i.e., active) communication to a third party.
+
+### **Click-to-dial (CTD)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to initiate a request to establish a communication conveniently by clicking on a web page icon or button. The use of this service feature alone is not sufficient to establish a communication, this service feature needs to combine with the third party communication control service feature.
+
+### **Communication waiting (CW)**
+
+This service feature allows the called party to receive a notification that another party is trying to reach his number while he is busy communicating to another party.
+
+### **Destination-associated message type query (DMTQ)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to pre-define possible message types, with this information being accessible by other users. When this feature is applied, the user is able to access this information by querying the application server to obtain a destination terminal address and the associated pre-defined message types.
+
+### **Follow-me diversion (FMD)**
+
+With this service feature, a user may register for incoming calls to any terminal access. When registered to a terminal access, all incoming calls to the user will be presented to that terminal access. A registration for incoming calls will cancel any previous registration. Several users may register for incoming calls to the same terminal access simultaneously. The user may also explicitly de-register for incoming calls.
+
+### **Group communication (GC)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to request pre-defined group information stored in the network when establishing multiple simultaneous communication with other parties. The use of this service feature alone is not sufficient to establish the communication. Different users are added to the communication according to their pre-defined privileges.
+
+### **Multi-party communication (MPC)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to establish multiple simultaneous communication with other parties.
+
+### **Message waiting (MW)**
+
+This service feature enables a user to be informed that messages for his attention are waiting.
+
+### **Originating communication screening (OCS)**
+
+This service feature allows the subscriber to specify that outgoing calls be either restricted or allowed, according to a screening list and, optionally, by time of day control. This can be overridden on a per-communication basis by anyone with the proper authorization code.
+
+### **Off-line charging (OFLC)**
+
+This service feature allows for off-line charging for services where delayed charging is acceptable.
+
+### **ON-line charging (ONLC)**
+
+This service feature allows applying on-line charging for services where real-time charging and control are critical and required.
+
+### **Personal identifier (PI)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to hold a unique identifier as personal identification while communicating with others. The user can use a personal identifier as his/her unique identification to communicate with others. All of the user's terminal devices could be bound with a personal
+
+identifier. The service capabilities would be defined with respect to a personal identifier. No matter whether a binding fixed terminal or a binding mobile terminal is used, the user could enjoy the same service experience.
+
+### **Reverse charging (REVC)**
+
+This service feature allows the service subscriber (e.g., free phone) to accept receipt of calls at its expense and be charged for the entire cost of the communication.
+
+### **Ring pattern (RP)**
+
+This service feature supports various ring patterns of destination number, i.e., parallel ring, sequential ring, combination ring of the previous two.
+
+### **Split charging (SC)**
+
+This service feature allows for the separation of charges for a specific communication, the calling and called party each being charged for one part of the communication.
+
+### **Terminating communication screening (TCS)**
+
+Terminating calls may be controlled by the terminating communication screening capability. This allows the called party to specify that incoming calls be either restricted or allowed, according to a screening list of identifiers of the calling parties and, optionally, by time of day control.
+
+Typical scenarios include:
+
+- 1) Calling user A attempts to make a communication to B. The communication is screened via the screening list assigned to B. The communication is allowed to complete and A is connected to B.
+- 2) Calling user A attempts to make a communication to B. The communication is screened via the screening list assigned to B. The communication is not allowed to complete and A is connected to an announcement.
+
+### **Third party communication control (3PCC)**
+
+This service feature allows a user to set up, release and control a communication between parties when the user is different from the parties directly involved in the communication.
+
+### **Unsuccessful communication notification (UCN)**
+
+This service feature allows the subscriber to be informed of the unsuccessful incoming calls in a preset way, e.g., e-mail message, etc.
+
+### **User identification presentation and restriction (UIPR)**
+
+This service feature allows the user to receive user identification information from the other party or prevent presentation of his user identification information to the other party within a communication. The user could be either a calling party or a called party. As government policy or operator policy, this feature is sometimes forced to be supported.
+
+### **User profile management (UPM)**
+
+This service feature allows the served user to manage his service profile, e.g., terminating destinations, announcements to be played, communication forwarding, and so on.
+
+# **9 PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+## **9.1 Introduction**
+
+An important aspect of the PSTN/ISDN simulation service is to provide PSTN/ISDN-like services. Nevertheless, the requirements are independent of the media that is used during the communication.
+
+This clause covers part of the transition from PSTN/ISDN to an NGN. Interconnection between the existing networks and an NGN is also covered.
+
+## **9.2 General**
+
+There is no mandatory requirement to offer PSTN/ISDN simulation services in a particular network deployment.
+
+The PSTN/ISDN simulation services support interworking with existing fixed and mobile networks, including PSTN, ISDN, GSM/UMTS and Internet. Services not interoperated across the different network types should be declined in a graceful and consistent manner.
+
+In addition to the capabilities to establish a bidirectional point-to-point communication between two parties, a selected number of PSTN/ISDN simulation services, corresponding to perceived popular PSTN/ISDN supplementary services, are included in this Recommendation. PSTN/ISDN simulation services are described from a user's perspective and are similar, and in some instances almost identical, to the corresponding PSTN/ISDN supplementary services. The services described are not limited to the voice media as in PSTN/ISDN, but are intended to be generally applicable regardless of the media used (voice, video, text, etc.).
+
+However, from a functionality distribution perspective, this clause places no particular requirements on the functionality distribution between the network and terminals. Further, the need to preserve the split of functionality, between the network and terminals, provided for supplementary services in an ISDN or PSTN is not a requirement with regard to the NGN.
+
+This clause only deals with services using IMS. Services provided by an NGN to support legacy terminals and interfaces (PSTN/ISDN emulation) are defined in existing PSTN/ISDN documents. Requirements for PSTN/ISDN emulation are out the scope of this Recommendation and are described in other Recommendations (e.g., [b-ITU-T Y.2271] and [b-ITU-T Y.2031]).
+
+Provision, withdrawal, registration, erasure, activation, deactivation and invocation are defined in [b-ITU-T I.210].
+
+The remaining subclauses within this clause provide the description of the PSTN/ISDN simulation services.
+
+For each PSTN/ISDN simulation service, the following is provided:
+
+- a short service definition;
+- a description of the normal operation with successful outcome.
+
+And, when applicable, also:
+
+- a description of exceptional operation or unsuccessful outcome;
+- descriptions on interaction with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services; and
+- considerations for interworking with the PSTN/ISDN.
+
+If one simulation service is not mentioned within the interaction clause, then there is no impact or the interaction is described in the clause related to that simulation service.
+
+## **9.3 Interworking considerations**
+
+### **9.3.1 Interworking with existing PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+An NGN supports the interoperability of the PSTN/ISDN simulation services with PSTN/ISDN services and vice versa. This includes interworking PSTN/ISDN supplementary services with the services defined in this Recommendation and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+### 9.3.2 Interworking with other NGNs
+
+An NGN supports the interoperability of the simulation services defined in this Recommendation with other NGNs if the services are supported by both NGNs.
+
+### 9.3.3 Interworking with emulation services
+
+An NGN supports the interoperability of the PSTN/ISDN simulation services with the services provided by the NGN PSTN/ISDN emulation subsystems where both are deployed. The scope of this interworking may result in the same limited service capability as interworking with an existing PSTN/ISDN network.
+
+## 9.4 Originating identification presentation (OIP)
+
+### 9.4.1 Description
+
+The OIP simulation service provides the terminating party with the asserted identification information of the originating party.
+
+### 9.4.2 OIP service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services
+
+**Originating identification restriction:** The OIR service shall have precedence over OIP.
+
+NOTE – The requirements for support of emergency telecommunication may override the user request for suppression.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU):** When a communication has been forwarded and the forwarded-to party has subscribed to the OIP simulation service, the forwarded-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if the original originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB):** When a communication has been forwarded and the forwarded-to party has been provided with the OIP simulation service, the forwarded-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if this original originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR):** When a communication has been forwarded and the forwarded-to party has been provided with the OIP simulation service, the forwarded-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if this original originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL):** When a communication has been forwarded and the forwarded-to party has been provided with the OIP simulation service, the forwarded-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if this original originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD):** When a communication has been deflected and the deflected-to party has been provided with the OIP simulation service, the deflected-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if this original originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** When a communication has been forwarded and the forwarded-to party has been provided with the OIP simulation service, the forwarded-to party receives the identification information of the original originating party, if this originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** When a communication diversion is being notified to a served user (who has subscribed for CDIV notification) and the served user has been provided with the OIP simulation service, then the served user receives the identification information of the originating party, if:
+
+- this originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service; and
+- the served user has not disabled delivery of originating party identification within the CDIV notification.
+
+**Communication waiting (CW):** If a party has the OIP service active and is notified that an incoming communication is waiting, then this party receives the identification information of the originating party, if this originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the OIR simulation service.
+
+### **9.4.3 OIP interoperability with PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the OIP service with the PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CLIP and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability (only E.164 numbers can be used in the PSTN/ISDN).
+
+## **9.5 Originating identification restriction (OIR)**
+
+### **9.5.1 Description**
+
+The originating identification restriction (OIR) simulation service enables the originating party to withhold the presentation of its identification information to the terminating party.
+
+NOTE – The requirements for support of emergency telecommunication may override the user request for suppression, i.e., a properly authorized terminating party may invoke an override capability.
+
+### **9.5.2 OIR service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Originating identification presentation:** The OIR service shall have precedence over OIP.
+
+NOTE – The requirements for support of emergency telecommunication may override the user request for suppression.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU), communication forwarding busy (CFB), communication forwarding no reply (CFNR), communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL), communication deflection (CD), communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** When the OIR simulation service has been invoked, the originating party's identification information is not presented to the forwarded-to party unless the forwarded-to party has invoked an override capability.
+
+**Communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** When the OIR simulation service has been invoked, the originating party's identification information shall not be notified to the user who has subscribed for the CDIVN service.
+
+**Explicit communication transfer (ECT):** Originating party's restriction requirements from the original communication are used in order to restrict the presentation of that party's identification information to any party in a transferred communication, unless the forwarded-to party has invoked an override capability.
+
+### **9.5.3 OIR interoperability with PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+An NGN supports the interoperability of OIR service with the PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CLIR and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability. The originating party's identification restriction information is conveyed from an NGN to a PSTN/ISDN and vice versa. The network to which the terminating party is connected to is responsible to handle this service.
+
+In case of limited interoperability, OIR/CLIR shall have precedence over OIP/CLIP.
+
+## **9.6 Terminating identification presentation (TIP)**
+
+### **9.6.1 Description**
+
+The TIP simulation service provides the originating party with the asserted identification information of the terminating party.
+
+### **9.6.2 TIP service interactions with other ISDN/PSTN simulation services (NGN)**
+
+**Terminating identification restriction (TIR):** TIR shall have precedence over TIP.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** If forwarding party B chooses to restrict the presentation of the forwarded-to party, i.e., C's identification information, the originating party A does not receive the terminating party C's identification information, irrespective of whether the terminating party C has TIR activated or not.
+
+### **9.6.3 TIP interoperability with PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the TIP services with the PSTN/ISDN supplementary service COLP and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## **9.7 Terminating identification restriction (TIR)**
+
+### **9.7.1 Description**
+
+The terminating identification restriction (TIR) enables the terminating party to withhold presentation of its asserted identification information to the originating party.
+
+NOTE – The requirements for support of emergency telecommunication may override the user request for suppression.
+
+### **9.7.2 TIR service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Terminating identification presentation (TIP):** TIR shall have precedence over TIP.
+
+### **9.7.3 TIR interoperability with PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the TIR services with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service COLR and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+In case of limited interoperability, TIR/COLR shall have precedence over TIP/COLP.
+
+## **9.8 Malicious communication identification (MCID)**
+
+### **9.8.1 Description**
+
+The malicious communication identification (MCID) simulation service enables an incoming communication to be identified and registered.
+
+The service is required for all communications, irrespective of which network originated the communication. It is normally provided following a request from the customer concerned, and may be subject to authorization before being invoked.
+
+### **9.8.2 MCID service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** The MCID simulation service can be invoked for a diverted communication. In addition to the normal operation of the MCID simulation service, the identifier of the first diverting party is registered and, as a network option, the last diverting party may be registered.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR):** If the terminating party has activated CFNR, once forwarding has taken place, the forwarding party cannot invoke the MCID simulation service.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD):** If the terminating party has activated communication deflection, once deflection has taken place, the deflecting party cannot invoke the MCID simulation service.
+
+**Explicit communication transfer (ECT):** The transferring party cannot invoke the MCID simulation service on a communication after transfer of that communication has been successfully invoked.
+
+If, after a transfer has been completed, the transferred-to party successfully invokes the MCID service, then the network registers the identities of all parties involved.
+
+**Conference (CONF):** The conference controller cannot invoke the malicious call identification supplementary service for participants within the conference.
+
+NOTE – To activate the malicious call identification supplementary service, the conference controller should first create a private communication with the user to be identified using the malicious call identification supplementary service.
+
+If a participant invokes the malicious call identification supplementary service, only information about the connection to the conference controller is registered. No information about the other participants is registered.
+
+### **9.8.3 MCID interoperability with PSTN/ISDN networks**
+
+The MCID service interoperates for all communication from a PSTN/ISDN to an NGN and vice versa. The registered information is stored in the invoking party's network and may also be stored in the network that serves the malicious party.
+
+## **9.9 Anonymous communication rejection (ACR)**
+
+### **9.9.1 Description**
+
+The anonymous communication rejection (ACR) simulation service allows the terminating party to reject incoming communication from originating parties that cannot be identified.
+
+### **9.9.2 ACR service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Originating identification presentation (OIP):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Originating identification restriction (OIR):** If the terminating party has activated the ACR simulation service, then the OIR simulation service causes the execution of the ACR simulation service.
+
+If the terminating party has the override capability according to the OIR simulation service, then the ACR simulation service is not applicable.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** If the diverted-to user has activated the ACR simulation service, then the ACR simulation service takes precedence over the communication diversion simulation service, i.e., the communication is rejected according to the ACR simulation service.
+
+NOTE 1 – The precedence that ACR takes over the communication diversion services does not exclude the use of forwarding functionality in the ACR functionality itself. As an example, forwarding of anonymous communication (e.g., to a voice mailbox) as part of the ACR functionality is possible.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR):** If the forwarding party has activated the ACR simulation service, then there is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE 2 – If the originating party has restricted its identification information due to the OIR simulation service, the communication will not be presented.
+
+**Communication waiting (CW):** If the terminating party has activated the ACR simulation service, then the ACR simulation service takes precedence over the communication waiting simulation service. The ACR simulation service can be activated while a communication is waiting without changing the state of the waiting communication session.
+
+**Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS):** Assuming the originating party connects to the terminating party and the terminating party activates the ACR simulation service (or has activated the ACR simulation service), two cases are possible:
+
+- a) The ACR simulation service was activated by the terminating party before the originating party originates a communication: No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE 3 – If the originating party has restricted the presentation of its identification information due to the invocation of the OIR simulation service and if the terminating party is busy, the originating party will receive no busy indication, and the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service will not apply. Instead, the communication session attempt is rejected according to the normal procedures of the ACR simulation service.
+
+- b) The ACR simulation service is activated by the terminating party after the originating party has activated the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service on the terminating party: If the terminating party activates the ACR simulation service after the originating party has activated the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service on the terminating party, then the communication resulting from the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service is rejected if the originating party has restricted its identification information due to the OIR simulation service.
+
+NOTE 4 – A CCBS recall (from the network to the originating party) resulting from the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service is not rejected due to the application of the ACR simulation service.
+
+Assuming the originating party connects to the terminating party and the terminating party activates the ACR simulation service (or has activated the ACR simulation service), two cases are possible:
+
+- a) The ACR simulation service was activated by the terminating party before the originating party originates a communication: There is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE 5 – If the originating party has restricted its identification information due to the OIR simulation service and if the terminating party is busy, the originating party will receive no busy indication, and the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service will not apply. Instead, the communication session attempt is rejected according to the normal procedures of the ACR simulation service.
+
+- b) The ACR simulation service is activated by the terminating party after the originating party has activated the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service on the terminating party: If the terminating party activates the ACR simulation service after the originating party has activated the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service on the terminating party, then the communication resulting from the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service is rejected if the originating party has restricted its identification information due to the OIR simulation service.
+
+### 9.9.3 ACR interoperability with PSTN/ISDN
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the ACR services with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service ACR and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## **9.10 Communication diversion (CDIV)**
+
+### **9.10.1 Description**
+
+The following communication diversion simulation services are described:
+
+- Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU).
+- Communication forwarding busy (CFB).
+- Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR).
+- Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL).
+- Communication deflection (CD).
+- Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc).
+- Communication diversion notification (CDIVN).
+
+For all communication diversion simulation services, a service provider option of notification of diversion may be provided to the originating party. This service provider option may also include support for the invoking user to suppress the notification.
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider defines the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU)**
+
+The CFU service enables a user to have the network redirect all communication to another user. The CFU service may operate on all communication, or just those associated with specified services. The user's ability to originate communication is unaffected by the CFU simulation service. After the CFU service has been activated, communication is forwarded independently of the status of the user.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the user to receive an indication that the CFU service has been activated. This indication may be provided when the user originates a communication if the CFU service has been activated for the user and for the service requested for the communication.
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider defines the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication forwarding busy (CFB)**
+
+The CFB service enables a user to have the network redirect communication, which would otherwise be regarded as busy, to another user. The CFB service may operate on all communications, or just those associated with specified services. The user's ability to originate communication is unaffected by the CFB simulation service.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the user to receive an indication that the CFB service has been activated. This indication may be provided when the user originates a communication if the CFB service has been activated for the user and for the service requested for the communication.
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider defines the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR)**
+
+The CFNR service enables a user to have the network redirect communication, when the communication request is not responded to within a defined period of time, to another user. The
+
+CFNR service may operate on all communications, or just those associated with specified services. The user's ability to originate communication is unaffected by the CFNR simulation service.
+
+The CFNR service can only be invoked by the network after the communication has been offered to the user and an indication that the user has been informed of the communication request.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the user to receive an indication that the CFNR service has been activated. This indication may be provided when the user originates a communication if the CFNR service has been activated for the user and for the service requested for the communication.
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider defines the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL)**
+
+The CFNL service enables a user to redirect incoming communication, when the user is not currently registered (logged in), to another user. The CFNL service may operate on all communications, or just those associated with specified services.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the user to receive an indication that the CFNL service has been activated. This indication may be provided when the user next registers (logs in). An indication may also be provided as part of de-registration (log out).
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider defines the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication deflection (CD)**
+
+The CD service enables the user to respond to an incoming communication by requesting redirection of that communication to another user. The CD service can only be invoked before the communication is established by the user, i.e., in response to the offered communication, or during the period that the user is being informed of the communication. The user's ability to originate communication is unaffected by the CD simulation service.
+
+#### **Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc)**
+
+The CFNRc service enables a user to have the network redirect all incoming communication, when the user is not reachable (e.g., there is no IP connectivity to the user's terminal), to another user. The CFNRc service may operate on all communication, or just those associated with specified services. The user's ability to originate communication is unaffected by the CFNRc simulation service.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the user to receive an indication that the CFNRc service has been activated. This indication may be provided when the user originates a communication if the CFNRc service has been activated for the user and for the service requested for the communication.
+
+The maximum number of diversions permitted for each communication is a service provider option. The service provider shall define the upper limit of diversions. When counting the number of diversions, all types of diversion are included.
+
+#### **Communication diversion notification (CDIVN)**
+
+The CDIVN service enables a user to receive notifications about the diversions (or forwarding) of incoming communication, post execution of at least one other CDIV service.
+
+As a service provider option, a subscription option can be provided to enable the served user to receive an indication that the CDIVN service has been activated. This indication is provided when
+
+the served user originates a communication if the CDIVN service has been activated for the served user.
+
+### **9.10.2 CDIV service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Originating identification presentation (OIP):** When a communication has been diverted and the diverted-to party has been provided with the originating identification presentation simulation service, the diverted-to party receives the identification information of the originating party, if this originating party has not subscribed to or invoked the originating identification restriction simulation service.
+
+**Originating identification restriction (OIR):** When the originating identification restriction simulation service has been invoked, the originating party's identification information is not presented to the diverted-to party unless the diverted-to party has an override capability.
+
+**Terminating identification presentation (TIP):** When a communication has been diverted and the originating party has been provided with the terminating identification presentation simulation service, the originating party receives the identification information of the diverted-to party, unless the diverting user has selected the option to suppress the notification of diversion.
+
+**Terminating identification restriction (TIR):** If the diverting party or the diverted-to party has invoked the terminating identification restriction simulation service, then the diverted-to party's identification information is not provided to the originating party unless the originating party has an override capability.
+
+**Malicious communication identification (MCID):** As described in the MCID clause.
+
+**Anonymous communication rejection (ACR):** As described in the ACR clause.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU) with CFU:** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact, as CDIVN only enables a notification of communication diversion information, post execution of at least one CDIV service.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU) with other CDIV services:** Invocation of CFU takes precedence over other CDIV simulation services.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication forwarding busy (CFB):** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication forwarding no reply (CFNR):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication forwarding not logged in (CFNL):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication deflection (CD):** If the terminating party is not network-determined user busy, then the CD simulation service or the communication forwarding busy simulation service can be invoked, depending on the response from the terminating party.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication forwarding subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** If the terminating party is network-determined user busy, then CFB takes precedence over CFNRc. Otherwise, if the terminating party is not network-determined user busy, then there is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact, as CDIVN only enables a notification of communication diversion information, post execution of at least one CDIV service.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication forwarding busy (CFB):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication forwarding no reply (CFNR):** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication deflection (CD):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE 1 – If the network indicates the arrival of an incoming communication to the terminating party, then the CD simulation service, or the communication forwarding no reply simulation service can be invoked, depending on the response, or lack of response, from the terminating party.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact, as CDIVN only enables a notification of communication diversion information, post execution of at least one CDIV service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL) with communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL):** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact. In case of CFNL activation, the CDIVN service buffers the communication diversion notification information and notifies the user when the user logs in again. The communication diversion information is buffered for a time-period configurable by the user and/or the provider.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL) with other CDIV simulation services:** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD) with communication deflection (CD):** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD) with communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact, as CDIVN only enables a notification of communication diversion information, post execution of at least one CDIV service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc) with communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc):** Not applicable.
+
+**Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc) with communication diversion notification (CDIVN):** No impact. In case of CFNRc activation, the CDIVN service buffers the communication diversion notification information and notifies the user, until the time the user is reachable again. The communication diversion information is buffered for a time-period configurable by the user and/or the provider.
+
+**Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc) with other CDIV services:** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU) with communication waiting:** CW has no impact on CFU. The communication will be forwarded without regard to the terminating party's state. A forwarded-to party may have communication waiting service and this will be activated if busy. A forwarded communication can result in the communication waiting simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding busy (CFB) with communication waiting:** CW cannot co-exist with CFB. Service provider options to prevent both services being active at the same time include:
+
+- One service cannot be activated while the other service is active.
+- CFB has priority over CW (i.e., the CW never occurs).
+- CW has priority over CFB (i.e., the CFB never occurs).
+
+**Communication forwarding no reply (CFNR) with communication waiting:** If terminating party has activated the CFNR simulation service, then a waiting communication shall still be offered. If the CFNR timer expires before an answer is received then the CFNR simulation service shall be invoked and the communication shall be forwarded and communication waiting ceased. A forwarded communication can result in the communication waiting simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL) with communication waiting:** No impact.
+
+NOTE 2 – If a party with an active communication waiting logs out, the all active and offered communication would be released.
+
+**Communication deflection (CD) with communication waiting:** When receiving the communication waiting indication, terminating party can invoke the CD simulation service. A deflected communication can result in the communication waiting simulation service.
+
+**Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc) with communication waiting:** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service shall affect the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Outgoing communication barring (OCB):** If the outgoing communication barring simulation service has already been activated, a request to activate any CDIV simulation service shall be rejected if the forwarding party's communication to the diverted-to party would be barred by the outgoing communication barring simulation service.
+
+If the CDIV simulation service was activated before the activation of the outgoing communication barring simulation service, the outgoing communication barring simulation service can still be activated. When the two services have already been activated, a request to invoke the CDIV simulation service shall be rejected if the forwarding party's communication to the diverted-to party would be barred by the outgoing communication barring simulation service at the time of the invocation attempt of the CDIV simulation service.
+
+**Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS):** CCBS recalls are never diverted, and are always provided to the original originating party.
+
+CCBS cannot be activated on a diverted communication.
+
+**Charging information at the end of the communication (AOC-E) activated at the originating party:** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Charging information at the end of the communication (AOC-E) activated at the forwarding party:** When a communication is forwarded and the forwarding party is charged for the forwarded part of the communication then, as a network option, the charging information can be transferred to the forwarding user when the communication is terminated provided that the served user has subscribed to the advice of charge: charging information at the end of the communication simulation service with the value of the subscription option set to "for all communication automatically".
+
+### **9.10.3 CDIV interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the CDIV service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CF and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability. The CLI information of the originating party as well as further CLI information (first redirected address, last redirected address) may be provided to the final called party, if the PSTN/ISDN allows this.
+
+## **9.11 Communication hold (HOLD)**
+
+### **9.11.1 Description**
+
+The communication hold simulation service enables a user to suspend one/more media within a session, and resume that/those media at a later time.
+
+Each party in a communication can hold and retrieve the communication independently from the other party. This also applies when a communication involves more than two parties (e.g., CONF).
+
+### **9.11.2 HOLD service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Conference (CONF):** A, B and C are in a conference that was created by B invoking the CONF service. B can interrupt his own participation in the conference by using the HOLD service. When B does this, A and C shall not receive the HOLD notification and are not prevented from carrying on their conversation.
+
+### **9.11.3 HOLD interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the HOLD service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service HOLD and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## **9.12 Communication barring (CB)**
+
+### **9.12.1 Description**
+
+Communication barring consists of two simulation services:
+
+#### **Outgoing communication barring (OCB)**
+
+This service enables a user to bar certain categories of outgoing communication. The network provides the capability for a user to select a set of categories (e.g., identifiers or range of identifiers) for barring. The type of barring is chosen by the user at provision time, and is valid for all outgoing communication. The network provides the capability for the user to bar outgoing communication based on user-defined identifiers or identifier ranges. Barring of an outgoing communication for a specific identifier, a number of specific identifiers, or a range of identifiers is dependent on an entry in an OCB identifier list held in the network. This list is either a "black list" or "white list". A "black list" contains the identifiers or identifier ranges to be barred by the network for outgoing communication. A "white list" contains the identifiers or identifier ranges that are allowed by the network for outgoing communication, i.e., all identifiers not in the "white list" are barred.
+
+The ability of the served user to receive communication and to originate emergency telecommunication is unaffected by OCB.
+
+NOTE 1 – This service uses the OCS service feature.
+
+#### **Incoming communication barring (ICB)**
+
+This service allows a user to bar certain categories of incoming communication. The service also allows the user to have the barring of incoming calls activated always or only during certain conditions. The network shall provide the capability for a user to select from a set of categories (e.g., identifiers or range of identifiers) for barring. The type of barring is chosen by the user at
+
+provision time and may be valid for all incoming communication, or be limited to a specific service group or certain conditions (e.g., when the user is roaming).
+
+The ability of the served user to set-up outgoing communication is unaffected by ICB.
+
+NOTE 2 – This service uses the TCS service feature.
+
+### **9.12.2 Service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** The interactions between communication barring and communication diversion services are described in clause 9.10.2.
+
+### **9.12.3 Communication barring interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the CB service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CB and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## **9.13 Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS)**
+
+### **9.13.1 Description**
+
+The CCBS simulation service enables an originating party, encountering a busy terminating party, to have the communication completed without having to make a new communication attempt when the terminating party becomes free.
+
+When the originating party requests the CCBS simulation service, the network will monitor for the terminating party becoming free.
+
+When the terminating party becomes free, then the network will wait a short time in order to allow the resources to be re-used for originating a communication. If the resources are not re-used by the terminating party within this time, then the network will automatically inform the originating party that the terminating party has become free. The originating party can then generate the CCBS communication to the terminating party.
+
+When the originating party accepts the CCBS recall, then the network automatically generates a CCBS communication to the terminating party.
+
+NOTE – A simulation service provided to the terminating party which prevents the registration of CCBS requests is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+During the CCBS recall, information is provided which indicates it is a CCBS recall. The information provided in the original communication attempt is included in the CCBS recall.
+
+### **9.13.2 CCBS service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+**Anonymous communication rejection (ACR):** A CCBS recall (from the network to the originating party) resulting from the completion of communication to busy subscribers does not result in a rejection due to the application of the ACR simulation service.
+
+Assuming the terminating party activates or has activated the ACR simulation service:
+
+If the terminating party activates the ACR simulation service after the originating party has activated the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service on the terminating party, then the communication resulting from the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service is rejected if the originating party has restricted its identification information due to the OIR simulation service.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** CCBS recalls are never diverted. They are provided to the original originating party.
+
+**Communication waiting (CW):** If the communication waiting indication cannot be provided at the terminating party, the originating party will receive busy indication and can invoke the CCBS simulation service to the terminating party.
+
+CCBS requests in the terminating party's CCBS queue are only processed if there is no communication waiting.
+
+NOTE 1 – For a waiting communication, the terminating party is not considered as busy.
+
+CCBS cannot be activated on a diverted communication.
+
+**Communication hold (HOLD):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE 2 – When receiving a CCBS communication indication, the originating party may invoke the communication hold simulation service in order to make interface resources available for the establishment of the CCBS communication.
+
+NOTE 3 – When the originating party is busy or CCBS busy and is notified that the terminating party is free, invocation of the communication hold simulation service does not result in the CCBS communication being established.
+
+**Communication barring (CB):** The originating party calls the terminating party who is busy, and then the originating party invokes CCBS. If the originating party invokes OCB before the CCBS has timed out or the terminating party becomes free, then the CCBS communication may be rejected due to the OCB invocation.
+
+**Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS):** A user can be both an "originating party" and a "terminating party" simultaneously, i.e., that user can have activated the CCBS simulation service and have CCBS requests outstanding whilst at the same time that user can be the destination of CCBS requests from other users.
+
+If a user receives a CCBS recall while that terminating party's CCBS queue is being processed, then the CCBS recall takes priority over the handling of the terminating party's CCBS queue. The handling of CCBS requests activated by this user has priority over the handling of CCBS requests activated by other users on this user.
+
+If one of the user's CCBS requests matures as a result, then the user is provided with a CCBS recall or notification. The terminating party idle guard timer, if running, is cancelled.
+
+**Advice of charge (AOC):** Charging information can be provided for the original communication, and for the resulting CCBS communication.
+
+### 9.13.3 CCBS interoperability with PSTN/ISDN
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the CCBS service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CCBS and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## 9.14 Communication waiting (CW)
+
+### 9.14.1 Description
+
+The communication waiting (CW) service enables a terminating party to be informed at the time that a new communication is requested, and that no resources are available for that incoming communication.
+
+The user then has the choice of accepting, rejecting or ignoring the incoming communication.
+
+The maximum number of calls that may be waiting is a service provider option.
+
+If the current number of calls waiting is equal to the maximum, then any new attempted incoming communication request shall be rejected with a busy cause.
+
+NOTE – This simulation service may be provided entirely by means of a terminal or other user equipment, e.g., utilizing the communication hold simulation service; in which case, communication waiting may not be provided by the network.
+
+### **9.14.2 Service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services (NGN)**
+
+**Anonymous communication rejection (ACR):** If the terminating party has activated the ACR simulation service, then the ACR simulation service shall take precedence over the communication waiting simulation service. The ACR simulation service can be activated while a communication is waiting without changing the state of the waiting communication session.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** The interactions between communication waiting and communication diversion services are described in clause 9.10.2.
+
+**Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS):** If a subscriber to the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service places a communication to a terminating party who has subscribed to the CW simulation service, and the terminating party has provided the communication waiting indication, then the invocation of the completion of communication to busy subscriber simulation service cannot occur.
+
+### **9.14.3 Interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+No special requirement.
+
+## **9.15 Message waiting indication (MWI)**
+
+### **9.15.1 Description**
+
+The MWI simulation service enables the network, upon the request of a controlling user, to indicate to the receiving user that there is at least one message waiting. The indication is sent to the receiving user when a message is deposited. Optionally, the network may send an indication to the user that there are no more unread messages in the mail box. This indication may be sent when the last unread message is read.
+
+NOTE – As an example, a voice message is stored by the network for a particular user. The network then provides the MWI to the user to indicate there is a message for retrieval. Having received this indication, the receiving user can subsequently access the mail box to listen to the message.
+
+The means by which the receiving user accesses and manages the mail box voice message service are outside the scope of this recommendation.
+
+### **9.15.2 MWI service interactions with other services (NGN)**
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** MWI is never diverted.
+
+**Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL):** MWI is never diverted. The indication is provided to the user on re-registering (logging in).
+
+### **9.15.3 MWI interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+There is no interoperability with PSTN/ISDN because MWI is a local service.
+
+## **9.16 Conference (CONF)**
+
+### **9.16.1 Description**
+
+The CONF simulation service enables a user to participate in and control a simultaneous communication involving a number of users.
+
+When the CONF simulation service is invoked, conference resources are allocated to the served user.
+
+Once a conference is active, users can join and leave a conference, and remote users can be added to or removed from the conference.
+
+Conference participants can request to be informed of these actions.
+
+### 9.16.2 CONF service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services
+
+**Conference (CONF):** A user can be involved as the conference controller separately in more than one conference. However, a user cannot add any conference to another conference.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Advice of charge (AOC):** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+NOTE – Every communication within the CONF service may be charged according to the normal communication procedures. Special arrangements (e.g., conference initiator may be charged for other parties' communication in the conference) are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+**Terminating identification presentation (TIP):** The conference controller shall ensure that privacy policies on identity information that it includes in conference notifications are enforced.
+
+**Terminating identification restriction (TIR):** The conference controller shall ensure that privacy policies on identity information that it includes in conference notifications are enforced.
+
+### 9.16.3 CONF interoperability with PSTN/ISDN
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the CONF service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary service CONF and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## 9.17 Advice of charge (AOC)
+
+### 9.17.1 Description
+
+AOC is a group of simulation services as follows:
+
+#### **Advice of charge: Charging information at communication set-up time (AOC-S)**
+
+The advice of charge at communication set-up simulation service provides the user with information about the charging rates at the time of communication establishment or during the communication in the case of charging rate changes. The charge information provided relates to the charges incurred on the network to which the served user is attached.
+
+#### **Advice of charge: Charging information during the communication (AOC-D)**
+
+The advice of charge during the communication simulation service enables the user to receive information on the recorded charges for a communication during the active phase of the communication. The charging information rates provided may be exchanged between different operator domains if those operators have interconnecting agreements to do so.
+
+#### **Advice of charge: Charging information at the end of the communication (AOC-E)**
+
+The advice of charge at end of communication simulation service provides the user with charging information for a communication when the communication is terminated. Depending on the option chosen at the time of subscription, the information can be sent for all communication, or on a per-communication basis. The charge information provided relates to the charges incurred on the network to which the served user is attached.
+
+### 9.17.2 AOC service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV) activated at the originating party:** No impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Communication diversion (CDIV) activated at the forwarding party:** When a communication is forwarded and the forwarding party is charged for the forwarded part of the communication, then as
+
+a network option, the charging information can be transferred to the forwarding user when the communication is terminated.
+
+**Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS):** Charging information is provided for the original communication, and for the resulting CCBS communication.
+
+### 9.17.3 AOC interoperability with PSTN/ISDN
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of the AOC service with PSTN/ISDN supplementary services and vice versa. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## 9.18 Explicit communication transfer (ECT)
+
+### 9.18.1 Description
+
+The ECT simulation service enables a transferring party A to transform two of that party's communication, e.g., an active communication to party B and a communication on hold to party C, each of which can be an incoming communication or an outgoing communication, into a new communication between party B and party C.
+
+Prior to transfer, the media session has been established on the communication between transferring party A and party B. On the communication between transferring party A and party C, either the media session has been established prior to transfer, or, as a service provider option, transfer can occur while the communication to party C is requested or being established (i.e., the media session has not yet been established).
+
+The minimum requirement for NGN release 1 is to perform an "immediate" communication transfer for an incoming communication, without waiting for a response from the party originating that communication. The service should be applicable independent of whether party B and party C are NGN users or not.
+
+This service description is based on the service description in [b-ITU-T I.256.3].
+
+### 9.18.2 ECT service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services
+
+**Terminating identification restriction (TIR):** A terminating party's restriction requirements from the original communication apply for the presentation of that party's identification information to the other user in a transferred communication.
+
+NOTE 1 – If the media flow(s) is established on the communication to party C after transfer, the presentation of party C's identification information is restricted according to party C's terminating identification restriction simulation service (i.e., as for the normal operation of the terminating identification restriction simulation service).
+
+**Communication barring (CB):** In case the transferring party A has outgoing communication barring active towards party C, transferring party A's request for communication transfer between party B and party C is barred if it occurs in relation to the establishment of the communication to C.
+
+**Conference (CONF):** The conference controller cannot transfer the conference to another party.
+
+NOTE 2 – Conferees can invoke the ECT simulation service in order to transfer their connection to the conference to another party after that connection has been established.
+
+**Advice of charge at communication set-up (AOC-S):** When party A transfers a communication, AOC-S is considered as completed.
+
+For party B and party C, there is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Advice of charge during the communication (AOC-D):** When party A transfers a communication and has activated AOC-D, the charge up to the transfer time is sent as a subtotal charge for that communication. The AOC-D simulation service is then considered as completed.
+
+NOTE 3 – If party A has activated AOC-D, then party A receives information separately for both of the communications which generated the transfer.
+
+For party B and party C, there is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Advice of charge at the end of a communication (AOC-E):** If party A is charged for the transferred part of the communication and has activated AOC-E, then either:
+
+- a) the charging information is sent to party A when the transferred communication is terminated; or
+- b) when the communication is transferred, party A is informed that charging information is not available. The AOC-E is then considered as completed.
+
+For party B and party C, there is no impact, i.e., neither simulation service affects the operation of the other simulation service.
+
+**Explicit communication transfer (ECT):** The ECT simulation service can be invoked simultaneously by any of the parties on an active communication, but this is not regarded as a normal situation. The network is not required to explicitly prevent this from occurring.
+
+Therefore, both parties (party A and party B) in a normal communication, who have each subscribed to the ECT simulation service, can simultaneously transfer the communication. That is, if party A and party B are involved in a communication on which the connection has been established, party A can transfer the communication to party C and party B can transfer the communication to another party.
+
+NOTE 4 – Mechanisms which prevent the ECT simulation service from resulting in a connection which contains no parties able to terminate the communication may result in rejection of simultaneous requests to invoke the ECT simulation service by the parties involved in the communication.
+
+### **9.18.3 ECT interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+No restrictions.
+
+## **9.19 Reverse charging (RC)**
+
+### **9.19.1 Description**
+
+The reverse charging at communication set up time simulation service allows the terminating party to be charged for the entire communication. Only usage-based charges can be applied to the terminating party. The service is requested by the originating party at communication set up time. The terminating party receives an explicit indication of a reverse charge communication request.
+
+This service description is based on the service description in [b-ITU-T I.256.3].
+
+### **9.19.2 Reverse charging service interactions with other PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+None.
+
+### **9.19.3 Reverse charging interoperability with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+The NGN supports the interoperability of reverse charging with the PSTN/ISDN supplementary services and vice versa.
+
+## **9.20 Use of authorization option in relation to PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+### **9.20.1 Description**
+
+Some PSTN/ISDN simulation services (e.g., communication barring) may be offered to a user with the subscription option of authorization to control the service. When this option is selected, every
+
+action (related to that simulation service), such as registration, erasure, activation or deactivation is performed by the user with concurrent authentication.
+
+When the subscription option of authorization is provided for a PSTN/ISDN simulation service, authentication handling is supported by the network.
+
+### **9.20.2 Management – Normal procedures and successful outcome**
+
+#### **Provision of authorization**
+
+Each simulation service which requires authorization to control the service itself may be offered with the subscription option of authorization. The values of this option may be:
+
+- user authentication;
+- service-provider authentication.
+
+#### **Withdrawal of authorization**
+
+Authorization may be withdrawn for administrative reasons or due to subscription modification.
+
+#### **Authentication requirements**
+
+The network is required to provide, and allow the user to maintain, the authentication credentials.
+
+# **10 Universal personal telecommunication (UPT)**
+
+The following text is intended to describe the service and not to define it. It was developed to assist in the development of the related service features.
+
+The UPT service allows the subscriber to use his/her unique UPT number to bind all his/her available terminals.
+
+The UPT service supports several service features, such as personal identifier (PI), customized announcement (supporting different ring-back tones according to the different destination numbers), ring pattern (RP) (including parallel ring feature, sequential ring feature, etc.), customized routing (CR), destination-associated message type query (DMTQ), etc.
+
+When the UPT service is activated by the UPT number, the UPT service queries the subscriber's routing rules to obtain an appropriate subscriber's terminal based on the UPT number, and routes the communication to the appointed subscriber's terminal. Also, the UPT service selects an appropriate media resource according to the information of the calling/called party and the media resource, and indicates the selected media resource to play the ring-back tone set by the subscriber to the calling party.
+
+The routing rules may include:
+
+- route incoming calls to the appointed terminal based on caller number, rest day or working day, rest time or working time;
+- screen incoming calls according to caller number, etc.;
+- route all incoming calls to a terminal;
+- route incoming calls to a default terminal if there is no satisfied condition.
+
+If the appointed terminal is busy or not replying, the incoming communication will be routed to another terminal.
+
+# **11 Customized ring-back tone (CRBT)**
+
+The following text is intended to describe the service and not define it. It was developed to assist in the development of the related service features.
+
+The customized ring-back tone service enables the calling party to receive customized ring-back tones other than the traditional ring-back tone. Customized ring-back tones may be of different types, for example, a specific song, a multimedia stream or even a traditional tone plus a customized image.
+
+Each CRBT user may have their own customized ring-back tone depository. The CRBT user can choose customized ring-back tone contents of his preference. A plentiful supply of customized ring-back tone contents may be available for the CRBT user, e.g., on a website, for searching, trying and ordering. Customized ring-back tone contents may be provided by content providers as well as service providers. Besides, the CRBT user may share his customized ring-back tones with other people, e.g., by uploading them to a website.
+
+Playing of a customized ring-back tone follows a set of rules deployed by the CRBT user. The rule information includes the numbers of the calling party or the called party, the current time, the state and location of the called party, etc. The state of the called party can be turned off, roaming, busy, no service, etc. When the CRBT user receives an incoming communication request, the information of the calling party, the called party and the current network situation will be gathered. And a specific piece of customized ring-back tone will match from his pre-arranged customized ring-back tone depository based on one type or a random combination of the gathered information. The selected customized ring-back tone is played to the calling party. If no appropriate customized ring-back tone can be found in his pre-arranged depository, the default ring-back tone is played.
+
+If an incoming communication is distributed to multiple users or terminals that provide different customized ring-back tones, the priority among the various customized ring-back tones follows the service provider policy.
+
+# **12 Customized ringing tone (CRT)**
+
+The following text is intended to describe the service and not define it. It was developed to assist in the development of the related service features.
+
+The CRT service enables the user to allocate and send distinctive caller information to a called party. When the user (calling party) makes a communication, the pre-selected contents (e.g., video business card) are played to the user equipment of the called party, until the called party answers. Different media types are allowed for the contents presented to the called party, including audio, video and image. The media types presented to the called party's terminal are negotiated with those of original contents according to the capabilities of the terminal.
+
+The customized ringing tone contents may be configured by service web pages.
+
+The priority between the network-based customized ringing tone and the default ringing tone (music bell) from the phone follows the service provider policy.
+
+The CRT service concept is opposite to the CRBT service concept since the customized ring-back tone presents called party's information to the calling party, while the customized ringing tone presents calling party's information to the called party.
+
+# **13 Additional services and service features**
+
+NOTE – Appendices I and II contain additional services that require further service features.
+
+# **14 Security consideration**
+
+Security aspects are contained in clause 6.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Multimedia conference (MultiCONF)
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+The multimedia conference service provides a conference-form conversation, which allows multiple users from different places to communicate with each other or together using multiple types of real-time media. This service also offers the means for a user to create, manage, reconfigure and terminate the conference. It also provides the involved users with information about the conference, which consists of a set of rules governing the conference, the set of participants connected to the conference, and the state of their respective conversation.
+
+The multimedia conference uses the following service features:
+
+- Customized announcement
+- Customized background music
+- Communication hold
+- Communication logging
+- Click to dial
+- Communication waiting
+- Destination-associated message type query
+- Group communication
+- Multi-party communication
+- Off-line charging
+- On-line charging
+- Split charging
+- Third party communication control
+- Terminating communication screening
+- Unsuccessful communication notification
+- User identification presentation and restriction
+- User profile management
+
+The multimedia conference also allows for capabilities such as conference policy, media mixing, floor control, multiple conference configuration, and conference management, which are not addressed in this Recommendation.
+
+# **Appendix II**
+
+## **IP Centrex**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+IP Centrex is not a service in its own right, rather it is a collection of services that are packaged and marketed as IP Centrex.
+
+IP Centrex uses the following service features:
+
+- Customized announcement
+- Communication distribution
+- Communication forwarding
+- Communication hold
+- Communication logging
+- Customized ringing
+- Customized routing
+- Communication transfer
+- Communication waiting
+- Follow-me diversion
+- Group communication
+- Multi-party communication
+- Message waiting
+- Originating communication screening
+- Off-line charging
+- On-line charging
+- Personal identifier
+- Ring pattern
+- Terminating communication screening
+- User identification presentation and restriction
+- User profile management
+
+IP Centrex also allows for capabilities such as closed user groups, session management, private numbering plan, and automated console, which are not addressed in this Recommendation.
+
+# **Appendix III**
+
+## **Mappings between IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services and service features**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes the relationship between service features in clause 8 and services in clauses 9 through 12, and in Appendices I and II.
+
+Table III.1 describes the service features associated to each service. The row headings contain the service features defined in clause 8. The column headings contain the services described in clauses 9 through 12, and in Appendices I and II.
+
+Character "C" indicates that the particular service feature is fundamental to the service, i.e., a core feature.
+
+Character "O" indicates that the service feature can be regarded as an optional enhancement to the service.
+
+**Table III.1 – Mapping between IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services and service features**
+
+| Service features | PSTN/ISDN simulation services | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UPT | CRBT | CRT | MultiCONF | IP Centrex |
+|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|------|------|----|------|----|-----|------|-----|-----|----|-----|------|-----|-----------|------------|
+| | OIP | OIR | TIP | TIR | MCID | ACR | CDIV | HOLD | CB | CCBS | CW | MWI | CONF | AOC | ECT | RC | | | | | |
+| Authorization code (AC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | |
+| Automatic communication back (ACB) | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Customized announcement (CA) | | | | | | O | O | O | O | | O | O | | O | | | O | C | | O | O |
+| Customized background music (CBM) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | |
+| Communication distribution (CDIST) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O |
+| Communication forwarding (CF) | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C |
+| Communication hold (HOLD) | | | | | | | | C | | | | | O | | | | | | | C | C |
+| Communication logging (CL) | O | O | O | O | C | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O | O |
+| Customized routing (CR) | | | | | | | O | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | O |
+| Customized ringing (CRG) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | C | | C |
+
+**Table III.1 – Mapping between IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services and service features**
+
+| Service features | PSTN/ISDN simulation services | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UPT | CRBT | CRT | MultiCONF | IP Centrex |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|------|------|----|------|----|-----|------|-----|-----|----|-----|------|-----|-----------|------------|
+| | OIP | OIR | TIP | TIR | MCID | ACR | CDIV | HOLD | CB | CCBS | CW | MWI | CONF | AOC | ECT | RC | | | | | |
+| Communication transfer (CT) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | C |
+| Click-to-dial (CTD) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | |
+| Communication waiting (CW) | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | | | O | C |
+| Destination-associated message type query (DMTQ) | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | | | O | | | O | |
+| Follow-me diversion (FMD) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | O |
+| Group communication (GC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | C | |
+| Multi-party communication (MPC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | C | C |
+| Message waiting (MW) | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | | | O |
+| Originating communication screening (OCS) | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | | | | | | | | C |
+| Off-line charging (OFLC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | C | | | | C | C |
+
+**Table III.1 – Mapping between IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services and service features**
+
+| Service features | PSTN/ISDN simulation services | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | UPT | CRBT | CRT | MultiCONF | IP Centrex |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|------|------|----|------|----|-----|------|-----|-----|----|-----|------|-----|-----------|------------|
+| | OIP | OIR | TIP | TIR | MCID | ACR | CDIV | HOLD | CB | CCBS | CW | MWI | CONF | AOC | ECT | RC | | | | | |
+| On-line charging (ONLC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | O | | | | C | C |
+| Personal identifier (PI) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | O | | | O |
+| Reverse charging (REVC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | | |
+| Ring pattern (RP) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | | C |
+| Split charging (SC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | C | | | C | |
+| Terminating communication screening (TCS) | | | | | | C | | | C | | | | | | | | O | O | | C | C |
+| Third party communication control (3PCC) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | |
+| Unsuccessful communication notification (UCN) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | | | O | |
+| User identification presentation and restriction (UIPR) | C | C | C | C | | | | | | | | | | | | | O | C | C | C | C |
+| User profile management (UPM) | | | | | | | O | | O | | | | O | | | | C | | O | C | C |
+
+# **Appendix IV**
+
+## **Implementation scenarios for IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes possible scenarios, including information flows, for implementation of some service features for IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services. The implementation scenarios and information flows are only examples of how these features could be implemented, and are not normative.
+
+## **IV.1 Customized announcement**
+
+There are two scenarios for customized announcement, the announcement and the customized ring-back tone.
+
+The first scenario, which is the announcement, includes the following steps:
+
+- 1) User A initiates a request to the application/service support function and sets up a connection with the AS-FE. A specific service is triggered by the request.
+- 2) The application/service support function AS-FE discovers that user A has an announcement feature involved in the service, and then sends the announcement request. Then the AS-FE sets up a session to connect to MRC-FE, including an identification of the announcement multimedia clip to be played, and associates this session with the previous session initiated by the user.
+- 3) The MRC-FE passes the identification of the announcement to the MRP-FE and allocates MRP-FE media resources that are needed for playing the announcement multimedia clip to user A.
+- 4) The connection and the media channel are set up between user terminal A and the MRP-FE under control of the application/service support function.
+- 5) The MRP-FE plays the announcement to user A.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EndUserA as End user A
+ participant ASFE as Application/service support functions (AS-FE)
+ participant MRCFE as MRC-FE
+ participant MRPFEE as MRP-FE
+
+ EndUserA->>ASFE: 1. User sends service request
+ activate ASFE
+ ASFE->>ASFE: Check user A has an announcement feature
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 2. Send an announcement request with the clip identifiers
+ deactivate ASFE
+ MRCFE->>MRPFEE: 3. Send the request to MRP-FE
+ deactivate MRCFE
+ MRPFEE->>ASFE: 4. Finish the connection between user A and MRP-FE
+ deactivate MRPFEE
+ ASFE->>EndUserA: 5. Play the announcement to user A
+ deactivate ASFE
+ EndUserA-->>EndUserA:
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F01
+
+Sequence diagram for Customized announcement scenario showing interactions between End user A, Application/service support functions (AS-FE), MRC-FE, and MRP-FE.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – Customized announcement**
+
+The second scenario is customized ring-back tone. The calling party hears the distinctive ring-back tone set by the called party.
+
+In this scenario, the information of ring-back tone can be set on the user equipment. The user subscribes to a specific service with the customized announcement feature which stores the user's identification information. When the user is called, the service is triggered and sends a request to the user equipment about the information of ring-back tone. The user equipment generates the indication of ring back-tone according to the user's configuration and sends it back to the service. The service directs the media resource function to play the distinctive ring-back tone to the calling party according to the indication. The detailed steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The AS-FE receives a communication request from user A, discovers user B's subscription of customized ring-back tone and the specific service is triggered.
+- 2) The AS-FE checks the called party subscription, and sends a request to user B to get an indication of the customized ring-back tone.
+- 3) The equipment of user B returns this information according to user B's configuration.
+- 4) The AS-FE gets the information of ring-back tone media and notifies the MRC-FE/MRP-FE to play the customized ring-back tone for the calling party user A.
+- 5) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE prepares media resources and returns response to the AS-FE.
+- 6) The AS-FE forwards response to user A, and user A starts listening to the ring-back tone indicated by user B.
+- 7) User B answers the communication.
+- 8) The AS-FE sends to the MRC-FE/MRP-FE a notify indicating disconnect from the calling party.
+- 9) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE replies to the AS-FE.
+- 10-12) The AS-FE continues the normal communication process.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UA as User A
+ participant ASFE as AS-FE
+ participant MRCFE as MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ participant UB as User B
+
+ Note over UA: User A sends request, calls user B
+ UA->>ASFE: 1) Request
+ Note over ASFE: Discovers user B's subscription of customized ring-back tone
+ ASFE->>UB: 2) Request
+ Note over UB: Checks the user's configuration, informs user of the caller's ID, accepts the user's input if necessary, generates indication of ring-back tone
+ UB->>ASFE: 3) Response
+ Note over ASFE: Gets the information of ring-back tone media, informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 4) Notify
+ Note over MRCFE: Prepares media resource according to the indication
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 5) Response
+ ASFE->>UA: 6) Response
+ UA->>MRCFE: 7) Answer
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 8) Notify
+ Note over MRCFE: Disconnects from the calling party
+ ASFE->>UA: 9) Response
+ ASFE->>UB: 10) Notify
+ UA->>MRCFE: 11) Release
+ MRCFE->>UB: 12) Release
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for a customized ring-back tone. It involves four entities: User A, AS-FE (Access Service Function - Front End), MRC-FE/MRP-FE (Media Resource Control Function - Front End / Media Resource Pool Function - Front End), and User B. The process begins with User A sending a request to AS-FE. AS-FE then discovers User B's subscription and sends a request to User B. User B checks its configuration and sends a response to AS-FE. AS-FE then gets information about ring-back tone media and informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE. MRC-FE/MRP-FE prepares a media resource and sends a response to AS-FE. AS-FE then sends a response to User A. User A sends an answer to MRC-FE/MRP-FE, which then disconnects from the calling party and sends a response to AS-FE. AS-FE then notifies User B and sends a release message to MRC-FE/MRP-FE, which finally sends a release message to User B.
+
+Sequence diagram for Customized ring-back tone showing interactions between User A, AS-FE, MRC-FE/MRP-FE, and User B.
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F02
+
+**Figure IV.2 – Customized ring-back tone**
+
+## IV.2 Group communication
+
+This clause describes a possible scenario for information flows associated with the use of the group communication feature. User A would like to inform his colleagues (user B1, user B2) of the agenda of an important meeting. He initiates a group communication to his colleagues instead of initiating multiple one-to-one communication. During the group communication conversation, User B1 wishes to invite user Bn to join the current conversion:
+
+- 1) User A initiates a group communication to users B1 and B2.
+- 2) The destination users are informed that this is a group communication request from user A to users B1 and B2.
+- 3) The destination users accept the communication and send a response to the AS-FE.
+- 4) User A receives the response from the destination users indicating that the request is accepted, the group starts the conversation.
+- 5) User B1 wants to invite Bn to join the current conversation, and sends a request to the AS-FE.
+- 6) The AS-FE checks the user B1's rights and the information of user Bn, and then sends an invitation to user Bn.
+- 7) User Bn accepts the invitation and sends a response to the AS-FE.
+- 8) The AS-FE forwards the response to user B1.
+- 9) The AS-FE notifies user A and user B2 that user Bn has joined in the current conversation.
+- 10) User A ends the communication.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UA as User A
+ participant ASFE as AS-FE
+ participant UB1 as User B1
+ participant UB2 as User B2
+ participant UBn as User Bn
+
+ Note over UA: User A sends group communication request, calls users B1 and B2
+ UA->>ASFE: 1) Request
+ ASFE->>UB1: 2) Request
+ UB1-->>ASFE: 3) Response
+ ASFE-->>UA: 4) Response
+
+ Note over UA,ASFE,UB1,UB2,UBn: Group communication conversation
+
+ Note over UB1: User B1 wishes to invite Bn
+ UB1->>ASFE: 5) Request
+ Note over ASFE: Checks the rights of user B1 and the information of user Bn for permission
+ ASFE->>UBn: 6) Invite
+ UBn-->>ASFE: 7) Response
+ ASFE->>UB1: 8) Response
+ ASFE->>UA: 9) Notify
+ ASFE->>UB1: 9) Notify
+
+ Note over UA,ASFE,UB1,UB2,UBn: Updated group communication conversation
+
+ UA->>ASFE: 10) Release communication
+ ASFE->>UB1: Release communication
+ ASFE->>UB2: Release communication
+ ASFE->>UBn: Release communication
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F03
+
+Sequence diagram for Group communication involving User A, AS-FE, User B1, User B2, and User Bn. The process starts with User A sending a group communication request to AS-FE (1) Request. AS-FE then sends a request to User B1 (2) Request and receives a response (3) Response. AS-FE then sends a response to User A (4) Response. A 'Group communication conversation' block follows. Then, User B1 sends a request to AS-FE (5) Request, which checks the rights of user B1 and the information of user Bn for permission. AS-FE then sends an invite to User Bn (6) Invite and receives a response (7) Response. AS-FE then sends a response to User B1 (8) Response. AS-FE then sends a notify to User A (9) Notify and a notify to User B1 (9) Notify. An 'Updated group communication conversation' block follows. Finally, User A sends a release communication to AS-FE (10) Release communication, which then sends a release communication to User B1 and User Bn. A callout 'User B1 wishes to invite Bn' points to the start of step 5.
+
+**Figure IV.3 – Group communication**
+
+## IV.3 Customized routing
+
+The customized routing feature allows services to support policy-based routing. For example, routing may be based on presence information or on time.
+
+The first scenario is about routing based on presence information:
+
+- A personal identifier is assigned to a user.
+- The user's status is synchronized between the presence service server and the customized routing server.
+- When this personal identifier is called, the customized routing server routes the communication according to the user's status.
+
+The information flow includes the following steps:
+
+- 1) The presence server notifies user B's status to the customized routing server.
+- 2-3) The personal identifier of user B (according to B's status) is called and communication is requested to the customized routing server.
+- 4) The customized routing server routes the communication to the appropriate terminal according to user B's status.
+
+
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram for customized routing based on presence information. The diagram shows four entities: User A, AS-FE (customized routing server), AS-FE (presence server), and User B (1...n terminals). The process starts with User A sending a '2) Request' to AS-FE (customized routing server). This server sends a '1) Notify' message to AS-FE (presence server). The presence server then sends a '3) Response' to AS-FE (customized routing server), which in turn sends a '4) Response' back to User A. A callout box indicates that 'The communication is transferred to the appropriate terminal according to B's status'. A long double-headed arrow at the bottom spans the entire sequence.
+
+**Figure IV.4 – Customized routing based on presence information**
+
+The second scenario is about routing based on time:
+
+- 1) At 11 a.m., a communication request for the subscriber arrives at the destination S-CSC-FE.
+- 2) S-CSC-FE proxies the communication request to the AS-FE.
+- 3) The AS-FE checks the subscriber's customized routing table and finds a currently optimal number which is pointed to the subscriber's office phone.
+- 4-5) The AS-FE tries to connect the subscriber via the office phone number.
+- 6) At 7 p.m., another communication request for the subscriber arrives at the destination S-CSC-FE.
+- 7) S-CSC-FE proxies the communication request to the AS-FE.
+- 8) The AS-FE checks the subscriber's customized routing table and finds a currently optimal number which is pointed to the subscriber's mobile phone.
+- 9-10) The AS-FE tries to connect the subscriber via the mobile phone number.
+
+
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram for customized routing based on time. The diagram shows two entities: S-CSC-FE and AS-FE. The process is divided into two time-based scenarios. In the first scenario, S-CSC-FE receives a call request at 11 a.m. (1) and proxies it to AS-FE (2). AS-FE performs service control to find the optimal destination number (3) and then connects the subscriber via an office telephone number (4). S-CSC-FE then connects (5). In the second scenario, S-CSC-FE receives a call request at 7 p.m. (6) and proxies it to AS-FE (7). AS-FE performs service control to find the optimal destination number (8) and then connects the subscriber via a mobile telephone number (9). S-CSC-FE then connects (10).
+
+**Figure IV.5 – Customized routing based on time**
+
+It is assumed that the subscriber prefers using an office telephone from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., while using a mobile telephone at remaining time.
+
+## **IV.4 Click-to-dial**
+
+The information flows of the click-to-dial (CTD) feature include the following steps:
+
+- 1) User A has subscribed to a CTD-based service and wants to initiate a communication between user B and user C.
+- 2) User A clicks the button on the web page associated to a client of the CTD-based service.
+- 3) The client of the CTD-based service sends the communication request to the CTD server.
+- 4) The CTD server then initiates a communication between user B and user C.
+- 5) The CTD server continuously updates the CTD-based client so that User A knows the status of the communication.
+- 6) The communication is terminated and the CTD server informs user A about the termination.
+
+## **IV.5 User profile management**
+
+There are various ways to manage a user profile. Two examples are provided below.
+
+If a web portal is used to manage the profile, when user profile change requests are received by the portal, the corresponding web pages are sent back to the user profile management AS. The related AS database is updated accordingly.
+
+If a user profile change request is initiated by a UE (e.g., user phone), the steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The UE initializes the user profile change request.
+- 2) The specific media resources are requested to the MRC-FE/MRP-FE by the AS-FE, according to the user's request.
+- 3) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE plays the media to the UE under control of the AS-FE.
+- 4) The user profile update information by the UE is sent to the AS-FE after the interaction between the user and the MRC-FE/MRP-FE is finished.
+- 5) The AS-FE validates the user profile update information.
+- 6) The AS-FE updates the related database and requests the MRC-FE/MRP-FE to notify the UE about success (or failure) of the update.
+
+## **IV.6 Customized background music**
+
+The customized background music feature allows the playing of a background music during a communication, e.g., music. The network activates the customized background music feature for a specific service according to predefined service triggers when a communication is received by the network. A customized background music server, which stores and plays background music, exists on the network side. The network sets up a three-way exchange among the calling party, the called party and the customized background music server. The steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The calling party (user A) sends a communication request to the called party (user B). According to some service-specific criteria, e.g., the specific service number, the request is routed to the AS-FE (customized background music server), which identifies the corresponding background music information.
+- 2) The AS-FE routes the communication request to User B.
+- 3) User B sends a response.
+- 4) The AS-FE notifies the MRC-FE/MRP-FE about the background music information identified in step 1.
+
+- 5-6) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE receives the notification, prepares the customized background music according to the media indication and sends a response. The three way exchange among the calling party, the called party and the MRC-FE/MRP-FE is now established.
+- 7-8) The AS-FE monitors the calling party during the communication, and if the calling party sends any change request (e.g., change the background music, change its volume), the AS-FE notifies the MRC-FE/MRP-FE to adapt correspondingly.
+- 9-10) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE responds with the media resource according to the indication.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UA as User A
+ participant ASFE as AS-FE
+ participant MRCFE as MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ participant UB as User B
+
+ UA->>ASFE: 1) Request
+ activate ASFE
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 2) Request
+ activate MRCFE
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 3) Response
+ deactivate MRCFE
+ ASFE->>UB: 4) Notify
+ activate UB
+ UB->>MRCFE: 5) Response
+ deactivate UB
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 6) Response
+ deactivate MRCFE
+ ASFE->>UA: 7) Insert music request
+ activate UA
+ UA->>ASFE: Informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ deactivate UA
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 8) Notify
+ activate MRCFE
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 9) Response
+ deactivate MRCFE
+ ASFE->>UA: 10) Response
+ deactivate ASFE
+ UA->>UB:
+ UB->>UA:
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for customized background music. It involves four entities: User A, AS-FE, MRC-FE/MRP-FE, and User B. The process begins with User A sending a request to AS-FE (1). AS-FE then sends a request to MRC-FE/MRP-FE (2). MRC-FE/MRP-FE responds to AS-FE (3). AS-FE notifies User B (4). User B sends a response to MRC-FE/MRP-FE (5). MRC-FE/MRP-FE responds to AS-FE (6). AS-FE sends an insert music request to User A (7). User A informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE (8). AS-FE notifies MRC-FE/MRP-FE (9). MRC-FE/MRP-FE responds to AS-FE (10). Finally, a communication channel is established between User A and User B, indicated by a double-headed arrow.
+
+Sequence diagram for Customized background music showing interactions between User A, AS-FE, MRC-FE/MRP-FE, and User B.
+
+**Figure IV.6 – Customized background music**
+
+## IV.7 Ring pattern
+
+The ring pattern feature supports various types of ring patterns, i.e., parallel ring, sequential ring, combination ring of the previous two.
+
+The first example scenario is about parallel ring:
+
+- 1) A subscriber is called via the personal identifier, so that the originating S-CSC-FE initiates a service request to the AS-FE. The AS-FE checks whether the called party is a legal subscriber. After authentication, the AS-FE gets subscriber-related information such as destination numbers and parallel ring pattern.
+- 2) The AS-FE tries to connect the user and sends a ring-back tone to the calling party.
+- 3) The AS-FE splits the communication into three simultaneous communication to the three bound destination numbers.
+
+- 4) It is assumed that the user answers the communication with a certain terminal. The terminating S-CSC-FE sends a response to the AS-FE.
+- 5) The AS-FE asks the originating S-CSC-FE to update the communication.
+- 6) The AS-FE disconnects the other calls. The calling and called parties begin the conversation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as S-CSC-FE
+ participant AS as AS-FE
+ participant S2 as S-CSC-FE
+
+ Note over S1: 1) Initiate service
+request to AS-FE
+ S1->>AS:
+ Note over S2: Check destination
+numbers and ring pattern
+ AS->>S2:
+ Note over S1: 2) Try to connect
+ AS->>S1:
+ Note over S2: 3) Call destination number
+simultaneously
+ AS->>S2:
+ Note over S2: ...
+ Note over S2: 4) User answers
+ S2->>AS:
+ Note over S1: 5) Ask to update call
+ AS->>S1:
+ Note over S2: 6) Disconnect other calls
+ AS->>S2:
+ S1<->S2: Conversation
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F07
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Parallel ring pattern between three entities: S-CSC-FE (left), AS-FE (middle), and S-CSC-FE (right).
+
+**Figure IV.7 – Parallel ring pattern**
+
+It is assumed that the subscriber binds his personal identifier with three destination numbers of different user terminals.
+
+The second scenario is about sequential ring:
+
+- 1) A subscriber is called via the personal identifier, so that the originating S-CSC-FE initiates a service request to the AS-FE. The AS-FE checks whether the called party is a legal subscriber. After authentication, the AS-FE gets subscriber-related information such as destination numbers and sequential ring pattern.
+- 2) The AS-FE tries to connect the user and sends a ring-back tone to the calling party.
+- 3) The AS-FE sequentially calls the three destination numbers.
+- 4) It is assumed that the subscriber answers the communication with a certain terminal. The terminating S-CSC-FE sends a response to AS-FE.
+- 5) The AS-FE asks the originating S-CSC-FE to update the communication, then the AS-FE stops attempting to connect the remaining destination numbers. The calling and called parties begin a conversation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as S-CSC-FE
+ participant AS as AS-FE
+ participant S2 as S-CSC-FE
+
+ S1->>AS: 1) Initiate service request to AS-FE
+ AS->>S2: Check destination numbers and ring pattern
+ AS->>S1: 2) Try to connect
+ AS->>S2: 3) Call destination numbers one by one
+ S2-->>AS: :
+ AS->>S1: 5) Ask to update call
+ S2-->>AS: 4) User answers
+ Note over S1, AS, S2: Conversation
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of interactions between three entities: S-CSC-FE (left), AS-FE (middle), and S-CSC-FE (right). The process begins with the left S-CSC-FE sending a '1) Initiate service request to AS-FE' to the AS-FE. The AS-FE then sends 'Check destination numbers and ring pattern' to the right S-CSC-FE. Next, the AS-FE sends '2) Try to connect' back to the left S-CSC-FE. The AS-FE then sends '3) Call destination numbers one by one' to the right S-CSC-FE. A vertical ellipsis indicates further interactions. The right S-CSC-FE then sends '4) User answers' back to the AS-FE. The AS-FE then sends '5) Ask to update call' back to the left S-CSC-FE. A large double-headed arrow at the bottom labeled 'Conversation' spans the entire duration of the process.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Sequential ring pattern involving S-CSC-FE, AS-FE, and S-CSC-FE entities.
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F08
+
+**Figure IV.8 – Sequential ring pattern**
+
+It is assumed that the subscriber binds his personal identifier with three destination numbers of different user terminals.
+
+## IV.8 Personal identifier
+
+The scenario is as follows:
+
+- 1) A subscriber is called via the personal identifier, so that the originating S-CSC-FE initiates a service request to the AS-FE. The AS-FE checks whether the called party is a legal subscriber. After authentication, the AS-FE gets subscriber-related information such as destination numbers and ring pattern, and selects an appropriate destination number according to the subscriber's configuration through personal identifier.
+- 2) The AS-FE selects a destination number and initiates a call to it.
+- 3) The subscriber-related information includes a customized ring-back tone. The AS-FE selects the appropriate media resource according to the detailed information of the calling/called party, the location of media resource and the ring-back tone information set by the subscriber, then requests the MRC-FE/MRP-FE to allocate specific media resources.
+- 4) The AS-FE connects the user and sends the customized ring-back tone to the calling party.
+- 5) It is assumed that the user answers with a certain terminal. The terminating S-CSC-FE sends a response to the AS-FE.
+- 6) The AS-FE asks the originating S-CSC-FE to update the communication.
+- 7) The AS-FE disconnects other calls. The calling and called parties begin a conversation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as S-CSC-FE
+ participant A as AS-FE
+ participant S2 as S-CSC-FE
+ participant M as MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+
+ S1->>A: 1) Initiates service request to AS-FE
+ Note right of A: AS-FE selects an appropriate destination number
+ A->>S2: 2) Call destination number
+ S2->>M: 3) Request media resource
+ A->>S1: 4) Connect and play customized ring-back tone
+ S2->>A: 5) User answers
+ A->>S1: 6) Ask to update call
+ S2->>A: 7) Disconnect other calls
+ rect rgb(200, 200, 200)
+ Note over S1, S2: Conversation
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F09
+
+Sequence diagram for Personal identifier service involving S-CSC-FE, AS-FE, and MRC-FE/MRP-FE.
+
+**Figure IV.9 – Personal identifier**
+
+## **IV.9 Unsuccessful communication notification**
+
+- 1) A communication request addressed to the subscriber is received at the S-CSC-FE.
+- 2) The S-CSC-FE proxies the communication request to the AS-FE.
+- 3) The AS-FE tries to connect the calling party.
+- 4) The AS-FE does not receive any reply.
+- 5) The AS-FE checks whether the called party has subscribed to the "unsuccessful communication notification" feature and determines the notification pattern.
+- 6-7) The AS-FE releases the communication with the calling party.
+- 8-9) The AS-FE sends a notification of unsuccessful communication to the called party according to the notification pattern (e.g., via SMS).
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as S-CSC-FE
+ participant A as AS-FE
+ participant S2 as S-CSC-FE
+
+ S1->>S1: 1) Receive call request
+ S1->>A: 2) Initiate service request to AS-FE
+ A->>S1: 3) Connect the destination numbers
+ A->>S2: 4) No reply
+ A->>A: 5) Service control: Check notification pattern for unsuccessful call
+ A->>S1: 6) Release call
+ S1->>S1: 7) Release call
+ A->>S2: 8) Send a message to called party
+ A->>S2: 9) Send a message to called party
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F10
+
+Sequence diagram for Unsuccessful communication notification showing interactions between S-CSC-FE, AS-FE, and another S-CSC-FE.
+
+**Figure IV.10 – Unsuccessful communication notification**
+
+It is assumed that the subscriber of a specific service is provided with a notification feature for unsuccessful communication addressed to himself.
+
+## IV.10 Originating communication screening
+
+- 1) A communication request addressed to the subscriber arrives at the terminating S-CSC-FE.
+- 2) The S-CSC-FE proxies the communication request to the AS-FE.
+- 3) The AS-FE checks the validity of the destination number and finds it is a special number used by an emergency service.
+- 4-5) The AS-FE cancels the communication.
+- 6) The AS-FE requests the subscriber to change his destination number by a notification message or other means.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S as S-CSC-FE
+ participant A as AS-FE
+
+ S->>S: 1) Receive call request
+ S->>A: 2) Initiate service request to AS-FE
+ A->>A: 3) Service control: Check validity of the destination number
+ A->>S: 4) Cancel call for an unallowed destination number
+ S->>S: 5) Cancel call
+ A->>S: 6) Request subscriber to change the destination number
+
+```
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F11
+
+Sequence diagram for Originating communication screening showing interactions between S-CSC-FE and AS-FE.
+
+**Figure IV.11 – Originating communication screening**
+
+It is assumed that, by mistake, the subscriber binds his number with a special destination number, for example an emergency service number, which is not allowed to be set as a destination number.
+
+## **IV.11 Terminating communication screening**
+
+- 1) A communication request from user A arrives at the terminating S-CSC-FE.
+- 2) The S-CSC-FE proxies the communication request to the AS-FE.
+- 3) The AS-FE checks the subscriber's screening list and finds that incoming communication from user A is restricted.
+- 4-5) The AS-FE cancels the communication.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S as S-CSC-FE
+ participant A as AS-FE
+ Note left of S: 1) Receive call request
+ S->>A: 2) Initiate service request to AS-FE
+ Note right of A: 3) Service control: Check screening list
+ A-->>S: 4) Cancel call for a restricted calling party
+ Note left of S: 5) Cancel call
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of events for terminating communication screening. It involves two main entities: S-CSC-FE and AS-FE. The process begins with the S-CSC-FE receiving a call request (Step 1). It then proxies this request to the AS-FE (Step 2). The AS-FE performs a service control check on the screening list (Step 3). Upon finding the communication restricted, the AS-FE sends a cancellation message back to the S-CSC-FE (Step 4). Finally, the S-CSC-FE cancels the call (Step 5).
+
+Sequence diagram for Terminating communication screening showing interactions between S-CSC-FE and AS-FE.
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F12
+
+**Figure IV.12 – Terminating communication screening**
+
+It is assumed that user A initiates a communication to the subscriber. As user A is in the screening list of the subscriber, the communication is cancelled.
+
+## **IV.12 Destination-associated message type query**
+
+This service feature allows the user to pre-define possible message types, with this information being accessible by other users. The sender sends a message whose destination address is a personal identifier to a unified message centre. The unified message centre queries through personal identifier to obtain the destination terminal address and the associated message types. The unified message centre transforms the message if the message type is different from the pre-defined message type and stores it in the unified message storage. The unified message centre sends the message to the destination.
+
+The steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) A sender sends a message to a subscriber using a personal identifier. The message is sent to the unified message centre.
+- 2-4) The message centre triggers the service and queries the related AS-FE through personal identifier to obtain the destination terminal address and the associated pre-defined message types. Then the AS-FE obtains the destination address and message types and returns them to the message centre.
+- 5) The message centre transforms the message if the message type is different from the pre-defined message types, and stores it in the unified message storage.
+- 6) The message centre sends the message to the destination.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MC as Message centre
+ participant ASFE as AS-FE
+ participant Terminal
+
+ Note left of MC: 1) Receive a message
+ MC->>ASFE: 2) Initiate service request to AS-FE
+ Note right of ASFE: 3) Service control: Check destination number and message types
+ ASFE->>MC: 4) Return destination number and message types
+ Note left of MC: 5) Transform message type
+ MC->>Terminal: 6) Send message
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of a destination-associated message type query. It involves three main entities: Message centre, AS-FE, and Terminal. The process begins with the Message centre receiving a message (Step 1). It then initiates a service request to the AS-FE (Step 2). The AS-FE performs service control, checking the destination number and message types (Step 3). The AS-FE returns this information to the Message centre (Step 4). The Message centre then transforms the message type (Step 5) and finally sends the message to the Terminal (Step 6). The diagram is identified as Y.2211App.D(07)\_F13.
+
+Sequence diagram for Destination-associated message type query showing interactions between Message centre, AS-FE, and Terminal.
+
+**Figure IV.13 – Destination-associated message type query**
+
+## IV.13 Customized ringing
+
+This service feature allows that the customized ringing tone contents pre-selected by the subscriber (user A) are played to the called party (user B) during the ringing period of the communication from user A to user B.
+
+The customized ringing tone contents may be audio, video, text, etc., and may also be retrieved via a web URL. The following scenario is about playing of network-based (MRC-FE/MRP-FE) customized ringing tone contents to the called party. The detailed steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The AS-FE receives a communication request from user A who has subscribed to the customized ringing tone service. The service is triggered from the originating S-CSC-FE to the AS-FE (not shown here).
+- 2) The AS-FE checks the service subscription of the calling party and sends a request to user B.
+- 3) User B retrieves the indicated web URL of customized ringing tone contents and sends a response. The AS-FE knows if user B's terminal is in an idle state based on the response.
+- 4) The response is relayed to user A.
+- 5) The AS-FE notifies the MRC-FE/MRP-FE to play the customized ringing tone contents for the called party (user B).
+- 6) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE responds to the AS-FE and plays the customized ringing tone contents.
+- 7) User B answers.
+- 8) The AS-FE notifies the MRC-FE/MRP-FE for disconnection from the called party and stop of streaming.
+- 9) The MRC-FE/MRP-FE replies to the AS-FE.
+- 10-12) The AS-FE continues the normal communication process.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UA as User A
+ participant ASFE as AS-FE
+ participant MRCFE as MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ participant UB as User B
+
+ Note over UA: User A sends request, calls user B
+ UA->>ASFE: 1) Request
+ Note over ASFE: Discovers user A's subscription to CRT
+ ASFE->>UB: 2) Request
+ Note over UB: May retrieve the indicated URL of CRT contents
+ UB->>ASFE: 3) Response
+ Note over ASFE: Gets the information of CRT media, informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ ASFE->>UA: 4) response
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 5) Notify
+ Note over MRCFE: Prepares media resource according to the indication
+ MRCFE->>ASFE: 6) Response
+ Note over ASFE: Customized ringing tone play
+ ASFE->>UB: 7) Answer
+ Note over UA: Informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE
+ UB->>ASFE: 8) Notify
+ Note over MRCFE: Disconnects from called party
+ ASFE->>MRCFE: 9) Response
+ MRCFE->>UA: 10) Response
+ Note over UA, UB: Normal call connection
+ UA->>ASFE: 11) Release
+ ASFE->>UB: 12) Release
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for a customized ringing call. It involves four entities: User A, AS-FE (Access Service Function - Front End), MRC-FE/MRP-FE (Media Resource Control Function / Media Resource Provider Function - Front End), and User B. The process begins with User A sending a request to AS-FE. AS-FE then discovers User A's subscription to CRT (Customized Ringing Tone) and sends a request to User B. User B may retrieve the indicated URL of CRT contents and responds to AS-FE. AS-FE then informs MRC-FE/MRP-FE about the CRT media information. MRC-FE/MRP-FE prepares a media resource according to the indication and sends a response to AS-FE. AS-FE then plays the customized ringing tone to User B. User B answers the call, and AS-FE sends a notify message to MRC-FE/MRP-FE. MRC-FE/MRP-FE disconnects from the called party and sends a response to AS-FE. AS-FE then sends a response to User A. Finally, User A releases the call, and AS-FE releases the call to User B. A normal call connection is established between User A and User B during the process.
+
+Sequence diagram for Customized ringing showing interactions between User A, AS-FE, MRC-FE/MRP-FE, and User B.
+
+Y.2211App.D(07)\_F14
+
+Figure IV.14 – Customized ringing
+
+# Appendix V
+
+## Table of service interactions between pairs of PSTN/ISDN simulation services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+Table V.1 summarizes the service interactions between pairs of PSTN/ISDN simulation services, as identified in clause 9.
+
+Each case in the table represents a scenario where services on the horizontal row heading are invoked when services on the vertical column heading are already active.
+
+The case is filled with one of three possible options:
+
+- character "Y" indicates interaction has been identified between the corresponding services and described in this Recommendation,
+- character "N" indicates no interaction has been identified,
+- grey colour filling is for scenarios which are not applicable.
+
+**Table V.1 – Identified service interactions between pairs of PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+| | OIP | OIR | TIP | TIR | MCID | ACR | CFU | CFB | CFNR | CFNL | CD | CFNRc | CDIVN | CW | HOLD | CB | CCBS | MWI | CONF | AOC | ECT | RC |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|-----------|
+| Originating identification presentation (OIP) | | Y | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Originating identification restriction (OIR) | N | | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | N |
+| Terminating identification presentation (TIP) | N | N | | Y | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Terminating identification restriction (TIR) | N | N | Y | | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Malicious communication identification (MCID) | N | N | N | N | | N | N | N | Y | N | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | N |
+| Anonymous communication rejection (ACR) | Y | Y | N | N | N | | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Communication forwarding unconditional (CFU) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
+| Communication forwarding busy (CFB) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | | N | N | Y | Y | N | seeCommunication forwarding no reply (CFNR) | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | | N | N | N | N | Y | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
+| Communication forwarding on not logged in (CFNL) | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | N | N | | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
+
+**Table V.1 – Identified service interactions between pairs of PSTN/ISDN simulation services**
+
+| | OIP | OIR | TIP | TIR | MCID | ACR | CFU | CFB | CFNR | CFNL | CD | CFNRc | CDIVN | CW | HOLD | CB | CCBS | MWI | CONF | AOC | ECT | RC |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-----|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----|---------------|------|------|----|-------|-------|----|------|----|------|-----|------|-----|-----|----|
+| Communication deflection (CD) | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | | N | N | Y | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | N | N |
+| Communication forwarding on subscriber not reachable (CFNRc) | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | | N | Y | N | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Communication diversion notification (CDIVN) | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Communication waiting (CW) | N | N | N | N | N | Y | N | seeCommunication hold (HOLD) | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | | N | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Communication barring (CB) | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | | N | N | N | N | N | N |
+| Completion of communication to busy subscriber (CCBS) | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | Y | Y | | N | N | Y | N | N |
+| Message waiting indication (MWI) | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | Y | N | N | N | N | N | | N | N | N | N |
+| Conference (CONF) | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | | Y | N | N |
+| Advice of charge (AOC) | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | | N | N |
+| Explicit communication transfer (ECT) | N | N | N | Y | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | Y | N | N | Y | Y | | N |
+| Reverse charging (RC) | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | N | |
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.703] ITU-T Recommendation F.703 (2000), *Multimedia conversational services*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.210] ITU-T Recommendation I.210 (1993), *Principles of telecommunication services supported by an ISDN and the means to describe them*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.252.1] ITU-T Recommendation I.252.1 (1988), *Call offering supplementary services: Call Transfer*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.256.3] ITU-T Recommendation I.256.3 (1992), *Charging supplementary services: Reverse charging*.
+- [b-ITU-T I-Sup.1] ITU-T I-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (1998), *Generic service descriptions for ten supplementary services defined in I.250-Series Recommendations*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1211] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1211 (1993), *Introduction to intelligent network capability set 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1231] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1231 (1999), *Introduction to intelligent network capability set 3*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2031] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2031 (2006), *PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2271] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2271 (2006), *Call server-based PSTN/ISDN emulation*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.1] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2006), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on NGN release 1 scope*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 122 228] ETSI TS 122 228 (2007), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Service requirements for the Internet Protocol (IP) multimedia core network subsystem (IMS); Stage 1*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 181 002] ETSI TS 181 002 (2007), *Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Multimedia Telephony with PSTN/ISDN simulation services*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Available |
+| Series C | Available |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series W | Available |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2236
+
+(09/2009)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **Framework for NGN support of multicast-based services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2236
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2236**
+
+# **Framework for NGN support of multicast-based services**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2236 provides a framework for NGN support of multicast-based services. In particular, it provides general descriptions of NGN multicast capabilities and functional requirements for each functional group of the NGN architecture.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2236 was approved on 12 September 2009 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2009-2012) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedures.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Multicast, multicast-based services, NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Multicast communication modes ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 One-to-many multicast communication mode ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Many-to-many multicast communication mode..... | 4 |
+| | 7.3 Many-to-one multicast communication mode..... | 5 |
+| 8 | General description of NGN multicast capabilities..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 Multicast data delivery ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.2 Multicast group management ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.3 Multicast service control ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.4 QoS control..... | 7 |
+| | 8.5 Security..... | 7 |
+| | 8.6 Mobility ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.7 Accounting and charging..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Functional requirements for multicast-based services..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 NGN multicast framework architecture ..... | 9 |
+| | 9.2 Service stratum functional requirements ..... | 10 |
+| | 9.3 Transport stratum functional requirements ..... | 11 |
+| | 9.4 End-user functional requirements..... | 12 |
+| | 9.5 Management functional requirements ..... | 13 |
+| | 9.6 Accounting and charging functional requirements..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix I – Example scenario of multicast-based services..... | 15 |
+| | Appendix II – End-to-end multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains ..... | 17 |
+| | Appendix III – Concepts of group and phases of a multicast communication ..... | 18 |
+| | III.1 Concepts of group..... | 18 |
+| | III.2 Phases of a multicast communication..... | 18 |
+| | Appendix IV – QoS aspects of multicast communications..... | 21 |
+| | IV.1 Levels of QoS agreement ..... | 21 |
+| | IV.2 QoS metrics ..... | 21 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 22 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2236
+
+# Framework for NGN support of multicast-based services
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes a framework for NGN support of multicast-based services. It provides a general description of NGN multicast capabilities and the functional requirements for each functional group of the NGN architecture (i.e., transport stratum functions, service stratum functions, end-user functions and management functions).
+
+Specific multicast-based services, as well as the actual implementation of NGN multicast capabilities for different network technologies, are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.601] Recommendation ITU-T X.601 (2000), *Multi-peer communications framework*.
+- [ITU-T X.603] Recommendation ITU-T X.603 (2004) | ISO/IEC 16512-1:2005, *Information technology – Relayed multicast protocol: Framework*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), *NGN release 1 requirements*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2233] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2008), *Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 active group** [ITU-T X.601]: A set of enrolled group members that has entered the multicast data transfer phase; satisfying the group-characteristics requirements.
+
+**3.1.2 multicast** [ITU-T X.603]: A data delivery scheme where the same data unit is transmitted from a single source to multiple destinations in a single invocation of service.
+
+**3.1.3 multicast group** [ITU-T X.601]: A set of service users that abide by appropriate group-membership criteria, or a set of rules belonging to a group that enables multicast-based services and applications.
+
+**3.1.4 nomadism** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability of the users to change their network access point on moving. When changing the network access point, the user's service session is completely stopped and then started again, i.e., there is no service continuity or hand-over used. It is assumed that normal usage pattern is that users shut down their service session before attaching to a different access point.
+
+**3.1.5 personal mobility** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: This is the mobility for those scenarios where the user changes the terminal used for network access at different locations. The ability of a user to access telecommunication services at any terminal on the basis of a personal identifier, and the capability of the network to provide those services delineated in the user's service profile.
+
+**3.1.6 service continuity** [ITU-T Y.2201]: The ability for a moving object to maintain ongoing service over including current states, such as user's network environment and session for a service.
+
+**3.1.7 terminal mobility** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: This is the mobility for those scenarios where the same terminal equipment is moving or is used at different locations. The ability of a terminal to access telecommunication services from different locations and while in motion, and the capability of the network to identify and locate that terminal.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 group:** A set of service users using a particular service.
+
+NOTE – The concept of group allows defining a set of entities as a virtual single entity. One of the main reasons to create a group is the possibility to name and address all group members with a single name, a single address, or unified characteristics of group communications, called group-name, group-address, or group-characteristics respectively.
+
+**3.2.2 multicast connection:** A transmission path used for data transfer among members of a multicast group.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------|
+| ANI | Applications to Network Interface |
+| DMB | Digital Multimedia Broadcasting |
+| EPG | Electronic Program Guide |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| IGMP | Internet Group Management Protocol |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPTV | Internet Protocol Television |
+| MPLS | MultiProtocol Label Switching |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| PON | Passive Optical Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SDR | Session Directory |
+| TTL | Time to Live |
+| VoD | Video on Demand |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+As shown in Figure 6-1 below, various services – multimedia conference, linear TV, file distribution and entertainment applications such as games being representative examples – may require that NGN supports multicast capabilities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationship between services and NGN multicast capabilities. It consists of two main rectangular boxes. The top box is titled "Services using NGN multicast capabilities" and contains four ovals labeled "Linear TV", "Multimedia Conference", "File Distribution", and "Games", with three dots between "File Distribution" and "Games". The bottom box is titled "NGN" and contains a smaller rectangular box labeled "NGN multicast capabilities".
+
+Diagram showing services using NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Examples of services using NGN multicast capabilities**
+
+NGN may provide multicast capabilities based on different network technologies (e.g., IP, MPLS, Ethernet and PON); these different network technologies do not necessarily provide identical multicast related functionalities.
+
+This Recommendation provides the description of requirements for NGN multicast capabilities. Detailed requirements for specific network technologies are out of scope of this Recommendation. Appendix I describes an example scenario of multicast-based services.
+
+# 7 Multicast communication modes
+
+This clause describes multicast communication modes. Three types of multicast communication modes are required to be supported by NGN multicast capabilities [ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+NOTE – The actual mechanisms to provide each multicast communication mode may vary according to the network environment, and their usage may be implementation dependent.
+
+## 7.1 One-to-many multicast communication mode
+
+This mode can be applied to deliver data to multiple recipients. It assumes one sender and a receiving group consisting of multiple recipients.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the one-to-many multicast communication mode. A single sender, represented by a circle labeled 'S', sends data to a central cloud labeled 'NGN'. From the 'NGN' cloud, three unidirectional arrows point to three separate receiver circles, each labeled 'R'. A legend on the right defines the symbols: a solid arrow for 'Unidirectional data path', a circle with 'S' for 'Sender', and a circle with 'R' for 'Receiver'.
+
+Diagram of One-to-many multicast communication mode
+
+**Figure 7-1 – One-to-many multicast communication mode**
+
+Examples of services that may use the one-to-many multicast communication mode include:
+
+- Real-time services such as linear TV and digital multimedia broadcasting (DMB);
+- Reliable services such as file distribution, software update and e-learning.
+
+## 7.2 Many-to-many multicast communication mode
+
+This mode can be applied to deliver data from multiple senders to multiple recipients. It assumes a group consisting of multiple senders and multiple recipients.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the many-to-many multicast communication mode. A central cloud labeled 'NGN' is connected to four circles, each labeled 'S/R'. Each 'S/R' circle has a bidirectional arrow connecting it to the 'NGN' cloud. A legend on the right defines the symbols: a double-headed arrow for 'Bidirectional data path' and a circle with 'S/R' for 'Sender /Receiver'.
+
+Diagram of Many-to-many multicast communication mode
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Many-to-many multicast communication mode**
+
+For the many-to-many multicast communication mode, according to specific service requirements, data may be required to be aggregated, either within the NGN or at the recipient side.
+
+Examples of services that may use the many-to-many multicast communication mode include:
+
+- Real-time services such as teleconference;
+- Reliable services such as whiteboard, application-sharing and network gaming.
+
+## 7.3 Many-to-one multicast communication mode
+
+This mode can be applied to deliver data from multiple sources to one recipient. It assumes a group consisting of multiple senders and one recipient.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the many-to-one multicast communication mode. It features a central cloud labeled 'NGN'. Three circles labeled 'S' (Senders) are positioned to the right of the cloud, with arrows pointing from each 'S' to the 'NGN' cloud. A single circle labeled 'R' (Receiver) is positioned to the left of the cloud, with an arrow pointing from the 'NGN' cloud to 'R'. To the right of the diagram, a legend defines the symbols: an arrow represents the 'Unidirectional data path', a circle with 'S' represents the 'Sender', and a circle with 'R' represents the 'Receiver'.
+
+Diagram of Many-to-one multicast communication mode showing three senders (S) connected to a central NGN cloud, which is connected to a single receiver (R).
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Many-to-one multicast communication mode**
+
+For the many-to-one multicast communication mode, according to specific service requirements, data may be required to be aggregated, either within the NGN or at the recipient side.
+
+Examples of services that may use the many-to-one multicast communication mode include:
+
+- Real-time services such as vehicle traffic monitoring;
+- Reliable services such as centralized data collection.
+
+# 8 General description of NGN multicast capabilities
+
+This clause describes the NGN multicast capabilities which may be used to provide the multicast communication modes, as required by multicast-based services.
+
+The provision of NGN multicast capabilities is a deployment decision of service and network providers.
+
+## 8.1 Multicast data delivery
+
+This capability deals with the delivery of data to the multicast group members.
+
+NOTE – Usually, as defined in [ITU-T X.603], multicast data delivery is associated with an 1:N data delivery scheme. However, more generally, it is not restricted only to an 1:N data delivery scheme, but it may cover other data delivery schemes such as N:1 and M:N. The real meaning of "multicast" is then dependent on its effective usage.
+
+- Multicast data forwarding support
+It provides the capability of data forwarding of multicast packets. Various mechanisms of data forwarding can be used to support each multicast communication mode. The detailed mechanisms are implementation dependent.
+- Multicast data delivery support across multiple NGNs
+It enables multicast-based services to be provided across multiple NGN domains. An example scenario for end-to-end multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains is described in Appendix II.
+
+NOTE – The impact on other NGN multicast capabilities of the provisioning of multicast-based services across multiple NGN domains is for further study.
+
+- **Reliable multicast data delivery support**
+It provides the capability to deliver multicast data with reliability. Some services such as file distribution, software-updates, and application-sharing need reliable data delivery support. Senders and receivers need to support reliable data delivery mechanisms to ensure that multicast data are correctly delivered.
+Usually, reliable data delivery is required at the end-to-end level. If the NGN transport stratum supports a reliable data delivery capability, this capability can be used by NGN end-user functions and/or NGN service stratum functions to support efficient reliable data delivery. However, it may happen that the NGN transport stratum cannot support a reliable data delivery capability: in this case, reliable data delivery may be ensured by functions at the service stratum (e.g., service level multicast functions).
+- **Load sharing for multicast data delivery support**
+It provides the capability for multicast-based services to share the load (including load balancing) while delivering multicast traffic. This capability may maintain service resilience as the size of the group grows.
+
+## **8.2 Multicast group management**
+
+This capability deals with membership management of a group involved in a multicast-based service. Appendix III describes the concepts of group and phases of a multicast communication.
+
+- **Group identification and group member identification support**
+It provides the capability to identify group/group member. Examples of group identifiers include IP multicast address, e-mail address, alphanumeric name, etc.
+- **Group advertisement and discovery support**
+It provides the capability to announce and discover multicast groups. By using multicast group identifiers, it is possible to perform service discovery.
+- **Group creation/release support**
+It provides the capability to create and release groups.
+- **Group monitoring support**
+It provides the capability to monitor relevant information of groups. Group monitoring parameters depend on the deployment decisions made by each service provider (e.g., group members' status, group size).
+- **Membership change notification support**
+It provides the capability to inform the service provider and/or service users of group membership changes. This capability allows multicast-based services to easily manage group member changes for frequent joins and/or leaves.
+- **Membership management support**
+It provides the capability to manage group membership. Examples of membership management operations include inviting specific members to the group, expelling specific members from the group, and examining the status of active members.
+
+## **8.3 Multicast service control**
+
+This capability deals with service control for multicast data delivery.
+
+- **Multicast connection management support**
+It provides the capability to initiate and release a multicast connection. Also, it provides the capability to identify a multicast connection for group members to join and leave multicast-based services.
+
+- Service admission control support
+It provides the capability to determine whether to accept new members into an already established multicast connection. NGN needs to judge whether it has enough resources available to accept new members into an already established multicast connection. Typical resources include bandwidth, storage capacity and processing capacity.
+- Service advertisement and discovery support
+It provides the capability to enable advertisement and discovery of relevant information of multicast connections. Service providers (users) may have specific methods of advertising (discovering) relevant information of multicast connections. Relevant information of multicast connections can be provided to multicast group members by offline or online mechanisms.
+- Service scope control support
+It provides the capability of constraining the scope of packet delivery for multicast-based services. This scope can be controlled to not overload the entire network. Most popular methods of scoping include TTL scoping and administrative scoping. The TTL scoping is used to scope services by limiting the packet forwarding hop counts. The administrative scoping is used to scope services by configuring boundaries which limit forwarding of specified ranges of multicast addresses.
+
+## **8.4 QoS control**
+
+This capability deals with QoS control support for multicast-based services.
+
+The QoS parameter value set for a given multicast group (group-wide QoS) is a single value set applicable for all group members. The single QoS value set is predefined before the establishment of the multicast connection.
+
+Participation into the multicast connection by multicast group members who cannot support the single predefined QoS value set depends on the specific policies of each multicast group member.
+
+QoS negotiation among the group members (located in the NGN or in the end user functions) is for further study.
+
+- Support of predefinition of a QoS parameter value set
+The QoS parameter value set is defined before the establishment of the multicast connection.
+- Support of advertisement of predefined QoS parameter value set
+The group members need to be aware of the predefined QoS parameter value set in order to determine their participation in the related multicast connection. The advertisement of the predefined QoS parameter value set can be provided to end-users by online or offline mechanisms.
+- Group-wide QoS support
+Every group member uses a single QoS parameter value set for the multicast connection.
+
+Appendix IV provides some details on QoS aspects of multicast communications.
+
+## **8.5 Security**
+
+This capability deals with security support for multicast-based services.
+
+- Authentication support
+It provides the capability to authenticate users of a multicast group.
+
+- **Authorization support**
+It provides the capability to authorize a user once authenticated to behave as sender and/or receiver.
+Being a sender gives the rights to "send" to specific receivers while being a receiver gives the rights to "receive" from specific senders. After being successfully authorized, the senders can send multicast data to the group members, while the receivers can receive multicast data addressed to the multicast group. Authorization support protects from non-authorized members' participation in a particular multicast connection.
+- **Confidentiality support**
+It provides the capability that enables multicast-based services to secure multicast data delivery through encryption/decryption of multicast data. This capability can protect multicast-based services from eavesdroppers. A group key is used to encrypt/decrypt multicast data.
+- **Data integrity support**
+It provides the capability to ensure that multicast data have not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
+- **Group key management support**
+The group members of a multicast-based service may share a group key to encrypt and decrypt the exchanged multicast data. A group key management capability is needed to control the sharing of group keys among group members.
+
+## **8.6 Mobility**
+
+This capability deals with mobility support for multicast-based services. It is important to note that both receivers and senders can be mobile. The movement of a user equipment may cause changes in the multicast connection.
+
+- **Nomadism support**
+It provides the capability for a user equipment to access multicast-based services when connecting to a new access network after disconnection from another access network. The user equipment needs to "leave" the multicast-based service(s) in this last access network and "join" the multicast-based service(s) in the new one.
+
+## **8.7 Accounting and charging**
+
+This capability deals with the charging and accounting of multicast-based services. For further information, see [ITU-T Y.2233].
+
+# **9 Functional requirements for multicast-based services**
+
+The functional requirements described in this clause are expected to be supported by the NGN architecture, extended so as to support multicast-based services. While details on the NGN architecture are presented in [ITU-T Y.2012], this clause provides considerations with respect to multicast-based services. The functional requirements are identified for the NGN multicast capabilities provided in clause 8 and structured according to the NGN multicast framework architecture described in clause 9.1.
+
+## 9.1 NGN multicast framework architecture
+
+The NGN multicast capabilities identified in clause 8 may be supported by the different functional groups of the NGN architecture, i.e., transport stratum functions, service stratum functions, end-user functions, and management functions.
+
+It is recognized that, according to different possible functional implementations for the support of the identified NGN multicast capability requirements, the functions required for each specific NGN multicast capability may be provided by more than one of the functional groups of the NGN architecture.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the high-level architecture of NGN multicast. At the top, a rounded rectangle labeled 'Multicast based applications' is connected to a central block via a horizontal line labeled 'ANI'. The central block consists of two stacked rounded rectangles: 'Multicast capable service stratum functions' on top and 'Multicast capable transport stratum functions' on the bottom. To the left of this central block is a vertical rounded rectangle labeled 'Management functions for multicast based services'. To the right is another vertical rounded rectangle labeled 'Other networks'. A vertical line labeled 'UNI' connects the 'Management functions' block to the 'Multicast capable service stratum functions' block. Another vertical line labeled 'NNI' connects the 'Multicast capable transport stratum functions' block to the 'Other networks' block. Green lines connect the 'Management functions' block to both the 'Multicast capable service stratum functions' and 'Multicast capable transport stratum functions' blocks.
+
+High level illustration of the NGN multicast framework architecture diagram.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – High level illustration of the NGN multicast framework architecture**
+
+Figure 9-1 is a high level illustration of the NGN multicast framework architecture. This figure shows the following functions:
+
+- **Multicast capable service stratum functions**
+The NGN service stratum [ITU-T Y.2011] is the part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer service-related data and the functions that control and manage service resources and network services to enable user services and applications. User services may be implemented by a recursion of multiple service layers within the service stratum. The NGN service stratum is concerned with the application and its services to be operated between peer entities.
+The functions of the NGN service stratum need to be extended to support multicast-based services. These extensions include support of multicast service control and multicast data delivery capabilities.
+- **Multicast capable transport stratum functions**
+The NGN transport stratum [ITU-T Y.2011] is the part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities.
+
+The functions of the NGN transport stratum need to be extended to support multicast-based services. These extensions include support of multicast data delivery and multicast QoS control capabilities.
+
+### - **Multicast capable end-user functions**
+
+The end-user functions need to be extended to support multicast-based services, including functions for the end-user participation in multicast-based services as a sender and/or receiver.
+
+NOTE – No assumptions are made about the diverse end-user interfaces and end-user networks that may be connected to an NGN access network. End-user equipment may be either mobile or fixed [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+### - **Management functions for multicast-based services**
+
+Support for management is fundamental to the operation of the NGN. These functions provide the ability to manage the NGN in order to provide NGN services with the expected quality, security and reliability [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The management functions need to be extended to support multicast-based services. These extensions include support of group membership management capability.
+
+## **9.2 Service stratum functional requirements**
+
+This clause describes the functional requirements of the NGN service stratum in support of the identified NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+### **9.2.1 Multicast group management**
+
+- NGN is required to support group and group member identification management capability.
+- NGN is required to support group advertisement and discovery capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support group membership change notification to multicast-based services' providers and/or users.
+- NGN is recommended to support group membership management capabilities such as addition and deletion of group membership.
+
+### **9.2.2 Multicast service control**
+
+- NGN is required to support multicast connection management capability.
+- NGN is required to support service admission control capability.
+- NGN is required to support service advertisement and discovery capability.
+
+### **9.2.3 Multicast data delivery**
+
+- NGN is recommended to support load sharing capability for multicast data delivery support.
+
+NOTE 1 – Load sharing at the service stratum is recommended in case multicast data delivery is performed at the service stratum.
+
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability for providing service level multicast mechanisms.
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability to support the one-to-many communication mode.
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability to support the many-to-many communication mode.
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability to support the many-to-one communication mode.
+
+NOTE 2 – Multicast data forwarding at the service stratum may be used in case it is not supported by the transport stratum.
+
+- NGN can optionally support reliable multicast data delivery capability for providing service level multicast mechanisms.
+
+### **9.2.4 QoS control**
+
+- NGN is required to support group-wide QoS.
+- NGN is required to support predefinition of a QoS parameter value set before the establishment of a multicast connection.
+
+NOTE – QoS control at the service stratum is required in case multicast data forwarding is performed at the service stratum.
+
+- NGN is recommended to support advertisement of a pre-defined QoS parameter value set to multicast group members.
+
+### **9.2.5 Mobility**
+
+- NGN is required to support nomadism for terminal mobility in case of multicast communications.
+- NGN is required to support nomadism for personal mobility in case of multicast communications.
+- NGN is prohibited from precluding support of service continuity for terminal mobility.
+
+### **9.2.6 Security**
+
+- NGN is recommended to support sender/receiver authentication capability.
+- NGN is required to support sender/receiver authorization capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support data confidentiality capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support data integrity capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support group key management capability.
+
+NOTE – These security capabilities are provided at the service stratum in case multicast data delivery is performed at the service stratum.
+
+## **9.3 Transport stratum functional requirements**
+
+This clause describes the functional requirements of the NGN transport stratum in support of the identified NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+#### **9.3.1 Multicast group management**
+
+- NGN is required to support group and group member identification management capability.
+
+### **9.3.2 Multicast service control**
+
+- NGN is required to support multicast connection management capability.
+- NGN is required to support service admission control capability.
+- NGN is required to support management of the multicast-based services' scope.
+
+#### **9.3.3 Multicast data delivery**
+
+- NGN is required to support multicast data forwarding capability to support the one-to-many multicast communication mode.
+
+NOTE 1 – Multicast data forwarding capability to support the one-to-many multicast communication mode can be provided efficiently when the transport stratum supports one-to-many multicast mechanisms (e.g., IP multicast).
+
+- NGN is required to support multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains.
+
+- NGN is prohibited from precluding support of reliable multicast data delivery mechanisms in the transport stratum.
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability to support the many-to-many multicast communication mode.
+- NGN can optionally support multicast data forwarding capability to support the many-to-one multicast communication mode.
+
+NOTE 2 – Multicast data forwarding capability for, respectively, the many-to-many and many-to-one multicast communication modes can be provided efficiently when the transport stratum supports, respectively, many-to-many and many-to-one multicast mechanisms. Many-to-one and many-to-many multicast mechanisms at the transport stratum are for further study.
+
+#### **9.3.4 QoS control**
+
+- NGN is required to support group-wide QoS.
+- NGN is required to support predefinition of a QoS parameter value set before the establishment of a multicast connection.
+- NGN is recommended to support advertisement of a predefined QoS parameter value set to multicast group members.
+
+#### **9.3.5 Mobility**
+
+- NGN is required to support nomadism for terminal mobility in case of multicast communications.
+- NGN is required to support nomadism for personal mobility in case of multicast communications.
+- NGN is prohibited from precluding support of service continuity for terminal mobility.
+
+#### **9.3.6 Security**
+
+- NGN is recommended to support sender/receiver authentication capability.
+- NGN is required to support sender/receiver authorization capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support data confidentiality capability.
+- NGN is recommended to support data integrity capability.
+
+## **9.4 End-user functional requirements**
+
+This clause describes the functional requirements of the NGN end-user functions in support of the identified NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+### **9.4.1 Multicast group management**
+
+- End user functions are required to support group and group member identification management capability.
+- End user functions are required to support group advertisement and discovery capability.
+- End user functions are required to support reliable multicast data delivery mechanisms for support of multicast-based services requiring multicast reliable data delivery.
+- End user functions are recommended to support group membership change notification.
+
+### **9.4.2 Multicast service control**
+
+- End user functions are required to support multicast connection management capability.
+- End user functions are required to support service advertisement and discovery capability.
+
+#### **9.4.3 QoS control**
+
+- End user functions are required to support group-wide QoS.
+- End user functions are required to support predefinition of a QoS parameter value set before the establishment of a multicast connection.
+- End user functions are recommended to support advertisement of a predefined QoS parameter value set from the NGN.
+
+#### **9.4.4 Mobility**
+
+- End user functions are required to support nomadism for terminal mobility for multicast communications.
+- End user functions are required to support nomadism for personal mobility for multicast communications.
+- End user functions are prohibited from precluding support of service continuity for terminal mobility.
+
+#### **9.4.5 Security**
+
+- End user functions are recommended to support sender/receiver authentication capability.
+- End user functions are recommended to support sender/receiver authorization capability.
+- End user functions are recommended to support data confidentiality capability.
+- End user functions are recommended to support data integrity capability.
+- End user functions are recommended to support group key management capability.
+
+## **9.5 Management functional requirements**
+
+This clause describes the functional requirements of the NGN management functions in support of the identified NGN multicast capabilities.
+
+### **9.5.1 Multicast group management**
+
+- NGN management functions are required to support group and group member identification management capability.
+- NGN management functions are required to support group membership management capabilities such as addition and deletion of group membership (by default, these capabilities include support of group membership change notification).
+- NGN management functions are required to support group creation and release management capability.
+- NGN management functions are required to support group monitoring capability.
+- NGN management functions are recommended to support group advertisement and discovery capability.
+
+### **9.5.2 Multicast service control**
+
+- NGN management functions are required to support multicast connection management capability.
+
+#### **9.5.3 QoS control**
+
+- NGN management functions are recommended to support predefinition of a QoS parameter value set before the establishment of a multicast connection.
+
+#### **9.5.4 Security**
+
+- NGN management functions are recommended to support group key management capability.
+
+## **9.6 Accounting and charging functional requirements**
+
+- NGN is required to support accounting and charging functionalities associated with the provision of multicast-based services.
+
+NOTE – These functionalities may reside in the NGN service stratum and/or NGN transport stratum.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Example scenario of multicast-based services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes an example scenario of multicast-based services.
+
+
+
+Multicast based services
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MS as Multicast Sender
+ participant SS as Service stratum
+ participant TS as Transport stratum
+ participant R1 as Multicast Receiver 1
+ participant R2 as Multicast Receiver 2
+
+ Note over SS, TS: Group management
+ MS->>SS: Group creation
+ SS->>TS: Group advertisement
+ TS->>R1: Group advertisement
+ TS->>R2: Group advertisement
+ MS->>SS: Group authorization
+ SS->>TS: Group authorization
+ TS->>R1: Group authorization
+ TS->>R2: Group authorization
+ R1->>TS: Group joining (client 1)
+ R2->>TS: Group joining (client 2)
+ Note over SS, TS: Multicast data delivery path construction & multicast data delivery
+ SS-->>TS: n-1
+ TS-->>R1: n-1
+ TS-->>R2: n-1
+ R1->>TS: Group leaving (client 1)
+ R2->>TS: Group leaving (client 2)
+ Note over SS, TS: Multicast data delivery path construction & multicast data delivery
+ SS-->>TS: n+0
+ TS-->>R1: n+0
+ TS-->>R2: n+0
+ SS-->>TS: n+1
+ TS-->>R1: n+1
+ TS-->>R2: n+1
+ SS-->>TS: n+2
+ TS-->>R1: n+2
+ TS-->>R2: n+2
+ Note over SS, TS: Group management
+ MS->>SS: Group termination
+ SS->>TS: Group termination
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the scenario of multicast-based services in a one-to-many communication mode. The diagram involves four lifelines: Multicast Sender, Service stratum, Transport stratum, and two Multicast Receivers (Receiver 1 and Receiver 2). The process is divided into two main phases: 'Group management' and 'Multicast data delivery path construction & multicast data delivery'. The 'Group management' phase includes 'Group creation', 'Group authorization', 'Group joining (client 1)', 'Group joining (client 2)', 'Group leaving (client 1)', 'Group leaving (client 2)', and 'Group termination'. The 'Multicast data delivery' phase includes 'Multicast data delivery' (n-1, n+0, n+1, n+2).
+
+Figure I.1 – Scenario of multicast-based services (one-to-many communication mode)
+
+- Group creation
+At the start of a multicast-based service, a multicast group is created in the service stratum. Various pieces of information of the multicast-based service such as group address and media types are defined in this phase.
+
+- **Group advertisement**
+Potential or candidate members of the multicast group are notified of the creation of a new multicast group through group advertisement. Examples of group advertisement are EPG (electronic program guide), SDR (session directory), web page, etc.
+- **Group authorization**
+Group members are authorized to access the multicast-based service through multicast authorization procedures. When a group is not open to the public, a member is required to have access permission to use the multicast-based service. An example of group authorization is the use of ID and password.
+- **Group join**
+The subscribed members join the multicast-based service. Since a multicast-based service can be implemented in several ways, each multicast member joins the multicast-based service by using the appropriate method such as IGMP, proxy IGMP, etc.
+- **Multicast data delivery path construction**
+The multicast data delivery path is constructed from the multicast sender to multicast receivers. The method of constructing the multicast data delivery path depends on the underlying network technologies. For example, IP multicast uses multicast routing protocols, and other multicast technologies use multicast tree management protocol in the NGN service stratum.
+- **Multicast data delivery**
+Multicast data are delivered from the multicast sender to multicast receivers along the constructed multicast data delivery path.
+- **Group leave**
+Multicast group participants can leave a multicast-based service.
+- **Group termination**
+Multicast-based services can be terminated. During the group termination phase, NGN needs to release the allocated network resources such as multicast address, network bandwidth, etc.
+- **Group management**
+During the operation of a multicast-based service, the service provider may need to monitor the multicast-based service for management of multicast groups or for other administrative purposes. As some group participants may affect the operation of the multicast-based service, the service provider needs to control those participants to provide a robust multicast-based service.
+
+Group management is also needed to control and distribute a group key to provide a secure multicast-based service. If the service is being degraded due to the lack of resources or network fault, the service provider may take actions to solve such problems.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## End-to-end multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes some aspects related to multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains. Each NGN domain may be administrated by a different provider which may have different policies or different network capabilities. Due to the heterogeneity of NGN domains, multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains can have some limitations.
+
+The different policies of the different NGN domains should be associated for interworking. In order to provide successful multicast data delivery, the NGN domains need to interwork different NGN multicast capabilities such as multicast group management, multicast service control, multicast data delivery, QoS control, mobility, security, etc.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the flow of multicast data across multiple NGN domains. On the left, a 'Sender(s)' represented by server icons sends 'Multicast Contents' (indicated by a red arrow) into the first of three 'NGN Domain' clouds. Within each cloud, a grey bar labeled 'multicast' represents the 'Multicast Connection'. The data flows sequentially through these connections across the three domains. Finally, a red arrow labeled 'Multicast Contents' exits the last domain and is received by 'Receivers' represented by computer icons. A legend at the bottom right identifies the grey bar as 'Multicast Connection' and the red arrow as 'Multicast Contents'.
+
+Diagram illustrating end-to-end multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains.
+
+**Figure II.1 – End-to-end multicast data delivery across multiple NGN domains**
+
+Figure II.1 shows the delivery of multicast contents through the multicast connections that are established by the various NGN domains. The NGN domains need to support interworking capabilities to achieve end-to-end multicast data delivery.
+
+# **Appendix III**
+
+## **Concepts of group and phases of a multicast communication**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes various instances of multicast group and different phases of a multicast communication based on relevant terms contained in [ITU-T X.601].
+
+## **III.1 Concepts of group**
+
+#### **III.1.1 Multicast group**
+
+It is a set of service users that abide by appropriate group-membership criteria, or a set of rules for belonging to a group that enables multicast-based services and applications utilization.
+
+NOTE – To each multicast group, a group name is assigned. The group name and the rule defining the multicast group are known, but it may not be feasible to determine all service users that satisfy the rule.
+
+#### **III.1.2 Registered group**
+
+It is a set of multicast group members that have indicated implicitly or explicitly to the group manager their intention to be a member of the enrolled group.
+
+#### **III.1.3 Enrolled group**
+
+It is a set of registered group members that is assigned with a group address. A member of an enrolled group can be reached by its individual address.
+
+#### **III.1.4 Active group**
+
+It is a set of enrolled group members that has entered the multicast data transfer phase, satisfying the requirements for participating in a group communication.
+
+## **III.2 Phases of a multicast communication**
+
+A multicast communication needs different phases of communication such as creation/release, registration/de-registration, enrolment/de-enrolment, activation/deactivation and data transfer. This clause describes the phases of a multicast communication and the relationship with the different instances of the group. Figure III.1 shows the life cycle state transition diagram of a group member and the phases of a multicast communication.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Undefined([Undefined]) -- "Define criteria" --> Defined([Defined])
+ Defined -- "Remove criteria" --> Undefined
+ Defined -- "Registration" --> Registered([Registered])
+ Registered -- "De-registration" --> Defined
+ Registered -- "Enrolment" --> Enroled([Enroled])
+ Enroled -- "De-enrolment" --> Registered
+ Enroled -- "Activation" --> Activated([Activated])
+ Activated -- "De-activation" --> Enroled
+
+```
+
+Lifecycle state transition diagram of a group member. The diagram shows five states in ovals: Undefined, Defined, Registered, Enroled, and Activated. Transitions between states are labeled with actions: 'Define criteria' and 'Remove criteria' between Undefined and Defined; 'Registration' and 'De-registration' between Defined and Registered; 'Enrolment' and 'De-enrolment' between Registered and Enroled; 'Activation' and 'De-activation' between Enroled and Activated. On the left, four phases are indicated with vertical double-headed arrows: 'Creation/Release phase' (Undefined to Defined), 'Registration/De-registration phase' (Defined to Registered), 'Enrolment/De-enrolment phase' (Registered to Enroled), and 'Activation/Deactivation phase' (Enroled to Activated). A 'Data transfer phase' is shown at the bottom with a vertical double-headed arrow.
+
+**Figure III.1 – Lifecycle state transition diagram of a group member**
+
+#### - **Creation/release phase**
+
+The first phase associated with a multicast-based service is the creation of the multicast group. The multicast group may be created by specifying the set of rules that define the future enrolled group membership. A multicast group is created in this phase by the group management functions. In this phase, the service provider can announce service availability to multicast-based service users.
+
+#### - **Registration/de-registration phase**
+
+After successful creation of a multicast group, a multicast-based service user is required to inform the group manager about his/her intention to become a member of the enrolled group. A registration phase can be understood as simply letting the group manager to know peer names and addresses of multicast group members. Thus, a registered group is composed of members of a multicast group that have successfully performed the registration phase. In this phase, a multicast-based service user can subscribe to the multicast-based service group and wait for the acknowledgement of the subscription and permission to enrol in a group.
+
+#### - **Enrolment/de-enrolment phase**
+
+The enrolment phase allows the registered user to become a member of the enrolled group. An enrolled group is composed of members that have successfully performed the registration and the enrolment phase. This is the phase when a multicast-based service user waits for the multicast-based service to start.
+
+#### - Activation/deactivation phase
+
+The activation phase establishes the shared state of a specific instance of the multicast-based service based on the information exchanged during the enrolment phase. The successful completion of the activation phase leaves the user in the data transfer phase. An active group is composed of enrolled group members that have completed the activation phase. In this phase, a multicast-based service user is ready to send or receive data.
+
+#### - Data transfer phase
+
+The data transfer phase involves the actual transfer of data among the group participants who belong to the active group. Data transfers are allowed among the participants only if the integrity condition is satisfied.
+
+# Appendix IV
+
+## QoS aspects of multicast communications
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+Group members may have different QoS characteristics so that they need to agree on a QoS parameter value set before the initiation of a multicast communication. This appendix describes various QoS aspects of multicast communications based on [ITU-T X.601].
+
+## IV.1 Levels of QoS agreement
+
+This term is used to describe the agreed actions, which are to be taken by the service provider and/or the service users to maintain the agreed levels of QoS.
+
+Two levels of agreement are defined: best effort and guaranteed.
+
+- **Guaranteed QoS level**
+In the guaranteed QoS level, the agreed QoS must be guaranteed so that the requested level will be met. This implies that the service will not be initiated unless there is the expectation that it can be maintained within the specified limits.
+- **Best-effort QoS level**
+The weakest QoS level so that all parties do their best to meet the user requirements without compromising any services for which a guarantee QoS level is offered. In this case, there is no assurance that the requested QoS will be provided.
+
+## IV.2 QoS metrics
+
+QoS metrics describe the performance parameters of networks, such as speed or reliability of multicast traffic, that need to be considered. The traditional parameters used to measure network QoS are bandwidth, delay, jitter and packet loss.
+
+- **Bandwidth**
+The "bandwidth" of a link refers to the ability of the link to transfer data at a rate expressed commonly in bits per second. The bandwidth is an important factor in evaluating and provisioning QoS. There are several factors related to bandwidth, including maximum burst size, peak bandwidth, minimum guaranteed bandwidth, and average bandwidth.
+- **Delay**
+Delay in packet transmission can significantly affect the quality of real-time traffic. Packets belonging to real-time traffic benefit when delay is minimized across the network.
+- **Jitter**
+Jitter is defined as the variation in the delay introduced between different packets of a single transmission. Jitter may be caused by bandwidth constraints and network congestion.
+- **Packet loss**
+Packet loss may be due to various factors such as low bandwidth and link congestion. Intelligent user equipments are capable of reconstructing data using various algorithms, but extreme packet losses may result in the inability to reconstruct data.
+
+# **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..abfa70719d94f888ff2953dda1d5a393b75e724d
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@@ -0,0 +1,982 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2237
+
+(01/2010)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **Functional model and service scenarios for QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2237
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2237**
+
+# **Functional model and service scenarios for QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2237 introduces a functional model and service scenarios for QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service in WiFi, 3G, and mobile WiMAX networks. In this Recommendation, mobile VoIP service is assumed to be provided by application of Layer 2 authentication and make-before-break based service continuity in the transport stratum.
+
+The functional model used for the description of service scenarios provided in this Recommendation is based on components and entities defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 covering user terminal, networks and media handling related aspects.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2237 | 2010-01-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Mobile WiMAX, mobility, VoIP, WiFi, 3G.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Overview ..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Functional model ..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Key assumptions..... | 7 |
+| | 8.1 User terminal aspects..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 Networks aspects ..... | 7 |
+| | 8.3 Media handling aspects ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.4 End-to-end considerations ..... | 9 |
+| 9 | Security considerations..... | 9 |
+| | Appendix I – Service scenarios for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service ..... | 10 |
+| | I.1 User terminal moving in a single operator's network..... | 10 |
+| | I.2 Interworking between different operators' networks..... | 15 |
+| | I.3 User terminal moving between different access networks within the same operator's network ..... | 19 |
+| | Appendix II – Mapping between functions defined in NGN and 3GPP, Mobile WiMAX, WiFi entities ..... | 23 |
+| | II.1 Mapping of 3GPP entities to NGN functional entities..... | 23 |
+| | II.2 Mapping of mobile WiMAX entities to NGN functional entities..... | 25 |
+| | II.3 Mapping of WiFi entities to NGN functional entities ..... | 25 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 26 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2237
+
+# Functional model and service scenarios for QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation introduces a functional model and service scenarios related to the support of QoS-enabled mobile voice over IP (VoIP) service in WiFi, 3G, and mobile WiMAX networks. More specifically, this Recommendation provides a description of:
+
+- a functional model applicable to the context of QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service;
+- service scenarios related to the provision of QoS-enabled mobile VoIP service:
+ - in a single operator's network which supports either WiFi, 3G or mobile WiMAX;
+ - in multiple operator's networks, each supporting a different wireless network, e.g., a WiFi, mobile WiMAX or 3G wireless network;
+ - in a single operator's network where the user terminal moves between different wireless access networks.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Q.1706] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), Mobility management requirements for NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Q.1707] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1707/Y.2804 (2008), Generic framework of mobility management for next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Q.1708] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1708/Y.2805 (2008), Framework of location management for NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2014] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2008), Network attachment control functions in next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2018] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2018 (2009), Mobility management and control framework and architecture within the NGN transport stratum. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2111] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2008), Resource and admission control functions in next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1. |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.2 functional model** [b-ITU-R M.1224]: A model which identifies and defines functional entities and relationships between these functional entities.
+
+**3.1.3 host-based mobility** [ITU-T Y.2018]: A mode of operation whereby the mobile UE takes an active role in the provision of mobility service at layer 3, in particular by contacting the mobile service provider directly to invoke this service after gaining network access.
+
+**3.1.4 location identifier (LID)** [ITU-T Q.1707]: A topological location identifier of a user equipment (UE). An IP address can be used as a location identifier.
+
+**3.1.5 network-based mobility** [ITU-T Y.2018]: A mode of operation whereby the mobile UE does not take an active role in the provision of mobility service at layer 3.
+
+**3.1.6 persistent location identifier (PLID)** [ITU-T Q.1708]: A location identifier that does not change even when a mobile user equipment (MUE) moves across different access networks or IP subnets.
+
+**3.1.7 seamless service** [ITU-T Q.1706]: A service that is implemented such that it will ensure that users will not experience any service disruptions while changing the point of attachment.
+
+**3.1.8 service continuity** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for a moving object to maintain ongoing service over including current states, such as user's network environment and session for a service.
+
+**3.1.9 temporary location identifier (TLID)** [ITU-T Q.1708]: A location identifier that changes when a mobile user equipment (MUE) moves across different access networks or IP subnets.
+
+**3.1.10 terminal mobility** [ITU-T Q.1706]: This is the mobility for those scenarios where the same terminal equipment is moving or is used at different locations. The ability of a terminal to access telecommunication services from different locations and while in motion, and the capability of the network to identify and locate that terminal.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 persistent IP address:** An IP address that does not change even when a user equipment moves across different access networks or IP subnets.
+
+NOTE – A persistent IP address can be used as a persistent location identifier; see clause 3.1.6.
+
+**3.2.2 temporary IP address:** An IP address that changes when a user equipment moves across different access networks or IP subnets.
+
+NOTE – A temporary IP address can be used as a temporary location identifier; see clause 3.1.9.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|------------------------------------------------------|
+| 3G | Third Generation wireless system |
+| AAA | Authentication Authorization Accounting |
+| ABG-FE | Access Border Gateway Functional Entity |
+| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity |
+| AN-FE | Access Node Functional Entity |
+| AR-FE | Access Relay Functional Entity |
+| AP | Access Point |
+| BSC | Base Station Controller |
+| CSCF | Call Session Control Function |
+| DNS | Domain Name Server |
+| EN-FE | Edge Node Functional Entity |
+| FRA | Functional Requirements and Architecture |
+| HA | Home Agent |
+| HDC-FE | Handover Decision and Control Functional Entity |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber Server |
+| IBG-FE | Interconnection Border Gateway Functional Entity |
+| I-CSC-FE | Interrogating-Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| L2 | Layer 2 |
+| L2HEF | Layer 2 Handover Execution Function |
+| L3 | Layer 3 |
+| L3HEF | Layer 3 Handover Execution Function |
+| MAC | Media Access Control |
+| MLM-FE | Mobile Location Management Functional Entity |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management and Control Functions |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NAC-FE | Network Access Configuration Functional Entity |
+| OUT | Originating User Terminal |
+| P-CSCF | Proxy-Call Session Control Function |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PD-FE | Policy Decision Functional Entity |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| RAS | Radio Access Station |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving-Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| SCF | Service Control Functions |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SL-FE | Subscription Locator Functional Entity |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TRC-FE | Transport Resource Control Functional Entity |
+| TUT | Terminating User Terminal |
+| UT | User Terminal |
+| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |
+| WiFi | Wireless Fidelity |
+| WiMAX | Worldwide interoperability for Microwave Access |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Overview
+
+In this Recommendation, mobile voice over IP service is assumed to be a seamless service as defined in clause 3.1.7, i.e., a VoIP service that is implemented such that it will ensure that mobile users will not experience any service disruptions while changing the point of attachment. Mobile VoIP service requires the support of service continuity for terminal mobility taking into account network conditions (e.g., the number of user sessions, mobility events and bandwidth consumption) and users' requirements.
+
+QoS enabled mobile VoIP service is a mobile VoIP service which has the characteristic of ensuring the QoS when the user terminal moves, e.g., changes from one access point to another one. This service requires some form of adaptation in order to support service continuity when users' requirements and network conditions mismatch. Adaptation may include negotiation/renegotiation of network QoS and/or terminal parameters (e.g., codec change/adaptation).
+
+When the user terminal moves between different networks, network QoS parameters may either be maintained or adapted. Network QoS parameters include information such as IP layer available bandwidth, maximum packet transfer delay, jitter, packet loss rate, burst loss rate, packet delay variation tolerance, packets per second, etc.
+
+Figure 1 illustrates a general network architecture involving two operators supporting different types of access networks, i.e., cellular access networks (such as 3G), WiFi access networks and mobile WiMAX access networks, and where users of the mobile VoIP service may move between different access networks in the same operator domain or between different operator domains.
+
+As shown in Figure 1, NGN architectural components, i.e., service control functions (SCF), mobility management and control functions (MMCF), network attachment control functions (NACF) and resource and admission control functions (RACF), are assumed to be used for supporting the QoS enabled mobile VoIP service.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: General network architecture for QoS enabled mobile VoIP service. The diagram shows two operators, Operator A and Operator B, each with a Service Control Function (SCF), Mobile Management Control Function (MMCF), and Radio Access Control Function (RACF). A central DNS server connects the SCFs. The MMCFs are connected to the RACFs. The RACFs are connected to the Network Access Control Function (NACF) in each operator's network. The NACFs are connected to the Access Switches. The Access Switches are connected to the Radio Access Network (RAN) elements: Mobile WiMAX (RAS), WiFi (AP), and 3G (BSC). The RAN elements are connected to mobile devices. A legend indicates: Red dashed line: Service Session Signal; Dotted line: DNS Query; Orange dotted line: Network Control Signal; Blue dashed line: Binding Update Signal.
+
+**Figure 1 – General network architecture for QoS enabled mobile VoIP service**
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to describe corresponding service scenarios for the case where QoS enabled mobile VoIP service is provided to the mobile users. The following provides the functional model used for describing the corresponding service scenarios, while clause 8 provides the overall key assumptions. Appendix I contains the detailed description of service scenarios.
+
+## 7 Functional model
+
+This clause provides a functional model for the support of QoS enabled mobile VoIP services. This functional model is based on the NGN framework architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] and reuses the functions and functional entities of RACF [ITU-T Y.2111], NACF [ITU-T Y.2014], MMCF [ITU-T Y.2018] and SCF [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional model of a QoS enabled mobile VoIP service, organized into three main strata:
+
+- Service stratum functions (Service Stratum):**
+ - SCF:** P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE.
+ - HSS:** SAA-FE, SL-FE, SUP-FE.
+- Transport control functions (Transport Stratum):**
+ - NACF:** TAA-FE, NAC-FE, AM-FE.
+ - MMCF:** HDC-FE, MLM-FE.
+ - RACF:** PD-FE, TRC-FE.
+- End-user functions:**
+ - Control Plane:** (Not explicitly detailed in the diagram).
+ - Forwarding Plane:**
+ - Access Transport:** AR-FE, AN-FE, L2HEF, L2 Transport Functions, EN-FE, L3HEF, L3 Transport Functions.
+ - Core Transport:** ABG-FE, L3HEF, Packet Transport Functions, IBG-FE, L3HEF.
+
+A dashed line separates the Control Plane and Forwarding Plane. A box labeled 'End-user functions' points to the Forwarding Plane section.
+
+Figure 2 – Functional model diagram showing the architecture of a QoS enabled mobile VoIP service. The diagram is divided into three main horizontal sections: Service stratum functions (Service Stratum), Transport control functions (Transport Stratum), and End-user functions. The Service Stratum contains SCF (P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE) and HSS (SAA-FE, SL-FE, SUP-FE). The Transport Stratum contains NACF (TAA-FE, NAC-FE, AM-FE), MMCF (HDC-FE, MLM-FE), and RACF (PD-FE, TRC-FE). The End-user functions section is divided into the Control Plane and Forwarding Plane. The Forwarding Plane is further divided into Access Transport (AR-FE, AN-FE, L2HEF, L2 Transport Functions, EN-FE, L3HEF, L3 Transport Functions) and Core Transport (ABG-FE, L3HEF, Packet Transport Functions, IBG-FE, L3HEF). A dashed line separates the Control Plane and Forwarding Plane. A box labeled 'End-user functions' points to the Forwarding Plane section.
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional model**
+
+The functional model shown in Figure 2 includes the following functional entities:
+
+- The functional entities in SCF for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service are composed of S-CSC-FE, P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, SL-FE, SUP-FE, and SAA-FE. Further details can be found in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- The required functional entities in MMCF for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service are composed of HDC-FE, and MLM-FE. For further details see [ITU-T Y.2018].
+- The required functional entities in RACF for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service are composed of PD-FE and TRC-FE. For further details see [ITU-T Y.2111].
+- The required functional entities in NACF for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service are composed of TAA-FE, NAC-FE and AM-FE. For further details see [ITU-T Y.2014].
+- The required functional entities in the forwarding plane for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service are composed of AR-FE, AN-FE, EN-FE, ABG-FE and IBG-FE. For further details see [ITU-T Y.2012]. In order to support handover execution in the forwarding plane, it is assumed that L3HEF as defined in [ITU-T Y.2018] is supported by the EN-FE, ABG-FE and IBG-FE.
+
+Based on the functional model described in this clause, clause 8 describes the overall assumptions made for describing the different service scenarios, while Appendix I goes into the details of service scenarios descriptions themselves.
+
+## **8 Key assumptions**
+
+This clause identifies the key components assumptions considered in this Recommendation.
+
+### **8.1 User terminal aspects**
+
+The user terminal (UT) is the device that facilitates end user's access to services and applications. User terminals can be classified as single-mode terminals and multi-mode terminals.
+
+- Single-mode terminal: A terminal which provides connection to either fixed or mobile or a wireless network. Connection of a single-mode terminal to the network is identified by a single identity which is the basis to bind all services and applications delivered to the terminal. A single-mode terminal is equipped with various media processing capabilities including various codecs to handle services and applications, such as voice phone call, conference, SMS, video and IPTV.
+- Multi-mode terminal: A terminal which provides connections to fixed, mobile or wireless networks. Each network connection of a multi-mode terminal is identified by a different identity according to each network. Therefore, binding of services and applications delivered to a multi-mode terminal is much more complex than for a single-mode terminal. A multi-mode terminal is also equipped with various media processing capabilities, including various codecs to handle services and applications similar to those for single-mode, but forming different sets of service categories with different sets of processing capabilities, such as different sets of codecs according to associated network connection capability.
+
+The user terminals considered in this Recommendation are multi-mode terminals, equipped with WiFi, 3G, and mobile WiMAX functions and for which different voice codecs can be associated.
+
+### **8.2 Networks aspects**
+
+The concept of generalized mobility as defined in [ITU-T Y.2001] introduces the ability to treat all related networks equally as far as mobility is concerned. This aspect raises several issues. First, the QoS capabilities may vary from one access network to another. For example, WiFi networks are able to support much higher bandwidths than mobile WiMAX or 3G networks. Second, a user terminal connected to different access networks may use different service coverages and different transmission speeds. Networks considered in this Recommendation are WiFi, 3G, and mobile WiMAX networks.
+
+These networks have different capabilities due to the different available bandwidths, service coverages, and transmission speeds when a user terminal moves or accesses these different networks. The following identifies the main characteristics of these networks:
+
+- WiFi: This network provides wireless access technology approximately at 10 Mbit/s-100 Mbit/s (802.11x based) transmission speed to user terminals such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) or notebooks within several hundred metres from the user terminal to the access point.
+- Mobile WiMAX: This network provides wireless access technology at approximately 1 Mbit/s-2 Mbit/s transmission speed to user terminals such as personal digital assistants (PDAs) or notebooks with 60 km/h mobility support within 100 m-1 km service coverage per cell.
+- 3G: This network provides wireless access technology at approximately 10 Mbit/s-50 Mbit/s transmission speed to user terminals such as PDAs or notebooks with 250 km/h mobility support within 1 km-3 km service coverage per cell.
+
+This Recommendation assumes the use of Layer 2 (e.g., MAC) authentication based on triggering of Layer 2 signal strength in the user terminal. In addition, "make-before-break" is also assumed as a functional capability being used for handover in the transport stratum functions. The "make-before-break" functional capability minimizes the packet delay and packet loss which can occur in mobile VoIP. This capability consists in pre-establishing the Layer 2/Layer 3 path before handover and releasing the previous in-service path after connecting to the pre-established Layer 2/Layer 3 path. Figure 3 shows a handover procedure where a user terminal moves from a WiFi in-service network to a mobile WiMAX network.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Handover procedure with 'make-before-break' capability. The diagram illustrates a three-stage process for a user terminal moving from WiFi to Mobile WiMAX. Stage 1 (Make): The user terminal is in the WiFi network, connected to an Old WiFi AR. It detects a new L2 link in the Mobile WiMAX network. Stage 2 (before): The user terminal has established a pre-established L2/L3 path to the New WiBro AR in the Mobile WiMAX network. The old path is still active. Stage 3 (Break): The user terminal decides to handover and communicates through the new path. Finally, it breaks the previous in-service path in the WiFi network. The diagram uses color coding: blue for the old path and red for the new path. Arrows indicate the 'move' of the user terminal and the state changes of the paths.
+
+**Figure 3 – Handover procedure with "make-before-break" capability**
+
+The steps considered in Figure 3 are as follows:
+
+- 1) The user terminal detects a new L2 link in the mobile WiMAX network.
+- 2) The user terminal sets up the pre-established L2/L3 path before handover to the mobile WiMAX network.
+- 3) The user terminal decides to handover to the WiMAX network based on information triggers such as signal threshold or operator's policy.
+- 4) The user terminal communicates through the pre-established path in the mobile WiMAX network.
+- 5) The user terminal breaks the previous in-service path in the WiFi network.
+
+### 8.3 Media handling aspects
+
+The following two aspects can be considered when a user terminal moves between different networks:
+
+- Same content quality: Content quality remains the same when the user terminal moves between different networks. In this case, there is no need to change the media processing capability and the network QoS parameters remain the same.
+- Different contents quality: This is the case where content quality may change when the user terminal moves between different networks. In this case, there may be a need to change the media processing capabilities as well as network QoS parameters.
+
+This Recommendation assumes that content quality can be changed when a user terminal moves between different networks and as a result, different network QoS parameters may be applied in these different networks.
+
+### 8.4 End-to-end considerations
+
+Taking into consideration the assumptions made in clauses 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, Figure 4 shows the overall considerations made in this Recommendation regarding user terminal, networks, and content.
+
+
+
+◄----> : related function model in this Rec.
+
+```
+graph LR
+ subgraph User_Terminal [User Terminal]
+ SMT[Single-mode terminal]
+ SL[Same location]
+ MM[Multi-mode terminal]
+ DL[Different location]
+ SMT <--> MM
+ end
+
+ subgraph Networks
+ WiFi[WiFi]
+ MWiMAX[Mobile WiMAX]
+ 3G[3G]
+ WiFi <--> MWiMAX
+ MWiMAX <--> 3G
+ end
+
+ subgraph Media_Handling [Media Handling]
+ CSQ[Capability for same quality]
+ CDQ[Capability for different quality]
+ SCQ[Same content quality]
+ DCQ[Different content quality]
+ CSQ <--> CDQ
+ end
+
+ SMT -.-> CSQ
+ SL -.-> CSQ
+ MM -.-> CDQ
+ DL -.-> CDQ
+ MWiMAX -.-> CSQ
+ MWiMAX -.-> CDQ
+ 3G -.-> CDQ
+ CDQ -.-> DCQ
+```
+
+Figure 4: End-to-end view of key assumptions. The diagram is organized into three main columns: User Terminal, Networks, and Media Handling. Under 'User Terminal', there are two rows: 'Single-mode terminal' and 'Same location' (top row, green boxes), and 'Multi-mode terminal' and 'Different location' (bottom row, green boxes). A dashed double-headed arrow connects 'Single-mode terminal' and 'Multi-mode terminal'. Under 'Networks', there are three rows: 'WiFi' (top, purple box), 'Mobile WiMAX' (middle, purple box), and '3G' (bottom, purple box). Double-headed arrows connect 'WiFi' to 'Mobile WiMAX' and 'Mobile WiMAX' to '3G'. To the right of the Networks column are two rows: 'Capability for same quality' (top, pink box) and 'Capability for different quality' (bottom, pink box). Dashed arrows point from 'WiFi' to 'Capability for same quality' and from 'Mobile WiMAX' to 'Capability for different quality'. Under 'Media Handling', there are two rows: 'Same content quality' (top, yellow box) and 'Different content quality' (bottom, yellow box). A dashed arrow points from 'Capability for different quality' to 'Different content quality'. A large dashed box encloses the 'Multi-mode terminal', 'Different location', 'Mobile WiMAX', '3G', 'Capability for different quality', and 'Different content quality' components.
+
+**Figure 4 – End-to-end view of key assumptions**
+
+Figure 4 illustrates the following considerations:
+
+- a multi-mode user terminal is operating in such a way that its network connection is kept active as long as possible;
+- the network connection of a user terminal may change depending on the user terminal behaviour, such as when moving or changing the connection among WiFi, mobile WiMAX, and 3G networks. Changing of access network implies a change in the connecting capabilities like bandwidth, security, QoS, service coverage and others. Therefore, networks can be characterized by two elements: connection change and capability for different quality;
+- content quality can stay the same or can change (i.e., downgrade or upgrade) depending on end-to-end QoS conditions involving the user terminal and networks. For example, when a user terminal moves from a WiFi network to a mobile WiMAX network during VoIP service, the QoS enabled VoIP service may continue by QoS profile transfer from WiFi network to mobile WiMAX network.
+
+## 9 Security considerations
+
+The path between the user terminal and the network could pass over a variety of technologies, many of which are subject of attacks. While the network elements considered in the service scenarios described in this Recommendation could be considered to be in the trusted zone, security regarding the user terminal and the path from user terminals to the network must be considered. The security requirements provided in [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2702] are applicable to the support of the QoS enabled mobile VoIP services described in this Recommendation.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Service scenarios for providing QoS enabled mobile VoIP service
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes service scenarios by using the functional model provided in clause 7 and taking into account the technical assumptions made in clause 8. The described service scenarios consider the case where the user terminal moves:
+
+- in a single operator's network which supports either WiFi, 3G or mobile WiMAX;
+- between multiple operators' networks, each supporting a different wireless network, e.g., WiFi, mobile WiMAX or 3G wireless networks;
+- in a single operator's network where the user terminal moves between different wireless access networks, e.g., between a mobile WiMAX and a WiFi network.
+
+### I.1 User terminal moving in a single operator's network
+
+Service scenarios described in this clause assume that the originating user terminal (OUT) and the terminating user terminal (TUT) are located in the same operator's network, which supports either WiFi, 3G or mobile WiMAX access.
+
+The described scenarios are related to the following phases:
+
+- registration;
+- service establishment;
+- data transfer configuration;
+- service release.
+
+#### I.1.1 Registration
+
+In this clause, attachment to the network (IP address allocation) and service provider registration (e.g., IMS network registration) are performed.
+
+Registration includes:
+
+- network attachment procedures including temporary IP address allocation and registration of the binding between the persistent IP address and the temporary IP address;
+- service stratum authentication and authorization procedures based on information included in the service user profile.
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates the overall procedure related to the registration.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the registration process across four functional layers:
+
+- Service stratum functions:** Contains the SCF (Service Control Function) and the HSS (Home Subscriber System). The HSS includes SAA-FE (Service Authorization and Authentication Function Entity), SUP-FE (Service User Profile Function Entity), and SL-FE (Service Location Function Entity).
+- Transport control functions:** Contains the NACF (Network Access Control Function) and the MMCF (Mobile Management Control Function). The NACF includes TAA-FE (Temporary Address Assignment Function Entity) and NAC-FE (Network Access Control Function Entity). The MMCF includes MLM-FE (Mobile Location Management Function Entity) and HDC-FE (Home Domain Control Function Entity).
+- Transport functions:** Contains the IP network.
+- End-user functions:** Contains the user terminal.
+
+The registration process follows these steps:
+
+- 1) Authentication:** The user terminal sends an authentication request to the TAA-FE of the NACF.
+- 2) Temporary location identifier assigned:** The NAC-FE of the NACF assigns a temporary location identifier to the user terminal.
+- 3) Temporary location identifier report:** The user terminal reports the temporary location identifier to the MLM-FE of the MMCF.
+- 4) Service request registration:** The user terminal sends a service request registration message to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 5) S-CSCF selection:** The P-CSC-FE sends a service request registration message to the I-CSC-FE, which then selects the S-CSC-FE.
+
+Figure I.1 – Registration: A diagram showing the registration process across four layers: Service stratum functions, Transport control functions, Transport functions, and End-user functions. The process involves a user terminal, IP network, NACF, MMCF, HSS, and various functional entities like SCF, P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE, TAA-FE, NAC-FE, MLM-FE, HDC-FE, SAA-FE, SUP-FE, and SL-FE. The steps are: 1) Authentication, 2) Temporary location identifier assigned, 3) Temporary location identifier report, 4) Service request registration, and 5) S-CSCF selection.
+
+Y.2237(10)\_FI.1
+
+**Figure I.1 – Registration**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.1:
+
+- 1) L2 MAC layer authentication and authentication, authorization, accounting (AAA) associations are executed by the TAA-FE after connecting to the network.
+- 2) A temporary IP address (network IP address) is assigned to the user terminal by the NAC-FE of NACF.
+- 3) The received temporary IP address from the local network is reported by the user terminal to the MLM-FE.
+- 4) A service request registration message which contains the user's URL is sent to the P-CSC-FE by the user terminal.
+- 5) The P-CSC-FE sends a service request registration message which contains the user's URL and the P-CSC-FE URL to the SL-FE via the I-CSC-FE.
+
+#### I.1.2 Service establishment
+
+Service establishment includes the signalling information flows required for the establishment of a communication between the originating user terminal and the terminating user terminal.
+
+Figure I.2 illustrates the overall procedure related to the service establishment.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service establishment process across four functional layers:
+
+- Service stratum functions (Top Layer):** Contains the HSS (Home Subscriber System) with components SL-FE, SUP-FE, and SAA-FE. It also includes I-CSC-FE (Inter-CSCF Function Entity) and two S-CSC-FE (Serving-CSCF Function Entity) nodes.
+- Transport control functions (Second Layer):** Contains the MMCF (Multimedia Control Function) with HDC-FE and MLM-FE, and the RACF (Resource and Admission Control Function) with PD-FE and TRC-FE. It also includes two P-CSC-FE (Proxy-CSCF Function Entity) nodes.
+- Transport functions (Third Layer):** Contains the IP network cloud.
+- End-user functions (Bottom Layer):** Contains the OUT (Originating User Terminal) and TUT (Terminating User Terminal) represented by mobile phone icons.
+
+The service establishment process follows these steps:
+
+- 1) Service request:** The OUT terminal sends a service request to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 2) Service request message interpreted:** The P-CSC-FE forwards the request to the I-CSC-FE, which interprets it.
+- 3) Service request forwarded to terminating user terminal:** The I-CSC-FE forwards the request to the TUT terminal via the P-CSC-FE.
+- 4) Service response:** The TUT terminal sends a service response to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 5) QoS setup information forwarding:** The P-CSC-FE forwards QoS setup information to the PD-FE in the RACF.
+- 6) QoS setup information forwarding:** The TRC-FE in the RACF forwards the QoS setup information to the IP network.
+- 7) Service response forwarded to originating user terminal:** The P-CSC-FE forwards the service response from the TUT terminal back to the OUT terminal.
+
+Figure I.2 – Service establishment diagram showing the flow of service request and response messages between various network components across four layers: Service stratum functions, Transport control functions, Transport functions, and End-user functions.
+
+Y.2237(10)\_FI.2
+
+**Figure I.2 – Service establishment**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.2:
+
+- 1) The service request message sent to the P-CSC-FE by the originating user terminal contains the URL information of both the originating and terminating user terminals, codec information and UDP port number of the originating user terminal.
+- 2) The I-CSC-FE interprets the service request message from the originating user terminal.
+- 3) The service request message from the originating user terminal is forwarded to the terminating user terminal.
+- 4) The terminating user terminal forwards the service response message to the P-CSC-FE. This message contains the URL information of the originating and terminating user terminals, codec information and UDP port number of the terminating user terminal.
+- 5) The P-CSC-FE forwards QoS set-up information to the PD-FE. This information includes network bandwidth.
+- 6) The TRC-FE forwards QoS set-up information to the IP network elements.
+- 7) The originating user terminal receives a service response message from the P-CSC-FE.
+
+#### I.1.3 Data transfer configuration
+
+Data transfer configuration covers the use of the real-time transport protocol (RTP) for the transfer of voice over IP.
+
+Figure I.3 illustrates the overall procedure related to the data transfer configuration.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a central cloud representing a network. Inside the cloud, three steps are listed: 1) Pre-setup Path (QoS guaranteed), 2) RTP session set-up, and 3) bidirectional real data forwarding. Above the cloud is a box labeled RACF, which contains two sub-components: PD-FE and TRC-FE. Below the cloud are two user terminals: 'Originating user terminal' on the left and 'Terminating user terminal' on the right. Red lines connect each terminal to a blue cylinder representing a network node within the cloud. A red line also connects these two nodes. Dashed lines connect the RACF box to both network nodes.
+
+Diagram illustrating Data transfer configuration. A central cloud contains three steps: 1) Pre-setup Path (QoS guaranteed), 2) RTP session set-up, and 3) bidirectional real data forwarding. Above the cloud is a box labeled RACF containing PD-FE and TRC-FE. Below the cloud are two user terminals: Originating user terminal and Terminating user terminal. Red lines connect the terminals to the cloud, and a red line connects the two cloud nodes. Dashed lines connect the RACF box to the cloud nodes.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Data transfer configuration**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.3:
+
+- 1) The RACF sets up a pre-established path with the same QoS characteristics as established between the OUT and TUT during the service establishment phase.
+- 2) An RTP session is set up between the originating and terminating user terminals.
+- 3) Bidirectional data is forwarded between the originating and terminating user terminals.
+
+#### **I.1.4 Service release**
+
+Service release includes the necessary information in order to release an established VoIP session between two user terminals.
+
+Figure I.4 illustrates the overall procedure related to service release.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service release process across four functional layers:
+
+- Service stratum functions (Top Layer):** Contains P-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE, and I-CSC-FE.
+ - Step 1: Service request BYE from OUT terminal to P-CSC-FE.
+ - Step 2: Service request BYE interpreted by I-CSC-FE.
+ - Step 3: QoS release information forwarding from P-CSC-FE to PD-FE.
+ - Step 5: Forwarding of the BYE service request to the terminating user terminal (TUT) by P-CSC-FE.
+- Transport control functions (Second Layer):** Contains MMCF (HDC-FE, MLM-FE) and RACF (PD-FE, TRC-FE).
+ - Step 6: Service response forwarded to P-CSC-FE by TUT.
+ - Step 7: Service response to originating user terminal by P-CSC-FE.
+- Transport functions (Third Layer):** Contains the IP network cloud.
+ - Step 4: QoS release enforcement to network node by TRC-FE.
+- End-user functions (Bottom Layer):** Contains OUT and TUT mobile phones.
+
+Figure I.4 – Service release diagram showing the flow of a BYE service request and response across four layers: Service stratum functions, Transport control functions, Transport functions, and End-user functions.
+
+Y.2237(10)\_FI.4
+
+**Figure I.4 – Service release**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.4:
+
+- 1) In order to release the VoIP session, the originating user terminal sends a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 2) The I-CSC-FE interprets the BYE service request received from the originating user terminal.
+- 3) The P-CSC-FE forwards the QoS release information to the PD-FE.
+- 4) The TRC-FE transmits the QoS release message to the IP network elements.
+- 5) The P-CSC-FE forwards the BYE service request to the terminating user terminal.
+- 6) The terminating user terminal sends a service response message to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 7) The P-CSC-FE transmits the service response message to the originating user terminal. The RTP (real-time transport protocol) session is closed.
+
+In case the terminating user terminal initiates release of the VoIP session, the following changes apply:
+
+- in step 1), the terminating user terminal transmits a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE, instead of the originating user terminal;
+- in step 5), the P-CSC-FE forwards the BYE service request to the originating user terminal, instead of to the terminating user terminal;
+- and in step 7), the P-CSC-FE transmits the service response message to the terminating user terminal, instead of to the originating user terminal.
+
+### I.2 Interworking between different operators' networks
+
+The scenarios described in this clause are related to service interworking between different operators' networks, each with its own access technology, such as between a WiFi network and a 3G network. These scenarios include registration, service establishment, data transfer configuration, and service release.
+
+#### I.2.1 Registration
+
+Registration is described in clause I.1.1, and is executed once a terminal registers to a given operator's network.
+
+#### I.2.2 Service establishment
+
+Service establishment covers the required signalling information for call establishment.
+
+Figure I.5 illustrates the overall procedure related to service establishment.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service establishment process between two operators, Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network) and Operator B (3G Network), connected via an IP Network. The process is divided into three main functional layers: Service Stratum Functions, Transport Control Functions, and Transport Functions, with End-User Functions at the bottom.
+
+**Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network):**
+
+- Service Stratum Functions:** Includes SCF (S-CSC-FE, HSS, I-CSC-FE, P-CSC-FE) and DNS.
+- Transport Control Functions:** Includes MMCF (HDC-FE, MLM-FE) and RACF (PD-FE, TRC-FE).
+- Transport Functions:** Connects to the IP Network.
+- End-User Functions:** Originating user terminal.
+
+**Operator B (3G Network):**
+
+- Service Stratum Functions:** Includes SCF (HSS, S-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, P-CSC-FE).
+- Transport Control Functions:** Includes MMCF (MLM-FE, HDC-FE) and RACF (TRC-FE, PD-FE).
+- Transport Functions:** Connects to the IP Network.
+- End-User Functions:** Terminating user terminal.
+
+**IP Network:** A central cloud connecting the two operators.
+
+**Service-related flows (red arrows):**
+
+- 1) Service request from Originating user terminal to P-CSC-FE of Operator A.
+- 2) Service request interpretation at I-CSC-FE of Operator A.
+- 3) Service request URL query & response from I-CSC-FE to DNS.
+- 4) Service request forwarding from I-CSC-FE of Operator A to I-CSC-FE of Operator B.
+- 5) Service request interpretation at I-CSC-FE of Operator B.
+- 6) Destination service request forwarding from I-CSC-FE of Operator B to P-CSC-FE of Operator B.
+- 7) Service response from P-CSC-FE of Operator B to I-CSC-FE of Operator B.
+- 8) QoS setup information forwarding from I-CSC-FE of Operator B to MMCF of Operator B.
+- 9) QoS setup information to network node B from MMCF of Operator B to IP Network.
+- 10) Service response from I-CSC-FE of Operator B to I-CSC-FE of Operator A.
+- 11) QoS setup information forwarding from I-CSC-FE of Operator A to MMCF of Operator A.
+- 12) QoS setup information to network node A from MMCF of Operator A to IP Network.
+- 13) Service response from P-CSC-FE of Operator A to Originating user terminal.
+
+**Network-related flows (blue arrows):**
+
+- QoS setup information forwarding from MMCF to RACF in both operators.
+- QoS setup information to network nodes A and B from MMCF to IP Network.
+
+Figure I.5 – Service establishment diagram showing the flow between Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network) and Operator B (3G Network) through an IP Network.
+
+Figure I.5 – Service establishment
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.5:
+
+- 1) The originating user terminal forwards a service request message to the P-CSC-FE of operator A. This message contains the URL information of the originating and terminating user terminals, codec information and UDP port numbers.
+- 2) The I-CSC-FE of the SCF of operator A interprets the service request message received from the originating user terminal.
+
+- 3) After recognizing that the URL (uniform resource locator) of the terminating user terminal does not belong to its own domain name, the I-CSC-FE of SCF of operator A forwards the URL of the service request message to the DNS (domain name server) and receives in the response the network IP address information of the terminating user terminal.
+- 4) The I-CSC-FE of operator A forwards the service request message to the I-CSC-FE of operator B after getting the SIP URL of operator B.
+- 5) The I-CSC-FE of operator B interprets the service request message received from the I-CSC-FE of operator A.
+- 6) The service request message from the originating user terminal is forwarded to the terminating user terminal.
+- 7) The terminating user terminal forwards the service response message to the P-CSC-FE of the SCF of operator B. This message contains the URL information of the originating and terminating user terminals, the codec information and the UDP port number of the terminating user terminal.
+- 8) In the operator B network, the P-CSC-FE forwards the QoS set-up information (which contains network bandwidth information) to the PD-FE.
+- 9) The TRC-FE of operator B requests QoS set-up information to the IP network elements of operator B.
+- 10) The I-CSC-FE of operator B forwards the service response message to the I-CSC-FE of operator A.
+- 11) The P-CSC-FE of operator A forwards the QoS set-up information to the PD-FE of operator A.
+- 12) The TRC-FE of the RACF of operator A requests QoS set-up information to the IP network elements of operator A.
+- 13) The originating user terminal receives the service response message from the P-CSC-FE of operator A.
+
+#### **1.2.3 Data transfer configuration**
+
+Data transfer configuration includes the use of the real-time transport protocol (RTP) for the support of voice service.
+
+Figure I.6 illustrates the overall procedure related to the data transfer configuration.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the data transfer configuration between two operators. On the left, **Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network)** contains a **RACF** block with **PD-FE** and **TRC-FE** components. Below it is a cloud representing the network, with a dashed arrow labeled **2) Pre-setup Path (QoS guaranteed)** pointing to a blue cylinder (router). An **Originating user terminal** is connected to this router. On the right, **Operator B (3G Network)** contains a similar **RACF** block. Below it is a cloud with a dashed arrow labeled **1) Pre-setup Path (QoS guaranteed)** pointing to a blue cylinder. An **Terminating user terminal** is connected to this router. A red line connects the two blue cylinders, with a label **3) RTP session set-up** above it. A red line also connects the two blue cylinders, with a label **4) bidirectional real data forwarding** below it.
+
+Figure I.6 – Data transfer configuration diagram showing the setup between Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network) and Operator B (3G Network).
+
+**Figure I.6 – Data transfer configuration**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.6:
+
+- 1) The RACF of operator B sets up the pre-established path in order to maintain the same QoS level as the one requested during the initial call establishment.
+- 2) The RACF of operator A sets up the pre-established path in order to maintain the same QoS level as the one requested during the initial call establishment.
+- 3) An RTP session is set up between the originating and terminating user terminals.
+- 4) Bidirectional real data is forwarded between the originating and terminating user terminals.
+
+#### **I.2.4 Service release**
+
+Service release includes the information required for call termination.
+
+Figure I.7 illustrates the overall procedure related to the service release.
+
+
+
+Y.2237(10)\_Fl.7
+
+Figure I.7 – Service release diagram showing information flows between Operator A (Mobile WiMAX Network) and Operator B (3G Network). The diagram is divided into four horizontal layers: Service stratum functions, Transport control functions, Transport functions, and End-user functions. Operator A's SCF contains S-CSC-FE, HSS, P-CSC-FE, and I-CSC-FE. Operator B's SCF contains HSS, S-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, and P-CSC-FE. Transport control functions include MMCF (HDC-FE, MLM-FE) and RACF (PD-FE, TRC-FE) for both operators. The IP network is in the Transport functions layer. End-user functions show the Originating and Terminating user terminals. Numbered steps 1-13 describe the flow: 1) BYE request from terminal A; 2) interpretation at A; 3) QoS info forwarding to PD-FE A; 4) QoS enforcement to IP network A; 5) BYE forwarding to I-CSC-FE B; 6) interpretation at B; 7) QoS info forwarding to PD-FE B; 8) QoS info to IP network B; 9) BYE forwarding to terminal B; 10) response from terminal B; 11) response to P-CSC-FE B; 12) response to P-CSC-FE A; 13) RTP session release. Solid orange lines are service-related flows; dashed purple lines are network-related flows.
+
+**Figure I.7 – Service release**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.7:
+
+- 1) The originating user terminal sends a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE of operator A.
+- 2) The I-CSC-FE of operator A interprets the BYE service request message which was received from the originating user terminal.
+- 3) The P-CSC-FE of operator A forwards the QoS release information to the PD-FE of operator A.
+- 4) The TRC-FE of operator A forwards the QoS release message to the IP network elements of operator A.
+- 5) The I-CSC-FE of operator A forwards the BYE service request message to the I-CSC-FE of operator B.
+- 6) The I-CSC-FE of operator B interprets the BYE service request message which was received from the I-CSC-FE of operator A.
+- 7) The P-CSC-FE of operator B forwards the QoS release information to the PD-FE of operator B.
+- 8) The TRC-FE of operator B forwards the QoS release message to the IP network elements of operator B.
+- 9) The P-CSC-FE of operator B forwards the BYE service request message to the terminating user terminal.
+- 10) The terminating user terminal sends a service response message to the P-CSC-FE of operator B.
+
+- 11) The I-CSC-FE of operator B forwards the service response message to the I-CSC-FE of operator A.
+- 12) The P-CSC-FE of operator A forwards the service response message to the originating user terminal.
+- 13) The RTP (real-time transport protocol) session is closed.
+
+In case the terminating user terminal initiates the off-hook, the following changes apply:
+
+- in step 1), the terminating user terminal transmits a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE, instead of the originating user terminal;
+- in step 9), the P-CSC-FE forwards the BYE service request message to the originating user terminal, instead of to the terminating user terminal;
+- and in step 11), the I-CSC-FE transmits the service response message to the terminating user terminal, instead of to the originating user terminal.
+
+### **I.3 User terminal moving between different access networks within the same operator's network**
+
+The service scenarios described in this clause cover the case where a user terminal moves between different access networks within the same operator's network. In these scenarios, handover using the "make-before-break" concept is required in order to support service continuity. These scenarios are composed of the registration, service establishment, data transfer configuration, handover establishment and service release phases.
+
+#### **I.3.1 Registration**
+
+This service scenario is as described in clause I.1.1.
+
+#### **I.3.2 Service establishment**
+
+This service scenario is as described in clause I.1.2.
+
+#### **I.3.3 Data transfer configuration**
+
+This service scenario is as described in clause I.1.3, with handover being required to support service continuity between different networks.
+
+##### **I.3.3.1 Handover establishment**
+
+Handover establishment covers the required signalling based on the "make-before-break" concept. Figure I.8 illustrates the overall procedure related to the handover establishment.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the handover establishment process across four layers:
+
+- Service stratum functions:** Contains the SCF (S-CSC-FE, P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE) and HSS. It receives a 'Changed originating terminal location / QoS profile' (4) from the MLM-FE and forwards 'Changed originating terminal location' (6) to the terminating user terminal.
+- Transport control functions:** Contains the MMCF (MLM-FE, HDC-FE) and RACF (TRC-FE, PD-FE). The MMCF sends a 'mobility management table update' (3) to the SCF and a 'binding update' (2) to the MLM-FE. The HDC-FE notifies the BU (5) to the PD-FE. The RACF sends 'New path information' (7) to the PD-FE.
+- Transport functions:** Contains the WiFi and Mobile WiMAX networks. The WiFi network performs 'Temporary location identifier assignment' (1) for the originating user terminal. The RACF sets 'New resource reservation policy' (9) for both WiFi and Mobile WiMAX. The PD-FE sets 'New resource reservation policy' (8) for the Mobile WiMAX network.
+- End-user functions:** Shows the 'Originating user terminal' moving from Mobile WiMAX to WiFi, and the 'Terminating user terminal' receiving the 'Changed originating terminal location' (6).
+
+Legend: — Service-related flow, - - - Network-related flow
+
+Y.2237(10)\_FI.8
+
+Figure I.8 – Handover establishment diagram showing the flow of information between Service stratum functions, Transport control functions, Transport functions, and End-user functions during a handover from Mobile WiMAX to WiFi.
+
+**Figure I.8 – Handover establishment**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.8:
+
+- 1) A temporary IP address (network IP address) is assigned to the originating user terminal by the NAC-FE (e.g., via DHCP) after L2 MAC layer authentication and AAA associations are performed by the TAA-FE.
+- 2) The originating user terminal informs his moving status to the MLM-FE by sending a binding update message. In this case, the originating user terminal signals its movement from the mobile WiMAX network to the WiFi network.
+- 3) The MLM-FE updates the mobility management table as a measure for location management of the originating user terminal.
+- 4) The MLM-FE informs the SCF of the updated location and QoS profile information of the originating user terminal.
+- 5) The MLM-FE forwards the binding update (BU) message received from the originating user terminal to the in-service terminating user terminal in order to inform the changed location information of the originating user terminal.
+- 6) The S-CSC-FE forwards the updated location information of the originating user terminal to the terminating user terminal.
+- 7) The HDC-FE informs the PD-FE of the creation of a new path between the originating user terminal and the terminating user terminal.
+- 8) The TRC-FE sends a resource reservation request for a new path to the mobile WiMAX network to which the terminating user terminal is connected.
+
+- 9) The TRC-FE sends a resource reservation request for a new path to the WiFi network to which the originating user terminal is connected.
+
+#### I.3.4 Service release
+
+Service release covers the required information for call termination.
+
+Figure I.9 illustrates the overall procedure related to the service release.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service release procedure across four functional layers:
+
+- Service stratum functions:** Contains the SCF (S-CSC-FE, P-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE) and HSS.
+ - 1) Service request BYE: From Originating user terminal to P-CSC-FE.
+ - 2) Service request BYE: From P-CSC-FE to Terminating user terminal.
+ - 3) Service response: From Terminating user terminal to P-CSC-FE.
+- Transport control functions:** Contains MMCF (MLM-FE, HDC-FE) and RACF (TRC-FE, PD-FE).
+ - 4) QoS release information forwarding: From P-CSC-FE to PD-FE.
+ - 5) QoS release enforcement to network node: From TRC-FE to Mobile WiMAX.
+ - 6) QoS release enforcement to network node: From TRC-FE to WiFi.
+- Transport functions:** Contains WiFi and Mobile WiMAX networks.
+- End-user functions:** Contains Originating user terminal, a middle Originating user terminal, and Terminating user terminal.
+ - 7) Service response: From P-CSC-FE to the middle Originating user terminal.
+ - Move: Dashed arrow from the middle Originating user terminal to the left Originating user terminal.
+
+Legend: Solid orange line = Service-related flow; Dashed blue line = Network-related flow.
+
+Y.2237(10)\_FI.9
+
+Figure I.9 – Service release diagram showing the flow of service-related and network-related messages across different functional layers.
+
+**Figure I.9 – Service release**
+
+The following describes in more detail the information flows shown in Figure I.9:
+
+- 1) The originating user terminal transmits a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 2) The P-CSC-FE forwards the BYE service request message to the terminating user terminal.
+- 3) The terminating user terminal forwards the service response message to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 4) The P-CSC-FE forwards the QoS release information to the PD-FE.
+- 5) The TRC-FE transmits the QoS release message to the IP network elements within the mobile WiMAX network.
+- 6) The TRC-FE transmits the QoS release message to the IP network elements within the WiFi network.
+- 7) The P-CSC-FE transmits the service response message to the originating user terminal, and the RTP (real-time transport protocol) session is closed.
+
+In case the terminating user terminal initiates the off-hook, the following changes apply:
+
+- in step 1), the terminating user terminal transmits a BYE service request message to the P-CSC-FE, instead of to the originating user terminal.
+
+- in step 2), the P-CSC-FE forwards the BYE service request message to the originating user terminal, instead of to the terminating user terminal.
+- in step 3), the originating user terminal forwards the service response message to the P-CSC-FE, instead of to the terminating user terminal.
+- and in step 7), the P-CSC-FE transmits the service response message to the terminating user terminal, instead of to the originating user terminal.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Mapping between functions defined in NGN and 3GPP, Mobile WiMAX, WiFi entities
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### II.1 Mapping of 3GPP entities to NGN functional entities
+
+Table II.1 lists key entities in the 3GPP EPS architecture, their functions, and the NGN functional entities responsible for those functions (see [ITU-T Y.2012]).
+
+**Table II.1 – Mapping of 3GPP entities to NGN functional entities**
+
+| 3GPP entity | Functions performed | NGN functional entity responsible |
+|----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| eNodeB | Functions for radio resource management: Radio bearer control, radio admission control, connection mobility control, dynamic allocation of resources to UEs in both uplink and downlink (scheduling) | AN-FE |
+| | IP header compression and encryption of user data stream | AN-FE |
+| | Selection of an MME at UE attachment when no routing to an MME can be determined from the information provided by the UE | AR-FE |
+| | Routing of user plane data towards serving gateway | AN-FE |
+| | Scheduling and transmission of paging messages (originated from the MME) | AN-FE |
+| | Scheduling and transmission of broadcast information (originated from the MME or O&M) | AN-FE |
+| | Measurement and measurement reporting configuration for mobility and scheduling | AN-FE |
+| | Scheduling and transmission of ETWS messages (originated from the MME) | AN-FEz |
+| Mobility management entity (MME) | NAS signalling | NACF |
+| | NAS signalling security | NACF |
+| | AS Security control | NACF |
+| | Inter CN node signalling for mobility between 3GPP access networks | NACF |
+| | Idle mode UE reachability (including control and execution of paging retransmission) | TBD |
+| | Tracking area list management (for UE in idle and active mode) | TBD (logically, could be TLM-FE) |
+| | PDN GW and Serving GW selection | TBD (TUP-FE) |
+| | MME selection for handovers with MME change | NACF |
+
+**Table II.1 – Mapping of 3GPP entities to NGN functional entities**
+
+| 3GPP entity | Functions performed | NGN functional entity responsible |
+|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
+| | SGSN selection for handovers to 2G or 3G 3GPP access networks | NACF |
+| | Roaming | NACF (TAA-FE) |
+| | Authentication | NACF (TAA-FE) |
+| | Bearer management functions including dedicated bearer establishment | HDC-FE |
+| | Support for ETWS message transmission | NACF |
+| Serving Gateway | The local mobility anchor point for inter-eNB handover | L2HE-FE |
+| | Mobility anchoring for inter-3GPP mobility | L2HE-FE |
+| | E-UTRAN idle mode downlink packet buffering and initiation of network triggered service request procedure | L2HE-FE |
+| | Lawful interception | EN-FE |
+| | Packet routing and forwarding | EN-FE |
+| | Transport level packet marking in the uplink and the downlink | EN-FE |
+| | Accounting on user and QCI granularity for inter-operator charging | EN-FE |
+| | UL and DL charging per UE, PDN, and QCI | EN-FE |
+| | Originator of PMIP signalling. Proxy point for PMIP signalling (chained PMIP) | MLM-FE(P) |
+| | Lower IP tunnel end point | L3HEF |
+| Packet data network (PDN) gateway | Per-user based packet filtering (by, e.g., deep packet inspection) | ABG-FE |
+| | Lawful interception | ABG-FE |
+| | UE IP address allocation | NACF |
+| | DHCPv4 (server and client) and DHCPv6 (client and server) functions | NACF |
+| | UL and DL service level charging, gating and rate enforcement | ABG-FE |
+| | DL rate enforcement based on AMBR | ABG-FE |
+| | Transport level packet marking in the downlink | ABG-FE |
+| | Terminator of PMIP signalling | MLM-FE(C) |
+| | Upper tunnel end point | L3HEF |
+| | Terminator of DSMIPv6 signalling from the UE | MLM-FE(P)Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation**ITU-T Y.2247 (01/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture
+
+---
+
+**Framework and requirements of network-oriented data integrity verification service based on blockchain in future networks**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2247
+
+# Framework and requirements of network-oriented data integrity verification service based on blockchain in future networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2247 specifies the network-oriented data integrity verification service (DIVS) based on blockchain in future networks. It provides the service requirements, framework and service scenarios of the network-oriented data integrity verification service based on blockchain and specifies the network capability requirements accordingly in the context of future networks including IMT-2020 network and beyond. Detailed descriptions of the use cases are listed in the appendix.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2247 | 2023-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15247 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Blockchain, data integrity verification service, framework, future networks, IMT-2020 network and beyond, network capability exposure, network-oriented.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Transport vehicles in logistics industry generate masses of valuable data in different dimensions, such as the driving behaviour data, the location and route data, the running speed and distance data, etc. On the one hand, the service platform/operation platform could optimize the service operations making use of the data collected, such as vehicle dispatching, safety reminders, route optimization and so on. On the other hand, the collected data may generate derivative business, e.g., second-hand transaction and finance leasing businesses. However, the collected data may be tampered with during the circulation between the data consumers, which may lead to unnecessary economic losses and even security attacks.
The network-oriented DIVS provides a trusted data integrity verification infrastructure for the data consumers in the industry chain. The data consumers could directly verify if the data provided by the service platform/operation platform is the same as that collected originally based on DIVS, in the entire lifecycle of the data.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | 1) The DIVS AS function has obtained the parameters for the data integrity verification, such as the public key, the signature algorithm, device ID, ICCID, MSISDN, etc. 2) The UE (transport vehicle) has sent the application data with signature and necessary identity information to the service platform/operation platform. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+| Roles | UE (transport vehicle): The UE collects the specific source data, generates the digital signature of the data and sends it to the service platform.
The service platform: The service platform could be a vehicle management platform or service operation platform, which collects the application data from the UEs.
The DIVS AS function: The DIVS AS function is an application function in IMT-2020 network, providing the data integrity verification service.
The service user: The service user needs to verify the data integrity from the DIVS AS function and makes use of the data.
|
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating the operational flows for data integrity verification of transport vehicles in logistics industry. The diagram shows a UE (transport vehicle) sending data (1) to the DIVS AS function within the IMT-2020 network. The DIVS AS function is connected to the MCN. The IMT-2020 network is connected to the Service platform (2). The Service platform sends data (3) to Service user A and Service user B. Service user A and Service user B send data (4) back to the DIVS AS function. The diagram is labeled Y.2247(23).
The diagram illustrates the operational flows for data integrity verification of transport vehicles in logistics industry. It shows a UE (transport vehicle) sending data (1) to the DIVS AS function within the IMT-2020 network. The DIVS AS function is connected to the MCN. The IMT-2020 network is connected to the Service platform (2). The Service platform sends data (3) to Service user A and Service user B. Service user A and Service user B send data (4) back to the DIVS AS function. The diagram is labeled Y.2247(23).
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Operational flows:
1) The DIVS AS function obtains and stores the data integrity verification parameter from the UE (transport vehicle) and MCN if necessary. 2) The UE (transport vehicle) generates and collects the data specified by the service platform, generates the digital signature of the data and sends it to the service platform through the data plane of the IMT-2020 network. The data could include driving behaviour data, the location and route, the running speed and distance, the timestamp, etc. 3) The service user A applies for the data or the data signature related parameters to the service platform. 4) The service user A requests to get the data integrity verification metadata from the DIVS AS function and verifies the data integrity. 5) The service user A makes use of the data. For the sake of privacy protection, the service platform may only exchange the data integrity signature related information but not original data with the service user A. |
+| Derived requirements | Based on the operational flows:
The DIVS AS function provides data integrity verification service to the service users. The service includes returning the data signature verification metadata.
The DIVS AS function obtains and stores the data integrity verification parameter once the network service of the UE provisioning.
The DIVS AS function provides anti-tamper storage of the data integrity verification metadata.
|
+
+### I.2 Data integrity verification of the capacity record of distributed renewable power generation
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Data integrity verification of the capacity record of distributed renewable power generation |
+| Description | Distributed renewable power generation systems, e.g., a solar-panel roof, are often installed by private owners in their homes or by enterprises in their parks. The electricity generated could be used by the individuals and enterprises themselves to reduce costs and achieve carbon neutrality. The distributed renewable power generation systems can also connect to the electricity grid to obtain benefits by selling overcapacity. A smart meter connected to the IMT-2020 network records the electricity consumption and the electricity supplied to the grid.
Since the green electricity from distributed power generation could be used for applying the subsidies from the governments and carbon trading, it is important to guarantee that the number recorded by the smart meter is untampered and that the integrity of the data collected by the smart meter could be verified throughout its lifecycle. The DIVS AS provides the network-oriented DIVS for applying the green electricity certificate or the subsidies.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | 1) The UE (smart meter) has completed the network service provisioning and is able to access the IMT-2020 network, either the slice of public network or dedicated network. The smart meter has registered the data integrity verification parameters to the DIVS AS function. 2) The DIVS AS function has endorsed the data integrity verification parameters. 3) The UE has sent the recorded data of the electricity consumption with the signature and necessary identity information to the data aggregation platform. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The owner of the distributed renewable power generation system receives the green electricity certificate based on the smart meter record of the electricity consumption. |
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Roles | UE (smart meter): The UE records the data of the electricity consumption and sends it to the data aggregator.
The data aggregator: The data aggregator could be a vendor management platform for the distributed renewable power generation systems, or a third party service platform for applying the green electricity certificate. The data aggregator receives and stores the data from UEs.
The DIVS AS function: The DIVS AS function is an application function in IMT-2020 network, which is providing the data integrity verification service.
Authority for issuing green electricity certificate: The authority for issuing the green electricity certificate needs to verify the data integrity from the data aggregator and then issues the green electricity certificate.
|
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | Y.2247(23)
Operational flows:
1) The DIVS AS function obtains and stores the data integrity verification parameter from the UE (smart meter) and MCN if necessary. 2) The UE (smart meter) gathers the data of the electricity capacity, generates the digital signature of the data and sends it to the data aggregator through the data plane of the IMT-2020 network. The data could include the electricity consumption, electricity supplied to the grid, the timestamp, etc. 3) The data aggregator applies the green electricity certificate to the authority for issuing the green electricity certificate according to the accumulated data of electricity consumption. 4) The authority for issuing the green electricity certificate accesses to the DIVS AS function to get the data integrity verification parameters and verifies the data integrity. Based on the verification result, the authority for issuing the green electricity certificate decides whether to issue the green electricity certificate. |
+| Derived requirements | Based on the operational flows,
The DIVS AS function provides the data integrity verification service throughout the lifecycle of the data, even if the UE switches mobile network operators.
The DIVS AS function is able to handle massive machine-type terminals, in the terms of configuration distribution and integrity verification parameter registration.
The UE can sign the collected data in a trusted environment to guarantee the signature is from the true source.
|
+
+### I.3 Trustworthy source verification of industry digital twin
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Trustworthy source verification of industry digital twin |
+| Description | Digital twin of vertical industry maps the physical space to the digital space by collecting the manufacturing and process data of the physical counterpart. The digital twin could provide the monitoring, simulation, prediction, and optimization and make decisions regarding the physical space. Thus, it is important to manifest not only the trustworthiness of the data-generating sources but also the original of the data collected, to avoid injecting false data to the digital space.
The network-oriented DIVS could provide the trustworthy source verification based on the binding of the terminal ID, public key and USIM/eSIM UICCID for the industry digital twin system. Furthermore, the network-oriented DIVS could also provide the service to verify whether the data collected is tampered.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | 1) The UE has completed the network service provisioning and is able to access the IMT-2020 dedicated network. The UE has registered the data integrity verification parameters to the DIVS AS function. 2) The DIVS AS function has endorsed the data integrity verification parameters. 3) The UE has sent the collected manufacturing data with the signature and necessary identity information to the data aggregation platform. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+| Roles | UE (Industrial terminal): The UE collects the specific manufacturing data, generates the digital signature of the data and sends it to the data aggregator. The UEs are network connected industrial terminals, such as the industrial cameras and industrial inspection robots.
The data aggregator: The data aggregator could be a data aggregation platform which receives and stores the data from the UEs. The data aggregator provides the APIs for the industry digital twin system to request data.
The DIVS AS function: The DIVS AS function is an application function in IMT-2020 network, which is providing the data integrity verification service.
The industry digital twin system: The industry digital twin system requests data from the data aggregators to establish the digital space. The industry digital twin system needs to verify the trustworthiness of the data source and data integrity from the network-oriented DIVS.
|
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating the trustworthy source verification of industry digital twin. It shows two IMT-2020 networks, each containing a DIVS AS function and an MCN. An Industrial inspection robot (UE) connects to the first network, and an Industrial camera (UE) connects to the second. Data flows are numbered: 1) UEs send parameters to DIVS AS functions; 2) DIVS AS functions send parameters to Data aggregators A and B; 3) Data aggregators send data to the Industry digital twin system; 4) The system sends requests back to the DIVS AS functions.
Operational flows:
1) The DIVS functions obtain and store the data integrity verification parameters from the UEs and MCNs if necessary. |
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | 2) The UEs collect the specific manufacturing data, generates the digital signature of the data and sends it to the data aggregators through the data plane of the IMT-2020 network.
3) The industry digital twin system retrieves the collected manufacturing data maintained at the data aggregators.
4) The industry digital twin system accesses the DIVS AS functions to get the data integrity verification parameters, verifies the data integrity if the collected data is from the trustworthy sources.
5) The industry digital twin system establishes digital space and performs the simulation and data analysis.
|
+| Derived requirements | Based on the operational flows,
The DIVS AS function provides a measure to enable the service user to verify if the collected data is from the trustworthy source, e.g., by binding the terminal ID, public key and USIM/eSIM UICCID.
|
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1290] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1290 (1998), *Glossary of terms used in the definition of intelligent networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2019), *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1400] Recommendation ITU-T X.1400 (2020), *Terms and definitions for distributed ledger technology*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1402] ITU-T Recommendation X.1402 (2020), *Security framework for distributed ledger technology*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3102] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), *Framework of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4880] IETF RFC 4880 (2007), *OpenPGP Message Format*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2248-202301-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2248-202301-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2248 (01/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture
+
+## --- **Service model for entry-level smart farms**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+
+### **Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+## BIG DATA
+
+| | |
+|----------|---------------|
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+|----------|---------------|
+
+## QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------|---------------|
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------------------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2248
+
+## Service model for entry-level smart farms
+
+## Summary
+
+Entry-level smart farms can provide convenience of use and increased economic profits to agricultural producers previously unfamiliar with high-level information and communication technologies. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2248 describes the service model for the entry-level smart farm. The scope of this Recommendation covers reference architecture, service requirements and service scenarios for the entry-level smart farm.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2248 | 2023-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15232 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Entry-level smart farm, farm management system.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Concept of the entry-level smart farm ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Reference architecture for entry-level smart farm..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Sensor device interface function ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Active device interface function..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Farm control and monitoring function ..... | 5 |
+| 7.4 Network interface function..... | 5 |
+| 7.5 Administrative management function ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Service requirements for entry-level smart farm..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 General requirements..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Requirements for interfacing sensor devices..... | 6 |
+| 8.3 Requirements for interfacing active devices ..... | 6 |
+| 8.4 Requirements for farm control and monitoring..... | 6 |
+| 8.5 Requirements for the interfacing network..... | 7 |
+| 9 Network capabilities ..... | 7 |
+| 10 Service scenarios ..... | 7 |
+| 10.1 Service scenario for service registration..... | 8 |
+| 10.2 Service scenario for local control ..... | 9 |
+| 10.3 Service scenario for local monitoring..... | 10 |
+| 10.4 Service scenario for service-provider-aided control..... | 12 |
+| 11 Security considerations..... | 13 |
+| Appendix I Smart agriculture classification and major components ..... | 14 |
+| Bibliography..... | 17 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2248
+
+## Service model for entry-level smart farms
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the service model for entry-level smart farms. The scope of this Recommendation covers:
+
+- Reference architecture for the entry-level smart farm;
+- Service requirements for the entry-level smart farm;
+- Service scenarios for the entry-level smart farm.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T T.135] Recommendation ITU-T T.135 (2007), *User-to-reservation system transactions within T.120 conferences*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4105] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4105/Y.2221 (2010), *Requirements for support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services in the NGN environment*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4109] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4109/Y.2061 (2012), *Requirements for the support of machine-oriented communication applications in the next generation network environment*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4401] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4401/Y.2068 (2015), *Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4450] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4450/Y.2238 (2015), *Overview of smart farming based on networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4466] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4466 (2020), *Framework of smart greenhouse service*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4806] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4806 (2017), *Security capabilities supporting safety of the Internet of things*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+- 3.1.1 actuator** [ITU-T Y.4109]: A device performing physical actions caused by an input signal.
+
+**3.1.2 agricultural producer** [ITU-T Y.4450]: The service role that actually produces agricultural products to be supplied to distributors or consumers.
+
+**3.1.3 greenhouse** [ITU-T Y.4466]: A facility that can control a crop-growth environment (i.e., light, temperature, humidity, etc.).
+
+**3.1.4 sensor** [ITU-T Y.4105]: An electronic device that senses a physical condition or chemical compound and delivers an electronic signal proportional to the observed characteristic.
+
+**3.1.5 service user** [ITU-T T.135]: A person, an organization or any intermediate entity using the services provided by a service provider.
+
+**3.1.6 smart farming based on networks** [ITU-T Y.4450]: A service that uses networks to actualize a convergence service in the agricultural field to attain more efficiency and quality improvement and to cope with various problems.
+
+**3.1.7 smart farming service provider** [ITU-T Y.4450]: The service role that provides the requested Smart Farming services, such as providing a portal or consulting based on data gathered from agricultural fields, to requesting users.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation uses 'service provider' with the same meaning as that of 'smart farming service provider'.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 active device interface function:** A function that controls actuators in the entry-level smart farm on service users' command or manipulation.
+
+**3.2.2 administrative management function:** A function that allows service registration, operation management and fault analysis to support the continuous operation of the farm management system.
+
+**3.2.3 entry-level smart farm:** A smart farm that can provide convenience of use and increased economic profits to agricultural producers previously unfamiliar with high-level information and communication technologies (ICTs).
+
+**3.2.4 farm management system:** A system that controls active devices with all related data from sensor devices according to the intention of agricultural producers in the entry-level smart farm.
+
+**3.2.5 network interface function:** A function that connects the functions in the farm management system with the network.
+
+**3.2.6 sensor device interface function:** A function that gathers all related data from sensors distributed in the entry-level smart farm.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization, Accounting |
+| FMS | Farm Management System |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| MTBF | Mean Time Between Failures |
+| MTTR | Mean Time To Repair |
+| TVWS | Television White Space |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a specification which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this specification need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally," "could" indicate an optional specification which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+In the body of this Recommendation, the words shall, shall not, should, and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+This Recommendation uses 'service provider' with the same meaning as that of 'smart farming service provider'.
+
+## 6 Concept of the entry-level smart farm
+
+Entry-level smart farms can provide convenience of use and increased economic profits to agricultural producers previously unfamiliar with high-level ICT technologies. In addition, there could be necessities for a service handling various interactions and cooperation between service users, their entry-level smart farms and service providers. Entry-level smart farms mainly engage remote control and farm status monitoring by deploying a farm management system (FMS) in single-span greenhouses, multi-span greenhouses or outdoor farm connected via a network as shown in Figure 1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of an entry-level smart farm. On the left, three silhouettes represent 'Agricultural producers'. A dashed double-headed arrow labeled 'Local or remote control and monitoring' connects them to a 'Farm management system' (FMS) located inside a 'Single-span greenhouse'. To the right, under the heading 'Entry-level smart farms', there are three types of farm structures: a 'Multi-span greenhouse' containing an FMS, an 'Outdoor farm' (represented by a green oval) containing an FMS, and another 'Single-span greenhouse' also containing an FMS. All these FMS units are connected to a central cloud labeled 'Network'. The 'Network' cloud is further connected to a 'Service provider' on the far right, which is depicted as a server rack with a database cylinder icon.
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Conceptual diagram of entry-level smart farm showing agricultural producers, various farm types (single-span, multi-span, outdoor), FMS, network, and service provider.
+
+**Figure 1 – Conceptual diagram of entry-level smart farm**
+
+## 7 Reference architecture for entry-level smart farm
+
+Considering the motivations in the previous clause, entry-level smart farms could consist of a FMS, actuator devices and sensor devices that could differ between each smart farm and would be connected with agricultural producers and the service provider via a network as shown in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the reference architecture for an entry-level smart farm. It is centered around a 'Farm management system' (FMS) which contains several key functions: 'Administrative management function', 'Network interface function', 'Farm control and monitoring function', 'Active device interface function', and 'Sensor device interface function'. These functions are interconnected with each other and with external components. 'Sensor devices' are connected to the 'Sensor device interface function'. 'Active devices' are connected to the 'Active device interface function'. 'Agricultural producers' (represented by mobile devices) are connected to the 'Network interface function'. A 'Service provider' (represented by a server) is also connected to the 'Network'. All these components are connected to a central 'Network' cloud. The reference Y.2248(23) is noted in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+Figure 2: Reference architecture for entry-level smart farm. The diagram shows an 'Entry-level smart farm' box containing a 'Farm management system' box. Inside the FMS are 'Administrative management function', 'Network interface function', 'Farm control and monitoring function', 'Active device interface function', and 'Sensor device interface function'. 'Sensor devices' connect to the 'Sensor device interface function'. 'Active devices' connect to the 'Active device interface function'. 'Agricultural producers' (with mobile devices) connect to the 'Network interface function'. A 'Service provider' (with a server) connects to the 'Network'. All components are connected to a central 'Network' cloud. Reference: Y.2248(23)
+
+**Figure 2 – Reference architecture for entry-level smart farm**
+
+The current statuses of the single-span greenhouses, multispan greenhouses and outdoor farms are delivered to the sensor device interface function of the FMS via sensor devices distributed on the greenhouse surfaces or bare ground of outdoor farms. The status data delivered to the sensor device interface function are sent to the farm control and monitoring function to be analysed. The farm control and monitoring function could provide the analysed results to agricultural producers when requested via the network interface function. The agricultural producers, who are the service users of this service, can control the farm apparatus installed in their farms manually or by manipulating their terminal devices. The control information from the terminal devices are conveyed by the network interface function to the farm control and monitoring function. The farm control and monitoring function combines the control information received and the current status of the farm, and sends control commands to active devices via the active device interface function when possible to control according to the service users' intention. Otherwise, it notifies service users of the current status that prevents control commands according to their intentions.
+
+All the functions shown in Figure 2 are explained in the following subclauses.
+
+### 7.1 Sensor device interface function
+
+This function allows the various sensor devices to access the FMS and transfers data received from the sensor devices to the farm control and monitoring function. The sensor devices cover all or part of the following various types, among others:
+
+- Temperature sensors that measure the current temperature of the atmosphere inside the smart farm;
+- Humidity sensors that measure the current humidity of the atmosphere inside the smart farm;
+- CO2 sensors that measure the current CO2 density of the atmosphere inside the smart farm;
+
+- Soil moisture sensors that measure the current degree of moisture of the soil inside the smart farm;
+- pH sensors that measure the current pH of the soil inside the smart farm;
+- Wind direction sensors that measure the current wind direction inside the smart farm;
+- Camera devices that capture the current image of the inner and outer sides of the smart farm.
+
+### **7.2 Active device interface function**
+
+This function conducts the various active devices and transfers control commands from the farm control and monitoring function to the active devices. The active devices cover all or part of the following various types, among others:
+
+- Irrigation pump devices that irrigate the smart farm supplying water from external water sources into the smart farm;
+- Fertilizer devices that fertilize the smart farm supplying nutrient solution or fertilizer;
+- Sprayer devices that spray water from the irrigation pump into the soil of the smart farm;
+- Exhaust fan devices that absorb air inside and discharge the air to the outside to help the air circulation of the smart farm;
+- Heat cover devices that prevent the smart farm from overexposure to sunlight;
+- Cooler/heater devices that regulate the temperature of the smart farm by cooling or heating;
+- Shutter devices that open or close the windows of the smart farm.
+
+### **7.3 Farm control and monitoring function**
+
+This function analyses data received from the sensor device interface function and delivers the analysed results to agricultural producers who will be aware of the current status of their farms. Accordingly, the farm control and monitoring function delivers control commands from the agricultural producers to the active device control function that will give control commands to the active devices to in turn control the farm apparatus according to the agricultural producers' intentions.
+
+### **7.4 Network interface function**
+
+This function allows agricultural producers to access the FMS and transfers the analysed results from the farm control and monitoring function to the agricultural producers, and the control commands from the agricultural producers to the farm control and monitoring function. This function also allows agricultural producers to access the service provider through the network.
+
+### **7.5 Administrative management function**
+
+This function allows service registration, operation management and fault analysis to support the continuous operation of the FMS. This function is responsible for:
+
+- Initial registration of the owner of the farm, the farm type (single-span greenhouses, multispans greenhouses or outdoor farm), relevant imaging facilities, crop type and characteristics, etc.;
+- Farm operation management is carried out by farmers directly using panels/webs or by remote automatic management with the support of service providers;
+- Collection of environmental information and status information and reporting of the status of basic environmental information;
+- Fault analysis and notification according to the operation of the FMS's error state.
+
+## **8 Service requirements for entry-level smart farm**
+
+Services provided in entry-level smart farms, as shown in Figure 2, are required to meet following requirements.
+
+### **8.1 General requirements**
+
+Entry-level smart farms are required to fulfil the following:
+
+- Installation and operating costs should be low.
+- The user control panel should be easily operated by the user.
+- By applying an intuitive and human-friendly interface, it should be possible to install and use the low-end smart farm without reading a complicated manual.
+- Must be able to support wired and wireless communication networks.
+- The sensor and actuator should be modularized so that they can be easily replaced without additional manipulation.
+- All means to prevent malfunction should be included.
+- The reliability of the equipment used in the entry-level smart farm must have MTBF and MTTR values that can guarantee a quality equal to or better than that of general ICT equipment.
+
+### **8.2 Requirements for interfacing sensor devices**
+
+Interfacing sensor devices to the farm control and monitoring function have the following requirements:
+
+- Adaptation of the received signals to be compatible with the signals inside the FMS;
+- Addition or reduction of interface modules according to the addition or reduction of sensor devices, where slots for configuration and extension are recommended.
+
+### **8.3 Requirements for interfacing active devices**
+
+Interfacing active devices to the farm control and monitoring function have the following requirements:
+
+- Adaptation of the received control commands to be compatible with the control signals in active devices;
+- Addition or reduction of interface modules according to the addition or reduction of active devices, where slots for configuration and extension are recommended.
+
+### **8.4 Requirements for farm control and monitoring**
+
+Farm control and monitoring have the following requirements:
+
+- Saving and maintenance of the registration information of agricultural producers in internal memories (e.g., flash memories) according to service registration procedures;
+- Authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) procedures utilizing the registration information of agricultural producers in internal memories to decide whether it will accept agricultural producers who are newly requesting services or not;
+- Mediation that enables the service provider to answer to a registered agricultural producer's inquiry through the connection between the service provider and the agricultural producers via a network.
+
+### 8.5 Requirements for the interfacing network
+
+The interfacing network has the following requirements:
+
+- Adaptation of the signals from/to the agricultural producers to be compatible with the signals inside the FMS;
+- Connection to variable network technologies (e.g., wired, wireless, Wi-Fi, IEEE802.11ah, TVWS, etc.);
+- Addition or reduction of interface modules according to addition or reduction of telecommunication equipment with changing network technologies, where slots for configuration and extension are recommended.
+
+## 9 Network capabilities
+
+The high-level network capabilities for the support of the entry-level smart farm are as follows:
+
+- End-to-end connectivity over interconnected networks: A solution can optionally be developed to provide end-to-end connectivity between relevant users or terminals over interconnected heterogeneous networks such as next-generation networks (NGNs), other IP-based networks, broadcasting networks, mobile/wireless networks (5G [b-ETSI TS 137 141], NB-IoT, LoRa [b-ETSI TR 103]) and public switched telephone network/integrated services digital networks.
+- Intermediate transmission capabilities: Provide intermediate transmission among entry-level smart farms to support control and monitoring over interconnected heterogeneous networks or field-based networks (IEEE 802.11ah [b-IEEE 802.11ah], TVWS (IEEE 802.11af/802.22) [b-IEEE 802.11af] [b-IEEE 802.22], etc.).
+- Service provider access capabilities: Provide access to agricultural information originated from service providers over interconnected heterogeneous networks or field-based networks.
+- Networking capabilities: Provide relevant control functions of network connectivity and transport resource control functions, mobility management or AAA [b-ITU-T Y-Sup3].
+- IoT service providers offer products and services to end users, with wide area embedded connectivity. To ensure the quality and reliability of services, they also need to ensure the quality and reliability of the embedded network connectivity of each IoT device. With tens or hundreds of thousands of deployed devices, it is difficult to monitor and manage network connectivity manually by enterprise customers and IoT service providers through traditional customer care services provided by network operators. An IoT transport network is recommended to have a solution for efficient and scalable operation and maintenance.
+
+## 10 Service scenarios
+
+The operation of an entry-level smart farm is managed according to its infrastructure condition. If a service provider can be connected via the infrastructure, then service providers can answer questions sent by agricultural producers through the network. The agricultural producers will control their own entry-level smart farms referring to the given answers. Otherwise, they only can control their own entry-level smart farms manually using panel or via local connection (e.g., ad-hoc mode of IEEE 802.11 [b-IEEE 802.11], etc.). The relations between infrastructure condition and the service feature is shown in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Entry-level smart farm] --> B{Service provider can be connected?}
+ B -- No --> C{Local connection is available?}
+ B -- Yes --> D[Connect to service provider via network]
+ C -- Yes --> E["Local control (2)
+Local monitoring (3)"]
+ C -- No --> F[Manual control and monitoring]
+ D --> G["Service registration (1)
+– Single-span or multi-span
+– Registration requester (Farmer, guider, etc.)
+– Cultivation facilities
+– Crops for cultivation"]
+ G --> H[Service provider provides answers for questions given by service users after authentication]
+ H --> I[Service-provider-aided control (4)]
+
+```
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Flowchart showing the relation between infrastructure condition and service features in entry-level smart farms. The process starts with 'Entry-level smart farm', leading to a decision 'Service provider can be connected?'. If 'No', it leads to 'Local connection is available?'. If 'Yes' to either, it leads to 'Local control (2) Local monitoring (3)'. If 'No' to 'Service provider can be connected?', it leads to 'Manual control and monitoring'. If 'Yes' to 'Service provider can be connected?', it leads to 'Connect to service provider via network', followed by 'Service registration (1)' (Single-span or multi-span, Registration requester, Cultivation facilities, Crops for cultivation), 'Service provider provides answers for questions given by service users after authentication', and finally 'Service-provider-aided control (4)'.
+
+**Figure 3 – Relation between infrastructure condition and service features in entry-level smart farms**
+
+Numbered service features in Figure 3, service registration (1), local control (2), local monitoring (3), and service-provider-aided control (4), are basic service scenarios for entry-level smart farms. Detailed descriptions for these service scenarios are given in the following subclauses.
+
+### 10.1 Service scenario for service registration
+
+Agricultural producers shall register to obtain benefits from their entry-level smart farms, applying their registration information ranging from personal identification to farm facilities and crop characteristics.
+
+The information flow for this service is shown in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AP as Agricultural producers
+ participant NIF as Network interface function
+ participant AMF as Administrative management function
+ participant SP as Service provider
+
+ AP->>NIF: 1. Registration request with registration information
+ NIF->>AMF: 2. Registration request with registration information
+ Note over AMF: 3. Registration information checked
+ AMF-->>NIF: 4. Reject message if the registration information is not valid
+ AMF->>SP: 4. Registration information
+ Note over AMF,SP: 5. AAA procedure
+ SP->>AMF: 6. Registration completed
+ Note over AMF: 7. Registration information updated
+ AMF->>NIF: 8. Registration completed
+ NIF->>AP: 9. Registration completed
+
+```
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow for service registration between Agricultural producers, Network interface function, Administrative management function, and Service provider. The process includes: 1. Registration request with registration information from Agricultural producers to Network interface function; 2. Registration request with registration information from Network interface function to Administrative management function; 3. Registration information checked by Administrative management function; 4. Registration information from Administrative management function to Service provider; 5. AAA procedure (encompassing steps 3, 4, and 5); 6. Registration completed from Service provider to Administrative management function; 7. Registration information updated by Administrative management function; 8. Registration completed from Administrative management function to Network interface function; 9. Registration completed from Network interface function to Agricultural producers. A reject message (4) is sent from Administrative management function back to Network interface function if the registration information is not valid.
+
+**Figure 4 – Information flow for service registration**
+
+#### Assumption
+
+- 1) The information flows shown here are at high level and not meant to show the actual protocol procedures.
+
+#### Flow descriptions:
+
+- 1) The agricultural producers request service registration with registration information (e.g., farm owner, farm location, crop types, farm size).
+- 2) The network interface function conveys the requested registration request to the administrative management function.
+- 3) The administrative management function checks the received registration information.
+- 4) The administrative management function delivers checked information to the service provider if the checked result is valid. Otherwise, it will send a message notifying that the request is denied to the agricultural producers.
+- 5) The service provider carries out the AAA procedure for the requesting agricultural producer.
+- 6) The service provider sends a registration completed message to the administrative management function.
+- 7) The administrative management function then updates its registration table for AAA with the information from the registration completed message from the service provider.
+- 8) The administrative management function conveys the registration completed message to the network interface function.
+- 9) The network interface function conveys the registration completed message to the agricultural producers.
+
+### 10.2 Service scenario for local control
+
+Farm facilities in single-span/multispan greenhouses and outdoors must be controlled according to agricultural producers' intention when required. The information flow for this service is shown in Figure 5.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AP as Agricultural producer
+ participant NIF as Network interface function
+ participant AMF as Administrative management function
+ participant ADIF as Active device interface function
+ participant S as Sprayer
+
+ AP->>NIF: 1. Service Request
+ NIF->>AMF: 2. Service Request
+ AMF-->>AP: 5. Service Granted
+ AMF-->>NIF: 4. Service Granted
+ Note over AMF: 3. AAA procedure
+ AP->>AMF: 6. Service parameters for apparatus control
+ AMF->>ADIF: 7. Format conversion
+ ADIF->>S: 8. Control commands
+ S-->>ADIF: 9. Control commands
+ S-->>ADIF: 10. Demanded control actions
+ ADIF-->>AMF: 11. Controlled results
+ AMF-->>NIF: 12. Controlled results
+ NIF-->>AP: 13. Format conversion
+ AP-->>AMF: 14. Service Response with controlled results
+```
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for local control between Agricultural producer, Network interface function, Administrative management function, Active device interface function, and Sprayer.
+
+**Figure 5 – Information flow for local control**
+
+#### Assumption
+
+- 1) The information flows shown here are at high level and not meant to show the actual protocol procedures.
+
+Flow descriptions:
+
+- 1) The agricultural producer sends a service request message requesting single-span greenhouse control to the network interface function.
+- 2) The network interface function conveys the service request message to the administrative management function.
+- 3) The administrative management function carries out the AAA procedure.
+- 4) The administrative management function sends a service granted message to the requesting agricultural producer if the AAA result is valid. Otherwise, it will send the message notifying that the request is denied to the agricultural producers.
+- 5) The network interface function conveys the service granted message to the agricultural producer.
+- 6) The agricultural producer sends service parameters for apparatus control (e.g., apparatus types, indicated control amount) to the administrative management function via the network interface function.
+- 7) The administrative management function converts the received service information to control commands which are compatible with the entry-level smart farm.
+- 8) The administrative management function sends control commands to the active device interface function.
+- 9) The active device interface function conveys the received control commands to the corresponding active device.
+- 10) The corresponding active device performs the demanded control actions.
+- 11) The corresponding active device sends the controlled results to the active device interface function.
+- 12) The active device interface function conveys the controlled results to the administrative management function.
+- 13) The administrative management function converts the received controlled results to a service response message that is understandable to the agricultural producer.
+- 14) Administrative Management Function sends the Service Response message to the agricultural producers via the network interface function.
+
+NOTE – The service scenarios for single-span greenhouse control and outdoor farm control (e.g., simple irrigation control) are to be configured identically. The outdoor farm control performs irrigation control according to the outdoor environment and the moisture level in the soil and provides sensor and actuator information.
+
+### **10.3 Service scenario for local monitoring**
+
+Farm facilities in single-span/multispan greenhouses and outdoor farms must be able to be monitored by agricultural producers when required. The information flow for this service is shown in Figure 6.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AP as Agricultural producer
+ participant NIF as Network interface function
+ participant AMF as Administrative management function
+ participant SDIF as Sensor device interface function
+ participant TS as Temperature sensor
+
+ AP->>NIF: 1. Service Request
+ NIF->>AMF: 2. Service Request
+ AMF-->>NIF: 4. Service Granted
+ NIF-->>AP: 5. Service Granted
+ AMF->>NIF: 6. Service parameters for sensor monitoring
+ NIF->>AMF: 7. Format conversion
+ AMF->>SDIF: 8. Monitoring parameters (e.g., sensor types, etc.)
+ SDIF->>TS: 9. Monitoring parameters (e.g., sensor types, etc.)
+ TS-->>SDIF: 11. Measured results
+ SDIF-->>AMF: 12. Measured results
+ AMF-->>NIF: 13. Results analysis
+ NIF-->>AP: 14. Service Response with analysed results
+
+```
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for local monitoring between Agricultural producer, Network interface function, Administrative management function, Sensor device interface function, and Temperature sensor.
+
+**Figure 6 – Information flow for local monitoring**
+
+#### Assumption
+
+- 1) The information flows shown here are at high level and not meant to show the actual protocol procedures.
+
+#### Flow descriptions:
+
+- 1) The agricultural producer sends a service request message requesting single-span greenhouse monitoring to the network interface function.
+- 2) The network interface function conveys the service request message to the administrative management function.
+- 3) The administrative management function carries out the AAA procedure.
+- 4) The administrative management function sends a service granted message to the requesting agricultural producer if the AAA result is valid. Otherwise, it will send a message notifying that the request is denied to the agricultural producer.
+- 5) The network interface function conveys the service granted message to the agricultural producer.
+- 6) The agricultural producer sends service parameters for monitoring (e.g., sensor types, indicated monitoring range) to the administrative management function via the network interface function.
+- 7) The administrative management function converts the received service parameters to monitoring parameters that are compatible with the entry-level smart farm.
+- 8) The administrative management function sends monitoring parameters to the sensor device interface function.
+- 9) The sensor device interface function conveys the received monitoring parameters to the corresponding sensor device.
+- 10) The corresponding sensor device performs the demanded sensor measuring.
+- 11) The corresponding sensor device sends the measured results to sensor device interface function.
+- 12) The sensor device interface function conveys the measured results to the administrative management function.
+
+- 13) The administrative management function analyses the received measured results and constructs a service response message with the analysed results (e.g., detection of water shortage from a degree of soil moisture below the critical level).
+- 14) The administrative management function sends the service response message with the analysed results to the agricultural producer via the network interface function.
+
+### 10.4 Service scenario for service-provider-aided control
+
+Farm facilities in single-span/multispan greenhouses and outdoor farms must be controlled not only according to the agricultural producer's intention but also following the service provider's advice considering the larger scale of farming. The information flow for this service is shown in Figure 7.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AP as Agricultural producer
+ participant NIF as Network interface function
+ participant AMF as Administrative management function
+ participant SDIF as Sensor device interface function
+ participant S as Sprayer
+ participant SP as Service provider
+
+ AP->>NIF: 1. Service Request
+ NIF->>AMF: 2. Service Request
+ AMF->>AMF: 3. AAA procedure
+ AMF->>NIF: 4. Service Request (In case of an AAA valid result)
+ NIF->>SP: 4. Service Request (In case of an AAA valid result)
+ SP->>SP: 5. Service availability checked
+ SP->>NIF: 6. Service Granted
+ NIF->>AMF: 6. Service Granted
+ AMF->>NIF: 7. Service Granted
+ NIF->>AP: 8. Service Granted
+ AMF->>NIF: 9. Send inquiry with questions
+ NIF->>SP: 9. Send inquiry with questions
+ SP->>SP: 10. Answers for questions searched
+ SP->>NIF: 11. Service Response
+ NIF->>AMF: 11. Service Response
+ AMF->>NIF: 12. Service parameters for apparatus control
+ NIF->>AP: 12. Service parameters for apparatus control
+ AMF->>AMF: 13. Format conversion
+ AMF->>SDIF: 14. Control commands
+ SDIF->>S: 15. Control commands
+ S->>S: 16. Demanded control actions
+ S->>SDIF: 17. Controlled results
+ SDIF->>AMF: 18. Controlled results
+ AMF->>AMF: 19. Format conversion
+ AMF->>NIF: 20. Service Response with controlled results
+ NIF->>AP: 20. Service Response with controlled results
+
+```
+
+Y.2248(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for service-provider-aided control between Agricultural producer, Network interface function, Administrative management function, Sensor device interface function, Sprayer, and Service provider.
+
+**Figure 7 – Information flow for service-provider-aided control**
+
+#### Assumption
+
+- 1) The information flows shown here are at high level and not meant to show the actual protocol procedures.
+
+#### Flow descriptions:
+
+- 1) The agricultural producer sends a service request message requesting multispan greenhouse control to the network interface function.
+- 2) The network interface function conveys the service request message to the administrative management function.
+- 3) The administrative management function carries out the AAA procedure.
+- 4) The administrative management function conveys the service request to the service provider via the network interface function if the AAA result is valid. Otherwise, it will send a message notifying that the request is denied to the Agricultural producer.
+- 5) The service provider checks the service availability.
+
+- 6) The service provider sends a service granted message to the administrative management function via the network interface function.
+- 7) The administrative management function conveys a service granted message to the network interface function.
+- 8) The network interface function conveys a service granted message to the agricultural producer.
+- 9) The agricultural producer sends an inquiry with questions to the service provider via the network interface function.
+- 10) The service provider searches answers for the received inquiry.
+- 11) The service provider sends a service response to the agricultural producer via the network interface function.
+- 12) The agricultural producer, with answers from the service provider, sends service parameters for apparatus control (e.g., apparatus types, indicated control amount) to the administrative management function via the network interface function.
+- 13) The administrative management function converts the received service information to control commands which are compatible with the entry-level smart farm.
+- 14) The administrative management function sends control commands to the active device interface function.
+- 15) The active device interface function conveys the received control commands to the corresponding active device.
+- 16) The corresponding active device performs the demanded control actions.
+- 17) The corresponding active device sends the controlled results to the active device interface function.
+- 18) The active device interface function conveys the controlled results to the administrative management function.
+- 19) The administrative management function converts the received controlled results to a service response message which is understandable to the agricultural producer.
+- 20) The administrative management function sends a service response message to the agricultural producer via the network interface function.
+
+# **11 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation is recognized as providing for services based on IP-based networks. Thus, it is assumed that security considerations in general are based on the security of IP-based networks and therefore it is required to follow the security considerations identified by clauses 7 and 8 of [ITU-T Y.2701]. The data exchanged between the entry-level smart farm and service provider should be treated as public information to be secured. In addition, it is also required to consider the security of agricultural data collected and processed with the capabilities of [ITU-T Y.4401] and [ITU-T Y.4806].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+### Smart agriculture classification and major components
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Smart agriculture is an approach in which various cutting-edge technologies such as ICT are grafted into the overall agricultural value chain to make farming more connected and intelligent. The smart farm refers to agriculture where technologies such as ICT are converged with agriculture to enable automated remote control. Smart farm technology can implement the production stage for maximizing added value by optimally managing the growth environment of crops and livestock through external environment blocking, internal environmental informatization and automation. Smart farms are divided into smart greenhouses, smart livestock, smart open-field and smart distribution.
+
+In the case of a smart greenhouse, temperature, humidity, and CO2 are monitored by a PC or mobile in a glass greenhouse or plastic house, and the window opening and closing and nutrient supply are controlled remotely and automatically. Through this, the optimal growth environment of crops is maintained and productivity is increased.
+
+**Table I.1 – Smart greenhouse main components**
+
+| Category | | Content |
+|-------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Environment | Internal | Temperature, humidity, CO 2 , soil moisture, nutrient solution measurement sensor (EC, pH), moisture sensor, etc. |
+| | External | Temperature, humidity, wind direction, wind speed, rainfall, insolation, etc. |
+| Video equipment | | Infrared camera, DVR, etc. |
+| Control equipment | | Ventilation, heating, fluid fan, motor control, nutrient solution control, LED, etc. |
+| Information management system | | Real-time growth environment monitoring, facility control environment, growth level database analysis, etc. |
+
+
+
+A collage of six photographs showing various ICT equipment installed in a smart greenhouse. The top row shows a vertical nutrient solution measurement sensor, a camera mounted on the greenhouse structure, and a camera on a pole outside. The bottom row shows an open electrical control box, a blue sensor mounted on the plastic covering, a blue solenoid valve for nutrient control, and a close-up of a sensor on a plant.
+
+A collage of six photographs showing various ICT equipment installed in a smart greenhouse. The top row shows a vertical nutrient solution measurement sensor, a camera mounted on the greenhouse structure, and a camera on a pole outside. The bottom row shows an open electrical control box, a blue sensor mounted on the plastic covering, a blue solenoid valve for nutrient control, and a close-up of a sensor on a plant.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Smart greenhouse ICT equipment installation site**
+
+Smart livestock monitors the livestock environment with a PC or mobile device, and remotely controls feed and water supply in terms of timing and amount. Various services (internal environment, birth, milking, etc.) are provided for in the growth environment of livestock, and ICT equipment is operated to provide each service.
+
+**Table I.2 – Smart livestock main components**
+
+| Category | | Content |
+|-----------------------------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Environment | Internal | Temperature, humidity, CO 2 , illuminance, ammonia, short circuit (blackout) detection, etc. |
+| | External | Temperature, humidity, wind direction, rainfall, insolation, etc. |
+| Video and management system | | Infrared camera, DVR, PC, monitor, etc. |
+| Control equipment | | Oestrus checker, feeder, feed bin, drinking water management device, thermal lamp, feed mixer, etc. |
+
+
+
+Figure I.2 – Smart livestock ICT equipment installation site. The figure consists of six photographs arranged in a 2x3 grid. Top-left: A brown cow in a pen. Top-middle: A person milking a brown cow. Top-right: A close-up of a cow's ear with a small electronic tag. Bottom-left: An infrared camera mounted on a pole in a barn. Bottom-middle: A computer monitor displaying a software interface with various charts and graphs. Bottom-right: A multi-camera view of a livestock facility showing several pens with cows.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Smart livestock ICT equipment installation site**
+
+Smart open-field monitors temperature, humidity, and weather conditions, and remotely manages irrigation and pests. It is possible to create an optimal growth environment based on data on weather environment and soil information. Recently, technologies such as drone-based growth status analysis, autonomous driving of agricultural machinery, and unmanned agricultural work are being developed.
+
+**Table I.3 – Smart open-field main components**
+
+| Category | | Content |
+|-------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Environment | Internal | Temperature, humidity, CO 2 , soil moisture, nutrient solution measurement sensor (EC, pH), moisture sensor, etc. |
+| | External | Temperature, humidity, wind direction, wind speed, rainfall, insolation, etc. |
+| Video equipment | | Infrared camera, DVR, etc. |
+| Control equipment | | Ventilation, heating, fluid fan, motor control, nutrient solution control, LED, etc. |
+| Information management system | | Real-time growth environment monitoring, facility control environment, growth level DB analysis, etc. |
+
+
+
+Figure I.3: Smart open-field ICT equipment installation site. The figure consists of six photographs showing various components of the smart farm system. Top-left: A close-up of a blue and black irrigation pipe with a sensor attached. Top-middle: A black cable running along the ground next to a small white sensor unit. Top-right: A grey electrical control box mounted on a metal pole. Bottom-left: A person's hands planting a seedling in a blue fabric grow bag. Bottom-middle: A close-up of a 'Smart Farm Controller SFC200' device with a screen and buttons. Bottom-right: A white control box mounted on a metal pole in a field.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Smart open-field ICT equipment installation site**
+
+In order to introduce such a system, there are some things to consider. Current farm items, facility types, equipment, communication, electricity and so on should be checked in advance. In addition, it is necessary to prepare a plan for the introduction of smart farms through pre-inspection in cases where it is difficult to apply them.
+
+
+
+Figure I.4: Considerations for smart farm adoption. This diagram illustrates the system architecture. A smartphone on the left is connected via lightning bolts to a central power line tower. A dashed arrow labeled 'Remote control (Irrigation, heating, etc.)' points from the smartphone to a wireless router. Another dashed arrow labeled 'Monitoring (environmental information, etc.)' points from the router back to the smartphone. The router is connected to an 'Auto controller' (represented by server icons) and a 'Smart farm device' (represented by a camera icon). The 'Auto controller' is labeled 'Control' and is connected to 'Smart greenhouse, bare-ground' (represented by a greenhouse icon). A 'Power supply' (represented by a battery icon) is also shown. The text 'Y.2248(23)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Considerations for smart farm adoption**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup3] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations Sup3 (2008), *ITU-T Y.2000-series – Supplement on service scenarios for convergence services in a multiple network and application service provider environment*.
+- [b-ETSI TR 103] ETSI TR 103 526 V1.1.1 (2018), *System reference document (SRdoc); Technical characteristics for low power wide area networks chirp spread spectrum (LPWAN-CSS) operating in the UHF spectrum below 1 GHz*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 137 141] ETSI TS 137 141 V15.8.0 (2019), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; NR, E-UTRA, UTRA and GSM/EDGE; Multi-standard radio (MSR) base station (BS) conformance testing (3GPP TS 37.141 version 15.8.0 Release 15)*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11] IEEE 802.11-2020 (2020), *IEEE standard for information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN medium access control (MAC) and physical layer specifications*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11af] IEEE 802.11af (2013), *A standard for TV white space spectrum sharing*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11ah] IEEE 802.11ah (2016), *IEEE standard for information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications amendment 2: Sub 1 GHz License Exempt Operation*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.22] IEEE 802.22 (2019), *IEEE Standard – Information technology- Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Wireless regional area networks-specific requirements – Part 22: Cognitive wireless RAN MAC and PHY specifications: Policies and procedures for operation in the bands that allow spectrum sharing where the communications devices may opportunistically operate in the spectrum of primary service*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2249 (09/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture
+
+---
+
+## **Service model for human-centric touring guide with augmented reality**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2249
+
+## Service model for human-centric touring guide with augmented reality
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2249 specifies a service model for a human-centric touring guide with augmented reality (AR), including the concept, reference architecture, service requirements, and specific application scenarios of the service model. This Recommendation can be used to guide AR-based cultural tourism service providers to develop a service model for a human-centric touring guide with AR.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2249 | 2023-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15636 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Augmented reality, service model.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2252
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects:
+Interoperability of services and networks in NGN
+
+# --- **Identification and configuration of resources for multi-connection**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2252
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2252**
+
+# **Identification and configuration of resources for multi-connection**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2252 describes the identification of resources given by different types of simultaneous connections at the user equipment (UE) side. The resource identifiers are required to be configured in order to achieve utilization and harmonization through interaction between the multi-connection UE and the multi-connection network.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2252 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Configuration, identification, multi-connection UE, resources.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Identification of resources and attributes for multi-connection..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Identification of resources ..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Resource identifiers ..... | 6 |
+| 7 Configuration of resource identifiers..... | 7 |
+| 7.1 Relations between resource identifiers within each layer ..... | 7 |
+| 7.2 Relationship between resource identifiers and multi-connectionIMT-2000 references to ANSI-41 evolved core network with cdma2000 access network. |
+| [ITU-T X.200] | Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994), Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model. |
+| [ITU-T Y.1221] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1221 (2010), Traffic control and congestion control in IP-based networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2027] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2027 (2012), Functional architecture of multi-connection. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2091] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), Terms and definitions for next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2251] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2251 (2011), Multi-connection Requirements. |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 connection** [ITU-T X.200]: A connection is an association established for the transfer of data between two or more peer-(N)-entities. This association binds the peer-(N)-entities together with the (N–1)-entities in the next lower layer.
+
+**3.1.2 IP flow** [ITU-T Y.2251]: An IP flow at a given interface is defined as the occurrence at that interface of the set of IP packets, which match a given classification. An IP flow may consist of packets from a single application session, or it may be an aggregation comprising the combined traffic from a number of application sessions. When a classification may be subdivided into different sub-classifications (separate or overlapping), different IP sub flows may be recognized in the corresponding IP flow.
+
+NOTE 1 – In this Recommendation, a session is identified by a session identifier (SEID).
+
+NOTE 2 – In this Recommendation, an IP flow is identified by an Internet protocol flow identifier (FLID). When a classification may be subdivided into different sub-classifications, these separate sub-classifications are identified by different FLIDs.
+
+**3.1.3 multi-connection user equipment (MUE)** [ITU-T Y.2027]: A user equipment which can support two or more network connections simultaneously under the control of a network enhanced for multi-connection capability.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 lower abstraction point (LAP):** A conceptual place that exists in the lower part between two adjacent layers where various relations are established between layers.
+
+**3.2.2 multi-connection:** The collection of several connections between two or more peer-(N)-entities simultaneously. At least one of the connections is associated with a physical layer connectivity different from the rest of the connections. All connections are coordinated with each other to provide service to higher layer entities.
+
+NOTE – In [ITU-T Y.2251], multi-connection is defined as the functionality which provides capability to the user equipment and network to maintain more than one access network connection simultaneously.
+
+**3.2.3 upper abstraction point (UAP):** A conceptual place that exists in the upper part between two adjacent layers where various relations are established between layers.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-----------------------------------|
+| 3G | Third Generation |
+| AC-FE | Access Control FE |
+| ANID | Access Network Identifier |
+| APN | Access Point Name |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| FLID | Internet protocol Flow Identifier |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IFID | Interface Identifier |
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------------|
+| IMPI | IP Multimedia Private Identity |
+| IMPU | IP Multimedia Public identity |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| ISM | Industrial, Scientific and Medical |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| LAP | Lower Abstraction Point |
+| MAC | Media Access Control |
+| MAS-F | Multi-connection Application Support Function |
+| MC | Multi-Connection |
+| MC-FE | Multi-connection Coordination Functional Entity |
+| MMF | Multi-connection Media Function |
+| MPC-FE | Multi-connection Policy Control Functional Entity |
+| MR-FE | Multi-connection Registration Functional Entity |
+| MTC-FE | Multi-connection Terminal Control Functional Entity |
+| MUE | Multi-connection User Equipment |
+| MUP-FE | Multi-connection User Profile Functional Entity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| PHY | Physical layer |
+| RAT | Radio Access Technologies |
+| SCF | Service Control Functions |
+| SEID | Session Identifier |
+| SVID | Service Identifier |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| UAP | Upper Abstraction Point |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| Wi-Fi | Wireless Fidelity |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+| WPAN | Wireless Personal Area Network |
+| WWAN | Wireless Wide Area Network |
+| WWW | World Wide Web |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Identification of resources and attributes for multi-connection**
+
+An MUE has multiple network interfaces to each of its attached access networks such as wired Ethernet LANs, 802.11 LANs, 3G cellular networks, etc. In order to use these multiple interfaces,
+
+the MUE needs first to receive from the network side information on the available resources, such as access network information, network prefixes, IP addresses, etc., and is required to identify these resources and attributes. These resources could be received from the multi-connection architecture on the NGN network side as well as from its own system.
+
+This clause addresses resources and attributes used in the multi-connection environment at the UE side. Also, resource identifiers are again defined, from the MUE perspective, in order to manage these resources so as to achieve certain capabilities at the MUE, such as efficient utilization of the network and reliability of the connection.
+
+### 6.1 Identification of resources
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the association of the multi-connection architecture functional entities relative to the general TCP/IP stack.
+
+
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: Association of the multi-connection architecture functional entities relative to the general TCP/IP stack. The diagram shows a general TCP/IP stack on the left with layers: Applications, Application layer, Transport layer, Network layer, and PHY/MAC layer. In the center, a green box contains 'Multi-connection application support function (MAS-F)' and 'Service control function (SCF)', and a yellow box contains 'Multi-connection media function (MMF)', two 'Access control FE (AC-FE)' blocks, and two 'Access network' blocks. On the right, an orange box labeled 'Multi-connection control function' contains 'Multi-connection policy control FE', 'Multi-connection user profile FE', 'Multi-connection coordination FE', and 'Multi-connection registration FE'. Below this is the 'MUE' block with 'Multi-connection terminal control function'. Dashed lines indicate associations between the stack layers and the functional entities.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Association of the multi-connection architecture functional entities relative to the general TCP/IP stack**
+
+The MUE is required to identify the information on the available resources received from the multi-connection functional entities in order to utilize this information corresponding to multi-connection.
+
+The following clauses describe the available resources and their attributes from the MUE perspective.
+
+#### 6.1.1 Resources related to multi-connection
+
+This clause describes the available multi-connection resources with reference to the TCP/IP stack as follows:
+
+- a) PHY/MAC layer: It is directly related to multi-connection since the primary feature of multi-connection is to federate all means of access technologies. The available resources are defined as follows:
+ - i) Access network: There are many available access networks in the multi-connection environment. Even though the same access technology is used, different access networks which belong to the same or to different service providers may be used.
+
+- ii) Access technology: Given the multiplicity of access networks, there are also many available access technologies. For multi-connection, it is necessary to specify which access technology is used such as WLAN, WWAN, WPAN, and 3GPP.
+ - iii) Network interface: A specific access technology can be mapped to one network interface. To connect multiple heterogeneous access networks, it is necessary to use multiple heterogeneous network interfaces.
+ - iv) Radio access technologies (RAT): If a wireless access network is used, there are many radio spectrums. For a given WLAN access technology, there are many radio frequencies such as 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz and above 5 GHz.
+ - v) Wireless channel: There could be many available channels for a given RAT. For example, in WLAN, there are 11 or 13 available channels.
+- b) Network layer: IP address and prefix information (in the IPv6 case) are typical resources for multi-connection. But not only the IP address but also flow label and other extension headers (in IPv6 case) can be the resources for multi-connection.
+ - c) Transport layer: Port number is a typical resource for multi-connection. In addition, stream (session) can also be a resource for multi-connection.
+ - d) Application layer: Uniform resource locator (URL), domain name, session, access point name (APN), IP multimedia private identity (IMPI), and IP multimedia public identity (IMPU) are the identity resources for multi-connection.
+
+#### **6.1.2 Resource attributes related to multi-connection**
+
+This clause describes the resource attributes. These resource attributes are required to describe features and usage.
+
+- a) PHY/MAC layer: The resources for multi-connection in the PHY/MAC layer are identified as access network, access technology, network interface, radio access technologies (RAT) and wireless channel. The attributes of each resource are defined as follows:
+ - i) Access network: The access network is related to the access technology and RAT. One specific access network may be operated by one access technology or several access technologies. In addition, a service provider may manage several access networks. Usually, if an access network is referred to as a network that connects access technologies to the core network [ITU-T Q.1742.1], the characteristics of the access network can be determined by the service provider, including the access technologies for each access network.
+ - ii) Access technology: The access technology is related to the access network and the service provider. To provide multi-connection, service providers can use one same or different access technologies.
+ - iii) Network interface: The network interface is directly related to access the technology. A specific access technology may restrict the characteristics of a network interface. For a multi-connection node, multiple network interfaces are directly used simultaneously. For a network interface of the multi-connection, there can be a physical network interface and a logical/virtual network interface. A network interface is a logical interface to the upper layer (e.g., network layer) and is related to the establishment of a network layer connection.
+ - iv) Radio access technologies (RAT) and wireless channels: These multi-connection resources are related only to wireless access technology. The wireless specific attribute of these resources is used radio frequency or used bandwidth. For example, WLAN (Wi-Fi) uses an ISM band (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz) and 20 MHz/40 MHz bandwidth per wireless channel. To create a multi-connection, the used wireless access technology and channel information should be considered.
+
+- b) Network layer: The resources for multi-connection in the network layer are identified as IPv4 address, IPv6 address, prefix, flow label and extension header. The attributes of each resource are defined as follows.
+ - i) IPv4 address: The IP address is a basic resource in the network layer needed to route to the next hop and to identify the point of attachment of the host. IPv4 addresses are composed of 32 bits and their availability can be limited. The usage of IPv4 addresses can be categorized as local-scope usage or global-scope usage.
+ - ii) IPv6 address, prefix and flow label: In contrast to IPv4 addresses, IPv6 addresses are composed of 128 bits and their availability is relatively sufficient. The usage of IPv6 address is categorized as local-scope usage or global-scope usage. Regarding the prefix, the 64-bit length prefix identifies the network domain to be used to configure the IPv6 address. The prefix is managed hierarchically by each router. Regarding the flow label, each connection is distinguished by IPv6 address as well as flow label for specific applications. The flow label is a 20-bit field in the IPv6 header and is used to label the sequences of packets.
+- c) Transport layer: The resources for multi-connection in the transport layer are identified as port number and stream (session) number. The attributes of each resource are defined as follows:
+ - i) Port number: The port number is not directly related to multi-connection because the port number is used to distinguish data packet through proper applications. But, if multi-connection is used to identify data streams towards applications, the port number is a resource for multi-connection. Usually, the port number is categorized as a well-known port number (for example, port number 21 is used only for FTP and port number 23 is used for telnet) or an unspecified port number.
+ - ii) Stream (session) number: As for port numbers, if a stream (session) number is used to identify data streams towards applications, the stream (session) number is a resource of multi-connection. Stream (session) number is not related to TCP/UDP transport protocol, but is related to stream control transmission protocol (SCTP) transport protocol.
+- d) Application layer: The resources for multi-connection in the application layer are identified as uniform resource locator (URL), domain name, session, access point name (APN), IP multimedia private identity (IMPI) and IP multimedia public identity (IMPU). The attributes of each resource are defined as follows:
+ - i) The resource for multi-connection in the application layer is closely related to the specific applications and access technology. URL is related to WWW service. Domain name is related to DNS service. APN, IMPI, IMPU are related to the specific access technology and system.
+
+### 6.2 Resource identifiers
+
+This clause identifies the resources to support the multi-connection functions and capabilities specified in [ITU-T Y.2027] and [ITU-T Y.2251] in a high-level approach.
+
+The resource identifiers (IDs) are defined by reusing existing resource IDs or can be newly defined.
+
+- a) Service ID (SVID): According to service decomposition [ITU-T Y.2251], a service can be decomposed into several service components. To achieve service decomposition and composition, the identification of each service component is recommended to support one or more applications. In that case, a new SVID is required. For example, the service ID may be defined by using a public service ID as in 3GPP.
+- b) Session ID (SEID): The definition of session describes a temporary telecommunication relationship among a group of objects in the service stratum [ITU-T Y.2091]. Regarding the
+
+multi-connection aspect, session can be used for session combination capability. An application can be supported by one or more sessions, so session IDs should be identified. For example, the session ID may be defined by using a combination of IP addresses and ports like a session defined in IETF.
+
+- c) IP flow ID (FLID): The current IP flows can be identified by a flow ID in IP packets to support a service. However, it is required that these flows be distinguished by service components in order to support the service decomposition and composition. Therefore, IP flow ID should be identified to support the service components. In addition, these IP flow IDs should be linked to specific network interfaces.
+- d) Access network ID (ANID): To provide the UE with a multi-connection environment, different types of access networks should be connected simultaneously to the UE. The UE should be able to identify the different access networks before using them, and to choose the appropriate one, depending on policy, QoS, etc. for multi-connection.
+- e) Interface ID (IFID): Regarding the UE aspect with respect to multi-connection, a UE should have several heterogeneous logical/virtual and physical interfaces. Therefore the UE should identify the interface IDs. To achieve utilization of multi-connection, the UE has to choose the corresponding interfaces.
+
+## 7 Configuration of resource identifiers
+
+The subscriber and the operator are required to handle the resource IDs to achieve efficient utilization of the resource in the multi-connection environment. From the UE point of view, the subscriber is recommended to configure the resource IDs to provide benefits from multi-connection through multi-connection capability [ITU-T Y.2251].
+
+The configuration makes alignment between the resource IDs at the MUE and the network. Additionally, a new interface between the MUE and the network is required to be defined as well as the functional description of the configuration.
+
+### 7.1 Relations between resource identifiers within each layer
+
+This clause describes the relations between the resource IDs by using a layering point of view in order to provide information for configuration as well as to describe its mapping. The abstraction points may be represented by mapping of the resource IDs as described in Figure 7-1. Basically there are several possible relations between the upper abstraction point (UAP) and the lower abstraction point (LAP), such as one-to-one, *N*-to-one, and *N*-to-*N* mapping to represent different configurations among the resource IDs at the MUE. Therefore, all of the resource IDs at the MUE are required to be mapped for configuration by various mapping types such that one UAP can be split into multiple LAPs and multiple UAPs can be merged to one LAP.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates three mapping types between Upper ID(s) (Upper abstraction point, UAP) and Lower ID(s) (Lower abstraction point, LAP):
+
+- A. One to one mapping:** A single Upper ID is mapped to a single Lower ID.
+- B. N to one mapping:** Multiple Upper IDs are mapped to a single Lower ID.
+- C. N to N mapping:** Multiple Upper IDs are mapped to multiple Lower IDs.
+
+Legend:
+
+- ■ Abstraction point
+- ↔ Relationship
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F7-1
+
+Figure 7-1: Conceptual configuration of multi-connection IDs in the MUE. The diagram illustrates three mapping types: A. One to one mapping, B. N to one mapping, and C. N to N mapping. It shows the relationship between Upper ID(s) (Upper abstraction point, UAP) and Lower ID(s) (Lower abstraction point, LAP).
+
+Figure 7-1 – Conceptual configuration of multi-connection IDs in the MUE
+
+#### 7.1.1 MAC and PHY layer
+
+In the MAC and PHY layer, each upper abstract point (UAP) is represented by the interface ID (IFID) like MAC address, and each lower abstraction point (LAP) is represented by the access network ID (ANID) given from the multi-connection network. Multiple IFIDs may attach just one access network so that multiple IFIDs are mapped to one ANID as shown in case A of Figure 7-2. Some LAPs may be a set of multiple access networks so that there is a mapping between multiple ANIDs and multiple IFIDs as shown in case B of Figure 7-2. As shown in case C in Figure 7-2, multiple IFIDs may be represented by one logical/virtual IFID in order to be easily configured so that multiple ANIDs representing the LAP may be mapped to one logical/virtual IFID.
+
+
+
+**A. Same ANID and different IFIDs** **B. Different ANIDs and IFIDs** **C. Logical interface**
+
+Interface IDs Interface IDs Interface IDs
+ #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3 #1 #2 #3
+
+UAP UAP UAP
+
+MAC/PHY layer MAC/PHY layer MAC/PHY layer
+
+LAP LAP LAP
+
+Access network ID Access network IDs Access network IDs
+
+▲ ● ■ Abstraction point ↔ Relationship
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F7-2
+
+Figure 7-2: Configuration of interface IDs and access network IDs. The diagram shows three cases (A, B, C) within a MAC/PHY layer box. Case A: Three Interface IDs (#1, #2, #3) at the UAP level map to a single Access network ID at the LAP level. Case B: Three Interface IDs (#1, #2, #3) at the UAP level map to three separate Access network IDs at the LAP level. Case C: Three Interface IDs (#1, #2, #3) at the UAP level map to a single 'Virtual interface ID' at the LAP level, which then maps to three Access network IDs. A legend indicates that triangles and circles represent abstraction points and arrows represent relationships.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Configuration of interface IDs and access network IDs**
+
+#### 7.1.2 Network layer
+
+In the network layer, each UAP is generally represented by IP flow ID (FLID), which can be substituted by one or more IP addresses. In case A shown in Figure 7-3, an FLID may generally be mapped to an IFID as one-to-one mapping. As shown in cases B and C in Figure 7-3, multiple FLIDs may be configured with one IFID, or an FLID may be configured with multiple IFIDs. These cases represent $N$ -to-one mapping and one-to- $N$ mapping, respectively. As shown in case D of Figure 7-3, some LAPs may be represented by a logical/virtual interface as logical/virtual IFID so that the relation between FLID and IFID can be configured by one-to-one mapping even though there are several IFIDs.
+
+
+
+**A. An IFID and an FLID** **B. An IFID and FLIDs** **C. Many IFIDs and an FLID** **D. Logical interface and FLID**
+
+IP flow ID IP flow IDs IP flow ID IP flow ID
+
+UAP UAP UAP UAP
+
+Network layer Network layer Network layer Network layer
+
+LAP LAP LAP LAP
+
+Interface ID Interface ID Interface IDs Interface IDs
+
+▲ ● ■ Abstraction point ↔ Relationship
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F7-3
+
+Figure 7-3: Configuration of IP flow IDs and interface IDs. The diagram shows four cases (A, B, C, D) within a Network layer box. Case A: One IP flow ID at the UAP level maps to one Interface ID at the LAP level. Case B: One IP flow ID at the UAP level maps to two Interface IDs at the LAP level. Case C: One IP flow ID at the UAP level maps to three Interface IDs at the LAP level. Case D: One IP flow ID at the UAP level maps to a 'Virtual interface ID' at the LAP level, which then maps to three Interface IDs. A legend indicates that triangles and circles represent abstraction points and arrows represent relationships.
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Configuration of IP flow IDs and interface IDs**
+
+#### 7.1.3 Transport and application layer
+
+In the transport layer, the session ID (SEID) is defined for UAP and it is required to be locally unique at the MUE. That is, each UAP is required to be only associated with an application in the MUE. Each application represented by the service ID (SVID) is typically served through the abstraction point with the SEID. Regarding the application layer, service IDs (SVIDs) representing the UAP may be configured to distinguish decomposed services from composed services. Here, the SVID is required to be also locally unique at the MUE and is used to identify the composed service.
+
+NOTE – Not all of MUE's resource IDs need to be globally unique. Generally, SVID, SEID, and IFID are locally unique at the MUE. However, IFID may be globally unique like MAC address. In addition, both FLID and ANID may be globally unique according to the applied protocols or services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the configuration of service IDs and session IDs across three scenarios (A, B, and C) showing the relationship between the Application layer and the Transport layer.
+
+**A. A service ID and session ID**
+
+- Application layer:** Appl. A (represented by a dashed circle).
+- Transport layer:** A single orange dot (Abstraction point) connects Appl. A to a single Session ID.
+- IP flow ID:** A single black square (Abstraction point) labeled #1.
+
+**B. Many service IDs and many session IDs**
+
+- Application layer:** Appl. B containing three services: Data, Audio, and Video (each in dashed circles).
+- Transport layer:** Three orange dots (Abstraction points) labeled 'Session IDs'. Each service maps to its own Session ID.
+- IP flow IDs:** Three black squares (Abstraction points) labeled #1, #2, and #3. There is a complex web of dashed 'Relationship' lines between the Session IDs and IP flow IDs.
+
+**C. Many service IDs and session ID**
+
+- Application layer:** Appl. C containing three services: Data, Audio, and Video (each in dashed circles).
+- Transport layer:** A single orange dot (Abstraction point) labeled 'Session ID' to which all three services converge.
+- IP flow IDs:** Three black squares (Abstraction points) labeled #1, #2, and #3. The single Session ID maps to all three IP flow IDs via dashed 'Relationship' lines.
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- ■ Abstraction point
+- $\longleftrightarrow$ Relationship
+- Service ID (indicated by green dashed lines in Scenario C)
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F7-4
+
+Figure 7-4: Configuration of service IDs and session IDs showing three scenarios A, B, and C for mapping Application layer services to Transport layer sessions and IP flows.
+
+Figure 7-4 – Configuration of service IDs and session IDs
+
+### 7.2 Relationship between resource identifiers and multi-connection functional entities
+
+This clause describes the relationship between the resource identifiers (IDs) at the MUE and the multi-connection functional entities (FEs).
+
+The multi-connection architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2027] includes architectural functions to provide multi-connection related signalling and enhancements of the existing functionality in NGN. These functions are performed to maintain information of the concurrent multiple connections for a given MUE and to support multi-connection capability in the MUE and the network [ITU-T Y.2251]. Therefore, the multi-connection architecture defines new FEs characterized by these multi-connection functions. Especially, in the MUE, the multi-connection terminal control functional entity (MTC-FE) is added to support the interaction between the MUE and the network.
+
+Additionally, the multi-connection control function (MCF) contains the multi-connection user profile functional entity (MUP-FE), the multi-connection policy control functional entity (MPC-FE), the multi-connection coordination functional entity (MC-FE), the multi-connection registration functional entity (MR-FE) and the multi-connection media function (MMF).
+
+Therefore, the resource IDs defined at the MUE are recommended to be related to these multi-connection functions as well as FEs. Figure 7-5 depicts the relationship between the multi-connection resource IDs at the MUE and the multi-connection FEs at the network side.
+
+
+
+Y.2252(12)\_F7-5
+
+Figure 7-5: Relationship between resource IDs and multi-connection FEs. The diagram illustrates the architecture of a Multi-connection User Equipment (MUE) and its interaction with network functional entities. On the left, 'Resource identifiers' include Service ID (SVID), Session ID (SEID), IP flow ID (FLID), Interface ID (IFID), and Access network ID (ANID). These are managed by the 'Multi-connection terminal control FE (MTC-FE)'. The MTC-FE connects to 'Functional entities for multi-connection' which include: Multi-connection application support function (MAS-F) and Service control function (SCF) (green box); Multi-connection media function (MMF), Access control FE (AC-FE), and Access network (yellow box). Applications connect to MAS-F via ANI. The MUE connects to the network via UNI. On the right, network functional entities include Multi-connection policy control FE (MPC-FE), Multi-connection coordination FE (MC-FE), Multi-connection registration FE (MR-FE), and Multi-connection user profile FE (MUP-FE). These are interconnected via interfaces Pa, Ps, Pc, Cr, Pu, Ru, Cm, and Rt. A legend defines the line types: solid blue for MUE internal coordination, dashed blue for FE control, and solid red for MUE-network relationships.
+
+**Figure 7-5 – Relationship between resource IDs and multi-connection FEs**
+
+An MUE can exchange its multi-connection information for configuration with the network through the MTC-FE via reference point Rt. Especially, the MR-FE is responsible for managing the status of the current active MUEs, so the available resources in the MUE, such as IFID and ANID, are recommended to be maintained in the MR-FE. Moreover, these IDs are recommended to be registered in the MUP-FE to interact between the MUE policy for selecting interfaces from subscriber's view point and the network policy from network operator's view point.
+
+The extended access control functional entity is responsible for connecting the MUE to the core network so that the FE manages the current location information at the MUE, such as IFID and ANID.
+
+The multi-connection media function (MMF) is responsible for applying multiple access policies, so that information for configuration at the MUE is maintained. Therefore, the FLID, which is an element of the transport stratum resources, is managed and other information such as IFID, ANID and the subscriber's policy can be obtained from the MR-FE and the MUP-FE. Additionally, the FLID is also recommended to be maintained in the MC-FE.
+
+The extended service control function (SCF) maintains multi-connection in the session layer and is responsible for the session continuity when the service is transferred among different connections so that the SEID is recommended to be maintained in the SCF to handle the session layer multi-connection management.
+
+Finally, the extended multi-connection application support function (MAS-F) is responsible to support between applications and the SCF, and the SVID is recommended to be maintained in the MAS-F.
+
+# **8 Resource identifiers in multi-connection network**
+
+### **8.1 Introduction of resource IDs according to multi-connection scenarios**
+
+This clause describes examples of the usage of resource IDs according to multi-connection scenarios described in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.9].
+
+#### **1) Scenario A**
+
+An MUE accesses an access network simultaneously via multiple frequency bands. Because a single access network is served, and one ANID is used to identify it, multiple IFIDs for logical/virtual interfaces are also used to distinguish multiple frequency bands.
+
+#### **2) Scenario B**
+
+An MUE can access multiple access networks simultaneously using the same access technology. One ANID for an access technology is used because a single access control function is supported in this scenario. Multiple IFIDs for the physical interfaces are also used to distinguish many access networks.
+
+#### **3) Scenario C**
+
+An MUE connects to heterogeneous access networks, which are controlled by different access control functions. Therefore, multiple ANIDs and IFIDs are used to distinguish different access networks and access control functions. One SEID is used in the service control function.
+
+#### **4) Scenario D**
+
+An MUE connecting to multiple heterogeneous access networks is controlled by separate access control and service control functions using multiple ANIDs, IFIDs and SEIDs. One SVID is used in the application.
+
+#### **5) Scenario E**
+
+An MUE connects to multiple heterogeneous access networks through multiple access points, which are controlled by separate access control and service control functions for different applications. Here, multiple ANIDs, IFIDs, SEIDs and SVIDs are used at the same time.
+
+### **8.2 Introduction of resource IDs according to multi-connection use cases**
+
+This clause describes the usage of resource IDs in multi-connection use cases described in [ITU-T Y.2027].
+
+#### **8.2.1 Initiating the services of application**
+
+If an MUE is using multiple connections to support an application with several service components, one or more SVIDs represent the application or service components. Here, a connection, served by a SEID and a FLID, is mapped and maintained to support each service component. This clause describes initiation and addition of multiple connections by using resource IDs.
+
+- a) An MUE attaches an access network with an IFID and an ANID. After access authorization, the MUE will get an IP address and then allocate it to the interface connecting to the access network.
+- b) An MUE selects a SVID to identify the application with several service components. After getting information of a peer MUE, the MUE connects to the peer MUE. A connection is distinguished by using SEID and FLID.
+- c) An MUE gets a new IP address and assigns IFID and ANID to identify access networks and interfaces after completion of the authorization procedure of new access network authority. And then, the MUE binds the FLID to its access related resource IDs such as IFIDs and ANIDs, and their information is delivered to the MR-FE.
+
+- d) The MR-FE also informs the connection information to the MC-FE. And the MC-FE interacts with the MPC-FE to use the QoS policy rules. After receiving an acknowledgement for the connection, the MUE may complete mappings between resource IDs to serve each service component of an application through multi-connection.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Deleting the connection and keep services of application**
+
+When an MUE moves out of the coverage of an access network, it is required to change and/or delete a connection associated with the access network. This clause describes the deletion of multiple connections in the MUE.
+
+- a) An MUE recognizes the detachment from an access network, and checks the existing resource IDs and their mappings to keep the services.
+- b) If there is another connected access network, the MUE requests the Connection Update message to the MR-FE via the connected access network. The MR-FE updates a mapping between a FLID and ANIDs, and deletes a disconnected ANID. The connection information is delivered to the MC-FE.
+- c) The MC-FE also updates connection information. In order to keep service continuity, an existing mapping between SEID and FLID is not changed. The MC-FE also informs the status of connections to the MPC-FE. The MPC-FE replies the information of QoS policy to the MC-FE.
+- d) After receiving the acknowledgement for the connection, the MUE completes deleting one connection to keep service continuity.
+
+#### **8.2.3 IP flow mobility**
+
+When an MUE needs to transfer one IP flow from one access network to another, the MUE has to change mapping information between FLID and ANID in the MUE as well as in the multi-connection network. This clause describes the IP flow mobility.
+
+- a) When an MUE is connected simultaneously to multiple access networks, the MUE receives access network information and maintains these resources by representing resource IDs such as ANIDs and IFIDs. Additionally, to send and receive IP flows through multiple connections, a FLID can be mapped to ANIDs and its mapping will be maintained and registered in both the MR-FE and the MC-FE.
+- b) The MUE sends a Connection Update Request message to the MR-FE to change from one connection to another connection. The message contains the existing mapping information with a FLID and new connection information such as an ANID. Next, the MR-FE updates the existing mapping information between the FLID and new ANID based on the Connection Update Request message. Then the MR-FE sends a Connection Information message to the MC-FE including updated mapping information.
+- c) The MC-FE sends a Transport Resource Modification Request message which contains updated information of the connections to the MPC-FE. Then the MPC-FE selects new QoS policy rules for the connection based on the operator policy and the updated connection information. Finally, the MPC-FE returns a Transport Resource Modification Response message to the MC-FE.
+- d) The MC-FE makes and assigns related rules for the access network to the MMF, the MMF installs the rules, sends new QoS rules to new AC-FE and updates the QoS policy rules of the connection. After completing these procedures, finally the MUE also updates and maintains the mapping without change of mapping between SVID, SEID and FLID.
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+The MUE is recommended to securely manage the resource IDs inside the MUE as well as in the multi-connection network as follows:
+
+- a) Globally scoped resource IDs such as FLID and ANID are recommended to be encrypted in order to facilitate secure transmission between the MUE and the multi-connection network.
+- b) User multi-connection policy enforcement as subscriber's view point can optionally be registered securely as a top priority policy regardless of network operator policies.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.9] ITU-T Y-Series Recommendations – Supplement 9 (2010),
+*ITU-T Y.2000-series – Supplement on multi-connection scenarios.*
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# **ITU-T Y.2256 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects:
+Interoperability of services and networks in NGN
+
+---
+
+## **Overview of unmanned smart farms based on networks**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2256
+
+## Overview of unmanned smart farms based on networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2256 provides an overview of unmanned smart farms based on networks. The scope of this Recommendation includes a reference architecture and identifies services required to support unmanned smart farms.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2256 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16095 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Smart farm machines, unmanned smart farm.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Concept of unmanned smart farm smart service ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Unmanned smart farm reference architecture based on network ..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Data processing function ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Environmental control function..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Smart Machines control function ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Service requirements for unmanned smart farm based on networks..... | 6 |
+| 9 Service scenario ..... | 7 |
+| 9.1 Service introduction..... | 7 |
+| 9.2 Procedures of service scenario ..... | 7 |
+| 9.3 Service information flow ..... | 8 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 10 |
+| 11 Network capabilities ..... | 10 |
+| Appendix I – Background of unmanned smart farm based on networks..... | 11 |
+| I.1 Full-cycle activities of a networked unmanned smart farm ..... | 11 |
+| I.2 Categories of unmanned smart farm based on networks..... | 12 |
+| Bibliography..... | 15 |
+
+# **Introduction**
+
+At present, unmanned services in the agriculture sector are developed and utilized to perform simple tasks such as monitoring the growth environment of crops, as well as to handle various tasks that used to be done by human hands [b-FG-AI4A-I-162]. In order to enhance the competitiveness of the agriculture sector, demand for the development of unmanned services in the sector has been constantly growing to respond to the need for increased production and to find an alternative for performing simple, but labour-intensive, farm chores. In addition, it is essential to integrate smart machines with nearby smart farm equipment which use information and communication technology (ICT) to increase utilization and automation skills. In order to properly operate the agricultural smart machines which utilize ICT and take full advantage of cutting-edge technologies, it is necessary to define a new concept, and to standardize the requirements that should be met before implementing the new smart farm service. This Recommendation defines a reference architecture and an overview of services for the unmanned smart farm.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2256
+
+## Overview of unmanned smart farms based on networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation addresses unmanned smart farms based on networks. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Concept of unmanned smart farm services;
+- Reference architecture;
+- Service requirements;
+- Service scenarios.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1752] Recommendation ITU-T X.1752 (2022), *Security guidelines for big data infrastructure and platform*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 agro-industry** [b-ITU-T Y.2245]: The agricultural activity of an area viewed as an industrial sector of the economy.
+
+**3.1.2 big data** [b-ITU-T L.1390]: A term that describes the large volume of data – both structured and unstructured – that inundates a business on a day-to-day basis.
+
+**3.1.3 expertise data** [b-ITU-T Y.2244]: Values gathered from skilled service users, experts, service user communities that will help cultivation.
+
+**3.1.4 log data** [b-ITU-T Y.2244]: Values tracked from past consultation, past cultivation records, final profits per variety of crop, etc.
+
+**3.1.5 measured data** [b-ITU-T Y.2244]: Values recorded from sensors or measurement facilities, or gathered from agricultural product markets or distribution networks, or government agencies or statistic offices including cultivation data, market status data, production cost data.
+
+**3.1.6 smart farm** [b-ITU-T Y.2245]: Farms that can control the growing environment for crops and livestock automatically and remotely by applying ICT to greenhouse farms, livestock farms, bare ground.
+
+**3.1.7 smart farming service provider** [b-ITU-T Y.4450]: The service role that provides the requested Smart Farming services, such as providing a portal or consulting based on data gathered from agricultural fields, to requesting users.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 smart farm machines:** Intelligent machines that can perform the entire process of farming (seeding, breeding, harvesting, etc.) by the use of mechanical devices (robots, drones, tractors, irrigation equipment, etc.) combined with ICT technologies such as IoT, big data, artificial intelligence and IMT-2020.
+
+**3.2.2 unmanned smart farm:** A farm that works autonomously with limited human intervention by combining smart farm machines.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| DB | Database |
+| DRM | Digital Right Management |
+| DT-ITS | Digital Twin for Intelligent Transport System |
+| EC | Electric Conductivity |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| LP | Low Power |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
+| USV | Unmanned Surface Ship |
+| WAN | Wide Area Network |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement needs not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" and "may" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Concept of unmanned smart farm smart service
+
+The network-based unmanned smart farm model provides services while minimizing user involvement by using various mechanical devices (drones, robots, etc.) to make the most of smart farm components connected to the network. By analysing various information collected through the network, agricultural equipment can be controlled. The mode can be autonomously determined so that agricultural equipment can operate in the most suitable form in a given situation. In addition, all information exchanged between sensors, using information and communications technology (ICT) facilities and smart devices, is stored for learning.
+
+The unmanned smart farm smart service system may incorporate the use of sowing, growing and harvesting [b-FG-AI4A-1-144] procedure functions for each crop as well as the provision of surrounding environment control functions. It allows for the collection of real-time data information which, when processed using artificial intelligence, can be used for the automation of various and complex tasks using autonomous agricultural machines.
+
+Therefore, the unmanned smart farm is expected to reduce the need for human labour resources, increase crop yield by responding appropriately to changes in the growing environment, and provide accurate and professional services based on stored learning information. Figure 1 shows a conceptual diagram of an unmanned smart farm smart service system that can be applied to sowing, transplanting, breeding and harvesting, which are the production processes of open fields, greenhouse houses and vertical greenhouse [b-FG-AI4A-1-145]. This system incorporates the use of remote-control capabilities in all farm production operations, e.g., automatic control of facilities, equipment, machines and robots. An unmanned smart farm is an example of the ultimate form of intelligent agriculture operation and results in top-notch agricultural production.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the conceptual model of an unmanned smart farm service system. At the center is a box labeled "Unmanned smart farm service system". Inside this box, on the left, is a "Smart machine control" section containing an icon of a computer monitor and a cloud. On the right is a "Smart machines device" section. To the left of the central box is an icon of a farmer holding a smartphone, labeled "Farmers". A dashed double-headed arrow connects the farmer to the "Smart machine control" section. Below the central box and the farmer icon is a large oval labeled "Network". Double-headed vertical arrows connect the farmer icon and the central box to the "Network" oval. To the right of the central box is a vertical stack of three farm types: "Open field" (with a drone icon), "Greenhouse", and "Vertical farm". A double-headed vertical arrow connects this stack to the "Network" oval. Between the central box and the farm types, there are two horizontal arrows: a top arrow pointing right labeled "Operation" and a bottom arrow pointing left labeled "Monitoring". In the top right corner of the diagram, there is a small icon showing a drone, a robot, and a person. The text "Y.2256(24)" is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+Conceptual model of an unmanned smart farm service based on networks
+
+**Figure 1 – Conceptual model of an unmanned smart farm service based on networks**
+
+# 7 Unmanned smart farm reference architecture based on network
+
+Figure 2 defines a reference architecture for unmanned smart farms based on networks. This architecture incorporates the following functions: a smart farm machine control function, an environmental control function and a data processing function.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: A reference architecture for unmanned smart farm based on networks. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top, three main functional blocks are shown: 'Data processing function' (containing 'Data collection and big data analysis entity', 'AI decision support entity', and 'User interface entity'), 'Environmental control function' (containing 'Sensor node entity', 'Environmental device control entity', and 'ICT facility entity'), and 'Smart machines control function' (containing 'Machines entity' and 'Machines device control entity'). These three blocks are interconnected by horizontal double-headed arrows. To the left of the 'Data processing function' block is an icon representing a farmer with a smartphone. Below these functional blocks is a network layer represented by a cloud containing several red server icons and white node icons. Vertical double-headed arrows connect each of the three functional blocks to the network layer. A reference number 'Y.2256(24)' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 2 – A reference architecture for unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+## 7.1 Data processing function
+
+The data processing function is comprised of: a data collection and big data analysis entity, an AI decision-support entity and a user interface entity. Real-time data input from the field is processed and analysed to produce big data. AI-based decision-support services are performed based on the generated big data.
+
+### 7.1.1 Data collection and big data analysis entity
+
+Big data is created by capturing on-site environmental information input from sensors in real time and applying pre-processing technology and data analysis technology to the collected data. The data is normalized through deduplication, noise removal and the application of machine learning algorithms on the data collected in the pre-processing process to enable data analysis. In the data analysis process, final usable big data is created through data processing processes such as data fusion, clustering, statistics and data mining.
+
+### 7.1.2 AI decision-support entity
+
+The AI decision-support entity autonomously produces AI-based decisions based on created big data in response to user requests, input through the user interface. To ensure the autonomy of AI-based decision-making, statistical processing is performed, which allows correlation between input variables and results. By systematically analysing farmers' diverse intellectual abilities and big data from unmanned smart farm sites, a reliable decision-making algorithm, which is based on learned patterns, can be developed.
+
+### 7.1.3 User interface entity
+
+The user interface entity performs physical and virtual intermediary functions to enable communication between unmanned smart farm farmers and AI decision-support entities. It recognizes the farmer's needs related to environmental control and smart farm machine control, creates information that can be processed by the AI decision-support entity and performs the function of providing immediate feedback regarding the actions necessary to respond to the farmer's requirements.
+
+## **7.2 Environmental control function**
+
+The environmental control function processes temperature, humidity, crop nutrients, and insect and pest prescriptions [b-FG-AI4A-1-145] by collecting and analysing the environmental information and facilitates information collection through the network. After the information is processed, it initiates the appropriate control to ensure appropriate actions are taken.
+
+### **7.2.1 Sensor node entity**
+
+Sensor node entity control sensors detect the atmospheric environment such as temperature, humidity, CO2 , solar radiation, wind direction and wind speed, which have a great influence on the growth of crops. Sensors are also used to detect such items as soil water content, soil moisture tension, EC, pH and ground temperature. This information is shared with the data collection and big data analysis entity.
+
+### **7.2.2 Environmental control device entity**
+
+The environmental device control entity actuates ventilation equipment, heating systems, skylights, side windows (for temperature control), shading curtains (opened or closed for light control), light retention systems, carbon dioxide supply systems, irrigation systems and nutrient solution delivery systems. The main actuator, operated by a control panel, uses a drive motor incorporated in the nutrient solution control system. The nutrient solution control system consists of an irrigation and fertilization machine, a heater and a CO2 supply driver.
+
+### **7.2.3 ICT facility entity**
+
+The ICT facility entity provides information transport to a controller or data storage using wired or wireless transmission (RS485, RS232, Ethernet, power line communication, LP-WAN, Internet, mobile communications). This information when provided to an environmental controller, which is responsible for control of: ventilation; heating; shading; thermal insulation; irrigation; and fertilization inside and outside the unmanned smart farm, can be used to operate actuators which control such items as sky windows, curtains, ventilation fans, CO2 generators, irrigation facilities and observation equipment.
+
+## **7.3 Smart Machines control function**
+
+The smart machine control function realizes the complete replacement of human labour in unmanned smart farms by relying on intelligent equipment and robots to complete tasks that have been done manually in traditional farming.
+
+### **7.3.1 Machines entity**
+
+The machines entity is divided into intelligent fixed machines and agricultural robots.
+
+Intelligent fixed equipment provides accurate management and control, especially intelligent monitoring.
+
+Intelligent fixed machine minimizes labour by automatically responding to analysis results from environmental sensors to: control sprinklers to manage temperature and humidity, invoke pest prevention and control pumps that spray liquid fertilizer.
+
+Agricultural robots are mobile equipment, which include unmanned vehicles, unmanned surface ships (USVs) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are key devices for unmanned cultivation.
+
+Agricultural robots are mobile and autonomously operated equipment in unmanned farms. Agricultural robots perform ploughing and sowing functions in field farms within open field, green house and vertical farms. Agricultural robots not only enable unmanned transportation missions, but can also serve as platforms to transport other intelligent mechanical device.
+
+Agricultural robots (along with mobile platform equipment and robots) include automatic sowing and harvesting, point spraying, plant health testing, and point pruning, and can be used in a variety of applications. Field robots play an important role in improving operational reliability, environmental health and crop productivity.
+
+Agricultural field robots and manipulators are a part of intelligent agricultural systems, and unmanned driving technology forms the basis for the free movement of field robots.
+
+In agricultural environments, unmanned driving is utilized for automatic sowing, cultivation and harvesting, and this process should be able to be monitored in real time.
+
+### **7.3.2 Machines device control entity**
+
+The machines device control entity, using intelligent computing information technology, interconnects: operating mechanical devices; sensor-based equipment; transmission systems; and provides processing functions.
+
+The intelligent management capability results from the use of AI decisions based on the use of big data to achieve effective docking and cooperative operations between devices and increased environmental adaptability and work efficiency of unmanned automatic operating equipment, and improves the level of intelligence of unmanned smart farms.
+
+Automatic working equipment is equipped with an information processing system, and provides reliable hardware support for edge computing. The use of edge computing technology allows for terminal processing of equipment information and terminal control for autonomous work.
+
+For example, with a feeding system using fully automatic self-walking robots, cleaning robots and automated guided vehicles, robots can efficiently complete tasks without human intervention after receiving the necessary instructions. Further, visual control technology provides important technical support for fruit harvesting robots, supports positioning recognition used by picking robots and also allows for all-weather operating modes.
+
+# **8 Service requirements for unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+To support unmanned smart farm services, the following requirements are needed in terms of data, analytics and execution. These requirements can be communicated through the network.
+
+**8.1** The unmanned smart farm service decides whether to work or not by analysing data based on artificial intelligence. Therefore, it is essential to collect various types of data, specifically:
+
+- a) growing conditions, market information, and expertise, from data repositories.
+- b) environmental conditions of open fields or greenhouse houses, from sensors.
+
+**8.2** The requirements for analysing the data collected are as follows:
+
+- a) The collected data should be analysed according to the stage or purpose of the work.
+- b) The analysed results should be produced in a defined (structured) form that can be used to trigger smart devices or ICT equipment on the farm.
+
+**8.3** There are requirements for implementing analytics results into machines or ICT facilities as follows:
+
+- a) The results of the analysis should be delivered by the data processing function to the machine or ICT facility over the network.
+- b) The machine or ICT facility must be able to receive tasks from the data processing function and operate accordingly.
+- c) The results of the operation of the machine or ICT facility must be communicated back to the data processing function.
+
+# **9 Service scenario**
+
+## **9.1 Service introduction**
+
+This service scenario relates to growing and harvesting crops using unmanned smart machines.
+
+- Smart farm machines used in the field during the sowing, growing and harvesting seasons utilize data from equipment installed in the field (decision models) to perform tasks.
+- The service is used to support smart machine control functions and environmental control functions, per the basic structure proposed in Figure 2. The service also supports the smart machines control function, the environmental control function and a data processing function, as illustrated in Figure 2.
+
+**9.1.1** Environmental information such as climate and soil information, location information (location area, etc.) and field information such as agricultural machines information are collected. The collected data is analysed to determine the condition of the farm and the suitability of the crops, and this information is used to predict the timing of the sowing, growing and harvesting operation.
+
+**9.1.2** It provides decision-support services to farmers based on the sowing, growing and harvesting periods predicted by the first procedure.
+
+- In the sowing stage, the decision support is provided to recommend the required procedures, e.g., tillage, furrowing, mulching, pesticide applications (including provision of a plastic covering), application of manure and/or fertilizer (to improve soil quality) and seeding.
+- In the growth stage, the monitoring process is carried out to identify crop health status through environmental control functions, and the collected measurement data is analysed for AI-based pest and growth nutrition information. Based on this information, decision support is proposed to the farmer through the data processing function and the farmer may instruct the smart machine to undertake the suggested actions.
+- In the harvesting stage, the environmental control function utilizes data from video devices installed in the field to determine if the crop is mature, predicts the harvesting time according to the results of the data processing function and provides a decision on whether to harvest.
+
+The farmer then instructs the harvesting smart machines to harvest the crops, and dry, wash, process and package the crops for distribution.
+
+## **9.2 Procedures of service scenario**
+
+Prediction-related service procedures can be provided by following the steps shown in Figure 3.
+
+Each step is based on decision-support services provided by the data processing Function, shown in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Start([Unmanned smart farm start]) --> Plan[Cultivation plan decision for selection of production crops considering farmland or cultivation facilities (greenhouse, vertical farming, etc.)]
+ Plan --> Dec1{Cultivation plan decision}
+ Dec1 -- No --> Start
+ Dec1 -- Yes --> Seeding[Seeding (plough, seeding, breeding and field management) in indoor (greenhouse or vertical farm) and open field for using the smart machine]
+ Seeding --> Dec2{Seeding}
+ Dec2 -- No --> Start
+ Dec2 -- Yes --> Harvest[Harvest in crop growth]
+ Harvest --> Dec3{Harvest}
+ Dec3 -- No --> Start
+ Dec3 -- Yes --> Sale[Packaging and sale of crops]
+ Sale --> End([End])
+
+```
+
+Y.2256(24)
+
+Flowchart of the functional procedure for an unmanned smart farm. The process starts with 'Unmanned smart farm start', followed by 'Cultivation plan decision for selection of production crops considering farmland or cultivation facilities (greenhouse, vertical farming, etc.)'. A decision diamond 'Cultivation plan decision' loops back to the start if 'No' and proceeds to 'Seeding (plough, seeding, breeding and field management) in indoor (greenhouse or vertical farm) and open field for using the smart machine' if 'Yes'. Another decision diamond 'Seeding' loops back to the start if 'No' and proceeds to 'Harvest in crop growth' if 'Yes'. A third decision diamond 'Harvest' loops back to the start if 'No' and proceeds to 'Packaging and sale of crops' if 'Yes'. The process ends at 'End'.
+
+**Figure 3 – Functional procedure for unmanned smart farm**
+
+## 9.3 Service information flow
+
+An example of a detailed information flow for a service scenario is shown in Figure 4.
+
+- Agricultural producers need to know the exact status of the agricultural field at the reproduction stage by obtaining the necessary agricultural information for planting planning.
+- Therefore, agricultural information retrieval can be the most demanded service scenario in the pre-production stage.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S as Server user
+ participant SM as Smart machines control function
+ participant E as Environmental control function
+ participant D as Data processing function
+
+ S->>D: 1. Service registration request
+ Note over S,D: 2. AAA procedure
+ D->>S: 3. Service registration granted
+ S->>D: 4. Service request
+ D->>E: 5. Requesting service-related environmental information
+ E->>D: 6. Forwarding collected environmental information
+ D->>SM: 7. Transmitting control commands
+ Note over SM: 8. Controlling smart machines
+ SM->>D: 9. Data forwarding
+ D->>S: 10. Result data notify
+
+```
+
+Y.2256(24)
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow between four entities: Server user, Smart machines control function, Environmental control function, and Data processing function. The process includes service registration, request, data forwarding, and control commands.
+
+**Figure 4 – Information flow diagram**
+
+### a) Assumptions
+
+- 1) The service user is subscribed to the smart farm decision-support service linked to the organization, and the service can only be provided to service subscribers.
+- 2) The information flow between the service provider (system) and the user shall be DRM processed.
+
+### b) Information flow description:
+
+Service scenarios are basically divided into service users, smart machine control, environmental control processing, data monitoring and big data analysis.
+
+- 1) The service user (e.g., farmer) requests a registration of service by activity (sowing/growing/harvesting) to activate the service from the data processing function.
+- 2) The data processing function performs the AAA procedure according to the service user's request.
+- 3) If the AAA procedure is successfully performed, the data processing function sends a service registration granted message to the service user. However, if the AAA procedure is not performed normally, a service denied message is sent to the service user.
+- 4) After receiving the service registration granted message, the service user sends a service request to the data processing function.
+- 5) The data processing function requests the collected environmental information necessary for environmental control processing to the environmental control function in order to perform environmental control according to the request received from the service user.
+- 6) The environmental control function forwards the environmental information requested from the data processing function.
+- 7) The data processing function performs environmental control and monitoring by forwarding the optimal environmental control value for crop growth to the smart machines control function based on the results received from the environment control function.
+- 8) The smart machines control function activates the equipment installed in the facility and regulates the environment in order to perform the commands received from the data processing function.
+
+- 9) The data collected during this process is forwarded to the data processing function for storage and analysis.
+- 10) The data processing function notifies the result of service request to the service user.
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation describes an overview of the unmanned smart farm based on future networks. Thus, it is assumed that security considerations in general are based on the security of IP-based networks and general network security requirements, and that security mechanisms used in IP-based networks should be applied [ITU-T Y.3101].
+
+General requirements and capabilities of data security for DT-ITS (digital twin for intelligent transport system) align with the framework described in [ITU-T X.1752]. The security considerations for DT-ITS include considerations for data source security, data collection security, data processing security, application security and security management [ITU-T X.1752].
+
+Relevant security requirements of [b-ITU-T Y.2201], [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and applicable X, Y and M series of ITU-T Recommendations need to be taken into consideration, including access control, authentication, data confidentiality, data retention policy, network security, data integrity, availability and privacy.
+
+# **11 Network capabilities**
+
+The high-level network capabilities for the support of an unmanned smart farm are as follows:
+
+It is optional to develop a solution to provide end-to-end connectivity between relevant users or terminals over interconnected heterogeneous networks such as next generation networks (NGNs), other IP-based networks, broadcasting networks, mobile/wireless networks ([b-ETSI TS 137], NB-IoT) and public switched telephone network/integrated services digital networks.
+
+Intermediate transmission capabilities: Provide intermediate transmission among unmanned smart farms to support control and monitoring over interconnected heterogeneous networks or field-based networks [b-IEEE 802.11ah], [b-IEEE 802.11af], [b-IEEE 802.22], etc.).
+
+Service Provider access capabilities: Provide access to agricultural information originated from service providers over interconnected heterogeneous networks or field-based networks.
+
+Networking capabilities: Provide relevant control functions of network connectivity and transport resource control functions, mobility management or authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 3].
+
+IoT service providers offer products and services to end users, with wide area embedded connectivity. To ensure the quality and reliability of services, they also need to ensure quality and reliability of embedded network connectivity of each IoT device. With tens or hundreds of thousands of deployed devices, it is difficult to monitor and manage network connectivity manually by enterprise customers and IoT service providers through traditional customer care services provided by network operators. The IoT transport network is recommended to have a solution for efficient and scalable operation and maintenance.
+
+An unmanned smart farm can optionally support local area network (LAN) and wide area network (WAN) operating modes, and allow for the connection of LAN and WAN ports through network interfaces.
+
+An unmanned smart farm can optionally support the capability of transmission resuming at breakpoints. When the network is disconnected, the resource download process will continue after reconnection.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Background of unmanned smart farm based on networks
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 Full-cycle activities of a networked unmanned smart farm
+
+The overall process of agricultural activities using network-based unmanned smart farms can be defined as shown in Figure I.1.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR; A[Planning and design phase] --> B[Seeding phase]; B --> C[Growth monitoring phase]; B --> D[Pest management phase]; C --> E[Harvest phase]; D --> E; E --> F[Packaging and storage phase]; F --> G[Distribution and sales phase];
+```
+
+Y.2256(24)
+
+Flowchart of the overall agricultural process showing sequential phases: Planning and design phase, Seeding phase, Growth monitoring phase, Pest management phase, Harvest phase, Packaging and storage phase, and Distribution and sales phase.
+
+Figure I.1 – Overall agricultural process
+
+### I.1.1 Planning and design phase
+
+In an unmanned smart farm environment, big data and AI technologies are used to analyse past crop data, climate information, soil information, etc. to provide decision support for optimal cultivation plans.
+
+AI technology is used to provide services such as selecting crops optimized for cultivation and predicting expected yields.
+
+#### I.1.2 Seeding phase
+
+In the sowing stage, automatic sowing robots, autonomous tractors and agricultural drones are used to sow seeds at precise locations and depths.
+
+This includes the process of transmitting data collected in real time from sensor nodes mounted on the sowing equipment to a DB (database) connected to the farm.
+
+#### I.1.3 Growth monitoring phase
+
+In the growth monitoring phase, the system analyses the growth status of crops, predicts future growth processes and supports decision-making on farmers' actions through the use of complex calculation devices, sensor nodes, driver nodes and AI technology. Monitoring and control can be performed through the use of the farmer's PC and associated mobile applications
+
+Real-time data collected from sensor nodes installed in the field (soil humidity, temperature, CO2 concentration, illumination, etc.) and real-time data collected from driver nodes (skylight/side window operation, ventilation fan operation, cooling/heating machine operation, etc.) will be captured.
+
+The collected data can be analysed to determine the current growth status of crops and predict the future growth process through AI analysis, and provide decision support such as guiding farmers on necessary measures.
+
+This processed data can be used to drive a complex control machine which will invoke actions to automatically adjust and optimize various environmental factors that affect the growth of crops.
+
+#### I.1.4 Pest management phase
+
+The pest management stage utilizes cameras with built-in AI analysis technology, control robots, and unmanned aerial vehicles to prevent or take action against crop diseases/pests.
+
+Cameras with built-in AI analysis technology can be used to detect the presence of pests or determine the type of disease and degree of progress, and transmit this information to a DB connected to the farm for subsequent analysis and action.
+
+Control robots and unmanned aerial vehicles can perform precise chemical spraying for pest control, based on the analysed results.
+
+#### **I.1.5 Harvest phase**
+
+In the harvesting stage, automatic harvesting robots with built-in AI technology are utilized to determine when and how to harvest crops, providing decision support to farmers or performing harvesting activities themselves.
+
+The automated harvesting robot determines the optimal time and method of harvesting by judging the maturity status of the crop in stages, and then provides notifications to the farmer or performs the harvest itself.
+
+### **I.1.6 Packaging and storage phase**
+
+The packaging and storage phase utilizes automatic packaging robots, sensor nodes, etc. to package and store crops.
+
+Automatic packaging robots utilize built-in sensor nodes to sort the harvest by grade, and then proceed with packaging and transporting it to the farmer's storage facility, the location of which is previously designated in the packaging robot's internal system.
+
+### **I.1.7 Distribution and sales phase**
+
+In the distribution and sales phase, crops previously packaged and stored by grade are tracked in real time so that farmers can check the location, status and distribution route of crops using RFID and/or QR codes. AI prediction technology can play a role in analysing inventory requirements and anticipating consumer demand.
+
+AI prediction technology analyses farm transaction data, auction market data, etc. to visualize data that predicts expected sales volume, price and potential consumers and provides this information to farmers.
+
+## **I.2 Categories of unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+There are three main categories of network-based unmanned smart farms, specifically greenhouses, open fields and vertical farms.
+
+### **I.2.1 Greenhouse unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+An example of a greenhouse network-based unmanned smart farm using a control robot, as shown in Figure I.2, follows.
+
+
+
+A photograph showing a blue and silver autonomous mobile robot (AMR) operating inside a large greenhouse. The robot is positioned on a light-colored floor, moving along a track. It has a blue top section and a silver base. In the background, there are rows of plants in the greenhouse, and the structure of the greenhouse is visible.
+
+A blue and silver autonomous mobile robot (AMR) operating inside a large greenhouse, moving along a track next to rows of plants.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Greenhouse unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+The smart greenhouse control robot was developed to reduce or replace the need for human resources to perform simple and repetitive tasks in domestic smart greenhouses and free them from pesticide spraying tasks. Exposure to pesticides can cause harm to the human body, resulting in increased worker fatigue and the need to take measures to protect against harms. This technology was developed to ensure these greenhouse tasks could be completed even when there are conditions that result in a reduced supply of human resources, e.g., during COVID-19 pandemic events. Smart greenhouse control Robots are able to operate continuously for more than 8 hours and able to service 0.33 ha when equipped with 300 L of chemical solution.
+
+#### **I.2.2 Open field unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+An example of an open field greenhouse network-based unmanned smart farm using unmanned aerial vehicles follows.
+
+
+
+Two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are shown. On the left is a quadcopter drone with a white body and red accents, equipped with a large white spray tank. On the right is a red and white helicopter-style UAV with a red body and white accents, also equipped with a spray tank.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Unmanned aerial vehicles**
+
+An open field network-based unmanned smart farm may use unmanned aerial vehicles as shown in Figure I.3 above to assist in crop production. Unmanned aerial vehicles may be equipped with technologies such as thermal infrared, multispectral, hyperspectral sensors and LiDAR to identify the growth and pest status of crops planted in the field. Additionally, they may be programmed to fly specific routes and spray pesticides, from on-board pesticide canisters. In a soybean growth management and quality control experiment, an unmanned drone was successful in reducing the amount of pesticide used by 90%. The results also showed that no pesticide residue was detected in the harvested peas.
+
+#### **I.2.3 Vertical unmanned smart farm based on networks**
+
+Figure I.4 provides an example of a vertical network-based unmanned smart farm.
+
+
+
+A 3D rendering of a vertical farm. It shows multiple levels of green plants growing in a controlled environment with a blue translucent roof and artificial lighting. The plants are arranged in rows, and the structure is supported by vertical poles.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Example of a vertical network-based unmanned smart farm**
+
+An advanced vertical farm, using network-based unmanned smart farm technology, is an unmanned, moving bed system that is automatically moved within a controlled environment, and is unmanned in all situations except for sowing and harvesting. In this example, after three weeks of growth in the lower three LED tiers of the moving bed, the plants are automatically transferred to the upper four tiers for one week of growth in natural light, enabling crops to be grown with the same or higher quality as conventional cultivation methods, with regards to such parameters as maturity and texture.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T L.1390] Recommendation ITU-T L.1390 (2022), *Energy saving technologies and best practices for 5G radio access network (RAN) equipment*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2244] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2244 (2019), *Service model for the cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2245] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2245 (2020), *Service model of the agriculture information based convergence service*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4450] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4450/Y.2238 (2015), *Overview of Smart Farming based on networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 3] ITU-T Y Suppl. 3 (2008), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on service scenarios for convergence services in a multiple network and application service provider environment*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 137] ETSI TS 137, *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS)*.
+- [b-FG-AI4A-1-144] ITU, *Use case on IoT-based Intelligent platform for End-to-End Crop Monitoring and Management during Pre-harvest Stages*.
+- [b-FG-AI4A-1-145] ITU, *Use case on Harnessing Sensors and IoT for Smart Climate and Nutrient Management in Greenhouse Cultivation and Vertical Farming*.
+- [b-FG-AI4A-I-162] ITU, *Unnamed grassland survey method*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11af] IEEE 802.11af:2013, *IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 5: Television White Spaces (TVWS) Operation*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11ah] IEEE 802.11ah:2016, *IEEE Standard for Information technology– Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications Amendment 2: Sub 1 GHz License Exempt Operation*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.22] IEEE 802.22 2019, *IEEE Standard – Information Technology- Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Wireless Regional Area Networks-Specific requirements – Part 22: Cognitive Wireless RAN MAC and PHY specifications: Policies and Procedures for Operation in the Bands that Allow Spectrum Sharing where the Communications Devices May Opportunistically Operate in the Spectrum of Primary Service*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6f5206667d2a288b66df9c58328185bc1cbcb902
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@@ -0,0 +1,1005 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2271
+
+(09/2006)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects:
+Interoperability of services and networks in NGN
+
+# --- **Call server-based PSTN/ISDN emulation**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2271
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.2271**
+
+# **Call server-based PSTN/ISDN emulation**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+The NGN shall support PSTN/ISDN emulation. One mechanism for providing this functionality is the use of a Call Server-based architecture. This Recommendation identifies service and network capabilities for this call server-based solution.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2271 was approved on 13 September 2006 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Call server, emulation, ISDN, PES, PSTN
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 PSTN/ISDN emulation in NGN ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Service and network capabilities ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Service capabilities..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Network capabilities..... | 5 |
+| 8 Relevant network elements..... | 8 |
+| 8.1 Application server ..... | 8 |
+| 8.2 Application server gateway ..... | 8 |
+| 8.3 User profile server ..... | 8 |
+| 8.4 Call server..... | 8 |
+| 8.5 Gateways ..... | 11 |
+| 8.6 Media server (MS)..... | 11 |
+| Appendix I – Mapping functional entities to network elements..... | 12 |
+| Appendix II – Basic call control scenario in call server-based PES..... | 13 |
+| II.1 Intra CS-PES call..... | 13 |
+| II.2 Scenario 5: Call between CS-PES user and PSTN, ISDN or PLMN..... | 15 |
+| II.3 Scenario 6: Inter CS-PES call..... | 15 |
+| II.4 Scenario 7: Call between CS-PES user and user of other IP networks..... | 16 |
+| II.5 Scenario 8: Call between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN users via CS-PES ..... | 16 |
+| Appendix III – Reference points and protocols ..... | 17 |
+| BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... | 18 |
+
+
+
+## ITU-T Recommendation Y.2271
+
+# Call server-based PSTN/ISDN emulation
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the service and network capability requirements for a call server-based (CS-based) PSTN/ISDN emulation component. It also provides a list of network elements used in conjunction with the CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component. Appendix II also provides a number of call control scenarios for CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component.
+
+Administrations may require operators and service providers to take into account national regulatory and national policy requirements in implementing this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [E.360.1] ITU-T Recommendation E.360.1 (2002), *Framework for QoS routing and related traffic engineering methods for IP-, ATM-, and TDM-based multiservice networks.*
+- [E.360.2] ITU-T Recommendation E.360.2 (2002), *QoS routing and related traffic engineering methods – Call routing and connection routing methods.*
+- [E.600] ITU-T Recommendation E.600 (1993), *Terms and definitions of traffic engineering.*
+- [G.711] ITU-T Recommendation G.711 (1988), *Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies.*
+- [G.723.1] ITU-T Recommendation G.723.1 (2006), *Dual rate speech coder for multimedia communications transmitting at 5.3 and 6.3 kbit/s.*
+- [G.729] ITU-T Recommendation G.729 (2007), *Coding of speech at 8 kbit/s using conjugate-structure algebraic-code-excited linear prediction (CS-ACELP).*
+- [H.248.1] ITU-T Recommendation H.248.1 v3 (2005), *Gateway control protocol: Version 3 (and its specific capabilities defined in H.248.x-series of Recommendations).*
+- [Q.826] ITU-T Recommendation Q.826 (2000), *Routing management model.*
+- [X.110] ITU-T Recommendation X.110 (2002), *International routing principles and routing plan for Public Data Networks.*
+- [X.805] ITU-T Recommendation X.805 (2003), *Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications.*
+- [Y.2031] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2031 (2006), *PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture.*
+- [Y.2261] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2261 (2006), *PSTN/ISDN evolution to NGN.*
+- [RFC 3261] IETF RFC 3261 (2002), *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol.*
+- [EN 301 703] ETSI European Standard, EN 301 703 V7.0.2 (1999), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR); Speech processing functions; General description.*
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+NOTE – In this clause the [aaa] notation after the title of a term indicates source of the definition for that term.
+
+**3.1 access border gateway (ABG)**: A packet gateway between an access network and a core network.
+
+**3.2 access gateway (AG)** [Y.2261]: A unit that allows end users with various accesses (e.g., PSTN, ISDN, V5.x) connection to the packet node of NGN.
+
+NOTE – The AG may be embedded in an access node, which serves also other access interfaces (e.g., xDSL, LAN). Such access nodes are also known as multi-service access nodes (MSAN).
+
+**3.3 application server (AS)**: A unit that interacts with the call server and the user profile server to support service execution.
+
+**3.4 application server gateway (ASG)**: A unit that interworks between application server and call server.
+
+NOTE – In IMS, ASG interworks between the application server and the core IMS.
+
+**3.5 call server (CS)**: The core element of a CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component, which is responsible for call control, media resource control, call routing, user profile and subscriber authentication, authorization and accounting. Depending on its role, the behaviour of the call server may be different. In these cases, the role of the call server is identified, for example, as "Access call server", "Breakout call server", "IMS call server", "Routing call server" or "Gateway call server".
+
+**3.6 media server (MS)**: A network element providing the media resource processing function for telecommunication services in NGN.
+
+**3.7 PSTN/ISDN emulation**: Provides PSTN/ISDN service capabilities and interfaces using adaptation to an IP infrastructure.
+
+NOTE – Not all service capabilities and interfaces have to be present to provide an emulation.
+
+**3.8 interconnection border gateway (IBG)**: A unit responsible for packet interworking between two service provider's core networks.
+
+**3.9 residential gateway (RG)**: A unit that interworks PSTN/ISDN user equipments to a packet network. A residential gateway is located at the customer premises.
+
+**3.10 signalling gateway (SG)** [Y.2261]: A unit that provides out-of-band call control signalling conversion between the NGN and other networks (e.g., between a Call server in NGN and a STP or SSP in SS7).
+
+**3.11 trunking media gateway (TMG)** [Y.2261]: A unit that provides interfaces between the packet nodes of the NGN and the circuit-switched nodes (e.g., transit exchange, local exchange, international exchange) of PSTN/ISDN for bearer traffic. The TMG provides any needed conversion to the bearer traffic.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|------|---------------------------------|
+| ABG | Access Border Gateway |
+| ACS | Access Call Server |
+| AG | Access Gateway |
+| AGCF | Access Gateway Control Function |
+
+| | |
+|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| AMG | Access Media Gateway |
+| AS | Application Server |
+| ASG | Application Server Gateway |
+| ASR | Automatic Speech Recognition |
+| BCS | Breakout Call Server |
+| BICC | Bearer Independent Call Control |
+| BRI | Basic Rate Interface |
+| CAMEL | Customized Applications for Mobile Network Enhanced Logic |
+| CCF | Call Control Function |
+| CDR | Call Detail Record |
+| CS | Call Server |
+| CS-based | Call Server based |
+| CSCS | Call Session Control Server |
+| CS-PES | Call Server-based PSTN/ISDN Emulation Service component |
+| DTMF | Dual Tone Multi Frequency |
+| FE | Function Entity |
+| GCS | Gateway Call Server |
+| IBG | Interconnection Border Gateway |
+| ICS | IMS Call Server |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IN | Intelligent Network |
+| INAP | Intelligent Network Application Part |
+| IPSec | IP Security |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| ISUP | ISDN User Part |
+| IVR | Interactive Voice Response |
+| MGCF | Media Gateway Control Function |
+| MRCF | Media Resource Control Function |
+| MRP | Media Resource Process |
+| MS | Media Server |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| PES | PSTN/ISDN Emulation Service component |
+| PIEA | PSTN/ISDN Emulation Architecture |
+| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network |
+| POTS | Plain Old Telephone Service |
+| PRI | Primary Rate Interface |
+
+| | |
+|---------|--------------------------------------------|
+| PSAP | Public Safety Answering Point |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| RCS | Routing Call Server |
+| RF | Routing Function |
+| RG | Residential Gateway |
+| SCP | Service Control Point |
+| SG | Signalling Gateway |
+| SIGTRAN | Signalling Transport |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SIP-I | SIP with encapsulated ISUP |
+| SPF | Service Provider Function |
+| SSF | Service Switching Function |
+| TDR | Telecommunications for Disaster Relief |
+| TMG | Trunking Media Gateway |
+| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |
+| UPS | User Profile Server |
+| WIN | Wireless Intelligent Network |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 PSTN/ISDN emulation in NGN**
+
+PSTN/ISDN emulation, as one of the service components of NGN, provides PSTN/ISDN basic and supplementary services, and co-exists with the IP Multimedia component, the streaming component, and other components. It interworks with the existing networks and other components of NGN.
+
+PSTN/ISDN emulation satisfies the following basic requirements:
+
+- In terms of service provisioning, it inherits PSTN/ISDN basic and supplementary services, and provides IN services.
+- In terms of user-network connection, it supports existing PSTN/ISDN UNI interfaces.
+
+Therefore, PSTN/ISDN end users may use existing services and existing terminals under the PSTN/ISDN emulation environment, without the knowledge of network being replaced by NGN.
+
+The term "call server-based" indicates that service control logic and service execution environment is primarily located in a call/session control server (CSCS; briefly call server (CS)). The CS is therefore the responsible network entity for service delivery (often also called as "anchor point of services"). This function relates to the service switching function (SSF) in PSTN/ISDN.
+
+Completely opposite to the CS-based service control concept is the IMS-based approach, because the application server (AS) houses the service control logic and service execution environment behind CSCS entities.
+
+# **7 Service and network capabilities**
+
+### **7.1 Service capabilities**
+
+The CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component should support:
+
+- PSTN/ISDN teleservices and supplementary services as per I.240 and I.250 series of ITU-T Recommendations.
+- Capabilities provided by the application server (AS).
+- Capabilities provided by traditional IN.
+- Public interest services.
+
+### **7.2 Network capabilities**
+
+#### **7.2.1 Numbering, naming and addressing**
+
+The users of the PSTN/ISDN emulation component will be allocated numbers in the appropriate E.164 spaces. The nature of this E.164 number varies from service provider to service provider and from country to country. The use of both geographical and non-geographical E.164 numbers shall be permitted.
+
+There is no requirement to support the use of non-E.164 numbers within the PSTN/ISDN emulation, but the use of non-E.164 numbers is not precluded.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Call routing**
+
+A CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation system is required to provide the ability to use different routing mechanisms. The CS can choose a route based on dialled number, calling party features and traffic routing policy (see e.g., call routing as defined by [Q.826], [E.360.1], [E.360.2], [E.600] or [X.110]).
+
+#### **7.2.3 Accounting, charging and billing**
+
+Billing and charging functions are supported in the CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation in order to provide accounting data to the service provider regarding the utilization of resources in the network. These functions support the collection of data for later processing as well as near real-time interactions with applications such as prepaid card services. A CS should have the capability of terminating a session/call in real-time.
+
+#### **7.2.4 User profile management**
+
+A user profile is a set of attributes related to the user. These attributes include, but are not limited to:
+
+- Authentication, authorization.
+- Service subscription.
+- Charging, accounting.
+- User registration status (registered, not registered).
+
+#### **7.2.5 Access network types**
+
+A CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component supports access networks of diverse technologies and capabilities. PSTN/ISDN emulation services should be available to all authorized users requesting those services regardless of the type of access network technology.
+
+The following non-exhaustive list of telephony access types should be supported for the CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component:
+
+- POTS (analogue lines, e.g., Z interface) access.
+- ISDN BRI or PRI access.
+- V5.x or ANSI equivalent access.
+
+#### **7.2.6 Capability of supporting various user equipments**
+
+User equipments are connected via the customer network to the access network and provide services to the end users. A variety of user equipments should be supported. These include AG with connected legacy user equipment that provides the capability of supporting PSTN/ISDN emulation services.
+
+#### **7.2.7 Identification, authentication and authorization**
+
+A CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component shall provide authentication and authorization of the devices connected to an NGN. Authentication requires devices connected to an NGN to be identified by the service provider and network provider in order to obtain access to the network or service.
+
+#### **7.2.8 Media resource management**
+
+##### **7.2.8.1 Overview**
+
+Media resources support mechanisms are traditionally used in conjunction with the traditional voice processing services and user interactions via voice and dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF). A CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component provides the capability of handling various media resource types in order to enable applications that include but are not limited to:
+
+- Recorded and composed announcements.
+- Interactive voice response (IVR).
+- Audio recording.
+- Voice mail.
+- Automatic speech recognition (ASR).
+- Text-to-speech, speech-to-text.
+- Audio conference bridge.
+
+##### **7.2.8.2 Audio codecs**
+
+As the NGN should be able to interwork with different networks (e.g., PSTN/ISDN, UMTS, IP network), the following should be considered:
+
+- Support for different types of voice codecs (e.g., [G.711], AMR [EN 301 703], [G.729] and [G.723.1]).
+- Support for negotiation among NGN entities (e.g., terminal and network elements).
+- If necessary, audio transcoding shall be performed to ensure end-to-end service interoperability. It is preferable to avoid transcoding wherever possible.
+
+#### **7.2.9 Quality of service (QoS)**
+
+A CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component should provide guaranteed QoS for a session through resource and admission control, including general coordination between access and core networks as well as inter-core-network aspects. End-to-end QoS required by applications running on the network should be clearly described. To that purpose, required conditions for each network performance parameter, such as throughput, delay, jitter, loss, and so on, have to be described.
+
+#### **7.2.10 Security**
+
+The security requirements are based on the application of [X.805] for NGN and thus address the following dimensions of NGN security:
+
+- Authentication.
+- Non-repudiation.
+- Data confidentiality.
+- Communication security.
+- Data integrity.
+- Availability.
+- Privacy.
+
+#### **7.2.11 Open service environment**
+
+In the call server-based emulation environment, as new services can be provided in the application layer, demands for new services will greatly increase. This may require:
+
+- Development of more intelligent networks capable of supporting basic and supplementary services.
+- Ease of provisioning, portability and reuse of services by network service provider.
+- Application programming interfaces (APIs) may be applicable to services and applications as a part of a service creation environment.
+- A call server-based emulation component should be able to provide the user status, such as availability, to other users.
+
+#### **7.2.12 Emergency telecommunications**
+
+It is desirable that CS-PES provides:
+
+- The capability of supporting priority mechanisms for emergency telecommunications in multimedia services (e.g., voice, data, and video). Emergency telecommunications include:
+ - individual-to-individual telecommunications;
+ - individual-to-authority telecommunications, i.e., calls to emergency service providers;
+ - authority-to-authority telecommunications. Telecommunications for disaster relief (TDR); and
+ - authority-to-individual telecommunications;
+- support for calls to emergency service providers which may be free of charge for the calling user. Such calls should include information on how to enable emergency services to call back the calling user and, at least, the accurate location information about the calling user at the time of call initiation, e.g., to be provided to the emergency response centres, routing of the call to the public safety answering point (PSAP), regardless of whether the user is fixed, mobile or nomadic. Accurate location may be such information as postal address, geographic coordinates or other information like cell indicators. Both network and user location information shall be provided, if available;
+- the capability of ensuring that calling line identification presentation (or the equivalent information in IMS) is not ruled out on a per call, per line or per identity basis for calls to the emergency call number;
+- network integrity, as far as possible, in order to support critical telecommunications such as TDR support in a crisis situation.
+
+#### **7.2.13 Interworking**
+
+##### **7.2.13.1 Interworking with PSTN/ISDN**
+
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation component shall provide interfaces to PSTN/ISDN.
+
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation components shall support service transparency between PSTNs/ISDNs. The CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation service component should support user plane and the control plane interworking.
+
+##### **7.2.13.2 Interworking with other PSTN/ISDN emulation**
+
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation component shall provide a high level of interoperability with the services in other emulated PSTN/ISDN networks.
+
+##### **7.2.13.3 Interworking with PLMN**
+
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation component shall provide interfaces to interwork with PLMNs.
+
+##### **7.2.13.4 Interworking with IMS**
+
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation component shall support the interworking with 3GPP IMS-based PSTN/ISDN-like services. The scope of this interworking may result in a limited service capability.
+
+## **8 Relevant network elements**
+
+The functional architecture of CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation is described in [Y.2031]. This clause provides a number of network elements used in conjunction with the CS-based PSTN/ISDN emulation component.
+
+### **8.1 Application server**
+
+The application server (AS) is a unit that interacts with the call server and the user profile server to support service execution. Examples of application servers are conference servers and messaging servers (e.g., server for fixed SMS, server for fixed MMS).
+
+### **8.2 Application server gateway**
+
+The application server gateway is a unit that interworks between application server and call server. This relates to entity APL-GW-FE in [Y.2031]. It may provide an open interface (e.g., for third-party application service providers).
+
+### **8.3 User profile server**
+
+The user profile server (UPS) is responsible for storing of user profile and user subscription data.
+
+### **8.4 Call server**
+
+Depending on the network configuration, a call server may support different capabilities and may be deployed as one of:
+
+- Access call server.
+- Breakout call server.
+- IMS call server.
+- Gateway call server.
+- Routing call server.
+
+#### 8.4.1 Access call server (ACS)
+
+The ACS serves for PSTN/ISDN emulation access subscribers.
+
+The capabilities supported by the ACS are:
+
+- Access gateway control, which includes registration, authentication, event detection, resource allocation of access gateway (AG).
+- Call control: the ACS maintains call states as needed for support of the related service, and forwards the requested messages or responses to the access gateway, other call server or application server (AS).
+- Routing schemes within domain that ACS belongs to.
+- Service capabilities including basic voice services, supplementary services and other services controlled by itself or by interacting with application platforms.
+- Media resource control, which control media servers (MS), to provide related resources that are needed for services (e.g., announcements).
+- Protocol adaptation (e.g., mapping [H.248.1] protocol elements to or from SIP [RFC 3261] messages).
+- Service switching function (SSF) in order to access to intelligent network (IN) service logic programs hosted in service control point (SCP).
+- User profile management capabilities if hosted in ACS.
+- Interaction with access border gateway (ABG). The access border gateway acts as a signalling proxy between access gateway and ACS, in such an instance, ACS sends and receives messages to or from access gateway by access border gateway.
+- Interaction with user profile server if user profile is hosted outside the ACS.
+- Interaction with application server directly or through application service gateway for the support of services.
+- Interaction with the resource and admission control system.
+- Generation of CDRs.
+
+#### 8.4.2 Breakout call server (BCS)
+
+The BCS controls the trunking media gateway to interwork with PSTN/ISDN.
+
+The capabilities supported by the BCS are:
+
+- Media gateway control, which controls trunking media gateway to interwork with PSTN/ISDN, and to exchange SS7 signalling information with the signalling gateway (SG).
+- Call control: the BCS maintains call states as needed for support of the related service.
+- Routing schemes within the domain that BCS belongs to.
+- Interworking capability between SIP/BICC and non-call related SS7 signalling (e.g., TCAP-based signalling).
+- Generation of CDRs.
+
+#### 8.4.3 IMS call server (ICS)
+
+ICS controls the interconnection border gateway to interwork with packet-based networks (e.g., other NGN, other IP multimedia network and Internet).
+
+The capabilities supported by the ICS are:
+
+- Call control.
+NOTE – Whether the ICS needs to maintain call states is for further study.
+- Protocol adaptation.
+
+- Routing schemes within the domain that the ICS belongs to.
+- Capabilities, which control interconnection border gateway to interwork with packet-based network (e.g., media codec conversion (e.g., transcoding), topology hiding, resource reservation, etc.).
+- Interaction with the resource and admission control function (RACF). When the ICS provides interconnection border gateway control capabilities, it can control interconnection border gateway directly or through RACF.
+- Network information hiding capabilities to restrict the flow of selected information from one service provider to another.
+- Security mechanisms, especially interworking with Internet.
+- Generation of call detail records (CDRs).
+
+#### **8.4.4 Gateway call server (GCS)**
+
+The Gateway Call Server provides interoperability function among CS-PESs in order to provide end-to-end services.
+
+The capabilities supported by the GCS are:
+
+- Call control.
+NOTE – Whether the GCS needs to maintain call states is for further study.
+- Protocol adaptation (e.g., mapping SIP messages to BICC messages and vice versa).
+- Routing schemes within the domain that GCS belongs to.
+- Capabilities which control interconnection border gateway to interwork with other service providers' CS-PES networks (e.g., media codec conversion, topology hiding, resource reservation, etc.).
+- Interaction with the resource and admission control functions (RACF). When the GCS provides packet gateway control capabilities, it can control packet gateway directly or through RACF.
+- Network information hiding capabilities to restrict the flow of selected information from one service provider to another.
+- Security mechanisms (e.g., IPSec tunnel).
+- Generation of call detail records (CDRs).
+
+#### **8.4.5 Routing call server (RCS)**
+
+The Routing Call Server provides a routing function between call servers.
+
+The capabilities supported by the RCS are:
+
+- Call control.
+NOTE – Whether the RCS needs to maintain call states is for further study.
+- Routing schemes in order to determine the next hop of the call server.
+- Service switching function (SSF) in order to access intelligent network service logic programs hosted in legacy service control points.
+- Interaction with the application server directly or through the application service gateway for supporting services.
+- Media resource control (see MRCF in [Y.2031]), which controls the media server (MS, see MRP-FE in [Y.2031]) to provide related resources needed for services (e.g., announcements).
+- Generation of call detail records (CDRs).
+
+### **8.5 Gateways**
+
+A gateway is a unit that interconnects different networks and performs the necessary translation between the protocols used in these networks.
+
+#### **8.5.1 Access gateway (AG)**
+
+The AG may be located at the service provider's premises, or the customer premises.
+
+The capabilities supported by the AG are:
+
+- Support of codec algorithms (e.g., [G.711]).
+- Detection of the events from the user, and reporting these events to the ACS.
+- Downloading of the digital map information from the ACS.
+- Possible facsimile support (some gateways may not support this capability).
+- When the AG is located in the customer premises, it may communicate with the ACS through the ABG, mainly for security.
+- Silence detection.
+- Echo cancellation.
+
+#### **8.5.2 Trunking media gateway (TMG)**
+
+The capabilities supported by the TMG are:
+
+- Voice, voiceband data and optionally facsimile.
+- Silence detection.
+- Echo cancellation.
+
+#### **8.5.3 Signalling gateway (SG)**
+
+SG should be able to map signalling messages received from the call server to the PSTN/ISDN and vice versa.
+
+#### **8.5.4 Access border gateway (ABG)**
+
+The access border gateway (see ABG-FE in [Y.2031]) performs both border policy enforcement functions and NA(P)T functionality under the control of the call server, amongst others.
+
+#### **8.5.5 Interconnection border gateway (IBG)**
+
+IBG (see IBG-FE in [Y.2031]) enables masking of one domain from another. It should support inter-domain media conversion (e.g., IPv4/IPv6 conversion) amongst others.
+
+### **8.6 Media server (MS)**
+
+The capabilities supported by the MS include but are not limited to:
+
+- Media stream resources storage and management function.
+- Media stream processing (e.g., audio transcoding, media analysis).
+- Mixing of the incoming media streams (e.g., for multiple parties).
+- Interaction with the call server to allow call server control of media stream resources provided by the MS.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Mapping functional entities to network elements
+
+Table I.1 shows an example of mapping functional entities to a network element.
+
+**Table I.1/Y.2271 – Mapping CS-based PIEA functional entity into network elements**
+
+| Network element | Required functional entities | Optional functional entities |
+|--------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
+| Application server | AS-FE | APL-GW-FE |
+| Application service gateway | APL-GW-FE | |
+| User profile server | SUP-FE | |
+| ACS | AGCF, CCF, SPF, MRCF, SIF | SSF, SUP-FE, RF |
+| BCS | MGCF, CCF | RF |
+| ICS | CCF, SIF | RF, IBC-FE |
+| GCS | CCF, SIF | RF, IBC-FE |
+| RCS | RF, CCF | SSF, MRCF |
+| Access media gateway | AMG-FE | MRP-FE |
+| Trunking media gateway | TMG-FE | MRP-FE |
+| Signalling gateway | SG-FE | |
+| Access border gateway | ABG-FE | |
+| Interconnection border gateway | IBG-FE | |
+| Media server | MRP-FE | |
+
+NOTE 1 – There is no intention that the table should disallow any other combination of functional entities that would result in a NE not shown in the table. Figure I.1 provides a high level presentation of how call servers and other network elements are deployed in an NGN, and the relationship between different call servers and networks.
+
+NOTE 2 – All functional entities identified in this appendix are described either in [Y.2012], [Y.2031] or in related Recommendations.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ AS[AS] --- SCP[SCP]
+ subgraph CS_PES_X [CS-PES (Carrier X)]
+ RCS[RCS]
+ ACS[ACS]
+ BCS[BCS]
+ GCS[GCS]
+ ICS[ICS]
+ SG[SG]
+ RCS --- ACS
+ RCS --- BCS
+ RCS --- GCS
+ RCS --- ICS
+ ACS --- SG
+ BCS --- SG
+ GCS --- SG
+ end
+ ICS --- OIPN((Other IP networks
+e.g. IMS))
+ SG --- PSTN((PSTN, ISDN
+or PLMN))
+ OIPN --- CS_PES_OTHER((CS-PES of
+other carrier))
+
+```
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FI-1
+
+Figure I.1/Y.2271 – Call server deployment example. The diagram shows a hierarchical network structure. At the top, a light blue box contains 'AS' and 'SCP'. Below this, a large yellow box represents 'CS-PES (Carrier X)'. Inside this box, 'RCS' is at the top, connected to 'ACS', 'BCS', 'GCS', and 'ICS'. 'ACS' is connected to 'SG'. 'BCS' is connected to 'SG'. 'GCS' is connected to 'SG'. 'ICS' is connected to 'Other IP networks (e.g. IMS)'. 'SG' is connected to 'PSTN, ISDN or PLMN'. 'Other IP networks (e.g. IMS)' is connected to 'CS-PES of other carrier'.
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.2271 – Call server deployment example**
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Basic call control scenario in call server-based PES
+
+This appendix provides a number of scenarios for basic call control for CS-PES. The term intra CS-PES indicates when there is one or more ACSs belonging to one domain (e.g., belonging to one operator). Inter CS-PES indicates presence of gateway call server between two different domains (e.g., belonging to different operators).
+
+### II.1 Intra CS-PES call
+
+#### II.1.1 Scenario 1, single ACS and no ABG
+
+Call between two CS-PES users belonging to the same ACS. $AG_A$ and $AG_B$ are connected to ACS. $AG_A$ and $AG_B$ may be the same.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as Legacy terminal A
+ participant AGA as AGA
+ participant ACS as ACS
+ participant AGB as AGB
+ participant B as Legacy terminal B
+
+ A->>AGA: (1)
+ AGA->>ACS: (2)
+ ACS->>AGB: (3)
+ AGB->>B: (4)
+ B->>AGB: (5)
+ AGB->>ACS: (6)
+ ACS->>AGA: (7)
+ AGA->>A: (8)
+
+```
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-1
+
+Sequence diagram for Intra CS-PES call scenario 1. The diagram shows the flow of messages between Legacy terminal A, AG\_A, ACS, AG\_B, and Legacy terminal B. The sequence is: (1) Legacy terminal A to AG\_A; (2) AG\_A to ACS; (3) ACS to AG\_B; (4) AG\_B to Legacy terminal B; (5) Legacy terminal B to AG\_B; (6) AG\_B to ACS; (7) ACS to AG\_A; (8) AG\_A to Legacy terminal A.
+
+Figure II.1/Y.2271 – Intra CS-PES call scenario 1
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the legacy terminal A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to ACS.
+- (3) The ACS performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging, etc.) and requests the appropriate AG (i.e., $AG_B$ ) to allocate resources and setup the connection.
+- (4) $AG_B$ sends an alerting indication to the legacy terminal B.
+- (5) - (8) The call is answered and the response from legacy terminal B to legacy terminal A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call to establish the connection.
+
+#### II.1.2 Scenario 2, single ACS and two ABGs
+
+Call between two CS-PES users belonging to the same ACS. $AG_A$ and $AG_B$ are connected to ACS through $ABG_A$ and $ABG_B$ respectively. $AG_A$ and $AG_B$ may be the same, so are $ABG_A$ and $ABG_B$ .
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as Legacy terminal A
+ participant AGA as AGA
+ participant ABGA as ABGA
+ participant ACS as ACS
+ participant ABGB as ABGB
+ participant AGB as AGB
+ participant B as Legacy terminal B
+
+ A->>AGA: (1)
+ AGA->>ABGA: (2)
+ ABGA->>ACS: (3)
+ ACS->>ABGB: (4)
+ ABGB->>AGB: (5)
+ AGB->>B: (6)
+ B->>AGB: (7)
+ AGB->>ABGB: (8)
+ ABGB->>ACS: (9)
+ ACS->>ABGA: (10)
+ ABGA->>AGA: (11)
+ AGA->>A: (12)
+
+```
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-2
+
+Sequence diagram for Intra CS-PES call scenario 2. The diagram shows the flow of messages between Legacy terminal A, AG\_A, ABG\_A, ACS, ABG\_B, AG\_B, and Legacy terminal B. The sequence is: (1) Legacy terminal A to AG\_A; (2) AG\_A to ABG\_A; (3) ABG\_A to ACS; (4) ACS to ABG\_B; (5) ABG\_B to AG\_B; (6) AG\_B to Legacy terminal B; (7) Legacy terminal B to AG\_B; (8) AG\_B to ABG\_B; (9) ABG\_B to ACS; (10) ACS to ABG\_A; (11) ABG\_A to AG\_A; (12) AG\_A to Legacy terminal A.
+
+Figure II.2/Y.2271 – Intra CS-PES call scenario 2
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the legacy terminal A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to $ABG_A$ .
+- (3) $ABG_A$ transfers the notification to the ACS.
+- (4) ACS performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging, etc.) and requests the appropriate AG (i.e., $AG_B$ ) through $ABG_B$ to allocate resources and setup the connection.
+
+- (5) $ABG_B$ transfers the notification to $AG_B$ .
+- (6) $AG_B$ sends an alerting indication to the legacy terminal B.
+- (7) - (12) The call is answered and the response from legacy terminal B to legacy terminal A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call to establish the connection.
+
+#### II.1.3 Scenario 3, single ACS and a single ABG
+
+Call between two CS-PES users belonging to the same ACS. $AG_A$ is connected to ACS and $AG_B$ is connected to ACS through ABG.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as Legacy terminal A
+ participant AGA as AG_A
+ participant ACS as ACS
+ participant ABG as ABG
+ participant AGB as AG_B
+ participant B as Legacy terminal B
+
+ A->>AGA: (1)
+ AGA->>ACS: (2)
+ ACS->>ABG: (3)
+ ABG->>AGB: (4)
+ AGB->>B: (5)
+ B->>AGB: (6)
+ AGB->>ABG: (7)
+ ABG->>ACS: (8)
+ ACS->>AGA: (9)
+ AGA->>A: (10)
+
+```
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-3
+
+Sequence diagram for Intra CS-PES call scenario 3 showing the flow between Legacy terminal A, AG\_A, ACS, ABG, AG\_B, and Legacy terminal B.
+
+**Figure II.3/Y.2271 – Intra CS-PES call scenario 3**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the legacy terminal A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events and sends notifications to ACS.
+- (3) ACS performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging) and requests the $AG_B$ through ABG to allocate resources and setup the connection.
+- (4) ABG transfers the notification to $AG_B$ .
+- (5) $AG_B$ sends an alerting indication to the legacy terminal B.
+- (6) - (10) The call is answered and the response from the legacy terminal B to legacy terminal A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the legacy terminals A and B is established.
+
+#### II.1.4 Scenario 4, multiple ACSs
+
+Call between two CS-PES users belonging to different ACSs.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as Legacy terminal A
+ participant AGA as AG_A
+ participant ABGA as ABG_A
+ participant ACSA as ACS_A
+ participant RCS as RCS
+ participant ACSB as ACS_B
+ participant ABGB as ABG_B
+ participant AGB as AG_B
+ participant B as Legacy terminal B
+
+ A->>AGA: (1)
+ AGA->>ABGA: (2)
+ ABGA->>ACSA: (2)
+ ACSA->>RCS: (3)
+ RCS->>ACSB: (3)
+ ACSB->>ABGB: (4)
+ ABGB->>AGB: (4)
+ AGB->>B: (5)
+ B->>AGB: (6)
+ AGB->>ABGB: (7)
+ ABGB->>ACSB: (7)
+ ACSB->>RCS: (8)
+ RCS->>ACSA: (8)
+ ACSA->>ABGA: (9)
+ ABGA->>AGA: (9)
+ AGA->>A: (10)
+
+```
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-4
+
+NOTE – Boxes shown with the dashed lines are optional.
+
+Sequence diagram for Intra CS-PES call scenario 4 showing the flow between Legacy terminal A, AG\_A, optional ABG\_A, ACS\_A, optional RCS, ACS\_B, optional ABG\_B, AG\_B, and Legacy terminal B.
+
+**Figure II.4/Y.2271 – Intra CS-PES call scenario 4**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the legacy terminal A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to $ABG_A$ if present. Otherwise, $AG_A$ sends notifications to $ACS_A$ .
+- (3) $ACS_A$ performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning and charging) and routes the call to $ACS_B$ . If $ACS_A$ cannot locate $ACS_B$ , a relevant RCS(s) is used to route and forward the call.
+- (4) $ACS_B$ performs the call-related functions and requests $AG_B$ , through $ABG_B$ , if present, to allocate resources and setup the connection.
+- (5) $AG_B$ sends an alerting indication to the legacy terminal B.
+
+- (6) - (10) The call is answered and the response from the legacy terminal B to legacy terminal A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the legacy terminals A and B is established.
+
+### II.2 Scenario 5: Call between CS-PES user and PSTN, ISDN or PLMN
+
+Call between CS-PES user and PSTN, ISDN or PLMN user. User equipment A is a legacy terminal and User equipment B may be a legacy terminal or a wireless terminal.
+
+
+
+```
+
+[User equipment A] --(1)--> [AG_A] --(2)--> [ABG_A (dashed)] --(3)--> [ACS_A] --(4)--> [BCS_A] --(4)--> [SG_A] ----> [PSTN/ISDN/PLMN] ----> [User equipment B]
+[User equipment A] <--(8)-- [AG_A] <--(7)-- [ABG_A (dashed)] <--(6)-- [RCS_A (dashed)] <--(6)-- [ACS_A] <--(5)-- [BCS_A] <--(5)-- [SG_A] <---- [PSTN/ISDN/PLMN] <---- [User equipment B]
+
+```
+
+NOTE – Boxes shown with the dashed lines are optional.
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-5
+
+Figure II.5/Y.2271 – Call scenario involving interworking with PSTN/ISDN/PLMN
+
+**Figure II.5/Y.2271 – Call scenario involving interworking with PSTN/ISDN/PLMN**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the user equipment A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to $ABG_A$ , if present. Otherwise, $AG_A$ sends notifications to $ACS_A$ .
+- (3) The $ACS_A$ performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging, etc.), and routes the call to $BCS_A$ . If $ACS_A$ cannot locate $BCS_A$ , relevant $RCS_A$ is used to route and forward the call.
+- (4) The $BCS_A$ routes the call to PSTN/ISDN/PLMN domain via $SG_A$ , which adapts the IP-based signals to the circuit-based ones. PSTN/ISDN/PLMN entities take over the call, find out the called terminal and send an alerting indication to user equipment B.
+- (5) - (8) The call is answered and the response from user equipment B to user equipment A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the user equipments A and B is established.
+
+### II.3 Scenario 6: Inter CS-PES call
+
+Call between CS-PES user and other service provider's CS-PES user. User equipments A and B are legacy terminals and connect to CS-PES networks that belong to different service providers.
+
+
+
+```
+
+[User equipment A] --(1)--> [AG_A] --(2)--> [ABG_A (dashed)] --(3)--> [ACS_A] --(4)--> [GCS_A] --(4)--> [GCS_B] ----> [(Note 2)] ----> [User equipment B]
+[User equipment A] <--(8)-- [AG_A] <--(7)-- [ABG_A (dashed)] <--(6)-- [RCS_A (dashed)] <--(6)-- [ACS_A] <--(5)-- [GCS_A] <--(5)-- [GCS_B] <---- [(Note 2)] <---- [User equipment B]
+
+```
+
+NOTE 1 – $GCS_B$ (other service provider) signifies the combination of $GCS_A$ . Boxes shown with the dashed lines are optional.
+NOTE 2 – This box is indicative of the sequence of $AG_B$ , $ABG_B$ (optional), $ACS_B$ and $RCS_B$ (optional) and is shown this way due to lack of space.
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-6
+
+Figure II.6/Y.2271 – Call scenario involving interconnection with PES of other service providers
+
+**Figure II.6/Y.2271 – Call scenario involving interconnection with PES of other service providers**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the user equipment A.
+- (2) $AG_A$ detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to $ABG_A$ , if present. Otherwise, $AG_A$ sends notifications to $ACS_A$ .
+
+- (3) The ACSA performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging, etc.), and routes the call to GCSA . If ACSA cannot locate GCSA , relevant RCSA is used to route and forward the call.
+- (4) GCSA performs the call-related functions and routes the call to GCSB . The call is processed in the CS-PES domain B.
+- (5) - (8) The call is answered and the response from user equipment B to user equipment A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the user equipments A and B is established.
+
+### II.4 Scenario 7: Call between CS-PES user and user of other IP networks
+
+Call between CS-PES user and other IP network user. User equipment A is a legacy terminal and B may be an NGN end system.
+
+
+
+NOTE – Boxes shown with the dashed lines are optional.
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-7
+
+Diagram of Scenario 7: Call between CS-PES user and user of other IP networks. The diagram shows a sequence of network elements: User equipment A, AG\_A, ABG\_A (dashed), ACS\_A, RCS\_A (dashed), ICS\_A, Other IP networks, and User equipment B. Arrows indicate the call path with numbered steps (1) through (8).
+
+**Figure II.7/Y.2271 – Call scenario involving interworking with other IP networks**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the user equipment A.
+- (2) AGA detects the relevant events, allocates resources and sends notifications to ABGA , if present. Otherwise, AGA sends notifications to ACSA .
+- (3) The ACSA performs the call-related functions (e.g., service provisioning, charging, etc.), and routes the call to ICSA . If ACSA cannot locate ICSA , relevant RCSA is used to route and forward the call.
+- (4) ICSA performs the call-related and interworking functions between the CS-PES domain and another IP network, and routes the call to the other IP network.
+- (5) - (8) The call is answered and the response from the user equipment B to A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the user equipments A and B is established.
+
+### II.5 Scenario 8: Call between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN users via CS-PES
+
+Call between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN users via CS-PES. The CS-PES provides a call transit function between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN domains in the scenario. The user equipments A and B may be legacy terminals or wireless terminals. Two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN domains may belong to the same service provider.
+
+
+
+NOTE – Boxes shown with the dashed lines are optional.
+
+Y.2271(06)\_FII-8
+
+Diagram of Scenario 8: Call between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN users via CS-PES. The diagram shows a sequence of network elements: User equipment A, PSTN/ISDN/PLMN\_A, SG\_A, BCS\_A, RCS (dashed), BCS\_B, SG\_B, PSTN/ISDN/PLMN\_B, and User equipment B. Arrows indicate the call path with numbered steps (1) through (8).
+
+**Figure II.8/Y.2271 – Call scenario between two PSTN/ISDN/PLMN users via CS-PES**
+
+- (1) A call attempt is originated from the user equipment A.
+- (2) The PSTN/ISDN/PLMNA routes the call to BCSA via SGA , which adapts the IP-based signals to the circuit-based ones.
+
+- (3) The $BCS_A$ controls the appropriate transit gateway to allocate media resources and routes the call to the $BCS_B$ . If $BCS_A$ cannot locate $BCS_B$ , relevant RCS(s) is used to route and forward the call.
+- (4) The $BCS_B$ controls the appropriate transit gateway to allocate media resources and routes the call to PSTN/ISDN/PLMNB via SGB . PSTN/ISDN/PLMNB entities take over the call, find out the called terminal and send an alerting indication to User equipment B.
+- (5) - (8) The call is answered and the response from the user equipment B to A traces the path across all the network elements involved in the call. Then connection for the call between the user equipments A and B is established.
+
+# Appendix III
+
+## Reference points and protocols
+
+Table III.1 provides examples of protocols at the identified reference points of CS-based emulation architecture as described in [Y.2031].
+
+**Table III.1/Y.2271 – Candidate protocols for reference points**
+
+| Reference point | Reference point located between | Candidate protocols |
+|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| I1 | AMG-FE and AGCF | H.248I2 | AMG-FE and ABG-FE | H.248, RTCP and RTP with UDP/IP transport |
+| I3 | AGCF and ABG-FE | H.248 |
+| I4 | MRCF and MRP-FE | H.248, SIP |
+| I5 | CCF and RACF | TBD |
+| I6 | MGCF and TMG-FE | H.248 |
+| I7 | MGCF and SG-FE | SIGTRAN |
+| I8 | IBC-FE and IBG-FE | H.248 |
+| I9 | SIF and APL-GW-FE/AS-FE | SIP, SIP-I |
+| I10 | SSF and APL-GW-FE/AS-FE | INAP, CAMEL, WIN |
+| I11 | CCF and SUP-FE | DIAMETER, MAP |
+| I12 | AS-FE and SUP-FE | DIAMETER, MAP |
+| I13 | SG-FE and PSTN/ISDN | ISUP, TUP |
+| I14 | IBC-FE and other PES | SIP, SIP-I, BICC |
+| I15 | IBC-FE and other Multimedia Systems (e.g., IMS) | SIP H.323 |
+| I16 | AGCF and NACF | |
+
+## BIBLIOGRAPHY
+
+- [E.164] ITU-T Recommendation E.164 (2005), *The international public telecommunication numbering plan*.
+- [H.323] ITU-T Recommendation H.323 (2006), *Packet-based multimedia communications systems*.
+- [Q.761] ITU-T Recommendation Q.761 (1999), *Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part functional description*.
+- [Q.762] ITU-T Recommendation Q.762 (1999), *Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part general functions of messages and signals*.
+- [Q.763] ITU-T Recommendation Q.763 (1999), *Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part formats and codes*.
+- [Q.764] ITU-T Recommendation Q.764 (1999), *Signalling System No. 7 – ISDN User Part signalling procedures*.
+- [Q.1901] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1901 (2000), *Bearer independent call control protocol*.
+- [Q.1912.5] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1912.5 (2004), *Interworking between Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Bearer Independent Call Control protocol or ISDN User Part*.
+- [Y.2012] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN*.
+- [RFC 2719] IETF RFC 2719 (1999), *Framework Architecture for Signalling Transport*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..815a99013fffd475bd00369b3325b9c1ec009fd1
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@@ -0,0 +1,786 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2301
+
+(08/2013)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+# --- **Network intelligence capability enhancement – Requirements and capabilities**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2301
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2301**
+
+# **Network intelligence capability enhancement – Requirements and capabilities**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2301 specifies the requirements and capabilities of network intelligence capability enhancement (NICE), an enhancement for NGNs supporting some intelligence capabilities for the provisioning of services according to the requirements of users and application providers.
+
+NICE capabilities aim to support the following features: 1) awareness features: user, application and network awareness with content and context analysis; 2) on-demand provision features: user self-assignment of service subscription and network resources, and user on-demand service of quality assurance; 3) optimization features: traffic management based on intelligent traffic scheduling; 4) openness features: invocation of the above features by third-party application providers; 5) cooperation features: network coordination between policy control capabilities of different access networks.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2301 | 2013-08-13 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Network intelligence capability enhancement, next generation network, NGN, NICE, NICE provider.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2302
+
+(08/2014)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+# --- **Network intelligence capability enhancement – Functional architecture**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2302
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2302
+
+# Network intelligence capability enhancement – Functional architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2302 specifies the functional architecture for network intelligence capability enhancement (NICE). NICE, which is based on next generation network (NGN) technology, contains a set of enhanced capabilities to intelligently provide services according to the requirements of users and application providers. It enables operators to assign specific network resources according to these requirements and dynamically adjust them based on several factors, such as multi-dimensional awareness, traffic optimization and cooperation between different access networks. NICE supports interfaces for users and applications enabling on-demand resource and service provision.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2302 | 2014-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12281 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Network intelligence capability enhancement, next generation network, NGN, NICE, NICE provider.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 Overview of NICE..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Rationale behind the development of NICE..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Enhanced capabilities of NICE ..... | 5 |
+| 7 Architecture enhancements to NGN..... | 5 |
+| 8 Functional architecture of NICE..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 Overview ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Application support functions ..... | 8 |
+| 8.3 Service control functions ..... | 8 |
+| 8.4 Transport control functions ..... | 9 |
+| 8.5 Transport functions..... | 10 |
+| 9 Procedures supported in NICE ..... | 11 |
+| 9.1 Procedure for on-demand provision ..... | 11 |
+| 9.2 Procedure for cooperation between fixed and mobile networks ..... | 12 |
+| 9.3 Procedure for awareness and optimization..... | 13 |
+| 9.4 Procedure for openness..... | 14 |
+| 10 Reference points ..... | 14 |
+| 10.1 Pn reference point..... | 14 |
+| 10.2 Sn reference point..... | 14 |
+| 10.3 Rm reference point ..... | 15 |
+| 10.4 Ru reference point ..... | 15 |
+| 10.5 Rs reference point..... | 15 |
+| 10.6 Sc reference point..... | 15 |
+| 10.7 Rw reference point ..... | 15 |
+| 10.8 Rf reference point..... | 16 |
+| 10.9 Rb reference point ..... | 16 |
+| 10.10 Fc reference point ..... | 16 |
+| 10.11 Ft reference point..... | 16 |
+| 10.12 Ce reference point..... | 17 |
+| 10.13 Su reference point..... | 17 |
+| 11 Security considerations ..... | 17 |
+| Bibliography..... | 19 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2302
+
+# Network intelligence capability enhancement – Functional architecture
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the functional architecture for network intelligence capability enhancement (NICE). NICE (see [ITU-T Y.2301]), which is based on next generation network (NGN) technology, contains a set of enhanced capabilities to intelligently provide services according to the requirements of users and application providers. It enables operators to assign specific network resources according to these requirements and dynamically adjust them based on several factors, such as multi-dimensional awareness, traffic optimization and cooperation between different access networks. It supports interfaces for users and applications enabling on-demand resource and service provision.
+
+This Recommendation defines the functional architecture of NICE, which includes the definition of functional entities, the reference points between different functional entities, the service procedures and security considerations.
+
+Note that network management functionality is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2008), *Resource and admission control functions in next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2240] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2240 (2011), *Requirements and capabilities for next generation network service integration and delivery environment*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2301] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2301 (2013), *Network intelligence capability enhancement – Requirements and capabilities*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 application** [b-ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services.
+
+**3.1.2 application provider** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A general reference to a provider that offers applications to the customers making use of the services capabilities provided by the NGN.
+
+**3.1.3 charging** [b-ITU-T Q.825]: The set of functions needed to determine the price assigned to the service utilization.
+
+**3.1.4 content** [b-ITU-T H.780]: A combination of audio, still image, graphic, video, or data.
+
+NOTE – A variety of formats is classified as the "data" (e.g., text, encoded values, multimedia description language introduced by ITU-T H.760).
+
+**3.1.5 context** [b-ITU-T Y.2002]: The information that can be used to characterize the environment of a user.
+
+NOTE – Context information may include where the user is, what resources (devices, access points, noise level, bandwidth, etc.) are near the user, at what time the user is moving, interaction history between person and objects, etc. According to specific applications, context information can be updated.
+
+**3.1.6 context awareness** [ITU-T Y.2201]: A capability to determine or influence a next action in telecommunication or process by referring to the status of relevant entities, which form a coherent environment as a context.
+
+**3.1.7 identity** [ITU-T Y.2720]: Information about an entity that is sufficient to identify that entity in a particular context.
+
+**3.1.8 identity management** [ITU-T Y.2720]: Set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administration, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for:
+
+- assurance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials, attributes),
+- assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users/subscribers, groups, user devices, organizations, network and service providers, network elements and objects, and virtual objects), and
+- enabling business and security applications.
+
+**3.1.9 media** [ITU-T Y.2012]: One or more of audio, video, or data.
+
+**3.1.10 network intelligence capability enhancement (NICE)** [ITU-T Y.2301]: An enhancement for NGNs supporting some intelligent capabilities for the provisioning of services according to requirements of users and application providers. These intelligent capabilities (termed as "NICE capabilities") enable operators to assign and dynamically adjust specific network resources based on the requirements, as well as support interfaces for users and applications enabling on-demand resource and service provision.
+
+**3.1.11 NGN** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their
+
+choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.12 service** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+**3.1.13 service provider** [b-ITU-T M.1400]: A general reference to an operator that provides telecommunication services to customers and other users either on a tariff or contract basis. A service provider may or may not operate a network. A service provider may or may not be a customer of another service provider.
+
+**3.1.14 user** [ITU-T Y.2201]: A user includes end user [b-ITU-T Y.2091], person, subscriber, system, equipment, terminal (e.g., FAX, PC), (functional) entity, process, application, provider, or corporate network.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project |
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| ANI | Application Network Interface |
+| ASF | Application Support Function |
+| BSS | Business Support System |
+| CA-FE | Content and context Analysis Functional Entity |
+| CD-FE | Content and context Detection Functional Entity |
+| ID | Identity |
+| IDMF | Identity Management Function |
+| IDP | Identity Provider |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IM | Instant Messaging |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NICE | Network Intelligence Capability Enhancement |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| OE-FE | Open Environment Functional Entity |
+| PC-FE | Policy Control Functional Entity |
+| PE-FE | Policy Enforcement Functional Entity |
+| PCC | Policy and Charging Control |
+| P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| SC-FE | Service Control Functional Entity |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+| TRC-FE | Transport Resource Control Functional Entity |
+| TRE-FE | Transport Resource Enforcement Functional Entity |
+| TS-FE | Traffic Scheduling Functional Entity |
+| TSE-FE | Traffic Scheduling Enforcement Functional Entity |
+| UNI | User-Network Interface |
+| URL | Universal Resource Locator |
+| WiFi | Wireless Fidelity |
+| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Line |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+## 6 Overview of NICE
+
+### 6.1 Rationale behind the development of NICE
+
+Future telecom services will face challenges due to innovations in technologies and applications. For instance, the emergence of mobile Internet, cloud computing applications and their new business models have resulted in new requirements for networks, such as high bandwidth pipes, increased mobility, real-time interactivity, higher quality, increased security, etc. Emerging services such as multi-screen service also require coordination between different networks, especially between mobile and fixed networks.
+
+With the commencement of the mobile Internet era, operators are increasingly facing the threat of becoming "pipeline providers". In the past, the network was an operator's source of core competitiveness advantage, nowadays however user information and management and service capabilities are the new competitive factors. At the same time, due to the growing success of new Internet applications such as high-bandwidth video applications and peer-to-peer (P2P) applications, operators are facing huge pressure to expand network capacity. The scissors difference between traffic and revenues growth becomes wider.
+
+These network development trends require that operators identify the implications for users and of service requirements at the network level. Operators need to increase the efficiency and value of their networks through intelligent resource scheduling and network traffic management. Therefore, the
+
+NGN capabilities need to be enhanced. This enhanced NGN is referred to as network intelligence capability enhancement (NICE).
+
+### **6.2 Enhanced capabilities of NICE**
+
+As defined in [ITU-T Y.2301], NICE is an enhanced NGN which supports some intelligent capabilities for the provisioning of services according to the requirements of users and application providers. These intelligent capabilities (termed as "NICE capabilities") enable operators to assign and dynamically adjust specific network resources based on the requirements, as well as enabling them to support interfaces for users and applications enabling on-demand resource and service provision.
+
+NICE supports the followings capabilities:
+
+- 1) Awareness capabilities: user, application and network awareness with content and context analysis.
+- 2) On-demand provision capabilities: user self-assignment of service subscription and network resources, user on-demand service of quality assurance.
+- 3) Optimization capabilities: traffic management based on intelligent traffic scheduling.
+- 4) Openness capabilities: invocation of the above features by 3rd party application providers.
+- 5) Cooperation capabilities: network coordination between policy control capabilities of different access networks.
+
+## **7 Architecture enhancements to NGN**
+
+The NICE architecture is an enhancement of the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+Concerning the service stratum, the following required enhancements are identified:
+
+- The application support functions need to be enhanced to take information as input from the content and context analysis functional entity, policy control functional entity and traffic scheduling functional entity. Application support functions must then adapt the interface and provide it to both self-operated applications and third party applications. Then self-operated applications and the third party applications can invoke the network resource conveniently for quality of service (QoS) guarantees, network status awareness, suitable content cache, delivery node selection, route optimization, etc.
+- The service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) requires access to user subscription and user location information (e.g., access network related information and physical and logical location). SUP-FE is responsible for storing user profiles and presence status data [ITU-T Y.2012]. The storage and update of these data are handled by the user profile management functions of SUP-FE. They can optionally be used for support of commonly used authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) and security schemes. With the deployment of an identity management (IdM) function, SUP-FE is enhanced to increase confidence in identity information of entities and thus enhance business and security applications and services.
+- The service control functional entity needs to be enhanced to support applications' request transferring to functional entities in the transport stratum. The service control functional entity acts as a connection between NICE functional entities in the transport stratum (e.g., the policy control functional entity) and application support functions. The service control functional entity provides the interfaces to allow the applications to access NICE functions in the transport stratum. The service control functional entity also receives and transfers information such as the information allowing the identification of application data for policy control and traffic scheduling, information allowing the identification of applications and
+
+users and transport stratum events (e.g., notifications of QoS modifications) reported by the transport stratum to the service stratum.
+
+Concerning the transport stratum, the following required enhancements are identified:
+
+- Transport control functions need to be enhanced to support the content and context analysis functional entity. The content and context analysis functional entity retrieves the awareness related information and deeply analyses the information. The content and context analysis functional entity provides analysis results related to user traffic and network status to the policy control functional entity and traffic scheduling functional entity.
+- Transport control functions need to be enhanced to support the policy control functional entity which supports coordination between different access networks, for instance via cooperation with policy and charging control (PCC) for 3GPP access networks. The policy control functional entity receives bandwidth and QoS assignment requirements from users and 3rd party or self-operated applications.
+- Transport control functions need to be enhanced to support the traffic scheduling functional entity. The traffic scheduling functional entity receives 3rd party or self-operated applications' traffic scheduling requests and is enhanced to support traffic optimization based on traffic scheduling rules. Traffic scheduling rules include traffic localization, delivery node selection, network status awareness, intelligent route adjustment, network resource allocation, etc.
+- Besides access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions and gateway functions [ITU-T Y.2012], the transport stratum needs to be enhanced to support the content and context detection functional entity, the policy enforcement functional entity and the traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity.
+
+## **8 Functional architecture of NICE**
+
+### **8.1 Overview**
+
+The functional architecture of NICE includes a service stratum and transport stratum in alignment with the NGN functional architecture. The service stratum consists of application support functions and service control functions. The transport stratum consists of transport control functions and transport functions and this architecture enables the separation of network control and data transport, as shown in Figure 1.
+
+
+
+Y.2302(14)\_F01
+
+Control Management Data
+
+Figure 1 – Functional architecture of NICE. A layered diagram showing the functional architecture of NICE. At the top is the 'Application' layer with 'Self-operated applications' and 'Third party applications'. Below is the 'Service stratum' (green box) containing 'Application support functions' (with 'Open environment FE') and 'Service control functions' (with 'Service user profile FE' and 'Service control FE'). Below that is the 'Transport stratum' (orange box) containing 'Transport control functions' (with 'Content and context analysis FE', 'Policy control FE', and 'Traffic scheduling FE') and 'Transport functions' (with 'Content and context detection FE', 'Policy enforcement FE', and 'Traffic scheduling enforcement FE'). On the left are 'Management functions' (pink) and 'CPE functions'. On the right is 'Other network'. Various interfaces like Pn, Sn, Rm, Su, Sc, Rs, Ru, Rf, Rb, Rw, Fc, Ft, and Ce connect the entities. A legend at the bottom defines line styles: dashed for Control, dotted for Management, and a blue bar for Data.
+
+**Figure 1 – Functional architecture of NICE**
+
+Figure 1 describes the functional architecture of NICE with functions, related functional entities and relevant interfaces and reference points.
+
+In the service stratum, there are application support functions (ASF) and service control functions (SCF). For supporting self-operated applications and 3rd party applications, the application support functions include an open environment functional entity to provide secure access and capability openness. Service control functions include a service control functional entity (SC-FE) and a service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE).
+
+In the transport stratum, there are transport control functions and transport functions. Transport control functions include a policy control functional entity (PC-FE), a content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE) and a traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE). In addition to access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions and gateway functions [ITU-T Y.2012], transport functions include a content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE), a policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) and a traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE).
+
+### **8.2 Application support functions**
+
+#### **8.2.1 Open environment functional entity (OE-FE)**
+
+In order to provide an interface to self-operated applications and third party applications, the open environment functional entity (OE-FE) has the following functions:
+
+- The OE-FE provides exposure of new resources to the applications in a secure and controlled way.
+- The OE-FE provides an enhanced service creation environment for new resources including standardized description of resources and service logic, a static and dynamic service orchestration function, online and offline design tools and an easy to operate testing environment.
+- The OE-FE provides an enhanced service execution environment for new resources, including a mechanism for resource registration, discovery and routing and a mechanism for application provisioning, addressing and routing.
+- The OE-FE provides an enhanced service delivery management environment for new resources, particularly for new security assurance and charging models.
+- The OE-FE provides an enhanced brokering function and adaptor function for new resources. The resource brokering function interacts between applications and the new resources for the downward invocation of resources and the upward triggering of applications and also executes policies related to resources and applications.
+
+### **8.3 Service control functions**
+
+#### **8.3.1 Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE)**
+
+The service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) in NICE is aligned with the SUP-FE in NGN [ITU-T Y.2012] and includes some functional enhancements.
+
+In NICE architecture, the SUP-FE can be constructed in a hierarchical structure which supports a network to network interface (NNI) by name mapping.
+
+In an authorization scenario, the SUP-FE can deliver a user's authorization grant token from a content provider (CP) to a service provider (SP) with Oauth protocol application network interface (ANI).
+
+In NICE architecture, the SUP-FE supports identity management (IdM) [ITU-T Y.2720] as an enhancement to increase confidence in the identity information of entities and enhance business and security applications and services. The SUP-FE supports IdM as follows:
+
+- assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users, user groups, user devices, network and service providers, network elements and objects and virtual objects).
+- support of entity mobility, entity location and presence information, discovery and exchange of identity information.
+- identity lifecycle management.
+- enablement of business and security applications.
+- support of data models and schemas to facilitate interoperability of SUP related information (e.g., identity information exchange) within a NICE provider.
+
+#### **8.3.2 Service control functional entity (SC-FE)**
+
+In NICE architecture, the service control functional entity (SC-FE) has an enhancement on the routing and protocol transmission function to support the policy control functional entity and the traffic scheduling functional entity. The service control functional entity interconnects with these two functional entities, transmits the protocol transparently to the ASF and allows the ASF to invoke these functions.
+
+The SC-FE also receives and transfers the following information:
+
+- information allowing the identification of application data for policy control and traffic scheduling.
+- information allowing the identification of applications and users.
+- transport stratum events (e.g., notifications of QoS modifications) reported by the transport stratum to the service stratum.
+
+### **8.4 Transport control functions**
+
+#### **8.4.1 Policy control functional entity (PC-FE)**
+
+The policy control functional entity (PC-FE) receives results from the content and context analysis functional entity regarding user, traffic and network information while it also receives application bandwidth and QoS assignment requirements from the service control functional entity (SC-FE) and the open environment functional entity (OE-FE).
+
+The PC-FE makes decisions regarding network resource and admission control. It supports a unified policy database and consistent policies definitions as well as a variety of access and core networks within a general resource control framework.
+
+The PC-FE outputs decisions to the policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE).
+
+The PC-FE is aligned with the functional requirements of the resource and admission control function (RACF) [ITU-T Y.2111], and includes the following additional functions concerning transport resource allocation and management of QoS policies (within the network and at the network boundaries), based on the requirements of users and application providers:
+
+- intelligent bandwidth and QoS level assignment according to the output from user self-service functions. Self-service functions are the interfaces for users requesting on-demand service provision from NICE functions;
+- intelligent bandwidth and QoS level assignment and adjustment according to specific requirements from a third party application provider or NICE provider through application support functions;
+- intelligent bandwidth and QoS level adjustment according to the output of the content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE).
+
+#### **8.4.2 Content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE)**
+
+The content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE) receives the extracted information from the content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE).
+
+The CA-FE performs processing and storage of content and context information.
+
+The CA-FE distributes user traffic analysis results and network status analysis results to the requestor of content and context information such as the policy control functional entity and the traffic scheduling functional entity. Content and context information can be distributed in real time or/and on-demand according to requirements.
+
+Context analysis functions are aligned with the context awareness requirements of NGN (clause 7.3 of [ITU-T Y.2201]).
+
+The CA-FE also provides the following information:
+
+- The CA-FE provides user traffic analysis results based on predefined rules and information provided by the content and context detection functional entity, such as user profile information, user traffic information and user terminal parameters.
+
+- The CA-FE provides network status analysis results based on predefined rules and information provided by the content and context detection functional entity, such as network resource information and access network related information.
+- The CA-FE provides information related to user application data, such as application data type (e.g., audio, image, graphic, video, data, etc.), application data statistics and application user preferences.
+
+#### **8.4.3 Traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE)**
+
+In NICE architecture, the traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE) receives application traffic delivery requests from the service control functional entity and application support functions and also receives analysis results from the content and context analysis functional entity. The TS-FE supports the establishment of traffic scheduling rules based on these results.
+
+The TS-FE is aligned with the functions of the transport resource control functional entity (TRC-FE) of NGN [ITU-T Y.2111] and includes the following additional requirements in terms of generation of traffic scheduling rules:
+
+- traffic scheduling rules (for intra-NICE provider networks and inter-NICE provider networks) based on traffic localization;
+- traffic scheduling rules based on selection of the traffic delivery network node;
+- traffic scheduling rules according to network status;
+- traffic scheduling rules according to intelligent routing based on route selection policy.
+
+### **8.5 Transport functions**
+
+In NICE architecture, in addition to access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions and gateway functions [ITU-T Y.2012], transport functions include the content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE), the policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) and the traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE).
+
+#### **8.5.1 Policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE)**
+
+The policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) receives policy decisions and updates from the PC-FE and then enforces different QoS and resource allocation policies based on different traffic.
+
+The PE-FE performs end-to-end traffic management across different networks of varying technologies provided by multiple operators to ensure the requirements for users or applications can be accomplished.
+
+The PE-FE is aligned with the functional requirements of the resource and admission control function (RACF) [ITU-T Y.2111], with the following additional requirements:
+
+- In order to satisfy on-demand requirements from users and application providers, the PE-FE performs on-demand bandwidth and QoS management.
+- The PE-FE performs bandwidth and QoS management based on PC-FE outputs.
+
+#### **8.5.2 Content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE)**
+
+The content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE) collects transport related information and provides the information to the CA-FE.
+
+The context detection functions are aligned with the context awareness requirements of NGN (clause 7.3 of [ITU-T Y.2201]).
+
+The CD-FE extracts information related to the following aspects according to national and regional laws, regulations and policies:
+
+- user location information, including physical location and logical location;
+
+- user application data information, including application data type (such as audio, still image, graphic, video and data) and application data statistics;
+- user terminal parameters, such as terminal manufacturer, terminal type, terminal OS, etc.;
+- network resource information, such as link bandwidth, bandwidth utilization, user data rate and other available resource parameters;
+- access network related information, such as access technology and access bandwidth.
+
+#### **8.5.3 Traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE)**
+
+The traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE) receives traffic scheduling rules and decisions from the TS-FE and enforces these rules and decisions. TSE-FE supports traffic scheduling rules deployed in network devices, such as routers, switches and access control systems.
+
+The TSE-FE is aligned with the functions of the transport resource enforcement functional entity (TRE-FE) of NGN [ITU-T Y.2111], with the following additional aspects:
+
+- traffic scheduling based on traffic localization schemes.
+NOTE – P2P contents may be stored locally to decrease outgoing traffic and the peers for storage are selected based on the localization principle.
+- traffic scheduling based on optimal selection of delivery nodes.
+NOTE – Other nodes can be selected to satisfy the requirements when a current delivery node has insufficient computation and storage resources.
+- traffic scheduling based on intelligent route selection and adjustment based on routing policies.
+NOTE – Route selection and adjustment may occur, for example, when a default link is overloaded.
+
+## **9 Procedures supported in NICE**
+
+Clauses 9.1 to 9.4 describe some procedures supported in NICE.
+
+### **9.1 Procedure for on-demand provision**
+
+In NICE architecture, the policy control functional entity of the transport stratum plays the role of capability engine that controls the policy enforcement functional entity and on-demand provision applications or 3rd party applications can invoke this capability engine for policy updates or event reports through the service stratum.
+
+The procedure illustrated in Figure 2 invokes a particular resource such as policy control capability. This procedure involves the interaction between an on-demand provision application (which can be a self-operated application or 3rd party application), application support functions, service control functional entity, policy control functional entity and policy enforcement functional entity.
+
+In the following service flows, the on-demand provision application requests more bandwidth for QoS guarantees by sending a policy change request.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ODP as On-demand provision applications
+ participant ASF as Application support functions
+ participant SCFE as Service control FE
+ participant PCFE as Policy control FE
+ participant PEF as Policy enforcement FE
+
+ ODP->>ASF: 1. Policy change request
+ ASF->>SCFE: 2. Policy change request
+ SCFE->>PCFE: 3. Policy change request; application information
+ PCFE->>PEF: 4. Policy change request; application information
+ PEF->>PEF: 5. Request processing
+ PEF-->>ODP: 6. Response
+
+```
+
+Y.2302(14)\_F02
+
+Sequence diagram for Policy change request and response. The diagram shows five lifelines: On-demand provision applications, Application support functions, Service control FE, Policy control FE, and Policy enforcement FE. The sequence of messages is: 1. Policy change request from On-demand provision applications to Application support functions; 2. Policy change request from Application support functions to Service control FE; 3. Policy change request; application information from Service control FE to Policy control FE; 4. Policy change request; application information from Policy control FE to Policy enforcement FE; 5. Request processing (self-loop on Policy enforcement FE); 6. Response from Policy enforcement FE back to On-demand provision applications. The diagram is labeled Y.2302(14)\_F02.
+
+**Figure 2 – Policy change request and response**
+
+1. An on-demand provision application sends a policy change request to the application support functions;
+2. The application support functions transfer this request to the service control functional entity;
+3. The service control functional entity transfers this request and the application information (IP filter, application ID, etc.) to the policy control functional entity;
+4. The policy control functional entity analyses the request according to factors such as network status and application QoS level, then decides if the policy should be changed or not;
+5. If yes, policy enforcement functional entity processes the request;
+6. The policy enforcement functional entity sends a policy change report back as response.
+
+### 9.2 Procedure for cooperation between fixed and mobile networks
+
+This procedure describes the service flow of policy control cooperation between fixed and mobile networks. This service flow includes interactions between the policy control and enforcement of fixed and mobile networks and the application. The following service flow, illustrated in Figure 3, describes the detailed procedure for visiting applications through converged policy control.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CA as Cooperation application
+ participant FMN1 as Fixed/Mobile network policy
+ participant FMN2 as Fixed/Mobile network policy
+ participant FMN3 as Fixed/Mobile network policy
+ participant FMN4 as Fixed/Mobile network policy
+
+ CA->>FMN1: 1. Application asks for policy control
+ FMN1->>FMN2: 2. Converged policy control cooperation
+ FMN2->>FMN3: 3. Policy provided to check availability in current network
+ FMN3->>FMN4: 4. Policy determined and provided to policy enforcement
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note over CA, FMN4: 5. Visit application
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.2302(14)\_F03
+
+Sequence diagram for Procedure for visiting application policy control. The diagram shows four lifelines: Cooperation application, and three instances of Fixed/Mobile network policy. The sequence of messages is: 1. Application asks for policy control from Cooperation application to the first Fixed/Mobile network policy; 2. Converged policy control cooperation from the first Fixed/Mobile network policy to the second Fixed/Mobile network policy; 3. Policy provided to check availability in current network from the second Fixed/Mobile network policy to the third Fixed/Mobile network policy; 4. Policy determined and provided to policy enforcement from the third Fixed/Mobile network policy to a fourth implicit entity; 5. Visit application (a dashed box spanning all lifelines). The diagram is labeled Y.2302(14)\_F03.
+
+**Figure 3 – Procedure for visiting application policy control**
+
+1. A user visits an application while accessing via a fixed/mobile network which is not the subscribed network.
+
+2. Converged policy control is established between the network that the user is currently accessing and the network to which the user is subscribed.
+3. The policy of the user's subscribed network is checked by the current network's policy control and modified accordingly.
+4. The policy is determined and sent to the policy enforcement functional entity.
+5. The policy enforcement functional entity carries out the policy and the user visits the application.
+
+### 9.3 Procedure for awareness and optimization
+
+In NICE architecture, the content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE) extracts information from the transport stratum, including network resource, user profile information etc., and transfers the extracted information to the content and context analysis functional entity. Then the analysis results are provided to the traffic scheduling functional entity for route scheduling.
+
+The service flow illustrated in Figure 4 describes the procedure to schedule the route for a special application based on content and context analysis of this application. This procedure involves interaction of the content and context detection functional entity, the content and context analysis functional entity, the traffic scheduling functional entity and the traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CD as Content and context detection FE
+ participant CA as Content and context analysis FE
+ participant TS as Traffic scheduling FE
+ participant SE as Scheduling enforcement FE
+ participant SC as Service control FE
+
+ CD->>CA: 1. Information detected
+ CA->>TS: 2. Analysis results
+ TS->>SE: 3. Traffic scheduling request
+ SE->>SE: 5a. Optimization enforcing
+ TS->>SC: 4. Traffic optimization information
+ SC->>SC: 5b. Application processing
+
+```
+
+Y.2302(14)\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the application route scheduling procedure based on content and context analysis. The diagram shows five functional entities: Content and context detection FE, Content and context analysis FE, Traffic scheduling FE, Scheduling enforcement FE, and Service control FE. The process flow is as follows: 1. Information detected (CD-FE to CA-FE), 2. Analysis results (CA-FE to TS-FE), 3. Traffic scheduling request (TS-FE to SE-FE), 4. Traffic optimization information (TS-FE to SC-FE), 5a. Optimization enforcing (SE-FE), and 5b. Application processing (SC-FE).
+
+**Figure 4 – Application route scheduling based on content and context analysis**
+
+1. The content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE) extracts network resource information, user profile information and user terminal parameters, and provides the information to the content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE).
+2. The CA-FE distinguishes and marks traffic flows based on predefined rules. The CA-FE provides analysis results to the traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE) according to predefined rules and information provided by the CD-FE.
+3. The TS-FE provides scheduling rules to the traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE) based on the content and context analysis results and scheduling rules.
+4. The TS-FE also provides scheduling rules to the service control functional entity (SC-FE).
+5. The TSE-FE executes traffic localization, route selection or delivery node selection rules or the SC-FE executes application scheduling rules to optimize the application experience.
+
+### 9.4 Procedure for openness
+
+Similar to clause 9.1, Figure 5 and the procedure that follows describe how third party applications invoke the capability of the policy control functional entity (PC-FE) for guarantying QoS.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant TPA as Third party applications
+ participant OEFE as Open environment FE
+ participant SCFE as Service control FE
+ participant PCFE as Policy control FE
+ participant PEFE as Policy enforcement FE
+
+ TPA->>OEFE: 1. Policy change request
+ OEFE->>SCFE: 2. Policy change request
+ SCFE->>PCFE: 3. Policy change request; application information
+ PCFE->>PEFE: 4. Policy change request; application information
+ PEFE->>PEFE: 5. Request processing
+ PEFE-->>TPA: 6. Response
+```
+
+Y.2302(14)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram showing the QoS guarantee procedure for third party applications.
+
+**Figure 5 – QoS guarantee invoked for third party applications**
+
+1. Third party applications send a policy change request to the open environment functional entity (OE-FE);
+2. The OE-FE adapts the protocol and transfers this request to the service control functional entity (SC-FE);
+3. The SC-FE transfers this request and the application information (IP filter, application ID, etc.) to the policy control functional entity (PC-FE);
+4. The PC-FE analyses the request according to factors such as network status or application QoS level, then decides if the policy should be changed or not;
+5. If the policy is to be changed, the policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) processes the request;
+6. The PE-FE sends a change report back as response.
+
+## 10 Reference points
+
+### 10.1 Pn reference point
+
+Pn is the reference point between the open environment functional entity (OE-FE) and the applications.
+
+With this reference point, the application developers can access the development and test environment provided by the OE-FE.
+
+In addition with this reference point, the applications can send resource and capability requests with authentication and authorization information to the OE-FE.
+
+### 10.2 Sn reference point
+
+Sn is the reference point between open environment functional entity (OE-FE) and service control functional entity (SC-FE).
+
+With this reference point, the OE-FE can transfer formatted resource and capability requests, such as application bandwidth and QoS assignment requirement, to the SC-FE.
+
+In addition with this reference point, the response and notification information, such as the resource invocation result or network current status, can be sent from the SC-FE to the OE-FE.
+
+### **10.3 Rm reference point**
+
+Rm is the reference point between the open environment functional entity (OE-FE) and the policy control functional entity (PC-FE).
+
+With this reference point, the OE-FE sends policy requests, such as bandwidth adjustment or QoS level update, to the PC-FE, then receives the response or invokes a result and sends it back to third party applications.
+
+### **10.4 Ru reference point**
+
+Ru is the reference point between the service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) and the policy control functional entity (PC-FE).
+
+With this reference point, the PC-FE utilizes the user's identity message (in NICE architecture, charge rate/content authorization information is required to be included).
+
+The Ru reference point is required to correspond with I-TCn in [ITU-T Y.2012]. In NICE architecture, the transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE) is merged into the SUP-FE; the PC-FE is required to support user priority according to the SUP-FE.
+
+### **10.5 Rs reference point**
+
+Rs is the reference point between the service control functional entity (SC-FE) and the policy control functional entity (PC-FE).
+
+The Rs reference point is aligned with the Rs reference point specified in RACF [ITU-T Y.2111] which allows application bandwidth and QoS assignment requirements to be exchanged between PC-FE and SC-FE. Either push or pull mode may be used.
+
+The Rs reference point allows the PC-FE to send release of resource confirmation and results to the SC-FE.
+
+Besides the capabilities described in RACF [ITU-T Y.2111], the Rs reference point allows the PC-FE to assign bandwidth and QoS level according to the output of application support functions which reflects the requirements from third party or self-operated applications.
+
+### **10.6 Sc reference point**
+
+Sc is the reference point between the service control functional entity (SC-FE) and the transport scheduling functional entity (TS-FE).
+
+The Sc reference point allows traffic distribution requirements to be exchanged between the TS-FE and the SC-FE. Either push or pull mode may be used.
+
+The Sc reference point allows the TS-FE to send scheduling of resource confirmation and results to the SC-FE.
+
+### **10.7 Rw reference point**
+
+Rw is the reference point between the policy control functional entity (PC-FE) and the policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE).
+
+The Rw reference point is aligned with the Rw reference point of RACF [ITU-T Y.2111] which allows the final admission decisions to be installed (either pushed or pulled) to the PE-FE from the PC-FE. This reference point is required to be able to support both fixed and mobile networks.
+
+The Rw reference point allows the PC-FE to push decisions to the PE-FE and also allows the PE-FE to request decisions.
+
+### **10.8 Rf reference point**
+
+Rf is the reference point between the policy control functional entity (PC-FE) and the content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE).
+
+The Rf reference point allows the CA-FE to distribute analysis results to the PC-FE. The distribution is performed in either push or pull mode.
+
+The information distributed with the Rf reference point includes, but is not limited to, the following items:
+
+- User traffic analysis results based on predefined rules and information provided by the CD-FE, such as user profile information, user traffic information and user terminal parameters.
+- Information about users' service preferences (e.g., preferred URL while surfing the web).
+- Network status analysis results based on predefined rules and information provided by the CD-FE, such as network resource information and access network related information.
+
+### **10.9 Rb reference point**
+
+Rb is the reference point between the policy control functional entity (PC-FE) and the traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE).
+
+The Rb reference point allows PC-FE decisions regarding network resources including QoS and bandwidth and admission control to be distributed to the TS-FE. The distribution is performed in either push or pull mode.
+
+### **10.10 Fc reference point**
+
+Fc is the reference point between the content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE) and the traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE).
+
+The Fc reference point allows the CA-FE to distribute analysis results to the TS-FE. The distribution is performed in either push or pull mode.
+
+The information distributed with Fc reference point could be the same as that distributed with the Rf reference point.
+
+### **10.11 Ft reference point**
+
+Ft is the reference point between the content and context analysis functional entity (CA-FE) and content and context detection functional entity (CD-FE).
+
+The reference point Ft allows the following information to be exchanged between the CA-FE and the CD-FE:
+
+- Data information:
+ - user profile information from the service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE), including user geographical location, logical location, user ID, service profile etc.;
+ - user terminal parameters from traffic transferred through the transport network or from the terminal management system, such as manufacturer, terminal type, terminal OS, etc.;
+ - user traffic information from traffic transferred through the transport network, including types of network traffic such as web, P2P, instant message (IM) and e-mail. Concerning web traffic, the CD-FE counts the number of visits to different uniform/universal resource locators (URLs);
+
+- network resource information from the operation support system (OSS), such as link bandwidth, bandwidth utilization, user data rate and other available resource parameters;
+- access network related information from the OSS, such as the access technology used (cable, fibre, DSL, 3G, WiFi) and available bandwidth.
+- Control information:
+ - Application/user management strategy.
+ - AAA information.
+ - Necessary file updates.
+ - Device management information.
+
+The reference point Ft also allows security analysis between the CA-FE and the CD-FE. Abnormal data flows are checked through the reference point Ft.
+
+### **10.12 Ce reference point**
+
+Ce is the reference point between the traffic scheduling functional entity (TS-FE) and the traffic scheduling enforcement functional entity (TSE-FE).
+
+The reference point Ce allows traffic scheduling rules exchanged between the TSE-FE and the TS-FE. Either push or pull mode can be used.
+
+All types of traffic scheduling rules are specified as follows:
+
+- Localization rules: The TSE-FE deploys traffic localization rules from Ce.
+- Intelligent route rules: The TS-FE selects or adjusts routes intelligently based on the rules from Ce. The TSE-FE deploys network resource allocation. The intelligent route rules include but are not limited to:
+ - Messages to keep the the reference point and the channel alive.
+ - Messages for the TS-FE to request device information from the TSE-FE, including processing capabilities, transport capabilities, storage capabilities, etc.
+ - Messages for the TSE-FE to send device information, flow table information and port information to the TS-FE.
+ - Command messages from the TS-FE to the TSE-FE.
+- Traffic scheduling rules based on selection of the traffic delivery network node.
+- Traffic scheduling rules according to network status.
+
+NOTE – For example, a route needs to be changed when a certain network link in the route is overloaded in order to improve the user experience.
+
+### **10.13 Su reference point**
+
+Su is the reference point between the service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) and the service control functional entity (SC-FE).
+
+With this reference point, the SC-FE utilizes the user's identity message (in NICE architecture, charge rate/content authorization information is required to be included) for authentication and authorization.
+
+## **11 Security considerations**
+
+NICE is required to contain the security features incorporated in existing networks and allow for secure interconnection with other networks including NICE or non-NICE networks. The security requirements of the NGN are addressed in [ITU-T Y.2701], [ITU-T Y.2201], [ITU T Y.2702], [ITU-T Y.2240] and [ITU-T Y.2111].
+
+Besides the security requirements for NGN, NICE provides:
+
+- 1) Protection against unauthorized use of data from the CA-FE results.
+- 2) Security checks of abnormal data flow between the CA-FE and the CD-FE.
+- 3) Protection against third party unauthorized use of network resources and unauthorized access to information flows and applications.
+- 4) Security access environment for third party and self-operated applications and compliance with the authentication and authorization requirements according to [ITU-T Y.2240].
+- 5) Encrypted channel between the TS-FE and the TSE-FE. The TS-FE and TSE-FE are required to authenticate each other by exchanging certificates. The certificates must be configurable.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H.780] Recommendation ITU-T H.780 (2012), *Digital signage: Service requirements and IPTV-based architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.1400] Recommendation ITU-T M.1400 (2013), *Designations for interconnections among operators' networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.825] Recommendation ITU-T Q.825 (1998), *Specification of TMN applications at the Q3 interface: call detail recording*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), *Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2002] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2002 (2009), *Overview of ubiquitous networking and of its support in NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2321
+
+(09/2016)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+# --- **Functional architecture for supporting virtualization of control network entities in next generation network evolution**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2321
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+
+### **Enhancements to NGN** **Y.2300–Y.2399**
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2321
+
+# Functional architecture for supporting virtualization of control network entities in next generation network evolution
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2321 introduces virtualization technology into next generation networks (NGNs), especially control functions. It also describes the functional architecture, functional entities (FEs), reference points and information flow to support virtualization of the control network entities (VCN) for NGN evolution. The architecture design fulfils the requirements proposed in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2320.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2321 | 2016-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13012 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Network function virtualization, NGN, orchestration, resource management, VCN.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview..... | 3 |
+| 7 Functional architecture for supporting virtualization of control network entities inSeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2347 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+---
+
+## **Requirements of next generation network evolution for support network and cloud interworking**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2347
+
+## Requirements of next generation network evolution for support network and cloud interworking
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2347 provides the overview and scenarios of network and cloud interworking of the next generation network evolution (NGNe) and specifies the general requirements and capabilities of the NGNe. The network and cloud interworking refers to the use of the network to connect user sites and cloud resource pools. Network and cloud interworking focuses on the coordination and connection between network and cloud, rather than the operation or management of scheduling in-cloud resources.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2347 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16123 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Network and cloud interworking, next generation network, requirements, scenarios.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Background..... | 3 |
+| 7 Network and cloud interworking scenarios ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Scenario of network connections for multi-cloud services ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Scenario of cloud-based network ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Requirements of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking ..... | 5 |
+| 8.1 Overview ..... | 5 |
+| 8.2 Requirements of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking ..... | 7 |
+| 9 General capabilities of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking..... | 7 |
+| 9.1 Relationships between requirements and capabilities of NGNe for supportMinimum data set and communication interface requirements for data centre energy management. |
+| [ITU-T L.1306] | Recommendation ITU-T L.1306 (2023), Specification of an edge data centre infrastructure. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2091] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), Terms and definitions for next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3300] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), Framework of software-defined networking. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3500] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3512] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3512 (2014), Cloud computing – Functional requirements of Network as a Service. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3527] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3527 (2021), Cloud computing – End-to-end fault and performance management framework of network services in inter-cloud. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3537] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3537 (2022), Cloud computing – Functional requirements of a cloud service partner for multi-cloud. |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cloud computing** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with self-service provisioning and administration on-demand.
+
+NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications, and storage equipment.
+
+**3.1.2 cloud service** [ITU-T Y.3527]: One or more capabilities offered via cloud computing invoked using a defined interface. It may comprise the hardware and hypervisor layers delivering individual servers, border routers, firewalls, load balancers and switches.
+
+NOTE – Expanded version of definition in [ITU-T Y.3500].
+
+**3.1.3 cloud service provider** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Party (see 3.1.6 in [ITU-T Y.3500]) which makes cloud services (see 3.2.8 in [ITU-T Y.3500]) available.
+
+**3.1.4 data centre** [ITU-T L.1301]: A physical location dedicated to computing, as well as a telecom operator location, with equipment dedicated to telecommunication functions (e.g., switching functionality, billing).
+
+**3.1.5 edge data centre** [ITU-T L.1306]: A data centre located near the final user in which it is necessary to finish relevant data processing in a short time and with low latency.
+
+NOTE – Edge data centre can make timely and safe data processing for one or not too many serviced bodies. Meanwhile, it can make a supplement for calculating the capability of cloud computing. Furthermore, it provides services for users on information processing, storage, communication, etc. Additionally, daily monitoring and maintenance of the edge data centre can be accomplished by it.
+
+**3.1.6 multi-cloud** [ITU-T Y.3537]: One or more capabilities offered via cloud computing invoked using a defined interface. It may comprise the hardware and hypervisor layers delivering individual servers, border routers, firewalls, load balancers and switches.
+
+NOTE – Expanded version of definition in [ITU-T Y.3500].
+
+**3.1.7 next generation network (NGN)** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network which is able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadbands, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent of underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.8 service** [ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+**3.1.9 software-defined networking (SDN)** [ITU-T Y.3300]: A set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| CSP | Cloud Service Provider |
+| DC | Data Centre |
+| GW | Gateway |
+| IT | Internet Technology |
+| NGNe | Next Generation Network Evolution |
+| NFV | Network Functions Virtualization |
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| NFVI | Network Functions Virtualization Infrastructure |
+| SDN | Software Defined Network |
+| SP | Service Provider |
+| VAS | Value Added Service |
+| vBRAS | virtual Broadband Remote Access Server |
+| VC | Virtual Connection |
+| VNF | Virtualised Network Function |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Background
+
+As the network is increasingly integrated with industry, medical care, entertainment and other fields the interworking between cloud and network is becoming more and more important. In the future, most services and applications will be carried on the cloud, therefore network and cloud interworking has become an irresistible trend. The network will provide network resources (e.g., access point, bandwidth, link, tunnel, forwarding devices. etc) according to the requirements of the customers, while the cloud will provide cloud computing resources such as computing, storage and value added service (VAS) according to the needs of the application, therefore it requires the network and cloud interworking which will affect the NGN to evolve to support these new features and services.
+
+As more and more service functions are deployed in cloud resource pools, and the number of cloud resource pools is growing, the distribution locations of cloud resource pools are also becoming wider. Therefore, the network and cloud interworking should pay more attention to real-time and agility of the connection between cloud and network, and the ability to adapt to the flexibility of the cloud services. At the same time, it should also consider the stability and reliability to provide users with a stable and convenient service experience.
+
+The network and cloud interworking refers to the use of the network to connect user sites and cloud resource pools. When a user initiates a business-related request, the network will initiate a scheduling request, and then the cloud will respond and cooperate to establish a connection channel and provide the capabilities required by the services. In this process, network and cloud interworking focuses on the coordination and connection between network and cloud, rather than the operation or management of scheduling in-cloud resources.
+
+# 7 Network and cloud interworking scenarios
+
+## 7.1 Scenario of network connections for multi-cloud services
+
+
+
+Y.2347(24)
+
+Diagram illustrating the scenario of network connections for multi-cloud services. A central cloud labeled 'NGNe' is connected to four surrounding components: 'Office branch' (top left), 'Private cloud' (bottom left), 'Public cloud A' (top right), and 'Public cloud B' (bottom right). Each public cloud contains a 'VPC' with server icons. Blue arrows indicate bidirectional connections between the central NGNe cloud and each of the four components.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Scenario of network connections for multi-cloud services**
+
+Enterprises usually use different computing resource pools to flexibly deploy their services with multiple cloud environments such as public cloud, private cloud or hybrid cloud by different cloud service providers (CSPs). In this scenario, enterprises prefer to use multiple public cloud service providers (SPs) at the same time to enable the selection of the most suitable cloud service combination, while reducing the risk of service unavailability by using a single cloud service platform.
+
+The advantages of the customer in using multi-cloud services are as follows:
+
+- Complementary advantages of different cloud services: Enterprises are willing to select cost-effective and best quality service from multiple cloud service providers. For example, artificial intelligence (AI) service and storage are from the two options.
+- Cloud-based disaster recovery: Using multi-cloud to back up each other to enhance the security and reliability of the service.
+- Global service deployment: Some large international enterprises want to build global Internet technology (IT) and service systems based on cloud computing. Private cloud or single public cloud provider usually cannot cover all the regions, they need to use multi-cloud service to achieve global deployment.
+
+However, different cloud service providers hardly provide direct network connection and coordination to each other according to the customers' demands, because they are under different cloud management platforms. Thus, the next generation network evolution (NGNe) should provide network connections for multi-cloud services and support the coordination mechanism among different cloud management platforms, thus it requires NGNe to cooperate with the multi-cloud management system.
+
+## 7.2 Scenario of cloud-based network
+
+
+
+Y.2347(24)
+
+Figure 7-2: Scenario of cloud-based network. The diagram shows three data centers (Edge-DC, Core-DC, Region-DC) at the top, each containing a cloud with vRouter, vSwitch, and NFVI components. These are connected to a central NGNe cloud. Below the NGNe cloud are Enterprise users and Home users. Arrows indicate connections between the DCs and NGNe, and between NGNe and the users.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Scenario of cloud-based network**
+
+With the development of software defined network (SDN) / network functions virtualization (NFV) technologies, operator networks are evolving towards cloud-based networks. A large number of NFV enabled infrastructures are deployed in the network including the edge data centre (DC), the core data centre, etc., carrying the virtual network functions (VNFs), such as virtual broadband remote access server (vBRAS), vRouter, vSwitch, and so on. It requires NGNe to support the network and cloud interworking to provide high-quality communication and flexible service deployment between the VNFs and the physical network elements. For example, a service of an enterprise user is deployed across multiple cloud resource pools, which are interconnected through NGNe. The enterprise user needs NGNe to utilize the corresponding resources in these cloud resource pools to provide the service.
+
+# 8 Requirements of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking
+
+## 8.1 Overview
+
+This Recommendation focuses on some specific enhancements to NGNe to support network and cloud interworking. The NGNe related infrastructures are depicted in Figure 8-1.
+
+
+
+Y.2347(24)
+
+Figure 8-1: The related components to support network and cloud interworking. The diagram shows a central CORE (Core networks, IP networks, Data centres) surrounded by SD-WAN, Cloud edge computing, Optical networks, Access/edge networks, MPLS networks, and Wireless networks. The entire system is supported by SDN, NFV, Memory, and Computing.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – The related components to support network and cloud interworking**
+
+NGNe is required to support heterogeneous networks interaction which consists of multiple operators as depicted in Figure 8-2:
+
+- Connectivity operator: An intermediary that provides connectivity between cloud operators, connectivity operators, and users. In case of Internet, the connectivity operator is a public network provider.
+- Edge/access operator: An operator that provides edge computing and/or access networking.
+- Core network operator: An operator that provides a core network to support the interconnection between edge networks and cloud resource pools.
+- Cloud operator: An entity that is responsible for making applications available to users. It can be public or private.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-2: Operators of NGNe in providing services by a service provider. The diagram shows a large oval representing the NGNe environment. Inside, there are several components: 'Core network operator' (green oval), 'Wireless connectivity operator' (green oval), 'Wireline connectivity operator' (green oval), 'Edge/access operator' (green oval), and 'Application' (blue rectangle). These are interconnected by lines. 'User' boxes are shown at the top left and top right. 'Cloud operator' labels are shown near the 'Application' boxes. 'GW' (Gateway) labels are shown near the connectivity operators. 'Service provider' is labeled at the bottom. The diagram illustrates the flow of services from users through various operators and gateways to applications and cloud providers.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Operators of NGNe in providing services by a service provider**
+
+Each operator domain carries a segment of the virtual connection (VC). The segment in each operator domains is called operator VC. To achieve an end-to-end service assurance, the NGNe should have the ability to connect different VCs seamlessly and need to support heterogeneous networks interaction.
+
+In cloud resource pools, service chains can provide a series of service functions flexibly and efficiently to users. The introduction to the service chain can be found in Appendix I for information. When users' traffic needs to be handled by the same service function, the service chain resources should be allocated in an appropriate way by network and cloud interworking. For delay sensitive business service, a task should be created for it, and the NGNe orchestration functions should calculate the total number of resources required to deploy this service according to the service chain. Besides, the NGNe orchestration functions should determine whether the total number of resources exceeds the remaining resources of the current resource pool. If yes, the NGNe orchestration functions should calculate the scores of all service chains in the current resource pool for all the available resource pools and reassign and deploy all appropriate service chains from the current resource pool according to the scores. Otherwise, the delay sensitive service should be deployed normally as a delay insensitive service.
+
+NOTE – The calculation of service chain scores is performed by resource allocation optimization capability, which can be found in clause 9.3, "Resource allocation optimization capability".
+
+## **8.2 Requirements of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking**
+
+### **8.2.1 Requirements of end-to-end service assurance**
+
+To achieve the end-to-end service assurance, NGNe is required to provide a consistent, reliable, and efficient service experience. This includes but is not limited to the following aspects:
+
+- connect with the management systems of multiple operators and cloud service providers.
+NOTE – Each CSP that the NGNe provider can interwork within this Recommendation is a partner which agrees to provide relevant APIs to share their resource information.
+- manage and dispatch resources uniformly, including network resources and cloud resources.
+- seamlessly connect links between different operators.
+
+### **8.2.2 Requirements of path optimization for delay sensitive services**
+
+In the network and cloud interworking environment, services may involve complex network topologies across regions, operators, and cloud service providers. For delay sensitive services such as real-time audio and video communication, online gaming, and telemedicine, it is crucial to choose a low-latency and highly stable transmission path. Therefore, NGNe is required to support providing the optimal path for delay sensitive services that include the following aspect:
+
+- dynamically select paths which are optimized transmission paths based on factors such as distance between nodes, processing delay and resource utilization.
+
+### **8.2.3 Requirements of stability and reliability**
+
+Stability and reliability are the key aspects in the network and cloud interworking environment. Therefore, NGNe is required to support providing a stable and reliable features that include the following aspects:
+
+- high fault tolerance, which ensures that the network can continue to operate and provide services when various hardware and software failures or natural disasters occur.
+- self-healing, which ensures that the network can automatically recover from failure in a very short period of time and continue to transmit the services it carries.
+
+# **9 General capabilities of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking**
+
+## **9.1 Relationships between requirements and capabilities of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking**
+
+The framework of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking is shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-1: The framework of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking. The diagram shows two main layers: the Service layer and the Transport layer. The Service layer is represented by a dashed blue box containing eight orange boxes arranged in two rows. The top row includes 'Order fulfillment and service control', 'Order fulfillment orchestration', 'Service configuration orchestration', and 'Service control orchestration'. The bottom row includes 'Service delivery orchestration', 'Service activation testing orchestration', 'End-to-end service testing orchestration', and 'Service chaining orchestration'. Above the Service layer are two green boxes: 'Self-operated applications' and 'Third-party applications', both connected to the Service layer by double-headed blue arrows. The Transport layer is represented by a yellow rounded rectangle containing five orange boxes. The top row includes 'Resource allocation optimization', 'Delay optimization', and 'Traffic aggregation'. The bottom row includes 'Policy and traffic scheduling enforcement' and 'Data reporting'. A double-headed blue arrow connects the Service layer to the Transport layer. The text 'Service orchestration capabilities' is written in red at the bottom right of the Service layer box. The label 'Y.2347(24)' is at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – The framework of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking**
+
+Network and cloud interworking focuses on providing interconnection and collaborative management and unified scheduling between cloud and network at the orchestrator and controller levels. To support the requirements and scenarios that have been described in clause 8, NGNe is required to enhance its capabilities. The relationships between the requirements and capabilities of NGNe are as follows:
+
+- 1) Order fulfilment and service control capability, order fulfilment orchestration capability, service configuration orchestration capability, service control orchestration capability, service delivery orchestration capability, service activation testing orchestration capability, end-to-end service testing orchestration capability, and policy and traffic scheduling enforcement capability support end-to-end service assurance.
+- 2) Order fulfilment and service control capability, service chaining orchestration capability, resource allocation optimization capability, delay optimization capability, traffic aggregation capability, policy enforcement capability and data reporting capability support path optimization for delay sensitive services and stability and reliability.
+
+## 9.2 Service layer capabilities
+
+- **Order fulfilment and service control capability:** This capability is required to support the orchestration functions of provisioning related activities for the fulfilment of a customer order or a service control request, including the tracking and reporting of the provisioning progress. In NGNe, these functions should be performed dynamically with a performance that is acceptable to end users. This capability can determine the duration information of the traffic packet passing through the service chain based on the delay information and split the virtual service devices to obtain multiple service chains. Besides, this capability also supports to steer traffic packets to pass through multiple service chains in parallel.
+- **Order fulfilment orchestration capability:** This capability involves in decomposing a customer order into one or multiple service provisioning activities and orchestrating all customer order-related fulfilment activities.
+- **Service configuration orchestration capability:** This capability supports the design, assignment, and activation activities for the end-to-end service.
+
+- **Service control orchestration capability:** This capability permits the service to be dynamically changed within specific bounds described in policies that are established in advance or created on the fly.
+- **Service delivery orchestration capability:** This capability is responsible for the service delivery via network and application implementation of each service component to their respective delivery system.
+- **Service activation testing orchestration capability:** This capability coordinates all service activation testing activities, for a part of or the complete end-to-end service. The testing can be performed by the service provider as well as by the user.
+- **End-to-end service testing orchestration capability:** This capability can test all functions automatically such as service activation testing, and verification of services, seamlessly, across multiple operators.
+- **Service chaining orchestration capability:** This capability is recommended to support service chain orchestration and allocation based on the user's demand on delay sensitive business services. All service chains in the current resource pool can be reallocated and deployed according to the scores of all available resource pools of all service chains in the current resource pool. After the scores of all service chains in the current resource pool for all available resource pools are calculated and ranked. The service chain with the highest score should be migrated or deployed to the corresponding resource pool. After the migration or deployment, it should determine whether all service chains have been deployed. If not, it will remove the service chain with the highest score and repeat the above processes.
+
+## 9.3 Transport layer capabilities
+
+- **Resource allocation optimization capability:** This capability is recommended to support the delay sensitive service chain allocation requirement by calculating the scores of all service chains in the current available resource pools for all the available resource pools. It should determine whether the service chain is a delay sensitive business service chain. For delay insensitive business service chain, its score for all the available resource pools is set to a fixed value. For the delay sensitive business service chain, its score for all the available resource pools is determined according to at least one of the following: the delay sensitive levels, the number of required resources, the amount of available resource in the resource pool and the computing resource load balance. When there are multiple required resources, for each resource, the required resource score of each resource is determined according to the required resource amount and the available resource amount of the resource pool. Then calculating the average scores of the required resource of each resource as the required resource score.
+
+**Table 1 – The differences in score calculation between delay sensitive business service chain and delay insensitive business service chain**
+
+| | Delay sensitive business service chain | Delay insensitive business service chain |
+|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| The scores for all available resource pools | Each score is determined according to at least one of the following aspects: • the delay sensitive level • the number of required resources • the amount of available resource in the resource pool • computing resource load balance | Each score is a fixed value. |
+
+NOTE 1 – The delay sensitive levels are set by the cloud service provider. In the simplest case, they are divided into two levels: delay sensitive and delay insensitive.
+
+NOTE 2 – The deployment region refers to the resource pool to which the service chain intends to migrate.
+
+NOTE 3 – The computing resource load balance refers to the impact of the service chain to be deployed on the resources in the target resource pool. It is better to ensure that the utilization rates of the resources in the target resource pool are nearly the same after the service chain is deployed.
+
+- **Delay optimization capability:** This capability is recommended to support the determination of the duration information of the traffic packet that passes through the service chain which is used to indicate that the traffic packet passes through a preset number of virtualized service devices in the cloud resource pool in a pre-configured order. The prospective duration information of virtualized service devices which perform service processing on the traffic packet should be configured at first. Then, the duration information should be obtained. When the duration information exceeds the prospective one, the virtualized service devices should be split to obtain multiple service chains. The traffic packet should be replicated and controlled to pass through each of the service chains in parallel. The splitting of virtualized service devices should be based on the dependency relationship between them so that the devices with the dependency relationship are located in the same divided service chain.
+- **Traffic aggregation capability:** This capability is recommended to support the aggregation of the traffic through the parallel service chains which are divided from the same service chain. Due to the traffic replication on the traffic packet it should be performed according to the number of the divided service chains. The multiple traffic packets should be steered to each of the divided service chains. During the service processing, the traffic packets should be tagged and stored with the corresponding tag information. Then, the traffic packet should be determined and aggregated according to the comparison result of the tag information of the multiple traffic packets flowing out of the multiple service chains and forwarded.
+
+NOTE 4 – The decomposition and aggregation of the service chain is shown in Appendix II.
+
+- **Policy and traffic scheduling enforcement capability:** This capability is required to support the network nodes in the transport layer to execute the policy which is generated by the service layer capabilities and optimization capabilities of the transport layer and select the optimal path according to the policy.
+- **Data reporting capability:** This capability is required to support the network nodes in the transport layer to report information to the service layer capabilities, including the alarm message generated when a fault occurs in the network, the real-time status information of the network, etc. This capability can assist network providers to achieve functionalities such as data analysis, network status, fault location and self-healing.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+The security requirements of NGNe for support network and cloud interworking are aligned with the security requirements of NGN [ITU-T Y.2701], and the comprehensive study on security aspects should take place in ITU-T SG17. Furthermore, NGNe is recommended to support the following aspects:
+
+- comprehensive message filtering mechanism prevents users' messages from being sent to unexpected operator networks.
+- hiding the topology of the operator's internal network.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+### Introduction for service chain
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix illustrates how the service chain provides services. Service chain is an ordered set of functions that is used to enforce differentiated traffic handling policies for a traffic flow [ITU-T Y.3512]. As shown for example in Figure I.1, pool 1 and pool 2 are different cloud resource pools of a same cloud service provider (CSP). They have deployed different service functions to provide different services. User 1 and user 2 require different service functions in specific orders, and the service chain will steer their traffic path through different service functions in order according to their needs.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a service chain within a Cloud Service Provider (CSP). The CSP is represented by a dashed blue box containing two resource pools, Pool 1 and Pool 2, each depicted as a cloud shape. Pool 1 contains two service functions: 'Firewall' (labeled 'Service function 1') and 'Network address translation' (labeled 'Service function 2'). Pool 2 contains two service functions: 'Deep packet inspection' (labeled 'Service function 3') and 'Load balance' (labeled 'Service function 4'). Two users, 'User 1' and 'User 2', are shown on the left. User 1's traffic path (blue line) starts from the user, goes to Pool 1, then to Pool 2, and finally to 'AS1' on the right. User 2's traffic path (yellow line) starts from the user, goes to Pool 2, then to Pool 1, and finally to 'AS2' on the right. The label 'Cloud service provider' is at the bottom of the dashed box. The reference 'Y.2347(24)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+Diagram of service chain within one CSP showing two resource pools and their service functions.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Diagram of service chain within one CSP**
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Service chain decomposition and aggregation
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+As mentioned in clause 9.3, when the time taken for a data packet to pass through the service chain exceeds expectations, the service chain will be split into multiple service chains by delay optimization capability, and the data packet will be replicated by delay optimization capability and passed through the split service chains in parallel. Data packets processed through the split service chain should be aggregated by traffic aggregation capability.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph Pool1_Top [Pool 1]
+ subgraph SC1 [Service chain 1]
+ SF1[Service function 1] --> SF2[Service function 2] --> SF3[Service function 3] --> SF4[Service function 4]
+ end
+ end
+ DP[Data packet] --> SF1
+ SF4 --> HDP[The handled data packet]
+
+ Pool1_Top --> |Split| Pool1_Bottom
+
+ subgraph Pool1_Bottom [Pool 1]
+ subgraph SC1_1 [Service chain 1-1]
+ SF1_p[Service function 1] --> SF2_p[Service function 2]
+ end
+ subgraph SC1_2 [Service chain 1-2]
+ SF3_p[Service function 3] --> SF4_p[Service function 4]
+ end
+ end
+
+ DP2[Data packet] --> |Replicated| DP1_split[Data packet 1]
+ DP2 --> |Replicated| DP2_split[Data packet 2]
+ DP1_split --> SF1_p
+ DP2_split --> SF3_p
+ SF2_p --> HDP1[The handled data packet 1]
+ SF4_p --> HDP2[The handled data packet 2]
+ HDP1 --> |Aggregated| HDP_final[The handled data packet]
+ HDP2 --> |Aggregated| HDP_final
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of service chain decomposition and aggregation. At the top, a cloud labeled "Service chain 1" contains four sequential boxes: "Service function 1", "Service function 2", "Service function 3", and "Service function 4". An arrow labeled "Data packet" enters from the left, and an arrow labeled "The handled data packet" exits to the right. Below this, a cloud labeled "Pool 1" contains a downward arrow labeled "Split". This leads to two parallel service chains, "Service chain 1-1" and "Service chain 1-2", each within its own cloud. "Service chain 1-1" contains "Service function 1" and "Service function 2". "Service chain 1-2" contains "Service function 3" and "Service function 4". An arrow labeled "Data packet" enters from the left and splits into two arrows labeled "Data packet 1" and "Data packet 2", with the word "Replicated" above the split. "Data packet 1" enters "Service chain 1-1" and exits as "The handled data packet 1". "Data packet 2" enters "Service chain 1-2" and exits as "The handled data packet 2". These two arrows then merge into a single arrow labeled "The handled data packet", with the word "Aggregated" above the merge. A cloud labeled "Pool 1" is at the bottom. The reference "Y.2347(24)" is in the bottom right corner.
+
+Diagram illustrating service chain decomposition and aggregation. A single service chain (Service chain 1) is split into two parallel service chains (Service chain 1-1 and Service chain 1-2). A data packet is replicated into two packets (Data packet 1 and Data packet 2), which are processed by the respective service chains. The resulting handled data packets are then aggregated back into a single handled data packet.
+
+**Figure II.1 – An example for data packet replicated and aggregation**
+
+Figure II.1 describes an example for data packet replicated and aggregation. Service chain 1 contains four service functions. When the time taken for a data packet to pass through the service chain exceeds expectations, the service chain 1 is split to two service chains, service chain 1-1 and service chain 1-2. Then, when a data packet needs to be handled by service chain 1, this data packet will be replicated into two data packets: Data packet 1 and data packet 2. Data packet 1 passes through the service chain 1-1 while data packet 2 passes through the service chain 1-2. The handled data packet 1 and the handled data packet 2 will be aggregated into the handled data packet.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2348-202503-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2348-202503-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2b4363619c2adf8ca66387008f5b4a77ef41ff00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2348-202503-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2348 (03/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+---
+
+## **Functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2348
+
+## Functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2348 provides the functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology (NRS-DLT) by specifying functional components of infrastructure layer, resource control layer, DLT enabling layer, user layer, and management and support layer to provide distributed network resource sharing services to NRS-DLT consumers.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2348 | 2025-03-03 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16143 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Distributed ledger technology, functional architecture, network resource sharing.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Background and motivation..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Motivation of network resource sharing..... | 2 |
+| 6.2 Decentralized network resource sharing based on DLT..... | 2 |
+| 7 Functional architecture of network resource sharing based on DLT..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Overview of functional architecture ..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 User layer functional components of NRS-DLT ..... | 3 |
+| 7.3 DLT enabling layer functional components of NRS-DLT ..... | 4 |
+| 7.4 Resource control layer functional components of NRS-DLT ..... | 5 |
+| 7.5 Infrastructure layer functional components of NRS-DLT..... | 6 |
+| 7.6 Management and support layer functional components ..... | 6 |
+| 8 Cross-cutting aspects of NRS-DLT ..... | 7 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 7 |
+| Bibliography..... | 8 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2348
+
+## Functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology (NRS-DLT) and specifies the functional components for the support of NRS-DLT. The functional architecture of NRS-DLT includes infrastructure layer, resource control layer, DLT enabling layer, user layer and management and support layer.
+
+This Recommendation builds on [ITU-T Y.2345], and the related content of this Recommendation is aligned with [ITU-T Y.2345].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1400] Recommendation ITU-T X.1400 (2020), *Terms and definitions for distributed ledger technology*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2345] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2345 (2023), *Scenarios and requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 distributed ledger** [ITU-T X.1400]: A type of ledger that is shared, replicated, and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner.
+
+**3.1.2 distributed ledger technology (DLT)** [ITU-T X.1400]: Technology that enables the operation and use of distributed ledgers.
+
+**3.1.3 smart contract** [ITU-T X.1400]: A program written on a distributed ledger system which encodes the rules for specific types of distributed ledger system transactions in a way that can be validated, and triggered by specific conditions.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+- DLT Distributed Ledger Technology
+- NGNe Next Generation Network evolution
+
+| | |
+|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| NRC | Network Resource Customer |
+| NRNSM | Network Resource Nodes Service Maintainer |
+| NRNSP | Network Resource Nodes Service Provider |
+| NRP | Network Resource Provider |
+| NRS-DLT | Network Resource Sharing based on Distributed Ledger Technology |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Background and motivation
+
+## 6.1 Motivation of network resource sharing
+
+With the rapid evolution of network and Internet of things technology in recent years, an increasing number of devices are connected to the network, producing an enormous amount of data and network resource demands. The network has evolved into a relatively open platform with complex and rich resources to adapt to the diverse network environment. Therefore, for these diverse network resources, how to effectively promote the interconnection and comprehensive sharing of resources to meet the demands of diversified services is a critical issue in the future development of network technology.
+
+## 6.2 Decentralized network resource sharing based on DLT
+
+Network resource sharing is the system that supports the users of different networks to share the network resource among networks as business demands, including sharing connection and data resources.
+
+Because of lack of trust, it is difficult to guarantee the quality of network service because of the constraints imposed by the subjective or objective intentions of multiple network resource providers (NRPs) sharing the resources.
+
+As an emerging technology, distributed ledger technology (DLT) proposes a decentralized solution for network resource sharing to solve the above problem.
+
+Distributed ledger is a type of ledger that is shared, replicated and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner [ITU-T X.1400].
+
+DLT has core technologies, such as smart contract, incentive mechanism, encryption technology and distributed consensus technology, and has the following technical features: decentralization, tamper-proof and automatic operation.
+
+With the support of the above features, DLT can provide decentralized support for network resource sharing.
+
+NRS-DLT is distributed network resource sharing which supports traditional network system interaction and provides DLT related capabilities among various network entities by utilizing DLT as a data carrier for resource status, and for allocating network resources of infrastructure layer and network layer to applications [ITU-T Y.2345].
+
+# 7 Functional architecture of network resource sharing based on DLT
+
+## 7.1 Overview of functional architecture
+
+According to the layering framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology [ITU-T Y.2345], the functions in the NRS-DLT functional architecture are divided into four layers and a division called management and support layer functions, which spans across the four layers.
+
+NRS-DLT functional architecture is described from a set of functional components. The functional components consist of sets of functions that are required to perform the NRS-DLT capabilities described in [ITU-T Y.2345].
+
+As shown in Figure 7-1, the functional architecture of NRS-DLT consists of user layer, DLT enabling layer, resource control layer and infrastructure layer, as well as a management and support layer that spans these four layers as described below:
+
+- User layer: It provides login management and realizes permission management.
+- DLT enabling layer: It provides basic functions including consensus mechanism, smart contract management and key management for DLT infrastructure for supporting network resource sharing.
+- Resource control layer: It provides resource catalogue, asset control, resource evaluation and heterogeneous network collaboration to control diverse network resources.
+- Infrastructure layer: It provides resource discovery and information management to actively access various network resource entities which belong to different physical nodes.
+- Management and support layer: It includes the service management, encryption support and operational support to manage the execution of network resource sharing.
+
+
+
+| Layer | Functions |
+|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| User layer | Login management, Permission verification |
+| DLT enabling layer | Basic functions, Extended functions |
+| Resource control layer | Resource catalogue, Network resource control, Resource evaluation, Heterogeneous resource collaboration |
+| Infrastructure layer | Resource discovery, Information management |
+| Management and support layer functions | Service management (Service catalogue, Service integrity), Encryption support (Data encryption, Encryption audits, Encryption strategy management), Operational support (Policy management, Connection management, Problem and controversy management, Test management, Service evaluation) |
+
+Figure 7-1: Functional architecture of NRS-DLT. The diagram shows four main layers on the left and a management and support layer on the right. The layers are: User layer (Login management, Permission verification), DLT enabling layer (Basic functions, Extended functions), Resource control layer (Resource catalogue, Network resource control, Resource evaluation, Heterogeneous resource collaboration), and Infrastructure layer (Resource discovery, Information management). The management and support layer functions are: Service management (Service catalogue, Service integrity), Encryption support (Data encryption, Encryption audits, Encryption strategy management), and Operational support (Policy management, Connection management, Problem and controversy management, Test management, Service evaluation).
+
+Y.2348(25)
+
+Figure 7-1 – Functional architecture of NRS-DLT
+
+## 7.2 User layer functional components of NRS-DLT
+
+User layer involves all kinds of users participating in NRS-DLT, including ordinary users and administrator.
+
+The ordinary users include network resource provider (NRP) and network resource customer (NRC).
+
+The administrators include network resource nodes service provider (NRNSP), network resource nodes service maintainer (NRNSM) and network operator.
+
+With the functions provided in the user layer, the users can interact with the network resource sharing system through the user interface to complete the required work. Depending on the different needs of the different types of users, the user layer function is divided into login management and permission verification.
+
+#### **7.2.1 Login management**
+
+Login management is used for managing the login, registration and password verification of ordinary users and administrators.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Permission verification**
+
+Permission verification is used for verifying whether the ordinary user has permission to participate in network resource sharing and is also used for verifying whether the administrator has permission to manage the NRS-DLT.
+
+## **7.3 DLT enabling layer functional components of NRS-DLT**
+
+DLT enabling layer provides both the basic functions and the extended functions based on DLT to support the user layer and the resource control layer. The basic functions include peer-to-peer networking, consensus mechanism provision and smart contract management, and the extended functions include key management and information management.
+
+#### **7.3.1 Basic functions**
+
+With the basic functions, network resource sharing can be implemented in a decentralized environment.
+
+- Peer-to-peer network: It provides the ability to build a distributed peer-to-peer resource sharing network.
+- Consensus mechanism: It is responsible for ensuring agreement among network participants regarding the state of the distributed ledger. It ensures that all transactions are valid and that no malicious entities can manipulate the ledger. All the participants joining the same NRS-DLT system will adopt the same consensus mechanism.
+- Smart contract management: It facilitates the creation, deployment execution, and monitoring and maintenance of smart contracts within NRS-DLT. It defines rules for network resource access and control, manages the transactions, and serves as a mechanism for dispute resolution related to network resource sharing.
+
+NOTE – Smart contracts follow predefined rules and are supervised by all participants, which can prevent conflicts in the process of network resource sharing.
+
+#### **7.3.2 Extended functions**
+
+With the extended functions, the NRS-DLT can provide participating entities (e.g., NRP, NRC) with key management and information management services.
+
+- Key management: It is responsible for generating, encrypting, decrypting, storing and managing various keys required to access resources within the NRS-DLT. It ensures that only authorized users can access and operate shared resources.
+- Information management: All the resource information (e.g., resource type, amount, application programming interface) and participating entities' information will be verified in distributed manner to ensure the reliability of shared resources and user behaviours.
+
+## **7.4 Resource control layer functional components of NRS-DLT**
+
+To better manage and allocate network resources. Resource control layer includes the functional components of resource catalogue, asset control, heterogeneous network collaboration and resource evaluation. The resource control layer functional components are used to manage and control diverse network resources (such as computing, data and network flow), and support resource statistics, monitoring, collaboration and evaluation.
+
+#### **7.4.1 Resource catalogue**
+
+Resource catalogue is responsible for discovering and managing information of next generation network evolution (NGNe) resources. It includes network resource information acquisition, network resource classification and network\_resource cataloguing.
+
+- Network resource information acquisition: It obtains network resource information from the infrastructure layer, and extracts resource attributes as raw data, including resource type, resource amount, resource access control rules and resource price.
+- Network resource classification: It classifies network resources based on resource attributes or user requirements.
+- Network resource cataloguing: It provides resource catalogues to DLT enabling layer to form a characteristic resource list for users, so that users can efficiently get the required resources.
+
+#### **7.4.2 Network resource control**
+
+During the process of NRS-DLT, network resources are recorded on distributed ledger and controlled by resource providers to ensure integrity, and improve the utilization efficiency of the resources.
+
+- Integrity control: It provides access to network resources with permissions, ensures that the status of network resources can be monitored during sharing.
+- Resource sharing mechanism control: It provides the resource sharing mechanism agreed by resource providers, including sharing mode and sharing restrictions.
+
+#### **7.4.3 Resource evaluation**
+
+To improve the efficiency of network resources sharing (including computing, data, storage, and other resources) and reduce resource waste, the NRS-DLT architecture needs to support resource evaluation capabilities to achieve flexible on-demand scheduling. Resource evaluation is responsible for evaluating the resources of the network resource customer (NRC) and the network resource provider (NRP).
+
+- NRC network resource evaluation: It evaluates the required resources for NRC according to the business type included in the resource request of NRC.
+- NRP network resource evaluation: It evaluates the available resource provided by NRP, considering NRP's own resource information such as resource utilization rate. Based on the resource evaluation result, NRC and NRP try to be matched through the consensus sharing rules of smart contracts, identifying the best NRP for NRC to improve the efficiency of resource sharing.
+
+NOTE – Taking computing resources as an example, in order to improve the efficiency of sharing computing resources, resource evaluation functional components first evaluate the computing resources needed by NRC according to its identification information and business type. Next, it evaluates the idle computing resources of NRP according to its own information such as resource utilization rate and time related information. Then, the resource sharing scheduling is invoked by the smart contract, and automatically executed.
+
+#### **7.4.4 Heterogeneous resource collaboration**
+
+Based on the resource sharing decision generated by smart contract in DLT enabling layer, resource control layer uses heterogeneous resource collaboration function components to collaborate the
+
+allocated network resources including computing resources, communication resources and storage resource, so that the resource requests can be fulfilled.
+
+- Heterogeneous resource allocation: It allocates the specific network resources and updates the resource information in DLT based on resource sharing decision.
+- Collaboration mechanism invoke: It completes the task execution by using network resources according to the request. For example, coordinating communication resources, computing resources and storage resources on different network nodes to complete distributed artificial intelligence tasks.
+- Heterogeneous resource release: It releases heterogeneous network resources and updates resource information in the distributed ledger.
+
+## **7.5 Infrastructure layer functional components of NRS-DLT**
+
+The infrastructure layer functional components are responsible for network resource discovery and management.
+
+- Resource discovery: It provides detailed mechanisms for identifying and cataloguing network resources.
+- Information management: It supports managing and classifying resource information, ensuring efficient accessibility.
+
+## **7.6 Management and support layer functional components**
+
+The management and support layer functional components are responsible for integration and coordination of components across multiple layers, including service management, encryption support and operational support.
+
+### **7.6.1 Service management**
+
+Service management supports coordination and supervision of cross-layer functional component service delivery, including service catalogue and service integrity.
+
+- Service catalogue: It maintains a comprehensive list of all available services and their detailed information to facilitate easy access and integration.
+- Service integrity: It maintains the consistency and reliability of services provided by the NRS-DLT framework. It involves maintaining data integrity and the accuracy of transaction records.
+
+### **7.6.2 Encryption support**
+
+The encryption support function is responsible for implementing and managing encryption techniques to protect sensitive data and communications within the NRS-DLT framework, including data encryption, encryption audits and encryption strategy management.
+
+- Data encryption: It implements encryption algorithms to protect data from unauthorized access and breaches.
+- Encryption audits: It conducts regular audits to evaluate the effectiveness of implemented encryption strategies and enabling timely enhancements to the encryption framework.
+- Encryption strategy management: It provides a diverse array of encryption technologies and their combinations, and supports the customization of encryption policies by users for specific needs.
+
+#### **7.6.3 Operational support**
+
+The operational support function provides tools and prescribes processes to ensure the operation of the NRS-DLT system. It includes policy management, connection management, problem and controversy management, test management and service evaluation.
+
+- Policy management: It develops and enforces policies that ensure the smooth operation of the network.
+- Connection management: It manages the connections between different network resources to ensure efficient data exchange, supporting seamless interactions between participants.
+- Problem and controversy management: It addresses and resolves issues, disputes and conflicts that may arise within the NRS-DLT framework.
+- Test management: It plans, executes and manages testing activities to verify the functionality and performance of the NRS-DLT system, ensuring the delivery of high-quality services.
+- Service evaluation: It regularly evaluates the user satisfaction of services provided within the NRS-DLT framework to ensure aligning the system with user needs and expectations.
+
+## **8 Cross-cutting aspects of NRS-DLT**
+
+Cross-cutting aspects include both architectural and operational considerations, such as the performance aspect which identifies various performance metrics and indicators of network resource sharing based on DLT. Cross-cutting aspects can be shared and can impact multiple capabilities and functional components of NRS-DLT, as described in [ITU-T Y.2345]. This clause defines cross-cutting aspects for NRS-DLT.
+
+It encompasses the need for the system to remain robust and effective, not just under current operational demands but also as it scales to accommodate future growth, complexity and evolving network environments.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+The security considerations of functional architecture of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology should keep alignment with [ITU-T Y.2345]. In addition, the following security consideration aspect is recommended:
+
+- It is recommended to conduct security checks (i.e., vulnerability scanning, firewall setting checks, security log checks, permission setting checks and risk software checks) to ensure the resources in NRS-DLT are not hijacked or hacked.
+
+## **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.751.4] Recommendation ITU-T F.751.4 (2022), *General framework for distributed ledger technology (DLT)-based invoices*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2502 (09/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Computing power networks
+
+---
+
+## **Computing power network – Authentication and orchestration architecture**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2502
+
+## Computing power network – Authentication and orchestration architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2502 provides the architecture of resource authentication and orchestration in computing power network (CPN), such as resource discovery, resource registration, resource identification, and resource orchestration, in order to agilely organize and utilize the computing, storage network and service resources in the CPN, to provide services to enterprises.
+
+NOTE – The authentication and orchestration crossing multiple CPNs are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2502 | 2025-09-06 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15866 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architecture, computing power network, discovery, orchestration, registration, resource authentication.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview of resource authentication and orchestration in computing powerSeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2611**
+
+(12/2006)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks
+
+# --- **High-level architecture of future packet-based networks**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2611
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and "International Telecommunication Union" is written in a smaller, blue font below it.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with a red lightning bolt and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **ITU-T Recommendation Y.2611**
+
+# **High-level architecture of future packet-based networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2611 specifies a high-level architecture for future packet-based networks (FPBNs). This Recommendation also specifies the relationship between an FPBN and the NGN strata and the interfaces in an FPBN.
+
+In order to be able to provide a full suite of services (examples of which include data, video and voice telephony services) to their customers, operators may need to utilize both connectionless packet switched (cl-ps) and connection-oriented packet-switched (co-ps) transport modes. This is because each mode is well suited to the transport of some services and not so well suited to the transport of others.
+
+FPBNs provide the topmost layer(s) of the transport stratum as defined in ITU-T Recommendation Y.2011. The services mentioned above form part of the service stratum as defined in ITU-T Recommendation Y.2011.
+
+###### **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.2611 was approved on 14 December 2006 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions..... | 3 |
+| 6 | High-level architecture of future packet-based networks..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 FPBN architecture ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 User plane..... | 7 |
+| | 6.3 Control plane ..... | 7 |
+| | 6.4 Management plane..... | 8 |
+| | 6.5 OAM, performance management and availability ..... | 8 |
+| | 6.6 Relationship between layer networks and the OSI BRM..... | 12 |
+| | 6.7 Relationship with other strata..... | 13 |
+| | 6.8 Relationship between an FPBN and existing networks..... | 13 |
+| | 6.9 Interfaces in an FPBN ..... | 13 |
+| | 6.10 Reference points in an FPBN ..... | 14 |
+| | 6.11 Naming and addressing in an FPBN ..... | 15 |
+| | 6.12 Security considerations..... | 15 |
+| | Appendix I – Relationship between layer networks and the OSI BRM ..... | 17 |
+| | I.1 The OSI BRM (X.200) model ..... | 17 |
+| | I.2 The G.805/G.809 model..... | 17 |
+| | I.3 Comparing the two models..... | 18 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 21 |
+
+
+
+# ITU-T Recommendation Y.2611
+
+# High-level architecture of future packet-based networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This architecture for an FPBN addresses both connectionless packet switched (cl-ps) and connection-oriented packet switched (co-ps) layer networks. Connection-oriented circuit switched (co-cs) layer networks used to provide the lower layer(s) of the transport stratum are outside of the scope of this Recommendation. The definition and specification of specific services is left to other NGN Recommendations and is outside of the scope of an FPBN and this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T G.805] ITU-T Recommendation G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [ITU-T G.809] ITU-T Recommendation G.809 (2003), *Functional architecture of connectionless layer networks*.
+- [ITU-T X.200] ITU-T Recommendation X.200 (1994), *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model*.
+- [ITU-T X.800] ITU-T Recommendation X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1710] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710 (2002), *Requirements for Operation & Maintenance functionality for MPLS networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1711] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1711 (2004), *Operation & Maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2001] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2601] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2601 (2006), *Fundamental characteristics and requirements of future packet-based networks*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 address:** See [ITU-T Y.2601].
+
+- 3.1.2 authentication:** See [ITU-T X.800].
+- 3.1.3 client/server relationship:** See [ITU-T G.805].
+- 3.1.4 connection:** See [ITU-T G.805].
+- 3.1.5 flow:** See [ITU-T G.809].
+- 3.1.6 identifier:** See [ITU-T Y.2601].
+- 3.1.7 trail:** See [ITU-T G.805].
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 availability:** A measure of the capability of a given entity (for example, a layer network, connection, flow, etc.) to maintain connectivity with the associated performance criteria that have been guaranteed by the entity.
+
+**3.2.2 name:** A name is the identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element) that may be resolved/translated into an address.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transport Mode |
+| cl-ps | connectionless packet switched |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| co-cs | connection-oriented circuit switched |
+| co-ps | connection-oriented packet switched |
+| CV | Connectivity Verification |
+| E-NNI | External Network-to-Network Interface |
+| FPBN | Future Packet-Based Network |
+| FT_Sk | Flow Termination Sink |
+| FT_So | Flow Termination Source |
+| HRX | Hypothetical Reference Connection |
+| I-NNI | Internal Network-to-Network Interface |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| L2TP | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| MTNM | Multi-Technology Network Management |
+| MTOSI | Multi-Technology Operations Systems Interface |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NMS | Network Management System |
+| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
+| OAM | Operations, Administration and Maintenance |
+| OSI BRM | Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model |
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------|
+| OSS | Operations Support System |
+| PM | Performance Management |
+| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| p-t-mp | point-to-multipoint |
+| p-t-p | point-to-point |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+| RPT | Reference Point Type |
+| SDH | Synchronous Digital Hierarchy |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| TCP | Termination Connection Point |
+| TFP | Termination Flow Point |
+| TMF | TeleManagement Forum |
+| TN | Transport Network |
+| TT_Sk | Trail Termination Sink |
+| TT_So | Trail Termination Source |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+| VC-4 | Virtual Container Level 4 |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+None
+
+# 6 High-level architecture of future packet-based networks
+
+### 6.1 FPBN architecture
+
+A future packet-based network (FPBN) is composed of packet-based path layer networks (as defined in [ITU-T G.805] and [ITU-T G.809]) in the transport stratum (the functionality is similar to layers 2 and 3 in [ITU-T X.200]). An overview of [ITU-T G.805] and [ITU-T G.809], and the relationships to the open systems interconnection basic reference model (OSI BRM), is provided in Appendix I. The transport stratum is depicted in Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]. Each layer network 'system' in an FPBN consists of a user plane, a control plane and a management plane and each of the planes within a layer network will have its own traffic forwarding component which may belong to the same layer network (if the planes are not isolated from each other) or different layer networks (if the planes are isolated from each other).
+
+It is a requirement identified in clauses 6 and 7.8 of [ITU-T Y.2601] that an FPBN is expected to:
+
+- a) *completely secure the internal control and management plane traffic from external attack and ensure that it remains secure and stable under situations of extreme stress (clause 6);*
+- b) *provide mechanisms to protect the control plane communications from security threats (clause 7.8).*
+
+An identical requirement also exists for protecting the FPBN management plane from security threats. The user, control, and management planes (of each layer network) should be segregated
+
+from each other in order to keep the performance, security and reliability of each plane (and that of the other planes) from being violated. Techniques for doing so include (but are not limited to) isolation between planes or special treatment of traffic belonging to the different planes. How a particular NGN network maintains the integrity of its planes is up to it, so long as the requirements detailed in [ITU-T Y.2601] are met.
+
+It is a requirement identified in clause 6 of [ITU-T Y.2601] that an FPBN: *should support off-path control and management planes* and therefore isolation is the preferred 'default' mechanism that can meet the requirements for protecting the user, control and management planes (of each layer network) from each other. The user, control and management planes can be isolated from each other by the allocation of independent connection-oriented packet switched (co-ps) or connection-oriented circuit switched (co-cs) server layer network trails. The type of isolating technology is determined by several factors, such as location (e.g., access or core), network status, etc. It is up to the operator to decide to what degree they wish to operate their control and management planes off-path. Another motivation for isolating the control and management planes from the user plane is to ensure that the FPBN control and management planes continue to operate even if the FPBN user plane is overloaded or faulty.
+
+An FPBN should seek to harmonize functional components (e.g., control and management plane design and operation) across the networking modes as far as practically possible.
+
+Figures 6-1 and 6-2 show functional diagrams that depict the user plane of the FPBN architecture. The connectionless packet switched (cl-ps) network is drawn using G.809 conventions and the co-ps network is drawn using G.805 conventions.
+
+The transport stratum may be implemented by multiple discrete layer networks that form client/server relationships. A different networking mode (cl-ps, co-ps and co-cs) may be used for each of the layer networks (this is not shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2). The number of layer networks and networking modes used is a choice for the particular operator deploying the transport stratum and is beyond the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+In Figures 6-1 and 6-2, the cl-ps and co-ps layer networks are shown separately. This separation may be physical or logical. The cl-ps layer network may use co-cs server layer network trails that are separate from the server co-cs layer network trails used by the co-ps layer network. Alternatively, the separation may be logical; i.e., the cl-ps and co-ps layer networks share the same server layer network trails. There may be some strict logical partitioning between them so that bandwidth sharing is impossible.
+
+Similarly, the cl-ps layer network may use physically separate networking equipment (e.g., routers) to the co-ps layer network or both layer networks may use the same physical networking equipment but that equipment will be logically partitioned between the cl-ps and co-ps layer networks.
+
+
+
+This diagram illustrates the user plane architecture for cl-ps transport over co-ps layer network trails. It shows a vertical stack of components on both the left and right sides, connected by horizontal dashed lines representing network trails. The components, from top to bottom, are: cl-ps/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside), TFP (represented by a circle with a horizontal line), co-ps/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside), TCP (represented by a circle with a horizontal line), and Server/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside). The horizontal connections are labeled as follows: 'cl-ps transport client link flow' (topmost dashed line), 'cl-ps connectionless trail' (second dashed line), 'co-ps transport client link connection' (third dashed line), 'co-ps trail' (fourth dashed line), and 'Server trail' (bottommost dashed line). In the center, there are two dashed ovals labeled 'Flow domain' (enclosing the TFP components) and 'Subnetwork' (enclosing the TCP components). A reference code 'Y.2611(06)\_F5-1' is located at the bottom center.
+
+Figure 6-1: Functional diagram depicting the user plane of the FPBN architecture (cl-ps transport over co-ps layer network trails).
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Functional diagram depicting the user plane of the FPBN architecture (cl-ps transport over co-ps layer network trails)**
+
+
+
+This diagram illustrates the user plane architecture for cl-ps transport over server layer network trails. It shows a vertical stack of components on both the left and right sides, connected by horizontal dashed lines representing network trails. The components, from top to bottom, are: cl-ps/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside), TFP (represented by a circle with a horizontal line), co-ps/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside), TCP (represented by a circle with a horizontal line), and Server/client (represented by a triangle with a circle inside). The horizontal connections are labeled as follows: 'cl-ps transport client link flow' (topmost dashed line), 'cl-ps connectionless trail' (second dashed line), 'co-ps transport client link connection' (third dashed line), 'co-ps trail' (fourth dashed line), and 'Server trail' (bottommost dashed line). In the center, there are two dashed ovals labeled 'Flow domain' (enclosing the TFP components) and 'Subnetwork' (enclosing the TCP components). A reference code 'Y.2611(06)\_F5-2' is located at the bottom center.
+
+Figure 6-2: Functional diagram depicting the user plane of the FPBN architecture (cl-ps transport over server layer network trails).
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Functional diagram depicting the user plane of the FPBN architecture (cl-ps transport over server layer network trails)**
+
+In Figures 6-1 and 6-2, the server layer network trail may be provided by any technology, switched or un-switched. Further client/server relationships may exist below the server layer network trail; however, it should be noted that client layers inherit the impairments of their server layer networks and that this inheritance is recursive down to the duct.
+
+In co-cs layer networks, each client is explicitly allocated a dedicated amount of bandwidth from the server layer network trail. The clients are fully isolated and therefore one client's loading cannot impact the performance of another client. This makes it simple to guarantee dedicated bandwidth for a client.
+
+In co-ps layer networks, each client is allocated bandwidth from a server layer network trail. However, as the clients are only logically isolated, one client's loading may directly impact the capacity available to another client. The appropriate allocation of bandwidth and the use of ingress admission control and policing make it possible to guarantee dedicated bandwidth for a client.
+
+In cl-ps layer networks, flows are not normally explicitly allocated to server layer network trails. Therefore, the capacity available to one client flow may be impacted by the loading of other client flows. This may be mitigated by engineering the appropriate capacity in the server layer network (i.e., over-provisioning) or by establishing resource reservation state per-hop and pinning routes. This makes it possible to guarantee dedicated bandwidth for a client. This procedure is implicit in a co-ps layer network. However, these techniques are not generally used for the majority of traffic in cl-ps layer networks.
+
+NOTE – Due to the different characteristics of each networking mode it is generally advisable to stack modes that less efficiently provide dedicated bandwidth on top of modes that more efficiently provide dedicated bandwidth.
+
+Looking at the top of Figure 6-1 and working down the model shows cl-ps transport over cl-ps layer network connectionless trails, which are transported over co-ps layer network trails which are in turn transported over server layer network trails. co-ps transport is provided over co-ps layer network trails, which are in turn transported over server layer network trails.
+
+Looking at the bottom of Figure 6-1 and working up the model shows a server layer network trail providing transport for a co-ps layer network. The co-ps layer network in turn provides transport for co-ps services as well as providing transport for the cl-ps layer network. Then the model shows that the cl-ps layer network provides transport for cl-ps services.
+
+Looking at the top of Figure 6-2 and working down the model shows cl-ps transport over cl-ps layer network connectionless trails, which are in turn transported over server layer network trails. co-ps transport is provided over co-ps layer network trails, which are in turn transported over server layer network trails.
+
+Looking at the bottom of Figure 6-2 and working up the model shows a server layer network trail providing transport for a co-ps layer network and a cl-ps layer network. The cl-ps layer network provides cl-ps transport and the co-ps layer network provides co-ps transport.
+
+An operator may choose to use either of the options depicted in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 above (i.e., co-ps transport or other server layer network trails) in order to support a cl-ps layer network. Alternatively, an operator may choose to mix the above options (i.e., co-ps transport and other server layer network trails), so, for example, an operator may choose to use co-ps transport for some cl-ps connectionless trails and other server layer network trails for other cl-ps connectionless trails. One reason for mixing these options is that some cl-ps links within the operator's network may require the larger/coarse bandwidth granularities provided by server layer network trails, whereas other cl-ps links may require a finer bandwidth granularity. In order to maximize the utilization of the larger/coarse bandwidth granularities provided by server layer network trails, the operator may wish to utilize the co-ps layer network as a method of mediation between the server layer network trails and cl-ps layer networks.
+
+For the cl-ps layer network depicted in Figures 6-1 and 6-2, the choice of using co-ps transport or other server layer network trails or both will be a decision taken by the operator and will be dependent on a number of factors both economic and technical including (but not limited to):
+
+- the operator's local policy;
+- the traffic level guarantees the operator has made to their customers;
+- the level of bandwidth granularity a given service requires;
+
+- the volume of cl-ps traffic which is being aggregated, i.e., small volumes are likely to be better served off the co-ps mode, whilst larger volumes are likely to be better served off the co-cs mode.
+
+The specific encapsulation format used for an FPBN user plane is independent of network mode. It is the control plane or management plane that commonly determines the network mode. Therefore, operators may use the same encapsulation format for both cl-ps and co-ps network modes even though the forwarding behaviour of each mode is different.
+
+### 6.2 User plane
+
+User plane resources may be allocated to different service classes, so as to adapt to the open market, competitive circumstance, services implementation and evolution.
+
+Resources of service classes will be allocated on demand. Resources allocated to service classes are independent of each other. Different service classes have different attributes. For example, some service classes may guarantee the packet loss ratio and delay of packet transport, some may guarantee packet "importance", some may guarantee much higher security for packets, some may provide guaranteed throughput for packet streams, and some others may provide combinations of these above attributes or even combinations with some other attributes.
+
+It is not necessary to provision all services in a service class in the same way in an FPBN. The control plane may set up some of them, while the management plane may set up others.
+
+As the service stratum may require a large number of service classes with different attributes, an FPBN should provide service classes in an extensible way. There are many advantages to doing so; for example, voice service can be put into an independent service class so that traditional PSTN carriers can provide consistent voice service characteristics. As another example, an FPBN could provide "carrier of carriers" services so that the transport carrier and the service carriers can be different operators, etc.
+
+It is a requirement identified in clause 7.11 of [ITU-T Y.2601] that an FPBN is expected to support:
+
+- a) *point-to-point transport stratum services without adaptation;*
+- b) *point-to-point transport stratum services including adaptation functions;*
+- c) *point-to-multipoint transport stratum services including adaptation functions.*
+
+Such transport stratum services may support link connections (or link flows) within the service stratum or within other layer networks within the transport stratum. Such link connections (or link flows) may be operated by entities other than the entity that operates the FPBN layer network that is providing the transport stratum service upon which those link connections (or link flows) are built. It is clear that a client/server relationship exists between a link connection (or link flow) and the transport stratum service that supports that link connection (or link flow). It is also clear that in order for an FPBN to be able to support different entities operating different layer networks within the transport or service strata, the client and server layer networks within such a client/server relationship must be separated such that the server layer network can provide transparent (and client agnostic) transport to the client layer network.
+
+NOTE – When a client link connection (or link flow) extends beyond an FPBN transport stratum service without adaptation, the transport stratum service only provides transport for part of that link connection (or link flow), and adaptation is provided outside of the FPBN.
+
+### 6.3 Control plane
+
+The control plane configures the user plane to forward traffic from its source to its destination. The control plane will set up and maintain user plane service classes by allocating and scheduling FPBN resources according to the requirements of the services that an FPBN supports.
+
+To support NGN services that require quality of service (QoS), the FPBN control plane should support a resource and admission control function (RACF) [ITU-T Y.2111].
+
+The identifier space of the control plane may be independent of any other identifier spaces in an FPBN; see clause 6.10 for more details.
+
+The control plane of a layer network should be physically or logically segregated from the other planes of that layer network. Control plane communications may use user plane trails or may use logically or physically segregated trails.
+
+The user plane may rely on control plane mechanisms in order to provide survivability and robustness against failures. Therefore, the survivability design of the control plane is likely to be different to the survivability design of the user plane. In the case where the user plane relies on control plane mechanisms in order to provide survivability and robustness, then the diversity of the topology of the control plane communications should be at least as great as the diversity provided to the user plane.
+
+An FPBN may provide both cl-ps and co-ps user planes in order to provide both cl-ps and co-ps transport stratum services. The cl-ps user plane will be independent of the co-ps user plane and each user plane will have its own control plane.
+
+Although the control plane of the cl-ps user plane will be isolated from the control plane of the co-ps user plane, it is likely that there will be some overlap between the functions and features provided by both control planes. For example, both control planes may use a routing protocol to distribute the topology of the user plane that they are controlling. An FPBN should reuse as many functions and features as possible where such functions and features are required in both control planes. For example, if both control planes require a routing protocol, then they should both use the same routing protocol; however, the exact syntax and semantics of the routing protocol messages may differ between the two networking modes as the topology information that needs to be distributed by each mode and the requirements placed on each mode are not identical.
+
+### **6.4 Management plane**
+
+The management plane provides configuration, fault reporting, billing, security, and performance management for an FPBN.
+
+The identifier space of the management plane may be independent of any other identifier spaces in an FPBN; see clause 6.10 for more details.
+
+The management plane of a layer network should be physically or logically segregated from the other planes of that layer network. Management plane communications may use user plane trails or may use logically or physically segregated trails.
+
+An FPBN may provide both cl-ps and co-ps user planes in order to provide both cl-ps and co-ps transport stratum services. The cl-ps user plane will be independent of the co-ps user plane and each user plane will have its own management plane.
+
+### **6.5 OAM, performance management and availability**
+
+It is a requirement as identified in clauses 6 and 7.4 of [ITU-T Y.2601] that an FPBN is expected to:
+
+- a) *offer the appropriate operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) functions for each plane (clause 6);*
+- b) *support network performance monitoring (PM) including availability, packet loss, delay and jitter between any two points in the network (clause 7.4).*
+
+OAM, performance monitoring and availability are related and this clause discusses aspects of each function individually and then goes on to discuss the relationships between them.
+
+A layer network has two basic states: fully working, or broken to some degree. However, a specific client (service or layer network) of that layer network will only see either a working service (perhaps with some level of impairment) or a broken service.
+
+If the layer network is a co-ps layer network, then its trails have two basic states: available (and working within its performance objectives) or unavailable. Both these states are deterministic and can be fully specified. However, it is not possible to describe a cl-ps layer network so easily because cl-ps layer networks do not have a trail construct and therefore cl-ps layer networks can have a far wider range of what may be considered as impaired versus broken behaviour.
+
+Within a well designed and well engineered network, defects and performance degradation should be rare. However, there will be failures and/or performance problems from time to time and therefore OAM is required in order to detect and manage such problems. There are two broad categories of OAM: proactive fault detection ('always on') OAM and reactive fault location/diagnostic ('on demand') OAM.
+
+Proactive OAM is generally responsible for the rapid detection of defects (for example, by using connectivity verification (CV) flows) and initiating the necessary consequent actions. Proactive OAM should be as simple as possible so that the cost of continuously processing OAM flows is minimized. This cost of processing includes operational as well as capital costs (historically, the operational cost of enabling continual OAM monitoring has been very high for some networking technologies which has resulted in operators disabling the proactive OAM in some of their layer networks). Proactive OAM should not be burdened with the complexity required for fault diagnosis or fault location identification. The role of proactive OAM is simply to detect defects in a layer network and perform the necessary consequent actions (which may include triggering reactive OAM).
+
+Reactive OAM is responsible for providing and performing the more complex OAM functions that the proactive OAM does not perform, for example performance management measurements, defect diagnosis, defect location identification and tracing functions. These more complex OAM functions are not normally performed by proactive OAM for a number of reasons, including (but not limited to): complex OAM functions need not be performed continuously and the additional cost that they would add, to the proactive OAM component, is considered to be too large.
+
+Performance monitoring (or performance management) is the measurement of transfer performance for a given trail when that trail is in the up state. As noted previously in clause 6.1, client layer networks inherit the impairments of their server layer networks and this inheritance is recursive down to the duct. Therefore, the performance of a given trail is defined by the performance impairments inherited from its server layer networks plus the additional impairments introduced by the trail itself (from the layer network it is part of). This inheritance between client and server layer networks leads to a requirement that a server layer network's performance criteria is expected to be at least as stringent as its most stringent client layer network in order for the server layer network to be able to meet the performance criteria demanded by its client layer networks.
+
+The availability of a given layer network is essentially a measure of the capability of that layer network to maintain connectivity in spite of one (or more) defects or failures. As noted previously, because a link connection (or a link flow) in a client layer network is supported by a trail (or a connectionless trail) in that client's server layer network, a client layer network inherits certain characteristics (such as link diversity) from its server layer network and this inheritance recurses down to the duct. This means that regardless of where in the network stack a given layer network is situated, its ability to effect disjoint routing is closely coupled to the available physical duct topology. Therefore, it is impossible to achieve routings in a client layer network that are more diverse than the physical duct topology.
+
+In order to efficiently manage a layer network, that layer network's OAM, performance management and availability must be designed and processed in a logical order so that that layer
+
+network's OAM, performance management and availability mechanisms are extensible without adverse impact to that layer network or to the operator that 'owns' that layer network.
+
+The recommended logical ordering is as follows. The differences between the needs and requirements of proactive OAM and reactive OAM should be well understood and then the network mode (i.e., cl-ps or co-ps for FPBNs) that the OAM will be operating in must be identified. This is because each of the two packet switched networking modes has different characteristics, defects and consequently different OAM requirements.
+
+For each mode it is necessary to define suitable and appropriate OAM for defect detection and handling (i.e., proactive OAM), including defining which defects can occur in that networking mode. For example, there is a common requirement for both packet switched networking modes to provide a connectivity verification (CV) mechanism and therefore both packet switched networking modes must provide a mechanism that allows a trail's termination sink to identify that trail's termination source. In the cl-ps mode, the CV function effectively 'comes for free' because each and every packet contains a source address. However, verifying the connectivity of a cl-ps layer network that only supports transit flows requires some additional proactive OAM functionality. In addition to its other functions, a periodic CV flow between a pair of flow or trail termination points can be used to distinguish whether that flow or trail is quiescent or broken.
+
+For each defect identified in a given networking mode, it is necessary to define a set of entry and exit criteria (for the available and unavailable states) based on defect persistency as well as a set of consequent actions for that defect. The exact entry and exit criteria and consequent actions will depend upon the nature of the defect and the networking mode it applies to.
+
+Once the available defects, their entry and exit criteria and any consequent actions have been defined (for the networking mode being considered), only then is it possible to start to address mechanisms for taking performance management measurements and assessing a given trail, connection, flow or layer network against any performance management service level agreements (SLAs) that have been agreed. This is because performance measurements, at least for SLA purposes, are only meaningful when the network entity considered is in the available state.
+
+It should be noted that it is not just performance management that is dependent on the correct order of processing as outlined above. Some other examples include:
+
+- network element specification (in terms of registers and threshold crossing exception reports);
+- network management systems/operations support systems (NMSs/OSSs) that have to process network element collected data about defects, availability and performance management;
+- the definition of hypothetical reference connections (HRXs) and suitable end-to-end and apportioned availability and performance management objectives;
+- the definitions of consistent network services with measurable SLAs.
+
+#### **6.5.1 OAM, performance management and availability of co-ps layer networks**
+
+A layer network requires some mechanism (or mechanisms) to enable it to differentiate the up state from the down state for a given p-t-p connection, which in turn allows that layer network to measure against any performance SLAs that have been agreed for a given connection in that layer network. There is a requirement for the up and down states to have been clearly identified before we can consider performance management because performance SLAs are only meaningful when the connection they refer to is in the up state.
+
+NOTE 1 – If a co-ps service is being guaranteed by the transport stratum, then by implication the transport stratum has a "call admission policy" to prevent over-subscription and the consequent performance degradation.
+
+NOTE 2 – A p-t-mp trail can be considered as a set of p-t-p connection instances between a source and a specific sink. From the perspective of a given client instance, the only thing of concern is whether that client's source/sink p-t-p connection is working or not. Therefore, p-t-mp connectivity can be discussed in terms of p-t-p connectivity behaviour.
+
+NOTE 3 – In general, the server layer network's protection or restoration is designed such that it can recover the connection in the event of a failure before the connection is declared to be unavailable.
+
+NOTE 4 – In general, a transport network is monitoring a transit connection i.e., the service trail terminations are not within the scope of the transport network.
+
+The minimum set of possible defects within a co-ps layer network that proactive co-ps OAM should be capable of detecting is as follows.
+
+Loss of connectivity – This defect occurs when traffic originating from the co-ps trail termination source does not arrive at the corresponding co-ps trail termination sink. For example, for a co-ps trail between trail termination source A (TT\_So A) and trail termination sink A (TT\_Sk A), traffic originating from TT\_So A does not arrive at TT\_Sk A.
+
+NOTE 5 – Due to congestion or packet loss, a certain degree of lost connectivity may be deemed acceptable within a co-ps layer trail. Consequently, a loss of connectivity defect should only be raised once connectivity has been lost for a sustained period of time as defined in the entry and exit criteria for the loss of connectivity defect.
+
+Incorrectly connected connection – This defect occurs when, for whatever reason (for example, failures or incorrect operator configuration), a given trail termination source is connected to the incorrect trail termination sink. For example, a trail that should connect TT\_So A to TT\_Sk A is instead connected to TT\_Sk B.
+
+Incorrectly merged connections – This defect occurs when, for whatever reason (for example, failures or incorrect operator configuration), traffic in one trail is 'leaking' into another trail. For example, for a co-ps trail between TT\_So A and TT\_Sk A, traffic arriving at TT\_Sk A is originating from both TT\_So A and TT\_So B.
+
+Entry and exit criteria for the above defects are not defined in the FPBN architecture. However, definitions for defect entry and exit criteria along with definitions for when a connection is considered available or unavailable must be defined in order to allow HRXs with performance apportionments to be specified.
+
+[ITU-T Y.1710] specifies requirements for OAM functionality in MPLS networks and [ITU-T Y.1711] specifies an operation and maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks. Although specific to MPLS networks, the principles contained in [ITU-T Y.1710] and [ITU-T Y.1711] can be generalized and applied to any co-ps layer network and co-ps OAM mechanisms in an FPBN should reuse the general principles of [ITU-T Y.1710] and [ITU-T Y.1711] as appropriate to the specific co-ps layer network technology used.
+
+For services that provide bidirectional connectivity between two communicating entities, if one direction enters the down state then the service (i.e., both directions) should enter the down state (i.e., the service should be considered unavailable). Therefore, the collection of performance management measurements for a bidirectional connection must be suspended in both directions even if only one direction of the connection is defective (i.e., in the down state).
+
+The availability of a given connection is essentially a measure of the capability of that connection (or more precisely the layer network that that connection belongs to) to maintain connectivity (with the associated performance criteria that that connection has guaranteed) in spite of one (or more) defects or failures.
+
+#### **6.5.2 OAM, performance management and availability of cl-ps layer networks**
+
+In general, it is not feasible to individually monitor the state of all flows within an FPBN cl-ps layer network. In addition, it is also not feasible for an FPBN to individually monitor the state of all
+
+service stratum sessions. This is in part due to the large number of flows that may exist at any one time and the short-lived nature of many of those flows.
+
+It is however feasible to monitor the connectivity (i.e., the ability to transfer packets between two points) in a cl-ps layer network. A cl-ps layer network therefore requires some mechanism (or mechanisms) to enable it to differentiate whether or not connectivity exists between two points within that cl-ps layer network. This in turn allows a cl-ps layer network to measure any guarantees that have been agreed for connectivity between two points in that cl-ps layer network. Additionally, an FPBN should be able to detect when packets are delivered to an unintended destination(s)/egress(es).
+
+The minimum set of possible defects within a cl-ps layer network that proactive cl-ps OAM should be capable of detecting is as follows.
+
+Loss of connectivity – This defect occurs when traffic originating from a cl-ps flow termination source does not arrive at the corresponding cl-ps flow termination sink. For example, for a cl-ps flow between flow termination source A (FT\_So A) and flow termination sink A (FT\_Sk A), traffic originating from FT\_So A does not arrive at FT\_Sk A.
+
+NOTE – Due to congestion or packet loss, a certain degree of lost connectivity may be deemed acceptable within a cl-ps layer flow. Consequently, a loss of connectivity defect should only be raised once connectivity has been lost for a sustained period of time as defined in the entry and exit criteria for the loss of connectivity defect.
+
+Packets within a cl-ps layer network always contain a unique (within the context of that layer network) source address and therefore cl-ps layer network packets are always self-identifying with respect to their source. This means that cl-ps layer networks only multiplex, and never merge, flows and therefore a cl-ps layer network cannot experience misconnected flow defects or mismerged flow defects.
+
+Entry and exit criteria for the above loss of connectivity defect are not defined in the FPBN architecture. However, definitions for defect entry and exit criteria along with definitions for when a flow is considered available or unavailable must be defined in order to allow HRXs with performance apportionments to be specified.
+
+Flows are always unidirectional; however, many services require bidirectional connectivity and therefore it is often necessary to monitor the connectivity of both directions between two points in a cl-ps layer network. For services that provide bidirectional connectivity between two communicating entities, if one direction loses connectivity, then the service (i.e., both directions) should enter the down state (i.e., the service should be considered unavailable). Therefore, the collection of performance management measurements between two points in a cl-ps layer network must be suspended in both directions even if the loss of connectivity is only in one of the directions.
+
+The availability between two points in a cl-ps layer network is essentially a measure of the capability of that layer network to maintain connectivity with the associated performance criteria that have been guaranteed.
+
+### **6.6 Relationship between layer networks and the OSI BRM**
+
+The X.200 model and the G.805/G.809 model are useful in describing different aspects of the transport stratum. In general the X.200 model is most useful when describing the horizontal relationships (between peered layers) and functions between layers within a single stack. The G.805/G.809 model is most useful when describing the recursive interlayer relationships in multilayer transport networks. The term *layer* is used when applying the X.200 model and the term *layer network* is used when applying the G.805/G.809 model. The definition of 'layer network' used in G.805/G.809 is not the same as the definition of 'layer' used in X.200. Both X.200 and G.805/G.809 are widely used within the industry to describe networks. A brief overview of the X.200 model and the G.805/G.809 model is provided in Appendix I.
+
+### 6.7 Relationship with other strata
+
+See Figure 6-3.
+
+
+
+Y.2611(06)\_F5-3
+
+Diagram showing the relationship between an FPBN and the transport and service strata. The diagram consists of two main rectangular blocks. The top block is labeled 'Service stratum' to its right. The bottom block is labeled 'Transport stratum' to its right. A dashed horizontal line separates the two blocks. Inside the bottom block, there is a smaller rectangle labeled 'FPBN' at the top and 'Media-dependent layer networks' below it. Below the bottom block, the text 'Y.2611(06)\_F5-3' is written.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – Relationship between an FPBN and the transport and service strata**
+
+An FPBN is located between the service stratum and the lower part of the transport stratum from a interlayer point of view (as defined in [ITU-T G.805] and [ITU-T G.809]). An FPBN may provide co-ps and/or cl-ps transport stratum services. The FPBN may be implemented with multiple layer networks as described in clause 6.1.
+
+For transparency, an FPBN is independent of any lower (server) layer networking (media dependent) technologies. The lower (server) layer network provides the necessary adaptation functions and transport services required in order to interconnect FPBN nodes.
+
+FPBN packets may be adapted onto (i.e., encapsulated in) both present and future server layer networking technologies.
+
+#### 6.7.1 Relationship between an FPBN and its client (service or layer network)
+
+As required by [ITU-T Y.2001] an FPBN should act as a server layer and therefore must be independent of its client layers. The client layer packets, whether they are user packets, management packets or control packets, are all treated as the payload of an FPBN user plane.
+
+Client layers can be carried over cl-ps, co-ps or both transport modes as long as the service requirements of the client layers are satisfied.
+
+One service can be mapped into one or more than one service class.
+
+#### 6.7.2 Relationship between an FPBN and its server layer network
+
+An FPBN should act as a client of its underlying server layer and therefore the server layer must be independent of the FPBN.
+
+### 6.8 Relationship between an FPBN and existing networks
+
+It is a requirement identified in clause 6 of [ITU-T Y.2601] that an FPBN is expected to *interwork and co-exist with current cl-ps and co-ps packet networks*. In order for an FPBN to interwork with current cl-ps and co-ps networks, it may be necessary to perform address translation and other functions at the boundary of an FPBN.
+
+### 6.9 Interfaces in an FPBN
+
+An FPBN can serve as a core network and/or an access network, which may belong to different operators. An FPBN can interconnect remotely with another FPBN and/or connect with other heterogeneous transport networks.
+
+Consider the network interconnection scenarios depicted in Figure 6-4 in clause 6.10 below, in which the reference points of an FPBN are defined. In this figure, the core transport network may be connected to one or more access transport networks, and each access transport network may be connected to one or more user networks.
+
+FPBN A is interconnected with the adjacent FPBN B; at the same time, it is also interconnected with FPBN C. FPBN D belongs to a different operator to the operator that owns FPBNs A, B and C. FPBN D is connected with FPBN A but is not trusted by it. Another transport network (marked 'Other transport network' in Figure 6-4) is heterogeneous but connected with FPBN A and it is also not trusted by FPBN A.
+
+### 6.10 Reference points in an FPBN
+
+The reference points for a layer network within an FPBN are classified as types a, b, c, d, e, or f. The network interfaces include user-to-network interfaces (UNIs), internal network-to-network interfaces (I-NNIs), and external network-to-network interfaces (E-NNIs).
+
+
+
+Figure 6-4: Reference points in an FPBN. The diagram illustrates the internal structure of four Functional Policy-Based Networks (FPBNs) and their interconnections. FPBN A, B, and C are yellow boxes containing an 'Access transport network' and a 'Core transport network'. FPBN D is a red box, and the 'Other transport network' is a grey box. A 'Service stratum' (green box) is at the top. A vertical purple bar on the left represents 'Management functions'. Reference points are marked with dots and labeled: 'a' (User network to Access transport network), 'b' (Access transport network to Core transport network), 'c' (Core transport network to Core transport network), 'd' (Core transport network to Other transport network), 'e' (Management functions to Core transport network), and 'f' (Service stratum to Core transport network). Dashed lines indicate I-NNI (Internal Network-to-Network Interface) and E-NNI (External Network-to-Network Interface). A legend at the bottom shows a cloud icon for 'Cloud' and a dot for 'Reference point in FPBN'. The identifier 'Y.2611(06)\_F5-4' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-4 – Reference points in an FPBN**
+
+In Figure 6-4 each FPBN shown consists of an access transport network and a core transport network. However, the access transport network or the core transport network may be null. In other words, an FPBN may only support an access transport network or a core transport network but not both.
+
+A user network could be a home network, an enterprise network, or some other network.
+
+Reference point type (RPT) exists between a user network and an FPBN access transport network. It allows the user to transfer and receive user data, OAM and signalling information.
+
+RPT a may support more than one service instance within an NGN.
+
+RPT b is located between an FPBN access transport network and an FPBN core transport network. It acts as an aggregation point for the FPBN core transport network.
+
+RPT c represents an FPBN I-NNI and is located between two adjacent FPBN core transport networks. A single FPBN I-NNI may support more than one service instance destined to different destinations.
+
+RPT d represents an FPBN E-NNI and is located between two FPBNs that belong to different operators, or an FPBN and a heterogeneous transport network. A single FPBN E-NNI may support more than one FPBN service instance destined to different destinations in either operator's network.
+
+RPT e represents the management interface between the management plane of a layer network that belongs to the transport stratum and any network management functions which are outside of that layer network's management plane.
+
+RPT f represents the interconnection point between the transport and service strata within an NGN.
+
+### **6.11 Naming and addressing in an FPBN**
+
+An FPBN needs an addressing mechanism to identify a node, a link, an interface or other entities.
+
+Identification is required in each layer network of the NGN transport stratum. A given entity will be assigned one or more identifiers depending on the function of that entity. FPBN layer network identifiers are independent of any client (and any server) layer network identifiers even if they share the same syntax or structure. At the boundary of a layer network, mapping and/or translation mechanisms are required in order to set up relationships between the identifier used by the client layer network and the identifier used by the server layer network.
+
+NOTE – Identifiers could be determined from multiple discontinuous fields. The global uniqueness of an identifier may be provided by the context as well as the identifier itself.
+
+Whether a given identifier is considered to be a name or an address is dependent on several factors including the perspective (and location) of the entity that is using (or mapping to) that identifier. The same identifier can be considered an address to one entity and a name to a different entity because their perspective is different.
+
+An FPBN may require multiple identifier spaces, for example user, management and control plane identifier spaces. Each identifier space may be independent of the other identifier spaces (even if they use the same syntax or structure). Additional identifier spaces may also be used, for example to allow independent identification of the components that implement control plane functions.
+
+Each resource at a network boundary of the user plane of each layer network will have a name (from the user plane name space of that layer network) which is visible to the exterior of the network. These names may need to be translated into topologically significant addresses (from the user plane address space of that layer network) on the interior of the layer network boundary. In other words, resources on the interior of a given layer network use addresses. When these resources are made visible to entities on the exterior of that layer network, a name may be provided instead of the interior address.
+
+Identifiers within a layer network are administered by the owner of that layer network and must be unique within that context. Any identifiers that are made externally visible are administered within the boundaries of the enclosing network to ensure that they are unique within that context.
+
+### **6.12 Security considerations**
+
+An FPBN requires mechanisms to make it safe or "trusted" by its client layer.
+
+An entity can be said to 'trust' a second entity if the first entity assumes that the second entity will behave as expected by the first entity. Such an assumption of trust relies on the identity of the second entity being authenticated.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Relationship between layer networks and the OSI BRM
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix highlights and clarifies the key differences between the G.805/G.809 model and the X.200 model in order to assist a practitioner of one model to achieve an appreciation of the other model. This appendix is not intended to be a complete description of either the G.805/G.809 or X.200 models.
+
+### I.1 The OSI BRM (X.200) model
+
+The Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model (OSI BRM) [ITU-T X.200] is normally applied to describe a single 'network stack' from the application layer to the physical transport layer. [ITU-T X.200] describes a single network in terms of the logical functions that form the network and the hierarchy that exists between those logical functions at different levels within the network.
+
+When describing a network, [ITU-T X.200] assumes that there is only a single 'network stack' (a single open system), and that this contains a hierarchy of (up to seven) different layers that are named and organized according to their functions: Applications, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data Link and Physical. Generally, the transport stratum in the NGN architecture could be represented by the lower three layers in the OSI BRM, i.e., the Network, Data Link and Physical layers.
+
+The Network layer plays an important role in providing the interface between the service stratum and the transport stratum. The core function in the Network layer is routing and relay. It provides the service stratum with connection-oriented mode (co-ps) or connectionless mode (cl-ps) layer network services. The layering of the transport stratum based on the X.200 model is shown in Figure I.1.
+
+![Diagram of Transport stratum layering based on the X.200 model. A 'Service stratum' box at the top connects to two modes: 'Network connection mode' and 'Network connectionless mode'. Each mode has a vertical stack of three boxes: 'Network', 'Data link', and 'Physical'. A bracket on the right groups these three layers under the label 'Transport stratum layering based on [ITU-T X.200]'. The identifier 'Y.2611(06)_FI-1' is at the bottom right.](6f31cdb576d2f15c35c3f266e5f59211_img.jpg)
+
+```
+graph TD
+ SS[Service stratum]
+ NCM[Network connection mode]
+ NCLM[Network connectionless mode]
+ N1[Network]
+ DL1[Data link]
+ P1[Physical]
+ N2[Network]
+ DL2[Data link]
+ P2[Physical]
+
+ SS --- NCM
+ SS --- NCLM
+ NCM --- N1
+ N1 --- DL1
+ DL1 --- P1
+ NCLM --- N2
+ N2 --- DL2
+ DL2 --- P2
+
+ subgraph TSL [Transport stratum layering based on ITU-T X.200]
+ N1
+ DL1
+ P1
+ N2
+ DL2
+ P2
+ end
+```
+
+Y.2611(06)\_FI-1
+
+Diagram of Transport stratum layering based on the X.200 model. A 'Service stratum' box at the top connects to two modes: 'Network connection mode' and 'Network connectionless mode'. Each mode has a vertical stack of three boxes: 'Network', 'Data link', and 'Physical'. A bracket on the right groups these three layers under the label 'Transport stratum layering based on [ITU-T X.200]'. The identifier 'Y.2611(06)\_FI-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Transport stratum layering based on the X.200 model**
+
+### I.2 The G.805/G.809 model
+
+The G.805/G.809 model is used to describe "layer networks" within the transport stratum. Thus, the G.805/G.809 model includes the concept of recursion, i.e., one layer network can be the client of another layer network. This is known as a client/server interworking relationship. G.805/G.809 provide a set of tools and rules that allows us to visualize complex transport networks that are multi-operator and multi-technology.
+
+### I.3 Comparing the two models
+
+In contrast to X.200, G.805/G.809 assumes that a single layer network may contain all of the functions described in [ITU-T X.200]. In G.805/G.809, a layer network may be one of many that co-exist in parallel (either completely independently of each other or nested in client/server relationships), each of which have their own set of functions that map to the functions that are described by the OSI BRM (termed "layers" in [ITU-T X.200]). [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809] does not restrict the functions that can exist within a layer network, which allows the G.805/G.809 model to describe a layer network (or stack of layer networks) to whatever level of abstraction is most appropriate. Similarly, [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809] does not restrict the number of layer networks that can exist within a 'network stack', which allows G.805/G.809 models to describe a possibly infinite number of client/server relationships between layer networks in the 'network stack'.
+
+A single layer network as described by [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809] does not map directly to a single layer as described in [ITU-T X.200]. In fact, client/server relationships between G.805/G.809 layer networks allow for them to function independently, and each layer network has its own instantiation of the OSI BRM which is distinct from any instantiation of the OSI BRM in any parallel layer network. This includes both horizontally and vertically parallel layer networks. However, layer networks (as described by [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809]) need not instantiate all seven layers of the OSI BRM.
+
+This is not to say that functionality resembling that described in the OSI BRM is not present in layer networks (as defined by [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809]), but rather that the functionality may be distributed quite differently, say across a fewer or greater number of functions, or just simply distributed differently, and not 'layered' in the same rigid hierarchical fashion as that specified in the OSI BRM.
+
+NGN architectures require a greater amount of flexibility than was envisaged when [ITU-T X.200] was developed. Further details can be found in clause 6 of [ITU-T Y.2011] where the relationship between NGNs and X.200/OSI BRM is discussed in more detail. Annex A of [ITU-T Y.2011] identifies some areas of X.200 which are either too restrictive and/or insufficient to accommodate recent, emerging or expected future technologies. Additionally, Annex B of [ITU-T Y.2011] contains a detailed list of items retained from [ITU-T X.200] (since they are applicable to NGN) and a list of items not retained (since they are not applicable to NGN) from [ITU-T X.200].
+
+Figure I.2 shows how each layer network (as described by [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809]) has its own instantiation of the OSI BRM which is distinct from any other instantiation of the OSI BRM that exists in any parallel layer networks. Figure I.2 shows a scenario in which an Ethernet layer network is supported by an MPLS layer network that is, in turn, supported by a SDH layer network. Each layer network is depicted using the diagrammatic conventions described in [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809]. Alongside each layer network, an instantiation of the X.200/OSI BRM is shown to highlight that each of the three layer networks (Ethernet, MPLS and SDH) co-exist (nested in client/server relationships) and each of them has their own set of functions that map to the functions that are described by X.200/OSI BRM.
+
+
+
+G.805/G.809
+
+X.200 OSI BRM
+
+| |
+|--------------|
+| Application |
+| Presentation |
+| Session |
+| Transport |
+| Network |
+| Data link |
+| Physical |
+
+Instantiation of OSI BRM for Ethernet layer network
+
+| |
+|--------------|
+| Application |
+| Presentation |
+| Session |
+| Transport |
+| Network |
+| Data link |
+| Physical |
+
+Instantiation of OSI BRM for MPLS layer network
+
+| |
+|--------------|
+| Application |
+| Presentation |
+| Session |
+| Transport |
+| Network |
+| Data link |
+| Physical |
+
+Instantiation of OSI BRM for SDH layer network
+
+Y.2611(06)\_F1.2
+
+Diagram illustrating how each G.805/G.809 layer network has its own instantiation of the OSI BRM. The diagram shows three stacked layer networks: Ethernet, MPLS, and SDH. Each network is represented by a set of nodes and connections. To the right of each network is a table representing the instantiation of the OSI BRM for that network. The OSI BRM is divided into seven layers: Application, Presentation, Session, Transport, Network, Data link, and Physical. The Ethernet and MPLS networks instantiate all seven layers, while the SDH network only instantiates the Physical layer.
+
+**Figure I.2 – How each G.805/G.809 layer network has its own instantiation of the OSI BRM**
+
+Note that a layer network does not necessarily instantiate all seven layers of the OSI BRM (for example MPLS would not instantiate the OSI BRM physical layer). It is also worth noting that Figure I.2 shows a hierarchy of layer networks at a given level of abstraction. The G.805/G.809 model allows a layer network to be described at any level of abstraction, so for example the diagram could be expanded in order to decompose the SDH network into its constituent layer networks (VC-4, multiplex section, regenerator section, etc.).
+
+In addition to providing a model for describing layer networks (and their layering and interactions), the G.805/G.809 model can also be mapped into detailed equipment specifications (for example [b-ITU-T I.732] provides an ATM equipment specification and [b-ITU-T G.783] provides an SDH equipment specification) as well as management information models (for example TeleManagement Forum (TMF) Multi-Technology Network Management (MTNM) specifications TMF 513, TMF 608, TMF 814 and TMF Multi-Technology Operations Systems Interface (MTOSI) TMF 517 and TMF 608).
+
+Detailed equipment specifications are considered important by equipment manufacturers as they provide a detailed formal specification of what components a piece of transport equipment should contain, how those components should interact and how the piece of equipment itself should behave. Management information models are considered important by network operators (and management standardization organizations such as the TeleManagement Forum (TMF)) because they formally define and describe the reference points that the operator's OSS system must interact with in order to manage a piece of transport equipment (and ultimately the transport network itself).
+
+Figure I.3 shows a single SDH path layer network (e.g., VC-4) at the most abstract level (the highest level of partitioning), i.e., it is depicted as a single subnetwork bounded by its access points. This SDH path layer network is used to support various "network stacks". Note that the SDH network is itself decomposed into multiple layer networks (e.g., VC-4, Multiplex section, Regenerator section, Wavelength, etc. down to the duct level). Figure I.3 illustrates that [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809] allows us to describe a single server layer network that may support multiple (different) client layer networks (it is not possible to do the same with the OSI BRM because the OSI BRM assumes a single 'network stack'). Figure I.3 also shows how [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809] supports recursion (through client/server relationships) and demonstrates that layer networks are not always stacked according to the rigid model provided by
+
+X.200/OSI BRM. A wide variety of network stacks may be modelled using [ITU-T G.805]/[ITU-T G.809]. This is illustrated in Figure I.3.
+
+Working from left to right, the network stacks shown in Figure I.3 are:
+
+- PPP over L2TP over IP over MPLS over Ethernet over SDH;
+- IP over Ethernet over MPLS over Ethernet over SDH;
+- IP over SDH;
+- ATM over MPLS over SDH.
+
+
+
+Figure I.3: Illustration of network stacks and their connections. The diagram shows four vertical stacks of network layers, each represented by a triangle (server) and an oval (client). The layers are connected by dashed lines representing trails. The first stack (leftmost) has layers: PPP trail, L2TP trail, IP connectionless trail, MPLS trail, Ethernet trail, and SDH trail. The second stack has layers: IP connectionless trail, Ethernet trail, and SDH trail. The third stack has layers: IP connectionless trail, Ethernet trail, and SDH trail. The fourth stack (rightmost) has layers: ATM trail, MPLS trail, and SDH trail. All stacks are connected to a common SDH subnetwork at the bottom, represented by a large oval with multiple connection points. The label 'Y.2611(06)\_Fl.3' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Illustration that G.805/G.809 allows to describe a server layer network that may support multiple (different) client layer networks including client/server recursion**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T G.783] ITU-T Recommendation G.783 (2006), *Characteristics of synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) equipment functional blocks*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.732] ITU-T Recommendation I.732 (2000), *Functional characteristics of ATM equipment*.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2618-201801-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2618-201801-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f99eafedb1cebcb6d4e11db9fdf2bf493f0ab1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2618-201801-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,827 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2618
+
+(01/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Packet-based Networks
+
+# --- **The M interface in public packet telecommunication data networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2618
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+## CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2618
+
+# The M interface in public packet telecommunication data networks
+
+## Summary
+
+As one hierarchical packet data network which can meet requirements of future packet based networks, the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) has a reference point, called the M interface, between the PTDN management entities and network elements. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2618 defines this interface, specifies common PTDN management functions and protocols and defines specific PTDN management functions related to a virtual packet network (VPN) and multicast service. Annex A of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2618 describes a management information model for VPN and multicast service management using the management interface specification methodology defined in Recommendation ITU-T M.3020.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2618 | 2018-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13464 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+M interface, management information model, multicast, PTDN, VPN.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at >
+VirtualPacketNetwork"] --|> VN["<>
+VirtualNetwork"]; VMN["<>
+VirtualMulticastNetwork"] --|> VN;
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the inheritance hierarchy for virtual network classes. At the top is the class <> VirtualNetwork. Below it are two subclasses: <> VirtualPacketNetwork and <> VirtualMulticastNetwork. Both subclasses inherit from the parent class, as indicated by the hollow triangle arrows pointing from the subclasses to the parent class.
+
+Y.2618(18)\_FA.1
+
+Inheritance diagram of virtual network fragment
+
+Figure A.1 – Inheritance diagram of virtual network fragment
+
+
+
+```
+
+classDiagram
+ class VirtualPort["<>\nVirtualPort"]
+ class VirtualVPNPort["<>\nVirtualVPNPort"]
+ class VirtualMulticastPort["<>\nVirtualMulticastPort"]
+ VirtualPort <|-- VirtualVPNPort
+ VirtualPort <|-- VirtualMulticastPort
+
+```
+
+Y.2618(18)\_FA.2
+
+Inheritance diagram of virtual port fragment
+
+**Figure A.2 – Inheritance diagram of virtual port fragment**
+
+##### A.1.1.2 Relationship
+
+From the network level viewpoint, a PTDN virtual network is a logical collection of interconnected logical or physical ports. Figure A.3 shows the relationship between VirtualPacketNetwork, VirtualVPNPort in virtual packet network fragment where VirtualPacketPort may be supported by some other logical or physical termination points which IOC, TerminationPoint, can refer to [ITU-T M.3160].
+
+
+
+```
+
+classDiagram
+ class VirtualPacketNetwork["<>\nVirtualPacketNetwork"]
+ class VirtualVPNPort["<>\nVirtualVPNPort"]
+ class TerminationPort["<>\nTerminationPort"]
+
+ VirtualPacketNetwork "0..*" -- "1" VirtualVPNPort : #containedFPList / #containedInVPN
+ VirtualVPNPort "1" -- "1..*" TerminationPort : #supportedByObjectList
+
+ style TerminationPort stroke-dasharray: 5 5
+
+```
+
+Object Class can be
+physical or logical
+termination port
+
+Y.2618(18)\_FA.3
+
+ER diagram of virtual packet network fragment
+
+**Figure A.3 – ER diagram of virtual packet network fragment**
+
+Figure A.4 shows the relationship between VirtualMultipleNetwork, VirtualMultiplePort in virtual packet network fragment where VirtualMultiplePort may be supported by some other logical or physical termination points which IOC, TerminationPoint, can refer to [ITU-T M.3160].
+
+
+
+```
+
+classDiagram
+ class VirtualMulticastNetwork["<>\nVirtualMulticastNetwork"]
+ class VirtualMulticastPort["<>\nVirtualMulticastPort"]
+ class TerminationPort["<>\nTerminationPort"]
+ VirtualMulticastNetwork "1" *-- "0..*" VirtualMulticastPort : #containedMFPList
+ VirtualMulticastNetwork "1" *-- "1" VirtualMulticastPort : #containedInMulticast
+ VirtualMulticastPort "1..*" *-- "1" TerminationPort : #supportedByObjectList
+ style TerminationPort stroke-dasharray: 5 5
+
+```
+
+Object Class can be physical or logical termination port
+
+Y.2618(18)\_FA.4
+
+ER diagram of virtual multicast network fragment showing relationships between VirtualMulticastNetwork, VirtualMulticastPort, and TerminationPort.
+
+Figure A.4 – ER diagram of virtual multicast network fragment
+
+#### A.1.2 Information object classes definition
+
+##### A.1.2.1 VirtualNetwork
+
+###### A.1.2.1.1 Definition
+
+VirtualNetwork represents the logical collections of flow points that are available for the purpose of transferring information for specific virtual network. It has subclasses such as VirtualPacketNetwork and VirtualMulticastNetwork.
+
+###### A.1.2.1.2 Attributes
+
+Attributes and their manageable properties of VirtualNetwork are listed in Table A.1.
+
+Table A.1 – VirtualNetwork attributes
+
+| Attribute name | Support qualifier | Read qualifier | Write qualifier | Create qualifier | Requirements IDs |
+|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
+| administrativeState | O | M | M | M | |
+| availabilityStatus | O | M | – | – | |
+| containedAccessGroupList | O | M | M | M | |
+| containedVPList | O | M | M | M | |
+| operationalState | O | M | – | – | |
+| usageState | O | M | – | – | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | | | | |
+
+###### A.1.2.1.3 Notifications
+
+Notifications and their support qualifiers of VirtualNetwork are listed in Table A.2.
+
+**Table A.2 – VirtualNetwork notifications**
+
+| Name | Qualifier | Notes |
+|---------------------------------|-----------|-------|
+| attributeValueChange | O | |
+| objectCreation | M | |
+| objectDeletion | M | |
+| stateChange | O | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | |
+
+##### **A.1.2.2 VirtualPacketNetwork**
+
+###### **A.1.2.2.1 Definition**
+
+VirtualPacketNetwork represents the logical collections of VPN flow points that are available for the purpose of transferring information. It is subclass of VirtualNetwork.
+
+###### **A.1.2.2.2 Attributes**
+
+Attributes and their manageable properties of VirtualPacketNetwork are listed in Table A.3.
+
+**Table A.3 – VirtualPacketNetwork attributes**
+
+| Attribute name | Support qualifier | Read qualifier | Write qualifier | Create qualifier | Requirements IDs |
+|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
+| vpnId | M | M | – | M | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | | | | |
+
+###### **A.1.2.2.3 Notifications**
+
+Same as given in clause A.1.2.1, VirtualNetwork.
+
+##### **A.1.2.3 VirtualMulticastNetwork**
+
+##### **A.1.2.3.1 Definition**
+
+VirtualMulticastNetwork represents the logical collections of flow points that are available for the purpose of transferring multicast information. It is subclass of VirtualNetwork.
+
+##### **A.1.2.3.2 Attributes**
+
+Attributes and their manageable properties of VirtualMulticastNetwork are listed in Table A.4.
+
+**Table A.4 – VirtualMulticastNetwork attributes**
+
+| Attribute name | Support qualifier | Read qualifier | Write qualifier | Create qualifier | Requirements IDs |
+|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
+| multicastId | M | M | – | M | |
+| rootMVP | M | M | M | M | |
+| containedMVPList | O | M | M | M | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | | | | |
+
+###### A.1.2.3.3 Notifications
+
+Same as given in clause A.1.2.1, VirtualNetwork.
+
+##### A.1.2.4 VirtualPort
+
+##### A.1.2.4.1 Definition
+
+This IOC represents the termination of a transport entity for VPN or multicast. This is an abstract class. It has subclasses.
+
+##### A.1.2.4.2 Attributes
+
+Attributes and their manageable properties of VirtualPort are listed in Table A.5.
+
+**Table A.5 – VirtualPort attributes**
+
+| Attribute name | Support qualifier | Read qualifier | Write qualifier | Create qualifier | Requirements IDs |
+|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
+| administrativeState | O | M | M | M | |
+| availabilityStatus | O | M | – | – | |
+| bandwidth | M | M | M | M | |
+| operationalState | O | M | – | – | |
+| supportedByObjectList | M | M | – | M | |
+| threshold | M | M | M | M | |
+| userLabel | O | M | M | M | |
+| statistic | M | M | – | – | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | | | | |
+
+###### A.1.2.4.3 Notifications
+
+Notifications and their support qualifiers of VirtualPort are listed in Table A.6.
+
+**Table A.6 – VirtualPort notifications**
+
+| Name | Qualifier | Notes |
+|---------------------------------|-----------|-------|
+| attributeValueChange | O | |
+| objectCreation | M | |
+| objectDeletion | M | |
+| stateChange | M | |
+| NOTE – O-optional; M-mandatory. | | |
+
+##### A.1.2.5 VirtualVPNPort
+
+##### A.1.2.5.1 Definition
+
+This IOC represents the termination point for one VPN. It is subclass of VirtualPort.
+
+##### A.1.2.5.2 Attributes
+
+Attributes and their manageable properties of VirtualVPNPort are listed in Table A.7.
+
+**Table A.7 – VirtualVPNPort attributes**
+
+| Attribute name | SupportAdministrativeState ::= ENUMERATED { locked, unlocked, shuttingDown } | This attribute is to indicate the administrative state of the managed entity, which has three possible values: locked, unlocked, and shuttingDown. See [ITU-T X.731] for details. |
+| availabilityStatus | AvailabilityStatus ::= SET OF INTEGER { inTest(0), failed(1), powerOff(2), offline(3), offDuty(4), dependency(5), degraded(6), notInstalled(7), logFull(8) } | This attribute indicates the availability status of instances of the IOC. |
+| Bandwidth | M3108-1-Bandwidth ::= CHOICE { bitsPerSecond Number, kiloBitsPerSecond Number, megaBitsPerSecond Number, gigaBitsPerSecond Number, teraBitsPerSecond Number } Number ::= SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { ingress INTEGER, egress INTEGER } | This attribute indicates bandwidth that instances support |
+| containedAccessGroupList | ObjectList | This attribute defines the list of Access Group instances which are contained in a virtual network. |
+| containedInMulticast | VirtualMulticastNetwork | This attribute defines the parent Virtual Multicast Network which contains the instance of the corresponding IOC. |
+
+**Table A.9 – Attributes**
+
+| | | |
+|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| containedInVPN | VirtualPacketNetwork | This attribute defines the parent Virtual Packet Network which contains the instance of the corresponding IOC. |
+| containedVPList | ObjectList | This attribute is a list of pointers to Virtual Port instances that are contained in the Virtual Network instance. |
+| containedMVPList | ObjectList | This attribute is a list of pointers to Virtual Multicast Port instances that are contained in the Virtual Network instance. |
+| downstreamObjectList | ObjectList | This attribute is a list of pointers to downstream Virtual Port instances. |
+| multicastId | MulticastId String(SIZE(0..128)) | This attribute is the identifier of an instance of this managed class |
+| operationalState | OperationalState ::= ENUMERATED {Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2620**
+
+(04/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Packet-based Networks
+
+# --- **T interface for the public packet telecommunication data network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2620
+
+ITU-T
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2620
+
+# T interface for the public packet telecommunication data network
+
+## Summary
+
+Public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) is one of the hierarchical data networks needed to meet the requirements of future packet-based networks whose reference interfaces are defined in ITU-T Y.2613.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2620 identifies the T interface and its functions between PTDN edge devices and address translators (ADT). The functions, procedures for the two interface types, i.e., T1 interface and T2 interface, are described. Appendix I gives an example of encapsulation for T interface messages, and Appendix II gives a candidate message format for address resolution in the T1 interface.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2620 | 2019-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13889 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Address resolution, address update, public packet telecommunication data network, PTDN, registration.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Terms and Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Architecture ..... | 2 |
+| 7 Transmission..... | 3 |
+| 8 T1 interface..... | 3 |
+| 8.1 ED registration..... | 4 |
+| 8.2 Address resolution ..... | 4 |
+| 8.3 Address update ..... | 5 |
+| 9 T2 interface..... | 5 |
+| 9.1 Inter-domain interface ..... | 5 |
+| 9.2 Intra-domain interface ..... | 6 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 6 |
+| Appendix I – An example of encapsulation for the T interface message ..... | 8 |
+| Appendix II – One candidate message format for address resolution ..... | 9 |
+| II.1 Resolution request ..... | 9 |
+| II.2 Resolution response..... | 10 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2620
+
+## T interface for the public packet telecommunication data network
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the T interface of the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN), including general description, functions and procedures.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2613] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613 (2010), *General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network*.
+
+## 3 Terms and Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)** [ITU-T Y.2613]: A packet data network designed for the NGN transport stratum, which should be secure, trustworthy, controllable, and manageable, can meet all the requirements described in [b-ITU-T Y.2601]. PTDN is a hierarchical network, which can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+**3.1.2 address** [b-ITU-T Y.2601]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 T interface:** The interface that public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) address translator (ADT) uses to communicate with PTDN edge device (ED) and/or other ADTs to provide address translation service.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------------|
+| ACK | Acknowledge |
+| ADT | Address Translator |
+| ED | Edge Device |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| NM | Network Manager |
+| PTDN | Public packet Telecommunication Data Network |
+
+SR Service Router
+ VPN Virtual Private Network
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Architecture
+
+PTDN is a hierarchical network that consists of an access network, an aggregation network and a core network, which are also hierarchical networks that can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of a PTDN (Private Trusted Data Network) and its connection to external networks. The PTDN is composed of three hierarchical layers: the Core network (top), the Aggregation network (middle), and the Access network (bottom). The Core network contains a Service Router (SR) pair connected by a dashed line, with a Network Manager (NM) box connected to it via a dashed line labeled 'M'. The Aggregation network contains two SR pairs, each connected to the Core network via a solid line labeled 'R'. The Access network contains two SR pairs, each connected to the Aggregation network via a solid line labeled 'R'. A central Address Translator (ADT) box is connected to the Access network SR pairs via solid lines labeled 'T'. Below the Access network, two End systems (represented by a person at a computer) are connected to the SR pairs via solid lines labeled 'E'. Each End system is also connected to an 'Other network' (represented by a cloud) via a dashed line. The entire PTDN structure is enclosed in a large bracket labeled 'PTDN'. The End systems and their connections to other networks are enclosed in a bracket labeled 'End systems OR other networks'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2620(19)\_F01' in the bottom right corner.
+
+Diagram of the T interface in PTDN architecture showing the flow from end systems through access, aggregation, and core networks.
+
+**Figure 1 – T interface in PTDN**
+
+In the PTDN, address translators (ADTs) are responsible for mapping or translating Internet protocol (IP) addresses (or other networks addresses) to PTDN addresses. ADTs cooperate with edge devices (EDs) to achieve the activities of address mapping/translation by the T interface.
+
+
+
+Figure 2 – T interface category diagram. It shows a cloud representing a network of ADTs (Address Distribution Translators). Inside the cloud, three ADT boxes are connected by dashed lines labeled T2, forming a mesh topology. Outside the cloud, three ED (Edge Device) boxes are connected to the ADTs by dashed lines labeled T1. The connections show that each ADT can connect to multiple EDs and other ADTs. An ellipsis (...) indicates additional EDs and ADTs. The reference Y.2620(19)\_F02 is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 2 – T interface category**
+
+T interface includes the interface between ADTs and EDs, and the interface among ADTs, to provide address mapping and translation. T interface can be classified into:
+
+- T1 : Interface between ADTs and EDs.
+
+Through T1 interface, EDs can register their access customer network addresses to ADTs and resolve customer network addresses to PTDN addresses from ADTs.
+
+- T2 : Interface among ADTs.
+
+Through T2 interface, ADTs register, advertise and query address mapping information to/from other ADTs.
+
+ADTs form a logical network, which uses underlying network transmission facilities. Figure 2 illustrates a mesh ADT network topology including both a T1 interface and a T2 interface. ADT network topology is not limited to mesh topology, but it can also be other topologies, such as ring, star, etc.
+
+The ADT network should be designed to avoid the risk that a single fault may cause address translation failures.
+
+## 7 Transmission
+
+Messages on T interface are carried in the control plane of the PTDN or in a specific virtual private network (VPN).
+
+If T interface messages are transformed in control plane, the messages encapsulation shall follow the definitions defined in [ITU-T Y.2613]. The message type in control packet header is used to determinate T interface messages. An example is given in Appendix I.
+
+If T interface messages are transformed in a specific VPN, this specific VPN ID is used to determine T interface messages.
+
+## 8 T1 interface
+
+T1 interface includes three functions:
+
+- ED registration function is used to register EDs to ADTs. ADTs have the capability to authorize the registration of EDs;
+- the address resolution function is to provide the ED with the mapping information between the customer network address and the destination ED address;
+
+- the address update function is used to modify the mapping information.
+
+An ED can get address translation service from more than one ADT using primary and/or secondary ADT addresses, which can be assigned by the network operator or be implemented through any cast mechanism.
+
+### 8.1 ED registration
+
+As soon as an ED boots up successfully and is ready to work, it shall send a registration request message to its assigned ADT. The registration request message contains the ED identification information as well as authentication information.
+
+Based on this registration request, the ADT should verify whether the ED is attached to it. If the ED is attached to the ADT, then the ADT sends acknowledge response message. When the ED receives the ADT acknowledge response message, the ED sends an address update message to register its address mapping information into the ADT. Figure 3 shows a basic procedure of ED registration.
+
+If the ED is not attached to the ADT, then the ADT just drops this request silently.
+
+This procedure can optionally include additional negotiation processes to decide if and how to apply relevant mechanisms, such as message retransmission mechanism, keep alive mechanism, and security mechanism. The security mechanism is used to authenticate the subsequent messages exchanged between the ED and the ADT.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ED
+ participant ADT
+ Note left of ED: 1) Ready for work
+2) Got ADT address
+3) ED registration initiated
+ ED->>ADT: ED registration request
+ Note right of ADT: Validate and/or respond
+ ADT-->>ED: ED registration ACK
+
+```
+
+Y.2620(19)\_F03
+
+Sequence diagram showing the ED registration procedure between an ED and an ADT. The ED initiates registration after being ready for work and getting the ADT address. It sends an 'ED registration request' to the ADT. The ADT then 'Validate and/or respond' and sends back an 'ED registration ACK' to the ED.
+
+**Figure 3 – ED registration procedure**
+
+### 8.2 Address resolution
+
+Mapping information between customer network address and PTDN address are stored in ADTs. T1 address resolution function is used for the ED to get these mapping information from the ADT.
+
+When an ED receives a customer's packet whose destination address is not a local customer network address, it needs to look for the corresponding PTDN ED address of the destination customer network address. When a cache mechanism is used, ED looks up within its cache to find the entry that meets the conditions. If it cannot find a suitable one, it sends an address resolution request message to the ADT (see Figure 4). This request message includes:
+
+- a sequence number, that is used to correlate query and answer;
+- the customer network address information including address type and address.
+
+The ADT then looks up the customer-PTDN address mapping information. If it can obtain the corresponding entry, it returns the query result. Otherwise, it returns a query failure message. In query result, the following fields are included:
+
+- sequence number;
+- error code;
+- address mapping, that includes queried PTDN address, optional properties such as expiry time;
+- optional information.
+
+Cache containing recently used customer-PTDN address mapping should be used in ED to reduce address queries. It is recommended to support other mechanisms such as aging mechanism.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ED
+ participant ADT
+ Note left of ED: 1) ED has been registered
+2) User packet received with
+an unknown destination address
+3) Address resolution request
+sent to ADT
+ ED->>ADT: Address resolution request
+ ADT-->>ED: Address resolution response
+ Note right of ADT: Lookup and
+respond
+
+```
+
+Y.2620(19)\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram for Address resolution procedure (Figure 4).
+
+**Figure 4 – Address resolution procedure**
+
+### 8.3 Address update
+
+The address update function is used to guarantee that the address mapping information is up to date. Normally, only a small amount of customers addresses are changed, resulting in a small portion of changes on address mapping information. It is recommended to have an incremental mechanism to update this portion of changes instead of the entire address mapping information.
+
+An ED obtains and keeps track of its attached customers network addresses information by interface E which is defined in [ITU-T Y.2613].
+
+Once the changes of customer network reachability are detected, the ED will send an address update message to notify the ADT of these changes.
+
+As the information is critical, the acknowledge mechanism and retransmission mechanism are recommended during the address update procedure to make sure that the information is notified to the ADT. Figure 5 shows a typical address update procedure.
+
+Once the primary ADT out-of-service is detected, the ED is required to be able to interact with a secondary ADT.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ED
+ participant ADT
+ Note left of ED: 1) ED has been registered
+2) User network changed
+3) Address update sent to ADT
+ ED->>ADT: Address update request
+ ADT-->>ED: Address update response
+ Note right of ADT: Update and
+acknowledge
+
+```
+
+Y.2620(19)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram for Address update procedure (Figure 5).
+
+**Figure 5 – Address update procedure**
+
+## 9 T2 interface
+
+More than one ADT is deployed in a network to eliminate single points of failure. These ADTs work together to provide address translation services. The interface among these ADTs, i.e., T2 interface is further categorized into intra-domain interface and inter-domain interface.
+
+### 9.1 Inter-domain interface
+
+Peer-to-peer interaction between domains is required. The domain administrator deploys more than one ADT as domain border ADTs. When one customer from domain A wants to communicate to another customer in domain B, the information of both customers should be advertised to each other
+
+through domain border ADTs. When domain border ADTs receive the customer information, they can advertise the information to other ADTs in the domain, but, in principle, will not advertise them to other domains.
+
+The information to advertise includes, but is not limited to:
+
+- customer identification information;
+- customer network address type, (e.g., IP address);
+- customer network address and network address prefix;
+- PTDN address (i.e., border interworking gateway address).
+
+The inter-domain T2 interface should also have the following properties:
+
+- robustness to ensure reliable information delivery;
+- efficiency to update information;
+- flexibility and scalability to meet new requirements, such as new types of information and increasing number of network customers.
+
+### **9.2 Intra-domain interface**
+
+According to the network scale, and the characteristics of customers and services, ADTs are deployed in either a centralized way, a distributed way, or an hybrid way. The ADTs form a logical network, which may be flat or hierarchical.
+
+Intra-domain T2 interface should support one or both of the following two functions for different cases:
+
+- address resolution function
+
+This is required when an ADT does not maintain a whole set of address mapping information database for the domain. In this case, an ADT redirects the address resolution request received from the ED to other ADTs through the T2 interface when the requested customer address is not found in the local database (for detail, see clause 8.2).
+
+- address advertise function
+
+This is required when an ADT maintains the customer information received not only from local EDs but also from other ADTs. In this case, ADTs advertise the address mapping information learned from the local EDs to other ADTs and receive advertised information from other ADTs through the T2 interface. The intra-domain T2 interface has the same requirements as those listed in clause 9.1.
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+Address translation plays a crucial role in PTDN. Security must be considered on three levels: ADT, ED and communication between them.
+
+- communication between ADT and ED:
+
+The security techniques are recommended to be applied in order to guarantee the safety of the information. For example:
+
+- Authentication between ED and ADT can be used, only authenticated ED and ADT can setup a connection between them, and can update address information.
+- Security mechanism such as encryption can be used in communication between ED and ADT.
+- Resources used to transmit T interface messages should be guaranteed either in control plane or in a specific VPN.
+
+###### – ADT
+
+- Multiple ADTs in a PTDN should be deployed to remove a single point of failure and to balance load.
+- ADT may have a mechanism to detect malicious address resolution requests.
+
+###### – ED
+
+Beside the normal border security techniques and mechanisms to protect PTDN, EDs should have:
+
+- A mechanism to protect against denial-of-service attacks.
+- A mechanism to suppress address resolution requests by intentionally dropping new flows.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### An example of encapsulation for the T interface message
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Several values of message type in control packet header may be used to determine different types of T interface messages, for example, address resolution request, address resolution response, address update, etc. Figure I.1 shows the encapsulation of a T interface message in the control plane. In this example, control message with type value 0xAA is an address resolution request message.
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet | | | | |
+|-------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|--------------------|---|----------------|---|-------------------|--|--|--|--|
+| Version | | | | Packet typeSeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2622
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Packet-based Networks
+
+# --- **Architecture of an independent scalable control plane in future packet based networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2622
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, followed by "International Telecommunication Union" in a smaller font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2622**
+
+# **Architecture of an independent scalable control plane in future packet based networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2622 describes the functional architecture of an independent scalable control plane (iSCP) that is achieved by separating the control plane from the data plane in future packet based networks (FPBNs). Basic functional components and reference points of an iSCP are illustrated.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2622 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Forwarding, FPBN, iSCP, network entity, routing, scalability, separation, virtual network element.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 iSCP architecture ..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Virtual network element (VNE) ..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Control element (CE) ..... | 4 |
+| 6.3 Service control element (SCE) ..... | 5 |
+| 6.4 Forwarding element (FE) ..... | 6 |
+| 6.5 Service processing element (SPE)..... | 8 |
+| 6.6 Management element (ME)..... | 9 |
+| 7 Reference points ..... | 10 |
+| 8 Security considerations..... | 11 |
+| Appendix I – Procedures related to iSCP..... | 12 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2622
+
+# Architecture of an independent scalable control plane in future packet based networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the architecture, basic functional components, and reference points of an independent scalable control plane (iSCP) that is achieved by separating the control plane from the data plane in future packet based networks (FPBN), as described in [ITU-T Y.2621].
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2621] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2621 (2011), *Requirements for an independent, scalable control plane in future, packet-based networks*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.2 data plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+
+**3.1.3 future packet based network (FPBN)** [ITU-T Y.2621]: A network architecture providing the topmost layer(s) of the transport stratum as defined in [ITU-T Y.2011].
+
+**3.1.4 independent scalable control plane (iSCP)** [ITU-T Y.2621]: An architectural approach of future packet based networks (FPBNs) which consists of separating the control plane from the data plane.
+
+**3.1.5 management plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to manage entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this management.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+BGP Border Gateway Protocol
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------|
+| CE | Control Element |
+| FE | Forwarding Element |
+| FIB | Forwarding Information Base |
+| FPBN | Future Packet Based Networks |
+| iSCP | independent Scalable Control Plane |
+| ME | Management Element |
+| MIB | Management Information Base |
+| OSPF | Open Shortest Path First |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RIB | Routing Information Base |
+| SCE | Service Control Element |
+| SPE | Service Processing Element |
+| VNE | Virtual Network Element |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation, the following conventions are used:
+
+The keyword "entity" indicates a CE, SCE, FE, SPE, ME or VNE.
+
+# 6 iSCP architecture
+
+The high level requirements stated in [ITU-T Y.2621] necessitate defining the following reconstructible components for the iSCP architecture: the control plane, data plane, management plane, control elements (CEs), service control elements (SCEs), forwarding elements (FEs), service processing elements (SPEs), and management elements (MEs).
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the relationship between the control plane, data plane, and management plane, and the relationship of the reconstructible components. Multiple MEs, CEs, SCEs, FEs, and SPEs can form a virtual network element (VNE).
+
+
+
+The diagram shows three distinct planes: Management Plane, Control Plane, and Data Plane. The Management Plane is a yellow vertical rectangle containing a single box labeled 'ME'. The Control Plane is a light blue rounded rectangle containing four boxes: two labeled 'CE' and two labeled 'SCE'. The Data Plane is a light purple rounded rectangle containing four boxes: two labeled 'FE' and two labeled 'SPE'. A red dashed rectangular box, labeled 'VNE' in red text, spans across the Control Plane and Data Plane, enclosing the second 'CE' box, the first 'SCE' box, the first 'FE' box, and the first 'SPE' box.
+
+Diagram illustrating the three planes and reconstructible components of iSCP architecture. The Management Plane (yellow) contains the Management Element (ME). The Control Plane (light blue) contains Control Elements (CE) and Service Control Elements (SCE). The Data Plane (light purple) contains Forwarding Elements (FE) and Service Processing Elements (SPE). A red dashed box labeled VNE encloses the CE, SCE, FE, and SPE components across the Control and Data Planes.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Three planes and reconstructible components**
+
+The control plane of an iSCP contains mechanisms for operating the packets and deciding the pathways for user traffic. These mechanisms are implemented in the CEs and SCEs. The data plane of an iSCP contains mechanisms for forwarding and processing user traffic and/or control traffic. These mechanisms are implemented in the FEs and SPEs. The management plane of an iSCP
+
+contains mechanisms for dealing with the operation, administration, and management aspects of an iSCP based network, which is a network based on iSCP as an architectural approach. These mechanisms are implemented in the MEs.
+
+Figure 6-2 illustrates the iSCP functional architecture representing the entities of iSCP and the reference points among the entities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the iSCP functional architecture. A central rounded rectangle represents the VNE, containing four main components: CE (Control Element), SCE (Service Control Element), FE (Forwarding Element), and SPE (Service Forwarding Element). Outside the VNE, there is an ME (Management Element) on the left and two External nodes on the bottom left and bottom right. Management (M) points are shown as dots on dashed lines connecting the ME to CE, FE, and SPE. Control (C) points (C1, C2, C3) are shown as dots on dashed lines connecting CE to FE, CE to SCE, and SCE to SPE. Data (D) points (D1, D2, D3) are shown as dots on solid lines connecting FE to FE, FE to SPE, and FE to External nodes. A legend on the right defines the line styles: dashed for Control, solid for Data, dash-dot for Management, and a dot for Reference point.
+
+Figure 6-2 – iSCP functional architecture diagram. The diagram shows a Virtual Network Element (VNE) box containing CE, SCE, FE, and SPE components. External nodes connect to FEs. Management (M) points connect MEs to CE, FE, and SPE. Control (C) points (C1, C2, C3) and Data (D) points (D1, D2, D3) are shown at various interfaces. A legend defines line styles: dashed for Control, solid for Data, dash-dot for Management, and a dot for Reference point.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – iSCP functional architecture**
+
+The iSCP functional architecture provides two basic operations, VNE configuration and VNE operation. The VNE configuration includes: composing a VNE from CEs, SCEs, FEs, and SPEs based on configuration information from MEs; changing the structure of the VNE depending on the required capacity and flexibility; and breaking up the VNE. The VNE operation involves operating the constructed VNE as a single conventional network entity, e.g., a router.
+
+The iSCP architecture provides three types of reference points, control type reference point C, data type reference point D, and management type reference point M. The control type reference point C is used to exchange control information and includes reference points C1, C2, and C3. Reference point C1 is used between CEs and FEs, reference point C2 is used between SCEs and SPEs, and reference point C3 is used between CEs and SCEs. The data type reference point D is used to forward packets and includes reference points D1, D2, and D3. Reference point D1 is used between FEs and FEs, reference point D2 is used between FEs and SPEs, and reference point D3 is used between FEs and external nodes. The management type reference point M is used to exchange configuration and management information between MEs and CEs/FEs/SCEs/SPEs.
+
+## 6.1 Virtual network element (VNE)
+
+The VNE is a virtual entity composed of multiple CEs, SCEs, FEs, and SPEs based on the configuration information from MEs. The number of individual entities used for the VNE can vary depending on the required capacity and flexibility. The VNE operates as a single conventional network entity, e.g., a router. The VNE hides its internal organization from external nodes and represents a single point of management to entities outside the VNE. Besides management
+
+information bases (MIBs) of each entity in the VNE, there are also MIBs for the whole VNE. The MIBs of the VNE are held and managed by the MEs.
+
+## 6.2 Control element (CE)
+
+One VNE can include one or several CEs. The interfaces among the CEs, which are needed when several CEs cooperate with each other within the VNE, will not be defined in this Recommendation.
+
+The CE provides the capability to join and leave one VNE based on configuration information from the ME(s).
+
+The CE instructs one or a group of FE(s) on how to process packets. The CE generates the packet-forwarding rules for FE(s) and downloads the forwarding rules to the FE(s). To generate these forwarding rules, the CE maintains necessary information in a routing information base (RIB) to compute the most suitable route for incoming packets. The CE updates the RIB in several ways, e.g., by communicating with external nodes through routing protocols via FE(s), by receiving the topology information within the VNE from FE(s), or by receiving the static route configuration from ME(s). Also, the CE maintains routing policies for generating the forwarding rules for FE(s), which indicate specific routes for specific packets. The CE receives such routing policies from ME(s) upon request of network operators, or from SCE(s) upon request from the service control of the SCE(s).
+
+The CE manages the CE state information such as entity status and operating status of the CE itself and maintains the MIBs of the CE. The CE allows ME(s) to access these MIBs.
+
+Figure 6-3 shows the functions of the CE and its related reference points.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Control Element (CE) as a central box containing five functional modules. On the left, a dashed line with a dot represents reference point M. On the right, a dashed line with a dot represents reference point C3. Below the CE box, a dashed line with a dot represents reference point C1. The internal modules are arranged as follows:
+
+- Top-left: VNE composition functions
+- Top-right: Forwarding rule computation functions
+- Middle-left: Routing information management functions
+- Middle-right: CE state management functions
+- Bottom-left: Routing policy management functions
+
+Diagram of the Control Element (CE) showing its internal functions and external reference points.
+
+Figure 6-3 – Control element
+
+#### 6.2.1 VNE composition functions
+
+The VNE composition functions support the CE in composing the VNE. The VNE composition functions interact with ME(s) to receive the configuration information through reference point M. The configuration information indicates which other entities the CE should be connected to. Based on the configuration information, the VNE composition functions establish or terminate the control sessions with FE(s) through reference point C1 or with SCE(s) through reference point C3.
+
+#### **6.2.2 Routing information management functions**
+
+The routing information management functions provide the capabilities to collect and store the routing information required for the VNE to forward packets. The routing information management functions collect the routing information in several ways, e.g., by communicating with external nodes through routing protocols via FE(s) using reference point C1, by receiving the topology information within the VNE from FE(s) through reference point C1, and by receiving the static route configuration from ME(s) through reference point M. The routing information management functions store the collected routing information in the RIB.
+
+#### **6.2.3 Routing policy management functions**
+
+The routing policy management functions provide the capabilities to receive and store the routing policies required for the VNE to forward specific packets on a specific route. The routing policy management functions receive the routing policies from ME(s) through reference point M upon request of network operators or from SCE(s) through reference point C3 upon request from the service control of the SCE(s). The routing policy management functions store the received routing policies in the routing policy database.
+
+#### **6.2.4 Forwarding rule computation functions**
+
+The forwarding rule computation functions generate the forwarding rules for FE(s) to forward packets based on the information of the RIB and the routing policy database. The forwarding rule computation functions download the generated forwarding rules to the FE(s) through reference point C1.
+
+#### **6.2.5 CE state management functions**
+
+The CE state management functions are responsible for managing CE state information such as the entity status and operating status of the CE itself. The CE state management functions store the CE state information in the MIBs of the CE. The CE state management functions respond to the accesses from ME(s) to the MIBs of the CE through reference point M.
+
+### **6.3 Service control element (SCE)**
+
+One VNE can include one or several SCEs. The interfaces among the SCEs, which are needed when several SCEs cooperate with each other within the VNE, will not be defined in this Recommendation.
+
+The SCE provides the capabilities to join and leave one VNE based on configuration information from ME(s).
+
+The SCE instructs associated SPE(s) on how to process packets. The SCE generates the processing rules for SPE(s) to process packets, and downloads the processing rules to the SPE(s). The SCE maintains service policies to generate the processing rules for SPE(s). The SCE receives such service policies from ME(s) upon request of network operators. For example, service policies include quality of service (QoS) behaviour policies and access control policies. If the service policies need to indicate a specific route for specific packets, the SCE generates the appropriate routing policies and sends the generated routing policies to the CE(s).
+
+The SCE manages the SCE state information such as entity status and operating status of the SCE itself and maintains the MIBs of the SCE. The SCE allows ME(s) to access these MIBs.
+
+Figure 6-4 shows the functions of the SCE and its related reference points.
+
+
+
+Diagram of the Service Control Element (SCE) architecture. The SCE is represented as a large rectangle containing four functional blocks: 'VNE composition functions' (top-left), 'Processing rule computation functions' (top-right), 'Service policy management functions' (bottom-left), and 'SCE state management functions' (bottom-right). Three reference points are shown: 'M' is on the left, connected to the SCE by a dashed line; 'C3' is also on the left, connected to the SCE by a dashed line; and 'C2' is at the bottom, connected to the SCE by a dashed line.
+
+**Figure 6-4 – Service control element**
+
+#### **6.3.1 VNE composition functions**
+
+The VNE composition functions support the SCE in composing the VNE. The VNE composition functions interact with ME(s) to receive the configuration information through reference point M. The configuration information indicates which other entities the SCE should be connected to. Based on the configuration information, the VNE composition functions establish or terminate the control sessions with SPE(s) through reference point C2 or with CE(s) through reference point C3.
+
+#### **6.3.2 Service policy management functions**
+
+The service policy management functions provide the capabilities to receive and store the service policies required for SPE(s) to process specific packets. The service policy management functions receive the service policies from ME(s) through reference point M upon request of network operators. The service policy management functions store the received service policies in the service policy database.
+
+#### **6.3.3 Processing rule computation functions**
+
+The processing rule computation functions generate the processing rules for SPE(s) to process packets based on the information in the service policy database. The processing rule computation functions download the generated processing rules to the SPE(s) through reference point C2. If the service policies need to indicate a specific route for specific packets, the processing rule computation functions generate the appropriate routing policies and send the generated routing policies to CE(s) through reference point C3.
+
+#### **6.3.4 SCE state management functions**
+
+The SCE state management functions are responsible for managing SCE state information such as entity status and operating status of the SCE itself. The SCE state management functions store the SCE state information in the MIBs of the SCE. The SCE state management functions respond to the accesses from ME(s) to the MIBs of the SCE through reference point M.
+
+### **6.4 Forwarding element (FE)**
+
+The FE provides the capabilities to join and leave one VNE based on configuration information from ME(s).
+
+The FE forwards incoming packets according to the forwarding rules generated and given by CE(s). The forwarding rules consist of the information needed for the FE to forward incoming packets, e.g., information on the packets' next hop. The FE maintains the forwarding rules in a forwarding information base (FIB) and updates the FIB by receiving the latest forwarding rules from CE(s).
+
+The FE manages the FE state information such as entity status and operating status of the FE itself and maintains the MIBs of the FE. The FE allows ME(s) to access these MIBs.
+
+Figure 6-5 shows the functions of the FE and its related reference points.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Forwarding Element (FE) as a central rectangular box. Inside the box, there are four rounded rectangular function blocks arranged in a 2x2 grid:
+
+
+- Top-left: VNE composition functions
+- Top-right: Forwarding functions
+- Bottom-left: Forwarding information management functions
+- Bottom-right: FE state management functions
+
+ External reference points are connected to the FE box:
+
+
+- C1**: A dashed line connects the top of the box to a dot labeled C1.
+- D2**: A solid line connects the top of the box to a dot labeled D2.
+- M**: A dashed line connects the left side of the box to a dot labeled M.
+- D1**: A solid line connects the left side of the box to a dot labeled D1.
+- D3**: A solid line connects the right side of the box to a dot labeled D3.
+
+Diagram of the Forwarding Element (FE) showing its internal functions and external reference points.
+
+**Figure 6-5 – Forwarding element**
+
+#### 6.4.1 VNE composition functions
+
+The VNE composition functions support the FE in composing the VNE. The VNE composition functions interact with ME(s) to receive the configuration information through reference point M. The configuration information indicates which other entities the FE should be connected to. Based on the configuration information, the VNE composition functions establish or terminate the control sessions with CE(s) through reference point C1.
+
+#### 6.4.2 Forwarding information management functions
+
+The forwarding information management functions provide the capabilities to collect and store the forwarding rules for the FE to forward incoming packets. The forwarding information management functions receive the latest forwarding rules from CE(s) through reference point C1. The forwarding information management functions store the collected forwarding rules in the FIB.
+
+#### 6.4.3 Forwarding functions
+
+The forwarding functions provide the capabilities to forward incoming packets according to the information in the FIB. The forwarding functions receive packets from or send packets to the connected FE(s) through reference point D1, the connected SPE(s) through reference point D2, the connected external node(s) through reference point D3, and the connected CE(s) through reference point C1. Normal data packets are transmitted only through reference points D1 and D3. Specific data packets that are required to be processed by the connected SPE(s) are transmitted not only through reference points D1 and D3 but also D2. Specific control packets, e.g., open shortest path first (OSPF) protocol packets and border gateway protocol (BGP) packets are transmitted through reference points D3 and C1 because such packets are redirected from the data plane to the control plane at the FE(s) situated on the edges of the VNE.
+
+#### 6.4.4 FE state management functions
+
+The FE state management functions are responsible for managing FE state information such as entity status and operating status of the FE itself. The FE state management functions store the FE state information in the MIBs of the FE. The FE state management functions respond to the accesses from ME(s) to the MIBs of the FE through reference point M.
+
+### 6.5 Service processing element (SPE)
+
+The SPE provides the capabilities to join and leave one VNE based on configuration information from ME(s).
+
+The SPE processes incoming packets from the connected FE(s) according to the processing rules generated and given by SCE(s). The processing rules consist of the information needed for the SPE to process incoming packets, e.g., QoS behaviour information and access control information. The SPE maintains the processing rules in a service control table, and updates the service control table by receiving the latest processing rules from SCE(s).
+
+The SPE manages the SPE state information such as entity status and operating status of the SPE itself and maintains the MIBs of the SPE. The SPE allows ME(s) to access these MIBs.
+
+Figure 6-6 shows the functions of the SPE and its related reference points.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Service Processing Element (SPE) as a central rectangular block. Inside this block, four rounded rectangular boxes represent the internal functions: 'VNE composition functions' and 'Processing functions' are in the top row, while 'Processing information management functions' and 'SPE state management functions' are in the bottom row. The SPE is connected to three external reference points: a dashed line labeled 'M' enters from the left; a dashed line labeled 'C2' enters from the top; and a solid line labeled 'D2' exits from the bottom.
+
+Diagram of the Service Processing Element (SPE) showing its internal functions and reference points.
+
+Figure 6-6 – Service processing element
+
+#### **6.5.1 VNE composition functions**
+
+The VNE composition functions support the SPE in composing the VNE. The VNE composition functions interact with ME(s) to receive the configuration information through reference point M. The configuration information indicates which other entities the SPE should be connected to. Based on the configuration information, the VNE composition functions establish or terminate the control sessions with SCE(s) through reference point C2.
+
+#### **6.5.2 Processing information management functions**
+
+The processing information management functions provide the capabilities to collect and store the processing rules for the SPE to process incoming packets. The processing information management functions receive the latest processing rules from SCE(s) through reference point C2. The processing information management functions store the collected processing rules in the service control table.
+
+#### **6.5.3 Processing functions**
+
+The processing functions provide the capabilities to process incoming packets according to the information in the service control table. The processing functions receive packets from or send the processed packets to the connected FE(s) through reference point D2. Specific data packets that are required to be processed by the SPE are sent from the connected FE(s) through reference point D2. If the processed data packets have to reach other destinations, the processed packets are returned to the connected FE(s) through reference point D2.
+
+#### **6.5.4 SPE state management functions**
+
+The SPE state management functions are responsible for managing the SPE state information such as entity status and operating status of the SPE itself. The SPE state management functions store the SPE state information in the MIBs of the SPE. The SPE state management functions respond to the accesses from ME(s) to the MIBs of the SPE through reference point M.
+
+### **6.6 Management element (ME)**
+
+The ME provides the capabilities to manage CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s) and partition them into multiple reconstructible VNEs.
+
+The ME maintains VNE composition information set by network operators that describes the relationships between VNEs and the entities composing the VNEs. According to the VNE composition information, the ME sends VNE configurations to CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s).
+
+Upon request of network operators, the ME sends several kinds of operation configurations, e.g., static route configuration, routing policies, and service policies, to CE(s) or SCE(s).
+
+The ME monitors the state information of VNE(s), CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s) by accessing the MIBs of these entities.
+
+The ME manages the state information of all VNEs such as entity status and operating status of the VNEs, and maintains the MIBs of the VNEs.
+
+Figure 6-7 shows the functions of the ME and its related reference points.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Management element (ME) as a large rectangular box. Inside the box, there are three rounded rectangular sub-boxes: 'VNE composition management functions' and 'Entity state management functions' are positioned side-by-side at the top, while 'Policy configuration functions' is located below them on the left. To the right of the main box, a dashed line extends outwards, passing through a solid black circle labeled 'M', and then continues as a dotted line.
+
+Diagram of the Management element (ME) showing internal functions and an external reference point.
+
+**Figure 6-7 – Management element**
+
+#### **6.6.1 VNE composition management functions**
+
+The VNE composition management functions store the VNE composition information set by network operators, which describes the relationships between VNEs and the entities composing the VNEs, in the VNE composition information database. According to the VNE composition information, the VNE composition management functions send VNE configurations to CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s) through reference point M.
+
+#### **6.6.2 Policy configuration functions**
+
+The policy configuration functions provide the capabilities to send several kinds of policy configurations upon request of network operators. For example, the policy configuration functions send static route configurations or routing policies to CE(s), or service policies to SCE(s), through reference point M.
+
+#### **6.6.3 Entity state management functions**
+
+The entity state management functions provide the capabilities to monitor the state information of VNE(s), CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s) by accessing the MIBs of these entities.
+
+The state management functions retrieve the information in the MIBs on the CE(s), SCE(s), FE(s), and SPE(s) through reference point M.
+
+The entity state management functions are responsible for managing the VNE state information such as entity status and operating status of the VNE as a single network entity. The entity state management functions store the VNE state information in the MIBs of all VNEs.
+
+## **7 Reference points**
+
+The reference points within the iSCP architecture are as follows:
+
+- C1 Reference point between CEs and FEs. Through this reference point, CEs establish or terminate control sessions with FEs, collect routing information from FEs, and download forwarding rules to FEs.
+- C2 Reference point between SCEs and SPEs. Through this reference point, SCEs establish or terminate control sessions with SPEs and download processing rules to SPEs.
+- C3 Reference point between CEs and SCEs. Through this reference point, CEs establish or terminate control sessions with SCEs and receive routing policies from SCEs.
+- D1 Reference point among FEs in same VNE. Through this reference point, FEs receive packets from or send packets to connected FEs.
+
+- D2 Reference point between FEs and SPEs. Through this reference point, FEs send specific data packets that need to be processed by SPEs to the SPEs and receive processed packets from the SPEs.
+- D3 Reference point between FEs and external nodes. Through this reference point, FEs receive packets from or send packets to external nodes.
+- M Reference point between MEs and CEs/SCEs/FEs/SPEs. Through this reference point, MEs send VNE configurations to CEs/SCEs/FEs/SPEs, send static route configurations or routing policies to CEs, send service policies to SCEs, and retrieve information in MIBs on CEs/SCEs/FEs/SPEs.
+
+# **8 Security considerations**
+
+The security requirements within the iSCP architecture are addressed by the security requirements in [ITU-T Y.2621].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Procedures related to iSCP
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix describes a procedure for CE/SCE failover.
+
+The iSCP architecture separates the control plane from the data plane in the FPBNs, and one control plane element, CE/SCE, consolidates and controls multiple data plane elements, FEs/SPEs. Under this architecture, if faults occur in the CE/SCE, and the CE/SCE become unable to serve a control function, all of the FEs/SPEs controlled by the CE/SCE will be affected. Therefore, it is important to ensure the high reliability of the CE/SCE in the iSCP architecture.
+
+One of the standard ways to respond to a CE/SCE fault is to take a redundant configuration of CE/SCEs. This means that network operators provide some standby CE/SCEs for the active CE/SCEs. If faults occur in any of the active CE/SCEs, the operation of the failed CE/SCE will be continued in any of the standby CE/SCEs. The entire iSCP based network usually has multiple VNEs, and each active CE/SCE belongs to a VNE, but none of the standby CE/SCEs belong to a VNE. When faults occur in any of the active CE/SCEs, a standby CE/SCE will then become an active CE/SCE in the VNE that includes the failed CE/SCE. This means the active CE/SCEs in the existing VNEs share the standby CE/SCEs. Because each VNE does not need to have exclusive redundant CE/SCEs, network operators can adopt a cost-efficient redundant configuration.
+
+In an iSCP based network, the ME maintains VNE composition information describing the relationships between VNEs and the entities composing the VNEs, and it monitors the state information of each element. Therefore, the ME should be responsible for detecting CE/SCE faults and conducting CE/SCE failover operations. Figure I.1 shows an example of the CE/SCE failover flows describing how the CE/SCE fault can be handled.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ME
+ participant Active_CE_SCE as Active CE/SCE
+ participant Standby_CE_SCE as Standby CE/SCE
+
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (1) Monitoring state information
+ Note over Active_CE_SCE: (2) Fault
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (3) CE/SCE fault detection
+ ME->>Standby_CE_SCE: (4) Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information
+ Note over Standby_CE_SCE: (5) Joining VNE and operating as a new active CE/SCE
+ Note over Active_CE_SCE: (6) Returning to iSCP network as a new standby CE/SCE
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the CE/SCE failover flow. It involves three main entities: ME (Management Element), Active CE/SCE, and Standby CE/SCE. The process begins with the ME monitoring the state of the Active CE/SCE. A fault occurs in the Active CE/SCE, which is detected by the ME. The ME then sends VNE configurations, operation configurations, and state information to the Standby CE/SCE. The Standby CE/SCE joins the VNE and operates as a new active CE/SCE. Finally, the original Active CE/SCE returns to the iSCP network as a new standby CE/SCE.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the CE/SCE failover flow between ME, Active CE/SCE, and Standby CE/SCE.
+
+Figure I.1 – Example of CE/SCE failover flow
+
+- (1) The ME monitors the state information of the active CE/SCE.
+- (2) Faults occur in the active CE/SCE.
+- (3) The ME detects the CE/SCE fault.
+- (4) The ME sends the same VNE configurations and operation configurations, e.g., static route configuration, routing policies and service policies that the failed CE/SCE was given, and sends the latest state information on the failed CE/SCE to any standby CE/SCE.
+- (5) The standby CE/SCE joins the VNE including the failed CE/SCE as a new active CE/SCE according to the configurations sent from the ME and starts to operate with the state information sent from the ME.
+- (6) After recovering from a fault, the failed CE/SCE returns to the iSCP network as a new standby CE/SCE.
+
+In some cases, after fault recovery, the failed CE/SCE may have to return to the iSCP network as an active CE/SCE of the VNE that the failed CE/SCE belonged to previously. Figure I.2 shows another example of the CE/SCE failover flows describing how the CE/SCE fault can be handled in these cases.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ME
+ participant Active_CE_SCE as Active CE/SCE
+ participant Standby_CE_SCE as Standby CE/SCE
+
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (1) Monitoring state information
+ Note over Active_CE_SCE: (2) Fault
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (3) CE/SCE fault detection
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (4) Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information
+ ME->>Standby_CE_SCE: (4) Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information
+ Note over Standby_CE_SCE: (5) Joining VNE and operating as a new active CE/SCE
+ Note over Active_CE_SCE: (6) Returning to iSCP network after recovery
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (7) Ordering to leave VNE
+ ME->>Standby_CE_SCE: (7) Ordering to leave VNE
+ Note over Standby_CE_SCE: (8) Leaving VNE
+ ME->>Active_CE_SCE: (9) Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information
+ Note over Active_CE_SCE: (10) Joining VNE and operating as a new active CE/SCE
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the CE/SCE failover flow. The diagram shows three lifelines: ME, Active CE/SCE, and Standby CE/SCE. (1) ME sends 'Monitoring state information' to Active CE/SCE. (2) A fault occurs in Active CE/SCE. (3) ME sends 'CE/SCE fault detection' to Active CE/SCE. (4) ME sends 'Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information' to both Active CE/SCE and Standby CE/SCE. (5) Standby CE/SCE joins VNE and operates as a new active CE/SCE (dashed box). (6) Active CE/SCE returns to iSCP network after recovery (dashed box). (7) ME sends 'Ordering to leave VNE' to both Active CE/SCE and Standby CE/SCE. (8) Standby CE/SCE leaves VNE (dashed box). (9) ME sends 'Sending VNE configurations, operation configurations and state information' to Active CE/SCE. (10) Active CE/SCE joins VNE and operates as a new active CE/SCE (dashed box).
+
+**Figure I.2 – Example of CE/SCE failover flow where the failed CE/SCE returns to its original position**
+
+- (1) The ME monitors the state information of the active CE/SCE.
+- (2) Faults occur in the active CE/SCE.
+- (3) The ME detects the CE/SCE fault.
+- (4) The ME sends the same VNE configurations and operation configurations, e.g., static route configuration, routing policies and service policies that the failed CE/SCE was given, and sends the latest state information on the failed CE/SCE to any standby CE/SCE.
+- (5) The standby CE/SCE joins the VNE including the failed CE/SCE as a new active CE/SCE according to the configurations sent from the ME and starts to operate with the state information sent from the ME.
+- (6) After recovering from a fault, the failed CE/SCE returns to the iSCP network.
+- (7) The ME orders the new active CE/SCE to leave the VNE.
+- (8) The new active CE/SCE leaves the VNE.
+
+- (9) The ME sends the same VNE configurations and operation configurations, e.g., static route configuration, routing policies and service policies that the new active CE/SCE was given, and sends the latest state information on the new active CE/SCE to the recovered CE/SCE.
+- (10) The recovered CE/SCE joins the VNE as a new active CE/SCE according to the configurations sent from the ME and starts to operate with the state information sent from the ME.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+The following documents contain information that may be valuable to the reader of this Recommendation. They provide additional information about topics covered within this Recommendation, but are not essential for an understanding of this Recommendation.
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2601] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2601 (2006), *Fundamental characteristics and requirements of future packet based networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.11] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 11 (2010), *ITU-T Y.2600 series – Supplement on scenarios for independent scalable control plane (iSCP) in future packet-based networks (FPBN)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3654] IETF RFC 3654 (2003), *Requirements for Separation of IP Control and Forwarding*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3746] IETF RFC 3746 (2004), *Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Framework*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5810] IETF RFC 5810 (2010), *Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Protocol Specification*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5811] IETF RFC 5811 (2010), *SCTP-Based Transport Mapping Layer (TML) for the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Protocol*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5812] IETF RFC 5812 (2010), *Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Forwarding Element Model*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5813] IETF RFC 5813 (2010), *Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) MIB*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6041] IETF RFC 6041 (2010), *Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Applicability Statement*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6053] IETF RFC 6053 (2010), *Implementation Report for Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES)*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2705
+
+(03/2013)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **Minimum security requirements for the interconnection of the Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS)**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2705
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2705**
+
+# **Minimum security requirements for the interconnection of the Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS)**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) is a national service, providing priority communications services to ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2705 provides minimum security requirements for the inter-network interconnection of ETS. This will allow ETS to be supported with the necessary security protection between different national networks with bilateral and/or multilateral agreements in times of disaster and emergencies.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2705 | 2013-03-01 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Emergency telecommunications service (ETS), NGN security, priority services and capabilities.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Security threats and risks ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Reference architecture for ETS interconnection security ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of ETS..... | 5 |
+| 8.1 General objectives ..... | 5 |
+| 8.2 General guidelines ..... | 6 |
+| 8.3 Common objectives and requirements ..... | 6 |
+| 8.4 ETS authentication, authorization and access control..... | 7 |
+| 8.5 ETS integrity ..... | 8 |
+| 8.6 ETS communications confidentiality and PII protection ..... | 9 |
+| 8.7 Inter-network IP transport ..... | 11 |
+| 8.8 ETS availability ..... | 12 |
+| 8.9 Management and operations security ..... | 13 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) is a national service, providing priority communications services to ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies. ETS implementation is a national matter. However, disasters/emergencies can transcend international geographic boundaries, and thus there is a potential that countries/administrations may enter into bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to link their respective ETS systems. This would allow priority communications services (e.g., voice, messaging, video and data) under the umbrella of ETS to be supported between different national networks with bilateral and/or multilateral agreements in times of disaster and emergencies.
+
+The integrity, confidentiality and availability of ETS between interconnected national networks will depend on the security of each national network involved in an end-to-end communication. To allow network-provided security of end-to-end ETS between different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations), security requirements for the interconnection of ETS are needed.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2705
+
+## Minimum security requirements for the interconnection of the Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS)
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the minimum security requirements for the inter-network interconnection of ETS. The scope of the security requirements includes the integrity, confidentiality and availability protection for ETS communications across network boundaries (i.e., between different national networks).
+
+The purpose of this Recommendation is to provide a minimum set of security requirements that can be used to facilitate the support of ETS across directly or indirectly interconnected networks.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T E.106] Recommendation ITU-T E.106 (2003), *International Emergency Preference Scheme (IEPS) for disaster relief operations*.
+- [ITU-T E.107] Recommendation ITU-T E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*.
+- [ITU-T M.3342] Recommendation ITU-T M.3342 (2006), *Guidelines for the definition of SLA representation templates*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2205] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2205 (2011), *Next Generation Networks – Emergency telecommunications – Technical considerations*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+- 3.1.1 authorization** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights.
+- 3.1.2 availability** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity.
+- 3.1.3 confidentiality** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.
+- 3.1.4 data integrity** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
+
+**3.1.5 emergency telecommunications service (ETS)** [ITU-T E.107]: A national service, providing priority telecommunications to ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 Service Provider:** Service Provider (initial capital letters) is a public telecommunications service provider authorized to provide emergency telecommunications service (ETS).
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------|
+| ANI | Application Network Interface |
+| CVE | Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures |
+| CVE | Common Vulnerability and Exposure |
+| CVSS | Common Vulnerability Scoring System |
+| CWE | Common Weakness Enumeration |
+| CYBEX | Cybersecurity information Exchange |
+| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service |
+| DNS | Domain Name Server |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| DSCP | Diffserv Code Point |
+| ETS | Emergency Telecommunications Service |
+| IDS | Intrusion Detection System |
+| IEPS | International Emergency Preference Scheme |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPS | Intrusion Prevention System |
+| IPsec | IP Security |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| NE | Network Element |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-Network Interface |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| PSTN | Public Switch Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SNI | Service Network Interface |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The initial letters of the term "Service Provider" are capitalized in this Recommendation where "Service Provider" refers to a public telecommunications service provider which is authorized to provide ETS (see clause 3.2.1).
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+In the body of this Recommendation and its annexes, the words shall, shall not, should, and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 Security threats and risks
+
+ETS communications may be targeted for cybersecurity attacks because of the critical nature of the communications. Refer to [ITU-T E.107], [ITU-T Y.2205] and [b-ITU-T Q-Sup.57] for the definition of and information on ETS. The source of threats or malevolent actions intent on disrupting, misusing, manipulating or otherwise harming ETS could originate from a variety of sources including interconnected networks. For example, ETS may be targeted for cybersecurity attacks for reason such as to:
+
+- disrupt the ability of disaster recovery personnel to communicate
+- obtain sensitive information by eavesdropping on ETS calls/sessions.
+
+A threat is viewed as a security weakness or potential vulnerability that if exploited may negatively affect the availability, integrity or confidentiality of ETS communications.
+
+This Recommendation focuses mainly on threats pertaining to network interconnection for ETS. Example threats relating to network interconnection include, but are not limited to:
+
+- General interconnection threat: security weaknesses or potential vulnerabilities associated with connecting the network (e.g., NGN) to other managed and unmanaged networks, such as the public Internet.
+- Design and implementation threat: security weaknesses or potential vulnerabilities in the network interconnection architecture and implementation designs.
+- Management, operational and insider threat: security weaknesses or potential vulnerabilities in the command and control functions for ETS and their underlying infrastructure.
+
+- Transport and facilities threat: security weaknesses or potential vulnerabilities associated with the underlying transport network (e.g., routing, network duplication, diversity, resiliency), support systems (e.g., power, environmental) and the physical protection of network assets.
+
+# 7 Reference architecture for ETS interconnection security
+
+This Recommendation relies on the functional architecture and network connectivity model defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+![Figure 1 – Connectivity to the NGN [ITU-T Y.2012]. The diagram illustrates the connectivity of a Next Generation Network (NGN) to various external networks. A central blue box labeled 'Next generation network' is connected to several external components. On the left, 'Terminal equipment' (represented by a TV and phone icon) connects to 'User networks' and 'Corporate networks'. On the right, 'Other service providers' (two instances), 'Other NGNs', 'Other IP-based networks', and 'PSTN/ISDN' are connected. The interfaces are labeled: ANI (Application Network Interface) for service providers, SNI (Service Network Interface) for other NGNs, and NNI (Network-Network Interface) for other IP-based networks and PSTN/ISDN. A UNI (User Network Interface) is shown on the left. A legend at the bottom indicates that dashed lines represent 'Control' and solid blue lines represent 'Media'. The reference 'Y.2705(13)_F01' is noted at the bottom right.](e6df2733626a85205c1db682e6259c46_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 1 – Connectivity to the NGN [ITU-T Y.2012]. The diagram illustrates the connectivity of a Next Generation Network (NGN) to various external networks. A central blue box labeled 'Next generation network' is connected to several external components. On the left, 'Terminal equipment' (represented by a TV and phone icon) connects to 'User networks' and 'Corporate networks'. On the right, 'Other service providers' (two instances), 'Other NGNs', 'Other IP-based networks', and 'PSTN/ISDN' are connected. The interfaces are labeled: ANI (Application Network Interface) for service providers, SNI (Service Network Interface) for other NGNs, and NNI (Network-Network Interface) for other IP-based networks and PSTN/ISDN. A UNI (User Network Interface) is shown on the left. A legend at the bottom indicates that dashed lines represent 'Control' and solid blue lines represent 'Media'. The reference 'Y.2705(13)\_F01' is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Connectivity to the NGN [ITU-T Y.2012]**
+
+The interfaces pertaining to network interconnections are:
+
+- application network interface (ANI)
+- service network interface (SNI)
+- network-network interface (NNI).
+
+Refer to [ITU-T Y.2012] for descriptions of ANI, SNI and NNI.
+
+To allow different networks to support ETS communications across network boundaries, specific security measures are needed for the integrity, confidentiality and availability of protection of the ETS communication within each national network and across the interconnection between national networks.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: End-to-end network security for ETS applications. The diagram shows two national networks, A and B, connected via an NNI (National Network Interface). National network A contains an ETS Service Provider A (e.g., ingress ETS provider) and an Access network. National network B contains an ETS Service Provider B (e.g., egress ETS provider) and an Access network. An ETS user is connected to the Access network in National network A, and a Terminating user is connected to the Access network in National network B. The diagram illustrates the scope of security measures: Network A security, Interconnection security (scope of this Recommendation), and Network B security. A horizontal line at the bottom indicates 'End-to-end network security for ETS'. A legend shows a dashed line for Signalling and a solid line for Media. The reference Y.2705(13)\_F02 is noted in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 2 – End-to-end network security for ETS applications**
+
+Figure 2 shows that end-to-end security of an ETS communication traversing multiple networks (national networks A and B) will depend on the security measures enforced in the individual networks and security protection of the interconnection between the two networks.
+
+Figure 2 shows that the focus of this Recommendation is for secure interconnection of ETS.
+
+# 8 Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of ETS
+
+## 8.1 General objectives
+
+The general objective is to provide network security protection of end-to-end ETS communications that may traverse different network provider domains of national and international networks (i.e., countries/administrations) where each network is responsible for security within its domain on a hop-by-hop basis.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Example of end-to-end communications across different national ETS implementations. The diagram shows a communication path from an originating mobile phone to a terminating mobile phone. The path includes an Access network, an Originating network, an ETS provider network, a Transit network, an International provider network, another Transit network, an Intermediate network, another Transit network, a Terminating network, and another Access network. The diagram is divided into three main sections: Originating national network (ETS), International network, and Terminating national network (ETS). A horizontal line at the top indicates 'Network provided end-to-end secure communications'. A legend shows a dashed line with arrows for Signalling and control (service and control stratum) and a solid line for Bearer or data traffic (transport stratum). The reference Y.2705(13)\_F03 is noted in the bottom right corner.
+
+NOTE – Management plane not shown
+
+**Figure 3 – Example of end-to-end communications across different national ETS implementations**
+
+Figure 3 illustrates end-to-end ETS communications (e.g., priority voice, video, data or messaging communications) originating and terminating in two different national networks. The example illustrates that the end-to-end priority communication for ETS may traverse multiple network segments and administrative domains (e.g., access network, originating network, ETS provider network, international provider network, intermediate network and terminating network). The general objective is for each of the interconnected networks along the path of the end-to-end ETS communication to provide the necessary security protection within its domain including the interconnection to the adjacent network so that the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the end-to-end ETS communication are not compromised.
+
+## **8.2 General guidelines**
+
+A structured approach and methodology should be established and implemented between interconnecting networks for ETS through the use of service level agreements (SLAs). This should include:
+
+1. Security risk assessment: Risk assessment of an ETS asset, threat and vulnerability analysis related to the interconnection of ETS. It is critical that a security risk assessment be performed periodically and when changes, new technology, services or applications are introduced.
+2. Security architecture and solution: establishing a security policy, security architecture design and specification of solutions to mitigate identified threats to ETS. This includes establishing the necessary bilateral or multilateral SLAs for ETS security ([ITU-T M.3342] and [b-TMF GB917] for information on SLAs). Areas addressed include security policies, requirements, architecture design, situational awareness and forensics tools, and infrastructure security to be included in SLAs for interconnection.
+3. Security implementation: implementation and deployment of the security architecture and solutions based on the bilateral or multilateral SLAs as appropriate for ETS interconnection security.
+4. Security operations: operational measures for the management of the security solutions for ETS interconnection should be specified and implemented. For example, management of insider threats, management of configurable parameters and default values, resiliency and failure recovery operations, ETS security testing, logging and auditing of ETS security-related events.
+
+## **8.3 Common objectives and requirements**
+
+This clause provides common requirements and objectives.
+
+- R-1 The Service Provider shall protect ETS communications from intrusions (e.g., interception, hijacking and replay) that would compromise the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and availability of ETS in accordance with commercially-available security best practices while the ETS traffic is traversing the Service Provider's domain.
+
+In the above requirement, a domain is a physical or logical "network segment" over which the Service Provider exercises full administrative and operational control, management, maintenance and security.
+
+It is expected that Service Providers would be supporting and using a wide range of security tools and capabilities to protect both ETS and the entire network and all supported applications. It is important that appropriate measures be taken to ensure that the use of these security capabilities do not negatively impact the performance of ETS or introduce any unintended security compromises to ETS.
+
+- R-2 Service Provider use of security mechanisms (e.g., intrusion detection system and intrusion prevention system [IDS/IPS] and encryption) shall not interfere with the priority treatment mechanisms used to support ETS (refer to [ITU-T Y.2205] for the definition and description of priority treatment mechanisms).
+- O-1 It is desirable that the Service Provider's use of security tools and capabilities include appropriate measures to minimize negative impacts on ETS quality of service (QoS) (e.g., by introducing unnecessary delays).
+
+## **8.4 ETS authentication, authorization and access control**
+
+This clause covers:
+
+- authentication and authorization of ETS users
+- ETS user authentication and authorization of ETS providers
+- authentication of data sources for ETS
+- mutual authentication and authorization of ETS providers.
+
+### **8.4.1 Mutual authentication**
+
+Authentication is the process of verifying the claimed identity of a party that is participating in some form of communication. Authentication ensures the validity of the claimed identities of the entities participating in communication (e.g., person, device, service or application) and provides assurance that an entity is not attempting a masquerade or unauthorized replay of a previous communication.
+
+End-to-end communication for ETS may involve multiple network segments and administrative domains (e.g., originating access network, ETS Service Provider network, intermediate network, terminating access network). When receiving ETS traffic, the Service Provider is required to verify the validity and authorization of the source (e.g., network) of the received traffic. When handing off ETS traffic, the Service Provider is required to verify the validity and authorization of the entity to which it is handing off the NGN traffic (e.g., network). Presently, security trust relationships for interconnection are verifiable only through direct physical interconnection between two interconnected networks.
+
+- R-3 Service Providers shall mutually authenticate each other for exchanging (i.e., handing off or receiving) ETS traffic. This includes any ETS signalling or media traffic exchanges between two Service Providers across NNIs, ANIs or SNIs.
+
+This may be accomplished through verification of direct physical interconnections and service level agreements (SLAs).
+
+NOTE – The intention here is not authentication on a per call/session basis. The intention is to introduce the notion of mechanisms to do authentication on an as-needed basis or periodically.
+
+### **8.4.2 Access control**
+
+Access control measures are necessary to protect against unauthorized use of network resources, including use of resources in an unauthorized manner. Access control ensures that only authorized users or devices are allowed access to network elements, stored information, information flows, services and applications.
+
+Access control at the NNI refers to the capability of the receiving network to accept or reject specific traffic inbound from a neighbouring network and to restrict access to resources within the network by entities outside the network.
+
+- R-4 The Service Provider shall establish rules and enforce access control measures to protect against unauthorized ETS communications across the NNIs. Specifically, the SPs should only allow communications to traverse the NNI between NEs that have been identified and pre-authorized (e.g., through SLAs).
+- R-5 When receiving ETS signalling traffic from another service provider, the Service Provider shall verify the trust relationships between itself and the service provider from which it receives the traffic.
+- R-6 When receiving ETS media traffic from another service provider, the Service Provider shall verify the trust relationships of the service provider from which it receives ETS traffic.
+- R-7 When handing off ETS signalling traffic to another service provider, the Service Provider shall verify the trust relationships of the service provider to which it hands off ETS traffic.
+- R-8 When handing off ETS media traffic to another service provider, the Service Provider shall verify the trust relationships of the service provider to which it hands ETS traffic.
+
+NOTE – The above are not intended to imply verification on a per call/session basis.
+
+Authorization is the granting of privileges, which includes the granting of access based on access privileges. Authorization is given to an entity after validation by an authentication and access control process.
+
+- R-9 The Service Provider is required to provide security protection to prevent unauthorized access to ETS.
+
+The means by which R-9 may be accomplished include, but are not limited to the following (as appropriate):
+
+- authentication and authorization of ETS end-users and devices
+- authentication and authorization of data sources for ETS communications (e.g., message source or data source)
+- security capabilities to protect against unauthorized access to ETS information and resources (e.g., user information in authentication servers and management systems).
+
+System access control involves security measures to prevent unauthorized access to network elements and systems and their associated access points. There are threats associated with unauthorized access to network elements and systems supporting ETS. Therefore, appropriate access control measures to prevent unauthorized access must be established and enforced.
+
+- R-10 Service Providers shall establish rules and enforce system access control measures to prevent unauthorized access to network elements and systems supporting ETS. This includes security protection for both logical and physical access.
+- R-11 The Service Provider shall protect against unauthorized access to ETS data and resources (i.e., the Service Provider shall permit only authorized administrators to access ETS data and resources [e.g., files, command sets, software] on network elements and systems supporting ETS).
+
+## **8.5 ETS integrity**
+
+This clause covers:
+
+- integrity protection of ETS signalling
+- integrity protection of ETS media.
+
+### **8.5.1 Signalling integrity**
+
+Inter-network ETS signalling has to be protected against interception, corruption and manipulation (e.g., deletion, creation or replay).
+
+R-12 Service Providers shall protect the integrity of all inter-network ETS signalling traffic crossing NNIs, ANIs or SNIs.
+
+Actions that could be taken to protect the integrity of ETS signalling traffic include, but are not limited to:
+
+- a) physical security measures (e.g., physical protection of network elements, transmission medium and facilities, and enforcement of appropriate access control measures)
+- b) cryptographic protection
+- c) establishment and enforcement of appropriate integrity requirements and objectives defined in service level agreements
+- d) monitoring integrity of NNIs configurations.
+
+### **8.5.2 Media integrity**
+
+The media associated with inter-network ETS communications has to be protected against interception, corruption and manipulation (e.g., deletion, creation or replay).
+
+R-13 The Service Provider shall protect the integrity of all inter-network ETS media traffic crossing NNIs or SNIs.
+
+Actions that could be taken to protect the integrity of media traffic include, but are not limited to:
+
+- a) physical security measures (e.g., physical protection of network elements, transmission medium and facilities, and enforcement of appropriate access control measures)
+- b) cryptographic protection
+- c) establishment and enforcement of appropriate integrity requirements and objectives defined in service level agreements
+- d) monitoring integrity of NNIs configurations.
+
+## **8.6 ETS communications confidentiality and PII protection**
+
+ETS communications across NNI, ANI and SNI have to provide confidentiality protection to prevent unauthorized entities from obtaining sensitive information. This includes confidentiality protection of:
+
+- ETS signalling and control
+- ETS bearer traffic (e.g., voice, video or data)
+- personally identifiable information (PII).
+
+### **8.6.1 Signalling confidentiality**
+
+Service Providers have to protect inter-network ETS signalling supported over NNI, ANI or SNI against unauthorized access. The signalling information has to be protected from eavesdropping to reduce the chance of signalling traffic analysis revealing sensitive information which has a potential for misuse (e.g., calling patterns, location information and identity of users).
+
+R-14 The Service Provider shall protect the confidentiality of all inter-network ETS signalling crossing NNIs, ANIs or SNIs.
+
+Actions that could be taken to protect the confidentiality of signalling and media traffic include, but are not limited to:
+
+- a) physical security measures (e.g., physical protection of network elements, transmission medium and facilities, and enforcement of appropriate access control measures)
+- b) cryptographic protection
+- c) establishment and enforcement of appropriate confidentiality requirements and objectives in service level agreements.
+
+While confidentiality protection is often associated with cryptographic mechanisms, the requirement in this clause to provide confidentiality protection of inter-network signalling is not intended to imply that cryptographic methods must be used in all scenarios or for all end-to-end signalling flows. The intent of this requirement is that the Service Providers must provide and implement the necessary measures to ensure that the signalling communications across NNIs, ANIs and SNIs are protected from eavesdropping. This means that each interconnection must be examined to determine the appropriate mechanisms to be used to provide confidentiality protection, as mandated by a security policy. For example, it might be possible to provide confidentiality protection through the use of physical and the associated operation depending on the architectural and physical configurations of the IP interconnection (e.g., dedicated physical link scenario).
+
+### **8.6.2 Media confidentiality**
+
+Media streams (e.g., voice, video and data) have to be protected against unauthorized access because eavesdropping on ETS media streams could reveal sensitive security information (i.e., conveyed in the media communication).
+
+R-15 The Service Provider shall protect the confidentiality of all inter-network ETS media traffic crossing NNIs or SNIs.
+
+Actions that could be taken to protect the confidentiality of signalling and media traffic include, but are not limited to:
+
+- (a) physical security measures (e.g., physical protection of network elements, transmission medium and facilities, and enforcement of appropriate access control measures)
+- (b) cryptographic protection
+- (c) establishment and enforcement of appropriate confidentiality requirements and objectives in service level agreements.
+
+#### **8.6.3 PII protection**
+
+Personally identifiable information (PII) associated with ETS has to be protected against unauthorized observation or disclosure (e.g., ETS end-user identities, communicating entities identities, ETS subscription information and ETS end-user location).
+
+R-16 The Service Provider shall allow selected ETS users to use ETS anonymously.
+
+R-17 The Service Provider shall protect the confidentiality of selected ETS user identities.
+
+R-18 The Service Provider shall protect the confidentiality of the location of selected ETS users.
+
+Protection against unauthorized observation of ETS usage information (e.g., usage patterns such as ETS traffic volume, locations, time, frequency, etc.) is needed. This includes the support and use of security capabilities to protect sensitive information derived from the observation of network activities such as websites that an end-user has visited, an end-user's geographic location, and the IP addresses and domain name server (DNS) names of devices in a service provider network.
+
+O-2 It is desirable that the Service Provider protect against unauthorized observation or disclosure of ETS usage information (e.g., observation of network activities such as websites that an ETS user has visited, ETS user IP addresses, or usage patterns such as ETS traffic volume, locations, time, frequency).
+
+## 8.7 Inter-network IP transport
+
+### 8.7.1 General
+
+The IP-to-IP interconnection between two Service Providers will have architectural and physical connectivity variations with different security implications.
+
+The integrity and availability of the IP-to-IP interconnection between two Service Providers will depend on factors such as architecture, physical connectivity and service level agreements.
+
+
+
+**Scenario 1:** Interconnection using a dedicated physical link
+
+**Scenario 2:** Interconnection via an Ethernet switch
+
+**Scenario 3:** Interconnection via a managed IP network
+
+**Scenario 4:** Interconnection via the Internet
+
+Y.2705(13)\_F04
+
+Figure 4: IP-to-IP interconnection configurations. The diagram shows four scenarios for interconnecting Service Provider A and Service Provider B. Each scenario includes a 'Border element' (server icon) and a 'Peering edge router' (router icon) within each provider's cloud. Scenario 1: A direct physical link connects the peering edge routers. Scenario 2: An 'Ethernet LAN' (switch icon) connects the peering edge routers. Scenario 3: A 'Third-party IP network' (cloud icon) connects the peering edge routers. Scenario 4: The 'Internet' (cloud icon) connects the peering edge routers. Labels for each scenario are on the left: 'Scenario 1: Interconnection using a dedicated physical link', 'Scenario 2: Interconnection via an Ethernet switch', 'Scenario 3: Interconnection via a managed IP network', and 'Scenario 4: Interconnection via the Internet'. A reference code 'Y.2705(13)\_F04' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4 – IP-to-IP interconnection configurations**
+
+Figure 4 shows a set of possible IP-to-IP interconnection configurations:
+
+1. Interconnection using a dedicated physical link: In this configuration, a dedicated physical link is used to connect the peering edge router of Service Provider A to the peering edge router of Service Provider B.
+2. Interconnection via an Ethernet switch: In this configuration, the peering edge router of Service Provider A and the peering edge router of Service Provider B is physically connected via an Ethernet switch of a local area network (LAN).
+3. Interconnection via a managed IP network: In this configuration, the IP interconnection between Service Provider A and Service Provider B occurs via a managed IP network. This could be the managed IP network of a 3rd party provider.
+
+4. Interconnection via the Internet: In this configuration, the IP interconnection between Service Provider A and Service Provider B occurs via the open Internet.
+
+There are different ETS security implications for each of the scenarios depicted in Figure 4.
+
+There are no stipulations or restrictions being made in this document as to the IP interconnection being used for Service Provider interconnection. The general objective is that it is incumbent on the Service Providers to support and implement based on the specific IP-to-IP configuration, the appropriate security measures to protect the interconnection and prevent impacts to services from occurring through compromises of the IP interconnection.
+
+- R-19 The Service Provider shall protect the IP transport network between two interconnected Service Provider networks from intrusions (e.g., interception, hijacking and replay) that would compromise the authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and availability of ETS in accordance with commercially-available security best practices.
+
+To meet this requirement, the Service Provider should establish and enforce rules to protect the IP transport network between the interconnected Service Provider networks, and document the rules in SLAs.
+
+- R-20 The Service Provider shall protect the integrity of the IP traffic priority mechanisms, functional capabilities and the accompanying protocol data (e.g., Diffserv code points) employed to support ETS over IP network interconnection between Service Providers.
+
+NOTE – This includes integrity protection of any ETS-related configured data or parameters related to the IP interconnection as well as any mapping that is involved (e.g., mapping of Diffserv code points based on the scheme being used in the individual interconnection Service Provider).
+
+- CR-1 If ETS signalling is traversing an untrusted IP transport network segment (e.g., third-party IP transport), the Service Provider shall use encryption (e.g., IPsec) for integrity and confidentiality protection.
+
+- CR-2 If ETS media is traversing an untrusted IP transport network segment (e.g., third-Party IP transport), the Service Provider shall use encryption (e.g., IPsec) for integrity and confidentiality protection.
+
+### **8.7.2 Use of encryption**
+
+The use of security mechanisms (e.g., encryption) shall not interfere or obscure information for priority treatment mechanisms.
+
+The following requirement is applicable when IPsec tunnels are used for inter-network ETS traffic (i.e., crossing NNIs, ANIs and SNIs):
+
+- R-21 The Service Provider shall establish and enforce rules to populate and protect the integrity of priority information (e.g., DSCP values) when IPsec tunnels are used for inter-network ETS traffic. Specifically, rules on how the Diffserv code point (DSCP) values from the inner header is populated in the IPsec tunnel header at the IPsec ingress point, shall be established in SLAs and enforced to allow priority treatment between the ingress and egress IPsec points.
+
+## **8.8 ETS availability**
+
+### **8.8.1 General objective**
+
+To ensure a greater availability of ETS, failures of each service system (supporting ETS) must be kept small, and service recovery must be expeditious (once there is an outage or failure). Failures as a result of security compromises should be taken into account in the overall availability planning and design for ETS. The following is a general objective for ETS availability in the context of security:
+
+- O-3 It is desirable that the Service Providers take into account potential failures or service disruptions due to security events affecting inter-network interconnections in the overall planning and design for end-to-end service availability of ETS (i.e., ETS calls/sessions traversing multiple Service Provider networks). This includes measures for expeditious recovery from failures due to security events.
+
+### **8.8.2 Availability protection**
+
+ETS has to be protected against denial of service (DoS), distributed denial of service (DDoS), and other types of attacks that could affect ETS availability. This includes protection against attacks affecting ETS availability for individual ETS users, a group of ETS users, ETS users in a specific location or site (e.g., a government agency enterprise network site), ETS user in a targeted geographic or regional area or ETS as a whole.
+
+- R-22 Service Provider shall protect the availability of ETS (e.g., protection against DoS, DDoS, and other types of attacks impacting ETS availability) in accordance with commercially-available security best practices. This shall include protection against DoS, DDoS and other types of attacks affecting ETS availability for individual ETS users, a group of ETS users, ETS users in a specific location or site (e.g., a government agency enterprise network site), ETS user in a targeted geographic or regional area or ETS as a whole.
+
+Actions that may be taken to protect the availability of ETS include but are limited to:
+
+- a) use of admission control and throttling mechanisms
+- b) use of DoS and DDoS mitigation tools and functions
+- c) use of intrusion detection systems and intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS)
+- d) use of security monitoring tools
+- e) use of situational awareness tools.
+
+- R-23 Service Providers use of security tools and capabilities for availability protection (e.g., DoS and DDoS mechanisms) shall include appropriate measures to prevent unintended denial of legitimate ETS calls/sessions (e.g., blocking or preventing a legitimate ETS call/session from completing or the discard of legitimate ETS packets).
+
+## **8.9 Management and operations security**
+
+This clause covers some topics related to:
+
+- security of management operations (e.g., configurable and default parameters related to the provisioning of ETS interconnection),
+- logging of ETS security-related events,
+- alerts and alarms when security breaches have or may have occurred.
+
+### **8.9.1 ETS data integrity**
+
+The stored ETS data must be provided with integrity protection to prevent any corruption or manipulation of the data impacting the integrity or availability of ETS.
+
+- R-24 The Service Provider shall protect the integrity of ETS-provisioned data. This includes any ETS specific data, such as subscription data, that is provisioned.
+
+### **8.9.2 Configurable parameters and default values**
+
+There are many security threats related to the management of configurable parameters and default values set by vendors and equipment suppliers. For example, the default values of various configurable parameters, as delivered by the vendor, have to be adjusted to meet Service Provider requirements. The configurable parameters must be properly assigned and kept up to date so they
+
+can function satisfactorily. This human administrator must be appropriately authorized to perform the security administration.
+
+R-25 The Service Provider is required to establish and enforce rules for the administration of configurable parameters and default values in the context of supporting ETS. Access control measures shall be implemented and enforced so that the execution of these functions is reserved only for the authorized administrator (i.e., all other users shall be denied this permission).
+
+#### **8.9.3 Management of insider threats**
+
+An individual (e.g., an employee, contractor or other worker) may be able to gain unauthorized management access or misuse their management access to network elements and systems supporting ETS. Therefore, there is a need to minimize insider threats.
+
+R-26 The Service Provider shall establish and implement security processes to minimize insider threats to ETS.
+
+Example mitigation methods that could be considered include:
+
+- authentication controls, role-based privileging, separation of functions and secure access methods for remote, console, craft and automated system access;
+- logging of security events related to management actions;
+- compartmenting of ETS information, applications, and access to shared systems and applications;
+- auditing of configured data in network elements and databases (e.g., subscriptions profiles) for recording and exposure of unauthorized changes.
+
+#### **8.9.4 Collaboration for cybersecurity information exchange**
+
+Service Providers should establish collaborative relationships with partners for sharing information about cybersecurity events (including real-time exchange of information during cybersecurity attacks). An exchange of information about cybersecurity incidents can provide mutual benefits and can be used to anticipate threats to ETS placing the Service Provider in a situation to provide effective countermeasures.
+
+O-4 It is desirable that Service Providers establish and implement management and operational processes sufficient to provide collaborative relationships for sharing and exchanging information about cybersecurity events. The processes should take into consideration analysis functions to make the information useful as input into security actions and countermeasures to protect ETS.
+
+Refer to the following ITU-T Recommendations for information about cybersecurity information exchange:
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500]
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500.1]
+- [b-ITU-T X.1520]
+- [b-ITU-T X.1521]
+- [b-ITU-T X.1524]
+- [b-ITU-T X.1570]
+
+#### **8.9.5 Management of incident response and recovery from security events**
+
+Availability of ETS depends on the operational procedures in place for recovery and service restoration from security events. It is critical that these procedures be clearly defined, documented and implemented. This includes the necessary policies and practices for service recovery and restoration within a Service Provider domain and across domains for interconnection and inter-network services. Protection of the operational procedure documentation and implementation from intruders and insider threats is necessary.
+
+- R-27 The Service Provider is required to have a documented "Incident Response and Recovery" plan describing the policies, management, operational steps, processes and procedures for service recovery and restoration from security events. This includes the necessary policies and practices for service recovery and restoration within the Service Provider domain and across domains for interconnection and inter-network services.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q-Sup.57] ITU-T Q-series Recommendations – Supplement 57 (2008), *Signalling requirements to support the emergency telecommunications service (ETS) in IP networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500] Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 (2011), *Overview of cybersecurity information exchange*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500.1] Recommendation ITU-T X.1500.1 (2012), *Procedures for the registration of arcs under the object identifier arc for cybersecurity information exchange*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1520] Recommendation ITU-T X.1520 (2011), *Common vulnerabilities and exposures*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1521] Recommendation ITU-T X.1521 (2011), *Common vulnerability scoring system*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1524] Recommendation ITU-T (2012), *Common weakness enumeration*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1570] Recommendation ITU-T X.1570 (2011), *Discovery mechanisms in the exchange of cybersecurity information*.
+- [b-TMF GB917] GB 917 (2012), *SLA Management Handbook, Release 3.1*, TM Forum.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2720**
+
+(01/2009)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **NGN identity management framework**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720**
+
+# **NGN identity management framework**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 provides a framework for identity management (IdM) in next generation networks (NGN). The primary purpose of this framework is to describe a structured approach for designing, defining, and implementing IdM solutions and for facilitating interoperability in a heterogeneous environment.
+
+The management of entity identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) is not new. However, as we move towards a converged network environment where services are based on contexts and roles and may be accessed anywhere, and anytime, the assurance, security and management of identity information becomes more complex. Additionally, there may be different and independent solutions resulting in the need for interoperability. Therefore, new, enhanced, automated, and interoperable capabilities are needed for the following reasons:
+
+- end users are increasingly using multiple identities;
+- these identities may be associated with different contexts and service privileges;
+- the identities may only partially identify the end user;
+- the identities may be used anywhere and at anytime; and
+- the identities may not be interoperable between providers.
+
+IdM addresses this situation, and is a set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administration, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for:
+
+- assurance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials, attributes);
+- assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users/subscribers, groups, user devices, organizations, network and service providers, network elements and objects, and virtual objects); and
+- enabling business and security applications.
+
+This framework is intended to be used as a foundation to develop and specify specific aspects of IdM, such as detailed requirements, mechanisms and procedures, as needed. It also provides a clear and coherent overview of the totality of IdM in NGNs.
+
+The framework provided in this Recommendation is intended for NGN (i.e., managed packet networks) as defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001, General overview of NGN. However, it could be applied as appropriate to other types of networks (e.g., corporate and enterprise networks).
+
+NOTE – The use of the term "Identity" in this Recommendation relating to IdM does not indicate its absolute meaning. In particular, it does not constitute any positive validation of a person.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 was approved on 23 January 2009 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2009-2012) under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in other non-ITU standards ..... | 2 |
+| 3.3 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 4 |
+| 5 Introduction ..... | 4 |
+| 5.1 Identity management (IdM) overview..... | 4 |
+| 5.2 Business drivers and motivations ..... | 6 |
+| 5.3 Identity provider (IdP)..... | 8 |
+| 5.4 NGN functional architecture and use of identifiers..... | 9 |
+| 6 IdM framework overview ..... | 9 |
+| 7 IdM in the context of NGN architectures and reference models ..... | 11 |
+| 7.1 General relationship with NGN architectures and services..... | 11 |
+| 7.2 Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (General principles and general • User control of personal information and protection of personally identifiable information – Provides the ability to control who is allowed to access (i.e., providing consent) to personal information and how it is used. • Single sign-on/sign-off – Provides uniform access to multiple applications/services and across multiple service providers/federations. • Flexible access control for network and application services (e.g., VoIP, IPTV and data). • Social networking – Provides dynamic and flexible identity capabilities to access social networking services with confidence. • Security – Provides confidence in transactions to include identity theft protection. |
+
+**Table 1 – IdM drivers and motivations**
+
+| Perspective | IdM drivers and motivations |
+|--------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Business enterprises (e.g., NGN providers) | • Enables access to subscription-based services from anywhere, anytime and any device. • Provides identity assurance functions and capabilities to support multiple applications and services. • Enables dynamic/automatic connectivity between multiple partners (e.g., end users, visited and home networks) compared to pair-wise arrangements to establish service arrangements, exchange identity information and enforce policy. • Enables new applications and services (e.g., fixed and mobile convergence) including identity-based services such as identifier, credential and attribute services to subscribers and other service providers. • Enables a standard API and data scheme for application design across multi-vendor and service delivery platforms. • Enables federated identity and services. • Provides protection of application services, network infrastructure and resources. • Enables easier compliance with regulatory requirements. |
+| Government enterprises | • Enables identity assurance services and capabilities, and enhances the level of trust and confidence in the identities to support: – Electronic government (eGovernment) services (e.g., web-based transactions) – public safety services (e.g., emergency 911 services) – law enforcement services (e.g., lawful intercept) – emergency telecommunication services – early warning services – national security services • Enables federated government services • Provides protection of the communication infrastructure (i.e., against cybersecurity threats) |
+
+## 5.3 Identity provider (IdP)
+
+This Recommendation does not impose any restriction on who provides identity provider (IdP) services.
+
+An IdP is an entity that creates, maintains and manages trusted identity information of other entities (e.g., users/subscribers, organizations, and devices) and offers identity-based services based on trust, business and other types of relationships.
+
+In a multiple service provider environment, it is possible for an NGN provider to be an identity provider. It is also possible for an NGN provider to offer IdP services (e.g., identity-based services) to other providers. In addition, it is possible to use third party IdP services.
+
+## 5.4 NGN functional architecture and use of identifiers
+
+As described in [b-ITU-T Y.2012], *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*, the NGN consists of multiple functional elements that use identifiers of entities to perform their functions in order to support and facilitate services and applications. Figure 3 shows examples of identities mapped into NGN functional diagram, i.e., the NGN architecture shown in [b-ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Example of NGN identities. This diagram illustrates the mapping of various identities into the NGN functional architecture. The architecture is divided into two main strata: the Service Stratum (top) and the Transport Stratum (bottom). The Service Stratum includes Applications, Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions, S. User Profile Functions, Other NGN Service Components, Service Control Functions, and IP Multimedia Service Components. The Transport Stratum includes Network Attachment Control Functions (NACF), Resource and Admission Control Functions (RACF), Access Network Functions, Edge Functions, and Core Transport Functions. External elements include Legacy Terminals, Custom Networks, End-User Functions, and Other Networks. Red arrows and labels indicate the mapping of identities: 'User Identity Data' points to S. User Profile Functions; 'Identities in NACF' points to NACF; 'User and terminal identities' points to Legacy Terminals and End-User Functions; 'Identities in applications' points to Applications; 'Identities in IMS, PES, and other components' points to IP Multimedia Service Components; 'Identity Interoperability' points to the interface between the Service and Transport Strata; 'Identities in RACF' points to RACF; and 'Network elements identities' points to Core Transport Functions. A note at the bottom states: '\* Note: Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport Stratum or End-User Functions.'
+
+**Figure 3 – Example of NGN identities**
+
+Since all NGN operations use these various identities, it is important to maintain their integrity. IdM provides assurance services, capabilities and functions to maintain their integrity and the use of NGN identities.
+
+In the NGN network environment, a single entity may have multiple identity attributes. Different network elements may use these identity attributes (e.g., in different NGN provider domains or different strata of the NGN (i.e., the service stratum or transport stratum)). Different entities in different locations may also use these identity attributes. It is therefore necessary for IdM to provide capabilities that allow secure information exchange between entities (and/or locations) such as relying parties (e.g., application or service providers) and identity providers (IdP). Note that the NGN provider can also be an IdP. The exchange of IdM information is based on established policies and on trust established between these entities in a multiple service provider environment. This trust is based on the assertion and validation of the entities' identities across distributed NGNs. IdM also provides capabilities to protect the privacy of the entities' information (e.g., specific identity attributes), and to ensure that only authorized information is disseminated across NGNs.
+
+# 6 IdM framework overview
+
+The framework is organized as shown in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+Figure 4 – IdM framework overview diagram. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is a green dashed box labeled 'Business and Security Applications including Identity-based Services'. Below it is a pink dashed box labeled 'Identity Management Services, Functions and Capabilities'. An upward arrow labeled 'Supports' connects the pink box to the green box. Below the pink box is a blue solid box labeled 'Identity Management (IdM) Framework'. An upward arrow labeled 'Enables' connects the blue box to the pink box. Inside the blue box, there are eight red rounded rectangles representing IdM functions: 'Identity Lifecycle Management', 'IdM OAM&P Functions', 'IdM Signalling & Control Functions', 'IdM Federated Identity Functions', 'IdM User & Subscriber Functions', 'IdM, Performance, Reliability & Scalability', 'IdM Security', and '\*IdM legal & Regulatory Rules'. A note at the bottom of the blue box states: '\*Note: Legal & Regulatory is not within the scope of this framework but is shown for completeness'.
+
+**Figure 4 – IdM framework overview**
+
+The framework consists of the following IdM functions and capabilities:
+
+- 5) Identity management (IdM) user and subscriber functions:
+This includes functions and processes related to control by end users and subscribers of their identity related information (e.g., PII, personal preferences and location). This includes functions to control, delegate and authorize the use and dissemination of identity-related information.
+- 6) Identity management (IdM) performance, reliability, and scalability:
+This includes functions and procedures addressing performance, reliability and scalability of IdM systems and solutions.
+- 7) Identity management (IdM) security:
+This includes functions and procedures addressing the security protection of IdM systems, services and capabilities.
+- 8) Identity management (IdM) legal and regulatory rules:
+Legal and regulatory regulations are not within the scope of this Recommendation.
+NOTE – This item is shown here for completeness.
+
+The detailed description of each item is provided in clause 8.
+
+# 7 IdM in the context of NGN architectures and reference models
+
+## 7.1 General relationship with NGN architectures and services
+
+Figure 5 illustrates the relationship of the IdM framework in the broader context of NGN networks.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Business and Security Applications Including Identity-based Services] <--> |Improves| B[Identity Management Framework: IdM Services, Functions and Capabilities]
+ B <--> |Utilizes NGN Resources| C[Example NGN Resources]
+ subgraph C [Example NGN Resources]
+ D[Subscription Profiles Servers]
+ E[Location Servers]
+ F[Presence Servers]
+ G[Policy Servers]
+ H[Home Subscriber Server (HSS)]
+ I[Other (e.g., CSCF and SBC)]
+ D --- E --- F --- G --- H --- I
+ end
+
+```
+
+Diagram illustrating the relationship of the IdM framework in the broader context of NGN networks. The diagram shows a central yellow box labeled 'Identity Management Framework: IdM Services, Functions and Capabilities'. Above it is a pink box labeled 'Business and Security Applications Including Identity-based Services', connected by a double-headed arrow labeled 'Improves'. Below it is a blue box labeled 'Example NGN Resources', connected by a double-headed arrow labeled 'Utilizes NGN Resources'. The 'Example NGN Resources' box contains several green boxes: 'Subscription Profiles Servers', 'Location Servers', 'Presence Servers', 'Policy Servers', 'Home Subscriber Server (HSS)', and 'Other (e.g., CSCF and SBC)', connected by a horizontal line with an ellipsis.
+
+**Figure 5 – Relation with NGN architectures and services**
+
+As shown in the diagram, the framework utilizes the resources of the NGN network (e.g., information in subscription, location, policy, presence and home subscriber servers and other network elements such as call session control function (CSCF) and session border controller (SBC)). The IdM services, functions, and capabilities provided by the framework are used to support and enhance business and security applications including identity-based services.
+
+## 7.2 Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (General principles and general reference model for NGN) reference models
+
+This clause describes the IdM services, functions and capabilities in the context of the NGN architectural models and references defined in [ITU-T Y.2011], *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the scope of Identity Management (IdM) within the NGN reference architectural model. It consists of two 3D block diagrams, one for the 'NGN Service Stratum' and one for the 'NGN Transport Stratum'. Each stratum is composed of three stacked planes: a yellow 'Management Plane' at the top, a green 'Control Plane' in the middle, and a blue 'User Plane' at the bottom. A dashed-line box labeled 'Scope of IdM' is positioned vertically, encompassing the Management, Control, and User planes of both the Service and Transport Strata. Below the diagrams, the text 'Figure 2/Y.2011' is displayed.
+
+Diagram showing the Scope of IdM in the context of NGN Service and Transport Stratum.
+
+**Figure 6 – Scope of IdM in the context of Figure 2 of [ITU-T Y.2011]**
+
+Figure 6 shows the scope of IdM in the context of the NGN reference architectural model defined in Figure 2 of [ITU-T Y.2011]. It shows that IdM-related functions may be found in the user, control and management planes.
+
+![Figure 7: IdM in the context of Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.2011]. The diagram shows a 3D architectural model with three main layers. The top layer is an orange block labeled 'Services' with text 'Infrastructural, application, middleware and baseware services'. Below it are two identical grey blocks labeled 'Resources' on the right side. Each 'Resources' block contains two sub-blocks: a yellow one labeled 'Service Management Functions' and a green one labeled 'Service Control Functions' (or 'Transport Management Functions' and 'Transport Control Functions' for the bottom block). A dashed vertical cylinder labeled 'Scope of IdM' passes through all three layers, indicating that IdM functions span across the Services, Service Management, and Service Control layers.](9c6461e1e94afae4dec455e69a2ce152_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 7: IdM in the context of Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.2011]. The diagram shows a 3D architectural model with three main layers. The top layer is an orange block labeled 'Services' with text 'Infrastructural, application, middleware and baseware services'. Below it are two identical grey blocks labeled 'Resources' on the right side. Each 'Resources' block contains two sub-blocks: a yellow one labeled 'Service Management Functions' and a green one labeled 'Service Control Functions' (or 'Transport Management Functions' and 'Transport Control Functions' for the bottom block). A dashed vertical cylinder labeled 'Scope of IdM' passes through all three layers, indicating that IdM functions span across the Services, Service Management, and Service Control layers.
+
+**Figure 7 – IdM in the context of Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.2011]**
+
+Figure 7 shows the scope of IdM in context of the NGN reference architectural model defined in Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.2011]. It shows that IdM-related functions may be included in all of the vertical layers of the NGN architecture.
+
+# **8 Identity management framework**
+
+This clause provides detailed description of functional groups mentioned in clause 6.
+
+## **8.1 Identity lifecycle management**
+
+### **8.1.1 Proofing and enrolment**
+
+A first step of creating an identity for an entity (e.g., subscriber, device, organization, NGN provider or object) begins with the identity or credential proofing and enrolment process. That is the process for subscribing an identity or credential associated with a particular entity which may be based on a particular context (e.g., roles).
+
+In the case of end user subscribers, this is the process where an applicant applies to become a subscriber of an IdP or of an NGN provider.
+
+For end user subscribers, the subscriber's name may be a verified name. A verified name is associated with the identity of an entity. Before an applicant can receive credentials or enrolment of a token associated with a verified name, the applicant needs to demonstrate that the identity is a real identity, and that it is the entity that is entitled to use that identity. This process is called identity proofing. Once the name is verified, it can be associated with pseudonyms to allow anonymity.
+
+Proofing includes verifying attributes and claims associated with an identity. It involves processes and procedures to verify and validate information when enrolling an entity into an identity system.
+
+The overall effectiveness of IdM depends initially on the proofing and enrolment process. Well-defined assurance requirements are needed and appropriate policy and management procedures are
+
+necessary to be put in place to ensure that the overall enrolment process is properly designed and implemented.
+
+Guidelines to consider include:
+
+- Training of personnel involved in the enrolment process
+- Quality of documents and other evidence supporting enrolment of an entity
+- Processes for avoiding masquerade at enrolment
+- Processes for avoiding multiple or duplicate enrolment of the same entity.
+
+### **8.1.2 Issuance and revocation**
+
+Successful completion of the enrolment process results in the granting of a means (e.g., a credential) by which the entity can be authenticated in the future. For example, the issuance of a credential(s) by an IdP (or NGN provider) binds it to the identity or related attribute (e.g., privilege or claim) of the identity associated with an entity.
+
+Identity revocation is the process of rescinding an identity and the associated credentials. The party or system (e.g., IdP or NGN provider) that issues an identity or credential is responsible for the maintenance and protection of the information associated with the identity. Revocation is required to prevent the continued use of an identity or credential that is no longer valid or has a security breach.
+
+Guidelines to consider include:
+
+- establishment of criteria for issuance and revocation;
+- establishment of criteria for updates and modifications;
+- synchronization of identity information;
+- establishment of processes and procedures for issuance and revocation;
+- auditing and review of issuance and revocation processes;
+- procedures and processes for notification of issuance, updates and revocation of identity or credentials (i.e., all systems and processes with which an identity has been established need to be able to determine that the identity or credentials have been issued, updated and revoked);
+- well-defined procedures and processes for the issuance and revocation of an identity or credential and appropriate policy. Management procedures are also necessary to ensure that the overall process is properly designed and implemented; and
+- mechanisms to protect the revocation processes and procedures from security threats.
+
+## **8.2 Identity management OAM&P functions**
+
+#### **8.2.1 Data model and schema**
+
+Each NGN provider, federation or enterprise may have its own formats, schemas, definitions or semantics to represent and share identity-related data and information. For example, the same information such as date of birth may be represented differently by two different systems (e.g., month/day/year or day/month/year). Also, the semantics, schemas and protocols used to request and exchange identity-related information can be different resulting in interoperability problems. For example, identity information in public switched telephone network (PSTN) such as calling party number and caller identity are represented using specific semantics and retrieved using specific protocols (e.g., SS7), and they are different from SIP-based VoIP systems.
+
+Solutions to allow interoperability between heterogeneous IdM systems using different data models, structures and schemas are important.
+
+Guidelines to consider include:
+
+- data model and schemas to facilitate interoperability between heterogeneous IdM systems (e.g., identity data sources) within an NGN provider domain (i.e., different supplier products);
+- data model and schemas to facilitate interoperability between different NGN providers (inter-network); and
+- data model and schemas to facilitate interoperability between different federations (e.g., NGN provider and web-services providers).
+
+#### **8.2.2 Identifier management**
+
+The identity(s) of an entity (e.g., user/subscriber, organization, federation, enterprise, service provider, device and objects) may have one or more identifiers associated with the identity that have to be managed and maintained.
+
+An identifier is any designation that is used to represent the identity of an entity, such as a user ID, a network ID, an e-mail address, a pseudonym, a group name, etc. For example, the following identifiers may be associated with the identity of a user/subscriber:
+
+- User ID
+- E-mail address
+- Telephone number
+- URI
+- IP address.
+
+The overall effectiveness of IdM depends on the assurance of the individual identifiers that may be correlated and bound to assure the identity of an entity. Therefore, well-defined requirements and procedures for the management of the identifiers are needed.
+
+Guidelines to consider for IdM designs and implementations include:
+
+- There are different types of identifiers with various characteristics that would have to be managed. For example, some identifiers may be global (i.e., unique across different federations), pseudonyms that are meaningful within a system, or a one-time identifier that has a temporary period of validity.
+- Identifiers may have different characteristics with privacy implications with respect to guarding against inappropriate correlation of user actions.
+
+#### **8.2.3 Attribute management**
+
+Identity attributes are descriptors of an entity, such as entity type, preferred IP address, domain, address information, telephone number. Attributes may also contain claims, rights, privileges, delegate lists, and special restrictions. Other types of attributes include information being tracked for intrusion detection, such as failed identity assertion attempts, rekeying counters, etc.
+
+The effectiveness of IdM would depend on the assurance of attributes that may be correlated and bound to assure the identity of an entity. This includes storing and provisioning of attributes. Therefore, well-defined requirements and procedures for the management of attributes are necessary to be put in place.
+
+Pattern is a special type of attribute, which is any characteristic associated with the behaviour of an entity. Pattern information may be assigned by IdM systems based on reputation and past interactions, as opposed to being set by the entity itself. Examples of pattern information that can be used to assess identity assurance include IP address, access point, location information, time of usage, and systems accessed. Intelligent features may additionally take into consideration current events to predict future usage patterns.
+
+Guidelines to consider for attribute management include:
+
+- pattern information may be considered as PII;
+- stringent requirements and procedures for the management of pattern information;
+- use of pattern information to minimize identity theft; and
+- compliance with PII policy.
+
+#### **8.2.4 Credential management**
+
+Credentials are used to authenticate a claimed identity. Credentials include:
+
+- username/passwords;
+- digital certificates;
+- tokens and smart cards;
+- security hints;
+- PKI-related information such as keys, certificates, signing certificate authority, cryptographic information; etc.; and
+- biometrics.
+
+Entity credential management encompasses the operational activities to create, issue, and manage information used to authenticate identity claims. The effectiveness of IdM depends on the credential management processes, procedures and capabilities. Therefore, well-defined requirements and procedures for credential management are needed.
+
+Guidelines for credential management include:
+
+- establishment and maintenance of credential policies;
+- credential lifecycle management processes and procedures (a subset of identity lifecycle management discussed in clause 8.1); and
+- policies and service agreements in multiple service/network provider environments (negotiates credential policies, comply with federation requirements, publish credential information, such as public keys).
+
+#### **8.2.5 Logging and auditing**
+
+Logging and auditing functions and capabilities are important to the effectiveness of IdM solutions. Example auditing and compliance measures include maintaining security logs to satisfy accountability requirements, protecting and appropriately using personal information, and providing notification to the appropriate systems or entities (e.g., identity owners).
+
+Guidelines for logging and auditing include:
+
+- logging and auditing of IdM related events (e.g., access to identity information, unauthorized access attempts, updates timestamps, etc.) for forensic analysis;
+- mechanisms and procedures to enable trace-back;
+- detection of non-compliance to applicable policies; and
+- assurance of national regulatory requirements.
+
+### **8.3 Identity management signalling and control functions**
+
+#### **8.3.1 Introduction**
+
+Signalling and control functions are used to discover and communicate trusted identity information (e.g., identifiers, attributes, claims) associated with an entity (e.g., user/subscriber, group, organization, network element, service provider) to support IdM services, functions and capabilities.
+
+This clause describes signalling and control functions related to IdM.
+
+#### **8.3.2 Discovery of identity information**
+
+In a distributed environment, such as NGN, identity information may exist in different network elements (e.g., subscription server, location server, presence server, home subscription server, etc.). Structured means to discover identity information sources are an integral part of IdM. For an application to make use of identity information, it needs to know that it exists. In a dynamic and evolving NGN environment, identity information and sources of identity information are expected to be dynamic as well. Therefore, relying parties and entities (e.g., applications) would need structured means to learn the existence and to discover the identity information. This also includes discovery of IdM function services and capabilities.
+
+Guidelines to consider in specifying and implementing discovery capabilities include:
+
+- discovery within a NGN provider domain (intra-network);
+- discovery between different NGN provider domains (inter-network); and
+- discovery among federation members. See clause 8.4.2, federation discovery.
+
+Discovery also includes capabilities to find or locate IdPs. Discovery is necessary in the NGN IdM framework because there may be multiple IdPs. In situations where there is only one IdP (e.g., enterprise), there is no need for a discovery operation because it will be known where to obtain the identity attributes. In addition, within a single NGN provider network, there may be multiple systems providing various identity management-related functions and appropriate discovery functions.
+
+Discovery is similar to a web search for an identity. The inputs to the search engine are the identity features and the output is a list of identifiers and IdPs that match the requirements. This query and response scenario typically requires IdPs to register themselves as providers of a particular identity service for a given user/device.
+
+The available methods used to support the associated needs for authoritative discovery and access roughly fall into two categories: 1) overlay root-of-roots approaches, and/or 2) inferential discovery. The former relies on some entity assuming the role of a master registrar of namespaces with a supporting server, while the latter approach relies on well-known rules by which the address for a supporting server may be recursively obtained. Mixtures may also be used.
+
+#### **8.3.3 IdM communications**
+
+This includes capabilities and functions to discover and exchange identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) associated with an entity's identity that is located in different network systems (e.g., in a subscription server, location server, presence server, etc.) within an NGN provider network that could be correlated and verified (i.e., by an IdM application server providing authentication and correlation functions) in order to provide identity assurance capabilities. Assertions of identity and associated attributes (e.g., claims and privileges) can be communicated to relying systems (e.g., application services) to make access control decisions. This would allow different application services (i.e., of different vendor platforms) to make use of a common infrastructure for IdM, as opposed to independent and autonomous solutions. Communication relationships to consider include:
+
+- intra-network: communications with a NGN provider domain (e.g., between network elements);
+- inter-network: communications between two different NGN providers; and
+- federation: communications between members of a federation.
+
+##### 8.3.3.1 Real-time and near real-time communications
+
+The solution used to discover and exchange identity information needs to take into account whether real-time or near real-time communications are required. This would depend on the specific applications being supported.
+
+##### 8.3.3.2 Signalling and control protocols and interfaces
+
+Figure 8 shows external interfaces that are applicable to support IdM communications. For example, interfaces are used to exchange identity information or control IdM services, functions and capabilities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the external interfaces for Identity Management (IdM) in a Next-Generation Network (NGN). It shows two NGN Providers, NGN Provider A and NGN Provider B, connected via a 3rd Party Provider. Each NGN Provider consists of a Service Stratum (containing Application Servers, Softswitch, and CSCF) and a Transport layer (containing routers). The 3rd Party Provider is represented by a cloud containing an IdP (Identity Provider). The interfaces are labeled as follows: UNI (User-to-Network Interface) connects the User/Device to the NGN Provider; ANI (Application-to-Network Interface) connects the NGN Provider to the 3rd Party Provider; and NNI (Network-to-Network Interface) connects the two NGN Providers. The diagram also includes two text boxes: 'Each of the items illustrated in this figure has identities associated with it.' and 'The IdP may be either a NGN Provider or 3rd Party Provider'.
+
+Figure 8: External interfaces diagram showing NGN Provider A and NGN Provider B connected via a 3rd Party Provider. The diagram illustrates the User-to-Network Interface (UNI), Application-to-Network Interface (ANI), and Network-to-Network Interface (NNI).
+
+**Figure 8 – External interfaces**
+
+External interfaces include:
+
+- user-to-network interface (UNI)
+- application-to-network interface (ANI), and
+- network-to-network interface (NNI).
+
+Specific requirements and protocols to be used depend on the specific interface, information to be communicated or control functions to be performed. Specific requirements and protocol options and profiles to be used should be identified and specified to facilitate interoperability. The interface solutions depend on factors such as specific application and service needs (e.g., real-time versus near-real time), protocol solutions (e.g., SAML, Diameter, RADIUS), and mechanisms and approaches (e.g., [b-ITU-T X.509], generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA)).
+
+In addition to the external interfaces, internal interfaces are also important to the overall solutions. Within an NGN network, identity information may be located in different network elements and application services (e.g., subscription, location, and presence servers and other network elements
+
+such as CSCF and SBC). The internal interfaces and protocols to be used to discover and exchange identity information are important considerations for multi-vendor interoperability.
+
+##### **8.3.3.3 Mechanisms and procedures**
+
+The mechanisms and procedures used to implement a specific IdM function or capability should be identified and specified. For example, the specific mechanisms or protocols and where and how it is used should be identified and specified. Example mechanisms and protocols include:
+
+- SAML
+- X.509
+- GBA, and
+- E.115
+
+#### **8.3.4 Correlation and binding**
+
+The identity information (e.g., identifiers, credential and attributes) may be correlated to establish a binding to assure the identity of an entity. For example, the identity information associated with a subscriber (e.g., UserID), a subscriber device (e.g., DeviceID), and location information may be correlated to establish a binding to provide a higher assurance of the subscriber.
+
+Guidelines to consider in specifying and implementing correlation and binding include:
+
+- enforcement of applicable policy (e.g., anonymity or privacy policies).
+
+#### **8.3.5 Authentication**
+
+Authentication is the process of establishing confidence in the identity of an entity. One means of achieving authentication assurance is to describe the objectives and guidelines necessary to quantify the risks that an entity is who or what it claims to be. This includes establishing which entity identifiers are more important than others in the identification process and why certain identifiers used in authentication should not have the same authentication value.
+
+Traditionally, trust is achieved by issuing user-ID and password pairs for individual systems. However, in the NGN this approach is undesirable, operationally inefficient, and can lead to insecure practices. Guidelines to consider in specifying and implementing authentication include:
+
+- Confidentiality and integrity of the authentication mechanisms
+- Credentials strong enough to be trusted across systems.
+
+#### **8.3.6 Authentication assurance**
+
+Authentication assurance is the process of establishing confidence in the identities and claims that are presented to an information system. Not all information used for authentication should be treated equally or necessarily have the same assurance value. For example, the confidence in an authentication using biometric is significantly different from an authentication using user ID/password. Relative value based on fundamental principles needs to be assigned to each identifier in order to quantify the confidence that an authenticated entity is the valid entity.
+
+The objective of authentication assurance is to quantify the risks that an entity is who or what it claims to be. Not all identifiers used in an authentication decision process are treated equally or necessarily have the same authentication value. In addition, as the consequence of an authentication error becomes more serious, the required level of authentication assurance should increase depending on the risk implication (e.g., critical nature of the impact) of an authentication error.
+
+A mechanism to quantify and communicate authentication assurance allows relying parties to make decisions regarding their confidence in the authentication process used to validate the identity or claims of an entity.
+
+Primary benefits of authentication assurance include the ability to determine the level of confidence that an entity is that which is claimed throughout the identity's life cycle. Standard criteria for assigning and communicating relative assurance value of authentication process, mechanisms and the data (e.g., password, credentials, biometrics) across different federation are critical for supporting federated services and cyber-security protection.
+
+An authentication assurance process should take into account the following:
+
+- Authentication mechanism: Static passwords are weaker than one-time passwords, and a hardware token with a PIN is generally better than software token.
+- Authentication protocol: A protocol that is known to be secure against man-in-the-middle attacks or one based on cryptographic operations is generally considered strong.
+- Characteristics of the device used to authenticate: Authentication confidence is partly based on the characteristics of the device being used by the user, i.e., a commercial off-the-shelf computer owned and controlled by the organization or a dedicated tamper resistant device is better than a publicly accessible commercial off-the-shelf device.
+- Location of the entity being authenticated: The location of the user should be considered, e.g., within the organization's area or in public kiosk, Internet café, etc. Authentication confidence will be higher if it is difficult for a public terminal in a kiosk to convince the authentication server that it is located within an organization's physical boundaries.
+- Communications path: Authentication typically involves a communications path (wireless networks, commercial leased lines, etc.) between the entity being authenticated and the server providing authentication and/or access decisions. Information used for authentication is needed to be reliably conveyed to the authentication server and not be susceptible to spoofing by an attacker.
+- Relative ease of authentication manipulation by malicious behaviour: It is important to assess the risk associated with the compromise of cryptographic keys.
+
+#### **8.3.7 Delegation**
+
+Delegation involves actions and processes for the transfer of privileges to perform certain action on behalf of a principal from an entity that has privileges over another entity which does not have the privileges.
+
+For example, delegation authority begins with the ability to define which accounts have the ability to perform certain managerial actions (such as creating new accounts) or managing specific functions (such as changing an account password). Thus, given the ability to delegate the actions or effort of administration, the goal then is to provide an environment wherein this task is undertaken in a secure and responsible manner.
+
+#### **8.3.8 Policy enforcement**
+
+The design and implementation of IdM solutions should take into account that the applicable policies are enforced. For example, enforcement of policy is usually associated with:
+
+- anonymity and privacy;
+- creation and collection of identity information; and
+- use and dissemination of identity information.
+
+#### **8.3.9 Support of services requiring priority treatment**
+
+Design and implementation of IdM solutions should take into consideration support of application services and communication sessions requiring priority treatment such as emergency telecommunications service (ETS). For example, any interactions with IdM systems to set up and maintain ETS communication sessions should be given priority treatment. Refer to [b-ITU-T E.107] and [b-ITU-T Y.2205] for information on services and capabilities requiring priority treatment.
+
+### **8.4 Identity management federated identity functions**
+
+#### **8.4.1 Federated identity**
+
+The general concept of federation is to allow each federation member to remain independent while facilitating sharing of specific identity information to allow federated services. For example, certain identity information of a user/subscriber (e.g., subset of a subscriber profile) could be federated (i.e., made available to federation members).
+
+#### **8.4.2 Federation discovery**
+
+Federation discovery consists of functions and mechanisms to discover and exchange federated identity information. For example, certain identity information about a user/subscriber may be federated such as a subset of the subscriber profile information.
+
+The main aspect of federation discovery is to identify or discover a candidate IdP or the IdP that is the authoritative source for a particular identity information associated with an entity (e.g., location information).
+
+Discovery is necessary in any architecture in which there are multiple IdPs, or for which the location of IdPs is potentially dynamic. In situations where there is only a single identity provider (e.g., an enterprise), there is no need for a discovery operation because any RP/SP will implicitly know where to obtain the entity's identity information.
+
+#### **8.4.3 Bridging and interworking**
+
+In general, each NGN provider, enterprise or federation member may have its own formats, schemas, definitions or semantics to represent and share identity-related data and information. For example, the same information such as date of birth may be represented differently by two different systems. Also, the semantics, schemas and mechanisms used to request and exchange identity-related information can be different resulting in interoperability problems. Therefore, appropriate capabilities to allow bridging and interworking between different federations will be necessary.
+
+### **8.5 Identity management user and subscriber functions**
+
+Functions to allow an end user/subscriber to provide information regarding the control of their identity information are needed for effective IdM solutions. This includes functions and capabilities to enable an entity such as an end user/subscriber to provide service providers and IdPs information about conditions, restrictions, consents, authorization regarding creation, collection, use and dissemination of their identity information.
+
+These functions are related to the enforcement of applicable policies such as policies regarding protection of PII, anonymous or pseudonymous identity information.
+
+Guidelines to consider include:
+
+- means for end users/subscribers to convey information to NGN provider about the control of their identity information;
+- compliance with applicable policies regarding protection of PII; and
+- ease of use for the end user/subscriber.
+
+## **8.6 Performance and reliability**
+
+#### **8.6.1 Performance**
+
+IdM capabilities and functions will be used to support and enhance a wide range of business and security applications. For example, IdM functions may be used to assure the identity of communication entities before allowing a communication session (e.g., VoIP, IPTV or data
+
+sessions). Therefore, the performance implications of IdM on the higher level application services being supported (e.g., VoIP, IPTV, data) is important for the overall effectiveness of the solution. For example, IdM should not negatively impact the higher level applications services that are being supported so that the overall quality of service (QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) of end users/subscribers are affected.
+
+Performance management considerations are important in IdM solution designs. Performance management includes gathering and analysing statistical data for performance monitoring purposes. Performance monitoring is the systematic assessment of a network system ability to carry out its assigned function, through the continuous collection and analysis of appropriate performance data. Performance monitoring procedures are intended to capture intermittent error conditions and troubles resulting from the gradual deterioration of network equipment. Proactive maintenance techniques, such as performance monitoring, enable early detection of troubles before they escalate in severity.
+
+#### **8.6.2 Timestamp accuracy**
+
+Timestamp accuracy is a factor for IdM. Auditing describes the occurrence of events within those time-frames. For auditing purposes, timestamps are essential, and the quality, if not the usability, of audit data is determined by timestamp accuracy.
+
+The accuracy of timestamps is determined by three factors – the precision with which the local timestamp clock is read, the traceability of the local clock to a reference clock, and the mathematical uncertainty of the local clock measured against a reference.
+
+#### **8.6.3 Reliability and availability**
+
+Reliability and resiliency of network elements and systems providing IdM functions and capabilities are an important aspect of the design and implementation of solutions because IdM will be used to support and enhance a wide range of business and security applications that may have specific availability requirements. Therefore, requirements and guidelines for reliability factors, such as the following, need to be considered:
+
+- system designs (e.g., redundancy) for robustness and resiliency; and
+- diversity (e.g., geographical diversity) for availability.
+
+In addition, design and implementation of IdM solution should also consider failsafe measures. For example, the relying application may allow certain limited privileges if the entire IdM system was to fail or become unavailable.
+
+## **8.7 IdM security**
+
+#### **8.7.1 Security protection of network elements providing IdM**
+
+Because identity information and resources are valuable, sensitive, and used to support business applications and services, network elements providing IdM services, functions and capabilities will be targeted for security attacks and therefore will require security protection.
+
+Appropriate requirements and measures to secure and protect the network elements and systems providing IdM functions, services and capabilities are necessary. Examples of security considerations are:
+
+- security protection of the IdM services, functions and capabilities;
+- security protection of the signalling and communication interfaces; and
+- security protection of the management interfaces of IdM systems (i.e., interfaces used to configure and manage identity information).
+
+#### **8.7.2 Protection of personally identifiable information (PII)**
+
+Protecting PII is a highly important aspect of IdM. Specific capabilities to protect PII should be defined and implemented. This is related to the enforcement of applicable policy on PII protection subject to national and regional regulations. Functions and capabilities to consider include:
+
+- capabilities for users/subscribers to communicate preferences regarding PII;
+- capabilities to provide transparency (i.e., capabilities to make sure that only authorized entities have access to or can observe PII); and
+- capabilities to provide notices regarding dissemination and use of identity information.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.107] Recommendation ITU-T E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*.
+- [b-ITU-T E.115] Recommendation ITU-T E.115 (2008), *Computerized directory assistance*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.810] Recommendation ITU-T X.810 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Overview*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.811] Recommendation ITU-T X.811 (1995) | ISO/IEC 1081-2:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.911] Recommendation ITU-T X.911 (2005) | ISO/IEC 15414:2006, *Information technology – Open distributed processing – Reference model – Enterprise language*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1121] Recommendation ITU-T X.1121 (2004), *Framework of security technologies for mobile end-to-end data communications*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1141] Recommendation ITU-T X.1141 (2006), *Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2205] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2205 (2008), *Next Generation Networks – Emergency telecommunications – Technical considerations*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ETSI EG 202 072] ETSI EG 202 072, V1.1.1 (2002), *Universal Communications identifier (UCI); Placing UCI in context; Review and analysis of existing identification schemes*.
+<[http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report\\_WorkItem.asp?WKI\\_ID=14108](http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report_WorkItem.asp?WKI_ID=14108)>
+- [b-ETSI EG 202 236] ETSI EG 202 236, V1.1.1 (2003), *Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization Over Networks (TIPHON); Design guide; Use of non-numeric names*.
+<[http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report\\_WorkItem.asp?WKI\\_ID=17732](http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report_WorkItem.asp?WKI_ID=17732)>
+
+- [b-ETSI EG 284 004] ETSI EG 284 004, V1.1.2 (2007), *Telecommunications and Internet Converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); Incorporating Universal Communications Identifier (UCI) support into the specification of Next Generation Networks.*
+<[http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report\\_WorkItem.asp?WKI\\_ID=21139](http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report_WorkItem.asp?WKI_ID=21139)>
+- [b-ETSI TS 102 042] ETSI TS 102 042, V1.3.4 (2007), *Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing public key certificates.*
+<[http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report\\_WorkItem.asp?WKI\\_ID=27736](http://webapp.etsi.org/workprogram/Report_WorkItem.asp?WKI_ID=27736)>
+- [b-RFC 3650] IETF RFC 3650 (2003), *Handle System Overview.*
+<>
+- [b-NIST] NIST SP800-63, v6.3.3, *Electronic Authentication Guidelines.*
+<[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1\\_0\\_2.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf)>
+- [b-OGIM] The Open Group, *Identity Management White Paper* (03/2004).
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2721
+
+(09/2010)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **NGN identity management requirements and use cases**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721**
+
+# **NGN identity management requirements and use cases**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721 provides identity management (IdM) example use cases and requirements for the next generation network (NGN) and its interfaces. IdM functions and capabilities are used to increase confidence in identity information and support and enhance business and security applications including identity-based services.
+
+The requirements provided in this Recommendation are intended for NGN (i.e., managed packet networks) as defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001.
+
+The objectives and requirements in this Recommendation are based on the IdM framework provided in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 and an analysis of use case examples relevant to NGN. The example use cases are informative and are documented in the appendices of this Recommendation.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2721 | 2010-09-16 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Federated identity, identity management, next generation network, security.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 2 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 5 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 5 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 7 |
+| 6 | IdM overview..... | 7 |
+| | 6.1 General ..... | 7 |
+| | 6.2 IdM relationships..... | 8 |
+| | 6.3 Drivers and motivations ..... | 11 |
+| | 6.4 Multiple service provider and federated environment..... | 11 |
+| | 6.5 Identity service provider (IdSP) ..... | 11 |
+| | 6.6 IdM in the context of NGN architectures and reference models..... | 12 |
+| 7 | IdM objectives ..... | 13 |
+| 8 | IdM requirements ..... | 14 |
+| | 8.1 General requirements..... | 14 |
+| | 8.2 Identity lifecycle management requirements..... | 15 |
+| | 8.3 Identity management OAM&P functions..... | 17 |
+| | 8.4 Signalling and control functions..... | 18 |
+| | 8.5 Identity management federated identity functions ..... | 21 |
+| | 8.6 User/subscriber functions and protection of PII..... | 22 |
+| | 8.7 Security..... | 23 |
+| | Appendix I – General IdM use cases ..... | 25 |
+| | I.1 Introduction ..... | 25 |
+| | I.2 Governments..... | 25 |
+| | I.3 Business enterprise ..... | 25 |
+| | I.4 End user/subscribers ..... | 26 |
+| | Appendix II – IdM use cases for NGN applications..... | 27 |
+| | II.1 Introduction ..... | 27 |
+| | II.2 Basic use case example ..... | 27 |
+| | II.3 Use of common IdM systems to support multiple application servicesPage |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| II.6 Enforcement of user control of personally identifiable information (e.g., preferences) across peer network/service provider domains..... | 38 |
+| II.7 Bridging/mapping between heterogeneous IdM systems..... | 40 |
+| II.8 Support of converged services (e.g., fixed and mobile access) within a service provider network ..... | 41 |
+| II.9 Example use case – User authentication and authorization of NGN provider (mutual authentication and authorization) ..... | 42 |
+| II.10 Example use case – Peer user assertion (non-cash transactions) ..... | 43 |
+| II.11 IdM use case – Assurance of end user device identity and integrity..... | 44 |
+| Appendix III – Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) related IdM use cases..... | 48 |
+| III.1 Introduction ..... | 48 |
+| III.2 Authentication assurance using device and user combination ..... | 48 |
+| III.3 Enhanced authentication of ETS users for next generation priority services (priority multimedia services) ..... | 50 |
+| III.4 Authentication of called party and data communication sources..... | 53 |
+| III.5 Trusted identification and authentication of service providers in a multi-provider environment ..... | 56 |
+| III.6 Single sign-on and single sign-off..... | 59 |
+| Appendix IV – Mobile-related use cases ..... | 63 |
+| IV.1 Introduction ..... | 63 |
+| IV.2 Use case examples ..... | 63 |
+| Appendix V – Example IdM transaction models..... | 67 |
+| V.1 Introduction ..... | 67 |
+| V.2 Examples of possible identity management transaction models ..... | 67 |
+| Appendix VI – Example illustrative deployment scenario for IdM in NGN..... | 70 |
+| VI.1 Introduction ..... | 70 |
+| VI.2 IdM architecture deployment ..... | 70 |
+| Bibliography..... | 72 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721
+
+# NGN identity management requirements and use cases
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides identity management (IdM) objectives, requirements, guidelines and example use cases for the next generation network (NGN) and its interfaces. IdM functions and capabilities are used to increase confidence in identity information and support and enhance business and security applications including identity-based services.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes objectives, requirements, guidelines and example use cases addressing:
+
+- Increasing confidence in the identity information of an NGN entity (e.g., user, group, user device, service provider, enterprise, federation, network element and object).
+- Secure management of the lifecycle (e.g., registration, validation, revocation) of identity information subject to user's specific and informed consent.
+- IdM as an enabler of business (e.g., single sign-on and sign-off for multiple application services) and security applications (e.g., access controls) including identity-based services (e.g., authentication, assertions and federated identity).
+- Secure discovery and exchange of information associated with an NGN entity's identity or identities subject to user's specific and informed consent. This includes information that may be located within an NGN and across different administrative domains or federations.
+- Interworking/interoperability among the IdM systems and capabilities within a NGN provider domain (i.e., intra-network).
+- Interworking/interoperability of the IdM systems and capabilities among different provider domains or federations subject to user's specific and informed consent where user information is concern (e.g., among NGN providers, web services providers and content providers).
+- Enforcement of applicable policy (e.g., protection of personally identifiable information) associated with an entity's identity or identity information.
+- Security of IdM systems, functions, capabilities, data and communications.
+
+The objectives and requirements provided in this Recommendation are intended for NGN (i.e., managed packet networks) as defined in [ITU-T Y.2001], *General overview of NGN*.
+
+The objectives and requirements in this Recommendation are based on the IdM framework provided in [ITU-T Y.2720] and an analysis of use case examples documented in the appendices.
+
+NOTE 1 – In this Recommendation, the use of the term 'Identity' relating to IdM does not indicate its absolute meaning. In particular, it does not constitute any positive validation of a person.
+
+NOTE 2 – In this Recommendation, a user can be a person, groups, companies, juridical entities, or any other entities which make use of NGN services.
+
+NOTE 3 – In this Recommendation, the term "NGN/identity service provider (NGN/IdSP)" is used to indicate that it could be an NGN provider or a third party that provides IdM services.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T E.107] Recommendation ITU-T E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*.
+- [ITU-T X.811] Recommendation ITU-T X.811 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework*.
+- [ITU-T X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252 (2010), *Baseline identity management terms and definitions*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2205] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2205 (2008), *Next Generation Networks – Emergency telecommunications – Technical considerations*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN Release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 anonymity** [ITU-T X.1252]: A situation where an entity cannot be identified within a set of entities.
+
+NOTE – Anonymity prevents the tracing of entities or their behaviour such as user location, frequency of a service usage, and so on.
+
+**3.1.2 assertion** [ITU-T X.1252]: A statement made by an entity without accompanying evidence of its validity.
+
+**3.1.3 attribute** [ITU-T X.1252]: Information bound to an entity that specifies a characteristic of the entity.
+
+**3.1.4 authentication** [ITU-T X.1252]: A process used to achieve sufficient confidence in the binding between the entity and the presented identity.
+
+NOTE – Use of the term authentication in an identity management (IdM) context is taken to mean entity authentication.
+
+**3.1.5 authentication assurance** [ITU-T X.1252]: The degree of confidence reached in the authentication process that the communication partner is the entity that it claims to be or is expected to be.
+
+NOTE – The confidence is based on the degree of confidence in the binding between the communicating entity and the identity that is presented.
+
+**3.1.6 authorization** [ITU-T X.1252]: The granting of rights and, based on these rights, the granting of access.
+
+**3.1.7 binding** [ITU-T X.1252]: An explicit established association, bonding, or tie.
+
+**3.1.8 claim** [ITU-T X.1252]: To state as being the case, without being able to give proof.
+
+**3.1.9 claimant** [ITU-T X.1252]: An entity that is or represents a principal for the purposes of authentication.
+
+NOTE – A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges on behalf of a principal.
+
+**3.1.10 context** [ITU-T X.1252]: An environment with defined boundary conditions in which entities exist and interact.
+
+**3.1.11 credential** [ITU-T X.1252]: A set of data presented as evidence of a claimed identity and/or entitlements.
+
+**3.1.12 delegation** [ITU-T X.1252]: An action that assigns authority, responsibility, or a function to another entity.
+
+**3.1.13 discovery** [ITU-T Y.2720]: The act of locating a machine-processable description of a network-related resource that may have been previously unknown and that meets certain functional criteria. It involves matching a set of functional and other criteria with a set of resource descriptions. The goal is to find an appropriate service-related resource.
+
+**3.1.14 entity** [ITU-T X.1252]: Something that has separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in context.
+
+NOTE – An entity can be a physical person, an animal, a juridical person, an organization, an active or passive thing, a device, a software application, a service, etc., or a group of these entities. In the context of telecommunications, examples of entities include access points, subscribers, users, network elements, networks, software applications, services and devices, interfaces, etc.
+
+**3.1.15 emergency telecommunications (ET)** [ITU-T Y.2205]: ET means any emergency related service that requires special handling from the NGN relative to other services. This includes government authorized emergency services and public safety services.
+
+**3.1.16 emergency telecommunications service (ETS)** [ITU-T E.107]: A national service providing priority telecommunications to the ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies.
+
+**3.1.17 federation** [ITU-T X.1252]: An association of users, service providers, and identity service providers.
+
+**3.1.18 federated identity** [ITU-T Y.2720]: An identity that can be used to access a group of services or applications that are bounded by the policies and conditions of a federation.
+
+**3.1.19 identifier** [ITU-T X.1252]: One or more attributes used to identify an entity within a context.
+
+NOTE – In the context of NGN as defined in [b-ITU-T Y.2091], an identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects).
+
+**3.1.20 identity** [ITU-T X.1252]: A representation of an entity in the form of one or more attributes that allow the entity or entities to be sufficiently distinguished within context. For identity management (IdM) purposes, the term identity is understood as contextual identity (subset of attributes), i.e., the variety of attributes is limited by a framework with defined boundary conditions (the context) in which the entity exists and interacts.
+
+NOTE – Each entity is represented by one holistic identity that comprises all possible information elements characterizing such entity. However, this holistic identity is a theoretical issue and eludes any description and practical usage because the number of all possible attributes is indefinite.
+
+**3.1.21 identity assurance** [ITU-T X.1252]: The degree of confidence in the process of identity validation and verification used to establish the identity of the entity to which the credential was issued, and the degree of confidence that the entity that uses the credential is that entity or the entity to which the credential was issued or assigned.
+
+**3.1.22 identity management** [ITU-T Y.2720]: Set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administration, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for:
+
+- assurance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials, attributes),
+- assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users/subscribers, groups, user devices, organizations, network and service providers, network elements and objects, and virtual objects), and
+- enabling business and security applications.
+
+**3.1.23 identity pattern** [ITU-T X.1252]: A structured expression of attributes of an entity (e.g., the behaviour of an entity) that could be used in some identification processes.
+
+**3.1.24 identity provider**: See identity service provider (IdSP).
+
+NOTE – The term "identity provider (IdP)" is used in [ITU-T Y.2720] and in specifications by other organizations. However, to avoid misinterpretation that it could be construed to mean an entity that provides identities, rather than an entity that manages identities, the term identity service provider (IdSP) is used in this Recommendation.
+
+**3.1.25 identity service provider** [ITU-T X.1252]: An entity that verifies, maintains, manages, and may create and assign identity information of other entities.
+
+**3.1.26 next generation network** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.27 personally identifiable information (PII)** [ITU-T X.1252]: Any information a) that identifies or can be used to identify, contact, or locate the person to whom such information pertains; b) from which identification or contact information of an individual person can be derived; or c) that is or can be linked to a natural person directly or indirectly.
+
+**3.1.28 presence** [ITU-T Y.2720]: A set of attributes that characterizes an entity relating to current status.
+
+**3.1.29 principal** [ITU-T X.811]: An entity whose identity can be authenticated.
+
+**3.1.30 privacy** [ITU-T X.1252]: The right of individuals to control or influence what personal information related to them may be collected, managed, retained, accessed, and used or distributed.
+
+**3.1.31 relying party (RP)** [ITU-T X.1252]: An entity that relies on an identity representation or claim by a requesting/asserting entity within some request context.
+
+**3.1.32 security domain** [ITU-T X.1252]: A set of elements, a security policy, a security authority, and a set of security-relevant activities in which the elements are managed in accordance with the security policy.
+
+**3.1.33 trust** [ITU-T X.1252]: The firm belief in the reliability and truth of information or in the ability and disposition of an entity to act appropriately, within a specified context.
+
+**3.1.34 user** [ITU-T X.1252]: Any entity that makes use of a resource, e.g., system, equipment, terminal, process, application, or corporate network.
+
+NOTE – In the context of NGN, according to [b-ITU-T Y.2091], it includes end user, person, subscriber, system, equipment, terminal (e.g., Fax, PC), (functional) entity, process, application, provider, or corporate network.
+
+**3.1.35 verifier** [ITU-T X.1252]: An entity that verifies and validates identity information.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| 3G | 3rd Generation |
+| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement |
+| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| BSS | Business Support System |
+| CSP | Communications Service Provider |
+| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service |
+| DeviceID | Device Identity |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| EAG | External Application Gateway |
+| EDS | Enterprise Directory Service |
+| ET | Emergency Telecommunications |
+| ETS | Emergency Telecommunications Service |
+| EV-DO | Evolution Data Optimized |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| FTTX | Fibre-To-The-X |
+| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber Server |
+| IBGC-FE | Interconnection Border Gateway Control Functional Entity |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IdMCC-FE | IdM Coordination and Control Functional Entity |
+| IdSP | Identity Service Provider |
+| IDPS | Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems |
+
+| | |
+|----------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ID-WSF | Identity Web Services Framework |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPTV | IP Television |
+| ISC | IMS Service Control |
+| IT | Information Technology |
+| KDC | Key Distribution Centre |
+| LS | Location Server |
+| LTE | Long Term Evolution |
+| MNO | Mobile Network Operator |
+| MSISDN | Mobile Subscriber Integrated Service Director Number |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NGN | Next Generation Networks |
+| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
+| OAM&P | Operation, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning |
+| OSS | Operations Support System |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| POTS | Plain Old Telephone System |
+| PS | Presence Server |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+| RFID | Radio-Frequency Identification |
+| RP | Relying Party |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| SAML | Security Assertion Markup Language |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SN | Service Node |
+| SNI | Server-to-Network Interface |
+| SP | Service Provider |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+
+| | |
+|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| TGS | Ticket Granting Server |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| UserID | User Identity |
+| VoD | Video-on-Demand |
+| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |
+| WiFi | Wireless Fidelity |
+| WiMAX | Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+| WS | Web Server |
+| WSG | Web Services Gateway |
+| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Loop |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement that is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**is prohibited from**" indicate a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" indicate an optional requirement that is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+In the body of this Recommendation and its annexes, the words *shall*, *shall not*, *should*, and *may* sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as *is required to*, *is prohibited from*, *is recommended*, and *can optionally*. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as *informative* are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 IdM overview
+
+## 6.1 General
+
+[ITU-T Y.2720] provides a framework for IdM. IdM functions and capabilities are used to increase confidence in identity information of an entity and support business and security applications (e.g., access control and authorization) including identity-based services. An entity is considered to be something that has separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in a context. In the context of IdM, examples of entities include subscribers, users, network elements, networks, software applications, services and devices.
+
+The NGN will be supporting a broad range of application services for end user subscribers, governments, and business enterprises. To provide integrity and security protection of application services, it is recommended that the NGN supports the necessary functions and capabilities to assure the identity and identity data associated with an entity based on specific context. Refer to [ITU-T X.1252] for a definition of IdM.
+
+The example uses cases, documented in the following appendices, are taken into consideration in defining IdM requirements:
+
+- Appendix I – General IdM use cases
+- Appendix II – IdM use cases for NGN applications
+- Appendix III – Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) related IdM use cases
+- Appendix IV – Mobile-related use cases
+
+In addition, the following factors associated with end user identity in an NGN environment are taken into consideration in defining IdM requirements:
+
+- End users are increasingly using multiple identities
+- An identity may be associated with differing contexts and service privileges
+- An identity may only partially identify an end user
+- Pseudonyms may be used as identity
+- Identities may be used anywhere, anytime and from any device
+- Identities may not be interoperable between NGN providers
+
+## **6.2 IdM relationships**
+
+Figure 1 provides a general overview of IdM relationships based on the framework in [ITU-T Y.2720].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationships between different layers of Identity Management (IdM) in a network environment. It is structured as follows:
+
+- Business and security applications including identity-based services** (Top layer, pink box):
+ - Federated services
+ - Application services access control (e.g., Multimedia and IPTV)
+ - Single sign-on/sign-off
+ - Role-based access to information, resources and assets
+ - Protection of personally identifiable information
+ - Security protection of information and network infrastructure
+- IdM functions and capabilities** (Middle layer, purple box):
+ - Identity lifecycle management
+ - Identity information organization, correlation and binding
+ - Identity information authentication, assurance and assertions
+ - Discovery and exchange of identity information
+- Identity information** (Bottom layer, yellow box):
+ - Identifiers** (e.g., subscription account, network element addresses, service provider identifier)
+ - Credentials** (e.g., digital certificates, and tokens)
+ - Attributes** (e.g., email address, telephone number, roles, claims, context, privileges, location)
+- Entities** (Bottom layer, yellow box):
+ - Organizations, business enterprises, government enterprises**
+ - Network and service providers**
+ - Virtual objects**
+ - Users and subscribers** (represented by icons of people)
+ - User devices** (represented by icons of a laptop, mobile phone, and landline phone)
+ - Network elements and objects** (represented by icons of network hardware)
+
+An arrow labeled "Enables" points from the IdM functions and capabilities layer up to the Business and security applications layer.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F01
+
+Figure 1 – IdM relationships diagram showing the hierarchy from Business and security applications to IdM functions and capabilities, and then to Identity information and Entities.
+
+**Figure 1 – IdM relationships**
+
+The entities can range from individual human users to broad organizations, e.g., businesses and virtual objects such as electronic applications. The identity information associated with each may range in sensitivity from relatively public data, for example, a telephone number listed in a public directory to highly sensitive identity data such as passwords, digital certificates, and other private authenticators.
+
+An entity may have one or more identities. These identities may be used to represent multiple roles (such as citizen, spouse, parent, customer, and patient) and used for specific transactions ranging from commercial to social activities. A person or individual may be associated with multiple digital identities based on different contexts as shown in Figure 1. In addition, a person acting through digital identities may be familiar to others as one or more persona assumed or displayed in public or society, or through roles (e.g., emergency responder) that are assigned or granted by some authority.
+
+Figure 1 shows the following:
+
+a) Entities:
+
+In a NGN environment where services are based on contexts and roles and accessed anywhere, anytime, and from any device, multiple forms of identity-related information may be associated with an entity. In addition, an entity may have one or more identities based on context. Example entities include:
+
+- User and subscribers.
+- User devices, network elements and objects.
+- Organizations, groups, business enterprises and government enterprises.
+
+- Network and service providers.
+- Virtual objects.
+
+#### b) Identity information:
+
+The identity information associated with an entity can be grouped as follows:
+
+- Identifiers (e.g., subscription account, network element addresses, service provider identifier).
+- Attributes (e.g., email addresses, telephone numbers, URI, IP addresses, roles, claims, privileges, authentication method, patterns and location).
+- Credentials (e.g., digital certificates and tokens).
+
+### c) IdM functions and capabilities:
+
+IdM functions and capabilities are used to increase confidence in identity information of an entity and support or enhance business and security applications including identity-based services. Example IdM functions and capabilities are:
+
+- Identity lifecycle management.
+- Identity information organization, correlation and binding.
+- Authentication, authentication assurance and assertion.
+- Discovery and exchange of identity information.
+- Functions and capabilities to bridge different IdM systems to facilitate interoperability.
+
+### d) Business and security applications:
+
+IdM functions and capabilities support and enhance business and security applications including identity-based services.
+
+Example business applications include:
+
+- Federated services (e.g., access to services across different federations or NGN providers).
+- Single sign-on and sign-off (e.g., access to multiple applications and services without having to resubmit the authentication credentials to each application or service platform).
+
+Example security applications include:
+
+- Access control.
+- Authorization management of privileges.
+- Protection of personally identifiable information (PII).
+
+Example identity-based services include:
+
+- Identifier, credential and attributes services.
+- Bridging services (mapping and interworking of identity information in heterogeneous environment).
+- Pattern information services.
+
+IdM includes life-cycle management processes, plus the functions and capabilities to discover and obtain identity sources that can be used to verify and validate an identity. IdM services and capabilities allow entities to control how their identity information is used and disseminated. IdM provides entities (e.g., relying parties) with the necessary information to make decisions regarding authentication and have confidence in the associated transactions and communications. IdM also allows federated identity information to be shared and used by members of a federation (e.g., different NGN providers, business enterprises or government enterprises) to support federated services. For example, federated identity services would allow authorized entities from members of the federation to obtain access to resources based on roles and privileges in accordance with the
+
+rules and policies of the federation without having to register and authenticate to each member of the federation.
+
+## **6.3 Drivers and motivations**
+
+Because many NGN services and capabilities involve service based on subscriber identity and preferences and access from any device, anywhere and anytime, IdM solutions must be able to respond in real time to increasingly complex interactions as users may move between devices, access technologies, payment methods, and even identities. In addition, end users are also demanding easy or user-friendly capabilities. More important, end users are demanding capabilities to allow user control of privacy and personally identifiable information (PII).
+
+Drivers and motivation for IdM come from end users (e.g., subscribers of applications and services), NGN providers, business and government enterprises, all of whom want to see their interests and needs met by IdM implementations. The following factors are taken into consideration in defining the IdM requirements for NGN:
+
+- End users/subscribers need to control and protect their identity information, a desire to have flexible and uniform methods of access to resources, and a need to balance the benefits of social networking and the exposure of personal information.
+- NGN providers (network and service providers) need to protect their network infrastructure resources, services and applications, enable federated services, promote broadly-available subscription-based services, and meet end users' needs for privacy and protection of personally identifiable information (PII).
+- Business enterprises and users need to protect their business interests, have confidence in authentication capabilities for business transactions and protection of business partner's identity data.
+- Protection of the network infrastructure against cyberattacks, and protection of private data.
+- Governmental organizations support of electronic governmental services, public safety services, early warning services, emergency telecommunications service (ETS) and other national services.
+
+## **6.4 Multiple service provider and federated environment**
+
+In a multiple service provider and federated environment, IdM services and capabilities are used to discover and communicate information to establish confidence in the identity(s) of an entity. For example, identifiers, credentials and attributes associated with an identity could be verified by an identity service provider which is regarded as trusted by the relying party and communicated, through assertions, to the relying party (e.g., a user, a service provider) to support authentication, which may be a basis for access control, business decisions, and enforcement of applicable policy (e.g., privacy and protection of personally identifiable information).
+
+Additionally, there may be different and independent IdM solutions resulting in the need for interoperability among service providers.
+
+## **6.5 Identity service provider (IdSP)**
+
+This Recommendation does not impose any restriction on who provides identity service provider (IdSP) services.
+
+An IdSP is an entity that maintains, manages, and may create identity information of other entities (e.g., user/subscribers, organizations, and devices) and offers identity-based services based on trust, business and other types of relationship.
+
+In a multiple service provider environment, it is possible for an NGN provider to also be an IdSP and offer identity management services (e.g., identity-based services) to other providers.
+
+In this Recommendation, the term "NGN/IdSP" is used to indicate that it could be an NGN provider or third party that provides IdM services.
+
+## 6.6 IdM in the context of NGN architectures and reference models
+
+### 6.6.1 Relationship with NGN functional architecture
+
+In the context of the NGN reference architecture model defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], it is possible for IdM related functions to reside in the different planes (e.g., user, control and management) and different strata of the distributed architecture (e.g., service stratum and transport stratum). From a realization or implementation perspective, support of IdM services and capabilities could involve the use of existing network elements or it could involve the use of additional network elements (e.g., specialized application servers) in a NGN.
+
+
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F02
+
+Figure 2 – NGN architecture overview. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a Next-Generation Network (NGN). At the top is the 'Applications' layer. Below it is the 'Service stratum' (green box), which contains 'Application support functions and service support functions', 'Service control and content delivery functions' (including 'Service user profiles', 'Service control functions', and 'Content delivery functions'), and 'Transport control functions' (including 'Network attachment and control functions' with 'Transport user profiles', 'Mobility management and control functions', and 'Resource and admission control functions'). The bottom layer is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow box), containing 'Transport functions'. To the left is a vertical pink bar for 'Management functions'. To the right are boxes for 'Functions from other service providers' and 'Functions from other networks'. Interfaces are shown: ANI (Application Network Interface) between Applications and Service stratum; SNI (Service Network Interface) between Service stratum and other service providers; UNI (User Network Interface) between End-user functions and Transport stratum; and NNI (Network Network Interface) between Transport stratum and other networks. IdM functions (yellow box) are shown interacting with various components. A legend at the bottom indicates: Control (dashed line), Management (dashed line), Media (solid blue line), and IdM (dashed orange line).
+
+**Figure 2 – NGN architecture overview**
+
+Figure 2 is based on Figure 7-1 of [ITU-T Y.2012], which includes a functional block representing IdM functions in the NGN functional architecture. Figure 7-1 of [ITU-T Y.2012] illustrates the general concepts that the support of IdM services and capabilities may involve interaction with specific functional entities (FEs) to enable and support services including identity services. This may include interactions with FEs in the following functional blocks depending on the specific IdM service or capability being supported and the implementation design:
+
+- applications;
+- service stratum: application support functions and service support functions, service control functions and content delivery functions;
+- transport stratum: transport control functions and transport functions;
+- end-user functions;
+- management functions.
+
+In the NGN functional architecture, IdM functions may reside in different planes (e.g., user, control and management) and different strata of the distributed architecture (e.g., service stratum and transport stratum). Although IdM functions are shown in a stand-alone group of functions, this is not intended to impose any design and restrictions for IdM implementations. Implementation of IdM functions is subjected to the compliance with relevant policies, such as national and regional regulations and legislations for protection of identity data (e.g., PII). Specifically, implementation and use of IdM functions must ensure the compliance with the relevant policies for basic data protection principles:
+
+- binding of data to a specific purpose;
+- no data sharing between applications for different purposes;
+- limitation of data to the minimum needed for a specific purpose;
+- right of persons to have control over their PII.
+
+NOTE – For some specific national regulations, this may imply implementation of separated IdM functions in the different strata of the NGN.
+
+### **6.6.2 External interfaces and IdM communications**
+
+The standard interfaces defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] are used to exchange identity data among different administrative domains and federations. This may include the following interfaces as applicable:
+
+- user-to-network interface (UNI);
+- network-to-network interface (NNI);
+- application-to-network interface (ANI);
+- server-to-network interface (SNI).
+
+The interface solutions would depend on factors such as specific application and services needs (e.g., real-time versus near-real time), protocol solution (e.g., SAML, Diameter, RADIUS, SIP), and mechanisms and approaches.
+
+Refer to Appendix VI for an example IdM realization scenario showing how the NGN external interfaces may be applicable.
+
+### **6.6.3 Transactional models**
+
+[b-ITU-T X.1250] provides descriptions of example transactional models involving multiple parties (e.g., users, IdSPs and relying parties). Refer to Appendix V for a summary of the transactional models described in [b-ITU-T X.1250].
+
+# **7 IdM objectives**
+
+The following are general objectives for IdM:
+
+- 1) Facilitate trust decisions between entities.
+- 2) Support of IdM solution(s) minimizing impacts on users/subscribers.
+- 3) Solution(s) involving new capabilities would provide appropriate transition solution.
+
+- 4) Support of interoperable IdM solutions within an NGN provider domain. For example, interoperability between different vendor products supporting multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, IPTV, video and data).
+- 5) Support of interoperable IdM solutions across different NGN provider and service provider domains and federations based on applicable business arrangements and relationships and under application of regulation and policies for PII protection.
+- 6) Support of bridging of heterogeneous IdM systems and federations. For example, capability to allow bridging between NGN provider IdM systems and other types of IdM systems (e.g., web services, content and 3rd party provider IdM systems) based on applicable business arrangements and relationships and under application of regulation and policies for PII protection.
+- 7) End users/subscribers being able to interact and use application services in an easy and intuitive fashion while retaining control of their personal data throughout their life cycle. This includes how and when the information is used and by whom.
+- 8) End users/subscribers being able to reveal only the minimally necessary information to establish mutual trust and conduct transactions based on the applicable policies.
+- 9) End users/subscribers being able to check the authenticity of the entity requesting identity data and PII. It is an objective for an end user/subscriber to be able to use multiple identifiers based on context.
+- 10) End user/subscriber being able to operate anonymously, pseudonymously or intentionally known based on the application context and applicable policies.
+
+# **8 IdM requirements**
+
+This clause describes IdM requirements applicable to NGN, in alignment with the high-level requirements of NGN described in [ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+## **8.1 General requirements**
+
+The following are general requirements for identity management:
+
+- R-1 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities for the identity management of the various types of entities supported by NGN, including:
+- a) Users/groups.
+ - b) Organizations/federations/enterprise/service providers.
+ - c) Devices/network elements/systems.
+ - d) Objects (e.g., application process, content, data).
+- R-2 NGN/IdSP is required to support:
+- a) Secure management of the lifecycle (e.g., from issuance to revocation of identities).
+ - b) Secure discovery and exchange of identity information. This includes discovery and exchange of identity information that may be located within an NGN and across different administrative domains.
+- R-3 NGN/IdSP is required to support enforcement of applicable policies associated with an entity's identity or identity information.
+- R-4 NGN/IdSP is required to support IdM functions and capabilities for both real-time (e.g., VoIP and IPTV) and near-real time applications (e.g., web-based data transactions).
+- R-5 NGN/IdSP is required to support IdM functions and capabilities to allow anonymous assertion of identity information (e.g., identity and attributes), subject to applicable policy.
+
+- R-6 NGN/IdSP is required to support secure interworking for IdM among network elements within a NGN provider domain (i.e., intra-network) and among different provider domains (e.g., other NGN provider, web services providers).
+- R-7 NGN/IdSP is required to support end user's ease-of-use services and features such as:
+- a) Single sign-on/sign-off to multiple application services.
+ - b) Converged services (e.g., fixed and mobile convergence).
+ - c) Control and protection of personally identifiable information (PII).
+- R-8 NGN/IdSP is required to support single sign-on to applications using credentials associated with a subscriber device (e.g., UICC credentials) or credentials associated with a user/subscriber (e.g., SIP Digest credentials) as appropriate based on the security requirement of the applications. Specifically:
+- It shall be possible to use subscriber credentials (e.g., SIP Digest credentials) to support single sign-on for applications accessed via mobile devices.
+ - It shall be possible to use subscriber credentials (e.g., SIP Digest credentials) to support single sign-on for applications accessed via fixed devices.
+
+## **8.2 Identity lifecycle management requirements**
+
+Identity lifecycle management involves the process and procedures associated with the enrolment and issuance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials, and attributes).
+
+- R-9 NGN/IdSP is required to establish and enforce applicable policies for identity lifecycle management. This includes processes, procedures and policies for the proofing, enrolling, issuing and revoking identity information.
+
+### **8.2.1 Enrolment and issuance**
+
+Enrolling an entity (e.g., subscriber, device, organization, NGN provider or object) into a context begins with the identity or credential proofing and enrolment. Enrolment is the process of inauguration of an entity into a context and includes the recording of the entity's identity and possibly assignment of specific attributes (e.g., identifiers) or credentials or roles. In the case of end user subscribers, this is the process where an applicant applies to become a subscriber of an IdSP or of an NGN provider.
+
+Proofing includes verifying and validating attributes and possibly associated credentials.
+
+- R-10 NGN/IdSP is required to verify and validate an entity's identity during enrolment according to the requirements of the context. The recording of the entity's identity and the assignment of identifiers, credentials and attributes for the specific context is subject to a successful confirmation of the applicable proofing criteria and policies.
+
+The proofing process and policies shall be based on the value of the resources (e.g., services, transactions, information and privileges) allowed by the identity and the risks associated with an unauthorized entity obtaining and using the identity. Specifically, measures to ensure the following is required:
+
+- An entity (e.g., person, organization or legal entity) with the claimed attributes exists, and those attributes are suitable to distinguish the entity sufficiently according to the needs of the context.
+- An applicant whose identity is recorded is in fact the entity to which the identity is bound.
+- It is difficult for an entity which has used the recorded identity and credentials to later repudiate the registration/enrolment and dispute an authentication.
+
+Successful completion of the enrolment and proofing process results in the recording of the identity which may include assigned attributes and/or credentials by which the entity can be authenticated in the future.
+
+R-11 It is required that identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) associated with an identity only be issued after successful identity proofing of the entity.
+
+In some scenarios this may involve recording and issuance of electronic credentials such as digital certificates and tokens binding to an identity or making a claim (i.e., attribute) about an identity. Depending on the type of token being used, the NGN/IdSP will either create a new token and supply the token to the subscriber, or require the subscriber to register a token that the applicant already possesses or has newly created.
+
+R-12 In either case, the mechanism for transporting the token from the token origination point to the other party is required to be secured to ensure that the confidentiality and integrity of the newly established token is maintained.
+
+### **8.2.2 Maintenance and updates**
+
+After an identity(s), including any identity information (identifiers, credentials and attributes), has been registered and issued, both the NGN/IdSP and the subscriber have responsibilities during the operational and use phase to keep it secure.
+
+R-13 NGN/IdSP is required to securely manage and maintain the data and the status of data (e.g., identifiers, credentials, attributes) associated with an identity.
+
+R-14 NGN/IdSP is required to securely manage and log any updates or changes to an identity.
+
+R-15 NGN/IdSP is required to periodically validate the status of an identity.
+
+R-16 NGN/IdSP is required to support procedures to provide notifications about the updates or changes to an identity(s) or any of the data associated with the identity(s) to the systems and network elements that need to be aware of the updates or changes.
+
+R-17 NGN/IdSP is required to provide functions to inform the user about its identity data and to change or delete it.
+
+The subscriber is also responsible for security of assigned credential based on business and policy agreements with the NGN/IdSP. For example, a subscriber has responsibilities to manage his or her electronic credentials (e.g., tokens) and keeps it secure.
+
+R-18 NGN/IdSP is required to take measures based on business and contractual agreements to ensure that an entity (e.g., subscriber, or other NGN/IdSP) securely manages and uses the issued credentials (e.g., digital certificates or tokens) associated with an identity subject to the applicable regulations and policies.
+
+### **8.2.3 Revocation**
+
+Identity revocation is the process of rescinding an identity and the associated credentials. The party or system (e.g., NGN/IdSP) that manages identity or credentials is responsible for its termination or decommission. Revocation is required to prevent the continued use of an identity or credential that is no longer valid or has a security breach.
+
+R-19 NGN/IdSP is required to establish and enforce applicable policies for revoking an identity(s). Specifically, capabilities to terminate or destroy the credentials (e.g., digital certificates or tokens) associated with an identity(s) when the credential is no longer valid or has a security breach shall be supported.
+
+- R-20 NGN/IdSP is required to support procedures to provide notifications about the revocation or termination of an identity(s) or any of the data associated with the identity(s) to the entity and to the systems and network elements that needs to be aware (i.e., all systems and processes with which the identity can be used for access have to be notified that the identity is no longer valid).
+
+## **8.3 Identity management OAM&P functions**
+
+### **8.3.1 Data model and schema**
+
+Each NGN provider, federation or enterprise may have its own formats, schemas, definitions or semantics to represent and share identity-related data and information. Clause 8.2.1 of [ITU-T Y.2720] describes the need for interoperability between heterogeneous IdM systems using different data models, structures and schemas.
+
+- R-21 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities to allow interoperability between heterogeneous IdM systems that are using different data models, structures and schemas as needed.
+
+### **8.3.2 Management of identity data**
+
+Clause 8.2 of [ITU-T Y.2720] describes the need for management of identity data (e.g., management of identifiers, credentials and attributes). Detailed requirements for identity data management is beyond the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+In an NGN, different identity data (e.g., identifiers such as email address, telephone numbers, URIs and IP addresses) may be managed by different management systems and operations processes (e.g., operations support system (OSS)/business support system (BSS)). The following general requirements are provided in the context of providing a structured and coordinated approach for interactions between the different management systems and customer care systems in support of IdM services and capabilities.
+
+- R-22 NGN/IdSP is required to support a standard interface (e.g., customer portal) to allow end users/subscribers to interact with applicable NGN management systems and processes in support of end user/subscribers identity data management transactions (e.g., changes and updates) subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies.
+- R-23 NGN/IdSP is required to support the necessary interfaces, functions and capabilities to facilitate consistent transactions and work flows between the different management systems and processes related to the management of identity data (e.g., changes and updates that need to flow through different OSS/BSS, customer care systems and application services platforms), as appropriate, subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies.
+- R-24 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities to log and store (e.g., backup data) records of transactions related to identity data management subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies.
+- R-25 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities to synchronize changes and updates to identity data between the different management systems and processes, as appropriate, subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies.
+- R-26 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities to verify linkages between the identity data associated with an entity (e.g., subscriber) and contracted services (e.g., access, voice, data, video) subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies.
+
+## **8.4 Signalling and control functions**
+
+### **8.4.1 Discovery of identity information**
+
+In a distributed NGN environment, identity information may exist in different network elements (e.g., subscription server, location server, presence server, home subscription server, etc.). For an application to make use of identity information, it needs to know that it exists and where to locate it.
+
+- R-27 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities to discover sources of identity information within an NGN/IdSP domain. For example, functions and capabilities for an identity management server to discover the existence of identity information in other network elements such as location, presence or subscription servers or for an application/service to discover identity management or other servers hosting identity data.
+- R-28 NGN/IdSP is required to support functions and capabilities using standard interfaces and protocols to discover sources of identity information across different NGN/IdSP domains. For example, use of standard interfaces and protocols to discover sources of identity information in other NGN/IdSP domain based on applicable inter-network agreements.
+- R-29 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities for the protection of discovery capabilities and mechanisms.
+
+### **8.4.2 Identity information access control**
+
+Identity data should only be accessible to entities that are authorized to have access to the information.
+
+- R-30 It is required that identity information only be accessible to authorized entities subject to applicable regulations and policies. Specifically:
+- NGN/IdSP is required to authenticate the entity (e.g., relying party) requesting identity data or perform mutual authentication.
+ - NGN/IdSP is required to authenticate an entity (e.g., relying party or requesting party) requesting identity data, and verify and validate its authorization before access to the information is provided or the requesting identity data is exchanged.
+
+### **8.4.3 IdM communications**
+
+Network systems and elements need to establish communication sessions to exchange identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) located in different network systems (e.g., identity management server, subscription server, location server, presence server, etc.) that could be correlated and verified (i.e., by an IdM application server providing authentication and correlation functions) to provide identity assurance capabilities.
+
+NGN/IdSP can communicate assertions of identity and associated attributes (e.g., claims and privileges) to the relying parties e.g., for making access control decisions. This would allow different application services (i.e., of different vendor platforms) to use a common available IdM service as opposed to independent and autonomous solutions. Communication relationships to consider include:
+
+- Intra-network: Communications with a NGN provider domain (e.g., between network elements).
+- Inter-network: Communications between two different NGN providers.
+- Federation: Communications between members of a federation.
+
+#### **8.4.3.1 Real-time and near real-time communications**
+
+The solution used to discover and exchange identity information would have to take into account whether real-time or near real-time communications are required. This would depend on the specific applications being supported. Certain applications (e.g., VoIP and IPTV) may need the validation of
+
+the requesting user/subscriber identity and authorization for the application service. Other applications (e.g., data and messaging services) may only need near-real-time communication sessions to validate the requesting user/subscriber identity and authorization for the application service.
+
+R-31 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities to establish communication sessions according to the specific application service requirement to exchange identity information in real-time or near-real time. This includes communication sessions to exchange identity information within a NGN provider domain, between two different NGN providers and between members of a federation.
+
+Attribute information can be, but is not required to be, limited to membership status, affiliated functions (billing, operations), attributes used by other services (such as a directory service or certificate service). This allows the relying party to provide customized information and contents for users based on their attributes.
+
+R-32 It shall be possible for NGN/IdSP and the relying party to exchange assertions associated with an identity. This includes assertion of attributes.
+
+### **8.4.4 Correlation and binding**
+
+The identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) may be correlated to establish a binding to assure the identity of an entity. For example, the identity information associated with a subscriber (e.g., UserID), a subscriber device (e.g., DeviceID), and other related information such as location and pattern data may be correlated to establish a binding to provide a higher degree of assurance of the subscriber's identity (i.e., confidence of the identity validity).
+
+R-33 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities to correlate multiple pieces of identity related data (e.g., location and pattern) to support the establishment of the appropriate binding to the identity of the entity subject to applicable data protection regulations and policies. The use of these capabilities requires user's specific and informed consent.
+
+NOTE – It is possible that some national data protection regulations and policies may restrict support of this requirement.
+
+### **8.4.5 Authentication requirements**
+
+Authentication is the process of establishing confidence in the binding between an identity and the entity. One means for achieving authentication assurance is to describe the objectives and guidelines necessary to quantify the risks that an entity is who or what it claims to be. This includes establishing which entity identifiers are more important than others in the identification process and why certain identifiers used in authentication should not have the same authentication value.
+
+Refer to [ITU-T Y.2702] for NGN authentication requirements.
+
+The following are security requirements for authentication aspects of IdM:
+
+R-34 Mutual authentication between entities (e.g., user, NGN/IdSP, relying party) shall be possible.
+
+R-35 It shall be possible for a relying party to send requests to the NGN/IdSP for authentication of an entity (e.g., user/subscriber).
+
+R-36 It shall be possible for the NGN/IdSP to support authentication of an entity (e.g., user/subscriber) and provide assertions to a relying party.
+
+R-37 It shall be possible for a relying party to be able to request re-authentication of an entity specifying the current or an alternative method of re-authentication that is required.
+
+#### 8.4.6 Authentication assurance
+
+Authentication assurance is the degree of confidence reached in the authentication process that the communication partner is the entity that it claims to be or is expected to be. The confidence is based on the degree of confidence in the binding between the communicating entity and the identity that is presented. Entities (e.g., users, application services, etc.) may have different authentication assurance needs based on context. There are cases that require different authentication strengths for access to different resources depending upon the sensitivity and value of information and transactions envisaged. In such cases, relying parties (e.g., users, NGN/IdSPs) would need to have more detail (e.g., authentication methods, number of factors of authentication, authentication contexts, etc.) than usual to meet the expected authentication assurance. This involves assessment of the potential risks associated with the consequences of authentication errors or to determine the appropriate level of assurance in an entity identity. Authentication errors with potentially worse consequences will require higher levels of assurance.
+
+- R-38 NGN/IdSP is required to support appropriate authentication method(s) depending on the needed level(s) of assurance.
+- R-39 It shall be possible for a relying party to be able to indicate to the NGN/IdSP the needed assurance level for the authentication of an entity.
+- R-40 It shall be possible to negotiate assurance level between NGN/IdSP, the relying party and the entity being authenticated.
+
+#### 8.4.6.1 Assurance of user device identity and integrity
+
+NGNs will be supporting a variety of user devices (e.g., fixed telephones, wireless handsets, personal computers, PDA, IPTV set top boxes). The hardware and software components of the devices attaching to the NGN ranges from simple to complex, and if stolen and compromised, can be used to orchestrate a variety of attacks. It is recognized that NGN would also need to support devices (such as "dumb" terminal or POTS devices), which will be unable to provide the required degree of protection.
+
+- R-41 It shall be possible for an NGN/IdSP to support end user devices which hold security capabilities and encrypted identity management data (e.g., passwords, digital keys, and certificates) in tamper-resistant hardware components.
+- R-42 It shall be possible for an NGN/IdSP to communicate with the security capabilities in tamper-resistant hardware components of an end user device via standardized interfaces to support security application services relying on the specialized tamper-resistant hardware component as a trust anchor to uniquely identify and assure the identity of the end user device.
+
+Applications that execute on subscriber devices to let subscribers interact with services and local device features could potentially compromise the integrity of the device. Popular Internet applications, such as web browsers and email, could introduce vulnerabilities that alter the integrity of subscriber devices. Software and file downloads, particularly from an untrusted source, make subscriber devices vulnerable to malicious code, worms, viruses, and Trojan horses. Specialized tamper-resistant hardware component could potentially be designed and implemented in an end user device to provide integrity verification of the device. For example, the specialized tamper-resistant hardware component could contain vendor-specific algorithms and functions to check for integrity compromises. The special hardware component could include a reference model with a set of known-good integrity metrics specifically to identify the correct code and provide reference values for the device. The known-good integrity metrics would be used to compare actual reported values to the configuration and determine if the unit is within compliance.
+
+- R-43 It shall be possible for an NGN/IdSP to support end user devices with specialized tamper-resistant hardware component to provide integrity checks and confirmation of the device integrity compliance to applications and services.
+
+- R-44 It shall be possible for an NGN/IdSP to communicate with security capabilities in tamper-resistant hardware component of end user devices via standardized interfaces to support security application services relying on the integrity checks and confirmation of the device integrity compliance.
+
+Loss or theft of a device with PII and other sensitive data could result in serious consequences to individuals, business and government enterprises. The specialized hardware component designed to uniquely indentify and confirm integrity of trusted devices could also potentially support capabilities to encrypt and protect PII and other sensitive data on end user devices.
+
+- R-45 It shall be possible for an NGN/IdSP to support end user devices with specialized tamper-resistant hardware component to encrypt and protect PII and other sensitive data on end user devices.
+
+### **8.4.7 Support of services requiring priority treatment**
+
+The IdM systems and capabilities of NGNs will have to support application services and communication sessions requiring priority treatment relative to other services. [ITU-T Y.2205] describes emergency telecommunications (ET) requiring special handling from the NGN. A specific example is emergency telecommunications service (ETS) defined in [ITU-T E.107]. ETS leverages the IdM capabilities used for ordinary services (e.g., identity assurance and discovery of trusted identities). Therefore, the IdM systems must support the necessary functions and capabilities to recognize and provide priority treatment when setting up and maintaining an ETS call/session, based on applicable national rules and policies. Refer to [ITU-T E.107] and [ITU-T Y.2205] for information on services and capabilities requiring priority treatment.
+
+- R-46 NGN/IdSP IdM systems are required to support the functions and capabilities necessary to recognize and provide priority treatment when setting up and maintaining an ETS call/session, based on applicable national rules and policies.
+- R-47 IdM network elements and databases used to support ETS calls/sessions are required to provide priority treatment based on applicable national rules and policies. This includes, but is not limited to:
+- Intra-network IdM communications (e.g., interactions within an NGN provider IdM system).
+ - Inter-network IdM communications (e.g., interactions between two NGN provider systems based on bilateral agreements and policies).
+ - Federated IdM communications (e.g., interactions between members of the federations based on applicable federated identity rules and policies).
+
+Refer to Appendix III for ETS related use case examples.
+
+## **8.5 Identity management federated identity functions**
+
+Federation involves establishing a relationship between two or more entities or establishing an association comprised of any number of service providers and/or identity service providers. The general concept of federation is to allow each federation member to remain independent while facilitating sharing of specific identity information to allow federated services. For example, certain identity information of a user/subscriber (e.g., subset of a subscriber profile) could be federated (i.e., made available to federation members) bounded by the policies and conditions of the federation and data protection regulations and policies. Federated identity enables the portability and transmission of identity information across otherwise autonomous security domains bounded by the policies and conditions of a federation and subject to applicable rules, regulations and policies. Federated identity enables users of one domain to securely access data or systems of another domain without the need for completely redundant user administration.
+
+- R-48 It shall be possible to discover and exchange federated identity information among members of a federation, subject to applicable rules, regulations and policies.
+- R-49 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities to allow a subscriber to provide the necessary authorization to federate its identities.
+- R-50 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities to provide a subscriber the option to terminate participation in all or specific federated identity services and applications and to terminate the federation of its identities.
+- R-51 NGN/IdSP is required to support capabilities to allow a subscriber to be able to set permissions and prohibitions regarding its federated identity information. It shall be possible for subscribers to control which personal data are given to whom and for what purposes.
+
+NOTE – The requirements for PII protection in clause 8.6 are also applicable to federated identities.
+
+In general, each NGN provider, enterprise or federation member may have its own formats, schemas, definitions or semantics to represent and share identity-related data and information. For example, the same information such as date of birth may be represented differently by two different systems. Also, the semantics, schemas, technologies and mechanisms used to represent, request and exchange identity related information can be different resulting in interoperability problems. Therefore, appropriate capabilities to allow bridging and interworking among trusted federations will be necessary.
+
+- R-52 It shall be possible to accomplish bridging and interoperability among trusted federations that are using different IdM systems, semantics, schemas, mechanisms and technologies. For example, it shall be possible for relying parties in different domains (e.g., NGN domain and web services/Internet) using different IdM capabilities and technologies to interwork and interoperate. In particular, the secure transmission of federated identity information shall be assured.
+
+## **8.6 User/subscriber functions and protection of PII**
+
+End users/subscribers need to be provided with applicable institutive interfaces and capabilities to control their PII and make informed decisions and consent regarding their personal data. End users/subscribers should be able to express their privacy policies and preferences and negotiate the terms of data disclosure with the NGN/IdSP.
+
+Disclosure of personal data should only be made to authorized entities based on applicable policies (e.g., user/subscriber consent, government regulatory rules). In addition, collecting, storing, and use of PII should be minimized and adhere to the applicable policies.
+
+- R-53 NGN/IdSP is required to provide IdM services and confidentiality protection of PII, in accordance with applicable regulations, policies and rules.
+- R-54 It shall be possible for end users/subscribers to communicate to the NGN/IdSP, preferences regarding their personal data (e.g., set privacy preferences) according to the applicable regulations and policies (e.g., stated consent of the individuals, providers' policies, or regulatory rules).
+- R-55 It shall be possible for the end user/subscriber to be able to verify the authenticity of the entity requesting PII before providing the requested information.
+- R-56 NGN/IdSP is required to delete PII when specified purposes of data collection and retention are met based on applicable regulations, policies and rules.
+- R-57 It shall be possible for the end user/subscriber to operate anonymously or pseudonymously based on the application context and applicable regulations, policies and rules.
+
+## **8.7 Security**
+
+Identity information and data are highly sensitive and targeted by intruders. In addition, since IdM services and capabilities will be used for access control to business, governments and social networking applications, the network elements and systems (e.g., network elements and databases supporting IdM functions and capabilities) will be targeted for security attacks and intrusions. Therefore, appropriate security measures must be implemented to secure and protect the network elements and systems providing IdM functions, services and capabilities.
+
+### **8.7.1 System and data access control**
+
+System access control involves security measures to prevent unauthorized access to network elements and systems and their associated access points. There are threats associated with unauthorized access to network elements and systems supporting IdM functions, capabilities and data. Therefore, appropriate access control measures to prevent unauthorized access must be established and enforced.
+
+R-58 NGN/IdSP is required to support and enforce system access control measures to prevent unauthorized access to network elements and systems supporting IdM functions and capabilities. NGN/IdSP shall not allow an entity to gain access to the network elements and databases supporting IdM functions and capabilities unless the entity is identified, authenticated and authorized. This applies to all entities (i.e., persons, processes, and remote systems).
+
+Data access control involves security measures to prevent unauthorized access to stored or provisioned data and data in transit. There are threats associated with unauthorized access to provisioned or stored IdM related data. Therefore, appropriate access control measures to prevent unauthorized access must be established and enforced.
+
+R-59 NGN/IdSP is required to support and enforce access control measures to prevent unauthorized access to IdM data. This includes any identity data stored or provisioned in IdM databases, application servers, home subscriber servers (HSS), or any other network element. The NGN/IdSP shall not allow an entity to gain access to IdM data unless the entity is identified, authenticated and authorized. This applies to all entities (i.e., persons, processes, and remote systems).
+
+### **8.7.2 System and data integrity**
+
+Network elements, systems and functions supporting IdM services and capabilities must have integrity protection. This includes the IdM databases and application servers.
+
+R-60 NGN/IdSP is required to provide integrity protection of all network elements, systems, and functions supporting IdM services and capabilities.
+
+Stored identity information and data must be provided with integrity protection to prevent any corruption or manipulation of the data impacting the integrity.
+
+R-61 NGN/IdSP is required to provide integrity protection of IdM provisioned data.
+
+R-62 NGN/IdSP is required to provide integrity protection of any data distribution, communication, updates or changes, and any offline data associated with IdM.
+
+### **8.7.3 Data confidentiality**
+
+R-63 NGN/IdSP is required to support and enforce measures to protect provisioned IdM data from being observed by unauthorized entities (e.g., unauthorized insiders).
+
+R-64 NGN/IdSP is required to support and enforce measures to protect IdM data distribution, communications, updates or changes, and any offline IdM data from being observed by unauthorized entities (e.g., unauthorized insiders).
+
+### **8.7.4 Security protection of IdM communications**
+
+IdM communications (signalling and media) have to be protected against unauthorized access, corruption, manipulation and interception (e.g., eavesdropping).
+
+- R-65 NGN/IdSP is required to provide integrity and confidentiality protection of intra-network and inter-network IdM communications. All IdM related signalling and media traffic crossing network-to-network interface (NNI), application-to-network interface (ANI) or server-to-network interface (SNI) between network domains shall be provided integrity protection.
+
+#### **8.7.5 Management security**
+
+Management access to NGN network elements and configured data must be secure and protected against unauthorized access and controls.
+
+- R-66 NGN/IdSP is required to prevent unauthorized access to management interfaces and controls of network elements and functional entities supporting IdM.
+
+Management traffic must be secure and protected against corruption, manipulation and unauthorized observation.
+
+- R-67 NGN/IdSP is required to provide integrity and confidentiality protection of management traffic associated with the support of IdM.
+
+#### **8.7.6 Security and auditing log**
+
+Security and auditing log for the purpose of recording events that will support after-the-fact investigation of specific activities are needed.
+
+- R-68 NGN/IdSP is required to generate security logs for the purpose of recording events that will support after-the-fact investigation of specific activities (e.g., logins, modification of critical system resources and data, management access to configured NGN parameters and resources) related to the support of IdM.
+
+#### **8.7.7 Protection against denial of service (DoS) and distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks**
+
+IdM services and capabilities must be highly available and therefore must be protected against DoS and DDoS threats potentially affecting availability.
+
+- R-69 NGN/IdSP is required to provide protection against DoS, DDoS and other types of attacks impacting availability of IdM services and capabilities. This includes the support and use of capabilities and tools as appropriate to detect, isolate, and mitigate DoS and DDoS and other types of attacks.
+
+#### **8.7.8 Monitoring and intrusion detection**
+
+- R-70 NGN/IdSP is required to support and use security monitoring and intrusion detection tools as appropriate to detect fraud, abuse, and intrusion into IdM network elements and systems.
+
+# **Appendix I**
+
+## **General IdM use cases**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## **I.1 Introduction**
+
+This appendix provides general uses cases for IdM organized as governments, business enterprises and end users/subscribers.
+
+## **I.2 Governments**
+
+IdM capabilities can be used by governments to enhance and support applications and transactions between government enterprises and citizens; between different governmental organizations (federated government services) and agencies; and between different governments (e.g., inter-government federated services). Examples of governmental use cases include:
+
+- Assurance of citizen identification: IdM can be used by governments to validate the identity of citizens to receive electronic governmental services while improving protection of PII. Consider health care as an example, the sensitivity of health-related information highlights the importance of data minimization and more broadly the need for security and privacy of identity information.
+- Assurance of governmental employee identification for federated governmental services: IdM capabilities can be used by government enterprises to develop common solutions for secure and reliable forms of identification for government employees that offer enhanced security, efficiency, reduced identity fraud, and the protection of personal privacy.
+- Enhancement and support of federated services between different governments: IdM can be used to enhance and support federated services between different governments. For example, governments may collaborate to develop enhanced IdM solutions for citizens travelling between different countries addressing security, privacy, and user experience.
+
+## **I.3 Business enterprise**
+
+IdM can be used to assist business organizations to enhance and support new and existing businesses while improving security, privacy and PII protection. Examples of business enterprise use cases include:
+
+- Federated identity services: IdM can be used to support single sign-on and sign-off services across multiple business partners (including NGN, web services, content and 3rd party providers).
+- Communications services: IdM can be used by NGN providers to enable end users/subscribers to be provided with application services over different platforms (e.g., managed IP networks, Internet and mobile platforms) and to allow users to access their chosen applications over multiple platforms in ways that are customized to their own preferences.
+- Electronic financial transactions and applications: IdM can be used to enhance and support applications for electronic payments for e-commerce transactions.
+
+## **I.4 End user/subscribers**
+
+For end users/subscribers, IdM can be used to enhance experience and control PII. Examples of end user/subscriber use cases include:
+
+- User control of PII: IdM can be used to provide an enhanced user experience, and to allow control of PII. Individuals can use multiple pseudonyms to participate in different activities such as checking news feeds, publishing blog posts, managing social networks and swapping photographs or music. IdM can help provide individuals with more choices about how they participate in different communities, and the degree to which they want aspects of their different identities to be linked (i.e., control of their PII).
+- Social networks: IdM can be used to enhance and support social networking applications by providing the necessary tools for effective user control of PII and accountability.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## IdM use cases for NGN applications
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## II.1 Introduction
+
+This appendix provides example identity management (IdM) use case examples for NGN. The example use cases would be used as a basis for developing the IdM requirements for NGN.
+
+## II.2 Basic use case example
+
+Figure II.1 shows a basic use case example involving three basic elements. There are other possible scenarios beyond this basic example. Refer to Appendix V for a description of the other possible scenarios (e.g., user centric scenarios).
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Entity
+ participant Relying_party
+ participant Identity_service_provider
+
+ Entity->>Relying_party: (1) Request resource or service
+ Relying_party->>Entity: (2) Request IdSP
+ Entity->>Relying_party: (3) IdSP
+ Relying_party->>Identity_service_provider: (4) Request identity
+ Identity_service_provider->>Relying_party: (5) Identity response
+ Relying_party->>Entity: (6) Resource or service
+```
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F01-App.II
+
+Sequence diagram showing the basic use case example for IdM involving an Entity, a Relying party, and an Identity service provider.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Basic use case example**
+
+The three elements consist of an entity (an asserting party or principal) who seeks services from a relying party (an RP, which could be a network or an application), and who obtains an associated identity assertion, including anonymous or pseudonymous assertions, from an identity service provider (IdSP) based on trust and security policy.
+
+In Figure II.1, the following high-level IdM information flow is shown.
+
+- 1) The entity provides a claimed identity to the relying party (the resource or service provider) and requests a resource or service from that relying party.
+- 2) The relying party (network or application) needs to have the entity authenticated before providing the requested resource or service. For authentication, the relying party needs information from the appropriate IdSP, which must be determined and contacted. The relying party returns a "Request for IdSP info" to the entity, asking the entity to provide the appropriate IdSP name.
+- 3) The entity responds to this "Request for IdSP info" by identifying the appropriate IdSP to the relying party. The entity may identify multiple IdSPs.
+- 4) The relying party in turn queries the appropriate IdSP(s) to validate the entity's claimed identity to a sufficient trust level (assurance level), as required.
+- 5) The IdSP confirms the entity's claimed Identity. The IdSP functions may include delegation (meaning that the IdSP may delegate some aspects of the authentication process to other IdSPs by relaying the identity assertion to them). There may be subsequent requests from
+
+the relying party to the IdSP(s), in the event of the need for higher assurance level authentication, or for other implementation-specific capabilities.
+
+- 6) The relying party, after receiving validation of the entity's claimed identity from the IdSP(s), provides the requested resource or service.
+
+Combinations of these three elements (entity, relying party, and IdSP) are possible. The underlying media involved are not relevant. The only requirement is that these communication mechanisms should be "well-structured" with syntaxes and profiles that are known or potentially obtainable by the parties involved, if they possess the necessary permissions to use the mechanisms. Where appropriate, standard mechanisms for trusted, global interoperability should be used.
+
+In addition, other high-level IdM information flows are possible. For example:
+
+- 1) An RP can request authentication credentials directly from an entity.
+- 2) The entity can provide its authentication credentials to a trusted IdSP.
+- 3) The IdSP can validate the given credentials from the entity, and then generate new credentials for the entity, in order to satisfy the authentication request from the RP.
+- 4) The entity (or its delegate) can obtain the generated credentials from the IdSP and give them to the RP.
+- 5) The generated credentials sent from the entity to the RP can either contain 1) a copy of the identity claims generated by the IdSP, or 2) a reference to them.
+
+In addition, the entity may decide not to give the IdSP-generated authentication credentials to the RP.
+
+It is also possible to have a hierarchy of identity providers or a hierarchy of relying parties. It is also possible that an entity may have more than one delegate.
+
+## **II.3 Use of common IdM systems to support multiple application services (e.g., voice, data, IPTV) within a service provider network**
+
+#### **II.3.1 Overview**
+
+Network/service providers (e.g., NGN providers) would be supporting and hosting multiple applications and services. The distributed nature of the NGN environment allows the possibility that different application services might be hosted on different network elements and vendor-specific platforms (e.g., VoIP, data and IPTV). Each service may have its own vendor-specific or technology-specific means for access control that may not be compatible with each other, and therefore would have to be configured, managed and used separately.
+
+An approach leveraging a common IdM infrastructure enabling multiple applications/services may provide cost and business efficiency benefits. It could also provide a standard approach to allow application developers to utilize common enablers for IdM rather than having each application/service supporting specific IdM functions (e.g., vendor-specific access control capabilities and mechanisms) and allow an efficient process to design, implement and offer application services. In addition, a common approach can assist to manage the security risks to each application service and the overall network infrastructure as a whole.
+
+The IdM approach for NGN would include both intra-network solutions (i.e., solutions within a NGN provider domain) and inter-network solutions (i.e., solutions between different NGN providers including 3rd party providers). For the intra-network scenario, this may involve approaches to allow interactions between different network elements or components within a NGN provider domain for IdM (e.g., claimants, relying systems and identity systems). For inter-network scenarios, this may include specification of approaches to allow interaction between the network element entities across different NGN domains for IdM (e.g., claimants, relying parties and IdSP).
+
+NOTE – An NGN provider may also be an IdSP.
+
+#### II.3.2 Use case description
+
+This use case example illustrates how multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and IPTV) use a common identity management infrastructure for access control and security protection of the application service. The use case involves interactions between the following entities:
+
+- End users (i.e., end user and/or end user device).
+- Relying system (i.e., application service or network system).
+- IdM system (i.e., network system providing IdM services such as registration, authentication and authorization, subscription profile information).
+
+
+
+The diagram shows the interaction between three entities: End-user (blue box), Relying system (NGN application service) (orange box), and IdM system (e.g., identity application server) (green box). The sequence of messages is as follows:
+
+- (1) Application service request: End-user to Relying system.
+- (2) Challenge: Relying system to End-user.
+- (3) Identity info request [ID]: Relying system to IdM system.
+- (4) Authentication request: IdM system to End-user.
+- (5) Authentication input [ID, Cred]: End-user to IdM system.
+- (6) Authentication: IdM system performs authentication (indicated by a blue circle on the IdM system lifeline).
+- (7) Identity response [CredAssert, attributes, policy]: IdM system to Relying system.
+- (8) Access authorized: Relying system to End-user.
+- (9) Service session: A yellow double-headed arrow between End-user and Relying system.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F02-App.II
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the basic use case example for access control and security protection.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Basic use case example**
+
+Figure II.2 illustrates a basic example where an application service uses the services of an IdM system that is external or independent of the application service for access control and the management of privileges. The example call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke the application service.
+- 2) Challenge: The application service sends a response challenging user access.
+- 3) Identity information request [UserID]: The application service sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information, for example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 4) Authentication request: The IdM systems send the user a request for authentication.
+- 5) Authentication input [Credentials]: The user provides information for authentication (e.g., UserID and password or personal identification number).
+- 6) Authentication: The IdM system performs authentication and obtains other needed information. This may involve obtaining information from other network systems (e.g., HSS).
+- 7) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy
+
+associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+
+- 8) Access authorization: The application service provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 9) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with the application service.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between end-user devices, rely applications, and an IdM system across three scenarios: Application A (VoIP), Application B (data), and Application C (IPTV).
+
+**Participants:**
+
+- End-user device (User)
+- Rely application A (e.g., VoIP)
+- Rely application B (e.g., data)
+- Rely application C (e.g., IPTV)
+- IdM system (e.g., identity application server)
+- End-user device (User)
+
+**Scenarios:**
+
+- Application A (e.g., VoIP):**
+ - (1) Application service request (End-user device to Rely application A)
+ - (2) Identity info request [DeviceID] (Rely application A to IdM system)
+ - (3) Authorization (IdM system to Rely application A)
+ - (4) Identity info response [DeviceID, attributes] (IdM system to Rely application A)
+ - (5) Authorization (Rely application A to End-user device)
+ - (6) Service session (End-user device to Rely application A)
+- Application B (e.g., data):**
+ - (1) Application service request (End-user device to Rely application B)
+ - (2) Identity info request [UserID] (Rely application B to IdM system)
+ - (3) Authentication challenge (IdM system to Rely application B)
+ - (4) Authentication input [UserID, credentials] (Rely application B to IdM system)
+ - (5) Authentication (IdM system to Rely application B)
+ - (6) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy] (IdM system to Rely application B)
+ - (7) Authorization (Rely application B to End-user device)
+ - (8) Access authorization (Rely application B to End-user device)
+ - (9) Service session (End-user device to Rely application B)
+- Application C (e.g., IPTV):**
+ - (1) Application service request (End-user device to Rely application C)
+ - (2) Identity info request [UserID] (Rely application C to IdM system)
+ - (3) Authentication challenge (IdM system to Rely application C)
+ - (4) Authentication input [UserID, credentials] (Rely application C to IdM system)
+ - (5) Authentication (IdM system to Rely application C)
+ - (6) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy] (IdM system to Rely application C)
+ - (7) Authorization (Rely application C to End-user device)
+ - (8) Access authorization (Rely application C to End-user device)
+ - (9) Service session (End-user device to Rely application C)
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F03-App.11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the use of a common IdM infrastructure by multiple application services (VoIP, data, IPTV) and end-user devices. The diagram shows three scenarios: Application A (VoIP), Application B (data), and Application C (IPTV). Each scenario involves an end-user device, a rely application, and an IdM system (identity application server). The flows include application service requests, identity info requests, authentication challenges, identity responses, authorization, and service sessions.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Multiple application services use of common IdM infrastructure**
+
+Figure II.3 illustrates an example use case where multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and IPTV) are using a common IdM system that is external and independent of the application services. This example assumes that the end user device has registered and is attached to the service provider using the normal procedures.
+
+The example flows for application A (VoIP) are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user initiating a call.
+- 2) Identity info request [DeviceID]: The application service sends a request to the IdM system to verify whether the end user device is authorized for VoIP service. This example assumes that VoIP service is based on the subscription profile of the user device or line (e.g., xDSL subscription).
+
+- 3) Authorization: The IdM system determines whether the end user is authorized for VoIP service.
+NOTE 1 – It is assumed that this would involve retrieving subscription profile information for the end user device or line (e.g., xDSL). It is also assumed that for VoIP, authentication of the end user is not needed.
+- 4) Identity information response [DeviceID, attributes]: The IdM system provides attributes associated with the DeviceID (i.e., whether the device is authorized for VoIP service). This would include relevant information obtained from the subscription profile (e.g., privileges and preferences).
+- 5) Access authorization: The application service provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 6) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful call session.
+
+The example call flows for application B (data) are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke the application service.
+- 2) Identity information request [UserID]: The application service sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information, for example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 3) Authentication challenge: The IdM systems send the user a request for authentication.
+- 4) Authentication input [Credentials]: The user provides information for authentication (e.g., UserID and password or personal identification number).
+- 5) Authentication: The IdM system performs authentication and obtains other needed information. This may involve obtaining information from other network systems (e.g., HSS or other subscription database).
+- 6) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 7) Authorization: The application service processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 8) Access authorization: The application service provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 9) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with the application service.
+
+The example call flows for application C (IPTV) are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke the application service.
+- 2) Identity information request [UserID]: The application service sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information, for example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 3) Authentication challenge: The IdM systems send the user a request for authentication.
+- 4) Authentication input [Credentials]: The user provides information for authentication (e.g., UserID and password or personal identification number).
+
+- 5) Authentication: The IdM system performs authentication and obtains other needed information. This may involve obtaining information from other network systems (e.g., HSS or other subscription database).
+- 6) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 7) Authorization: The application service processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 8) Access authorization: The application service provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 9) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with the application service.
+
+NOTE 2 – To provide mutual authentication (i.e., to authenticate the application or service provider), further functionalities and flows will be necessary. However, this is not shown in Figure II.3.
+
+#### **II.3.3 Implied requirements**
+
+The following requirements are implied by this use case example:
+
+- The NGN can have a common IdM solution to be used by multiple application and services independent of the application platform or vendor solution.
+- Common IdM functions shall not be used, if they contradict the principles of data collection limitation, data minimization, data separation, purpose specification and use limitation.
+- The NGN shall support a standard and structured approach to allow application services to discover the IdM system(s) and exchange identity data securely.
+
+## **II.4 Single sign-on/single sign-off to multiple application services (e.g., voice, data, and IPTV) within a service provider network**
+
+#### **II.4.1 Overview**
+
+Users typically have to sign-on to multiple systems hosting application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and IPTV), necessitating an equivalent number of sign-on dialogues, each of which may involve different usernames and authentication information. System administrators are faced with managing user accounts within each of the multiple systems to be accessed in a coordinated manner in order to maintain the integrity of security policy enforcement.
+
+End user subscribers are demanding ease of use features such as "Single Sign-on/Sign-off." The premise of "Single Sign-On" is that an end user, device, or end user and device combination can sign-on once (i.e., providing credential input for authentication and authorization) to a service in a next generation network (NGN), and as a result be authenticated with one or more additional services in the same NGN (i.e., the end user is not burdened with authentication for each service). The word "Sign-On", as used here, means the same thing as the word "Register with", "Log-On", or "Log-In", where the end-user/device "registers with", "logs-on" or "logs-in" to a service. Similar "Single Sign-off" provides the use with a feature to avoid having to "Sign-off" each application service in a given session.
+
+Benefits provided by single sign-on/sign-off services include:
+
+- Reduction in the time taken by users in sign-on operations to individual domains, including reducing the possibility of such sign-on operations failing.
+- Improved security through the reduced need for a user to handle and remember multiple sets of authentication information.
+
+- Reduction in the time taken, and improved response, by system administrators in adding and removing users to the system or modifying their access rights.
+- Improved security through the enhanced ability of system administrators to maintain the integrity of user account configuration including the ability to inhibit or remove an individual user's access to all system resources in a coordinated and consistent manner.
+
+#### II.4.2 Use case description
+
+This use case example illustrates the use of an IdM system to support "Single Sign-on/Sign-off" to multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and IPTV) within a NGN provider domain. The use case involves interactions between the following entities:
+
+- End users (i.e., end user and/or end user device).
+- Relying system (i.e., application service or network system).
+- IdM system (i.e., network system providing IdM services such as registration, authentication and authorization, subscription profile information).
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User as User
+(End-user device)
+ participant RelyA as Rely
+application A
+(e.g., VoIP)
+ participant RelyB as Rely
+application B
+(e.g., data)
+ participant RelyC as Rely
+application C
+(e.g., IPTV)
+ participant IdM as IdM system
+(e.g., identity
+application server)
+
+ Note over User, IdM: User authenticates to access application C (e.g., IPTV)
+ User->>RelyC: (1) Application service request
+ RelyC->>IdM: (2) Identity info request [UserID]
+ IdM-->>User: (3) Authentication challenge
+ User-->>IdM: (4) Authentication input [UserID, credentials]
+ IdM->>IdM: (5) Authentication
+ IdM-->>RelyC: (6) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy]
+ IdM->>RelyC: (7) Authorization
+ RelyC-->>User: (8) Access authorization
+ Note over User, RelyC: (9) Service session
+
+ Note over User, IdM: User invokes application B (e.g., data) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate
+ User->>RelyB: (10) Application service request
+ RelyB->>IdM: (11) Identity info request [UserID]
+ IdM->>IdM: (12) Verification
+ IdM-->>RelyB: (13) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy]
+ IdM->>RelyB: (14) Authorization
+ RelyB-->>User: (15) Access authorization
+ Note over User, RelyB: (16) Service session
+
+ Note over User, IdM: User invokes application A (e.g., VoIP) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate
+ User->>RelyA: (17) Application service request
+ RelyA->>IdM: (18) Identity info request [DeviceID]
+ IdM->>IdM: (19) Verification
+ IdM-->>RelyA: (20) Identity info response [DeviceID, attributes]
+ RelyA->>User: (21) Authorization
+ Note over User, RelyA: (22) Service session
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Single Sign-on service process. The diagram shows interactions between a User (End-user device), three Relying applications (A, B, C), and an IdM system (identity application server). The process is divided into three main phases: 1. User authenticates to access application C (e.g., IPTV). 2. User invokes application B (e.g., data) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate. 3. User invokes application A (e.g., VoIP) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate. The diagram shows the flow of messages (requests, responses, challenges, inputs, outputs, and sessions) between the entities.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F04-App.II
+
+**Figure II.4 – Single sign-on service**
+
+Figure II.4 illustrates an end user subscriber using a single sign-on service to access multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and IPTV). This example assumes that the end user device has registered and is attached to the NGN using the normal procedures.
+
+The call flow examples are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke application service C (IPTV).
+- 2) Identity information request [UserID]: Application service C (IPTV) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information, for example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 3) Authentication challenge: The IdM system challenges the user for authentication.
+- 4) Authentication input [Credentials]: The user provides information for authentication (e.g., UserID and password or personal identification number).
+- 5) Authentication: The IdM system performs authentication and obtains other needed information. This may involve obtaining information from other network systems (e.g., HSS or other subscription database).
+- 6) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 7) Authorization: Application service C (IPTV) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 8) Access authorization: Application service C (IPTV) provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 9) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with application service C (IPTV).
+- 10) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke application service B (data).
+- 11) Identity information request [UserID]: Application service B (data) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information, for example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 12) Verification: The IdM system processes the request, determines that single sign-on is applicable and verifies that user authentication is still valid.
+- 13) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 14) Authorization: Application service B (data) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 15) Access authorization: Application service B (data) provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 16) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with application service B (data).
+- 17) Application service request: This information flow represents the end user request to invoke application service A (VoIP).
+
+- 18) Identity information request [DeviceID]: Application service A (VoIP) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the DeviceID.
+- 19) Verification: The IdM system processes the request, determines that single sign-on is applicable and verifies that user authentication is still valid.
+- 20) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the DeviceID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 21) Authorization: Application service A (VoIP) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 22) Application service session: This information flow represents the user successful session with application service A (VoIP).
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant End-user device
+ participant Rely application A (e.g., VoIP)
+ participant Rely application B (e.g., data)
+ participant Rely application C (e.g., IPTV)
+ participant IdM system (e.g., identity application server)
+
+ Note over End-user device, Rely application A, Rely application B, Rely application C: Active service session
+ Note over End-user device, Rely application A: Active service session
+ Note over End-user device, Rely application A: Active service session
+
+ Rely application C->>End-user device: (1) Request for sign-off from all service sessions [UserID]
+ Rely application C->>IdM system: (2) Sign-off notification [UserID]
+ IdM system-->>Rely application C: (4) Ack [UserID]
+ IdM system->>Rely application B: (5) Sign-off notification [UserID]
+ Rely application B-->>IdM system: (6) Ack [UserID]
+ IdM system->>Rely application A: (7) Sign-off notification [UserID]
+ Rely application A-->>IdM system: (8) Ack [UserID]
+ IdM system-->>End-user device: (9) Single sign-off ack [UserID]
+
+```
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F05-App.11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Single sign-off service. The diagram shows interactions between a User, an End-user device, three Rely applications (A, B, and C), and an IdM system. The process starts with an active service session across all applications. The user requests sign-off from all sessions. Application C initiates the sign-off process by notifying the IdM system, which then sends an acknowledgment back to Application C. Application B follows with a sign-off notification and acknowledgment. Finally, Application A sends a sign-off notification and acknowledgment. The IdM system then sends a single sign-off acknowledgment back to the End-user device.
+
+**Figure II.5 – Single sign-off service**
+
+Figure II.5 illustrates a "Single Sign-off" service allowing the user to automatically sign-off from multiple application services (VoIP, data, and IPTV) without having to sign-off from each application service in the session. This use case assumes that the user is in a service session with active application services A (VoIP), B (data) and C (IPTV).
+
+The call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) Service sign-off [UserID]: This call flow represents the user request to end all service sessions.
+- 2) Sign-off notification [UserID]: Application service C (IPTV) notifies the IdM system of user request to sign-off.
+
+- 3) SSO verification: The IdM system determines single sign-off is applicable and verifies the active application services.
+- 4) Ack [UserID]: The IdM system sends an acknowledgement to application service C (IPTV) about the end of service session.
+- 5) Sign-off notification [UserID]: The IdM system notifies application service B (data) of sign-off.
+- 6) Ack [UserID]: Application service B (data) acknowledges the sign-off.
+- 7) Sign-off notification [DeviceID]: The IdM system notifies application service A (VoIP) of sign-off.
+- 8) Ack [UserID]: Application service A (VoIP) acknowledges sign-off.
+- 9) Single sign-off Ack [UserID]: IdM system sends an acknowledgement to the user confirming sign-off from all active application services in the session.
+
+## **II.5 Correlation of distributed identity information for multi-factor authentication assurance**
+
+#### **II.5.1 Overview**
+
+This use case illustrates the use of IdM to correlate and bind multiple pieces of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) to assure the identity of an end user/subscriber. For example, the identity information associated with a subscriber (e.g., UserID), the subscriber device (e.g., DeviceID), and location information may be correlated to provide a higher assurance of the subscriber.
+
+#### **II.5.2 Use case example**
+
+Figure II.6 illustrates a use case example binding the user identity with the device identity and correlating with presence and location information to provide a higher level of assurance of the identity and the claims associated with the identity.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of interactions between the following components: User, End-user device, IdM server, Rely application (e.g., remote configuration), HSS, Presence server, and Location server.
+
+- (1) User requests application (User to End-user device)
+- (2) Identity info request (Rely application to IdM server)
+- (3) Authentication challenge (IdM server to End-user device)
+- (4) Authentication input [UserID and credential] (End-user device to IdM server)
+- (5) User authentication (IdM server internal action)
+- (6) Request for assertion of device authentication (IdM server to HSS)
+- (7) HSS sends assertion of device identity (HSS to IdM server)
+- (8) Request for presence information (IdM server to Presence server)
+- (9) Presence server sends presence information (Presence server to IdM server)
+- (10) Requests for location information (IdM server to Location server)
+- (11) Location server sends location information (Location server to IdM server)
+- (12) Binding and correlation of identity information (IdM server internal action)
+- (13) IdM server provides assertion of identity and claims (IdM server to Rely application)
+- (14) Authorization (Rely application internal action)
+- (15) Access authorized (Rely application to End-user device)
+- (16) Service session (Indicated by a pink double-headed arrow between End-user device and Rely application)
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F06-App.11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the correlation of identity information between various network components.
+
+**Figure II.6 – Correlation of identity information**
+
+In this example, the end user/subscriber is attempting to access an application that requires a high level of assurance of the user identity and the privileges associated with the identity because the security risks associated with allowing unauthorized access to the application or resource can be costly.
+
+The example call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) The user requests access to the application.
+- 2) The application sends a request to the IdM server for assertions of the user identity and the claims associated with the identity.
+- 3) The IdM server sends an authentication challenge to the user.
+- 4) The user provides input for authentication (e.g., UserID and credentials) to the IdM server.
+- 5) The IdM server authenticates the user.
+- 6) The IdM server sends a request to the HSS for an assertion of the user's device identity (Note that it is assumed that the user device registers with and is authenticated by the network using normal procedures).
+- 7) The HSS sends an assertion of the user's device identity.
+- 8) The IdM server sends a request to the presence server for presence information.
+- 9) The presence server provides presence information to the IdM server.
+- 10) The IdM server sends a request to the location server for location information.
+- 11) The location server provides location information to the IdM server.
+
+- 12) The IdM server binds the user identity and user device identity information. The combined identity is correlated with presence and location information to verify the claims (e.g., privileges) associated with the identity.
+- 13) The IdM server provides the application with assertions of the user identity and the claims associated with the identity.
+- 14) The application determines whether the user is authorized for access.
+- 15) The user is granted access to the application.
+- 16) Service session is established.
+
+## **II.6 Enforcement of user control of personally identifiable information (e.g., preferences) across peer network/service provider domains**
+
+#### **II.6.1 Overview**
+
+Protection of PII is very important for end users/subscribers. An important feature of IdM is to enable end users/subscribers to provide service providers and IdSPs information about conditions, restrictions, consents, authorization regarding creation, collection, use and dissemination of their identity information.
+
+#### **II.6.2 Use case description**
+
+This use case is related to the enforcement of applicable policies such as policies regarding anonymous or pseudonymous identity information.
+
+Figure II.7 illustrates an example use case where a user requests anonymity.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of anonymous user identity assignment and usage across three main entities: an End-user device, NGN Provider A, and NGN Provider B.
+
+**Entities:**
+
+- End-user device:** Represented by a user icon and a box labeled "End-user device".
+- NGN Provider A:** Contains an "IdM system (e.g., IdM) server" and a "Rely application A (e.g., IPTV)".
+- NGN Provider B:** Contains a "Rely application B (e.g., content)".
+
+**Sequence of Events:**
+
+- (1) User requests enrolment
+- (2) NGN A prompts user for additional information
+- (3) User provides requested information
+- (4) Proofing/vetting
+- (5) NGN A requests user to provide preferences about PII
+- (6) User provides preferences
+- (7) PII preferences (e.g., anonymity) included in profile
+- (8) User assigned pseudonymous identity and credentials
+- (9) User requests service
+- (10) Identity info request
+- (11) Authentication challenge
+- (12) Authentication input [UserID and credential]
+- (13) Authentication
+- (14) Identity response [pseudonymous identity and credential assertion]
+- (15) Access authorized
+- (16) Service session (indicated by a red double-headed arrow between NGN A and NGN B)
+- (17) User requests access to application B host by NGN B
+- (18) Identity info request
+- (19) Identity response [pseudonymous identity and credential assertion]
+- (20) Authorization
+- (21) Access authorized
+- (22) Service session (indicated by a red double-headed arrow between NGN A and NGN B)
+
+**Phases:**
+
+- User enrolls with NGN A and requests anonymous identity:** Steps 1 through 8.
+- User invokes application A (e.g., IPTV):** Steps 9 through 15.
+- Application A (e.g., IPTV) involves interaction with application B from NGN provider B:** Steps 17 through 22.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F07-App.11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating anonymous user identity flow between an end-user device, NGN Provider A, and NGN Provider B.
+
+**Figure II.7 – Anonymous user identity**
+
+NOTE – The term IdM system is used as a generic term to represent any network element that might be providing IdM functions and allow different realization/implementation possibilities.
+
+The use case example shows an NGN provider (NGN provider A) assigning an identity using pseudonyms based on a request for anonymity from the end user/subscriber. The pseudonymous identity is used for interactions with NGN provider B to protect the end user subscriber's personally identifiable information.
+
+The example call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) The user requests enrolment with NGN provider A.
+- 2) NGN provider A prompts the user for additional information.
+- 3) The user provides requested information to NGN provider A.
+- 4) NGN provider A proofs and vets the information.
+- 5) NGN provider A prompts the user to provide information about preferences concerning the personally identifiable information (PII).
+- 6) The user indicates preference for anonymity.
+
+- 7) NGN provider A includes anonymity preference to the user profile information.
+ - 8) The user is assigned a pseudonymous identity and credential binding the identity.
+ - 9) The user invokes application A (e.g., IPTV) hosted by NGN provider A.
+ - 10) The relying application A requests identity information about the user from the IdM system (e.g., IdM server).
+ - 11) The IdM system sends authentication challenge to the user.
+ - 12) The user provides input for authentication to the IdM system (e.g., UserID and credential).
+ - 13) The IdM system authenticates the user.
+ - 14) The IdM system sends assertions of the user identity and credentials to the relying application A.
+- NOTE – Only pseudonymous identity information is provided to enforce anonymity.
+- 15) The user is authorized for access to application A.
+ - 16) Service session.
+ - 17) The user requests access to application B hosted by NGN B.
+ - 18) Application B sends requests to the IdM system for information asserting the user identity and associated claims.
+ - 19) The IdM system provides assertion of the user identity and associated claims. Only pseudonymous identity information is sent to enforce policy for anonymity.
+ - 20) Application B verifies information for authorization.
+ - 21) Authorization for access is provided to the user.
+ - 22) Service session is established.
+
+## **II.7 Bridging/mapping between heterogeneous IdM systems**
+
+#### **II.7.1 Overview**
+
+In order to enable a user to receive multiple services offered by the various components of the NGN, the NGN needs to have the mechanisms for bridging among various IdM systems. Such a need is illustrated by a use case described in clause II.7.2.
+
+#### **II.7.2 Use case description**
+
+This scenario describes access by a subscriber of a NGN to a resource (e.g., a directory server) located in an enterprise network with the use of her or his handset. Because the NGN and enterprise networks employ different IdM mechanisms, there is a need for bridging between the IdM systems of these networks.
+
+The following entities are involved in an example illustrating the scenario:
+
+- The IdM system of the NGN. This system is modified in such a way that it is capable, in addition to supporting mutual AKA-based authentication of the user's handset, to provide it with the credentials for authentication to the IdM system of the enterprise network.
+- The IdM system of the enterprise network (e.g., key distribution centre).
+- The enterprise directory server (EDS) located in the enterprise network.
+- The user's handset.
+
+- These entities perform the following interactions:
+ - The user's handset and the mobile network authenticate each other using the AKA method.
+ - The user, using a handset, sends a request to the enterprise directory server (EDS) located in the enterprise network.
+ - The EDS replies with an authentication request.
+ - The user obtains from the IdM system of the NGN the authentication credentials (e.g., a Kerberos ticket), which are based on the results of the AKA authentication, and are valid for authentication to the enterprise IdM system.
+
+For example, the user's handset obtains a ticket to the key distribution centre (KDC) of the enterprise network. Specifically, the ticket allows the user to get authenticated by the ticket granting server (TGS), which is a part of the KDC.
+
+- The user requests from the TGS a ticket for authentication to the EDS.
+- The TGS validates the presented credentials and responds to the user with a ticket to the EDS.
+- The end user responds to the EDS's authentication request with the ticket received from the TGS.
+- The EDS authenticates the user and responds with its own credentials for authentication to the user and a confirmation for the requested service. After validating the EDS credentials, the user can access the EDS.
+
+#### **II.7.3 Implied requirements**
+
+- The IdM system of the NGN must support the AKA authentication mechanism and the authentication mechanism (e.g., Kerberos) used by the enterprise network.
+- The IdM system of the NGN must be capable of issuing authentication credentials (e.g., a Kerberos ticket) to the end user device for authenticating the user to the enterprise IdM system.
+- The IdM system of the NGN must manage the user identity and credentials.
+- The enterprise IdM system must manage the server identity and credentials.
+
+NOTE – a) No new capability is required of 3G networks (which thus may serve as an example); b) The requirements here apply specifically to the support of the above use case.
+
+## **II.8 Support of converged services (e.g., fixed and mobile access) within a service provider network**
+
+#### **II.8.1 Overview**
+
+A promise of next generation networks is the support for a myriad of converged services over fixed and mobile access networks. A user, thus, would have the flexibility to invoke a service using an access device and network of convenience at a particular moment. (In return, the service provider would expand its customer base and increase its revenue.) Since the underlying security mechanisms suitable for fixed and mobile environments are typically different, an important enabler would be a converged IdM system that can address the differences. The converged IdM would manage the identities and credentials of end users and network servers regardless of access technology.
+
+#### **II.8.2 Use case description**
+
+This scenario describes access by a subscriber of a 3G network to a resource (e.g., a video-on-demand server) located in a fixed network with the use of her or his handset. In this scenario, the 3G network and a resource in a fixed network support different IdM-related mechanisms. The following entities are involved in an example illustrating the scenario:
+
+- The IdM system of the 3G network. This system is modified in such a way that it is capable, in addition to supporting mutual AKA-based authentication of the user's handset, to provide it with the credentials for authentication to the video-on-demand (VoD) server.
+- The VoD server located in the fixed network.
+- The user's 3G handset.
+- These entities perform the following interactions:
+ - The user's handset and the mobile network authenticate each other using the AKA method.
+ - The user, using a handset, sends a request to the VoD server.
+ - The VoD server replies with an authentication request to the user.
+ - The user obtains authentication credentials (e.g., a Kerberos ticket) from the IdM system of the 3G network, which generates such credentials based on the results of the AKA authentication.
+ - The user responds to the VoD server with the authentication credentials (a ticket).
+ - The VoD server authenticates the user and responds with confirmation for the requested service.
+
+#### **II.8.3 Implied requirements**
+
+- The IdM system of the 3G network must support the AKA authentication mechanism and the authentication mechanism (e.g., Kerberos) used by the VoD server.
+- The IdM system must be capable of issuing authentication credentials (e.g., ticket) to the user device for authenticating the user to the VoD server.
+- The IdM system of the 3G network must manage the user identity and credentials.
+- The IdM system of the 3G network must manage the VoD server's identity and credentials.
+
+NOTE – The requirements here apply specifically to the support of the presented use case.
+
+## **II.9 Example use case – User authentication and authorization of NGN provider (mutual authentication and authorization)**
+
+Figure II.8 illustrates an example use case involving the user authentication of an NGN provider. This example assumes an open service environment where NGN providers are capable of advertising services to the user. This use case example illustrates gaps or lack of capabilities for the user to authenticate and authorize NGN providers (or mutual authentication) in an open service and multi-provider environment.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant NGN_provider_A as NGN provider A
+ participant IdSP as IdSP (NGN provider B)
+
+ NGN_provider_A->>User: (1) NGN provider advertises service to user
+ User->>NGN_provider_A: (2) User requests identity assertion
+ NGN_provider_A->>User: (3) NGN provider A provides IdSP information
+ User->>IdSP: (4) User requests identity assertion from IdSP
+ IdSP->>NGN_provider_A: (5) IdSP requests authentication of NGN provider A
+ NGN_provider_A->>IdSP: (6) NGN provider A authenticates with IdSP
+ IdSP->>User: (7) IdSP asserts NGN provider A identity
+ User->>NGN_provider_A: (8) User authorizes NGN provider A
+
+```
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F08-App. II
+
+Sequence diagram showing the user authentication and authorization of NGN provider A. The diagram involves three lifelines: User (blue), NGN provider A (orange), and IdSP (NGN provider B) (green). The sequence of messages is: (1) NGN provider A advertises service to user; (2) User requests identity assertion from NGN provider A; (3) NGN provider A provides IdSP information to user; (4) User requests identity assertion from IdSP; (5) IdSP requests authentication of NGN provider A; (6) NGN provider A authenticates with IdSP; (7) IdSP asserts NGN provider A identity to user; (8) User authorizes NGN provider A.
+
+**Figure II.8 – Example use case: User authentication and authorization of NGN provider**
+
+The example call flows are summarized as follows:
+
+- 1) NGN provider A advertises services to the user.
+- 2) The user requests assertion of NGN provider A identity.
+- 3) NGN provider A provides the user with the address of an IdSP.
+- 4) The user sends requests to the IdSP for assertion of NGN provider A Identity.
+- 5) The IdSP sends requests to NGN provider A to authenticate.
+- 6) NGN provider A provides authentication information.
+- 7) The IdSP sends information to the user asserting identity of NGN provider A.
+- 8) The user authorizes NGN provider A to provide services.
+
+NOTE – This example does not show the flows related to the NGN provider authentication and authorization of the user.
+
+## II.10 Example use case – Peer user assertion (non-cash transactions)
+
+Currently, there is a lack of NGN IdM capabilities allowing users to authenticate communication origination or data sources. In general, the IdM approaches that are being specified are focused mainly on IdM for cash transactions and electronic commerce. The NGN would need to support IdM capabilities for a broader range of transactions and communications. This is especially important for certain emergency services that would have to be supported by NGN. Figure II.9 shows an example use case illustrating the need for NGN IdM capabilities to allow users to assert the identity of each other for peer communications and non-cash transactions. For example, a user may need to authenticate the source of a received message (e.g., email or instant message), the request for communication (e.g., voice or video or data communication) or received data. Currently, there is a lack of NGN specification to support such IdM capabilities.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UA as User A
+(relying party)
+ participant UB as User B
+(principal)
+ participant IdSP as IdSP
+
+ UA->>UB: (1) User A receives message from user B
+ UA->>UB: (2) User A requests identity assertion
+ UB->>UA: (3) User B provides IdSP information
+ UA->>IdSP: (4) User A requests identity and message assertion from IdSP
+ IdSP->>UB: (5) IdSP requests authentication of user B
+ UB->>IdSP: (6) User B authenticates with IdSP
+ IdSP->>UA: (7) IdSP asserts identity and message from user B
+ UA->>UB: (8) User A acknowledges communication
+
+```
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F09-App.II
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the peer user assertion use case (non-cash transactions) between User A (relying party), User B (principal), and IdSP.
+
+**Figure II.9 – Example use case: Peer user assertion (non-cash transactions)**
+
+The example use case illustrated in Figure II.9 assumes that user A receives a message or request for communication from user B and would like to assert the identity of user B and the received data. The example call flows are summarized as follows:
+
+- 1) User A receives message or communication request from user B.
+- 2) User A requests assertion of user B identity and authentication of information received from user B.
+- 3) User B provides user A with address information of identity provider (IdSP).
+- 4) User A sends requests to IdSP to assert the identity of user B and authenticate the received information.
+- 5) IdSP sends the request to user B for authentication.
+- 6) User B responds and is authenticated by IdSP.
+- 7) IdSP sends the response to user A asserting the identity of user B and the received information.
+- 8) User A acknowledges communication to user B.
+
+## **II.11 IdM use case – Assurance of end user device identity and integrity**
+
+NGNs will be supporting a variety of user devices (e.g., fixed telephones, wireless handsets, personal computers, PDA, IPTV set top boxes). The hardware and software components of the devices attaching to the NGN ranges from simple to complex, and, if stolen and compromised, can be used to orchestrate a variety of attacks.
+
+Special security capabilities could be designed and implemented as part of tamper-resistant hardware component in end user devices to hold identity management data in encrypted form and support specialized security capabilities to validate the identity and integrity of the end user devices. This clause describes example use cases where specialized security hardware component could be designed and implemented as part of end user devices and used to support identity management services to:
+
+- 1) Assure the identity of an end user device.
+- 2) Assure the integrity of an end user device (i.e., verify that the configured software and hardware have not been compromised).
+- 3) Allow users to encrypt and protect PII and other sensitive data on end user devices.
+
+#### II.11.1 Example use case – Assurance of user and device authentication
+
+This use case involves the support of specialized tamper-resistant hardware component in end user devices to provide unique identification of the device. For example, passwords, digital keys, and certificates can be stored in specialized tamper-resistant hardware component of the device to provide unique identification of the device. The specialized hardware component could support standardized application programming interfaces (API) to allow support of security application services relying on the specialized hardware component as a trust anchor for the end user device.
+
+The unique identification and authentication of the tamper-resistant hardware component could be correlated with identification and authentication of the user to provide a higher degree of assurance for access control in a multi-service provider environment.
+
+Figure II.10 illustrates an example use case where specialized tamper-resistant hardware component is designed and implemented in end user devices to provide unique identification of the device. In this example, it is assumed that specialized tamper-resistant hardware component is controlled by the NGN provider through contractual agreement with the subscriber. Subject to qualified user consent, the NGN/IdSP provider could provide identity services to other providers (e.g., content providers, web services providers, and 3rd party providers) and partners assuring the identity and authentication of the end user device. This would allow service providers to have confidence in the identity and authentication of the end user device. The information about the user device identity and authentication can be correlated with the user authentication for a higher degree of assurance and confidence.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the correlation of user and device authentication for assurance. It shows a User (represented by a laptop and a mobile phone) connected to an Access network, which is connected to an NGN provider. The NGN provider contains Identity services and an IdM server. The Internet cloud contains Web services providers and a Content provider. The sequence of events is as follows:
+
+- (1) User A requests service from content provider
+- (2) Content provider decides that verification of the user device is needed and determines NGN provider is associated with the user device
+- (3) Content provider sends requests to NGN provider
+- (4) NGN provider verifies special security hardware component of user device
+- (5) NGN provider provides content provider with confirmation that user device is trusted
+- (6) Content provider correlates information with user authentication information to determine authorization
+- (7) User is allowed access to service
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F10-App.II
+
+Figure II.10: Correlation of user and device authentication for assurance. The diagram shows a User (with a laptop and mobile phone) connected to an Access network, which is connected to an NGN provider. The NGN provider contains Identity services and an IdM server. The Internet cloud contains Web services providers and a Content provider. The sequence of events is: (1) User A requests service from content provider; (2) Content provider decides that verification of the user device is needed and determines NGN provider is associated with the user device; (3) Content provider sends requests to NGN provider; (4) NGN provider verifies special security hardware component of user device; (5) NGN provider provides content provider with confirmation that user device is trusted; (6) Content provider correlates information with user authentication information to determine authorization; (7) User is allowed access to service.
+
+**Figure II.10 – Correlation of user and device authentication for assurance**
+
+The following is a summary of the call flows:
+
+- 1) The user requests service from a content provider.
+- 2) The content provider decides that verification of the user device is needed to allow access to the service, and determines that the NGN provider is associated with the user's device.
+- 3) The content provider sends requests to the NGN provider to assert the user device identity and authentication.
+- 4) The NGN provider identifies and authenticates special security hardware component of the user device (e.g., by verifying certificates stored in tamperproof security hardware component of device).
+- 5) The NGN provider sends a response to the content provider validating the user device identity and authentication.
+- 6) The content provider correlates the information from the NGN provider with user authentication information and determines authorization to the service.
+- 7) The user is allowed access to the service (e.g., content).
+
+#### **II.11.2 Example use case – Assurance of user device integrity**
+
+In today's security environment, subscribers attach to the network using different devices (e.g., fixed telephones, wireless handsets, personal computers, PDA, IPTV set top boxes). The integrity of end user devices (e.g., the configured software and hardware) could be easily compromised unknowingly to the user/subscriber. Popular Internet applications, such as web browsers and email, and other applications that execute on subscriber devices to allow subscribers to interact with services and local device features, could potentially compromise integrity of the device by introducing vulnerabilities. For example, these applications may have inherent security flaws or support features, such as file downloads, software applets, browser plug-ins and embedded links, which can be exploited. Software and file downloads, particularly from an untrusted source, make subscriber devices vulnerable to malicious code, worms, viruses, and Trojan horses. Keyloggers (which record all key entries, including user names and passwords, and then relay the information to an attacker who can use it to gain unauthorized access) are a popular type of malicious code. Other types of malicious code include spyware (programs that track subscriber activity), and adware (programs that push unwanted advertisements, often based upon information collected by monitoring a subscriber). Some of these programs literally hijack subscriber devices and obfuscate their presence by embedding themselves deep in the operating system.
+
+This use case involves the support of specialized tamper-resistant hardware component in end user devices to provide integrity checks and provide confirmation of the device integrity to applications and services. For example, the specialized tamper-resistant hardware component could contain vendor-specific algorithms and functions to check for integrity compromises. The special hardware component could include a reference model with a set of known-good integrity metrics, specifically to identify the correct code and provide reference values for the device. The known-good integrity metrics would be used to compare actual reported values to the configuration and determine if the unit is within compliance.
+
+Figure II.11 illustrates an example use case where specialized tamper-resistant hardware component is designed and implemented in an end user device to provide integrity verification of the device. In this example, it is assumed that specialized tamper-resistant hardware component is controlled by the NGN provider through contractual agreement with the subscriber. Subject to qualified user consent, the NGN/IdSP could provide identity services to other providers (e.g., content providers, web services providers, and 3rd party providers) and partners validating the integrity and compliance of the end user device.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User as User
+ participant Access as Access network
+ participant NGN as NGN provider (IdM server)
+ participant Content as Content provider
+
+ User->>Content: (1) User A requests service from content provider
+ Note right of Content: (2) Content provider decides that integrity verification...
+ Content->>NGN: (3) Content provider sends requests to NGN provider
+ NGN-->>User: (4) NGN provider verifies special security hardware component...
+ NGN->>Content: (5) NGN provider provides content provider with confirmation...
+ Note right of Content: (6) Content provider determines authorization
+ User<->Content: (7) User is allowed access to service
+
+```
+
+Diagram illustrating the assurance of device integrity process. The diagram shows a User (represented by a person at a computer and a mobile phone) connected to an Access network. The Access network is connected to an NGN provider (Next Generation Network provider) which contains Identity services and an IdM server. The NGN provider is connected to the Internet, which contains 3rd party providers, Web services providers, and a Content provider. The process flow is as follows: (1) User A requests service from content provider; (2) Content provider decides that integrity verification of the user device is needed and determines NGN provider is associated with the user device; (3) Content provider sends requests to NGN provider; (4) NGN provider verifies special security hardware component of user device; (5) NGN provider provides content provider with confirmation of user device integrity compliance; (6) Content provider determines authorization; (7) User is allowed access to service.
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F11-App.II
+
+**Figure II.11 – Assurance of device integrity**
+
+The following is a summary of the example call flows:
+
+- 1) The user requests the service from the content provider.
+- 2) The content provider determines that verification of the user device integrity is needed and determines the NGN provider associated with the user device.
+- 3) The content provider sends requests to the NGN provider for user device integrity confirmation.
+- 4) The NGN provider interacts with the special security hardware component of the user device to verify integrity compliance.
+- 5) The NGN provider provides the content provider with the confirmation of user device integrity.
+- 6) The content provider determines authorization.
+- 7) The user is allowed access to the service (e.g., content).
+
+#### II.11.3 Example use case – Encryption of PII and sensitive files/data
+
+Loss or theft of a device with PII and other sensitive data could mean serious consequences to individuals, business and government enterprises. The specialized hardware component designed to uniquely identify and confirm integrity of trusted devices could also support capabilities to encrypt and protect PII and other sensitive data on end user devices. With encrypted confidential data, unauthorized parties cannot access the data on computers, cell phones or storage devices, thus avoiding extensive corrective action as well as cost.
+
+# **Appendix III**
+
+## **Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) related IdM use cases**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## **III.1 Introduction**
+
+This appendix provides example ETS related IdM use cases. ETS is a service that requires priority treatment. See clause 8.4.7.
+
+## **III.2 Authentication assurance using device and user combination**
+
+Authentication of authorized users of ETS is necessary to protect the availability and integrity of ETS, and associated networks. Two basic authentication methods that are currently used for legacy ETS applications are:
+
+- 1) A PIN-based method; and
+- 2) A subscription-based method.
+
+The first method involves the use of a personal identification number (PIN) for authentication and authorization. Validation of the PIN authenticates the user, thus authorizing the user for ETS. This approach identifies the user and not the user device. Therefore, it is normally used in cases where the user is allowed to invoke ETS from any device.
+
+The second method involves authentication and authorization based on the subscription profile information associated with a particular terminal or end user device. The user device or terminal identity is authenticated as part of the NGN provider (i.e., ETS provider) normal registration and authentication, and individual ETS calls/sessions are authorized by checking the service subscription profile (i.e., verifying whether the service subscription allows ETS calls/session from the device). This approach authenticates the user's device (i.e., wireless handset) and not the user.
+
+The use of the simple PIN-based and subscription-based methods is adequate for legacy ETS applications. However, the simple PIN-based and subscription-based methods are not adequate for all types of ETS applications in the NGN environment. Specifically, applications such as multimedia priority services (e.g., data and video services) would require a higher degree of assurance or confidence of the ETS user's identity and of the level of authorization to access the ETS application and its associated resource. Therefore, in addition to supporting the existing PIN-based and subscription-based authentication methods, the NGN would also need to support enhanced mechanisms to authenticate and authorize ETS users and devices.
+
+An approach to consider in the transitioning of ETS (i.e., priority voice services) to the NGN environment is the use of IdM to correlate and bind authentication of the user and the identification and authentication of the user device. This will provide enhanced assurance (i.e., confidence) of the identity and authorization of the user for access to ETS. The concept is described in the following general use case example.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a combined user and device authentication process. It involves three main entities: an ETS user, Service provider A (e.g., ingress ETS provider), and Service provider B (e.g., egress ETS provider). Service provider A contains an ETS application, an HSS (Home Subscriber System), and an IdM server. Service provider B contains ETS applications, an HSS, and an IdM server. The process follows these steps:
+
+- (1) Normal handset registration and authentication procedures at power-on
+- (2) ETS user initiates ETS application
+- (3) ETS application requests authentication and authorization
+- (4) IdM server requests handset device authentication information
+- (5) Subscription profile is verified for handset device
+- (6) HSS provides handset device authentication information
+- (7) ETS user is challenged for authentication
+- (8) ETS user provides input for authentication (e.g., PIN)
+- (9) IdM server correlates and binds ETS user and handset device information for enhanced authentication and authorization
+- (10) ETS communication is authorized
+
+After step 10, a blue arrow indicates that the ETS communication session is established between the ETS user and the terminating user.
+
+Sequence diagram showing combined user and device authentication between an ETS user, Service Provider A, and Service Provider B. The process involves 10 steps: (1) Normal handset registration and authentication at power-on; (2) ETS user initiates ETS application; (3) ETS application requests authentication and authorization; (4) IdM server requests handset device authentication information; (5) Subscription profile is verified for handset device; (6) HSS provides handset device authentication information; (7) ETS user is challenged for authentication; (8) ETS user provides input for authentication (e.g., PIN); (9) IdM server correlates and binds ETS user and handset device information; (10) ETS communication is authorized. A final blue arrow indicates the ETS communication session is established.
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F01-App.III
+
+**Figure III.1 – Combined user and device authentication**
+
+Figure III.1 shows a use case example where IdM functions are used to combine user and device authentication for enhanced assurance of authorization of ETS users.
+
+The example call flows are summarized as follows:
+
+- 1) The user handset device is registered and authenticated using the normal procedures upon power-on.
+- 2) The ETS user initiates an ETS application.
+- 3) The ETS application requests authentication and authorization from the IdM server.
+- 4) The IdM server requests handset device authentication information from the HSS.
+- 5) The HSS verifies subscription profile of handset.
+- 6) The HSS provides IdM server handset device authentication information.
+- 7) The ETS user is challenged for authentication.
+- 8) The ETS user provides input for authentication (e.g., PIN).
+- 9) The IdM server correlates and binds ETS user and handset device information for enhanced authentication and authorization.
+- 10) The ETS communication session is authorized.
+
+The result of this example flow is enhanced assurance of the identity of the ETS user and authorization to use the service. Combining authentication of the device with the user would require additional interactions with the ETS user for authentication and might be viewed as burdensome. However, this may not be needed for all ETS sessions. It could be considered for ETS sessions requiring higher levels of assurance.
+
+## **III.3 Enhanced authentication of ETS users for next generation priority services (priority multimedia services)**
+
+As the communications environment transitions to an NGN/IMS environment, ETS users will need to keep up with the technology changes and new trends in communications. For instance, ETS users are increasingly becoming dependent on communications beyond voice communications such as instant messaging, text messaging, and emails to carry out their mission. In general, there are initiatives in the planning and development stages to allow ETS users to obtain priority access to multimedia services such as voice, data, and video services. However, the PIN-based and subscription-based mechanisms used for ETS in the PSTN environment will not be adequate for multimedia services in the NGN/IMS environment. Specifically, applications such as multimedia priority services (e.g., data and video services) would require a higher degree of assurance or confidence of the ETS user's identity and of the level of authorization to access the ETS application and its associated resource because of the higher level of security risks and threats of the NGN environment in general. Also, unlike existing ETS supported in the PSTN, it is expected that next generation multimedia priority services may only be authorized to a selected population of ETS users. In addition, given the general objective for ETS users to have easy and user friendly access from anywhere, anytime, and from any device, it is important that more advanced IdM mechanisms be considered and leveraged as appropriate. High assurance of ETS user identity will be critical to protect the integrity and availability of the ETS multimedia services and resources and the overall NGN/IMS infrastructure as a whole during disasters and emergencies. Multimedia data and video applications (e.g., web information or video clips downloads) are bandwidth and resource intensive compared to voice applications. Without adequate controls, unauthorized access to ETS data and video applications could potentially have negative impacts on ETS applications themselves and the entire communications infrastructure in general. For example, unauthorized access to resource intensive ETS application could potentially be used to cause network congestions or carry out denial of service attacks. Therefore, more sophisticated approaches using special security tokens, digital certificates, voice recognition or biometric capabilities to authenticate and authorize ETS users and/or terminals should be considered.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ETS as ETS user
+ participant SPB as Service provider B (Video provider)
+ participant SPC as Service provider C (IdSP)
+ participant TU as Terminating user
+
+ Note over ETS, SPC: (1) ETS user registers and obtains security token from IdP
+ ETS->>SPB: (2) ETS user initiates video conference application
+ SPB->>ETS: (3) ETS user is challenged for authentication
+ ETS->>SPB: (4) ETS user provides credentials and security token
+ SPB->>SPC: (5) Service provider B interacts with IdSP for assertion of token validity
+ Note right of SPB: (6) ETS user and terminal are verified for video conference authorization
+ SPB->>ETS: (7) ETS user and terminal are authorized for video conference service
+ ETS<->TU: (8) ETS video conference session is established
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating enhanced authentication for next generation priority services. The diagram shows interactions between an ETS user, Service provider B (video provider), Service provider C (IdSP), and a Terminating user. The process involves eight steps: (1) registration and token acquisition, (2) application initiation, (3) authentication challenge, (4) credential provision, (5) token validation, (6) authorization verification, (7) service authorization, and (8) session establishment.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F02-App.III
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+###### Figure III.2 – Enhanced authentication for next generation priority services
+
+Figure III.2 illustrates an example use case involving enhanced authentication of authorized users for next generation multimedia priority services (e.g., video conferencing). This use case assumes that the identity credential (i.e., security token or digital certificate) is provided by an IdSP that is different from the provider of the multimedia service (although it is possible that the service provider and IdSP could be the same). If the IdSP and the service provider are different, it would require prior establishment of the necessary business and trust arrangements. It would also require mutual authentication between the IdSP and the service provider.
+
+The following is a summary of the call flows:
+
+- 1) The ETS user registers and obtains credential (i.e., security token or digital certificate) identifying the ETS user and privileges for multimedia services.
+- 2) The ETS user initiates video conference application.
+- 3) The ETS user is challenged for authentication.
+- 4) The ETS user provides credentials (e.g., security token or digital certificate) for authentication.
+- 5) Service provider B interacts with identity service provider (IdSP) requesting validation of the credentials (e.g., security token or digital certificate).
+- 6) Service provider B processes and verifies information to determine whether the ETS user and the terminal are authorized for multimedia priority services.
+- 7) The ETS user is authorized to initiate multimedia priority service (e.g., video conference) after successful authentication.
+- 8) Multimedia session is set up and established.
+
+It is possible that certain next generation multimedia communications may require the use of biometric information to authenticate authorized ETS users. For example, the sensitive nature of certain information may require that it only be shared among a subset of authorized ETS users. In such a scenario, a high degree of confidence in the validation of the ETS user identity is critical. In these cases, biometric mechanisms may be considered as candidate validation technologies.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User as NS/EP user
+ participant IdP as Identity provider (service provider C)
+ participant IdM as IdM server
+ participant IdS as Identity services
+ participant GE as Government enterprise (information server)
+ participant AN1 as Access network
+ participant AN2 as Access network
+
+ User->>IdS: (1) ETS user registers with IdSP
+ User->>IdS: (2) ETS user initiates data application to access sensitive information
+ GE->>IdS: (3) Government enterprise sends requests to IdSP for identity assertion
+ IdS->>User: (4) ETS user is challenged for authentication and redirected to the IdSP
+ User->>IdS: (5) ETS user provides credentials and biometric information for authentication
+ IdS->>IdM: (6) ETS user is authenticated
+ IdS->>GE: (7) IdSP sends assertion of ETS user identity
+ GE->>GE: (8) Authorization to access sensitive information is validated
+ IdS->>User: (9) ETS user is authorized to access sensitive information
+ User->>GE: (10) Data access session is established
+ IdS->>User: (11) IdP prompts ETS user to re-authenticate after certain time intervals
+ IdS->>GE: (12) IdSP provides re-authentication updates
+
+```
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F03-App.III
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating a biometric use case example. The diagram shows interactions between an NS/EP user, an Identity provider (service provider C), and a Government enterprise (information server) via access networks. The process includes registration, authentication challenges, biometric verification, identity assertion, authorization, and session establishment.
+
+**Figure III.3 – Biometric use case example**
+
+Figure III.3 shows an example use case involving biometrics. In this example, it is assumed that the user handset is equipped with the appropriate capability to read biometric information. It is also assumed that the ETS user pre-registers with the IdSP and the necessary biometric information is obtained and stored. Note that it is also possible for the government enterprise to host and provide the identity services (e.g., registering and keeping ETS user identity and biometric information) as opposed to using third-party service provider services. The following is a summary of the call flows:
+
+- 1) The ETS registers with the IdSP to activate biometric authentication service. It is assumed that the necessary process to collect and prove the biometric and other identity information has already occurred (e.g., in-person registration).
+- 2) The ETS user initiates communication for remote access to a government enterprise database hosting sensitive information.
+- 3) The government enterprise security policy indicates that a high level of assurance is needed to allow access, and initiates a redirection procedure to the IdSP.
+
+- 4) The ETS user is challenged for authentication and redirected to the IdSP.
+- 5) The ETS user provides input for authentication. For example, the ETS user scans his or her thumb on a special biometric chip scanner integrated in the wireless handset.
+- 6) The IdSP uses the input information to authenticate the ETS user.
+- 7) The IdSP sends the information to the government enterprise asserting the identity of the ETS user.
+- 8) The government enterprise verifies whether ETS identity is authorized for access to information server hosting the sensitive data.
+- 9) ETS is authorized for access.
+- 10) Data access session is established.
+- 11) The IdSP prompts the ETS user to re-authenticate after specific time-interval as a result of the security policy for access to the government enterprise information server.
+- 12) The IdSP provides information about ETS user re-authentication to the government enterprise.
+
+## **III.4 Authentication of called party and data communication sources**
+
+Currently there are no specific mechanisms as part of ETS application themselves to authenticate the called party of the communication session (i.e., the terminating side of the ETS call). In the closed PSTN environment, this was not much of an issue. However, the transition to NGN/IMS environment with IP transport allows for the possibility of forging of called party number and routing information resulting in masquerading threats.
+
+In the future, it might be possible to leverage identity management services offered by communications service providers (CSPs) and third-party service providers to authenticate the called party or the terminating side of ETS communication sessions. Specifically, the ETS service provider could support IdM capabilities to provide identity services to authenticate users and assert user identities. Example identity information could be simple line and calling name verifications or use of stronger authentication mechanisms such as security tokens, smart cards, or digital certificates to assure the user's identity.
+
+Figure III.4 illustrates a use case example involving assertion of the terminating user of an ETS communication session (e.g., an ETS voice call). Specifically, this use case assumes that the ETS user is pre-registered with the ETS service provider for web-based identity services. After establishing an ETS communication (e.g., ETS voice call) to a user in the public network, the ETS user initiates an identity service through a web portal to verify the identity of the terminating user on the other end of the ETS communication. In this use case example, the establishment of the ETS communications session is independent of the identity service that is used to assure the identity of the terminating user.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of asserting the identity of a terminating user during an ETS communication session. It involves an ETS user, a terminating user, two service providers (A and B), and their respective IdM servers.
+
+**Sequence of Events:**
+
+- (1) ETS communication session (e.g., ETS voice call) is established using normal procedures.
+- (2) ETS user initiates web-based identity service application.
+- (3) Service provider A verifies ETS user authorization for service.
+- (4) ETS user requests assertion of the terminating user identity for the existing ETS communication session.
+- (5) Service provider A processes request and identifies IdSP (service provider A) associated with the terminating user.
+- (6) Service provider A sends requests to service provider B to assert identity of the terminating user.
+- (7) Service provider B validates identity of the terminating user. This may involve real-time authentication of the terminating user.
+- (8) Service provider B sends response asserting the identity of the terminating user.
+- (9) Service provider A sends response to ETS user validating the identity of the terminating user.
+
+**NOTE** – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F04-App.III
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the assertion of terminating user identity between an ETS user and a terminating user through two service providers (A and B) and their IdM servers.
+
+**Figure III.4 – Assertion of terminating user identity**
+
+The following is a summary of the call flow and interactions:
+
+- 1) The ETS user initiates an ETS communication session (e.g., ETS voice call). The ETS communication session is established using the normal procedures.
+- 2) The ETS user initiates web-based identity service (e.g., via a web portal of service provider A, the ingress ETS provider) to validate the user on the terminating end of the established ETS communication session.
+- 3) Service provider A verifies the ETS user authorization for the service.
+- 4) The ETS user requests validation of the identity of the user on the terminating end of the established communication session.
+- 5) Service provider A processes the request and determines the IdSP associated with the terminating user (i.e., the egress ETS provider).
+- 6) Service provider A sends a request to service provider B to assert the identity of the terminating user.
+
+- 7) Service provider B validates the identity of the terminating user. This may involve real-time authentication of the terminating user.
+- 8) Service provider B sends a response asserting the terminating user identity.
+- 9) Service provider A sends a response to the ETS user (e.g., visual web display) validating the identity of the terminating user of the ETS communication session.
+
+ETS users are also increasingly dependent on the use of data services such as emails, instant messaging, and text messaging. In certain situations, it may be necessary to authenticate or validate the sources of such data services. Given the abundance of junk and spam mails, the ability to distinguish and validate authentic messages during certain disaster events will be critical for ETS users.
+
+Figure III.5 illustrates an example use case asserting the source of a text message. In this example, it is assumed that the ETS user receives a text message originated from a source that may or may not be another ETS user. To obtain assurance of the text message source, the identity services of a service provider are used. The identity service to assert the text message source may or may not be part of the text message service itself.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of asserting the source of a text message. It involves four main entities: an ETS user, Service provider A (IdSP), Service provider B (IdSP), and a Message source. The ETS user and Message source are connected to their respective service providers via access networks. Each service provider contains identity services and an IdM server. The process follows these steps:
+
+- (1) ETS user receives text message
+- (2) ETS user initiates identity service to validate text message source
+- (3) ETS user is challenged for authentication
+- (4) ETS user provides credentials for authentication
+- (5) ETS user is authenticated
+- (6) Service provider A sends request to service provider B to validate text message source
+- (7) Service provider B verifies text message source. This may involve real time interaction with text message source
+- (8) Service provider B provides information validating text message source
+- (9) Service provider A provides ETS user with information validating text message source
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the assertion of text message source between an ETS user, Service Provider A (IdSP), Service Provider B (IdSP), and a Message source.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F05-App.III
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+**Figure III.5 – Assertion of text message source**
+
+The following is a summary of the interactions:
+
+- 1) The ETS user receives a text message.
+- 2) The ETS user wants to verify the authenticity of the text message source and initiates identity services from service provider A.
+- 3) The ETS user is challenged for authentication.
+- 4) The ETS user provides credentials for authentication.
+- 5) Service provider A authenticates ETS user and verifies authorization for identity service.
+- 6) Service provider A sends requests to service provider B to assert text message source.
+- 7) Service provider B processes requests and verifies text message source. This may involve interaction with the text message source.
+- 8) Service provider B sends a response to service provider A asserting the identity of the text message source.
+- 9) Service provider A sends the ETS user information validating the text message source.
+
+## **III.5 Trusted identification and authentication of service providers in a multi-provider environment**
+
+Today's communication infrastructure has evolved into a multi-provider environment that includes multiple fixed and mobile access providers using different technologies (e.g., xDSL, cable, FTTX, WiFi, WiMAX, EV-DO, LTE), communications service providers using "managed core IP networks", web services providers, content providers, and 3rd party providers. In this multi-provider environment, the identity of the service provider can no longer be implicitly trusted, as it was in the closed PSTN environment.
+
+In the open multi-provider environment, there is a lack of capabilities to provide trusted identification, authentication, and authorization of service providers, which can result in the possibility of illegitimate entities masquerading, forging, or misrepresenting legitimate service providers. Therefore, IdM capabilities to identify and validate service providers are critical to infrastructure protection. When the service providers are supporting ETS services, such capabilities are critical to national security.
+
+Figure III.6 shows an ETS use case example where the ETS user is attempting to obtain network access in a multi-provider environment. Specifically, the ETS user is roaming and the mobile handset device could potentially attach to one of a set of access network providers offering services in the area (not all the service providers may be authorized ETS service providers). In this use case example, it is assumed that the ETS user attaches to access network 1 as the first choice. After attaching to access network 1, the ETS user would like to validate the network before conducting any sensitive ETS communications. There are multiple options and variations for consideration to validate the access network provider, including direct authentication by the ETS user. This example assumes that the ETS user uses the identity services of ETS service provider A to validate the access network. In this example, the ETS user trusts service provider A and will accept the validation information service provider A sends about access network 1.
+
+
+
+(1) ETS user attaches to access network 1 using normal procedures
+
+(2) ETS user uncertain about access network validity
+
+(3) ETS user initiates identity service from service provider A (IdSP) to validate access network 1
+
+(4) Service provider A sends request to access network 1 to authenticate
+
+(5) Access network 1 provides identity (e.g., EV certificate)
+
+(6) Service provider A verifies certificate with certificate authority
+
+(7) Service provider A provides ETS user with information validating access network 1
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F06-App.III
+
+Diagram illustrating the validation of an access service provider. The diagram shows an ETS user (mobile handset) interacting with multiple access networks (Access network 1, 2, ..., N). The user attaches to Access network 1. The user is uncertain about the network's validity and initiates identity services from ETS service provider A (IdSP). Service provider A sends a request to Access network 1 to authenticate. Access network 1 provides identity information (e.g., EV certificate). Service provider A verifies the certificate with a Certificate authority. Finally, Service provider A provides the ETS user with information validating Access network 1. The Internet cloud contains 3rd party providers, Web services providers, and Content providers. Both ETS service provider A and the Certificate authority have Identity services and IdM servers.
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+**Figure III.6 – Validation of access service provider**
+
+The following is a summary of the interactions:
+
+- 1) The ETS user is roaming with a mobile handset device that is capable of attaching to multiple access network types (e.g., WiFi, WIMAX, LTE or EV-DO). The ETS user mobile handset device attaches to network 1 (i.e., first choice based on factors such as known ETS providers and signal strength).
+- 2) The ETS user would like to validate network 1 before authorizing services.
+- 3) The ETS user initiates identity services from ETS service provider A to validate access network 1.
+- 4) Service provider A sends authentication requests to access network 1.
+- 5) Access network 1 provides identity information for authentication (e.g., extended validation ITU-T X.509 certificate).
+- 6) ETS service provider A verifies network 1 certificate with the certificate authority.
+- 7) ETS service provider A provides ETS user with information validating access network 1.
+
+This allows the ETS user to proceed with confidence that his mobile handset device is attached to an authorized access network.
+
+After obtaining network access, the ETS user could potentially use the services of several service providers in the multi-provider infrastructure. For example, it is possible that the ETS user may need to use the services of web services providers (e.g., earth and other map/data providers) or content providers (e.g., service providers offering real-time streaming of monitoring camera or weather reports or video). It is possible that the ETS user may access the services of web services and content providers directly through Internet access or indirectly through the services of NGN providers. In any of these cases, the ETS user may need to validate the provider of a specific service.
+
+Figure III.7 illustrates a use case example, where the ETS user needs to validate the identity of a web services provider. As in the use case above, there are many options and variations for consideration to validate the web services provider, including direct authentication by the ETS user. This example assumes that the ETS user uses the identity services of ETS service provider A to validate the web services provider. As in the previous example, the ETS user trusts service provider A and will accept the validation information service provider A sends about the web services provider.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the validation process for a web services provider. It shows the Internet cloud containing 3rd party providers, Web services providers, and Content providers. ETS users connect via Access networks to ETS service provider A (IdSP) and the Certificate authority, both containing Identity services and IdM servers. The sequence of steps is as follows:
+
+- (1) ETS user successfully initiates and obtains access to web services
+- (2) ETS user initiates identity service from service provider A (IdSP) to validate identity of web services provider
+- (3) Service provider A sends request to web services provider to authenticate
+- (4) Web services provider provides identity (e.g., EV certificate)
+- (5) Service provider A verifies web services provider with certificate authority
+- (6) Service provider A provides ETS user with information validating web services provider
+
+Figure III.7: Validation of web service or content provider. The diagram shows a multi-provider infrastructure where an ETS user validates a web services provider through ETS service provider A (IdSP) and a Certificate authority. The Internet cloud contains 3rd party providers, Web services providers, and Content providers. ETS users connect via Access networks to ETS service provider A (IdSP) and the Certificate authority, both containing Identity services and IdM servers. A sequence of six steps describes the validation process: (1) ETS user obtains access to web services; (2) ETS user initiates identity service from service provider A to validate the web services provider; (3) Service provider A sends a request to the web services provider to authenticate; (4) Web services provider provides identity (e.g., EV certificate); (5) Service provider A verifies the web services provider with the certificate authority; (6) Service provider A provides the ETS user with information validating the web services provider.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F07-App.III
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+**Figure III.7 – Validation of web service or content provider**
+
+The following is a summary of the interactions:
+
+- 1) The ETS user successfully initiates and accesses web services. However, the ETS user would like to validate the web services provider to have confidence in the data.
+- 2) The ETS user initiates identity service of ETS provider A to validate the web services provider.
+- 3) ETS service provider A sends requests to web services provider for authentication.
+- 4) Web services provider provides information for authentication (e.g., EV1 certificate).
+- 5) ETS service provider A verifies the information with the certificate authority.
+- 6) ETS service provider A provides the ETS user with information validating the identity of the web services provider.
+
+Validation of the web services provider allows the ETS user to have confidence in the identity of the web services, which may boost his confidence in the information obtained from the web services.
+
+## **III.6 Single sign-on and single sign-off**
+
+Users typically have to sign on to multiple systems hosting application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and video), necessitating an equivalent number of sign on dialogues, each of which may involve different usernames and authentication information. System administrators are faced with managing user accounts within each of these multiple systems in a coordinated manner in order to enforce security policy.
+
+ETS users may need to leverage IdM capabilities such as "Single Sign-on/Sign-off". The premise of single sign-on is that an end user, device, or end user and device combination can sign on once (i.e., by providing credential input for authentication and authorization) to a service and thus be authenticated to one or more additional services in the same NGN domain, or in the case of federated services, across multiple NGN domains. The value of single sign-on is that the end user is not burdened with authentication for each service. The word "Sign-On" as used here means the same thing as "Register with", "Log-On", or "Log-In", where the end user or device "registers with", "logs-on" or "logs-in" to a service. Similarly, "Single Sign-off" provides a comprehensive "Sign-off" from multiple application services in a given session.
+
+Potential benefits of single sign-on/sign-off capabilities to ETS users may include:
+
+- Reduction in the time taken by users in sign-on operations to individual domains, including reducing the number of sign-on failures. Improved security through the reduced need for a user to handle and remember multiple sets of authentication information.
+- Reduction in the time taken by system administrators in adding and removing users to the system or modifying their access rights.
+- Improved security through the enhanced ability of system administrators to maintain the integrity of user account configuration, including the ability to inhibit or remove an individual user's access to all system resources in a coordinated and consistent manner.
+
+Figure III.8 illustrates a use case example involving the use of an IdM system to support "Single Sign-on/Sign-off" to multiple application services (e.g., VoIP, data, and video) within an NGN provider domain. The use case involves interactions between the following entities:
+
+- End users (i.e., end user and/or end user device).
+- Relying system (i.e., application service or network system).
+
+---
+
+1 Extended validation certificates are a special type of ITU-T X.509 certificate which requires extensive investigation of the requesting entity by the certificate authority before being issued.
+
+- IdM system (i.e., network system providing IdM services such as registration, authentication and authorization, subscription profile information).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a Single sign-on (SSO) process involving an ETS user, an End-user device, three Rely applications (A, B, and C), and an IdM system (identity application server).
+
+**Scenario 1: User authenticates to access application C (e.g., Video)**
+
+- (1) Application service request: End-user device to Rely application C.
+- (2) Identity info request [userID]: Rely application C to IdM system.
+- (3) Authentication challenge: IdM system to End-user device.
+- (4) Authentication input [UserID, credentials]: End-user device to IdM system.
+- (5) Authentication: IdM system (indicated by a dot on the lifeline).
+- (6) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy]: IdM system to Rely application C.
+- (7) Authorization: Rely application C to End-user device.
+- (8) Access authorization: End-user device to Rely application A.
+- (9) Service session: A long green double-headed arrow between End-user device and Rely application C.
+
+**Scenario 2: User invokes application B (e.g., data) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate**
+
+- (10) Application service request: End-user device to Rely application B.
+- (11) Identity info request [UserID]: Rely application B to IdM system.
+- (12) Verification: IdM system (indicated by a dot on the lifeline).
+- (13) Identity response [UserID, CredAssertion, attributes, policy]: IdM system to Rely application B.
+- (14) Authorization: Rely application B to End-user device.
+- (15) Access authorization: End-user device to Rely application A.
+- (16) Service session: A long red double-headed arrow between End-user device and Rely application B.
+
+**Scenario 3: User invokes application A (e.g., VoIP) and obtains access without having to re-authenticate**
+
+- (17) Application service request: End-user device to Rely application A.
+- (18) Identity info request [DeviceID]: Rely application A to IdM system.
+- (19) Verification: IdM system (indicated by a dot on the lifeline).
+- (20) Identity info response [DeviceID, attributes]: IdM system to Rely application A.
+- (21) Authorization: Rely application A to End-user device.
+- (22) Service session: A long green double-headed arrow between End-user device and Rely application A.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating Single sign-on (SSO) across three scenarios: authentication for application C, access for application B, and access for application A.
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F08-App.III
+
+**Figure III.8 – Single sign-on**
+
+This example assumes that the end user device registers and attaches to the NGN using the normal procedures.
+
+The call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) Application service request: This information flow represents the ETS end user request to invoke application service C (video).
+- 2) Identity information request [UserID]: Application service C (video) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences and policy information. For example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 3) Authentication challenge: The IdM system challenges the user for authentication.
+- 4) Authentication input [Credentials]: The user provides information for authentication (e.g., UserID and password or personal identification number).
+
+- 5) Authentication: The IdM system performs authentication and obtains other needed information. This may involve obtaining information from other network systems (e.g., HSS or other subscription database).
+- 6) Identity response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 7) Authorization: Application service C (video) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 8) Access authorization: Application service C (video) provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 9) Service session: The user's successful session with application service C (video) is established.
+- 10) Application service request: The user requests invocation of application service B (data).
+- 11) Identity information request [UserID]: Application service B (data) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user's identity and provide attributes associated with the UserID. This may include information such as service profile, privileges, preferences, and policy information. For example, any policy or restrictions associated with the identity.
+- 12) Verification: The IdM system processes the request, determines that single sign-on is applicable, and verifies that user authentication is still valid.
+- 13) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the UserID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 14) Authorization: Application service B (data) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 15) Access authorization: Application service B (data) provides the user with an indication that access to the service is granted.
+- 16) Service session: The user session with application service B (data) is initiated successfully.
+- 17) Application service request: The user requests invocation of application service A (VoIP).
+- 18) Identity information request [DeviceID]: Application service A (VoIP) sends a request to the IdM system to assert the user's identity and provide attributes associated with the DeviceID.
+- 19) Verification: The IdM system processes the request, determines that single sign-on is applicable, and verifies that the user authentication is still valid.
+- 20) Identity information response [Credential assertions, attributes, policy]: The IdM system provides information asserting the credentials. Other information that may be included are attributes associated with the DeviceID (e.g., privileges and preferences) and policy associated with the identity information (e.g., any restriction regarding use, display and dissemination).
+- 21) Authorization: Application service A (VoIP) processes the information and determines that the user is authorized for the service.
+- 22) Application service session: The user establishes a session with application service A (VoIP).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Single Sign-off process across five lifelines: ETS user, End-user device, Rely application A (e.g., VoIP), Rely application B (e.g., data), Rely application C (e.g., video), and IdM system (e.g., identity application server). Three active service sessions are shown at the top: a green session for Application C, a pink session for Application B, and a yellow session for Application A. The process flow is as follows:
+
+- (1) Service sign-off [UserID]: ETS user to End-user device.
+- (2) Sign-off notification [UserID]: End-user device to Application C.
+- (3) SSO verification: Application C to IdM system.
+- (4) Ack [UserID]: IdM system to Application C.
+- (5) Sign-off notification [UserID]: IdM system to Application B.
+- (6) Ack [UserID]: Application B to IdM system.
+- (7) Sign-off notification [UserID]: IdM system to Application A.
+- (8) Ack [UserID]: Application A to IdM system.
+- (9) Single sign-off ack [UserID]: IdM system to End-user device.
+
+NOTE – For simplicity, not all signalling flows and interactions are shown.
+
+Y.2721(10)\_F09-App.III
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Single Sign-off process. The diagram shows the interaction between an ETS user, an End-user device, three Rely applications (A, B, and C), and an IdM system. The process starts with the ETS user signaling a service sign-off, followed by notifications to the IdM system, verification, and acknowledgments back to the user.
+
+**Figure III.9 – Single sign-off**
+
+Figure III.9 illustrates a "Single Sign-off" service allowing the user to automatically sign-off from multiple application services (VoIP, data, and video) without having to sign-off from each application service in the session. This use case assumes that the user is in a service session with active application services A (VoIP), B (data) and C (video).
+
+The call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) Service sign-off [UserID]: The ETS user signals a request to end the service session.
+- 2) Sign-off notification [UserID]: Application service C (video) notifies the IdM system of the user's request to sign off.
+- 3) SSO verification: The IdM system determines that single sign-off is applicable and verifies the active application services.
+- 4) Ack [UserID]: The IdM system sends an acknowledgement to application service C (video) to end the service session.
+- 5) Sign-off notification [UserID]: The IdM system notifies application service B (data) of the sign-off.
+- 6) Ack [UserID]: Application service B (data) acknowledges the sign-off.
+- 7) Sign-off notification [UserID]: The IdM system notifies application service A (VoIP) of the sign-off.
+- 8) Ack [UserID]: Application service A (VoIP) acknowledges the sign-off.
+- 9) Single sign-off Ack [UserID]: The IdM system sends an acknowledgement to the user confirming sign-off from all active application services in the session.
+
+# Appendix IV
+
+## Mobile-related use cases
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## IV.1 Introduction
+
+This appendix provides example mobile-related IdM use cases. The example use cases in this appendix are based on the use cases described in 3G Americas White Paper, *Identity Management: Overview of Standards and Technologies for Mobile and Fixed Internet* [b-3G Americas White Paper].
+
+## IV.2 Use case examples
+
+**IV.2.1** A mobile user with a UICC-enabled 3G device accesses the MNO's portal (web store) to purchase a ringtone.
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- MNO (mobile network operator).
+- SP (service provider) is the MNO.
+
+User benefits:
+
+- Single sign-on experience with access to different MNO services.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- SP and MNO are in the same circle of trust (as per Liberty Alliance).
+
+**IV.2.2** A mobile user with a UICC-enabled 3G device accesses the MNO's portal web store; he or she navigates the portal digital merchandises catalog, sees the special promotion item (e.g., a video game, with which the MNO has an exclusive content distribution deal) and makes a purchase; he or she then agrees to charge the payment to his or her mobile phone bill; the user is able to download the video game from a secure link redirected from the MNO to the content provider.
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- MNO.
+- SP-a is the MNO; SP-b is the external content provider (e.g., video game).
+
+User benefits:
+
+- Single sign-on experience to a MNO and an external vendor portal.
+- Ability to use his or her credentials from his or her MNO to complete a transaction with an external content provider.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- SP-a MNO and SP-b video game content provider are in the same circle of trust.
+
+**IV.2.3** A mobile user is using his or her UICC-enabled 3G smartphone and is roaming in another country; while surfing on the Net, he or she signs up for a paid-subscription of a foreign auto magazine and charges it to his or her credit card (attributes from his or her user profile kept by his or her MNO are selectively disclosed to complete the magazine subscription application process); payment is authorized by the credit card company on behalf of the mobile user to the auto magazine portal.
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- MNO.
+- SP-a is the content provider (auto magazine); SP-b is the credit card company.
+
+User benefits:
+
+- Single sign-on experience with his or her MNO and the credit card company.
+- Ability to use his or her credentials from his or her MNO to authorize payment from his or her credit card company to complete a transaction with an external content provider.
+- Ability to reuse his or her personal attributes from his or her MNO subscriber profile to complete an external service subscription; hence minimizing re-entering much of these details.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- The MNO and SP-b credit card company are in the same circle of trust.
+- SP-a foreign auto magazine provider is not in the circle of trust.
+
+**IV.2.4** A mobile user is using his or her UICC-enabled 3G notebook while roaming in another country and waiting at an airport, he or she signs up for the airport WiFi service for several hours; the WLAN operator has an alliance with the mobile user's MNO; hence, it can accept the user's WiFi usage charges to his or her mobile phone bill; also the mobile user, while using the WiFi service, accesses several web portals with which he or she frequently interacts, including: a bank, a travel agency and a financial investment firm portal; the user wishes to be able to use the services provided by these web merchants without re-login, and also be able to exchange private personal information securely.
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- WLAN operator.
+- MNO.
+- SP-a is the MNO; SP-b is the bank, SP-c is the travel agency, and SP-d is the financial investment firm.
+
+User benefits:
+
+- Single sign-on experience with his or her MNO and the WiFi operator.
+- Ability to use his or her credentials from his or her MNO to authorize WiFi service charges.
+- Ability to access several web-based service providers not affiliated with the MNO with simplified log-in procedures and secured transfer of private information.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- The MNO and WLAN operator are in the same circle of trust.
+- SP-b bank, SP-c travel agency and SP-d financial investment firm are not in the same circle of trust.
+
+**IV.2.5** A mobile user is using his or her UICC-enabled 3G notebook while at home, he or she surfs the Net via his or her residential broadband DSL service through which he or she accesses his or her MNO portal; he or she pays his or her mobile account service bill (using his or her credit card, pre-authorization is on file) and adds a new feature to his or her mobile subscription; next he or she accesses a movie rental site and downloads a movie which is charged to his or her credit card (not pre-authorized).
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- Fixed network DSL carrier.
+- MNO.
+- SP-a is the MNO; SP-b is the movie rental portal; SP-c is the credit card company.
+
+User benefits:
+
+- Single sign-on experience with his or her fixed network operator and MNO.
+- Ability to use his or her credentials from his or her fixed network operator to authenticate his or her mobile service account and orders additional MNO services.
+- Ability to authorize content purchase charges from an external service provider (e.g., movie rental) to his or her credit card account.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- The MNO, fixed network carrier and SP-c credit card company are in the same circle of trust.
+- SP-b movie rental provider is not in the same circle of trust.
+
+**IV.2.6** A mobile user with UICC-enabled 3G device wants to access resources (e.g., enterprise directory service) located in an enterprise network.
+
+Actors:
+
+- Mobile user.
+- MNO.
+- Enterprise IdM system.
+- Enterprise directory services server (EDS server).
+
+The high-level interactions among these actors are described below. The mobile user requests service from the EDS server.
+
+- The EDS server requests authentication from the user.
+- The user, who has been authenticated by the MNO system, obtains authentication credentials from the MNO for authentication by the enterprise IdM system.
+- The user submits the credentials to the enterprise IdM system and, upon successful authentication, obtains from it credentials for authentication to the EDS server.
+- The user responds to the EDS server's request with the credentials received from the enterprise IdM system.
+- The authenticated user obtains the requested service from the EDS server.
+
+User benefits:
+
+- The mobile user can access resources available in his or her enterprise network (e.g., enterprise directory service) in a cost-effective way while fulfilling stringent security requirements typically imposed by enterprise IT (information technology) environments.
+
+Key constraints:
+
+- A two-factor authentication (e.g., uid/password/PIN) may be required by the enterprise IdM system in addition to the MNO provided user credentials.
+- The MNO IdM and enterprise IdM systems are in the same circle of trust.
+
+# Appendix V
+
+## Example IdM transaction models
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## V.1 Introduction
+
+This appendix provides example IdM transaction models. The models provided in this appendix are described in [b-ITU-T X.1250]. Other models beyond those included in this appendix are also possible.
+
+## V.2 Examples of possible identity management transaction models
+
+One of the primary transactions in identity management is the basic query-response process common to most structured information exchange shown in Figure V.1. The most basic form of message exchange involves two parties using an agreed-upon protocol and information model.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR; A[Entity A] -- "Assertion or query message" --> B[Entity B]; B -.-> A; style A fill:#90EE90,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px; style B fill:#90EE90,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px;
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates a two-party message exchange. On the left is a green square labeled 'Entity A'. On the right is a green square labeled 'Entity B'. A solid blue arrow points from Entity A to Entity B, labeled 'Assertion or query message'. A dashed blue arrow points from Entity B back to Entity A, labeled 'Response message/action'. Below Entity B, the text 'Y.2721(10)\_F01-App.V' is written.
+
+Diagram of the basic query/response information exchange process between Entity A and Entity B.
+
+**Figure V.1 – Basic query/response information exchange process**
+
+The parties that participate in this process may be any kind of entity. An entity can be a physical person, an animal, a juridical person, an organization, an active or passive thing, a device, a software application, a service, etc., or a group of these individuals. In the context of telecommunications, examples of entities include access points, subscribers, users, network elements, networks, software applications, services and devices, interfaces, etc. They can be any physical or virtual object, such as network equipment, software, terminal devices, sensors, actively tagged physical objects (e.g., using RFIDs or optical codes), passively tagged objects. Network devices, for instance, may be treated as entities subject to special IdM capabilities on behalf of end users, providers, and governmental authorities. In the context of digital rights management, the entity may be intellectual property or copyright protected material, such as multimedia or IPTV content. A special type of entity is the group. The group's identity is the intersection of the identities (common attributes) of the group members.
+
+Most identity management use cases involve complex models. For example, where the relying party who originally receives the claim is not the identity service provider, and as illustrated in Figures V.2 and V.3, the function of being an identity service provider is separate and distinct from the relying party; the relying party evaluates the responses from the identity service provider(s) and decides whether there is a sufficient level of entity authentication assurance. The primary function of an identity service provider is to manage the creation, update, verification, suspension, and deletion of identity information.
+
+There are many possible identity information exchange models. One model in common use is a three-party query response model shown in Figure V.2. Some of the new open IdM protocols are predicated on this model.
+
+
+
+Figure V.2: A three-party identity management model. The diagram shows three entities: 'Requesting/asserting entity' (blue box), 'Relying party entity' (orange box), and 'Identity provider(s)' (green box). The 'Requesting/asserting entity' sends an 'Identity assertion' (red arrow) to the 'Relying party entity'. The 'Relying party entity' sends 'Query(ies) to identity resources' (solid arrow) to the 'Identity provider(s)'. The 'Identity provider(s)' sends a 'Response' (dashed arrow) back to the 'Relying party entity'. The 'Relying party entity' then sends a 'Response' (dashed arrow) back to the 'Requesting/asserting entity'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2721(10)\_F02-App.V' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure V.2 – An example of a three-party identity management model**
+
+Another identity management model that provides the requesting party with more control of the identity relationships is depicted in Figure V.3.
+
+
+
+Figure V.3: A user-centric five-party identity management model. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Identity lifecycle' and 'Authentication'. In the 'Identity lifecycle' section, a 'Requesting party' (green box) interacts with 'Identity provider(s)' (purple box) and 'Credential service provider(s)' (brown box). The interactions are: (a) Identity proofing and registration from the Requesting party to the Identity provider(s); (b) Registration confirmation from the Identity provider(s) to the Credential service provider(s); (c) Credential validation/issuance from the Credential service provider(s) to the Requesting party; and (III) Credential validation from the Requesting party to the Credential service provider(s). In the 'Authentication' section, the 'Requesting party' interacts with 'Relying party(s)' (green box) and 'Verification service provider(s)' (blue box). The interactions are: (I) Authentication challenge from the Requesting party to the Relying party(s); (II) Authentication protocol exchange from the Relying party(s) to the Requesting party; (III) Credential validation from the Requesting party to the Verification service provider(s); and (IV) Claim/assertion from the Verification service provider(s) to the Relying party(s). The diagram is labeled 'Y.2721(10)\_F03-App.V' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure V.3 – An example of a user-centric five-party identity management model**
+
+"User-centric" models (i.e., that require full requesting party control be enabled over use of their identities) are receiving significant attention and may also be mandated in national and regional jurisdictions. Figure V.3 shows an example where specialized roles and capabilities for identity management are provided by different service providers. All queries/responses are directed through the requesting party. For the purposes of these kinds of model, the entities are defined as:
+
+- **Identity provider:** An entity that maintains and manages, and may create, trusted identity information of other entities (e.g., end user, organizations, and devices) and offers identity based services. This entity responsible for assigning and issuing attributes (i.e., involving the identity (e.g., for a subscriber to a credential provider) for a specific context) – also described as enrolment – is responsible for the lifecycle management of the identity which includes proofing, registration and maintenance of the identity, including revocation.
+
+- Credential service provider: The entity providing capabilities related to the issuance of credentials and tokens (e.g., credentials that bind tokens to verifiable identifiers and attributes).
+- Verification service provider: The entity providing capabilities of assessing identity information (e.g., claims and credentials) and classifying its validity.
+- Relying party [ITU-T Y.2720]: An entity that relies on an identity representation or claim by a requesting/asserting entity within some request context.
+
+# **Appendix VI**
+
+## **Example illustrative deployment scenario for IdM in NGN**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+## **VI.1 Introduction**
+
+This appendix provides an example deployment scenario for IdM in NGN.
+
+## **VI.2 IdM architecture deployment**
+
+NGN may deploy IdM infrastructure with capabilities supporting identity-based services to its users leveraging web services capabilities and specifications defined by the Liberty Alliance Project and OpenID, for example, IdM capabilities to allow its users to access services among different service and application providers, including federated application services. In addition, NGN may support IdM capabilities to offer IdSP services to other applications and service providers (e.g., assertion of user device identity and authentication, location and other relation identity information).
+
+Support of IdM capabilities to offer IdSP services or to partner with other applications and service providers that are using different types of IdM systems based on different semantics, schemas, mechanisms and technologies would require appropriate bridging and interworking functions to facilitate interoperability. For example, to support IdM service and capabilities with other applications and service providers (e.g., web services and content providers), NGN could support capabilities for the following:
+
+- 3GPP GBA interworking with Liberty Alliance Framework.
+- 3GPP GBA interworking with OpenID.
+- Other mechanisms for interworking with OpenID and Liberty Alliance Framework.
+
+
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1141] Recommendation ITU-T X.1141 (2006), *Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1250] Recommendation ITU-T X.1250 (2009), *Baseline capabilities for enhanced global identity management and interoperability*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1251] Recommendation ITU-T X.1251 (2009), *A framework for user control of digital identity*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-NIST SP 800-63] NIST Special Publication 800-63 (2006), *Electronic Authentication Guidelines*.
+- [b-NIST SP 800-94] NIST Special Publication 800-94 (2007), *Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)*.
+- [b-CA/Browser Forum] CA/Browser Forum, *Guidelines For The Issuance And Management Of Extended Validation Certificates*.
+- [b-3G Americas White Paper] 3G Americas White Paper (2009), *Identity Management, Overview of Standards and Technologies for Mobile and Fixed Internet*.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2722**
+
+(01/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **NGN identity management mechanisms**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722**
+
+# **NGN identity management mechanisms**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722 specifies the mechanisms that can be used to meet the identity management (IdM) requirements and deployment needs of next generation networks (NGN).
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2722 | 2011-01-28 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Federated identity, identity management, identity management mechanisms, next generation network, security.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Mechanisms and procedures supporting IdM functions..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 | Lifecycle management..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 | Authentication and authentication assurance ..... | 4 |
+| 6.3 | Correlation and binding ..... | 24 |
+| 6.4 | Discovery..... | 25 |
+| 6.5 | IdM communications and information exchange ..... | 26 |
+| 6.6 | Protection of personally-identifiable information (PII)..... | 30 |
+| 6.7 | Federated identity functions ..... | 30 |
+| 6.8 | Identity information access control ..... | 31 |
+| 6.9 | Single sign-on..... | 31 |
+| 6.10 | Single sign-off ..... | 32 |
+| 7 | Security ..... | 35 |
+| | Appendix I – WSS ITU-T X.509 v3 message authentication..... | 36 |
+| | Appendix II – "OpenID + OAuth"-based mechanism for access control ..... | 38 |
+| | II.1 OAuth [b-IETF RFC 5849] ..... | 38 |
+| | II.2 Using OpenID in conjunction with OAuth..... | 38 |
+| | II.3 OpenID + OAuth authorization flow..... | 38 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 41 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722
+
+# NGN identity management mechanisms
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+[ITU-T Y.2721], *NGN identity management requirements and use cases*, specifies identity management (IdM) requirements for the next generation networks (NGN). This Recommendation describes the specific IdM mechanisms and suites of options that should be used to meet the requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2721]. In addition, it provides best practices and guidelines to support interoperability and other needs.
+
+This Recommendation is intended to be used together with [ITU-T Y.2720] and [ITU-T Y.2721], as the fundamental architectural concepts, requirements and use cases are not repeated in this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE – Implementers and users of the described mechanisms shall comply with all applicable national and regional laws, regulations and policies. Some specific regulations and legislations may require implementation of mechanisms to protect personally-identifiable information.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, *Information technology – Open systems interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [ITU-T X.1035] Recommendation ITU-T X.1035 (2007), *Password-authenticated key exchange (PAK) protocol*.
+- [ITU-T X.1141] Recommendation ITU-T X.1141 (2006), *Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)*.
+- [ITU-T X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252 (2010), *Baseline identity management terms and definitions*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2704] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2721] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721 (2010), *NGN identity management requirements and use cases*.
+- [3GPP TS 23.228] 3GPP TS 23.228 (in force), *IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2*.
+- [ATIS 33102] ATIS.3GPP.33.102V710-2007, *Security Architecture*.
+- [IETF RFC 2289] IETF RFC 2289 (1998), *A One-Time Password System*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation relies on the terms defined in [ITU-T Y.2720] and [ITU-T X.1252]. Particularly, the following definitions are adopted from [ITU-T X.1252]:
+
+**3.1 identity provider (IdP):** See identity service provider (IdSP).
+
+**3.2 identity service provider (IdSP):** An entity that verifies, maintains, manages, and may create and assign identity information of other entities.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement |
+| ASP | Application Service Provider |
+| AuC | Authentication Centre |
+| AV | Authentication Vector |
+| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function |
+| CK | Ciphering Key |
+| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber System |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IdP | Identity Provider |
+| IdSP | Identity Service Provider |
+| IK | Integrity Key |
+| IMPI | IP Multimedia Private user Identity |
+| IMPU | IP Multimedia Public User identity |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity |
+| IPTV | Internet Protocol Television |
+| ISIM | IMS Subscriber Identity Module |
+| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
+| MS | Mobile Station |
+| NAF | Network Application Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Networks |
+| OASIS | Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards |
+
+| | |
+|------|--------------------------------------------|
+| OTP | One-Time Password |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
+| RP | Relying Party |
+| SAML | Security Assertion Markup Language |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SLF | Subscriber Locator Function |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| SQL | Structured Query Language |
+| SSO | Single Sign-On |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card |
+| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |
+| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identifier Module |
+| WAP | Wireless Application Protocol |
+| WSS | Web Services Security |
+| XML | eXtensible Markup Language |
+| XRDS | eXtensible Resource Descriptor Sequence |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+In the body of this Recommendation and its appendices, the words *shall*, *shall not*, *should*, and *may* sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as *is required to*, *is prohibited from*, *is recommended*, and *can optionally*. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as *informative* are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 Mechanisms and procedures supporting IdM functions
+
+## 6.1 Lifecycle management
+
+Refer to [ITU-T Y.2720], *NGN identity management framework*, for information on identity lifecycle management.
+
+## 6.2 Authentication and authentication assurance
+
+This clause describes mechanisms for authentication and assurance of identities and identity information. It references authentication mechanisms defined elsewhere.
+
+Specific authentication mechanisms such as authentication based on web services (WS), security assertion markup language (SAML) profile, certificate-based authentication, or password-based authentication (including one-time password (OTP)) can be used by the IdSP for specific applications or services based on the context and on the needed level of assurance. The authentication method (or methods) is selected based on the assurance level requirements. The IdSP may request information to determine the authentication methods that satisfy the service provider's assurance level requirements.
+
+### 6.2.1 Authentication based on WS security SAML profile
+
+#### 6.2.1.1 SAML assertions
+
+Security assertion markup language (SAML), [ITU-T X.1141], specifies the format of assertions that can be used for exchanging security information for IdM. Among the IdM functions that can be implemented with the use of SAML are authentication, attribute sharing, and authorization, which correspond to three types of the statements about a subject of a SAML assertion:
+
+- Authentication statement – Conveys information that the assertion subject was authenticated by a particular means at a particular time.
+- Attribute statement – Conveys information that the assertion subject is associated with the listed attributes.
+- Authorization decision statement – Conveys information that access to a specified resource was granted to the assertion subject, or the subject was denied such access.
+
+The content of a SAML assertion can be described at a high level as follows: assertion **A** was issued at time **t** by issuer **R** regarding subject **S**, provided conditions **C** are valid.
+
+The SAML assertions used for communicating authentication, attribute and authorization information are conveyed in simple object access protocol (SOAP) messages. When SOAP messages are exchanged over an unprotected transport, it is strongly recommended that XML signature [b-W3C XML signature] be used to verify the relationship between the SOAP message and the statements of the assertions carried in the message. The *web services security (WSS): SAML token profile* [b-OASIS SAML token] standard describes how:
+
+- SAML assertions (also referred to as SAML tokens) are carried in and referenced from a SOAP message.
+- XML signature is used to bind a subject and the statements of a SAML assertion with a SOAP message.
+
+A typical use of a SAML token with a SOAP message constructed according to this Recommendation is depicted in Figure 1 and described below.
+
+In this example, a signed SOAP message contains a SAML assertion with an attribute statement. Based on the information in this statement, the receiver could make access control decisions.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Attesting entity] -- "2
+WSS-signed
+SOAP message" --> B[Verify signature]
+ subgraph Receiver
+ B -- "SAML attribute
+information" --> C[Access control]
+ end
+ 1 --> A
+ style 1 fill:none,stroke:none
+
+```
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F01
+
+Diagram illustrating the typical steps of construction and processing of a SOAP message with a SAML token. Step 1: An arrow points down to the 'Attesting entity' box. Step 2: An arrow labeled 'WSS-signed SOAP message' points from the 'Attesting entity' box to the 'Verify signature' box. Step 3: The 'Verify signature' box is inside a larger box labeled 'Receiver'. Step 4: An arrow labeled 'SAML attribute information' points from the 'Verify signature' box to the 'Access control' box, which is also inside the 'Receiver' box.
+
+**Figure 1 – Typical steps of construction and processing of a SOAP message with a SAML token**
+
+- 1) The attesting entity obtains a SAML assertion with an attribute statement, constructs and includes it in a SOAP message according to [b-OASIS SAML token].
+- 2) The attesting entity sends the WSS-signed SOAP message to the receiver.
+- 3) The receiver verifies the digital signature.
+- 4) The information of the SAML statement may be used for access control decisions.
+
+#### **6.2.1.2 Subject confirmation methods of the SAML tokens**
+
+The OASIS Standard, *Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1* [b-OASIS SAML token] specifies how to attach a SAML assertion to a SOAP message and defines two mandatory subject confirmation methods:
+
+- holder-of-key;
+- sender-vouches.
+
+The main XML elements of the SOAP message constructed, according to [b-OASIS WSS SOAP], are depicted in Figure 2.
+
+The SAML assertion is placed into the header, which also contains the digital signature . The digital signature is used by the receiver of the SOAP message to verify that the sender of the message knows the key used for computing the signature over the digest of the SOAP body and for checking its integrity. The digest algorithm is SHA 1 and the signature algorithm is RSA\_SHA 1, as specified in [b-OASIS WSS SOAP]. The signature's value is provided in the element of the digital signature .
+
+The two subject confirmation methods define different ways for conveying information on the key to the receiver.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the structure of a SOAP message with a SAML assertion. It is organized as follows:
+
+- SOAP envelope **: The outermost container, shown as an orange rectangle.
+- SOAP header **: A white rectangle inside the envelope containing:
+ - WS security **: A gray rectangle containing:
+ - SAML assertion **: A yellow rectangle containing:
+ - **: A light blue rectangle.
+ - **: A light blue rectangle.
+ - **: A light blue rectangle.
+- SOAP body **: A white rectangle at the bottom of the envelope.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F02
+
+Diagram showing the structure of a SOAP message with a SAML assertion. The message is contained within a SOAP envelope (S12:Envelope). Inside the envelope is a SOAP header (S12:Header) and a SOAP body (S12:Body). The SOAP header contains a WS security (wsse:Security) block. The WS security block contains a SAML assertion (saml2:Assertion) and a digital signature (ds:Signature). The SAML assertion contains a subject (saml2:Subject) and a subject confirmation (saml2:SubjectConfirmation).
+
+**Figure 2 – Structure of the SOAP message with SAML assertion**
+
+The following clauses describe the two subject confirmation methods.
+
+##### **6.2.1.2.1 Holder-of-key subject confirmation method**
+
+Figure 3 depicts the structure of the SAML assertion used for the holder-of-key subject confirmation method. The method attribute of the element `` indicates the method of the subject confirmation (holder-of-key).
+
+The method specifies that the sender (also known as the attesting entity) must prove that it is entitled to make the statements about the subject by demonstrating knowledge of the key, which is identified in the `` element contained in the `` element of the SAML assertion. The `` element identifies a public or a secret key that is used to confirm the identity of the subject. The method further specifies that the sender may do so by signing a digest of the SOAP body with that key. The signature is contained in the element `` of the WS security header, as shown in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the structure of a SAML assertion for the holder-of-key subject confirmation method. The structure is nested: a yellow outer box contains a light blue box labeled , which contains a white box labeled . Below this is a white box labeled , which contains a grey box labeled . Inside the grey box is a green box labeled , which contains a purple box labeled . Below the light blue box is a light blue box labeled , and at the bottom is a light blue box labeled .
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F03
+
+**Figure 3 – Structure of the SAML assertion used for the holder-of-key subject confirmation method**
+
+The receiver of the SOAP message obtains the key using information that is provided by the attesting entity in the `` element. The receiver then computes the digital signature of the SOAP body and checks whether it matches the signature provided by the attesting entity. If it is the case, then the subject and statements of the SAML assertion may be attributed to the attesting entity and the content of the SOAP body whose integrity is protected by the key may be considered as provided by the attesting entity.
+
+##### **6.2.1.2.2 Sender-vouches subject confirmation method**
+
+Figure 4 depicts the structure of the SAML assertion used for the sender-vouches subject confirmation method. The method attribute of the element `` indicates the method of the subject confirmation (sender-vouches).
+
+The attesting entity is trusted by a receiver to make SAML assertions regarding a subject under the condition that value of the method attribute of the `` element indicates the sender-vouches method.
+
+The attesting entity obtains one or more assertions or references to assertions from one or more authorities and includes them in a SOAP message. It then computes a signature of the digest of the SAML assertions and the body of the SOAP message. The signature is contained in the element `` of the WS security header (shown in Figure 2). The attesting entity optionally
+
+provides information to the receiver on the key that was used to compute the signature. If there is no such information, the receiver is expected to identify the key by other means.
+
+The receiver checks the validity of the signature. If the signature is valid, the receiver establishes the fact that the statements have been made about the subject by the attesting entity.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ subgraph Assertion []
+ subgraph Subject []
+ NameId[]
+ subgraph SubjectConfirmation []
+ subgraph SubjectConfirmationData []
+ end
+ end
+ end
+ Statement[]
+ end
+```
+
+Diagram showing the structure of a SAML assertion. The outermost container is a yellow box labeled . Inside it is a light blue box labeled . Within the subject box is a white box labeled . Below the NameId box is another white box labeled . Inside the SubjectConfirmation box is a dark grey box labeled . At the bottom of the yellow box is a light blue box labeled .
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F04
+
+**Figure 4 – Structure of the SAML assertion used for the sender-vouches subject confirmation method**
+
+### 6.2.2 Certificate-based authentication
+
+[ITU-T X.509] certificates may be used for specific application or service based on the context and the needed level of assurance. The use of [ITU-T X.509] certificates for authentication is described in [ITU-T Y.2704], *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN*.
+
+### 6.2.3 Password-based authentication
+
+Password-based authentication may be used for specific applications or services based on the context and the needed level of assurance. Refer to [ITU-T X.1035] for a description of a password-based authentication mechanism.
+
+### 6.2.4 One-time password
+
+One-time password (OTP) may be used for specific application or service based on the context and the needed level of assurance. One method of implementing OTP is described in [IETF RFC 2289].
+
+### 6.2.5 Use of authentication and key agreement (AKA) for mutual authentication
+
+The universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol can be used to provide mutual authentication of the mobile station (MS) and the network. The UMTS AKA is a challenge-response protocol, which uses a long-term key shared between the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) and the authentication centre (AuC). These entities reside on the universal integrated circuit card (UICC) of the MS and in the mobile station's home network respectively. In certain business arrangements, the functions of the AuC could be provided by an IdSP. The AKA protocol is specified in [ATIS 33102].
+
+### 6.2.6 Integration of PKI-based authentication with IMS
+
+IP multimedia subsystems (IMSs) security is based on the AKA mechanism, which uses a shared secret and a challenge-response protocol for user-network authentication. However, security of certain NGN services (e.g., IPTV) is based on the public key infrastructure (PKI) certificates. To allow blending of NGN services using PKI certificates and IMS security, it may be desirable to integrate PKI-based authentication with the IMS authentication in such a way that leverages the strength of IMS security.
+
+Integration of the IMS authentication with PKI-based authentication allows the user equipment and the network to authenticate each other, based on their respective certificates, and to agree on a set of cryptographic keys based on the same key generation algorithms as in AKA. To this end, the user equipment and network need to be provisioned with the respective private keys and certificates, and be able to perform the PKI operations.
+
+With respect to the agreement on the ciphering key (CK) and the integrity key (IK), the described mechanism for integration specifies two options:
+
+- 1) Establishing an agreement on the CK and IK keys with the use of a shared secret between the end-user function and the S-5 – Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- 2) Establishing an agreement on the CK and IK keys without the use of the shared secret.
+
+The generic call flows for the first option and the second option are depicted in Figures 5 and 6, respectively.
+
+#### 6.2.6.1 Conventions
+
+The following conventions are used in this clause:
+
+- "|" designates the string concatenation.
+- *CK* designates the ciphering key.
+- *IK* designates the integrity key.
+- *K()* designates a symmetric key encryption.
+- $N_{pr} []$ designates encryption with the network private key $N_{pr}$ .
+- $N_{pu} []$ designates encryption with the network public key $N_{pu}$ available from the network certificate.
+- $U_{pr} []$ designates encryption with the user private key $U_{pr}$ .
+
+#### 6.2.6.2 Entities involved in authentication
+
+- S-5 – Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE).
+- End-user function: The entity is capable of running a SIP client.
+- S-n call session control functional entity (CSC-FE), where S-n stands for one of the following entities:
+ - S-1 Serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE);
+ - S-2 Proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE);
+ - S-3 Interrogating call session control functional entity (I-CSC-FE).
+
+The S-n is used to denote one of these entities when there are no differences between them as far as the described authentication procedure is concerned. Refer to [ITU-T Y.2012] for descriptions of the NGN functional entities (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-5 and end-user function).
+
+#### 6.2.6.3 Establishing an agreement on the CK and IK keys with the use of a shared secret between the end-user function and S-5 (option 1)
+
+The call flow is depicted in Figure 5. The basic steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The end-user function sends the SIP register request with the user's *IMPU* and *IMPI* to the S-n.
+- 2) The S-1 requests a random challenge *RAND*, *CK*, and *IK* from the S-5. The values *RAND*, *CK*, and *IK* are specified in [ATIS 33102].
+- 3) The S-1 receives *RAND*, *CK*, and *IK* from the S-5 for the user.
+- 4) The S-n sends to the end-user function the SIP 401 unauthorized message with a challenge *RAND* and its encrypted value $N_{pr}[RAND]$ .
+
+The end-user function:
+
+- receives values *A*, which is supposedly equal to *RAND*, and *B*, which is supposedly equal to $N_{pr}[RAND]$ ;
+ - retrieves the network public key $N_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts *B* with $N_{pu}$ and compares the result to *A*. If the values are equal, then the network is authenticated, if not, the authentication procedure is aborted;
+ - generates *IK* and *CK* using the shared secret $K_s$ ;
+ - generates value $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ .
+- 5) The end-user function sends to the S-n the SIP Register message with the *IMPU* and *IMPI* identifiers and the value $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ .
+ - 6) The S-1 sends to the S-5 the data received in step 5 and requests verification and the user's record.
+
+The S-5:
+
+- queries the user certificate to obtain the user public key $U_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts with $U_{pu}$ the received value *C*, which is supposedly equal to $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ to retrieve the value D|E, where D is supposedly equal to $N_{pu}[K]$ and E is supposedly equal to $K(RAND)$ ;
+ - decrypts with the network private key $N_{pr}$ the value *D* to obtain $K'$ ;
+ - decrypts with $K'$ the value E to obtain $RAND'$ ;
+ - compares $RAND'$ with *RAND*. If they match, the user has been authenticated.
+- 7) The S-5 communicates the authentication result and the user's record to the S-1.
+ - 8) The S-1 uses the record to check whether the authenticated user is authorized to register and receive the requested service. If that is the case, the S-n notifies the end-user function that access is granted using a SIP 200 OK message.
+
+![Sequence diagram showing the integration of IMS authentication with PKI-based authentication. The diagram involves three entities: End-user function, Service control functional entity (S-n), and S-5 (SUP-FE). The process starts with the End-user function sending a '1. Register (IMPU, IMPI)' message to S-n. S-n then sends '2. S-1: Get RAND, CK, IK (IMPU, IMPI)' to S-5. S-5 returns '3. RAND, CK, IK' to S-n. S-n sends '4. 401 Unauthorized (RAND, Npr(RAND))' to the End-user function. The End-user function performs a verification step: 'Verify Npr(RAND) Generate Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)], IK and CK'. Then, the End-user function sends '5. Register (IMPU, IMPI, Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)])' to S-n. S-n sends '6. Get verification record' to S-5. S-5 returns '7. Verification record' to S-n. Finally, S-n sends '8. 200 OK' to the End-user function.](8fbdfc3d17fb1dae7b2d8f5a287fa9fc_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant E as End-user function
+ participant S_n as Service control functional entity (S-n)
+ participant S_5 as S-5 (SUP-FE)
+
+ E->>S_n: 1. Register (IMPU, IMPI)
+ S_n->>S_5: 2. S-1: Get RAND, CK, IK (IMPU, IMPI)
+ S_5-->>S_n: 3. RAND, CK, IK
+ S_n-->>E: 4. 401 Unauthorized (RAND, Npr(RAND))
+ Note over E: Verify Npr(RAND)
+Generate Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)], IK and CK
+ E->>S_n: 5. Register (IMPU, IMPI, Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)])
+ S_n->>S_5: 6. Get verification record
+ S_5-->>S_n: 7. Verification record
+ S_n-->>E: 8. 200 OK
+
+```
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram showing the integration of IMS authentication with PKI-based authentication. The diagram involves three entities: End-user function, Service control functional entity (S-n), and S-5 (SUP-FE). The process starts with the End-user function sending a '1. Register (IMPU, IMPI)' message to S-n. S-n then sends '2. S-1: Get RAND, CK, IK (IMPU, IMPI)' to S-5. S-5 returns '3. RAND, CK, IK' to S-n. S-n sends '4. 401 Unauthorized (RAND, Npr(RAND))' to the End-user function. The End-user function performs a verification step: 'Verify Npr(RAND) Generate Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)], IK and CK'. Then, the End-user function sends '5. Register (IMPU, IMPI, Upr[Npu(K)|K(RAND)])' to S-n. S-n sends '6. Get verification record' to S-5. S-5 returns '7. Verification record' to S-n. Finally, S-n sends '8. 200 OK' to the End-user function.
+
+**Figure 5 – Integration of the IMS authentication mechanism with PKI-based authentication (option 1)**
+
+#### 6.2.6.4 Establishing an agreement on the CK and IK keys without the use of a shared secret between the end-user function and S-5 (option 2)
+
+The call flow is depicted in Figure 6. The basic steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The end-user function sends the SIP register request with the user's *IMPU* and *IMPI* to the S-n.
+- 2) The S-1 requests a random challenge *RAND* from the S-5. The value *RAND* is specified in [ATIS 33102].
+- 3) The S-1 receives *RAND* from the S-5 for the specified user.
+- 4) The S-n sends to the end-user function the SIP 401 unauthorized message with a challenge *RAND* and its encrypted value $N_{pr}[RAND]$ .
+
+The end-user function:
+
+- receives values *A*, which is supposedly equal to *RAND*, and *B*, which is supposedly equal to $N_{pr}[RAND]$ ;
+ - retrieves the network public key $N_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts *B* with $N_{pu}$ and compares the result to *A*. If the values are equal, then the network is authenticated, if not, the authentication procedure is aborted;
+ - generates *IK* and *CK* using the randomly-generated key *K*;
+ - generates value $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ .
+- 5) The end-user function sends to the S-n the SIP register message with the *IMPU* and *IMPI* identifiers and the value $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ .
+
+- 6) The S-1 sends to the S-5 the data received in step 5 and requests verification, the user's record, and the *CK* and *IK* keys.
+- The S-5:
+- queries the user certificate to obtain the user public key $U_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts with $U_{pu}$ the received value $C$ , which is supposedly equal to $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ to retrieve the value $D|E$ , where $D$ is supposedly equal to $N_{pu}[K]$ and $E$ is supposedly equal to $K(RAND)$ ;
+ - decrypts with the network private key $N_{pr}$ the value $D$ to obtain $K'$ ;
+ - decrypts with $K'$ the value $E$ to obtain $RAND'$ ;
+ - compares $RAND'$ with $RAND$ . If they match, the user has been authenticated and $K' = K$ . That is, the end-user function and S-5 now share the key $K$ ;
+ - generates the *CK* and *IK* keys using the shared key $K$ . For instance, the same functions for generating the *CK* and *IK* that are specified in [ATIS 33102] can be employed with the use of $K$ as an input parameter.
+- 7) The S-5 communicates the authentication result, the user's record, and the *CK* and *IK* keys to the S-1.
+- 8) The S-1 uses the record to check whether the authenticated user is authorized to register and receive the requested service. If that is the case, the S-n notifies the end-user function that access is granted using a SIP 200 OK message.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant E as End-user function
+ participant Sn as Service control functional entity (S-n)
+ participant S5 as S-5 (SUP-FE)
+
+ E->>Sn: 1. Register (IMPU, IMPI)
+ Sn->>S5: 2. S-1: Get RAND (IMPU, IMPI)
+ S5-->>Sn: 3. RAND
+ Sn-->>E: 4. 401 Unauthorized (RAND, N_pr(RAND))
+ Note over E: Verify N_pr(RAND)
+Generate U_pr[N_pu(K)|K(RAND)], CK and IK using K
+ E->>Sn: 5. Register (IMPU, IMPI, U_pr[N_pu[K]|K(RAND)])
+ Sn->>S5: 6. Get verification, record, CK, IK
+ S5-->>Sn: 7. Verification, record, CK, IK
+ Sn-->>E: 8. 200 OK
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations between three entities: End-user function, Service control functional entity (S-n), and S-5 (SUP-FE). The process begins with the End-user function sending a '1. Register (IMPU, IMPI)' message to S-n. S-n then sends '2. S-1: Get RAND (IMPU, IMPI)' to S-5, which responds with '3. RAND'. S-n then sends '4. 401 Unauthorized (RAND, $N_{pr}(RAND)$ )' back to the End-user function. A local action box on the End-user function indicates: 'Verify $N_{pr}(RAND)$
+Generate $U_{pr}[N_{pu}(K)|K(RAND)]$ , *CK* and *IK* using $K$ '. The End-user function then sends '5. Register (IMPU, IMPI, $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ )' to S-n. S-n sends '6. Get verification, record, *CK*, *IK*' to S-5, which responds with '7. Verification, record, *CK*, *IK*'. Finally, S-n sends '8. 200 OK' back to the End-user function.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F06
+
+Sequence diagram showing the integration of the IMS authentication mechanism with PKI-based authentication (option 2). The diagram involves three entities: End-user function, Service control functional entity (S-n), and S-5 (SUP-FE).
+
+**Figure 6 – Integration of the IMS authentication mechanism with PKI-based authentication (option 2)**
+
+#### 6.2.6.5 Comparison of option 1 and option 2
+
+Table 1 provides a comparison between the mechanisms described for options 1 and 2.
+
+**Table 1 – Comparison of option 1 and option 2 for the key agreement between the end-user function and S-5 on the *CK* and *IK* keys**
+
+| | Option 1 (with pre-shared secret) | Option 2 (without pre-shared secret) |
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Advantages | Completely reuses the AKA mechanism for establishing agreement on the CK and IK keys | Does not require provisioning of the shared secret between the end-user function and S-5 |
+| Disadvantages | Requires provisioning of the shared secret between the end-user function and S-5 | Requires modifications to the applications running on the end-user function (e.g., on a smart card) and S-5 for enabling agreement on the CK and IK |
+
+Option 1 should be selected to simplify key agreement on the *CK* and *IK* keys when the end-user function and the S-5 share a secret. Option 2 should be the choice when the end-user function and the S-5 do not have a shared secret.
+
+The implementations of this integration mechanism must support both options.
+
+##### Requirements for the S-5 functional entity
+
+In addition to the capabilities specified in [ATIS 33102], the S-5 must be capable of:
+
+- Storing users' and network's certificates in and retrieving these certificates from the certificate repository.
+- Performing PKI-based decryption as described in step 6 (for both options).
+- Running the Diameter protocol modified to carry information described in step 6 (for both options) and information needed for negotiation with the end-user function on the PKI-based authentication.
+- Negotiating with the end-user function an agreement on the PKI-based authentication method.
+
+#### 6.2.6.6 Requirements to the end-user function
+
+The end-user function must be capable of:
+
+- Securely storing the user's private key $U_{pr}$ .
+- Securely storing the shared secret $K_s$ with the network (only for option 1).
+- Storing a network ITU-T X.509 certificate with the network's public key $N_{pu}$ .
+- Randomly generating one-time session key $K$ and performing the symmetric key encryption with $K$ .
+- Generating the *CK* and *IK* keys with the use of the shared secret $K_s$ , as specified in [ATIS 33102] (only for option 1).
+- Generating the *CK* and *IK* keys as described in step 6 for option 2.
+- Performing PKI-based encryption and decryption described in steps 4 and 5 for both options.
+- Running a SIP client with a modified SIP protocol enabling communication of information described in steps 4 and 5.
+- Negotiating with the S-2 an agreement on the use of the PKI-based authentication.
+
+#### **6.2.6.7 Requirements to the S-1**
+
+The additional requirements to the S-1 are as follows:
+
+- It must be capable of constructing the SIP messages with information described in step 4 (for both options).
+- It must be capable of retrieving from the SIP messages information described in step 5 and repackaging it into the Diameter messages as described in step 6 (for both options).
+- It must be capable of performing the PKI-based encryption described in step 4 (for both options).
+- It must be able to understand the notification from the S-5 on the use of the PKI-based authentication.
+
+#### **6.2.6.8 Requirements to the SIP interfaces between the participating entities**
+
+The end-user function and the S-1 communicate via the S-2 and S-3 functional entities. The S-2 and S-3 entities are not essential to the described authentication and are not shown in Figures 5 and 6.
+
+There are SIP interfaces between:
+
+- The end-user function and S-2.
+- S-2 and S-3.
+- S-1 and S-3.
+
+These interfaces must be able to negotiate the use of the PKI-based authentication (including the specific option for key generation) and to carry information described in steps 4 and 5 (for both options).
+
+#### **6.2.6.9 Requirements to the Diameter interfaces between the participating entities**
+
+There are Diameter interfaces between:
+
+- S-1 and S-5.
+- S-3 and S-5.
+
+These interfaces must be able to negotiate the use of the PKI-based authentication (including the specific option for key generation) and to carry information described in step 6 (for both options).
+
+### **6.2.7 Integration of the PKI-based authentication and the SAML assertion mechanisms**
+
+SAML allows having one entity (e.g., IdSP) to perform authentication and another entity (a relying party, such as an application service provider) to use the authentication results. In such a scenario, an IdSP may implement multiple authentication methods, while the application service provider (ASP) relies on the IdSP's SAML assertions. This scenario is beneficial to both IdSPs and ASPs. Benefits to ASPs are as follows:
+
+- ASP does not have to implement numerous authentication methods.
+- ASP could support a wide range of application services with different authentication assurance requirements.
+
+The benefits to the IdSP are as follows:
+
+- It can offer IdM services, particularly authentication, to multiple ASPs.
+- The IdSP (especially when IdSP is an NGN provider) can utilize its deployed authentication infrastructure to offer IdM services to other providers.
+
+This clause specifies a mechanism for authenticating a client with the use of SAML assertions and PKI-based authentication. This mechanism, along with the one described in clause 6.2.6, *Integration of PKI-based authentication with IMS*, allows NGN providers to leverage and utilize their PKI-based infrastructure.
+
+This mechanism is based on the SAML HTTP redirect binding specified in [ITU-T X.1141].
+
+#### 6.2.7.1 Entities involved in the authentication and the information flow
+
+- End-user function – This entity is capable of running a web client and supporting PKI-based authentication [ITU-T X.509].
+- Application server (AS) – An entity providing a web service. It plays a role of a relying party. It acts as a SAML requestor as defined in [ITU-T X.1141].
+- A-2 – Application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE), which is enabled to perform the PKI-based authentication and act as a SAML responder, as defined in [ITU-T X.1141].
+- S-5 – Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE).
+
+The information flow of the authentication procedure is depicted in Figure 7. The basic steps of data exchange for the PKI-based authentication with SAML-assertion are described below. Refer to [ITU-T Y.2012] for descriptions of NGN functional entities (end-user function, AS, A-2 and S-5).
+
+#### 6.2.7.2 Conventions
+
+The description uses the following conventions:
+
+"|" designates the string concatenation
+
+$K()$ designates a symmetric key encryption
+
+$K_s$ designates a secret shared between A-2 and AS
+
+$N_{pr} []$ designates encryption with the network private key $N_{pr}$
+
+$N_{pu} []$ designates encryption with the network public key $N_{pu}$ available from the network certificate
+
+$U_{pr} []$ designates encryption with the user private key $U_{pr}$
+
+$RAND$ designates randomly-generated challenge
+
+#### 6.2.7.3 Mechanism's parameters
+
+This clause specifies the mechanism-specific parameters. The list of the parameters is as follows:
+
+`pki-auth-challenge` – Parameter for transmitting the value of $RAND$
+
+`pki-auth-challenge-encrypted` – Parameter for transmitting the value of $N_{pr}[RAND]$
+
+`pki-auth-user-signature` – Parameter for transmitting the value of $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$
+
+`pki-auth-keyinfo` – Parameter for transmitting the value of $K_s(K)$
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant E as End-user function
+ participant A2 as A-2 (IdP)
+ participant AS as Application server (Relying party)
+ participant S5 as S-5
+
+ E->>AS: 1. Access request, ID
+ AS->>A2: 2. Redirect to IdP with SAML request
+ A2->>S5: 3. Get user's ITU-T X.509 certificate
+ S5->>A2: 4. 401 Unauthorized, ITU-T X.509 auth. request, RAND, Npr[RAND]
+ A2->>E: 5. Response Upr[Npr[K] | K(RAND)]
+ E->>AS: 6. Return SAML assertion with the authentication result redirecting to AS
+ AS->>A2: 7. Obtain auth. context
+ A2->>E: 8. Return auth. result
+
+```
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F07
+
+Sequence diagram showing the basic steps of data exchange for PKI-based authentication with SAML-assertion between End-user function, A-2 (IdP), Application server (Relying party), and S-5.
+
+**Figure 7 – Basic steps of data exchange for the PKI-based authentication with SAML-assertion**
+
+The mutual authentication of the end-user function and A-2 is similar to the procedure used by the mechanism for integration of PKI-based authentication with IMS authentication, which is described in clause 6.2.6.
+
+The basic steps of the procedure that relies on the PKI-based authentication and SAML assertions are as follows:
+
+- 1) A web client of the end-user function issues an HTTP access request to the application server (AS). The request includes a user identifier and the URL of the A-2.
+- 2) The application server acting as a SAML requester responds to the HTTP request by sending a SAML request. The SAML request is encoded into the HTTP response's location header with the HTTP status set to either 302 or 303. The agent of the end-user function delivers the SAML request by issuing HTTP GET request to A-2, which acts as a SAML responder. This HTTP redirection procedure, known as HTTP redirect binding, is specified in [ITU-T X.1141]. To ensure authentication and integrity of the URL-encoded message, it should be signed as specified in clause 10.2.4.5.2, *Security considerations*, of [ITU-T X.1141]. The shared secret $K_s$ must be used for signing.
+- 3) After signature validation, A-2 obtains from the S-5 the end-user's certificate and checks whether it is valid. The certificate contains the end-user function's public key.
+- 4) A-2 responds to the end-user function with an HTTP response message indicating that authentication with the use of ITU-T X.509 certificate is required. This is accomplished by setting the value of the response header `www-Authenticate` [b-IETF RFC 2616] to "pki-auth". The body of the message includes the `pki-auth-challenge` and `pki-auth-challenge-encrypted` parameters that carry the values of the randomly-generated challenge $RAND$ and its encryption $N_{pr}[RAND]$ respectively. The header `Content-Type` must be set to `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`.
+
+- 5) The end-user function:
+- retrieves values $A$ , which is supposedly equal to $RAND$ , and $B$ , which is supposedly equal to $N_{pr}[RAND]$ ;
+ - retrieves the network public key $N_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts $B$ with $N_{pu}$ and compares the result to $A$ . If the values are equal, then the network is authenticated, if not, the authentication procedure is halted;
+ - generates a secret key $K$ ;
+ - generates the value $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ , sets the parameter `pki-auth-user-signature` to that value, and sends it in the body of an HTTP POST message to A-2. The header `Content-Type` of the message must be set to the value `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`.
+
+After this step, the A-2 checks whether the response is valid. To that end, A-2:
+
+- queries the user certificate to obtain the user public key $U_{pu}$ ;
+ - decrypts with $U_{pu}$ the received value $C$ , which is supposedly equal to $U_{pr}[N_{pu}[K]|K(RAND)]$ to retrieve the value $D|E$ , where $D$ is supposedly equal to $N_{pu}[K]$ and $E$ is supposedly equal to $K(RAND)$ ;
+ - decrypts with the network private key $N_{pr}$ the value $D$ to obtain $K'$ ;
+ - decrypts with $K'$ the value $E$ to obtain $RAND'$ ;
+ - compares $RAND'$ with $RAND$ . If they match, the user has been authenticated and $K' = K$ . That is the end-user function and A-2 now share key $K$ .
+- 6) If all the above steps were successful, the A-2:
+- generates a SAML assertion setting the attribute method of the element `` to the value `sender-vouches`;
+ - computes the value $K_s(K)$ ;
+ - includes the assertion in a SAML response. It then delivers the SAML response and the computed value $K_s(K)$ over HTTP in the same manner, as described for the SAML request in step 2 (i.e., as part of a query string). The value $K_s(K)$ is carried by the parameter `pki-auth-keyinfo`;
+ - to ensure origin authentication and integrity of the URL-encoded message, A-2 signs it as specified in clause 10.2.4.5.2, *Security considerations*, of [ITU-T X.1141]. The shared secret $K_s$ should be used for signing.
+- After validating the signed URL, AS is assured that the SAML assertion is made by A-2. The AS checks the assertion itself (e.g., to ensure that conditions are met). After that, the AS retrieves the value $K_s(K)$ and decrypts it using the shared $K_s$ to obtain $K$ . At this point, AS has authenticated the end-user function and both entities share the key $K$ , which can be used for securing communications between them.
+- 7) The AS, if it is required by policy for making an authorization decision, obtains information about the authentication context. In that case, A-2 responds with information specified by the Public key – ITU-T X.509 authentication context class [ITU-T X.1141].
+- 8) The AS sends to the end-user function the result of the authorization decision.
+
+#### 6.2.7.4 Additional requirements for the entities participating in the authentication
+
+In order to support the described mechanism, the participating entities must meet the following requirements:
+
+##### 6.2.7.4.1 Requirements for the end-user function
+
+The end-user function must be capable of:
+
+- Running HTTP client.
+- Securely storing its private key $U_{pr}$ (e.g., on a smart card).
+- Obtaining the network public key $N_{pu}$ .
+- Performing encryption and decryption.
+- Generating a key $K$ .
+
+##### 6.2.7.4.2 Requirements for the application server (AS)
+
+- The AS must support SAML [ITU-T X.1141].
+- The AS must have a shared secret ( $K_s$ ) with A-2.
+
+##### 6.2.7.4.3 Requirements for the A-2 functional entity
+
+The A-2 functional entity must be able to:
+
+- Support the HTTP protocol.
+- Securely store its private key $N_{pr}$ .
+- Obtain the user public key $U_{pu}$ .
+- Perform encryption and decryption.
+- Generate a random challenge $RAND$ .
+- Support SAML [ITU-T X.1141].
+- Have a shared secret ( $K_s$ ) with the AS.
+
+##### 6.2.7.4.4 Requirements for the S-5 functional entity
+
+The S-5 functional entity should be capable of storing the users' ITU-T X.509 certificates or retrieving the certificates from the repository (or both).
+
+#### 6.2.7.5 Additional requirements for the interfaces between the participating entities
+
+The requirements for the interfaces are as follows:
+
+- The interface between the end-user function and the application server must support the HTTP protocol [b-IETF RFC 2616].
+- The interfaces between the end-user function and A-2 functional entities must support HTTP protocol [b-IETF RFC 2616].
+- The interface between A-2 and the application server must support SAML [ITU-T X.1141].
+- The interface between the A-2 and S-5 functional entities must support a query-response mechanism that allows A-2 to obtain the users' X.509 certificates from S-5.
+
+### 6.2.8 Integration of OpenID-based authentication with the AKA authentication
+
+Integration of AKA authentication with OpenID-based authentication allows a combination of network-centric and user-centric IdM capabilities. The integration mechanism:
+
+- Enables the network providers to provide identity services to users accessing web applications.
+- Can be used to provide users with single sign-on (SSO) across the IMS network and web services environment with an existing ISIM application as well as with other SIM applications that rely on AKA.
+- Allows users to control their public identifiers on the web as specified in [b-OpenID v.2] while leveraging NGN services.
+- Improves user security by engaging a user-trusted network provider in the access control to the web applications.
+
+[b-3GPP TR 33.924] describes several solutions for the integration of OpenID with AKA that relies on the use of the bootstrapping server function (BSF).
+
+This clause describes an additional mechanism for the integration of OpenID and AKA. To this end, the OpenID specification calls for a variety of authentication mechanisms.
+
+OpenID can interwork with other technologies, such as OAuth, as shown in Appendix II.
+
+#### 6.2.8.1 Entities involved in the authentication and the information flow
+
+- End-user function – This entity is capable of running a web client and of communicating with the appropriate SIM application.
+- Application server – An entity providing a web service. It plays a role of a relying party.
+- A-2 – Application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE), which is enabled to serve as an OpenID [b-OpenID v.2] identity provider. (The A-2 optionally shares a short-term secret with the application server as specified in [b-OpenID v.2].)
+- S-5 – Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE).
+
+The information flow of the authentication procedure is depicted in Figure 8. The procedure of establishing the short-term signing key between the application server and A-2 is not shown. The figure shows the basic steps of the procedure for two OpenID options:
+
+- a) The A-2 and the application server share a secret.
+- b) The A-2 and the application server do not share a secret.
+
+The common steps for both options are 1 through 6. Step 7a is for option a) only.
+
+Steps 7b, 8b, and 9b are for option b) only.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant E as End-user function
+ participant A2 as A-2 (OpenID, IdSP)
+ participant AS as Application server (Relying party)
+ participant S5 as S-5
+
+ E->>AS: 1. AuthnOpenID request
+ AS->>A2: 2. Redirect request to IdP
+ A2->>E: 4. Auth, request, challenge
+ AS->>S5: 3. Get AV and user profile (e.g., based on IMSI or IMPI)
+ S5->>A2: 5. Response
+ A2->>E: 6. Return signed authentication result with redirection
+ E->>AS: 7a. Return auth. result
+ AS->>A2: 7b. Request signature verification
+ A2->>AS: 8b. Signature verification result
+ AS-->>E: 9b. Return auth. result
+
+```
+
+Legend:
+ ← Messages common to options a and b
+ ←····· Messages for option a
+ ←--- Messages for option b
+
+Sequence diagram showing the integration of AKA authentication with OpenID between End-user function, A-2 (OpenID, IdSP), Application server (Relying party), and S-5.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F08
+
+**Figure 8 – Integration of the AKA authentication mechanism with OpenID**
+
+The basic steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) A web client of the end-user function issues an authentication request *AuthnOpenID* to the application server. The request includes an OpenID identifier.
+- 2) The application server, using the presented OpenID identifier, discovers the URL of A-2, which serves as an OpenID identity provider, and redirects the user authentication request to that URL.
+After this step, A-2 correlates the user identifier with the appropriate identity (such as IMSI or IMPI).
+- 3) A-2 obtains from the S-5 the AKA authentication vector (AV) and the user profile based on the IMPI.
+- 4) A-2 sends to the end-user function the authentication request using the HTTP Digest AKA method [b-IETF RFC 4169] or [b-IETF RFC 3310]. The request includes a challenge and a quantity that enables the end-user function to authenticate the network.
+After this step, the end-user function authenticates the network, as specified in [b-IETF RFC 4169] or [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+
+- 5) The end-user function sends the challenge response to the A-2, as specified in [b-IETF RFC 4169] or [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+After this step, A-2 authenticates the end-user function, as specified in [b-IETF RFC 4169] or [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+- 6) The A-2 sends to the end-user function a signed message asserting that the claimed OpenID identifier belongs to the user. The message is signed with the use of a secret shared with the application server for option a). For option b), the message is signed with the A-2 secret key. The message includes a request to redirect the web client of the end-user function to the application server. The details of the signing and redirection procedures are described in [b-OpenID v.2]. [b-OpenID v2] also specifies measures to prevent attacks based on the reuse of the signed authentication assertion.
+
+##### **Steps that are specific to option a):**
+
+- 7a. After verifying the signature of the response received in step 6, the application server notifies the end-user function of the authentication result. The application server uses the secret shared with the A-2 for such verification.
+
+If there is a failure in one of the following steps: 1 through 6, or 7a, the authentication procedure stops.
+
+##### **Steps that are specific to option b):**
+
+- 7b. The application server sends a copy of the message received in step 6 to the A-2 with a request to verify the signature.
+- 8b. After verifying its own signature, the A-2 reports the verification result to the application server.
+- 9b. The application server reports the authentication result to the end-user function.
+
+If there is a failure in one of the following steps: 1 through 6, 7b, 8b, or 9b, the authentication procedure stops.
+
+#### **6.2.8.2 Additional requirements for the entities participating in the authentication**
+
+In order to support the described mechanism, the participating entities must meet the following requirements:
+
+##### **6.2.8.2.1 Requirements for the end-user function**
+
+The end-user function must be capable of:
+
+- Authenticating with the use of the HTTP Digest AKA method.
+- Communicating with the appropriate SIM application.
+
+##### **6.2.8.2.2 Requirements for the application server**
+
+The application server must be able to support OpenID specification version 2.0 [b-OpenID v.2].
+
+##### **6.2.8.2.3 Requirements for the A-2 functional entity**
+
+The A-2 functional entity must be able to:
+
+- Perform the HTTP Digest AKA authentication.
+- Correlate the user OpenID identifier with the appropriate identifier (such as IMSI or IMPI).
+- Serve as an OpenID identity provider.
+
+##### **6.2.8.2.4 Requirements for the S-5 functional entity**
+
+There are no other requirements to the S-5 functional entity than those specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### **6.2.8.3 Additional requirements for the interfaces between the participating entities**
+
+The requirements for the interfaces are as follows:
+
+- The interface between the end-user function and the application server must support the OpenID authentication as specified in specification version 2.0 [b-OpenID v.2].
+- The interfaces between the end-user function and A-2 functional entities must support the HTTP Digest AKA protocol [b-IETF RFC 4169] or [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+
+The interface between the A-2 and S-5 functional entities does not have any mechanism-specific requirements.
+
+#### **6.2.8.4 Mechanism for interworking of OpenID and AKA for the split user terminal scenario**
+
+The mechanism described in this clause also supports the split terminal scenario, described in [b-3GPP TR 33.924]. The split user terminal scenario refers to a situation where an authenticating agent (an entity with access to the UICC card) and the browsing agent are not located on the same user terminal.
+
+Considering that in the direct AKA solution specified in this clause, IdSP corresponds to a collapsed NAF/BSF, the scenarios described in [b-3GPP TR 33.924] are completely supported by the solution. The mechanism relies on the direct AKA authentication instead of the GBA-based authentication.
+
+### **6.2.9 Generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA)**
+
+The generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) specifies a framework for bootstrapping authentication and establishing key agreement, leveraging the 3GPP authentication and key agreement (AKA) mechanism. The GBA facilitates authentication of the end-users to the network application function (NAF) and can be used in NGN identity management for enabling:
+
+- Authentication and key agreement.
+- Privacy protection.
+- Single sign-on.
+
+The GBA is an authentication system that includes three parties:
+
+- An end-user who is trying to obtain network services using user equipment (UE).
+- An application server (called network application function or NAF).
+- A trusted entity (called bootstrapping server function or BSF), which is involved in authentication and key exchange between two other entities.
+
+The GBA enables authentication of the end-user, who is using the UE, to an application server (NAF) without revealing the end-user's long-term credentials and secrets to the NAF by using a trusted entity BSF.
+
+Figure 9 depicts the GBA [b-ETSI TS 133 220] and provides mapping of the 3GPP-defined entities to the functional entities specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ HSS["HSS (S-5)"] --- Zh --- BSF
+ SLF["SLF (S-4)"] --- Dz --- BSF
+ BSF --- Zn --- NAF["NAF (Applications)"]
+ BSF --- Ub --- UE["UE (End-user function)"]
+ UE --- Ua --- NAF
+
+```
+
+Figure 9: Simple network model for bootstrapping. The diagram shows a network architecture with five main entities: HSS (S-5) at the top, SLF (S-4) on the left, BSF in the center, NAF (Applications) on the right, and UE (End-user function) at the bottom. Connections are as follows: HSS (S-5) connects to BSF via reference point Zh; SLF (S-4) connects to BSF via reference point Dz; BSF connects to NAF (Applications) via reference point Zn; BSF connects to UE (End-user function) via reference point Ub; and both UE (End-user function) and NAF (Applications) connect via reference point Ua.
+
+NOTE – Labels in parentheses denote entities specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F09
+
+**Figure 9 – Simple network model for bootstrapping**
+
+These are the basic steps of the GBA procedure:
+
+- 1) The NAF requests authentication and negotiates the use of GBA over the Ua reference point.
+- 2) The BSF client that runs on the UE initiates the bootstrapping procedure over reference point Ub. The BSF fetches authentication information and the GBA user security settings from the HSS over Zh. The UE and the BSF mutually authenticate using HTTP Digest AKA. The procedure results in the UE receiving bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) from the BSF and establishing a shared key (Ks) between the UE and the BSF.
+- 3) The UE derives Ks\_NAF from Ks and sends B-TID (along with the application-specific data) to the NAF.
+- 4) The NAF sends B-TID to the BSF over the Zn reference point.
+- 5) The BSF based on B-TID determines the Ks that should be used, derives Ks\_NAF from it and sends Ks\_NAF to the NAF.
+- 6) Finally, the UE and NAF can authenticate each other using the shared key Ks\_NAF. The exact authentication procedure depends on the protocol between the UE and NAF. For instance, GBA specifies that HTTP-based applications can use either HTTP Digest authentication [b-IETF RFC 2617] or TLS pre-shared key ciphersuites [b-IETF RFC 4279].
+
+NOTE – The BSF queries the SLF over the Dz reference point to obtain the name of the HSS containing the subscriber-specific data. The SLF is not needed when the BSF is configured to use a pre-defined HSS.
+
+Mapping of the GBA entities to the NGN entities specified in [ITU-T Y.2012], *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*, is as follows:
+
+- NAF corresponds to the "Applications" entity of Figure 3, *NGN generalized functional architecture*, of [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- HSS corresponds to S-5, service user profile FE.
+- SLF corresponds to S-4, subscription locator FE.
+- UE corresponds to the end-user function.
+
+### 6.2.10 IMSI-based authentication
+
+Depending on the required level of assurance, the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) may be used in the wireless application protocol (WAP) network for authentication providing backward compatibility. As the IMSI is a unique alphabetic string, it can be used as an entity-identity for a particular service.
+
+The approach:
+
+- uses the IMSI code as an entity-identity in wireless applications;
+- provides a reliable service channel on condition that the endpoint has a legitimate IMSI, when the endpoint requests authentication;
+- assumes that all the systems trust the WAP gateway's authentication result, and provide services for that entity;
+- can be used to provide a single sign-on function by virtue of the uniqueness of the IMSI for the same endpoint between GPRS/CDMA 1x and wireless applications (e.g., wireless-mailbox, etc.);
+- provides security to the IMSI code.
+
+## 6.3 Correlation and binding
+
+[ITU-T Y.2720], *NGN identity management framework*, states that *identity information (e.g., identifiers, credential and attributes) may be correlated to establish a binding to assure the identity of an entity*.
+
+An objective of a solution that enables correlation is to gather various types of identity information from different sources and present it to the applications in a unified format that they would understand.
+
+The concept of such a solution is illustrated in Figure 10. The figure depicts three example sources of identity information: HSS, presence server, and a database of the application-specific user data. An application may need all three types of information for making authentication and authorization decisions. In the depicted example, the correlation mechanism employs the Diameter, LDAP, and SQL protocols for obtaining data from the respective sources. These data are then presented to the application in a format that it understands. Thus, the correlation mechanism relieves applications from a burden to support multiple protocols for communicating with different sources of an identity information.
+
+
+
+Figure 10: Correlation of identity information. The diagram shows a stack of green rectangles labeled 'Applications' at the top. A line labeled 'Unified view of identity data' connects them to a yellow triangle labeled 'IdSP' and 'Correlation'. From the bottom of the triangle, three lines labeled 'Diameter', 'LDAP', and 'SQL' connect to three blue cylinders labeled 'HSS', 'Presence', and 'Database' respectively. These three cylinders are enclosed in a dashed box labeled 'Data sources'.
+
+NOTE – Correlation mechanism provides applications with a unified view of all identity data.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F10
+
+**Figure 10 – Correlation of identity information**
+
+## 6.4 Discovery
+
+[ITU-T Y.2721], *NGN identity management requirements and use cases*, specifies that *NGN/IdSP* is required to support functions and capabilities to discover sources of identity information within an *NGN/IdSP* domain and across different *NGN/IdSP* domains.
+
+This clause provides examples of standard mechanisms that support these requirements and the references to the relevant specifications.
+
+### 6.4.1 Intra-network discovery
+
+[ITU-T Y.2012], *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN*, defines a special entity – the subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE) – that provides an address of the service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) that stores identity information of a particular subscriber. SL-FE enables discovery of SUP-FE, which is responsible for storing user profiles, subscriber-related location data, and presence status data. Through querying SUP-FE, the network entities can obtain this identity information. As specified in [ITU-T Y.2012], the following network entities may query SL-FE for the address of the appropriate SUP-FE:
+
+- application support functional entity (AS-FE);
+- interrogating call session control functional entity (I-CSC-FE);
+- serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE).
+
+A mechanism, which enables these entities to find in an operator's network the address of SUP-FE that stores the identity information for a given user, is specified in [3GPP TS 23.228]. Note that the mapping of the entities of [ITU-T Y.2012] to the entities of [3GPP TS 23.228] is as follows:
+
+- AS-FE corresponds to AS;
+- I-CSC-FE corresponds to I-CSCF;
+- S-CSC-FE corresponds to S-CSCF;
+- SL-FE corresponds to SLF.
+
+### **6.4.2 Inter-network discovery**
+
+Examples of the mechanisms for inter-network discovery of an IdSP include those specified in SAML [ITU-T X.1141] and ID-WSF [b-LA WSF]. These mechanisms depend on pre-established agreements among the involved entities (e.g., IdSP and relying party) or members of a federation.
+
+Another example is OpenID [b-OpenID v.2], which specifies a discovery mechanism that enables a relying party to locate a user's IdSP based on the user-supplied OpenID identifier.
+
+## **6.5 IdM communications and information exchange**
+
+This clause recommends protocols and mechanisms to communicate and exchange identity information.
+
+### **6.5.1 Security of IdM communications and exchange**
+
+This clause recommends mechanisms to provide integrity and confidentiality protection of IdM communications.
+
+#### **6.5.1.1 Solutions based on SAML 2.0 [ITU-T X.1141]**
+
+For both integrity and confidentiality protection, SAML 2.0 recommends the use of a secure channel or secure network protocol such as TLS or IPsec to be configured to protect the packets transmitted via the network connection.
+
+For message-level integrity protection, in addition to the secured communication channel, XML signature can be used. Clause 8.4, SAML and XML signature syntax and processing, of [ITU-T X.1141] is required to be followed when XML signature is used.
+
+For message-level confidentiality protection, in addition to the secured communication channel, XML encryption can be used. Clause 8.4, SAML and XML signature syntax and processing, of [ITU-T X.1141] is required to be followed when XML encryption is used.
+
+#### **6.5.1.2 Identity web services framework (known as ID-WSF)**
+
+In order to use ID-WSF, its communications and its messages between the sender and recipient are expected to have their integrity and confidentiality protected. Like SAML 2.0, it recommends the use of a secure channel or a secure network protocol such as TLS or IPsec to be configured to protect the packets transmitted via the network connection [b-LA ID-WSF security].
+
+##### **1) Transport layer channel protection**
+
+In case of using SSL or TLS as secure network protocol for ID-WSF, it is required to use either SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 or higher. An entity that terminates an SSL (3.0) or TLS (1.0) connection is required to offer or accept suitable cipher suites during the handshake. Recommended TLS 1.0 cipher suites (or their SSL 3.0 equivalent) are as follows, although they are not exhaustive.
+
+- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_RC4\_128\_SHA
+- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA
+- TLS\_DHE\_DSS\_WITH\_3DES\_EDE\_CBC\_SHA
+- TLS\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_CBC\_SHA
+- TLS\_DHE\_DSS\_WITH\_AES\_CBC\_SHA
+
+For the signing and verification of protocol messages, communicating entities are recommended to use certificates and private keys that are distinct from the certificates and private keys applied for SSL or TLS channel protection.
+
+Other security protocols such as IPsec or Kerberos may be used as long as they implement equivalent security measures.
+
+##### 2) Message confidentiality protection
+
+In the presence of intermediaries, communicating entities are required to ensure that sensitive information is not disclosed to unauthorized entities. In this case, these entities are required to use the confidentiality mechanisms specified in the web services security (WSS) SOAP message security by OASIS [b-OASIS WSS SOAP], to encrypt the SOAP envelope content.
+
+##### 3) Message integrity rules
+
+Message integrity rules in this clause only apply if web services security (WSS) SOAP message security by OASIS [b-OASIS WSS SOAP] is used for an ID-WSF protocol message bound to SOAP according to the Liberty SOAP Binding Version 2.0 [b-LA SOAP binding].
+
+In this case, the sender is required to create a single contained in the header, and this signature is required to reference all of the message components required to be signed.
+
+In particular, this signature is required to reference the SOAP Body element (the element itself), the security token associated with the signature, and all headers in the message that have been defined in the Liberty SOAP Binding Version 2.0 [b-LA SOAP binding], including both required and optional header blocks.
+
+An example security token is a element conveyed in the header. The wsu:Timestamp header in the wsse:Security header block, the wsa:MessageID, wsa:RelatesTo, sb:Framework, sb:Sender and sb:InvocationIdentity header blocks are examples of header elements that would be referenced in a signature.
+
+Note that care is required to be taken when constructing elements contained in reference parameters in endpoint references, as these will be promoted to SOAP header blocks. Appropriate measures should be taken to avoid conflicting or duplicate id attributes, for example, by using techniques to generate unique ids.
+
+If the message is signed, the sender is required to include the resultant XML signature in a element as a child of the header.
+
+The element is required to refer to the subject confirmation key with a element. The element is required to include a element so that the subject confirmation key can be located within the header. The inclusion of the reference is recommended to adhere to the guidance specified in section 3.4.2 of *Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1* by OASIS [b-OASIS SAML token].
+
+###### i) Sender processing rules:
+
+- The construction and decoration of the header element is required to adhere to the rules specified in the *Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1* by OASIS [b-OASIS SAML token] .
+- The header element is required to have a mustUnderstand attribute with logical value true.
+- The sender is required to place the message authentication security token as a direct child of the element.
+- The sender is required to follow the message integrity rules outlined for senders and recipients when message authentication mechanisms are used.
+
+The following considerations do not apply to bearer tokens:
+
+- For deployment settings which require independent message authentication, the obligation is required to be accomplished by signing the message body and portions of the header and placing the as a direct child of the header.
+- For deployment settings which do not require independent message authentication, the subject confirmation obligation may be accomplished by correlating the certificate and key used to affect peer entity authentication with the certificate and the key described by the message authentication token. To accommodate this, the assertion issuing authority is required to construct the assertion such that the confirmation key can be unambiguously verified to be the same certificate and key used in establishing peer entity authentication. This is necessary to mitigate the threat of a certificate substitution attack. It is recommended that the certificate or certificate chain be bound to the subject confirmation key.
+
+###### ii) Recipient processing rules:
+
+- The recipient is required to locate the element for which it is the target. This MUST adhere to the rules specified in the *Web Services Security (WSS) SOAP Message Security* by OASIS [b-OASIS WSS SOAP] and the applicable WSS token profiles (e.g., *Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1.* by OASIS [b-OASIS SAML token] for SAML tokens).
+- The header element is required to have a mustUnderstand attribute with a logical value true and the recipient must be able to process this header block according to the *Web Services security (WSS) SOAP Message Security* by OASIS [b-OASIS WSS SOAP] and the appropriate WSS token profiles (e.g., *Web Services Security: SAML Token Profile 1.1.* by OASIS [b-OASIS SAML token] for SAML tokens).
+- The recipient is required to locate the security token and the recipient is required to determine that it trusts the authority which issued the token.
+- The recipient is required to validate the issuer's signature over the token. This validation is required to conform to the core validation rules described in *XML signature syntax and processing* (second edition) by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [b-W3C XML signature]. The recipient is recommended to validate the trust semantics of the signing key, as appropriate, to the risk of incorrect authentication.
+- If the message has been signed, then the recipient is required to locate the element carried inside the header.
+- Unless the security mechanism is peerSAMLV2, the recipient is required to resolve the contents of the element carried within the and use the key it describes for validating the signed elements. When the security mechanism is peerSAMLV2, the key is the client key used in SSL/TLS client authentication.
+- The recipient is required to follow the message integrity rules outlined for senders and recipients when message authentication mechanisms are used.
+
+##### 4) Processing messages with WSS ITU-T X.509 token
+
+The semantics and processing rules for mechanisms with MESSAGE having the value of ITU-T X.509 are described in this clause. An example can be found in Appendix I.
+
+These URIs support unilateral (sender) message authentication and are of the form:
+
+- *urn:liberty:security:2003-08:PEER:X509* where PEER may vary depending on the peer authentication mechanism deployed (e.g., may be null, TLS, etc.).
+
+The WSS ITU-T X.509 message authentication mechanism uses the Web Services Security ITU-T X.509 Certificate Token Profile [b-OASIS WSS X.509 profile] as the means by which the message sender authenticates to the recipient. These message authentication mechanisms are unilateral. That is, only the sender of the message is authenticated. It is not in the scope of this Recommendation to suggest when response messages should be authenticated, but it is worth noting that this mechanism could be relied upon to authenticate the response message as well. It is recommended to recognize, however, that independent authentication of response messages does not provide the same message stream protection semantics as a mutual peer entity authentication mechanism would offer.
+
+For deployment settings that require message authentication independent of peer entity authentication, the sending peer is required to perform message authentication by demonstrating proof of possession of the key associated with the ITU-T X.509 token. This key is required to be recognized by the recipient as belonging to the sending peer.
+
+When the sender wields the subject confirmation key to sign elements of the message, the signature ensures the authenticity and integrity of the elements covered by the signature. However, this alone does not mitigate the threat of replay, insertion and certain classes of message modification attacks. To secure the message from such threats, one of the mechanisms which support peer entity authentication can be used or the underlying SOAP binding request processing model is required to address these threats.
+
+###### i) Sender processing rules:
+
+The rules in this clause are in addition to the generic message authentication processing rules specified in this Recommendation.
+
+- The sender is required to demonstrate possession of the private key associated with the signature generated in conjunction with the WSS ITU-T X.509 token profile.
+- For deployment settings which require independent message authentication, the obligation is required to be accomplished by signing portions of the message, as appropriate, and recording information in the header (as outlined in [b-OASIS WSS SOAP]).
+- For deployment settings which do not require independent message authentication, the sender is required to accomplish this obligation by decorating the security header with a element bearing the certificate.
+
+This is required to be unambiguously verified to be the same certificate and key used in establishing peer entity authentication. This is necessary to mitigate the threat of a certificate substitution attack. Furthermore, note that this optimization only applies to *ClientTLS:X509* mechanisms.
+
+- ii) Recipient processing rules:
+- If the validation policy that regards peer entity authentication is sufficient for the purposes of authentication, then the recipient is required to establish the correspondence of the certificate and key used to establish peer authentication with the corresponding key information conveyed in the message. This allows the message recipient to determine that the message sender intended a particular transport authenticated identity to be used. Information relating the SSL/TLS key to the message MAY be conveyed in the message using an OASIS SOAP Message Security ITU-T X.509 security token.
+
+## 6.6 Protection of personally-identifiable information (PII)
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.2720], *NGN identity management framework*, protection of PII is a subject to national and regional regulations. While the mechanisms and procedures employed for supporting the PII protection may vary depending on such regulations, they are based on common principles.
+
+This clause provides a brief overview of the procedures for the protection of PII that are specified by the NIST Special Report *Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)* [b-NIST-SP 800-122]. The document's specifications of the *PII confidentiality safeguards* could be used as a guidance by the designers of the IdM systems. The following categories of the safeguards are defined:
+
+- Operational safeguards:
+ - Policy and procedure creation.
+ - Awareness, training, and education.
+- Privacy-specific safeguards:
+ - Minimizing the use, collection, and retention of PII.
+ - Conducting privacy impact assessments.
+ - De-identifying information.
+ - Anonymizing information.
+- Security controls:
+
+The *Security Controls* section provides guidance on the security mechanisms and procedures that are not PII-specific, but can be employed for the PII protection. Similarly, the non-specific to PII security mechanisms specified in [ITU-T Y.2704] can be used for the protection of PII.
+
+## 6.7 Federated identity functions
+
+[ITU-T Y.2721], *NGN identity management requirements and use cases*, explains that *the general concept of federation is to allow each federation member to remain independent while facilitating sharing of specific identity information to allow federated services*.
+
+This clause recommends the use of two widely implemented standard mechanisms that allow a user to access multiple services without subscribing to each service individually.
+
+The SAML Recommendation [ITU-T X.1141] provides a standard solution for federation. It is used mostly by the businesses, government organizations and their service providers.
+
+OpenID [b-OpenID v.2] specifies a user-centric solution, which is popular for accessing web services on the Internet.
+
+### 6.7.1 Bridging and interworking
+
+This Recommendation describes a number of the mechanisms that support bridging and interworking among different IdM solutions and federations. The major ones are described in the following clauses:
+
+- Integration of the PKI-based authentication with IMS (clause 6.2.6).
+- Integration of the PKI-based authentication and the SAML assertion mechanisms (clause 6.2.7).
+- Integration of OpenID-based authentication with the AKA authentication (clause 6.2.8).
+- Generic bootstrapping architecture (clause 6.2.9).
+- Correlation and binding (clause 6.3).
+- Federated identity functions (clause 6.7).
+
+### 6.7.2 Discovery of IdSPs in federated environments
+
+Clause 11.4.3 of the SAML Recommendation [ITU-T X.1141] defines *identity provider discovery profile*, which enables a service provider to discover the identity providers of a user. The profile is specified in support of the SAML Web browser SSO profile (defined in clause 11.4.1 of [ITU-T X.1141]).
+
+OpenID [b-OpenID v.2] specifies a discovery mechanism that enables a relying party to locate a user's IdSP based on the user-supplied OpenID identifier.
+
+## 6.8 Identity information access control
+
+[ITU-T Y.2721] requires that identity information only be accessible to authorized entities subject to applicable regulation and policy. This clause describes mechanisms that can be used to verify authorization privileges.
+
+### 6.8.1 SAML-based mechanism for attribute sharing
+
+SAML assertions containing attribute statements can be used as a mechanism for privilege management. The mechanism described in clause 6.2.1 can be used for distributing SAML tokens.
+
+### 6.8.2 ITU-T X.509-based privilege management infrastructure
+
+The attribute certificate framework defined in [ITU-T X.509] can be used as a mechanism for a privilege management infrastructure.
+
+## 6.9 Single sign-on
+
+Single sign-on (SSO) is a network capability that enables a user to log in once and obtain access to the multiple application services of a network, without being repeatedly requested to provide her or his authentication credentials for each individual application service. This capability significantly improves user experience by enabling a user to receive various services without having to maintain multiple authentication credentials (e.g., username/password pairs). Because the SSO allows a user to have one set of the authentication credentials for accessing multiple application services, it makes it easier for the service providers to enforce more strict rules for establishing the credentials. This helps to improve the network security.
+
+On the other hand, if the user credentials are compromised, the impact on the SSO-enabled networks could be greater than on the systems that do not support SSO. To that end, it is essential for the SSO to employ secure mechanisms. This clause provides an overview of several mechanisms that can be used for supporting SSO.
+
+### 6.9.1 GBA-based mechanism
+
+Clause 6.2.9 describes the use of GBA for the authentication of a user to any network application function (NAF). Thus, the GBA effectively provides a single mechanism for signing a user to all GBA-enabled NAFs on a network. Indeed, if a user has been signed on to a NAF, the BSF and the UE have already authenticated each other and established a shared key (Ks). Then the procedure of signing on the user to a next NAF will consist of steps 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (step 2 is skipped), described in clause 6.2.9. Again, the procedure results in a secret (Ks\_NAF) being shared between the UE and a new NAF. This shared secret can be used for authentication between the UE and the NAF.
+
+The GBA-based SSO is recommended for use in environments where GBA has been deployed.
+
+### 6.9.2 SAML-based mechanism
+
+The mechanisms of the SAML-based single sign-on (SSO) are specified in clause 11.4, *SSO Profiles of SAML*, of [ITU-T X.1141], which defines a set of the SAML profiles supporting SSO, and that includes also a *Single logout profile* (clause 11.4.4 of [ITU-T X.1141]). The profile specifies a procedure that allows a user to logout from all application to which she or he had signed using SSO.
+
+SAML v.2 presumes trust relationships between an IdSP and relying parties (RPs) established in advance. It also supports pseudonym identifiers available between an IdSP and RP. It is suitable for applications where contractual agreement such as SLA, or high value information and transactions are involved.
+
+### 6.9.3 OpenID-based mechanism
+
+OpenID authentication 2.0 supports single sign-on capability to allow an end user to access more than one relying parties, once the end user is successfully authenticated. It does not require a trust relationship between IdSP and RP. Since it only supports URL-URI-based format to identify users, a DNS is necessary for its use. Thus, it is suitable for web services applications where relatively lower value information and transactions are involved.
+
+## 6.10 Single sign-off
+
+The *SAML Single Logout Protocol*, clause 8.2.7 of [ITU-T X.1141] enables the end user to sign off from multiple participating sessions near-simultaneously. The participating sessions are those that have been established through the IdSP (i.e., the IdSP has asserted the user identity for the sessions between a user and the applications). The IdSP keeps track of all authenticated sessions with various relying parties that a user has established through the IdSP. This includes invalidation of the authentication credentials (e.g., cookies, assertions) for the concluded sessions. The protocol can be used in the following cases:
+
+- 1) The user signs off from one of the sessions and indicates that she or he wishes to log out of all sessions that have been initiated by the IdSP.
+- 2) The user indicates directly to the IdSP that she or he wishes to log out of all sessions.
+- 3) The IdSP logs out a user without her or his request (e.g., due to a timeout).
+
+The protocol defines the participating entities, their behaviour, the message flow and the format of the exchanged messages. The following subclauses describe the use of the protocol for the cases listed above.
+
+### 6.10.1 User signs off from one of the sessions and indicates that she or he wishes to log out of all sessions that have been initiated by IdSP
+
+Figure 11 illustrates the basic steps of the message flow, which are described below.
+
+#### 6.10.1.1 Entities involved in the procedure and information flow
+
+The involved entities are as follows:
+
+- End-user function.
+- Application server 1 (AS1) – An entity providing a service. It plays a role of a relying party. It acts as a SAML requestor and responder, as defined in [ITU-T X.1141].
+- Application server 2 (AS2) – An entity providing a service. It plays a role of a relying party. It acts as a SAML requestor and responder, as defined in [ITU-T X.1141].
+- A-2 – Application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE), which serves as an IdSP and acts as a SAML requestor and responder, as defined in [ITU-T X.1141].
+
+
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the SAML-based single sign-off procedure. The diagram shows four entities: End-user function, Application server 1 (Relying party), Application server 2 (Relying party), and A-2 (IdSP). The process starts with Session 1 and Session 2 established between the End-user function and the respective Application servers. Step 1: The End-user function sends a 'Single logout request' to Application server 1. Step 2: Application server 1 sends '' to A-2. Step 3: A-2 sends '' to Application server 2. Step 4: Application server 2 sends '' to A-2. Step 5: A-2 sends '' to Application server 1. Step 6: Application server 1 sends 'Report the logout results' to the End-user function. The diagram also shows 'Termination of session 1' and 'Termination of session 2' occurring during the process.
+
+**Figure 11 – SAML-based single sign-off requested by a user at a participating session**
+
+The basic steps of the single sign-off (also called single logout) procedure are as follows:
+
+- 1) The end user function invokes a logout request at the application server 1 (AS1) indicating that it wishes to log out from all participating sessions.
+- 2) AS1 requests a logout from all participating sessions by sending to A-2. The request should be signed for authentication and integrity protection, as specified in clause 8.2.7 of [ITU-T X.1141].
+
+After this step, AS1 attempts to terminate session 1. To that end, AS1 invalidates the session's authentication credentials (e.g., assertions, cookies), which will force the end user function to go through an authentication procedure, if it issues another request to AS1.
+
+- 3) After validating the request from AS1, A-2 sends messages to all relying parties (only AS2 is shown in Figure 11). The requests should be signed, as specified in clause 8.2.7 of [ITU-T X.1141].
+After validating the logout request, AS2 attempts to terminate session 2.
+- 4) AS2 reports to the sender of the logout request (A-2) on the result of the logout attempt by sending , which should be signed.
+- 5) A-2 sends to the initial sender of the logout request (AS1) reporting the results of the single logout (e.g., success, partial logout). The response should be signed.
+After this step, A-2 updates its list of active sessions and invalidates the authentication credentials (e.g., cookies, assertions) for the sessions that had to be terminated.
+- 6) AS1 responds with the logout result to the request of the end user function in step 1.
+
+### 6.10.2 User indicates directly to IdSP that she or he wishes to log out of all sessions
+
+Figure 12 illustrates the basic steps of the message flow, which are described below.
+
+#### 6.10.2.1 Entities involved in the procedure and information flow
+
+The entities involved in the logout procedure are the same as those described in clause 6.10.1.1. In this use case, the end user function has a separate session (session 3) with A-2 (IdSP). It uses the session to send a single logout request in step 1. Other steps of the procedure are similar to the steps described in clause 6.10.1.1.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EUF as End-user function
+ participant AS1 as Application server 1
+(Relying party)
+ participant AS2 as Application server 2
+(Relying party)
+ participant A2 as A-2
+(IdSP)
+
+ Note over EUF, AS1: Session 1
+ Note over EUF, AS2: Session 2
+ Note over EUF, A2: Session 3 (with IdP)
+
+ EUF->>A2: 1. Single logout request
+ A2->>AS1: 2.
+ A2->>AS2: 3.
+
+ Note over AS1: Termination of session 1
+ AS1->>A2: 4.
+
+ Note over AS2: Termination of session 2
+ AS2->>A2: 5.
+
+ A2->>EUF: 6. Report the logout results
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the SAML-based single sign-off procedure requested by a user at IdSP. The diagram shows four lifelines: End-user function, Application server 1 (Relying party), Application server 2 (Relying party), and A-2 (IdSP). It depicts three active sessions: Session 1 between End-user and AS1, Session 2 between End-user and AS2, and Session 3 between End-user and A-2. The message flow is: 1. Single logout request from End-user to A-2. 2. from A-2 to AS1. 3. from A-2 to AS2. 4. from AS1 to A-2 after termination of session 1. 5. from AS2 to A-2 after termination of session 2. 6. Report the logout results from A-2 to End-user function.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_F12
+
+**Figure 12 – SAML-based single sign-off requested by a user at IdSP**
+
+The basic steps of the single sign-off procedure are as follows:
+
+- 1) The end user function invokes a single logout directly at A-2.
+- 2) A-2 sends to AS1. The request should be signed for authentication and integrity protection, as specified in clause 8.2.7 of [ITU-T X.1141].
+After validating the request, AS1 attempts to terminate session 1. To that end, AS1 invalidates the session's authentication credentials (e.g., assertions, cookies), which will force the end user function to go through an authentication procedure, if it issues another request to AS1.
+- 3) A-2 sends to AS2 (it also sends the request to all other servers of the participating sessions). This step is similar to step 2.
+After validating the logout request, AS2 attempts to terminate session 2.
+- 4) AS1 reports to the sender of the logout request (A-2) on the result of the logout attempt by sending , which should be signed.
+- 5) Similarly to the action in the previous step, AS2 reports to the sender of the logout request (A-2) on the result of the logout attempt by a signed .
+After this step, A-2 updates its list of active sessions and invalidates the authentication credentials (e.g., cookies, assertions) for the sessions that had to be terminated.
+
+After validating all logout responses, A-2 reports to the end user function on the single logout result. This is a response to the request of the end-user function in step 1.
+
+# **7 Security**
+
+The mechanisms covered in this Recommendation, together with the mechanisms specified in [ITU-T Y.2704], address the IdM security requirements of [ITU-T Y.2721].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## WSS ITU-T X.509 v3 message authentication
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following example demonstrates a way to process messages with WSS ITU-T X.509 token, as described in clause 6.5.1.2.
+
+```
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ ...
+
+ ...
+
+ ...
+
+
+
+
+ 2005-06-17T04:49:17Z
+
+
+
+ MIIB9zCCAWSgAwIBAgIQ...
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ ...
+
+
+ ...
+
+
+ ...
+
+
+ ...
+
+
+
+ Ru4cAfeBABE...
+
+
+
+
+ YgGfS0pi56pu...
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ HJJWbvqW9E84vJVQkjjLLA6nNvBX7mY00TZhwBdFNDElgscS XZ5Ekw==
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+# **Appendix II**
+
+## **"OpenID + OAuth"-based mechanism for access control**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Clause 6.2.8 describes the use of the OpenID for authentication of a user to any network application function (NAF). Thus, it proposes to introduce OAuth based on OpenID for protecting the PII and control access.
+
+## **II.1 OAuth [b-IETF RFC 5849]**
+
+OAuth is an open protocol enabling an application to access end user information from a web service when the application is authorized by the end user. The end user's information is securely transferred without revealing the identity of the user.
+
+The goal of OAuth is to acquire an access token from the web server, which can then be used to exchange user-specific data with a web service (such as calendar information or an address book). The regular OAuth process is a four-step sequence:
+
+- 1) Ask for a "request" token.
+- 2) Ask for the token to be authorized, which triggers user approval.
+- 3) Exchange the authorized request token for an "access" token.
+- 4) Use the access token to interact with the user's web service data.
+
+For more information on OAuth, refer to [b-IETF RFC 5849].
+
+## **II.2 Using OpenID in conjunction with OAuth**
+
+While OpenID can be used as an IdM mechanism for authenticating users, OAuth could also be used for authorizing permission to sensitive user data. In such a scenario, the IdSP provides combined functions and serves both as an OpenID identity provider (OP) and an OAuth service provider.
+
+## **II.3 OpenID + OAuth authorization flow**
+
+With OpenID + OAuth, this sequence remains essentially the same. The difference is that getting an authorized OAuth request token (steps 1 and 2) is wrapped up in the OpenID authentication request. In this way, the user can approve a login and a service access at the same time.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant End-user as End-user function
+ participant IdP as OpenID IdP / OAuth server
+ participant Web as Web application
+
+ Web->>End-user: 1. Request user sign-in
+ End-user->>Web: 2. Opts to "sign in with OpenId"
+ Web->>IdP: 3. Performs discovery on IdM address
+ IdP->>Web: 4. Responds with XRDS document
+ Web->>IdP: 5. Request login auth (+OAuth token)
+ IdP->>End-user: 6. Redirects to IdM sign-in page
+ End-user->>IdP: 7. Logs in and approves third party authentication
+ IdP->>Web: 8. Returns user identity (+OAuth request token)
+ Web->>End-user: 9. Allows user access to protected features (continues OAuth process at step 7)
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the OpenID + OAuth-based authentication process between an End-user function, OpenID IdP / OAuth server, and a Web application.
+
+ITU-T Y.2722(11)\_FII-1
+
+**Figure II.1 – OpenID + OAuth-based authentication**
+
+The basic steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The web application asks the end user to log in by offering a set of log-in options, including using their OpenID account.
+- 2) The user selects the "Sign in with OpenID" option.
+- 3) The web application sends a "discovery" request to the IdSP to get information on the IdSP login authentication endpoint.
+- 4) The IdSP returns an XRDS document, which contains the endpoint address.
+- 5) The web application sends a login authentication request to the IdSP endpoint address.
+- 6) This action redirects the user to an IdSP federated login page, either in the same browser window or in a pop-up window, and the user is asked to sign in.
+- 7) Once the user has logged in, the IdSP displays a confirmation page and notifies the user that a third-party application is requesting authentication. The page asks the user to confirm or reject linking their IdSP account login with the web application login. The user is then asked to approve access to a specified set of IdSP services. Both the login and the user information sharing must be approved by the user for authentication to continue.
+- 8) If the user approves the authentication, the IdSP returns the user to the URL specified in the `openid.return_to` parameter of the original request. An IdSP-supplied identifier, which has no relationship to the user's actual IdM account name or password, is appended as the query parameter `openid.claimed_id`. If the request also included an attribute exchange, additional user information may be appended. For OpenID + OAuth, an authorized OAuth request token is also returned.
+
+- 9) The web application uses the IdSP-supplied identifier to recognize the user and allow access to application features and data. For OpenID + OAuth, the web application uses the request token to continue the OAuth sequence and gain access to the user's IdSP services.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI TS 133 220] ETSI TS 133 220 V6.3.0 (2004), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2616] IETF RFC 2616 (1999), *Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP/1.1*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4169] IETF RFC 4169 (2005), *Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) Version-2*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4279] IETF RFC 4279 (2005), *Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*.
+<>
+- [b-LA WSF] Liberty Alliance (2008), *Web Services Framework: A Technical Overview*.
+<>
+- [b-LA ID-WSF security] Liberty Alliance Project (2007), *Liberty ID-WSF Security Mechanisms Core version 2.0-errata version 1.0*.
+- [b-LA SOAP binding] Liberty Alliance Project Web Services Security (WSS) (2006), *Liberty SOAP Binding Version 2.0*.
+- [b-NIST-SP 800-122] NIST Special Publication SP 800-122 (2010), *Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII)*.
+<>
+- [b-OASIS SAML token] OASIS (2006), *Web Services security: SAML Token Profile 1.1, and its Approved Errata 1*.
+- [b-OASIS WSS SOAP] OASIS (2004), *Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 1.1 (WS-Security 2004)*.
+- [b-OASIS WSS X.509 profile] OASIS (2006), *Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile 1.1*.
+- [b-OpenID v.2] *OpenID Authentication 2.0*.
+<[http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2\\_0.html](http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html)>
+- [b-W3C XML signature] World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) (2008), *XML Signature Syntax and Processing (second edition)*.
+
+[b-3GPP TR 33.924]
+
+3GPP TR 33.924 Release 9 (2009), 3rd Generation
+Partnership Project, *Identity management and 3GPP security
+interworking; Identity management and Generic
+Authentication Architecture (GAA) interworking (Release 9)*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2740
+
+(01/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **Security requirements for mobile remote financial transactions in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2740
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2740**
+
+# **Security requirements for mobile remote financial transactions in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Within the last few years, a great variety of remote payment networks using mobile networks have been established. While implementing different approaches, quite often they lack of security. At the same time communication networks, including mobile networks, yield substantial changes undergoing transition to the next generation networks (NGN).
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2740 elaborates approaches to develop system security for mobile commerce and mobile banking in the next generation networks (NGN). It describes security requirements for the mobile commerce and the mobile banking systems, based on four specified security levels. It outlines probable risks in mobile commerce and mobile banking systems, and specifies means for risk reduction.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2740 | 2011-01-28 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Mobile banking, mobile commerce, mobile payments, remote payments, security.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Security considerations for mobile banking and mobile commerce systems in theSeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2760
+
+(05/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **Mobility security framework in NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2760
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2760**
+
+# **Mobility security framework in NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2760 specifies the mobility security framework in next generation network (NGN) transport stratum. It addresses the security requirements, security mechanisms and procedures for mobility management and control in NGN.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2760 | 2011-05-20 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Mobility security, NGN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Security requirements for mobility in NGN ..... | 3 |
+| 5.1 Security threats ..... | 5 |
+| 5.2 Security requirements..... | 5 |
+| 6 Security capabilities supported by relevant function entities ..... | 5 |
+| 6.1 Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)..... | 6 |
+| 6.2 Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)..... | 6 |
+| 6.3 Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE)..... | 6 |
+| 6.4 Handover decision control functional entity (HDC-FE) ..... | 6 |
+| 6.5 Network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE)..... | 6 |
+| 6.6 Access management functional entity (AM-FE)..... | 6 |
+| 6.7 Layer3 handover execute function (L3HEF)..... | 6 |
+| 6.8 Access node functional entity (AN-FE) ..... | 6 |
+| 7 Key management and authentication..... | 7 |
+| 7.1 Key management framework ..... | 7 |
+| 7.2 Authentication ..... | 8 |
+| 8 Establishment of security context..... | 14 |
+| 8.1 Security context transfer between serving AM-FE and target AM-FE..... | 14 |
+| 8.2 Security context transfer between serving AR-FE and target AR-FE..... | 15 |
+| 8.3 Security context transfer between UE and HDC-FE..... | 15 |
+| 9 IP mobility security ..... | 16 |
+| 9.1 Host-based mobility security ..... | 16 |
+| 9.2 Network-based mobility security ..... | 17 |
+| 10 Security between UE and HDC-FE ..... | 17 |
+| 10.1 Host-initiated security association establishment between UE and HDC-FE ..... | 17 |
+| 10.2 Network-initiated security association establishment between UE and HDC-FE..... | 18 |
+| 10.3 Security association pre-establishment between UE and HDC-FE based on PKI..... | 19 |
+| 11 Security between UE and NID-FE ..... | 20 |
+| 11.1 Host-initiated security association establishment between UE and NID-FE ..... | 20 |
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 11.2 Network-initiated security association establishment between UE and NID-FE ..... | 21 |
+| 11.3 Security association establishment between UE and NID-FE based on PKI..... | 21 |
+| 12 Security for transport functions ..... | 22 |
+| 12.1 Security between UE and access node function entity ..... | 22 |
+| 12.2 Security between UE and L3HEF (Layer3 Handover Execute Function) ..... | 23 |
+| Appendix I..... | 24 |
+| I.1 Example of full authentication procedure ..... | 24 |
+| I.2 Example of fast re-authentication procedure..... | 24 |
+| I.3 Example of host-based mobility ..... | 25 |
+| Bibliography..... | 27 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2760
+
+## Mobility security framework in NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the mobility security framework in next generation network (NGN) transport stratum. This Recommendation considers the security requirements in [ITU-T Y.2018]. This Recommendation includes authentication and key management, security context establishment, IP mobility security, and security of mobility management, control and transport in the transport stratum. This Recommendation addresses the scenarios including intra- and inter-technology mobility, intra- and inter-domain mobility.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Q.1706] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), Mobility management requirements for NGN . |
+| [ITU-T X.805] | Recommendation ITU-T X.805 (2003), Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2011] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2014] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2010), Network attachment control functions in next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2018] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2018 (2009), Mobility management and control framework and architecture within the NGN transport stratum . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2704] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y-Sup.7] | ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 7 (2008), ITU-T Y.2000-series – Supplement on NGN release 2 scope . |
+| [ITU-R M.1645] | Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 handover** (clause 6.2.2 of [ITU-T Q.1706]): The ability to provide services with some impact on their service level agreements to a moving object during and after movement.
+
+**3.1.2 horizontal mobility** (clause 6.2.3 of [ITU-T Q.1706]): Mobility on the same layer as defined in [ITU-R M.1645]. Generally, it is referred to as the mobility within the same access technology.
+
+**3.1.3 mobility** (clause 3.2 of [ITU-T Q.1706]): The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment.
+
+**3.1.4 NGN transport stratum** (clause 3.10 of [ITU-T Y.2011]): That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities.
+
+**3.1.5 trust** (clause 3.2.9 of [ITU-T Y.2701]): Entity X is said to trust entity Y for a set of activities if and only if entity X relies upon entity Y behaving in a particular way with respect to the activities.
+
+**3.1.6 vertical mobility** (clause 6.2.3 of [ITU-T Q.1706]): Mobility between different layers as defined in [ITU-R M.1645]. Generally, it is referred to as the mobility between different access technologies.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 inter-technology mobility:** See "Vertical mobility" in clause 3.1.
+
+**3.2.2 intra-technology mobility:** See "Horizontal mobility" in clause 3.1.
+
+**3.2.3 security context:** A set of security parameters including identifier, key material, key algorithm, etc.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------|
+| 3G | 3rd Generation |
+| ABG-FE | Access Border Gateway Functional Entity |
+| AE | Authentication Extension |
+| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement |
+| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity |
+| AN-FE | Access Node Functional Entity |
+| ANI | Application to Network Interface |
+| AR-FE | Access Relay Functional Entity |
+| DDoS | Distributed Deny of Service |
+| EAP | Extensible Authentication Protocol |
+| EN-FE | Edge Node Functional Entity |
+| FA | Foreign Agent |
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| HA | Home Agent |
+| HDC-FE | Handover Decision Control Functional Entity |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| L3HEF | Layer 3 Handover Execution Function |
+| MIP | Mobile IP |
+| MIPv4 | Mobile IP for IP version 4. See [b-IETF RFC 3220] |
+| MIPv6 | Mobile IP for IP version 6. See [b-IETF RFC 3775] |
+| MLM-FE | Mobile Location Management Functional Entity |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management Control Functions |
+| MN | Mobile Node |
+| MOBIKE | IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol. See [b-IETF RFC 4555] |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NID-FE | Network Information Distribution Functional Entity |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
+| PMIPv6 | Proxy Mobile IPv6. See [b-IETF RFC 5213] |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| RRP | Registration Reply |
+| RRQ | Registration Request |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TLM-FE | Transport Location Management Functional Entity |
+| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
+| TTLS | Tunnelled Transport Layer Security |
+| TUP-FE | Transport User Profile Functional Entity |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UNI | User to Network Interface |
+| WiMax | Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access |
+| WLAN | Wireless LAN |
+
+# 5 Security requirements for mobility in NGN
+
+NGN supports multiple access technologies, such as WLAN, WiMax, and 3G RAN, etc. [ITU-T Y.2012]. Mobility support is one of the features in NGN, which includes nomadicity and handover. In NGN release 2, handover covers inter-access networks and intra-access networks scenarios [ITU-T Y-Sup.7].
+
+NGN supports the following features:
+
+- 1) Trust model: NGN security trust model defines three security zones: trusted, trusted but vulnerable and un-trusted [ITU-T Y.2701]. It shows that access network has to go through the security gateway before accessing the core network.
+
+- 2) NGN supports multiple access technologies.
+- 3) NGN supports several mobility protocols, such as MIPv4, MIPv6, DSMIPv6, PMIPv6 and MOBIKE.
+- 4) NGN supports multi-radio UE, such as WLAN, WiMax, 3G RAN, etc.
+- 5) NGN supports service continuity when handover between heterogeneous access systems.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – Mobility security architecture in NGN. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is a blue box labeled 'Applications'. Below it is a green box labeled 'Service stratum'. Below the service stratum is a yellow box containing three sub-boxes: 'Network attachment control functions', 'Mobility management control functions', and 'Resource and admission control functions'. These three sub-boxes are collectively labeled 'Transport control functions'. Below the transport control functions is a white box labeled 'Transport functions'. To the left of the main stack is a white box labeled 'End-user functions'. To the right is a white box labeled 'Other networks'. Five security feature groups are indicated by Roman numerals in parentheses: (I) is between End-user functions and Transport functions; (II) is between End-user functions and Transport control functions; (III) is between End-user functions and Service stratum; (IV) is between Applications and Service stratum; and (V) is between the main NGN stack and Other networks. A reference 'Y.2760(11)\_F01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Mobility security architecture in NGN**
+
+Five security feature groups are defined to:
+
+- (I) focus on security in transport layer between end-user functions and transport functions, such as access security which may be protected physically or logically between end-user functions and access network entity in transport functions. (I) also concerns the security of UNI between end-user functions and transport functions.
+- (II) focus on security in the control layer between end-user functions and the transport control function entity. (II) also focuses on security in the control message interface between transport functions entity and transport control function entity. (II) concerns the security of UNI between end-user functions and transport control functions.
+- (III) focus on security of interface between end-user functions and service stratum. (III) also focuses on security in control message interface between transport control functions entity and service stratum. (III) concerns the security of UNI between end-user functions and service stratum.
+- (IV) focus on security of interface between service stratum and application entity. (IV) concerns the security of ANI between end-user functions and transport functions.
+- (V) focus on security of interface between NGN and other networks which include both transport layer and control layer. (V) concerns the security of NNI between NGN network and other networks.
+
+The principles of [ITU-T X.805] are applicable to the security threats and security requirements identified in this Recommendation.
+
+## 5.1 Security threats
+
+The following security threats are identified in [ITU-T Y.2018]:
+
+- T1 UE can be unauthorized to initiate the mobility signalling with MLM-FE.
+- T2 Mobility signalling can be tampered with by intruders.
+- T3 MLM-FE can be impersonated to provide false information to the UE.
+- T4 The UE location can be eavesdropped by intruders.
+- T5 Traffic redirection attack can happen.
+- T6 Attacker can insert itself on-path by man-in-the-middle attack.
+- T7 DDoS attack can consume a large quantity of network resources.
+- T8 UE can be unauthorized to get information from HDC-FE or NID-FE.
+- T9 HDC-FE or NID-FE can be impersonated to push false information to UE.
+- T10 The signalling between the UE and the HDC-FE or the NID-FE can be modified or eavesdropped.
+- T11 The user plane data can be eavesdropped or modified.
+
+## 5.2 Security requirements
+
+The following security requirements are identified in [ITU-T Y.2018]:
+
+- R1 The UE and NID-FE are required to be mutually authenticated.
+- R2 Signalling between the UE and the MLM-FE is required to be integrity- and confidentiality-protected.
+- R3 Signalling between the UE and the MLM-FE is required to be protected against replay attacks.
+- R4 The location privacy of the UE is required to be provided.
+- R5 The UE and HDC-FE are required to be mutually authenticated.
+- R6 Signalling between the UE and the HDC-FE is required to be integrity- and confidentiality-protected.
+- R7 Signalling between the UE and the HDC-FE is required to be protected against replay attacks.
+- R8 Low-latency authentication and signalling protection is required to be provided.
+- R9 Security context transfer is required to be optimized.
+- R10 The mobility security solution is required to be media independent.
+- R11 Mechanisms are required to be available to protect user plane traffic between the UE and the EN-FE when the user profile so indicates.
+
+In addition to the security requirements identified in [ITU-T Y.2018], the following security requirement is also concerned:
+
+- R12 The security for multi-connection is required to be supported.
+
+# 6 Security capabilities supported by relevant function entities
+
+The functional entities related to mobility security in NGN are as follows:
+
+- Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)
+- Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)
+- Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE)
+- Handover decision control functional entity (HDC-FE)
+
+- Network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE)
+- Access management functional entity (AM-FE)
+- Layer3 handover execute function (L3HEF)
+- Access node functional entity (AN-FE)
+
+### **6.1 Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)**
+
+The TUP-FE stores subscription authentication data such as key material, authentication methods and the user transport profile. The detailed functional description of TUP-FE refers to [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+## **6.2 Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)**
+
+The TAA-FE retrieves authentication data and accesses authorization information from TUP-FE. The TAA-FE can also act as a proxy.
+
+The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+### **6.3 Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE)**
+
+MLM-FE obtains authentication, authorization and accounting information from NACF, performs mutual authentication with the UE, and creates security association between the UE and the MLM-FE. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+## **6.4 Handover decision control functional entity (HDC-FE)**
+
+HDC-FE is required to establish security association with the UE, and obtains a security key used for security association from TAA-FE via TLM-FE. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+## **6.5 Network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE)**
+
+NID-FE is required to establish security association with the UE to protect information such as network selection information. NID-FE can obtain security information from TAA-FE via TLM-FE. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+## **6.6 Access management functional entity (AM-FE)**
+
+The AM-FE forwards network access requests to the TAA-FE to authenticate the user, authorize or deny the network access, and retrieve user-specific access configuration parameters. AM-FE can reuse the network registration/authentication data for fast recovery without performing the whole procedures of the registration/authentication/configuration repeatedly. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+## **6.7 Layer3 handover execute function (L3HEF)**
+
+L3HEF is required to establish security association with the UE to protect traffic between them. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+NOTE – The security of L3HEF addresses the security requirement of user plane traffic protection between the UE and EN-FE.
+
+## **6.8 Access node functional entity (AN-FE)**
+
+AN-FE is required to establish security association with the UE, and it obtains key material from TAA-FE via AM-FE. The detailed functional description refers to [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+# 7 Key management and authentication
+
+## 7.1 Key management framework
+
+Hierarchical key derivation mechanism is used for mobility security in NGN. There are several kinds of key material in NGN, e.g., root key, session key, etc. The root key is one kind of long-term credential stored securely (e.g., shared secret key or password). The session key is one kind of short-term key material that is generated based on root key. Both the UE and authentication entity in NGN (e.g., TAA-FE/TUP-FE) store shared root key.
+
+Usually, session key material is generated based on root key and other key generation parameters such as negotiation information during authentication procedure. Session key material is used to protect signalling traffic and user traffic. Session key can be derived further. The key derivation mechanism depends on the specific cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the generic keying framework for mobility security in NGN. It shows three main functional areas: End-user functions (blue box on the left), Transport control function (green box in the middle), and Transport function (yellow box at the bottom). The End-user functions interact with the Transport control function via three main paths: (I) Authentication, (II) Security associations, and (III) Key material distribution. The Transport control function contains TAA-FE, TUP-FE, AM-FE, TLM-FE, and MMCF. The Transport function contains AN-FE, EN-FE, and ABG-FE. Arrows indicate the flow of key material and authentication vectors between these entities.
+
+Figure 2 – Generic keying framework for mobility security in NGN. The diagram illustrates the key management framework across three layers: End-user functions, Transport control function, and Transport function. The End-user functions (blue box) interact with the Transport control function (green box) via three main paths: (I) Authentication, (II) Security associations, and (III) Key material distribution. The Transport control function contains TAA-FE, TUP-FE, AM-FE, TLM-FE, and MMCF. The Transport function (yellow box) contains AN-FE, EN-FE, and ABG-FE. Arrows show the flow of key material and authentication vectors between these entities.
+
+**Figure 2 – Generic keying framework for mobility security in NGN**
+
+The generic keying framework for mobility security in NGN is described as follows:
+
+- (I) The UE performs mutual authentication procedure with function entities in NGN. In the authentication procedure, the TUP-FE generates authentication vectors based on root key material and sends these authentication vectors to TAA-FE. After the mutual authentication procedure has finished successfully, both the TAA-FE and the UE generate session key material. The session key material can be used to generate sub-session key material. The session key material is transferred to the function entities such as AM-FE, MMCF. Both AM-FE and MMCF can generate sub-session key materials based on the received session key material.
+- (II) The security associations for reference points between the UE and the MMCF are based on session key material from TAA-FE via TLM-FE. The session key material used in (II) is generated or derived according to session key material in TAA-FE.
+- (III) The security associations between the UE and the transport function layer in NGN are established based on shared key material which is generated from the previous session key material in TAA-FE, AM-FE or MMCF. AN-FE receives session key material from TAA-FE via AM-FE. If AM-FE has the capability of deriving session key material, AN-FE can get session key material from AM-FE directly. Both EN-FE and ABG-FE receive key material generated from TAA-FE via TLM-FE and MMCF. If MMCF has the capability of deriving session key material, both EN-FE and ABG-FE can get key material from MMCF.
+
+The authentication procedure is based on challenge-response protocol, e.g., AKA [b-3GPP TS 33.102].
+
+## 7.2 Authentication
+
+### 7.2.1 Generic authentication procedure
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the generic authentication procedure through a sequence of steps and messages between several entities: UE, AR-FE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/ TLM-FE. A dashed box at the top indicates that step 1, 'Control channel is established between UE and AN', is a prerequisite for the subsequent steps.
+
+- Step 1:** Control channel is established between UE and AN (indicated by a dashed box).
+- Step 2:** 'Authentication data request' is sent from AM-FE to TAA-FE.
+- Step 3:** 'User profile fetching' is a bidirectional interaction between TAA-FE and TUP-FE/ TLM-FE.
+- Step 4:** 'Authentication data response' is sent from TAA-FE to AM-FE.
+- Step 5:** 'Authentication request' is sent from AM-FE to UE.
+- Step 6:** 'Authentication response' is sent from UE to AM-FE.
+
+Additional elements in the diagram include a box labeled 'Authenticate network' near the UE and a box labeled 'Authenticate UE' near the TAA-FE. The reference 'Y.2760(1')\_F03' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Sequence diagram of the Generic authentication procedure showing interactions between UE, AR-FE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/ TLM-FE.
+
+**Figure 3 – Generic authentication procedure**
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and the access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation).
+- 2) The AM-FE sends the information of the UE to the TAA-FE to request authentication data.
+- 3) The TAA-FE obtains the authentication information from the authentication request which includes user subscriber ID and access network information, interacts with the TUP-FE/TLM-FE to get user profile and authentication vectors including authentication token and session key material.
+- 4) The TAA-FE sends the authentication data response including the authentication token to the AM-FE.
+- 5) The AM-FE sends the authentication request to the UE. The UE fetches the authentication token from the authentication request, generates local authentication vectors including session key material based on authentication token and root key. The UE authenticates the network by validating the received authentication token.
+- 6) The UE sends the authentication response to the AM-FE including the authentication token generated by the UE. The AM-FE forwards the information to the TAA-FE. The TAA-FE fetches the authentication token, checks the validation of the received authentication token to authenticate the UE.
+
+### 7.2.2 Generic fast re-authentication procedure
+
+Fast re-authentication is used to decrease handover latency. TUP-FE/TLM-FE is not involved in the fast re-authentication procedure, which makes the authentication procedure faster and reduces the load on the TUP-FE/TLM-FE. Both the UE and the authentication entities in NGN are recommended to support generic fast re-authentication.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AR-FE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP_FE_TLM_FE as TUP-FE/TLM-FE
+
+ Note over UE, AR-FE: 1. Control channel is established between UE and AN
+ AM-FE->>TAA-FE: 2. Authentication data request
+ TAA-FE-->>AM-FE: 3. Authentication data response
+ AM-FE->>UE: 4. Authentication request
+ UE-->>AM-FE: 5. Authentication response
+
+ Note left of UE: Authenticate network
+ Note right of TAA-FE: Authenticate UE
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Generic fast re-authentication procedure. The diagram shows five entities: UE, AR-FE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/TLM-FE. The procedure consists of five steps: 1. Control channel establishment between UE and AN (indicated by a dashed box). 2. AM-FE sends 'Authentication data request' to TAA-FE. 3. TAA-FE sends 'Authentication data response' to AM-FE. 4. AM-FE sends 'Authentication request' to UE. 5. UE sends 'Authentication response' to AM-FE. Additionally, there are two boxes: 'Authenticate network' near the UE and 'Authenticate UE' near the TAA-FE, indicating the authentication actions performed by the UE and the network respectively. The reference Y.2760(1')\_F04 is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4 – Generic fast re-authentication procedure**
+
+The following steps are executed with the assumption that the UE and the TAA-FE have the capability of fast re-authentication.
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and the access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation).
+- 2) The AM-FE sends the information of the UE to the TAA-FE to request authentication data.
+- 3) The TAA-FE sends the authentication data response including the authentication token to the AM-FE.
+- 4) The AM-FE sends the authentication request to the UE. The UE fetches the authentication token from the authentication request, generates local authentication vectors including session key material based on the authentication token and root key. The UE authenticates the network by validating the received authentication token.
+- 5) The UE sends the authentication response to the AM-FE including the authentication token generated by the UE. The AM-FE forwards the information to the TAA-FE. The TAA-FE fetches the authentication token, checks the validation of the received authentication token to authenticate the UE.
+
+When the UE reuses session key material, fast re-authentication information is only used for mutual authentication. When the UE does not reuse session key, both the UE and the authentication entity (e.g., TAA-FE/TUP-FE) generate a new session key based on session key material and fast re-authentication information.
+
+##### **7.2.2.1 Optimized fast re-authentication**
+
+For optimized fast re-authentication, a UE which has previously been authenticated by NGN generates authentication information. This procedure is different from generic re-authentication in that the UE first authenticates NGN and then NGN generates an authenticated token.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AR-FE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE_TLM-FE as TUP-FE/TLM-FE
+
+ AM-FE->>UE: 1. Fast re-authentication indication
+ UE->>TAA-FE: 2. Fast re-authentication request
+ activate TAA-FE
+ TAA-FE->>TAA-FE: Authenticate UE
+ deactivate TAA-FE
+ TAA-FE->>UE: 3. Fast re-authentication response
+ activate UE
+ UE->>UE: Authenticate network
+ deactivate UE
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram for Optimized fast re-authentication procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, AR-FE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/TLM-FE. Step 1: AM-FE sends '1. Fast re-authentication indication' to UE. Step 2: UE sends '2. Fast re-authentication request' to TAA-FE via AM-FE. A box labeled 'Authenticate UE' is shown on the TAA-FE lifeline. Step 3: TAA-FE sends '3. Fast re-authentication response' to UE via AM-FE. A box labeled 'Authenticate network' is shown on the UE lifeline. The TUP-FE/TLM-FE lifeline is present but has no messages. Reference: Y.2760(11)\_F05.
+
+**Figure 5 – Optimized fast re-authentication procedure**
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and the access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation). The AM-FE sends optimized re-authentication indication to UE, which indicates that TAA-FE supports optimized fast re-authentication.
+- 2) The UE generates the authentication vector and sends an optimized re-authentication request to the TAA-FE via the AM-FE. The optimized re-authentication request includes an authentication token and re-authentication information. The TAA-FE generates a local authentication vector and a new session key material based on the re-authentication information and session key material. The TAA-FE authenticates the UE by validating the received authentication token.
+- 3) The TAA-FE sends the re-authentication response including the authentication token to the UE via the AM-FE. The UE authenticates the network by its own authentication vector. After authentication has finished successfully, the UE can generate a sub-session key material.
+
+#### 7.2.3 Intra-domain authentication
+
+#### 7.2.3.1 Authentication in single network connection
+
+Single network connection means that the UE can detect a different network, but can access one network at a time. Pre-authentication means the UE mutually authenticates with a target network via the serving network before that UE makes a handover to the target network. When the UE is single network-connection based, the UE uses the pre-authentication to keep service continuity and lower latency. The pre-authentication procedure is similar to the generic authentication procedure. The serving AM-FE and the target AM-FE are involved in the pre-authentication procedure, if necessary.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AR-FE
+ participant Serving-AM-FE as Serving AM-FE
+ participant Target-AM-FE as Target AM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+
+ Note over UE, AR-FE: 1. Control channel is established between UE and AN
+ Serving-AM-FE->>TAA-FE: 2. Authentication data request
+ TAA-FE->>TUP-FE: 3. Fetching user profile
+ TAA-FE-->>Serving-AM-FE: 4. Authentication data response
+ Serving-AM-FE->>UE: 5. Authentication request
+ Note over UE: Authenticate network
+ UE-->>Serving-AM-FE: 6. Authentication response
+ TAA-FE->>Target-AM-FE: 7. Send key material
+ Note over TAA-FE: Authenticate UE
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F06
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Single network-connection based pre-authentication procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, AR-FE, Serving AM-FE, Target AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE. The steps are: 1. Control channel established between UE and AN. 2. Authentication data request from Serving AM-FE to TAA-FE. 3. Fetching user profile from TAA-FE to TUP-FE. 4. Authentication data response from TAA-FE to Serving AM-FE. 5. Authentication request from Serving AM-FE to UE. 6. Authentication response from UE to Serving AM-FE. 7. Send key material from TAA-FE to Target AM-FE. The diagram also includes boxes for 'Authenticate network' and 'Authenticate UE'.
+
+**Figure 6 – Single network-connection based pre-authentication procedure**
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation).
+- 2) AM-FE sends an authentication data request to the TAA-FE which includes subscriber information. The authentication data request is forwarded by the serving AM-FE and the target AM-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE fetches the user profile by interacting with the TUP-FE.
+- 4) The TAA-FE sends the authentication data response to the target AM-FE and the serving AM-FE including the authentication token.
+- 5) The serving AM-FE sends the authentication request to the UE. The UE fetches the authentication token and authenticates the network by its own authentication information. After authentication has finished successfully, the UE generates a session key material.
+- 6) The UE sends the authentication response to the serving AM-FE. The serving AM-FE forwards the information to the target AM-FE and TAA-FE including the authentication token. The TAA-FE retrieves the authentication token and authenticates the UE. After authentication has finished successfully, the TAA-FE generates a session key material which can derive a sub-session key material, if needed.
+- 7) The TAA-FE sends the key material to the target AM-FE which will be used after the UE executes handover to the target network to protect communication between the UE and the target network.
+
+### 7.2.4 Inter-domain authentication
+
+A different administrative domain means a different NGN provider. An authentication procedure is described below for the UE handover between different administrative domains.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AR_FE as AR-FE
+ participant Serving_AM_FE as Serving AM-FE
+ participant Target_AM_FE as Target AM-FE
+ participant Target_TAA_FE as Target TAA-FE
+ participant Home_TAA_FE as Home TAA-FE
+ participant TUP_FE as TUP-FE
+
+ Note over UE, AR_FE: 1. Control channel is established between UE and AN
+ Serving_AM_FE->>Target_TAA_FE: 2. Authentication data request
+ Home_TAA_FE->>TUP_FE: 3. Fetching user profile
+ Target_TAA_FE->>Serving_AM_FE: 4. Authentication data response
+ Serving_AM_FE->>UE: 5. Authentication request
+ Note over UE: Authenticate network
+ UE->>Home_TAA_FE: 6. Authentication response
+ Note over UE: Authenticate UE
+ Home_TAA_FE->>Target_TAA_FE: 7. Send key material
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F07
+
+Sequence diagram showing the authentication procedure between different domains. The diagram involves seven entities: UE, AR-FE, Serving AM-FE, Target AM-FE, Target TAA-FE, Home TAA-FE, and TUP-FE. The steps are: 1. Control channel established between UE and AN. 2. Authentication data request from Serving AM-FE to Target TAA-FE. 3. Fetching user profile from Home TAA-FE to TUP-FE. 4. Authentication data response from Target TAA-FE to Serving AM-FE. 5. Authentication request from Serving AM-FE to UE. 6. Authentication response from UE to Home TAA-FE. 7. Send key material from Home TAA-FE to Target TAA-FE. There are also boxes for 'Authenticate network' and 'Authenticate UE'.
+
+**Figure 7 – Authentication procedure between different domains**
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and the access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation).
+- 2) The serving AM-FE sends the authentication data request to the home TAA-FE including subscriber information. The authentication data request is forwarded by the target AM-FE, and the target TAA-FE. The home TAA-FE fetches the user profile by interacting with the TUP-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE fetches the user profile by interacting with the TUP-FE.
+- 4) The home TAA-FE sends the authentication data response to the serving AM-FE including the authentication token. The authentication data response is forwarded by the target TAA-FE, and the target AM-FE.
+- 5) The serving AM-FE sends the authentication request to the UE. The UE fetches the authentication token and authentication network by its own authentication information. After authentication has finished successfully, the UE generates a session key material.
+- 6) The UE sends the authentication response to the home TAA-FE including the authentication token. The home TAA-FE retrieves the authentication token and authenticates the UE. After authentication has finished successfully, the home TAA-FE generates a session key material which can be used to derive a sub-session key material if needed.
+- 7) After authentication has finished successfully, the home TAA-FE sends the key material to the target TAA-FE which is used after the UE executes the handover from the serving network to the target network to protect communication between the UE and the target network.
+
+#### 7.2.5 Key material mapping mechanism in authentication
+
+When a UE moves from a serving network to a target network, mutual authentication is executed and session key material is generated. NGN supports different key derivation mechanisms and key material mapping is used to coordinate key material used for different key derivation mechanisms.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Serving_AR_FE as Serving AR-FE
+ participant Serving_AM_FE as Serving AM-FE
+ participant TAA_FE as TAA-FE
+ participant Target_AR_FE as Target AR-FE
+ participant Target_AM_FE as Target AM-FE
+
+ UE->>TAA_FE: 1. Authentication
+ UE->>Target_AM_FE: 2. Key material mapping request
+ Target_AM_FE->>TAA_FE: 3. Key material mapping request
+ TAA_FE->>Target_AM_FE: 4. Key material mapping response
+ Target_AM_FE->>UE: 5. Key material mapping response
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F08
+
+Sequence diagram showing the Key material mapping procedure between UE, Serving AR-FE, Serving AM-FE, TAA-FE, Target AR-FE, and Target AM-FE. The steps are: 1. Authentication (UE to TAA-FE), 2. Key material mapping request (UE to Target AM-FE), 3. Key material mapping request (Target AM-FE to TAA-FE), 4. Key material mapping response (TAA-FE to Target AM-FE), and 5. Key material mapping response (Target AM-FE to UE).
+
+**Figure 8 – Key material mapping procedure**
+
+- 1) Connection is established between the UE and the TAA-FE, the authentication procedure has finished and session key material is generated.
+- 2) The UE detects a target network and prepares handover to the target network. The UE sends a key material mapping request to the target AM-FE. The key material mapping request includes mapping information such as current key derivation mechanism and supported key derivation mechanism.
+- 3) The target AM-FE sends the key material mapping request to the TAA-FE.
+- 4) The TAA-FE receives the key material mapping request and maps the key material in the serving network to key material in the target network, and sends the key material mapping response to the target AM-FE.
+- 5) The target AM-FE sends the mapping response to the UE. The UE maps the key material in the serving network to the target key material in the target network. Both the UE and the TAA-FE have shared the target key material in the target network, which is used to protect traffic between the UE and the target network.
+
+#### 7.2.6 Multiple network access-based authentication
+
+Multiple network access-based authentication means that the UE has the capability of communicating with multiple access networks simultaneously. When the UE has multiple network access capabilities, the UE connects to the target network and executes a mutual authentication procedure before disconnecting from the serving network. Mutual authentication is generic authentication, as depicted in Figure 3. After mutual authentication has finished successfully, both the UE and the TAA-FE generate a shared session key material, and the TAA-FE sends a session key material to the target AM-FE. When the UE moves to the target network, traffic between the UE and the target network is protected by the session key material or its sub-key material.
+
+#### 7.2.7 Multi-connection based authentication
+
+Multi-connection means that the UE keeps more than one network connections simultaneously. Different types of network connections may provide users with different user experiences, such as broad bandwidth, low time delay, and high security. The case of multiple connections to different administrative domains is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AR-FE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE_TLM-FE as TUP-FE/TLM-FE
+ participant AN as Authenticate network
+ participant UE_auth as Authenticate UE
+
+ Note over UE, AR-FE: 1. Control channel is established between UE and AN
+ AM-FE->>TAA-FE: 2. Authentication data request (subscriber info, multi-access info)
+ TAA-FE->>TUP-FE_TLM-FE: 3. Fetching user profile
+ TUP-FE_TLM-FE-->>TAA-FE:
+ TAA-FE-->>AM-FE: 4. Authentication data response
+ AM-FE->>UE: 5. Authentication request
+ UE->>AM-FE: 6. Authentication response
+ Note over UE: Authenticate network
+ Note over TAA-FE: Authenticate UE
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F09
+
+Sequence diagram for Multi-connection based authentication. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, AR-FE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/TLM-FE. Step 1: Control channel established between UE and AN. Step 2: AM-FE sends authentication data request to TAA-FE. Step 3: TAA-FE fetches user profile from TUP-FE/TLM-FE. Step 4: TAA-FE sends authentication data response to AM-FE. Step 5: AM-FE sends authentication request to UE. Step 6: UE sends authentication response to AM-FE. The UE authenticates the network and generates a session key material. The AM-FE forwards the information to TAA-FE, which authenticates the UE and generates a session key material.
+
+**Figure 9 – Multi-connection based authentication**
+
+- 1) The control channel between the UE and the access network functions is established (the procedure is out of the scope of this Recommendation). The UE gets information from the access network and indication of supporting multi-access authentication.
+- 2) The AM-FE sends an authentication data request to the TAA-FE. The authentication data request includes the UE information such as subscriber information (e.g., user subscriber ID); multi-access information (e.g., multi-access indication and multiple access interface ID).
+- 3) The TAA-FE obtains the authentication information and interacts with the TUP-FE/TLM-FE to get user profile and authentication vector. An authentication vector is generated in the TUP-FE/TLM-FE. The authentication token is included in authentication vector.
+- 4) TAA-FE sends the authentication data response, including the authentication token to the AM-FE.
+- 5) The AM-FE sends the authentication request to the UE. The UE generates local authentication tokens based on the authentication information in the authentication request message. The UE authenticates the network by checking the validation of the received authentication token according to local authentication tokens. After authentication has finished successfully, the UE generates a session key material based on the authentication information. If multi-access indication is set, the UE generates multiple session key materials based on multi-access information.
+- 6) The UE sends the authentication response message to the AM-FE. The AM-FE forwards the information to the TAA-FE including the authentication token generated by the UE. The TAA-FE fetches the authentication token in the authentication response message and authenticates the UE, based on the authentication vector in the TAA-FE. After authentication has finished successfully, the TAA-FE generates a session key material according to the authentication token. If multi-access indication is set, the TAA-FE generates multiple session key materials based on multi-access information.
+
+# 8 Establishment of security context
+
+## 8.1 Security context transfer between serving AM-FE and target AM-FE
+
+The traffic of security context transfer between the serving AM-FE and the target AM-FE should be protected. The security between the serving AM-FE and the target AM-FE is achieved by establishing a security association. If the two AM-FEs are in the same zone, the security association
+
+is not required. If the two AM-FEs are in a different zone, such as in different operator domains, the security association is created by the security mechanism and the operator's policy or agreement.
+
+## 8.2 Security context transfer between serving AR-FE and target AR-FE
+
+When the UE makes a handover between the serving AR-FE and the target AR-FE, the traffic of security context transfer between the target AR-FE and the serving AR-FE shall be protected. The security for security context transfer between the serving AR-FE and the target AR-FE is achieved by a establishing security association.
+
+## 8.3 Security context transfer between UE and HDC-FE
+
+#### 8.3.1 Host-initiated security context transfer
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+ participant TLM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant Target_AM-FE as Target AM-FE
+ participant Serving_AM-FE as Serving AM-FE
+
+ UE->>HDC-FE: 1. Handover request
+ HDC-FE->>NID-FE: 2. Retrieve handover information
+ HDC-FE->>Serving_AM-FE: 3. Security context transfer request
+ Serving_AM-FE->>Target_AM-FE: 4. Security context transfer
+ Target_AM-FE-->>Serving_AM-FE:
+ Serving_AM-FE-->>HDC-FE: 5. Security context transfer response
+ Serving_AM-FE->>UE: 6. Handover confirmation
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F10
+
+Sequence diagram for Host-initiated security context transfer procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, HDC-FE, NID-FE, TLM-FE, TAA-FE, Target AM-FE, and Serving AM-FE. The steps are: 1. Handover request from UE to HDC-FE; 2. Retrieve handover information from HDC-FE to NID-FE; 3. Security context transfer request from HDC-FE to Serving AM-FE; 4. Security context transfer from Serving AM-FE to Target AM-FE; 5. Security context transfer response from Target AM-FE to Serving AM-FE; 6. Handover confirmation from Serving AM-FE to UE.
+
+**Figure 10 – Host-initiated security context transfer procedure**
+
+When the UE decides to achieve a handover from the serving network to the target network, the UE sends a handover request to the HDC-FE which triggers a security context transfer. After the security context transfer has finished, the target AM-FE uses the security context to protect the traffic between the UE and the target network. The steps are as follows:
+
+- 1) The UE sends a handover request to the HDC-FE.
+- 2) The HDC-FE receives the handover request, interacts with the NID-FE to get the handover-related information.
+- 3) The HDC-FE forwards the handover request, including the handover-related information to the serving AM-FE.
+- 4) The serving AM-FE interacts with the target AM-FE to transfer the security context.
+- 5) When the security context transfer is finished, the serving AM-FE sends the security context transfer response to the HDC-FE.
+- 6) The HDC-FE receives the security context transfer response. If the security context transfer has finished successfully, the HDC-FE sends the handover confirmation to the UE.
+
+### 8.3.2 Network-initiated security context transfer
+
+When the HDC-FE decides to trigger the UE to achieve a handover from the serving network to the target network, the HDC-FE sends a handover bootstrapping message to trigger security context transfer. After security context transfer has finished, the target AM-FE uses the security context to protect traffic between the UE and the target network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant Target_AM-FE as Target AM-FE
+ participant Serving_AM-FE as Serving AM-FE
+
+ HDC-FE->>Serving_AM-FE: 1. Handover bootstrap start
+ Serving_AM-FE->>Target_AM-FE: 2. Security context transfer
+ Target_AM-FE-->>Serving_AM-FE:
+ Serving_AM-FE->>HDC-FE: 3. Handover bootstrap finish
+ HDC-FE->>UE: 4. Handover request
+ UE->>HDC-FE: 5. Handover confirmation
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F11
+
+Sequence diagram for Network-initiated security context transfer procedure (Figure 11).
+
+**Figure 11 – Network-initiated security context transfer procedure**
+
+- 1) The HDC-FE prepares for handover procedure and sends a handover bootstrap start message to the serving AM-FE to trigger security context transfer.
+- 2) The serving AM-FE interacts with the target AM-FE to transfer security context.
+- 3) When security context transfer is finished, the serving AM-FE sends the handover bootstrap finish message to the HDC-FE.
+- 4) When HDC-FE receives the handover bootstrap finish message, it begins the handover procedure by sending a handover request to the UE.
+- 5) The UE sends the handover confirmation message when handover is finished.
+
+# 9 IP mobility security
+
+## 9.1 Host-based mobility security
+
+Host-based mobility control traffic between the UE and MLM-FE (C) is required to be protected. The security association (SA) is required to be created between the UE and the MLM-FE(C). The SA between the UE and the MLM-FE (P) is optional.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant MLM-FE_P as MLM-FE(P)
+ participant MLM-FE_C as MLM-FE(C)
+ participant TAA_FE_TUP_FE as TAA-FE/TUP-FE
+
+ Note over UE, TAA_FE_TUP_FE: Mutual authentication procedure
+ UE->>MLM-FE_P: 1. Registration request
+ MLM-FE_P->>MLM-FE_C: 1a. Registration request
+ MLM-FE_C->>TAA_FE_TUP_FE: 2. Registration request
+ TAA_FE_TUP_FE-->>MLM-FE_C: 3. AAA interactions
+ TAA_FE_TUP_FE->>MLM-FE_C: 4. Registration reply
+ MLM-FE_C-->>MLM-FE_P: 4a. Registration reply
+ MLM-FE_P->>UE: 5. Registration reply
+ Note left of UE: 6. UE validates security information
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F12
+
+Sequence diagram for Host-based mobility procedure (Figure 12).
+
+**Figure 12 – Host-based mobility procedure**
+
+The following steps are executed with the assumption that the UE and the TAA-FE have finished the generic authentication procedure.
+
+- 1) The UE sends a registration request to the MLM-FE(P). The registration request includes security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(C), and security information between the UE and MLM-FE(P).
+ - 1a. If the MLM-FE(P) does not exist, the UE sends a registration request to the MLM-FE(C) directly.
+- 2) The MLM-FE(P) validates the security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(P) and forwards the registration request to the MLM-FE(C). The MLM-FE(P) may add security information between the MLM-FE(P) and the MLM-FE(C) to the registration request message before forwarding it.
+- 3) MLM-FE(C) interacts with TAA-FE/TUP-FE to get the authentication information and authorization information.
+- 4) MLM-FE(C) validates the security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(C) in the registration request. The MLM-FE(C) sends the registration reply and security information to the MLM-FE(P). The registration reply may include security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(C), and security information between the MLM-FE(P) and the MLM-FE(C).
+ - 4a. If MLM-FE (P) does not exist, MLM-FE(C) sends the registration reply to the UE directly. The registration reply may include security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(C).
+- 5) MLM-FE(P) validates the security information between the MLM-FE(P) and the MLM-FE(C) and sends the registration reply to the UE. MLM-FE(P) may add security information between the UE and MLM-FE(P) to the registration reply message before forwarding it.
+- 6) MLM-FE(C) validates the security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(C), and creates the SA between the UE and the MLM-FE(C). If the MLM-FE(P) exists, the UE validates the security information between the UE and the MLM-FE(P) and creates the SA between the UE and the MLM-FE(P).
+
+## 9.2 Network-based mobility security
+
+The protection for network-based mobility control traffic between two network entities in trust zone, or trust but vulnerable zone, is optional and based on the operator's policy. The security mechanisms for network-based mobility control traffic are based on security mechanisms in [ITU-T Y.2704].
+
+# 10 Security between UE and HDC-FE
+
+The information flow between the UE and the HDC-FE is used to carry information to make the handover decision. The UE and the HDC-FE should establish a security association to protect the information flow between the UE and the HDC-FE.
+
+## 10.1 Host-initiated security association establishment between UE and HDC-FE
+
+The host-initiated security association establishment procedure means that the UE triggers the procedure to create security association between the UE and the HDC-FE, which is depicted in Figure 13. There are two pre-conditions for host-initiated security association establishment between the UE and the HDC-FE. First, the UE and the TAA-FE have a pre-shared key material. The pre-shared key material can be achieved after mutual authentication procedure. Second, the UE knows the HDC-FE information, such as address, by which the UE sends a security association request to the HDC-FE. The way in which the UE obtains the HDC-FE information is out of the scope of this Recommendation. The TLM-FE is used to relay the key material information to/from the TAA-FE; this is omitted in the following figure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+
+ UE->>HDC-FE: 1. Security association request
+ HDC-FE->>TAA-FE: 2. Key material request
+ TAA-FE->>TUP-FE: 3. Fetching user profile information
+ TAA-FE->>HDC-FE: 4. Key material response
+ HDC-FE->>UE: 5. Security association response
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F13
+
+Sequence diagram for Host-initiated security association establishment procedure. The diagram shows five entities: UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE. The steps are: 1. UE sends '1. Security association request' to HDC-FE. 2. HDC-FE sends '2. Key material request' to TAA-FE. 3. TAA-FE sends '3. Fetching user profile information' to TUP-FE. 4. TAA-FE sends '4. Key material response' to HDC-FE. 5. HDC-FE sends '5. Security association response' to UE. NID-FE has a vertical line but no messages.
+
+**Figure 13 – Host-initiated security association establishment procedure**
+
+- 1) The UE generates a shared key material for creating an association with the HDC-FE, according to the authentication information. The UE sends the security association request to the HDC-FE, including authentication information and UE information.
+- 2) The HDC-FE sends the key material request to the TAA-FE, including HDC-FE information, authentication information and UE information.
+- 3) The TAA-FE fetches user profiles information by interacting with the TUP-FE and checks that HDC-FE is authorized to create a security association with the UE.
+- 4) The TAA-FE generates key material for HDC-FE, according to authentication information, HDC-FE information, and UE information when the HDC-FE has authorization to create a security association with the UE. The TAA-FE sends a key material response to the HDC-FE, including such information as key material for HDC-FE, key lifetime.
+- 5) The HDC-FE sends the security association response to inform that security association between UE and HDC-FE is established.
+
+## 10.2 Network-initiated security association establishment between UE and HDC-FE
+
+The network-initiated security association establishment procedure means that the network side triggers the procedure to create a security association between the UE and the HDC-FE, which is depicted in Figure 14. There are two pre-conditions for network-initiated security association establishment between the UE and the HDC-FE. First, the UE and the TAA-FE have a shared key material. The shared session key material can be generated after mutual authentication procedure. Second, the HDC-FE knows the UE information such as subscriber information or location information by which the HDC-FE sends the security association information to the UE. The way in which to get the UE information for HDC-FE is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+
+ HDC-FE->>TAA-FE: 1. Network-initiate bootstrap request
+ TAA-FE->>TUP-FE: 2. Fetching user profile information
+ TAA-FE->>HDC-FE: 3. Network-initiate bootstrap response
+ HDC-FE->>UE: 4. Security association information
+ Note over UE, HDC-FE: 5. Establish SA based on shared key materials
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F14
+
+Sequence diagram for Network-initiated security association establishment procedure. The diagram shows five entities: UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE. The steps are: 1. HDC-FE sends '1. Network-initiate bootstrap request' to TAA-FE. 2. TAA-FE sends '2. Fetching user profile information' to TUP-FE. 3. TAA-FE sends '3. Network-initiate bootstrap response' to HDC-FE. 4. HDC-FE sends '4. Security association information' to UE. 5. A wide double-headed arrow labeled '5. Establish SA based on shared key materials' spans from UE to HDC-FE. NID-FE has a vertical line but no messages.
+
+**Figure 14 – Network-initiated security association establishment procedure**
+
+- 1) The HDC-FE sends a network-initiate bootstrap request to the TAA-FE, including HDC-FE information and UE information.
+
+- 2) The TAA-FE fetches the user-profile information by interacting with the TUP-FE and checks that HDC-FE is authorized to initiate creating a security association with the UE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE generates a key material for HDC-FE, according to HDC-FE information and UE information when HDC-FE has authorization to initiate creating a security association with the UE. TAA-FE sends the network-initiate bootstrap response to the HDC-FE, including the authentication information such as key material for HDC-FE and its lifetime.
+- 4) HDC-FE sends the security association information, including authentication information to the UE to create a security association.
+- 5) The UE generates key material for HDC-FE, according to the authentication information in security association information and validates the security association information. Security association is created between the HDC-FE and the UE.
+
+## 10.3 Security association pre-establishment between UE and HDC-FE based on PKI
+
+Security association establishment procedure between UE and HDC-FE based on PKI is depicted in Figure 15. The pre-condition for security association establishment procedure between UE and HDC-FE is that UE knows HDC-FE information, such as address by which UE sends security association request to HDC-FE. The way in which UE gets HDC-FE information is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+
+ UE->>HDC-FE: 1. Security association request
+ HDC-FE->>TAA-FE: 2. Authorization request
+ TAA-FE->>HDC-FE: 3. Authorization response
+ HDC-FE->>UE: 4. Security association response
+ UE->>HDC-FE: 5. Security association request
+ HDC-FE->>UE: 6. Security association response
+ NID-FE
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F15
+
+Sequence diagram showing the security association establishment procedure between UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE. The diagram illustrates six steps: 1. Security association request from UE to HDC-FE; 2. Authorization request from HDC-FE to TAA-FE; 3. Authorization response from TAA-FE to HDC-FE; 4. Security association response from HDC-FE to UE; 5. Security association request from UE to HDC-FE; 6. Security association response from HDC-FE to UE. NID-FE is shown as a participant but has no messages.
+
+**Figure 15 – Security association establishment procedure based on PKI**
+
+- 1) The UE sends a security association request to the HDC-FE, including UE certificate and UE information.
+- 2) The HDC-FE validates the UE certificate and sends an authorization request, including UE information and HDC-FE information to the TAA-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE checks the authorization based on UE information and HDC-FE information. If the UE is authorized to use HDC-FE, the TAA-FE sends an authorization response to the HDC-FE, including authorization information and server certificate.
+- 4) The HDC-FE receives the authorization information and sends a security association response to the UE, including server certificate.
+- 5) If a shared key material is needed between the UE and the TAA-FE, the TAA-FE sends key generation information to the UE in step 4. The UE generates a shared key material based on the received key generation information and local key generation information. The UE sends local key generation information to the HDC-FE.
+- 6) The HDC-FE generates key material based on the received key generation information and local key generated information. The HDC-FE sends the security association response to the UE. Security association between the UE and the HDC-FE is established.
+
+# 11 Security between UE and NID-FE
+
+## 11.1 Host-initiated security association establishment between UE and NID-FE
+
+Host-initiated security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE is depicted in Figure 16. The pre-conditions for security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE are as follows: 1) the UE and the TAA-FE have a shared key material. The shared session key material can be generated after mutual authentication procedure. 2) The UE knows NID-FE information, such as address by which the UE sends a security association request to the NID-FE. The way in which UE obtains NID-FE information is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+
+ UE->>NID-FE: 1. Security association request
+ Note over TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, NID-FE: 2a. Key material request
+ Note over TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, NID-FE: 2b. Key material request
+ TAA-FE->>TUP-FE: 3. Fetching authentication info
+ Note over TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, NID-FE: 4a. Key material response
+ Note over TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, NID-FE: 4b. Key material response
+ NID-FE->>UE: 5. Security association response
+ Note over UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, NID-FE: 6. Establish SA based on shared key materials
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for host-initiated security association establishment. It involves five entities: UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE. The process begins with the UE sending a security association request to the NID-FE. This is followed by a series of key material requests and responses between the TAA-FE, TUP-FE, and NID-FE, with the HDC-FE acting as a relay for some messages. The process concludes with the NID-FE sending a security association response to the UE, which then establishes the security association based on the shared key materials.
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F16
+
+Sequence diagram showing the host-initiated security association establishment procedure between UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE.
+
+**Figure 16 – Host-initiated security association establishment**
+
+- 1) The UE sends a security association request to the NID-FE.
+- 2) The NID-FE sends a key material request to the TAA-FE, including NID-FE information and UE information. When the NID-FE does not support sending an authentication request to the TAA-FE directly, the NID-FE sends an authentication request to the TAA-FE via HDC-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE interacts with the TUP-FE and generates key material for NID-FE.
+- 4) The TAA-FE sends the key material response to the HDC-FE, including authentication information. Authentication information includes shared key material and its lifetime. When the TAA-FE does not support sending an authentication request to the NID-FE directly, the TAA-FE sends authentication request to the NID-FE via the HDC-FE.
+- 5) The NID-FE sends the security association response, including authentication information to the UE protected by the shared key material.
+- 6) The UE generates the shared key material and validates the security association response. Security association is created by the NID-FE and the UE based on the shared key material.
+
+## 11.2 Network-initiated security association establishment between UE and NID-FE
+
+Network-initiated security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE is depicted in Figure 17. The pre-conditions for security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE are as follows: 1) the UE and TAA-FE have a shared key material. The shared session key material can be generated after mutual authentication procedure. 2) The UE knows the NID-FE information such as address by which the UE sends the security association request to the NID-FE. The way in which the UE obtains the NID-FE information is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the network-initiated security association establishment procedure between a UE and a NID-FE, involving TAA-FE, TUP-FE, and HDC-FE. The sequence of steps is as follows:
+
+- 1a. SA bootstrapping request:** NID-FE sends to TAA-FE.
+- 1b. SA bootstrapping request:** NID-FE sends to HDC-FE, which then forwards it to TAA-FE.
+- 2. Fetching authentication info:** TAA-FE interacts with TUP-FE.
+- 3a. SA bootstrapping response:** TAA-FE sends to NID-FE.
+- 3b. SA bootstrapping response:** TAA-FE sends to HDC-FE, which then forwards it to NID-FE.
+- 4. Security association information:** NID-FE sends to UE.
+- 5. Security association response:** UE sends to NID-FE.
+
+Y.2760(1')\_F17
+
+Sequence diagram for Network-initiated security association establishment between UE and NID-FE.
+
+**Figure 17 – Network-initiated security association establishment**
+
+- 1) The NID-FE sends a SA bootstrapping request to the TAA-FE, including NID-FE information. When the NID-FE does not support sending a SA bootstrapping request to the TAA-FE directly, the NID-FE sends a SA bootstrapping request to the TAA-FE via the HDC-FE.
+- 2) The TAA-FE interacts with the TUP-FE and generates a key material for the NID-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE sends a SA bootstrapping response to the NID-FE, including authentication information. The authentication information includes key material and its lifetime. When the TAA-FE does not support sending a SA bootstrapping response to the NID-FE directly, the TAA-FE sends a SA bootstrapping response to the NID-FE via the HDC-FE.
+- 4) The NID-FE sends the security association information, including authentication information to the UE protected by the shared key material.
+- 5) The UE generates the shared key material and validates the security association information. The security association is created by the NID-FE and the UE based on the shared key material.
+
+## 11.3 Security association establishment between UE and NID-FE based on PKI
+
+The security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE based on the PKI is depicted in Figure 18. The pre-condition for the security association establishment procedure between the UE and the NID-FE is that the UE knows NID-FE information, such as address by which the UE sends the security association request to the NID-FE. The way in which the UE obtains the NID-FE information is out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP-FE
+ participant HDC-FE
+ participant NID-FE
+
+ Note over UE, TUP-FE: Authentication procedure
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 1. Security association request
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 2. Authorization request
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 3. Authorization response
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 4. Security association response
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 5. Security association request
+ Note over TAA-FE, NID-FE: 6. Security association response
+ Note over UE, TUP-FE: 7. Establish SA based on shared key materials
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the security association establishment procedure based on PKI. It involves five entities: UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE. The procedure starts with an authentication procedure between UE and TUP-FE. Then, TAA-FE sends a security association request (1) to NID-FE, followed by an authorization request (2). NID-FE responds with an authorization response (3), and TAA-FE sends a security association response (4) to NID-FE. Next, TAA-FE sends a security association request (5) to NID-FE, which responds with a security association response (6). Finally, UE and TUP-FE establish the security association (7) based on shared key materials. A shaded gray box highlights steps 5 and 6. The reference Y.2760(11)\_F18 is noted at the bottom right.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the security association establishment procedure based on PKI between UE, TAA-FE, TUP-FE, HDC-FE, and NID-FE.
+
+**Figure 18 – Security association establishment procedure based on PKI**
+
+After the authentication procedure between the TUP-FE and the TAA-FE is completed, the following steps are performed:
+
+- 1) The UE sends a security association request to the NID-FE, including the UE certificate and UE information.
+- 2) The NID-FE validates the UE certificate and sends an authorization request, including UE information and NID-FE information, to the TAA-FE.
+- 3) The TAA-FE checks the authorization based on the UE information and the NID-FE information. If the UE is authorized to use the NID-FE, the TAA-FE sends an authorization response to NID-FE, including authorization information and server certificate.
+- 4) The NID-FE receives the authorization information and sends a security association response to the UE, including server certificate.
+- 5) If a shared key material is needed between the UE and the TAA-FE, the TAA-FE sends the key generation information to the UE in step 4. The UE generates shared key material based on the received key generation information and the local key generation information. The UE sends the local key generation information to the NID-FE as part of a security association request.
+- 6) The NID-FE generates the key material based on the received key generation information and the local key generated information. The NID-FE sends the security association response to the UE.
+- 7) The security association between the UE and the NID-FE is established.
+
+# **12 Security for transport functions**
+
+## **12.1 Security between UE and access node function entity**
+
+The traffic between the UE and the AN-FE should be protected. The security association between the UE and the AN-FE is based on the shared key material. When the authentication procedure between the UE and the TAA-FE has finished successfully, both the UE and the TAA-FE generate a key material such as session key for protecting traffic between the UE and the AN-FE. The TAA-FE sends the key material to the AN-FE via the AM-FE, and AR-FE.
+
+## 12.2 Security between UE and L3HEF (Layer3 Handover Execute Function)
+
+The traffic between the UE and the L3HEF should be protected. The security association between the UE and the L3HEF is based on the pre-shared key material. When mutual authentication is finished successfully, both the UE and the TAA-FE generate the key material such as session key for protecting traffic between the UE and L3HEF. L3HEF obtains the key material from TAA-FE directly. L3HEF also obtains the key material from the TAA-FE via the AM-FE or the HDC-FE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant MLMF-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant L3HEF
+
+ Note over UE, TAA-FE: 1. Authentication and authorization
+ Note over UE, MLMF-FE: 2. Host based mobility registration request
+ Note over MLMF-FE, TAA-FE: 3. AAA interactions
+ Note over MLMF-FE, UE: 4. Host based mobility registration response
+ Note over TAA-FE, MLMF-FE: 5a. Traffic key materials
+ Note over TAA-FE, AM-FE: 5b. Traffic key materials
+ Note over TAA-FE, L3HEF: 5c. Traffic key materials
+ Note over UE, L3HEF: 6. Protect user plane traffic based on SA
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F19
+
+Sequence diagram showing the user plane traffic security procedure between UE, AM-FE, MLMF-FE, TAA-FE, and L3HEF. The steps are: 1. Authentication and authorization between UE and TAA-FE. 2. Host based mobility registration request from UE to MLMF-FE. 3. AAA interactions between MLMF-FE and TAA-FE. 4. Host based mobility registration response from MLMF-FE to UE. 5a. Traffic key materials from TAA-FE to MLMF-FE. 5b. Traffic key materials from TAA-FE to AM-FE. 5c. Traffic key materials from TAA-FE to L3HEF. 6. Protect user plane traffic based on SA between UE and L3HEF.
+
+**Figure 19 – User plane traffic security between UE and L3HEF procedure**
+
+- 1) Connection is established between the UE and the TAA-FE. After the mutual authentication is finished, the both UE and the TAA-FE have a shared key material such as transient key material and session key material.
+- 2) The UE sends a host-based mobility registration request to the MLM-FE to create a host-based mobility security association.
+- 3) The MLM-FE obtains the key material by interacting with the TAA-FE. The MLM-FE authenticates the UE based on the key material. After authentication has finished successfully, the MLM-FE creates a security association with the UE based on the key material.
+- 4) The MLM-FE sends a host-based mobility registration response to the UE. The UE validates the host-based mobility registration response message and creates a security association with the MLM-FE.
+- 5) After the security associations between the UE and the MLM-FE are created, three situations will have occurred:
+ - 5a. The TAA-FE generates the traffic key material, and sends the traffic key material to the L3HEF via the MLM-FE.
+ - 5b. The TAA-FE generates the traffic key material and sends the traffic key material to the L3HEF via the MLM-FE and the AM-FE.
+ - 5c. The TAA-FE sends the traffic key material to the L3HEF directly.
+- 6) The L3HEF uses the traffic key material to protect user plane traffic between the UE and the L3HEF.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+(This appendix forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 Example of full authentication procedure
+
+
+
+The diagram shows the following steps:
+
+1. Connection established (between UE and AM-FE)
+2. EAP-REQ/identity (from AM-FE to UE)
+3. EAP-RSP/identity (from UE to AM-FE)
+4. AAA (EAP-RSP/identity) (from AM-FE to TAA-FE)
+- Get user profile (process in TAA-FE involving TUP-FE/TLM-FE)
+5. EAP method (EAP-TTLSv0, EAP-AKA or EAP-TLS, etc.) (from TAA-FE to UE)
+- Master session key (MSK) established in MS and AAA server (indicated by a dashed line between TAA-FE and AM-FE)
+6. AAA (EAP-success) (from TAA-FE to AM-FE)
+7. EAP-success (from AM-FE to UE)
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F1.1
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the full authentication procedure between UE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP-FE/TLM-FE.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Full authentication procedure**
+
+NOTE – The identity in step 2-4 refers to UE Identity.
+
+The bootstrapping for authentication is depicted in Figure I.1:
+
+- 1) Connection is established between the UE and the AM-FE.
+- 2) The AM-FE sends an EAP Request (EAP-REQ)/Identity to the UE [b-IETF RFC 3748].
+- 3) The UE sends an EAP Response (EAP-RSP)/Identity message.
+- 4) The AM-FE forwards the EAP-RSP/Identity towards the TAA-FE; afterwards, the TAA-FE exchanges information with TUP-FE/TLM-FE, and TUP-FE/TLM-FE sends user information, including the profile, to the TAA-FE.
+- 5) The key derivation and distribution process are executed in the TAA-FE and the UE. Several methods can be considered, such as EAP-TTLS, EAP-AKA, EAP-TLS, etc.
+- 6) The TAA-FE sends the EAP Success message to the AM-FE.
+- 7) The AM-FE informs the UE of the successful authentication with the EAP Success message. Now the key exchange process, based on the EAP, has been successfully completed, and the UE and AM-FE share the keying material derived during that exchange.
+
+## I.2 Example of fast re-authentication procedure
+
+When handover occurs, fast re-authentication can keep the continuity of service in low latency. Fast re-authentication needs to use a fast re-authentication id, and it does not need to exchange authentication information between the TAA-FE and the TUP-FE/TLM-FE.
+
+The general procedure of fast re-authentication is shown as follows.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant TAA-FE
+ participant TUP_TLM_FE as TUP/TLM-FE
+
+ Note over UE, AM-FE: 1. Connection established
+ AM-FE->>UE: 2. EAP-REQ/identity
+ UE->>AM-FE: 3. EAP-RSP/identity
+ AM-FE->>TAA-FE: 4. AAA (EAP-RSP/identity)
+ Note over AM-FE, TAA-FE: 5. EAP method (EAP-TTLSv0, EAP-AKA or EAP-TLS, etc.)
+ Note over AM-FE, TAA-FE: Master session key (MSK) established in MS and AAA server
+ TAA-FE->>AM-FE: 6. AAA (EAP-success)
+ AM-FE->>UE: 7. EAP-success
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(11)\_F1.2
+
+Sequence diagram of the Fast re-authentication procedure involving UE, AM-FE, TAA-FE, and TUP/TLM-FE.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Fast re-authentication procedure**
+
+- 1) Connection is established between the UE and the AM-FE.
+- 2) The AM-FE sends an EAP-REQ/Identity to the UE, carrying the re-authentication id.
+- 3) The UE sends an EAP Response/Identity message.
+- 4) The AM-FE forwards the EAP-RSP/Identity towards the TAA-FE.
+- 5) The key derivation and distribution process are executed. Several methods can be considered, such as EAP-AKA, EAP-TLS, etc.
+- 6) The TAA-FE sends the EAP Success message to the AM-FE.
+- 7) The AM-FE informs the UE of the successful authentication with the EAP Success message. Now the key exchange process, based on EAP, has been successfully completed, and the UE and the AM-FE share the keying material derived during that exchange.
+
+## I.3 Example of host-based mobility
+
+For MIPv4, the IP mobility security is based on MIP authentication extensions as defined in [b-IETF RFC 3344]. The IP mobility signalling messages shall be protected between the UE and the node acting as a HA (i.e., MLM-FE) using the MIP authentication extensions, and optionally between the UE and the node acting as a FA (i.e., MLM-FE).
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant MLMFE_P as MLM-FE(P)
+ participant MLMFE_C as MLM-FE(C)
+ participant TAAFE_TUPFE as TAA-FE/TUP-FE
+
+ Note over UE, MLMFE_P: 1. Authentication and authorization
+ Note over MLMFE_P, TAAFE_TUPFE: 1. Authentication and authorization
+ Note over UE, MLMFE_P: 2. MIPv4 registration request [MN-HA AE and MN-FA AE]
+ Note over UE, MLMFE_P: 3. Authentication and authorization
+ Note over MLMFE_P, TAAFE_TUPFE: 3. Authentication and authorization
+ Note over MLMFE_P, MLMFE_C: 4. MIPv4 registration request [MN-HA AE]
+ Note over MLMFE_C, TAAFE_TUPFE: 5. AAA interactions
+ Note over MLMFE_C, MLMFE_P: 6. MIPv4 registration reply [MN-HA AE]
+ Note over MLMFE_P, UE: 7. MIPv4 registration reply [MN-HA AE and MN-FA AE]
+ Note over UE: 8. UE validates the AE(s)
+
+```
+
+Y.2760(1\*)\_F1.3
+
+Sequence diagram of the MIPv4 bootstrapping procedure involving UE, MLM-FE(P), MLM-FE(C), and TAA-FE/TUP-FE.
+
+**Figure I.3 – MIPv4 bootstrapping procedure**
+
+The MIPv4 bootstrapping procedure depicted in Figure I.3 is as follows:
+
+- 1) Authentication and authorization are created between the UE and the MLM-FE with the help of the TAA-FE/TUP-FE.
+- 2) The UE sends a Registration Request (RRQ) message to the FA (MLM-FE). The UE includes the MN-HA authentication extension (AE) and optionally the MN-FA authentication extension (AE) as specified in [b-IETF RFC 3344].
+- 3) The RRQ triggers the access authentication procedure.
+- 4) The FA processes the message according to [b-IETF RFC 3344] and validates the MN-FA authentication extension, if present. The FA then forwards the RRQ message to the HA (MLM-FE).
+- 5) The selected MLM-FE obtains the authentication and authorization information from the TAA-FE/TUP-FE.
+- 6) The MLM-FE validates the MN-HA authentication extension. After successful authentication extension validation, the MLM-FE sends a Registration Reply (RRP) to the UE through the FA.
+- 7) The FA processes the RRP according to [b-IETF RFC 3344]. The FA then forwards the RRP message to the UE. The FA includes the MN-FA authentication extension, if the FA received the MN-FA authentication extension in the RRQ message.
+- 8) The UE validates the MN-HA authentication extension and MN-FA authentication extension, if present.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-IETF RFC 3220] IETF RFC 3220 (2002), *IP Mobility Support for IPv4*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3344] IETF RFC 3344 (2002), *IP Mobility Support for IPv4*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3748] IETF RFC 3748 (2004), *Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3775] IETF RFC 3775 (2004), *Mobility Support in IPv6*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4555] IETF RFC 4555 (2006), *IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5213] IETF RFC 5213 (2008), *Proxy Mobile IPv6*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 33.102] 3GPP TS 33.102 V7.1.0 (2007), *3G Security: Security Architecture*.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2814
+
+(09/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Generalized mobility
+
+# --- **Mobility management framework over reconfigurable networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2814
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+
+### **Generalized mobility** **Y.2800–Y.2899**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------|---------------|
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+|--------------------------------|---------------|
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2814
+
+# Mobility management framework over reconfigurable networks
+
+## Summary
+
+The framework in this Recommendation focuses on application-driven mobility management of user devices and their related functions and services, to improve users' quality of experience in the evolving reconfigurable network environment. The main issues that this Recommendation focuses on include:
+
+- enhanced management on location, handover and connection over reconfigurable networks;
+- application-based mobility management orchestration for automation and optimization;
+- open interface supporting mobility of applications and services deployed within this framework.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2814 describes the requirements, functional architecture, information flows and service scenarios for specifying the target mobility management framework.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2814 | 2018-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13689 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Active mobility management, reconfigurable networks, smart mobile edge
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.3022**
+
+(08/2014)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Measuring energy in networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3022
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3022
+
+# Measuring energy in networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3022 describes the measurement of energy in networks and identifies the requirements for energy measurement. Based on this, a reference model, functional architecture, energy efficiency metrics and energy measurement methods are defined. To aid better understanding of energy efficiency metrics, relevant detailed equations are described in the appendices.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3022 | 2013-08-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/11976 |
+| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.3022 | 2014-08-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12208 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Energy efficiency metrics, energy measurement.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| VIII.3 Variation of energy consumption based method for adjusting the energy measurement time T ..... | 29 |
+| Bibliography..... | 30 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3022
+
+# Measuring energy in networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes a reference model and methods for measuring energy in networks to reduce the operating expenditure (OPEX) of telecommunication network equipment. This Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- requirements to measure energy consumption in networks;
+- reference model and architecture to build an energy measurement framework;
+- energy efficiency metrics of network elements based on a reference model;
+- energy consumption measurement methods based on functional architecture.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+| | |
+|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T G.8013] | Recommendation ITU-T G.8013/Y.1731 (2013), OAM functions and mechanisms for Ethernet based networks . |
+| [ITU-T L.1310] | Recommendation ITU-T L.1310 (2014), Energy efficiency metrics and measurement methods for telecommunication equipment . |
+| [ITU-T X.805] | Recommendation ITU-T X.805 (2003), Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3021] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3021 (2012), Framework of energy saving for future networks . |
+| [ATIS-0600015.03.2009] | ATIS-0600015.03.2009, Energy Efficiency for Telecommunications Equipment: Methodology for Measurement and Reporting for Router and Ethernet Switch Products . |
+| [ETSI ES 203 215] | ETSI ES 203 215 V1.2.1 (2011), Environmental Engineering (EE); Measurement Methods and Limits for Power Consumption in Broadband Telecommunication Networks Equipment . |
+| [ETSI TS 102 706] | ETSI TS 102 706 V1.2.1 (2011), Environmental Engineering (EE); Measurement Method for Energy Efficiency of Wireless Access Network Equipment . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 network energy efficiency** [ITU-T Y.3021]: Throughput of the network divided by the power consumed.
+
+NOTE – It is usually expressed in bps/W.
+
+**3.1.2 energy efficiency metrics** [ITU-T L.1310]: Ratio between the functional unit and the energy necessary to deliver the functional unit.
+
+NOTE 1 – Functional unit is the amount of information transmitted.
+
+NOTE 2 – It is usually expressed in bits/Joule.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 network energy profile**: Energy consumption of network elements versus offered traffic load.
+
+NOTE – Network elements include interfaces, nodes and servers in a network.
+
+**3.2.2 power efficiency metrics**: Throughput per power calculated by network energy profile.
+
+NOTE – It is usually expressed in bps/W.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| AC | Alternating Current |
+| CDMA | Code Division Multiple Access |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+| DC | Direct Current |
+| FFT | Fast Fourier Transform |
+| GSM | Global System for Mobile communications |
+| HPA | High Power Amplifier |
+| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
+| IDC | Internet Data Centre |
+| IFFT | Inverse Fast Fourier Transform |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LNA | Low Noise Amplifier |
+| LTE | Long-Term Evolution |
+| MSPP | Multi-Service Provisioning Platform |
+| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance |
+| OLT | Optical Line Terminal |
+| ONU | Optical Network Unit |
+| OPEX | Operating Expenditure |
+
+| | |
+|---------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| OXC | Optical Cross-Connect |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| PON | Passive Optical Network |
+| RF | Radio Frequency |
+| RLDRAN | Reduced-Latency Dynamic Random access memory |
+| RN | Remote Node |
+| RRH | Remote Radio Head |
+| RSOA | Reflective Semiconductor Optical Amplifier |
+| TCAM | Ternary Content-Addressable Memory |
+| TDM | Time Division Multiplexing |
+| TDM-PON | Time Division Multiplexing – Passive Optical Network |
+| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |
+| WDM-PON | Wavelength Division Multiplexing – Passive Optical Network |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+## 6 Overview of measuring energy consumption in networks
+
+In response to the demands imposed by climate change, telecommunication networks should reduce energy consumption by utilizing energy saving technologies, see [ITU-T Y.3021]. When considering network energy consumption, network energy efficiency is an important factor. In order to calculate network energy efficiency, the total of transmitted data bits is divided by the energy consumption of the network over a specific time period. The network energy efficiency is measured and then calculated at interfaces, nodes, servers and networks as follows:
+
+- Energy measurement at interfaces: The interface is the module of network equipment that enables communication via various mediums such as copper, optical fibres and air. The measurement of the energy consumption of interfaces is affected by various conditions including traffic load, interface state and packet size.
+- Energy measurement at nodes: Nodes operate as switches or routers to exchange data in a network. Energy measurement at the node includes energy measurement at the interfaces and at the non-interfaces. The power consumption at non-interfaces such as fans, central processing units (CPUs) and alternating current (AC) to direct current (DC) converters is generally included in the measurement of energy consumption at the nodes. Depending on the power consumption of the non-interface elements within the node, energy consumption of the node varies according to the manufacturer's product characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – Routers equipped with different AC-DC power supply converters can cause the power consumption at the node to vary.
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, the clock rate of a CPU can be controlled at a lower traffic condition to save energy [ITU-T Y.3021].
+
+- Energy measurement at servers: The energy consumption at a server is affected by equipment density and inter-operating relationships. In an Internet data centre (IDC), there are generally numerous air conditioners and dehumidifiers that enable large numbers of servers to operate normally. These external devices operating next to servers and
+
+controlling temperature and humidity indirectly induce additional energy consumption in networks. Energy measurement at the server takes into account both energy consumption from the network equipment such as personal computer (PC)-type or rack-type servers and the non-network equipment such as air conditioners or humidifiers. The energy measurement for network equipment at the server considers the processing power required to generate service traffic as well as the server interfaces.
+
+- Energy measurement at the network: A network is comprised of sets of nodes and servers with interfaces. Energy measurement for networks includes the energy consumption of nodes and servers with interfaces and non-network equipment.
+
+# **7 Requirements for measuring energy consumption in networks**
+
+The following are high-level requirements for network energy consumption measurement:
+
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to measure energy consumption according to traffic load, which is dependent on interface, node and server states.
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to include external devices such as air-conditioning devices operating next to network equipment as sources of energy consumption.
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to include measurement time and packet size with protocols in [b-IETF RFC 1944].
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to include the effects of the load distribution of routing protocols which significantly impact energy consumption.
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to use all measurement functional entities to gather information on all nodes and servers in the network.
+- It is recommended for network energy consumption measurement to store and manage information related to network energy profiles in a database.
+- It is recommended that network energy consumption measurement be done several times in order to reduce tolerance.
+
+# 8 Reference model and functional architecture for network energy consumption measurement
+
+### 8.1 Reference model for network energy consumption measurement
+
+
+
+```
+
+ graph LR
+ subgraph Network_Domain [Network domain]
+ subgraph Access_Domain [Access domain]
+ WN[Wireless node E_node]
+ SW[Switch E_node]
+ end
+ subgraph Core_Domain [Core domain]
+ RT[Router E_node]
+ end
+ WN -- E_interface --- RT
+ SW -- E_interface --- RT
+ end
+ subgraph Server_Domain [Server domain]
+ SRV[Server]
+ AC[Air conditioner and dehumidifier]
+ SRV_AC[E_server]
+ end
+ RT -- E_interface --- Server_Domain
+ Network_Domain & Server_Domain -- Total --- E_network
+
+```
+
+Y.3022(13)\_F8-1
+
+Figure 8-1: Reference model for measuring energy consumption in networks. The diagram illustrates two primary domains: the Network domain and the Server domain. The Network domain is subdivided into an Access domain and a Core domain. The Access domain contains a wireless node (tower icon) and a switch, both labeled E\_node. These connect via lines labeled E\_interface to a router in the Core domain, also labeled E\_node. The router then connects via an E\_interface line to the Server domain. The Server domain contains a server and an air conditioner/dehumidifier unit, collectively labeled E\_server. A top-level bracket spans both domains, labeled E\_network. A legend at the bottom right identifies the icons for Wireless node, Router, Switch, Server, and Air conditioner and dehumidifier.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Reference model for measuring energy consumption in networks**
+
+The reference model for network energy consumption measurement consists of the network domain and the server domain as shown in Figure 8-1.
+
+The network domain has various nodes (e.g., a switch, a router and a wireless node) in the access domain and core domain. The nodes communicate with each other via wireless and wired interfaces. The server domain includes a number of servers and the non-network equipment. In order to measure the energy consumption of networks, it is important to be aware of network and system configurations, traffic loads of nodes and the number of interfaces both in the network domain and the server domain.
+
+In the network domain, the energy consumption of the interface ( $E_{interface}$ ) and the energy consumption of the node ( $E_{node}$ ) are measured and calculated from their network energy profiles and traffic loads.
+
+In the server domain, the energy consumption of the server ( $E_{server}$ ) is measured and calculated according to server configuration, including the non-network equipment (e.g., an air conditioner and a dehumidifier). The server domain may have a centralized or distributed configuration. For example, distributed servers incorporating the cloud computing concept can be configured at the server domain. The energy consumption of a network ( $E_{network}$ ) is the combined energy consumptions of all interfaces, nodes and servers within the defined area of the network.
+
+## 8.2 Functional architecture for measuring energy consumption in networks
+
+Functional architecture for network energy consumption measurement consists of energy measurement functions and transport functions as shown in Figure 8-2. Transport functions include both domains of the reference model for network energy consumption measurement shown in Figure 8-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-2: Functional architecture for measuring energy consumption in networks. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Energy measurement functions' at the top and 'Transport functions' at the bottom, separated by a dashed line. The 'Energy measurement functions' section contains a large box with two sub-boxes: 'Calculation functional entity' and 'Monitoring functional entity'. To the right of this box is a 'Database' represented by a cylinder icon. The 'Transport functions' section contains two boxes: 'Network domain' and 'Server domain'. The 'Network domain' box shows an 'Access node' (represented by a tower icon) and a 'Core node' (represented by a router icon). The 'Server domain' box shows server hardware icons. Arrows indicate data flow: from the 'Access node' and 'Core node' to the 'Monitoring functional entity'; from the 'Server domain' to the 'Monitoring functional entity'; and from both the 'Calculation functional entity' and 'Monitoring functional entity' to the 'Database'.
+
+Y.3022(13)\_F8-2
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Functional architecture for measuring energy consumption in networks**
+
+The network energy consumption measurement functions include two functional entities. The functional entities interact with each other for network energy consumption measurement as follows:
+
+- **Monitoring functional entity:** This functional entity monitors required information about networks such as traffic load, which can be obtained from transport functions in nodes and servers.
+
+The monitoring functional entity also performs measurement of energy consumption such as interface states (e.g., on, off and sleep) and packet size on each interface, node and server when traffic load reaches a target value of for example 0%, 10% or 100%, which can be decided by the network manager. The monitoring functional entity delivers information such as throughput, state and packet size on each interface, node and server to the calculation functional entity. In order to calculate the energy consumption and the network energy efficiency, the monitoring functional entity operates in association with the calculation functional entity.
+
+NOTE – If a node is turned on and a port cable is connected to an interface of the node, the interface's state is on. If a node is turned on and traffic load is zero (0%), the interface's state is changed to sleep as a power saving mode. If a port cable is disconnected, the interface's state is off, regardless of whether the node is turned on or off.
+
+- **Calculation functional entity:** This functional entity calculates the energy consumption and network energy efficiency by using traffic load and network energy profiles, which contain the measured information in a database. The energy consumption can be calculated according to measurement time and power consumption. This functional entity operates in association with the monitoring functional entity and database.
+
+A database stores the network energy profiles, which combine the energy consumptions of interface, node and server in both the network domain and the server domain.
+
+## 9 Energy efficiency metrics
+
+To determine network energy consumption, various input parameters should be calculated. Input parameters consist of traffic load, environmental and electrical conditions and system and operating conditions. Figure 9-1 shows network energy consumption, which is calculated according to several input parameters and network energy profiles.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows three input parameter groups on the left, each with an arrow pointing to a central box labeled 'Network energy profiles'. The first group is 'Traffic conditions' with the sub-item 'Traffic Load ( $\rho$ )'. The second group is 'Environmental and electrical conditions' with sub-items 'Temperature', 'Humidity', 'Pressure', and 'AC/DC voltage'. The third group is 'System and operating conditions' with sub-items 'Time ( $T$ )', 'State ( $s$ )', 'No of interfaces ( $n$ )', and 'Packet size ( $l$ )'. The central box contains a blue bar chart with 'Energy consumption' on the y-axis and 'Traffic load' on the x-axis. The chart shows a series of bars of increasing height. To the right of the box, an arrow labeled 'Energy consumption of networks' points to the right. The text 'Y.3022(13)\_F9-' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram illustrating the calculation of network energy consumption based on input parameters and energy profiles.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Measuring energy consumption in networks according to input parameters and energy profiles**
+
+When calculating network energy consumption, the following input parameters are taken into account:
+
+- **Traffic conditions:** Traffic load ( $\rho$ ) can be measured actively or passively at interface, node and server level. Traffic can be measured by handshaking or management protocols. It can be passively calculated by counting the number of packets during a time period. In addition, traffic for operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) functions can be measured in terms of traffic load ( $\rho$ ), see [ITU-T G.8013].
+- **Environmental and electrical conditions:** The environmental and electrical conditions relating to energy consumption are described in [ITU-T L.1310]. Temperature, humidity, air pressure and AC/DC voltage are used to calculate energy consumption for each server. Energy consumptions for networks are calculated differently depending on higher and/or lower temperature conditions.
+- **System and operating conditions:** In order to calculate energy consumption, system and operating conditions should be provided in terms of measurement time ( $T$ ), operating state ( $s$ ) of interfaces, nodes and servers, the number of interfaces ( $n$ ) and packet size ( $l$ ). For the measurement time ( $T$ ), the periodical behaviour of input traffics may be considered. The busy hours or off-peak hours are also a factor in measurement time. The operating state ( $s$ ) assumes that the interfaces, nodes and servers are in on/off/sleep states reflecting operation modes. The number of interfaces ( $n$ ) is used to provide information on the topological configuration and functional modularity of the interfaces, nodes and servers. Also it is useful to calculate energy consumption at the corresponding links or in an end-to-end manner. Generally, measurement time ( $T$ ) can assume the same meaning as reporting frequency. However, depending on the characteristics of traffic or energy consumption, measurement time and reporting frequency can be differentiated.
+
+In Figure 9-1, the network energy profiles are described in terms of energy consumption versus traffic load. All interfaces, nodes and servers have their own network energy profiles depending on the network, system configuration and functional modularity. In addition, the operating modes depending on environments and application protocols are dynamically changed for network energy efficiency. At the off-peak hours, the functional module running on high-layer protocols may go into sleep mode while only the reception module is on. The network energy profiles are reflected in the implementation or operating algorithm of interfaces, nodes and servers for network energy efficiency.
+
+The energy consumption of networks is calculated with input parameters obtained from traffic conditions, environmental and electrical conditions and system and operating conditions. In addition, the network energy profiles of each interface, node and server are also used to calculate the network energy consumption.
+
+In general, the power efficiency metrics ( $P_{metrics}$ ) are formulated as follows:
+
+$$P_{metrics} = \text{Power efficiency metrics} \left( \frac{\text{bps}}{\text{Watt}} \right) \\ = \frac{\text{Average data rate during measurement time of } T}{\text{Average power consumption during measurement time of } T}$$
+
+Also, the energy efficiency metrics ( $E_{metrics}$ ) are formulated as follows:
+
+$$E_{metrics} = \text{Energy efficiency metrics} \left( \frac{\text{bits}}{\text{Joule}} \right) \\ = \frac{\text{Total length of data bits during measurement time of } T}{\text{Accumulation of power consumption during measurement time of } T}$$
+
+NOTE 1 – Each numerator of power/energy efficiency metrics is required to calculate average data rates and total length of data bits at interfaces, nodes and servers. Average data rates required to calculate power consumption metrics are calculated from throughput multiplied by traffic load through network energy profiles during measurement time. In addition, total length of data bits required to calculate energy efficiency metrics is calculated from throughput multiplied by measurement time.
+
+NOTE 2 – Examples for the calculation process for energy consumption at interfaces are shown in Appendix I.
+
+NOTE 3 – Examples for the calculation process for energy consumption at nodes are shown in Appendix II. The node includes a switch, router and optical equipment as well as a wireless node such as at a base station.
+
+NOTE 4 – Examples for the calculation process for energy consumption at servers are shown in Appendix III. In addition, it includes energy consumption with consideration of environmental conditions.
+
+NOTE 5 – Examples for the calculation process for network energy consumption are shown in Appendix IV. Using typical access domain network elements, the examples for the calculation process for energy consumption for passive optical networks (PONs) are shown in Appendix IV.
+
+NOTE 6 – Energy management levels on restricted electricity supply are shown in Appendix V.
+
+NOTE 7 – Energy consumption in relation to functional operations is described in Appendix VI.
+
+NOTE 8 – Based on measurement of power consumption and calculation of network energy profiles, the energy efficiency rating of network equipment is provided in Appendix VII, which is in accordance with [ITU-T L.1310].
+
+NOTE 9 – Appendix VIII shows methods for adjusting the energy consumption measurement time.
+
+## 10 Energy consumption measurement methods
+
+### 10.1 Measurement methods at an interface
+
+This clause defines measurement methods at an interface. Input parameters for energy consumption at an interface are listed in Table 10-1.
+
+**Table 10-1 – Measurement methods at an interface**
+
+| Measurement point | Input parameters | Measurement methods | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | | References | Descriptions |
+| Interface | Traffic load | [ATIS-0600015.03.2009] | Target values required to monitor traffic load |
+| | | [ITU-T G.8013] | Method to measure traffic load |
+| | Environmental and electrical conditions | [ITU-T L.1310] | Specific operation conditions such as temperature, humidity, air pressure, and AC/DC |
+| | | [ETSI TS 102 706] | |
+| | Measurement time | [ATIS-0600015.03.2009] | Configuration for measurement time |
+| | State | [ITU-T L.1310] | Measurement methods for active (on), low power (sleep) or idle (off or non-traffic) mode based on traffic load |
+| | Number of interfaces | [ETSI TS 102 706] | Intuitive (wired) or number of connected user terminals (wireless) |
+| | Packet size | [ATIS-0600015.03.2009] | Various packet sizes required to be measured |
+| NOTE – In the case of a base station, 'number of interfaces' can substitute for 'number of connected user terminals'. | | | |
+
+### 10.2 Measurement methods at a node
+
+This clause defines measurement methods at a node. The power consumption of a node consists of power consumption at non-interfaces and the summation of power consumption at interfaces. The power consumption at an interface refers to Table 10-1. Power consumption of the non-interface at a node such as a switch, a router, optical equipment or a base station is described in Table 10-2. Figure 10-1 shows a block diagram for power consumption of a node. The power consumption of the non-interface at a node is variable according to the manufacturer's product characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – The power consumption of the non-interface at a node is measured when traffic load is 0% and all interfaces are in an off state.
+
+NOTE 2 – The non-interface at a node includes the AC/DC module, fan, switching and processing.
+
+
+
+Y.3022(13)\_F10-1
+
+Block diagram for energy consumption of a node. The diagram shows a large rectangle containing four sub-blocks: 'Interface' (top left), 'Interface' (top left, below the first), 'AC/DC module' (top right), 'Fan' (middle right), 'interface' (bottom left), and 'Switching and processing' (bottom right). Three horizontal lines enter from the left, connecting to the 'Interface' blocks. The label 'Y.3022(13)\_F10-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Block diagram for energy consumption of a node**
+
+**Table 10-2 – Measurement methods at a non-interface of a node**
+
+| Measurement point | Input parameters | Measurement methods | |
+|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | | References | Descriptions |
+| Non-interface at a node | AC/DC module | [ITU-T L.1310] | Specific operation conditions such as temperature, humidity, air pressure and AC/DC |
+| | | [ETSI TS 102 706] | |
+| | Fan | [b-EMERSON-White] | Measurement for fan's power consumption in a large IDC |
+| | | [ETSI ES 203 215] | Power consumption inside a rack cooling system needs to be taken into account |
+| | | [ETSI TS 102 706] | Air fan based cooling solution needs to be compensated for in consumption. |
+| | Switching and processing | [b-Joseph] | Power consumption for switching and processing |
+
+## 10.3 Measurement methods at a server
+
+This clause defines measurement methods at a server. The power consumption of a server consists of power consumption at non-interfaces, the summation of power consumption at interfaces and non-network equipment. The power consumption at interfaces is described in Table 10-1. Power consumption of the non-interface at the server and the non-network equipment is described in Table 10-3. Figure 10-2 shows a block diagram for the energy consumption of a server.
+
+NOTE – The power consumption of the non-interface at a server is measured when traffic load is 0% and all interfaces are in an off state.
+
+
+
+Block diagram for energy consumption of a server. The diagram shows a server block with three interfaces on the left: two labeled 'Interface' at the top and one labeled 'interface' at the bottom. Inside the server block, there are three main components: 'AC/DC module' at the top right, 'Fan' in the middle right, and 'Distributed storages and processing' at the bottom right. To the right of the server block, there is a dashed box labeled 'Air-conditioners and dehumidifiers (may not exist)'. Below the dashed box, the text 'Y.3022(14)\_F10-2' is written.
+
+**Figure 10-2 – Block diagram for energy consumption of a server**
+
+**Table 10-3 – Measurement methods at non-interface of a server and non-network equipment**
+
+| Measurement point | Input parameters | Measurement methods | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | | References | Descriptions |
+| Non-interface at server | AC/DC module | [ITU-T L.1310] | Specific operation conditions such as temperature, humidity, air pressure and AC/DC |
+| | | [ETSI TS 102 706] | |
+| | Fan | [b-EMERSON-White] | Measurement of fan's power consumption in a large IDC |
+| | | [ETSI ES 203 215] | Power consumption inside rack cooling system needs to be taken into account |
+| | | [ETSI TS 102 706] | Air fan based cooling solution needs to be taken into account in consumption |
+| | Distributed storages and processing | [b-Zhu] | Power consumption of a large storage cache in a storage system such as an IDC |
+| Non-network equipment | Air conditioners and dehumidifiers | [ITU-T L.1310] | Specific operation conditions such as temperature and humidity |
+| NOTE – Specific profiles of power consumptions for non-network equipment are supplied by manufacturers. | | | |
+
+### **10.4 Measurement methods at a network**
+
+This clause defines measurement methods at a network. The power consumption of a network consists of the power consumption of nodes, power consumption of servers and power consumption of non-network equipment. Power consumptions of nodes and servers are calculated in accordance with clauses 10.1 to 10.3. In addition, the power consumption of devices present due to environmental and electrical conditions such as air conditioners is optionally calculated by using profiles supplied from manufacturers.
+
+## **11 Security considerations and requirements**
+
+These security considerations and requirements are based on security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications [ITU-T X.805], the security requirements for NGN release 1 [ITU-T Y.2701] and a framework for energy saving in future networks [ITU-T Y.3021]. Because cyclic interactions among functional entities for energy consumption measurement of networks in dynamic technologies [ITU-T Y.3021] may provide security risks, the operation parameters of the cyclic interactions should be carefully selected.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Calculation process for energy consumption at an interface
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+A node consists of various types of interfaces such as uplink/downlink and multiple links. In an interface, state (e.g., on, off or sleep) and utilization are used for measurement. At an interface of each node, there is a consumption of power when transmitting and receiving traffic depending on traffic load and states. Generally, as utilization increases, energy consumption also increases. The following equation for interface energy consumption is considered for traffic load and interface states:
+
+$$E_{interface} = \sum_0^T \sum_i P_{interface,i}(\rho, s, n, l)$$
+
+where $P_{interface}(\rho, s, n, l)$ is power consumption dependent on the node features, $\rho$ is a traffic load, $s$ is state, $n$ is the number of interfaces with $s$ state, $l$ is packet size and $T$ is a measurement time.
+
+### I.1 Switch
+
+The switch conceptual diagram consists of a processor, a buffer, a module and a fan. Figure I.1 shows a module configured with a physical interface, a processor to process the incoming packet, a buffer for temporary data storage and a fan for maintaining the proper temperature. More specifically, the module features each individual operation for energy saving.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a large rectangular box representing the switch. Inside this box, there is a smaller box labeled 'Module'. Inside the 'Module' box, there are four smaller boxes labeled 'Interface' arranged horizontally. To the right of the 'Module' box, there is a box labeled 'Process'. Below the 'Module' box, there is a box labeled 'Buffer'. To the right of the 'Buffer' box, there is a box labeled 'Fan'. The label 'Y.3022(13)\_Fl.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Conceptual diagram of a switch showing a Module containing four Interfaces, a Process block, a Buffer block, and a Fan block.
+
+Figure I.1 – Conceptual diagram of a switch
+
+The energy consumption of a switch can be determined from the processor, buffer, module and fan. The energy consumption of interfaces in a switch is shown in Figure I.2.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows three separate boxes, each representing a module. The first box is labeled 'Module 1' and contains eight smaller boxes labeled 'Interface 1' through 'Interface 8' arranged in two rows of four. The second box is labeled 'Module 2' and contains eight smaller boxes labeled 'Interface 9' through 'Interface 16' arranged in two rows of four. The third box is labeled 'Module 3' and contains eight smaller boxes labeled 'Interface 17' through 'Interface 24' arranged in two rows of four. The label 'Y.3022(13)\_Fl.2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Conceptual diagram on modules and interfaces in a switch showing three modules with their respective interfaces.
+
+Figure I.2 – Conceptual diagram on modules and interfaces in a switch
+
+Interface groups are divided into modules. The energy measurement of a module is the summation of interfaces in a switch as shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{module} = \sum_i E_{interface,i}$$
+
+Examples of energy consumption in an interface are shown below:
+
+- Case of using two interfaces in one module
+ - In this case, a switch uses the two interfaces in one module. During this measurement time ( $T$ ), two other unused modules can be turned off for energy saving. Energy consumption of the interface in a switch $E_{interface}$ is:
+
+$$E_{interface} = \sum_0^T \{P_{processor} (\rho_{interface\_1} + \rho_{interface\_2}) + P_{module} \times 1\}$$
+
+- Case of using each interface in two modules, respectively
+ - In this case, it is assumed that the switch uses interface 1 and interface 9, which are in different modules, module 1 and module 2, respectively. Energy consumption of the interface in a switch $E_{interface}$ is:
+
+$$E_{interface} = \sum_0^T \{P_{processor} (\rho_{interface\_1} + \rho_{interface\_9}) + P_{module} \times 2\}$$
+
+### 1.2 Router
+
+The energy consumption of a router interface is shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{interface,i} = \sum_0^T P_{interface,i} (\rho, l, s, c)$$
+
+where $P_{interface,i}$ is the function that provides the energy consumption of an interface, $T$ is the measurement time, $\rho$ is the traffic load on an interface, $l$ is the packet size, $s$ is the status of the interface and $c$ is the computing factor which relates to the power consumption overhead of routing protocols.
+
+The computing factor $c$ depends on the routing technology in the router. If this technology includes traffic processing operations such as traffic aggregation, multi-path routing and network coding, this computing factor will differ from conventional store-and-forward based routing technology.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Calculation process for energy consumption at a node
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+A network contains various types of nodes for delivering traffic (e.g., switch, router, gateway base station, etc.). Node energy consumption comprises the summation of interface energy consumption and environment energy consumption (e.g., cooling) during measurement time. Environment energy consumption is an input parameter known to a network management administrator. For example, chiller-based cooling is responsible for 30-70% of overhead in energy usage. The following equation for node energy consumption is considered for the energy consumption of a common module and interfaces:
+
+$$E_{node} = E_{common} + \sum_i E_{interface,i}$$
+
+The following energy consumptions for a node are based on various mediums.
+
+### II.1 Energy consumption for wired nodes
+
+#### II.1.1 Switch
+
+The calculation for the energy consumption of a switch is shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{switch} = \sum_0^T \left( P_{common} + \sum_i P_{Module,i} \right)$$
+
+$$P_{module} = \sum_i P_{interface,i}$$
+
+$$P_{common} = P_{buffer} + P_{fan}$$
+
+$$P_{fan} = \{ P_{processor}(\rho) + P_{module} \times n + P_{buffer} \} \times \eta$$
+
+where $E_{switch}$ is energy consumption, $T$ is measurement time, $P_{processor}$ is power consumption to process traffic volume, $\rho$ is traffic volume, $P_{buffer}$ is power consumption per buffer, $P_{module}$ is power consumption of the module, $n$ is the number of modules in use and $\eta$ is power consumption for cooling the heat dissipated by $1\text{ W}$ (case of efficient cooling system: $P_{fan}$ is approximately $0.358\text{ W}$ in [b-CISCO-White]). Energy consumption indicates on and off state ( $s$ ) according to the number ( $n$ ) of interfaces and modules.
+
+#### II.1.2 Router
+
+The calculation for the energy consumption of a router is shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{router} = E_{common} + \sum_i E_{interface,i}$$
+
+where $E_{common}$ is the energy consumption of the router when no port connects to the Internet. $E_{interface,i}$ is the energy consumption of packet processing in $i$ -th interface.
+
+The calculation for the energy consumption of the router when no port is connected is shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{common} = \sum_0^T P_{common}$$
+
+where:
+
+$$P_{common} = P_{chassis} + \sum_i P_{routing\ engine,j} + \sum_k P_{power\ supply\ unit,k} + \sum_l P_{line\ card,l}$$
+
+here $P_{common}$ is the power consumption of the router when there is no port connected to a router and $T$ is the measurement time. $P_{chassis}$ is the power consumption of chassis including the power for operating internal temperature moderation components, $P_{routing\ engine,j}$ is the power consumption of $j$ -th routing engine module, $P_{power\ supply\ unit,k}$ is the power consumption of $k$ -th power supply unit and $P_{line\ card,l}$ is the power consumption of $l$ th line card [b-Joseph].
+
+#### II.1.3 Optical equipment
+
+A passive optical network (PON) system combines both time division multiplexing (TDM)-PON and wavelength division multiplexing (WDM)-PON.
+
+##### II.1.3.1 Energy consumption of an OLT and an ONU in TDM-PON
+
+An optical line terminal (OLT) has a transmitter, a receiver and a common module in a PON system. These OLT components are always on, so the energy consumption by all the components in an OLT is given by:
+
+$$E_{OLT} = \sum_0^T \{P_{OLT-CM} + P_{OLT-Tx}(\rho_{DL}, n) + P_{OLT-Rx}(\rho_{UL}, n)\}$$
+
+Here, $P_{OLT-CM}$ is the power consumption of the common module of OLT, $P_{OLT-Tx}$ is the power consumption of the OLT transmitter, and $P_{OLT-Rx}$ is the power consumption of the OLT receiver. $\rho_{DL}$ is the downlink traffic load to optical network units (ONUs) and $\rho_{UL}$ is the uplink traffic load from ONUs. $P_{OLT-TX}$ and $P_{OLT-RX}$ are the related downlink/uplink traffic load and number of ONUs. Here, $T$ is the measurement time of energy consumption and $n$ is the number of ONUs served by the OLT.
+
+An ONU has a transmitter, a receiver and a common module in a PON system. These ONU components are always on, so the energy consumption by all the components in an ONU is given by:
+
+$$E_{ONU} = \sum_0^T \{P_{ONU-CM} + P_{ONU-Tx}(\rho_{DL}) + P_{ONU-Rx}(\rho_{UL})\}$$
+
+Here, $P_{ONU-CM}$ is power consumption of the common module of an ONU, $P_{ONU-Tx}$ is the power consumption of transmitter of an ONU and $P_{ONU-Rx}$ is the power consumption of receiver of an ONU. $\rho_{DL}$ is the downlink traffic load to an ONU and $\rho_{UL}$ is the uplink traffic load from an ONU.
+
+NOTE 1 – An ONU and an OLT of a PON have $T_x$ and $R_x$ as pairs of an interface.
+
+NOTE 2 – Optical equipment such as optical cross-connect (OXC) multi-service provisioning platform (MSPP) can be included as an optical node.
+
+ITU-T has introduced sleep mode to save on the power consumption of ONUs [b-ITU-T G.Sup45]. Therefore, to calculate the energy consumption of an ONU, it is necessary to consider the ONU sleep mode mechanism. Overall the ITU-T introduced two kinds of sleep mode. These two sleep modes are doze mode and cyclic sleep mode.
+
+- Formulating energy consumption when an OLT uses doze mode: In doze mode, an ONU only shuts down its $T_x$ and keeps the $R_x$ always on. As a result, the OLT can send downstream traffic to the ONU whenever the OLT receives packets. When uplink traffic arrives, an ONU should turn on the transmitter and transmit to the OLT during a dedicated uplink transmission slot. As the receiver and CM are always on when doze mode is used, the energy consumption of all the components except the transmitter is obtained. In doze mode, energy consumption by the transmitter mainly depends on uplink traffic load $\rho_{UL}$ ,
+
+packet size $l_{size}$ and state (i.e., doze mode) $s_{Doze}$ . Then the energy consumption of an ONU in doze mode state is as follows:
+
+$$E_{ONU} = \sum_0^T \{P_{Rx} + P_{CM} + P_{Tx}(\rho_{UL}, l_{size}, s_{Doze})\}$$
+
+where $P_{Tx}$ is the power consumption of the transmitter of an ONU, $P_{Rx}$ is the power consumption of the receiver of an ONU, and $P_{CM}$ is power consumption of the CM of an ONU.
+
+- Formulating energy consumption when an OLT uses cyclic sleep mode: In cyclic sleep mode, an ONU periodically wakes up by turning on both $Tx$ and $Rx$ to check whether it has any traffic to receive or not, as shown in Figure II.1.
+
+
+
+Figure II.1 – Cyclic sleep mode. The figure consists of three vertically stacked plots sharing a common 'Time' axis. The top plot shows 'Traffic' as yellow bars of varying heights. The middle plot shows the state of 'Both Tx and Rx' as green bars labeled 'Both Tx and Rx are on' (Active) and 'Both Tx and Rx are off' (Cyclic sleep). The bottom plot shows the ONU's state as a black line that is high for 'Active/aware' and low for 'Asleep'. Red arrows indicate the transitions from 'Asleep' to 'Active/aware' at the start of each traffic burst. A horizontal dashed line marks the 'Ts' interval, which is the length of the sleep interval. The label 'Y.3022(13)\_Fl.1' is located at the bottom right of the figure.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Cyclic sleep mode**
+
+To measure energy consumption, the following steps must be considered.
+
+- Step 1: Consider the parameter $T_s$ (length of sleep interval). The smaller the size of $T_s$ assigned, the more energy an ONU consumes.
+- Step 2: Consider both uplink and downlink arrival. The more traffic arrives at an ONU, the more an ONU stays in active mode.
+- Step 3: Consider the signalling messages that are used in this cyclic sleep mode.
+
+In this case, this model considers that the $CM$ is always on. However, $Tx$ and $Rx$ are periodically turned on at the end of every $T_s$ . Therefore, the energy consumed solely by these two modules depends on the arrival of $\rho_{DL}$ , $\rho_{UL}$ and the length of the sleep interval. Then the energy consumption of an ONU in cyclic sleep mode states is as follows:
+
+$$E_{ONU} = \sum_0^T \{P_{CM} + P_{Tx}(\rho_{UL}, l_{size}, T_s, s_{CycleSleep}) + P_{Rx}(\rho_{DL}, l_{size}, T_s, s_{CycleSleep})\}$$
+
+##### II.1.3.2 Energy consumption of an OLT in a WDM-PON
+
+- Formulating energy consumption when an OLT uses active mode: The energy consumption of an OLT and ONUs in a WDM-PON during the measurement time $T$ can be summarized as follows:
+
+$$E_{OLT} = \sum_0^T P_{OLT-CM} + \sum_i \left\{ \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Tx,i} + \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Rx,i} \right\}$$
+
+$$E_{ONU,i} = \sum_0^T P_{ONU-CM,i} + \sum_0^T P_{ONU-Rx,i} + \sum_0^T P_{RSOA,i}$$
+
+where $P_{OLT-CM}$ is power consumption by the CM of an OLT, $P_{ONU-CM,i}$ is power consumption by the CM of an $ONU_i$ , $P_{OLT-Tx,i}$ is power consumption by the $i$ -th $Tx$ of OLT, $P_{OLT-Rx,i}$ is power consumption by the $i$ -th $Rx$ of an OLT, $P_{ONU-Rx,i}$ is power consumption by a $Rx$ of $ONU_i$ and $P_{RSOA,i}$ is power consumption by a RSOA of an $ONU_i$ .
+
+This WDM-PON architecture with centralized light sources also has a critical power consumption problem. Without the downstream signal, the ONU cannot send the upstream signal. Thus even if no traffic is on the line, the OLT has to send the downstream signal all the time and cannot switch to the sleep mode.
+
+- Formulating energy consumption when an OLT uses sleep mode: [b-Tatsuya] uses a polling scheme of a supervisor transceiver in WDM-PON. If a $Tx_i$ of the OLT has no downstream traffic, then the $Tx_i$ interface state is changed to sleep mode, which stops the transmission of downstream signals. If an $ONU_i$ has upstream traffic, then the $ONU_i$ sends a "recovery request" signal using the optical source of the supervisor. After the supervisor transceiver receives the request signal, it awakens $Tx_i$ of the OLT from sleep mode.
+
+Using the sleep mode in WDM-PON, the total energy consumption of this WDM-PON during the measurement time $T$ can be summarized as follows:
+
+$$E_{OLT} = \sum_0^T P_{OLT-CM} + \sum_0^T P_{Supervisor-TRx} + \sum_i \left\{ \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Tx,i}(T_s) + \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Rx,i}(T_s) \right\}$$
+
+$$E_{ONU,i} = \sum_0^T P_{ONU-CM,i} + \sum_0^T P_{ONU-Rx,i} + \sum_0^T P_{RSOA,i}$$
+
+where $P_{supervisor-TRx}$ is the power consumption of the transceiver of a supervisor in the OLT. The other notation is explained in the clause above.
+
+NOTE – The length of the sleep interval $T_s$ in sleep mode of a WDM-PON is variable. However, $T_s$ is fixed in the cyclic sleep mode of the TDM-PON.
+
+In sleep mode, the CM and a supervisor transceiver of the OLT are always on, however if some of $Tx$ and $Rx$ in the OLT have no traffic (down/up), then $Tx$ and $Rx$ switch to sleep mode.
+
+### II.2 Energy consumption for wireless nodes
+
+#### II.2.1 Base station
+
+A typical base station consists of a baseband processing unit, a radio frequency (RF) power amplifier unit, a power supply unit and a climate control unit. Figures II.2 and II.3 show simplified base stations with these units. Figure II.2 shows a conventional base station and Figure II.3 shows a remote radio head (RRH)-based distributed base station architecture. The amount of energy consumption of units can vary over time according to resource allocation, data rates and baseband signal processing.
+
+
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FII.2
+
+Figure II.2 – Conventional base station architecture. This block diagram shows a Base Station (BS) with four internal units: Climate control unit, RF power amplifier (HPA/LNA), Power supply, and Signal processing. AC power enters the BS from the left to the Power supply unit. A Traffic flow line exits the BS from the Signal processing unit. The RF power amplifier is connected to an Antenna, which is shown transmitting signals to two mobile devices (a car and two people).
+
+**Figure II.2 – Conventional base station architecture**
+
+
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FII.3
+
+Figure II.3 – Distributed RRH-based base station architecture. This diagram shows a Base Station (BS) with three internal units: Climate control unit (may not exist), Power supply, and Signal processing. AC power enters the BS from the left to the Power supply unit. A Traffic flow line exits the BS from the Signal processing unit. The Signal processing unit is connected via a line to an external unit containing a Power supply and an RF power amplifier (HPA/LNA). This external unit is connected to an Antenna, which is shown transmitting signals to two mobile devices (a car and two people).
+
+**Figure II.3 – Distributed RRH-based base station architecture**
+
+$P_{SP}$ , $P_{PA}$ , $P_{PS}$ , $P_{CC}$ and $P_{ckt}$ represent the power consumptions of the signal processing unit, the RF power amplifier unit consisting respectively of the high power amplifiers (HPAs) and low noise amplifiers (LNAs), the power supply unit with AC power input, the climate control unit and the energy management unit with power circuit. The signal processing unit contains wireless signal processing blocks for baseband processing, precoding, subcarrier mapping, fast Fourier transform (FFT) and inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT). The climate control unit can be optionally removed to improve energy efficiency when used in a distributed RRH-based base station architecture. With the energy consumption models, the conventional base station architecture is modelled as shown in Figure II.4 and distributed (RRH-based) base station architecture as shown in Figure II.5. Each sector is assumed to have $K$ antennas for transmission.
+
+
+
+**Base station**
+
+Energy management unit ( $P_{ckt}$ )
+
+Sector #1
+
+Antenna #1
+
+Antenna #K
+
+Signal processing ( $P_{SP}$ )
+
+Power Amp. ( $P_{PA}$ )1
+
+Power Amp. ( $P_{PA}$ )2
+
+Power supply ( $P_{PS}$ )
+
+Sector #2
+
+Sector #N
+
+Climate control unit ( $P_{cc}$ )
+
+Status information base (energy, traffic, resource...)
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FII.4
+
+Figure II.4: A conventional base station architecture. The diagram shows a large yellow box representing the base station. At the top is the 'Energy management unit (P\_ckt)'. Below it are several sectors: 'Sector #1', 'Sector #2', and 'Sector #N'. Each sector contains a 'Signal processing (P\_SP)' block and a 'Power Amp. (P\_PA)' block. 'Sector #1' also shows 'Antenna #1' and 'Antenna #K'. A 'Power supply (P\_PS)' block is shared across sectors. At the bottom is the 'Climate control unit (P\_cc)'. To the right, outside the main base station box, is a 'Status information base (energy, traffic, resource...)' block connected to the Energy management unit.
+
+**Figure II.4 – A conventional base station architecture**
+
+
+
+**Central base station**
+
+Climate control unit ( $P_{cc}$ )
+
+Sector #1
+
+Power supply ( $P_{PS}$ )
+
+Signal processing ( $P_{SP}$ )
+
+Antenna #1
+
+Antenna #K
+
+Sector #N
+
+Energy management unit ( $P_{ckt}$ )
+
+Power Amp. ( $P_{PA}$ )
+
+Power supply ( $P'_{PS}$ )
+
+Status information base
+
+Distributed base station
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FII.5
+
+Figure II.5: A distributed RRH-based base station architecture. The diagram shows a 'Central base station' (blue box) and multiple 'Distributed base station' units (yellow boxes). The central station contains a 'Climate control unit (P\_cc)', 'Energy management unit (P\_ckt)', and sectors like 'Sector #1' and 'Sector #N'. 'Sector #1' includes 'Power supply (P\_PS)', 'Signal processing (P\_SP)', and 'Antenna #1' and 'Antenna #K'. The distributed base stations contain 'Power Amp. (P\_PA)', 'Power supply (P'\_PS)', and a 'Status information base'. Arrows show connections between the central and distributed units.
+
+**Figure II.5 – A distributed RRH-based base station architecture**
+
+The energy consumption of a base station is summarized in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{BS} = \sum_0^T P_{BS} \approx \sum_0^T \alpha_{conv} P_{BS.tx} + P_{BS.other}$$
+
+where $T$ is the measurement time and $P_{BS}$ is the power consumption of the base station. In the above equation, $E_{BS}$ is the integration of interface power consumption during the measurement time $T$ . $P_{BS.tx}$ is the sum of the transmission power of the base station's antennas and $\alpha_{conv}$ is the power conversion efficiency accounting for the power amplifier efficiency, feeder loss and extra loss.
+
+$P_{BS,other}$ is the sum of the power consumptions of the other components such as signal processing, battery backup and the base station's cooling. In the above equation, $E_{BS}$ is the sum of node power consumption during the measurement time $T$ . The $P_{BS}$ is measured from a conventional base station and a distributed or RRH-based base station. In wireless system technologies such as global system for mobile communications (GSM), code division multiple access (CDMA), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) and long-term evolution (LTE), RRH-based base stations are deployed.
+
+The power consumption of the conventional base station can be modelled as follows:
+
+$$P_{BS\_CONV} = P_{ckt} + P_{CC} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_{sector}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{TXi}} P_{PAij} + P_{SPi} + P_{PSi} \right], \quad (II.1)$$
+
+where $N_{sector}$ and $N_{TXi}$ represent respectively the number of sectors in a base station and the number of transmit/receive antennas in the $i$ -th sector. $P_{PAijk}$ represents the power consumption of the power amplifier unit in the $j$ -th antenna of the $i$ -th sector. $P_{SPi}$ and $P_{PSi}$ respectively represent the power consumptions of signal processing and power supply, in the $i$ -th sector. Similarly, the power consumption of the distributed RRH-based base station can be modelled as follows:
+
+$$P_{BS\_RRH} = P_{ckt} + P_{CC} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_{sector}} \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{N_{TXi}} P_{PAij} + P_{SPi} + P_{PSi} \right] + \sum_{k=1}^{N_{RRH}} P'_{PSk} \quad (II.2)$$
+
+where $N_{RRH}$ represents the number of remote radio heads and $P'_{PSk}$ denotes the power consumption of the power supply unit in the $k$ -th remote radio head. Even the same parameters in equations II.1 and II.2 have different values due to different base station architectures.
+
+The power consumption of each unit can be measured for varying resource utilizations (or traffic loads). Using these results, it is possible to characterize the relationship between the resource utilization and the power consumption of each unit.
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Calculation process for energy consumption at a server
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In the case that a server within an IDC exists, energy consumption of network air conditioners is considered as $E_{environment}$ . The following equation for server energy consumption is defined as the sum of common energy consumption, interface energy consumption and the energy environment:
+
+$$E_{server} = \sum_0^T P_{server} = \sum_0^T \{ P_{common} + \sum_i P_{interface,i} + (P_{environment}) \}.$$
+
+$E_{environment}$ is optionally added in the case of an IDC. The energy consumption at a server is affected by the environment conditions as well as the operation state, such as an idle or a peak mode of a server. The idle mode of a server indicates power consumption when the traffic load is 0%. The peak mode of a server indicates power consumption when the traffic load is 100%. The server's power consumption generally increases with utilization and has linear characteristics in utilization between idle load power (e.g., traffic load 0%) and peak load power (e.g., traffic load 100%).
+
+$$P_{common} = P_{server\_idle},$$
+
+$$\sum_i P_{interface,i} = (P_{server\_peak} - P_{server\_idle}) \times u_{server}$$
+
+where $P_{server\_idle}$ is the server power consumption when traffic load is 0%, $P_{server\_peak}$ is the server power consumption when traffic load is 100%, and $u_{server}$ is normalized traffic load between 0 and 1.
+
+In the IDC, it is important to consider the environment power consumption of air conditioners and dehumidifiers. Though this equipment functions separately from network equipment, it is essential for operating networks normally. This environment power consumption at the IDC is obtained using the following equation:
+
+$$P_{environment} = P_{chiller} + P_{dehumid}.$$
+
+$P_{chiller}$ is power consumption from all of the air conditioners in an IDC
+
+$P_{dehumid}$ is power consumption from the all of the dehumidifiers in an IDC
+
+$P_{chiller} = (\text{number of air conditioners}) \times \text{standard power consumption of an air conditioner}$
+
+$P_{dehumid} = (\text{number of dehumidifiers}) \times \text{standard power consumption of a dehumidifier}$
+
+To obtain $E_{server}$ , the environment power consumption for one server is calculated as there are a number of servers in the IDC. The environment power consumption per server ( $P_{environment}^*$ ) is calculated using the following equation:
+
+$$P_{environment}^* = \frac{P_{environment}}{\text{number of servers}}.$$
+
+The equation for $E_{environment}$ is shown as follows:
+
+$$E_{environment} = \sum_0^T P_{environment}^*,$$
+
+where $T$ is measurement time and $E_{environment}$ is environment energy consumption per server during $T$ .
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+### Calculation process for energy consumption at a network
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The network energy consumption is the sum of the energy consumption of nodes contained in the network. The general energy consumption ( $E_{Network}$ ) is described by the following equation:
+
+$$E_{network} = \sum_i E_{node,i} + \sum_j E_{server,j} + E_{environment}$$
+
+Energy consumption ( $E_{Network}$ ) optionally consists of the sum of $E_{node,i}$ or the sum of $E_{server}$ and $E_{environment}$ .
+
+One of the representative access networks can become a PON. A typical PON system consists of an OLT, a remote node (RN) and ONUs. The RN is either a passive power splitter or an arrayed waveguide grating that has no energy consumption. The energy consumption of a PON is shown in the following equation:
+
+$$E_{PON} = E_{OLT} + \sum_i E_{ONU,i}$$
+
+where $E_{OLT}$ is the energy consumption of an OLT and $E_{ONU,i}$ is the energy consumption of the ONUs.
+
+For greater understanding the following description of PON energy consumption includes TDM-PON and WDM-PON.
+
+### IV.1 Energy consumption of TDM-PON
+
+TDM-PON is the more conventional optical access network compared to the WDM-PON system because of ease of implementation, low cost, etc. In this clause, the energy consumption of a TDM-PON is introduced as one of the PON system models.
+
+The TDM-PON system consists of an OLT and ONUs. The block diagram of the TDM-PON system is shown in Figure IV.1.
+
+
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FIV.1
+
+Block diagram of a TDM-PON system. On the left is the OLT (Optical Line Terminal) block, which contains a 'Common module (CM)' and two sub-modules labeled 'Tx' and 'Rx'. A line connects the OLT to a central 'Splitter' symbol, represented by a circle with two diagonal lines. From the splitter, a line connects to the ONU (Optical Network Unit) block on the right. The ONU block contains two sub-modules labeled 'Tx' and 'Rx', and a 'Common module (CM)'.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – Block diagram of TDM-PON system**
+
+The energy consumption of the TDM-PON system can be summarized as follows:
+
+$$E_{TDM-PON} = E_{OLT} + E_{ONUs}$$
+
+#### IV.1.1 Formulating energy consumption in doze mode
+
+$$E_{TDM-PON} = \sum_0^T \{P_{OLT-CM} + P_{OLT-Tx}(\rho_{DL}, n) + P_{OLT-Rx}(\rho_{UL}, n)\} \\ + \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_0^T \{P_{ONU_i-CM} + P_{ONU_i-Rx} + P_{ONU_i-Tx}(\rho_{UL}, l_{size})\}$$
+
+#### IV.1.2 Formulating energy consumption in cyclic sleep mode
+
+$$E_{TDM-PON} = \sum_{0}^{T} \left\{ P_{OLT-CM} + P_{OLT-Tx}(\rho_{DL}, n) + P_{OLT-Rx}(\rho_{UL}, n) \right\}$$
+
+$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{0}^{T} \left\{ P_{ONU_i-CM} + P_{ONU_i-Rx}(\rho_{DL}, l_{size}, T_s, s_{CycleSleep}) + P_{ONU_i-Tx}(\rho_{UL}, l_{size}, T_s, s_{CycleSleep}) \right\}$$
+
+### IV.2 Energy consumption of a WDM-PON
+
+WDM-PON is a promising access network technology developed to meet increasing traffic due to its capacity for huge bandwidth compared to TDM-PON. In this clause, the energy consumption of a WDM-PON is introduced as a PON model.
+
+Recently, the WDM-PON architecture with centralized light sources at the OLT has emerged as an attractive solution for low-cost implementation. The architecture of WDM-PON with centralized light sources is shown in Figure IV.2.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph OLT
+ direction TB
+ subgraph TxRx1
+ Tx1
+ Rx1
+ end
+ subgraph TxRx2
+ Tx2
+ Rx2
+ end
+ Dots1[...]
+ subgraph TxRxn
+ Txn
+ Rxn
+ end
+ CM_OLT[CM]
+ end
+
+ AWG((AWG))
+
+ subgraph ONU_Group
+ direction TB
+ subgraph ONU1
+ Rx1_ONU[Rx1]
+ RSOA1
+ CM1[CM]
+ end
+ subgraph ONU2
+ Rx2_ONU[Rx2]
+ RSOA2
+ CM2[CM]
+ end
+ Dots2[...]
+ subgraph ONUn
+ Rxn_ONU[Rxn]
+ RSOAn
+ CMn[CM]
+ end
+ end
+
+ CM_OLT --- AWG
+ AWG --- ONU1
+ AWG --- ONU2
+ AWG --- ONUn
+
+```
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FIV.2
+
+Block diagram of WDM-PON architecture showing OLT on the left, AWG in the middle, and multiple ONUs on the right. The OLT contains stacked Tx/Rx pairs (Tx1/Rx1 to Txn/Rxn) connected to a Control Module (CM). The AWG (Arrayed Waveguide Grating) acts as a central distribution point. On the right, multiple ONUs are shown, each containing an Rx and RSOA (Reflective Semiconductor Optical Amplifier) pair (Rx1/RSOA1 to Rxn/RSOAn) connected to their respective CMs.
+
+**Figure IV.2 – Block diagram of WDM-PON**
+
+In this WDM-PON, an OLT has a number of $n$ transmitters ( $Tx$ ) and $n$ receivers ( $Rx$ ) which use different wavelengths and each ONU has a receiver and a reflective semiconductor optical amplifier (RSOA). Each ONU does not have a light source because an ONU can transmit upstream signals by reusing downstream signals from an OLT light source using RSOA. Otherwise, an arrayed waveguide grating (AWG) in a remote node does not include power consumption because it is a passive component.
+
+#### IV.2.1 Formulating energy consumption for active mode
+
+The total energy consumption of this WDM-PON during the measurement time $T$ can be summarized as follows:
+
+$$E_{WDM-PON(on)} = E_{OLT} + \sum_{i} E_{ONU,i}$$
+
+$$= \sum_{0}^{T} P_{OLT-CM} + \sum_{i} \left\{ \sum_{0}^{T} P_{OLT-Tx,i} + \sum_{0}^{T} P_{OLT-Rx,i} \right\}$$
+
+$$+ \sum_{i} \left\{ \sum_{0}^{T} P_{ONU-CM,i} + \sum_{0}^{T} P_{ONU-Rx,i} + \sum_{0}^{T} P_{RSOA,i} \right\}.$$
+
+where $P_{OLT-CM}$ is the power consumption by the CM of the OLT, $P_{ONU-CM,i}$ is the power consumption by the CM of an ONU*i* , $P_{OLT-Tx,i}$ is the power consumption by the *i*-th Tx of the OLT, $P_{OLT-Rx,i}$ is the power consumption by the *i*-th Rx of the OLT, $P_{ONU-Rx,i}$ is the power consumption by a Rx of ONU*i* and $P_{RSOA,i}$ is the power consumption by a RSOA of an ONU*i* .
+
+#### IV.2.2 Formulating energy consumption for sleep mode
+
+Using clause II.1.3.2, the total energy consumption of this WDM-PON during the measurement time $T$ can be summarized as follows:
+
+$$\begin{aligned} E_{WDM-PON(sleep)} &= E_{OLT} + \sum_i E_{ONU,i} \\ &= \sum_0^T P_{OLT-CM} + \sum_0^T P_{Supervisor-TRx} + \sum_i \left\{ \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Tx,i}(T_s) + \sum_0^T P_{OLT-Rx,i}(T_s) \right\} \\ &\quad + \sum_i \left\{ \sum_0^T P_{ONU-CM,i} + \sum_0^T P_{ONU-Rx,i} + \sum_0^T P_{RSOA,i} \right\}, \end{aligned}$$
+
+where $P_{supervisor-TRx}$ is the power consumption for the transceiver of a supervisor in the OLT.
+
+In sleep mode, the CM and a supervisor transceiver of the OLT is always on, however if some of Tx and Rx in the OLT have no traffic (down/up), then Tx and Rx switches to sleep mode.
+
+## **Appendix V**
+
+### **Energy management levels on restricted electricity supply**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Rising energy prices and pollution credit policy on carbon emissions are encouraging governmental and industrial movement to agree on enhancing energy related goals and energy management practices. Energy regulation in the ICT industry would be active and restrictive. Consequently, possible levels are presented for the near future.
+
+In the case of disruption of energy supplies, electricity suppliers would recommend a network provider to reduce energy usages. For example, network providers operate their own networks on best effort mode for energy consumption or for the specific energy consumption usage.
+
+For example, a network can be operated on the following energy levels.
+
+- Level 0: Full capacity level
+In level 0, a network utilizes its full bandwidth regardless of energy consumption.
+- Level 1: Tolerant level
+In level 1, a network conditionally reduces energy consumption levels when network energy consumptions exceed the thresholds.
+- Level 2: Best effort level
+In level 2, a network reduces energy consumption with best effort. It is a similar concept to the best effort delivery of an Internet protocol (IP) network.
+- Level 3: Delayed transfer level
+In level 3, a network is forced to reduce energy consumption to meet the specific energy consumption level. Delayed transfer can be implemented to reduce the energy consumption level.
+
+## Appendix VI
+
+### Energy consumption in relation to functional operations
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix presents elements of energy consumption defined by functional operations as follows:
+
+- **Wired/Wireless selection:** The IP sharing equipment consists of common modules, wired modules and wireless modules. The energy consumption in the IP sharing equipment varies according to operating modules. For example, if there is no user using wireless modules, the IP sharing equipment turns off the power for wireless modules or enters the sleep state for energy saving. Also, if there is no user using wired modules, the sharing equipment enters the sleep state for energy saving. In this way, the power consumption may be different according to operating modules. Each module respectively operates independently.
+- **Modularization:** The network equipment consists of several modules for carrying out various functions. The module usage is determined according to whether each function is used or not. Network systems are commonly available in both fixed and modular form. The energy consumption can be directly measured by adding or removing the module from the network equipment. In the latter case, the systems can be variably configured, which may affect their efficiency ratings. Whenever a telecom system can be equipped with diverse modules to a degree that they form different classes (e.g., separate packet switching and TDM switching modules), such a system may obtain two or more ratings within the appropriate product classes.
+- **Memory technology:** Choosing a memory system is one of the biggest technology challenges when designing a modern router. Progress in memory channel bandwidth has trailed Moore's law, while Internet bandwidth has grown much faster than Moore's law. This has created a significant discrepancy between the demand for memory throughput and the technology that is actually available. Thus, hardware engineers face hard choices between cost, speed, energy efficiency and the general availability of prospective memory technologies. The trade-off for hardware engineers is whether to heavily optimize memory access algorithms to retain flexibility and programmability, or to remove certain features like flexibility and power efficiency in favour of more complex (and limited) linear models such as reduced-latency dynamic random access memory (RLDRAN) or non-linear memory structures, such as ternary content-addressable memories (TCAMs) that feature deterministic prefix matching speeds and thus can significantly relax processing requirements in the forwarding path. In fact, some contemporary router designs use TCAM for the execution of both forwarding and filtering, thus effectively freeing packet processors to perform only service differentiation and generic lookup tasks. TCAM technology allows for lower-grade packet processing designs without complex memory lookup algorithms. But while both linear and content-driven lookup approaches are proven in the context of large lookup structures and are widely used, prefix tree-based lookup is generally more efficient with respect to energy.
+
+## Appendix VII
+
+### Energy efficiency rating for network equipment
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix describes other methods for measuring the efficiency of energy consumption of a network. It shows how well an input power is used without directly being affected by data transmission of network equipment. This value is the energy efficiency rating for network equipment ( $EER_{NE}$ ).
+
+$$EER_{NE} = \frac{\sum P_{wi}}{P_{ingress}}$$
+
+- $P_{ingress}$ is energy consumption provided from the power supply of an item of network equipment
+- $P_{wi} = a \times P_{\rho_1} + b \times P_{\rho_2} + c \times P_{\rho_3}$
+ - $\rho_1 \sim \rho_3$ is system utilization (traffic load)
+ - $a, b$ and $c$ are weighted factors ( $a+b+c=1$ )
+
+Where, $P_{\rho_1}$ , $P_{\rho_2}$ , and $P_{\rho_3}$ are the energy consumption when they operate at each system utilization level (e.g., 0%, 10% and 100%). $P_{wi}$ is the modular weighted energy consumption at $i$ -th interface. To obtain this value, a decision on weighted factors is required. These weighted factors ( $a, b, c$ ) are decided as different values per item of equipment because they usually operate at different system utilization levels. This parameter is indicated in [ITU-T L.1310].
+
+$\sum P_{wi}$ means energy consumption only consumed by data transmission at network equipment. Therefore, $EER_{NE}$ presents the ratio of energy consumption for transmission to input power. High $EER_{NE}$ means that network equipment largely contributes its energy consumption to data transmissions.
+
+The energy efficiency of networks is calculated as the following equation:
+
+$$EER_{total} = \alpha_1 \times EER_{NE,1} + \alpha_2 \times EER_{NE,2} + \dots + \alpha_i \times EER_{NE,i}$$
+
+where
+
+- $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_i$ and weighted factors ( $\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + \dots + \alpha_i = 1$ ),
+- $EER_{NE,i}$ is a value of $EER_{NE}$ at $i$ -th network equipment.
+
+Each weighted factor ( $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_i$ ) is decided by a given power. This is obtained via the following equation:
+
+$$\alpha_i = \frac{P_{ingress,i}}{\sum P_{ingress,i}}$$
+
+## Appendix VIII
+
+### Methods for adjusting the energy measurement time
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix explains the methods for adjusting the energy measurement time.
+
+### VIII.1 Framework of adjusting the energy measurement time
+
+This clause describes the framework for adjusting the energy measurement time. Figure VIII.1 shows the general framework for adjusting the energy measurement time. Each node can include the four functions: alarm functional entity, measurement functional entity, calculation functional entity and adjusting functional entity of measurement time for adjusting the energy measurement time.
+
+- Alarm functional entity: This functional entity can set an alarm flag when traffic congestion occurs at a node. At the same time, this functional entity can send the alarm to the calculation functional entity for adjusting the energy measurement time.
+- Monitoring functional entity: This functional entity can measure the energy consumption of a node during the energy measurement time. In addition, this function can operate in association with the calculation function in order to adjust the energy measurement time.
+- Calculation functional entity: This functional entity can calculate the energy measurement time considering the variation of traffic volume or energy consumption, traffic volume and the alarm flag.
+- Adjusting functional entity of measurement time: This functional entity adjusts the energy measurement time based on the results of the calculation functional entity.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD; A[Alarm functional entity] --> C[Calculation functional entity]; M[Monitoring functional entity] --> C; C --> B[Adjusting functional entity of measurement time]; B --> M;
+```
+
+Y.3022(13)\_FVIII.1
+
+Figure VIII.1 – Framework for adjusting the energy measurement time. The diagram shows four functional entities in boxes: 'Alarm functional entity' (top left), 'Adjusting functional entity of measurement time' (top middle), 'Monitoring functional entity' (top right), and 'Calculation functional entity' (bottom center). Arrows indicate the flow of information: from 'Alarm functional entity' to 'Calculation functional entity'; from 'Monitoring functional entity' to 'Calculation functional entity'; from 'Calculation functional entity' to 'Adjusting functional entity of measurement time'; and from 'Adjusting functional entity of measurement time' to 'Monitoring functional entity'. The label 'Y.3022(13)\_FVIII.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure VIII.1 – Framework for adjusting the energy measurement time
+
+### VIII.2 Variation of traffic volume-based adjusting method for the energy measurement time $T$
+
+This clause explains the adjusting method for the energy measurement time based on the variation of traffic volume. The energy measurement time can be changed by variations in traffic volume, as in the traffic congestion situation using equation VIII.1. When the variation in traffic volume $\Delta L$ is higher than the arbitrary value $M$ , the energy measurement time decreases by a specific time $\alpha$ . On the other hand, it increases by $\alpha$ when $\Delta L$ is lower than $M$ . If $\Delta L$ is equal to zero, the energy measurement time is not changed. In addition, the energy measurement time is the threshold value $T_{threshold}$ if the alarm is on. Through the adjustment of the energy measurement time, the network providers can efficiently measure energy consumption.
+
+$$T = \begin{cases} T_{prev} + \alpha, & \text{if } \Delta L > M \\ T_{prev} - \alpha, & \text{if } \Delta L < M \\ T_{prev}, & \text{if } \Delta L = 0 \\ T_{threshold}, & \text{if alarm is on} \end{cases} \quad (\text{VIII.1})$$
+
+where $T_{prev}$ represents the energy measurement time at the previous time. $\alpha$ represents the standard value of the energy measurement time to evaluate whether $T$ is increased or not. $M$ represents an arbitrary value, the network provider can randomly set this value. $\Delta L$ represents the variation of traffic volume during the measurement time. $T_{threshold}$ represents the threshold value of the energy measurement time for the traffic congestion situation.
+
+### VIII.3 Variation of energy consumption based method for adjusting the energy measurement time $T$
+
+This clause explains the method for adjusting the energy measurement time based on the variation of energy consumption. The energy measurement time can be changed by a variation in energy consumption according to the traffic congestion situation using equation VIII.2. If $\Delta L$ is equal to zero, the energy measurement time is not changed. In addition, the energy measurement time is the threshold value $T_{threshold}$ if the alarm is on. Except for the previous two cases, if $\Delta L$ is changed, the energy measurement time is $T$ divided by $k$ , which is the slope of the energy profile function ( $=f_l()$ ) shown in Figure VIII.2,
+
+$$T = \begin{cases} T_{prev}, & \text{if } \Delta L = 0, \\ T_{threshold}, & \text{if alarm is on} \\ T / k, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (\text{VIII.2})$$
+
+where $f_l()$ represents the energy profile function of link $l$ according to the normalized traffic load. Therefore, $f_l(L)$ represents the normalized energy consumption at the normalized traffic load $L$ according to the energy profile function.
+
+NOTE – The energy profile function can be also termed as a mathematical formula.
+
+
+
+Figure VIII.2: The energy profile function. A graph showing Normalized energy consumption on the y-axis (ranging from 0 to 1) versus Normalized traffic load on the x-axis (ranging from 0 to 1). An orange curve labeled 'Energy profile function' starts at the origin and increases. A blue tangent line is drawn at a point on the curve corresponding to normalized traffic load L. The y-coordinate of this point is labeled f\_l(L). The slope of the tangent line is labeled k = f'\_l(L). The x-axis is labeled 'Normalized traffic load' and has a tick mark at L. The y-axis is labeled 'Normalized energy consumption' and has a tick mark at 1. The origin is labeled 0. The x-axis also has a tick mark at 1. The text 'Y.3022(13)\_FVIII.2' is located at the bottom right of the graph area.
+
+Figure VIII.2 – The energy profile function
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T G.Sup45] Recommendation ITU-T G.Sup45 (2009), *GPON power conservation*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 1944] IETF RFC 1944 (1996), *Benchmarking Methodology for Network Interconnect Devices*.
+Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3043
+
+(08/2013)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Smart ubiquitous networks – Context awareness framework**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3043
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.3043**
+
+# **Smart ubiquitous networks – Context awareness framework**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3043 describes the framework of context awareness for smart ubiquitous networks (SUN). It also addresses the concept of context awareness as a key capability of SUN. It further specifies requirements based on key characteristics of context awareness. In addition, key functionalities to support context awareness including architectural model and related context awareness mechanisms are also identified. For a better understanding of context awareness for SUN, relevant use cases are described in Appendix II.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3043 | 2013-08-13 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Context awareness, SUN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Overview of context awareness for SUN ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Requirements to support context awareness for SUN ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 General requirements for context awareness..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Specific requirements for context delivery..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Functional model and architecture to support context awareness in SUN ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 Functional model for context awareness ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.2 Functional architecture for context awareness in SUN ..... | 6 |
+| 9 | Context awareness mechanisms ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Context gathering mechanisms..... | 8 |
+| | 9.2 Decision-making scheme for context prediction..... | 8 |
+| 10 | Operations model of context awareness in SUN ..... | 10 |
+| 11 | Security considerations ..... | 10 |
+| | Appendix I – Types of context sources (entities) for context awareness..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix II – Applications and use case of context awareness ..... | 12 |
+| | II.1 Applications of context awareness ..... | 12 |
+| | II.2 A use case of context awareness – context aware content deliverySeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3044
+
+(08/2013)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Smart ubiquitous networks – Content awareness framework**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3044
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.3044**
+
+# **Smart ubiquitous networks – Content awareness framework**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3044 describes a framework for the content awareness feature of smart ubiquitous networks (SUN). The content awareness feature of SUN considers enhanced capabilities to enable networks to optimally and efficiently handle the content. This Recommendation describes the concept, functional requirements and functional model of content awareness of SUN.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3044 | 2013-08-13 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Content awareness, SUN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3057
+
+(12/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **A trust index model for information and communication technology infrastructures and services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3057
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3057
+
+## A trust index model for information and communication technology infrastructures and services
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3057 describes a trust index model for information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures and services. In order to provide a commonly applicable way for evaluating trust that covers different characteristics, trust index is a key concept for trust provisioning by considering the trust value chain in the ICT environment. A trust index, which can evaluate and quantify trust of stakeholders, is a comprehensive accumulation of trust indicators. This Recommendation identifies trust indicators that represent fundamental criteria for evaluating trust of entities in ICT environments. To represent characteristics of trust, trust indicators are categorized into two parts: objective trust indicators and subjective trust indicators. A list of trust indicators and an application of a trust index are introduced.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3057 | 2021-12-06 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14769 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Model, trust index, trust indicator.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview ..... | 2 |
+| 7 Trust indicators for measuring a trust index..... | 6 |
+| 8 Application of trust index ..... | 7 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 9 |
+| Bibliography..... | 10 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3057
+
+### A trust index model for information and communication technology infrastructures and services
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides a trust index model for information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures and services. A trust index is a composite and relative value that combines multiple trust indicators for representing trust of an entity quantitatively into one benchmark measure to help decision-making of stakeholders through identifying characteristics of entities in ICT environments. More specifically, this draft Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- The importance of the trust and trust value chain in ICT environment;
+- The necessity of a trust index for trust provisioning;
+- A list and detailed description of trust indicators for obtaining trust index;
+- An application of a trust index.
+
+This Recommendation provides a generic, flexible approach to the evaluation of trust. It does not specify the mechanics for trust index calculation or the underlying decision-making process based on trust. Use of trust, and the supporting trust evaluation, are specific to a particular application or network setting. As a result, detailed trust evaluation algorithms and methods, and the application of those calculations, are out of scope for this Recommendation.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3052] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3052 (2017), *Overview of trust provisioning in information and communication technology infrastructures and services*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 trust** [ITU-T Y.3052]: Trust is the measurable belief and/or confidence which represents accumulated value from history and the expecting value for future.
+
+NOTE – Trust is quantitatively and/or qualitatively calculated and measured. Trust is used to evaluate values of entities, value-chains among multiple stakeholders and human behaviours, including decision making.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 trust provisioning:** A process to evaluate trust and provide trust-related information (e.g., trust index) to help decision-making of stakeholders through identifying characteristics of entities.
+
+NOTE – Various trust perspectives can be considered separately for trust evaluation.
+
+**3.2.2 trust index:** A composite and relative value that combines multiple trust indicators for representing trust of an entity quantitatively into one benchmark measure.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+ICT Information and Communication Technology
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Overview
+
+The concept of trust infers belief and confidence that the functional entities in ICT infrastructures and services will behave in expected ways. The concept of trust provisioning is to provide "an integral function of physical, cyber and social trust that provides a valuable method of minimizing risks through identifying the trust characteristics of entities" [ITU-T Y.3052]. The considered risks for trust provisioning are described in [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+Based on the model for trust provisioning in ICT infrastructures and services [ITU-T Y.3052], there are four major stakeholders: humans (including individuals and communities) in the social world, services and control, communication and computing devices in the cyber world, and physical things in physical world. Since each world has different characteristics and criteria for judging trust, trust provisioning is done from various different perspectives (e.g., technical, business, social, ethical) to cover various cases. In addition, it is important to find commonly applicable criteria for trust provisioning that cover different characteristics to set up the same measurable condition. Based on trust provisioning, an individual player can utilize trust information to interact with other players. Figure 1 shows trust provisioning from various perspectives.
+
+
+
+The diagram is divided into three main sections: Stakeholders' interactions in ICT world, Trust evaluation, and Trusted ICT services/applications.
+
+- Stakeholders' interactions in ICT world:** This section contains three boxes representing different worlds:
+ - Social world:** Contains 'Social entities' and an illustration of people.
+ - Cyber world:** Contains 'Cyber objects' and an illustration of networked devices.
+ - Physical world:** Contains 'Physical things' and an illustration of a city with a car and a house.Double-headed arrows connect the Social world to the Cyber world, and the Cyber world to the Physical world. A single-headed arrow points from the Social world to the Physical world.
+- Trust evaluation:** This section contains three ovals representing different trust perspectives:
+ - Social trust perspective** (orange oval)
+ - Cyber trust perspective** (green oval)
+ - Physical trust perspective** (blue oval)These are connected by vertical lines. To the right of these ovals is a vertical orange bar labeled 'Various perspectives (Technical, business, ethical, etc.)'. A large purple arrow labeled 'Trust provisioning' points from this section towards the right.
+- Trusted ICT services/applications:** This section contains three boxes representing different applications:
+ - Healthcare:** Illustration of a doctor and a patient.
+ - Intelligent transportation:** Illustration of a car and a traffic light.
+ - Social media:** Illustration of a tree with many small icons representing social media.
+
+Arrows indicate the flow of trust provisioning from the interactions in the ICT world to the trust evaluation and then to the trusted ICT services/applications.
+
+Y.3057(21)
+
+Figure 1: Trust provisioning in ICT environments from various perspectives. The diagram illustrates the flow from stakeholder interactions to trust evaluation and finally to trusted ICT services.
+
+**Figure 1 – Trust provisioning in ICT environments from various perspectives**
+
+NOTE – Three trust perspectives (social, cyber and physical trust) in Figure 1 are aligned with [ITU-T Y.3052]. For trust evaluation, according to applications, each trust perspective can be selectively
+
+considered. The detailed evaluation methods of each trust perspective are out of scope for this Recommendation.
+
+Information flow is a process of dividing various activities among stakeholders in the ICT world which consists of interactions, for examples, among creators, intermediate providers and consumers. The information flow is tightly related to human life and business activities. Each activity in an information flow is identified to analyse trust assessment. For multiple information flows, one activity in a single flow may have some effects on all the corresponding flows. Trust from a single information flow can give some information to evaluate trust in all the related value chains. The classification of the information value chain for trust evaluation is as follows.
+
+- **Primary activities of information flow:** Information flows based on stakeholder activities are related at the direct interface between stakeholders (e.g., creator and consumer, provider and consumer, provider and distributor). Direct information flows between stakeholders can be associated with corresponding or cascading information flows from a single value chain. All activities of a single value chain are analysed and accumulated by the trust index. The trust in a single information flow can be used to maintain success flows (e.g., for advertising, promotion, sales, marketing and further analysis).
+- **Secondary activities of information flow:** Secondary and supporting activities are not directly related to primary activities of the original information flow. Some activities in the primary information flow can invoke other activities in other flows. In an integrated environment of multiple information flows, the activities of a single flow can lead to corresponding activities in other flows. Some activities in a single flow can trigger appropriate activities in other information flows. Secondary activities from different information flows, on the other hand, can give important information about the original flow while calculating trust.
+
+As described above, to provide successful interactions among stakeholders, one of the critical factors is trust. If trust is high, the collaborative relationship through information flows can be improved. Trust is a kind of tool to maintain honesty, fairness, openness and competence among stakeholders, and it can also reduce costs for security provisioning and risks of privacy violation. Therefore, it is important to identify the trust value chain among stakeholders. Even if stakeholders have multiple types of interactions between or among them, a relationship between stakeholders can be described as "A trustor trusts a trustee".
+
+One stakeholder can be either trustor or trustee depending on the context of the relationship. For example, when a mobile device installs an application, the device may evaluate the trust of the application with the context of deciding whether it installs the application or not. In this case, the device becomes the trustor, and the application becomes the trustee. On the other hand, when the device runs the application, the application may evaluate the trust of the device with the context of evaluating the usage behaviour of the device. In this case, the application becomes the trustor, and the device becomes the trustee.
+
+The trust value chain is described as follows (Figure 2):
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Trust value chain. On the left, a network of yellow squares represents 'Stakeholders' interactions'. A large blue arrow points from this network to a central process flow. The central process flow consists of three sequential chevron-shaped boxes: 'Trust establishment' (orange), 'Trust update' (red), and 'Trust termination' (grey). Above the 'Trust establishment' box is a yellow rounded rectangle labeled 'Trustor', and above the 'Trust termination' box is a yellow rounded rectangle labeled 'Trustee'. A horizontal arrow labeled 'trusts' connects the 'Trustor' box to the 'Trustee' box. Below the central process flow is a wide orange bar labeled 'Trust analytics'. In the bottom right corner, the text 'Y.3057(21)' is visible.
+
+Figure 2 – Trust value chain diagram. The diagram illustrates the flow from stakeholder interactions to trust establishment, update, and termination, all underpinned by trust analytics.
+
+**Figure 2 – Trust value chain**
+
+- **Trust establishment:** The stakeholder establishes a certain level of trust of other stakeholders based on the result of trust analytics. The stakeholder has a chance to make interactions with trust if other stakeholders' level of trust satisfies its requirement.
+- **Trust update:** As time goes on, the measured value of the criteria for trust have changed depending on context, environment, and behaviour of other stakeholders, etc. Therefore, the stakeholder periodically updates the trust of other stakeholders.
+- **Trust termination:** Based on the results of the trust update, the stakeholder decides to terminate the trust evaluation of other stakeholders. The stakeholder may end its interaction with stakeholders who have a lower level of trust than its requirement.
+- **Trust analytics:** A stakeholder analyses and evaluates the trust of other stakeholders in whom the stakeholder has interests. The stakeholder analyses and decides specific criteria for measuring trust.
+
+Since trust provisioning is a process to evaluate trust and provide trust-related information (e.g., trust index) to help decision-making of stakeholders through identifying characteristics of entities, it can be applied to trust analytics in a trust value chain by providing useful information when the stakeholder needs to decide the trust of other stakeholders.
+
+For trust provisioning, a commonly applicable trust assessment method is needed. The concept of the trust index is introduced in [ITU-T Y.3052] for representing the trust of entities in ICT infrastructures and services as a numerical value. The detailed trust evaluation model is shown in Figure 3. A trust evaluation model is based on a set of trust indicators to evaluate trust between a trustor and a trustee, and a trust indicator is a composite of various trust attributes that represent characteristics of the trustee.
+
+![Figure 3 – Trust evaluation model [ITU-T Y.3052]. The diagram illustrates the process of trust evaluation. At the top, a flowchart shows 'Data from various sources' feeding into 'Trust attributes' (Qualitative and Quantitative) and 'Trust indicators' (Subjective and Objective). Both sets of attributes/indicators are accumulated and then combined via 'objectify' and 'calculate' processes to produce a 'Trust index', which is used by a 'Trustor' for a 'Decision'. Below this, a detailed 'Operation' diagram shows 'Data' being processed through 'Attributes' and 'Sub-indicator' stages to produce multiple 'Indicator' graphs (Indicator 1, Indicator 2, ..., Indicator n) over 'Time'. These indicators are then combined into a 'Trust index' graph, which shows an 'Observation point' and the 'Trust index for decision'.](cfef993dcc8fb513de79eb1f93cf26ae_img.jpg)
+
+Y.3057(21)
+
+Figure 3 – Trust evaluation model [ITU-T Y.3052]. The diagram illustrates the process of trust evaluation. At the top, a flowchart shows 'Data from various sources' feeding into 'Trust attributes' (Qualitative and Quantitative) and 'Trust indicators' (Subjective and Objective). Both sets of attributes/indicators are accumulated and then combined via 'objectify' and 'calculate' processes to produce a 'Trust index', which is used by a 'Trustor' for a 'Decision'. Below this, a detailed 'Operation' diagram shows 'Data' being processed through 'Attributes' and 'Sub-indicator' stages to produce multiple 'Indicator' graphs (Indicator 1, Indicator 2, ..., Indicator n) over 'Time'. These indicators are then combined into a 'Trust index' graph, which shows an 'Observation point' and the 'Trust index for decision'.
+
+**Figure 3 – Trust evaluation model [ITU-T Y.3052]**
+
+- **Trust attribute:** Trust attributes represent characteristics of an entity (including direct and indirect trust), which consist of qualitative and quantitative attributes. Trust attributes refer to properties and features of an entity that can be trusted. Qualitative attributes need the quantization process to accumulate with quantitative attributes.
+- **Trust indicator:** Trust indicators are used to calculate a trust index by combining qualitative and quantitative attributes of trust. Objective trust indicators stand for features that represent the trustworthiness of an entity quantitatively. In addition to objective trust indicators, subjective trust indicators can be optionally considered to reflect subjective or personal attributes of trust entities. The trust indicators are calculated at the measurement instance of their trustworthiness since their values are changing as time goes on.
+- **Trust index:** A trust index is a composite and relative value that combines multiple trust indicators into one benchmark measure for representing the trustworthiness of an entity, which is similar to the ICT development index or stock market index. A trust index is a comprehensive accumulation of the objective trust indicators and the subjective trust indicators objectified for calculation. A trust index evaluates and quantifies the trustworthiness of a trustee.
+
+NOTE – The detailed trust provisioning process is described in [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+## 7 Trust indicators for measuring a trust index
+
+Trust includes both trustworthiness and trust propensity, so it may be influenced not only by entities' characteristics but also by entities' expectations and context. In addition, trust also includes context-dependent characteristics. Hence, in principle, trust can be considered subjectively by the entities and may differ from one entity to another. However, it is often estimated using objective measurements (including objectified methods) as shown in Figure 3.
+
+Trust indicators for measuring a trust index can be categorized into two different types: objective and subjective.
+
+- **Objective trust indicators** are appraised only with unbiased factors without the intervention of the opinions, views, attitudes or experiences of the evaluator. Objective trust indicators are sets of common features that can be directly quantified through various methods. For example, technical aspects, ability, integrity and benevolence can be categorized as objective trust indicators.
+- **Subjective trust indicators** are determined by entities based on the intrinsic perspectives and propensities of the evaluator, including their opinions, cultural perspectives and intent. Accordingly, subjective trust indicators will reflect personal opinions, perspectives and attitudes as well as non-technical aspects (such as social, political, economic or cultural context) that are subject to dynamic parameters. Such subjective aspects cannot be directly measured and, therefore, the manner by which subjective trust indicators are identified, measured and used is outside the scope of this Recommendation. For example, experience, reputation and inclination can be categorized as subjective trust indicators.
+
+Figure 4 shows examples of trust indicators for ICT infrastructures and services. This Recommendation describes only commonly applicable trust indicators in ICT infrastructures and services. The detailed trust indicators are listed below. This list is not exhaustive.
+
+### Examples of objective trust indicators
+
+- **Ability** represents characteristics that enable an entity to have influence within some specific contexts. The indicator 'ability' indicates the characteristics related to competency and ability in handling ICT infrastructures and services.
+- **Integrity** represents the quality of being honest and fair in the social world, the state of being complete in cyber and physical worlds, or intactness and consistency of information in terms of information. The indicator 'integrity' indicates the characteristics of the trustee's adherence to principles related to ICT infrastructures and services.
+- **Benevolence** represents to the desire to do well to others and the willingness to work or act together for common purposes or benefits. The indicator 'benevolence' indicates the characteristics of the trustee's attitude to work or acts with ICT infrastructures and services.
+
+### Examples of subjective trust indicators
+
+- **Experience** may represent the observation about the interactions between the evaluator and the subject of the evaluation, which is achieved by accumulating the state of interactions among entities over time. The indicator 'experience' may indicate the accumulated interactions between the evaluator and the subject of the evaluation.
+- **Reputation** may represent the accumulated experience of the evaluator about the subject of the evaluation with respect to its prior behaviour. The indicator 'reputation' may indicate the appraisals of the trustee's previous behaviour.
+- **Inclination** may represent the subjective preferences of evaluators toward the subjects of the evaluation, which is accumulated from experience and reputation. The indicator 'inclination' may imply the importance of the other trust indicators. For example, it may express the weights of the indicators in the trust index calculation.
+
+NOTE 1 – Detailed interpretation, measurement and application of each trust indicator are dependent upon contexts. For example, an appendix of [b-ITU-T Y.3055] describes a use case for applying trust indicators and a trust index in the personal data management context.
+
+NOTE 2 – Various approaches can be applied to quantify each trust indicator. The details are out of scope for this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+**Trust indicators**
+
+- Objective trust indicators**
+ - Ability** (Characteristics that enable an entity to have influence within some specific contexts.)
+ - Stability: The quality or state of something that is not easily changed or likely to change at any time.
+ - Reliability: The ability of an entity to perform a required function sufficiently under any conditions.
+ - Scalability: The capability of a system or process to handle a growing amount of work.
+ - Safety: The ability to protect the entity from existing risk and danger and to take care of oneself.
+ - Robustness: The ability of a system to cope with errors during execution and erroneous input.
+ - Integrity** (The quality of being honest and fair or the state of being complete)
+ - Completeness: The status is not missing and is sufficient.
+ - Accuracy/correctness: The condition or quality of being true, correct, or exact.
+ - Consistency: Steadfast adherence to the same principles, course, form, etc.
+ - Certainty: Free from doubt or reservation or satisfaction of someone's expectation
+ - Recency: Reducing the duration of the revision remaining.
+ - Benevolence** (Working or acting together willingly for a common purpose or benefit)
+ - Assurance: A positive declaration intended to give confidence. It also means promise, pledge, guaranty, or surety.
+ - Availability: The ability of the system to be in a state to perform adequately at a given instant within a given time interval.
+ - Credibility: The quality of being believable or worthy of trust.
+ - Relevance: The degree connected with the matter in hand; the relation between the trustor and the trustee.
+- Subjective trust indicators**
+ - Experience**: A personal observation considering only interactions from a trustor to a trustee.
+ - Reputation**: Public assessment of the trustor regarding the trustee's prior behaviour and performance.
+ - Inclination**: The subjective preferences of evaluators toward the subjects of the evaluation.
+
+A hierarchical diagram of trust indicators for ICT infrastructures and services. The root node is 'Trust indicators', which branches into 'Objective trust indicators' and 'Subjective trust indicators'. 'Objective trust indicators' further branches into 'Ability', 'Integrity', and 'Benevolence'. 'Subjective trust indicators' branches into 'Experience', 'Reputation', and 'Inclination'. Each of these sub-categories has a list of specific indicators with their definitions.
+
+Y.3057(21)
+
+**Figure 4 – An example of trust indicators for ICT infrastructures and services**
+
+## 8 Application of trust index
+
+As described in Figure 3, the trust evaluation model measures the quantified value of trust indicators and performs a trust index calculation by using the measured trust indicators. Since the trust index represents the trust of an entity quantitatively into one benchmark measure, it can be used as one piece of useful information. Various approaches (e.g., from simple weighted sum to complex artificial intelligence) can be applied to obtain a trust index.
+
+Figure 5 shows an application of a trust index aligned with a general decision-making process. During the decision-making process, a trust index can be utilized as one of the decision criteria. Particularly when a decision maker (i.e., trustor) needs a trust index, a trust evaluation model performs a trust provisioning process for evaluating a trust index (in this case, the decision maker itself or any trustworthy entity perform a trust provisioning process). Then the decision maker can utilize the trust index (including trust indicators if necessary) to choose the best alternatives for the decision-making process.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph "Decision-making process"
+ A[Identify transaction issues] --> B[Establish decision criteria]
+ B --> C[Evaluate alternatives]
+ C --> D[Choose best alternatives]
+ D --> E[Make a decision]
+ end
+
+ subgraph "Trust provisioning process"
+ F[Trust data] --> G[Trust evaluation model]
+ H["Other data
+(e.g., history, context information)"] --> G
+ G --> I[Trust index]
+ G -.-> J[Trust indicators]
+ end
+
+ B -- "Request trust index" --> G
+ I -- "Return trust index" --> C
+
+```
+
+Figure 5: A diagram showing the integration of a trust provisioning process into a decision-making process. The decision-making process (top) consists of five steps: Identify transaction issues, Establish decision criteria, Evaluate alternatives, Choose best alternatives, and Make a decision. The trust provisioning process (bottom) involves a Trust evaluation model that takes Trust data and Other data (e.g., history, context information) as input to produce a Trust index and Trust indicators. A red arrow points from 'Establish decision criteria' to the Trust evaluation model, and another red arrow points from the Trust index back to 'Evaluate alternatives'.
+
+**Figure 5 – An application of trust index obtained by trust provisioning process**
+
+The trust evaluation model can be deployed by multiple stakeholders and applications. Since each stakeholder may have different requirements, the resulting trust indicators can be different from stakeholder to stakeholder. It is possible to identify common criteria for applying trust indices across multiple stakeholders or applications. What is required is transparency of the trust evaluation model. With a trust model fully documented, each stakeholder or application can decide if the generated trust index is useful in their application. Any interoperability of a common trust index relies on the transparency of the full trust model, its indicators and the calculations of the trust index.
+
+To find common criteria for applying a trust index among different stakeholders, each stakeholder could check detailed trust indicators of other stakeholders' trust index evaluation models. This will allow the stakeholders to decide whether they can accept the provided trust index based on the trust index evaluation model or not. For those stakeholders that choose to utilize a commonly applicable trust index, they may exchange their trust indicators and methods for measuring them.
+
+By applying a trust index model with trust indicators for ICT environments, various risks and limitations need to be carefully considered. For combining detailed criteria (e.g., trust indicators and trust attributes) to measure a certain value, a trust evaluation model keeps in mind that unpredictable situations can occur. For example, measured values can result in unpredictable biases influencing the entities of trust. Therefore, it is important to consider transparent, explainable and auditable approaches. Moreover, since a trust index model may consider both objective and subjective trust indicators for calculation, it may not be possible to obtain a value in real-time due to the characteristics of trust such as context and time dependency.
+
+On the other hand, each trust indicator has a different importance to each stakeholder who actually wants to use it. Therefore, even stakeholders who use the same measurement method for obtaining trust indicators may find that the result of trust index calculation may differ due to differences in the weights assigned to different factors. Therefore, stakeholders' priority factors should be shared among stakeholders to establish common criteria for providing a common understanding of trust index applications. This is an essential part of making the trust index model transparent, explainable and auditable to stakeholders and other interested parties.
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+Any activities, including data collection, analysis and management, for measuring trust indicators and calculating a trust index should follow technical and/or regulatory guidelines for security and privacy such as [b-ITU-T X.1058], [b-ISO/IEC 27701], [b-ISO/IEC 29100], etc. Details of security and privacy related technologies for trust index evaluation are out of scope for this Recommendation.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3055] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3055 (2020), *Framework for trust-based personal data management*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1058] Recommendation ITU-T X.1058 (2017), *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for personally identifiable information protection*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27701] ISO/IEC 27701:2019, *Security techniques – Extension to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 for privacy information management – Requirements and guidelines*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 29100] ISO/IEC 29100:2011, *Information technology – Security techniques – Privacy framework*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## ITU-T Y.3061 (12/2023)
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+## **Autonomous networks – Architecture framework**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3061
+
+## Autonomous networks – Architecture framework
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3061 provides requirements, architecture, components and related sequence diagrams that together comprise an architecture framework for autonomous networks.
+
+This Recommendation includes:
+
+- requirements for the architecture;
+- description of the architecture and its components;
+- sequence diagrams explaining the interactions between architecture components.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3061 | 2023-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15735 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architecture framework, autonomous networks, components, dynamic adaptation, experimentation, exploratory evolution, requirements, sequence diagram.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Introduction..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Requirements for the architecture..... | 6 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements for exploratory evolution..... | 6 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements for online experimentation ..... | 10 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements for dynamic adaptation..... | 12 |
+| | 7.4 Requirements for knowledge..... | 16 |
+| | 7.5 Requirements for autonomous network orchestration..... | 18 |
+| 8 | Architecture framework description ..... | 20 |
+| | 8.1 High-level architecture framework..... | 20 |
+| | 8.2 Description of controller..... | 21 |
+| | 8.3 Description of the sub-systems and their components ..... | 22 |
+| 9 | Sequence diagrams ..... | 31 |
+| | 9.1 Exploratory evolution of controllers ..... | 31 |
+| | 9.2 Experimentation for controllers..... | 32 |
+| | 9.3 Dynamic adaptation of controllers ..... | 34 |
+| 10 | Security considerations..... | 36 |
+| | Appendix I – An example realization of the architecture framework for autonomousNOTE 1 – Examples of metadata regarding the AN workflow include current capabilities, status and context of the AN components, including knowledge base (KB), controllers, orchestrators and simulators. Managing may include identifying actors and points in the AN workflow, capturing metadata regarding the workflow that can then be exchanged.
NOTE 2 – Examples of points of metadata exchange in the AN workflow are the different stages of experimentation and dynamic adaptation.
NOTE 3 – The format used for the metadata exchange lies outside the scope of this Recommendation.
NOTE 4 – Examples of AN workflow include the generation of scenarios for potential experimentation and potential evolution.
NOTE 5 – Peers may include humans and machines.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-006 | AN architecture is required to have the ability to integrate the impacts of metadata exchange with peer entities involved in AN workflows.
NOTE – Examples of impacts of the metadata exchange are updates of KB and selection of API versions to use for adaptation.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-007 | AN architecture is required to support the optimization of controllers.
NOTE – Examples of optimization of controllers are optimization of adaptation mechanisms like data collection, data quality and frequency. Other examples are optimization of CL implementations like root cause analysis (RCA) mechanisms and recommendations on better algorithms for achieving the same objective. Other examples are formation or evolution of new controllers to address new or unforeseen problems in the underlay network.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-008 | AN architecture is required to support the ability to discover characteristics of controllers that are relevant for enabling evolution.
NOTE – Examples of characteristics of controllers that are relevant for evolution are: capabilities exposed by and requirements to be satisfied for the controllers.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-009 | AN architecture is required to support the capability to recommend modules that can satisfy the characteristics of controllers.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-010 | AN architecture is required to enable the integration of controllers from different domains to achieve complex use cases.
NOTE – For example, an AN may integrate controllers in different domains of the network, like radio access network (RAN) and CN domains.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-011 | AN architecture is required to enable the utilization of declarative specifications of use cases while deciding the design, deployment and management of controllers.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-012 | AN architecture is required to allow for the utilization of declarative specifications of use cases to capture both use case requirements from applications and deployment requirements from underlay networks.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-013 | AN architecture is required to support the capability to choose a compatible set of interfaces to integrate with underlay network services.
NOTE – Examples of interfaces that may be used include those to monitor the services and controllers in the underlay networks.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-014 | AN architecture is required to support the creation or recommendation of candidate designs for potential network services and interfaces in the underlay networks, which may possibly satisfy new use cases.
NOTE – Design creation may also be triggered in response to an observed fault in underlay networks.
|
+| AN-arch-evo-req-015 | AN architecture is required to consider use case specific requirements (including operator preferences) while determining operator preferences for design, deployment and management of controllers, including connectivity options between various domains.
|
+
+| Requirement | Description |
+|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | NOTE – For example, in rural areas, end-users may have usage patterns with characteristics dependent on applications (e.g., low mobility, high bandwidth). The choice of last mile connectivity options may be influenced by such preferences. |
+| AN-arch-evo-req-016 | AN architecture is required to support capabilities enabling the evolution of inter-domain connectivity among controllers deployed in various domains of the underlay network. |
+| AN-arch-evo-req-017 | AN architecture is required to support adaptation to the evolution of applications at run-time.AN architecture is required to have the ability to execute experimentation and to collate and validate its results, considering the metadata and constraints, as well as corresponding controller designs.
NOTE 1 – Experimentations may have several phases, e.g., simulation driven, testbed driven or canary test driven. The phases of an experimentation may be configurable and automated, for example, as per a workflow.
NOTE 2 – The specific success and failure criteria for the experiments lie outside the scope of this Recommendation. Acceptable formats for representing metadata and constraints related to potential success and failure as related to a use case are for further study.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-004 | AN architecture is required to support the ability to verify, before the actual integration of controllers into the underlay networks, that the proposed evolution of the controllers is compatible with the underlay networks. |
+| AN-arch-exp-req-005 | AN architecture is required to support the automation and abstraction of experimentation of underlay network services. |
+| AN-arch-exp-req-006 | AN architecture is required to provide capabilities for the creation of strategies regarding the deployment of experimentation scenarios, testing and validation of controllers in a sandbox environment. |
+| AN-arch-exp-req-007 | AN architecture is required to support capabilities allowing the AN to deploy, test and validate controllers in a sandbox environment. |
+| AN-arch-exp-req-008 | AN architecture is required to provide capabilities allowing the AN to analyse the results from experiments in a sandbox environment and to use those results to update the KB, optimize deployed controllers in underlay networks as well as optimize the experimentation strategies in sandbox.
NOTE – An example of controller optimization is the selection of new controllers or modules. An example of experimentation strategy optimization is the selection of new test scenarios.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-009 | AN architecture is required to support the ability of the AN to experiment with the generation of changes to user specific models that may help ease of experience for users in hitherto unforeseen circumstances.
NOTE – AN experimentation may be done in a sandbox using simulators.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-010 | AN architecture is required to support capabilities for the AN to provide experimentation of controllers as a service to underlay networks.
NOTE – Underlay networks may have different types of controller deployed including those from third parties. An AN discovers the characteristics of different types of controller, providing different experimentation services and results as output for various types of experimentation scenario.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-011 | AN architecture is required to support means for the AN to import and export configurations for simulators.
NOTE – Examples of configurations for simulators are simulated network topologies, simulated number of devices, simulated traffic settings and CL interfaces.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-012 | AN architecture is required to enable the AN to asynchronously trigger experimentations.
NOTE – Examples of asynchronous triggering are evolution of new set of controllers that need to be validated, updated network configurations by operator, provisioning or update of NFs in the underlay network.
|
+| AN-arch-exp-req-013 | AN architecture is required to enable the validation of experimentation results by the AN. |
+
+| Requirement | Description |
+|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | NOTE – Examples of validation include sanity checks, functional and non-functional tests. |
+| AN-arch-exp-req-014 | AN architecture is required to support the ability of the AN to provide feedback on the design of controllers based on the results of experimentation.AN architecture is required to support the ability to parse, validate and translate abstracted use case descriptions, with high-level objectives of a controller into controller designs.
NOTE 1 – The abstracted use case descriptions may be hand crafted as unstructured text or derived from controller specifications.
NOTE 2 – Controller designs may be provided using structured languages formats (e.g., TOSCA [b-TOSCA]) and may be structured in a way that facilitates downstream exploration, experimentation, and adaptation.
NOTE 3 – Controller designs may use and enable properties derived from various domains in the network, e.g., properties allowing description of use cases of physical layer, network layer and application layer.
NOTE 4 – Examples of use cases are:
a) RCA and diagnosis of network elements based on real-time analysis of data – see FG-AN-usecase-006 in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 71]. b) Intelligent energy-saving solution based on automatic data acquisition, AI-based energy consumption modelling and inference, facilities parameters control policies decision, facilities adjustment actions implementation, energy-saving result evaluation and control policies continuous optimization – see FG-AN-usecase-007 in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 71]. c) Optimal adjustment of antenna parameters with AI-enabled multi-dimensional analysis and prediction – see FG-AN-usecase-008 in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 71]. d) Management of third party vertical applications and related services in the network – see FG-AN-usecase-010 in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl. 71]. |
+| AN-arch-ano-req-002 | AN architecture is required to have the ability to manage the lifecycle of controllers.
NOTE 1 – Examples of management tasks of a controller's lifecycle include creating a configuration for the controller (based on the capabilities of the underlay network), creating an instance of the controller in the underlay network, monitoring the execution of the controller in the underlay network and subsequently optimizing controllers or related parameters.
NOTE 2 – Examples of subsequent optimization are recommendations on new AI/ML analysis techniques, data collection techniques, evolution of controllers to move up the intelligence level [b-ITU-T Y.3173].
|
+
+| Requirement | Description |
+|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AN-arch-ano-req-003 | AN architecture is required to enable the management of lifecycle of controllers based on their output.
+- [b-Bega] Bega, D., Gramaglia, M., Fiore, M., Banchs, A., Costa-Perez, X. (2020). AZTEC: Anticipatory capacity allocation for zero-touch network slicing, *IEEE INFOCOM 2020 – IEEE Conf. Comput. Commun.*, pp. 794-803, DOI: 10.1109/INFOCOM41043.2020.9155299.
+- [b-Bennett] Bennett, S. (1993). Development of the PID controller. *IEEE Control Syst. Mag.*, **13**(6), pp. 58-62. DOI: 10.1109/37.248006
+- [b-Bleiholder] Bleiholder, J., Naumann, F. (2009). Data fusion. *ACM Comput. Surv.* **41**(1), Article 1, 41 pp. DOI: [10.1145/1456650.1456651](https://doi.org/10.1145/1456650.1456651)
+- [b-Blessed] Blessed, G., Aliyu, I., Agajo, J., Sarmento, T.L., Nahum, C.V., Novoa, L., et al. (2022). Network resource allocation for emergency management based on closed-loop analysis. *ITU J. Future Evol. Technol.* **3**(2), pp. 175-201. DOI: [10.52953/HVPI8935](https://doi.org/10.52953/HVPI8935)
+- [b-Boyd] Boyd, J.R., Hammond, G.T. (editor). (2017). *A discourse on winning and losing*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 392 pp.
+- [b-Dagsthul] Demestrescu, C., Seidel, R, editors (Internet). *Dagstuhl artifacts series*. Wadern: Schloss Dagstuhl. Available [viewed 2024-02-22] from: [https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/institut\\_darts.php](https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/institut_darts.php)
+- [b-El Hattachi] El Hattachi, R., Erfanian, J. (editors) (2015). *NGMN 5G white paper*. Reading: Next Generation Mobile Networks Alliance. Available [viewed 2024-02-20] at: [https://ngmn.org/wp-content/uploads/NGMN\\_5G\\_White\\_Paper\\_V1\\_0.pdf](https://ngmn.org/wp-content/uploads/NGMN_5G_White_Paper_V1_0.pdf)
+- [b-FRINX] GitHub (2024). *FRINX machine*. San Francisco, CA: GitHub. Available [viewed 2024-02-21] at:
+- [b-Kephart] Kephart, J.O., Chess, D.M. (2003). The vision of autonomic computing. *Computer*, **36**(1), pp. 41–50. DOI: 10.1109/MC.2003.1160055
+- [b-Kubernetes] Kubernetes authors (2024). *Overview*. San Francisco: Linux Foundation. Available [viewed 2024-02-21] at:
+- [b-Maggi] Maggi, L., Valcarce, A., Hoydis, J. (2021). Bayesian optimization for radio resource management: Open loop power control. *IEEE J- Selected Areas Commun.* **39**(7), pp. 1858-1871. DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2021.3078490.
+
+- [b-MAPE-K] IBM (2006). *An architectural blueprint for autonomic computing*, Academic Computing White Paper, fourth edition. Hawthorne, NY: IBM 36 pp.
+- [b-Mwanje] Mwanje, S.S., Mannweiler, C., editors (2020). *Towards cognitive autonomous networks: Network management automation for 5G and beyond*. Chichester: Wiley. 560 pp. DOI:10.1002/9781119586449
+- [b-ONAP] Open Network Automation Platform (2024). *About*. San Francisco: Linux Foundation. Available [viewed 2024-02-21] at:
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+- [b-Rossi] Rossi, F., Cardellini, V., Presti, F. L. (2020). Hierarchical scaling of microservices in Kubernetes. *2020 IEEE Int. Conf. Auton. Comput. Self-Organizing Syst.*, pp. 28–37. DOI: 10.1109/ACSOS49614.2020.00023.
+- [b-Sutton] Sutton, R.S. Barto, A.G. (2018). *Reinforcement learning: An introduction*, 2nd edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 552 pp.
+- [b-TOSCA] OASIS (2020). *TOSCA simple profile in YAML version 1.3*. Open-source Alliance for Social Innovation & Sustainability. Available [viewed 2024-02-21] at: .
+- [b-Umuroglu] Umuroglu, Y., Akhauri, Y., Fraser, N.J., Blott, M. (2020), LogicNets: Co-designed neural networks and circuits for extreme-throughput applications. *30th Int. Conf. Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL)*, Gothenburg, Sweden, 2020, pp. 291-297. DOI: 10.1109/FPL50879.2020.00055
+- [b-Whitley] Whitley, D. (2001). An overview of evolutionary algorithms: Practical issues and common pitfalls. *Inform. Softw. Technol.*, **43**(14), pp. 817-831. DOI: 10.1016/S0950-5849(01)00188-4.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3071
+
+(03/2017)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071
+
+# Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071 specifies the requirements and capabilities of data aware networking (DAN) to realize the use cases and scenarios described in Supplement 35 to the ITU-T Y-series Recommendations, which are expected to be major applications/services provided on DAN. One of the objectives reflecting emerging requirements for future networks is data awareness as specified in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001. DAN is expected to have capabilities optimized to handle enormous amounts of data and to enable users to access desired data safely, easily, quickly and accurately, regardless of their location. DAN can be described as networking whose central aim is retrieving information, i.e., information centric networking (ICN).
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3071 | 2017-03-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13253 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+DAN, data awareness, data aware networking, future networks, ICN, information centric networking.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Justification..... | 2 |
+| 7 Requirements for DAN..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Forwarding ..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 Routing ..... | 3 |
+| 7.3 Mobility ..... | 3 |
+| 7.4 Security..... | 4 |
+| 7.5 Management ..... | 4 |
+| 7.6 Miscellaneous ..... | 4 |
+| 7.7 Use case specific..... | 5 |
+| 8 Capabilities of DAN ..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 Configuration of DAN components ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Capabilities ..... | 6 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 8 |
+| 10 Environmental considerations ..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071
+
+## Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements of data aware networking (information centric networking) derived from the use cases and scenarios described in [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35]. One of the objectives reflecting emerging requirements for future networks is data awareness as specified in [ITU-T Y.3001]. This Recommendation identifies the capabilities to fulfil the requirements and describes the components including their corresponding capabilities.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3031] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031 (2012), *Identification framework in future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3033] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3033 (2014), *Framework of data aware networking for future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3034] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3034 (2015), *Architecture for interworking of heterogeneous component networks in ID/locator split-based future networks*.
+- [ITU-T M.3400] Recommendation ITU-T M.3400 (2000), *TMN management functions*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 access control** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource in an unauthorized manner.
+
+**3.1.2 authorization** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights.
+
+**3.1.3 availability** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity.
+
+**3.1.4 data ID** [ITU-T Y.3033]: An identifier used to identify a data object. It has a form of a series of digits, characters and symbols or any of these combinations, which generally do not have any meaning.
+
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, the terms "data ID" and "ID" are used interchangeably.
+
+**3.1.5 data integrity** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner.
+
+**3.1.6 data name** [ITU-T Y.3033]: A string of alpha-numeric characters that is used to identify the data object. A data name, which may have variable length, is usually configured in such a way that it would be easier to be read and remembered by humans.
+
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, the terms "data name", "NDO name", and simply "name" are used interchangeably.
+
+**3.1.7 data origin authentication** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
+
+**3.1.8 named data object (NDO)** [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35]: A data object that is identifiable by a name.
+
+**3.1.9 peer-entity authentication** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the one claimed.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 DAN element:** A network component that forwards messages to producers, consumers, and other data aware networking (DAN) elements.
+
+**3.2.2 DAN realm:** A set of data aware networking (DAN) elements operated under one DAN realization and managed by an organization. Different DAN realms may adopt different DAN realizations such as naming convention, communication models including push and pull models and name resolution mechanisms.
+
+**3.2.3 NDO consumer:** A component that makes requests on named data objects (NDOs).
+
+**3.2.4 NDO producer:** A component holding named data objects (NDOs) and make them reachable by corresponding requests. An NDO producer may be an actual owner of the NDO or a delegate of the actual owner.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+APL Application
+
+DAN Data Aware Networking
+
+ICN Information Centric Networking
+
+ID Identifier
+
+NDO Named Data Object
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## **6 Justification**
+
+It is essential to define the capabilities of DAN to bring its concept into reality.
+
+Several use case scenarios for DAN have been introduced in [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35], which can be realized in different ways, e.g., with different combinations of capabilities. This aspect encourages the identification of the capabilities of DAN to realize various use case scenarios.
+
+For this reason, this Recommendation intends to specify the requirements of DAN that are derived from the use case scenarios, and then defines its capabilities considering previously performed studies, such as those on communication based on name or identifier (ID) in [ITU-T Y.3031] [ITU-T Y.3033] [ITU-T Y.3034]. Understanding the requirements and components of DAN enables the enrichment of the process of developing additional use case scenarios.
+
+# **7 Requirements for DAN**
+
+## **7.1 Forwarding**
+
+- NDO name based forwarding function:
+It is required that a request be forwarded by attaching the name or ID of the NDO to the request.
+- Request aggregation function:
+It is recommended that DAN elements be equipped with the function to aggregate requests to the same NDO to reduce network traffic and server load.
+- Subscription:
+DAN is required to provide a mechanism for an NDO consumer to register description(s) to identify one or more NDOs that the consumer is interested in receiving when they are published.
+- Publication:
+DAN is required to provide a mechanism for an NDO producer to publish NDOs to the network. The published NDOs may be distributed to consumers whose subscription matches the published NDOs.
+- Packet forwarding loop avoidance function:
+DAN is required to have functions to avoid or resolve packet forwarding loops.
+
+### **7.2 Routing**
+
+- NDO registration function:
+It is required that the unique name or ID of an NDO be registered to DAN so that NDO consumers can access the NDO with the name or ID.
+- NDO location resolution function:
+DAN optionally provides the facility for a DAN element to ask for a forwarding direction when the DAN element cannot judge the forwarding direction of a request for an NDO.
+- Advertisement function for the availability of NDOs:
+It is required that availability information of NDOs be disseminated to help in the choice of the correct direction of request forwarding.
+- Network selection function for requests to reach an NDO:
+It is required that appropriate network interfaces be selected to forward requests in order to reach a specified NDO.
+
+### **7.3 Mobility**
+
+- Consumer mobility:
+DAN is required to provide a mechanism for a consumer to maintain undisrupted message flows while the consumer is in motion.
+- NDO mobility:
+DAN is required to provide a mechanism for NDOs to re-locate without disrupting NDO availability when the NDOs change their locations.
+
+- Network mobility:
+DAN optionally provides an efficient mechanism for a network to maintain seamless network connection for its mobility.
+
+### **7.4 Security**
+
+- Access control:
+It is required that DAN be equipped with a mechanism to examine and confirm the authenticity of consumers and that NDO be accessible only by the authorized consumers.
+- Network security function from malicious attacks:
+DAN is required to have a mechanism to protect its functions from malicious network attacks.
+- NDO availability:
+DAN is required to provide a mechanism to ensure that the NDOs published in networks are available for authorized consumers.
+- NDO origin authentication:
+DAN is required to be equipped with a mechanism to examine and confirm the authenticity of the owners of NDOs.
+- NDO name verification:
+DAN is required to be equipped with a mechanism to examine and confirm the mapping between an NDO and its name or ID.
+- NDO integrity:
+DAN is required to be equipped with a mechanism to examine and confirm the data integrity of NDOs.
+
+### **7.5 Management**
+
+[ITU-T M.3400] defines the standard network management functions and DAN is also required to provide similar management functions, which include:
+
+- Performance management
+- Fault management
+- Configuration management
+- Accounting management
+- Security management
+
+DAN specific management functions are expected to be required. One of the potential DAN specific management functions is the function to manage NDOs. The NDO management function may include monitoring and regulation of NDO accesses and the number of NDOs, as well as withdrawal of NDOs. Further development of DAN technologies is required before the requirements on DAN specific management functions are defined.
+
+### **7.6 Miscellaneous**
+
+- NDO cache function:
+It is required that DAN elements be equipped with a cache that temporally holds NDOs to reduce unnecessary duplicated transmission of the same NDO. The cache may be populated by NDOs either passing by or allocated proactively.
+- NDO fragmentation function:
+It is required that DAN elements fragment large NDOs into a series of smaller units for network transmission.
+- Function of updating and versioning NDOs:
+DAN optionally provides versioning capability to update content while keeping its name.
+
+## 7.7 Use case specific
+
+- Processing function:
+DAN optionally provides the capability to process NDOs before transmitting them in order to adapt the NDOs to the capability of the receiving consumer or to aggregate information.
+- Process registration function:
+When a processing function is available in DAN, a mechanism to register the description of the process is required.
+- Process scheduling and coordination function:
+DAN optionally has a capability to recognize data processing requests, coordinate the requested processing placed at appropriate DAN elements, and schedule the processing.
+- NDO and processing description retrieval function:
+DAN elements optionally have a capability to retrieve data processing descriptions and the NDOs to be processed by the requested processing.
+- Explicit processing allocation function:
+DAN elements optionally have a capability to allocate data processing function to a specified location.
+- Data collection function:
+DAN elements optionally have a capability to collect sensor data and store the data in their storage.
+- Long live period of cached data:
+Cached data can optionally have a long live period before the cached data are deleted. This function is indispensable to the dissemination of information that is accessed by a large number of users, e.g., disaster-related information, using DAN.
+- Consumer and cache location function:
+DAN optionally has a mechanism to identify networks and geographical locations of consumers and caches.
+- NDO distribution scheduling function:
+DAN optionally has a function to estimate the arrival time of mobile consumer requests to DAN elements and the duration that the consumers are connected to the DAN elements. DAN also optionally has a capability to schedule delivery of appropriate NDOs to the DAN elements before the consumer request arrives.
+- Multiple NDO request function:
+DAN optionally provides a mechanism to request multiple NDOs in one request.
+- Vehicle-to-vehicle communication function:
+IDAN optionally provides the capability for a vehicle-onboard DAN element to directly communicate with other vehicle-onboard DAN elements.
+- Vehicle-to-roadside-infrastructure communication function:
+DAN optionally provides the capability for a vehicle-onboard DAN element to communicate with roadside producers that give location specific information.
+- Distribution of information among fragmented networks:
+DAN optionally provides a mechanism to distribute NDOs while a DAN network is fragmented into multiple DAN networks with intermittent connections among them.
+- Function to specify service classes in NDO names:
+DAN can optionally specify service classes in NDO names in order to provide appropriate service quality for communication services.
+- Service class provisioning function:
+DAN is optionally equipped with a mechanism to provide the appropriate communication quality for different communication services specified in NDO names.
+
+# 8 Capabilities of DAN
+
+## 8.1 Configuration of DAN components
+
+Figure 1 shows the configuration of a DAN network consisting of the following components (see clause 3.2 for definitions of the terms):
+
+- NDO producers
+- NDO consumers
+- DAN elements
+- DAN realms
+
+When there are multiple DAN realms, the DAN elements connecting heterogeneous DAN realms act as gateways to make appropriate conversions of names, IDs, protocols, etc. so that the DAN realms can communicate with each other.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Overall network structure of DAN. The diagram illustrates a network with two DAN realms, DAN realm 1 and DAN realm 2, represented by yellow ovals. DAN realm 1 contains three green 3D boxes labeled 'DAN element'. DAN realm 2 contains two green 3D boxes labeled 'DAN element'. A central blue oval labeled 'NDO' is connected to the DAN elements in both realms. On the left, a laptop icon is connected to a green box labeled 'NDO consumer'. At the bottom, a smartphone icon is connected to a green box labeled 'NDO consumer'. On the right, a server icon is connected to a green box labeled 'NDO producer', which is also connected to a blue oval labeled 'NDO'. The connections show the flow of data and control between the realms and the central NDO.
+
+Y.3071(17)\_F01
+
+Figure 1 – Overall network structure of DAN
+
+## 8.2 Capabilities
+
+DAN is composed of the capabilities shown in Figure 2. There are five major capabilities: data capability, control capability, security capability, management capability and application capability. The capabilities can be further subdivided into functional blocks as shown in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Figure 2 – Functional view of DAN capabilities. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure of capabilities. At the top is 'Application (APL) capability'. Below it are three main sections: 'Security capability' on the left, 'Control capability' in the center, and 'Management capability' on the right. 'Security capability' includes 'Access control function', 'NDO authentication function', and 'NDO integrity function'. 'Control capability' includes 'Routing function', 'Mobility support function', 'Forwarding information base' (represented as a cylinder), 'Pub/sub function', and 'APL specific function' (dashed box). 'Data capability' (part of the central section) includes 'Forwarding function', 'Cache function', 'NDO repository' (cylinder), and 'APL specific function' (dashed box). 'Management capability' includes 'Performance management', 'Fault management', 'Configuration management', 'Accounting management', and 'Security management'. A reference 'Y.3052(17)\_F02' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional view of DAN capabilities**
+
+### 8.2.1 Data capability
+
+The data capability has functional blocks as follows:
+
+- Forwarding function:
+This functional block contains an NDO name-based forwarding function, request aggregation function and packet forwarding loop avoidance function.
+- Cache function:
+This functional block includes storage to cache NDOs and their accompanying control functions.
+- NDO repository:
+The repository is the storage to hold original content.
+
+Additionally, application specific functional blocks may be placed in the data capability.
+
+### 8.2.2 Control capability
+
+The control capability has functional blocks as follows:
+
+- Routing function:
+The routing functional block is composed of an NDO registration function, NDO location resolution function, advertisement function for the availability of NDOs and network selection function for messages to reach an NDO.
+- Mobility support function:
+The mobility support function includes a consumer mobility function, NDO mobility function and network mobility function.
+- Forwarding information base:
+The forwarding information base is the storage to hold information to determine the direction of forwarding and is to be used by the forwarding function.
+- Publish/subscribe function:
+This functional block includes publication and subscription functions.
+
+Additionally, application specific functional blocks may be placed in the control capability.
+
+### 8.2.3 Security capability
+
+The security capability has functional blocks as follows:
+
+- Access control function:
+The access control function is a mechanism to secure data confidentiality so that an NDO is only accessible by authorized consumers.
+- NDO authentication function:
+The NDO authentication function is a mechanism to secure data authenticity so that an NDO is claimed to be true by an authorized entity.
+- NDO integrity function:
+The NDO integrity function is a mechanism to examine and confirm the integrity of an NDO so that an NDO is ensured to be the same as the source.
+
+### **8.2.4 Management capability**
+
+The management capability is the function block to provide network management functions. [ITU-T M.3400] defines the standard network management function groups and DAN is also required to facilitate the management functions defined in [ITU-T M.3400], which are:
+
+- performance management;
+- fault management;
+- configuration management;
+- accounting management;
+- security management.
+
+### **8.2.5 Application capability**
+
+The application capability contains network service functions. The network service functions in the application capability do not include user applications that only send and receive messages among communicating network users. Instead, the network service functions are functions to implement and control application specific network behaviour.
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+DAN provides mechanisms to guarantee secrecy, integrity and availability of NDOs, as well as verifying the owners of NDOs by means of the capabilities described in clause 8.2.3. To operate the mechanisms properly, an additional mechanism to distribute cryptographic keys may be required.
+
+Revealing the NDO access history by NDO consumers is an intrinsic problem in DAN where NDO names are expected to be long-lived. Even if the name itself does not reveal the content of the NDO, the name can be used to retrieve the NDO and the content may be known.
+
+The new network function, caching, potentially poses a new security threat to network users. For example, placing improper NDOs in a cache prevents access to the correct NDOs and forcing the cache to store improper NDOs reduces cache efficiency.
+
+# **10 Environmental considerations**
+
+The environmental considerations in this Recommendation are mainly subject to those provided by DAN as specified in [ITU-T Y.3033]. Additional energy reduction by DAN may come from the processing capability provided by DAN elements. The processing capability can be used to reduce the amount of data and the number of messages to be transferred over DAN. Although the processing increases energy consumption at one DAN element, reduction in the number of messages being exchanged lowers energy consumption in the other DAN elements, which results in energy reduction in the entire network.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT Applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 35 (2016), *ITU-T Y.3033 – Data-aware networking – Scenarios and use cases*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3072
+
+(04/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information-centric networking in IMT-2020**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+### GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+### INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+#### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information-centric networking in IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072 specifies the requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution to achieve high performance such as low latency and scalability for a large number of named objects for information-centric networking in IMT-2020. The Recommendation provides the following: (1) It provides an introduction to name mapping and resolution in IMT-2020. (2) It describes the service and functional requirements of name mapping and resolution. (3) Based on the requirements, it specifies the capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information-centric networking in IMT-2020.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3072 | 2019-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13890 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+ICN, IMT-2020, name mapping, name resolution
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3078
+
+(02/2022)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Information centric networking for IMT-2020 and beyond – Requirements and capabilities of data object segmentation**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3078
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3078
+
+# Information centric networking for IMT-2020 and beyond – Requirements and capabilities of data object segmentation
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3078 starts with an introduction to data object segmentation in information centric networking (ICN) for IMT-2020 and beyond. It specifies the service and functional requirements and capabilities of data object segmentation to achieve high efficiency of caching and forwarding in ICN.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3078 | 2022-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14851 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+ICN, IMT-2020, manifest, named data chunk, named data object.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Service and functional requirements of data object segmentation ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Service requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Functional requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Capabilities of data object segmentation ..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 DO segmentation ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 DO reassembling ..... | 7 |
+| 8.3 Manifest processing..... | 7 |
+| 8.4 Sending and receiving LDCs..... | 7 |
+| 8.5 Security consideration ..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3078
+
+# Information centric networking for IMT-2020 and beyond – Requirements and capabilities of data object segmentation
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and capabilities of data object segmentation to achieve high efficiency of caching and forwarding in information centric networking (ICN) for IMT-2020 and beyond. Its scope specifically includes the following items:
+
+- Introduction to data object segmentation in ICN for IMT-2020 and beyond,
+- Service and functional requirements of data object segmentation,
+- Capabilities of data object segmentation in ICN for IMT-2020 and beyond.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3033] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3033 (2014), *Framework of data aware networking for future networks*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3071] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071 (2017), *Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 address** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+
+**3.1.2 data object (DO)** [ITU-T Y.3033]: An individually identifiable unit of information created by individuals, institutions and technology to benefit audiences in contexts that they value.
+
+**3.1.3 identifier** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects).
+
+**3.1.4 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-R M.2083]: IMT-2020 is systems, system components, and related aspects that support to provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+**3.1.5 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A name is the identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element) that may be resolved/translated into address.
+
+**3.1.6 named data object (NDO)** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.35]: A data object that is identifiable by a name.
+
+**3.1.7 name mapping** [b-ITU-T Y.3072]: Name mapping is a service that builds one-to-one or one-to-many relationships between an identifier of an object and addresses of the object, where the addresses can be IP addresses.
+
+**3.1.8 name resolution** [b-ITU-T Y.3072]: Name resolution is a service that provides the translation between an identifier and address(es) of the object based on the relationship built by name mapping.
+
+**3.1.9 service** [b-ITU-T Y.3031]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 data chunk (DC)**: A part of a data object which is segmented with specific size.
+
+**3.2.2 DO metadata**: Structural information describing the data object's attributes such as times of last change, access, and modification, as well as owner and permission data, which may be modified during its lifecycle and may be as a special data object.
+
+**3.2.3 DO segmentation**: A process, which comprises segmenting data objects into data chunks, labelling data chunks as labelled data chunks, generating the relationship between data objects and labelled data chunks, and reassembling the data object based on labelled data chunks and the relationship between the data object and labelled data chunks.
+
+**3.2.4 labelled data chunk (LDC)**: A data chunk with a unique label. The label is the identifier of a data chunk, and the name also can be used as a kind of identifier.
+
+**3.2.5 manifest**: A description which describes the structural information between a data object and labelled data chunks.
+
+**3.2.6 name mapping and resolution system**: A system that supports the name mapping and resolution services.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------|
+| DAN | Data Aware Networking |
+| DC | Data Chunk |
+| DO | Data Object |
+| GNMRS | Global Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| ICN | Information Centric Networking |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LDC | Labelled Data Chunk |
+| LNMRs | Local Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| NA | Network Address |
+| NDO | Named Data Object |
+| NMRS | Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------|
+| TTL | Time-To-Live |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+Use of information centric networking (ICN) or data aware networking (DAN) as an emerging technology for the IMT-2020 network to achieve performance goals, provides a new network paradigm to deal with an enormous amount of data efficiently in a distributed environment, and enables users to access desired data safely, easily, quickly and accurately, regardless of data locations. [ITU-T Y.3033] notes that the essence of DAN lies in the name-based communication that routes a data object in the network by its name or identifier (ID). [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.35] presents a set of service scenarios and use cases supported by DAN. In these scenarios and use cases, all kinds of named data objects (NDOs) (e.g., videos, text files, measurement data, and executable programs, etc.) were collected, cached, and transmitted by DAN elements to achieve multiple benefits for service providers and users, network operators, and application developers etc. [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.48] describes a proof-of-concept for data service using ICN in IMT-2020, and demonstrates the feasibility and benefits of ICN by providing data service based on globally unique named data. In light of these service scenarios and use cases, [ITU-T Y.3071] specifies the requirements of DAN, including NDO cache and fragmentation function requirements. It is required that DAN elements are equipped with a cache that temporally holds NDOs, and that DAN elements fragment large NDOs into a series of smaller units for network transmission. Therefore, it is necessary to segment the large data object (DO) into a series of smaller units, also called data chunks (DCs), of specific size, which can benefit transmission and caching in ICN. Actually, this process involves complex operations in ICN, and some capabilities should be supported by the network, including segmenting DOs into labelled DCs (LDCs) and managing the relationship between DOs and LDCs (manifest), caching and transmitting LDCs in the ICN network, and reassembling DOs based on LDCs, manifest and certain strategies. However, no existing standard focuses on similar work. Some work in IETF refers to some of the technique points, such as designing the format of the manifest, but that is not the same issue as the DO segmentation process. Therefore, the purpose of this Recommendation is to discuss the requirements and capabilities of DO segmentation to achieve high efficiency of caching and forwarding for ICN. An overview of the DO segmentation process in ICN is introduced. Here, the smaller unit that is assigned a label is the labelled data chunk (LDC).
+
+For a DO, when it is to be transmitted or cached in an ICN should be segmented into LDCs, and the relationship between the DO and LDCs should be created. Meanwhile, the replicas of LDCs should be cached and managed by the network; when a subscriber requests this DO, how to get the corresponding LDCs of this DO from the network, and how to select proper LDC replicas for reassembling the DO to respond the subscriber, should also be considered. The above process relates to complex operations of the network, and a series of capabilities should be provided by the network. There are three kinds of capabilities that the network should provide:
+
+- 1) When a DO is transmitted and cached by the network, firstly, it should be segmented into a series of LDCs, and a manifest that contains the description of the relationship between the DO and LDCs should be generated. In order to process LDCs in ICN safely and efficiently,
+
+the network should have some capabilities, including access control, integrity guarantees, safety processes and data chunk labelling. Meanwhile, the network can also register a data chunk in a name mapping and resolution system (NMRS) for further retrieval.
+
+- 2) After the segmentation, LDC is used to cache and transmit in the network. Each LDC can be replicated and cached in different positions independently based on some strategies. All replicas of a LDC may be located in different positions in the network, and each replica should be registered in the NMRS. Meanwhile, the manifest of the DO is also published in the network.
+- 3) If a subscriber requests a DO, the manifest should be returned first. Labels of LDCs and the structure of LDCs for reassembling the DO can be obtained. Then, the proper replica of each LDC will be chosen based on some strategies. The DO will be reconstructed based on the returned replicas of LDCs, and the reassembled DO is returned to the subscriber. In this process, some capabilities, such as the access control and integrity check, are also required.
+
+The above stages support the ICN to provide capabilities for accepting any size of DO, caching, forwarding and publishing/subscribing data, which has not been referred to directly in existing standards and consequently Recommendation ITU-T Y.3078 is proposed resolve these issues.
+
+# **7 Service and functional requirements of data object segmentation**
+
+Requirements of DO segmentation in the network for IMT-2020 and beyond, including service requirements and functional requirements, are described in clauses 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.
+
+### **7.1 Service requirements**
+
+- 1) It is required to support the DO segmentation service, by which DOs can be segmented into LDCs and a manifest is generated, and all LDCs and the corresponding manifest can be published in the network for further transmission, caching and storing.
+- 2) It is required to support providing DCs and the relationship between the DO and DCs for reconstructing the DO.
+- 3) It is required to support caching replicas of LDCs based on specific caching strategies, or support storing LDCs based on storage requirements such as reliability or location.
+- 4) It is required to support registering LDCs in the NMRS.
+- 5) It is recommended to support choosing and obtaining the proper replica of an LDC based on some specific strategies.
+- 6) It is recommended to separately store DOs and DO metadata based on different strategies, such as different reliability levels and different positions.
+- 7) It is recommended to have interfaces which can be used to map data to objects to deal with different kinds of data, such as files, streaming, and DO metadata.
+- 8) It is recommended to deliver DOs to applications in different ways, such as on demand or by subscription.
+
+### **7.2 Functional requirements**
+
+- 1) It is required to have the capability to pre-process DOs.
+ - It is required to support processing application-related preferences and mapping them to underlying transmission parameters which are carried in packet headers during the transmission process. The application-related preferences include storage QoS, specific storing positions, caching strategies, security strategies, multipath transmission, one-to-many transmission based on multicasting, etc.
+
+- 2) It is required to have the capability to segment DOs.
+ - It is required to support segmenting DOs into specific size DCs.
+ - It is required to support assigning a unique label for each DC.
+ - It is required to support registering the LDC and network address (NA) mapping in a NMRS.
+ - It is required to support generating LDC's transmission parameters inherited from DO's transmission parameters or based on DO's preferences.
+ - It is recommended to have the capability to generate integrity check information for LDCs.
+- 3) It is required to have the capability to reassemble DOs.
+ - It is required to support obtaining the manifest based on the DO.
+ - It is required to support extracting LDCs from the underlying transported information.
+ - It is required to support providing DCs and the relationship between DO and DCs for reconstructing a DO.
+ - It is recommended to support the integrity check for DCs.
+- 4) It is required to have the capability to process the manifest.
+ - It is required to support creating the manifest when a DO is segmented to LDCs and publishing the manifest.
+ - It is required to support retrieving the manifest of DOs and parsing the manifest structure.
+ - It is required to have the capability to maintain the manifest for a DO with streaming data content whose manifest may be dynamically changed.
+ - It is recommended to have the capability to store manifest with high reliability if it is stored in ICN and maintain structural information if it contains sub-manifests.
+ - It is recommended to support deleting the manifest of a DO when the DO is deleted from the network.
+- 5) It is required to have the capability to support the security functions.
+ - It is required to support controlling access to LDCs and the manifest of a DO.
+ - It is required to support LDC integrity validation and recovery from LDC corruption throughout its lifecycle.
+- 6) It is required to have the capability to define different quality of service (QoS) levels and storing reliability levels for applications, which are associated to DO storing patterns, such as transmission priority, where to store the LDCs of DOs, or how many replicas of LDCs should be stored in the network.
+- 7) It is required to have the capability to map different transmission strategies from applications to underlying transmission schemas, such as multipath transmission or multicasting.
+
+# 8 Capabilities of data object segmentation
+
+
+
+Y.3078(22)
+
+Figure 1: Capabilities of data object segmentation in ICN for IMT-2020 and beyond. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure of capabilities. On the left, 'DO segmentation' includes 'DO pre-processing', 'DC generation', and 'DC labelling and registration'. Below this is 'Transport information preparation'. In the center, 'Manifest processing' includes 'Manifest creation', 'Manifest retrieval', 'Manifest maintaining', and 'Manifest parsing'. To the right of 'Manifest processing' is 'Extraction'. Above 'Manifest processing' is 'DO reassembling', which includes 'DO reconstruction' and 'DO reconstruction preparation'. At the bottom, 'Sending and receiving LDCs' includes 'Sending LDCs' and 'Receiving LDCs'. On the far right, 'Security' includes 'Authentication', 'Access control', 'Encryption', and 'Integrity verification'. A reference 'Y.3078(22)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Capabilities of data object segmentation in ICN for IMT-2020 and beyond**
+
+Capabilities of data object segmentation in ICN for IMT-2020 and beyond and the interaction between different parts are shown in Figure 1, containing: DO segmentation, DO reassembling, manifest processing, sending and receiving LDCs, and security.
+
+### 8.1 DO segmentation
+
+The DO segmentation is required to have the capabilities to segment a DO into DCs and assign a unique label for each DC. Then, all LDCs will be registered in the NMRS for the further querying. There are at least four functions to support the corresponding capabilities, including DO pre-processing, DC generation, DC labelling and registration, and transport information preparing. The description of each part is as follows:
+
+- DO pre-processing: It is used to parse application-related preferences, map them to defined transmission parameters such as transmission priority, transmission or storage security level, how many replicas of LDCs, where to store the LDCs of a DO, or multicasting in the network.
+- DC generation: It is used to receive the DO, segment the DO into DCs with the specific size, and generate the relationship between the DO and DCs for manifest creation.
+- DC labelling and registration: It is used to assign a unique label to each DC. There are many methods to assign the label to a DC, such as the hierarchically human-readable naming method, self-certifying flat naming method, attribute-based naming method, hybrid method of multiple naming mechanism, etc. For example, the label can be composed by the hash value of the uniform resource identifier (URI) and the hash value of the DC. It can also get the NA of the network element where the DC is located, and register the label and the NA mapping to the NMRS.
+- Transport information preparation: It is used to combine output from the modules above it, prepare the parameters or information that is necessary for the transport process, and build the LDC transport packet based on DC and some additional information, such as labels, structural information of the DC, integrity checking information, and replica placement strategies according to the specific packet structure. It may have the capability to store DOs and DO metadata based on specific strategies, such as different reliability levels, different positions and different lifecycles. It may also hint for transport path selection to steer DCs to different paths. Moreover, these strategies can assist in generating information for
+
+collaboration between nodes. Meanwhile, it should manage and configure resource requirements of the transport process such as queue size and buffer size.
+
+### **8.2 DO reassembling**
+
+The DO reassembling is required to have the capability to aggregate requests and replicate LDC for multiple applications and reconstruct the DO based on LDCs. The corresponding functions include:
+
+- DO reconstruction: It is used to deliver the DO to applications on demand or by subscription. When a DO is requested on-demand, it is used to convert DO requests from multiple applications to corresponding LDCs requests according to the DO's manifest which should be obtained firstly, and construct responded LDCs into the DO based on the manifest of the DO. When the DO is obtained by subscription, it is recommended to utilize a more efficient underlying network service such as multicasting service to get the DO. It is responsible for allocating and configuring the temporary buffer space for DO reconstruction. It is recommended that this function may be executed in the application to enhance the performance.
+- DO reconstruction preparation: It should aggregate simultaneous LDC requests based on the request related information, and maintain status information of requests such as the request identifier, request timestamp, request time-to-live (TTL), and buffer space address. It should also get the responded LDC from the extraction module below and replicate LDCs to corresponding buffer space based on the status information of requests.
+- Extraction: It is used to extract the useful information from the transported information, such as LDCs. It should also maintain the mapping of the LDC request to the transport process, and allocate a queue for the received LDCs.
+
+### **8.3 Manifest processing**
+
+The manifest processing is required to have the capability to create, retrieve, maintain and parse manifest, which includes several functions.
+
+- Manifest creation: It is used to generate the manifest for DOs and publish the manifest in the network.
+- Manifest retrieval: It can retrieve the manifest, including building an index of the manifest and responding to the retrieval request.
+- Manifest maintaining: It can maintain the manifest in the network, such as storing, backup, updating or deleting the manifest. It guarantees that the manifest should be stored with high reliability in a proper network location. Meanwhile, it can be obtained based on the structural information which describes the sub-manifests.
+- Manifest parsing: It is used to parse the content of the manifest and extract the needed information such as the relationship between the DO and LDCs from it.
+
+### **8.4 Sending and receiving LDCs**
+
+Sending and receiving LDCs is to provide the interface to the transport layer for ICN, which includes two functions, sending LDCs and receiving LDCs.
+
+- Sending LDCs: It is used to send the LDC and some necessary information to the protocol of the transport layer, and call the application programming interface (API) of the transport layer for data sending. It is recommended that the information should contain the identifier of the LDC to better support the identifier-based multipath scheme and in-network caching.
+- Receiving LDCs: It can call the API of the transport layer for receiving the LDCs and their related information. It is recommended that the receiving API receives the LDCs based on the identifier to better support the identifier-based multipath scheme and in-network caching.
+
+Sending and receiving LDCs is mainly responsible for maintaining the information that will be sent by the transport layer, or the information received from the transport layer, such as DC, manifest information, and transporting parameters. Moreover, the DC should be processed by the transport layer based on this information, such as duplicating replicas and multipath selection hints.
+
+### **8.5 Security consideration**
+
+The security has the capability of authentication, access control, encryption and integrity verification.
+
+- Authentication: The authentication capability is mainly used for authenticating the valid users, which can be further used for access control, encryption, etc.
+- Access control: The access control capability is used for guaranteeing that all access and operations are correct and from authorized users.
+- Encryption: The encryption capability can support the encryption of LDCs and manifest to ensure the data confidentiality. To satisfy the different requirements of security, it can support encryption with different security levels, which comes from the application-related preferences.
+- Integrity verification: The integrity verification capability is used for examining and confirming the integrity of each LDC to ensure that the LDC has not been tampered with. It is recommended to achieve integrity through the naming method of LDCs. The label of the LDC is obtained from the hash value of the DC and the label can be further used to verify the integrity of the LDC.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3031] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031 (2012), *Identification framework in future networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3072] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072 (2019), *Requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.35] Supplement 35 (2016) to ITU-T Y-series Recommendations, *ITU-T Y.3033 – Data aware networking – Scenarios and use cases*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.48] Supplement 48 (2018) to ITU-T Y-series Recommendations, *Proof-of-concept for data service using information centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.2083] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083 (2015), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3082 (03/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Mobile network sharing based on distributed ledger technology for networks beyond IMT-2020 – Requirements and framework**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3082
+
+## Mobile network sharing based on distributed ledger technology for networks beyond IMT-2020 – Requirements and framework
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3082 specifies the requirements and framework of distributed ledger technology used in mobile network sharing for networks beyond IMT-2020. The detailed requirements of distributed ledger technology based mobile network sharing are put forward. The high-level framework, service procedures and security considerations are presented. The detailed use cases are described in the appendix.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3082 | 2023-03-24 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15246 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Distributed ledger technology, framework, mobile network sharing, requirements.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at BS: Base station
Operational flows:
1. The sharable BS constructed by hosting operator A stores the statistics of physical resource utilization in the DLT platform. 2. Participating operators and non-operator participants can acquire this information through the DLT platform. |
+| Derived requirements | Credible statistics of physical resource utilization should be acquired by the BS of hosting operator A. |
+
+### I.2 Fault reporting
+
+Table I.2 describes the fault reporting process.
+
+**Table I.2 – Fault reporting**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Fault reporting |
+| Description | Trusted fault reporting can be achieved using DLT based MNS. The hosting operator is responsible for providing service to the customers of participating operators, and reporting the fault from those customers to the DLT platform to prove they are treated equally as the hosting operator's customers. Participating operators can acquire the fault reporting of their customers through the DLT platform. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | The EMS of hosting operator A is connected to the DLT platform. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The fault reporting is stored in the DLT platform. |
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | BS: Base station
Operational flows:
1. The sharable BS constructed by hosting operator A reports the fault to the EMS of hosting operator A. 2. The EMS of hosting operator A stores the fault reporting in the DLT platform. 3. Participating operators and non-operator participants can acquire the fault reporting through the DLT platform. |
+| Derived requirements | 1. Credible fault reporting should be acquired by the BS of hosting operator A. 2. EMS could provide the fault reporting of BS. |
+
+## I.3 Transport layer resource utilization acquirement
+
+Table I.3 describes the process for transport layer resource utilization acquirement.
+
+**Table I.3 – Transport layer resource utilization acquirement**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Transport layer resource utilization acquirement |
+| Description | Participating operators and non-operator participants can acquire the transport layer resource utilization of each operator through the DLT platform. DLT is used to ensure the neutrality and trustworthiness of the transport layer resource utilization. Furthermore, the hosting operator can optimize the allocation of system transport layer resources in a high-efficiency mode based on the operators' real resource occupancy from the DLT platform. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | The sharable BS of hosting operator A is connected to the DLT platform. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The transport layer resource utilization is stored in the DLT platform. |
+
+**Table I.3 – Transport layer resource utilization acquirement**
+
+| Title | Transport layer resource utilization acquirement |
+|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | BS: Base station
|
+| Derived requirements | Credible transport layer resource utilization should be acquired by the BS of hosting operator A. |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.751.0] Recommendation ITU-T F.751.0 (2020), *Requirements for distributed ledger systems.*
+- [b-ITU-T L.1317] Recommendation ITU-T L.1317 (2021), *Guidelines on energy efficient blockchain systems.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.1255] Recommendation ITU-T X.1255 (2013), *Framework for discovery of identity management information.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.1400] Recommendation ITU-T X.1400 (2020), *Terms and definitions for distributed ledger technology.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network.*
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2005), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000.*
+- [b-ITU-R M.2083] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083 (2015), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond.*
+- [b-ITU-T TS FG DLT D1.1] Technical Specification ITU-T FG DLT D1.1 (2019), *Distributed ledger technology terms and definitions.*
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3089 (08/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Information-centric networking in networks beyond IMT-2020 – Requirements and capabilities of network nodes to support in-network processing**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3089
+
+# Information-centric networking in networks beyond IMT-2020 – Requirements and capabilities of network nodes to support in-network processing
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3089 specifies the requirements and capabilities of information-centric networking (ICN) node to support in-network processing in networks beyond IMT-2020. It describes the requirements of ICN network node from two aspects: service requirements and functional requirements. Based on the ICN capability architecture established in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075, it specifies enhanced ICN network node capabilities to support in-network processing, including resource-ID registration and resolution, resource-ID based routing, local resources monitoring, collaborative neighbourhood awareness and maintenance, autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3089 | 2025-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16439 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Information-centric networking, in-network processing, networks beyond IMT-2020.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Introduction..... | 2 |
+| 7 Requirements of ICN network node to support in-network processing ..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Service requirements ..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 Functional requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Capabilities of ICN network node to support in-network processing ..... | 4 |
+| 9 Security considerations ..... | 6 |
+| Appendix I – Scenarios of ICN network node to support in-network processing ..... | 7 |
+| I.1 Computing scenario ..... | 7 |
+| I.2 Storing scenario ..... | 7 |
+| I.3 High-speed file transmission scenario ..... | 7 |
+| I.4 Distributed model inference scenario ..... | 7 |
+| I.5 Industrial scenario ..... | 8 |
+| I.6 ICN scalable networking scenario ..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3089
+
+# Information-centric networking in networks beyond IMT-2020 – Requirements and capabilities of network nodes to support in-network processing
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and capabilities of information-centric networking (ICN) node to support in-network processing. The specific scope includes the following items.
+
+- Requirements of ICN network node to support in-network processing;
+- Capabilities of ICN network node to support in-network processing;
+- Security considerations.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [[ITU-T Y.3001](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3033](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3033 (2014), *Framework of data aware networking for future networks*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3072](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072 (2019), *Requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information-centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3073](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3073 (2024), *Framework for service function chaining in information-centric networking*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3075](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075 (2020), *Requirements and capabilities of information-centric networking routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation in IMT-2020*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3076](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3076 (2020), *Architecture of ICN-enabled edge network in IMT-2020*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 identifier (ID)** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities.
+
+**3.1.2 information-centric networking (ICN)** [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.48]: A new approach to networking where named objects (not only devices) are the principal components for the network. Named data objects can be stored in network nodes (with caching capability) distributed throughout the network. Data objects are transmitted by using names to requesting consumers from any network
+
+node that can provide the requested data. Locations of the nodes that store data objects in their caches are irrelevant to consumers because they send their requests for data objects by using names (not the data object locations).
+
+**3.1.3 in-network processing** [ITU-T Y.3073]: This refers to executing computer programs in network nodes such as routers instead of in-host computers connected at the end of the network.
+
+**3.1.4 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: The identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element, physical or logical objects) that may be resolved/translated into an address.
+
+**3.1.5 name mapping** [ITU-T Y.3072]: A service that builds one-to-one or one-to-many relationships between an identifier of an object and addresses of the object, where the addresses can be Internet protocol (IP) addresses.
+
+**3.1.6 name resolution** [ITU-T Y.3072]: A service that provides the translation between an identifier and the address(es) of the object based on the relationship built by name mapping.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| ARFS | Autonomous Resource-ID-based Forwarding and Scheduling |
+| CN | Control plane Node |
+| CNAM | Collaborated Neighbourhood Awareness and Maintenance |
+| DN | Data plane Node |
+| GNMRS | Global Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| ICN | Information-Centric Networking |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LNMRs | Local Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| LRM | Local Resources Monitoring |
+| RR | Resource-ID based Routing |
+| RRR | Resource-ID Registration and Resolution |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# **6 Introduction**
+
+All data/functions/services/facilities in information-centric networking (ICN) are labelled by identifiers (ID) [ITU-T Y.3033]. It has been identified as one of the most effective ways to overcome
+
+some problems from the location-dependent network model [ITU-T Y.3072] [ITU-T Y.3076]. In ICN, since ID-based routing should be supported, the ICN network node should have the capabilities [ITU-T Y.3073] [ITU-T Y.3075] [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.47], which are usually used to preserve ID-based routing information to make the forwarding decision and support the potential in-network processing.
+
+In [ITU-T Y.3073], the requirements and scenarios about in-network processing and ICN service functions are discussed, and the related mechanism is analysed. The ICN network node is recommended to support the virtualization of resources associated with networks [ITU-T Y.3001] to support the in-network processing efficiently.
+
+In [ITU-T Y.3075], an ICN capabilities framework based on control and user plane separation in International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 (IMT-2020) is proposed, but for the scenarios of in-network processing, the capabilities of ICN network node should be enhanced with aspects as follows:
+
+The network node needs to provide on-site or real-time processing [ITU-T Y.3076]. Presently, a large amount of data is generated at the edge of the network, and the moving and transportation of data are hard to meet the low-latency requirement for applications. Therefore, the ICN network node should have the capabilities to provide resources efficiently.
+
+The network node needs to provide virtualized resources for satisfying different applications [ITU-T Y.3001]. The processing requirements of different applications are various and dynamic. Therefore, each ICN network nodes need to have the capability to collaborate with each other to build a resource pool, in which the tasks could be balanced to guarantee the performance requirements, such as low latency.
+
+The network node needs to have the capabilities of autonomous decision of resource locating or scheduling. In the large-scale network, a distributed scheduling and routing architecture is pivotal.
+
+Based on the [ITU-T Y.3075], this Recommendation focuses on investigating the requirements and capabilities of ICN network nodes to support in-network processing in networks beyond IMT-2020, which aims to provide efficient in-network processing for applications.
+
+# **7 Requirements of ICN network node to support in-network processing**
+
+## **7.1 Service requirements**
+
+The ICN network adopts the control plane and data plane separation framework [ITU-T Y.3075]. The ICN network node encompasses both the control plane node (CN) and the data plane node (DN) in ICN. The CN possesses the functionalities of the control plane, and the DN supports all the capabilities of the data plane.
+
+### **1) Requirements for CN**
+
+- The CN is required to have the capability to measure how much resources are used for different applications.
+- The CN is required to have the capability to authenticate users and manage the tasks for different users.
+- The CN is required to have the capability to manage the dynamic network topology.
+- The CN is required to have the capability to configure or load the routing and forwarding strategies dynamically to meet in-network processing requirements elastically.
+- The CN is recommended to have the capability to estimate the network status and available resources and decide the forwarding path by considering these multiple factors and the requirements of applications.
+
+### **2) Requirements for DN**
+
+- The DN is required to have the capability to maintain the neighbourhood information, which is usually a node list.
+- The DN is required to have the capability to decide whether to forward a data request to another DN to respond to the request based on some information, including workload, latency, bandwidth, and other strategies.
+- The DN is required to have the capability to update the neighbourhood information based on the workload, latency, bandwidth, and some strategies, etc.
+- The DN is recommended to have the capability to estimate network status and available resources of its own and neighbours for different applications.
+- The DN is recommended to have the capability to report the network status or resource status to the control plane for the decision making.
+
+## **7.2 Functional requirements**
+
+1. The DN is required to provide resources to support the program execution.
+2. The DN is required to have the functional capabilities to manage available resources for the in-network processing autonomously and dynamically.
+3. The DN is required to manage data involved in storage and program calling.
+4. The DN is required to perceive or measure the status of the network and available resources of its own and of other DNs.
+5. The DN is required to have the capability to maintain and update the status information of the network.
+6. The DN is required to collaborate with neighbours to provide load-balancing.
+7. The DN is required to have the capability to store and cache the processing data.
+8. The DN is recommended to have the capability to make the routing and scheduling decision autonomously.
+
+# **8 Capabilities of ICN network node to support in-network processing**
+
+Figure 8-1 is based on the basic capability architecture of ICN [ITU-T Y.3075], in which the highlighted functions are introduced to support in-network processing. In an ICN network, CN provides capabilities of the control plane; DN provides capabilities of the data plane.
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|---------------------------------|---------------|
+| Application capabilities | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Control plane capabilities Interface of registration and resolution Resource-ID registration and resolution Routing Forwarding information base Resource-ID based routing
| | | | | | | | Control plane capabilities | | | | Interface of registration and resolution | | Resource-ID registration and resolution | | Routing | Forwarding information base | Resource-ID based routing | | Name mapping and resolution capabilities Global name mapping and resolution capabilities
Local name mapping and resolution capabilities
| | | | |
+| Control plane capabilities | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Interface of registration and resolution | | Resource-ID registration and resolution | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Routing | Forwarding information base | Resource-ID based routing | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Data plane capabilities Local computing Local storage Local resources monitoring Collaborated neighborhood awareness and maintaining Autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling Flow classifier Name based forwarding ID/IP integrated reconstruction IP forwarding
| | | | | | | | Data plane capabilities | | | | | Local computing | Local storage | Local resources monitoring | Collaborated neighborhood awareness and maintaining | Autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling | Flow classifier | Name based forwarding | ID/IP integrated reconstruction IP forwarding
| | | ID/IP integrated reconstruction | IP forwarding |
+| Data plane capabilities | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Local computing | Local storage | Local resources monitoring | Collaborated neighborhood awareness and maintaining | Autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Flow classifier | Name based forwarding | ID/IP integrated reconstruction IP forwarding
| | | ID/IP integrated reconstruction | IP forwarding | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| ID/IP integrated reconstruction | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| IP forwarding | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+Y.3089(25)
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Capabilities of ICN network node to support in-network processing**
+
+In control plane, some capabilities about resource-ID based processing should be considered to support in-network processing, which include resource-ID registration and resolution, and resource-ID based routing.
+
+**Resource-ID registration and resolution (RRR):** Provide the interface to global name mapping and resolution system (GNMRS) and the local name mapping and resolution system (LNMRS). Node addresses or information related to a resource-ID will be registered and resolved in GNMRS and LNMRS.
+
+NOTE – Usually, GNMRS maintains the global information and LNMRS contains the information that is related to the nearby users. The look-up efficiency of GNMRS and LNMRS is different, and it is more efficient for end users to look up in LNMRS than in GNMRS. ICN network node can register the address information related to an ID, or resolve the address information based on an ID.
+
+**Resource-ID based routing (RR):** Collect and analyse the network topology and resource status information reported from the data plane; calculate the transmission path based on specific routing algorithms oriented by resource-ID.
+
+In the data plane, some capabilities to support the on-site and autonomous in-network processing based on the resource-ID should be considered, including local resources monitoring, collaborated neighbourhood awareness and maintenance, and autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling.
+
+**Local resources monitoring (LRM):** Monitor the status of resources, including network resources and computing resources.
+
+**Collaborated neighbourhood awareness and maintenance (CNAM):** Aware of the other DNs and maintain the neighbors by some mechanisms, including learning from historical information or network measuring, and by message advertisement.
+
+**Autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling (ARFS):** If the requested resources can be satisfied locally, DN should respond to the request immediately. Otherwise, DN should interact with the LNMRS and CNAM to decide about the appropriate destination DN, and forward the request based on some scheduling algorithms.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+To ensure the in-network processing works in security, the security mechanisms in the ICN network should be considered. The maintaining process among neighbours, including network measuring and network status exchange, should be constricted to avoid interrupting the forwarding and computing execution. Moreover, ICN network nodes should be authenticated, both for the CN and DN.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Scenarios of ICN network node to support in-network processing
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Computing scenario
+
+In a computing scenario, an ICN network node maintains the resources status of its own and its neighbours by the collaborated neighbourhood awareness and maintenance (CNAM) capability in the data plane. When a node receives a computing task request, it will parse the request to get the information about the resource requirement, including but not limited to the processor number, type, etc. If the node's resources can meet the requirement, it will process the task and respond. If the node cannot meet the task's requirement, it will check the status of neighbours, which is maintained locally. ARFS capability is used to choose a neighbour node which can support the needs of the task. Then, the request will be redirected to the chosen node to be processed.
+
+### I.2 Storing scenario
+
+In a storing scenario, an ICN network node maintains the resources status of its own and its neighbours by the CNAM capability in the data plane. When a node receives a storing task request, it will parse the request to get the resource requirement, including but not limited to storage capacity, I/O capability, etc. If the available resources of the node can meet the requirement, this node will take on this task and store the data. If this node cannot meet the need, ARFS capability is used to schedule the request to another node which could store the data. The request will be redirected to the chosen node. When another node receives the storing request, the above process will be implemented again until the data is stored completely.
+
+### I.3 High-speed file transmission scenario
+
+In a high-speed file transmission scenario, a data chunk or file is stored in an ICN network node, and some replicas are stored in its neighbour nodes. The ICN network node maintains its available bandwidth and its neighbour nodes' bandwidth status through the CNAM capability in the data plane. If the available bandwidth of the ICN network node can meet the requirement, it will provide data directly. If the available bandwidth of this ICN network node cannot satisfy the need, ARFS capability is used to reassign the request to a neighbour node, which has a replica of the file and satisfies the bandwidth requirement.
+
+### I.4 Distributed model inference scenario
+
+In distributed model inference scenarios, models and data are stored in ICN network nodes. Leveraging the in-network cooperative processing capabilities of ICN network nodes, data and models can be split into multiple parts and distributed and stored in different ICN network nodes. Multiple computing devices support parallel retrieval of data and models from the ICN, perform distributed computing, and aggregate these computational results to derive the final inference and prediction result. Distributed model inference can adopt different strategies based on the varying device capabilities and network statuses. Among these, data parallelism and model parallelism are two common strategies.
+
+For the data parallelism strategy, data is distributed and stored in different ICN network nodes. Each ICN network node maintains the status of its own and neighbours based on the CNAM capability. To accelerate the training process, computing devices can parallelly retrieve different parts of data from their neighbour nodes based on data IDs. When an ICN network node receives a data retrieval request, it determines whether it can respond locally or not. If it can, it returns the data from its cache; otherwise, it uses the ARFS capability module to schedule the retrieval request to another ICN network node. By distributing the loading of data and executing model inference in each computing
+
+device, distributed parallel computing is achieved. For the model parallelism strategy, the model is divided into multiple parts, with each part stored in an ICN network node. Computing devices retrieve the corresponding parts of the model from ICN based on the model's file ID, load the corresponding model parameters, and execute them. The inference results from each device are aggregated to one node to obtain the final prediction outcome.
+
+### **1.5 Industrial scenario**
+
+In industrial scenarios like remote control, vehicle networking, and robotic inspection, ensuring the promptness and precision of industrial control is crucial. On one hand, the network needs to facilitate the immediate capture, delivery, and on-site processing of collected data, such as video, environmental data, etc. On the other hand, it is required to guarantee the instant and reliable transmission of control messages. Meanwhile, in the industrial scenario of branch interconnection, there are also differentiated transmission requirements. For instance, sufficient bandwidth must be guaranteed for video conferencing, while transmission paths need to be randomized and concealed for sensitive data.
+
+To meet the requirements of instant data delivery and acquisition, ICN network nodes provide the capabilities of caching and obtaining data nearby in the network. An ICN network node maintains its own and neighbour nodes' resource status by the CNAM capability in the data plane, such as cache capacity, bandwidth, congestion levels, etc. When a node receives a data response message, it will determine whether the cache capacity can meet the caching requirement. If it meets the requirements, cache data locally and register the ID in LNMRS or GNMRS by using Resource-ID registration and resolution capability. If it cannot meet the requirements, forward the data packet. When a node receives a data request message, it will determine whether its bandwidth status can meet the transmission requirement. If it meets the requirements, access data from caches and respond to the data request in the ICN network nodes. If it cannot meet the requirements, ARFS capability is used to schedule the request to another ICN network node which caches the data.
+
+To meet the requirement of diversified transmission requirements in industrial scenarios, ICN uses different Resource-IDs to identify variable transmission resource requirements and preferences, such as high bandwidth, low latency, secure random transmission, etc. An ICN network node monitors its state of network resources by using the LRM capability. CNAM capability is used to discover neighbour nodes that can provide network resources to satisfy different transmission resource preferences, and maintain the neighbour nodes' network resources status, including bandwidth, delay, and congestion levels. When an ICN network node receives a data packet, it detects and extracts the resource-ID to identify the specific transmission preferences. ARFS capability is calculated and determined based on both local and neighbourhood network status. It schedules and forwards the packet to a proper ICN network node that can provide the corresponding network resources. By leveraging autonomous resource-ID-based forwarding and scheduling at each ICN network node, the network can dynamically adjust transmission paths to meet the diverse requirements and preferences of different transmission tasks.
+
+### **1.6 ICN scalable networking scenario**
+
+ICN control plane needs to have capabilities to support elastic routing control and resource management, flexible network status supervision and maintenance, and intelligent processing. As the ICN network scale becomes larger, a distributed control plane is needed, and some computing functionalities in the control plane should be offloaded to the data plane to accelerate the decision process. In this scenario, some computing tasks that are usually executed in the control plane, such as operations of machine learning, may be moved to the data plane for instant processing. If the computing capability of the DN cannot meet the requirement, the neighbour node which can satisfy the resource need for this task will be selected by the CNAM module, and the ARFS is used to pass the task to the selected destination. If no proper neighbour node is found, the task will be sent to the control plane for execution.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.2091](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.Sup.47](#)] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 47 (2018), *Information-centric networking – Overview, standardization gaps and proof-of-concept*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.Sup.48](#)] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 48 (2018), *Proof-of-concept for data service using information centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# ITU-T Y.3091 (12/2023)
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- Digital twin network – Capability levels and evaluation methods
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3091
+
+## Digital twin network – Capability levels and evaluation methods
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3091 specifies the capability levels and evaluation methods of the digital twin network (DTN) system to help the telecommunication industry reach a consensus on indicating DTN's capability levels, as well as DTN's technical maturity levels. Digital twin network is a virtual representation of the physical network. It is useful for analysing, diagnosing, simulating, and controlling the physical network, and can help the physical network achieve intelligent decision-making and predictive maintenance.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3091 | 2023-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15736 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Capability level, digital twin network, evaluation indicators.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 1 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 2 |
+| 7 Capability levels of digital twin network ..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Significance of evaluating capability levels of DTN ..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 Capability level definition ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Evaluation methods of digital twin network..... | 5 |
+| 8.1 Evaluation principles ..... | 5 |
+| 8.2 Dimensions and evaluation indicators for capability levels ..... | 5 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 14 |
+| Bibliography..... | 15 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3091
+
+## Digital twin network – Capability levels and evaluation methods
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the capability levels and evaluation methods of digital twin network (DTN) systems. It addresses the following topics:
+
+- Definitions of capability levels of DTN;
+- Evaluating dimensions and indicators of DTN's capability levels;
+- Methods for evaluating capability levels of DTN.
+
+NOTE – Policy and regulation issues are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3090] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3090 (2022), *Digital twin network – Requirements and architecture*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3173] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3173 (2020), *Framework for evaluating intelligence levels of future networks including IMT-2020*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 digital twin network** [ITU-T Y.3090]: It is a virtual representation of the physical network. It is useful for analysing, diagnosing, simulating, and controlling the physical network based on data, model and interface, so as to achieve real-time interactive mapping between the physical network and virtual twin network.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-----|-------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| AR | Augmented Reality |
+| DTN | Digital Twin Network |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| VR | Virtual Reality |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# **6 Introduction**
+
+A digital twin is a fit for purpose digital representation of an observable object with synchronization between the object and its digital representation. A procedure for representing an observable object as known as a physical asset or an object of interest, as a digital twin in a domain is as follows:
+
+- defining a purpose for expressing the observable object as a digital twin in the domain;
+- collecting and mapping data based on the roles of the observable object in the domain;
+- configuring the observable object into the digital twin based on the data for the purpose;
+- interworking among digital twins reflecting various roles of the observable object;
+- synchronizing the observable object and the digital twin.
+
+In the network and telecommunication field, digital twin network (DTN) is also being developed to help the physical network realize low-cost trials of functionalities and procedures, intelligent decision-making, efficient innovation, and predictive maintenance.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3090] specifies the definition, architecture, and requirements of DTN. It defines DTN as a virtual representation of the physical network, analysing, diagnosing, simulating, and controlling the physical network based on data, model and interface, so as to achieve the real-time interactive mapping between the physical network and the virtual twin network. A reference architecture of "three-layer, three-domain, and double closed-loop" is also specified as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, a variety of functional requirements and service requirements are also categorized and described to establish a DTN system for a specific physical network.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – Reference architecture of digital twin network. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top is a 'Network application' layer with components: Network innovation, Network visualization, Intent validation, Network management, Network optimization, and Network application. Below this is the 'Network digital twin' layer, which contains three main sections: 'Unified data repository' (Data mgmt, Data service, Data storage, User/service Oprt./State, Net config, Data collection), 'Unified data models' (Functional model and Basic model), and 'DT entity Mgmt' (Model mgmt, Security mgmt, Topology mgmt). The 'Unified data models' section is further divided into 'Optimization' (Network planning, Traffic analysis, Security drills, Failure detection, Scheduling optimization, Quality assurance) and 'Emulation' (Network element, Network topology). The 'Network digital twin' layer is connected to the 'Network application' layer via 'Capability exposure' and 'Intent input'. It is also connected to the 'Network infrastructure' layer via 'Data collection' and 'Control'. The 'Network infrastructure' layer at the bottom shows various network elements like satellites, ground stations, and routers. A reference 'Y.3091(23)' is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Reference architecture of digital twin network**
+
+It is certain that a complete DTN system with full functionalities and full performance will bring great value for future network management as well as network innovation. However, it is not easy to build a complete DTN system, considering a variety of challenges on the large scale of network data, high complexity of data modelling, real-time requirements, security requirements, and so on. On the other hand, different network scenarios have different capability requirements on the DTN system. For example, some require high-level capability, while others may require relatively low-level capability support. Therefore, it is necessary and also feasible to promote the construction of the DTN system step by step, based on the requirements of a specific network application scenario and the restriction of current technical capabilities.
+
+Standardization development organizations (SDOs) have studied approaches to network intelligence level evaluation (e.g., [ITU-T Y.3173]) and digital twin maturity level evaluation (e.g., [b-ISO/IEC 30186]). This Recommendation aims to define the capability levels of DTN systems from lower to higher, and then find relative objective indicators and methods to evaluate a DTN system's capability levels.
+
+# 7 Capability levels of digital twin network
+
+## 7.1 Significance of evaluating capability levels of DTN
+
+Overall, the capability level of DTN and its evaluation methods can help achieve the below key benefits.
+
+- Provide an evaluation basis for measuring the DTN system's capability level of a specific network and its components, then help the DTN system provider and consumer reach a common understanding of capability levels.
+
+- Help the industry to reach a consensus and unified understanding of the concepts of DTN's capability level, as well as DTN's current technical maturity and user requirement level.
+- Provide guidance for the industry's research direction as well as a roadmap plan to improve the capability level of DTN.
+- Provide a reference for industry supervisors to formulate relevant strategies and development planning for future DTN systems.
+
+## 7.2 Capability level definition
+
+In order to facilitate various applications to judge whether one specific DTN system can meet customers' requirements, DTN's capability levels should be clearly defined based on [ITU-T Y.3090]. In this Recommendation, DTN's capabilities are classified into five levels. Table 7-1 shows the basic level names and definitions of each level.
+
+**Table 7-1 – Capability level definition of DTN**
+
+| Level | Name | Capability definition |
+|-------|----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| L1 | Representation level | The virtual twin can represent the states and behaviours of the physical network.Keywords: one-way mapping |
+| L2 | Interaction level | The virtual twin can be used to control the physical network.Keywords: two-way interaction |
+| L3 | Prediction level | The virtual twin can be used to assess the states and predict the performance and future trends of the physical network.Keywords: performance and trend prediction |
+| L4 | Optimization level | The virtual twin can use knowledge and intelligent algorithms to achieve timely intelligent decision-making and optimization and achieve intelligent control of the physical network based on real-time interaction.Keywords: intelligent control |
+| L5 | Autonomy level | The virtual twin and the physical network live in symbiosis with each other. They can perceive and recognize each other's states and behaviours in real time and can autonomously and dynamically reconfigure themselves.Keywords: autonomous twin |
+
+- L1: Representation level
+
+DTN can realize one-way mapping from the physical network to the virtual twin. The virtual twin can represent the states and behaviours of the physical network, and visually present the data and model with high fidelity. The virtual twin continually updates the physical network's performance, maintenance, and health status data throughout the physical system's life cycle. However, the operation and control of the physical network still rely on manual intervention.
+
+- L2: Interaction level
+
+On the basis of the representation level (L1), the control channel from the virtual twin to the physical network is added. The virtual twin can accept input instructions, complete operations on the virtual network, and control the physical network to complete the same operations, realizing virtual-physical two-way interaction.
+
+- L3: Prediction level
+
+On the basis of the interaction level (L2), the virtual twin can analyse data characteristics and trends based on the collected physical network data and can use strategies and algorithms to infer indicators that cannot be directly measured or under "what-if" scenes. Based on the analysis and
+
+inference results, the virtual twin can evaluate performance, diagnose problems, and predict future trends of the physical network.
+
+- L4: Optimization level
+
+On the basis of the prediction level (L3), the virtual twin can not only analyse and predict the performance and future trends of the physical network but can also use AI algorithms, expert knowledge, big data analysis and other intelligent technologies to achieve timely intelligent decision-making and optimization and achieve intelligent control of physical network based on real-time interaction.
+
+- L5: Autonomy level
+
+As the ideal goal of DTN, the virtual twin and the physical network live in symbiosis with each other. They can perceive and recognize each other's states and behaviours in real time and can autonomously and dynamically reconfigure themselves. The virtual twin and the physical network can maintain dynamic consistency in the long-running process, to ensure the effectiveness of visualization, prediction, decision-making, and optimization, and achieve low-cost, high-quality, sustainable DTN.
+
+# 8 Evaluation methods of digital twin network
+
+## 8.1 Evaluation principles
+
+The capability level of DTN (clause 7) describes the concept and the evolution roadmap of DTN. To comprehensively, objectively, scientifically, and effectively evaluate the capability level of DTN, effective factors should be selected and specified as evaluation indicators. The design of evaluation indicators should follow "SMART" principles [b-Doran], as indicated below.
+
+- **Scientific and specific:** The indicator should be objective, scientific, effective, clear, unambiguous, and directly related to the result.
+- **Measurable:** The indicator should be counted, observed, analysed, tested, fair, comparable, and operable.
+- **Achievable:** The indicator should be achievable if the objective accurately specifies the quantity or level to be measured to achieve the result.
+- **Relevant:** The indicator should be a valid measure of the result and be linked through research and professional expertise.
+- **Timely:** The indicator should be able to be evaluated in a cost-effective manner, including the cost of time, storage space, computing power, and other resources.
+
+## 8.2 Dimensions and evaluation indicators for capability levels
+
+Based on the "SMART" evaluation principles described above, this Recommendation specifies evaluation factors from six evaluation dimensions, whose names and definitions are shown in Table 8-1.
+
+**Table 8-1 – Evaluation dimensions**
+
+| Seq. | Dimension | Dimension definition |
+|------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| A | Data service | It provides high-precision network data collection, multi-source heterogeneous database construction, and a unified data service interface. |
+
+**Table 8-1 – Evaluation dimensions**
+
+| Seq. | Dimension | Dimension definition |
+|------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| B | Digital twin modelling | The basic model refers to the network element model and the topology model corresponding to the physical network. The functional model refers to the network perception, analysis, simulation, reasoning, decision-making, and other models established for specific applications. |
+| C | Interactive mapping | It provides virtual and physical synchronization services which can collect data from the physical network to represent and control the physical network. |
+| D | Intelligence | It provides services for analysis, decision-making, control, and other intelligent capabilities. |
+| E | User experience | It provides the user with the ability to interact with the digital twin network and visualize its data. |
+| F | Trustworthiness | It provides security, privacy, reliability, resilience, and other trustworthiness capabilities. |
+
+The following subclauses specify the evaluation indicators and their capacity levels for each dimension and define the specific requirements of each capability level of DTN for the capability level of evaluation indicators.
+
+### 8.2.1 Evaluation indicators of dimension A (Data service)
+
+Data plays a specific role in different capability levels of DTN. The capability of data service is advanced from low-level basic data supply to high-level data processing, analysis, suggestions and decision-making. Real-time, effective, accurate, and complete data service capability is the basis for DTN to provide accurate prediction and correct decision-making for industrial applications.
+
+It is recommended to evaluate the capability level of data service by using the evaluation indicators as shown in Table 8-2. The evaluation indicators are selected with reference to [b-ISO/IEC 30186].
+
+**Table 8-2 – Evaluation indicators of data service**
+
+| Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|-----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Data richness | Level 1: Equipment data, running status data.Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Data quality | Level 1: High degree of accuracy and completeness, but with some irrelevant / duplicate data.Evaluation indicator | Capability levels and definitions |
+|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Basic model integrity | Level 1: Capable of modelling certain aspects of physical network equipment such as device geometric attributes, device physical information and provisional information.Evaluation indicator | Capability levels and definitions |
+|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Level 5: Capable of implementing all functional models and has the ability of self-optimization. |
+| Standardization | Level 1: No standards, incompatible and not reusable.
Level 2: The description dimensions of the physical entity are unified and reusable but cannot form a unified format of data.
Level 3: The description dimensions of the physical entity are unified, reusable and can form a unified format of data, but cannot be compatible with other basic models.
Level 4: The description dimensions of the physical entity are unified, reusable, can form a unified format of data, and is compatible with other basic models.
|
+| Interfaces | Level 1: With no internal interfaces, functional models are isolated from each other, functional models can interact with the basic model, the application layer, and the management layer.
Level 2: With internal interfaces between functional models, only partial information can be exchanged, and the efficiency of information interaction is low.
Level 3: Arbitrary messages can be passed with low efficiency.
Level 4: Arbitrary messages can be passed with high efficiency.
|
+| Update Frequency | Level 1: Daily
Level 2: Hourly
Level 3: Minute by minute
Level 4: Every second
Level 5: Real-time/near real-time
|
+| Flexibility | Level 1: Models have little flexibility.
Level 2: Models are with low flexibility, can only adapt to specific network equipment and application scenarios.
Level 3: Models are with high flexibility and can well adapt to most of the network equipment and application scenarios.
Level 4: Models are with high flexibility, can be well tailored and expanded on-demand to adapt to all new network equipment and application scenarios.
|
+| Efficiency | Level 1: Modelling with relatively high resource consumption including but not limited to CPU, memory, and servers; suitable only for small-scale networks.
Level 2: Modelling with moderate resource consumption, suitable for medium-scale networks.
Level 3: Modelling with lower resource consumption, suitable for large-scale networks.
Level 4: Modelling in adaptive and composable options to accommodate various networks, with optimal and affordable resource consumption.
|
+
+### 8.2.3 Evaluation indicators of dimension C (Interactive mapping)
+
+Interactive mapping between a physical network and a virtual twin network is the most typical feature where the DTN is different from a network simulation system. The capabilities of virtual-real mapping mainly include the degree of automation of interaction, the richness of interface, the real-time of interaction, the standardization of interface and the quality of interaction.
+
+It is recommended to evaluate the capability level of interactive mapping by using the evaluation indicators as shown in Table 8-4. The evaluation indicators are selected with reference to [b-IEEE P2888.3].
+
+**Table 8-4 – Evaluation indicators of interactive mapping**
+
+| Evaluation indicator | Capability levels and definition |
+|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Mapping mode | Level 1: One-to-one mapping, single copy for one real network entity.Evaluation indicator | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Orchestration | Level 1: Single network element intelligence.Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Visualization scope | Level 1: Ability to display the network equipment, topology and physical links.Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Level 4: Ability to display the process of network simulation and optimization based on various data models.
Level 5: Ability to timely display the mapping interaction between a network digital twin and a physical network.
|
+| Data visualization mode | Level 1: At-a-glance views of key performance indicators.
Level 2: Simple charts, graphs, dashboards and tables.
Level 3: Complex charts, graphs, dashboards, tables of raw and processed data.
|
+| Entity visualization mode | Level 1: Presented by general shapes or symbols.
Level 2: Presented by basic 3D views with rough shapes and specifications.
Level 3: Presented by complex 3D models and animations with detailed shapes and specifications.
Level 4: Presented by augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) tools.
|
+| Interaction | Level 1: Passive interactivity such as navigation and object animation.
Level 2: Limited interactivity such as clickable objects, drag and drops, and links to external resources.
Level 3: Moderate interactivity such as 3D rendering.
Level 4: Advanced interactivity such as augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) to help achieve immersive experiences.
|
+
+#### 8.2.6 Evaluation indicators of dimension F (Trustworthiness)
+
+The trust degree of the service provided by DTN is related to different capability levels, including security, privacy, reliability and resilience.
+
+It is recommended to evaluate the capability level of trustworthiness by using the evaluation indicators as shown in Table 8-7.
+
+**Table 8-7 – Evaluation indicators of trustworthiness**
+
+| Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Security | Level 1: Security of a few data can be guaranteed.
Level 2: Security of important data and partial functionalities of DTN system can be guaranteed.
Level 3: Security of most data and most functionalities of DTN system can be guaranteed.
Level 4: Security of all data and all functionalities of DTN system can be guaranteed.
|
+| Privacy | Level 1: Without privacy protection, all information is accessible to anybody.
Level 2: Partial privacy protection, all information is accessible to certain users or operators (such as operation and maintenance management personnel).
Level 3: A higher level of privacy protection allows certain personnel to obtain specific information.
Level 4: Hierarchical privacy protection mechanism to protect various privacy data on demand.
|
+
+**Table 8-7 – Evaluation indicators of trustworthiness**
+
+| Evaluation indicators | Capability levels and definitions |
+|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Reliability | Level 1: Reliability cannot be guaranteed.Dimension | Evaluation indicators | DTN L1 | DTN L2 | DTN L3 | DTN L4 | DTN L5 |
+|------------------------|------------------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
+| Data service | Data richness | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L4 |
+| | Update frequency | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| | Compatibility | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | =L4 |
+| | Data quality | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | =L3 |
+| | Data service interface | ≥L1 | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | =L3 |
+| | Efficiency | ≥L1 | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | =L3 |
+| Digital twin modelling | Basic model integrity | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L3 | =L4 |
+| | Functional model integrity | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| | Standardization | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L4 |
+| | Interfaces | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L4 |
+| | Update frequency | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| | Flexibility | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L3 | =L4 |
+| | Efficiency | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L4 |
+| Interactive mapping | Mapping mode | ≥L1 | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L2 | =L3 |
+| | Real to virtual mapping | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L4 |
+| | Virtual to real mapping | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| | Interface richness | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| | Interaction quality | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L4 | =L5 |
+| Intelligence | Orchestration | ≥L1 | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | =L3 |
+| | Analysis | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L3 | ≥L3 | =L3 |
+| | Decision-making | ≥L1 | ≥L1 | ≥L2 | ≥L2 | =L3 |
+
+**Table 8-8 – Requirements of capability levels of DTN**
+
+| Dimension | Evaluation indicators | DTN>
+- [b-ISO/IEC 30186] ISO/IEC 30186 ED1 (under development), *Digital twin – Maturity model and guidance for a maturity assessment*.
+<[https://www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=103:38:9651066392215:::FSP\\_ORG\\_ID,FSP\\_APEX\\_PAGE,FSP\\_PROJECT\\_ID:20486,23,111892](https://www.iec.ch/dyn/www/f?p=103:38:9651066392215:::FSP_ORG_ID,FSP_APEX_PAGE,FSP_PROJECT_ID:20486,23,111892)>
+- [b-ISO 9241-11:2018] ISO 9241-11:2018, *Ergonomics of human-system interaction – Part 11: Usability: Definitions and concepts*.
+<[https://www.iso.org/standard/63500.html#:~:text=ISO%209241%2D11%3A2018%20provides,se rvices%20\(including%20technical%20and%20personal](https://www.iso.org/standard/63500.html#:~:text=ISO%209241%2D11%3A2018%20provides,se rvices%20(including%20technical%20and%20personal)>
+- [b-Doran] Doran, G.T. (1981), *There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management's goals and objectives*. *Management Review*. 70 pp 35-36.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3100-201709-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3100-201709-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1ae7250e37d09cdbdffed43c2df5d4320d40d6f5
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@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3100
+
+(09/2017)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100
+
+# Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 describes essential terms and their definitions for IMT-2020 network to provide a general common understanding for ITU-T IMT-2020 related standard documents. It can be used as a guideline for the further development of IMT-2020 related documents.
+
+The terms defined in this Recommendation will constitute a reference for other ITU-T IMT-2020 related standard documents.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3100 | 2017-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13349 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+IMT-2020, definitions, network slice, network softwarization, orchestration, terms.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 4 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| Bibliography..... | 5 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100
+
+# Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation contains common terms and definitions to provide a general understanding for IMT-2020 standard documents and a guideline for the development of IMT-2020 related documents.
+
+This Recommendation provides terms and definitions, which are considered particularly suitable and applicable to the development of IMT-2020 standard documents and have already been defined in published ITU-T Recommendations and other relevant specifications. New terms are also defined as required in this Recommendation.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.1714] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1714 (2009), *MPLS management and OAM framework*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), *Framework of software-defined networking*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3321] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3321 (2015), *Requirements and capability framework for NICE implementation making use of software-defined networking technologies*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4406] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4406/Y.2016 (2009), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN for applications and services using tag-based identification*.
+- [ITU-R M.2083-0] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), *IMT Vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.2 data plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+
+NOTE – In the ITU-T IMT-2020 related standard documents, "User plane" is used preferentially rather than "Data plane".
+
+**3.1.3 functional architecture** [ITU-T Y.4406]: A set of functional entities used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions. The functional entities can be used to describe a set of reference configurations. These reference configurations identify which reference points are visible at the boundaries of equipment implementations and between administrative domains.
+
+**3.1.4 logical resource** [ITU-T Y.3011]: An independently manageable partition of a physical resource, which inherits the same characteristics as the physical resource and whose capability is bound to the capability of the physical resource.
+
+NOTE – "independently" means mutual exclusiveness among multiple partitions at the same level.
+
+**3.1.5 management plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to manage entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this management.
+
+**3.1.6 network virtualization** [ITU-T Y.3011]: A technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collection of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource.
+
+**3.1.7 software-defined networking** [ITU-T Y.3300]: A set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner.
+
+**3.1.8 user plane** [ITU-T Y.1714]: Refers to the set of traffic forwarding components through which traffic flows.
+
+NOTE – "User plane" is referred to as "transport plane" in other ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+**3.1.9 virtual resource** [ITU-T Y.3011]: An abstraction of physical or logical resource, which may have different characteristics from the physical or logical resource and whose capability may be not bound to the capability of the physical or logical resource.
+
+**3.1.10 virtualized network function** [ITU-T Y.3321]: A network function whose functional software is decoupled from hardware, and runs on virtual machine(s).
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 backhaul**: A network path between base station systems and a core network.
+
+**3.2.2 evolved IMT-advanced RAT**: The enhanced version of IMT-advanced radio access technologies (RAT).
+
+NOTE – IMT-advanced is the ITU's official terminology for so-called LTE-advanced.
+
+**3.2.3 fixed mobile convergence**: In the context of IMT-2020, the capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed or mobile access technologies being used and independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.2.4 fronthaul**: A network path between centralized radio controllers and remote radio units of a base station function.
+
+**3.2.5 functional entity:** (Based on the definition given in [ITU-T Y.2012]) An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific capabilities. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.2.6 IMT-2020:** (Based on [ITU-R M.2083-0]) Systems, system components, and related aspects that support to provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.2.7 management:** In the context of IMT-2020, the processes aiming at fulfilment, assurance, and billing of services, network functions, and resources in both physical and virtual infrastructure including compute, storage, and network resources.
+
+**3.2.8 network function:** In the context of IMT-2020, a processing function in a network.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network functions include but are not limited to network node functionalities, e.g., session management, mobility management and transport functions, whose functional behaviour and interfaces are defined.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network functions can be implemented on a dedicated hardware or as virtualized software functions.
+
+NOTE 3 – Network functions are not regarded as resources, but rather any network functions can be instantiated using the resources.
+
+**3.2.9 network slice:** A logical network that provides specific network capabilities and network characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network slices enable the creation of customized networks to provide flexible solutions for different market scenarios which have diverse requirements, with respect to functionalities, performance and resource allocation.
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice may have the ability to expose its capabilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – The behaviour of a network slice is realized via network slice instance(s).
+
+**3.2.10 network slice blueprint:** A complete description of the structure, configuration and work flows on how to create and control a network slice instance during its life cycle.
+
+NOTE – A network slice template can be used synonymously with a network slice blueprint.
+
+**3.2.11 network slice instance:** An instance of network slice, which is created based on a network slice blueprint.
+
+NOTE 1 – A network slice instance is composed of a set of managed run-time network functions, and physical/logical/virtual resources to run these network functions, forming a complete instantiated logical network to meet certain network characteristics required by the service instance(s).
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice instance may also be shared across multiple service instances provided by the network operator. A network slice instance may be composed of none, one or more sub-network slice instances which may be shared with another network slice instance.
+
+**3.2.12 network softwarization:** An overall approach for designing, implementing, deploying, managing and maintaining network equipment and/or network components by software programming.
+
+NOTE – Network softwarization exploits the nature of software such as flexibility and rapidity all along the lifecycle of network equipment and/or components, for the sake of creating conditions that enable the re-design of network and services architectures, the optimization of costs and processes, self-management and bring added values in network infrastructures.
+
+**3.2.13 orchestration:** In the context of IMT-2020, the processes aiming at the automated arrangement, coordination, instantiation and use of network functions and resources for both physical and virtual infrastructures by optimization criteria.
+
+**3.2.14 orchestrator:** In the context of IMT-2020, an entity that fulfils orchestration functions.
+
+**3.2.15 PDU session:** In the context of IMT-2020, an association between a user equipment (UE) and a data network that provides a protocol data unit (PDU) connectivity service.
+
+NOTE – The type of the association includes IP type, non-IP type and Ethernet type.
+
+**3.2.16 physical resource:** A physical asset for computation, storage and/or networking.
+
+NOTE – Components, systems and equipment can be regarded as physical resources.
+
+**3.2.17 service instance:** An instance of a service that is realized within a network slice.
+
+NOTE 1 – A service may be represented by one or more service instances.
+
+NOTE 2 – A service instance may be provided by the network slice operator or a third party.
+
+**3.2.18 third party (3rd party):** In the context of IMT-2020, with respect to a given network operator and network end-users, an entity which consumes network capabilities and/or provides applications and/or services.
+
+NOTE 1 – An example of 3rd party, a virtual network operator (VNO) may use capabilities exposed by a network operator, e.g., to manage specific network slices. Another example of 3rd party, a service and/or application provider (e.g., an over the top (OTT) player) may provide applications and/or services to enhance the network capabilities.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network end-users are not regarded as 3rd parties.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------------------|
+| IMT | International Mobile Telecommunications |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| PDU | Protocol Data Unit |
+| OTT | Over The Top |
+| RAT | Radio Access Technologies |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| VNO | Virtual Network Operator |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-FG IMT2020-Gap] ITU-T TD 208 (PLEN/13) (2015), *Report on Standards Gap Analysis*.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,702 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3102
+
+(05/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- Framework of the IMT-2020 network
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102
+
+# Framework of the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 provides the framework for overall non-radio aspects of the IMT-2020 network. Following an introduction to the key features of the IMT-2020 network, architectural design considerations and framework of the IMT-2020 network are provided.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3102 | 2018-05-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13610 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Access network agnostic common core network, framework, IMT-2020, network architecture, network function, network service framework, network slice.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Terms and definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Introduction to the key features of the IMT-2020 network ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.1 Distributed architecture based on softwarized network functions ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 Access network agnostic common core network ..... | 5 |
+| | 6.3 Network slicing ..... | 5 |
+| 7 | Design considerations for the IMT-2020 network architecture..... | 7 |
+| | 7.1 Support of network slicing ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.2 Support of network capability exposure..... | 8 |
+| | 7.3 Common interface to support access network agnostic common coreSeries Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3116
+
+(02/2022)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Traffic typization IMT-2020 management based on an artificial intelligence approach**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3116
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3116
+
+# Traffic typization IMT-2020 management based on an artificial intelligence approach
+
+## Summary
+
+At present, the standardization of IMT-2020 networks aims at dealing with architectural issues (infrastructure and new services), analysing and ensuring signalling at the management level and ensuring the quality and security of IoT services. As is well known, according to ITU-R Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 "IMT Vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond", one of the IMT-2020 infrastructure technologies is software-defined networking (SDN). Given the heterogeneous nature of the traffic, it is necessary to ensure efficient and effective infrastructure management. With a view to increasing the effectiveness of the automation of management, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies needs to be considered for traffic detection and typization. In this way, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3116 considers an overview of machine learning (ML) technologies for traffic detection and a method for the traffic typization and recognition for IMT-2020 management based on an ML approach.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3116 | 2022-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14855 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+AI, IMT-2020, machine learning, neural network, traffic typization.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), Requirements of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3172] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3174] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3174 (2020), Framework for data handling to enable machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3175] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175 (2020), Functional architecture of machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3176] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3176 (2020), Machine learning marketplace integration in future networks including IMT-2020 . |
+| [ITU-R M.2083-0] | Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), IMT Vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 network virtualization** [b-ITU-T Y.3011]: A technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collection of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource.
+
+**3.1.2 software-defined networking** [ITU-T Y.3300]: A set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner.
+
+**3.1.3 future network (FN)** [b-ITU-T Y.3001]: A network able to provide services, capabilities, and facilities difficult to provide using existing network technologies. A future network is either:
+
+- a) A new component network or an enhanced version of an existing one, or
+- b) A heterogeneous collection of new component networks or of new and existing component networks that is operated as a single network.
+
+**3.1.4 application** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services, which may be supported by an API interface.
+
+**3.1.5 machine learning** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed.
+
+NOTE 1 – This definition adapted from [b-ETSI GR ENI 004].
+
+NOTE 2 – Supervised machine learning and unsupervised machine learning are two examples of machine learning.
+
+**3.1.6 machine learning data model** [ITU-T Y.3174]: The format which describes the data used for data handling in machine learning (ML) applications.
+
+NOTE 1 – An ML data model may specify the data exchanged between an ML overlay and an ML underlay network.
+
+NOTE 2 – An ML data model includes the data structures as well as a semantic description used while collecting data from an ML underlay network and while applying the ML output from the ML overlay to this ML underlay network.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| ANN | Artificial Neural Network |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CNN | Convolutional Neural Network |
+| DBN | Deep Belief Network |
+| eMBB | enhanced Mobile Broadband |
+| HMM | Hidden Markov Model |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| LSTM | Long Short-Term Memory |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| NFV | Network Function Virtualization |
+| RNN | Recurrent Neural Network |
+| SDN | Software-Defined Networking |
+| SOM | Self-organizing Map Method |
+| SVM | Support Vector Machine |
+| URLLC | Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+- The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, such requirements need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Background and motivation
+
+IMT-2020 is introducing new challenges for telecom providers, and it is expected that artificial intelligence (AI) methods will be integrated into networks and solve these challenges.
+
+The IMT-2020 network will request robust smart algorithms to adapt network protocols and resource management for different services in different scenarios.
+
+Recently, developments in deep learning, convolutional neural networks and reinforcement learning hold enormous promise for the solution of very complex problems considered intractable until now.
+
+According to "IMT vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2020 and beyond" [ITU-R M.2083-0], infrastructure will be based on software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) to provide the new quality of service level.
+
+In general, a significant number of the available Internet services require necessary value of network parameters, which are defined in QoS levels.
+
+There are several Recommendation regarding the usage of ML in networks. Use cases for ML in future networks including IMT-2020 are described in [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.55], an architectural framework for ML in future networks including IMT-2020 is presented in [ITU-T Y.3172], the framework for data handling to enable ML in future networks including IMT-2020 is described in [ITU-T Y.3174] and ML marketplace integration in future networks including IMT-2020 is presented in [ITU-T Y.3176]. In addition, the functional architecture of ML-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network is presented in [ITU-T Y.3175]. Consequently, the documents presented above focus on high-level important issues such as frameworks, ML use cases, ML marketplace integration and architectures. The motivation of this Recommendation is to extend the current list of ML Recommendations in the field of detailed methods, which can be presented as ML models for the ML pipeline [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+# 7 Introduction
+
+In order to ensure the necessity of higher quality of communications and process automation, it is requested to implement AI technologies to IMT-2020 networks for traffic monitoring and dynamic traffic management. AI technologies are the classes of the mathematical algorithms, models, approaches, such as ML and big data.
+
+ML provides a way to teach computational systems to gain knowledge from data without necessarily being explicitly programmed in order to realize complicated tasks such as detection of characteristics or prediction of behaviours.
+
+The following challenges are addressed in this Recommendation:
+
+- 1) An overview of ML technologies for the traffic detection.
+- 2) Traffic typization and recognition for IMT-2020 management based on an ML approach.
+
+# 8 An overview of ML technologies for monitoring and detection of network flows
+
+In issues of identification and classification of traffic, ML methods can be applied. They are divided into four groups.
+
+### 8.1 Supervised learning
+
+The supervised learning ML method is dedicated to solving the following problem. There are many objects (situations) and many possible responses including reactions. There is some unknown relationship between responses and objects. Only a finite set of precedents is known: "object, response" pairs, called a tagged training set. After algorithm training on the training set, it is able to show an appropriate response when new data arrives at the input.
+
+To measure the accuracy of answers, a quality function, which is a special function tracking errors or another parameter in ML model training, is introduced. A teacher can be represented in the following way:
+
+- A tagged training sample;
+- Someone who indicates correct answers.
+
+The following methods in supervised learning could be used:
+
+- The artificial neural networks (ANN) method including supervised deep learning (e.g., convolutional neural network (CNN), recurrent neural network (RNN) and their hybrid) [b-Smys];
+- Support vector machine (SVM) [b-Yu];
+- Decision tree method [b-Hand].
+
+### 8.2 Unsupervised learning
+
+The unsupervised learning ML method studies a lot of data processing problems in which only descriptions of a set of objects (training set) are known, and it is requested to discover internal relationships, dependencies and patterns that exist between objects.
+
+NOTE – In unsupervised learning, the training set is the only information about objects, and the main task is to find the internal relationships. An example is the task of data clustering based on the distance criterion.
+
+Unsupervised learning is often contrasted with supervised learning.
+
+There are following methods in supervised learning could be used:
+
+- Clustering method "K-means" [b-Jahwar];
+- Self-organizing Kohonen map method (SOM) [b-Lozano];
+- Hidden Markov model (HMM) [b-Mor];
+- Restricted Boltzmann machine (RBM) [b-Fischer];
+- Unsupervised deep learning system (e.g., deep belief network (DBN)) [b-Tran].
+
+### 8.3 Reinforcement learning
+
+The reinforcement learning ML method where an agent (or system) on its own interacts with the environment in order to learn. The reinforcement learning method is a special case of the supervised learning method.
+
+In this way, "Reinforcement learning" method can also be presented as a feedback system.
+
+### 8.4 Semi-supervised learning
+
+The semi-supervised learning ML method uses both tagged and untagged data for training. Usually, a small amount of tagged data and a significant amount of untagged data are used.
+
+Semi-supervised learning is considered a trade-off between unsupervised learning (without any labelled training data) and supervised learning (with a fully labelled training set).
+
+# 9 Traffic typization and recognition for management in IMT-2020 based on the metadata approach and ML
+
+There are various approaches to traffic recognition in current existing communication networks. These approaches are mainly based on the periodic capture of traffic and the analysis of its headers. Such methods have several disadvantages that include the delaying stream, the implementation of the analytical module requiring additional hardware/software solutions and the high complexity of such methods.
+
+This Recommendation proposes the implementation of an analytical system at the service level of the SDN, which could recognize and then perform traffic typization. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed SDN based network structure.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 illustrates the principle structure of the proposed SDN-based network architecture. The architecture is divided into three main layers: the Services layer, the Control plane, and the Data plane. The Services layer contains an Analytical application. The Control plane contains the SDN controller. The Data plane contains the network switches. The SDN controller is connected to the switches. The SDN domain is connected to other networks (NGN/IMS and IMT-2020 network) via a Northbound interface (API). The diagram is labeled Y.3116(22).
+
+Figure 1: Principle structure of the proposed scheme. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is the 'Services layer' containing an 'Analytical application' icon. Below this is a 'Northbound interface (API)' layer. The middle section is the 'Control plane', which contains an 'SDN controller' icon. The bottom section is the 'Data plane', which contains three 'Switch' icons connected in a mesh topology. The entire SDN domain is enclosed in a dashed box. To the left and right of the SDN domain are dashed boxes labeled 'Another network (NGN/IMS)' and 'Another IMT-2020 network' respectively. The label 'SDN domain' is at the bottom left of the dashed box, and 'Y.3116(22)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Principle structure of the proposed scheme**
+
+Figure 1 presents the following important nodes:
+
+- Switch: data forwarding devices
+(NOTE – Openflow protocol (from ver. 1.0) [b-ONF] is one well known flow control protocol)).
+- SDN controller;
+- Analytical application: software realizing ML methods of traffic recognition and typization.
+
+The proposed SDN based structure ensures system portability, the independence of the data transmission medium, and mostly ensures the integration of the data plane.
+
+For an analytical application, which may be software, all devices and flows are digital objects with a number of parameters and a functionality represented by a set of API methods.
+
+The level of network abstraction of the SDN based structure enables the implementation of an analytical application that works with traffic flows metadata.
+
+So far as this method uses data received through the northbound interface, the proposed system does not introduce additional traffic delays or make changes to its activity.
+
+This Recommendation introduces the usage of a supervised approach with neural network training. A supervised approach is easy to implement considering the data, which are received via the northbound API and are in the structure of an openflow table.
+
+### 9.1 Input data for analytical (ML) application
+
+An analytical application receives data via the northbound interface of the SDN controller at the data plane of a core network in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+The analytical application has the ability to request flow table data from all switches connected to the SDN controller. Flow tables contain two main fields: a match field and an action field [b-ONF]. The analysis of match and action fields allows the development of a meta model of each flow. The general structure of the flow table is shown in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+| Match field | | | | | Action |
+|-------------|---------|-----------|-------|-----------------|--------------|
+| # | In port | TimeStamp | ..... | Flow statistics | |
+| | | | | Byte Count | Packet Count |
+| 1 | | | | B_count_1 | P_count_1 |
+
+Y.3116(22)
+
+Figure 2: General structure of the flow table. The diagram shows a table with columns for Match field and Action. The Match field is further divided into In port, TimeStamp, and Flow statistics (Byte Count and Packet Count). The Action field is empty. A yellow circle highlights the TimeStamp, Byte Count, and Packet Count fields. Below the table, a switch icon is shown with the label Y.3116(22).
+
+**Figure 2 – General structure of the flow table**
+
+The circled data in Figure 2 are the data that should be used to form the digital model of the network flow. These data include two main counters: [Byte Count] and [Packet Count]. In addition to these counters, the flow table contains a [Time Stamp] parameter. [Time Stamp] enables the instantaneous calculation of [ByteCount-delta] and [PacketCount-delta].
+
+- [Byte Count]: A bit length of total of collected packets;
+- [Packet Count]: The total number of collected packets;
+- [ByteCount-delta]: A difference between [Byte Count #N] and [Byte Count #N+1];
+- [PacketCount-delta]: A difference between [Packet Count #N] and [Packet Count #N+1];
+- [Time Stamp]: A time in data flow.
+
+Based on only [Byte Count] and [Packet Count] counters, it is impossible to accurately determine the exact packet length in each flow. However, for an arbitrary period of time, $\Delta T$ , with a combination of samples of [Byte Count], [Packet Count] and [Time Stamp] values, it is possible to create a data set with an established data structure.
+
+- $\Delta T$ : a period of data collection.
+
+The values of [Byte Count], [Packet Count] and [Time Stamp] are generated by instantaneous requests received via the northbound API of the SDN controller.
+
+### 9.2 Machine learning data model preparation
+
+The data structure is formed on the basis of [DataSetRQ ] queries with "raw" data as shown in Equation (1). Equation (2) is used to convert the data structure to the required [DataSetML ] format (ML data model), while the instantaneous values are evaluated based on Equation (3).
+
+There are start parameters:
+
+$$\begin{array}{ccc}
+ \text{[TimeStamp]} & \text{[ByteCount]} & \text{[PacketCount]} \\
+ \text{TimeStamp}_{11} & \text{ByteCount}_{12} & \text{PacketCount}_{13} \\
+ \text{DataSet}_{RQ} = \text{TimeStamp}_{21} & \text{ByteCount}_{22} & \text{PacketCount}_{23} \\
+ \dots & \dots & \dots \\
+ \text{TimeStamp}_{N1} & \text{ByteCount}_{N2} & \text{PacketCount}_{N3}
+ \end{array} \quad (1)$$
+
+$$\begin{cases} BC\_delta_{N2} = ByteCount_{N2} - ByteCount_{(N-1)2}, & \text{if } N \geq 1 \\ PC\_delta_{N2} = PacketCount_{N2} - PacketCount_{(N-1)2}, & \text{if } N \geq 1 \end{cases} \quad (2)$$
+
+DataSetML is the ML data model, which presents the meta model of each flow of the data plane.
+
+$$DataSet_{ML} = \begin{matrix} & [TimeStamp] & [ByteCount] & [PacketCount] \\ & TS & BC_{delta_{12}} & PC_{delta_{13}} \\ & TS & BC_{delta_{22}} & PC_{delta_{23}} \\ & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ & TS & BC_{delta_{N2}} & PC_{delta_{N3}} \end{matrix} \quad (3)$$
+
+NOTE – TS is TimeStampN1 .
+
+For checking the data collection process, the total values of these parameters for a period of time are calculated as follows:
+
+$$ByteCount_{\Delta T} = \sum_{N=1}^{N=\Delta T/TS} BC_{delta_{N2}} \quad (4)$$
+
+$$PacketCount_{\Delta T} = \sum_{N=1}^{N=\Delta T/TS} PC_{delta_{N2}} \quad (5)$$
+
+### 9.3 Machine learning data model for neural network training
+
+In order to train the neural network within the analytical application, the input DataSetML is converted to a DataSetMLtrain by adding a new data column with tags of traffic types. This is necessary considering the supervised ML method.
+
+NOTE 1 – The proposed method uses the supervised approach in neural network training. The type of tag can be set arbitrarily depending on the field of the method application:
+
+- In order to match the IMT-2020 network QoS requirements, the tag is set in accordance with the number "5QI value" [b-3GPP TS 23.501] for the corresponding set of traffic;
+- A tag can be set based on the use case (for example, a URLLC slice, an eMBB slice) in an independent network domain from the "5QI value". In order to recognize a wide range of traffic types, this training data set needs to be expanded by marking the appropriate statistical sample with a traffic tag.
+
+Thus, the structure of the training DataSetMLtrain for IoT video traffic (as an example of a use case) can be defined as follows:
+
+$$DataSet_{MLtrain} = \begin{matrix} & [TypeOfTraffic] & [TimeStamp] & [ByteCount] & [PacketCount] \\ & IoT & TS & BC_{delta_{12}} & PC_{delta_{13}} \\ & IoT & TS & BC_{delta_{22}} & PC_{delta_{23}} \\ & \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ & Video & TS & BC_{delta_{N2}} & PC_{delta_{N3}} \\ & others & TS & BC_{delta_{(N+1)2}} & PC_{delta_{(N+1)3}} \end{matrix} \quad (6)$$
+
+NOTE 2 – In the first step of the learning process, data are collected separately for each type of traffic and the appropriate tag is set. In the second step, a finite data set (DataSetMLtrain ) is formed by gluing all the data sets marked by the tag in the first step.
+
+### 9.4 Requirements of neural network architecture for traffic typization and recognition
+
+Considering the object characteristics as traffic and its features as numerical and statistical series, a neural network can be used for detection and classification.
+
+[REQ]: A hybrid of multiple RNN hidden layers with at least two long short-term memory (LSTM) hidden layers is recommended as a neural network architecture of ML model.
+
+The RNN part of the neural network allows the consideration of the previous values of the statistical data of the flow over a short time interval. This improves the quality of the ML model.
+
+On the other hand, the LSTM part of the neural network, which include memory mechanisms in RNN architecture, allows the neural network to identify the patterns of influence of the samples considering the correlations between the values of the samples. An example of values is the frequency of IoT traffic and the self-similarity of characters.
+
+NOTE – The number of neurons in the each of the hidden layers is related to the traffic type.
+
+# **10 Security consideration**
+
+This Recommendation describes a method of traffic typization for subsequent management in IMT-2020; general network security requirements and mechanisms in IP-based networks should be applied [ITU-T Y.2701] [ITU-T Y.3101]. It is required to prevent unauthorized access to, and data leaking from the analytical application (with ML model and data sets), whether or not a malicious intention exists, with implementation of mechanisms regarding authentication and authorization, external attack protection, etc.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091(2011), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), *Framework of Software-defined networking*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.55] ITU-T Supplement 55 to Y.3170 (2019), *Machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020: use cases*.
+- [b-ETSI 3GPP TS 23.501] 3GPP TS 23.501 V16.7.0 (2020), *Technical specification group services and system aspects. System architecture for the 5G System (5GS). Stage 2 (Release 16)*.
+- [b-ETSI GR ENI 004] ETSI GR ENI 004 V1.1.1 (2018), *Experiential networked intelligence (ENI); Terminology for main concepts in ENI*.
+- [b-Hand] Hand, D.J., Smyth, P., and Mannila, H. (2001), *Principles of Data Mining*. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
+- [b-Fischer] Fischer, A., Igel, C. (2014), *Training restricted Boltzmann machines: An introduction*, Pattern Recognition, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp 25-39.
+- [b-Jahwar] Jahwar, A.F., & Abdulazeez, A.M. (2020), *Meta-heuristic algorithms for k-means clustering: A review*. PalArch's Journal of Archaeology of Egypt/Egyptology, Vol. 17, No. 7, pp. 12002-12020.
+- [b-Lozano] Lozano, S., Guerrero, F., Onieva, L., and Larrañeta, J. (1998), *Kohonen maps for solving a class of location-allocation problems*, European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 108, No. 1, pp. 106-117.
+- [b-Mor] Mor, B., Garhwal, S., and Kumar, A. (2021), *A Systematic Review of Hidden Markov Models and Their Applications*. Archives of computational methods in engineering, 28(3).
+- [b-ONF] Open Networking Foundation, *OpenFlow/Software-Defined Networking (SDN)*, Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3122 (05/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Quality of service assurance requirements
+and framework for smart grid supported by
+IMT-2020 and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3122
+
+# Quality of service assurance requirements and framework for smart grid supported by IMT-2020 and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3122 specifies the quality of service (QoS) assurance aspects for the smart grid supported by the international mobile telecommunications 2020 (IMT-2020) and beyond.
+
+It first provides an overview of the smart grid supported by IMT2020 and beyond. It then identifies a number of QoS considerations and the QoS assurance requirements and framework based on the QoS considerations are specified. Finally, smart grid application scenarios with detailed QoS requirements supported by IMT2020 and beyond are described in Appendix I.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3122 | 2023-05-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15531 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Framework, IMT-2020, QoS assurance, requirements, smart grid.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3129 (04/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Requirements and framework for stateless fair queuing in large scale networks including IMT-2020 and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+### Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3129
+
+# Requirements and framework for stateless fair queuing in large scale networks including IMT-2020 and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3129 specifies the requirements and framework for deterministic networking with a set of work conserving packet schedulers that guarantees end-to-end latency bounds to flows. The schedulers in core nodes do not need to maintain flow states. Instead, the entrance node of a flow marks an ideal service completion time according to a fluid model, called finish time (FT), of a packet in the packet header. The subsequent core nodes update FT by adding a delay factor, which is a function of the flow and upstream nodes. The packets in the queue of the scheduler are served in the ascending order of FT. This mechanism is called stateless fair queuing. The result is that flows are isolated from each other almost perfectly. The latency bound of a flow depends only on the flow's intrinsic parameters, except the maximum packet length among other flows sharing each output link with the flow.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3129 | 2024-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15868 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Deterministic networking, fair queuing, finish time, flow isolation, latency guarantee, scheduler.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,529 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3130
+
+(01/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- Requirements of IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS**
+
+**Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130
+
+# Requirements of IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130 specifies service related requirements such as unified user identity, unified charging, service continuity and guaranteed quality of service support, and network capability requirements such as control plane convergence, user data management, capability exposure and cloud-based infrastructure, to support fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3130 | 2018-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13467 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Fixed mobile convergence, IMT-2020, requirements.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation ..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Overview of FMC in IMT-2020 network..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Objectives of FMC in IMT-2020 network ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of FMC in IMT-2020 network from service point of view ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Unified user identity ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Unified charging..... | 4 |
+| 7.3 Service continuity and guaranteed quality of service support..... | 4 |
+| 8 IMT-2020 FMC network capability requirements ..... | 5 |
+| 8.1 Control plane convergence ..... | 5 |
+| 8.2 User data management ..... | 6 |
+| 8.3 Network capability exposure..... | 7 |
+| 8.4 Cloud-based infrastructure ..... | 7 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 7 |
+| Appendix I – Service scenarios supported by FMC in IMT-2020..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130
+
+# Requirements of IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements of fixed mobile convergence (FMC) in IMT-2020 networks; it covers aspects related to the overview and objectives of FMC, requirements from a service point of view, requirements from a network capability point of view and security considerations. Service scenarios supported by FMC in IMT-2020 are provided in the appendix.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Q.1762] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1762/Y.2802 (2007), *Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.2 fixed mobile convergence** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, the capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed or mobile access technologies being used and independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.1.3 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-R M.2083-0]: Systems, system components, and related aspects that support more enhanced capabilities than those described in Recommendation ITU-R M.1645.
+
+NOTE – ITU-R M.1645 defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.4 mobility** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment.
+
+**3.1.5 mobility management** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: The set of functions used to provide mobility. These functions include authentication, authorization, location updating, paging, download of user information and more.
+
+**3.1.6 network virtualization** [b-ITU-T Y.3011]: A technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collection
+
+of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource.
+
+**3.1.7 service continuity** [b-ITU-T Q.1743]: The uninterrupted user experience of a service that is using an active communication (e.g., an ongoing voice call) when a user equipment (UE) undergoes a radio access technology change or a CS/PS domain change without, as far as possible, the user noticing the change.
+
+NOTE – In particular service continuity encompasses the possibility that after a radio access technologies (RAT)/domain change the user experience is maintained by a different telecommunication service (e.g., tele- or bearer service) than before the RAT/domain change.
+
+**3.1.8 third party (3rd party)** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, with respect to a given network operator and network end users, an entity which consumes network capabilities and/or provides applications and/or services.
+
+NOTE 1 – An example of 3rd party, a VNO (virtual network operator) may use capabilities exposed by a network operator, e.g., to manage specific network slices. Another example of 3rd party, a service and/or application provider (e.g., an OTT player) may provide applications and/or services to enhance the network capabilities.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network end users are not regarded as 3rd parties.
+
+**3.1.9 user plane** [b-ITU-T Y.1714]: Refers to the set of traffic forwarding components through which traffic flows.
+
+NOTE 1 – "User plane" is also referred to as "transport plane" in other ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+NOTE 2 – "User plane" is defined as a synonym for data plane in [ITU-T Y.2011].
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization, Accounting |
+| AR | Augmented Reality |
+| BRAS | Broadband Remote Access Server |
+| CAPEX | Capital Expenditure |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| FMC | Fixed Mobile Convergence |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber Server |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| NFV | Network Function Virtualization |
+| OPEX | Operating Expense |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RAT | Radio Access Technologies |
+| RG | Residential Gateway |
+| SDN | Software-Defined Networking |
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------|
+| SGW | Serving Gateway |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| VR | Virtual Reality |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "IMT-2020 FMC network" indicates that the IMT-2020 network provides FMC capabilities.
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+### 6.1 Overview of FMC in IMT-2020 network
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.3101], the IMT-2020 network is envisioned to have an access network-agnostic architecture whose core network will be a common unified core network for new radio access technologies for IMT-2020, as well as existing fixed and wireless networks (e.g., wireless local area network (WLAN)). The access technology-agnostic unified core network is expected to be accompanied by common control mechanisms which are decoupled from access technologies.
+
+Emerging information and communications technologies (e.g., virtualization, cloud, software-defined networking (SDN), network function virtualization (NFV)) are transforming telecommunication operators' networks including fixed and mobile networks to achieve high resource utilization and network flexibility, which can contribute to network functions' convergence in an IMT-2020 network:
+
+- A common infrastructure is intended to separate network functions from the dedicated hardware; it will be transformed into cloud-based or NFV/SDN-based common infrastructure, including multilayer data centres with general hardware, intelligent management and orchestration. This would allow a flexible deployment of fixed and mobile network functions.
+- Fixed and mobile network functions are realized by software with a separation of the control plane and user plane. Softwarized control and user plane functions are easier to be upgraded and designed in a converged way, to enable flexible services, overall network design and evolution.
+
+### 6.2 Objectives of FMC in IMT-2020 network
+
+#### 6.2.1 Service objective
+
+Through FMC provided by an IMT-2020 network, the end user can enjoy a seamless service experience and ubiquitous service availability, and service providers can provide seamless service realization for fixed and mobile access networks.
+
+#### 6.2.2 Network evolution objective
+
+FMC provides possibilities of mutual evolution and coordination of different access networks in an IMT-2020 network, to achieve overall network evolution with the following characteristics:
+
+- Enable flexible network operation by the coordination of fixed access and mobile access network connections, e.g., traffic offload from mobile access network into fixed access network;
+
+- enable converged network functionalities or capabilities of fixed and mobile networks, e.g., unified charging to support flexible market promotion policy;
+- share infrastructure resources between fixed network functions and mobile network functions;
+- share common value added services between fixed and mobile networks;
+- reduce the capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating expense (OPEX), e.g., implementing shared common user profile data, common functions like charging, etc.
+
+# **7 Requirements of FMC in IMT-2020 network from service point of view**
+
+The requirements of FMC in an IMT-2020 network from the service point of view are based on the general requirements described in [ITU-T Y.3101].
+
+### **7.1 Unified user identity**
+
+In the IMT-2020 FMC network, the end user is facilitated to use fixed and mobile access technologies. It is a significant improvement to the user experience if a unified user identity is applied when the end user is using fixed and mobile access technologies. One use case related to unified user identity is provided in the appendix. (See use case 1 in Scenario A)
+
+Requirements of unified user identity are as follows:
+
+- Unified user identity is required to support an end user's single identification for both fixed and mobile access technologies.
+- Unified user identity is required to support an end user's single authentication and authorization for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+- Unified user identity is required to enable unified charging for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+
+### **7.2 Unified charging**
+
+In the IMT-2020 FMC network, charging information of one single end user for both fixed service and mobile service is integrated, which brings benefit to the network operator by reducing operation costs (e.g., one unified repository of charging information is needed instead of distributed ones for different access networks) and by supporting a flexible accounting strategy. One use case related to unified charging is provided in the appendix. (See use case 1 in Scenario A)
+
+Requirement of unified charging is as follows:
+
+- Unified charging is required to support a unified user's account which includes charging information for fixed and mobile services.
+
+### **7.3 Service continuity and guaranteed quality of service support**
+
+Emerging applications (e.g., augmented reality (AR), virtual reality (VR)) pose high network performance requirements (e.g., bandwidth, latency). Considering the status of active fixed or mobile network connections (e.g., when a single fixed or mobile network connection cannot provide the required network performance), mobile or fixed network connections can be initiated and reused to provide complementary network performance. In this case, service continuity (for support of both scenarios of handover between access networks with different technologies and migration from a single access network to multiple access networks with different technologies) and guaranteed quality of service (QoS) need to be supported by FMC in an IMT-2020 network. Two use cases related to service continuity and guaranteed QoS support are provided in the appendix. (See use case 2 in Scenario A and use case 1 in Scenario B)
+
+Service continuity and guaranteed QoS support are aligned with the requirements of diversity of service continuity control identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirements:
+
+- Service continuity is required to support a seamless service experience when there is a handover between fixed and mobile access technologies, no matter if the handover is initialized by the network side or user side.
+- Service continuity is required to support a seamless service experience when there is a migration from a single access network to multiple access networks with different technologies.
+- Guaranteed QoS is required to be supported for both single and multiple access network connections.
+
+# **8 IMT-2020 FMC network capability requirements**
+
+The requirements of IMT-2020 FMC network capabilities are based on the requirements of fixed mobile convergence described in [ITU-T Y.3101].
+
+### **8.1 Control plane convergence**
+
+Separation of user plane and control plane is a key design principle of an IMT-2020 network's architecture, which separates functions (e.g., serving gateway (SGW), broadband remote access server (BRAS), etc.) into control plane functions and user plane functions. The control plane executes most of the control logics, and the user plane mainly provides packet switching under the instruction of the control plane.
+
+This clause demonstrates requirements of control plane convergence.
+
+NOTE – User plane convergence requirements are for further study.
+
+#### **8.1.1 Authentication and authorization**
+
+Authentication and authorization for FMC are aligned with the requirements of authentication identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirements:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to provide a unified storage capability for authentication and authorization data for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support a unified authentication and authorization framework for a unified identity of the end user for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+
+#### **8.1.2 QoS control**
+
+QoS control for FMC is aligned with the requirements of QoS control identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirements:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support unified measurement of network performance (e.g., bandwidth, latency) for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support unified QoS policy management for fixed and mobile access technologies.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support a unified QoS decision-making point in the control plane and distributed QoS enforcement points in the user plane.
+
+#### **8.1.3 Charging**
+
+Charging for FMC is aligned with the requirements of charging identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirements:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support aggregation of charging information, simultaneously and independently of the access network fixed or mobile technology, for a single user, to determine total charging information for the user.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support charging models for fixed-only and mobile-only services, as well as for integrated fixed and mobile services.
+
+#### **8.1.4 Session management**
+
+Requirements of session management for FMC include:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support traffic switching, splitting and steering between fixed access networks and mobile access networks on the network side.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support traffic switching, splitting and steering on the user equipment side.
+
+NOTE 1 – Traffic steering aims to select the access network(s) to transport traffic.
+
+NOTE 2 – Traffic splitting aims to divide traffic into multiple pieces which are transported through different access networks.
+
+NOTE 3 – Traffic switching allows the movement of traffic from one access network to another one.
+
+#### **8.1.5 Mobility management**
+
+Mobility management for FMC is aligned with the requirements of enhanced mobility management identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirements:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support a unified mobility state management capability for mobile and fixed access networks.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support session continuity when the end user moves between fixed and mobile access networks.
+
+NOTE – The mobility scenarios supported in the IMT-2020 FMC network include the following:
+
+- Intra-access mobility: when an end user equipment moves within an access network (such as new radio network) and changes its access point.
+- Inter-access mobility: when an end user equipment switches between different access networks (such as new radio network and fixed network) and changes its access point.
+
+### **8.2 User data management**
+
+The location and structure of user data storage vary in different access networks. For example, user data is stored by the authentication, authorization, accounting (AAA) server in fixed networks, while it is stored and managed by the home subscriber server (HSS) in 4G networks. This kind of data separation results in several drawbacks such as data redundancy and service development difficulties. So a unified database can reduce maintenance costs and provide conditions for service development and (big) data analysis.
+
+Requirements of user data management for FMC are as follows:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support a single centralized user data storage for an end user's access to the IMT-2020 network using fixed and mobile access technologies;
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support unified access mechanisms in user data storage.
+
+### **8.3 Network capability exposure**
+
+Within the capability limits set by the network operators, in order to allow third parties to access information regarding services provided by the IMT-2020 network, and to dynamically customize the network capabilities for diverse use cases, the IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support network capability exposure.
+
+Network capability exposure for FMC is aligned with the requirements identified in [ITU-T Y.3101], in particular with the following additional requirement:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support the exposure of the end user's access type, including single (fixed or mobile) access type, and simultaneous (fixed and mobile) access type, accessible by third parties.
+
+### **8.4 Cloud-based infrastructure**
+
+Cloud-based network infrastructure is a set of interconnected multilayer data centres (e.g., edge data centre, core data centre) with general purpose standardized hardware, centralized management and orchestration enabled by NFV and SDN technologies. The IMT-2020 FMC network is expected to be deployed on a cloud-based network infrastructure in order to support flexible and automatic network deployment, extension and scalability.
+
+Requirements of cloud-based infrastructure for FMC are as follows:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support network functions to be designed in a cloud native way.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support network functions to be deployed on cloud-based network infrastructure.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to support network management and orchestration capabilities.
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to be aligned with the security requirements contained in [ITU-T Q.1762] and the requirements of security and personal data protection contained in [ITU-T Y.3101], with the following additional ones:
+
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to provide mechanisms to support data confidentiality and integrity for fixed and mobile access networks.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to provide secure storage, handling and enforcement of policies.
+- An IMT-2020 FMC network is required to provide a security coordination function for coordinating security policies of each and all involved access networks.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Service scenarios supported by FMC in IMT-2020
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This section lists two service scenarios, and related use cases supported by FMC in IMT-2020 network, for readers to understand related requirements of FMC in IMT-2020.
+
+Service scenarios supported by FMC in IMT-2020 are not limited to the ones depicted in Figure I.1 and Figure I.2.
+
+#### Scenario A: Fixed broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates the scenario of a fixed broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks. A terminal (e.g., customer premises equipment (CPE), residential gateway (RG)) of a fixed broadband service can be globally controlled by an IMT-2020 FMC network, and get access to data sources (e.g., websites on the Internet) via both fixed and mobile access networks simultaneously (which 'and' in the figure stands for) or via one of the access technologies at one time (which 'or' in the figure stands for).
+
+
+
+Y.3130(18)\_Fl.1
+
+Diagram illustrating the scenario of a fixed broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks. The diagram shows an IMT-2020 FMC network cloud at the top, connected to two access network clouds: 'Fixed access' on the left and 'Mobile access' on the right. Below these are icons for a fixed network (cable/modem) and a mobile network (cell tower). At the bottom is a 'CPE/RG' device. A dashed blue line connects the CPE/RG to the Fixed access network, and a dashed orange line connects it to the Mobile access network. A green dashed line with 'and/or' connects the two access networks. Arrows point from both access networks to the IMT-2020 FMC network cloud. The label 'Y.3130(18)\_Fl.1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Fixed broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks**
+
+There are some points to highlight for this scenario. An IMT-2020 FMC network:
+
+- serves both fixed and mobile access networks;
+- supports the use of fixed or mobile access network, or simultaneous use of both, seamlessly, to provide a high performance user experience;
+- transports traffic on one or the other access networks, or transports on both simultaneously, and traffic can be split, combined, steered according to service requirements and network conditions for user experience optimization;
+- supports the continuous and consistent provision of charging, traffic policies, etc.;
+- supports unified management of subscriber's mobility and session stack;
+- supports unified management of subscriber's identity and credentials.
+
+##### Use case 1
+
+A user can have a portable RG. When at home, he can access the fixed broadband service. When he goes out, he can take this RG with him, and benefit of its capability to connect via a mobile access network. The user can use the same identity and credentials to surf the Internet with terminals that connect to the Wi-Fi hotspot created by the RG, which gets access to a cellular network provided by the same operator. All the charging records are attributed to a unified bill for this user.
+
+##### Use case 2
+
+An RG, connected to the fixed broadband line, is simultaneously providing both wired LAN and Wi-Fi connections at home. A user is watching TV, which connects to the RG by a wired LAN interface. At the same time, he is making a voice call based on an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) [b-ITU-T Y.2021] with his cell phone via Wi-Fi. The IMT-2020 FMC network detects that the bandwidth provided by the fixed access network for this RG is not enough to support both a TV service and voice call service, so under the control of the IMT-2020 FMC network, the RG simultaneously opens a connection via a mobile access network (without releasing exited fixed connection) to broaden the bandwidth so as to fulfil the requirements of all the services it carries.
+
+#### **Scenario B: Mobile broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks**
+
+Figure I.2 illustrates the scenario of a mobile broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile accesses. A terminal (e.g., cell phone) of a mobile broadband service can be globally controlled by an IMT-2020 FMC network, and get access to data sources (e.g., websites on the Internet) via both fixed and mobile access networks simultaneously (which 'and' in the figure stands for) or via one of the access technologies at one time (which 'or' in the figure stands for).
+
+NOTE – In this scenario, the fixed access network for the mobile broadband service indicates that a mobile terminal (e.g., cell phone) can connect to a fixed access network via wireless hotspots (e.g., Wi-Fi) provided by traditional fixed gateways (e.g., CPE, RG).
+
+
+
+A central cloud at the top is labeled "IMT-2020 FMC network". Two bidirectional arrows (one blue dashed, one yellow dashed) point downwards from this cloud to two smaller clouds below it. The left cloud is labeled "Fixed access" and the right cloud is labeled "Mobile access". From the "Fixed access" cloud, a blue dashed line with a bidirectional arrow connects to a "CPE/RG" device icon. From the "Mobile access" cloud, a yellow dashed line with a bidirectional arrow connects to a mobile phone icon. Additionally, there is a blue dashed line with a bidirectional arrow connecting the "CPE/RG" to the mobile phone, labeled "and/or". The mobile phone is also shown with a yellow dashed line connecting to a cellular tower icon. A Wi-Fi signal icon is shown between the CPE/RG and the mobile phone. The diagram is labeled "Y.3130(18)\_FI.2" at the bottom right.
+
+Diagram of IMT-2020 FMC network architecture showing connections between fixed and mobile access networks to a CPE/RG and a mobile terminal.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Mobile broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access networks**
+
+The points to highlight for this scenario are aligned with those described in Scenario A.
+
+##### Use case 1
+
+A user of a mobile broadband service is making a voice call based on an IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) via a cellular network. When the user steps into his house, the cellular coverage is too weak to provide enough bandwidth for this phone call. An IMT-2020 FMC network detects this situation and
+
+switches the mobile seamlessly to the Wi-Fi hotspot provided by the RG at home. The voice call continues and all data packets of this dialogue are not dropped or missed.
+
+##### **Use case 2**
+
+A user can get access to multiple kinds of service (e.g., data service, voice service) over mobile broadband. When the user initiates a voice call, mobile access connection will be selected and used for a voice service. At the same time or after that, a fixed access connection will be selected and used for the data download traffic when the user initiates a movie file download.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1743] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1743 (2016), *IMT-Advanced references to Release 11 of LTE-Advanced evolved packet core network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1714] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1714 (2009), *MPLS management and OAM framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2021] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2021 (2006), *IMS for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2011), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.2083-0] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), *IMT Vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3136
+
+(09/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Session management for fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3136
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3136
+
+# Session management for fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3136 describes the scenarios, general requirements and design principles of session management (SM) for fixed mobile convergence (FMC) in IMT-2020 networks. This Recommendation also describes the functional architecture and key functions of session management for supporting FMC in IMT-2020 networks as well as provides information flows of protocol data unit (PDU) session management and traffic routing management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3136 | 2020-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14398 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+IMT-2020 network, PDU session, session continuity, session management, traffic routing.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3100] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), Requirements of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3102] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), Framework of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3104] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3104 (2018), Architecture of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3130] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130 (2018), Requirements of IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3131] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3131 (2019), Functional architecture for supporting fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks . |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 fixed mobile convergence** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, the capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed or mobile access technologies being used and independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.1.2 PDU session** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, an association between a user equipment (UE) and a data network that provides a protocol data unit (PDU) connectivity service.
+
+NOTE – The type of the association includes IP type, non-IP type and Ethernet type.
+
+**3.1.3 session continuity** [ITU-T Q.1702]: The ability of the user to maintain continuity of ongoing sessions while changing between terminal devices and across various access and core networks. For example, the user of a mobile terminal may wish to switch from his mobile equipment attached to a wireless network to a laptop connected to a wire-line or Digital Subscriber Line connection. This should be supported without any session discontinuity.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| AN | Access Network |
+| ATSSS | Access Traffic Switching, Splitting and Steering |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| CP | Control Plane |
+| DN | Data Network |
+| FMC | Fixed Mobile Convergence |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IWF | Interworking Function |
+| NF | Network Function |
+| NFR | Network Function Registry function |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| PDU | Protocol Data Unit |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SM | Session Management |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UP | User Plane |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+# 6 Design considerations of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks
+
+## 6.1 Session management design principles
+
+Session management is required to manage protocol data unit (PDU) sessions including control of PDU session tunnel establishment, modification and release. In addition, session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks is required to support traffic routing management between fixed access networks and mobile access networks. Traffic routing management includes traffic switching, splitting and steering on the network side and the user equipment side. Session management is required to support PDU session management and traffic routing management for Internet protocol (IP) type PDU session level [ITU-T Y.3102].
+
+The application scenario of session management is shown in Figure 6-1, which illustrates the scenario of mobile broadband service via fixed and (or) mobile access. The IMT-2020 network is envisioned to have an access network agnostic architecture whose core network will be a common unified core network for new radio access technologies for IMT-2020, as well as existing fixed and wireless networks. A terminal of mobile broadband service can be globally controlled by unified core network (CN), and obtain access to data sources such as websites on the Internet via both fixed and mobile access simultaneously (which 'and' in the figure stands for) or via one of the access technologies at a given time (which 'or' in the figure stands for).
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a central cloud labeled "IMT-2020 FMC network". Below it are two smaller clouds: "Fixed access" on the left and "Mobile access" on the right. A "CPE/RG" (represented by a router icon) is connected to the "Fixed access" cloud. A smartphone is connected to the "Mobile access" cloud. A dashed line with a double-headed arrow connects the CPE/RG and the smartphone, with the text "and/or" in the middle. Blue arrows point from the "Fixed access" cloud to the main network cloud, and orange arrows point from the "Mobile access" cloud to the main network cloud. The label "Y.3136(20)\_F6-1" is at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 6-1: Scenarios of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 Network. The diagram illustrates a unified core network (IMT-2020 FMC network) connected to both Fixed access and Mobile access networks. A CPE/RG (Customer Premises Equipment/Routing Gateway) is shown connected to the Fixed access network. A mobile terminal (smartphone) is shown connected to the Mobile access network. The CPE/RG and the mobile terminal are connected to each other via a wireless link, labeled 'and/or', indicating simultaneous or alternative access. The diagram is labeled Y.3136(20)\_F6-1.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Scenarios of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 Network [ITU-T Y.3130]**
+
+There are some points to be highlighted for this scenario. Session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks is required:
+
+- to serve both fixed and mobile access networks;
+- to support the use of fixed or mobile access network, or simultaneous use of both, seamlessly;
+
+- to transport traffic on one or the other access networks, or transport on both simultaneously, and traffic can be split, combined, steered according to service requirements and network conditions;
+- to support unified management of subscriber's mobility and session stack.
+
+Session management is designed with the separation of control plane (CP) and user plane (UP). This feature makes it easier to implement and deploy the session management to a variety of access networks in IMT-2020 network.
+
+Session management is also designed by cooperating with other functionalities. The session management could be accomplished with the help of functionalities for authentication, security, call establishment and so on. For other functionalities of the CP such as authorization and charging, the interfaces are required to follow general standards.
+
+## **6.2 General session management requirement**
+
+The general session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks is required to provide PDU connectivity service including control of PDU session tunnel establishment, modification, and release. Session management is also required to provide traffic routing management including selecting the access network(s) to transport traffic (traffic steering), dividing traffic into multiple pieces which are transported through different access networks (traffic splitting), moving traffic from one access network to another (traffic switching), on both network side and user equipment side. The following details of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks describe the IP type of PDU sessions. Details of PDU session management for PDU types other than the IP type are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## **6.3 General session management functional architecture**
+
+Session management supports different access networks and support simultaneous connections of a user equipment (UE) via multiple access technologies. For different access networks for FMC in IMT-2020 network, session management is required to enable the establishment, modification and release of PDU session tunnels, and support the management of traffic routing.
+
+PDU session tunnels are required between access networks (ANs) and user plane functions (UPFs) as well as between different UPFs. Session management function (SMF) selects a proper UPF and allocates an IP address to the UE in the PDU session establishment. SMF releases the session, deletes all the flows belonging to the session and requests the deletion of the flows to UPF and AN when the releasing requests arrive in the PDU session release. SMF requests UPF to modify the PDU session via network access control function (NACF) in the PDU session modification.
+
+Session management mainly consists of PDU session management and traffic routing management. Figure 6-2 shows session management related functions in IMT-2020 network architecture. Entities relevant to PDU session management include AN, NACF, SMF, interworking function (IWF), UPF, policy control function (PCF), unified subscription management (USM), network function registry function (NFR) and data network (DN). Entities relevant to traffic routing management include AN, NACF, SMF, PCF, IWF and UPF.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-2: Session management related functions in IMT-2020 network architecture. The diagram shows a network architecture with various functional blocks. At the top, NSSF, USM, NFR, CEF, and AF are connected to a central horizontal line. Below this line, ASF is connected to NSSF. NACF, SMF, and PCF are connected to USM. NFR is connected to NACF. CEF and AF are connected to the central line. Below the central line, a red dashed box encloses USM, NACF, SMF, PCF, Fixed AN, IWF, AN, UPF, and DN. A blue dashed box encloses Fixed AN, IWF, AN, UPF, and DN. A legend at the bottom indicates that the red dashed box represents 'PDU session management' and the blue dashed box represents 'Traffic routing management'. The text 'Y.3136(20)\_F6-2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Session management related functions in IMT-2020 network architecture [ITU-T Y.3131]**
+
+NOTE – For ANs which do not natively support a common signalling interface, an IWF needs to be provided at the AN-CN interface so that network functions deployed in the CN can still use a common signalling interface" [ITU-T Y.3102].
+
+The IMT-2020 network is required to provide PDU connectivity service that enables exchange of PDUs between UEs and DNs. The PDU connectivity service is supported via PDU sessions that are established upon session request from UEs. The PDU session tunnels are used between AN and UPF(s) as well as between different UPFs as UP data transport for PDU sessions.
+
+SMF controls the establishment, modification, and release of PDU sessions. SM messages are exchanged between SMF and UE via NACF. SMF controls UPFs for the management of PDU sessions. The serving SMF performs authentication and authorization with the DN. PCF provides functionalities for the control and management of policy rules including rules for traffic routing. UPF provides functionalities for traffic routing and forwarding, PDU session tunnel management.
+
+USM stores and manages, in a unified way, UE context and subscription information including, but not limited to, information on session management for PDU session establishment. NFR provides functionalities to assist the discovery and selection of required network functions and maintains information of the available network function instances.
+
+## 7 Key functions of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks
+
+This clause describes the functions to support session management for FMC in IMT-2020 network. The features of PDU session management function and traffic routing management function are described in clauses 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.
+
+## 7.1 Functional description for PDU session management
+
+PDU session management function is used to provide PDU connectivity service, i.e., a service that enables exchange of PDUs between UEs and DNs. PDU sessions upon session request from UEs are required to support the PDU connectivity service. Each PDU session supports a single PDU type as requested by the UE at the establishment of the PDU session.
+
+According to the requirements of session management for FMC, session management is required to support PDU session management, selection and control of UP function. PDU session tunnels are required between ANs and UPFs as well as between different UPFs. The UPF manages PDU
+
+sessions including control of PDU session tunnel establishment, modification, and release. SMF controls UPFs for the management of PDU sessions. The implementation of PDU session management function requires the cooperation of NACF, SMF, UPF, PCF, and USM.
+
+The PDU session management function includes PDU session establishment, PDU session modification and PDU session release. PDU session management procedures are based on the characteristic of FMC in IMT-2020 networks and session management in ITU-T Y.3104.
+
+PDU session establishment procedure starts when the UE requests to establish a PDU session to NACF. SMF controls UPF and, via NACF, AN to establish PDU session tunnels and UE-AN data transport tunnel. The procedure provides tunnels that enable exchange of PDUs between UEs and DN. PDU session modification procedure starts when the status changes in access networks or for load balancing. SMF sends the modification request to UPF. When UPF receives a response, SMF sends a request to AN to modify the PDU session. PDU session release procedure starts when the UE sends the release request to SMF or when SMF or AN trigger the PDU session release. SMF releases the session, deletes all the flows belonging to the session, and UPF and AN delete the corresponding resources. The UE can request the release of the PDU session explicitly, or the release of PDU session can be triggered by SMF or AN implicitly.
+
+A PDU session management procedure may correspond to:
+
+- a UE initiated PDU session management procedure,
+- a UE initiated PDU session handover between mobile access network and fixed access network,
+- a network triggered PDU session management procedure. In this case the network sends the device trigger message to application(s) on the UE side. The device trigger request message contains information on which application on the UE side is expected to trigger the PDU session management request. Based on that information, the application(s) on the UE side trigger the PDU session management procedure.
+
+In session management scenarios for FMC in IMT-2020 Network, a UE may request to establish multiple PDU sessions, to the same data network or to different data networks, such as via mobile access networks and via fixed access networks at the same time. A UE with multiple established PDU sessions may be served by different SMF. A UE may request to move a PDU session between mobile accesses and fixed accesses. The SMF shall be registered and deregistered on a per PDU session granularity in the USM. The UP paths of different PDU sessions belonging to the same UE may be completely disjoint between the AN and the UPF interfacing with the same or different DN.
+
+## **7.2 Functional description for traffic routing management**
+
+Traffic routing management function is used to support traffic switching, splitting, and steering between fixed access networks and mobile access networks. The function includes traffic routing management for IP type PDU session level [ITU-T Y.3102].
+
+According to the requirements of session management for FMC, this function supports the selection of the access network(s) to transport traffic, supports to transport traffic through different access networks (such as fixed access and mobile access) by dividing traffic into multiple pieces, supports to move traffic from one access network to another, such as from mobile network to fixed network.
+
+The traffic steering procedure selects an access network for a new data flow and transfers the traffic of this data flow over the selected access network.
+
+The traffic switching procedure moves all traffic of an ongoing data flow from one access network to another access network in a way that maintains the continuity of the data flow. When the UE(s) move between different access networks (such as mobile network and fixed network), the traffic switching procedure will be triggered.
+
+The traffic splitting procedure splits the traffic of a data flow across multiple access networks. When traffic splitting is applied to a data flow, some of the traffic of the data flow is transferred via one access network while some other traffic of the same data flow is transferred via another access network.
+
+All the procedures mentioned above are applicable between mobile access networks and fixed access networks.
+
+To provide traffic routing, the function supports multi-access PDU session, that is a type of PDU session whose traffic can be sent over mobile access, or over fixed access, or over both accesses. The UE or the UPF distributes the traffic based on access traffic switching, splitting and steering (ATSSS) rules implementing different policies. The SMF provides ATSSS forwarding rules to UPF that indicate how traffic should be routed across the PDU sessions. The ATSSS forwarding rules are derived based on the multi-access policy and charging control rules provided by PCF. When the traffic routing requests that target multiple UE(s) are sent and may target multiple PCF(s), the PCF(s) transform(s) the requests into policies that apply to PDU sessions.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SMF
+ participant PCF
+ SMF->>PCF: Multi-access PDU session request
+ PCF-->>SMF: Multi-access PDU session policy rule
+(including ATSSS policy control information)
+
+```
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F7-1
+
+Sequence diagram showing the Multi-access PDU session procedure between SMF and PCF. The SMF sends a 'Multi-access PDU session request' to the PCF, and the PCF returns a 'Multi-access PDU session policy rule (including ATSSS policy control information)' to the SMF.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Multi-access PDU session procedure**
+
+During the establishment of a multi-access PDU session, the PCF may take ATSSS policy decisions and create policy rules that contain ATSSS policy control information, which determines how the uplink and the downlink traffic of the multi-access PDU session should be distributed across the mobile and fixed access networks.
+
+The PCF provides policy rules for the multi-access PDU session, i.e., policy rules that include ATSSS policy control information, as described in Figure 7-1. The SMF receives the policy rules with ATSSS policy control information and maps these rules into ATSSS rules and SMF-UPF rules. The ATSSS rules is a prioritized list of rules which are applied by the UE to enforce the ATSSS policy in the uplink direction and the SMF-UPF rules are applied by the UPF to enforce the ATSSS policy in the downlink direction.
+
+The ATSSS rules are sent to UE with UE-CN signalling when the multi-access PDU session is created or when they are updated by the SMF, e.g., after receiving updated policy rules from the PCF. Similarly, the SMF-UPF rules are sent to UPF when the multi-access PDU session is created or when they are updated by SMF.
+
+## **8 Information flows of session management for FMC in IMT-2020 networks**
+
+This clause describes detailed information flows of the PDU session management function and traffic routing management function. PDU session management procedures are based on the characteristic of FMC in IMT-2020 networks and session management in [ITU-T Y.3104].
+
+### **8.1 PDU session management**
+
+The procedures of the PDU session management function include session establishment procedure, session modification procedure and session release procedure. Detailed information flows of these procedures are described in clauses 8.1.1 to 8.1.3.
+
+### 8.1.1 Information flows for session establishment
+
+PDU session tunnels are required between ANs and UPFs as well as between different UPFs. SM enables the establishment of PDU session tunnels. SMF controls the establishment of PDU sessions. SM messages are exchanged between SMF and UE by NACF signalling. SMF controls UPF and, via NACF, AN to establish PDU session tunnels and UE-AN data transport tunnel. The session establishment procedure is illustrated as Figure 8-1.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN
+ participant NACF
+ participant UPF
+ participant SMF
+ participant PCF
+ participant USM
+ participant DN
+
+ Note over NACF: SMF selection
+ UE->>NACF: 1. PDU Session Establishment Request
+ NACF->>SMF: 2. PDUSession_CreateSMContext Request
+ Note over SMF,USM: 3. PDU session registration/subscription retrieval
+ SMF->>USM:
+ USM-->>SMF:
+ SMF->>NACF: 4. PDUSession_CreateSMContext Response
+ Note over SMF,DN: 5. PDU session authentication/authorization
+ SMF->>DN:
+ DN-->>SMF:
+ Note over SMF: PCF selection
+ SMF->>PCF: 6. Get session management policy
+ PCF-->>SMF:
+ Note over SMF: UPF selection
+ SMF->>UPF: 7. Session Establishment Request
+ UPF-->>SMF: 8. Session Establishment Response
+ SMF->>NACF: 9. Communication_MessageTransfer
+ NACF->>AN: 10. AN-CN PDU Session Request
+ AN->>UE: 11. PDU Session Establishment Accept
+ AN->>NACF: 12. AN-CN PDU Session Response
+```
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F8-1
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the PDU session establishment procedure between UE, AN, NACF, UPF, SMF, PCF, USM, and DN.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – PDU session establishment procedure**
+
+1. The UE sends a request message to the NACF. In order to establish a new PDU session, the UE generates a new PDU session ID. The UE initiates the PDU session establishment procedure by the transmission of a request message containing a PDU session establishment request. The NACF selects a most appropriate SMF.
+2. The NACF sends the PDUSession\_CreateSMContext Request message to the SMF.
+3. The SMF retrieves PDU session information from the USM.
+4. The SMF sends the PDUSession\_CreateSMContext Response message to the NACF. The SMF processes the PDU session establishment request, and the SMF creates a SM context and responds to the NACF by providing a SM context identifier.
+5. The serving SMF performs PDU session authentication/authorization with DN.
+6. After the SMF selects an appropriate PCF via NFR, SMF gets SM policy for the PDU session via PCF.
+7. Upon PDU session establishment request message, the SMF selects a proper UPF and allocates an IP address. If CN Tunnel Info is allocated by the SMF, the CN Tunnel Info is provided to the UPF in this step.
+
+8. The UPF acknowledges by sending a session establishment response message. If CN Tunnel Info is allocated by the UPF, the CN Tunnel Info is provided to the SMF in this step.
+9. The SMF sends the Communication\_MessageTransfer message with PDU session and SM information to the NACF.
+10. The NACF sends the AN-CN PDU session request message (PDU session ID and PDU session establishment accept targeted to the UE, the SM information received from the SMF to the AN).
+11. The AN forwards the PDU session establishment accept message to the UE.
+12. The AN acknowledges by sending the AN-CN PDU session response message to the NACF to setup PDU session UE-CN signalling.
+
+### 8.1.2 Information flows for session modification
+
+A PDU session modification may be initiated in order to change the path and quality of service (QoS) of an IP flow [ITU-T Y.3102], e.g., to cope with the status changes in access networks or for load balancing. The SMF requests the UPF to modify the IP type PDU session. According to the response message received from the UPF, the SMF sends a PDU session modification request message to the AN via the NACF. Figure 8-2 illustrates the PDU session modification procedure .
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN
+ participant NACF
+ participant SMF
+ participant UPF
+ participant PCF
+
+ Note over UE, AN: 1a. PDU Session Modification Request
+ AN-->>NACF: 1a. PDU Session Update
+ Note over NACF, SMF: 1a. PDU Session Update SM Context
+ Note over PCF, SMF: 1b. PCF initiated management policy modification
+ Note over SMF: 1c. QoS update trigger
+ Note over SMF, PCF: 2. Session management policy modification
+ SMF->>UPF: 3. PDU Session Modification Request
+ UPF-->>SMF: 4. PDU Session Modification Response
+ SMF->>NACF: 5. Response of PDU Session Update SM Context
+ NACF->>AN: 6. PDU Session Request
+ Note over AN, UE: 7. AN-specific resource modification (Including PDU session modification command/Ack)
+ AN->>NACF: 8. PDU Session Response (UE-CN Uplink Transfer)
+ Note over NACF, SMF: 9. PDU Session Update SM Context
+ Note over SMF, PCF: 10. Session management policy modification
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows the sequence of messages for PDU session modification. It starts with a UE-initiated request (1a) passing through AN and NACF to SMF. SMF then interacts with PCF for policy modification (1b, 2) and triggers a QoS update (1c). SMF sends a request (3) to UPF, which responds (4). SMF then sends a response (5) to NACF, which forwards a request (6) to AN. AN performs resource modification (7) and sends a response (8) to NACF. Finally, NACF sends an update (9) to SMF, which triggers another policy modification (10) with PCF.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the PDU session modification procedure between UE, AN, NACF, SMF, UPF, and PCF.
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F8-2
+
+**Figure 8-2 – PDU session modification procedure**
+
+1. The procedure may be triggered by the following events:
+ - 1a. The UE initiates the PDU session modification procedure by the transmission of UE-CN signalling. The signalling is forwarded by the AN to the NACF with an indication of user location information.
+ - 1b. Triggered by a policy decision or upon AF requests, the PCF performs a session management policy modification procedure to notify the SMF about the modification of policies.
+
+- 1c. The SMF may decide to modify a PDU session. It may also be triggered if the SMF has marked that the status of one or more QoS flows are deleted in the CN but not yet synchronized with the UE. A QoS flow associated with the default QoS rule is required to be established for a PDU session and remains established throughout the lifetime of the PDU session.
+2. The SMF may need to report some subscribed event to the PCF by performing a session management policy modification procedure. The PCF may provide new policy information to the SMF. This step may be skipped if PDU session modification procedure is triggered by step 1b or 1c, the PDU session modification requires action only at an UPF.
+3. The SMF sends the PDUSession\_ModificationRequest message to the UPF to modify the IP type PDU session.
+4. The UPF responds to the SMF by sending the PDUSession\_ModificationResponse message.
+5. According to the response message received from the UPF, the SMF responds to the NACF through PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext.
+6. The NACF sends PDU Session Request message (SM information received from SMF, UE-CN signalling) to the AN, because the SMF sends a PDU Session Modification Request message to the AN via the NACF.
+7. The AN issues AN specific signalling exchange with the UE that is related with the information received from the SMF.
+8. The AN sends PDU session response message to the NACF, including that the AN forwards the UE-CN signalling to the NACF.
+9. The NACF forwards the PDU Session Modification Command Ack message received from the AN to the SMF via PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext Request message. The SMF replies with a PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext Response message.
+10. The SMF notifies the PCF with a session management policy modification message.
+
+### **8.1.3 Information flows for session release**
+
+There are two types to trigger the PDU session release, explicit type and implicit type [ITU-T Y.3102]. Figure 8-3 illustrates the PDU session release procedure.
+
+**Explicit:** The UE can request the release of an IP type PDU session explicitly to SMF. SMF releases the session, deletes all the flows belonging to the session and requests the deletion of the flows to UPF and AN. UPF and AN delete the corresponding resources.
+
+**Implicit:** SMF or AN can trigger the PDU session release. For example, if there is no traffic through an IP flow within a given period, UPF notifies it to SMF. SMF deletes the flow and requests the deletion of the flow to UPF and AN. UPF and AN delete the corresponding resources. If there are no more IP flows in the PDU session, SMF releases the PDU session.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN
+ participant NACF
+ participant SMF
+ participant UPF
+
+ Note over UE, AN: 1a. PDU Session Release Request
+ AN-->>NACF: 1a. PDUSession_UpdateSMContext (PDUSession Release Request)
+ Note over SMF: 1b. PDU Session Release Trigger
+ Note over SMF, UPF: 2. Session Release
+ SMF-->>NACF: 3a. PDUSession_UpdateSMContext Response
+ Note over SMF, NACF: 3b. Communication_Message Transfer
+ NACF-->>AN: 4. AN-CN Resource Release Request
+ Note over UE, AN: 5. AN-specific Resource Modification (Including PDU Session Release Command)
+ AN-->>NACF: 6. AN-CN Resource Release Ack
+ Note over SMF, NACF: 7. PDUSession_UpdateSMContext (SM information)
+ Note over UE, AN: 8. PDU Session Release Ack
+ AN-->>NACF: 9. Uplink UE-CN Transport
+ Note over SMF, NACF: 10. PDUSession_UpdateSMContext (SM information)
+ Note over SMF, NACF: 11. PDUSession_StatusNotifySMContext (Release)
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the PDU session release procedure between UE, AN, NACF, SMF, and UPF. The diagram shows the flow of messages and triggers for session release, including resource modification and transport.
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F8-3
+
+**Figure 8-3 – PDU session release procedure**
+
+1. The procedure is triggered by one of the following events:
+
+1a. The UE initiates the UE requested PDU Session Release procedure by the transmission of UE-CN signalling (PDU Session Release Request, PDU Session ID). The UE-CN signalling is forwarded by the AN to the NACF with an indication of user location information. The NACF sends the PDU Session Release Request message to the SMF together with user location information received from the AN.
+
+1b. The SMF may decide to release a PDU session under the following scenarios:
+
+- based on a request from the AN;
+- if there is no traffic through an IP flow within a given period, the UPF notifies it to the SMF.
+
+If the SMF receives one of the triggers in step 1a or 1b, the SMF starts PDU Session Release procedure.
+
+2. The SMF sends a Session Release Request message (Session ID) to the UPF(s) of the PDU session. The UPF(s) shall drop any remaining packets of the PDU session and release all tunnel resource and contexts associated with the session. The UPF(s) acknowledges the session release request message by the transmission of a Session Release Response message (Session ID) to the SMF.
+
+3a. If the PDU Session Release is initiated by the UE, the SMF creates a SM message including PDU Session Release Command message (PDU Session ID, Cause) and responds to the NACF with the PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext Response message (SM Resource Release Request, SM information (PDU Session Release Command)).
+
+- 3b. If the PDU session release is initiated by the SMF, the SMF invokes the Communication\_MessageTransfer service operation (SM container (PDU Session Release Command), skip indicator). If the UP connection of the PDU session is active, the SMF shall also include the resource release request (PDU Session ID) in the Communication\_MessageTransfer, to release the AN resources associated with the PDU session.
+4. The NACF transfers the SM information (SM Resource Release Request, SM information) received from the SMF to the AN.
+5. When the AN has received a SM request to release the AN resources associated with the PDU session, it issues AN specific signalling exchange(s) with the UE to release the corresponding AN resources.
+6. After the AN had received a SM request to release the AN resources, the AN acknowledges the SM Resource Release Request message by sending a SM Resource Release Ack message (user location information) to the NACF.
+7. The NACF invokes the PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext message (SM Resource Release Ack, User Location Information) to the SMF. The SMF responds to the NACF with a PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext Response message.
+8. When all corresponding resources deleted, the UE acknowledges the PDU Session Release Command by sending UE-CN signalling (PDU Session ID, SM information (PDU Session Release Ack)) over the AN.
+9. The AN forwards the UE-CN signalling from the UE by sending Uplink UE-CN Transport (UE-CN signalling (PDU Session ID, SM information (PDU Session Release Ack)), User Location Information) to the NACF.
+10. The NACF invokes the PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext message (SM information (PDU Session Release Ack), User Location Information) to the SMF. The SMF responds to the NACF with a PDUSession\_UpdateSMContext Response message.
+11. The SMF sends PDUSession\_StatusNotify message to notify the NACF that the SM context for this PDU session is released. The NACF releases the association between the SMF ID and the PDU Session ID.
+
+## **8.2 Traffic routing management**
+
+The traffic routing management describes how the ATSSS is executed based on the link quality detection and feedback. Traffic routing management function includes two procedures, downlink traffic routing management and uplink traffic routing management. In the procedures, it is assumed that UE has already established PDU sessions over mobile or fixed access network. The detailed information flow can be illustrated in the following procedures, representing the downlink and uplink procedure. For ANs which do not natively support a common signalling interface, an IWF needs to be provided at the AN-CN interface so that NFs deployed in the CN can still use a common signalling interface.
+
+### 8.2.1 Downlink traffic routing management
+
+The procedure is applied for ATSSS execution, in which the UPF implements the steering, switching, splitting operations based on the ATSSS rule and the status of the network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN
+ participant IWF
+ participant NACF
+ participant SMF
+ participant UPF
+
+ Note over UE, AN, IWF, NACF, SMF, UPF: PDU session establishment procedure via mobile or fixed access
+UE and SMF is configured ATSSS rule
+
+ SMF->>UPF: 0. ATSSS rule config.
+ Note over UPF: Downlink data
+ UPF->>UE: 1. User plane: Downlink data via fixed or mobile
+ Note over UE: 2. UE-CN: Path performance measurement report
+ UE->>SMF:
+ SMF->>UPF: Update the ATSSS rule
+ UPF->>SMF: 3. ATSSS rule update
+ Note over UPF: Adjust downlink data path
+ UPF->>UE: 4. User plane: Downlink data via fixed or mobile
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Downlink traffic routing management procedure. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, AN, IWF, NACF, SMF, and UPF. The procedure starts with PDU session establishment and ATSSS rule configuration. The SMF decides to perform ATSSS operation. Step 0: SMF configures the ATSSS rule to the UPF. Downlink data arrives at the UPF. Step 1: UPF executes the ATSSS rule and sends downlink data to the UE. Step 2: UE sends a path performance measurement report to the SMF. Step 3: SMF updates the ATSSS rule and sends the update to the UPF. Step 4: UPF adjusts the downlink data path and sends downlink data to the UE.
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F8-4
+
+**Figure 8-4 – Downlink traffic routing management procedure**
+
+The UE establishes the PDU sessions over mobile or fixed access network, and the ATSSS rule is configured at the UE and the SMF. The SMF decides to perform ATSSS operation.
+
+0. The SMF configures the ATSSS rule and operation command to the UPF. The UPF sends the ATSSS rule configuration ACK message to the SMF.
+
+1. When downlink data arrives, the UPF executes the ATSSS rule and determines the appropriate access path based on the ATSSS rule, to steer or split the downlink data. The UPF sends the downlink data to the UE via the selected access path.
+
+2. The UE performs path performance measurement for each access path, e.g., the data loss rate, latency, the radio signal quality and reports the results to the SMF via UE-CN signalling based on the configured reporting condition. The SMF updates the ATSSS rule considering the UE feedback (the information of UE-CN signalling).
+
+3. The SMF sends the updated ATSSS rule to the UPF; the UPF sends the ATSSS rule update ACK message to the SMF. The UPF implements the updated ATSSS rule and may adjust the access path for the service, e.g., switching the path from one access to another one or start/stop splitting operation for the uplink data based on the updated ATSSS rule.
+
+4. The UPF sends the downlink data to the UE via the adjusted access path.
+
+### 8.2.2 Uplink traffic routing management
+
+The procedure is applied for ATSSS operation uplink transmission, in which the UE implements the ATSSS operation based on the ATSSS rule and the status of the network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN
+ participant IWF
+ participant NACF
+ participant SMF
+ participant UPF
+
+ Note over UE, AN, IWF, NACF, SMF, UPF: PDU session establishment procedure via mobile or fixed access
+UE and SMF is configured ATSSS rule
+
+ Note over SMF: Decide to perform ATSSS operation
+
+ SMF->>UE: 0. ATSSS rule configuration
+ Note over UE: Implement ATSSS rule
+
+ UE->>UPF: 1. User plane: Uplink data via fixed or mobile
+
+ Note over UPF: Perform path performance measurement
+
+ UPF->>SMF: 2. Report path performance result
+ SMF->>UPF: 3. Path performance feedback
+ UPF->>SMF: 4. Path performance feedback ACK
+
+ SMF->>UE: 5. Updated ATSSS rule configuration
+ Note over UE: Adjust uplink data path
+
+ UE->>UPF: 6. User plane: Uplink data via fixed or mobile
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of messages between the UE, AN, IWF, NACF, SMF, and UPF. The process starts with a PDU session establishment procedure where the UE and SMF are configured with an ATSSS rule. The SMF then decides to perform ATSSS operation. It sends a message (0. ATSSS rule configuration) to the UE, which implements the rule. The UE then sends uplink data (1. User plane: Uplink data via fixed or mobile) to the UPF. The UPF performs path performance measurement and reports the results (2. Report path performance result) to the SMF. The SMF sends path performance feedback (3. Path performance feedback) to the UPF, which responds with a feedback ACK (4. Path performance feedback ACK). The SMF then sends an updated ATSSS rule configuration (5. Updated ATSSS rule configuration) to the UE, which adjusts the uplink data path. Finally, the UE sends uplink data (6. User plane: Uplink data via fixed or mobile) to the UPF via the adjusted path.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Uplink traffic routing management procedure between UE, AN, IWF, NACF, SMF, and UPF.
+
+Y.3136(20)\_F8-5
+
+**Figure 8-5 – Uplink traffic routing management procedure**
+
+The UE establishes the PDU sessions over mobile or fixed access network, and the ATSSS policy is configured at the UE and the SMF. The SMF decides to perform ATSSS operation.
+
+0. The SMF configures the ATSSS rule and operation command to the UE.
+1. The traffic flow control protocol in the UE implements ATSSS rule, and when uplink data arrives, the UE entity determines the appropriate access path based on the ATSSS rule. The UE sends the uplink data to the UPF via the selected access path.
+2. The UPF performs path performance measurement, e.g., the data loss rate, latency and reports the results to the SMF based on the configured report condition.
+3. The SMF sends the path performance feedback message to request the UPF feedback.
+4. The UPF sends the path performance feedback ACK message to the SMF.
+5. The SMF updates the ATSSS rule based on the UPF feedback and provides the updated ATSSS rule to the UE. The UE implements the updated ATSSS rule and may adjust the access path for the service, e.g., switching the path from one access to another one or start/stop splitting operation for the uplink data based on the updated ATSSS rule.
+6. The UE sends the uplink data to the UPF via the adjusted access path.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+The FMC in IMT-2020 network is required to be aligned with the security requirements contained in [ITU-T Q.1762] and the requirements of security and personal data protection contained in [ITU-T Y.3101], with the following additional ones:
+
+- The FMC in IMT-2020 network is required to provide mechanisms to support data confidentiality and integrity for fixed and mobile access networks.
+- The FMC in IMT-2020 network is required to provide secure storage, handling, and enforcement of policies.
+- The FMC in IMT-2020 network is required to provide a security coordination function [ITU-T Y.3130] for coordinating security policies of all the individual access networks involved.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5369b8911e5e3645f9b3216e340e132bda3d2f9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3142-202404-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3142 (04/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Requirements and framework for AI/ML-based network design optimization in future networks including IMT-2020**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3142
+
+# Requirements and framework for AI/ML-based network design optimization in future networks including IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Due to the development of IMT-2020 networks, a large number of new applications and services have emerged, leading to explosive growth in network traffic and much more complicated networks, which results in increased difficulty in attaining network design optimization. Many services are changing rapidly, and network operators need to dynamically design and adjust their networks based on the traffic distribution and the traffic increment trends in order to guarantee the necessary quality of service (QoS). Artificial intelligence (AI) can be used for prediction and decision-making, which can make network design more intelligent and automated.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3142 focuses on the use of artificial intelligence (AI)/machine learning (ML) technologies to improve network design mechanisms. This Recommendation describes how AI/ML can be integrated in order to optimize the design of network capacity, network topology, and routing to satisfy all of the demands of service level agreements (SLAs) in a cost-effective way, instead of only guaranteeing the SLAs without taking into account the overall cost.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3142 | 2024-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15869 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+AI, future networks, IMT-2020, ML, network design, optimization.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
+- [b-Explainable AI] Ericsson White Paper, April 2021, *Explainable AI – how humans can trust AI*,
+
+- [b-Ian] Ian Goodfellow, Yoshua Bengio, Aaron Courville (2016), *Deep Learning*, MIT Press.
+- [b-IPFIX] IETF RFC 7011 (2013) *Specification of the IP flow information export (IPFIX) protocol for the exchange of flow information*.
+- [b-JSON] IETF RFC 8259 (2017), *The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format (JSON)*.
+- [b-LSTM] Y. Hua, et al., *Deep Learning with Long Short-Term Memory for Time Series Prediction*. IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 114-119, 2019.
+- [b-SNMP] IETF RFC 1098 (1989). *Simple network management protocol (SNMP)*.
+- [b-XML] W3C Recommendation (2008), *Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition)*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e6c26bd2878665ceb644eafea0f49c1bb27a3105
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@@ -0,0 +1,692 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3146 (04/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Functional architecture for quality of service assurance of deterministic communication services in local area networks for IMT-2020 and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+### Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3146
+
+# Functional architecture for quality of service assurance of deterministic communication services in local area networks for IMT-2020 and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3121 specifies requirements and framework including three QoS metrics groups and seven functional entities for inter-technology domain deterministic communication services in LAN. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3146 further specifies the functional architecture, functional entities, reference points, and operational procedures based on the requirements and framework defined in the Recommendation ITU-T Y.3121.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3146 | 2025-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16317 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Deterministic communication services, functional architecture, IMT-2020, QoS assurance.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL (Referenced 13.03.2025.)
+- [b-Service requirements] 3GPP TS 22.104, *Service requirements for cyber-physical control applications in vertical domains Stage 1 (Release 18)*, V18.3.0 (2021-12).
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3153
+
+(12/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Network slice orchestration and management for providing network services to 3rd party in the IMT-2020 network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3153
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3153
+
+# Network slice orchestration and management for providing network services to 3rd party in the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+The IMT-2020 network comprises an embedded capability exposure functionality that enables a third party (3rd party) to directly use a customised network slice under certain restrictions in order to efficiently provide optimized solutions for different market scenarios which have their own diverse requirements. Automated processes for orchestration and management are also important from the perspective of efficiency.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3153 describes the requirements, architecture, key functionalities and typical procedures of network slice orchestration and management for providing network services to a 3rd party in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3153 | 2019-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14132 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Network slicing, management and orchestration, third party.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3155-202009-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3155-202009-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..377413d3d01909f3d3decd8b6ffcab6eb3b6866d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3155-202009-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,649 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3155
+
+(09/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Enhanced software-defined networking data plane for IMT-2020**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3155
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3155
+
+# Enhanced software-defined networking data plane for IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3155 provides the requirements and high-level architecture of enhanced SDN data plane (ESDP) for IMT-2020 which aims to provide improved support for relevant requirements of the network. Based on the high-level architecture, it specifies functional blocks, reference points, and the workflow of ESDP.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3155 | 2020-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14400 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Autonomous functions, enhanced SDN data plane, IMT-2020, network programmability.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at ;' and 'Goto MAT n;'. A solid arrow labeled 'Read/write' connects MAT 0 to SIMA. SIMA is a vertical stack of blocks: Block_1, Block_2, ..., Block_n, ..., with an ellipsis at the bottom. A solid arrow connects MAT n to SIMA. The label 'Y.3155(20)_F8-2' is at the bottom right.](08441fa90c5fd11994626f662ac13f19_img.jpg)
+
+| MAT 0 | |
+|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| Matching condition | Action |
+| {Condition 1} &&;
+- [b-3GPP TR 22.891] 3GPP TR 22.891 V14.2.0 (2016), *Feasibility Study on New Services and Markets Technology Enablers; Stage 1 (Release 14)*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.501] 3GPP TR 23.501 V15.4.0 (2018), *System Architecture for the 5G System; Stage 2 (Release 15)*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.502] 3GPP TR 23.502 V15.2.0 (2018), *Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2 (Release 15)*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.724] 3GPP TR 23.724 V16.1.0 (2019), *Study on Cellular Internet of Things (CIoT) support and evolution for the 5G System (5GS) (Release 16)*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,510 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation **ITU-T Y.3163 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Network accelerating for edge computing in
+IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3163
+
+# Network accelerating for edge computing in IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3163 clarifies the requirements, architecture, reference points and information flows for network accelerating for edge computing in IMT-2020 networks and beyond.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3163 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16104 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Edge computing, IMT-2020 networks and beyond, network accelerating.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3175-202004-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3175-202004-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..067110f9b01f0806b05e0e987b050d93ca3daa3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3175-202004-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,563 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3175
+
+(04/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE,
+INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION
+NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART
+CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Functional architecture of machine learning- based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175
+
+# Functional architecture of machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175 specifies a functional architecture of quality of service (QoS) assurance based on machine learning (ML) for the international mobile telecommunications-2020 (IMT-2020) network.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175 first provides an overview of the architectural framework for ML in IMT-2020 (Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172). It then describes the functional architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network including the reference points. It finally specifies the procedures of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3175 | 2020-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14255 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Functional architecture, IMT-2020 network, machine learning, procedure, QoS assurance.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 Overview ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Functional architecture ..... | 6 |
+| 7.1 QoS assurance ML pipeline..... | 6 |
+| 7.2 QoS assurance ML sandbox ..... | 7 |
+| 7.3 QoS assurance ML management subsystem ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Reference points ..... | 8 |
+| 9 Procedures ..... | 9 |
+| 9.1 Procedures of QoS assurance ML pipeline ..... | 9 |
+| 9.2 Procedures of QoS assurance ML sandbox ..... | 10 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 11 |
+| Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3175
+
+# Functional architecture of machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies a functional architecture of quality of service (QoS) assurance based on machine learning (ML) for the international mobile telecommunications-2020 (IMT-2020) network. This Recommendation includes:
+
+- an overview of the architectural framework for ML in the IMT-2020 network [ITU-T Y.3172];
+- the functional architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network;
+- reference points of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network;
+- procedures of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network.
+
+This Recommendation uses ML only in the context of QoS assurance decision making. Therefore any other use of ML lies outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T E.860] | Recommendation ITU-T E.860 (2002), Framework of a service level agreement . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3110] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3110 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration requirements . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3111] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3111 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration framework . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3170] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3170 (2018), Requirements for machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3172] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020 . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 anomaly** [b-ITU-T X.1211]: A pattern in the data that does not conform to the expected behaviour.
+
+**3.1.2 assurance** [b-ITU-T X.1500]: The degree of confidence that the process or deliverable meets defined characteristics or objectives.
+
+**3.1.3 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: (Based on [b-ITU-R M.2083-0]) Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.4 machine learning (ML)** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed.
+
+NOTE 1 – This definition is adapted from [b-ETSI GR ENI 004].
+
+NOTE 2 – Supervised machine learning and unsupervised machine learning are two examples of machine learning types.
+
+**3.1.5 machine learning pipeline** [ITU-T Y.3172]: A set of logical nodes, each with specific functionalities, that can be combined to form a machine learning application in a telecommunication network.
+
+NOTE – The nodes of a machine learning pipeline are entities that are managed in a standard manner and can be hosted in a variety of network functions (clause 3.1.7).
+
+**3.1.6 machine learning sandbox** [ITU-T Y.3172]: An environment in which machine learning models can be trained, tested and their effects on the network evaluated.
+
+NOTE – A machine learning sandbox is designed to prevent a machine learning application from affecting the network, or to restrict the usage of certain machine learning functionalities.
+
+**3.1.7 network function** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, a processing function in a network.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network functions include but are not limited to network node functionalities, e.g., session management, mobility management and transport functions, whose functional behaviour and interfaces are defined.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network functions can be implemented on a dedicated hardware or as virtualized software functions.
+
+NOTE 3 – Network functions are not regarded as resources, but rather any network functions can be instantiated using the resources.
+
+**3.1.8 network performance** [b-ITU-T E.417]: The performance of a portion of a telecommunications network that is measured between a pair of network-user or network-network interfaces using objectively defined and observed performance parameters.
+
+**3.1.9 quality of experience (QoE)** [b-ITU-T P.10]: The degree of delight or annoyance of the user of an application or service.
+
+NOTE – Recognizing on-going research on this topic, this is a working definition which is expected to evolve for some time. (This note is not part of the definition.)
+
+**3.1.10 quality of service** [b-ITU-T Q.1743]: The collective effect of service performances, which determine the degree of satisfaction of a user of a service. It is characterized by the combined aspects of performance factors applicable to all services, such as:
+
+- service operability performance;
+- service accessibility performance;
+- service retainability performance;
+- service integrity performance; and
+- other factors specific to each service.
+
+**3.1.11 service level agreement (SLA)** [ITU-T E.860]: A formal agreement between two or more entities reached after a negotiating activity with the scope to assess service characteristics, responsibilities and priorities of every part.
+
+A SLA may include statements about performance, tariffing and billing, service delivery and compensations.
+
+Every performance reporting may include only the QoS parameters agreed in the correspondent SLA.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AF | Application Function |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| ASF | Authentication Server Function |
+| C | Collector |
+| CEF | Capability Exposure Function |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| D | Distribution |
+| DP | Detection and Prediction |
+| E | Evaluation |
+| eMBB | enhanced Mobile Broadband |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 |
+| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
+| M | Modelling |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| MLFO | Machine Learning Function Orchestrator |
+| MLMS | Machine Learning Management Subsystem |
+| MTC | Machine Type Communication |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NF | Network Function |
+| NFR | Network Function Registry |
+| NSSF | Network Slice Selection Function |
+| P | Policy |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| PP | Pre-processing |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RP-an | Reference Point between AN and NACF |
+| RP-au | Reference Point between AN and UPF |
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------|
+| RP-tn | Reference Point between UE and NACF |
+| RP-ud | Reference Point between UPF and data network |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| SRC | Source |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| URLLC | Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communications |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+The challenge of IMT-2020 (clause 3.1.3) is to assure network performance (clause 3.1.8) and various QoS (clause 3.1.10) or QoE (clause 3.1.9) requirements for different application scenarios, e.g., machine type communication (MTC), enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) and ultra-reliable low latency communications (URLLC). The key performance indicators (KPIs) include high data rates, high user density, high user mobility and highly variable data rates.
+
+ML mechanisms, with the capabilities of teaching a computer to learn knowledge using data without being explicitly programmed, have demonstrated their capabilities to solve complex tasks, e.g., image recognition and speech recognition. ML mechanisms can also be applied to the networking QoS field. They can learn from past QoS data contrasted with target KPIs and reconstruct relationships between past QoS-related data and QoS anomalies automatically and accurately. Using the learned relationships, ML mechanisms can detect and predict QoS anomalies. They can then trigger automatic mitigation or suggested actions for IMT-2020 to ensure QoS assurance (clause 3.1.2).
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.3170], the high-level requirements for ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network include those for: QoS-related data collection; data pre-processing; history QoS data storage; ML-based modelling and training; QoS anomaly (clause 3.1.1) detection and prediction; and QoS policy decision making, enforcement and reporting.
+
+A high-level architectural framework for ML in future networks including IMT-2020 is specified in [ITU-T Y.3172] and illustrated in Figure 1. A set of architectural components and network functions (NFs; clause 3.1.7) is presented. These components include, but are not limited to, an ML pipeline, as well as ML management and orchestration functionalities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the high-level architecture of the ML system, organized into four main components and their interactions:
+
+- Management subsystem:** Contains 'Other management and orchestration functions' and the 'MLFO' (Machine Learning Function Orchestrator). It receives 'ML intent' as input. It interacts with the ML sandbox subsystem (via arrow 6) and the ML pipeline subsystem (via arrow 5).
+- ML sandbox subsystem:** Contains a sequence of nodes: SRC, C, PP, M, P, D, and SINK. These nodes are connected to 'Simulated ML underlay networks'. It interacts with the ML pipeline subsystem (via arrow 3) and the ML underlay networks (via arrow 4).
+- ML pipeline subsystem:** Consists of multiple levels (Level - N, ..., Level - 2, Level - 1). Each level contains nodes: SRC, C, PP, M, P, D, and SINK. It interacts with the ML underlay networks (via arrow 4) and the ML sandbox subsystem (via arrow 3).
+- ML underlay networks:** Consists of 'Underlay network 1' and 'Underlay network 2', each containing nodes NF 1 to NF n. It interacts with the ML pipeline subsystem (via arrow 4) and the ML sandbox subsystem (via arrow 4).
+
+Numbered arrows indicate specific interactions: 1 (loop in ML sandbox), 2 (loop in ML sandbox), 3 (between ML sandbox and ML pipeline), 4 (between ML pipeline and ML underlay networks), 5 (between Management and ML pipeline), and 6 (between Management and ML sandbox).
+
+Figure 1 – High-level architecture diagram showing the interaction between the Management subsystem, ML sandbox subsystem, ML pipeline subsystem, and ML underlay networks.
+
+Y.3175(20)\_F01
+
+**Figure 1 – High-level architecture**
+
+The three subsystems of the high-level architecture shown in Figure 1 are described in a) to c) as follows.
+
+### **a) ML pipeline subsystem**
+
+The ML pipeline [ITU-T Y.3172] is a logical pipeline that can be overlaid on existing network infrastructures. The services of the machine learning function orchestrator (MLFO) are used for instantiation and set-up. Integration aspects of such ML pipeline overlay on technology-specific underlay networks may require the extension or definition of specific protocols and application programming interfaces (APIs).
+
+### **b) ML sandbox subsystem**
+
+An ML sandbox [ITU-T Y.3172] subsystem allows ML pipelines to adapt to dynamic network environments, such as those of future networks including IMT-2020, where a variety of conditions may change. The ML sandbox subsystem includes ML pipeline(s) and simulated ML underlay networks, and is managed by the MLFO according to the specifications in the ML intent. The ML sandbox subsystem allows network operators to study the effect of ML outputs before deploying them on live ML underlay networks.
+
+### **c) Management subsystem**
+
+This subsystem includes the MLFO and other management and orchestration functions, e.g., those specified in [ITU-T Y.3110] and [ITU-T Y.3111]. The management subsystem enables the extension of the management and orchestration mechanisms used for future networks including IMT-2020 to ML pipeline nodes. This brings uniformity to the management of ML functionalities and NFs. The MLFO works in coordination with the other functions of the management subsystem to manage ML pipeline nodes.
+
+Clause 7 specifies the functional architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network, which applies the high-level architecture specified in [ITU-T Y.3172] to fulfil the requirements for ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network.
+
+# 7 Functional architecture
+
+The functional architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network is illustrated in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- Green square: QoS assurance service for egress
+- Red square: QoS assurance service for ingress
+- SRC: QoS source of data
+- C: QoS data collector
+- PP: QoS data pre-processor
+- DP: QoS anomaly detection and prediction
+- SINK: QoS assurance target of ML output
+- P: QoS policy
+- D: QoS policy distributor
+- M: QoS assurance ML modeling
+- E: QoS assurance model evaluating
+
+Abbreviations:
+
+- CEF: capability exposure function
+- USM: unified subscription management
+- SMF: session management function
+- UPF: user plane function
+- RP-au: reference point between AN and UPF
+- NFR: network function registry
+- NACF: network access control function
+- ASF: authentication server function
+- RP-tn: reference point between UE and NACF
+- RP-an: reference point between AN and NACF
+- PCF: policy control function
+- NSSF: network slice selection function
+- AF: application function
+- RP-ud: reference point between UPF and data network
+
+Y.3175(20)\_F02
+
+Figure 2: Architecture of ML-based QoS assurance. The diagram shows a functional architecture across four main domains: User equipment (UE), Access network (AN), Core network (CN), and Management subsystem (MS). The Core network (CN) is divided into a Control plane and a User plane. The QoS assurance ML pipeline is a central component spanning the UE, AN, and CN. It includes various functional blocks like QoS assurance SRC, SINK, PP, DP, P, C, D, M, and E. The QoS assurance ML sandbox is located in the CN, containing QoS assurance M and E. The Management subsystem (MS) includes QoS assurance ML MS and QoS assurance MLFO. The Data network (DN) is connected to the User plane. Reference points (RP) are indicated between various components. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols and abbreviations used.
+
+**Figure 2 – Architecture of ML-based QoS assurance**
+
+The functional architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network includes three subsystems: QoS assurance ML pipeline; QoS assurance ML sandbox; and QoS assurance machine learning management subsystem (MLMS).
+
+### 7.1 QoS assurance ML pipeline
+
+The QoS assurance ML pipeline is a set of logical nodes, each with specific functionalities that can be combined to form an ML application for QoS assurance in IMT-2020.
+
+#### • QoS assurance source (SRC)
+
+QoS assurance SRC is the source of QoS data that can be used as input to the QoS assurance ML pipeline. There are several types of QoS assurance SRCs:
+
+- QoS assurance SRC for user equipment (UE) is responsible for reporting the UE QoS data (static, dynamic and KPI data) to the QoS assurance collector (C);
+- QoS assurance SRCs for access network (AN) (control plane or data plane) are responsible for reporting the AN QoS data (static, dynamic and KPI data) to the QoS assurance C;
+- QoS assurance SRCs for core network (CN) (control plane and data plane) are responsible for reporting the CN QoS data (static, dynamic and KPI data) to the QoS assurance C.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance collector (C)**
+
+QoS assurance C is responsible for collecting QoS data from one or more QoS assurance SRCs. A C may have the capability to configure SRC nodes. Such configurations may be used to control the nature of data, its granularity and periodicity while it is generated from the QoS assurance SRCs.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance pre-processing (PP)**
+
+QoS assurance PP is responsible for cleaning, aggregating, normalizing or performing any other PP of multi-source, heterogeneous data that should be in a suitable form so that the ML detection and prediction (DP) can consume it.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance detection and prediction (DP)**
+
+QoS assurance DP is responsible for detecting and predicting QoS-related anomalies based on ML models. QoS assurance DP is responsible for QoS anomaly root cause tracking.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance policy (P)**
+
+QoS assurance P is responsible for making QoS P decisions based on the results of the QoS anomaly DP.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance distribution (D)**
+
+QoS assurance D is responsible for identifying the SINK(s) and distributing the QoS assurance P decisions to the corresponding SINK nodes.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance target (SINK)**
+
+QoS assurance SINK is the target of the QoS assurance output on which it takes action.
+
+## **7.2 QoS assurance ML sandbox**
+
+A QoS assurance ML sandbox is an isolated domain that allows the hosting of separate ML pipelines to model, train and evaluate them before deploying them in an IMT-2020 network. The QoS assurance ML sandbox subsystem allows network operators to study the effect of ML outputs before deploying them on live IMT-2020 networks. For training or testing, the QoS ML sandbox can use data generated from a simulated ML underlay IMT-2020 network.
+
+This subsystem mainly includes QoS assurance modelling (M) and QoS assurance evaluation (E).
+
+#### - **QoS assurance modelling (M)**
+
+QoS assurance M is a logical node with functionalities to construct and train an ML model. The ML models include those for: supervised learning: un-supervised learning: semi-supervised learning: deep learning; and reinforcement learning, either alone or in combination.
+
+#### - **QoS assurance evaluation (E)**
+
+QoS assurance E is a logical node with functionalities that can evaluate the trained model based on the available IMT-2020 QoS testing data.
+
+## **7.3 QoS assurance ML management subsystem**
+
+This MLMS includes QoS intent, MLFO and other management and orchestration functions.
+
+#### - **QoS intent**
+
+The QoS requirements and service level agreement (SLA) [ITU-T E.860] are transformed into QoS intents. QoS intent is a declarative description that is used to specify an ML application. QoS intent does not specify any technology-specific NFs to be used in the ML application and provides a basis for mapping ML applications to IMT-2020 NFs.
+
+#### - **QoS MLFO**
+
+The MLFO is a logical node with functionalities that manage and orchestrate the nodes of the QoS ML pipelines and QoS ML sandbox based on ML intent or dynamic network conditions. The MLFO provides chaining functionality, i.e., connecting ML nodes together to form an ML pipeline. The MLFO selects the ML model based on the ML intents, corresponding network capabilities and constraints of the ML application.
+
+# **8 Reference points**
+
+The reference points for ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network are summarized as follows.
+
+- Reference point 1: reference point between QoS intent and the QoS assurance MLFO. It is responsible for transforming and exchanging QoS intent to QoS assurance MLFO.
+- Reference point 2: reference points between QoS assurance SRC (UE) and QoS assurance C. It is responsible for UE QoS data collection.
+- Reference point 3: reference points between QoS assurance SRC (user plane of AN) and QoS assurance C. It is responsible for AN user plane QoS data collection.
+- Reference point 4: reference points between QoS assurance SRC (control plane of AN) and QoS assurance C. It is responsible for AN control plane QoS data collection.
+- Reference point 5: reference points between QoS assurance SRC (user plane of CN) and QoS assurance C. It is responsible for CN user plane QoS data collection.
+- Reference point 6: reference points between QoS assurance SRC (control plane of CN) and QoS assurance C. It is responsible for CN control plane QoS data collection.
+- Reference point 7: reference point between QoS assurance C and the QoS PP. It is responsible for QoS data exchanging between data collector and data pre-processing.
+- Reference point 8: reference point between QoS assurance PP and QoS assurance DP. It is responsible for QoS data exchanges between data pre-processing and QoS anomaly detection/prediction.
+- Reference point 9: reference point between QoS assurance DP and the QoS assurance P. It is responsible for exchanges of the QoS anomaly detection/prediction results between anomaly detector/predictor and QoS policy making node.
+- Reference point 10: reference point between QoS assurance P and the QoS assurance D. It is responsible for exchanges of the QoS policy decision results between QoS assurance policy making node and QoS policy distribution node.
+- Reference point 11: reference point between QoS assurance D and the QoS assurance SINKs. It is responsible for QoS assurance policy distribution between QoS D and QoS SINKs.
+- Reference point 12: reference point between QoS assurance P and the QoS assurance MLFO. It is responsible for reporting QoS decision policy decision results to MLFO in the management subsystem.
+- Reference point 13: reference point between the QoS assurance sandbox and QoS assurance MLFO. It is responsible for exchanges of training or evaluation results between the QoS assurance sandbox and QoS assurance MLFO.
+
+- Reference point 14: reference point between the QoS assurance sandbox and underlay IMT-2020 network. It is responsible for exchanges of training or evaluation data between the QoS assurance sandbox and underlay IMT-2020 network.
+
+# 9 Procedures
+
+## 9.1 Procedures of a QoS assurance ML pipeline
+
+A QoS assurance ML pipeline is a set of logical nodes that can be combined to form an ML application for QoS assurance in IMT-2020. Based on ML correlation between QoS data and QoS KPIs, QoS assurance DP can detect and predict an IMT-2020 service QoS anomaly and triggers automatic mitigation or suggested enforcement for IMT-2020 to ensure QoS assurance.
+
+The pipeline in Figure 3 shows QoS ML pipeline node positions wherever the nodes are hosted and the general procedures of ML-based QoS assurance for the IMT-2020 network.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Procedures of a QoS assurance ML pipeline. The diagram illustrates the flow of data and control within a QoS assurance ML pipeline. On the left, 'QoS intent' (represented by a stack of blue boxes) is input to 'QoS assurance MLFO' (a blue box with a green top bar). An arrow labeled '2' points from MLFO to the start of the pipeline. The pipeline itself is a sequence of nodes: 'QoS assurance SRC' (blue), 'QoS assurance C' (orange), 'QoS assurance PP' (orange), 'QoS assurance DP' (orange), 'QoS assurance P' (orange), 'QoS assurance D' (orange), and 'QoS assurance SINK' (green). Arrows labeled 4 through 9 connect these nodes in sequence. A red arrow labeled '3' points from the SRC node to the 'IMT-2020 network' (a blue box at the bottom). A blue arrow labeled '10' points from the SINK node to the IMT-2020 network. The entire pipeline is enclosed in a light purple box labeled 'QoS assurance ML pipeline'.
+
+Y.3175(20)\_F03
+
+**Figure 3 – Procedures of a QoS assurance ML pipeline**
+
+- 1) The IMT-2020 service requirements are translated to the QoS intent. The QoS intent is input to the QoS MLFO.
+- 2) The QoS MLFO manages and orchestrates the nodes of QoS assurance ML pipelines based on the QoS intent or dynamic network conditions. The MLFO selects ML models based on the network capabilities and constraints of the QoS ML pipeline. The QoS assurance ML pipeline functionalities are placed and chained as depicted in Figure 3.
+- 3) The QoS assurance SRCs collect multi-source, heterogeneous QoS data from IMT-2020 UEs, AN and CN.
+- 4) The QoS assurance SRCs report the collected QoS data to the QoS assurance C.
+- 5) The QoS assurance C transfers the collected multi-source, heterogeneous QoS data to the QoS assurance PP.
+- 6) QoS assurance PP cleans the collected QoS data by removing noisy data and transforms the cleaned data into a unified data format. The pre-processed QoS data is transferred to QoS assurance DP.
+- 7) QoS anomaly detection and prediction are performed by the ML models in the QoS assurance DP. The anomaly detection and prediction results are transferred to the QoS assurance P.
+- 8) Given the detection and prediction results, a QoS policy decision can be made by the QoS P. The policy decision results are transferred to the QoS assurance D.
+- 9) The QoS assurance D distributes the QoS assurance policies to the QoS assurance SINKs.
+- 10) The QoS assurance SINKs enforce the QoS policy in underlay IMT-2020 networks.
+
+## 9.2 Procedures of a QoS assurance ML sandbox
+
+A QoS assurance ML sandbox is an isolated domain that allows the hosting of separate ML pipelines for their modelling, training and evaluation before their deployment in an IMT-2020 network. The QoS assurance ML sandbox subsystem allows network operators to study the effect of ML outputs before deploying them on live IMT-2020 networks.
+
+The pipeline in Figure 4 shows QoS ML sandbox node positions wherever the nodes are hosted and the general procedures of a QoS assurance ML sandbox.
+
+
+
+Y.3175(20)\_F04
+
+Figure 4: Procedures of a QoS assurance ML sandbox. The diagram illustrates the flow of data and control within a QoS assurance ML sandbox. It starts with 'QoS intent' (1) entering a 'QoS assurance MLFO' (2). The MLFO manages a pipeline of nodes: 'QoS assurance SRC' (4), 'QoS assurance C' (5), 'QoS assurance PP' (6), 'QoS assurance M' (7), 'QoS assurance E' (8), 'QoS assurance P' (9), 'QoS assurance D' (10), and 'QoS assurance SINK' (11). The 'Simulated IMT-2020 network' (12) provides input to the SRC and receives output from the SINK. A feedback loop (3) connects the SINK back to the SRC. The entire pipeline is contained within a 'QoS assurance ML sandbox' box.
+
+**Figure 4 – Procedures of a QoS assurance ML sandbox**
+
+- 1) The IMT-2020 service requirements are translated into the QoS intent. The QoS intent is input to the QoS MLFO.
+- 2) The QoS MLFO manages and orchestrates the nodes of a QoS assurance ML sandbox based on the QoS intent or dynamic network conditions. The MLFO selects ML models based on the network capabilities and constraints of the QoS ML pipeline. The QoS ML pipeline functionalities are placed and chained as in Figure 4.
+- 3) The QoS assurance SRCs collect multi-source, heterogeneous QoS data from the underlay simulated IMT-2020 UEs, AN and CN.
+- 4) The QoS assurance SRCs report QoS data to the QoS assurance C.
+- 5) The QoS assurance C transfers the collected multi-source, heterogeneous QoS data to the QoS assurance PP. The QoS assurance PP cleans the collected QoS data and divides the QoS data into two parts: training and evaluation.
+- 6) The QoS assurance M receives the training data and trains the models.
+- 7) The QoS assurance E receives the testing data and evaluates the models.
+- 8) The QoS assurance M updates the QoS assurance E based on the training result.
+- 9) The QoS policy decision can be made by the QoS P functional component based on the QoS evaluation result of the assurance E.
+- 10) The policy results are transferred to the QoS assurance D.
+- 11) The QoS assurance D distributes the QoS assurance policies to the QoS assurance SINKs.
+- 12) The QoS assurance SINKs enforce the QoS policy in the underlay simulated IMT-2020 network.
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation describes the architecture of ML-based QoS assurance for the: IMT-2020 network, therefore, general network security requirements and mechanisms should be applied [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and [b-ITU T Y.3101].
+
+Prevention of unauthorized access to and data leakage from a QoS ML pipeline and QoS ML sandbox is required whether or not they have a malicious intention, with implementation of mechanisms regarding authentication and authorization, external attack protection, etc.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.417] Recommendation ITU-T E.417 (2005), *Framework for the network management of IP-based networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T P.10] Recommendation ITU-T P.10/G.100 (2017), *Vocabulary for performance, quality of service and quality of experience*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1743] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1743 (2016), *IMT-Advanced references to Release 11 of LTE-Advanced evolved packet core network*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1211] Recommendation ITU-T X.1211 (2014), *Techniques for preventing web-based attacks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500] Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 (2011), *Overview of cybersecurity information exchange*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.2083-0] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), *IMT vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+- [b-ETSI GR ENI 004] ETSI GR ENI 004 V1.1.1 (2018), *Experiential networked intelligence (ENI); Terminology for main concepts in ENI*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3179
+
+(04/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Architectural framework for machine learning model serving in future networks including IMT-2020**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3179
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS**
+
+**Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3179
+
+# Architectural framework for machine learning model serving in future networks including IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3179 provides an architectural framework for machine learning (ML) model serving in future networks including IMT-2020, i.e., preparing and deploying ML models in different deployment environments to enable the application of ML model inference to ML underlay networks. The framework includes high-level requirements, and a high-level architecture description covering the definition of architectural components and reference points.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3179 | 2021-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14614 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architecture, future networks, IMT-2020, inference, machine learning, model optimization, reference points, requirements, serving ML model.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 7 High-level requirements ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Inference optimization..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Model deployment..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Model inference..... | 6 |
+| 8 High-level architecture ..... | 7 |
+| 8.1 Architectural components for ML model serving..... | 7 |
+| 8.2 Deployment options..... | 9 |
+| 8.3 High level architecture ..... | 10 |
+| 8.4 Reference points ..... | 11 |
+| 8.5 Sequence diagrams of the serving of ML models ..... | 18 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 24 |
+| Bibliography..... | 25 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3179
+
+# Architectural framework for machine learning model serving in future networks including IMT-2020
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides an architectural framework for machine learning (ML) models serving in future networks including IMT-2020, i.e., preparing and deploying ML models in different deployment environments to enable the application of ML model inference to ML underlay networks.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Background and motivations;
+- High level requirements;
+- High-level architecture description including the definition of architectural components, reference points and sequence diagrams.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3172] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), *Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3174] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3174 (2020), *Framework for data handling to enable machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3176] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3176 (2020), *Machine learning marketplace integration in future networks including IMT-2020*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 machine learning model** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Model created by applying machine learning techniques to data to learn from.
+
+NOTE 1 – A machine learning model is used to generate predictions (e.g., regression, classification, clustering) on new (untrained) data.
+
+NOTE 2 – A machine learning model may be encapsulated in a deployable fashion in the form of a software (e.g., virtual machine, container) or hardware component (e.g., IoT device).
+
+NOTE 3 – Machine learning techniques include learning algorithms (e.g., learning the function that maps input data attributes to output data).
+
+**3.1.2 machine learning function orchestrator (MLFO)** [ITU-T Y.3176]: A logical node with functionalities that manage and orchestrate the nodes in a machine learning pipeline.
+
+**3.1.3 machine learning sandbox** [ITU-T Y.3172]: An environment in which machine learning models can be trained, tested and their effects on the network evaluated.
+
+**3.1.4 machine learning marketplace** [ITU-T Y.3176]: A component which provides capabilities facilitating the exchange and delivery of machine learning models among multiple parties.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of parties include suppliers and users of ML models. Capabilities provided to users of ML models include functionalities to find, learn about, deploy (or download) and use ML models. Capabilities provided to suppliers of ML models (e.g., data scientist) include functionalities to share (on-board, upload), describe (learn about) and market their ML models.
+
+NOTE 2 – A network operator may use a machine learning marketplace deployed internally and/or externally to the network operator's administrative domains. Internal and external marketplaces differ only in the deployment perspective. A marketplace which is internal to a network operator may act as an external marketplace to another network operator and vice versa.
+
+**3.1.5 machine learning pipeline** [ITU-T Y.3172]: A set of logical nodes, each with specific functionalities, that can be combined to form a machine learning application in a telecommunication network.
+
+NOTE – The nodes of a machine learning pipeline are entities that are managed in a standard manner and can be hosted in a variety of network functions [b-ITU-T Y.3100].
+
+**3.1.6 machine learning underlay network** [ITU-T Y.3172]: A telecommunication network and its related network functions which interfaces with corresponding machine learning overlays.
+
+NOTE – An IMT-2020 network is an example of a machine learning underlay network.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 model inference:** Process by which a deployed machine learning model generates a result.
+
+NOTE – Examples of generated result from machine learning model are prediction or classification.
+
+**3.2.2 inference optimization:** Optimization performed on a trained machine learning model for better performance during inference.
+
+NOTE – Examples of better performance are improved latency and computing efficiency.
+
+**3.2.3 inference engine:** Functionality that provides runtime environment for a machine learning model and exposes corresponding machine learning model inference capability.
+
+**3.2.4 ML model serving:** A process of preparing and deploying machine learning models in different deployment environments to enable the application of model inference to machine learning underlay networks.
+
+**3.2.5 serving ML model:** A machine learning model, obtained as a result of a machine learning model serving process, which is ready for performing inference in machine learning underlay networks.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------------|
+| AN | Access Network |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| AUC | Area Under Curve |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------|
+| FPGA | Field Programmable Gate Arrays |
+| GPU | Graphics Processing Unit |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| MEC | Mobile Edge Computing |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| MLDB | Machine Learning Database |
+| MLFO | Machine Learning Function Orchestrator |
+| MSE | Mean Squared Error |
+| NF | Network Function |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| src | source (ML pipeline) |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| VNF | Virtual Network Function |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation, requirements are classified as follows:
+
+- The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+- The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, such requirements need not be present to claim conformance.
+- The keywords "can optionally" and "**may**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the NOP/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+**ML pipeline** – In this Recommendation, in alignment with the conventions of [ITU-T Y.3172] when the symbol shown in Figure 1 is used, this denotes a subset (including proper subset) of nodes in an ML pipeline. When this symbol is used in a figure, the symbol stands for the subset of an ML pipeline's nodes not explicitly shown in that figure.
+
+
+
+Y.3179(21)\_F01
+
+A red curved arrow pointing downwards and to the left, representing a subset of nodes in an ML pipeline.
+
+**Figure 1 – Symbol used to denote a subset of nodes in an ML pipeline**
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+This Recommendation aims at addressing challenges for ML models serving in future networks including IMT-2020, i.e., application of ML model inference to ML underlay networks. The challenges include the following:
+
+- Enabling efficient ML models optimization mechanisms for heterogeneous deployment environments.
+
+The existing ML marketplaces [ITU-T Y.3176], such as the ones available in open-source [b-LF Acumos], provide built-in packaging solutions which wrap the trained models using packaging mechanisms, like containers, without optimization considerations regarding the deployment environment. This may result in lack of efficiency, e.g., due to a high computational complexity and redundant parameters, while performing inference. Furthermore, diverse inputs and constraints from varied ML underlay networks may require specific optimization considerations.
+
+- Ensuring flexible deployment of ML models for different use case scenarios.
+
+Deployment requirements of ML models in network operators' networks may be specific to the use case requirements and deployment environment. The existing containerized deployment environments may not provide enough flexibility and portability to address the considerations of network operators' deployment preferences.
+
+NOTE 1 – For example, a network operator may prefer deployment of ML models from internal ML marketplace implemented using Acumos or external ML marketplaces of third party players. Each marketplace supports specific deployment environments, e.g., Kubernetes cluster [b-Kubernetes]. However, the network operator may need to deploy ML models optimized for less resource consumption or quicker execution in the access network (AN) while ML models optimized for higher throughput may be implemented in the core network (CN). Flexible solutions are needed to help with deploying ML models into various hardware environments, e.g., into environments with limitations in terms of computing power and support of strict latency requirements.
+
+- Providing effective interfaces in a ML pipeline when a ML model is deployed.
+
+For some ML pipelines where the ML model is embedded in a ML application, e.g., a ML pipeline for an access network, the interaction between the ML model and other nodes in the ML pipeline is implementation-specific. While in other cases, model inference is exposed to the network as web services and a standardized mechanism for serving these ML models is needed to ensure the workflow of the ML pipeline.
+
+To address the above listed challenges, this Recommendation specifies an architectural framework for ML models serving in future networks including IMT-2020 by considering three fundamental stages, which are inference optimization, model deployment and model inference.
+
+The inference optimization stage is the process by which the trained ML models are modified for better performance when executing inference in a certain deployment environment according to the requirements of the use case and the current state of the network. This is essential to achieve better performances, e.g., improved latency, throughput, power efficiency and memory consumption. Inference optimization may be achieved by both model-targeted optimization techniques, e.g., pruning, quantization, structural compression, graph conversion and layer fusion, as well as hardware specific ones, e.g., compiler acceleration and parallel computing acceleration.
+
+NOTE 2 – Metadata generated from the training and usage of ML models in the network operators' networks may be used for inference optimization of the ML models.
+
+The model deployment stage is aimed at getting the ML model ready to run in a specific deployment environment, which is followed by the inference stage where the model inference output result is applied to ML pipelines.
+
+Based on the high-level requirements in clause 7, clause 8 of this Recommendation provides a high-level architecture, including reference points and sequence diagrams, aiming to provide mechanisms for ML model serving in future networks including IMT-2020.
+
+# 7 High-level requirements
+
+## 7.1 Inference optimization
+
+This clause describes high-level requirements related to inference optimization of ML models before the ML models are deployed in ML pipeline subsystem.
+
+**REQ-ML-OPT-001:** It is required that inference optimization of a ML model be determined based on the deployment environment in the ML underlay network.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of deployment environment include real time deployment environment in the AN and cloud computing environment in the CN.
+
+**REQ-ML-OPT-002:** It is required that inference optimization of a ML model be determined based on the up-to-date characteristics and status of the ML model.
+
+NOTE 2 – Examples of ML model characteristics are the type of learning and structure of the ML models.
+
+NOTE 3 – Examples of ML model status are observed performance values and optimization status.
+
+NOTE 4 – Monitored performance reports of a ML model may be correlated with the type of data that the ML model has handled in order to decide what type of optimization to perform (e.g., pruning of decision trees).
+
+**REQ-ML-OPT-003:** It is required that inference optimization of a ML model be determined based on changes in input data patterns.
+
+NOTE 5 – Example of changes in data patterns are frequency of outliers' appearance, like frequency of call-drops or packet drops in the network, and change in number of network users in a location.
+
+**REQ-ML-OPT-004:** It is recommended to update ML models in the ML model repository along with their corresponding optimization information after inference optimization.
+
+NOTE 6 – Updated ML models can be reused in other ML pipelines deployed on similar hardware environment. Optimization information helps in the matching to similar runtime environments.
+
+NOTE 7 – Examples of optimization information include the target environment, changes to the original model and effects of the optimization.
+
+## 7.2 Model deployment
+
+This clause describes high-level requirements for deploying ML models in ML pipeline subsystems.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-001:** It is required that model testing and evaluation be done in the ML sandbox subsystem before model deployment in a ML pipeline to make sure the ML model meets the requirements of the ML pipeline.
+
+NOTE 1 – For example, the ML model may be evaluated with respect to specific performance requirements as laid out in the ML pipeline requirements.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-002:** It is required to select model runtime environments based on the resource requirements of the ML models and the resources' status of the ML underlay network.
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, some ML models may require graphics processing unit (GPU) capabilities to achieve the desired performance while some may be optimized for other specific capabilities, e.g., in terms of central processing unit (CPU) and field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) characteristics.
+
+NOTE 3 – An example of ML underlay network resources' status is the size of memory available for use in the ML underlay network. The deployment should prepare a ML model with a size less than the memory available for use in the ML underlay network.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-003:** It is required to select a model deployment option based on the use case specification as indicated in the ML Intent [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+NOTE 4 – A use case specification may include latency and throughput requirements, performance requirements and location requirements. Model performance metrics may include precision, recall, area under curve (AUC) [b-AUC in classification] for classification models and mean squared error (MSE) for
+
+regression models. A use case specification may also include how the prediction service is provided, e.g., in the form of web service or real-time streaming analytics, in which case the input data would be a stream of events triggering the prediction.
+
+NOTE 5 – Deployment options are detailed in clause 8.2.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-004:** It is recommended that model deployment operations be time-synchronized with events in the ML underlay network.
+
+NOTE 6 – Examples of other events in the network are upgrading, scaling and maintenance of network functions in the underlying network. Example of time-synchronization is scheduling of model deployment in a particular NF after scheduled software upgrade in the NF.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-005:** It is required to deploy ML models taking into account their performance status as evaluated in the ML sandbox subsystem and the capabilities of the ML underlay network along with network operator's preferences and policies.
+
+NOTE 7 – Examples of ML underlay network's capabilities are the capabilities of NFs and computing platforms of the ML underlay network. For example, a User Plane Function (UPF) [b-ITU-T Y.3102] may need a capability for feature extraction and execution of ML models, while a Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) [b-ETSI GS MEC 003] platform may need a capability for updating ML models based on optimizations identified by the Machine Learning Function Orchestrator (MLFO).
+
+NOTE 8 – An example of network operator preferences and policies is the scheduling of ML model updates in the ML pipeline subsystem.
+
+**REQ-ML-DEP-006:** It is required to configure the nodes of a ML pipeline during the deployment of the corresponding ML models.
+
+## 7.3 Model inference
+
+This clause describes requirements for a model inference stage in a ML pipeline subsystem.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-001:** It is required to perform model inference in coordination with the other nodes of the ML pipeline.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of the coordination are that data collector is configured to collect input data according to the input features of deployed ML models and pre-processor processes the raw data to align with the format of the input specifications of the deployed ML models. (For details of the nodes of a ML pipeline, see clause 8.1 in [ITU-T Y.3172]).
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-002:** It is required that versions of serving ML models be managed by authorized management functions.
+
+NOTE 2 – A ML model may have different versions; during inference, one of the versions can be selected based on criteria like interface compatibility and performance trade-offs.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-003:** It is required that model inference enables the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the performance of ML models.
+
+NOTE 3 – An example of monitoring results is whether the models are experiencing performance degradation over time. Inputs, outputs and exceptions of each inference request may be stored and used for such analysis.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-004:** It is recommended that authorized management functions be notified when the model performance deteriorates during model inference to a certain threshold which depends on each use case.
+
+NOTE 4 – MLFO is an example of authorized management functions.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-005:** It is recommended the serving ML models be managed upon requests from authorized management functions during model inference.
+
+NOTE 5 – The serving ML models may be stopped, restarted, updated and deleted by the authorized management functions.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-006:** It is required that profiles of serving ML models be exposed to the ML underlay network during model inference so that serving ML models can be discovered by model consumers to compose a ML pipeline.
+
+NOTE 6 – Profile of a serving ML model may include its current status as well as metadata as defined in [ITU-T Y.3176].
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-007:** It is required that, during inference, changes in data collection requirements of a serving ML model be notified to authorized management functions.
+
+NOTE 7 – For example, changes in data collection requirements of a serving ML model may be caused by ML model optimization.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-008:** It is recommended to enable the updating of ML models during their inference to continuously improve their performance based on incoming input data.
+
+NOTE 8 – This applies especially for ML use cases where data characteristics change dramatically over time. Online learning [b-Online learning] is an appropriate approach for such use cases.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-009:** It is recommended to support the scaling of the resources allocated to serving ML models.
+
+NOTE 9 – Examples of parameters for scaling are the volume of input data and the performance thresholds of the use case.
+
+NOTE 10 – The scaling decision may be taken by authorized management function (e.g., MLFO).
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-010:** It is recommended to support load balancing between multiple instances of a given serving ML model.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-011:** It is required to support the selection of the appropriate serving ML model among different available models for a given inference request.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-012:** It is required to support multiple serving types satisfying the requirements of different use cases.
+
+NOTE 11 – Examples of serving types are online prediction and batch prediction. Online prediction is useful for use cases with high latency requirements. Online prediction refers to real-time prediction where data generated from the network is sent to the serving ML model for inference immediately. Batch prediction refers to the prediction for a high volume of data per inference request.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-013:** It is required that fault management be supported including detecting whether the ML model fails to perform inference or to apply output to ML pipelines, as well as reporting and recovering from such failures.
+
+NOTE 12 – The fault management may be performed with the support of authorized management functions (e.g., MLFO).
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-014:** It is required that accounting and licensing management be supported when a ML model is deployed on a public cloud environment.
+
+**REQ-ML-INF-015:** It is required that model inference be exposed only to authorized entities in the network to minimize the risks of attacks.
+
+NOTE 13 – Examples of attacks are evasion attack (wrong inference output caused by adversarial data) and poisoning attack (interference to the update of ML model caused by malicious data during online learning).
+
+# **8 High-level architecture**
+
+## **8.1 Architectural components for ML model serving**
+
+The architectural components for ML model serving are shown in Figure 2. This is a simplified view of the main components along with external components (management subsystem and model repository) needed for ML model serving in the network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ MS[Management subsystem] --- MR[Model repository]
+ MS --- MMS[ML model serving subsystem]
+ MS --- MPL[ML pipeline or ML sandbox subsystem]
+ MMS --- MO[Model optimizer]
+ MMS --- IEB[Inference engine builder]
+ MPL --- IE[Inference engine]
+
+```
+
+Y.3179(21)\_F02
+
+Figure 2 – Functional components for ML model serving. The diagram shows a Management subsystem on the left connected to three stacked components on the right: Model repository, ML model serving subsystem (containing Model optimizer and Inference engine builder), and ML pipeline or ML sandbox subsystem (containing Inference engine).
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional components for ML model serving**
+
+### 8.1.1 Model repository
+
+This component is a repository of machine learning models [ITU-T Y.3174] from where ML models can be retrieved for the purpose of ML model serving.
+
+NOTE – ML marketplace as described in [ITU-T Y.3176] may include a model repository.
+
+### 8.1.2 ML model serving subsystem
+
+The ML model serving subsystem, composed of model optimizer and inference engine builder, is used to adapt the model for specific deployment environments.
+
+#### 8.1.2.1 Model optimizer
+
+The model optimizer component is responsible for inference optimization of a ML model that is ready to serve the ML underlay network. The inference optimization is performed based on the ML model and the deployment environment in order to achieve optimization goals, e.g., better throughput and latency. The inference optimization results in optimized ML models, the format of which may be different from the original ML models.
+
+#### 8.1.2.2 Inference engine builder
+
+The inference engine builder component generates inference engines for ML models.
+
+### 8.1.3 Inference engine
+
+This functional component provides the following functionalities in ML pipeline or ML sandbox subsystem:
+
+#### 1) Runtime environment
+
+Inference engine provides runtime environment for ML models. This enables:
+
+- loading the ML model artifacts, including the model file and metadata.
+- executing the operations defined in ML models so that ML models can accept input data and generate model inference output.
+
+#### 2) Model scheduling
+
+Inference engine schedules the ML models based on the respective scheduling policies so that multiple serving ML models can perform inference efficiently.
+
+#### 3) Version management
+
+- Inference engine manages the versions of the ML models according to the respective ML model update policy.
+
+#### 4) Model inference
+
+The inference engine provides ML model inference capability for ML pipeline(s).
+
+### 8.1.4 MLFO
+
+The machine learning function orchestrator (MLFO) manages and orchestrates the model optimizer, inference engine builder and inference engine.
+
+## 8.2 Deployment options
+
+There are different kinds of inference hosts where the serving ML model may be hosted and inference be executed, e.g., an Internet of things (IoT) device, a server located at the network edge or in the cloud, or other NFs.
+
+There are several options to deploy ML models into inference hosts in different hardware environments, as shown in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates three deployment environments for ML models:
+
+- Embedded deployment environment:** An orange box labeled 'ML model' is connected by a double-headed arrow to a green box labeled 'ML application'. A red curved arrow points from the 'ML application' box.
+- Holistic deployment environment:** Two identical units are shown. Each unit consists of an orange box labeled 'Inference engine' containing an orange box labeled 'ML model'. This unit is connected by a double-headed arrow to a green box labeled 'ML application'. A red curved arrow points from the 'ML application' box.
+- Model standalone deployment environment:** Two orange boxes labeled 'ML model' are each connected by a double-headed arrow to a single orange box labeled 'Inference engine'. This 'Inference engine' box is then connected by a double-headed arrow to a green box labeled 'ML application'. A red curved arrow points from the 'ML application' box.
+
+Y.3179(21)\_F03
+
+Figure 3: Deployment options of ML models. The diagram illustrates three deployment environments: Embedded, Holistic, and Model standalone.
+
+**Figure 3 – Deployment options of ML models**
+
+### 1) Embedded deployment
+
+Embedded deployment means ML models are built and packaged inside a ML application, where the ML pipeline is integrated within the ML application.
+
+NOTE 1 – For this option, the integration of ML models within the ML application is out of scope and implementation dependent.
+
+Such deployment reduces the latency to consume the model inference and is mostly used in resource constrained IoT scenarios.
+
+### 2) Service-based deployment
+
+Service-based deployment is usually used in cloud or edge computing platforms, where model inference is provided as a service via inference engine, which can then be consumed by ML pipelines in the networks. Management and orchestration functions, e.g., traffic routing, resource scaling and monitoring, and serving model management, may be provided for the inference engines in such deployments by the inference hosts.
+
+NOTE 2 – The inference service may be an online service or batch prediction service.
+
+#### – Holistic deployment
+
+In the holistic deployment approach, a new inference engine integrating the ML model is created, and then deployed in the host as a whole. This type of deployment can be chosen, e.g., for cloud computing platforms that ML models are deployed at scale.
+
+NOTE 3 – For this option, the ML model is hosted in the inference engine and the rest of the ML pipeline is integrated in the ML application.
+
+#### – Model-standalone deployment
+
+In the model-standalone deployment approach, ML models are loaded at run-time into already deployed service engines. The ML models can share the same, pre-deployed inference engine. This
+
+type of deployment can be chosen, e.g., for edge computing platforms where ML models are transferred over low bandwidth connections or deployed over low memory budget.
+
+NOTE 4 – For this option, the ML model is hosted separately from the inference engine and the rest of the ML pipeline is integrated in the ML application.
+
+### 8.3 High level architecture
+
+The architectural components for the serving of ML models in in future networks including IMT-2020 can be integrated in the architecture for ML marketplace specified in [ITU-T Y.3176], as shown in Figure 4. The reference points shown in Figure 4 correspond to the ones specified in [ITU-T Y.3172] and [ITU-T Y.3176].
+
+
+
+A block diagram showing the high-level architecture for ML model serving. The diagram includes the following main blocks and their interactions:
+
+- Management subsystem**: Contains 'Other management and orchestration functions', 'MLFO', and 'ML intent'. It connects to other subsystems via reference points 15, 6, 7, and 5.
+- Model repository**: A central storage for models, connected via reference points 15, 13, 19, and 16.
+- ML sandbox subsystem**: Contains an 'ML pipeline' and an 'Inference engine' connected by reference point 18. It interacts with the management subsystem (6), model repository (13), and ML model serving subsystem (17).
+- ML model serving subsystem**: Contains 'Model optimizer' and 'Inference engine builder'. It interacts with the model repository (16, 19), ML sandbox (17), and ML pipeline subsystem (3).
+- ML pipeline subsystem**: Contains an 'ML pipeline' and an 'Inference engine' connected by reference point 18. It interacts with the management subsystem (5), ML model serving subsystem (3), and ML underlay networks (4).
+- ML underlay networks**: Connected to the ML pipeline subsystem via reference point 4.
+
+Figure 4 – High-level architecture for ML model serving
+
+**Figure 4 – High-level architecture for ML model serving**
+
+As shown in Figure 4, a ML model serving subsystem, which is comprised of model optimizer and inference engine builder, is introduced in the high-level architecture.
+
+Model optimizer allows ML models obtained from a model repository via reference point 16 to be optimized.
+
+Inference engine builder generates an inference engine for a ML model. The model is deployed in a ML sandbox subsystem for evaluation via reference point 17 and then is deployed as a serving ML model in the ML pipeline subsystem via reference point 3.
+
+As far as the ML sandbox subsystem, the inference engine serves ML models for ML evaluation pipeline in the sandbox subsystem.
+
+As far as the ML pipeline subsystem, the inference engine serves ML models for ML pipelines in the real network.
+
+In the embedded deployment scenario, the ML application invokes the internal interface to load the embedded model and perform inference. In the service-based deployment scenario, instead of being tightly coupled with ML models, NFs that need ML capabilities consume the inference service exposed by the inference engine in a ML pipeline subsystem via reference point 18.
+
+10 Rec. ITU-T Y.3179 (04/2021)
+
+## 8.4 Reference points
+
+Reference point 3, 5 and 6, which are used for ML model serving, are described in the following clauses.
+
+### 8.4.1 Reference point 3 between ML sandbox subsystem and ML pipeline subsystem
+
+This reference point is specified in [ITU-T Y.3172] and it is used for deployment or update of ML models in the ML pipeline subsystem.
+
+#### 8.4.1.1 Serving\_model API
+
+**API description:** When the ML pipeline subsystem receives the model deployment request from the MLFO, it can pull ML models (for service-based model-standalone deployment) or deploy inference engines (for service-based holistic deployment) from the ML sandbox subsystem.
+
+**Serving\_model-request:**
+
+**Direction:** ML pipeline subsystem → ML sandbox
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Deployment option | Enum | Mandatory | It is used to indicate the requested deployment option. Applicable values are service-based holistic deployment or service-based model-standalone deployment. |
+| Model identifier | String | Conditional array | Mandatory | The configuration data according to the requirements of the use case, e.g., deployment option (as described in clause 8.2), memory and CPU requirements, model scaling policy, batching policy, update policy, etc. |
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+| Version identifier | String | Optional | The version identifier specified for the serving ML model. |
+| NOTE – Either the model identifier or inference engine identifier shall be present. | | | |
+
+**Model\_deployment-response:**
+
+**Direction:** ML pipeline subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | It indicates whether the deployment was successful. |
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+| Version identifier | String | Optional | The version identifier specified for the serving ML model. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.2 Model\_registration API
+
+**API description:** After a ML model is deployed in ML pipeline subsystem, its profile, including metadata, configuration, location and other basic information about the serving ML model is registered by inference engine so that model consumers can discover it from the registration information. This registration can be done in the MLFO via this API, i.e., the MLFO maintains the
+
+profile of the model. Furthermore, if the status of the deployed model is updated, its profile in the MLFO will change accordingly. Similarly, inference engine can deregister a model from the MLFO and the MLFO will remove its profile.
+
+NOTE 1 – The update of the model profile in the MLFO can be notified to the model consumer by polling or pub/sub mechanisms.
+
+NOTE 2 – The MLFO can deregister a serving ML model when it is not available anymore because the MLFO cannot receive the periodic heartbeat sent from the serving ML model.
+
+##### Model registration-request:
+
+**Direction:** Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+| Model metadata | array | Mandatory | The metadata of the serving ML model. |
+| API information | String | Mandatory | It provides information about how the inference service is performed so that consumers of the inference service can discover the model. |
+| Serving status | Boolean | Mandatory | It indicates whether the inference service of the serving ML model is available. |
+| Version identifier | String | Mandatory | The version identifier specified for the serving ML model. |
+
+##### Model registration-response:
+
+**Direction:** MLFO → Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | It indicates whether the registration was successful. |
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+
+#### 8.4.2.3 Serving\_model\_management API
+
+**API description:** This API is exposed by inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem to manage the serving ML models. Examples of model management operations enabled by this API are model start, stop, upgrade, scale, modify and delete operations, which may be used by an authorized management subsystem, e.g., MLFO.
+
+##### **Serving\_model\_management-request:**
+
+**Direction:** MLFO → Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|----------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+| Operation | Enum | Mandatory | The requested operation on the serving ML model. This includes model start, stop, upgrade, scale, modify, and delete operations. |
+| Additional information | array | Mandatory | Additional information or configuration for the requested operation. For example, the "modify" operation may have additional information such as information on memory setting and model version. |
+| Authentication information | String | Mandatory | Information for authenticating the operation requestor. If the authentication fails, the request is rejected. |
+
+##### **Serving\_model\_management-response:**
+
+**Direction:** Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | Indicates whether the model management operation was successful. |
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+
+##### **8.4.2.4 Model\_monitoring\_subscription API**
+
+**API description:** After the ML model is deployed in ML pipeline subsystem, model monitoring can be exposed by this API, e.g., to the MLFO.
+
+##### **Model\_monitoring\_subscription-request:**
+
+**Direction:** MLFO → Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model whose monitoring event is subscribed to. |
+| Notification Target Address | String | Mandatory | The address where the monitoring notification will be sent. |
+| Monitoring event information | String list | Mandatory | Monitoring information the MLFO wants to be notified of, including model status; model performance (e.g., based on AUC and MSE); and exceptions and triggering events (e.g., based on periodicity or threshold). |
+
+##### **Model\_monitoring\_subscription-response:**
+
+**Direction:** Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | Indicates whether the model monitoring subscription was successful. |
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+
+#### **8.4.2.5 Model\_monitoring\_event API**
+
+**API description:** When subscribed monitoring events are triggered, notification will be sent to all the subscribers.
+
+##### **Model\_monitoring\_event-notification:**
+
+**Direction:** Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|------------------------------|-------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Monitoring event information | String list | Mandatory | The information corresponding to the subscribed monitoring events. |
+
+#### **8.4.2.6 Health\_check API**
+
+**API description:** This API is used to check whether the serving ML model on the inference engine is active to process inference requests.
+
+##### **Health\_check-request:**
+
+**Direction:** MLFO→Inference engine in ML pipeline subsystem
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|--------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of a serving ML model. |
+
+##### **Health\_check-response:**
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|---------------------|---------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | Indicates whether the inference service is active. |
+
+### **8.4.3 Reference point 6: Interface between management subsystem and ML sandbox subsystem**
+
+This reference point is used for the management subsystem to manage the models pushed from the ML model repository to the ML sandbox subsystem. For example, the MLFO may trigger and monitor the training, optimization, chaining and deployment process of a ML model in the ML sandbox subsystem.
+
+#### 8.4.3.1 Model\_monitoring\_subscription API
+
+**API description:** This API is similar to the model monitoring subscription API in clause 8.4.2.4, this one is used to monitor the ML model in the ML sandbox subsystem.
+
+#### 8.4.3.2 Model\_monitoring\_event\_notification API
+
+**API description:** This API is similar to the model monitoring event notification API in clause 8.4.2.5, this one is used to send monitoring notification of the ML model in the the ML sandbox subsystem.
+
+#### 8.4.3.3 Model\_deployment API
+
+**API description:** For a ML model that is trained in the ML sandbox subsystem, the MLFO can trigger model deployment in the ML sandbox subsystem for validation and evaluation.
+
+**Model\_deployment-request:**
+
+**Direction:** MLFO → ML sandbox subsystem
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Model Identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the ML model. |
+| Deployment configuration | array | Mandatory | The configuration data according to the requirements of the use case, e.g., deployment option (as described in clause 8.2), memory and CPU requirements, model scaling policy, batching policy, update policy, etc. |
+| Version identifier | String | Optional | The version identifier specified for the ML model. |
+
+**Model\_deployment-response:**
+
+**Direction:** ML sandbox subsystem → MLFO
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|-----------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | Indicates whether the deployment was successful. |
+| Model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the ML model. |
+| Inference engine identifier | String | Conditional | Identifier of the inference engine. array | Mandatory | The meta-data of the inference request, indicating the nature of the input and expected output, e.g., name and data format of the input data. |
+| Input data | Byte array | Mandatory | The input data that needs to be passed to the serving ML model to get inference. |
+
+**Inference-response:**
+
+**Direction:** Inference engine → ML inference consumer
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/Optional/Conditional | Description |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Serving model identifier | String | Mandatory | Identifier of the serving ML model. |
+| Result | Boolean | Mandatory | It indicates whether the request is successful. |
+| Meta-data | array | Conditional | The meta-data of the response which can be used for the interpretation of the output data. (Referenced 10.03.2020).
+- [b-AUC in classification] Classification: ROC Curve and AUC. (Referenced 10.03.2020).
+- [b-ETSI GS MEC 003] ETSI GS MEC 003 V2.2.1 (2020-12), *Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC); Framework and Reference Architecture*.
+- [b-Fused layer] M. Alwani, H. Chen, M. Ferdman and P. Milder, *Fused-layer CNN accelerators*, 2016 49th Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO), Taipei, 2016, pp. 1-12, doi: 10.1109/MICRO.2016.7783725.
+- [b-Kubernetes] Concepts of Kubernetes. (Referenced 10.03.2020).
+- [b-Online learning] Online Methods in Machine Learning Theory and Applications. (Referenced 10.03.2020).
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation**ITU-T Y.3183 (01/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Framework for network slicing management assisted by machine learning leveraging quality of experience feedback from verticals**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3183
+
+## Framework for network slicing management assisted by machine learning leveraging quality of experience feedback from verticals
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3183 provides a framework for machine learning-assisted network slicing management, leveraging vertical end users' feedback on quality of experience (QoE), which can help achieve the runtime optimization of user perceived performance. The overall architecture, components, workflow and related APIs of this framework are specified with respect to the high-level requirements identified. A use case is provided in Appendix I to show an application example of this framework. Example implementations of the key application programming interfaces (APIs) are also provided.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3183 | 2023-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15238 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+ML, network slice, QoE, QoS, vertical feedback.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at • Scalar: 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 • String: Very bad, bad, regular, good, very good |
+| 2a | The feedback is inserted into the data lake component for its later consumption by ML pipelines. | A specific schema in the data lake component should be employed for this purpose, specifying for each entry, as a minimum, the time of collection, the value of the feedback and the identifier of the NS for which the feedback has been collected. |
+| 2b | The feedback is directly consumed by the QoE optimizer component for immediate actuation to maintain quality levels. | As a pre-condition, a policy should be already instantiated at the QoE optimizer component specifying the ECA values for the actuation related to the feedback. |
+| 3 | The feedback from the NSsu and the NS QoS parameters are gathered from the data lake component by an ML pipeline to perform their analysis and derive insights. | The QoS parameters are aggregated and prepared per end-to-end NS by the monitoring component. Then, pre-processing modules within the ML pipeline further prepare the data to be ML ready, such as by performing normalization and smoothing of the data. As such, the ML model consumes the data from the data aggregation/preparation modules within the pipeline, which has already gathered from the schemas of the data lake component the information tagged under the identifier of the NS to which the ML model belongs. |
+| 4 | The ML model, as a pluggable function of the NS control, performs the analysis of the consumed data. | The ML model is provided by an ML provider, e.g., the same NS provider or the vertical customer. The P&P controller component only provides a platform that allows the dynamic instantiation of pluggable control functions per NS. |
+| 5 | After the analysis, the ML model contacts the policy manager component to recommend which are the QoS parameters of the underlying NS that need to be (re-)configured in a case in which | The recommendation from the ML model should indicate which of the analysed QoS parameters of the NS gathered from the data lake need to be stated as to be re-configured in the action field of the policies related to the feedback event. To enable the exchange of information between the ML models and the policy manager component, a common |
+
+**Table 1 – Vertical QoE feedback mechanism**
+
+| Step | Description | Additional details |
+|------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | undesirable QoE situations are reported through the feedback mechanism. | information model for the action should be in place, for example, as defined in [ITU-T Y.3174]. |
+| 6 | The policy manager component disseminates the updated policy about the treatment of the feedback from the NSsu to the QoE optimizer component in order to have the most up to date action. | The policy manager component updates the QoE optimizer component, e.g., by publishing and subscription. Such mechanisms would enable gathering the latest policies related to the specific NS identifier to which the policy refers. |
+| 7 | At the time of an actuation trigger due to the reception of a feedback value, if a policy is in place that ties the received feedback value with a concrete (re-)configuration to be carried out, the QoE optimizer component contacts the orchestration component to apply the action. | The QoE optimizer component is only responsible for determining the 'when' and 'what' of the actuation, while the 'how' is the responsibility of the orchestration component, which should engage with the control plane component to achieve the specified (re-)configurations with the specified parameters. |
+
+# 9 Components and related APIs
+
+### 9.1 OSA
+
+The service-based architecture approach followed by the IMT-2020 core specification [ITU-T Y.3104] is paving the way for a fully modular and softwarized approach to network services.
+
+The OSA component provides role-based access to the services supported by the framework to the different business roles, i.e., NSp, NSsp and NSsu [b-ITU-T Y.3103].
+
+The following OSA operations are foreseen per role:
+
+- NSp
+ - actuation descriptors onboarding;
+ - monitoring descriptors onboarding;
+ - resource type registration associated with actuation and monitoring descriptors;
+ - identification of resource type availabilities;
+ - onboarding of policy-based rules with dependencies on actuation and monitoring descriptors;
+ - identification of network coverage;
+ - resources list based on type and capabilities.
+- NSsp
+ - technology agnostic information of actuation and/or monitoring descriptors;
+ - identification of monitoring and actuation capabilities offered by NSp;
+ - selection of SLA related automation rules;
+ - indication of the monitoring and actuation options which should be activated per NS type;
+ - registration of QoE plugin and P&P services;
+ - registration of NS templates with dependencies on QoE and P&P services;
+
+- NS templates list based on vertical-tailored services and underlying dependencies including network coverage per service;
+- NS templates annotation with service features on QoE and P&P;
+- NSsu information of NS templates annotated with service features;
+- selection of service features to be activated;
+- access to NS-specific actuation and monitoring information as exposed via P&P services.
+
+### 9.2 P&P controller
+
+The P&P controller component aims at providing truly customized runtime control, management and operation of E2E NS instances while offering vertical-tailored services. It enables NS customization, as it provides a novel combination of tailored control functions and APIs that allow verticals to customize their NS instances according to their needs. In practice, the P&P Controller component provides a control environment, dedicated per NS, which offers the verticals direct control of NS instances and provides a flavour of customization. The main idea is that the P&P controller component provides, for each NS instance, a vertical-tailored abstraction of the NS (including its view and the available control services) on top of the APIs exposed by the control plane component.
+
+The vertical-tailored services are constituted by the combination of:
+
+- An NS abstraction, which offers an abstract and vertical friendly view, on top of which the logic for the control operations is added so that these control operations can be consumed by verticals at runtime over their NSs. The runtime consumption is done by means of a dynamic and automatic mapping of operations issued from the vertical-tailored APIs into specific actions to be enforced or performed through the pluggable control functions.
+- Vertical-tailored APIs, which provide the set of tailored control and management APIs that are exposed to the vertical and offer the runtime control operations over the NS-specific view. The vertical accesses these APIs through the OSA component.
+
+The P&P vertical-tailored APIs rely on a generalized NS exposure that enables a vertical customized abstraction of NS instances, still agnostic to the network slicing technology and able to address the description of managed network entities from vertical service, to NS, and down to NFs and resources. This generalized exposure provides an NS topology view that is augmented with a set of runtime control operations that are offered to customize the NS control, management and monitoring: these operations are in practice the customized control primitives at disposal of the vertical. The P&P vertical-tailored APIs can be defined as the APIs (e.g., implemented as representational state transfer (REST) APIs) that a given P&P control instance exposes to the vertical for enabling tailored runtime control. These APIs can be grouped into two categories:
+
+- **Continuous monitoring APIs** – to expose towards the vertical continuous data streams including tailored NS performance metrics and statistics.
+- **Runtime control APIs** – to expose towards the vertical available control services.
+
+#### 9.2.1 Continuous monitoring APIs
+
+The **continuous monitoring APIs** provide access to NS monitoring information and can be considered a basic control exposure feature allowing verticals to be aware of statistics and performances related to their NS.
+
+The nature of the monitoring data accessible is subject to the P&P control customization process, and all kinds of resources, NFs, NS or service-level monitoring information can be in principle exposed to verticals according to the agreed control exposure. The P&P controller component exposes NS related monitoring information as continuous streams of data.
+
+This approach transforms single-query monitoring operations offered usually through an HTTP GET into a periodically executed query that pushes results on a proper channel, creating a data stream. The
+
+technology used to create such a channel can be based on, e.g., the concept of WebSocket [b-IETF WS]. Each P&P control instance is able to handle one or more channel in order to meet the requirement of having multiple streams per NS. Once the channel is opened, a vertical can request through the OSA the continuous monitoring of desired performance metric (e.g., through a graphical user interface), on the condition that such metric can be retrieved by a GET runtime control operation already exposed by the given P&P control instance. In practice, a vertical can request the P&P control instance to periodically execute a given monitoring query and then collect the results through the opened channel as continuous data streams. The vertical, through the OSA component, can perform such continuous monitoring requests through the operation described below.
+
+##### 9.2.1.1 Continuous monitoring data stream API request
+
+**API description:** This operation is used to request the P&P control instance to perform one shot monitoring operations periodically and put the results on specific channels.
+
+**Direction:** Vertical (through the OSA component) → dedicated per-NS P&P control instance.
+
+An example of attributes and parameters related to this API can be found in Appendix II.
+
+##### 9.2.1.2 Continuous monitoring data stream API response
+
+**API description:** When the vertical requests for a continuous monitoring data stream through the continuous monitoring data stream API request, the P&P control instance opens a channel. Since a single channel can be opened per continuous monitoring session, and the vertical can request multiple data streams, the P&P control instance augments each message in the data stream with proper attributes, in order to make the consumer able to distinguish different data streams and monitoring information structures.
+
+**Direction:** Dedicated per-NS P&P control instance → Vertical (through the OSA component).
+
+An example of attributes and parameters related to this API can be found in Appendix II.
+
+#### 9.2.2 Runtime control APIs
+
+The **runtime control APIs** allow verticals to have a degree of control over the NS owned by them. The P&P Controller component can follow an approach where client and server sides of the REST API are decoupled and interact via dynamic hypermedia information provided by the server, similarly to the REST Hypertext As The Engine Of Application State (HATEOAS) approach [b-Thijssen]. In practice, the client side of the API (i.e., the vertical through the OSA component) accesses the REST application (i.e., the P&P control instance) through a simple predefined endpoint offered by the server, which is used to retrieve the customized NS view. After that, all other interactions are based on information (i.e., endpoints and resource representations) that the client discovers directly from the server through dynamic hypermedia. In the case of a P&P control instance, this hypermedia is represented by the set of allowed APIs' properties within each element in the NS view. This approach enables flexibility and extensibility when compared with traditional service-oriented architectures where REST interactions happen over predefined and fixed interfaces shared through documentation or other out-of-band mechanisms. This also gives extensibility to the P&P controller component, which can be adapted to any vertical requirements in terms of expected runtime control granularity, and in terms of NS exposure constraints set by NS providers.
+
+In the case of a vertical's QoE feedback, the specific actuation exposed to the vertical is to enable the vertical to report QoE feedback through the OSA component.
+
+An example of attributes and parameters related to this API can be found in Appendix II.
+
+### 9.3 Control plane
+
+The main purpose of the control plane component is to provide NS control services through a set of configuration endpoints that expose control APIs towards the management and orchestration components (as shown in Figure 2). The control plane handles tasks for the enforcement of NF
+
+configuration rules and policies governing the runtime operations of the various network segments, and offers a set of CPSs, each supporting specific configuration and control capabilities' APIs as described in the following clauses.
+
+#### 9.3.1 QoS control plane service
+
+The QoS control plane service (QoS CPS) is responsible for enforcing dynamic QoS setting for each NS towards the underlying network segments according to the input parameters in the exposed interfaces between the control plane component and the orchestration component. The request to set the QoS constraints can be on a per-NS basis or for an international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), among others. The request to set the QoS constraints is deployed to all network segments depending on the NS composition.
+
+The QoS CPS exposes **APIs** for the following operations to the service consumers:
+
+- Set QoS constraints, to allow indication of quantitative QoS parameters per NS to be enforced towards the target network segment.
+- Set priority, to allow change of priority for a traffic type flow associated to a NS within the data plane.
+
+An example usage of the QoS CPS can be found in Appendix III.
+
+#### 9.3.2 NF config control plane service
+
+The NF config control plane service (NF config CPS) is responsible for enforcing the configuration operations towards the network functions composing an NS. Depending on the NS template that is instantiated, a number of operations are expected to be available per NS. These operations are not limited to a predefined subset. The NF config CPS analyses the requested operation and executes it in the context of a defined workflow among the operations configured during the NS instantiation.
+
+The NF Config CPS exposes **APIs** for the following operations to the service consumers:
+
+- Set NF configuration, to allow the addition, update and removal of configurations.
+
+An example usage of the NF config CPS can be found in Appendix III.
+
+#### 9.3.3 InterPoP connection control plane service
+
+The IPC Control Plane Service (IPC CPS) is responsible, for each NS, for delivering a proper interconnection of the NFs deployed in the different network segments, allowing geographically distributed NFs to be properly interconnected according to their E2E forwarding graph descriptor.
+
+The IPC CPS exposes **APIs** for the following operations to the service consumers:
+
+- Provision interPoP Connections, to create a new interPoP connection among two or more PoPs where the NFs of a given NS have been deployed and provisioned.
+- This operation interconnects two NFs in an NS between PoPs, through an interPoP connection descriptor representing the backbone network between the PoPs.
+- Update interPoP connections, to allow dynamic modification of QoS constraints for the interPoP connections (e.g., bandwidth, latency).
+- Remove interPoP connections, to delete the NS interPoP connections.
+
+An example usage of the IPC CPS can be found in Appendix III.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+This Recommendation presents the architectural framework for machine learning-assisted network slicing management leveraging QoE feedback from verticals, which is expected to be applied in future networks including IMT-2020.
+
+General network security requirements and mechanisms in future networks are applicable [ITU-T X.1601] [ITU-T Y.2701] [ITU-T Y.3101].
+
+It is required to prevent unauthorized access to, and data leaking from, the framework functionalities, especially to the OSA component functionalities by the different stakeholders (the OSA component providing the northbound interface of the framework functionalities), and to the ML pipelines. Implementation of mechanisms regarding authentication and authorization and external attack protection should be considered.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### eHealth use case
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the eHealth use case architecture. On the left, a 'Video headset' (worn by a paramedic in an ambulance) sends 'Video' data to the 'EDGE' (represented by a server rack and antenna). The 'EDGE' contains a 'Disease assessment App' and a 'Video App'. The 'Disease assessment App' sends an 'Analysed result' back to the 'Video headset' and also sends data to the 'CENTRAL DATA CENTRE' (represented by server racks). The 'CENTRAL DATA CENTRE' sends an 'Analysed result' to the 'HOSPITAL' (represented by a hospital building and ambulance). A direct blue line also connects the 'Video headset' to the 'HOSPITAL'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3183(23)' in the bottom right corner.
+
+Figure I.1 – eHealth use case high-level description diagram
+
+**Figure I.1 – eHealth use case high-level description**
+
+Figure I.1 shows the scenarios of the eHealth use case where an ambulance is connected to a hospital with an IMT-2020 network. There are two services running in this use case, including a video communication service via wearable video glasses and a ML-based stroke diagnosis assessment service. The video communication service is initiated with the glasses equipped with a video camera and worn by a paramedic in the ambulance capturing a live video of the scene. The glasses connect to the corresponding video communication app running at the edge for authentication to set up the communication with the hospital, providing a direct link from the glasses to the hospital where the doctors can view video of the scene. The stroke assessment service consists of the gateway app running in the ambulance, capturing the video of the patient, and the stroke assessment app running at the edge, collecting the data from the gateway and running an ML algorithm to analyse the images for the stroke condition. The assessment app will send the analysed result back to the paramedic and to the hospital for an expert to examine.
+
+![Figure I.2 – eHealth business model with NSsu and NSsp perspectives. The diagram illustrates the architecture of an eHealth network slice. At the top, a 'Network slice service user' (National ambulance service) is connected to a 'Network slice service provider (NSsp)'. Below the NSsp, two network slice providers (NSp) are shown: NSp A and NSp B. NSp A is associated with 'NSI1: [RAN + EPC + Core DC + Core IP/MPLS] network slice' and contains sub-slices for MEC, Core, and RAN. NSp B is associated with 'NSI2: [RAN + Core IP/MPLS] network slice' and contains sub-slices for Core and RAN. Both NSps are connected to a red 'Ambulance path' at the bottom, which includes an 'Ambulance' icon. The diagram also shows a 'E2E eHealth_slice: {type: eMBB}' at the top left.](7133ccf78043568ca62ecbcd43628a4a_img.jpg)
+
+The diagram illustrates the eHealth business model with NSsu and NSsp perspectives. At the top, a **Network slice service user** (National ambulance service) is connected to a **Network slice service provider (NSsp)**. Below the NSsp, two network slice providers (NSp) are shown: **NSp A** and **NSp B**. NSp A is associated with **NSI1: [RAN + EPC + Core DC + Core IP/MPLS] network slice** and contains sub-slices for MEC, Core, and RAN. NSp B is associated with **NSI2: [RAN + Core IP/MPLS] network slice** and contains sub-slices for Core and RAN. Both NSps are connected to a red **Ambulance path** at the bottom, which includes an **Ambulance** icon. The diagram also shows a **E2E eHealth\_slice: {type: eMBB}** at the top left.
+
+Figure I.2 – eHealth business model with NSsu and NSsp perspectives. The diagram illustrates the architecture of an eHealth network slice. At the top, a 'Network slice service user' (National ambulance service) is connected to a 'Network slice service provider (NSsp)'. Below the NSsp, two network slice providers (NSp) are shown: NSp A and NSp B. NSp A is associated with 'NSI1: [RAN + EPC + Core DC + Core IP/MPLS] network slice' and contains sub-slices for MEC, Core, and RAN. NSp B is associated with 'NSI2: [RAN + Core IP/MPLS] network slice' and contains sub-slices for Core and RAN. Both NSps are connected to a red 'Ambulance path' at the bottom, which includes an 'Ambulance' icon. The diagram also shows a 'E2E eHealth\_slice: {type: eMBB}' at the top left.
+
+**Figure I.2 – eHealth business model with NSsu and NSsp perspectives**
+
+Figure I.2 shows a business model, as applied in the eHealth use case. The E2E NS customer is a national/regional health service organization, which operates multiple (static) hospitals, dispatch centres, and (mobile) ambulances. The E2E eHealth NS offered to the customer by the NSsp consists initially of a "base" network slice instance (NSI) containing the minimal set of NFs and services. The base NS is static and is centred on a geographical area in the vicinity of the hospital. The hospital/dispatch hosts experts who provide real-time support to the paramedics. As ambulances are dispatched, additional network sub-slice instances may be instantiated to increase the geographical coverage of the NS (e.g., by adding RAN) or to guarantee the latency and availability requirements of the NS. For the latter, additional processing functions may be dynamically instantiated at suitable MEC locations. Dispatch may trigger a handover of a paramedic's communication stream to a different hospital. Handover between domains might be needed while the ambulance is moving.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Examples of P&P controller APIs
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### II.1 Example of a continuous monitoring data stream API request
+
+Table II.1 provides attributes and parameters related to a continuous monitoring data stream API.
+
+**Table II.1 – Continuous monitoring data stream API request attributes**
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/optional/conditional | Description |
+|---------------------|--------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ws_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the WebSocket channel. |
+| element_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the element in the NS topological view offered by the P&P control instance to the vertical, and that exposes the target monitoring operation requested by the vertical. |
+| api_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the target monitoring operation as expressed in the NS topological view offered by the P&P control instance to the vertical. |
+
+### II.2 Continuous monitoring data stream API response
+
+Table II.2 provides attributes and parameters related to a continuous monitoring data stream API.
+
+**Table II.2 – Continuous monitoring data stream API response attributes**
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/optional/conditional | Description |
+|---------------------|--------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| slice_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the NS instance for which the vertical requested a monitoring data streams. |
+| owner_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier (in the P&P context) of the NS owner (i.e., an identifier for the vertical). |
+| element_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the element in the NS topological view offered by the P&P control instance to the vertical, that was selected by the vertical in the monitoring data stream request. |
+| api_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the target monitoring operation as selected by the vertical in the monitoring data stream request. |
+
+**Table II.2 – Continuous monitoring data stream API response attributes**
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/optional/conditional | Description |
+|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| content | Object | Mandatory | It is the actual monitoring information and conveys the reply of the monitoring query for the "api_id" operation. The data follows the schema as defined in the NS topological view offered by the P&P control instance to the vertical, in line with the HATEOAS approach. |
+
+### **II.3 QoE feedback API**
+
+Table II.3 provides attributes and parameters related to a QoE feedback API.
+
+**Table II.3 – QoE feedback API attributes**
+
+| Information element | Type | Mandatory/optional/conditional | Description |
+|----------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| slice_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier of the NS instance for which the vertical requested a monitoring data streams. |
+| owner_id | String | Mandatory | It is the identifier (in the P&P context) of the NS owner (i.e., an identifier for the vertical). |
+| qoe_value | String | Mandatory | It is the QoE value input by the vertical. |
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Examples of control plane APIs
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### III.1 Example usage of QoS control
+
+The QoS CPS exposes **APIs** for the following operations to its service consumers:
+
+- Set QoS constraints, to allow indication of quantitative QoS parameters per NS to be enforced towards the wanted network segment.
+
+[PUT | POST] ../qos/v1/qos-instance/{sliceId}/set\_qos\_constraints/{parameters}
+
+The Set QoS constraints parameters are described in Table III.1.
+
+**Table III.1 – Set QoS constraints parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|---------------------|--------|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| sliceId | String | 6b699c12-d154-49ed-8922-f578e108f818 | YES | Unique ID of the NS associated to QoS. |
+| segmentId | String | ACCESS | NO | Identify the type of the adapter, ACCESS or CORE adapter kind. |
+| userEqId | String | 49150123456789 | NO | Identify the user equipment identity as IMSI. |
+
+The JSON parameters are described in Table III.2.
+
+**Table III.2 – Set QoS constraints, JSON parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|---------------------|--------|---------|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| qosDirName | String | UPL | YES | The setting directive for QoS parameters can be: UPL=Upload directive; DWL= Download directive. |
+| qosDirValue | String | 50 | YES | The value of setting directive. |
+| qosUnitScale | String | MB | YES | The measurement scale of the setting directive. |
+
+##### Request example:
+
+In the following an example is reported for the setting of QoS parameter UPL (UpLink) to 50 MB given the String value, segmentId (ACCESS), userEqId (IMSI) and epsBearerId (5).
+
+```
+curl -X PUT http://localhost:8082/slicenet/ctrlplane/qos/v1/qos-
+instance//set_qos_constraints?segmentId=ACCESS&userEqId=49150123456789&epsBe-
+arId=5 -H "Content-Type: application/json" -
+d '{"qosDirName": "UPL", "qosDirValue": "50", "qosUnitScale": "MB"}'
+```
+
+Success response: **200 OK**
+
+Error response: **400 Bad Request**
+
+- Set Priority, to allow change of priority for a traffic type flow associated to an NS within the backhaul data plane. Included parameters are:
+
+##### Example usage:
+
+[PUT] ../qos/v1/qos-instance/{sliceId}/set\_priority/{parameters}
+
+The set priority parameters are described in Table III.3.
+
+**Table III.3 – Set priority parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|---------------------|---------|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------|
+| sliceId | String | 6b699c12-d154-49ed-8922-f578e108f818 | YES | Unique ID of the NS associated to QoS. |
+| priorityValue | Integer | 1, 2, 3...9 | YES | Identify the priority value identity. |
+
+##### Request example
+
+In the following an example is reported for the setting of the priority parameter (1) given the String value.
+
+```
+curl -X PUT http://localhost:8082/slicenet/ctrlplane/qos/v1/qos-instance//set_priority?priorityValue=1
+```
+
+Success response:
+
+HTTP/1.1
+
+200 OK
+
+Error response:
+
+HTTP/1.1
+
+400 BadRequest
+
+### III.2 Example usage of NF config control
+
+The NF Config CPS exposes APIs for the following operations to its service consumers:
+
+- Set NF configuration, to allow addition, update and removal of configuration as described in Table III.4.
+
+**Table III.4 – NF config supported operations**
+
+| Endpoint | /function/{sliceid}/{operation}" |
+|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Request | POST/PUT/DELETE |
+| Request body | A JSON array with configuration items as presented in Table III.5. |
+| Consumes | application/json |
+| Produces | — |
+| Response body | — |
+| Return codes | 200, 404 if the operation does not exist |
+
+The body of the request is structured as presented in Table III.5.
+
+**Table III.5 – NF config body request structure**
+
+| Field | Type | Details |
+|-------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Name | String | The name of one of the parameters of the operation. It is the same as the key defined in the operation descriptor. |
+| Value | String | The current value to be applied for the parameter under the above name. |
+| Unit | String | An optional unit identifier for numeric parameters. |
+
+### III.3 Example usage of IPC control
+
+The IPC CPS exposes APIs for the following operations to its service consumers:
+
+- Provision of interPoP Connections, to create a new interPoP connection among two or more PoPs where the NFs (i.e., VNFs and MEC applications) of a given NS have been deployed and provisioned.
+
+This operation interconnects two NFs in an NS between PoPs intra single domain, through an interPoP connection descriptor representing the Backhaul software defined networking (SDN) network between infrastructure pillars.
+
+[PUT] ../ipc/v1/ipc-instance/{sliceId}/provision\_interpop\_connections
+
+#### Example usage:
+
+url: http://localhost:8081/slicenet/ctrlplane/ipc/v1/ipc-instance/{sliceId}/provision\_interpop\_connections
+
+#### URL parameters:
+
+operationId: provisionInterpopConnections
+
+The interPoP connections object table contains the specific NS identifier and the list of interPoP paths to interconnect.
+
+The provision of interPoP connection parameters are described in Table III.6.
+
+**Table III.6 – Provision of interPoP connection parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|----------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------|
+| sliceId | string | 6b699c12-d154-49ed-8922-f578e108f818 | YES | Unique ID of the NS associated to IPC. |
+| InterPoP_Connections | array | [InterPoP_Path1, ..., InterPoP_PathN] | YES | List of interPoP Paths. |
+
+Each interPoP\_Path table is an element of list in the interPoP connections, and it contains a set of parameters: the endPoints to interconnect and related constraints.
+
+The interPoP Path parameters are described in Table III.7.
+
+**Table III.7 – InterPoP path parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|---------------------|--------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| endPoints | object | [endPointA,endPointB] | YES | A pair of routing devices on the PoPs to interconnect through the SDN backhaul network. |
+| constraints | array | bandwidth=1GBPS | NO | Weights applied to a set of network resources, such as bandwidth and latency. |
+
+The endPoints object table contains the pair of IP addresses (either IPv4 or IPv6 format) and associated attributes of two nodes to interconnect.
+
+The endPoint parameters are described in Table III.8.
+
+**Table III.8 – endPoint parameters**
+
+| Information element | Type | Example | Mandatory | Description |
+|-----------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ipv4Address_nodeA/.
+- [b-ONAP] Open Network Automation Platform. Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## ITU-T Y.3189 (12/2025)
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+# **Network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+### Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3189
+
+# Network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Network slicing is a key IMT-2020 feature that supports heterogeneous services. Network slicing allows the IMT-2020 network operator to provide dedicated logical networks with customer-specific functionalities. In the meantime, the satellite and IMT-2020 network integration is expected to realize global three-dimensional coverage and ultra-wide-area broadband access capabilities anytime, anywhere. Specifying network slicing management and orchestration in satellite-terrestrial integration is essential.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3189 specifies requirements, overall framework, mechanisms and security considerations of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3189 | 2025-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16615 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Multi-access network, network slicing, satellite-terrestrial integration IMT-2020 network.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Overview of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration..... | 4 |
+| 7 Requirements for network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 General requirements..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Requirements of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration ..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Requirements for M&O of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration..... | 6 |
+| 8 Overall framework of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration network and M&O ..... | 6 |
+| 9 Mechanisms of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration..... | 8 |
+| 9.1 Network slicing isolation management and service assurance under satellite access ..... | 8 |
+| 9.2 M&O monitoring network performance during roaming on satellite-terrestrial integration ..... | 8 |
+| 9.3 Data processing in satellite-terrestrial integration ..... | 9 |
+| 10 Security considerations ..... | 10 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3189
+
+## Network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and mechanism of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration, as well as management and orchestration (M&O) in IMT-2020 networks and beyond. This Recommendation covers the following aspects:
+
+- Requirements of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond;
+- Overall framework of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration, and M&O, in IMT-2020 networks and beyond;
+- Mechanisms of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond;
+- Security considerations.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [[ITU-T Y.3101](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3160](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3160 (2023), *Architectural framework of end-to-end service level objective guarantee for future networks including IMT-2020*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3200](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3200 (2022), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Requirements for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3201](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3201 (2023), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Framework for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 network slice** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: A logical network that provides specific network capabilities and network characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network slices enable the creation of customized networks to provide flexible solutions for different market scenarios which have diverse requirements, with respect to functionalities, performance and resource allocation.
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice may have the ability to expose its capabilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – The behaviour of a network slice is realized via network slice instance(s).
+
+**3.1.2 mobile network** [b-ITU-T Q.1762]: A network that provides wireless access to its services and supports mobility.
+
+**3.1.3 fixed mobile convergence** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, the capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed or mobile access technologies being used and independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.1.4 fixed, mobile and satellite convergence** [ITU-T Y.3200]: The capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used independently of the users' location.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| CDN | Content Delivery Network |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| DLT | Distributed Ledger Technology |
+| FMSC | Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Convergence |
+| GEO | Geostationary Earth Orbit |
+| HPLMN | Home Public Land Mobile Network |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| LEO | Low Earth Orbit |
+| M&O | Management and Orchestration |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NFV | Network Function Virtualization |
+| NGSO | Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit |
+| NSSAI | Network Slicing Selection Assisted Indicator |
+| NSSP | Network Slice Service Provider |
+| PDU | Protocol Data Unit |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SDN | Software Defined Networking |
+| SEPP | Security Edge Protection Proxy |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SLO | Service Level Objective |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| TA | Tracking Area |
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------|
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| URLLC | Ultra Reliable and Low Latency Communication |
+| VPLMN | Visited Public Land Mobile Network |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement needs not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+### 6.1 Introduction
+
+IMT-2020 networks and beyond is proposed to meet more challenging requirements with the high demand from the popularization and development of the Internet/Internet of things, and the increasing demand for airborne, shipborne and space relay communications. Satellite communication has entered the development stage of satellite Internet with Internet applications as its service objects. The satellite and IMT-2020 network integration are expected to realize global three-dimensional coverage and ultra-wide-area broadband access capabilities anytime, anywhere.
+
+Network slicing is a key IMT-2020 feature that supports heterogeneous services. It ensures that the resources allocated to each service can provide performance guarantees and achieve separation from other services. Network slicing allows the IMT-2020 network operator to provide dedicated logical networks (i.e., network slices) with customer-specific functionalities. A network slice, spanning all the network segments including access network (AN), transport network and core network (CN), can be dedicated to specific types of service [ITU-T Y.3101]. When a user equipment (UE) is only associated with a single dedicated network slice, the IMT-2020 network can identify the association of the UE with the network slice based on user subscription, context, service provider's policy, etc. When the UE accesses multiple network slice instances simultaneously, the UE requests the network to additionally assist the network slice selection process according to UE's information (e.g., UE location).
+
+Therefore, combining with the scenarios and requirements for satellite-terrestrial integration network defined in [ITU-T Y.3200], developing a Recommendation for network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration is essential.
+
+First, fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) scenarios (e.g., remote areas with low-speed land networks, remote Internet of things (IoT)/industrial networks, cross-operator roaming, disaster recovery) have diverse quality of service (QoS) needs (e.g., ultra reliable and low latency communication (URLLC) for industrial services, massive connectivity for IoT) that network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration is expected to address this by customizing resource allocation, while lacking this mechanism would limit FMSC effectiveness.
+
+Second, the FMSC demands for unified/collaborative network functions (converged planes, support for satellite classes like geostationary Earth orbit (GEO)/low Earth orbit (LEO)) and enabling technologies require network slicing to support satellite-terrestrial integration to standardize resource allocation (e.g., low-latency slices with LEO) and policy control, without which converged networks would be unable to meet capability requirements.
+
+Third, to meet FMSC's requirements for security and service continuity, network slice isolation and handover procedures are benefited to address these considerations.
+
+Thus, this Recommendation aims to specify network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration by leveraging the capability of network slice to bridge scenario demands, network requirements and security mandates, enabling effective FMSC in IMT-2020 and beyond.
+
+### 6.2 Overview of network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration
+
+The satellite-ground converged network has new and complex application scenarios, with complicated and changeable business requirements. The realization of network slicing technology based on satellite-ground integration can efficiently organize network resources on demand according to various business characteristics, and form differentiated services for different users and different business scenarios. Figure 6-1 depicts the overall framework of fixed, mobile and satellite convergence in IMT-2020 networks and beyond, referred from [ITU-T Y.3201].
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ MAUE[Multi-access UE] --- SAN[Satellite access network]
+ MAUE --- MAN[Mobile access network]
+ MAUE --- FAN[Fixed access network]
+ SAN --- ICN[Interworking function]
+ MAN --- ICN
+ FAN --- ICN
+ ICN --- SBCN[Satellite-based core network]
+ ICN --- LBCN[Land-based core network]
+ SBCN --- SBDDN[Satellite-based data network]
+ SBCN --- SBSPL[Satellite-based service platform]
+ LBCN --- LBSPL[Land-based service platform]
+ LBCN --- LBDDN[Land-based data network]
+ subgraph "Satellite-based network"
+ SBCN
+ end
+ subgraph "Land-based network"
+ LBCN
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.3189(25)
+
+Figure 6-1: Overall framework of fixed, mobile and satellite convergence. The diagram illustrates a multi-access UE connected to three access networks: Satellite, Mobile, and Fixed. These networks converge into a central Interworking function block. This block is connected to two core networks: Satellite-based and Land-based. The Satellite-based core network is linked to a Satellite-based data network and a Satellite-based service platform. The Land-based core network is linked to a Land-based service platform and a Land-based data network. A dashed blue line separates the Satellite-based network (top) from the Land-based network (bottom).
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Overall framework of fixed, mobile and satellite convergence, referred from [ITU-T Y.3201]**
+
+To achieve network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration, its core capabilities are inherently dependent on the foundational framework defined in [ITU-T Y.3201]. This framework, which encompasses the overall architecture of fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC), the structure of land-based and satellite-based converged networks, and enhanced network functions (e.g., lightweight-customized network access control function (NACF), session management function (SMF) and user plane function (UPF) for satellite deployment), provides the essential infrastructure for network slicing implementation. Specifically, the land-based converged network enables satellite access to be integrated into terrestrial network slicing systems via an enhanced terrestrial core network, while the satellite-based converged network supports on-satellite network slice deployment through simplified functional core network components, both laying the terrestrial network for end-to-end satellite-terrestrial network slice service level agreement (SLA) connectivity.
+
+Building on this infrastructure, network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration should further extend its capabilities to align with the characteristics of satellite communications and the demands of FMSC. For instance, leveraging the enabling technologies outlined in [ITU-T Y.3201] (such as artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) for predicting non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) satellite trajectories and distributed ledger technology (DLT) for decentralized slice authentication),
+
+the network slicing mechanism can be enhanced to address satellite-specific challenges like high mobility, low latency and limited bandwidth. This extension ensures that the network slicing service can dynamically allocate resources across terrestrial and satellite domains. For example, assigning low-latency LEO satellite network slices to industrial IoT services or wide-coverage GEO satellite network slices to remote area communications, thereby meeting the diverse QoS requirements and scenario-specific needs (e.g., disaster recovery, cross-operator roaming) specified in [ITU-T Y.3200].
+
+Also, such complicated network slice management and orchestration are not accomplishable manually. It is necessary to introduce network autonomy capabilities to make reasonable arrangements from a global perspective. To ensure the delivery of the network slicing services and the fulfilment of the SLA, a native intelligence-based slicing SLA guarantee scheme is required. The customers of network slicing service would evaluate their experience and provide the scores together with their QoS requirements to the network operators. The network operators then can feed the collected evaluation data to appropriate artificial intelligence (AI) models to realize an intelligent guarantee of network slicing service level objective (SLO) described in [ITU-T Y.3160].
+
+Clause 7 specifies the foundation capabilities for network slice to support the satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond, and management and orchestration (M&O).
+
+# **7 Requirements for network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+### **7.1 General requirements**
+
+Generally, when prioritizing distributed heterogeneous network slices, the main concerns are factors that affect the operation of the network slices, such as running time, running network resource status, the requirements of isolation, latency and buffered packets from customers.
+
+[REQ-GR-1]: The IMT-2020 network and beyond is required to provide access resource reservation, pre-emption, guarantees and quotas.
+
+[REQ-GR-2]: The IMT-2020 network and beyond is required to provide access resource switching capabilities, fully consider the operating cycle of satellites.
+
+[REQ-GR-3]: The IMT-2020 network and beyond is required to provide timely satellite and ground access when supplementing coverage.
+
+[REQ-GR-4]: The IMT-2020 network and beyond is required to provide communication capabilities when heterogeneous network slice resources in hotspot regions are insufficient.
+
+[REQ-GR-5]: The IMT-2020 network and beyond is required to monitor the network performance during roaming on satellite-terrestrial integration.
+
+### **7.2 Requirements of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration**
+
+The IMT-2020 network is a network where multiple logical network instances, tailored to different customer-specific requirements, can be created by using network slicing.
+
+[REQ-RNS-1]: The IMT-2020 network is required to be flexible to support the various requirements in terms of application services, including specific adaptations for satellite connections that may have different latency and throughput profiles compared to terrestrial networks.
+
+[REQ-RNS-2]: The IMT-2020 network architecture is required to support multiple network slices and to allow a single user equipment (UE) to access to multiple network slices concurrently and seamlessly, accommodating for the unique characteristics of satellite communication.
+
+[REQ-RNS-3]: When a UE registers with the IMT-2020 network, accessing via satellite, the UE is required to provide information for the selection of the required network slice(s) which the UE wishes to establish one or more sessions on.
+
+[REQ-RNS-4]: The selection of the network slice for the UE access via satellite is triggered by the network access control function through its interaction with the network slice selection function.
+
+[REQ-RNS-5]: The IMT-2020 network architecture is required to support network capability exposure to enable third parties to use the capabilities provided by network slices as well as network functions, specifically accommodating services that rely on satellite data transmission characteristics.
+
+[REQ-RNS-6]: The IMT-2020 network architecture is required to provide a core network that can be commonly used by different access networks (Ans), including satellite and terrestrial, ensuring compatibility and effective resource allocation for diverse services.
+
+[REQ-RNS-7]: The IMT-2020 network architecture design is required to leverage existing techniques such as network function virtualization (NFV) [b-ETSI GS NFV 002] and software defined networking (SDN) [b-ITU-T Y.3300], specifically enabling dynamic configuration and optimization of network slices that serve satellite users in response to varying conditions and user demands.
+
+[REQ-RNS-8]: The mobility management in the IMT-2020 network architecture is required to support diverse mobility requirements, which includes tracking and managing user equipment transitioning between terrestrial and satellite networks without service interruption.
+
+[REQ-RNS-9]: The IMT-2020 network architecture design is required to support low latency requirements when the UE access via satellite.
+
+### **7.3 Requirements for M&O of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration**
+
+[REQ-RMO-1]: The M&O of IMT-2020 network is required to support management and orchestration of multiple network slices on satellite-terrestrial integration.
+
+[REQ-RMO-2]: The M&O of IMT-2020 network is required to support for efficient management and orchestration of network slices that cater to satellite connectivity.
+
+## **8 Overall framework of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration network and M&O**
+
+This clause specifies the high-level overview of network slicing technology based on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond.
+
+Figure 8-1 depicts the overall framework of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Overall framework of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond. The diagram illustrates a multi-layered network architecture. At the top, three orbital planes (Orbital plane1, Orbital plane2, Orbital planeN) are shown, each containing multiple satellites. These satellites are part of a 'Satellite-based network'. Below the satellites, a 'Network slice 1' is highlighted, which includes a 'UE' (User Equipment) and an 'Access network'. The 'Access network' is connected to a 'Land-based core network'. A central box labeled 'M&O of NS' (Management and Operation of Network Slicing) is connected to the 'Access network' and the 'Land-based core network'. The 'Land-based core network' is also labeled as a 'Land-based network'. The diagram shows the integration of satellite and terrestrial networks for network slicing.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Overall framework of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+This Recommendation specifies a method for realizing network slicing isolation and service guarantee under satellite access. The concurrent bearing of multiple slicing strategies is realized through the dynamic switching technology of the on-board core network for network slicing, i.e., the strategy of serving a satellite in one orbital plane of a network slicing instance is adjusted in real time according to the ephemeris and the position of the UE, so as to satisfy the requirements of resource isolation, quality assurance and service customization of different elements and different application scenarios.
+
+When a user accesses network slicing through a satellite, the on-board network NACF selects the satellite that the current user accesses within a time period (T1) to support network slicing 1 based on the satellite position information and ephemeris information, and if the user's access time exceeds the access time that can be provided by the satellite, then it switches to the next satellite, and inter-satellite switching is performed through the on-board NACF to the next satellite to continue to realize slicing 1. There are some pre-conditions:
+
+- There is more than one satellite in the same region at the same time.
+- The users in the same area at the same time will be prioritized to access the satellite with strong signal strength (in case of repeated coverage by multiple satellites).
+- Communication continues, the connection to the satellite will be maintained until the satellite moves out of the area.
+
+The on-board NACF and the terrestrial NACF can update the data through the core network interface, and the transmitted messages mainly include (UE position information, subscribed network slicing selection assisted indicator (NSSAI), tracking area (TA) list, UE's network slice service provider (NSSP), timer of different satellites covering the same TA, etc.).
+
+The on-board NACF can make a service judgment based on the network slice identification carried by the user to determine whether it is able to support that NSSAI. If it does support it, it starts the corresponding QoS. Then, through the SMF, it completes the identification of the corresponding UPF and passes this information to the on-board content delivery network (CDN)/cache unit. If it does not support it, the NACF returns this information to the terrestrial NACF through the enhanced interface or via the access network.
+
+There are three methods for on-board NACF switching, through the enhanced NACF interstellar enhancement interface to interact directly, or the on-board access network establishes an enhanced interface with the next NACF to pass NACF context information, or through the interstellar link between the access networks to realize the Xn port context transmission.
+
+## **9 Mechanisms of network slicing on satellite-terrestrial integration**
+
+### **9.1 Network slicing isolation management and service assurance under satellite access**
+
+This clause primarily describes the methods for achieving network slicing isolation and service assurance under satellite access. By utilizing the dynamic switching technology of network slices in the onboard core network, concurrent support for multiple network slice policies is realized. This involves real-time adjustment of the policy for a satellite in an orbital plane serving a particular network slice instance based on the ephemeris and the location of the UE, thereby meeting the requirements for resource isolation, quality assurance and service customization for different elements and application scenarios. The framework mainly supports the scenario where users access the network via satellite for the first time, without considering the deployment location of base stations. The method for network slice allocation is consistent with the process of assigning network slice identifiers through network management contracts in terrestrial networks.
+
+The process for a user to enter a specific network slice during satellite communication includes the following steps:
+
+- 1) When the satellite core network equipment receives a user session establishment request sent by the access network equipment, the user session establishment request is used to request the establishment of a session for a terminal user wishing to conduct satellite communication. The user session establishment request will contain the identifier of the desired network slice to be accessed.
+- 2) The satellite core network equipment then uses the terminal's location information and ephemeris information to select the satellite serving that network slice and establishes a session for the terminal user using the selected satellite.
+- 3) When the UE access duration exceeds the access duration that the selected satellite can provide, the satellite core network equipment will re-select the satellite that supports this network slice for the terminal user to access within a time period based on the terminal user's location information and ephemeris information.
+- 4) When determining the satellite serving this network slice, it mainly involves obtaining the UPF of the satellite serving this network slice and/or the satellite service platform.
+
+The relationship between network slices and satellites meets at least one of the following conditions:
+
+- A network slice is supported by a satellite.
+- A network slice is supported by a single bearer of a satellite.
+- A satellite supports a network slice.
+- Multiple bearers of a satellite support multiple network slices.
+
+The satellite core network equipment uses the above mapping relationships to determine the satellite supporting the network slice. The mapping relationships include the mapping relationship between network slices and satellite bearers, as well as network slices and satellites.
+
+### **9.2 M&O monitoring network performance during roaming on satellite-terrestrial integration**
+
+This clause introduces the mechanisms on monitoring network performance during roaming on satellite. When different operators provide peer-to-peer access, such as when terrestrial operator users communicate with satellite network operator users, the service experience of terrestrial operator users
+
+should not be deliberately restricted. Two methods for QoS monitoring and real-time reporting of user network service quality are proposed to ensure a satisfactory communication experience:
+
+#### 1) Method 1: Network-side reporting
+
+Terrestrial users access the network via satellite, transmitting data back to the satellite Internet's ground core network. Through roaming, the data enters the terrestrial operator's core network to reach the terrestrial user. QoS monitoring and real-time reporting are conducted at granular levels such as per UE, per node, per session, or per flow. The node could be an on-satellite access network or a satellite observation station, focusing on bandwidth, speed and latency statistics.
+
+#### 2) Method 2: Management reporting
+
+Terrestrial users access the network via satellite, transmitting data back to the satellite Internet's ground core network. Through roaming, the data enters the terrestrial operator's core network to reach the terrestrial users. The management system of both the visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) and the home public land mobile network (HPLMN) need to have interactive capabilities. The satellite operator's management system should introduce new interfaces to share bandwidth, speed, and latency statistics of satellite and terrestrial users with the terrestrial operator's management system.
+
+The specific method for network performance monitoring involves applying detection to the core network of the HPLMN to which the terminal belongs. This is particularly relevant when the terminal accesses the VPLMN via satellite. In this scenario, the HPLMN receives network performance monitoring data related to the VPLMN, which is reported by the VPLMN's core network. This monitoring data can be obtained through the HPLMN's UPF by accessing the ground UPF of the VPLMN.
+
+Before receiving the network performance monitoring data reported by the VPLMN's session management function (SMF), information sent by the SMF is received based on the security edge protection proxy (SEPP). This information is used to select the appropriate ground UPF for the terminal, and based on this ground UPF, the corresponding satellite UPF is determined.
+
+The network performance monitoring data reported by the SMF includes data obtained through the HPLMN's management system from the VPLMN's management system.
+
+The granularity of the reported data can vary, including levels such as the terminal, network node, protocol data unit (PDU) session and data flow.
+
+### 9.3 Data processing in satellite-terrestrial integration
+
+This clause introduces the mechanisms of a data processing platform on satellites, which is responsible for data interaction, storage and forwarding with onboard and ground core network functions. The platform features edge computing applications, satellite-to-ground data processing capabilities, and big data analytics functions. Through this data processing platform, dynamic optimization of onboard QoS and other network transmission metrics can be achieved to maximize the efficient use of satellite resources and ensure the quality of user experience.
+
+This data processing mechanism is primarily applied in satellite-based data processing platforms. The main method involves obtaining pre-set QoS configuration information from ground core network elements and receiving QoS measurement data sent by the satellite-based core network functions. By comparing the QoS configuration information with the QoS measurement data, a comparison result is obtained. Based on this comparison result, a recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information is generated. According to this recommended update strategy, QoS parameter adjustments are executed on the satellite-based core network functions.
+
+Before generating the recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information based on the comparison result, reference information needs to be obtained. This mainly includes operational information of the satellite-based core network functions, satellite operational information, and
+
+behaviour information of satellite users. The process of generating the recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information involves using the comparison result and the reference information to formulate the strategy.
+
+According to the method described above, the execution of QoS parameter adjustments on the satellite-based core network functions based on the recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information includes sending the recommended update strategy to the terrestrial network. The terrestrial network then generates an adjustment strategy for the QoS parameters based on the recommended update strategy and executes QoS parameter adjustments on the satellite-based core network functions according to the adjustment strategy.
+
+Based on the method, the recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information is sent to the terrestrial network. The terrestrial network then generates an adjustment strategy for the QoS parameters based on this recommended update strategy. Subsequently, QoS parameter adjustments are executed on the satellite-based core network functions according to the adjustment strategy. This process includes sending the recommended update strategy for the QoS configuration information to the access management function of the terrestrial network. The access management function generates the QoS parameter adjustment strategy based on the recommended update strategy. Then, using the policy control function of the terrestrial network, the QoS parameter adjustments are executed on the network functions of the satellite-based core network.
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+The security and privacy considerations on network slicing in satellite-terrestrial integration in IMT-2020 networks and beyond should include the architecture, mechanism and procedure.
+
+In addition, the security and privacy considerations of the satellite-terrestrial integrated in IMT-2020 networks and beyond should be aligned with the Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence-Framework for IMT-2020 networks and beyond specified in [ITU-T Y.3201] and [b-ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [[b-ITU-T Q.1762](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1762/Y.2802 (2007), *Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.2701](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3100](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3300](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), *Framework of software-defined networking*.
+- [b-ETSI GS NFV 002] ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.2.1 (2014), *Network functions virtualisation (NFV); Architectural Framework*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,741 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3202 (05/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence –
+Mobility management for IMT-2020 networks
+and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3202
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Mobility management for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3202 specifies the mobility management requirements, architecture, procedures and security considerations for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) in IMT-2020 networks and beyond. FMSC is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3202 | 2023-05-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15535 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+FMSC, IMT-2020, mobility management, satellite network.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence .. | 7 |
+| 8 The architecture of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence ..... | 8 |
+| 8.1 The framework of mobility management with geostationary earth orbit positioning satellite..... | 8 |
+| 8.2 Enhancements for the framework of mobility management ..... | 9 |
+| 9 Service procedures of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence ..... | 12 |
+| 9.1 Service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite..... | 12 |
+| 9.2 Service procedures of the mobility management for the NGSO satellite ..... | 14 |
+| 10 Security considerations ..... | 19 |
+| Bibliography..... | 20 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3202
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Mobility management for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the mobility management architecture for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) in IMT-2020 networks and beyond. This Recommendation covers the following aspects:
+
+- requirements of mobility management to support FMSC;
+- the architecture of mobility management for FMSC;
+- service procedures of mobility management for FMSC.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+| | |
+|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Q.1762] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1762/Y.2802 (2007), Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), Requirements of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3130] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3130 (2018), Requirements of IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence . |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cell** [b-ITU-T Q.1741.7]: Radio network object that can be uniquely identified by a user equipment from a (cell) identification that is broadcasted over a geographical area from one UTRAN or GERAN access point. A Cell in UTRAN is either FDD or TDD mode.
+
+**3.1.2 fixed, mobile and satellite convergence** [b-ITU-T Y.3200]: The capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.1.3 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related aspects that support to provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 tracking area:** The area where user equipment can be tracked in the IMT-2020 network. The tracking area for the non-geostationary satellite orbit satellite access is the Earth fixed and preconfigured by the operator based on the geographic area.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ACK | Acknowledgement |
+| AF | Application Function |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| ASF | Authentication Server Function |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| FDD | Frequency Division Duplex |
+| FMSC | Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Convergence |
+| GEO | Geostationary Earth Orbit |
+| GERAN | Global system for mobile communications/Enhanced data rates for global system for mobile communications evolution Radio Access Network |
+| GSO | Geostationary Satellite Orbit |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 |
+| LEO | Low Earth Orbit |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NGSO | Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit |
+| NSSF | Network Slice Selection Function |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| PDU | Packet Data Unit |
+| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| RAT | Radio Access Type |
+| RRC | Radio Resource Control |
+| RRM | Radio Resource Management |
+| RSRP | Reference Signal Received Power |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| S-NACF | Satellite-Network Access Control Function |
+| SRI | Satellite Radio Interface |
+| TA | Tracking Area |
+| TDD | Time Division Duplex |
+| T-NACF | Terrestrial-Network Access Control Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------|
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+| UTRAN | Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The phrase "is required" indicates a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The phrase "is recommended" indicates a requirement that is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The phrase "can optionally" indicates an optional requirement that is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator or service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+## 6 Overview
+
+The IMT-2020 network aims to provide a wide range of telecommunication services, but in some places, such as the desert or sea, it is quite difficult to provide coverage via terrestrial networks. In addition, the terrestrial networks are too vulnerable to extreme environmental conditions, e.g., natural disasters. In contrast, satellite access networks (ANs) can have broad coverage and provide stable and reliable communication.
+
+There are two types of satellite: geostationary satellite orbit (GSO); and non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO). The rotation rate of a GSO satellite is the same as that of the Earth, meaning a GSO satellite stands still with respect to the Earth. To ground observers, the rotational period of an object in GSO orbit is equal to that of the Earth and thus appears motionless at a fixed position in the sky. On the other hand, an NGSO satellite does not stand still with respect to the Earth. Therefore, it is necessary to have a constellation of several NGSO satellites associated with handover mechanisms to ensure service continuity.
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the reference architecture for direct access with a satellite-enabled AN. The IMT-2020 network can use the reference architecture in Figure 6-1 to enable FMSC.
+
+The satellite-enabled user equipment (UE) can be Internet of things devices, fixed or mobile terminals in this architecture. The satellite equips an entire AN. The transport layer connections between an AN and the core network (CN) are over a satellite radio interface (SRI) between the on-ground CN and the onboard AN.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ A[Satellite enabled UE] --- B[Satellite enabled AN]
+ B -.->|UE-CN| C[Core network]
+ B -.->|AN-CN| C
+ C <--> D[Data network]
+
+```
+
+Y.3202(23)
+
+Figure 6-1: IMT-2020 network with satellite-enabled AN. The diagram shows a block diagram of the network architecture. On the left is a green box labeled 'Satellite enabled UE'. A solid line connects it to a green box labeled 'Satellite enabled AN'. From the 'Satellite enabled AN' box, two dashed lines labeled 'UE-CN' and 'AN-CN' connect to a green box labeled 'Core network'. A double-headed arrow connects the 'Core network' box to a green box labeled 'Data network'. The reference Y.3202(23) is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – IMT-2020 network with satellite-enabled AN**
+
+Figure 6-2 illustrates the scenario where mobile broadband services can be provided via a fixed AN, a terrestrial mobile AN or a satellite AN.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the scenario for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence in an IMT-2020 network. At the top is a cloud labeled 'IMT-2020 FMSC network'. Below it are three clouds: 'Fixed access', 'Mobile access', and 'Satellite access'. Solid lines connect each of these three clouds to the top cloud. A smartphone icon is at the bottom. Dashed lines connect the smartphone to each of the three middle clouds. A dashed line also connects the 'Fixed access' cloud to the 'Satellite access' cloud. The reference 'Y.3202(23)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Scenario for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence in an IMT-2020 network**
+
+The terrestrial network may have poor coverage in some areas, so the IMT-2020 network may provide satellite access to ensure service availability. Therefore, for UE with poor terrestrial network coverage, it shall be possible to simultaneously establish connectivity via satellite and terrestrial access to obtain network services.
+
+The NGSO satellite keeps moving around the Earth at high speed. The beam coverage area moves with the satellite, and the movement of the beam coverage area is much faster than the movement of UE. Furthermore, the size of the satellite spot is larger than that of the terrestrial cell. As a result, the mapping relationship between the satellite spot and the tracking area (TA) of the UE does not match, and the satellite access nodes in the TA list area change dynamically. Therefore, the mobility management mechanism of the NGSO satellite needs to fully consider the movement of the NGSO satellite.
+
+The handover for the FMSC system can be of the intra- or inter-satellite, feeder link switchover, between NGSO and GSO satellites, and between terrestrial and satellite access nodes type.
+
+### 1) Intra-satellite handover
+
+In the low earth orbit (LEO) satellite system, UE resides on a cell for several seconds due to the fast movement of the satellite. Within the coverage area of the same satellite, intra-satellite inter-cell handover frequently occurs when UE crosses the coverage (cell) boundary of two adjacent beams of the same satellite. The handover may be an inter-beam handover within or between base stations.
+
+Figure 6-3 shows the scenario of intra-satellite handover. In this scenario, the handover procedure frequently initiated due to the cell change for UE will introduce latency in data transmission, reducing the user experience.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the scenario for intra-satellite handover. A satellite is shown moving to the left, as indicated by the 'Direction of the satellite's movement' arrow. The satellite is connected to a Hub on the ground via a 'Feeder link'. The satellite's coverage area is divided into five overlapping 'Beam' regions. A User Equipment (UE) is shown moving from left to right, as indicated by the 'Handover' arrow. The UE is currently in the fourth beam from the left, and a dashed line labeled 'Service link' connects it to the satellite. The Hub is labeled 'Hub Y.3202(23)'.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – Scenario for intra-satellite handover**
+
+A satellite-enabled AN predicts the orbit of a satellite and decides on handover based on satellite ephemeris, radio resource control (RRC) measurement and UE location information.
+
+### 2) Inter-satellite handover
+
+The inter-satellite handover procedure is initiated when the service link is switched from the current to the adjacent satellite due to UE entering the coverage area of the adjacent satellite. Figure 6-4 shows the inter-satellite handover scenario where two satellites can belong to the same or different Earth stations.
+
+As a significant number of UEs are served by one satellite, the inter-satellite handover procedure causes many UEs to simultaneously hand over from one satellite to another, leading to a group handover of the mobility management anchor.
+
+The inter-satellite handover needs to consider the UE beam tracking and switch capability.
+
+NOTE – The UEs of a parabolic antenna spend more time switching between beams.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-4: Scenario for inter-satellite handover. The diagram shows two satellites moving from left to right, as indicated by the 'Direction of the satellite's movement' arrow. Below them is a horizontal row of ten ovals, each labeled 'Beam'. A mobile device is shown within the fifth beam from the left. Dashed lines represent the coverage area of each satellite, showing that as the left satellite moves, its coverage area shifts to the right, eventually overlapping with the right satellite's coverage area. An 'Earth station' is shown on the right, connected to the right satellite. The label 'Y.3202(23)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-4 – Scenario for inter-satellite handover**
+
+### 3) Feeder link switchover
+
+As the satellite moves, the gateway to which it is connected may no longer be able to serve and another gateway takes over. As shown in Figure 6-5, the feeder link of satellite 3 switches from the source to the target gateway at a certain time. During the handover process, all UEs operating under the satellite need to switch to the target gateway station.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-5: Feeder link switchover. The diagram illustrates a handover process for Satellite 3. Satellite 3 is shown in the center, with a dashed arrow indicating its movement. It is connected to two gateways: a 'Source gateway' (gNB1) via an 'Old feeder link' and a 'Target gateway' (gNB2) via a 'New feeder link'. Satellite 1 and 2 are on the left, and Satellite 4 and 5 are on the right. A mobile device 'UE A' is shown in a cloud-like area, connected to Satellite 3. The gateways are connected to a 'Core network' via an 'Xn' interface. The label 'Y.3202(23)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-5 – Feeder link switchover**
+
+The satellite ephemeris data contains information about the orbital trajectories of artificial satellites, which are used to describe the location and orbital behaviour of stars and other astronomical bodies. In addition, it may predict feeder link switchover occurrences and mobility management events (idle and connected mode).
+
+### 4) Handover between NGSO and GSO satellites
+
+When the GSO satellite network signal is not good, or the NGSO satellite is not covered for the UE, handover between GSO and NGSO satellites is performed. In this case, the UE is simultaneously connected to one kind of satellite and the handover is completed via the CN.
+
+### 5) Handover between the terrestrial and satellite access nodes
+
+When UE enters into discontinuous coverage of a satellite AN, it has two options: to remain in no service; or to look for an alternate radio access type (RAT) or public land mobile network (PLMN) to receive normal services. If the UE detects that it is about to move outside of network coverage in the current satellite access node based on the ephemeris information and the UE detects another available terrestrial AN, then the satellite access node is handed over to its terrestrial counterpart based on operator policy.
+
+When the handover happens, the satellite beams are moving, and there is a potential disconnect between geographical coverage, cell and TA, and registration area. Therefore, mobility management mechanisms need enhancement based on the features of the FMSC network, such as network selection, the determination of the TA for the fixed, mobile, and satellite convergence network and UE reachability management. The related mobility management functions of the IMT-2020 network, such as the location management function, handover control function and coordination management function, need to be enhanced to complete service continuity for FMSC.
+
+The mobility management of FMSC has the following characteristics based on the analysis of the above scenarios:
+
+- the impact on handover performance caused by large delay;
+- the impact on handover triggered by satellite ephemeris and terminal location information (network-based, terminal-based, or both);
+- the impact on handover caused by frequent handover.
+
+## **7 Requirements of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence**
+
+The IMT-2020 network is required to support mobility management when the UE occurs in the following cases:
+
+- crossing multi-ANs;
+- changing the type of AN;
+- crossing the coverage boundary (cell boundary) of two adjacent beams of the same NGSO satellite;
+- entering the coverage area of the adjacent NGSO satellite.
+
+Mobility management is required to support service continuity of UE when the feeder link is switched over.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide a set of signalling and control operations for mobility management. Those signalling and control operations are performed among various mobility management-related functional entities. To support FMSC in the IMT-2020 network, an operator may implement those mobility management-related functions in the CN and different ANs.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide service continuity for FMSC in the IMT-2020 network. When UE moves between the fixed, mobile and satellite ANs, support for service continuity is required in the IMT-2020 network. For session continuity between different types of ANs for FMSC in the IMT-2020 network, mobility management is also required to support coordination management.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide UE and satellite access control functions in FMSC networks.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide the functions of UE registration management and satellite registration management in FMSC networks.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide UE location management and satellite location management functions in FMSC networks.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide UE and satellite handover management functions in FMSC networks. Satellite ephemeris can accurately calculate, predict, describe, and track satellite time, position, and speed.
+
+IMT-2020 network can predict the mobility event based on the satellite ephemeris and UE location information and prepare for handover in advance.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide a mechanism taking account of the large delay, satellite ephemeris, and UE location information, etc.
+
+Mobility management is required to provide mobility restriction functionality in FMSC networks. Mobility restrictions restrict mobility handling or service access of a UE. The UE, the AN and the CN provide the mobility restriction functionality.
+
+## **8 The architecture of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence**
+
+### **8.1 The framework of mobility management with geostationary earth orbit positioning satellite**
+
+The framework of mobility management for FMSC in the IMT-2020 network with a geostationary earth orbit (GEO) positioning satellite is depicted in Figure 8-1. Multi-access UE has fixed, mobile and satellite access. Apart from the fixed and mobile ANs, the NGSO satellite AN, including the NGSO satellite gateway, is introduced. The converged CN has connections to all the ANs, including those for fixed, mobiles and NGSO satellites; it also connects to the data network. The control plane functions (including network access control function (NACF), session management function (SMF), policy control function (PCF), capability exposure function (CEF), network function registry (NFR) function, unified subscription management (USM) function, network slice selection function (NSSF), authentication server function (ASF), an application function (AF), user plane functions (UPFs, including those for access via mobiles, fixed or NGSO satellites), service plane functions, and management plane functions are included in the converged CN. The NACF mainly provides mobility management functionalities in the converged CN. The NACF is enhanced to support fixed, mobile, NGSO satellite access and fixed, mobile, and satellite convergence. The multi-access UE and converged CN have connections to the GEO positioning satellite.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Framework of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence in IMT-2020 network with GEO positioning satellite. The diagram illustrates a network architecture where a Multi-access UE (represented by a smartphone) is connected to three types of access networks: a Mobile access network (via a radio tower), a Fixed access network (via a base station), and an NGSO-satellite access network (via a satellite). The NGSO-satellite access network is connected to an NGSO-satellite gateway, which in turn connects to a Converged core network. The Converged core network is also connected to a Data network. A GEO positioning satellite is shown at the top, connected via dashed lines to the Multi-access UE, the NGSO-satellite gateway, and the Converged core network. The diagram is labeled Y.3202(23) in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Framework of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence in IMT-2020 network with GEO positioning satellite**
+
+It is recommended that multi-access UE and converged CNs have connections to the GEO positioning satellite. The accurate real-time location acquired from the GEO positioning satellite is useful in the service procedures of mobility management, including initial registration, location update, and NGSO satellite handover. The rationale for introducing the GEO positioning satellite is that the size of the NGSO satellite beam is typically larger than the size of the cell of mobile communications; therefore, to map the location of UE into cell and TA, and to provide the services requiring accurate location, an assisting positioning method has to be introduced in FMSC networks. Considering the wide use of GEO positioning satellite and related technologies, it is reasonable to introduce the GEO positioning satellite to provide the assisting positioning method to multi-access UE and converged CNs in the mobility management framework.
+
+It is recommended that the ephemeris of the NGSO satellite be stored and periodically updated in multi-access UE and converged CNs. The ephemeris of the NGSO satellite include the accurate location, trajectory and connection capabilities (including signal quality, communications data rate, communications delay and communications reliability) of the NGSO satellite. With the ephemeris of the NGSO satellite, multi-access UE can choose the best-suited NGSO satellite according to the connection capabilities of NGSO satellites in the ephemeris and accurate real-time location of UE acquired from the GEO positioning satellite. With the ephemeris of the NGSO satellite, multi-access UE can initiate the location update and NGSO satellite handover, according to the accurate location and trajectory of the NGSO satellites in the ephemeris. With the ephemeris of the NGSO satellite, the converged CN could determine the current NGSO satellite and its current beam for multi-access UE according to the accurate location and trajectory of NGSO satellites in the ephemeris and UE's accurate real-time location inserted in the registration request message.
+
+NOTE – The current NGSO satellite and its current beam for multi-access UE can also be inserted in the registration request message by the NGSO satellite, which currently serves multi-access UE.
+
+### 8.2 Enhancements for the framework of mobility management
+
+For NGSO satellites, satellite orbits are accurately determined and anticipated. Satellite beams generate a fixed pattern based on the tracking scheme and generate fixed radio coverage towards the UE. For NGSO satellites, as time goes on, the mapping between the access node and satellite beams
+
+will change. Figure 8-2 shows the relationship between the cell and TA. The cell is the coverage of the NGSO satellite, and the TA is the pre-configuration by the operator based on the geographic area. The area of the cell includes several TAs.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a satellite in orbit at the top. A dashed line forms a cone representing the satellite's coverage area, which is labeled 'CELL' at the base. Within this coverage area, four overlapping ellipses represent Tracking Areas (TAs), labeled TA1, TA2, TA3, and TA4 from left to right. The TAs are contained within the larger 'CELL' area. The reference 'Y.3202(23)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram illustrating the relationship between a satellite cell and Tracking Areas (TAs). A satellite is shown at the top, with a dashed line representing its coverage area (the cell) extending to the ground. The cell is divided into four segments labeled TA1, TA2, TA3, and TA4. The entire area covered by the satellite is labeled 'CELL'. The diagram is labeled Y.3202(23) at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – The relationship between the cell and TA in the NGSO satellite**
+
+The design consideration of mobility management for FMSC is not based on the coverage of the NGSO satellite AN because the PLMN for FMSC is larger than the PLMN for fixed, mobile convergence. For the NGSO satellite, the beam coverage provided by the AN node moves with the corresponding AN node. The relationship between the satellite spot, the TA, and the registration area assigned to UE are not static. When the IMT-2020 network triggers the paging process, the NACF sends a paging request to the AN nodes in the TA list. However, for NGSO satellites, the satellite AN nodes in the TA list change dynamically.
+
+It is recommended that the IMT-2020 network create, store and update the NGSO satellite coverage information.
+
+The NGSO satellite coverage information includes the mapping relationship between the TA and the coverage area of the NGSO satellite AN node. The NGSO satellite coverage information is required to be dynamically maintained based on the satellite ephemeris information and the TA planning information.
+
+When the IMT-2020 network creates mapping information, the satellite access node is required to report its ephemeris information and antenna parameters to the network. The ephemeris information and antenna parameters are mainly used to calculate the irradiation range of the satellite beam.
+
+When the coverage of the satellite access node is changed, the IMT-2020 network is required to update the appropriate parameters.
+
+The IMT-2020 network creates a relationship between satellite coverage and registration area tracking based on the satellite coverage and registration area tracking planning so that the NACF can find the satellite information covering the area based on the list of registration area tracking information.
+
+The mobility management functional architecture in the IMT-2020 network architecture for NGSO satellite access is shown in Figure 8-3.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-3: Mobility management related functions in IMT-2020 network architecture for NGSO satellite access. The diagram shows a network architecture with various functional blocks. A UE connects to an AN (Access Node) and a UPF (User Plane Function). The AN connects to a NACF (Network Access Control Function) and a SMF (Session Management Function). The NACF connects to a USM (User Subscription Management) and a NFR (Network Function Repository). The SMF connects to a PCF (Policy Control Function). The USM, NFR, PCF, and CEF (Core Edge Function) are connected to a NSSF (Network Slice Selection Function). The NSSF connects to an ASF (Access and Security Function). The ASF connects to a UE. The UE connects to a DN (Data Network). The diagram is divided into three regions: Location management (dashed blue box), Coordination management (dashed orange box), and Handover Control (dashed green box). The legend indicates: Location management (dashed blue box), Coordination management (dashed orange box), Handover Control (dashed green box). Y.3202(23)
+
+**Figure 8-3 – Mobility management related functions in IMT-2020 network architecture for NGSO satellite access**
+
+The NFR determines the NGSO satellite access node current coverage area based on the received ephemeris information and antenna parameters of the NGSO satellite access node. Furthermore, the NFR derives the TA of the satellite access node based on the determined current coverage area and the preconfigured TA. The NFR stores the mapping relationship between the TA and the NGSO satellite AN node coverage area. When the NACF needs to page the UE, the NACF first queries the satellite coverage information from the NFR, and determines the satellite access node identification that can currently cover the registration area tracking according to the list of registration area tracking contained in the UE registration area. The NACF gets the track area from the registration area in the UE context and sends the track area identity to the NFR. The NFR determines the related NGSO satellite access node based on the mapping information between the TA and the NGSO satellite AN node coverage area.
+
+For intra- and inter-satellite handover, the radio resource management (RRM) measurement of the NGSO satellite access node ensures the target cell is available beforehand. When the reference signal received power (RSRP) of the target cell is higher than the threshold, the access node performs the measurement report and updates the UE location to the NACF. The NACF decides whether to hand over based on UE location and ephemeris.
+
+For feeder link handover, the satellite is only connected to one access node at any time. If the feeder link is handed over, the connection with the source access node should be cut off and connected to the target access node. After the handover is prepared, the access node can perform the path switch procedure to ensure the data is lossless during handover. After receiving the path switch request from the source access node or the handover notification message from the target access node, the CN stops sending data to the source access node and starts sending data to the target access node. After the path switch, the target access node catches the data and transfers it to UE.
+
+The IMT-2020 network determines the mobility restrictions for the given UE based on UE subscription information, location or local policy. The mobility restriction may change due, for example, to UE subscription, location change and local policy. Optionally, the service area restrictions or the non-allowed area may be fine-tuned by the PCF, e.g., based on UE location and network policies. The USM is required to provide to the NACF the information about subscriber access restriction set by the operator determined:
+
+- LEO satellite access is not allowed as primary access;
+- medium Earth orbit satellite access is not allowed as primary access;
+
+- GEO satellite access is not allowed as primary access;
+- OTHERSAT (i.e., other than GEO, LEO or MEO) satellite access is not allowed as primary access.
+
+## 9 Service procedures of mobility management for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence
+
+### 9.1 Service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite
+
+With the GEO positioning satellite and the ephemeris of the NGSO satellite introduced in the mobility management framework, the mobility management service procedures for fixed mobile and NGSO satellite convergence in the IMT-2020 network are as follows. Figure 9-1 depicts the service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite, which includes initial registration, location update and NGSO satellite handover.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite. The participants involved are Multi-access UE, NGSO-satellite 1, NGSO-satellite 2, GEO positioning satellite, Fixed/mobile access network, NGSO-satellite gateway, and a Converged core network (NACF, ASF/USM). The procedures are divided into three main phases: Initial registration, Location update, and NGSO-satellite handover.
+
+**Initial registration:**
+
+- a) The multi-access UE stores and periodically updates the ephemeris of NGSO-satellites.
+- a) The NACF stores and periodically updates the ephemeris of NGSO-satellites.
+- b) The multi-access UE interacts with the ASF/USM of converged core network to complete the authentication and authorization processes.
+- c) The multi-access UE acquires its accurate real-time location from the GEO positioning satellite.
+- d) The multi-access UE chooses the best-suited access of fixed access, mobile access, and NGSO-satellite access.
+- e) The multi-access UE chooses the best-suited NGSO-satellite.
+- e) The multi-access UE initiates the registration.
+- f) The converged core network performs the initial communications establishment related operations.
+
+**Location update:**
+
+- g) The multi-access UE determines the time for location update.
+- g) The multi-access UE initiates the location update.
+- h) The converged core network performs the location update.
+
+**NGSO-satellite handover:**
+
+- i) The multi-access UE determines the time for NGSO-satellite handover.
+- i) The multi-access UE initiates the NGSO-satellite handover.
+- j) The converged core network performs the NGSO-satellite handover related operations.
+
+Y.3202(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite. The diagram involves Multi-access UE, NGSO-satellite 1, NGSO-satellite 2, GEO positioning satellite, Fixed/mobile access network, NGSO-satellite gateway, and a Converged core network (NACF, ASF/USM). The procedures are divided into three main phases: Initial registration, Location update, and NGSO-satellite handover.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Service procedures of mobility management with GEO positioning satellite and ephemeris of NGSO satellite**
+
+- Initial registration
+
+- a) The multi-access UE and the converged CN store and periodically update the ephemeris of NGSO satellites, which includes the accurate location, trajectory and connection capabilities (including signal quality, communications data rate, communications delay and communications reliability) of NGSO satellites.
+ - b) The multi-access UE interacts with the ASF/USM of the converged CN to complete the authentication and authorization processes. The converged CN recognizes the multi-access UE as a trustable UE for a period after completing the authentication and authorization processes.
+ - c) The multi-access UE acquires its accurate real-time location from the GEO positioning satellite.
+ - d) The multi-access UE looks up the ephemeris of the NGSO satellites and executes the access performance evaluation based on signal quality, communications data rate, communications delay, communications reliability and user preference to choose the best-suited access of fixed access, mobile access and NGSO satellite access.
+ - e) When NGSO satellite access is chosen, multi-access UE executes the access performance evaluation based on signal quality, communications data rate, communications delay, communications reliability and user preference to select the best-suited NGSO satellite, initiates the registration and uses voice service, message service, data service, etc. on demand. In the registration request message, multi-access UE inserts its accurate real-time location acquired from the GEO positioning satellite.
+ - f) The converged CN uses the accurate real-time location of multi-access UE inserted in the registration request message to map into cell and TA and determines the current NGSO satellite and its current beam for multi-access UE according to the accurate location and trajectory of NGSO satellites in the ephemeris and accurate real-time location of a UE inserted in the registration request message. Then the converged CN performs initial registration-related operations.
+- Location update
+ - g) Multi-access UE uses the accurate real-time location acquired from the GEO positioning satellite and the ephemeris (including the accurate location and trajectory) of the NGSO satellite to determine the time for a location update and initiates the location update with the accurate real-time location inserted in the location update request message.
+ - h) The converged CN uses the accurate real-time location of a multi-access UE inserted in the location update request message to map into the cell and TA and determines the current NGSO satellite and its current beam for the multi-access UE according to the accurate location and trajectory of NGSO satellites in the ephemeris and accurate real-time location of a UE inserted in the location update request message. Then the converged CN performs location update-related operations.
+ - NGSO satellite handover
+ - i) Multi-access UE uses the accurate real-time location acquired from the GEO positioning satellite and the ephemeris (including accurate location and trajectory) of the NGSO satellite to determine the time for NGSO satellite handover, and initiates the NGSO satellite handover with the accurate real-time location inserted in the NGSO satellite handover request message.
+ - j) The converged CN uses the accurate real-time location of multi-access UE inserted in the NGSO satellite handover request message to map into cell and TA and determines the current NGSO satellite and its current beam for the multi-access UE according to the accurate location and trajectory of NGSO satellites in the ephemeris and accurate
+
+real-time location of UE inserted in the NGSO satellite handover request message. Then the converged CN performs NGSO satellite handover-related operations.
+
+### 9.2 Service procedures of the mobility management for the NGSO satellite
+
+The mobility management procedures for NGSO satellites include UE reachability management, intra-satellite handover, inter-satellite, feeder link handover, and handover procedures between the terrestrial and satellite ANs. Detailed information flows of these procedures are described in clauses 9.2.1 to 9.2.4.
+
+#### 9.2.1 UE reachability management procedure
+
+The UE reachability management request procedure is illustrated in Figure 9-2.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AN as NGSO-satellite access node
+ participant NACF
+ participant NFR
+ NACF->>NFR: 1. Downlink Signalling
+ NACF->>NFR: 2. NFR Discovery Request
+ NFR-->>NACF: 3. NFR Discovery Response
+ Note over AN, NACF: 4. Paging procedure
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the UE reachability management procedure. It involves three main entities: NGSO-satellite access node, NACF, and NFR. The procedure consists of four steps: 1. Downlink Signalling from NACF to NFR; 2. NFR Discovery Request from NACF to NFR; 3. NFR Discovery Response from NFR to NACF; and 4. Paging procedure, which is a horizontal bar spanning the NGSO-satellite access node and NACF. The reference Y.3202(23) is noted at the bottom right.
+
+Sequence diagram of the UE reachability management procedure involving NGSO-satellite access node, NACF, and NFR.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – UE reachability management procedure**
+
+1. After the NACF receives the downlink signalling for the UE in the IDLE state, the NACF determines the registration area of UE, including the TA information from the UE context.
+2. The NACF sends the NFR discovery request message to the NFR that includes the TA identification of the UE.
+3. The NFR checks the stored mapping relationship between the registration area tracking and coverage area of the NGSO satellite access node and finds the corresponding access node. Then, the NFR sends the NFR discovery response message to the NACF, which includes the related access node information.
+4. The NACF receives the relevant access node information and initiates the paging procedure to make the UE enter the connective state.
+
+#### 9.2.2 Inter-satellite handover procedure
+
+The inter-satellite handover procedure is shown in Figure 9-3. When the RSRP of the target access node is higher than the preconfigured threshold, the access node produces the measurement report and updates the UE location to the NACF. The NACF decides whether to hand over based on UE location and ephemeris.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Source as Source access node
+ participant Target as Target access node
+ participant Core as Core network
+
+ Note over UE, Source: 0. Downlink/Uplink data
+ Note over Source, Target: 0. Downlink/Uplink data
+ Note over Source, Core: 0. Downlink/Uplink data
+ UE->>Source: 1. Measurement report
+ Note over Source: 2. Handover decision based
+Ephemeris and UE location
+ Source->>Target: 3. HO REQUIRED
+ Target->>Core: 4. HO REQUEST
+ Core->>Target: 5. HO REQUEST ACK
+ Core->>Source: 6. HO COMMAND
+ Source->>UE: 7. RRCReconfiguration
+ Note over Source, Target: 8. DL Data
+ Note over Source, Target: 9. Direct data forwarding
+ Note over Source, Core: 10. Indirect data forwarding
+ UE->>Source: 11. RRCReconfigureComplete
+ Note over Source, Target: 12. DL forwarding Data
+ Note over Source, Target: 13. UL Data
+ Target->>Core: 14. HANDOVER NOTIFY
+ Core->>Source: 15. UE CONTEXT RELEASE COMMAND
+ Source->>Core: 16. UE CONTEXT RELEASE COMPLETE
+
+```
+
+Y.3202(23)
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating Inter-satellite handover procedures between UE, Source access node, Target access node, and Core network.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – Inter-satellite handover procedures**
+
+1. The UE measures RRM and reports the result and location information to the access node.
+2. The source access node makes the handover decision based on the ephemeris, the RRM of UE and location information.
+- 3–6. After receiving the handover request from the source access node, the CN initiates the handover request procedure to the target access node. The target access node allocates corresponding resources for the UE and responds with a handover request acknowledgement (ACK) message to the CN.
+- 7–11. UE completes the RRC reconfiguration procedure. The source access node performs the data forwarding to the target access node.
+- 12–13. The UE and the target access node perform uplink and downlink data transmission.
+14. The target access node notifies the CN that UE successfully accesses the target access node.
+- 15–16. The CN notifies the source access node to release the context, and the source access node sends the confirmation message to the CN.
+
+#### 9.2.3 Feeder link handover procedure
+
+The feeder link handover procedure is illustrated in Figure 9-4. If the feeder link handover happens, the source access node's connection should be cut off and connected to the target access node.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant SAN as Source access node
+ participant TAN as Target access node
+ participant CN as Core network
+
+ Note over SAN: 1. The source access node finds that it will disconnect from the satellite based ephemeris
+ SAN-->>UE: 0. Downlink/Uplink data
+ SAN-->>TAN: 0. Downlink/Uplink data
+ SAN->>CN: 2. Feeder link HO REQUEST
+ CN->>TAN: 3. Feeder link HO REQUEST
+ TAN->>CN: 4. Feeder link HO REQUEST ACK
+ CN->>SAN: 5. Feeder link HO REQUEST ACK
+ SAN->>TAN: 6. HO REQUEST
+ CN->>TAN: 7. HO REQUEST
+ TAN->>CN: 8. HO REQUEST ACK
+ CN->>SAN: 9. HO COMMAND
+ SAN->>UE: 10. RRCReconfiguration
+ SAN-->>TAN: 11. DL Data
+ SAN-->>TAN: 12. Direct data forwarding
+ SAN-->>CN: 13. Indirect data forwarding
+ SAN->>TAN: 14. RRCReconfigureComplete
+ SAN-->>UE: 15. DL forwarding Data
+ SAN-->>TAN: 16. UL Data
+ TAN->>CN: 17. HANDOVER NOTIFY
+ CN->>SAN: 18. UE CONTEXT RELEASE COMMAND
+ SAN->>CN: 19. UE CONTEXT RELEASE COMPLETE
+
+```
+
+Y.3202(23)
+
+Sequence diagram of the Feeder link handover procedure involving UE, Source access node, Target access node, and Core network.
+
+**Figure 9-4 – Feeder link handover procedure**
+
+1. The source access nodes find that it will disconnect the satellite, and the satellite will connect the target access node based on the ephemeris information.
+- 2–3. The source access node sends the feeder link handover request message to the target access node, which includes the satellite identifier (ID) and beam list.
+- 4–5. The target access node confirms the feeder link handover request based on the ephemeris information and sends the feeder link handover request ACK to the source access node.
+6. The source access node initiates a handover preparation process to the target access node for all connected UEs under the satellite.
+- 7–8. After receiving the source access node's handover request, the CN initiates a handover request process to the target access node. The target access node allocates corresponding resources for the UE and responds with a handover request confirmation message.
+9. The CN sends the handover command to the source access node.
+
+10–14. UE completes the RRC reconfiguration procedure. Then, the source access node forwards the data to the target access node.
+
+15–16. The UE and the target access node perform uplink and downlink data transmission.
+
+17. The target access node notifies the CN that UE successfully accesses the target access node.
+
+18–19. The CN notifies the source access node to release the context, and the source access node sends the confirmation message to the CN.
+
+#### **9.2.4 Handover procedure between the terrestrial access network and satellite access network**
+
+When UE detects it is about to leave network coverage of the satellite access node and the terrestrial access node is available to access, it reports the radio condition measurements in which the UE wants to access it and includes them in the source access node. This detection can be based on the UE current location and ephemeris information.
+
+Both the source AN and the target AN have different RATs and belong to the same or different operators. The inter AN node radio access network (RAN)-NACF interface-based handover for the UE may cause serving PLMN change in this solution. Figure 9-5 shows the handover procedure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant S-RAN
+ participant T-RAN
+ participant S-NACF
+ participant T-NACF
+ participant T-UPF
+ participant SMF
+ participant S-UPF
+
+ Note over S-RAN, T-RAN: Downlink/uplink data
+ UE->>S-RAN: 0. Radio condition measurement report
+ S-RAN->>S-NACF: 1. Handover request
+ S-NACF->>T-NACF: 2. T-NACF selection
+ S-NACF->>T-NACF: 3. CreateUEContext Request
+ Note over T-NACF, SMF: 4. Session update
+ Note over T-NACF: 5. PDU handover response supervision
+ T-NACF->>T-RAN: 6. Handover Request
+ T-RAN->>T-NACF: 7. Handover Request ACK
+ T-RAN->>S-RAN: 8. Handover Command
+ Note over UE: UE synchronizes to new cell
+ UE->>T-RAN: 9. Handover Confirm
+ Note over S-RAN, T-RAN: Uplink data
+ T-RAN->>T-NACF: 10. Handover Notify
+ Note over T-NACF, SMF: 11. Session Update Request
+ Note over SMF, S-UPF: Session modification
+ T-NACF->>SMF: 12. Session Update Response
+ Note over S-RAN, T-RAN: Downlink data
+ Note over UE, S-RAN, T-RAN, S-NACF, T-NACF, T-UPF, SMF, S-UPF: Registration procedure
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the handover procedure between terrestrial and satellite access networks. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, S-RAN, T-RAN, S-NACF, T-NACF, T-UPF, SMF, and S-UPF. The procedure includes steps from radio condition measurement to session update and registration.
+
+Y.3202(23)
+
+**Figure 9-5 – Handover procedure between the terrestrial and satellite access networks**
+
+0. When UE detects that it is about to leave network coverage of the satellite AN and the terrestrial AN is available, it reports to the source access node the radio condition measurements in which the UE wants terrestrial access. This detection can be based on UE current location and ephemeris information of the satellite.
+
+1. Triggered by the radio condition measurements report, the source access node determines whether to hand over based on the available AN. The source access node sends a handover request message to the source NACF and provides the access node information created by the source access node. The handover required message shall include all the packet data unit (PDU) sessions handled by the source access node, indicating which PDU session(s) are requested by the source access to handover.
+
+2. When the S-NACF can no longer serve the UE, the S-NACF selects the T-NACF.
+
+3. The S-NACF sends the create UE context request message to the target NACF to initiate the handover resource allocation procedure.
+
+4. The T-NACF sends a PDU session update request to the associated SMF for each PDU session indicated by the source access node.
+5. T-NACF supervises the PDU session update response messages from the SMFs involved.
+6. T-NACF sends the handover request to the target access node.
+7. The target access node sends the handover request ACK to T-NACF.
+8. S-NACF sends a handover command to the source access node including the target access node information. The target access node information is provided to the UE by the source access node using a handover command.
+9. After the UE has successfully synchronized to the target cell, it sends a handover confirm message to the T-RAN. Handover is considered successful by the UE with this message.
+10. T-RAN sends a handover notify message to T-NACF. Handover is considered successful in T-RAN with this message.
+11. T-NACF sends a session update request to the SMF indicating handover complete for a PDU session. A handover complete is sent for each PDU session to the corresponding SMF to indicate the success of the handover. T-NACF also uses UE registration to register itself as the serving NACF with the USM.
+12. SMF sends a session update response with PDU session ID to T-NACF to confirm receipt of handover complete.
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+The FMSC in the IMT-2020 network is required to be aligned with the security requirements contained in [ITU-T Q.1762] and the requirements of security and personal data protection contained in [ITU-T Y.3101], with the following additions.
+
+- The FMSC in the IMT-2020 network is required to provide mechanisms to support data confidentiality and integrity for fixed, mobile and satellite ANs.
+- The FMSC in the IMT-2020 network is required to provide secure storage, handling and enforcement of policies.
+- The FMSC in the IMT-2020 network is required to provide a security coordination function [ITU-T Y.3130] to coordinate security policies of each AN.
+- The FMSC in the IMT-2020 network is required to meet the specific requirements based on each country's policy.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1741.7] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1741.7 (2011), *IMT-2000 references to release 9 of GSM-evolved UMTS core network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3200] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3200 (2022), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Requirements for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3217 (04/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Peer-to-peer services for IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3217
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Peer-to-peer services for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks can provide several benefits in fixed mobile satellite convergence (FMSC) network for providing IMT-2020 networks and beyond services including distributed data processing and content caching. FMSC is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3217 specifies the peer-to-peer services in FMSC network for IMT-2020 networks and beyond, focusing on general consideration, requirements, functional architecture, workflow and security considerations.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3217 | 2025-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16305 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Content sharing, FMSC, IMT-2020, peer-to-peer services.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3218 (04/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence –
+Service scheduling for IMT-2020 networks and
+beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3218
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Service scheduling for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Service scheduling in fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) networks is the network capability to process information reported from the applications, networks and user equipment (UE) to determine service-scheduling policies in the converged core network, and then steer, split and switch service flow or UE handover among these accesses based on policies. FMSC is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3218 specifies the service scheduling in FMSC networks for IMT-2020 networks and beyond, focusing on overview, requirements, framework, network function enhancements, procedures and security considerations.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3218 | 2025-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16306 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+FMSC, IMT-2020, satellite network, service scheduling.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview of service scheduling in FMSC networks ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of service scheduling in FMSC networks..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Requirements of MUE..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Requirements of access networks..... | 4 |
+| 7.3 Requirements of the converged core network ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Framework of service scheduling in FMSC networks ..... | 5 |
+| 9 Network function enhancements of service scheduling in FMSC networks..... | 5 |
+| 9.1 Enhancements to the core network control plane..... | 5 |
+| 9.2 Enhancements to the core network user plane ..... | 7 |
+| 10 Procedures of service scheduling in FMSC networks ..... | 8 |
+| 11 Security considerations ..... | 9 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3218
+
+## Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Service scheduling for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the service scheduling for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) in IMT-2020 networks and beyond. Service scheduling in FMSC networks is the network capability to process information reported from the applications, networks and user equipment (UE), to determine service-scheduling policies in the converged core network, and then steer, split and switch service flow or UE handover among these accesses based on policies. FMSC is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used.
+
+The following aspects of service scheduling in FMSC networks are addressed in this Recommendation:
+
+- Overview;
+- Requirements;
+- Framework;
+- Network function enhancements;
+- Procedures;
+- Security considerations.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a standalone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [[ITU-T Y.3135](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3135 (2021), *Service scheduling to support fixed-mobile convergence in the IMT 2020 network*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3200](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3200 (2022), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Requirements for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3201](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3201 (2023), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Framework for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3204](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3204 (2023), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Service continuity for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 fixed, mobile and satellite convergence** [ITU-T Y.3200]: The capabilities that provide services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used independently of the users' location.
+
+**3.1.2 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related aspects that support to provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.3 network function** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, a processing function in a network.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 multi-access user equipment (MUE)**: User equipment which can support accessing two or more access networks simultaneously under the control of a network enhanced for multi-access capability.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------------|
+| AF | Application Function |
+| ASF | Authentication Server Function |
+| CHF | Charging Function |
+| FMSC | Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Convergence |
+| GSO | Geostationary Satellite Orbit |
+| MUE | Multi-access User Equipment |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NFR | Network Function Registry function |
+| NGSO | Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit |
+| NSSF | Network Slice Selection Function |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management function |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement needs not be present to claim conformance.
+
+## 6 Overview of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+Service scheduling in FMSC networks is the network capability to process information reported from applications, networks and UE to determine service-scheduling policies in the converged core network, then steer, split and switch service flow or UE handover among these accesses based on policies. In FMSC networks, due to the involvement of the satellite access, service flows will then have more choices. To guarantee service continuity and quality of service (QoS), service-scheduling policies are necessary. By the enhancements of the network functions, the converged core network is able to produce the service scheduling policy, which the network will execute smoothly. Figure 6-1 depicts the overview of service scheduling in FMSC networks.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture for service scheduling in FMSC networks. At the top, a box labeled "Applications" contains icons for various services: Computer, Laptop, Smartphone, Folder, Like, Gallery, Search, Premium quality, Touch screen, Click, Male avatar, Female avatar, Email, Inbox, and Services. A blue bracket labeled "Converged core network" connects this box to a row of four boxes: "Control plane functions", "User plane functions", "Service plane functions", and "Management plane functions". Below these is a box labeled "Access networks" containing icons for "Mobile access", "Fixed access", and "Satellite access". Dashed lines connect the "User plane functions" and "Service plane functions" boxes to the "Access networks" box. At the bottom is a box labeled "User equipment" containing icons for a smartphone and a laptop. Dashed lines connect the "Mobile access" and "Satellite access" boxes to the "User equipment" box. A reference code "Y.3218(25)" is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 6-1: Overview of service scheduling in FMSC networks. The diagram illustrates the flow from Applications to User equipment through the Converged core network and Access networks.
+
+Figure 6-1 – Overview of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+## 7 Requirements of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+In order to realize the service scheduling in FMSC networks for IMT-2020 networks and beyond, the MUE, the access network and the converged core network provide the corresponding abilities.
+
+### **7.1 Requirements of MUE**
+
+The MUE provides the capabilities for service scheduling in FMSC networks, as follows:
+
+- It is required that the MUE support the capability of storing the service-scheduling policy and the service-scheduling commands, which are generated by the converged core network, for sending service data to different access networks.
+
+NOTE – Service-scheduling commands are generated by the network access control function (NACF), according to the service-scheduling policy. The NACF will use the commands to indicate to the MUE the bearer access network used by different priorities of services.
+
+- It is required that the MUE support process and conduct the service-scheduling commands.
+
+### **7.2 Requirements of access networks**
+
+Access networks provide the capabilities for service scheduling in FMSC networks, as follows:
+
+- It is required that the access network support the service-scheduling procedure between fixed – mobile, fixed – satellites, mobile – satellites, satellite – satellite, fixed – mobile – satellites, and other scenarios.
+- It is required that the access network support UE handover for all service flows from one access to another based on service-scheduling policies/commands.
+- It is required that the access network support policies/commands transmitted to MUE for executing service scheduling.
+- It is recommended that the access network support service-scheduling policy/command execution in real-time mode or non real-time mode, which is decided by the converged core network.
+- It is required that the access network support service continuity during handover between different access networks, according to the service-scheduling policy.
+- It is recommended that the access network support synchronizing the access information and its resource situation to the converged core network for service-scheduling execution.
+
+### **7.3 Requirements of the converged core network**
+
+Service scheduling in FMSC networks is executed by network functions in the converged core network, as a method of information transmission.
+
+The converged core network provides the capabilities for service scheduling in FMSC networks as follows:
+
+- It is required that the converged core network support service-scheduling policy generation and synchronize it to the MUE.
+- It is recommended that the converged core network determine the service communication capability class of each type of service (voice, video, data, and message), according to the users' subscribed information and the QoS requirements corresponding to the various service types available to the UE.
+- It is recommended that the converged core network recognize the access network types and the corresponding empirical information from the MUE and access networks.
+- It is recommended that the converged core network analyse the traffic load of access networks in real-time or non real-time mode, for assisting service-scheduling policy generation.
+- It is required that the converged core network balance the traffic load among different access networks.
+
+- It is required that the converged core network support service-scheduling command generation based on the service-scheduling policy, and synchronize the service-scheduling commands to the MUE.
+
+## 8 Framework of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+As depicted in Figure 8-1, the framework of service scheduling in FMSC networks consists of UE, access networks, converged core network and the applications. There will be enhancements of MUE, access networks, control plane functions and user plane functions to support service scheduling in FMSC network.
+
+The converged core network includes NACF, session management function (SMF), policy control function (PCF), charging function (CHF), network function registry function (NFR), network slice selection function (NSSF), authentication server function (ASF) / unified subscription management function (USM) and user plane function (UPF).
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Framework of service scheduling in FMSC networks. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top, 'Application functions' and 'Data network' connect to a large green box representing the 'Converged core network with enhanced network functions'. Inside this box, several network functions are shown: ASF/USM (orange), PCF, NACF, NSSF, SMF, NFR, CHF, and UPF (green). These are interconnected with lines. To the right of the core network is a vertical box for 'Network management'. Below the core network is a grey box representing access networks, containing 'Satellite access network (NGSO)', 'Satellite access network (GSO)', 'Mobile access network', and 'Fixed access network'. A red text label 'Different services transmitted by different access types' is placed near these access networks. At the bottom, the 'MUE' (Multi-User Equipment) is shown, connected via dashed lines to the access networks and the core network. A reference 'Y.3218(25)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Framework of service scheduling in FMSC networks**
+
+## 9 Network function enhancements of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+### 9.1 Enhancements to the core network control plane
+
+Service scheduling needs enhancements of the control plane in the converged core network, which is a control method of access. The control plane and corresponding network entities (e.g., NACF, SMF, and PCF) in the core network support three access types, namely, fixed access, mobile access and satellite access.
+
+#### 9.1.1 Enhancements to NACF
+
+- NACF is required to receive and distinguish the access information, which is sent by the MUE and access networks.
+
+NOTE 1 – Access information includes access network types and their empirical values.
+
+NOTE 2 – Empirical values include empirical data rate, accessible signal strength, accessible signal coverage information and so on.
+
+- NACF is required to synchronize the access information to other network entities for generating the service-scheduling policy.
+- NACF is required to confirm the target access networks, according to the service-scheduling policy.
+- NACF is required to generate the service-scheduling commands based on the service-scheduling policy and synchronize them to the MUE.
+- NACF is required to select the candidate access network types from the available access network types, which can satisfy the service requirement of the service communication capability class.
+- NACF is required to select the candidate access network types for each service communication capability class of each service type.
+- NACF is required to select the candidate access network types according to the empirical values for each access network type which is accessible for the MUE.
+
+NOTE 3 – Available access network types are selected to satisfy the service requirements corresponding to the service communication capability class.
+
+NOTE 4 – The examples of service type include voice and video communication service, data service, and vertical industry service [ITU-T Y.3204].
+
+NOTE 5 – The examples of voice and video communication service capability classes include Class 1 (low data rate), Class 2 (medium data rate), and Class 3 (high data rate) [ITU-T Y.3204].
+
+NOTE 6 – The examples of data service capability classes include super speed, high speed, middle speed, and low speed [ITU-T Y.3204].
+
+- NACF is required to send the service data to the MUE according to the service-scheduling policy.
+- NACF is required to support load balancing among access networks based on service-scheduling policies that steer, split and switch service flow.
+
+#### **9.1.2 Enhancements to PCF**
+
+- PCF is required to generate service-scheduling policies according to access information, which will indicate the priorities of access networks for service types corresponding to their service communication capability class.
+- PCF is recommended to generate network policies based on service-scheduling policy recommendations from the service-scheduling management module.
+
+NOTE 1 – The service-scheduling management module is an application function (AF) which can analyse information from various parties and generate service-scheduling policy recommendations.
+
+- PCF is required to prioritize the candidate access network types to generate the service-scheduling policy for service flow steering, splitting and switching.
+
+NOTE 2 – The candidate access network types are prioritized by their access network resource conditions and the access network empirical values.
+
+- PCF is required to determine the different service communication capability classes for different service types, according to the QoS requirements of various service types in users' subscription information.
+- PCF is required to get the available service types and their QoS requirements of the MUE from users' subscription information in USM.
+- PCF is required to negotiate with the CHF to generate corresponding service-scheduling policies.
+
+#### 9.1.3 Enhancements to USM
+
+- USM is required to send the subscription information to the NACF for selecting the candidate access networks.
+- USM is required to determine the various types of available service according to users' subscription information.
+- USM is required to determine or update service-scheduling restriction information through local settings or interaction with external monitoring platforms, so that the availability of the access network types and traffic transmission network types of the MUE can be determined during authentication.
+
+#### 9.1.4 Enhancements to SMF
+
+- The SMF is required to map the service-scheduling policy of the core network control plane to a policy file or user plane signalling that can be understood by the user plane, and forward the policy file or deliver related service-scheduling commands to the user plane.
+
+NOTE 1 – The policy file or user plane signalling described here is mapped with the service-scheduling policy from the PCF. The SMF itself does not generate service-scheduling policies. The SMF supports mapping service-scheduling policies to another form that can be understood by the user plane.
+
+NOTE 2 – User plane signalling mapped from service-scheduling policies can be expressed in short characters. The policies corresponding to these characters have been pre-configured in the user plane function. Some common scheduling policies can be pre-configured on the user plane. The SMF sends user plane signalling to trigger these policies. In this way, the signalling transmission pressure between the SMF and the user plane can be reduced to a certain extent. Pre-configuring the corresponding policy on the UPF is unnecessary if the SMF directly delivers the policy file.
+
+- The SMF is recommended to receive service traffic reports from the user plane and share the information with the service-scheduling management module.
+- SMF is required to select the UPF according to user service requirements, such as real-time and continuous.
+- SMF is required to forward the traffic statistics result reported by the UPF to the CHF.
+
+#### 9.1.5 Enhancements to CHF
+
+- The CHF is required to process the received service statistics results in a unified manner, or separate some service statistics results and send them to other charging systems.
+- CHF is required to support the negotiation with PCF.
+
+#### 9.1.6 Enhancements to authentication server function (ASF)
+
+- ASF is required to support service scheduling authentication for MUE to limit the availability of the access network types and transmission network types.
+
+### 9.2 Enhancements to the core network user plane
+
+The user plane of the converged core network provides the capabilities for service scheduling in FMSC network as follows:
+
+- UPF is required to communicate with the multi-access network, including fixed access, mobile access and satellite access.
+- UPF is required to detect the service status of the application layer through deep packet detection, and directly trigger the service scheduling process based on the perceived information, or report to the core network control plane to help generate service-scheduling policies.
+
+- UPF is required to transfer and identify service flows according to the policy file or the user plane signalling from the control plane, when service flows are steered, split and switched between multiple accesses.
+- UPF is required to identify and collect statistics on the service flows transmitted through different access network types according to the policy file or user plane signalling from the control plane when service flows are steered, split and switched between multiple accesses.
+- UPF is required to report the identification and statistics of traffic of different access network types to the SMF for subsequent charging procedures.
+
+## 10 Procedures of service scheduling in FMSC networks
+
+Figure 10-1 depicts the procedures of service scheduling in FMSC networks.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE
+ participant AN1 as Access network type 1
+ participant AN2 as Access network type 2
+ participant NACF
+ participant SMF
+ participant UPF1
+ participant UPF2
+ participant PCF
+ participant ASFUSM as ASF/USM
+
+ Note over MUE, NACF: 1. MUE sends registration request to NACF through one access network, which could be accessed, and reports other accessible network information
+ Note over NACF, ASFUSM: 2. Authentication and NACF get subscription information
+ Note over NACF: 3. NACF determines candidate access networks according to subscription information and MUE reported in step 1
+ Note over NACF, SMF: 4. NACF sends candidate access networks and their access information to SMF. SMF synchronizes the information to PCF for generating service-scheduling policy
+ Note over PCF, ASFUSM: 5. PCF generates the service-scheduling policy according to access information and subscription information (e.g., QoS of different services)
+ Note over PCF, SMF: 6. PCF sends the service-scheduling policy to SMF
+ Note over SMF, NACF, UPF1, UPF2: 7. SMF stores and synchronizes the service-scheduling policy with NACF and UPF
+ Note over UPF1, UPF2: 8. UPF stores the service-scheduling policy for selecting the access network
+ Note over NACF, MUE: 9. NACF generates the service-scheduling commands according to received service-scheduling policy and sends them to MUE
+ Note over MUE: 10. MUE stores the service-scheduling commands for selecting the access network
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedures of service scheduling in FMSC networks. The diagram involves MUE, Access network type 1, Access network type 2, NACF, SMF, UPF1, UPF2, PCF, and ASF/USM. The steps are: 1. MUE sends registration request to NACF through one access network, which could be accessed, and reports other accessible network information. 2. Authentication and NACF get subscription information. 3. NACF determines candidate access networks according to subscription information and MUE reported in step 1. 4. NACF sends candidate access networks and their access information to SMF. SMF synchronizes the information to PCF for generating service-scheduling policy. 5. PCF generates the service-scheduling policy according to access information and subscription information (e.g., QoS of different services). 6. PCF sends the service-scheduling policy to SMF. 7. SMF stores and synchronizes the service-scheduling policy with NACF and UPF. 8. UPF stores the service-scheduling policy for selecting the access network. 9. NACF generates the service-scheduling commands according to received service-scheduling policy and sends them to MUE. 10. MUE stores the service-scheduling commands for selecting the access network.
+
+Y.3218(25)
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Procedures of service scheduling in FMSC networks**
+
+- 1) MUE sends registration request to NACF through one access network, which is selected by MUE, and reports access information of other accessible networks (e.g., access network types and their empirical values) to the converged core network.
+- 2) The convergence core network finishes the authentication procedure if necessary, and NACF gets subscription information at the same time to confirm which access networks are allowed according to the subscription information.
+- 3) NACF determines candidate access networks according to subscription information and the information MUE reported in step 1.
+- 4) NACF sends the candidate access networks and their access information to SMF; SMF then synchronizes the information with PCF to generate the service-scheduling policy.
+- 5) PCF generates the service-scheduling policy according to access information and users' subscription information (e.g., service types and QoS for different services). The service-
+
+scheduling policy includes service communication capability classes and access network priorities corresponding to the service communication capability classes. The transmission priorities of service communication capability classes are listed in Table 10-1.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of service communication capability classes are as follows. MUE1 subscription information includes services of voice, video, data, and message. Based on [ITU-T Y.3204], its service communication capability classes could be defined:
+
+- Voice communication capability classes include voice Class 1 (voice of low data rate), voice Class 2 (voice of medium data rate), and voice Class 3 (voice of high data rate).
+- Video communication capability classes include video Class 1 (video of low data rate), video Class 2 (video of medium data rate), and video Class 3 (video of high data rate).
+- Data service capability classes include data Class 1 (low data rate), data Class 2 (medium data rate), data Class 3 (high data rate), and data Class 4 (super data rate).
+- Message service capability classes include message Class 1 (message of high time delay), and message Class 2 (message of low time delay).
+
+NOTE 2 – An example of service-scheduling policy generation is as follows: MUE 1 supports fixed access, IMT-2000 mobile access, IMT-Advanced mobile access, IMT-2020 mobile access, and non-geostationary satellite orbit (NGSO) satellite access. PCF generates the service-scheduling policy for MUE1 according to its supported access network types and their access information and the service communication capability classes.
+
+**Table 10-1 – Transmission priorities of service communication capability classes**
+
+| Class | Transmission priority |
+|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Voice/video Class 3 | IMT-2020 mobile access, IMT-Advanced mobile access |
+| Voice/video Class 2 | IMT-Advanced mobile access, IMT-2020 mobile access |
+| Voice Class 1 | IMT-2000 mobile access, IMT-Advanced mobile access, NGSO satellite access, IMT-2020 mobile access |
+| Video Class 1 | IMT-Advanced mobile access, NGSO satellite access, IMT-2020 mobile access |
+| Data Class 4 | Fixed access, IMT-2020 mobile access |
+| Data Class 3 | Fixed access, IMT-Advanced mobile access, IMT-2020 mobile access |
+| Data Class 2 | IMT-Advanced mobile access, fixed access, NGSO satellite access |
+| Data Class 1 | NGSO satellite access, fixed access, IMT-Advanced mobile access |
+| Message Class 2 | IMT-2020 mobile access, IMT-Advanced mobile access |
+| Message Class 1 | IMT-2000 mobile access, NGSO satellite access, IMT-Advanced mobile access |
+
+- 6) PCF sends the service-scheduling policy to SMF.
+- 7) SMF stores and synchronizes the service-scheduling policy with NACF and UPF.
+- 8) UPF stores the service-scheduling policy for selecting the access network for different mobile-terminated services.
+- 9) NACF generates the service-scheduling commands according to the received service-scheduling policy and sends them to MUE.
+- 10) MUE stores the service-scheduling commands for selecting the access network for different mobile-originated services.
+
+## **11 Security considerations**
+
+The security and privacy considerations on service scheduling for FMSC in IMT-2020 networks and beyond include the following aspects:
+
+- 1) Network security
+
+- Network signalling and entity security.
+
+The network signalling related to service scheduling should be protected from leakage, tampering, and misuse by access control, authentication and authorization, transmission security, digital certificates and other technologies.
+
+The network entities related to service scheduling should provide effective business logic security, and protocol security. Network entities should support security reinforcement, remote access control and prevent the illegal intrusion of network resources.
+
+- Network operation security
+
+The network operations related to service scheduling should not influence the network functionalities, including the network functions and signalling interaction. In addition, the network operations related to service scheduling should support operation certification, interface communication confidentiality and integrity protection.
+
+###### 2) User privacy
+
+The privacy protection mechanisms need to be supported in MUE, the access network, and converged core network, which could store, cache and process user data related to privacy.
+
+In addition, the security and privacy considerations on service scheduling for FMSC should be aligned with the requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3200], [b-ITU-T Y.3101] and [b-ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.2701](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3100](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3101](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3222 (10/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence –
+Functional requirements and functional
+architecture of the transformer model based
+unified control entity**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3222
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Functional requirements and functional architecture of the transformer model based unified control entity
+
+## Summary
+
+One of the solutions to the unified control problems is the transformer-model-based control entity. When network control functions are implemented with the aid of a transformer model, the following advantages can be achieved: unified network control of the whole network, high extensibility, lower implementation cost, a unified interface and better end-to-end service. Therefore, it is a good solution for network control functions to be converged with transformer-model-related technologies; and it is beneficial and appropriate to implement network control functions based on the transformer model.
+
+Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3222 specifies the basic model, functional requirements, functional architecture and interfaces of the transformer-model-based unified control entity (TUCE) for FMSC networks and other heterogeneous networks.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3222 | 2025-10-28 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16458 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Control entity, FMSC, IMT-2020, transformer model.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 10.3 Southbound interfaces of TUCE ..... | 15 |
+| 10.4 Horizontal interfaces of TUCE..... | 15 |
+| 11 Security considerations ..... | 16 |
+| Appendix I – Use cases of TUCE ..... | 18 |
+| I.1 Use Case#1 Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence ..... | 18 |
+| I.2 Use Case#2 Hybrid access network ..... | 18 |
+| I.3 Use Case#3 Service setting for software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) ..... | 19 |
+| I.4 Use Case#4 End-to-End configuration for deterministic networking ..... | 19 |
+| Appendix II – Application scenarios of TUCE in FMSC ..... | 21 |
+| II.1 Overview of application scenarios of TUCE in FMSC..... | 21 |
+| II.2 Functional optimizing of TUCE..... | 22 |
+| Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3222
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Functional requirements and functional architecture of the transformer model based unified control entity
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the functional requirements and functional architecture of the transformer-model-based unified control entity (TUCE) for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) network and other heterogeneous networks.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- The introduction of a unified control function for FMSC;
+- The basic model of TUCE;
+- The functional requirements of TUCE;
+- The functional architecture of TUCE;
+- The interfaces of TUCE;
+- Security consideration.
+
+Some relevant use cases and scenarios are provided in Appendix I and Appendix II.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [[ITU-T Y.3101](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3131](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3131 (2019), *Functional architecture for supporting fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3134](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3134 (2020), *IMT-2020 fixed mobile convergence functional requirements for management and orchestration*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3200](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3200 (2022), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Requirements for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3201](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3201 (2023), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Framework for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3300](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), *Framework of software-defined networking*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 deep learning (DL)** [b-ITU-T F.748.12]: A representation learning method, used to model high-level abstractions in data through the use of model architectures, which comprise multiple nonlinear transformations.
+
+**3.1.2 machine learning (ML)** [b-ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed.
+
+NOTE 1 – This definition is adapted from [b-ETSI GR ENI 004].
+
+NOTE 2 – Supervised machine learning and unsupervised machine learning are two examples of machine learning types.
+
+**3.1.3 network virtualization** [b-ITU-T Y.3011]: A technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collection of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 transformer model:** A deep learning architecture model that can automatically transform one type of input into another type of output.
+
+NOTE – The transformer model relies on an attention mechanism to draw global dependencies between input and output. The attention mechanism looks at an input sequence and decides, at each step, which other parts of the sequence are important.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| BSS | Business Support System |
+| CP | Control Plane |
+| DL | Deep Learning |
+| EMS | Element Management System |
+| FMC | Fixed Mobile Convergence |
+| FMSC | Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Convergence |
+| IMT | International Mobile Telecommunications |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| MP | Management Plane |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NMS | Network Management System |
+| OSS | Operation Support System |
+| SD-WAN | Software-Defined Wide Area Network |
+| TUCE | Transformer-model-based Unified Control Entity |
+| UNIC | Unified Network Integrated Cloud |
+| UP | User Plane |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Introduction of unified control function for fixed, mobile and satellite convergence
+
+Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used, as specified in [ITU-T Y.3201]. The requirements and framework of FMSC are described in [ITU-T Y.3200] and [ITU-T Y.3201], respectively.
+
+Regarding the above, different access technologies such as fixed, mobile and satellite, if they are independently controlled, are difficult to manage and schedule their resources uniformly. It is also very difficult to allocate and utilize the network resources reasonably and fully realize the value of network resources. On the contrary, if unified control functions for heterogeneous networks such as fixed, mobile, satellite and so on are realized, the aforementioned problems can be solved effectively.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3131] provides a cloud-based fixed mobile convergence (FMC) architecture in International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 (IMT-2020) networks called the "unified network integrated cloud" (UNIC) and the architecture can also be used in the FMSC context. The core function of the architecture is divided into the control plane (CP) and the user plane (UP), which are UNIC-CP and UNIC-UP in this architecture. UNIC-CP handles most of the control logic, while UNIC-UP mainly provides packets switching under the instructions of UNIC-CP. It can be inferred from this architecture that unified control functions are appropriate for FMSC networks.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3134] illustrates the management and orchestration aspects for FMC, and the management and orchestration functions are implemented based on UNIC-CP.
+
+Therefore, the unified control functions for heterogeneous networks such as FMSC networks are not only beneficial but also necessary. Although there are possibly one or more kinds of implementation methods for the above unified control functions, transformer-model-based unified control is a proper and effective implementation method.
+
+Transformer-model-based unified control is a flexible implementation for the above unified control with the aid of a transformer model. In this implementation, the transformer-model-based unified control entity (TUCE) is the centric and basic functional component.
+
+TUCE is a functional entity that realizes the unified control function based on a transformer model for FMSC and other heterogeneous networks. TUCE can transform user intent into specific instructions that can be executed by network devices in heterogeneous networks (including fixed, mobile, satellite networks and so on).
+
+The effective implementation and deployment of TUCE face the following notable challenges:
+
+- 1) How to translate unified control commands into different instructions that can be executed by heterogeneous network devices in FMSC and other heterogeneous networks. This is vital for ensuring seamless communication and interaction among diverse network devices.
+- 2) Without prior awareness of a feedback mechanism for instruction execution in advance, the cost (e.g., time cost, resource cost) of the unified control function will increase dramatically. This necessitates a robust and real-time feedback mechanism that can monitor and adjust the execution of control instructions promptly.
+
+- 3) Owing to the continuous evolution of technology, there is a daunting task of implementing a unified control function that is not limited to FMSC and is also capable of controlling and managing other emerging networks. This requires a highly adaptable and flexible system that can readily incorporate new technologies and networks.
+
+To overcome the above challenges, artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning (ML) technology can be used to enhance the functions of TUCE. In particular, transformer models can be used to design and implement TUCE. Transformer models are a class of deep learning (DL) models that employ self-attention mechanisms to focus on various parts of the data, and they are suited for handling intricate network data.
+
+Transformer models bring advantages to the unified control functions. In terms of scalability, the self-attention capabilities of transformer models make them suited for handling vast and heterogeneous data; therefore, network performance can be optimized.
+
+From a cost perspective, transformer models allow for a unified representation of control information. It is not necessary to consider redundant and various control information across networks; therefore, significant cost savings can be achieved.
+
+With the capabilities of transformer models, particularly their autonomous learning through self-attention, TUCE is equipped to overcome the challenges faced by TUCE in controlling and managing heterogeneous networks. Consequently, TUCE can accelerate the optimization of heterogeneous networks by extending and enhancing their functionalities.
+
+# **7 Basic model of TUCE**
+
+### **7.1 Overview of TUCE**
+
+TUCE is the basic functional component for realising the transformer-model-based unified control functions, and it enhances the flexibility, intelligence and the extensibility of control functions for heterogeneous networks including fixed, mobile, satellite networks and so on. TUCE consists of multiple functional components based on transformer models.
+
+The following functional components are the basic and necessary components for TUCE:
+
+- A set of northbound interfaces based on user intent.
+- A customized control language.
+- A set of southbound interfaces based on unified control commands and adapted to different controlled network devices.
+
+In a converged network environment, diverse networks can share common management and control planes for numerous applications. However, maintaining stable operations in an efficient manner becomes challenging as the complexity and scale of the network increase.
+
+### **7.2 General model of TUCE**
+
+The typical model of TUCE is depicted in Figure 7-1. The model involves the following three layers which are similar to the architecture of software defined networking (SDN), see [ITU-T Y.3300].
+
+- Application layer;
+- Control layer;
+- Network layer.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1 – General model of TUCE. The diagram illustrates a multi-layered architecture. At the top is the 'Application layer' containing 'Network application' blocks and an ellipsis. Below this is the 'TUCE' block, which is part of the 'Control layer'. The TUCE block is divided into four sub-layers: 'Basic control sub-layer' (containing 'Network information collecting', 'Network route calculating', 'Network policy setting', and 'Network status analysing'), 'Transformer sub-layer' (containing 'Learning function', 'Repository function', 'Translating function', and 'Feedback function'), 'Network instruction sub-layer' (containing 'Instruction information collecting', 'Information preprocessing', 'Semantics analysing', and 'Network instruction generating'), and 'Network trust sub-layer' (containing 'Authentication', 'Trust information', and 'Authorization'). The TUCE block is connected to the 'Application layer' via a 'North bound interface' and to the 'Network layer' via a 'South bound interface'. The 'Network layer' at the bottom contains 'Fix network domains', 'Mobile network domains', 'Satellite network domains', and an ellipsis. The entire 'Control layer' is labeled on the left side of the diagram. A reference 'Y.3222(25)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – General model of TUCE**
+
+TUCE corresponds to the control layer, which includes the following four sub-layers:
+
+- Basic control sub-layer;
+- Transformer sub-layer;
+- Network instruction sub-layer;
+- Network trust sub-layer.
+
+Especially in the unified control layer, the transformer model facilitates the efficient translation of unified control commands into network-specific instructions, streamlining the end-to-end configuration in the converged networks.
+
+TUCE provides a higher level and more abstract way to describe network requirements and network behaviour. It makes it easier to implement complex network services without needing to understand the underlying network details, by translating network requirements into a control language and translating control language into instructions that network devices can execute. It is noted that the control language is a high-level abstract language which is used to realize the description of network requirements, network forwarding, processing and other control requirements, such as "routing data from host A to host B", "limiting traffic to specific sub-networks", and "achieving load balancing across the network" and so on.
+
+The general model of TUCE considers relevant network trust factors. In order to ensure the security and trust of the TUCE, external interfaces involving upper-level users and lower-level devices need to ensure a trusted relationship between the TUCE system and external entities. When TUCE interacts with external entities, it is essential to validate the security of connected users or devices through methods like identity recognition. By verifying the identity information of users and devices, it ensures that only authorized users or devices can interact with TUCE interfaces, helping to prevent unauthorized access, mitigate potential security risks, and uphold the stability and security of the entire system.
+
+On the other hand, functions for all control entities should be implemented and deployed with the permission of each network operator and network owner who plans and deploys their network. The trust sub-layer is responsible for guaranteeing this factor.
+
+Implementation of the trust sub-layer is recommended to be based on the following three modes:
+
+- Alliance mode: Heterogeneous networks compose a unified trust alliance.
+
+NOTE 1 – When trust is implemented in this mode, two or more heterogeneous networks can share the same processing mechanism under the permission of the network owner.
+
+- Message mode: Control message or control command needs to be authorized by the network owner.
+
+NOTE 2 – When trust is implemented in this mode, every control message or control command is necessary to be confirmed and authorized by the network owner.
+
+- Federated mode: Unified control is implemented based on the control entity of a certain network domain.
+
+NOTE 3 – When trust is implemented in this mode, different network domains have independent processing mechanism and the control entity corresponding to the network domain is responsible for implementing the trust functions.
+
+### **7.3 Functional sub-layers of TUCE**
+
+The above typical model of TUCE is based on the traditional SDN architecture. It is noted that the functions of the control entity include, but are not limited to, network state information acquisition, network state analysis, routing calculation and policy delivery, etc. The above functions are implemented in the basic control sub-layer.
+
+Besides the basic control sub-layer, a transformer sub-layer, a network instruction sub-layer and a network trust sub-layer are included in TUCE.
+
+The transformer sub-layer provides methods and mechanisms to translate the unified commands into instructions that can be executed by all heterogeneous devices, and thereby realize the control and management of end-to-end forwarding of heterogeneous networks.
+
+The network instruction sub-layer pre-processes the collected language with command information, performs semantic and syntactic analysis, matches it with services the controller can provide, and generates uniform commands that the controller can recognize.
+
+The network trust sub-layer is responsible for solving any trust related issues including authentication, authorization and the storage of trust-related information.
+
+# **8 Functional requirements of TUCE**
+
+### **8.1 Overview of functional requirements of TUCE**
+
+The functional requirements of TUCE mainly involve the four sub-layers such as transformer sub-layer etc. Transformer sub-layer is the core sub-layer of TUCE and includes four main functions (see Figure 7-1), and there are some independent functional requirements related to the four functions,
+
+respectively. On the other hand, functional requirements related to the interfaces of TUCE are also specified here.
+
+Therefore, the functional requirements of TUCE mainly include the following aspects:
+
+- Functional requirements of the learning function.
+- Functional requirements of the translating function.
+- Functional requirements of the feedback function.
+- Functional requirements of the repository function.
+- Functional requirements of the interfaces.
+- Functional requirements of the basic control sub-layer.
+- Functional requirements of the network instruction sub-layer.
+- Functional requirements of the network trust sub-layer.
+
+### **8.2 Functional requirements of the learning function**
+
+The functional requirements of the learning function are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the learning function supports multiple data formats related to heterogeneous networks.
+- It is required that the learning function supports multiple protocols for exchanging relevant information with heterogeneous networks.
+- It is required that the learning function supports an input data cleaning function.
+
+NOTE 1 – The data cleaning function includes removing irrelevant information, correcting errors, etc.
+
+- It is required that the learning function supports transforming the data from heterogeneous networks into a unified format.
+- It is required that the learning function supports an efficient self-attention mechanism to capture the intrinsic relationships and patterns in the input data.
+- It is recommended that the learning function processes data in parallel mode to enhance computational efficiency.
+- It is recommended that the learning function supports high scalability to improve the model according to input data.
+- It is recommended that the learning function allows for the configuration of different parameters to optimize performance.
+
+NOTE 2 – The above parameters include the number of attention heads, the depth of deep learning layers, etc.
+
+### **8.3 Functional requirements of the translating function**
+
+The functional requirements of the translating function are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the translating function supports transforming the output of the transformer model into control information suitable for the target heterogeneous networks.
+- It is required that the translating function supports generating end-to-end network configuration information based on a unified representation.
+- It is required that the translating function supports generating instructions that can be executed by the target heterogeneous networks.
+
+### **8.4 Functional requirements of the feedback function**
+
+The functional requirements of the feedback function are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the feedback function provides the feedback information in real-time mode.
+- It is recommended that the feedback function corrects and improves the transformer models and the instructions based on feedback information.
+
+### **8.5 Functional requirements of the repository function**
+
+The functional requirements of the repository function component are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the repository function stores various types of data in both structured and unstructured forms.
+- It is required that the repository function ensures data integrity, consistency, accuracy, and real-time availability.
+- It is recommended that the repository function supports regular data backups to prevent data loss.
+- It is recommended that the repository function provides mechanisms for data recovery in the event of system failure or data corruption.
+
+### **8.6 Functional requirements of the interfaces**
+
+The functional requirements of the interfaces are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that TUCE provides a uniform interface that allows different networks to exchange information through the same interface.
+- It is required that the interfaces support high data transmission rates to cope with the high volume of network communication requirements.
+- It is recommended that the interfaces support high scalability to accommodate the growth of the network scale and the evolution of network technology.
+- It is recommended that TUCE provides a manual interface to handle feedback messages.
+
+### **8.7 Functional requirements of the basic control sub-layer**
+
+The functional requirements of the basic control sub-layer are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the basic control sub-layer of TUCE supports collecting network information from the network.
+- It is required that the basic control sub-layer of TUCE supports network route generation based on the collected information.
+- It is recommended that the basic control sub-layer of TUCE supports network status analysis based on the collected information.
+- It is recommended that the basic control sub-layer of TUCE supports setting forwarding policies for the heterogeneous network.
+
+### **8.8 Functional requirements of the network instruction sub-layer**
+
+The functional requirements of the network instruction sub-layer are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the network instruction sub-layer of TUCE supports collecting network instruction related information from the heterogeneous networks.
+- It is recommended that the network instruction sub-layer of TUCE supports preprocessing the collected instruction information.
+- It is required that the network instruction sub-layer of TUCE supports semantic analysis of the instruction information.
+- It is required that the network instruction sub-layer of TUCE supports generating relevant instructions for the heterogeneous networks.
+
+### **8.9 Functional requirements of the network trust sub-layer**
+
+The functional requirements of the network trust sub-layer are listed as follows:
+
+- It is required that the network trust sub-layer of TUCE supports an authentication function for the instructions from the network instruction layer.
+- It is required that the network trust sub-layer of TUCE supports blocking the instructions that are not authorized by the network owner.
+- It is required that the network trust sub-layer stores trust policy information which is set up from the network operator.
+NOTE – The trust policy information is the trust configuration information that specifies whether the instructions are allowed to be sent to the heterogeneous networks or not.
+- It is recommended that the network trust sub-layer stores instruction information from the network instruction sub-layer.
+
+## **9 Functional architecture of TUCE**
+
+### **9.1 Overview of functional architecture of TUCE**
+
+Figure 9-1 depicts a typical functional model of TUCE. It can be seen from Figure 9-1 that TUCE is transformer-centric and efficiently connects diverse network user requirements with heterogeneous physical networks. Through the transformer-based TUCE, requirements from network users can automatically be mapped to the configuration or instructions of heterogeneous networks.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture model of TUCE, organized into three main layers: Application and user, TUCE, and Physical network.
+
+- Application and user layer:** Contains "Network application and network user requirements" which are processed into "Network requirement" blocks.
+- TUCE layer:** The core processing layer, divided into several components:
+ - Application interface component:** Includes the "Network user requirements interface".
+ - Basic control component:** Receives input from the application interface.
+ - Learning components:** Includes "Transformer components", "Learning sandbox", and "Learning management".
+ - Translating component:** Includes "Model maintaining" and "Network instruction translating".
+ - Network instruction component:** Receives output from the translating component.
+ - Feedback component:** Includes "Feedback processing" and "Feedback collecting".
+ - Network trust component:** Receives input from the feedback component.
+ - Network interface component:** Includes the "Heterogeneous physical network interface".
+ - Management and control interface component:** Includes the "Unified control instruction interface" and the "Operation interface".
+ - Repository component:** Contains data sets: "Training data set" (Network requirements data, Network resources data, Network instruction data, Network domain instruction data, ...), and "Model data set" (Model algorithm, Model parameter).
+- Physical network layer:** Contains the "Heterogeneous physical network" which is divided into "Network domain 1", "Network domain 2", "...", and "Network domain n".
+
+Arrows indicate the flow of data and control between these components, showing a bidirectional interaction between the TUCE layer and the Physical network layer.
+
+Functional architecture model of TUCE showing the flow from Application and user to Physical network.
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Functional architecture model of TUCE**
+
+TUCE can play a role as an independent entity or a unified control layer that provides support to other management, control and operation entities, such as the network access control function (NACF), element management system (EMS) / network management system (NMS), operation support system (OSS) / business support system (BSS), etc. Specifically, TUCE serves as an intermediary between these management, control and operation entities and the network devices. It converts the high-level control requirements of these management, control and operation entities into executable network instructions based on real-time device information and status information provided by them.
+
+TUCE mainly includes the following functional components.
+
+- Basic control component;
+- Learning component;
+- Translating component;
+- Feedback component;
+- Repository component;
+- Network instruction component;
+- Network trust component;
+- North bound interface component;
+- South bound interface component;
+- Management and control interface component.
+
+The above functional components compose the sub-layers depicted in Figure 7-1. For example, the basic control component forms the basic control sub-layer, while the network trust component composes the network trust sub-layer.
+
+### **9.2 Basic control component of TUCE**
+
+The basic control component implements the functions of the basic control sub-layer. The above functions include network information collection, network route calculation, etc.
+
+### **9.3 Learning component of TUCE**
+
+The learning component of TUCE support a set of functional elements in an ML pipeline subsystem including the transformer model, learning sandbox, and learning management.
+
+transformer model component: It is responsible for using the self-attentive mechanism to process contextual information in order to efficiently transform and interpret network control information. It can be used to predict network states, optimize network performance, and generate control instructions for different types of networks.
+
+Learning sandbox: it is responsible for studying the effect of learning outputs before deploying and executing them. For training or testing, the TUCE learning sandbox can use data generated from a simulated network.
+
+Learning management: it is responsible for monitoring the performance and status of the TUCE. It collects performance data such as processing latency, error rate, and system load to help identify and resolve potential issues.
+
+The transformer model is the most important and core component of TUCE. It aims to automatically translate from requirements of network users to instructions of physical networks. To facilitate implementation and improve extensibility, the transformer in TUCE is designed as a three-level structure, Figure 9-2 illustrates such a structure.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ NR1[Network requirements] --> ULT[Upper layer transformer]
+ NR2([Network requirements]) --> ULT
+ NR3[Network requirements] --> ULT
+ ULT --> URNR[Unified represented network requirements]
+ URNR --> MLT[Middle layer transformer]
+ MLT --> URNI[Unified represented network instructions]
+ URNI --> LLT[Lower layer transformer]
+ LLT --> NI1[Network instruction]
+ LLT --> NI2([Network instruction])
+ LLT --> NI3[Network instruction]
+
+```
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+Figure 9-2: Three-layer transformer model of TUCE. The diagram shows a vertical flow of data processing. At the top, three 'Network requirements' inputs (two rectangles, one oval) converge into an 'Upper layer transformer' (blue rounded rectangle). This leads to 'Unified represented network requirements' (blue rounded rectangle), which then goes to a 'Middle layer transformer' (green rounded rectangle). The output is 'Unified represented network instructions' (blue rounded rectangle), followed by a 'Lower layer transformer' (blue rounded rectangle). Finally, three 'Network instruction' outputs (two rectangles, one oval) are produced. A reference 'Y.3222(25)' is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Three-layer transformer model of TUCE**
+
+### 9.4 Translating component of TUCE
+
+The control information translating component of TUCE is responsible for converting divergent network user requirements into specific instructions that apply to different networks. For example, when a requirement to change the quality of service (QoS) is needed in one of the heterogeneous networks, this component will convert the network requirements into specific instructions for heterogeneous networks such as fixed, mobile and satellite networks.
+
+The target and process of the translating component can be illustrated as follows:
+
+- General target and process: real-time acquisition of the first network requirement from network users, input to the transformer model, and output of the second network entity instruction for the physical network.
+- Network instruction: divide the second network entity instruction into network domain instructions and network subdomain instructions, and sequentially issue them to the physical network.
+- Transformer model: the Transformer model comprises three layers of transformers. The upper layer transformer maps the diversified first network requirement to the integrated representation of the second network requirement, the middle layer transformer maps the second network requirement to the integrated representation of the first network entity instruction, and the lower layer transformer maps the first network entity instruction to the diversified second network entity instruction.
+
+### 9.5 Feedback component of TUCE
+
+The feedback component can collect and process information about the implementation of unified control instructions for heterogeneous networks. There are two classes of circumstances:
+
+- If the generated control instructions can be uniformly executed by all heterogeneous network devices, the relevant positive samples are generated for further training;
+
+- Otherwise, manual intervention is needed to generate relevant negative samples for further training.
+
+### **9.6 Repository component of TUCE**
+
+The repository component is responsible for storing various data sets, including the feedback information and data collected from various network sources, information pre-processed and generated by the learning component, updated model parameters and so on.
+
+### **9.7 Network instruction component of TUCE**
+
+The network instruction component is responsible for implementing the functions of the network instruction sub-layer. The above functions include instruction information collecting, instruction information processing etc.
+
+### **9.8 Network trust component of TUCE**
+
+The network trust component implements the functions of the network trust sub-layer. The above functions include authentication, authorization etc.
+
+### **9.10 North bound interface component of TUCE**
+
+The north bound interface component is the bridge between the TUCE and the network application and network user. It is responsible for receiving network requirements from network applications and network users. This functional component also supports different communication protocols.
+
+### **9.11 South bound interface component of TUCE**
+
+The south bound interface component is the bridge between the TUCE and the external network. It is responsible for sending and receiving data and control information. This component supports different communication protocols and standards to ensure compatibility with various networking technologies.
+
+### **9.12 Management and control interface component of TUCE**
+
+This interface component is the bridge between the TUCE and external management and control function entities.
+
+NOTE – The external management and control function entities are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## **10 Interfaces of TUCE**
+
+### **10.1 Overview of interfaces of TUCE**
+
+The interface component of TUCE mainly comprises the following three types of interfaces:
+
+- The northbound interfaces;
+- The southbound interfaces;
+- The horizontal interfaces.
+
+Figure 10-1 depicts the above three kinds of interfaces, as well as the entities related to those interfaces.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the external interfaces of the TUCE (Traffic User Control Engine) system. The central TUCE block is divided into several functional components:
+
+- Application interface component:** Contains the 'Network user requirements interface'.
+- Learning components:** Includes 'Transformer components', 'Learning sandbox', and 'Learning management'.
+- Translating component:** Includes 'Model maintaining' and 'Network instruction translating'.
+- Feedback component:** Includes 'Feedback processing' and 'Feedback collecting'.
+- Network interface component:** Includes the 'Heterogeneous physical network interface'.
+- Repository component:** Contains two data sets:
+ - Training data set:** Network requirements data, Network resources data, Network instruction data, Network domain instruction data, and others.
+ - Model data set:** Model algorithm and Model parameter.
+- Management and control interface component:** Includes the 'Unified control instruction interface' and the 'Operation interface'.
+
+External interfaces connect the TUCE to other entities:
+
+- Northbound interface:** Connects the TUCE to 'Network application and network user requirements' (Network requirement, Network requirement, ..., Network requirement).
+- Southbound interface:** Connects the TUCE to the 'Heterogeneous physical network' (Network domain 1, Network domain 2, ..., Network domain n).
+- Horizontal interface:** Connects the TUCE to 'Other entities related to control functions'.
+
+Figure 10-1: External interface between TUCE and Other entities. The diagram shows the TUCE architecture with its internal components and external interfaces. The TUCE block contains: 1. Application interface component (Network user requirements interface). 2. Learning components (Transformer components, Learning sandbox, Learning management). 3. Translating component (Model maintaining, Network instruction translating). 4. Feedback component (Feedback processing, Feedback collecting). 5. Network interface component (Heterogeneous physical network interface). 6. Repository component (Training data set: Network requirements data, Network resources data, Network instruction data, Network domain instruction data, ...; Model data set: Model algorithm, Model parameter). 7. Management and control interface component (Unified control instruction interface, Operation interface). External interfaces: Northbound interface connects to Network application and network user requirements. Southbound interface connects to Heterogeneous physical network. Horizontal interface connects to Other entities related to control functions.
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+**Figure 10-1 – External interface between TUCE and Other entities**
+
+The above interfaces are external interfaces of TUCE and are responsible for establishing efficient communication and control channels between upper-level users, the diverse underlying devices or other control related entities.
+
+Moreover, there are also some internal interfaces within the TUCE, such as the interface between the basic control sub-layer and the transformer sub-layer. Because internal interfaces are independent of user intent and network device instructions, these internal interfaces can be defined by the implementation of TUCE.
+
+### 10.2 Northbound interfaces of TUCE
+
+The northbound interface is the interface between upper-level users and TUCE, and it works based on the user intent and the customized control language.
+
+The TUCE northbound interfaces facilitate user interaction with the TUCE and the network at an upper level, allowing users to articulate their network requirements and control preferences in an intuitive manner. This interface enables users to express desired network services and objectives
+
+using natural language or high-level abstraction. Through this interface, TUCE can capture user intent and translate it into the control language. It is a necessary process for transforming abstract user requirements into executable control commands.
+
+### **10.3 Southbound interfaces of TUCE**
+
+The southbound interface is the interface between TUCE and the controlled devices, and it is responsible for sending unified control commands that can be executed by various controlled network devices.
+
+The southbound interfaces of TUCE facilitate interaction between TUCE and underlying network devices, with a focus on centralized management of diverse network device types. This interface is tasked with translating high-level control commands generated by TUCE into instructions that are understandable and executable by underlying network devices. Through this mechanism, TUCE dispatches uniform commands to diverse underlying network devices, ensuring unified control.
+
+### **10.4 Horizontal interfaces of TUCE**
+
+The Horizontal interface is the interface between TUCE and other control related entities, and it is responsible for inter-working and collaborating between different control related entities.
+
+#### **10.4.1 General role of the horizontal interface**
+
+The horizontal interfaces of TUCE are mainly responsible for connecting TUCE to other control related entities. It is noted that the horizontal interfaces do not necessarily need to be designed and implemented. For example, when a TUCE or a control entity which implemented the TUCE functions needs not collaborate with other control related entities, the horizontal interfaces can be neglected.
+
+There are various applications scenarios for the horizontal interfaces. The horizontal interface between TUCE and the SDN controller and the horizontal interface between TUCE and the FMSC core network, are two representative example applications scenarios.
+
+#### **10.4.2 Horizontal interface between TUCE and FMSC entities**
+
+[ITU-T Y.3201] describes the framework of FMSC. The framework includes three kinds of access (fixed, mobile and satellite) network, two kinds of core network (satellite based and land based) and two kinds of data network (satellite based and land based) and two kinds of service platform (satellite based and land based).
+
+TUCE can be introduced to enhance the functions of the core network or service platform. The horizontal interfaces can then be used to connect TUCE to the core network or service platform. Figure 10-2 describes how the horizontal interface is used in such application scenarios.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-2: Horizontal interface between TUCE and FMSC entities. The diagram shows a multi-access UE on the left connected to satellite, mobile, and fixed access networks. These connect to satellite and land-based core networks via interworking functions. The satellite core network is linked to satellite-based data and service platforms, while the land-based core network is linked to land-based data and service platforms. Two TUCE entities (blue ovals) are shown, each connected to both core networks. A horizontal interface (dashed blue line) connects the two TUCE entities, labeled 'Satellite-based network' and 'Land-based network'. A 'Horizontal interface' label is also present on the right side of the diagram.
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+**Figure 10-2 – Horizontal interface between TUCE and FMSC entities**
+
+#### 10.4.3 Horizontal interface between TUCE and SDN controller
+
+[ITU-T Y.3300] describes the framework of SDN. The framework mainly includes three layers, such as SDN applications, SDN controllers and network resources.
+
+TUCE can be introduced to enhance SDN control functions, and the horizontal interfaces can be used to connect TUCE to the SDN controller. Figure 10-3 describes how the horizontal interface is used in such application scenarios.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-3: Horizontal interface between TUCE and SDN controller. The diagram shows three layers: SDN applications (top, pink circles), SDN controllers (middle, purple rectangles), and Network resources (bottom, blue rectangles). Dashed orange arrows point from applications to controllers, labeled 'Programmatic control of abstracted network resources (Application-control interface)'. A green double-headed arrow connects a controller to a TUCE entity (blue oval), labeled 'Logically centralized control of network resources (Resource-control interface)'. A green double-headed arrow also connects the TUCE entity to the controllers, labeled 'Horizontal interface'.
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+**Figure 10-3 – Horizontal interface between TUCE and SDN controller**
+
+# 11 Security considerations
+
+It is required to be aligned with the security requirements contained in [b-ITU-T Q.1762] and the security requirements and personal data protection contained in [ITU-T Y.3101], with the following additional requirements:
+
+- It is required to provide mechanisms to support data confidentiality and integrity across heterogeneous networks.
+
+- It is required to provide a security coordination function that coordinates security policies for all heterogeneous networks.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases of TUCE
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Use Case#1 Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence
+
+When user requirements are implemented by a convergent fixed-mobile-satellite application scenario, TUCE can efficiently and automatically map the user requirements to different instructions or configuration sets.
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates such a use case.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a central orange server icon labeled 'TUCE' at the top. Three lines connect it to three separate network clouds below. The left cloud is labeled 'Satellite network' and contains three satellite icons and a small ground station icon. The middle cloud is labeled 'Fixed network' and contains four server rack icons. The right cloud is labeled 'Mobile network' and contains a small server rack icon and three antenna tower icons. The labels 'Satellite network', 'Fixed network', and 'Mobile network' are in red text below their respective clouds. The identifier 'Y.3222(25)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram illustrating the application scenarios of fixed-mobile-satellite convergence. A central TUCE (Traffic Usage Control Element) is connected to three networks: Satellite network, Fixed network, and Mobile network.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Application scenarios of fixed-mobile-satellite convergence**
+
+### I.2 Use Case#2 Hybrid access network
+
+In such an application scenario, TUCE can efficiently connect various access modes with a single network user who uses various access methods.
+
+Figure I.2 depicts such an application scenario.
+
+
+
+Figure I.2: Application scenario for hybrid access network. The diagram shows a central TUCE server connected to two clouds. The top cloud contains three routers, and the bottom cloud contains two routers. A mobile phone and a desktop computer are connected via yellow lightning bolts to a central hub, which is then connected to the top cloud. A wireless antenna is connected to the bottom cloud. The label 'Y.3222(25)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Application scenario for hybrid access network**
+
+### **I.3 Use Case#3 Service setting for software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN)**
+
+In such an application scenario, TUCE can efficiently configure services across different network partitions. For example, a service needs to traverse different areas of an enterprise.
+
+Figure I.3 depicts such an application scenario.
+
+
+
+Figure I.3: Application scenario for SDWAN. The diagram shows a central Internet cloud connected to a TUCE server and another Cloud. The Internet cloud is also connected to two Enterprise clouds: 'Enterprise headquarter' on the left and 'Enterprise branch' on the right. The label 'Y.3222(25)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Application scenario for SDWAN**
+
+### **I.4 Use Case#4 End-to-End configuration for deterministic networking**
+
+In such an application scenario, TUCE can efficiently set up deterministic networking services across different network domains. For example, a service needs to be supported by two or more different deterministic networking domains.
+
+Figure I.4 depicts such an application scenario.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for multiple-domain deterministic networking. At the top, a server icon labeled 'TUCE' is connected to three separate network domains, each represented by a cloud shape. The domains are labeled 'Detnet domain' and contain several server icons. A green line, labeled 'Detnet service', spans across all three domains, representing a service path. Three colored lines (green, orange, and purple) also span across the domains, likely representing different traffic flows or services. The text 'Y.3222(25)' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+Diagram of an application scenario for multiple-domain deterministic networking.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Application scenario for multiple-domain deterministic networking**
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Application scenarios of TUCE in FMSC
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### II.1 Overview of application scenarios of TUCE in FMSC
+
+The functional architecture of TUCE in FMSC is shown in Figure II.1. The architecture components are the FMSC network controller, fixed network controller, mobile network controller, satellite network controller, etc.
+
+
+
+Figure II.1 illustrates the functional architecture of TUCE in FMSC, divided into a Control Plane and Network Infrastructure.
+
+**Control Plane:**
+
+- FMSC network controller:** Contains a **Transformer model decision system** with components: Knowledge representation, Knowledge base (Policy, AI model, network status), Configuration generation and verification, Evaluation and optimization, Network Data, Network status awareness, and Automatic configuration. It interacts with **Management and control interaction**.
+- Fixed network controller**, **Mobile network controller**, and **Satellite network controller** are also part of the Control Plane.
+
+**Network Infrastructure:**
+
+- Satellite network:** Includes satellites and ground stations, connected to the Mobile network and Fixed network. It performs **Network resource allocation**.
+- Mobile network:** Includes base stations and user equipment. It performs **Access resource allocation**.
+- Fixed network:** Includes routers and a **Data Centre**. It performs **Network resource allocation**.
+
+The diagram is labeled Y.3222(25) in the bottom right corner.
+
+Figure II.1: The functional architecture instance of TUCE in FMSC. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of TUCE in FMSC, divided into a Control Plane and Network Infrastructure. The Control Plane includes the FMSC network controller, which contains a Transformer model decision system. This system consists of Knowledge representation, Knowledge base (Policy, AI model, network status), Configuration generation and verification, Evaluation and optimization, Network Data, Network status awareness, and Automatic configuration. The FMSC network controller interacts with Management and control interaction. The Network Infrastructure includes the Fixed network controller, Mobile network controller, and Satellite network controller. The Satellite network is shown with satellites and ground stations, connected to the Mobile network and Fixed network. The Mobile network includes base stations and user equipment. The Fixed network includes routers and a Data Centre. Network resource allocation is shown for the Satellite network, and Access resource allocation is shown for the Mobile network. The diagram is labeled Y.3222(25) in the bottom right corner.
+
+Figure II.1 – The functional architecture instance of TUCE in FMSC
+
+- FMSC network controller
+
+It accepts service transmission requirements in FMSC networks through management and control interfaces, generates corresponding requirements and service sequence numbers, and distributes them to fixed network controllers, mobile network controllers, and satellite network controllers. At the same time, the FMSC network controller feeds back the end-to-end service transmission
+
+configuration and operation results, optimizes the configuration by AI, adjusts the service transmission parameters, and modifies the service packets characteristics to achieve high-quality service transmission.
+
+- Fixed network controller, mobile network controller, satellite network controller
+
+They receive all service configurations from the FMSC network controller, then generate the initial service transmission configuration, and distribute this configuration to each network node. At the same time, these controllers receive service packet end-to-end transmission information from each network node in real time, and generate the service transmission configuration for the next cycle.
+
+- Fixed network, mobile network and satellite network
+
+They are network infrastructure formed by network nodes and links to realize end-to-end resource scheduling and service packet forwarding in the FMSC network, and send the corresponding service transmission information to their controllers.
+
+- Network resource allocation
+
+The transformer model realizes the allocation of network link and node resources for the service transmitting in the fixed network, mobile network and satellite network. Each network node periodically collects information on transmission service packet, and sends the collected information to the corresponding network controller. Each network controller allocates network resources for these services next cycle transmission using the revenue-maximization allocation method.
+
+- Access resource allocation
+
+The transformer model realizes the allocation of network resources between different networks links (fixed network, mobile network and satellite network) and terminal access network links. Edge nodes of fixed networks, mobile networks, and satellite networks allocate resources for these access services from other networks or terminals based on their interface resource status and these services priority.
+
+### **II.2 Functional optimizing of TUCE**
+
+The configurations and optimization architecture of TUCE is shown in Figure II.2. The main functions are as follows.
+
+- Data classification and storage
+
+This function is implemented by repository components of TUCE. Through management and control interaction, input data are received, including management and configuration instructions, user requirements, and network status provided by the feedback component. The repository component classifies and organizes the received data into relevant information according to certain rules, and this information is stored in the database on demand for easy retrieval.
+
+- Learning and training
+
+This function is implemented by learning components of TUCE. The learning component learns and understands the information through artificial intelligence to generate transformer model policies and configurations. Typically, the TUCE system stores these transformer model policies and configurations in the database for reuse in future closed-loop control cycles.
+
+- Decision-making and judgment
+
+This function is implemented by translating components of TUCE. The translating component performs learning and reasoning based on user requirements and transformer policies and configurations. Thus, TUCE finds the optimal solution to satisfy the requirements after training and learning by understanding the transformer policies and configurations that match the requirements of users, services and so on.
+
+#### - Configuration application
+
+This function is implemented by the interface components of TUCE. The interface component forms specific network policies or configuration entities based on the preceding policies and the optimal solution provided by the translating component. It then instantiates templates and fills with this network policies or configuration entities, and configures them to the infrastructure network.
+
+#### - Monitoring and collection
+
+This function is implemented by feedback components of TUCE. During operation, the feedback component collects network measurement data related to network policies and configurations from the infrastructure network, assesses the user requirement target and the predicted network status, and provides the relevant results as data for system analysis.
+
+By iterating through these functions, the TUCE continually optimizes and adapts to meet network requirements and improve overall system performance.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ NE[Network element] -- "Monitoring and collection" --> ID[Input data]
+ ID -- "Data classification and storage" --> IC["Information classification (Monitoring, configuration)"]
+ IC -- "Store" --> DB[(Database)]
+ DB -- "Get and store" --> TM[Transformer model]
+ TM -- "Learning and training" --> IC
+ TM -- "Decision-making and judgement" --> PC["Policies and configurations"]
+ PC -- "Configuration application" --> NE
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the configurations and optimizing architecture of TUCE. It features a central cycle of components: Network element, Input data, Information classification (Monitoring, configuration), Database, Transformer model, and Policies and configurations. The flow is as follows: Network element sends data to Input data via 'Monitoring and collection'. Input data is processed by Information classification via 'Data classification and storage'. Information classification stores data in the Database via 'Store'. The Database provides data to the Transformer model via 'Get and store'. The Transformer model undergoes 'Learning and training' with Information classification. The Transformer model then performs 'Decision-making and judgement' to update Policies and configurations. Finally, Policies and configurations are applied to the Network element via 'Configuration application'.
+
+Figure II.2 – Configurations and optimizing architecture of TUCE. The diagram shows a cyclical process involving Network element, Input data, Information classification (Monitoring, configuration), Database, Transformer model, and Policies and configurations.
+
+Y.3222(25)
+
+**Figure II.2 – Configurations and optimizing architecture of TUCE**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [[b-ITU-T F.748.12](#)] Recommendation ITU-T F.748.12 (2021), *Deep learning software framework evaluation methodology*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Q.1762](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1762/Y.2802 (2007), *Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3011](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [[b-ITU-T Y.3172](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), *Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*.
+- [b-ETSI GR ENI 004] ETSI GR ENI 004 V2.2.1 (2021), *Experiential Networked Intelligence (ENI); Terminology for Main Concepts in ENI*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,576 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3223 (08/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Multi-access edge computing for IMT-2020 networks and beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3223
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Multi-access edge computing for IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) refers to the capability of providing services and applications to end users, regardless of the access technology being used (fixed, mobile or satellite). Multi-access edge computing (MEC) is deployed at the edge of the FMSC network as a computing resource. It brings core network capabilities, such as computing, storage, acceleration, content, security and other services to the edge of the FMSC network, which helps reduce service transmission delays and effectively alleviates the business data demand for network bandwidth in the FMSC network.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3223 specifies the requirements, scenarios, framework, network function enhancements, procedures and security considerations for MEC in FMSC within IMT-2020 networks and beyond.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3223 | 2025-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16445 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC), IMT-2020, multi-access edge computing (MEC), satellite network.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3224-202508-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3224-202508-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3224 (08/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence –
+Requirements and framework for in-network
+aggregated federated learning for enabling
+artificial intelligence in IMT-2020 networks and
+beyond**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3224
+
+# Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Requirements and framework for in-network aggregated federated learning for enabling artificial intelligence in IMT-2020 networks and beyond
+
+## Summary
+
+Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) is the capability that provides services and applications to end users regardless of the fixed, mobile or satellite access technologies being used. This Recommendation specifies the requirements and framework for in-network aggregated federated learning (FL) to enable artificial intelligence (AI) in FMSC networks. In-network aggregated FL will enhance network capability in FMSC to reduce outgoing data traffic from the lower network entities, consume less bandwidth and enable more efficient model aggregation over multihop networks under limited communication resources.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3224 | 2025-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16446 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+AI, federated learning, FMSC, IMT-2020.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3505 (08/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Cloud Computing
+
+---
+
+## **Cloud computing – Overview and functional requirements for data storage federation**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3505
+
+## Cloud computing – Overview and functional requirements for data storage federation
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3505 provides an overview and functional requirements of data storage federation. Data storage federation provides a single virtual volume from multiple data sources in heterogeneous storages. In this Recommendation, configuration for logical components, and ecosystem of data storage federation as well as cloud computing based data storage federation are introduced for data storage federation. Functional requirements are derived from use cases.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3505 | 2018-05-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13616 |
+| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.3505 | 2022-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14941 |
+| 3.0 | ITU-T Y.3505 | 2025-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16454 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cloud computing, data storage federation, functional requirement.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview of data storage federation..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Introduction to data storage federation..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Benefits of the data storage federation ..... | 5 |
+| 6.3 Configuration of logical components for data storage federation ..... | 6 |
+| 6.4 Ecosystem of data storage federation ..... | 7 |
+| 7 Cloud computing-based data storage federation system context..... | 9 |
+| 7.1 CSP:storage federation provider (CSP:SFP) ..... | 10 |
+| 7.2 CSP:data manipulation provider (CSP:DMP)..... | 11 |
+| 8 Functional requirements for data storage federation ..... | 12 |
+| 8.1 Storage connection requirements ..... | 12 |
+| 8.2 Data manipulation requirements..... | 13 |
+| 8.3 Storage federation requirements..... | 14 |
+| 8.4 Metadata and policy management requirements ..... | 15 |
+| 9 Security considerations ..... | 15 |
+| Appendix I – Use case of data storage federation..... | 16 |
+| I.1 Storing a user file dispersedly ..... | 16 |
+| I.2 Data sharing between customers ..... | 17 |
+| I.3 Multiple storage types and access mechanisms for data access ..... | 17 |
+| I.4 Policy-driven provision and management of DSF local storage ..... | 18 |
+| I.5 Policy-driven provisioning and management of data ..... | 19 |
+| I.6 Data virtualization CSP:SFP ..... | 20 |
+| I.7 Efficient data storage management ..... | 22 |
+| I.8 The data read/write cache and parallel distributed file for performancePage |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| I.15 The use case for data offloading in core-edge cloud ..... | 33 |
+| Appendix II – Comparison analysis between cloud computing and data storage federation .. | 35 |
+| Bibliography..... | 36 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3505
+
+## Cloud computing – Overview and functional requirements for data storage federation
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides an overview and functional requirements of data storage federation including benefits, configuration for logical components and ecosystem of data storage federation as well as cloud computing-based data storage federation. The functional requirements provided in this Recommendation are derived from use cases.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [[ITU-T Y.3500](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3502](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing - Reference architecture*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3508](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3508 (2019), *Cloud computing - Overview and high-level requirements of distributed cloud*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3526](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3526 (2021), *Cloud computing - Functional requirements of edge cloud management*.
+- [[ITU-T Y.3538](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3538 (2022), *Cloud computing - Global management framework of distributed cloud*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 activity** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A specified pursuit or set of tasks.
+
+**3.1.2 cloud computing** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with self-service provisioning and administration on-demand.
+
+NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications, and storage equipment.
+
+**3.1.3 cloud service customer** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which is in a business relationship for the purpose of using cloud services.
+
+NOTE – A business relationship does not necessarily imply financial agreements.
+
+**3.1.4 cloud service provider** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which makes cloud services available.
+
+**3.1.5 metadata** [b-ITU-T M.3030]: Data that describes other data.
+
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, metadata includes structural, administrative, or descriptive aspects of data enabling operation and lifecycle management.
+
+**3.1.6 role** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A set of activities that serves a common purpose.
+
+**3.1.7 sub-role** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A subset of the activities of a given role.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 data storage federation:** A processing to provide a single virtual volume from multiple heterogeneous data storages using storage virtualization.
+
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, heterogeneous storage refers to data storage federation (DSF) local storage.
+
+**3.2.2 data storage federation local storage:** A physical storage to be integrated.
+
+NOTE – Data storage federation (DSF) local storage includes on-premises storage (e.g., main memory, non-volatile memory express, solid-state disk, hard disk drive, serial attached small computer system interface (SCSI), Internet SCSI storage and network-attached storage, object-based storage device, intelligent storage device, etc.), and cloud storage with different management units such as block, object and file.
+
+**3.2.3 single virtual volume:** A virtual storage unit provided in the form of a block device, file or object-based storage.
+
+NOTE – Customers of a single virtual volume include end-user, server, operating system and application.
+
+**3.2.4 storage virtualization:** An abstraction of a storage resource to provide logical storage.
+
+NOTE – The abstraction includes consolidating the different types of storages into a virtual storage pool as well as dividing a virtual storage pool into a single virtual volume.
+
+**3.2.5 virtual storage pool:** A logical storage achieved by integration of data storage federation (DSF) local storage.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CCRA | Cloud Computing Reference Architecture |
+| CRUD | Create Read Update Delete |
+| CSC | Cloud Service Customer |
+| CSM | Cloud Service Manager |
+| CSP | Cloud Service Provider |
+| CSU | Cloud Service User |
+| DMP | Data Manipulation Provider |
+| DSF | Data Storage Federation |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| GUI | Graphical User Interface |
+| HDD | Hard Disk Drive |
+| I/O | Input/Output |
+| iSCSI | internet Small Computer System Interface |
+| NFS | Network File System |
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| NVMe | Non-Volatile Memory express |
+| PCIe | Peripheral Component Interconnect express |
+| RAM | Random Access Memory |
+| SCSI | Small Computer System Interface |
+| SFP | Storage Federation Provider |
+| SFTP | Secure Fire Transfer Protocol |
+| SMB | Server Message Block |
+| SSD | Solid State Disk |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Overview of data storage federation
+
+## 6.1 Introduction to data storage federation
+
+Increasing data services in many industries, which use big volumes of data with various data types, has led to a tremendous growth in storage capacity needs. Storage users encounter difficulties to utilize various storages due to the different access mechanisms of each storage, and the different storage capabilities of each storage type. To resolve these difficulties, data storage federation (DSF) supports customers to utilize their data storages efficiently by the federation of heterogeneous storages including cloud storage and on-premises storage.
+
+Delays in accessing data from federated storages may arise in cloud storage provided by the core cloud when handling large amounts of data. As a result, there is a growing demand for cloud storage services that offer low latency data access closer to the user. For this matter, on-premises storage is a useful choice to construct DSF single virtual volume, and cloud storage in DSF local storage can be expanded according to the distributed cloud [ITU-T Y.3508], [ITU-T Y.3538] configuring combination of core cloud, regional cloud and edge cloud [ITU-T Y.3526], as shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+The diagram, titled "Cloud storage in DSF local storage", illustrates a hierarchical cloud architecture. On the left, a cloud icon contains a database cylinder. The central part shows a hierarchy of cloud nodes: a "Core cloud" node at the top, connected by dashed arrows to two "Regional cloud" nodes below it. Each "Regional cloud" node is connected by dashed arrows to two "Edge cloud" nodes, for a total of four "Edge cloud" nodes. On the right, three storage units are shown as cylinders: "Core cloud storage", "Regional cloud storage", and "Edge cloud storage". Dashed arrows point from each storage unit to its corresponding cloud node in the hierarchy: from "Core cloud storage" to "Core cloud", from "Regional cloud storage" to both "Regional cloud" nodes, and from "Edge cloud storage" to both "Edge cloud" nodes under the right "Regional cloud" node.
+
+Diagram illustrating Cloud storage in DSF local storage architecture. The diagram shows a hierarchical cloud structure with Core cloud, Regional cloud, and Edge cloud layers, connected to corresponding storage units (Core cloud storage, Regional cloud storage, Edge cloud storage).
+
+Y.3505(25)
+
+Figure 6-1 – Cloud storage in DSF local storage
+
+DSF integrates the DSF local storage into a virtual storage pool and creates a single virtual volume in the virtual storage pool as shown in Figure 6-2.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-2: Concept of data storage federation. The diagram is divided into three horizontal layers. The top layer, 'Customer', contains 'End-user', 'System (e.g., server, PC, etc.)', and 'Service'. The middle layer, 'Data storage federation', contains two 'Virtual storage pool' boxes, each with a 'Single virtual volume'. The bottom layer, 'DSF local storage', contains 'On-premises storage' (represented by server racks and a disk) and 'Cloud storage' (represented by a cloud icon). Arrows show data flow: from End-user and System to the first Virtual storage pool; from Service to the second Virtual storage pool; from both Virtual storage pools to both On-premises and Cloud storage; and from both On-premises and Cloud storage back to both Virtual storage pools.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Concept of data storage federation**
+
+DSF provides a single virtual volume for a customer with a single access point and also provides storage access mechanisms to DSF local storage.
+
+When a customer requests the single virtual volume the customer's requirements, DSF creates a single virtual volume in the virtual storage pool which meets the customer's requirement by storage operations. In accordance with customer requests to use the single virtual volume, storage operations are performed, such as creating, deleting and scaling storage (single virtual volume) by DSF.
+
+Examples of basic storage operations are described in detail as follows:
+
+- **creating:** connecting DSF local storage, creating virtual storage pool and creating single virtual volume;
+- **deleting:** deleting single virtual volume, deleting virtual storage pool and disconnecting DSF local storage;
+- **scaling:** extending single virtual volume, extending virtual storage pool and attaching another DSF local storage.
+
+Figure 6-3 shows an example flow of data manipulation in DSF. When a customer stores customer data in a single virtual volume, DSF manipulates the customer data by data operations. By the execution of data operation, the customer data is fragmented to DSF data, which is stored to DSF local storage. The name and location of the customer data is registered in the global registry. The global registry is a data set for customer data information.
+
+NOTE 1 – DSF data is a manipulated customer data in DSF and is permanently stored on DSF local storage. It includes fragmented, encrypted, de-duplicated and compressed customer data.
+
+NOTE 2 – The information of customer data includes the location, size and attributes, etc. This information is taken from data operation metadata and storage management metadata.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-3: Example of customer data manipulation in DSF. The diagram shows a three-tier architecture. The top tier is the 'Customer' layer, which contains 'Customer data'. The middle tier is the 'Data storage federation' layer, which contains a 'Global registry' and a 'Virtual storage pool'. The 'Global registry' stores 'Information (Name, location, size and attribute, operations, replicas, ...)' and is connected to the 'Customer data'. The 'Virtual storage pool' contains a 'Single virtual volume' which is linked to 'DSF data'. The bottom tier is the 'DSF local storage' layer, which contains three types of storage: a cloud storage icon, a server rack icon, and a stack of storage units icon. Arrows indicate data flow: 'Customer data' is sent to the 'Global registry', which then interacts with the 'Virtual storage pool'. The 'Virtual storage pool' interacts with the 'DSF local storage' layer. The 'DSF local storage' layer interacts with the 'Single virtual volume' in the 'Virtual storage pool'. The 'Single virtual volume' is linked to 'DSF data'.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – Example of customer data manipulation in DSF**
+
+According to customer requests to use data in a single virtual volume, the data operations are performed such as creating, reading, updating, deleting, searching and sharing data by DSF.
+
+Examples of basic data operations in DSF are described as follows:
+
+- **creating:** fragmenting customer data, storing them to DSF local storage and registering data name and locations to global registry;
+- **reading:** searching data name and location in global registry, loading fragmented data from the DSF local storage and combining the fragmented data;
+- **updating:** searching data name and location in global registry, updating customer data to DSF local storage and updating changes to global registry;
+- **deleting:** searching data location in global registry, removing data location from global registry and deleting fragmented data in the DSF local storage;
+- **searching:** searching data name in global registry;
+- **sharing:** searching data name and changing attribute in global registry to share.
+
+## 6.2 Benefits of the data storage federation
+
+DSF provides beneficial features from the customer perspective such as cost, technical function, service enhancement and resource utilization as follows:
+
+- **Easy storage management:** simple management by using a single user interface and centralized monitoring;
+- **Cost-effectiveness:** reduction of storage usage cost by archiving customer data to a cheaper DSF local storage;
+- **Performance enhancement:** improvement of data access performance by storing data to high-speed storage such as main memory, random access memory (RAM), non-volatile memory express (NVMe), etc.;
+- **Data availability:** increase of availability by replicating the data and storing to another DSF local storage;
+
+- **Storage scalability:** easy scaling storage resources by supporting on-demand storage capacity;
+- **Storage utilization improvement:** improvement of storage utilization by combining two or more DSF local storages to store large data;
+- **Data security:** storing secure data by splitting an important file into multiple fragments to be stored in different DSF local storage;
+- **Data management transparency:** the convenience of data management for data discovery, use of data without knowledge of data location, storage type or data format.
+
+## 6.3 Configuration of logical components for data storage federation
+
+Figure 6-4 shows the general configuration for logical components of DSF. The logical components consist of customer, storage connection, data manipulation, data distribution and storing, DSF local storage management, provision and policy management, and DSF local storage including cloud and on-premises storage.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Customer[Customer] <--> SC[Storage connection]
+ subgraph DSF_Federation [Data storage federation]
+ PPM[Provision and policy management]
+ SC
+ DM[Data manipulation]
+ DDS[Data distribution and storing]
+ DSLSM[DSF local storage management]
+ PPM -- "Data operation metadata" --> SC
+ PPM -- "Data operation metadata" --> DM
+ PPM -- "Data operation metadata" --> DDS
+ PPM -- "Data operation metadata" --> DSLSM
+ end
+ DSLSM -- "Storage management metadata" --> DSL
+ subgraph DSF_Local_Storage [DSF local storage]
+ Cloud[Cloud storage]
+ OnPrem[On-premises storage]
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.3505(25)
+
+Figure 6-4: General configuration for DSF. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is 'Customer'. Below it is a large box labeled 'Data storage federation'. Inside this box, on the left, is a vertical box 'Provision and policy management'. To its right are four stacked boxes: 'Storage connection', 'Data manipulation', 'Data distribution and storing', and 'DSF local storage management'. Arrows show 'Data operation metadata' flowing from the four stacked boxes to 'Provision and policy management'. A double-headed arrow connects 'Customer' and 'Storage connection'. Below the 'Data storage federation' box is another box labeled 'DSF local storage'. Inside this box are 'Cloud storage' and 'On-premises storage'. An arrow labeled 'Storage management metadata' points from 'DSF local storage management' to 'DSF local storage'.
+
+**Figure 6-4 – General configuration for DSF**
+
+Storage connection component provides:
+
+- an interface for a single virtual volume for a customer;
+- a customer access mechanism to connect a single virtual volume;
+
+NOTE 1 – The customer access mechanism includes the different types of protocols according to the storage type (e.g., Internet small computer system interface (iSCSI) for block device storage, server message block (SMB), network file system (NFS), secure fire transfer protocol (SFTP), file transfer protocol (FTP) for file-based storage, the Restful application programming interface (API) for object-based storage, etc.).
+
+- corresponding protocols or input/output (I/O) interfaces of single virtual volume;
+- acceleration of protocols for performance enhancement.
+
+Data manipulation component provides:
+
+- virtual storage pool;
+
+- configuration for virtual storage pool without considering the actual – location of the data;
+ - the write buffer or read cache – for customer data;
+ - enhancement of the read and write response time using high-speed storages for buffer and cache;
+- NOTE 2 – The high-speed storage includes main memory, non-volatile memory express (NVMe), solid state disk (SSD) and peripheral component interconnect express (PCIe) flash cards.
+- data management for snapshots, fast replication and distributed transaction logs.
+
+Data distribution and storing component provides:
+
+- the optimization of writing data to DSF local storage to minimize writing and accessing time;
+ - data fragmentation to distribute and store in DSF local storage;
+- NOTE 3 – Data fragmentation is a method to distribute and store customer data in other storages.
+- the encryption/decryption and compression/decompression of data fragments.
+- NOTE 4 – The encryption and compression are taken into account by customer demands.
+
+DSF local storage management component provides:
+
+- connections to DSF local storage;
+ - storage tiering of data according to the storage performance, time of data usage and data access frequency.
+- NOTE 5 – Storage tiering is the action of distributing and collocating data across multiple storage tiers in hierarchical manner.
+- NOTE 6 – This component automatically moves data between the various storage tiers according to the characteristics of the data.
+- NOTE 7 – When data is initially created, it is stored in high-speed storage. When data access frequency is low, it is moved to a lower-speed storage.
+
+Provisioning and policy management component provides:
+
+- the configurations and controls of logical components;
+ - the policy management of data storage and data manipulation;
+- NOTE 8 – Policy for data storage includes back-up, snapshot, scaling, recovery, data caching, thin-provisioning, tiering, storage type (file, block, object), etc.
+- NOTE 9 – Policy of data manipulation includes sharing support, read/write, replication, data migration, fragmentation, encryption, compression, de-duplication, etc.
+- the provision of single virtual volume in virtual storage pool.
+
+Two kinds of metadata are shown in Figure 6-4 as follows:
+
+- Data operation metadata is a description required to perform data operation. It includes the attribute of virtual storage pool and single virtual volume. It includes transaction log, and DSF data attribute of read/write caching, snapshot, replication, fragmentation, etc.
+- Storage operation metadata is a description required to perform storage operation. It includes the location of DSF local storage, interface, API for customer data operation, read/write speed, storage capacity, etc.
+
+## 6.4 Ecosystem of data storage federation
+
+This clause identifies roles and sub-roles of the DSF ecosystem. In addition, relationships among roles and sub-roles are specified.
+
+DSF service is a service to provide single virtual volume and policies, and it is offered by a DSF service provider.
+
+The DSF ecosystem includes the following roles as shown in Figure 6-5:
+
+- DSF service customer;
+- DSF service provider;
+- DSF local storage provider.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR; Customer[DSF service customer] -- "DSF service" --> Provider[DSF service provider]; subgraph Provider; SFP{{Storage federation provider}}; DMP{{Data manipulation provider}}; end; Provider -- "Data storage" --> LocalStorage[DSF local storage provider];
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the Data storage federation ecosystem. On the left is a rounded rectangle labeled 'DSF service customer'. An arrow labeled 'DSF service' points from the customer to a central box labeled 'DSF service provider'. This central box contains two stacked hexagons: 'Storage federation provider' on top and 'Data manipulation provider' on the bottom. An arrow labeled 'Data storage' points from the central box to a stack of three rounded rectangles on the right labeled 'DSF local storage provider'.
+
+Diagram of the Data storage federation ecosystem showing the flow from a customer to a service provider and then to local storage providers.
+
+Y.3505(25)
+
+**Figure 6-5 – Data storage federation ecosystem**
+
+### **6.4.1 DSF service customer**
+
+The DSF service customer uses DSF service including a single virtual volume and policies from the DSF service provider. DSF service customer's activity includes:
+
+- Use DSF service.
+
+### **6.4.2 DSF service provider**
+
+The DSF service provider federates DSF local storage and provides DSF service with an access mechanism.
+
+The DSF service provider role consists of two sub-roles:
+
+- Storage federation provider;
+- Data manipulation provider.
+
+##### **6.4.2.1 Storage federation provider**
+
+The storage federation provider provides a single virtual volume by federation of DSF local storage. Storage federation provider's activities include:
+
+- providing virtual storage pool;
+- providing single virtual volume;
+- managing storage management metadata;
+- managing data storage policy.
+
+##### **6.4.2.2 Data manipulation provider**
+
+The data manipulation provider provides DSF data by manipulation and manages data operation metadata and data manipulation policy (see clause 6.3). Data manipulation provider's activities include:
+
+- manipulating DSF data;
+- managing data operation metadata;
+- managing data manipulation policy.
+
+### 6.4.3 DSF local storage provider
+
+The DSF local storage provider provides DSF local storage and interfaces to use it. DSF local storage provider's activity includes:
+
+- provide DSF local storage.
+
+# 7 Cloud computing-based data storage federation system context
+
+This clause describes how cloud computing can support the three main roles of the DSF ecosystem: DSF service customer, DSF service provider and DSF local storage provider.
+
+By using cloud computing roles, sub-roles and activities, cloud computing based DSF supports more extensible features by facilitating on-premises storage resources which connects personal and enterprise storage resources.
+
+The cloud computing based DSF context is defined with new sub-roles and activities based on cloud computing reference architecture (CCRA) [ITU-T Y.3502]. For cloud computing based DSF, CSP:storage federation provider (CSP:SFP) for federation of DSF local storage and CSP:data manipulation provider (CSP:DMP) for management of DSF data and policies are defined to utilize DSF local storage as shown in Table 7-1.
+
+Table 7-1 – Mapping roles and sub-roles between data storage federation ecosystem and cloud computing based DSF system context
+
+| Roles and sub-roles of DSF ecosystem | Sub-roles of cloud computing based DSF system context |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| DSF service customer | CSC:cloud service user (CSC:CSU) |
+| DSF service provider:storage federation provider, DSF service provider:data manipulation provider | CSP:storage federation provider (CSP:SFP), CSP:data manipulation provider (CSP:DMP) |
+| DSF local storage provider | CSP:cloud service manager (CSP:CSM) |
+
+Figure 7-1 illustrates the cloud computing sub-roles related to DSF. This figure also identifies activities for DSF and assigns them to cloud computing sub-roles, and illustrates how cloud computing supports DSF service from the perspective of CSP:SFP and CSP:DMP. The cloud computing based DSF utilizes other sub-roles of CSP.
+
+
+
+DSF ecosystem
+
+DSF service customer
+
+DSF service provider
+
+DSF local storage provider
+
+Cloud computing based DSF
+
+Cloud service customer (CSC)
+
+CSC:cloud service user
+
+Use cloud service
+
+Cloud service provider (CSP)
+
+CSP:storage federation provider
+
+Provide virtual storage pool
+
+Provide single virtual volume
+
+Manage storage management metadata
+
+Manage data storage policy
+
+CSP:data manipulation provider
+
+Manipulate DSF data
+
+Manage data operation metadata
+
+Manage data manipulation policy
+
+CSP:cloud service manager
+
+Provide services
+
+Deploy and provision services
+
+Perform service level management
+
+Role
+
+Sub-role
+
+Newly added sub-role
+
+Activity
+
+Y.3505(25)
+
+Figure 7-1: Cloud computing based DSF context and its relationship with DSF ecosystem. The diagram shows the DSF ecosystem divided into three main components: DSF service customer, DSF service provider, and DSF local storage provider. Below these, the Cloud computing based DSF context is detailed, showing the Cloud service customer (CSC) and the Cloud service provider (CSP). The CSP is further divided into CSP:storage federation provider and CSP:data manipulation provider. The CSP:storage federation provider includes activities like Provide virtual storage pool, Provide single virtual volume, Manage storage management metadata, and Manage data storage policy. The CSP:data manipulation provider includes activities like Manipulate DSF data, Manage data operation metadata, and Manage data manipulation policy. The CSP:cloud service manager includes activities like Provide services, Deploy and provision services, and Perform service level management. A legend at the bottom identifies the shapes: Role (rectangle), Sub-role (hexagon), Newly added sub-role (hexagon with a dashed border), and Activity (oval).
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Cloud computing based DSF context and its relationship with DSF ecosystem**
+
+## 7.1 CSP:storage federation provider (CSP:SFP)
+
+CSP:storage federation provider (CSP:SFP) is responsible for the federation of DSF local storage. CSP:SFP activities include:
+
+- providing virtual storage pool;
+- providing single virtual volume;
+- managing storage management metadata;
+- managing data storage policy.
+
+### 7.1.1 Provide virtual storage pool
+
+This activity involves integrating and managing DSF local storage to make a logical storage.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- performing storage operation (see clause 6.1);
+- managing virtual storage pool;
+- delegating customer credentials of DSF local storage.
+
+### 7.1.2 Provide single virtual volume
+
+This activity involves providing and processing a way to use a single virtual volume for a CSC:CSU.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- managing single virtual volume;
+- providing a user access mechanism for CSC:CSUs;
+- performing storage operation (see clause 6.1).
+
+### **7.1.3 Manage storage management metadata**
+
+This activity involves creating, updating and deleting metadata (see clause 6.3) for virtual storage pool and single virtual volume.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- creating storage management metadata of DSF data;
+- updating storage management metadata on changes;
+- deleting storage management metadata.
+
+### **7.1.4 Manage data storage policy**
+
+This activity involves management of data storage policy.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- creating data storage policy;
+- triggering data storage policy;
+- updating data storage policy;
+- deleting data storage policy.
+
+## **7.2 CSP:data manipulation provider (CSP:DMP)**
+
+CSP:data manipulation provider (CSP:DMP) is responsible for operation of DSF data and management of data manipulation policy. CSP:DMP activities include:
+
+- manipulating DSF data;
+- managing data operation metadata;
+- managing data manipulation policy.
+
+### **7.2.1 Manipulate DSF data**
+
+This activity involves DSF data operation for CSC:CSU by data virtualization.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- performing data operation (see clause 6.1).
+
+NOTE 1 – Data virtualization is abstraction of multiple data resources into the logical data resource.
+
+NOTE 2 – Multiple data resources include object storage, file storage and block storage.
+
+### **7.2.2 Manage data operation metadata**
+
+This activity involves creating, updating and deleting metadata (see clause 6.3) for DSF data.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- creating data operation metadata of DSF data;
+- updating data operation metadata on changes;
+- deleting data operation metadata.
+
+### **7.2.3 Manage data manipulation policy**
+
+This activity involves management of data manipulation policy.
+
+This activity involves:
+
+- creating data manipulation policy;
+- triggering data manipulation policy;
+- updating data manipulation policy;
+- deleting data manipulation policy.
+
+# **8 Functional requirements for data storage federation**
+
+This clause describes the requirements for data storage federation.
+
+## **8.1 Storage connection requirements**
+
+- 1) It is required that CSP:SFP provide an interface to connect DSF local storage.
+NOTE 1 – The interface to connect DSF local storage refers to the direct interfaces (i.e., object or block storage interface), or a proxy interface to configure several types of storages interface with software program.
+NOTE 2 – The software program includes software agent, daemon, web worker and RESTful API for interface to DSF local storage.
+NOTE 3 – The proxy interface connects DSF local storage by automatically detecting the interface with the software program.
+- 2) It is required that CSP:SFP provide a user interface for CSC:CSU to use a single virtual volume.
+NOTE 4 – The user interface includes graphical user interface, web application, or the dedicated client for CSC:CSU to access a single virtual volume.
+- 3) It is recommended that CSP:SFP apply the changes of CSC:CSU's access mechanism according to the storage type of a single virtual volume.
+- 4) It is required that CSP:DMP translate data operation to the corresponding interface of DSF local storage.
+NOTE 5 – The corresponding interface includes API, I/O interface, execution commands with driver, etc.
+NOTE 6 – The single virtual volume on virtual storage pool sends a disk access command (read or write) through data distribution and storing to DSF local storage management to translate.
+NOTE 7 – Translation between data operations includes checking target identification for which DSF local storage to use.
+NOTE 8 – Target identification includes physical address, block ID and target API corresponding DSF local storage to use.
+- 5) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide a secure access mechanism to use a single virtual volume for CSC:CSU.
+- 6) It is required that CSP:DMP provide the registration of the CSC:CSU requirements.
+NOTE 9 – The requirements of CSC:CSU include data storage capacity, access mechanism, storage types of single virtual volume, data safety, data mobility, performance information, policies, etc.
+NOTE 10 – Performance information are read/write I/O bandwidth, network bandwidth, storage capacity, storage types, I/O latency, network latency, etc.
+- 7) It is required that CSP:SFP provide a seamless connection of DSF local storage interface to communicate with DSF local storage.
+- 8) It is required that CSP:SFP provide various storage types of virtual storage pool with interface to connect DSF local storage.
+NOTE 11 – Storage types of virtual storage pools include main memory, SSD or NVMe, hard disk drive (HDD) based storage pool, network-based storage pool, etc.
+
+NOTE 12 – Virtual storage pool has the logically mapped area of storage unified with one storage volume between different types of DSF local storages which has the combined direct interface (such as storage driver or direct I/O interfaces without buffer).
+
+NOTE 13 – CSP provides an interface for creating and managing a virtual storage pool that connects various types of storages, and CSP receive the request based on the performance information to use a single virtual volume on a virtual storage pool that CSC creates.
+
+- 9) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide a single virtual volume according to CSC:CSU requirements.
+
+NOTE 14 – CSC:CSU selects a single virtual volume which has the requirements for the lowest latency, the best bandwidth and huge capacity included in performance information.
+
+- 10) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide a communication link between a single virtual volume and DSF local storage.
+
+NOTE 15 – When a single virtual volume is utilized as cache storage to support CSC:CSU mobility, CSP:SFP establishes a communication link dynamically between the single virtual volume and DSF local storage.
+
+## **8.2 Data manipulation requirements**
+
+- 1) It is required that CSP:DMP provide the execution of CSC:CSU's create read update delete (CRUD) data operation.
+
+NOTE 1 – CRUD data operation includes creating, reading, updating and deleting data.
+
+- 2) It is required that CSP:DMP provide the searching for data operation from CSC:CSU data using query to global registry.
+
+- 3) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide the sharing for data operation by updating of sharing status of DSF data in global registry after checking sharing status of DSF data.
+
+NOTE 2 – Data sharing means that same DSF data is shared during data operation.
+
+NOTE 3 – Sharing status of DSF data is an information about if DSF data is shared or not.
+
+- 4) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide the capacity saving of data storage using de-duplication or compression of DSF data.
+
+NOTE 4 – De-duplication removes the duplicated parts between data and files in virtual storage pool and DSF local storage using main memory, RAM, NVMe, etc.
+
+- 5) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide DSF data encryption/decryption for data transfer to DSF local storage.
+
+- 6) It is required that CSP:DMP provide data recovery of CSC:CSU from system failure.
+
+NOTE 5 – Data recovery refers to restoring the most recently used CSC:CSU data preventing data loss due to errors from the storage and network connection failure.
+
+- 7) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide DSF data migration to available DSF local storage for resilience and cost efficiency of the storage space.
+
+NOTE 6 – The data migration for the resilience and cost efficiency of the data storage space is automatically performed without user intervention or recognition.
+
+- 8) It is required that the CSP:DMP provide the validation of DSF data on data operation to check the data integrity.
+
+- 9) It is required that CSP:DMP support CSC:CSU data consistency for the replicated DSF data.
+
+NOTE 7 –Data consistency means that CSP:DMP correctly backs up current DSF data in order to recover CSC:CSU data on storage failure.
+
+- 10) It is required that CSP:DMP support CSC:CSU data transparency.
+
+NOTE 8 –Data transparency means that CSC:CSU data can be accessed without knowing the location.
+
+- 11) It is required that CSP:SFP provide cache coherency.
+
+NOTE 9 – Cache coherency is responsible for maintaining consistency among data copies in the cache and in the DSF local storage, ensuring that the most recent and correct version of the data is accessed regardless of where it is stored.
+
+## 8.3 Storage federation requirements
+
+- 1) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide the performance information of DSF local storage from storage management metadata.
+- 2) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide the optimization of virtual storage pool considering the characteristics of DSF local storage.
+
+NOTE 1 – The characteristics of DSF local storage to optimize virtual storage pool includes storage mirroring, storage prioritization, CSC:CSU access geo-location and their combinations.
+
+- 3) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide the optimization of single virtual volume considering the CSC:CSU's requirements
+
+NOTE 2 – The optimization of single virtual volume include the optimization of storage capacity, data safety, storage performance, mobility of the usage environment and their combinations.
+
+- 4) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the configuration to create single virtual volume from CSC:CSU requirements.
+
+- 5) It is required that CSP:SFP provide a read/write cache to access data.
+
+NOTE 3 – The read/write cache enables to enhance the performance of the storage and the device storing the data is used by various devices for fast cache operation.
+
+NOTE 4 – The various devices for fast cache are main memory, RAM based disk, SSD, etc.
+
+- 6) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide the hierarchical cache management using cache multi-tiering.
+
+NOTE 5 – Cache multi-tiering means that for the high-speed access, cache hierarchy is extended to various devices for fast caching.
+
+NOTE 6 – For capacity limit, if main-memory cache area is exhausted, it is automatically expanded to RAM based disk cache and expanded to SSD cache.
+
+NOTE 7 – When CSC:CSU performs the data operation, the data operation is performed in the memory area in advance for fast write response.
+
+- 7) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the backup of global registry for high availability.
+
+NOTE 8 – The backup of the global registry is synchronized with most recently updated CSC:CSU data.
+
+- 8) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide in-parallel access to DSF local storage.
+
+- 9) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the registration of CSC:CSU's credential to DSF local storage.
+
+- 10) It is recommended that CSP:SFP support monitoring the performance information of DSF local storage.
+
+- 11) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the management of DSF local storage interface.
+
+- 12) It is recommended that CSP:SFP support to access the secured storage interface for DSF local storage.
+
+- 13) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the storage operation for DSF local storage.
+
+NOTE 9 – Storage operation for DSF local storage includes create, delete, scaling, partitioning, and checking volume, etc.).
+
+- 14) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the scaling of single virtual volume on CSC:CSU demand.
+
+NOTE 10 – Scaling of single virtual volume includes scale-in and scale-out operations to assign DSF local storage based on CSC:CSU demand.
+
+## **8.4 Metadata and policy management requirements**
+
+- 1) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide a configuration of single virtual volume by data storage policy for CSC:CSU.
+- 2) It is recommended that CSP:SFP provide default data storage policies when policy is not configured.
+NOTE 1 – Default data policy is reconfigured by customer's requests.
+- 3) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide a transformation of DSF data by data manipulation policy.
+NOTE 2 – Data manipulation policy for transformation of DSF data includes the policies of fragmentation, encryption, compression, de-duplication, etc.
+- 4) It is recommended that CSP:DMP provide the default data manipulation policy.
+- 5) It is required that CSP:SFP provide the global registry for customer data access.
+- 6) It is required that CSP:SFP provide high-speed access of global registry.
+- 7) It is required that CSP:DMP provide the management of data operation metadata automatically according to execution of data operation.
+- 8) It is required that CSP:SFP provide storage management metadata to communicate with DSF local storage.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+It is recommended that the security framework for cloud computing described in [b-ITU-T X.1601] be considered for data storage federation. [b-ITU-T X.1601] analyses security threats and challenges in the cloud computing environment and describes security capabilities that could mitigate these threats and meet security challenges.
+
+[b-ITU-T X.1631] provides guidelines supporting the implementation of information security controls for cloud service customers and cloud service providers. Many of the guidelines guide the cloud service providers to assist the cloud service customers in implementing the controls and guide the cloud service customers to implement such controls. Selection of appropriate information security controls, and the application of the implementation guidance provided, will depend on a risk assessment as well as any legal, contractual, regulatory or other cloud-sector specific information security requirements.
+
+It is also recommended that the guidelines for cloud service customer data security described in [b-ITU-T X.1641] be considered. It provides generic security guidelines for the cloud service customer (CSC) data in cloud computing, analyses the CSC data security lifecycle and proposes security requirements at each stage of the data lifecycle.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use case of data storage federation
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Storing a user file dispersedly
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Storing a user file dispersedly |
+| Description | In this scenario, a data storage customer having two data storages on DSF local storage requests a large file storing to DSF service provider. DSF service provider splits the file into several parts if there is not enough space in DSF local storage (Case 1) or if it needs to access it in parallel for better performance (Case 2), and stores the parts into different distributed DSF local storage. |
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service provider (CSP:SFP)Case 1: limited capacity of data storage in DSF local storage
Image: Diagram for Case 1: limited capacity of data storage in DSF local storage. A CSC:CSU box contains 'File A' with 'File size: 700 MB'. An arrow labeled 'Store' points to a CSP:SFP box labeled 'Store File A into different storages'. Inside the CSP:SFP box are two smaller boxes: 'File A-1 (350 MB)' and 'File A-2 (350 MB)'. A yellow starburst points to the CSP:SFP box with the text 'File A cannot be stored in one data storage because of limitation of capacity'. Two arrows labeled 'Store by API of data storage #1' and 'Store by API of data storage #2' point from the CSP:SFP box to two cylinders representing 'Data storage #1' and 'Data storage #2'. Both cylinders are labeled 'Storage size: 500 MB' and contain 'File A-1 (350 MB)' and 'File A-2 (350 MB)' respectively. The entire storage area is enclosed in a dashed box labeled 'DSF local storage'. A reference 'Y.3505(25)' is at the bottom right.
Case 2: CSC:CSU parallel access requirement
Image: Diagram for Case 2: CSC:CSU parallel access requirement. A CSC:CSU box contains 'File B' with 'File size: 200 MB'. An arrow labeled 'Store with policy' points to a CSP:SFP box labeled 'Store File B into different storages'. Inside the CSP:SFP box are two smaller boxes: 'File B-1 (100 MB)' and 'File B-2 (100 MB)'. A green starburst points to the CSP:SFP box with the text 'POLICY! parallel access'. Two arrows labeled 'Store by API of data storage #3' and 'Store by API of data storage #4' point from the CSP:SFP box to two cylinders representing 'Data storage #3' and 'Data storage #4'. Both cylinders are labeled 'Storage size: 250 MB' and contain 'File B-1 (100 MB)' and 'File B-2 (100 MB)' respectively. The entire storage area is enclosed in a dashed box labeled 'DSF local storage'. A reference 'Y.3505(25)' is at the bottom right.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – CSP:SFP is available to access DSF local storage. – CSC:CSU requests a single virtual volume to CSP:SFP. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (2) – Clause 8.4 requirement (2) – Clause 8.1 requirement (4) |
+
+### **I.2 Data sharing between customers**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Data sharing between customers |
+| Description | In this scenario, the DSF service customer #1 stored file A~D with data sharing mode policy setting. File A is non-sharing mode, file B is read-only data sharing mode, file C is over-writable data sharing mode, and file D is replicable data sharing mode. The other DSF service customer #2 uses file A~D with data sharing policy set by DSF service customer #1. DSF service customer #2 cannot access file A because of non-sharing mode policy setting. And DSF service customer #2 can read file B but not writable. In file C case, DSF service customer #2 can overwrite it and store it with changes. In file D case, by a replication request by DSF service customer #2, the original file D is preserved, and a new file E is generated and stored to DSF service customer #2's single virtual volume. |
+| Role/sub-role | DSF service provider (CSP:DMP)Image: Diagram illustrating data sharing between two DSF service customers (CSC:CSU) via a DSF service provider (CSP:DMP). Customer #1 (left) has files A, B, C, and D. Customer #2 (right) has a single virtual volume. The CSP:DMP (center) acts as a mediator. Arrows show data flow: File A (Non-sharing mode), File B (Read only), File C (Sharing mode/Writing), File D (Sharing mode/Replication). Customer #2 can Read File B, Write File C, and perform a Replication request for File D to create File E. A 'No' symbol indicates that Customer #2 cannot access File A. The diagram is labeled Y.3505(25) in the bottom right corner.
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (2) |
+
+### **I.3 Multiple storage types and access mechanisms for data access**
+
+| | |
+|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Multiple storage types and access mechanisms for data access |
+| Description | In this scenario, DSF service customer requests a variety of service interfaces and storage types to DSF service provider. Also, DSF service provider provides service interfaces to DSF service customer with the corresponding access mechanisms. |
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Figure (optional)
| The diagram illustrates the architecture of a storage service. At the top, three entities are shown: 'Application server', 'Application program', and 'User/Terminal'. These connect to three protocols: 'Block-based protocol', 'File-based protocol', and 'Object-based protocol'. These protocols then connect to a central layer labeled 'CSP:SFP/DMP'. This layer contains three main components: 'Block device service interface' (using iSCSI), 'File system service interface' (using SMB, NFS, FTP, SFTP), and 'Object storage service interface' (using Restful API). Each interface connects to a 'Single virtual volume'. Below these are three managers: 'Virtual block device manager', 'File system manager', and 'Object storage manager'. These managers connect to 'Virtual storage pools'. All these components connect to a 'Virtual volume driver'. This driver then connects to three storage providers: 'On-premises disk storage' (including SSD, SAS, SATA, SAN, and PCIe flash), 'On-premises object storage', and 'Public cloud storage'. The label 'DSF local storage provider' is associated with the on-premises storage options. The reference 'Y.3505(25)' is noted at the bottom right of the diagram area.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional)
| – CSC:CSU use its own storage types – CSC:CSU can be general user (which owns storage individually), some application programs, application servers and other cloud system. |
+| Post-conditions (optional)
| |
+| Derived requirements
| – Clause 8.4 requirement (3) – Clause 8.1 requirement (3) |
+
+Architecture diagram showing the flow from Application server, Application program, and User/Terminal through various protocols (Block-based, File-based, Object-based) to CSP:SFP/DMP, which then connects to DSF local storage providers (On-premises disk storage, On-premises object storage, Public cloud storage).
+
+### I.4 Policy-driven provision and management of DSF local storage
+
+| | |
+|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Policy-driven provision and management of DSF local storage |
+| Description | DSF service provider manages and provides a single virtual volume based on DSF local storage policies. DSF service provider organizes DSF local storage policies by using default policies configured by DSF service provider and re-configured by DSF service provider from multiple data storages. That is, DSF service provider's policies are dependent on storage providers' storage policies in DSF local storage.
DSF service provider provides the default policies as multiple options (e.g., backup, replication, snapshot, auto-scaling and storage type). DSF service customer selects options and DSF service provider applies options onto metadata. The options are
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | matched onto corresponding storage policies in DSF local storage. DSF service provider manages the DSF local storage by matched functions onto storage policies. All communications with DSF local storage between the DSF service provider and DSF local storage provider take place by managed storage API. |
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Diagram illustrating the policy-driven provisioning and management of data. It shows the interaction between CSC:CSU (Customer), CSP:SFP (DSF service provider), and DSF local storage (multiple CSP:CSM providers). The customer defines a single virtual volume policy (Backup, Duplication, Snapshot, Auto-scaling, Storage type). The service provider configures data storage policies, maps them to local storage providers' policies, and re-organizes them. The service provider then manages the single virtual volume by policy (Policy 1 to Policy 4) using management functions (Management function 1 to Management function 4). The service provider interacts with DSF local storage providers (CSP:CSM #1, #2, #3) via APIs (API of storage A, B, C) to provide, retrieve, update, and delete data. The diagram also shows metadata (Loc: [A, B], Snapshot: true, Duplication: true) and storage types (File, Block, Object).
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.4 requirement (1) – Clause 8.4 requirement (4) |
+
+### I.5 Policy-driven provisioning and management of data
+
+| | |
+|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Policy-driven provisioning and management of data |
+| Description | DSF service provider provides a unified interface to use DSF local storage and options to set data manipulation policies. DSF service provider configures the data manipulation policies because the data manipulation policies are independent from multiple data storages in DSF local storage. DSF service customer uses a single virtual volume (e.g., upload, download, copy, modify, delete and so on) and sets data manipulation policies (e.g., non-sharing, read-only, overwrite, replicate and so on) to saved files. DSF service provider applies data manipulation policies onto data operation metadata. DSF service provider manipulates data by corresponding functions and APIs with data manipulate policies.
DSF service customer #1 sets data manipulation policy. DSF service provider modifies data operation metadata of target data. Another DSF service customer (e.g., DSF service customer #2) searches and gets data by using catalogue. In this procedure, the data operation metadata is used in order to lookup data from DSF local storage.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Architecture diagram for data virtualization showing interactions between CSC:CSU, CSP:DMP, and DSF local storage.
The diagram illustrates a data virtualization architecture. On the left, CSC:CSU (Data sharing policy) has options: Customer #1 and Customer #2 . Customer #1 applies policies to Metadata (Partitioned: 2, Loc: ..., Shared: true). CSP:DMP manages data policies (Configured default policies of data) and data by policy (Policy 1 to 4 with Management functions 1 to 4). It also handles Data provision (Lookup shared data based on metadata). A DSF local storage API management block lists operations: Upload, Download, Copy, Modify, Delete. On the right, DSF local storage includes CSP:CSM A (API of storage A, storage A-1), CSP:CSM B (API of storage B, storage A-2), and DSF local storage provider C (API of storage C, storage B). Customer #2 uses a Data access interface to search data and receive results.
|
+| Pre-conditions – Policies for data storage are configured by CSP:SFP and selected by CSC:CSU, or set to default. – CSC:CSU save files on a single virtual volume. |
+| Post-conditions – Clause 8.1 requirement (7) – Clause 8.2 requirement (2) – Clause 8.2 requirement (3) |
+
+### I.6 Data virtualization CSP:SFP
+
+| | |
+|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Data virtualization by CSP:SFP |
+| Description | This scenario shows data virtualizations through the description of read and write data. DSF service customer #1 writes a file through the DSF service. DSF service provider prepares to write data because file A is saved on a single virtual volume. As the preparation information (e.g., owner, policies and corresponding APIs of data storage, etc.), data operation metadata for the file A is generated. The file A namely data A, is saved and managed by the data operation metadata, such as number of data portioning, data location, etc... In this procedure, the file A was abstracted for data provisioning and management by policies.
DSF service customer #1 reads a file through the DSF service. DSF service provider gathers data based on the data operation metadata. DSF service provider aggregates partitions of data, and then data is provided to DSF service customer #1. It is possible for the provided data to be used again. Therefore, the data is cached and reflected on data operation metadata. For this reason, DSF service customer #2 quickly reads the cached data. In this procedure, data A was virtualized because the partitioned data A was aggregated as if originally single data A was, and then was used for multiple DSF service customer. That is, DSF service customer #1 and #2 read same data.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Figure
| Figure I.6-1 – Writing data by abstracting data
Figure I.6-2 – Read data by virtualized data
|
+| Pre-conditions
| – CSC:CSU has one or more data storage. – CSC:CSU sets policies for DSF local storage. – The data A is shared in Figure 2. |
+| Post-conditions
| |
+| Derived
| – Clause 8.4 requirement (7) – Clause 8.4 requirement (7) – Clause 8.4 requirement (8) – Clause 8.1 requirement (2) – Clause 8.2 requirement (10) – Clause 8.2 requirement (9) |
+
+Figure I.6-1: Writing data by abstracting data. This diagram illustrates the process of writing data. A 'Customer' in the 'CSC:CSU' domain sends 'Write data' (File A) to the 'CSP:DMP' domain. Inside CSP:DMP, the process 'Prepare to write data' involves three steps: 'Lookup the DSF local storage of customer', 'Lookup policies of the DSF local storage', and 'Lookup correspond APIs of DSF local storage'. Then, 'Data A' is processed to 'Generate metadata'. This results in 'Abstract data' containing metadata like 'Partitioned: 2, Loc: ..., ...'. The data is then distributed to 'DSF local storage' which includes 'CSP:CSM A' (Cloud-based, receiving fragment A-1), 'CSP:CSM B' (Cloud-based, receiving fragment B), and 'DSF local storage provider C' (Non-cloud-based, receiving fragment A-2). Figure I.6-2: Read data by virtualized data. This diagram shows two customers, 'Customer #1' and 'Customer #2', in the 'CSC:CSU' domain. Customer #1 sends a 'Read data A' request to 'CSP:DMP'. Inside CSP:DMP, the 'Request and get data' process involves 'Lookup metadata' (which shows 'Partitioned: 2, Loc: ..., Shared: true, ...'), 'Gather data' from 'DSF local storage' (reading A-1 from CSP:CSM A and A-2 from DSF local storage provider C), and 'Aggregate data' (combining A-1 and A-2 into Data A). The aggregated 'Data A' is then 'Provide data' to Customer #1. Additionally, 'Data A' is stored in 'Cache data'. When 'Customer #2' sends a 'Read data A' request, CSP:DMP provides the 'Provide data (cached)' from the cache. An 'Update metadata' flow is also shown from the cache back to the metadata lookup. A note indicates 'Data A was shared'.
+
+### I.7 Efficient data storage management
+
+| | |
+|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Efficient data storage management |
+| Description | As shown in Figure I.7-1, DSF service provider efficiently manages data to support better storage access performance and to reduce management burden. Tiering is a technique to fulfil efficient data management. By organizing tiered caches, frequently accessed files are stored in high-speed cache. While rarely access files are stored in low speed one. Cached files are stored on corresponding data storages by managed API.
As shown in Figure I.7-2, DSF service customer saves a same file on a single virtual volume. It occurs waste of data storage capacity. To avoid the waste, DSF service provider performs to de-duplicate data to save capacity of data storage. For example, when a file is stored, data replication checking is accomplished. As the result of the checking, a file is stored. If same file is already stored, the file is managed by data operation metadata.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Figure I.7-1: Tiered caches for access performance. The diagram illustrates a data tiering strategy. On the left, a 'Customer' (CSC:CSU) is shown. In the center, 'Efficient data management' (CSP:SFP) is depicted with three tiers: 'High speed cache (e.g., In-memory storage)' containing 'Word file X', 'Normal speed cache (e.g., SSD)' containing 'Design document Y', and 'Low speed cache (e.g., HDD)' containing 'Research paper Z'. Arrows indicate access frequency: 'Frequently accessed (e.g., many time a day or online)' for Word file X, 'Normally accessed (e.g., several times a month)' for Design document Y, and 'Rarely accessed (e.g., not accessed over year)' for Research paper Z. On the right, 'DSF local storage' is shown with three providers: 'CSP:CSM A' (Cloud-based, high speed access, SSD) for Word file X, 'CSP:CSM B' (Cloud-based, high speed access, SSD) for Design document Y, and 'DSF local storage provider C' (Non-cloud-based, low speed access, HDD) for Research paper Z. A 'Read/write data by managed API' box is also present. The diagram is labeled Y.3505(25).
Figure I.7-1 – Tiered caches for access performance
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | CSC:CSU
Customer
Save the research paper Z (saved before)
Rarely accessed
CSP:DMP
Efficient DSF local storage mangement
De-duplicate data
Research paper Z
High speed cache
EXIST!
Compare the files
...., Partitioned: 1,
Data attribute metadata
Research paper Z
Low speed cache
DSF local storage
CSP:CSM A
To support high speed access
Cloud-based
DSF local storage provider B
To support low speed access
Non-cloud-based
Y.3505(25)
|
+| | Figure I.7-2 – De-duplication data for saving storage capacity
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.3 requirement (10) – Clause 8.3 requirement (6) – Clause 8.2 requirement (4) |
+
+### I.8 The data read/write cache and parallel distributed file for performance enhancement
+
+| | |
+|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The data read/write cache and parallel distributed file for performance enhancement |
+| Description | DSF service provider provides a cache function for data stored in a public cloud storage. Data stored in public cloud storage is slower than on-premises storage because data is transmitted over the Internet. In addition, since the data is automatically distributed to the public cloud storage in the state DSF service customer does not recognize, the data stored in the public cloud storage needs a high-speed access function. DSF service provider caches the data stored in the public cloud storage to the storage device inside the cloud integrated storage operating platform to provide an on-premises storage-level access speed to the public cloud storage.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service provider (CSP:SFP, CSP:DMP)
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Diagram of Data Storage Federation and Management architecture. At the top, a blue box contains 'Storage connection', 'Virtual block device service engine', 'File system service engine', and 'Object storage service engine'. Below this is a 'Single virtual volume' box. A 'Data manipulation block' connects the volume to a 'Name space' box. The 'Name space' box contains 'Read cache' and 'Write cache' boxes, each with an 'SSD' icon. Below the caches is a 'Distribution and storing' block containing 'Data compression' and 'Data distribution' boxes. This is followed by 'DSF local storage management' box, which connects to three storage types: 'On-premises disk storage', 'On-premises object storage', and 'Public cloud storage'. A note at the bottom states: 'NOTE – This figure is aligned with logical component.' and the identifier 'Y.3505(25)' is on the right.
NOTE – This figure is aligned with logical component.
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – CSC:CSU requests single virtual volume to CSP:SFP and has own data storage. – CSP:SFP provide storage system, appliance or device to federate the other storages |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.3 requirement (5) – Clause 8.4 requirement (16) – Clause 8.3 requirement (7) – Clause 8.2 requirement (5) – Clause 8.3 requirement (8) – Clause 8.3 requirement (9) |
+
+### I.9 Data storage federation and management
+
+| | |
+|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The use case for data storage federation and management |
+| Description | In this scenario, it is a use case for one storage system connected to various storage types. In the figure on this use case, no matter what type of storage the storage system has, DSF service customer is seen as the federated storage and DSF service customer does not care about what storage they use. Thus, a federated storage system or appliance in this figure is responsible for making multiple storage systems of a storage visible to a single system. Similarly, management has a unified management interface. |
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Architecture diagram of data storage federation. At the top, a 'Unified user view' (CSC:CSU) interacts with a 'Data storage federation system or appliance' (CSP:SFP/DMP). An 'Admin' manages the 'Data storage federation management' component. The federation system connects to 'Block I/O' and 'File I/O' interfaces. These connect to various storage providers: SAS/SATA IF adapter, FC/FCoE IF adapter, iSCSI storage, NAS system, and a Gateway. The Gateway connects to 'Public cloud storage' and 'SAN'. The DSF local storage provider is represented by the adapters and iSCSI storage. The diagram is labeled Y.3505(25) at the bottom right.
|
+| Pre-conditions – CSC:CSU requests a data storage to DSF service provider and has own data storage. – CSP:SFP provide storage system, appliance or device to federate the other storages |
+| Post-conditions – Clause 8.2 requirement (7) – Clause 8.3 requirement (14) – Clause 8.1 requirement (2) – Clause 8.2 requirement (6) – Clause 8.4 requirement (5) – Clause 8.1 requirement (8) – Clause 8.2 requirement (8) |
+
+### I.10 A use case of storage optimization
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | A use case for storage optimization based on the customer's purpose in data storage federation |
+| Description | When a DSF locals storage provider provides the information of his/ her cloud storage services with a DSF service provider, the DSF service provider optimizes single virtual volume according to the requirements of the user, such as data safety and storage performance. A detailed explanation is as follows. The DSF service provider configures the single virtual volume based on the cloud storages provided by DSF local storage provider. The following optimization policies can be applied, and the decision of the optimization policy can be done by the DSF service customer according to his requirements.
1) The DSF local storage provider registered multiple cloud storages to the DSF service provider. 2) DSF service provider provides optimization tool for s. 3) DSF service customer chooses optimization policy related with; A) data safety and storage performance (a): DSF service providers provide a binding function that configures a virtual, single data storage for efficient management of distributed data storage that is available to customers. In addition, DSF service providers provide real-time monitoring of the performance of each data storage and use it with a mirroring mechanism to provide optimized services for stability and performance. For example, when a DSF service customer uses his or her own data,
|
+
+| | |
+|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | virtual data storage provides a service by selecting a data storage that can provide optimal service among the mirrored data storage;
B) enhancement of performance without storage mirroring (b): DSF service provider provides real-time performance monitoring for each data storage. Using this, the DSF service provider determines the priority of the data storage that can provide the optimal service and then transfers the data to that storage in appropriate timing. Therefore, customers can always receive service from optimal data storage;
C) enhancement of performance considering user mobility (c): Basically, since the DSF service is affected by the data transmission performance of the network, the performance of the DSF service can be greatly influenced by the location of the customer. Therefore, the DSF service provider provides optimization not only for the performance for each data storage but also for the network situation at the user's location. Virtual data storage provides real-time switching function to the best possible data storage depending on the customer's location.
4) Based on the optimization policy selected by the customer, the DSF service provider optimizes the service. After this processing,
5) DSF service customers use services optimized for their purposes.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service provider (CSP:SFP)
DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)
DSF local storage provider (CSP:CSM)
|
+
+
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure
| CSP:SFP
Mirroring
Binding
Single virtual volume
Optimization by
• Virtual RAID (by mirroring and binding storage) CSC:CSU
DSF local storage
DSF local storage
DSF local storage
DSF local storage
a) Mirroring and binding storage for data safety and performance
CSP:SFP
Read/write
Move data
Single virtual volume
Optimization by
• Prioritization by performance and move data to free up high performance data storage. CSC:CSU
First performance
DSF local storage
Second performance
DSF local storage
Third performance
DSF local storage
Fourth performance
DSF local storage
b) Prioritization of data storages and move data for performance
CSC:CSU
Access at location A
CSC:CSU
Access at location D
CSP:SFP
First performance
Switching
Single virtual volume
First performance
Optimization by
• Real-time prioritization according to CSC:CSU's access geo-location DSF local storage
DSF local storage
DSF local storage
DSF local storage
c) Real-time prioritization and switching data storage related with user's access geo-location for performance
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions
| – CSP:SFP has an access interface with multiple DSF local storage.
|
+| Post-conditions
| |
+
+Diagram a: Mirroring and binding storage for data safety and performance. A CSC:CSU block is connected via a dashed line to a 'Single virtual volume' cylinder inside a 'CSP:SFP' box. From the cylinder, dashed arrows point to 'Binding' and 'Mirroring' operations. These operations connect to four 'DSF local storage provider' blocks (A, B, C, D). Optimization text specifies 'Virtual RAID (by mirroring and binding storage)'. Diagram b: Prioritization of data storages and move data for performance. Similar structure to (a), but with 'Read/write' and 'Move data to free up space' operations. The storage providers are labeled with performance tiers: First, Second, Third, and Fourth performance. Optimization text specifies 'Prioritization by performance and move data to free up high performance data storage.' Diagram c: Real-time prioritization and switching data storage related with user's access geo-location for performance. Shows a car moving between 'Access at location A' and 'Access at location D'. The 'Single virtual volume' switches its connection between storage providers based on location. Optimization text specifies 'Real-time prioritization according to CSC:CSU's access geo-location'.
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (1) – Clause 8.3 requirement (1) – Clause 8.3 requirement (2) – Clause 8.3 requirement (3) |
+|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+### I.11 The use case for data storage federation management
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The use case for data storage federation management |
+| Description | The management is generally separate from the data path and the management control path, and management is driven through the provisioning and policy management. The management provides the ability to display, create, modify and delete the contents of on-premises and public cloud services integrated into a single storage.
In backend storage management, the storage configuration is different from the on-premises and the public cloud storage service. The interface for backend storage are made in the form of the separate software daemon. When there are multiple cloud storage devices, DSF local storage management can be configured, and a proxy interface can be configured to interface with them, and an interface for registering and using on-premises storage is provided.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Architecture diagram of data storage federation management showing the flow from Customer to Cloud storage and On-premises storage, with a Management and control path.
The diagram illustrates the architecture of data storage federation management. It is divided into three main layers: CSC:CSU (Customer), CSCS:FSP/DMP (DSF service provider), and DSF local storage (local storage provider).
CSC:CSU Layer: Contains the 'Customer (User, application and server)' which connects to a 'Storage connection' block.CSCS:FSP/DMP Layer: Contains a 'Virtual storage pool' consisting of multiple 'Single virtual volume' blocks. Below this is a 'DSF local storage proxy interface' block.DSF local storage Layer: Contains a 'DSF local storage connection Daemon' block, which includes an 'Object storage interface Daemon' and a 'Block storage interface driver'. Below this are 'Cloud storage' and 'On-premises' storage blocks. Key components and connections:
The 'Storage connection' block connects to the 'Virtual storage pool'. The 'Virtual storage pool' connects to the 'DSF local storage proxy interface'. The 'DSF local storage proxy interface' connects to the 'DSF local storage connection Daemon'. The 'DSF local storage connection Daemon' connects to both 'Cloud storage' and 'On-premises' storage. A 'Management and control' path (dashed arrows) runs vertically through the 'Storage connection', 'Virtual storage pool', 'DSF local storage proxy interface', and 'DSF local storage connection Daemon'. A 'Data path' (solid arrows) runs horizontally at the bottom, connecting 'Cloud storage' and 'On-premises' storage. On the right side, there are four boxes: 'Provision', 'Policy', 'Monitoring', and 'Control', which are connected to the 'Management and control' path. Legend: Dashed arrows represent the 'Control and management path', and solid arrows represent the 'Data path'.
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – Each logical component consists of one server or several servers. – Each logical component is organized into a network through servers, virtual machines or containers |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.3 requirement (11) – Clause 8.1 requirement (5) |
+
+### I.12 Registration of data storage for federation service
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Registration of data storage for federation service |
+| Description | DSF service customer requests data storage service to DSF service provider. For the data storage registration, DSF service customer logs in through the already registered authentication information, and registers the cloud storage and on-premises storage to use. The registration process is provided by DSF service provider through the graphical user interface (GUI).
DSF service customer registers the service name, storage specification, data storage service protocol, and cloud storage name and cloud storage type through the GUI for setting virtual data storage and creates the virtual data storage.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)
DSF service provider (CSP:SFP/DMP)
|
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Flowchart of the registration process for data storage service. It starts with a user icon labeled 'CSC:CSU for single virtual volume'. The process steps are: Login, Registering for cloud storage, Registering for On-premises storage, Setting single virtual volume, and Invoking single virtual volume. The reference 'Y.3505(25)' is at the bottom of the flowchart.
graph TD User[CSC:CSU for single virtual volume] --> Login[Login] Login --> RegisterCloud[Registering for cloud storage] RegisterCloud --> RegisterOnPrem[Registering for On-premises storage] RegisterOnPrem --> SetVolume[Setting single virtual volume] SetVolume --> InvokeVolume[Invoking single virtual volume] Y.3505(25)
<The example operation of CSP for data storage service>
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – CSC:CSU for virtual data storage is a registered user to CSP:DMP. – CSP:DMP has each cloud storage service interfaces |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (6) – Clause 8.3 requirement (4) |
+
+### I.13 Provision of virtual storage pool for single virtual volume
+
+| | |
+|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Provision of virtual storage pool for single virtual volume |
+| Description | This use case is about a method for providing a single virtual volume from a virtual storage pool according to CSC:CSU's policy.
A virtual storage pool has different characteristics depending on the type of devices in which the virtual storage pool is created (DRAM-based storage pool, SSD or NVMe-based storage pool, HDD-based storage pool, network-based storage pool, etc.). The characteristics of single virtual volume provided to CSC:CSU are different according to the type of devices in virtual storage pools.
CSU selects single virtual volume created in various types of virtual storage pools, which is a means to overcome performance differences of the services.
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | For example, as shown in the figure, due to the characteristics of the device, a single virtual volume created in a memory-based storage pool has the fastest speed, and DSF local storage which selects a memory-based device also provides the fastest speed but it needs backup for data loss.
CSC:CSU requests various types of single virtual volumes with policy for data storage and DSF provides the type of each storage pool included in data operation metadata.
The following is the method to provide a single virtual volume according to the performance:
1) Acquire and store the device information of the virtual storage pool 2) Monitor the IO bandwidth of the virtual storage pool. 3) Request a new single virtual volume through performance requirements from CSC:CSU (I/O bandwidth and capacity information, device type, etc.). 4) Select a virtual storage pool that meets CSC:CSU's requirements and create a single virtual volume. 5) Create and provide an interface that meets CSC:CSU's requirements. |
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Architecture diagram showing the flow from user/system/service to virtual volumes, through a storage pool and DSF layers, to various storage backends.
The diagram illustrates the storage architecture. At the top, 'A user', 'A system (e.g., server, VM, container, etc.)', and 'A cloud service' send 'Performance requirements' to three 'Single virtual volume' nodes (volume1, volume2, volume3). 'Single virtual volume1' is highlighted as the 'Best performance case!'. These volumes connect via 'Storage connection' to a 'Virtual storage pool' within the 'DSF' (Data Storage Framework) layer. The 'Virtual storage pool' contains 'SSD', 'NVMe', and a database icon. Below this is 'Data manipulation', followed by 'Distribution and storing', and 'Backend storage management' which includes a 'Direct interface' and a 'Proxy'. These components connect to three storage backends: 'On-premises main memory' (with a memory stack icon), 'On-premises storage' (with 'SSD' and 'NVMe' icons), and 'Public cloud storage' (with a database icon). The identifier 'Y.3505(25)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (4) – Clause 8.1 requirement (6) – Clause 8.1 requirement (8) |
+
+| | |
+|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | – Clause 8.1 requirement (9) – Clause 8.2 requirement (4) – Clause 8.3 requirement (1) – Clause 8.3 requirement (2) – Clause 8.3 requirement (3) – Clause 8.3 requirement (4) |
+|--|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+### **I.14 The use case for caching using federated data storage in core-edge cloud configuration model**
+
+| | |
+|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The use case for caching using federated data storage in core-edge cloud configuration model |
+| Description | In this use case, a DSF service customer (CSC:CSU) uploads a video to DSF local storage for sharing as shown in Figure I.14-1 to improve data access performance using core-edge cloud infrastructure. The single virtual volume, consisting of multiple storages, provides read-only caches of video data. When the CSC:CSU moves from Edge Cloud A to Edge Cloud B as shown in Figure I.14-1, DSF service provider (CSP:SFP) need to quickly federate storages in Edge Cloud B to create single virtual volume and continue the caching service. If Edge Node 1 in Edge Cloud B has not enough resources for caching, storage of Edge Node 2 is also federated. So Video A stored in Core Cloud is distributed to Video A-1 in Edge Node 1 as a part of the video A and Video A-2 in Edge Node 2 as remaining portion of Video A of Edge Cloud B. Figure I.14-2 shows that DSF service customers (CSC:CSU) want to use the federated storages using core and edge cloud storages for read/write cache of data record in database. The single virtual volume includes Record A Cache stored in Edge Cloud used for frequently accessed records, while the final transacted Record A should be stored in database in Core Cloud to utilize with others in different edge clouds.
|
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)
DSF service provider (CSP:SFP)
|
+
+Figure
+(optional)
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a system architecture for caching video data across different cloud environments to support mobility.
+
+- CSC: CSU (Customer Specific Cloud):** Contains **Customer #1**. A **Read data** icon indicates data access.
+- Virtual storage pool:** Contains a **Single virtual volume**. This volume is divided into **Video A** and **Cache** sections. A red 'X' is placed over the **Video A** section, indicating it is not the source of the data being read.
+- DSF local storage (Data Service Function local storage):** Contains three cloud components:
+ - Edge cloud B:** Contains **Edge node 1** (with **Video A-1**) and **Edge node 2** (with **Video A-2**).
+ - Core cloud:** Contains **Storage** with **Video A**.
+ - Edge cloud A:** Contains **Video A**.
+- Data Flow and Operations:**
+ - A **Read** arrow points from the **Virtual storage pool** to **Edge node 1** in **Edge cloud B**.
+ - A **Connect** dashed arrow points from **Core cloud** to **Edge node 2**.
+ - A **Move** icon (person) with a dashed arrow points from **Edge cloud A** to **Edge node 1**.
+ - A **Disconnect** red dashed arrow points from **Core cloud** to **Edge cloud A**.
+
+Y.3505(25)
+
+Diagram illustrating the use case of caching between core and edge clouds supporting CSC's mobility.
+
+**Figure I.14-1 – Use case of caching between core and edge clouds supporting CSC's mobility**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Y.3505(25)
Figure I.14-2 – Use case of read and write cache in DSF local storage
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Clause 8.1 requirement (10) – Clause 8.2 requirement (3) – Clause 8.2 requirement (9) – Clause 8.2 requirement (11) – Clause 8.3 requirement (5) – Clause 8.3 requirement (6) – Clause 8.3 requirement (14) |
+
+### I.15 The use case for data offloading in core-edge cloud
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The use case for data offloading in core-edge cloud |
+| Description | In this use case as shown in figure, a DSF service customer (CSC:CSU) uploads a video to DSF local storage for fast sharing with other customers in later. To provide shared video with low-latency, the DSF service provider (CSP:SFP) provides federated storage space in single virtual volume using edge-core storages and CSC:CSU offloads the video to Edge Cloud A storage. When the Edge Cloud A storage has insufficient capacity to store the whole video file, part of the video is stored in the Edge Cloud A storage. The remaining part of the video is transferred from Edge Cloud A storage to Core Cloud storage through a fast channel. Additionally, for efficient storage utilization, fragmenting the video file is necessary. When customers move to a different region, the data offloaded to Edge Cloud A is migrated to Edge Cloud B adjacent to the customers to maintain fast sharing. When customer request the shared video file, the initial part of the video in the Edge Cloud B storage is provided to the customers with
|
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | low latency. While the customers are playing the initial part of the video, the remaining part from Core Cloud is provided to the customers. |
+| Role/Sub-role | DSF service customer (CSC:CSU)Image: Diagram of video distribution architecture showing upload, storage migration, and download paths between CSC:CSU, DSF local storage (Edge and Core clouds), and Customers.
The diagram illustrates the video distribution architecture. On the left, the CSC: CSU (DSF service customer) is shown with Customer #1 and Customers . Customer #1 uploads Video A (400 MB) to the DSF local storage . The DSF local storage consists of Edge cloud A (with Storage 1 at 200 MB and Storage 2 at 100 MB) and Edge cloud B (with Storage 1 at 200 MB). Video A is migrated from Edge cloud A Storage 1 to Core cloud Storage 1 (500 MB) via a Fast channel . Customers download Video A (400 MB) from the DSF local storage . The download path involves a Single virtual volume (Shared) containing Video A-1 and Video A-2 . Video A-1 is downloaded from Edge cloud B Storage 1 , and Video A-2 is downloaded from Core cloud Storage 1 . A Channel is indicated at the bottom right.
Y.3505(25)
|
+| Pre-conditions – Clause 8.1 requirement (2) – Clause 8.1 requirement (10) – Clause 8.2 requirement (3) – Clause 8.2 requirement (7) – Clause 8.3 requirement (2) – Clause 8.4 requirement (3) |
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Comparison analysis between cloud computing and data storage federation
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Table II.1 shows the mapping between data storage federation ecosystem and CCRA user view. The DSF service customer has two sub-roles, and these sub-roles are mapped onto the CSC:cloud service user because the two sub-roles have a relationship of using service. The DSF local storage provider, and CSP:cloud service manager and CSP:cloud service operations manager, which provide data storage, are mapped in the perspective of providing service. However, for the DSF service provider, the additional considerations in data storage perspective are needed in cloud computing. To federate and provide data storage from DSF local storages, such as cloud storage and non-cloud storage, they are properly described in CSP as new sub-roles, activities and involvements.
+
+**Table II.1 – Mapping between data storage federation ecosystem and CCRA user view**
+
+| ITU-T Y.3505 • The additional considerations in data storage and data perspective on the federated storage environment are needed. |
+| DSF service provider | • provide virtual storage pool • provide single virtual volume • manage storage management metadata • manage data storage policy | – | – | • The additional considerations in data storage perspective are needed as sub-roles and activities in CSP. • The sub-roles and activities support the data storage federation service. |
+| | • manipulate DSF data • manage data operation metadata • manage data manipulation policy | – | – | • The additional considerations in data storage perspective are needed as sub-roles and activities in CSP. • The sub-roles and activities support the data storage federation service. |
+| DSF local storage provider | • provide DSF local storage | CSP:cloud service manager | | • Activities and their involvements of the two sub-roles in [ITU-T Y.3502] are supported to provide cloud data storage. |
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [[b-ITU-T M.3030](#)] Recommendation ITU-T M.3030 (2002), *Telecommunications Markup Language (tML) framework*.
+- [[b-ITU-T X.1601](#)] Recommendation ITU-T X.1601 (2015), *Security framework for cloud computing*.
+- [[b-ITU-T X.1631](#)] Recommendation ITU-T X.1631 (2015) | ISO/IEC 27017:2015, *Information technology - Security techniques - Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services*.
+- [[b-ITU-T X.1641](#)] Recommendation ITU-T X.1641 (2016), *Guidelines for cloud service customer data security*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3524
+
+(12/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Cloud Computing
+
+# --- Cloud computing maturity requirements and framework
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3524
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+
+## **CLOUD COMPUTING**
+
+**Y.3500–Y.3999**
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3524
+
+# Cloud computing maturity requirements and framework
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3524 provides the functional framework and requirements for cloud computing maturity. It introduces an overview of cloud computing maturity and identifies the cloud computing maturity model including the cloud customer management module, cloud resource management module, cloud service management module and cloud security management module. Additionally, this Recommendation provides cloud computing maturity requirements derived from use cases.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3524 | 2019-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14136 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cloud computing, framework, maturity, model, requirements.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Overview of cloud computing maturity..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 Cloud computing maturity model..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 Definition of cloud computing maturity levels ..... | 6 |
+| 7 | Cloud computing maturity functional framework ..... | 8 |
+| | 7.1 Cloud customer management module (CCMM) ..... | 8 |
+| | 7.2 Cloud resource management module (CRMM) ..... | 9 |
+| | 7.3 Cloud service management module (CSMM)..... | 9 |
+| | 7.4 Cloud security management module (CSEMM) ..... | 10 |
+| 8 | Cloud computing maturity requirements ..... | 11 |
+| | 8.1 Cloud customer management maturity requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.2 Cloud resource management maturity requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.3 Cloud service management maturity requirements ..... | 12 |
+| | 8.4 Cloud security management maturity requirements..... | 13 |
+| 9 | Security considerations..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix I – Use case of cloud computing maturity..... | 15 |
+| | I.1 Use case template ..... | 15 |
+| | I.2 Use case on resource dynamic management ..... | 15 |
+| | I.3 Use case on cloud capacity management ..... | 16 |
+| | I.4 Use case on resource cost utilization of cloud..... | 17 |
+| | I.5 Use case on cloud resource management ..... | 18 |
+| | I.6 Use case on cloud service catalogue management ..... | 19 |
+| | I.7 Use case on cloud architecture management and cloud service openness ..... | 20 |
+| | I.8 Use case on cloud service operation and maintenance management ..... | 22 |
+| | I.9 Use case on cloud security management and availability management..... | 23 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 27 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3524
+
+# Cloud computing maturity requirements and framework
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the cloud computing maturity requirements and framework based on relevant use cases. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- 1) Overview of cloud computing maturity;
+- 2) Cloud computing maturity framework;
+- 3) Cloud computing maturity requirements;
+- 4) Typical use cases of cloud computing maturity.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1601] Recommendation ITU-T X.1601 (2015), *Security framework for cloud computing*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014) | ISO/IEC 17788:2014, *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3501] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3501 (2016), *Cloud computing framework and high-level requirements*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3502] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502 (2014) | ISO/IEC 17789:2014, *Information technology – Cloud computing – Reference architecture*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3517] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3517 (2018), *Cloud computing – Overview of inter-cloud trust management*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3521] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3521/M.3070 (2016), *Overview of end-to-end cloud computing management*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cloud computing** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with self-service provisioning and administration on-demand.
+
+NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications, and storage equipment.
+
+**3.1.2 cloud service** [ITU-T Y.3500]: One or more capabilities offered via cloud computing invoked using a defined interface.
+
+**3.1.3 cloud service customer** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which is in a business relationship for the purpose of using cloud services.
+
+NOTE – A business relationship does not necessarily imply financial agreements.
+
+**3.1.4 cloud service provider** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which makes cloud services available.
+
+**3.1.5 cloud service user** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Natural person, or entity acting on their behalf, associated with a cloud service customer that uses cloud services.
+
+NOTE – Examples of such entities include devices and applications.
+
+**3.1.6 service catalogue** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A listing of all the cloud services of a particular cloud service provider.
+
+**3.1.7 service level agreement (SLA)** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Documented agreement between the service provider and customer that identifies services and service targets.
+
+NOTE 1 – A service level agreement can also be established between the service provider and a supplier, an internal group or a customer acting as a supplier.
+
+NOTE 2 – A service level agreement can be included in a contract or another type of documented agreement.
+
+**3.1.8 resource management** [b-ITU-T Y.3520]: The most efficient and effective way to access, control, manage, deploy, schedule and bind resources when they are provided by service providers and requested by customers.
+
+**3.1.9 architecture** [b-ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010]: Fundamental concepts or properties of a system in its environment embodied in its elements, relationships and in the principles of its design and evolution.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms.
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+anti-DDoS anti-Distributed Denial of Service
+
+API Application Programming Interface
+
+BC/DR Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery
+
+CSC Cloud Service Customer
+
+CSP Cloud Service Provider
+
+CCMM Cloud Customer Management Module
+
+CRMM Cloud Resource Management Module
+
+CSMM Cloud Service Management Module
+
+CSEMM Cloud Security Management Module
+
+DB Database
+
+ETL Extract-Transform-Load
+
+FAQ Frequently Asked Questions
+
+IaaS Infrastructure as a Service
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------|
+| IAM | Identity and Access Management |
+| IOPS | Input/Output Operations Per Second |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| VM | Virtual Machine |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview of cloud computing maturity
+
+Cloud computing maturity is a kind of comprehensive criteria to define the effect and level in adoption of cloud computing. It describes three dimensions: technology, management and effectiveness, and covers partially cloud computing management as defined in [ITU-T Y.3521]: cloud customer management, cloud service management, and cloud resource management. Actually advanced description levels, rather than service level agreements (SLAs) are used to indicate the direction of maturity and to support different roles such as those of cloud service customers (CSCs), cloud service providers (CSPs), etc. to improve cloud computing maturity.
+
+This Recommendation focuses on analysing the cloud maturity framework and functional requirements based on the cloud customer management, cloud service management, resource management and cloud security management.
+
+## 6.1 Cloud computing maturity model
+
+The aim of cloud computing management is to use the cloud resources efficiently, ensure cloud service stability and CSC:cloud service user flexibility. This Recommendation describes a cloud computing maturity model based on four-module and three-dimensional design that supports management processes independent of the technology used. The matrices of the cloud computing maturity model shown in Figure 6-1 are as follows:
+
+- **Three-dimensions:** The ultimate effectiveness of cloud computing is reflected under the combined effects of technology and management. The three dimensions of cloud computing considered are technology, management and effectiveness. The requirements of maturity are derived from these three dimensions.
+- **Four modules:** The model covers a cloud customer management module (CCMM), a cloud service management module (CSMM), a cloud resource management module (CRMM) and a cloud security management module (CSEMM). Each of these modules should be considered in three dimensions (technology, management and effectiveness) as stated. Each module has its own maturity requirements, and is linked to the other modules to allow construction of the overall maturity requirement framework of cloud computing.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1 – The cloud computing maturity model. A triangular diagram with 'Effectiveness' at the top, 'Management' at the bottom-left, and 'Technology' at the bottom-right. In the center is a cloud icon labeled 'Cloud computing'. Surrounding it are four boxes: 'Cloud customer management' (top-left), 'Cloud resource management' (top-right), 'Cloud service management' (bottom-left), and 'Cloud security management' (bottom-right). Curved arrows indicate a clockwise flow between the boxes. The label 'Y.3524(19)\_F6-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – The cloud computing maturity model**
+
+In order to evaluate the cloud computing maturity, there are several matrices in the cloud computing maturity model. Table 6-1 presents indicators used in the cloud computing maturity model. The indicators and their descriptions are as follows: "T" refers to technology indicator, "M" refers to management indicator, "E" refers to effectiveness indicator.
+
+**Table 6-1 – Indicators in cloud computing maturity model**
+
+| Module | Indicator | Description | T | M | E |
+|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|
+| Cloud customer management | Resource cost utilization of cloud | It is the key measurement of capital investment and cloud resource utilization. It represents the cloud resource usage per unit cost. | | | √ |
+| | Cloud service design and deployment | It is the total time needed for design and deployment cloud service by CSP according to CSC's requirements. | | √ | |
+| Cloud resource management | Resource sharing scale | It is the number of shared resources in resource pool providing multiple services to CSC, according to the statistics of tangible equipment entities such as physical machine, storage equipment, network equipment and other tangible entities. | √ | | |
+| | Openness ability | It is the number of application programming interfaces (APIs) exposing the cloud service capabilities, including resource request, services configuration, etc. | √ | | |
+
+**Table 6-1 – Indicators in cloud computing maturity model**
+
+| Module | Indicator | Description | T | M | E |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|
+| | Physical machine cluster CPU average utilization | It is the average CPU utilization of physical machines in the resource pool, which reflects the overall CPU resource usage of the cloud. It could be calculated in given period of time (e.g., monthly, daily) average and the data can be obtained from the CSP. | | | √ |
+| | Physical machine cluster CPU peak utilization | It is the peak CPU utilization of physical machines in the resource pool, which reflects the max resource usage of the cloud. It could be calculated in given period of time (e.g., monthly, daily) average and the data can be obtained from the CSP. | | | √ |
+| | Physical machine memory utilization | It is the memory utilization of physical machines in the resource pool, which reflects the overall memory resource usage of the cloud. It could be calculated in given period of time (e.g., monthly, daily) and the data can be obtained from the CSP. | | | √ |
+| | Average virtualization integration | It is the ratio of the total number of virtual machines to the total number of the virtualized servers in resource pool. This indicator reflects the level of virtualization application. | | √ | |
+| | Resource pool virtualization | It is the ratio of host machines hosting the virtual machine to the total number of physical machines in a resource pool. This indicator reflects the virtualization degree. | | √ | |
+| | Data storage pooling | It is the ratio of cloud storage resources capacity to the total storage resources capacity of the resource pool, including distributed block storage, object storage and distributed file storage, etc. | | √ | |
+| | Computation resource specification | It is the specification providing the computation resource template (including QoS) according to computation unit and memory capacity, in which the resource capacity is variable and measurable. | √ | | |
+| | Storage resource specification | It is the specification providing the storage resource template (including QoS) according to storage capacity, throughput or IOPS, in which the storage resource capacity is variable and measurable. | √ | | |
+
+**Table 6-1 – Indicators in cloud computing maturity model**
+
+| Module | Indicator | Description | T | M | E |
+|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|
+| | Management capability of computation administrator | It is the number of per capita computation capacity (physical of virtualized servers) of CSP with the support of management tools, which represents cloud computation resource management level. | | √ | |
+| | Management capability of storage administrator | It is the number of per capita storage capacity of CSP with the support of management tools, which represents cloud storage resource management level. | | √ | |
+| | Management capability of network administrator | It is the number of per capita network resource of CSP with the support of management tools, which represents cloud network resource management level. | | √ | |
+| Cloud service Management | Cloud service delivery cycle | It is the time needed to deliver cloud service to CSC. It includes the time of resource allocation, cloud service delivery, cloud service deployment and cloud service adjustment. | | √ | |
+| | Cloud service availability | It is the property of accessibility and usability for a cloud service. It represents the percentages of application interruptions due to the unavailability of cloud services. | √ | | |
+| Cloud security management | Security incidents | It is the number of major security incidents referring to the incidents causing significant cloud service impact. | | | √ |
+
+## 6.2 Definition of cloud computing maturity levels
+
+According to the model presented in clause 6.1, the cloud computing maturity should be defined according to the appropriate development stage by using cloud computing. Table 6-2 presents cloud computing maturity levels.
+
+**Table 6-2 – Cloud computing maturity levels**
+
+| | Management | Technology | Effectiveness |
+|---------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Level 1 – Discrete island | Vertical shaft IT management mode | Local, script, repeat | Resource scattered, long the cloud service cycle |
+| Level 2 – Layered decoupling | Based on best practice service processes | Acquisition and monitoring, process engine, resource pooling, standardization | Different levels of resource sharing, IT infrastructure and application tiring, resource delivery and the cloud service cycle shortens |
+| Level 3 – Service oriented | Service Process is clear, IT service oriented | Shared architecture, rich cloud management capabilities, platform gradually automated | High degree of resource sharing, the cloud service cycle is monthly |
+| Level 4 – Competence systematization | Service oriented operation process system | Service-driven technology, decoupled architecture, stable development, enhanced automation capabilities | Various shared resource, the cloud service cycle is daily |
+| Level 5 – Service integration | Automated processes worked closely with the application | Diversified pooled resources, automated adaptive architecture | Resource deployment on demand, the cloud service cycle becomes second level |
+
+Each level could be described in terms of technology, management and effectiveness as follows:
+
+- **Level 1 – Discrete island:** This maturity level comprises the vertical shaft IT management mode. The system is local or partially based on cloud, each application has independent and scattered IT resources, such as repeat script, software and investment. It usually takes a long time to satisfy the CSC needs.
+- **Level 2 – Layered decoupling:** This maturity level comprises the best practice service processes. The resource pool is standardized, equipped with the acquisition monitoring and process engine. Resource is shared at different levels, IT infrastructure and application are tiring, and the cloud service delivery cycle becomes shorter to satisfy the CSC needs.
+- **Level 3 – Service oriented:** This maturity level comprises clear service processing which is service oriented. Technology is in shared architecture, there are several cloud management functions, the monitoring becomes a platform service in this service level, and the platform is gradually automated. A high degree of resources are shared, and the cloud service delivery cycles become a monthly level to satisfy the CSC needs.
+- **Level 4 – Competence systematization:** This maturity level constructs a service oriented operation process system. Technology used at this level is service driven and the architectural structure is in stable development. The automation capability is enhanced. There are various shared resources, and the cloud service time becomes a daily level to satisfy the CSC needs.
+- **Level 5 – Service integration:** This maturity level integrates automated management processes. There is an adaptive architecture with diversified resource pool. The resource is deployed on demand, and the cloud service cycle becomes a seconds level to satisfy the CSC needs.
+
+# 7 Cloud computing maturity functional framework
+
+The CCMM, CRMM, CSMM and CSEMM modules should be analysed in three dimensions comprising: technology, management and effectiveness. There are corresponding maturity requirements in each module, which facilitate each other to obtain the construction of the cloud computing maturity framework as shown in Figure 7-1.
+
+
+
+| CCMM | CRMM | CSMM | CSEMM |
+|----------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
+| Cloud architecture management | Resource assurance | Cloud service delivery
Service catalogue management
Service openness
Service SLA management
Service support management
Service report management
Service satisfaction management
| Cloud trust |
+| Cloud capacity management | Resource measurement management | | Virtualization security |
+| Cloud availability management | Resource dynamic management | | Network security |
+| Application continuity risk management | Resource assignment | Cloud service operation and maintenance
Service monitoring management
Service change management
Service knowledge management
Service problem management
Service task management
| Data security |
+| Cloud strategy management | Resource deployment | | Application security |
+| | Resource recycle | | Secure access |
+| | | | Security service |
+
+Y.3524(19)\_F7-1
+
+Category
+
+Functionalities
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Cloud computing maturity functional framework**
+
+## 7.1 Cloud customer management module (CCMM)
+
+The CCMM undertakes the capability of cloud strategic planning, technical architecture planning, and service capability improvement for cloud services in the requirements analysis and procurement phase. All the functionalities aim to improve planning management effectiveness through the technologies and management method. It contains functionalities including the following:
+
+- 1) **Cloud architecture management** – This functionality chooses the cloud architecture strategy, provides the evolution of cloud service, explores new technologies and updates the technical framework.
+- 2) **Cloud capacity management** – This functionality performs the capacity planning for the entire resource pool and for applications and predicts the trend of capacity.
+- 3) **Service availability management** – This functionality includes the virtual dynamic migration to ensure cloud service continuity and performs the cloud management data, application data and network backup and recovery.
+- 4) **Application continuity risk management** – This functionality carries out risk analysis, identifies important service interruption risks, makes plans for the cloud service continuity risk and conducts regular exercises.
+- 5) **Cloud strategy management** – This functionality performs cloud strategy selection and architecture and cost comparison services in order to improve the resource cost utilization of the cloud.
+
+NOTE – Cloud strategy includes multiple cloud strategies such as single cloud or hyper cloud, etc.
+
+## 7.2 Cloud resource management module (CRMM)
+
+The role of the CRMM is to dispose and manage cloud resource information including capabilities, types and usage. This module ensures the cloud resource ability and quality provided by the resource pool. All the functionalities aim to improve cloud resource management effectiveness through the technologies and management method. It contains functionalities including the following:
+
+- 1) **Resource assurance** – This functionality covers the assurance management of resources in support of cloud services including resource performance management, resource fault management and resource test management. For more information see clause 10.4.2 of [ITU-T Y.3521].
+- 2) **Resource measurement management** – This functionality collects the measurement data including configuration data and performance data during the resource management lifecycle and performs data-driven ability.
+- 3) **Resource dynamic management** – This functionality performs dynamic migration, expansion or shrinkage of applications in different clusters according to the system load calculation to ensure the level of cloud service.
+- 4) **Resource assignment** – This functionality chooses suitable resources to allocate the cloud service.
+- 5) **Resource deployment** – This functionality orchestrates a set of cloud resources and makes them available online to the CSC:cloud service user.
+- 6) **Resource recycle** – This functionality carries out resource recycling, data release and charging termination.
+
+## 7.3 Cloud service management module (CSMM)
+
+The CSMM consists of user-oriented cloud service delivery works and system-oriented operation and maintenance works, which reflect the overall maturity level of a cloud service. All the functionalities aim to improve cloud service management effectiveness through the technologies and management method. The CSMM should be considered from the perspective of the cloud service delivery category and cloud service operation and maintenance category.
+
+For the category of **cloud service delivery**, the CSMM contains functionalities including the following:
+
+- 1) **Service catalogue management** – This functionality includes service catalogue management and service inventory management. For more information see clause 10.3.3.1 of [ITU-T Y.3521].
+- 2) **Service openness** – This functionality offers APIs or function libraries for accurate cloud interoperability and portability.
+- 3) **Service SLA management** – This functionality offers capabilities for managing the service levels of a particular cloud service. For more information see clause 9.2.5.3.6 of [ITU-Y.3502].
+- 4) **Service support management** – This functionality focuses on customer relationship management, and performs service desk and incident solutions. It is responsible for receiving and processing service requests, assisting CSC, and coordinating with specialist support groups.
+- 5) **Service report management** – This functionality generates services usage reports according to the type of cloud service catalogue and specification based on monitor data
+
+and the measurement of information. It could offer cloud usage service optimization advice to CSC.
+
+- 6) **Service satisfaction management** – This functionality performs the service satisfaction survey and analysis of CSC:cloud service user action data and offers cloud service optimization recommendations to CSP.
+
+For the category of **cloud service operation and maintenance**, the CSMM contains functionalities including the following:
+
+- 1) **Service monitoring management** – This functionality provides monitoring and reporting on functional components. For more information see clause 9.2.5.3.3 of [ITU-Y.3502].
+- 2) **Service change management** – This functionality responds to manage the service change, ensures that the corresponding changes are recorded and assessed, and approves changes for the corresponding sorting, planning, testing, implementation and evaluation.
+- 3) **Service problem management** – This functionality identifies and records problems, creates the problem list, classifies and tracks the problem from the degree of importance, urgency and priority. For more information see clause 10.3.2.1 of [ITU-Y.3521].
+- 4) **Service knowledge management** – This functionality records, shares and transfers all the relevant knowledge about operation and maintenance in the summary of technical maintenance logs, operation manuals, etc.
+- 5) **Service task management** – This functionality performs regular inspection, routine operations, patch management, batch processing and other routine tasks on a regular basis and manages the implementation of the inspection report.
+
+## 7.4 Cloud security management module (CSEMM)
+
+The CSEMM is a guarantee of reliable operation in single cloud, of cloud trust management in multiple cloud and covers the cloud management lifecycle. All the functionalities aim to improve cloud security management effectiveness through the technologies and management method. It contains functionalities including the following:
+
+- 1) **Cloud trust management and mechanism** – This functionality defines the security areas and performs the mechanism of the workloads and data migration in inter-cloud, and performs trust cloud management to ensure security in multiple cloud.
+- 2) **Virtualization security** – This functionality provides a virtual machine image file encryption storage and integrity check function to prevent malicious tampering with the image file. It performs the virtualized resource isolation between physical machines and offers virus protection ability.
+- 3) **Network security** – This functionality identifies attacks between virtual machines, or external networks in the data centre network by traffic detection.
+- 4) **Data security** – This functionality identifies the sensitive data types and defines them to perform privacy protection. It authorizes and performs data access control to preserve data integrity.
+- 5) **Application security** – This functionality integrates security tools into the cloud developer's environment and finds and fixes security vulnerabilities in application running time.
+- 6) **Secure access** – This functionality provides critical user and resource access management for cloud service by identity and access management (IAM) and authentication support.
+- 7) **Security service** – This functionality offers various security cloud services to CSC such as firewall, anti-distributed denial of service (anti-DDoS), IAM service, security inventory, etc.
+
+# **8 Cloud computing maturity requirements**
+
+This clause provides cloud computing maturity requirements derived from the use cases described in Appendix I.
+
+## **8.1 Cloud customer management maturity requirements**
+
+This clause provides cloud computing maturity requirements related to cloud customer management maturity.
+
+### **8.1.1 Cloud architecture management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides openness and modular architecture to support heterogeneous resource and inter-cloud trust management.
+
+### **8.1.2 Cloud capacity management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides capacity measurement data and performs capacity forecasting in higher maturity level.
+
+### **8.1.3 Resource cost utilization of cloud**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports resource usage optimization to improve the resource cost utilization of cloud.
+
+### **8.1.4 Cloud availability management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides a data backup and recovery service in relation to the business continuity and disaster recovery (BC/DR) policy.
+
+### **8.1.5 Application continuity management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports application continuity practice in multi-cloud or inter-cloud to ensure service stability and reliability.
+
+### **8.1.6 Cloud strategy management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP adjusts cloud strategy planning to fit the CSC's demands.
+
+NOTE – The cloud strategy planning includes but is not limited to multi-cloud, inter-cloud.
+
+## **8.2 Cloud resource management maturity requirements**
+
+This clause provides cloud computing maturity requirements related to cloud resource management maturity.
+
+### **8.2.1 Resource measurement management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports continuously updating of the configuration and measurement data.
+
+NOTE – The configuration and measurement data includes available resources and performance data.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports openness and availability of cloud resources and its utilization data by APIs or other forms.
+
+### **8.2.2 Resource dynamic management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP automates resource scheduling.
+
+### **8.2.3 Resource assignment**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides automation for cloud resource assignment.
+
+### **8.2.4 Resource deployment**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides automation for cloud resource deployment.
+
+### **8.2.5 Resource recycle**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides automation for cloud resource recycle.
+
+## **8.3 Cloud service management maturity requirements**
+
+This clause provides cloud computing maturity requirements related to cloud service management maturity.
+
+### **8.3.1 Service catalogue management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports cloud service catalogue management.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports customization of cloud service catalogues to distinguish diversity in cloud services.
+
+### **8.3.2 Service openness**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides cloud service APIs.
+
+### **8.3.3 Service support management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides cloud service support.
+
+NOTE – The cloud service support includes but is not limited to a support desk or automation chatbot.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports unified maintenance framework in encapsulated manner.
+
+NOTE – The unified maintenance framework includes but is not limited to agent, operations libraries, runtime libs and deployment toolsets, etc.
+
+### **8.3.4 Service report management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP provides a monitoring and charging report including actual resource utilization distribution, average utilization and peak utilization.
+
+### **8.3.5 Service satisfaction management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports a satisfaction survey to enrich and improve their cloud service.
+
+### **8.3.6 Service change management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP establishes continuous integration and continuous deployment to support change management process.
+
+### **8.3.7 Service problem management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports recording the service problems, maintaining the service problems list and classifying the service problems according to urgency and priority.
+
+### **8.3.8 Service knowledge management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP establishes a knowledge management database to offer frequently asked questions (FAQ).
+
+It is recommended that CSP establishes a strategy knowledge database to enhance the maintenance ability.
+
+NOTE – The strategy knowledge includes but is not limited to abnormal detection, stop-loss strategy, root cause analysis and capacity forecast, etc.
+
+### **8.3.9 Service task management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP assigns the questions or problems of CSC into tasks and records, organizes into tracks and executes them in a task management process.
+
+## **8.4 Cloud security management maturity requirements**
+
+This clause provides cloud computing maturity requirements related to cloud security management maturity.
+
+### **8.4.1 Cloud trust management**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports inter-cloud trust management to leverage migration towards multi-cloud.
+
+### **8.4.2 Virtualization security**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports east-west traffic control between virtual machines.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports fault isolation between virtual machines.
+
+### **8.4.3 Network security**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports the network traffic isolation among the CSCs application.
+
+### **8.4.4 Data security**
+
+It is recommended that CSP imposes data control in rest and in transit.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports data encryption, data integrity authentication, software and data signing and secure time-stamping.
+
+### **8.4.5 Secure access**
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports an IAM service which provides secure access to the user layer of the virtualization stack, platform and application service.
+
+### **8.4.6 Security service**
+
+It can be optional that the CSP provides the configuration security baseline for OS and platform services.
+
+It is recommended that CSP supports various security services.
+
+NOTE – The security service includes but is not limited to block chain service, code audit and security evaluation.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+Security aspects for consideration within the cloud computing environment, including cloud security management phase in cloud computing maturity consideration, are described in
+
+[ITU-T X.1601], which analyses security threats and challenges, and describes security capabilities that could mitigate these threats and meet the security challenges.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use case of cloud computing maturity
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 Use case template
+
+The use cases developed in Appendix I should adopt the unified format presented in Table I.1 for better readability and convenient material organization.
+
+**Table I.1 – Use case unified format template**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | The title of the use case |
+| Description | Scenario description of the use case |
+| Roles | Roles involved in the use case |
+| Figure (optional) | Figure to explain the use case, but not mandatory |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | The necessary pre-conditions that should be achieved before starting the use case. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The post-condition that will be carried out after the termination of current use case. |
+| Derived requirements | Requirements derived from the use cases, whose detailed description is presented in the dedicated chapter |
+
+## I.2 Use case on resource dynamic management
+
+This use case presented in Table I.2 illustrates the resource dynamic management as a requirement. It is an example in a resource management phase.
+
+**Table I.2 – Resource dynamic management**
+
+| | |
+|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Resource dynamic management |
+| Description | – The CSC requests to deploy a new application in cloud. – The CSP provides the cloud resource in 2 resource clusters. – The purpose of CSC is to make full use of cloud resources and run application quickly – CASE1: CSP: cloud service manager manually chooses the cluster which has lower resource utilization to deploy the application. – CASE2: CSP: cloud service manager automatically chooses the cluster which has lower resource utilization to deploy the application with the help of cloud platform. – CASE3: CSP: cloud service manager automatically chooses the cluster which has lower resource utilization to deploy the application with the help of cloud platform. In order to load balance, the application might provision between the 2 clusters automatically . Take the resources utilization and efficiency as an important issue, CASE3 is the best way to resource dynamic management, and CASE2 better, CASE1 is common.
|
+
+**Table I.2 – Resource dynamic management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating Resource dynamic management. A circle labeled 'CSC' is connected by a double-headed arrow labeled 'App' to a box labeled 'CSP'. Inside the 'CSP' box, there are two rectangles: 'Cluster1' and 'Cluster2'. Three numbered arrows (1, 2, 3) point from 'CSP' to 'Cluster1'. A fourth numbered arrow (3) points from 'Cluster1' to 'Cluster2'.
Y.3524(19)_FI.Tab2
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – The CSP can gain the resource utilization data for the cluster. – The CSC's application is in dynamic load. – The CSP allocate resources according to current resource utilization. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Resource dynamic management (refer to clause 8.2.2) |
+
+## I.3 Use case on cloud capacity management
+
+This use case presented in Table I.3 illustrates the cloud capacity management as a requirement. It is an example in a cloud customer management phase.
+
+**Table I.3 – Cloud capacity management**
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud capacity management |
+| Description | In the requirements analysis and procurement phase, the CSC should choose the suitable cloud type (such as private cloud, hyper cloud or public cloud etc.), the resource type (such as virtual machine specification, storage, cloud mode and etc.) and calculate the total resource quantity in order to purchase or construct the enough cloud service in the resource pool. CSC should make sure of the final cloud capacity to meet the needs of a certain period of time for business development.
– CASE1: Each CSC: cloud service user estimates and forecasts its own needs. CSC:cloud service administrator collects the requirement and quantity form business applications over the cloud off-line following the process manually. – CASE2: CSC: cloud service administrator accurately collects performance and current cloud capacity measurement data (such as resource utilization) form CSP, who can help to identify current resource capabilities based on benchmarks, quantifies resource performance, and performs capacity forecasting through status analysis and capacity early warning information. – CASE3: CSC: cloud service administrator is not only forecasts the capacity basing on the cloud resource data of capabilities but also could combine with the data from CSC:cloud service user on-line or off-line pressure measurement, in order to make sure the balance of cloud service performance and actual business performance on demand. |
+
+**Table I.3 – Cloud capacity management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | For the capacity planning and forecasting and budget control, CASE3 is the best way for cloud capacity management, and CASE2 is better, CASE1 is common. |
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+| Figure (optional) | / |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – The CSC has already run some of applications in cloud. – The CSP provides the regular cloud resource for CSC. – The CSP could provide necessary monitoring data for CSC. – The CSC could make pressure measurement on-line or off-line for the application over the cloud. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The cloud capacity which CSC purchases or constructs in cloud customer phase could meet the need of a certain period of time for business development. |
+| Derived requirements | – Cloud capacity management (refer to clause 8.1.2) |
+
+## I.4 Use case on resource cost utilization of cloud
+
+This use case presented in Table I.4 illustrates the resource cost utilization as a requirement in the cloud customer management phase.
+
+**Table I.4 – Resource cost utilization of cloud**
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Resource cost utilization of cloud |
+| Description | CSC should control the expenditures in budget and meet as many business demands as possible and CSP will to attract more CSC for more incomings by improving the resource utilization. So resource cost utilization of cloud, which is the metric for measuring the effectiveness of investment by considering both expenditures and resource utilization, is the issue to be considered.
The CSC determines the cloud resource capacity to purchase including the numbers of suitable cloud services and service availability requirements for SLA. The CSP offers the cloud service catalogue and provides purchase suggestions and resource usage optimization recommendations.
After a period of cloud service operation time, the CSP will provide the charging and monitoring report including actual resource utilization distribution, average utilization, peak utilization, and also some resource usage optimization recommendations such as service specifications matching. CSC could optimize next procurement plan. As example, there might be different cases as follows :
– CASE1: CSP1 provides 100 virtual hosts in higher performance and cost 20000. In that case CSP could supports CSC's application load 100. The actual host average utilization is only 10% in given period of time. – CASE2: CSP2 provides 100 virtual hosts in common performance in the lowest costing 10 000 using less hosts than CSP1. In that case CSP could support CSC's same application load 100. The actual host average utilization is 20% in a given period of time. In this case CSP2's resource |
+
+**Table I.4 – Resource cost utilization of cloud**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | cost utilization of cloud is better than CSP1, because it optimizes the resource usage by data analysis of historical resource utilization and reduces the provided resources.
– CASE3: CSP3 provides 100 virtual hosts in higher performance and 100 virtual hosts in common performance with the same total cost 10 000 compared with CSP2. According the operation report and utilization distribution, the CSC plans to support more business requirements by mixing deployment of application1 (online application) and application2 (analysis application) to support more business. Therefore, the actual host average utilization is 50% over given period of time. In this case CSC3 resource service cost utilization is better than CSC2, because CSC3 could support more business requirements by mixing deployment applications at the same cost.
To improve the resource cost utilization of cloud the higher it is, the more mature it is. Therefore, the CASE3 is the best method for resource cost utilization of cloud, and CASE2 is better, CASE1 is common.
|
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating resource cost utilization of cloud. At the top, a box contains 'Charging' (blue), 'Monitor report' (orange), and 'Resource optimization' (orange). Below this, three circles represent CSP1, CSP2, and CSP3. Arrows point from each CSP to a box labeled 'CSC' at the bottom. CSP1 arrow is labeled '100 VM1, cost 20000, utilization 10%'. CSP2 arrow is labeled '100 VM2, cost 10000, utilization 20%'. CSP3 arrow is labeled '100 VM1 100 VM2, cost 20000, utilization 50%'. The diagram is labeled Y.3524(19)_FI.Tab4.
Y.3524(19)_FI.Tab4
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – The CSC pays for the cloud service as actual usage and SLA. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Service report management (refer to clause 8.3.4)
– Resource cost utilization of cloud (refer to clause 8.1.3)
|
+
+## I.5 Use case on cloud resource management
+
+This use case presented in Table I.5 illustrates some requirements in cloud resource management.
+
+**Table I.5 – Cloud resource management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud resource management |
+| Description | The CSC needs specified cloud resources (IaaS service) to deploy its application on demanded types with specified quantity.
– CASE1: CSP: cloud service manager could allocate and deploy the cloud resource to CSC off-line or manually. The total resource delivery cycle is long . And the CSP rarely performs resource recycle or resource release reminders proactively. The configuration and measurement data update on time after any resource change. – CASE2: CSP: cloud service manager could allocate and deploy the cloud resource to CSC automatically. The total resource delivery cycle is short . And the CSP could inform resource release to CSC and act resource recycle with the permissions of CSC. The configuration and measurement data update occurs after any resource change. – CASE3: CSC: cloud service administrator could allocate and deploy the cloud resource itself automatically with no interaction of CSP: cloud service administrator. The total resource delivery cycle is short , and the CSP cloud automatically act resource recycle without any effect to the application . The configuration and measurement data update occurs immediately after any resource change and can be consumed by the CSP or CSC to support the resource elasticity. According to the efficiency a of resource management, CASE3 is the best way for cloud resource management and CASE2 is better, CASE1 is common.
|
+| Roles | CSP, CSC |
+| Figure (optional) | / |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – The CSP provides the regular cloud resource for CSC. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | CSC could apply and adjust resources flexibly. |
+| Derived requirements | – Resource assignment (refer to clause 8.2.3) – Resource deployment (refer to clause 8.2.4) – Resource recycle (refer to clause 8.2.5) – Resource measurement management (refer to clause 8.2.1) |
+
+## I.6 Use case on cloud service catalogue management
+
+This use case present in Table I.6 illustrates the cloud service catalogue management and service satisfaction management as requirements of cloud maturity management.
+
+**Table I.6 – Cloud service catalogue management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud service catalogue management |
+| Description | The CSC chooses different cloud services form catalogues and the same cloud service template specification from different CSPs.
– CASE1: CSP1's cloud service catalogue has published 10 cloud services, which don't have the service the CSC needs. – CASE2: CSP2's cloud service catalogue has published 20 cloud services, which is more various than CSP. The CSP frequently interview CSC needs and act CSC satisfaction survey to update cloud service catalogue and optimize the existed cloud service. – CASE3: CSP3 has the same number of cloud services to CSP2, but for the same cloud service template specification (e.g., a kind of VM with 2VCPU and 32GB memory), the comprehensive performance of VM form CSP3 is better than the VM form CSP2 measured by the standard benchmark test. According to cloud resource capabilities form diversity and performance, comparison with the diversity of services CSP2 and CSP3 is better than CSP1.From performance perspective, CSP3 is better than CSP2 in the same template specification.
|
+| Roles | CSP, CSC |
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating cloud service catalogue management. Three CSPs (CSP1, CSP2, CSP3) are shown. CSP1 has a 'Service catalogue (10 types)', CSP2 has a 'Service catalogue (20 types)', and CSP3 has a 'Service catalogue (20 types)'. Arrows from CSP2 and CSP3 point to a box labeled 'Diversity: Catalogue for cloud service'. An arrow from this box points to a box labeled 'Performance: Same template and specialization e.g., 2VCPU, 32 GB memory'. CSP1's catalogue also has an arrow pointing towards the 'Diversity' box. The diagram is labeled Y.3524(19) Fl.Tab6.
graph TD CSP1((CSP1)) --- SC1[Service catalogue Y.3524(19) Fl.Tab6
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | CSC would rather to choose the CSP which has various and high performance cloud services |
+| Derived requirements | – Cloud service management (refer to clause 8.3.1) – Cloud service satisfaction management (refer to clause 8.3.5) |
+
+## I.7 Use case on cloud architecture management and cloud service openness
+
+This use case presented in Table I.7 illustrates the cloud architecture management and cloud service openness as requirements of cloud maturity management.
+
+**Table I.7 – Cloud architecture management and cloud service openness**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud architecture management and cloud service openness |
+| Description | The CSC needs to design and construct the cloud architecture themselves or with the support of CSP and makes cloud strategy of private or hybrid cloud. The architecture should consider the scalability, modularity and interoperability. CSC should consider the business continuity among multi-cloud.
– CASE1: CSC's application relies on the specific cloud architecture. The existing cloud architecture used by CSP is closed and it could only integrate limited resources in cloud environment. There are no APIs exposed to CSC. – CASE2: CSP's cloud architecture is openness and could integrate multiple heterogeneous resources through APIs exposed to CSC. In this case, the CSC has better flexibility to use the cloud service by programming. – CASE3: CSP's cloud architecture is openness, support heterogeneous resource and inter-cloud trust management. CSC could implement the hybrid cloud management. There are APIs exposed to CSC and inter-cloud. In this case, the CSC has better flexibility to use the cloud service by programming as well as CSC could perform multiple cloud migration. CSC could act application continuity practice to ensure service stability and reliability. According to the cloud architecture design and cloud deployment models, the CASE3 is the best way for cloud architecture management as cloud service is openness, CASE2 is better, CASE1 is common.
|
+| Roles | CSP, CSC |
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating cloud architecture management and cloud service openness. It shows three CSPs (CSP1, CSP2, CSP3) interacting with CSC: App. CSP1 is a single cloud with Resource 1 and Resource 2. CSP2 is a single cloud with Resource 1 and Resource 2. CSP3 consists of two inter-clouds (CSP3-1 and CSP3-2) with Resource 1 and Resource 2. APIs connect the CSC: App to each CSP. A legend defines Resource 1 as a cylinder, Resource 2 as a rectangle, and Inter cloud as a cloud shape. Reference: Y.3524(19), Fl.Tab7.
Legend:
Image: Cylinder icon
Resource 1 Image: Rectangle icon
Resource 2 Image: Cloud icon
Inter cloud
Y.3524(19), Fl.Tab7
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – CSC prefers to deploy the applications in different places or different clouds CSP providers. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Cloud architecture management (refer to clause 8.1.1) – Application continuity management (refer to clause 8.1.5) – Cloud strategy management (refer to 8.1.6) – Cloud service openness (refer to clause 8.3.2) |
+
+## I.8 Use case on cloud service operation and maintenance management
+
+This use case presented in Table I.8 illustrates requirements in cloud service operation and maintenance management.
+
+**Table I.8 – Cloud service operation and maintenance management**
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud service operation and maintenance management |
+| Description | The CSP provides the cloud service support by support desk. There will be many maintenance capacities and various advanced scenarios to guarantee the cloud SLA in cloud infrastructure and maintenance platform.
– CASE1: CSC requests a question or problem to CSP. The CSP records it to the problem list and assigns it into a task according urgency and priority, tracks and executes it. After the extract-transform-load (ETL) of the source data process, The CSP has established a knowledge management data base (DB) to support frequently asked questions (FAQ) to deal with the CSC's service request. The CSP: customer support and care representative cloud deal with the task. – CASE2: CSP builds a knowledge strategy database including abnormal detect, stop-loss strategy, cause analysis and capacity forecast by algorithm training data. The cloud service could be partially support by chatbot. Operation and maintenance capabilities can be encapsulated into a unified framework, including agent, operations libraries, runtime libraries and deployment toolsets. Base on the framework, knowledge management DB and knowledge strategy DB, the CSP cloud construct better maintenance scenario. In particular, the fault management, data limit traffic, host self-healing and consistency maintenance could be implemented. The change management, continuous integration and continuous deployment are used to support frequently cloud service publishing and changing. In case of capacity management, auto testing and capacity planning is necessary to enhance accuracy. The CASE2 has more maintenance capacity and various scenario than CASE1, therefore the cloud service operation and maintenance cloud be more flexible and effective in CASE2.
|
+| Roles | CSP,CSC |
+
+**Table I.8 – Cloud service operation and maintenance management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure (optional) | Image: Architecture diagram of cloud service operation and maintenance management. The diagram shows a 'CSP: Cloud service support desk' at the top, connected to four management areas: Fault management (DC data limit traffic, Host self-healing, Consistency maintenance), Knowledge management (FAQ, Chatbot), Change management (Continuous integration, Continuous deployment), and Capacity management (Auto testing, Capacity planning). Below these are two knowledge bases: 'Knowledge management DB' (Query and compute, Schema, ETL, Storage) and 'Knowledge strategy DB' (Abnormal detect, Stop-loss strategy, Root cause analysis, Capacity forecast). A 'Maintenance framework' (Agent, Runtime lib, Action lib, Development tools) is also shown. All components sit on a 'Cloud infrastructure and maintenance platform' with 'CASE1' and 'CASE2' at the bottom. Labels 'Maintenance scenario' and 'Maintenance capacity' are on the right.
The diagram illustrates the architecture for cloud service operation and maintenance management. At the top is the 'CSP: Cloud service support desk'. Below it are four main functional areas: Fault management (including DC data limit traffic, Host self-healing, and Consistency maintenance), Knowledge management (including FAQ and Chatbot), Change management (including Continuous integration and Continuous deployment), and Capacity management (including Auto testing and Capacity planning). These are supported by two knowledge bases: 'Knowledge management DB' (containing Query and compute, Schema, ETL, and Storage) and 'Knowledge strategy DB' (containing Abnormal detect, Stop-loss strategy, Root cause analysis, and Capacity forecast). A 'Maintenance framework' (including Agent, Runtime lib, Action lib, and Development tools) is also part of the system. All these components are built on a 'Cloud infrastructure and maintenance platform', which is supported by 'CASE1' and 'CASE2'. The diagram is labeled with 'Maintenance scenario' and 'Maintenance capacity' on the right side.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Service support management (refer to clause 8.3.3) – Service change management (refer to clause 8.3.6) – Service problem management (refer to clause 8.3.7) – Service knowledge management (refer to clause 8.3.8) – Service task management (refer to clause 8.3.9) |
+
+## I.9 Use case on cloud security management and availability management
+
+This use case presented in Table I.9 illustrates some requirements in cloud security management and availability management.
+
+**Table I.9 – Cloud security management and availability management**
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | Cloud security management and availability management |
+| Description | There is a sharing security responsibility model to provide a trustworthy foundation for enterprise systems and individual application by establishing high standards for information security within the cloud, which requires CSC and CSP to work together towards security objectives.
– CASE1: Infrastructure service: CSP mainly offers the IaaS catalogue including compute, storage and network services. The CSC can architect and build a cloud infrastructure using technologies similar to and largely compatible with on-premises solutions. In this case CSP only needs to configure and operate Identity and Access Management (IAM) system that provides access to the user layer of the virtualization stack and ensure the virtual machine east-west traffic and fault isolation. CSC owns the operating system credentials but CSP helps CSC bootstrap the initial access to the operating system. CSC imposes data control in rest and in transit, and acts data encryption, data integrity authentication, software and data signing and secure time-stamping. – CASE2: Platform services: CSP manages the underlying infrastructure and foundation services, the operating system and the application platform. In this case CSP offers the configuration security baseline for OS and platform service. CSP needs to configure and operate IAM that provides access to platform and application. CSP provides data backup and recovery tools. CSC is responsible to configure and use tools in relation to the BC/DR policy. CSC is responsible for the data and firewall rules for access to the platform service. – CASE3: Abstracted security services: CSP operates the infrastructure layer, the operating system, platforms and the access endpoints to store and retrieve data. All kinds of cloud service is integrated with CSP IAM. CSP imposes data control in rest and in transit, and acts data encryption, data integrity authentication, software and data signing and secure time-stamping. CSP keeps the network traffic isolation among the CSCs. CSP cloud offer various security service such as block chain service, code audit, security evaluation. CSP cloud carry the security consultation in trust cloud management and give the suggestion of cloud migration in multiple cloud. According to the sharing security responsibility model.CASE3 is the best way for cloud security management and CASE2 better, CASE1 is common.
|
+| Roles | CSP, CSC |
+
+**Table I.9 – Cloud security management and availability management**
+
+
+
+| | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|------------|-----|
+| FigureCustomer data
Platform and application management
OS, network and firewall configuration
Client-side data encryption, data integrity, authentication
Service-side encryption, file system or data
Network traffic protection
| | | CSC Foundation service
Compute
Storage
Network
Global infrastructure
Multiple cloud
| | | CSPLegend: For CSP For CSC
Case 1: Infrastructure service
| | | | | |
+| | Customer data
Client-side data encryption, data integrity, authentication
Service-side encryption, file system or data
Network traffic protection
Platform and application management
OS, network and firewall configuration
Foundation service
Compute
Storage
Network
Global infrastructure
Inter-cloud
Multiple cloud
| | | CSCLegend: For CSP For CSC
Case 2: Platform service
| | | | | |
+
+Y.3524(19)\_Fl.Tab9a
+
+Y.3524(19)\_Fl.Tab9b
+
+**Table I.9 – Cloud security management and availability management**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Image: Diagram of Cloud security management and availability management architecture. The diagram shows a stack of layers: Customer data, Client-side data encryption, data integrity, authentication, Service-side encryption, file system or data, Network traffic protection, Platform and application management, OS, network and firewall configuration, Foundation service (Compute, Storage, Network), Global infrastructure (Inter-cloud, Multiple cloud). A vertical bar on the right is labeled CSP IAM. Two circles on the right are labeled CSC and CSP. A legend at the bottom left shows 'For CSP' in an orange box and 'For CSC' in a blue box. The text 'Case 3: Security service' is at the bottom center. The reference 'Y.3524(19)_FI.Tab9c' is at the bottom right.
Customer data
Client-side data encryption, data integrity, authentication
Service-side encryption, file system or data
Network traffic protection
Platform and application management
OS, network and firewall configuration
Foundation service
Compute
Storage
Network
Global infrastructure
Inter-cloud
Multiple cloud
CSP IAM
CSC
CSP
Legend: For CSP For CSC
Case 3: Security service
Y.3524(19)_FI.Tab9c
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Derived requirements | – Cloud trust management (refer to clause 8.4.1) – Virtualization security(refer to clause 8.4.2) – Network security(refer to clause 8.4.3) – Data security(refer to clause 8.4.4) – Security access (refer to clause 8.4.5) – Security service (refer to clause 8.4.6) – Cloud availability management (refer to clause 8.1.4) |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3520] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3520 (2015), *Cloud computing framework for end to end resource management*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010] ISO/IEC/IEEE 42010:2011, *Systems and software engineering – Architecture description*.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation**ITU-T Y.3551 (04/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Cloud Computing
+
+---
+
+## **Cloud computing – Framework and functional requirements of cloud data mobility management**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3551
+
+## Cloud computing – Framework and functional requirements of cloud data mobility management
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3551 describes the concept of cloud data mobility management and its functional requirements and functional framework. It specifies the functional requirements derived from the corresponding use cases on several aspects, including heterogeneous cloud data storage, cloud data orchestration and cloud data protection and prediction. It also provides the functional framework by identifying the logical components based on the functional requirements and illustrates the relationship with functional components defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3551 | 2024-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15873 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cloud computing, cloud data mobility management, functional framework, functional requirement.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL The diagram shows a CSC (Cloud Service Consumer) represented by a server rack icon on the left. An arrow labeled 'Data migration request' points from the CSC to a cloud-shaped icon on the right labeled 'CSP's heterogeneous data storage platform'. Inside this cloud platform, five storage types are listed with corresponding icons: Block storage (cylinder), File storage (chip), Software-defined storage (server rack), Object storage (cloud with arrows), and Vendor storage (stack of disks). The identifier 'Y.3551(24)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – CSPs provide the heterogeneous data storage environment. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | – CSCs migrate their heterogeneous data efficiently, without performing the data storage format conversion by themselves. |
+| Derived requirements | – Unified platform for data access (see clause 7.1.1). – Conversion mechanism for heterogeneous data storage (see clause 7.1.2). |
+
+### I.2 Use case for data lifecycle management
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Name | Use case for data lifecycle management |
+| Description | In order to avoid vendor lock-in and lower the data governance cost, CSC places its data across different CSPs and requests the unified view for managing, circulating and utilizing its data. On the one hand, for the time dimension, the provision, protection, flow, archive and retirement of the distributed data sets are complicated in the inter-cloud environment. On the other hand, for the space dimension, the unified automatic data flow mechanism is necessary due to the frequent data migration and computation across different CSPs. |
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure | Image: Diagram of the Inter-cloud intermediary pattern. A central circle labeled 'CSC' is connected by double-headed arrows to a large rounded rectangle labeled 'Inter-cloud intermediary'. Inside this rectangle, 'CSP A' (containing 'Dataset-a') is connected by double-headed arrows to 'CSP B' (containing 'Dataset-b'), 'CSP C' (containing 'Dataset-c'), and 'CSP D' (containing 'Dataset-d').
Y.3551(24)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – A group of CSPs sets up the inter-cloud intermediary pattern. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | – CSC places the data across different CSPs and has the unified view for operating the data. |
+| Derived requirements | – Unified API (see clause 7.2.1). – Data lifecycle management (see clause 7.2.2). – Data operation automation (see clause 7.2.3). – Workflow definition and execution (see clause 7.2.4). |
+
+### I.3 Use case for data protection
+
+This clause provides a description of use cases for data protection.
+
+| | |
+|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Name | Use case for data protection |
+| Description | Data-intensive applications are widely used in an increasing number of fields, e.g., high-energy physics, bioinformatics and astronomy. There are several challenges to data safety and security if the datasets required by this kind of application, including already existing data, intermediate data and finalized data, should be placed in the inter-cloud environment.
In order to avoid data loss, when placing and transmitting data, the availability, reliability, integrity, encryption and decryption, and access control of the data are necessary to be considered entirely.
|
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure | Image: Diagram of Inter-cloud federation showing a CSC connected to three CSPs (A, B, C) within a federation boundary. CSP A contains Dataset-a, CSP B contains Dataset-b, and CSP C contains Dataset-c. Bidirectional arrows connect CSC to CSP A, and CSP A to both CSP B and CSP C.
Y.3551(24)
|
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | – A group of CSPs sets up the inter-cloud federation pattern. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | – CSC places the data across different CSPs and has the unified view for operating the data. |
+| Derived requirements | – Data availability (see clause 7.3.1). – Data reliability (see clause 7.3.2). – Data integrity (see clause 7.3.3). – Encryption and decryption (see clause 7.3.4). – Access control (see clause 7.3.5). |
+
+### I.4 Use case for data telemetry
+
+| | |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Name | Use case for data telemetry |
+| Description | With CSC data migration in the inter-cloud environment becoming more and more frequent, it is unavoidable to expose the transmitted data to danger. However, the conventional monitoring system is usually deployed and configured inside the management region of one single CSP and the data transmitted to the peer cloud cannot be monitored by the source CSP. For example, if the dataset originally located in CSP A (as the primary CSP and using the conventional monitoring system) is transferred to CSP B (as the secondary CSP) based on pre-defined data policies, the status of this dataset is no longer monitored by CSP A. Therefore, it is necessary for CSPs in the inter-cloud relationship to support the data telemetry mechanism in order to prevent the danger of data exposure during migration.
|
+| Roles | CSC, CSP |
+| Figure | Image: Diagram of Inter-cloud federation for data telemetry. A CSC is connected to three CSPs (A, B, C) within a federation boundary. CSP A contains a Telemetry server, CSP B contains a Telemetry client, and CSP C contains a Telemetry client. Bidirectional arrows connect CSC to CSP A, and CSP A to both CSP B and CSP C.
Y.3551(24)
|
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Pre-conditions – Data telemetry (refer to clause 7.4.1). – Anomaly detection (refer to clause 7.4.2). – Data analysis and prediction (refer to clause 7.4.3). |
+
+# Appendix II
+
+### Relationships between functional requirements and logical components of cloud data mobility management functional framework
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The analysis of the relationships between the functional requirements and logical components of the cloud data mobility management functional framework is shown in Table II.1.
+
+**Table II.1 – The relationships between the functional requirements and logical components of the cloud data mobility management functional framework**
+
+| Functional requirements of cloud data mobility management | | | Related logical components of cloud data mobility management functional framework |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| A. Heterogeneous cloud data storage (clause 7.1) | Unified platform for data access (clause 7.1.1) | It is recommended that the CSP provide the unified platform for docking different storage back-ends. | Data connection interface logical component (clause 8.1.1) |
+| | | It is recommended that the CSP provide APIs for data access and processing. | Data manipulation APIs logical component (clause 8.1.2) |
+| | Conversion mechanism for heterogeneous data storage (clause 7.1.2) | It is recommended that the CSP support conversion mechanism for heterogeneous data storage. | Data connection interface logical component (clause 8.1.1) |
+| | | CSP can optionally implement the conversion mechanism by providing a different storage format driver. | Data connection interface logical component (clause 8.1.1) |
+| B. Cloud data orchestration (clause 7.2) | Unified API (clause 7.2.1) | It is recommended that the CSPs negotiate and establish the unified API for interworking and circulating the data in the inter-cloud environment. | Data manipulation APIs logical component (clause 8.1.2) |
+| | Data lifecycle management (clause 7.2.2) | It is recommended that the CSP provide data lifecycle management in the inter-cloud environment from data provision, data circulation and data archive to data retirement. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| | Data operation automation (clause 7.2.3) | It is recommended that the CSP provide a data operation automation mechanism based on the pre-defined or customized data policies. | Workflow orchestrator logical component (clause 8.2.2) |
+| | Workflow definition and execution (clause 7.2.4) | It is recommended that the CSP provide workflow engine to define the workflow and ensure the streamlined process for the data execution with minimal manual intervention. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+
+**Table II.1 – The relationships between the functional requirements and logical components of the cloud data mobility management functional framework**
+
+| Functional requirements of cloud data mobility management | | | Related logical components of the cloud data mobility management functional framework |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C. cloud data protection (clause 7.3) | Data availability (clause 7.3.1) | It is required that the CSP provide a high availability solution for migrated data by defining and performing related protection policies, e.g., data backups and two phase commitment protocol. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| | Data reliability (clause 7.3.2) | It is required that the CSP provide the reliability solution for the migrated data by defining and performing the related protection policies, e.g., disk array and erasure codes. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| | Data integrity (clause 7.3.3) | It is required that the CSP provide data integrity validation for migrated data by defining and performing related protection policies, e.g., parity check and message digest algorithm. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| | Encryption and decryption (clause 7.3.4) | It is required that the CSP provides the encryption and decryption solution for migrated data by defining and performing the related protection policies. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| | Access control (clause 7.3.5) | It is required that the CSP provide the access control solution for the migrated data by defining and performing the related protection policies to identify and confirm different access permissions. | Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1) |
+| D. cloud data prediction (clause 7.4) | Data telemetry (clause 7.4.1) | It is recommended that the CSP in the inter-cloud relationship provide the data telemetry solution based on the negotiated data authority among CSPs. | Monitoring and alert logical component (clause 8.3.1) |
+| | Anomaly detection (clause 7.4.2) | It is recommended that the CSP in the inter-cloud relationship provide the abnormal data detection and alert mechanism based on the telemetry data. | Monitoring and alert logical component (clause 8.3.1) |
+| | Data analysis and prediction (clause 7.4.3) | It is recommended that the CSP in the inter-cloud relationship provide the data analysis based on the telemetry data and CSC request. | Analysis and prediction logical component (clause 8.3.2) |
+| | | CSP can optionally provide the prediction for the further data processing based on the telemetry data and machine learning algorithm. | Analysis and prediction logical component (clause 8.3.2) |
+
+# Appendix III
+
+### Relationships between logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the cloud computing reference architecture
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix illustrates the relationship between logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the cloud computing reference architecture (CCRA) described in [b-ITU-T Y.3502].
+
+Logical components of the cloud data mobility management functional framework described in clause 8 are mapped to the functional components in CCRA as shown in Figure III.1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationship between the layers of the Cloud Computing Reference Architecture (CCRA) and the functional components of the cloud data mobility management framework. The CCRA layers are shown on the left, and the functional components are shown on the right.
+
+**CCRA Layers (Left):**
+
+- User layer
+- Access layer
+- Service layer
+- Resource layer
+ - Resource abstraction and control
+ - Data connection interface (green box)
+ - Workflow and policy controller (blue box)
+ - Physical resources
+
+**Multilayer functions (Right):**
+
+- Security systems
+ - Encryption management
+ - Workflow and policy controller (blue box)
+- Operational support systems
+ - Monitoring and reporting
+ - Monitoring and alert (yellow box)
+ - Analysis and prediction (yellow box)
+ - Service policy management
+ - Workflow and policy controller (blue box)
+ - Service automation
+ - Workflow orchestrator (blue box)
+ - Peer service management
+ - Data manipulation APIs (green box)
+- Integration
+- Business support systems
+- Development support
+
+Y.3551(24)
+
+Figure III.1: Relationship between logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the CCRA. The diagram shows a mapping between layers of the CCRA and functional components of the cloud data mobility management framework.
+
+**Figure III.1 – Relationship between logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the CCRA**
+
+Relationships between the logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the CCRA are as shown in Table III.1.
+
+**Table III.1 – Relationships between the logical components in the cloud data mobility management functional framework and functional components in the CCRA**
+
+| Layers in CCRA | Functional components in CCRA | Related logical components in this Recommendation |
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Resource layer | Resource abstraction and control functional component | – Data connection interface logical component (clause 8.1.1). – Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1). – Monitoring and alert logical component (clause 8.3.1). – Analysis and prediction logical component (clause 8.3.2). Layers in CCRA | Functional components in CCRA | Related logical components in this Recommendation |
+|-----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Systems functional components | |
+| | Service policy management functional component in operational support systems functional components | – Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1). |
+| | Service automation functional component in operational support systems functional components | – Workflow orchestrator logical component (clause 8.2.2). |
+| | Peer service management functional component in operational support systems functional components | – Data manipulation APIs logical component (clause 8.1.2). |
+| | Encryption management functional component in security systems functional components | – Workflow and policy controller logical component (clause 8.2.1). |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1601] Recommendation ITU-T X.1601 (2015), *Security framework for cloud computing*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1631] Recommendation ITU-T X.1631 (2015) | ISO/IEC 27017:2015, *Information technology – Security techniques – Code of practice for information security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1642] Recommendation ITU-T X.1642 (2016), *Guidelines for the operational security of cloud computing*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3502] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502 (2014) | ISO/IEC 17789:2014 *Information technology – Cloud computing – Reference architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3511] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3511 (2014), *Framework of inter-cloud computing*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3537] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3537 (2022), *Cloud computing – Functional requirements of a cloud service partner for multi-cloud*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation**ITU-T Y.3603 (05/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Big Data
+
+---
+
+# **Big data – Requirements and conceptual model of metadata for data catalogue**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3603
+
+# Big data – Requirements and conceptual model of metadata for data catalogue
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3603 describes the general concept of metadata and its utilization in a big data ecosystem. Also, this Recommendation provides requirements and a conceptual model of metadata for the data catalogue as well as the extensible markup language (XML) schema of metadata as an example. This metadata supports finding data easier and is used for the exchange, preservation, integration and provenance of data in a big data ecosystem.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3603 | 2019-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14137 |
+| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.3603 | 2023-05-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15540 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Big data, conceptual model, data catalogue, metadata
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Information technology – Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3600] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3600 (2015), Big data – Cloud computing based requirements and capabilities. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3601] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3601 (2018), Big data – Framework and requirements for data exchange. |
+| [ITU-T Y.3602] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3602 (2018), Big data – Functional requirements for data provenance. |
+| [ITU-T Z.109] | Recommendation ITU-T Z.109 (2016), Specification and Description Language – Unified modeling language profile for SDL-2010. |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 data catalogue** [ITU-T Y.3601]: A listing of all metadata which a data broker makes available.
+
+**3.1.2 metadata** [b-ITU-T H.752]: Structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of information-bearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment and management of the described entities.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| BDC | Big Data Service Customer |
+| BDSP | Big Data Service Provider |
+| DCAT | Data Catalogue Vocabulary |
+| DP | Data Provider |
+| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
+| RDF | Resource Description Framework |
+| Turtle | Terse Resource Description Framework Triple Language |
+| UML | Unified Modelling Language |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| XML | extensible Markup Language |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+The keywords **"is required to"** indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords **"is recommended"** indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords **"can optionally"** indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+In the body of this document and its annexes, the words shall, shall not, should, and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+The unified modelling language (UML) schema used in this Recommendation follows [ITU-T Z.109].
+
+## 6 Overview of metadata
+
+### 6.1 Introduction to metadata in the big data ecosystem
+
+Metadata is structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of a dataset to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment and management of the dataset. Metadata summarizes overall information about data, making finding and working with particular data easier. Typically, the metadata structure is highly dependent on data format or application. Therefore, metadata for big data is needed to provide an overarching model to cover the characteristics of big data.
+
+Figure 6-1 illustrates metadata in the big data ecosystem defined in [ITU-T Y.3600]. Metadata is used for data publication and search among roles and sub-roles of the big data ecosystem.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1 – Metadata in the big data ecosystem. This diagram illustrates the flow of metadata and data within a big data ecosystem. A 'Data provider' box contains a 'Data broker' (with a 'Data catalogue registry') and a 'Data supplier'. The 'Data supplier' publishes metadata to the 'Data broker' and finds data from the 'Data broker'. A 'Big data service provider' searches the 'Data catalogue registry' for metadata and provides data to a 'Big data service customer'. A 'Big data service customer' sends a service request to the 'Big data service provider'. A 'Data request/crawling' arrow points from the 'Big data service provider' to the 'Data supplier'. A 'Service request' arrow points from the 'Big data service customer' to the 'Big data service provider'. A 'Metadata' label is circled in red, and a 'Publish metadata' label is also circled in red. The diagram is labeled Y.3603(19)\_F6-1.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Metadata in the big data ecosystem**
+
+Regarding the data provider (DP), DP:data broker provides a meta-information registry (e.g., data catalogue registry) to DP:data suppliers for publishing their data sources, and DP:data suppliers are creating and publishing metadata information to DP:data broker. A big data service provider (BDSP) searches information through metadata stored in the DP:data broker's data catalogue registry.
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.3600], metadata provides:
+
+- critical information for identification, access right to data;
+- information about the creation, control, and update of data for the management purpose;
+- additional information about data integration capabilities.
+
+### 6.2 Introduction to big data lifecycle
+
+Metadata is used for various purposes, such as preserving data, data distribution, data integration and data history management by continuously recording and updating. Figure 6-2 shows the usage of metadata according to the big data lifecycle.
+
+NOTE – An example of a big data lifecycle has a main cycle with creation/capture, storage, preparation, analysis, visualization, and also has branch cycles with retirement/deletion and share/exchange.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-2 – Usage of metadata in the big data lifecycle. This diagram shows the lifecycle of big data and how metadata is used. A central 'Metadata (Catalogue)' box is connected to four boxes: 'Big data preservation', 'Big data exchange', 'Big data integration', and 'Lineage tracking'. Below these, a main cycle of steps is shown: 'Creation capture' → 'Storage' → 'Preparation' → 'Analysis' → 'Visualization'. There are also branch cycles: 'Retirement deletion' from 'Storage' back to 'Creation capture', and 'Share exchange' from 'Preparation' back to 'Storage'. The diagram is labeled Y.3603(19)\_F6-2.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Usage of metadata in the big data lifecycle**
+
+[ITU-T Y.3601] defines the functional requirements for big data exchange. In that Recommendation, DP:data broker provides a common data catalogue schema to exchange big data which covers various
+
+types of data sources. DP: data broker provides meta-information (data catalogue for dataset) registry to a data source. A data source publishes metadata to an online registry for data sharing. This metadata includes:
+
+- data type, format, size and update frequency;
+- category (area of data source);
+- metadata and its access information (e.g., uniform resource identifier (URI));
+- delivery mechanism, and electronic access methods to data (e.g., application programming interface (API)).
+
+And, this metadata can optionally include:
+
+- data rights (e.g., general agreement, copyrights, patents, licenses policies and pricing policies) (e.g., the applied functions with parameter);
+- usage of data;
+- the quality of data (e.g., sales ranking, and data supplier's credit);
+- related keywords; and
+- sample data.
+
+DP: data broker also supports data classification with commonly used data vocabulary and taxonomy, and it is recommended to support multiple data classifications by usage area.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3602] defines the functional requirements for big data provenance. Provenance is information about the origin and creation process of data, including the metadata recording process of workflow, annotations and notes about processes. When data are imported from an outside data source and stored, the BDSP generates metadata based on the importing context, including:
+
+- responsible party information;
+- timestamp;
+- size, etc.
+
+The metadata can be used for recording provenance information according to [ITU-T Y.3602].
+
+For storage efficiency and performance, the BDSP provides data preservation capabilities by monitoring information (e.g., timestamps) included in the metadata. In addition, the BDSP uses metadata to retrieve the data for data preparation (e.g., data integration).
+
+## **7 Requirements of metadata for data catalogue**
+
+### **7.1 Metadata for data catalogue**
+
+A data catalogue describes the requirements for searching a dataset. It helps the users to evaluate the data resources to determine the suitability of usage of the data. This clause provides six elements and contents of a data catalogue for big data. Figure 7-1 shows the elements of metadata for a data catalogue.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the elements of metadata for a data catalogue. It features a large grey rectangle labeled 'Data catalogue' at the top left. Inside this rectangle, six smaller white boxes are arranged in a grid-like fashion. The boxes are labeled: 'Overview' (top left), 'Responsible party' (top right), 'Domain information' (middle left), 'Data resource information' (bottom left), 'Data quality' (top right, below 'Responsible party'), and 'Catalogue record' (bottom right, below 'Data quality'). The boxes are arranged in two columns. The left column contains 'Overview', 'Domain information', and 'Data resource information'. The right column contains 'Responsible party', 'Data quality', and 'Catalogue record'.
+
+Y.3603(23)\_F7-1
+
+Diagram showing the elements of metadata for a data catalogue. The elements are arranged in a grid within a box labeled 'Data catalogue'. The elements are: Overview, Responsible party, Domain information, Data resource information, Data quality, and Catalogue record.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Elements of metadata for a data catalogue**
+
+A data catalogue **is required to** include the following elements:
+
+- overview (see clause 7.2.1);
+- responsible party (see clause 7.2.2);
+- data resource information (see clause 7.2.3);
+- domain information (see clause 7.2.4).
+
+A data catalogue **is recommended to** include the following elements:
+
+- data quality (see clause 7.2.5);
+- catalogue record (see clause 7.2.6).
+
+### **7.2 Requirements of metadata elements**
+
+#### **7.2.1 Overview element**
+
+The overview element provides overall information about the data catalogue and is required to include:
+
+- information about the creation of the data catalogue;
+NOTE 1 – This may include the title, the language used in the text, and the version of the data catalogue specification.
+- an informal description of the data catalogue.
+NOTE 2 – An informal description is intended to give a short introduction to the data catalogue and allow a human reader to better understand it.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Responsible party element**
+
+The responsible party element provides authoritative reference information and is required to include:
+
+- information to identify and communicate with the person(s) and organizations associated with the data catalogue.
+NOTE 1 – This may include the role or function performed by the organization, the organization name, individual name and position name.
+
+The responsible party element is recommended to include the following:
+
+- contact information.
+NOTE 2 – This may include the phone number, address, online resources such as URI and time when individuals may contact the publisher of the data catalogue.
+
+#### **7.2.3 Data resource information element**
+
+A data catalogue element contains one or more data resources including dataset and data service.
+
+The data resource information of metadata represents the actual data resource as published by the DP:data provider, and is required to include:
+
+- the title of the data resource;
+- an informal description of the data resource.
+
+NOTE 1 – An informal description is intended to give a short introduction to the dataset or data service and allow a human reader a better understanding.
+
+- contact point information.
+
+NOTE 2 – Contact point information is represented with the same contents of the responsible party described in clause 7.2.2, but its target is DP:data provider.
+
+The data resource information element is recommended to include:
+
+- dataset distribution information;
+
+NOTE 3 – A dataset may have multiple distribution information.
+
+NOTE 4 – This information may include the distribution format of the dataset, type of dataset (structured, semi-structured, unstructured), access information including user's guide or its URI, size of the dataset, sample data for user's preview and data rights.
+
+- keywords representing dataset;
+- endpoint description that provides the information of data service available including data API through the endpoint.
+
+The data resource information may also include the following information optionally:
+
+- the frequency at which the dataset is updated;
+- temporal coverage of the dataset which is described by the time.
+
+#### **7.2.4 Domain information element**
+
+The domain information element provides the application area of data resources and is required to include:
+
+- source domain of the data resource for classification.
+
+The domain information element is recommended to include:
+
+- usage domain of the data resource.
+
+#### **7.2.5 Data quality element**
+
+In a big data ecosystem, there are various types and formats of data, each having different quality requirements. Therefore, different quality evaluation methods are applied to different data resources. The data quality element is required to include:
+
+- quality requirement on the data resource;
+- the unit of measure for data quality;
+- quality evaluation result.
+
+#### **7.2.6 Catalogue record element**
+
+The catalogue record element provides date information for registration and modification for instances of the data catalogue. The catalogue record element is required to include:
+
+- the most recent modified date of the data catalogue.
+
+The catalogue record element of the data catalogue is recommended to include:
+
+- the issued date of listing the data resource in the catalogue.
+
+NOTE – The issued date of listing a data resource in a data catalogue is different than the publication date of the data resource.
+
+## 8 Conceptual model for data catalogue
+
+### 8.1 Overall class diagram
+
+This clause provides a UML model based on clause 7, which describes the requirements of metadata for a data catalogue. Figure 8-1 shows the overall class diagram of the data catalogue using UML to provide the design of a concept for a data catalogue.
+
+
+
+The UML Class Diagram illustrates the structure of a data catalogue. The classes and their attributes are as follows:
+
+- BDC\_Record**:
+ - + modifiedDate: ITU-T X.680
+ - + issuedDate: ITU-T X.680 [0..1]
+- BDC\_Catalogue**:
+ - + title: FreeText
+ - + description: FreeText
+ - + language: FreeText [0..1]
+ - + versionInfo: FreeText [0..1]
+- BDC\_ResponsibleParty**:
+ - + individualName: FreeText
+ - + organizationName: FreeText
+ - + positionName: FreeText
+ - + function: FreeText
+ - + contact: BDC\_ContactType [0..\*]
+- BDC\_DataQuality**:
+ - + qualityRequirement: FreeText
+ - + unitOfMeasure: FreeText
+ - + qualityResult: FreeText
+- BDC\_Domain**:
+ - + title: FreeText
+ - + taxonomy: BDC\_TaxonomyType [1..\*]
+ - + comment: FreeText [0..\*]
+- BDC\_DataResource**:
+ - + title: FreeText
+ - + description: FreeText
+- BDC\_Dataset**:
+ - + keyword: FreeText [0..\*]
+ - + temporalCoverage: FreeText [0..1]
+ - + updateFrequency: FreeText [0..1]
+- BDC\_Distribution**:
+ - + dataType: BDC\_DataTypeCode
+ - + format: FreeText
+ - + byteSize: int
+ - + accessInformation: URI
+ - + sampleData: URI [0..\*]
+- BDC\_DataService**:
+ - + endpointDescription: URI
+- BDC\_DataRight**:
+ - + rightsStatement: FreeText [0..1]
+ - + license: URI [0..\*]
+- BDC\_ContactType** (DataType):
+ - + phoneNumber: FreeText [0..\*]
+ - + address: FreeText [0..1]
+ - + onlineResource: URI [0..\*]
+ - + hoursOfServices: FreeText [0..1]
+- BDC\_DataTypeCode** (enumeration):
+ - Attributes: STRUCTURED, SEMI\_STRUCTURED, UNSTRUCTURED
+- BDC\_TaxonomyType** (DataType):
+ - + taxonomyDomain: URI
+ - + taxonomyValue: FreeText
+
+Associations and Multiplicities:
+
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_Record**: +record (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_ResponsibleParty**: +responsibleParty (1..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_DataQuality**: +dataQuality (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_Domain**: +sourceDomain (1..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_Dataset**: +usageDomain (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_DataResource**: +dataResource (1..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_Distribution**: +distribution (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Catalogue** to **BDC\_DataService**: +hasRelation (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Dataset** to **BDC\_Distribution**: +serveDataset (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Dataset** to **BDC\_DataService**: +hasRelation (0..\*)
+- BDC\_Distribution** to **BDC\_DataRight**: +dataRight (0..1)
+- BDC\_DataService** to **BDC\_DataRight**: +serviceRight (0..1)
+
+Generalization:
+
+- BDC\_DataResource** is a generalization of **BDC\_Dataset** and **BDC\_DataService**.
+
+Notes:
+
+- A note on **BDC\_ContactType** states: BDC\_ContactType.count (phoneNumber + address + onlineResource + hoursOfService) > 0
+
+UML Class Diagram for a Data Catalogue
+
+Figure 8-1 – Overall class diagram of data catalogue using UML
+
+### 8.2 Classes and data type
+
+The following descriptors are used to explain the data dictionaries in the clauses that follow.
+
+- Name/Role name: title of class (gray colored row in the table), association (noted as role) and attribute;
+- Description: a short description of 'Name/Role name';
+- M/R/O: the mandatory/recommended/optional (M/R/O) necessity of each class, association and attribute;
+- Cardinality: the maximum number of instances that the metadata entity or metadata element may have. Single occurrences are shown by "1"; repeating occurrences are represented by "N".
+
+- Domain: the values allowed, or the use of free text placed on the contents of the field. "Free text" indicates that no restrictions are placed on the contents of the field. Integer-based codes shall be used to represent values for domains containing code lists.
+- Domain code: designated code used in place of the concept.
+
+#### 8.2.1 Class: BDC\_Catalogue
+
+Table 8-1 shows the data dictionary of *BDC\_Catalogue* which describes the overview element information in clause 7.2.1.
+
+**Table 8-1 – Catalogue overview**
+
+| | Name/Role name | Description | M/R/O | Cardinality | Domain |
+|----|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------------|----------------------------------------|
+| 1 | BDC_Catalogue | root entity which defines metadata about data resource | M | 1 | Line 2 to 12 |
+| 2 | role: responsibleParty | responsible party information for the data catalogue | M | N | BDC_ResponsibleParty |
+| 3 | role: dataResource | data resource information for the data catalogue | M | N | BDC_DataResource |
+| 4 | role: sourceDomain | source domain information for the data catalogue | M | N | BDC_Domain |
+| 5 | role: usageDomain | usage domain information for the data catalogue | R | N | BDC_Domain |
+| 6 | role: dataQuality | data quality information for the data catalogue | R | N | BDC_DataQuality |
+| 7 | role: record | record information for the data catalogue | R | N | BDC_Record |
+| 8 | role: hasRelation | related data catalogue of the data catalogue | O | N | BDC_Catalogue |
+| 9 | title | title of data catalogue | M | 1 | free text |
+| 10 | description | a short introduction to the data catalogue | M | 1 | free text |
+| 11 | language | the language used within the data catalogue | R | 1 | free text (e.g., RFC 5646 [b-RFC5646]) |
+| 12 | versionInfo | the version of data catalogue specification | R | 1 | free text (major.minor.patch) |
+
+#### 8.2.2 Class: BDC\_ResponsibleParty
+
+Table 8-2 shows the data dictionary of *BDC\_ResponsibleParty* and its data type class *BDC\_ContactType* which describes the responsible party in clause 7.2.2.
+
+**Table 8-2 – Responsible party information**
+
+| | Name/Role name | Description | M/R/O | Cardinality | Domain |
+|----|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------------|-----------------|
+| 13 | BDC_ResponsibleParty | name and position information for an individual or organization that is responsible for the data catalogue or data resource | M | N | Line 14 to 18 |
+| 14 | individualName | name of the responsible person: surname, given name, title | M | 1 | free text |
+| 15 | organisationName | name of the responsible organization | M | 1 | free text |
+| 16 | positionName | role or position of the responsible person | M | 1 | free text |
+| 17 | function | the function performed by the responsible party | M | 1 | free text |
+| 18 | contact | information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization | R | N | BDC_ContactType |
+| 19 | BDC_ContactType | information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization | R | N | Line 20 to 23 |
+| 20 | phoneNumber | telephone numbers at which the organization or individual may be contacted | R | N | free text |
+| 21 | address | physical and email address at which the organization or individual may be contacted | R | 1 | free text |
+| 22 | onlineResource | on-line information that can be used to contact the individual or organization | R | N | URI |
+| 23 | hoursOfServices | time(including time zone) when individuals can contact the organization or individual | R | 1 | free text |
+
+#### 8.2.3 Class: BDC\_DataResource
+
+Table 8-3 shows the data dictionary of *BDC\_DataResource* and its sub-classes (*BDC\_Dataset*, *BDC\_DataService*, *BDC\_Distribution*, *BDC\_DataRight*) that describes data resource information in clause 7.2.3.
+
+**Table 8-3 – Data resource information**
+
+| | Name/Role name | Description | M/R/O | Cardinality | Domain |
+|----|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
+| 24 | BDC_DataResource | a collection of data which is available for access and/or download | M | N | Line 25 to 27 |
+| 25 | role:
+
+
+ short introduction to the target (i.e. catalogue or data resource)
+
+
+
+ format information of dataset including a version
+
+
+
+ related data catalogue or dataset of the data catalogue or the dataset
+
+
+
+ commonly used word(s) used to describe the dataset
+
+
+
+ language used within the data catalogue
+
+
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ time (including time zone) when the dataset was captured
+
+
+
+ a given name to the target
+
+
+
+ rate of occurrence of dataset update
+
+
+
+ root entity which defines metadata about data resource
+
+
+
+ information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or
+organization
+
+
+
+ data quality information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ a collection of data which is available for access and/or download
+
+
+
+ information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset and data service
+
+
+
+ a collection of operations that provides dataset
+
+
+
+ the enumerated data type for data distribution
+
+
+
+ dataset information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset
+
+
+
+ source and/ or usage information for data catalogue
+
+
+
+ record information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ name and position information for an individual or organization that is responsible for the data
+catalogue or data resource
+
+
+
+ data that is neither raw data, nor typed data in a conventional database system (e.g. XML,
+JSON)
+
+
+
+ data that is organized in a format easily used by formatted repository
+
+
+
+ data that either does not have a pre-defined data model or is not organized in a pre-defined
+manner
+
+
+
+ information required to describe the taxonomy and the values used within that
+taxonomy
+
+
+
+ access information to dataset
+
+
+
+ physical and email address at which the organization or individual may be contacted
+
+
+
+ an additional information for domain
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or
+organization
+
+
+
+ contact point information for the dataset
+
+
+
+ data quality information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ data resource information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ Information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset
+
+
+
+ the type information of the dataset
+
+
+
+ information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset
+
+
+
+ a description of the service available through the endpoint
+
+
+
+ function performed by the responsible party
+
+
+
+ time (including time zone) when individuals can contact the organization or
+individual
+
+
+
+ name of the responsible person- surname, given name, title
+
+```
+
+```
+
+
+
+
+ the issued date of listing the data resource in the catalogue
+
+
+
+ This links to the license document under which the catalog is made available and not the datasets or
+data service
+
+
+
+ the most resent modified date of data catalogue
+
+
+
+ online information that can be used to contact the individual or organization
+
+
+
+ name of the responsible organization
+
+
+
+ telephone numbers at which the organization or individual may be contacted
+
+
+
+ role or position of the responsible person
+
+
+
+ requirement statement for evaluating quality of data resource
+
+
+
+ record information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ responsible party information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ information to the usage permissions being agreed to
+
+
+
+ location information about a sample data described by URI
+
+
+
+ a collection of data provided by data service
+
+
+
+ information about limitation placed upon the use of the data service
+
+
+
+ source domain information for the data catalogue
+
+
+
+ taxonomy information including classification system and authority
+
+
+
+ location information about a taxonomy described by URI
+
+
+
+ a value used within the taxonomy
+
+
+
+ standard unit or system of units utilizing which a quantity is accounted for and
+expressed
+
+
+
+ usage domain information for the data catalogue
+
+
+```
+
+```
+
+
+ the result of quality evaluation described by the unit of measure
+
+
+
+ version of data catalogue specification
+
+
+
+ information about the size of the dataset in bytes
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+### I.2 Turtle profile
+
+This clause provides the XML schema with Turtle format corresponding to the UML model in clause 8.
+
+```
+
+# baseURI: http://www.itu.int/xml-namespace/itu-t/Y.3603/bigdatacatalogue
+# imports: http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
+# imports: http://purl.org/dc/terms/
+# imports: http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#
+# imports: https://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#
+# prefix: bdc
+
+```
+
+```
+
+@prefix bdc: .
+@prefix owl: .
+@prefix rdf: .
+@prefix rdfs: .
+@prefix xsd: .
+@prefix dc: .
+
+```
+
+```
+
+dc:description
+ rdfs:comment "short introduction to the target (i.e. catalogue or data resource)" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:DataResource ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+dc:format
+ rdfs:comment "format information of dataset including a version" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+bdc:hasRelation
+ rdfs:comment "related data catalogue or dataset of the data catalogue or the dataset" ;
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Dataset ;
+ rdfs:range bdc:Catalogue ;
+ rdfs:range bdc:Dataset ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+dc:keyword
+ rdfs:comment "commonly used word(s) used to describe the dataset" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Dataset ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+dc:language
+ rdfs:comment "language used within the data catalogue" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+ rdfs:range dct:RFC5646 ;
+.
+bdc:temporalCoverage
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "time (including time zone) when the dataset was captured" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Dataset ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+dc:title
+ rdfs:comment "a given name to the target" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:DataResource ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Domain ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:updateFrequency
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "rate of occurrence of dataset update" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Dataset ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:Catalogue
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "root entity which defines metadata about data resource" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+bdc:ContactType
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+bdc:DataQuality
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "data quality information for the data catalogue" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+bdc:DataResource
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "a collection of data which is available for access and/or download" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+bdc:DataRight
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset and data service" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+bdc:DataService
+ rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+ rdfs:comment "a collection of operations that provides dataset" ;
+ rdfs:subClassOf bdc:DataResource ;
+.
+bdc:DataTypeCode
+
+```
+
+```
+
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "the enumerated data type for data distribution" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:Dataset
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "dataset information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf bdc:DataResource ;
+.
+
+bdc:Distribution
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:Domain
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "source and/ or usage information for data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:Record
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "record information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:ResponsibleParty
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "name and position information for an individual or organization that is responsible for the data catalogue
+or data resource" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:SemiStructured
+rdf:type bdc:DataTypeCode ;
+rdfs:comment "data that is neither raw data, nor typed data in a conventional database system (e.g. XML, JSON)" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:Structured
+rdf:type bdc:DataTypeCode ;
+rdfs:comment "data that is organized in a format easily used by formatted repository" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:Unstructured
+rdf:type bdc:DataTypeCode ;
+rdfs:comment "data that either does not have a pre-defined data model or is not organized in a pre-defined manner" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:TaxonomyType
+rdf:type rdfs:Class ;
+rdfs:comment "information required to describe the taxonomy and the values used within that taxonomy" ;
+rdfs:subClassOf owl:Thing ;
+.
+
+bdc:accessInformation
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "access information to dataset" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+
+bdc:address
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "physical and email address at which the organization or individual may be contacted" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:ContactType ;
+
+```
+
+```
+
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:comment
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "an additional information for domain" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Domain ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:contact
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+rdfs:range bdc:ContactType ;
+.
+bdc:contactPoint
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "contact point information for the dataset" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataResource ;
+rdfs:range bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+.
+bdc:dataQuality
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "data quality information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:DataQuality ;
+.
+bdc:dataResource
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "data resource information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:DataResource ;
+.
+bdc:dataRight
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "Information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+rdfs:range bdc:DataRight ;
+.
+bdc:dataType
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "the type information of the dataset" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+rdfs:range bdc:DataTypeCode ;
+.
+bdc:distribution
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Dataset ;
+rdfs:range bdc:Distribution ;
+.
+bdc:endpointDescription
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "a description of the service available through the endpoint" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataService ;
+rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+bdc:function
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "function performed by the responsible party" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:hoursOfServices
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "time period (including time zone) when individuals can contact the organization or individual" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ContactType ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:individualName
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "name of the responsible person- surname, given name, title" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:issuedDate
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "the issued date of listing the data resource in the catalogue" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Record ;
+ rdfs:range dct:W3CDTF ;
+.
+bcd:license
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "This links to the license document under which the catalog is made available and not the datasets or data
+service" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:DataRight ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+bcd:modifiedDate
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "the most recent modified date of data catalogue" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:Record ;
+ rdfs:range dct:W3CDTF ;
+.
+bcd:onlineResource
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "online information that can be used to contact the individual or organization" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ContactType ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+bcd:organizationName
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "name of the responsible organization" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:phoneNumber
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "telephone numbers at which the organization or individual may be contacted" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ContactType ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:positionName
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "role or position of the responsible person" ;
+ rdfs:domain bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+ rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bcd:qualityRequirements
+ rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+ rdfs:comment "requirement statement for evaluating quality of data resource" ;
+
+```
+
+```
+
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataQuality ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:record
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "record information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:Record ;
+.
+bdc:responsibleParty
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "responsible party information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+.
+bdc:rightsStatement
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "information to the usage permissions being agreed to" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataRight ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:sampleData
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "location information about a sample data described by URI" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+bdc:serveDataset
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "a collection of data provided by data service" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataService ;
+rdfs:range bdc:Dataset ;
+.
+bdc:serviceRight
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "information about limitation placed upon the use of the data service" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataService ;
+rdfs:range bdc:DataRight ;
+.
+bdc:sourceDomain
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "source domain information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:Domain ;
+.
+bdc:taxonomy
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "taxonomy information including classification system and authority" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Domain ;
+rdfs:range bdc:TaxonomyType ;
+.
+bdc:taxonomyDomain
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "location information about a taxonomy described by URI" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:TaxonomyType ;
+rdfs:range xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+bdc:taxonomyValue
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "a value used within the taxonomy" ;
+
+```
+
+```
+
+rdfs:domain bdc:TaxonomyType ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:unitOfMeasure
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "standard unit or system of units by means of which a quantity is accounted for and expressed" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataQuality ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+bdc:usageDomain
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "usage domain information for the data catalogue" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range bdc:Domain ;
+.
+bdc:qualityResult
+rdf:type rdf:Property ;
+rdfs:comment "the result of quality evaluation described by the unit of measure" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:DataQuality ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+owl:versionInfo
+rdfs:comment "version of data catalogue specification" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Catalogue ;
+rdfs:range xsd:string ;
+.
+dcat:byteSize
+rdfs:comment "information about the size of the dataset in bytes" ;
+rdfs:domain bdc:Distribution ;
+rdfs:range xsd:unsignedLong ;
+.
+
+```
+
+### I.3 JSON-LD profile
+
+This clause provides a JSON-based Serialization for Linked Data (JSON-LD) format corresponding to the UML model in clause 8.
+
+```
+
+{
+ "@context": {
+ "bdc": "http://www.itu.int/xml-namespace/itu-t/Y.3603/bigdatacatalogue#",
+ "dc": "http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/",
+ "dcat": "http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#",
+ "dct": "http://purl.org/dc/terms/",
+ "owl": "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#",
+ "rdf": "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#",
+ "rdfs": "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#",
+ "xsd": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
+ },
+ "@graph": [
+ {
+ "@id": "dc:description",
+ "rdfs:comment": "short introduction to the target (i.e. catalogue or data resource)",
+ "rdfs:domain": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+ }
+ ]
+ },
+ {
+ "rdfs:range": {
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "dc:format",
+ "rdfs:comment": "format information of dataset including a version",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:hasRelation",
+ "rdfs:comment": "related data catalogue or dataset of the data catalogue or the dataset",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:domain": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ }
+ ],
+ "rdfs:range": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ }
+ ]
+},
+{
+ "@id": "dc:keyword",
+ "rdfs:comment": "commonly used word(s) used to describe the dataset",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "dc:language",
+ "rdfs:comment": "language used within the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "dct:RFC5646"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:temporalCoverage",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "time (including time zone) when the dataset was captured",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "dc:title",
+ "rdfs:comment": "a given name to the target",
+ "rdfs:domain": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+ }
+ ],
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:updateFrequency",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "rate of occurrence of dataset update",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "root entity which defines metadata about data resource",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data quality information for the data catalogue",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "a collection of data which is available for access and/or download",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset and data service",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:DataService",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "a collection of operations that provides dataset",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:DataTypeCode",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "the enumerated data type for data distribution",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "dataset information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+}
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "source and/ or usage information for data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Record",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "record information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "name and position information for an individual or organization that is responsible for the data catalogue or data resource",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:SemiStructured",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataTypeCode"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data that is neither raw data, nor typed data in a conventional database system (e.g. XML, JSON)",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Structured",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataTypeCode"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data that is organized in a format easily used by formatted repository",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:Unstructured",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataTypeCode"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data that either does not have a pre-defined data model or is not organized in a pre-defined manner",
+ "rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+ }
+ }
+ ],
+ {
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType",
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdfs:Class"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "information required to describe the taxonomy and the values used within that taxonomy",
+"rdfs:subClassOf": {
+ "@id": "owl:Thing"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:accessInformation",
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "access information to dataset",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:address",
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "physical and email address at which the organization or individual may be contacted",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:comment",
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "an additional information for domain",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:contact",
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "information required to enable contact with the responsible person and/or organization",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:contactPoint",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "contact point information for the dataset",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:dataQuality",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data quality information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:dataResource",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "data resource information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataResource"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:dataRight",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "Information about limitation placed upon the use of the dataset",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:dataType",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "the type information of the dataset",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataTypeCode"
+ }
+},
+
+```
+
+```
+
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:distribution",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information about the distributor of and options for obtaining the dataset",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:endpointDescription",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "a description of the service available through the endpoint",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataService"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:function",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "function performed by the responsible party",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:hoursOfServices",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "time period (including time zone) when individuals can contact the organization or individual",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:individualName",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "name of the responsible person- surname, given name, title",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+}
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:issuedDate",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "the issued date of listing the data resource in the catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Record"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "dct:W3CDTF"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:license",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "This links to the license document under which the catalog is made available and not the datasets or data service",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:modifiedDate",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "the most recent modified date of data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Record"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "dct:W3CDTF"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:onlineResource",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "online information that can be used to contact the individual or organization",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:organizationName",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "name of the responsible organization",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+ }
+ }
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:phoneNumber",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "telephone numbers at which the organization or individual may be contacted",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:positionName",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "role or position of the responsible person",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:qualityRequirements",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "requirement statement for evaluating quality of data resource",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:record",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "record information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Record"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:responsibleParty",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "responsible party information for the data catalogue",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:rightsStatement",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information to the usage permissions being agreed to",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:sampleData",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "location information about a sample data described by URI",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:serveDataset",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "a collection of data provided by data service",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataService"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:serviceRight",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "information about limitation placed upon the use of the data service",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataService"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:sourceDomain",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ }
+}
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "source domain information for the data catalogue",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:taxonomy",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "taxonomy information including classification system and authority",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:taxonomyDomain",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "location information about a taxonomy described by URI",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:taxonomyValue",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "a value used within the taxonomy",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:unitOfMeasure",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "standard unit or system of units utilizing which a quantity is accounted for and expressed",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:usageDomain",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+},
+"rdfs:comment": "usage domain information for the data catalogue",
+"rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+},
+"rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:qualityResult",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "rdf:Property"
+ },
+ "rdfs:comment": "the result of quality evaluation described by the unit of measure",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "owl:versionInfo",
+ "rdfs:comment": "version of data catalogue specification",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:string"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "dcat:byteSize",
+ "rdfs:comment": "information about the size of the dataset in bytes",
+ "rdfs:domain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+ },
+ "rdfs:range": {
+ "@id": "xsd:unsignedLong"
+ }
+}
+]
+}
+
+```
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Examples of metadata instance
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+For a better understanding of the conceptual model, this appendix provides examples of metadata instances about healthcare data [b-NHIS]. The UML object diagram, RDF instance and Turtle instances follow the UML and XML models in clause 8 and Appendix I, and these examples provide information on a dataset about 'Health Insurance'.
+
+### II.1 UML object diagram
+
+An object diagram represents an instance of a class diagram. Figure II.1 is an object diagram derived from the class diagram presented in Figure 8-1. This example describes an air quality data catalogue. A *BDC\_Catalogue* instance named *airCatalog* contains three *BDC\_DataResource* instances of *pmSet*, *ozoneSet*, and *pmService*. The *pmSet* instance is a dataset for fine dust. The *ozoneSet* instance indicates ozone density. The *pmService* instance serves the data service for the *pmSet* instance via API. In the case of *distOzone*, it is responsible for the actual distribution of the *ozoneSet* instance in CSV format.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationships between several metadata objects. The central object is **airCatalog: BDC\_Catalogue**, which has the following attributes: +title = Air Quality, +description = data about air quality, +language = en\_US, and +versionInfo = 1.0.0. It is associated with several other objects: **weatherTaxonomy: BDC\_TaxonomyType** (via +taxonomyDomain), **pollutionTaxonomy: BDC\_TaxonomyType** (via +taxonomyDomain), **quality: BDC\_DataQuality** (via +dataQuality), **useDomain: BDC\_Domain** (via +usageDomain), **srcDomain: BDC\_Domain** (via +sourceDomain), **pmService: BDC\_DataService** (via +serveDataset), **right: BDC\_DataRight** (via +serviceRight), **record1: BDC\_Record** (via +record), **subject: BDC\_ResponsibleParty** (via +responsibleParty), **pmSet: BDC\_Dataset** (via +dataResource), **ozoneSet: BDC\_Dataset** (via +dataResource), and **distOzone: BDC\_Distribution** (via +distribution). The **pmSet** and **ozoneSet** objects are also associated with **subject: BDC\_ResponsibleParty** via +contactPoint. The **distOzone** object is associated with **ozoneSet** via +distribution. The **subject** object has attributes: +individualName = John, +organizationName = Korea Meteorological Administration, +positionName = Manager, +function = Manager, and +contact: BDC\_ContactType = myContact. The **myContact: BDC\_ContactType** object has attributes: +phoneNumber = 012-123-3456, +address = Seoul, +onlineResource = https://www.kma.go.kr, and +hoursOfServices = 09:00~18:00. The **record1: BDC\_Record** object has attributes: +issuedDate = 2018-01-01 and +modifiedDate = 2018-03-01. The **weatherTaxonomy** object has attributes: +taxonomyDomain = https://dbpedia.org/page/Weather\_spotting and +taxonomyValue = Weather. The **pollutionTaxonomy** object has attributes: +taxonomyDomain = http://dbpedia.org/resource/Air\_pollution and +taxonomyValue = Pollution. The **quality** object has attributes: +qualityRequirements = under 0.1% missing fields, +unitOfMeasure = percent, and +qualityResult = passed. The **useDomain** object has attributes: +title = Air pollution and +taxonomy = pollutionTaxonomy. The **srcDomain** object has attributes: +title = Weather and +taxonomy = weatherTaxonomy. The **pmService** object has attributes: +title = Particular Matter Data Service, +description = data service providing PM data, and +endpointDescription = http://www.weather.go.kr/pm. The **right** object has attributes: +rightsStatement = Public access and +license = https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT. The **pmSet** object has attributes: +title = Particular Matter, +description = Particular Matter data, +keyword = pollution, +temporalCoverage = 2013.1.1 ~ 2017.12.31, and +updateFrequency = weekly. The **ozoneSet** object has attributes: +title = Ozone density, +description = Data about Ozone density, +keyword = pollution, +temporalCoverage = 2010.1.1~2017.12.31, and +updateFrequency = daily. The **distOzone** object has attributes: +dataType: BDC\_TaxonomyType = STRUCTURED, +format = csv, +byteSize = 12000000, +accessInformation = http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.csv, and +sampleData = http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.sample.csv.
+
+UML object diagram of metadata showing relationships between various BDC objects.
+
+Figure II.1 – UML object diagram of metadata
+
+### II.2 RDF instance
+
+This clause provides an example of metadata instance based on the RDF schema which is described in clause I.1.
+
+
+
+
+ 12000000
+ http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.sample.csv
+ http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.csv
+ csv
+
+
+
+ Weather
+ https://dbpedia.org/page/Weather_spotting
+
+
+
+ Pollution
+ http://dbpedia.org/resource/Air_pollution
+
+
+
+ 1.0.0
+ data about air quality
+ en_US
+ Air Quality
+
+
+
+ weekly
+ 2013.1.1 ~ 2017.12.31
+ Particular Matter
+ pollution
+ Particular Matter data
+
+
+
+
+```
+
+```
+
+2018-03-01
+2018-01-01
+
+
+ 012-123-3456
+ https://www.kma.go.kr
+ 09:00~18:00
+ Seoul
+
+
+
+ percent
+ passed
+ under 0.1% missing fields
+
+
+
+ Manager
+ Korea Meteorological Administration
+ John
+ Manager
+
+
+
+ Public access
+ https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT
+
+
+
+ Air pollution
+
+
+
+ Weather
+
+
+
+ http://www.weather.go.kr/pm
+ Particular Matter Data Service
+ data service providing PM data
+
+
+
+ daily
+ 2010.1.1~2017.12.31
+ Ozone density
+ pollution
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ Data about Ozone density
+
+
+
+```
+
+### II.3 Turtle instance
+
+This clause provides an example of a metadata instance based on the Turtle format schema which is described in Appendix I.2.
+
+```
+
+# baseURI: http://www.itu.int/xml-namespace/itu-t/Y.3603/bigdatacatalogue
+# imports: http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
+# prefix: bdc
+
+```
+
+```
+
+@prefix bdc: .
+@prefix dc: .
+@prefix dct: .
+@prefix rdf: .
+@prefix rdfs: .
+@prefix xsd: .
+
+```
+
+```
+
+bdc:airCatalog
+ rdf:type bdc:Catalogue ;
+ dc:description "data about air quality" ;
+ dc:language "en_US"^^dct:RFC5646 ;
+ dc:title "Air Quality" ;
+ bdc:dataQuality bdc:quality ;
+ bdc:dataResource bdc:ozoneSet ;
+ bdc:dataResource bdc:pmService ;
+ bdc:dataResource bdc:pmSet ;
+ bdc:record bdc:record1 ;
+ bdc:responsibleParty bdc:subject ;
+ bdc:sourceDomain bdc:srcDomain ;
+ bdc:usageDomain bdc:useDomain ;
+ owl:versionInfo "1.0.0" ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+bdc:distOzone
+ rdf:type bdc:Distribution ;
+ dc:format "csv" ;
+ bdc:accessInformation "http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.csv"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+ bdc:dataRight bdc:right ;
+ bdc:dataType bdc:Structured ;
+ bdc:sampleData "http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.sample.csv"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+ dcat:byteSize "12000000"^^xsd:unsignedLong ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+bdc:ozoneSet
+ rdf:type bdc:Dataset ;
+ dc:description "Data about Ozone density" ;
+ dc:keyword "pollution" ;
+ dc:title "Ozone density" ;
+ bdc:contactPoint bdc:subject ;
+ bdc:distribution bdc:distOzone ;
+ bdc:temporalCoverage "2010.1.1~2017.12.31" ;
+ bdc:updateFrequency "daily" ;
+.
+
+```
+
+```
+
+bdc:pmService
+ rdf:type bdc:DataService ;
+ dc:description "data service providing PM data " ;
+ dc:title "Particular Matter Data Service" ;
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ bdc:endpointDescription "http://www.weather.go.kr/pm"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+.
+ bdc:pmSet
+ rdf:type bdc:Dataset ;
+ dc:description "Particular Matter data" ;
+ dc:keyword "pollution" ;
+ dc:title "Particular Matter" ;
+ bdc:contactPoint bdc:subject ;
+ bdc:temporalCoverage "2013.1.1 ~ 2017.12.31" ;
+ bdc:updateFrequency "weekly" ;
+.
+ bdc:right
+ rdf:type bdc:DataRight ;
+ bdc:license "https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+ bdc:rightsStatement "Public access" ;
+.
+ bdc:record1
+ rdf:type bdc:Record ;
+ bdc:issuedDate "2018-01-01"^^dt:W3CDTF ;
+ bdc:modifiedDate "2018-03-01"^^dt:W3CDTF ;
+.
+ bdc:myContact
+ rdf:type bdc:ContactType ;
+ bdc:address "Seoul" ;
+ bdc:hoursOfServices "09:00~18:00" ;
+ bdc:onlineResource "https://www.kma.go.kr"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+ bdc:phoneNumber "012-123-3456" ;
+.
+ bdc:subject
+ rdf:type bdc:ResponsibleParty ;
+ bdc:contact bdc:myContact ;
+ bdc:function "Manager" ;
+ bdc:individualName "John" ;
+ bdc:organizationName "Korea Meteorological Administration" ;
+ bdc:positionName "Manager" ;
+.
+ bdc:srcDomain
+ rdf:type bdc:Domain ;
+ dc:title "Weather" ;
+ bdc:taxonomy bdc:weatherTaxonomy ;
+.
+ bdc:useDomain
+ rdf:type bdc:Domain ;
+ dc:title "Air pollution" ;
+ bdc:taxonomy bdc:pollutionTaxonomy ;
+.
+ bdc:quality
+ rdf:type bdc:DataQuality ;
+ bdc:qualityRequirements "under 0.1% missing fields" ;
+ bdc:qualityResult "passed" ;
+ bdc:unitOfMeasure "percent" ;
+.
+ bdc:pollutionTaxonomy
+ rdf:type bdc:TaxonomyType ;
+ bdc:taxonomyDomain "http://dbpedia.org/resource/Air_pollution"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+ bdc:taxonomyValue "Pollution" ;
+.
+ bdc:weatherTaxonomy
+ rdf:type bdc:TaxonomyType ;
+ bdc:taxonomyDomain "https://dbpedia.org/page/Weather_spotting"^^xsd:anyURI ;
+
+```
+
+bdc:taxonomyValue "Weather" ;
+
+### II.4 JSON-LD instance
+
+This clause provides an example of a metadata instance based on the JSON-LD is described in Appendix I.3.
+
+```
+{
+ "@context": {
+ "bdc": "http://www.itu.int/xml-namespace/itu-t/Y.3603/bigdatacatalogue#",
+ "dc": "http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/",
+ "dcat": "http://www.w3.org/ns/dcat#",
+ "dct": "http://purl.org/dc/terms/",
+ "owl": "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#",
+ "rdf": "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#",
+ "rdfs": "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#",
+ "xsd": "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
+ },
+ "@graph": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:airCatalog",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Catalogue"
+ },
+ "dc:description": "data about air quality",
+ "dc:language": {
+ "@value": "en_US",
+ "@type": "dct:RFC5646"
+ },
+ "dc:title": "Air Quality",
+ "bdc:dataQuality": {
+ "@id": "bdc:quality"
+ },
+ "bdc:dataResource": [
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:ozonSet"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:pmService"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:pmSet"
+ }
+ ],
+ "bdc:record": {
+ "@id": "bdc:record1"
+ },
+ "bdc:responsibleParty": {
+ "@id": "bdc:subject"
+ },
+ "bdc:sourceDomain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:srcDomain"
+ },
+ "bdc:usageDomain": {
+ "@id": "bdc:useDomain"
+ },
+ "owl:versionInfo": "1.0.0"
+ },
+ {
+ "@id": "bdc:distOzone",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Distribution"
+},
+"dc:format": "csv",
+"bdc:accessInformation": {
+ "@value": "http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.csv",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+},
+"bdc:dataRight": {
+ "@id": "bdc:right"
+},
+"bdc:dataType": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Structured"
+},
+"bdc:sampleData": {
+ "@value": "http://www.weather.go.kr/ozone.sample.csv",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+},
+"dc:byteSize": {
+ "@value": "12000000",
+ "@type": "xsd:unsignedLong"
+}
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:ozoneSet",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "dc:description": "Data about Ozone density",
+ "dc:keyword": "pollution",
+ "dc:title": "Ozone density",
+ "bdc:contactPoint": {
+ "@id": "bdc:subject"
+ },
+ "bdc:distribution": {
+ "@id": "bdc:distOzone"
+ },
+ "bdc:temporalCoverage": "2010.1.1~2017.12.31",
+ "bdc:updateFrequency": "daily"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:pmService",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataService"
+ },
+ "dc:description": "data service providing PM data ",
+ "dc:title": "Particular Matter Data Service",
+ "bdc:endpointDescription": {
+ "@value": "http://www.weather.go.kr/pm",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:pmSet",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Dataset"
+ },
+ "dc:description": "Particular Matter data",
+ "dc:keyword": "pollution",
+ "dc:title": "Particular Matter",
+
+```
+
+```
+
+"bdc:contactPoint": {
+ "@id": "bdc:subject"
+},
+"bdc:temporalCoverage": "2013.1.1 ~ 2017.12.31",
+"bdc:updateFrequency": "weekly"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:right",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataRight"
+ },
+ "bdc:license": {
+ "@value": "https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+ },
+ "bdc:rightsStatement": "Public access"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:record1",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Record"
+ },
+ "bdc:issuedDate": {
+ "@value": "2018-01-01",
+ "@type": "dct:W3CDTF"
+ },
+ "bdc:modifiedDate": {
+ "@value": "2018-03-01",
+ "@type": "dct:W3CDTF"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:myContact",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ContactType"
+ },
+ "bdc:address": "Seoul",
+ "bdc:hoursOfServices": "09:00~18:00",
+ "bdc:onlineResource": {
+ "@value": "https://www.kma.go.kr",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+ },
+ "bdc:phoneNumber": "012-123-3456"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:subject",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:ResponsibleParty"
+ },
+ "bdc:contact": {
+ "@id": "bdc:myContact"
+ },
+ "bdc:function": "Manager",
+ "bdc:individualName": "John",
+ "bdc:organizationName": "Korea Meteorological Administration",
+ "bdc:positionName": "Manager"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:srcDomain",
+ "rdf:type": {
+
+```
+
+```
+
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+ },
+ "dc:title": "Weather",
+ "bdc:taxonomy": {
+ "@id": "bdc:weatherTaxonomy"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:useDomain",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:Domain"
+ },
+ "dc:title": "Air pollution",
+ "bdc:taxonomy": {
+ "@id": "bdc:pollutionTaxonomy"
+ }
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:quality",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:DataQuality"
+ },
+ "bdc:qualityRequirements": "under 0.1% missing fields",
+ "bdc:qualityResult": "passed",
+ "bdc:unitOfMeasure": "percent"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:pollutionTaxonomy",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType"
+ },
+ "bdc:taxonomyDomain": {
+ "@value": "http://dbpedia.org/resource/Air_pollution",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+ },
+ "bdc:taxonomyValue": "Pollution"
+},
+{
+ "@id": "bdc:weatherTaxonomy",
+ "rdf:type": {
+ "@id": "bdc:TaxonomyType"
+ },
+ "bdc:taxonomyDomain": {
+ "@value": "https://dbpedia.org/page/Weather_spotting",
+ "@type": "xsd:anyURI"
+ },
+ "bdc:taxonomyValue": "Weather"
+}
+]
+}
+
+```
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H.752] Recommendation ITU-T H.752 (2015), *Multimedia content provisioning interface for IPTV services*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5646] IETF RFC 5646 (2009), *Tags for Identifying Languages*.
+- [b-NHIS] Korean National Health Insurance Service.
+<Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3605
+
+(09/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Big Data
+
+# --- Big data – Reference architecture
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3605
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### **BIG DATA**
+
+**Y.3600–Y.3799**
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3605
+
+# Big data – Reference architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3605 defines a big data reference architecture (BDRA) that can serve as a fundamental reference point for big data standardization, and which provides an overall framework for the basic concepts and principles of big data. The Recommendation provides a description of reference architecture concepts, two distinct viewpoints including user view and functional view, and also cross cutting aspects. Furthermore, the Recommendation addresses layering framework, functional components within framework and detailed functional descriptions for big data.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3605 | 2020-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14406 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Big data, cross cutting, functional component, functional view, reference architecture, user view.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Reference architecture concepts ..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 BDRA architectural views..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Relationship between the user view and the functional view..... | 4 |
+| 7 User view ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Functional view ..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 Layering framework for big data..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Functional components..... | 8 |
+| 9 Cross cutting aspects ..... | 14 |
+| 9.1 Data redundancy..... | 14 |
+| 9.2 Performance..... | 14 |
+| 9.3 Data quality ..... | 15 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3605
+
+## Big data – Reference architecture
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the big data reference architecture (BDRA). The Recommendation provides a description of reference architecture concepts, user view, functional view and cross cutting aspects.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3502] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502 (2014) | ISO/IEC 17789:2014, *Cloud computing – reference architecture*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3519] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3519 (2018), *Cloud computing – functional architecture of big data as a service*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3600] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3600 (2015), *Big data – cloud computing based requirements and capabilities*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3601] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3601 (2018), *Big data – framework and requirements for data exchange*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3603] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3603 (2019), *Big data – requirements and conceptual model of metadata for data catalogue*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3604] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3604 (2020), *Big data – overview and requirements for data preservation*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 activity** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A specified pursuit or set of tasks.
+
+**3.1.2 big data** [ITU-T Y.3600]: A paradigm for enabling the collection, storage, management, analysis and visualization, potentially under real-time constraints, of extensive datasets with heterogeneous characteristics.
+
+NOTE – Examples of datasets characteristics include high-volume, high-velocity, high-variety etc.
+
+**3.1.3 big data provenance** [b-ITU-T Y.3602]: Information that records the historical path of data according to the data lifecycle operations in a big data ecosystem.
+
+NOTE 1 – Data lifecycle operations include data generation, transmission, storage, use, and deletion.
+
+NOTE 2 – The provenance information provides the details about data source, such as a person responsible for the provision of data, functions applied to data, and information about the computing environment for data processing (e.g., operating system, description of the hardware, locale settings, and time zone).
+
+**3.1.4 data catalogue** [ITU-T Y.3601]: A listing of all metadata which a data broker makes available.
+
+**3.1.5 functional component** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A functional building block needed to engage in an activity backed by an implementation.
+
+**3.1.6 metadata** [b-ITU-T H.752]: Structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of information-bearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment and management of the described entities.
+
+**3.1.7 party** [b-ITU-T Y.3500]: Natural person or legal person, whether or not incorporated, or a group of either.
+
+**3.1.8 personally identifiable information** [b-ITU-T X.1361]: Any information that a) can be used to identify the PII principal to whom such information relates, or b) is or might be directly or indirectly linked to a PII principal.
+
+NOTE – To determine whether a PII principal is identifiable, account should be taken of all the means which can reasonably be used by the privacy stakeholder holding the data, or by any other party, to identify that natural person.
+
+**3.1.9 provenance** [b-ITU-T X.1255]: Information pertaining to any source of information including the party or parties involved in generating it, introducing it and/or vouching for it.
+
+**3.1.10 reference architecture** [b-ISO/IEC 26550]: Core architecture that captures the high-level design of a software and systems product line including the architectural structure and texture (e.g., common rules and constraints) that constrains all member products within a software and systems product line.
+
+NOTE – Application architectures of the member products included in the product line reuse (possibly with modifications) the common parts and bind variable parts of the domain architecture. Application architectures of the member products may (but do not need to) provide variability.
+
+**3.1.11 role** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A set of activities that serves a common purpose.
+
+**3.1.12 sub-role** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A subset of the activities of a given role.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------|
+| BDC | Big Data Service Customer |
+| BDRA | Big Data Reference Architecture |
+| BDSP | Big Data Service Provider |
+| ETL | Extract, Transform, Load |
+| HTML | Hypertext Markup Language |
+| NoSQL | Not Only SQL |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| XML | Extensible Markup Language |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+The following conventions apply:
+
+Diagrams are used throughout this Recommendation to help illustrate the big data reference architecture (BDRA). Figure 5-1 provides the conventions used regarding the content of the diagrams.
+
+NOTE – In Figure 5-1, "Aspect" is to be understood as referring to "Cross-cutting aspect".
+
+
+
+Y.3605(20)\_F5-1
+
+Figure 5-1: Legend to the diagrams used throughout this Recommendation. The diagram shows five symbols: 'Party' in an oval, 'Role' in a rectangle, 'Sub-role' in a hexagon, 'Activity' in a shaded oval, and 'Aspect' in a shaded diamond. A 'Functional component' is shown in a rectangle. The label 'Y.3605(20)\_F5-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 5-1 – Legend to the diagrams used throughout this Recommendation [ITU-T Y.3502]**
+
+## 6 Reference architecture concepts
+
+This clause provides an overview of the architectural concepts that are used in this Recommendation.
+
+## 6.1 BDRA architectural views
+
+Big data systems can be described using a viewpoint approach.
+
+Four distinct viewpoints are used in the BDRA (see Figure 6-1):
+
+- user view;
+- functional view;
+- implementation view; and
+- deployment view.
+
+
+
+Y.3605(20)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: Transformations between architectural views. The diagram shows four yellow rounded rectangles: 'User view' (top left), 'Functional view' (top right), 'Implementation view' (bottom right), and 'Deployment view' (bottom left). Arrows indicate transformations: a horizontal arrow from User view to Functional view, a vertical arrow from Functional view to Implementation view, and a horizontal arrow from Implementation view to Deployment view. The label 'Y.3605(20)\_F6-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Transformations between architectural views [ITU-T Y.3502]**
+
+Table 6-1 provides a description of each of these views.
+
+**Table 6-1 – BDRA views**
+
+| BDRA view | Description of the BDRA view | Scope |
+|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|
+| User view | The ecosystem, the parties, the roles, the sub-roles and the big data activities | Within scope |
+| Functional view | The functions necessary for the support of big data activities | Within scope |
+| Implementation view | The functions necessary for the implementation of a big data service within service parts and/or infrastructure parts | Out of scope |
+| Deployment view | How the functions of a big data service are technically implemented within already existing infrastructure elements or within new elements to be introduced in this infrastructure | Out of scope |
+
+NOTE – Details of the user view is defined in clause 7. Clause 8 addresses details of the functional view. The implementation and deployment views are related to technology and vendor-specific big data implementations and actual deployments, and are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+Figure 6-2 shows the transition from the user view to the functional view.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the transition from the User view to the Functional view. In the User view, a 'Party' (oval) is associated with a 'Role' (rectangle). The 'Role' is further decomposed into 'Sub-role' (hexagons), which are associated with 'Activity' (ovals). A dashed diamond labeled 'Aspect' is shown, indicating cross-cutting concerns that span across roles, sub-roles, and activities. In the Functional view, these activities are mapped to 'Functional components' (rectangles) organized into 'Layers'. A 'Multi-layer functions' box encompasses these layers. A blue arrow indicates the transition from the User view to the Functional view.
+
+Diagram illustrating the transition from the User view to the Functional view. The User view (left) shows a hierarchy: Party (oval) points to Role (rectangle), which points to Sub-role (hexagon), which points to Activity (oval). A dashed diamond labeled 'Aspect' is connected to Role, Sub-role, and Activity. The Functional view (right) shows a stack of three 'Functional component' rectangles, each labeled 'Layer'. A 'Multi-layer functions' box contains these layers. A blue arrow points from the User view to the Functional view.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Transition from user view to functional view [ITU-T Y.3502]**
+
+Cross-cutting aspects are behaviours or capabilities which need to be coordinated across roles and implemented consistently in a big data system. Cross-cutting aspects can be shared and can impact multiple roles, activities and functional components. Cross-cutting aspects apply to multiple individual roles or functional components. An example of a cross-cutting aspect is data quality. A description of the cross-cutting aspects is provided in clause 9.
+
+## 6.2 Relationship between the user view and the functional view
+
+Figure 6-3 illustrates how the user view provides the set of activities that are represented within the functional view (and realized using the technologies of the implementation view).
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the transition from a User view to a Functional view. The User view on the left shows a 'Role' box connected to two 'Activity' ovals. The Functional view on the right is divided into two main sections. The top section, labeled 'Functional view', contains three stacked boxes, each labeled 'Layer' and containing a 'Functional component' box. The bottom section, labeled 'Multi-layer functions', contains a single 'Functional component' box. Arrows show the mapping: the 'Role' connects to both 'Activities'; the top 'Activity' connects to the top 'Layer' and the 'Multi-layer functions' component; the bottom 'Activity' connects to the middle and bottom 'Layers' and the 'Multi-layer functions' component. A small reference code 'Y.3605(20)\_F6-3' is at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – From user view to functional view [ITU-T Y.3502]**
+
+This Recommendation specifies the roles and activities view in clause 7 and the functional view, including architectural functional components in clause 8. This Recommendation describes in this clause the logical relationships of the roles and cloud computing activities to the functional components.
+
+Standards can be relevant to some of these relationships. Standards associated with a relationship can be used to (i) specify degrees of information flow or other types of interoperability; and/or (ii) ensure specified degrees of quality (e.g., security or service level).
+
+Logical relationships defined in these reference architecture concepts are a significant part of specifying the BDRA and its behaviour. The relationship describes matters such as the required information flows between the functional components in the BDRA.
+
+NOTE – Refer to more detailed common view of roles, activities and functional components in [ITU-T Y.3502]
+
+# 7 User view
+
+This clause describes an environment, called big data ecosystem, with roles and sub-roles. It also defines necessary activities for roles providing and consuming big data services as well as relationships between roles.
+
+The big data ecosystem includes the following roles:
+
+- data provider;
+- big data service provider;
+- big data service customer.
+
+The big data ecosystem is shown in Figure 7-1.
+
+This ecosystem is defined in [ITU-T Y.3601], which is extended from the big data ecosystem defined in [ITU-T Y.3600].
+
+![Figure 7-1: User view of big data [ITU-T Y.3601]. The diagram shows three main roles: Data provider, Big data service provider, and Big data service customer. Each role contains specific activities, some of which are extended to support big data exchange.](d4af765160d04ecef538e5066006dc77_img.jpg)
+
+**Data provider**
+
+- Data broker** (Role)
+ - register data (Activity)
+ - find data source (Activity)
+ - provide service catalogue (Activity)
+ - categorize data (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+ - match data product (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+- Data supplier** (Role)
+ - generate data (Activity)
+ - create metadata (Activity)
+ - publish metadata (Activity)
+ - deliver data (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+
+**Big data service provider**
+
+- search data source (Activity)
+- collect data (Activity)
+- store data (Activity)
+- integrate data (Activity)
+- provide tools for data analysis and visualization (Activity)
+- manage data (Activity)
+- offer auxiliary information (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+- deliver data and service's output (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+
+**Big data service customer**
+
+- request big data service (Activity)
+- use big data services (Activity)
+- feed-back on user experience (Activity - Extended to support big data exchange)
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- Role: Rectangle with rounded corners
+- Sub-role: Hexagon with rounded corners
+- Activity: Oval
+- Activity - Extended to support big data exchange: Shaded oval
+- Activity - Existing in ITU-T Y.3600: Unshaded oval
+
+Y.3605(20)\_F7-1
+
+Figure 7-1: User view of big data [ITU-T Y.3601]. The diagram shows three main roles: Data provider, Big data service provider, and Big data service customer. Each role contains specific activities, some of which are extended to support big data exchange.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – User view of big data [ITU-T Y.3601]**
+
+Details of each sub-roles and activities shown in Figure 7-1 are provided in clause 6.2 of [ITU-T Y.3600] and clause 7.2 of [ITU-T Y.3601].
+
+# 8 Functional view
+
+## 8.1 Layering framework for big data
+
+The layering framework used in the big data reference architecture has four layers, plus a set of functions which span across the layers. The four layers are:
+
+- Access layer;
+- Application layer;
+- Processing layer;
+- Data source layer.
+
+The functions which span the layers are called the multi-layer functions.
+
+The layering framework is shown in Figure 8-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1 – Big data layering framework diagram. The diagram shows a stack of four layers on the left: Access layer (white), Application layer (orange), Processing layer (light blue), and Data source layer (dark blue). To the right is a large green box labeled 'Multi-layer functions' which contains three vertical columns: 'Analysis supporting systems', 'Data life-cycle management', and 'Security'. A small reference code 'Y.3605(20)\_F8-1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Big data layering framework**
+
+Each of the layers in the framework is described in the following sub-clauses.
+
+#### **8.1.1 Access layer**
+
+The access layer provides a common interface for access to the capabilities available in the other layers of the reference architecture.
+
+The access layer is responsible for authenticating the request through the use of user credentials and for validating the authorization of the user to use particular capabilities. The access layer is also responsible for handling encryption and checking for request integrity, where required.
+
+The access layer passes on validated requests to the components in the other layers of the reference architecture. This layer handles big data service customer's service consumption requests to access big data services and resources provided by the big data service provider.
+
+#### **8.1.2 Application layer**
+
+The application layer is responsible for finding insights from big data and reporting the insights using various visualization tools. This layer contains the implementation for performing big data analysis.
+
+#### **8.1.3 Processing layer**
+
+The processing layer prepares data for further processing such as data analysis. This layer provides data cleaning, data aggregation, data transformation, data extraction and data loading.
+
+#### **8.1.4 Data source layer**
+
+The data source layer is where data are collected and stored. This layer supports registration and storage methods that are appropriate for the type of data collected. It also contains and supports a variety of storage needs for data preparation, data processing and data analysis.
+
+#### **8.1.5 Multi-layer functions**
+
+The multi-layer functions include a series of functional components that interact with functional components of the above four other layers to provide supporting capabilities including and not limited to:
+
+- analysis supporting systems capabilities (data catalogue, workflow management, monitoring and reporting);
+
+- data life-cycle management capabilities (data provenance management, data preservation management, data licence management);
+- security capabilities (privacy management, authentication management, authorization management).
+
+## 8.2 Functional components
+
+This clause describes the big data reference architecture in terms of the common set of big data functional components. Figure 8-2 presents a high-level overview of the big data reference architecture functional components organized by means of the layering framework.
+
+
+
+Y.3605(20)\_F8-2
+
+Figure 8-2: Big data functional components. The diagram shows a layered architecture on the left and a multi-layer functions block on the right. The layers on the left are: Access layer (Access control), Application layer (Analysis, Visualization), Processing layer (Aggregation, Cleaning, Extract, transform and load), and Data source layer (Data collection, Data storage). The Multi-layer functions block on the right is divided into three columns: Analysis supporting systems (Data catalogue, Workflow management, Monitoring and reporting), Data life-cycle management (Data provenance management, Data licence management, Data preservation management), and Security (Privacy management, Authorization management, Authentication management).
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Big data functional components**
+
+#### 8.2.1 Access layer functional components
+
+##### 8.2.1.1 Access control
+
+The access control functional component limits users to the use of particular big data services. Principally, access control involves the authentication of a user through the presentation and validation of credentials, followed by the authorization of this authenticated user to use specific big data services.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- accepting big data service customer's service consumption requests to access big data services and resources of the big data service provider;
+- authenticating the request through the use of user credentials and for validating the authorization of the user to use particular capabilities;
+- passing validated requests to the components in the other layers of the reference architecture.
+
+Access control restricts users to use certain services. In principle, access control includes authenticating users through the presentation and validation of credentials and authorizing users who are authorized to use certain services.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Application layer functional components**
+
+##### **8.2.2.1 Analysis**
+
+The analysis functional component is responsible for extracting useful information or valuable insights from big data. This functional component provides support for multiple data analysis methods. Besides, this functional component also supports customization of specific analysis methods.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- registration of data analysis methods which are used for data analysis. Typical data analysis methods are classification analysis, clustering analysis, association analysis, regression analysis, customized analysis;
+
+NOTE 1 – Classification analysis supports decision tree, support vector machine, neural networks and other algorithms, to identify to which set of categories data belongs.
+
+NOTE 2 – Clustering analysis supports k – means, k – centre point, overlapping clustering, fuzzy clustering, etc., to classify data into different classes or clusters according to their similarity.
+
+NOTE 3 – Association analysis supports some specific algorithms to find associations between stored data. Examples of association algorithms include Apriori algorithm and Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm. Apriori algorithm and Frequent Pattern Growth algorithm are two classical association analysis algorithms which can mine the associations through the frequency of data appearing together in the dataset.
+
+NOTE 4 – Regression analysis supports linear regression and logistic regression and other algorithms, to estimate the relationships among data.
+
+NOTE 5 – Customization of analysis supports the customization of detail data analysis method according to the customer's specific requirements.
+
+- setting up procedures which enable the analysis using the registered analysis methods in the analysis function registry;
+- executing analysis process according to the procedures.
+
+NOTE 6 – This functional component is same as the analysis functional component in [ITU-T Y.3519].
+
+##### **8.2.2.2 Visualization**
+
+The visualization functional component makes data more intuitive and easier to understand for users by using various data visualization tools.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- presenting data with multiple styles such as statistical graphics, forms, diagrams, charts and reports;
+- reporting tools that can be configured by user.
+
+NOTE – This functional component is same as the analysis functional component in [ITU-T Y.3519].
+
+#### **8.2.3 Processing layer functional components**
+
+The processing layer functional components include:
+
+- Aggregation functional component (see clause 8.2.3.1);
+- Cleaning functional component (see clause 8.2.3.2);
+- Extract, transform and load functional component (see clause 8.2.3.3).
+
+##### **8.2.3.1 Aggregation**
+
+The aggregation functional component provides a set of capabilities for gathering raw data and expressing in a summary form. Data aggregation enables the gathering of data through various
+
+criteria, such as average, peak, maximum, sum and count. There are two types of data aggregation, namely time aggregation and spatial aggregation.
+
+NOTE 1 – Time aggregation: all data points for a single resource over a specified time period.
+
+NOTE 2 – Spatial aggregation: all data points for a group of resources over a specified time period.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- schema mappings which define how data are converted between the schema of an external data source and the integration session schema;
+- support of various aggregation method such as time aggregation and spatial aggregation.
+
+##### **8.2.3.2 Cleaning**
+
+The cleaning functional component provides a set of capabilities for filtering data, smoothing noise data, and identifying and removing outliers to improve data quality. Data collected from various sources may affect the accuracy of the analysis results. The cleaning functional component provides better data quality, which helps organizations to make their data available for analysis phase.
+
+NOTE 1 – Outlier refers to abnormal data in the dataset. If it is not trimmed out, data quality may be damaged.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- data filtering, which is the process of selecting a small portion of data set and using that subset for viewing or analysis;
+- data cleansing, which is the process of detecting and modifying (or removing) corrupted or inaccurate data in a dataset. Data cleansing also refers to identifying incomplete or unrelated parts of data and then replacing, modifying or deleting the data;
+- data smoothing, which is the process of removing noise from a data set. When datasets are utilized, data can be manipulated to eliminate or reduce volatile or other types of noise;
+- identifying and removing outliers, which is the process to discover outliers and deleting them.
+
+NOTE 2 – Outliers can be discovered by detection functions such as model-base method or graphical method.
+
+##### **8.2.3.3 Extract, transform and load**
+
+The extract, transform and load (ETL) functional component provides procedures for pulling data out of one or more datasets and placing them in a target system. During the ETL process, data are extracted from the source dataset and converted to a format that can be analysed and loaded in another storage system.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- extraction, which is the process of retrieving the representative features from a large number of datasets for further processing such as data analysis;
+- transformation, which is the process of converting the format of the extracted data into the required form so that it can be placed in another dataset;
+- loading, which is the process of writing the data into the target dataset.
+
+#### **8.2.4 Data source layer functional components**
+
+The data source layer functional components include:
+
+- Data collection functional component (see clause 8.2.4.1);
+- Data storage functional component (see clause 8.2.4.2).
+
+##### 8.2.4.1 Data collection
+
+The data collection functional component performs data collection based on various data collection configurations.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- setting up various data collection configurations, such as data amount, traffic volume, collection period, collection method;
+NOTE 1 – Examples of collection methods include crawling, rich site summary collecting, log /sensor collecting.
+NOTE 2 – Rich site summary is used to aggregate syndicated web content, such as online newspapers, blogs, podcasts and video blogs in one location.
+NOTE 3 – Crawling is used to gather data from the web, especially the web indexing.
+NOTE 4 – Log collecting is used to collect data from log files generated by web servers.
+- gathering data based on established configurations of data collection. The collected data is stored in an appropriate storage according to the data type.
+NOTE 5 – This functional component is same as the data collection functional component in [ITU-T Y.3519]
+
+##### 8.2.4.2 Data storage
+
+The data storage functional component provides a set of capabilities for storing data. This functional component also provides different types storage for different data types and different database types while storing data.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- provisioning storage considering the various types of data storage, database, and different types of data such as structured data, unstructured data, and semi-structured data
+NOTE 1 – Data storage type includes block storage, file storage and object storage.
+NOTE 2 – Database includes relational database, not only SQL (NoSQL) database.
+NOTE 3 – Unstructured data can include mass data, such as log files, video, audio data, email, Web pages, data generated on social-media sites. Semi-structured data can include data stored in extensible markup language (XML), hypertext markup language (HTML) and other format documents. Structured data can include record data persistent in databases (see [ITU-T Y.3600]).
+- allocating the appropriate storage when a storage usage request comes in;
+- releasing storage when the storage usage is terminated;
+NOTE 4 – Data storage functional component interworks with the data collection functional component (see clause 8.2.4.1) to identify the characteristics of the data such as data type, data volume and so on.
+- storing data on various storage. It supports storage mirroring and provides data fragmentation to distribute and store data on distributed storage systems. This provides the ability to update data;
+NOTE 5 – Distributed storage system stores data on multiple independent storages. It adopts the scalable system structure, and uses multiple storage servers which are used to share the storage load.
+NOTE 6 – Storage mirroring is the replication of logical storage volumes onto separate physical disks.
+- data indexing which are stored together with data to improve the speed of data retrieval operation;
+- removing duplicated and redundant data while storing data.
+NOTE 7 – This functional component is same as the data storage functional component in [ITU-T Y.3519] expect last function "removing duplicated and redundant data while storing data".
+
+#### **8.2.5 Multi-layer functions**
+
+##### **8.2.5.1 Analysis supporting system**
+
+###### **8.2.5.1.1 Data catalogue**
+
+The data catalogue functional component provides a listing of all metadata which a data broker makes available [ITU-T Y.3601]. The data catalogue functional component is responsible for interfaces for data searching, metadata mapping and tools for generating data catalogue. The data catalogue acts as an inventory of available data, allowing the big data service customer (BDC) to search and find data. The BDC is able to view the metadata of all available data sets, and to select data sets.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- data searching interfaces;
+- metadata mapping;
+- tools for generating data catalogue.
+
+NOTE 1 – The tools have ability to generate a data catalogue using information about the creation of the data sets and informal description of the data sets.
+
+NOTE 2 – There are requirements and conceptual models of the data catalogue in [ITU-T Y.3603].
+
+###### **8.2.5.1.2 Workflow management**
+
+The workflow management functional component is responsible for defining, creating and managing workflow execution. Workflow is all or part of a process in which data, information or tasks are passed from one part to another part for action in accordance with a set of procedural rules. In data processes, workflows are widely used across the data collection, data storage and analysis processes. In the case of data analysis, workflow can be designed in conjunction with a series of tasks for loading, refining, consolidating and analysing data.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- defining and creating workflow;
+- managing the execution of workflow.
+
+###### **8.2.5.1.3 Monitoring and reporting**
+
+The monitoring and reporting functional component is responsible for monitoring the big data services with service implementations to ensure that they meet agreed service level agreement (SLA) targets, including the reporting and resolution of problems with those services.
+
+The monitoring and reporting functional component provides:
+
+- monitoring the use of big data services by the BDC such as the service access and service implementation;
+- reporting results or problems derived from data collection, processing, analysis and visualization;
+- reporting results of the utilization of each data.
+
+##### **8.2.5.2 Data life-cycle management**
+
+###### **8.2.5.2.1 Data provenance management**
+
+The data provenance management functional component is responsible for managing provenance lifecycle and policy related to data provenance. It supports analysis supporting (control workflow, data analysis automation, etc.) and monitoring for change of computational environments.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- recording provenance information when the state of data changes, that is, when it is stored, when it is changed, or when it is deleted;
+- keeping, combining and deleting provenance information when data is deleted from storage;
+- aggregating provenance information according to aggregate big data.
+
+###### **8.2.5.2.2 Data licence management**
+
+The data licence management functional component is responsible for notifying copyright, and managing licence information of data. Consideration and management of data licences are required during processing data or generating data.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- setting forth in the data licence agreement which are generated by the data creator or data seller;
+- provision of the data licence agreement defining the licensed data including usage manner and frequency limits with how the data is provided and updated.
+
+NOTE – Terms defined in data licence agreement may include the use of encryption and a secure delivery mechanism, designated communications technology platforms, and specific hardware or software configuration requirements.
+
+###### **8.2.5.2.3 Data preservation management**
+
+The data preservation management functional component is responsible for managing operation for big data preservation such as selecting and preparing the data to be preserved, preserving and retrieving the preserved data under policy rules which should be referenced and obeyed. Big data preservation is a combination of policies, strategies and actions developed by a big data service provider (BDSP) to ensure that digital information of continuing value remains accessible and usable within a big data ecosystem. Refer to [ITU-T Y.3604].
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- managing data preservation operation in accordance with various preservation policy rules;
+NOTE 1 – Examples of preservation policy rules are setting preservation selection rules, preservation period rules and preservation storage rules.
+NOTE 2 – The preservation storage rules specify which storage tier these data should be stored in and in which conditions they should be migrated to other storage tiers.
+NOTE 3 – The preservation period rules specify how long the data should be preserved in big data service provider (BDSP).
+- verifying privileges of the preserved data requestor to access the preserved data;
+- setting preservation selection rules, preservation period rules and preservation storage rules.
+
+##### **8.2.5.3 Security**
+
+###### **8.2.5.3.1 Privacy management**
+
+The privacy management functional component provides a set of capabilities for managing personal information in data. This functional component aims to avoid data being collected, stored by or disclosed to whom it may not be appropriate.
+
+This functional component provides:
+
+- methods to protect the privacy of confidential data and sensitive data. For example, this function supports the data desensitization to protect the sensitive data;
+NOTE 1 – Confidential data refers to provide for protection of data from unauthorized disclosure (see [b-ITU-T X.509]).
+
+NOTE 2 – Sensitive data refers to personally identifiable information or other sensitive information which is collected, stored, used and finally destroyed or deleted.
+
+- managing personally identifiable information (PII) to check whether a data instance contains PII when recording a provenance unit.
+
+NOTE 3 – This functional component is based on the privacy management functional component in [ITU-T Y.3519] and [b-ITU-T Y.3602].
+
+###### **8.2.5.3.2 Authentication management**
+
+The authentication management functional component provides the capabilities to manage identification so that only authenticated users shall access specific capabilities or data.
+
+###### **8.2.5.3.3 Authorization management**
+
+The authorization management functional component provides capabilities for controlling and enforcing permissions that allow users to access specific capabilities or data.
+
+## **9 Cross cutting aspects**
+
+Cross-cutting aspects can be shared and can impact multiple roles, activities and functional components, as described in [ITU-T Y.3600] and [ITU-T Y.3519].
+
+### **9.1 Data redundancy**
+
+Data redundancy refers to the repeated occurrence of the same data in the system. For example, in a relational database, data redundancy mainly refers to the repeated storage of the same data in the relational database, including the repetition of tables, attributes, tuples and attribute values. Necessary data redundancy can improve the anti-interference ability of data, thus preventing data loss and error. For example, redundantly encoding data by adding several bits based on the length of the original binary code, to prevent key data loss and errors. For more details, see clause 8.1 in [ITU-T Y.3519].
+
+On the other hand, data redundancy should be minimized to improve storage space utilization, but in some cases, data redundancy should also be increased appropriately. Data compression and de-duplication are two key technologies to reduce data redundancy. For more details, see clause 8.1 in [ITU-T Y.3519].
+
+### **9.2 Performance**
+
+Performance includes a set of non-functional facets relating to the operation of a big data service such as:
+
+- data usability: this means that the data user (BDSP or BDC) can access data with enough metadata to understand its meaning;
+- findability of data: this means that the data user (BDSP or BDC) can retrieve data with enough metadata according to different requirements;
+- availability of the big data service;
+- response time to complete big data service requests;
+- transaction rate at which big data service requests are executed;
+- latency for big data service requests;
+- data throughput rate (input and output);
+- number of concurrent big data service requests (scalability).
+
+- When running an application in a service, the same performance aspects apply to the behaviour of the application running in a big data service provider's environment.
+
+### **9.3 Data quality**
+
+Data quality can be assessed differently depending on the environment and target in which the data is used. Therefore, it is difficult to quantitatively evaluate data quality through some criteria. However, in some cases, high data quality means that the data used is accurate, usable and valued for its intended purpose.
+
+Data quality is defined through several dimensions such as accuracy, completeness, consistency, timeliness, validity and uniqueness. More specific dimensions are defined depending on data usage context.
+
+NOTE 1 – Accuracy refers to the degree to which data reflects a real object or event.
+
+NOTE 2 – Uniqueness refers to point out that there should be no data duplicates reported.
+
+NOTE 3 – Timeliness refers to the degree to which data represent reality from the required point in time.
+
+NOTE 4 – Validity refers that data are valid if it conforms to the syntax (format, type, range) of its definition.
+
+NOTE 5 – Completeness refers to whether all available data is present.
+
+NOTE 6 – Consistency refers to providing the same data for the same object even if the data is displayed in different reports.
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+Relevant security requirements of [b-ITU-T Y.2201], [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and applicable X, Y and M series of ITU-T Recommendations need to be taken into consideration, including access control, authentication, data confidentiality, data retention policy, network security, data integrity, availability and protection of personal information. Security guidelines for the analysis of big data security vulnerabilities and big data lifecycle management are provided in [b-ITU-T X.1751]. The security roles and responsibilities of components for big data services are identified, and the security framework for platforms, applications, analytics, interfaces and big data infrastructure are provided in [b-ITU-T X.1750].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H.752] Recommendation ITU-T H.752 (2015), *Multimedia content provisioning interface for IPTV services*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2019), *Information technology – open systems interconnection – the directory: public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1255] Recommendation ITU-T X.1255 (2013), *Framework for discovery of identity management information*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1361] Recommendation ITU-T X.1361 (2018), *Security framework for the internet of things based on the gateway model*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1750] Draft Recommendation ITU-T X.1750 (2020), *Guidelines on security of big data as a service for big data service providers*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1751] Draft Recommendation ITU-T X.1751 (2020), *Security guidelines on big data lifecycle management for telecommunication operators*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2011), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Cloud computing – overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3602] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3602 (2018), *Big data – functional requirements for data provenance*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 26550] ISO/IEC 26550:2015, *Software and systems engineering – reference model for product line engineering and management*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3660 (04/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Big Data
+
+---
+
+**Big data driven networking – Functional requirements and functional architecture of operation aspect for public network integrated non-public network service**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3660
+
+## Big data driven networking – Functional requirements and functional architecture of operation aspect for public network integrated non-public network service
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3660 specifies the functional requirements and the architecture of the operational aspect of public network integrated non-public (PNI-NPN) services based on big-data-driven networking (bDDN) to better enable bDDN, which is a type of future network framework that collects big data from networks and applications, and generates big data intelligence based on that data, to adapt to PNI-NPN service operations.
+
+Non-public networks (NPNs) are designed for non-public use. Distinguished from public networks that provide network services to the general public, NPNs are dedicated to verticals such as industrial factories and campuses, and provide coverage in specific geographic areas to maintain the customized services. PNI-NPN is deployed with the help of public network by network slices or sharing partial network functions. Usually, PNI-NPN has flexible networking topologies and provide customized services, which bring challenges in the aspect of service operation.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3660 | 2025-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16310 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Big data driven networking (bDDN), non-public network (NPN) service.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3802
+
+(12/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Quantum key distribution networks
+
+# --- Quantum key distribution networks – Functional architecture
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### **QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS**
+
+**Y.3800–Y.3999**
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802
+
+# Quantum key distribution networks – Functional architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802 defines a functional architecture model of quantum key distribution (QKD) networks. In order to realize this model, it specifies detailed functional elements and reference points, architectural configurations and basic operational procedures of QKD networks (QKDN).
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3802 | 2020-12-07 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14407 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architectural configuration, functional architecture, operational procedures, QKD quantum key distribution network.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| I.1 Session processing functionalities ..... | 21 |
+| I.2 Information exchange functionalities ..... | 21 |
+| Appendix II – Synchronization function and implementation in QKD network ..... | 22 |
+| Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802
+
+# Quantum key distribution networks – Functional architecture
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the functional architecture of quantum key distribution (QKD) networks.
+
+In particular, the scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Functional architecture model;
+- Functional elements and reference points;
+- Architectural configurations;
+- Basic operational procedures.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation addresses a functional architecture of QKD networks (QKDNs) based on the conceptual structure illustrated in [ITU-T Y.3800] and the functional requirements in [ITU-T Y.3801].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.3800] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800 (2019), Overview on networks supporting quantum key distribution . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3801] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3801 (2020), Functional requirements for quantum key distribution networks . |
+
+# 3 Terms and definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 key manager (KM)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) node to perform key management in the key management layer.
+
+**3.1.2 key manager link (KM link)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A communication link connecting key managers (KMs) to perform key management.
+
+**3.1.3 quantum key distribution (QKD)** [b-ETSI GR QKD 007]: Procedure or method for generating and distributing symmetrical cryptographic keys with information theoretical security based on quantum information theory.
+
+**3.1.4 quantum key distribution link** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A communication link between two quantum key distribution (QKD) modules to operate the QKD.
+
+NOTE – A QKD link consists of a quantum channel for the transmission of quantum signals, and a classical channel used to exchange information for synchronization and key distillation.
+
+**3.1.5 quantum key distribution module** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A set of hardware and software components that implements cryptographic functions and quantum optical processes, including quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, synchronization, distillation for key generation, and is contained within a defined cryptographic boundary.
+
+NOTE – A QKD module is connected to a QKD link, acting as an endpoint module in which a key is generated. These are two types of QKD modules, namely, the transmitters (QKD-Tx) and the receivers (QKD-Rx).
+
+**3.1.6 quantum key distribution network (QKDN)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A network comprised of two or more quantum key distribution (QKD) nodes connected through QKD links.
+
+NOTE – A QKDN allows sharing keys between the QKD nodes by key relay when they are not directly connected by a QKD link.
+
+**3.1.7 quantum key distribution network controller** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in the quantum key distribution (QKD) network control layer to control a QKD network.
+
+**3.1.8 quantum key distribution network manager** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) network management layer to monitor and manage a QKD network.
+
+**3.1.9 quantum key distribution node** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A node that contains one or more quantum key distribution (QKD) modules protected against intrusion and attacks by unauthorized parties.
+
+**3.1.10 user network** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A network in which cryptographic applications consume keys supplied by a quantum key distribution (QKD) network.
+
+NOTE – A QKD node can contain a key manager (KM).
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 key management agent (KMA)**: A functional element to manage keys generated by one or multiple quantum key distribution (QKD) modules in a QKD node (trusted node).
+
+NOTE – KMA acquires keys from one or multiple QKD modules, synchronizes, resizes, formats, and stores them. It also relays keys through key management agent (KMA) links.
+
+**3.2.2 key management agent link**: A communication link connecting key management agents (KMAs) to perform IT-secure key relay and communications for key management.
+
+**3.2.3 key supply agent (KSA)**: A functional element to supply keys to a cryptographic application, being located between a key management agent (KMA) and the cryptographic application.
+
+NOTE – Application interfaces for cryptographic applications are installed into the key supply agent (KSA). The KSA synchronizes keys, and verifies their integrity via a KSA link before supplying them to the cryptographic application.
+
+**3.2.4 key supply agent link**: A communication link connecting key supply agents (KSAs) to perform key synchronization and integrity verification.
+
+**3.2.5 quantum key distribution key**: A pair of symmetric random bit strings generated by a pair of quantum key distribution (QKD) modules, particularly referring to random bit strings before being resized and formatted in a key manager.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| FCAPS | Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security |
+| HMAC | Hash based message authentication code |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IPsec | Internet Protocol Security |
+| IT-secure | Information-Theoretically secure |
+| KM | Key Manager |
+| KMA | Key Management Agent |
+| KSA | Key Supply Agent |
+| MDI-QKD | Measurement Device Independent QKD |
+| NTP | Network Time Protocol |
+| OTP | One-Time Pad |
+| PTP | Precision Time Protocol |
+| QAN | QKD Access Network |
+| QBER | Quantum Bit Error Rate |
+| QBN | QKD Backbone Network |
+| QKD | Quantum Key Distribution |
+| QKDN | QKD Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| QRNG | Quantum noise Random Number Generator |
+| QKD-Rx | QKD Receiver |
+| QKD-Tx | QKD Transmitter |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RNG | Random Number Generation |
+| SPD | Single Photon Detector |
+| TF-QKD | Twin Field QKD |
+| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Functional architecture model**
+
+An overview on networks to support quantum key distribution (QKD) including design considerations, network capabilities, conceptual structure and basic functions of a quantum key distribution network (QKDN) is addressed in [ITU-T Y.3800]. Moreover, QKDN functional requirements are identified in [ITU-T Y.3801].
+
+Based on the conceptual structure of QKDN illustrated in Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.3800] and the functional requirements identified in [ITU-T Y.3801], a functional architecture model of QKDN is shown in Figure 1.
+
+Figure 1 includes the following architectural essence:
+
+- Layer structure defined in [ITU-T Y.3800]: a quantum layer, a key management layer, a QKDN control layer, a QKDN management layer, a service layer, and a user network management layer;
+- Basic functions and links defined in [ITU-T Y.3800]: a QKD module, a key manager (KM), a QKDN controller, and a QKDN manager, a QKD link, and a KM link in the QKDN; a cryptographic application, a user network manager, and an application link in the user network;
+- Functional elements defined in this Recommendation: Sub-functions contained in each basic function (e.g., a routing control function under the QKDN controller);
+- Detailed reference points defined in this Recommendation.
+
+Detailed descriptions of these functional elements and reference points are given in clause 7 and 8, respectively.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – A functional architecture model of QKDN. The diagram shows four main layers: Service layer, Key management layer, Quantum layer, and QKDN control layer, along with a User network management layer and a QKDN management layer. The Service layer contains a Cryptographic application (APP) with interfaces Ax and Ak. The QKDN control layer contains a QKDN controller with Routing control, Session control, Configuration control, Access control, and Policy based control, and a QKDN controller control and management module with interface Cx. The Key management layer contains a Key manager (KM) with KSA, Key supply, Key combination, KM control and management, KMA, Key replay, Key storage, and Key life cycle management, with interfaces Kx-2, Kx-1, Kq-1, and Kq-2. The Quantum layer contains a QKD module with Key distillation, QKD-key supply, QKD module control and management, Quantum channel synchronization, RNG, Quantum communication, and Channel multiplexing, with interfaces Qdist, Qsync, and Qqc. The QKDN link contains a Quantum relay point and Optical switching/splitting. The User network management layer contains a User network manager with interface Ma. The QKDN management layer contains a QKDN manager with FCAPS functions\*, Control layer management, Key management layer management, and Quantum layer management, with interfaces Mu, Mc, Mk, Mq, Cqrp, Cops, Mqrp, and Mops. A vertical bar on the right indicates Cross-layer management orchestration. The diagram is labeled Y.3802(20)\_F01.
+
+**Figure 1 – A functional architecture model of QKDN**
+
+# 7 Functional elements
+
+### 7.1 Functional elements in a quantum layer
+
+In a quantum layer, a pair of QKD modules connected by a QKD link generates quantum key distribution keys (QKD-keys) by using QKD protocols.
+
+A QKD module is comprised of the following functional elements.
+
+- Quantum communication function: It prepares, transmits, and/or measures quantum signals.
+
+NOTE 1 – In the case of QKD protocols called "prepare-and-measure" schemes, QKD modules can be either transmitters or receivers. In the case of QKD protocols based on measurement-assisted schemes such as measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) and twin field QKD (TF-QKD) mentioned in [ITU-T Y.3800], QKD modules are transmitters, while a receiver is located at an intermediate point of a quantum channel. In the case of entanglement-based QKD protocols, QKD modules are receivers, while a transmitter of entangled quantum signals is located at an intermediate point of the quantum channel.
+
+- Quantum channel synchronization function: It provides clock and timing synchronization for the quantum channel with adequate precision to support quantum signal transmission and measurement. This function may collaborate with the quantum communication function and/or the key distillation function mentioned below in order to provide clock and timing synchronization.
+- Key distillation function: It typically performs the following classical data processing:
+ - a) A key sifting to match modulation and/or measurement bases between QKD modules;
+ - b) A parameter estimation to ensure security and to set parameters for the error correction and privacy amplification described below;
+ - c) An error correction and a privacy amplification to establish identical and secure keys between QKD modules.
+
+NOTE 2 – The above classical data processing may be performed jointly.
+
+- QKD-key supply function: It receives QKD-key requests from a key management agent (KMA) and supplies QKD-keys to the KMA securely.
+- Random number generator (RNG) function: It generates random numbers and provides them to the quantum communication function and the key distillation function.
+
+NOTE 3 – The RNG should be non-deterministic: This can be realized with conventional physical-noise-based schemes as specified in [b-ISO/IEC 18031], or with quantum principle-based schemes such as quantum noise random number generator (QRNG).
+
+- QKD module control and management function: It is in charge of the overall control and management of functional elements in QKD modules, and communicates with functions in other layers, such as a KM, a QKDN controller, and a QKDN manager.
+- Optional channel multiplexing function: It enables the wavelength division multiplexing of quantum and classical channels between QKD modules.
+
+A QKD link optionally includes the following functional elements in addition to quantum signal transmission and classical communications for key distillation and synchronization.
+
+- Optical switching/splitting function: It enables to switch or split quantum channel traffic, and/or quantum channel synchronization signal and distillation channel traffic between pairs of QKD modules in multi-point networks in order to establish the same keys between different users on demand.
+- Quantum relay point function: It assists QKD by playing the role as an intermediate point in the QKD link or by relaying quantum and classical signals to extend QKD distance.
+
+NOTE 4 – The optical switching/splitting function and the quantum relay point function may be included in QKD modules and may not have interfaces with the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager. It is dependent upon their implementation.
+
+### 7.2 Functional elements in a key management layer
+
+In a key management layer, a KM function is to receive and manage keys generated by QKD modules and QKD links, relay the keys, and supply the keys to cryptographic applications. The KM consists of a key management agent (KMA), a key supply agent (KSA), and a KM control and management function. In addition, a KM link defined in [ITU-T Y.3800] is divided into the KMA link (Kx-1) and the KSA link (Kx-2) corresponding to their independent roles. These are further comprised of the following functional elements:
+
+- 1) KMA
+ - Key storage function: It receives keys from (a) QKD module(s), then synchronizes and authenticates, re-sizes (combines or splits), re-formats the keys with metadata such as key ID, key size, key type and generation time stamp, etc., and stores the processed keys and the metadata;
+
+- Key relay function: It relays the keys from end to end in a QKDN through KMA links in a highly secure manner with an IT-secure encryption, i.e. one-time pad (OTP) [b-Shannon 1949] is recommended;
+ - Key life cycle management function: It manages the life cycle of the keys from reception by KM to consumption by cryptographic applications. In addition, it manages the deletion or preservation of the keys in the key storage function depending on the key management policies.
+- 2) KSA
+- Key supply function: It synchronizes and authenticates the keys shared between end-to-end KSAs through KSA links, and supplies the keys to the cryptographic applications on demand;
+ - Key combination function: It is an optional functional element. It combines the keys produced by QKD and other key exchange methods (e.g., post-quantum cryptography).
+- 3) KM control and management function
+- KM control and management function: It is in charge of the overall control and management of the functional elements in the KM, and communicates with functions in other layers, such as the QKD module, the QKDN controller, and the QKDN manager.
+
+### 7.3 Functional elements in a QKDN control layer
+
+In a QKDN control layer, a QKDN controller function is to control QKDN resources to ensure secure, stable, efficient, and robust operations of a QKDN. It is further comprised of the following functional elements:
+
+- Session control function: It supports the KMAs, and controls the session procedures of key relay. It also supports KSAs to supply keys for multiple cryptographic applications;
+- Routing control function: It provisions an appropriate key relay route between two end points of KMs, and also performs rerouting of key relay depending on fault, performance, and/or availability status of the quantum layer and/or the key management layer, for ensuring the continuation of key relay and key supply;
+- Configuration control function: It performs the acquisition of configuration information on QKD modules, QKD links, KMs, and KM links, and the state of these components (e.g., in service, out of service, standby, or reserved). It conducts the reconfiguration of QKD links and KM links if an alarm including the result of failure diagnosis is notified;
+- Policy based control function: It controls the QKDN resources based on the quality of service (QoS) and charging policies for cryptographic applications;
+- Access control function: It provides capabilities to verify the claimed identity of functions and functional elements under control and support by the QKDN controller (i.e., authentication), and to restrict them to pre-authorized activities or roles by access rights based on enforced policies (i.e., authorization).
+- QKDN controller control and management function: It is in charge of the overall control and management of the functional elements in the QKDN controller, and communicates with functions in other layers, such as the QKD module, the KM, and the QKDN manager.
+
+### 7.4 Functional elements in a QKDN management layer
+
+In a QKDN management layer, a QKDN manager function is to manage fault, configuration, accounting, performance and security (FCAPS) aspects of a QKDN as a whole, and support user network management. It contains the following functional elements:
+
+- Fault management function: It performs to monitor, detect, diagnose including root causes and analysis, and remedy the faults of QKDN managed resources. It also supports the QKDN controller for the routing and rerouting control of key relay as needed in case of the faults.
+- Configuration management function: It manages the provisioning of QKDN resources, collects and manages QKDN topology. Its management roles cover the provisioning, configuration, discovery of the QKDN resources. It also supports the QKDN controller for the provisioning of key relay routes if QKDN supports key relay.
+- Accounting management function: It meters the usage of key supply services and support for charging/billing system to determine the costs of key usage by cryptographic applications;
+- Performance management function: It monitors and analyses the performance status of the QKDN managed resources. It also supports quality of service (QoS) assurance, QoS policy management and visualizing the QKDN performance information;
+- Security management function: It collects/receives security related management information from the QKDN, supports the key life cycle management, and manages the whole authentication and authorization in the QKDN.
+
+For FCAPS management in the QKDN control, the key management, and the quantum layers, the following management functional elements exist:
+
+- QKDN control layer management function: It provides FCAPS management functionality for functional elements in the QKDN control layer. Especially, this functional element supports the QKDN controller to control the routing and rerouting and provisioning of key relay paths in the case of faults and/or performance problems;
+- Key management layer management function: It provides FCAPS management functionality for functional elements in the key management layer. In addition, this functional element also supports key life cycle management;
+- Quantum layer management function: It provides FCAPS management functionality for functional elements in the quantum layer;
+- Cross-layer management function: It orchestrates management decisions and actions among management functions and functional elements in the QKDN control layer, key management layer, and quantum layer. It also exchanges management information with external management elements, especially with a user network management element to indirectly support QKDN users.
+
+### **7.5 Functional elements in a service layer**
+
+In a service layer, the following functional element exists:
+
+- Cryptographic application function: It consumes the shared key-pairs provided by a QKDN and performs secure communication between remote parties.
+
+### **7.6 Functional elements in a user network management layer**
+
+In a user network management layer, the following functional element exists:
+
+User network manager function: It performs FCAPS management features of a user network.
+
+# **8 Reference points**
+
+This clause addresses details of each reference point identified in Figure 1.
+
+The common functionalities of the QKDN reference points including session processing and information exchange are given in Appendix I.
+
+## 8.1 Reference points on a QKD module
+
+The following reference points are relevant to connections between QKD modules in a QKD link:
+
+- **Qqc**: a reference point connecting two quantum communication functions through a quantum channel in the QKD link. It is responsible for exchanging quantum state signals via optical fibre or free space required for quantum communication.
+- **Qsync**: a reference point connecting two quantum channel synchronization functions through a classical channel in the QKD link. It is responsible for exchanging information required for quantum channel synchronization.
+- **Qdist**: a reference point connecting two key distillation functions through a classical channel in the QKD link. It is responsible for exchanging information on sifting, parameter estimation, error correction and privacy amplification in QKD protocols required for key distillation.
+
+NOTE 1 – A primitive connection in QKD layer is a set of QKD module A, QKD link and QKD module B. Interface specifications at both ends of the QKD link are assumed to be the same; therefore, one single Qqc, Qsync and Qdist in the primitive set are sufficient reference points.
+
+NOTE 2 – Qsync and Qdist are indicated as a single link Qx for simplicity in the figures on QKDN configurations in clause 9.
+
+## 8.2 Reference points on a KM
+
+The following reference points are relevant to connections with KM(s) in a KM link:
+
+- **Kq-1**: a reference point connecting a key storage function in a KMA with a QKD-key supply function in a QKD module. It is responsible for transferring QKD-keys generated by a QKD module to the KM.
+- **Kq-2**: a reference point connecting a KM control and management function in the KM with a QKD module control and management function in the QKD module. It is responsible for allowing the QKD module to transmit QKD link parameters to the KM and responsible for allowing the KM to control the operation of the QKD module.
+- **Kx-1**: a reference point connecting two KMAs in each QKD node via a KMA link. It is responsible for exchanging information and operations required for key relay, key synchronization and authentication between KMAs.
+- **Kx-2**: a reference point connecting two KSAs in each QKD node via a KSA link. It is responsible for exchanging information and operations required for synchronization and authentication of the keys shared between KSAs.
+- **Kx'**: a reference point connecting a local KM in each QKD node and a centralized KM via a KM link. It is responsible for exchanging information and operations required for performing centralized key relay. (See Figure 5 in clause 9)
+
+NOTE – Kx-1 and Kx-2 are indicated as a single link Kx for simplicity in figures on QKDN configurations in clause 9.
+
+## 8.3 Reference points on a QKDN controller
+
+The following reference points are relevant to communications for QKDN controller(s).
+
+- **Ck**: a reference point connecting the QKDN controller control and management function in a QKDN controller and a KM control and management function in a KM. It is responsible for the QKDN controller to communicate control information with a KMA and a KSA.
+
+- **Cq**: a reference point connecting the QKDN controller control and management function in the QKDN controller with a QKD module control and management function in a QKD module. It is responsible for the QKDN controller to communicate control information with the QKD module.
+- **Cops**: a reference point connecting the QKDN controller control and management function in the QKDN controller with an optical switching/splitting function in a QKD link. It is responsible for the QKDN controller to communicate control information on optical switching/splitting with the QKD link.
+- **Cqrp**: a reference point connecting the QKDN controller control and management function in the QKDN controller with a quantum relay point function in a QKD link. It is responsible for the QKDN controller to communicate control information on quantum relay point with the QKD link.
+- **Cx**: a reference point connecting two QKDN controller control and management functions in each QKD node. It is responsible for the two QKDN controllers to communicate control information with each other.
+
+## 8.4 Reference points on a QKDN manager
+
+The following reference points are relevant to communications for a QKDN manager.
+
+- **Mq**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager with a QKD module control and management function in a QKD module. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information with the QKD module.
+- **Mops**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and an optical switching/splitting function in a QKD link. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information with the QKD link.
+- **Mqrp**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and a quantum relay point function in a QKD link. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information on the quantum relay point with the QKD link.
+- **Mk**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and a KM control and management function in a KM. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information with a KMA and a KSA.
+- **Mc**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and a QKDN controller control and management function in a QKDN controller. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information with the QKDN controller.
+- **Mu**: a reference point connecting a user network manager in a user network and the QKDN manager in the QKDN. It is responsible for the QKDN manager to communicate management information with the user network manager.
+
+## 8.5 Reference point on a user network manager
+
+- **Ma**: a reference point connecting a cryptographic application and a user network manager in a user network. It is responsible for management of the cryptographic application.
+
+## 8.6 Reference points on cryptographic applications
+
+The following reference points are relevant to communications of cryptographic applications in user networks:
+
+- **Ak**: a reference point connecting a cryptographic application and a key supply function in a KSA. It is responsible for sending key requests from the cryptographic application to the KSA, performing authentication between the cryptographic application and the KSA, and supplying keys from the KSA to the cryptographic application.
+
+- **Ax **: a reference point connecting two cryptographic applications in a user network. It is responsible for the two cryptographic applications to exchange information based on communication protocols.
+
+NOTE – The communication protocols used for Ax may include Internet protocol security (IPsec) [b-RFC 4301], Transport Layer Security (TLS) [b-RFC 8446], or other dedicated cryptographic protocols.
+
+# 9 Architectural configurations
+
+There are multiple possible network configurations of inter-connecting various entities supported within the QKDN architecture.
+
+Under the functional architecture model defined in clause 6, a QKDN consists of different types of nodes that contain various functions in different configurations as illustrated in this clause.
+
+NOTE – Nodes defined in this clause are logical entities that are individually identifiable in the QKDN. As logical objects, such nodes may or may not be mapped to physical objects.
+
+### 9.1 Configuration 1: Distributed QKDN
+
+A configuration of a distributed QKDN is illustrated in Figure 2 as configuration 1.
+
+In configuration 1, the QKDN consists of type 1 QKD nodes.
+
+Each type 1 QKD node can perform QKDN functions in a distributed manner, without relying on a centralized network controller.
+
+The type 1 QKD node contains the functions of QKD module(s), a KM and a QKDN controller.
+
+
+
+Figure 2 – Configuration 1 of a distributed QKDN. The diagram illustrates a distributed QKDN architecture. It shows multiple 'Type 1 QKD node' blocks, each containing a 'QKDN controller', a 'KM' (Key Management) module, and one or more 'QKD module' blocks. These nodes are interconnected via classical channels (solid lines) and quantum channels (yellow lines). Key connections include: APP (Application) blocks connected to QKDN controllers via Ax; QKDN controllers connected to KM modules via Cx; KM modules connected to QKD modules via Kx; and QKD modules connected to other QKD modules via Qx and Qqc. A 'QKDN manager' block is also shown, connected to the QKDN controllers. A legend at the bottom indicates that yellow lines represent Quantum channels and solid lines represent Classical channels. The reference Y.3802(20)\_F02 is noted in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 2 – Configuration 1 of a distributed QKDN**
+
+NOTE – An abbreviation "APP" appearing in the figures of clause 9 means cryptographic application.
+
+### 9.2 Configuration 2: Centralized QKDN
+
+To support efficient management of QKDN, it is a typical approach to centralize QKDN control functions in order to improve network control efficiency.
+
+A configuration of centralized QKDN is illustrated in Figure 3 as configuration 2.
+
+In configuration 2, the QKDN consists of type 2 QKD nodes and the centralized one or more QKDN controllers.
+
+The type 2 QKD node contains the functions of QKD module(s) and a KM.
+
+
+
+Y.3802(20)\_F03
+
+Figure 3 – Configuration 2 of a centralized QKDN. The diagram shows a central 'QKDN controller' connected to multiple 'Type 2 QKD nodes' and a 'QKDN manager'. Each 'Type 2 QKD node' contains an 'APP', a 'KM', and one or more 'QKD module's. The 'QKDN controller' is connected to the 'APP's of all nodes via classical channels. The 'QKDN manager' is connected to the 'QKDN controller' and the 'QKD module's of all nodes via classical channels. Quantum channels (yellow lines) connect the 'QKD module's of different nodes. Labels like Ax, Ck, Kx, Qx, Qqc, Ak, Kq, and Qx indicate specific connections and data flows.
+
+**Figure 3 – Configuration 2 of a centralized QKDN**
+
+### 9.3 Configuration 3: Centralized QKDN with hierarchical QKD nodes
+
+To support wide-area QKD network deployment and operation, the type 2 QKD nodes in clause 9.2 can be further classified into three kinds of nodes according to their roles: a QKDN user node, a QKDN access node and a QKDN relay node. A configuration of centralized QKDN with hierarchical QKD nodes is illustrated in Figure 4 as configuration 3.
+
+#### 1) QKDN user node
+
+A QKDN user node is a trusted node which is located at QKD user side. It is in charge of obtaining keys from the QKDN, and providing the corresponding key for a specific cryptographic application for secure communication. The user node is comprised of a QKD module and a KM. It is conventional that the user node only contains one QKD-Tx to reduce user device cost. The KM of the user node performs key storage, key supply and key relay functions.
+
+#### 2) QKDN access node
+
+A QKDN access node is a trusted node which is responsible for aggregating associated user nodes' key relaying service flows and forwarding them to remote QKD nodes according to key relay procedure. A user node can connect to the access node either directly or via an optical switch. The optical switch can be one optional component of the access node, which integrates multiple quantum channels in order to receive quantum signals from a plurality of user nodes simultaneously.
+
+It is conventional that the access node contains a powerful QKD-Rx to handle the signals of associated user nodes. A multi-user scheduling function is integrated to allocate channel resources to the multiple associated user nodes respectively.
+
+In addition, the access node can contain additional QKD modules to connect to remote QKD nodes (e.g., relay nodes) for key relay.
+
+The KM of the access node is to perform key storage and key relay functions.
+
+#### 3) QKDN relay node
+
+AQKDN relay node is a trusted node which is used to set up key relay routes in order to extend a QKD distance beyond the limitation of QKD quantum channels. The relay node usually contains at least one pair of a QKD-Tx and a QKD-Rx to connect at least two hops in QKD links. The KM of the relay node is to perform key storage and key relay functions.
+
+Through the combination of user nodes, access nodes and relay nodes, this architectural configuration can support flexible QKDN topology. For example, multiple user nodes and their associated access nodes can form a QKD access network (QAN), which is suitable for metropolitan area coverage. And multiple relay nodes can form a QKD backbone network (QBN) to connect multiple QANs for wide area coverage.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a hierarchical QKDN architecture. At the top, two APPs are connected to a central QKDN controller via classical channels (Ax and Ak). The controller is also connected to a QKDN manager. Below the controller is the QKD backbone network (QBN), which consists of multiple relay nodes. Each relay node contains a KM and a QKD module. The QBN is connected to three QKD access networks (QANs). Each QAN consists of multiple user nodes and one access node. Each user node contains a KM and a QKD module. The access node contains a KM and a QKD module. Classical channels (black lines) connect KMs to QKD modules and to the controller. Quantum channels (yellow lines) connect QKD modules between nodes. A legend at the bottom indicates that yellow lines represent Quantum channels and black lines represent Classical channels. The diagram is labeled Y.3802(20)\_F04.
+
+Figure 4: Configuration 3 of a centralized QKDN with hierarchical QKD nodes. The diagram illustrates a network architecture where a central QKDN controller manages a QKD backbone network (QBN) of relay nodes, which in turn connect to multiple QKD access networks (QANs). Each QAN consists of user nodes and access nodes. Classical channels (black lines) connect APPs to the controller, and KMs to QKD modules. Quantum channels (yellow lines) connect QKD modules between nodes. A QKDN manager is also shown connected to the controller.
+
+**Figure 4 – Configuration 3 of a centralized QKDN with hierarchical QKD nodes**
+
+### 9.4 Configuration 4: Centralized QKDN with centralized key relay
+
+There is another variation of the configurations of centralized QKDN as configuration 4. In configuration 4, key relay functions of KMs are centralized and can be co-located with a centralized QKDN controller as shown in Figure 5.
+
+In this way, the peer-to-peer mutual interaction interfaces between the QKD nodes in KM links can be removed, and thus, the complexity of QKD nodes can be further reduced, and the networking overhead is also reduced.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a centralized QKDN architecture. At the top, an 'APP' connects to a 'User network' via an 'Ax' interface. Below this, a 'QKDN controller' and 'Centralized KM' are grouped together. The network is divided into three segments: 'QAN', 'QBN', and another 'QAN'.
+ Nodes include:
+ - User nodes: Containing 'Local KM' and 'QKD module'.
+ - Access nodes: Containing 'Local KM', 'QKD module', and in one case, an 'Optical switch'.
+ - Relay nodes: Containing 'Local KM' and 'QKD module'.
+ - A 'QKDN manager' is shown on the right.
+ Interfaces labeled include 'Ak', 'Ck&Kx\'', 'Kq', 'Qx', and 'Qqc'.
+ Legend: Yellow double lines represent 'Quantum channel', and solid black lines represent 'Classical channel'.
+
+Figure 5 – Configuration 4 of a centralized QKDN with centralized key relay
+
+**Figure 5 – Configuration 4 of a centralized QKDN with centralized key relay**
+
+### 10 Basic operational procedures of the QKDN network functions
+
+This clause describes basic operational procedures based on the functional architecture model defined in clause 6.
+
+#### 10.1 Service provisioning and system initialization procedure
+
+
+
+Sequence diagram showing the following entities from left to right: QKD module, KM, QKDN controller, QKDN manager, Cryptographic application, and User network manager.
+ The sequence of events is:
+ 1. 'Provisioning information' is sent from User network manager to QKDN manager (indicated by a dotted arrow).
+ 2. 'QKDN controller initialization and configuration' arrow from QKDN manager to QKDN controller.
+ 3. 'KM initialization and configuration' arrow from QKDN manager to KM.
+ 4. 'QKD module initialization and configuration' arrow from QKDN manager to QKD module.
+
+Figure 6 – Service provisioning and system initialization procedure
+
+**Figure 6 – Service provisioning and system initialization procedure**
+
+Figure 6 illustrates a procedure for service provisioning and system initialization. There are two alternatives for service provisioning.
+
+In case where a user network manager is in charge of service provisioning, the user network manager provides service provisioning information including profiles of cryptographic applications to a QKDN manager.
+
+On the other hand, in case where the QKDN manager is in charge of service provisioning as standalone mode, the QKDN manager uses its own service provisioning information directly.
+
+14 Rec. ITU-T Y.3802 (12/2020)
+
+According to the provisioning information, the QKDN manager initiates the action of a QKDN controller, a KM and a QKD module to initialize and configure a QKDN. The sequence of the initialization and configuration of the QKDN controller, the KM and the QKD module can be in arbitrary order.
+
+### 10.2 Key generation procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant QKD link
+ participant QKD module
+ participant KM
+ participant QKDN controller
+ participant QKDN manager
+ participant Cryptographic application
+ participant User network manager
+
+ QKDN controller-->>QKD link: Connect optical path
+ QKDN controller-->>QKD module: Inform QKD module
+ QKDN controller->>QKD module: Initiate key generation
+ Note over QKD module: Generate keys
+ QKD module->>KM: Push up keys
+ Note over KM: Synchronize, format and store keys
+ KM->>QKDN controller: Report the status of key generation
+ QKDN controller->>QKDN manager: Report the status of key generation
+ QKDN manager-->>QKDN controller: Supporting information
+ Note right of QKDN manager: *Repeat
+ QKDN controller->>QKD module: Stop key generation
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the key generation procedure between QKD link, QKD module, KM, QKDN controller, QKDN manager, Cryptographic application, and User network manager. Steps include connecting optical path, initiating key generation, generating keys, pushing up keys, synchronizing/storing keys, reporting status, and stopping key generation.
+
+Y.3802(20)\_F07
+
+**Figure 7 – Key generation procedure**
+
+Figure 7 illustrates a procedure for key generation containing the following steps:
+
+- 1) A QKDN controller optionally instructs to initiate the connection of an optical path in a QKD link and informs QKD modules of the initiation result if necessary.
+- 2) The QKDN controller requests QKDN modules to initiate key generation.
+- 3) The QKD modules send and/or receive quantum signals and then perform synchronization of quantum signals and key distillation for key generation.
+- 4) The QKD modules push up the generated keys to KMs.
+- 5) The KMs optionally synchronize, format and store these keys if necessary.
+- 6) The KMs report the status of key generation to the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager for control and management functions respectively.
+- 7) The sequence from step 3 to step 6 can be repeated (and often executed in parallel) until a sufficient number of keys are generated.
+- 8) The QKDN manager optionally sends supporting information to the QKDN controller if necessary.
+- 9) The QKDN controller requests to stop key generation to the QKD modules due to the completion of key generation or other reasons.
+
+### 10.3 Key request and supply procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant QKD as QKD module
+ participant KM as KM
+ participant QKDN as QKDN controller
+ participant QKDNM as QKDN manager
+ participant CA as Cryptographic application
+ participant UNM as User network manager
+
+ CA->>KM: Request keys
+ KM-->>{Available keys?}
+ {Available keys?}->>QKDNM: Yes
+ {Available keys?}->>QKDNM: No
+ QKDNM->>QKDN: Key generation and/or key relay
+ QKDN->>CA: Supply keys
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the key request and supply procedure. It involves six participants: QKD module, KM, QKDN controller, QKDN manager, Cryptographic application, and User network manager. The process begins with a Cryptographic application requesting keys from a KM. The KM then checks if keys are available. If yes, it proceeds to supply keys to the Cryptographic application. If no, it requests key generation and/or key relay from the QKDN controller, which then supplies keys to the Cryptographic application.
+
+Y.3802(20)\_F08
+
+Sequence diagram for Key request and supply procedure (Figure 8).
+
+**Figure 8 – Key request and supply procedure**
+
+Figure 8 illustrates a typical procedure for key request and supply containing the following steps:
+
+- 1) A cryptographic application in a user network requests secure keys from a corresponding KM in a QKDN.
+- 2) The KM checks the availability of keys, which are shared with a matching KM corresponding to a matching cryptographic application, to supply to the cryptographic application:
+ - a) If the KM has a sufficient amount of available keys, then go to step 3;
+ - b) If the KM does not have the available keys, the KM gets the available keys through key generation and/or key relay processes.
+- 3) The KM supplies keys to the requesting cryptographic application.
+
+### 10.4 Key relay procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant QKD as QKD module
+ participant KM as KM
+ participant QKDN as QKDN controller
+ participant QKDNM as QKDN manager
+ participant CA as Cryptographic application
+ participant UNM as User network manager
+
+ KM-->>{Available key relay route?}
+ {Available key relay route?}->>QKDN: Yes
+ {Available key relay route?}->>QKDN: No
+ KM->>QKDN: Ask the key relay route
+ QKDN->>QKDNM: Decide the key relay route
+ QKDNM->>QKDN: Route information
+ QKDN->>KM: Relay keys to another KM
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the key relay procedure. It involves the same six participants as Figure 8. The process begins with a KM checking if a key relay route is available. If yes, it proceeds to relay keys to another KM. If no, it asks the QKDN controller for a key relay route. The QKDN controller then decides on the key relay route and provides route information to the KM, which then relays keys to another KM.
+
+Y.3802(20)\_F09
+
+Sequence diagram for Key relay procedure (Figure 9).
+
+**Figure 9 – Key relay procedure**
+
+Figure 9 illustrates a procedure for key relay containing the following steps:
+
+- 1) When key relay is needed, a KM checks the availability of key relay routes:
+ - a) If the KM confirms an available key relay route for the KM to relay keys to another KM, then go to step 3;
+ - b) If the KM does not have the available key relay route to relay keys, the KM can request the key relay route to a QKDN controller.
+- 2) The QKDN controller decides a key relay route and sends route information to the KM.
+- 3) The KM executes key relay.
+
+### 10.5 Key relay rerouting control procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant QKD as QKD module
+ participant KM as KM
+ participant QKDN_C as QKDN controller
+ participant QKDN_M as QKDN manager
+ participant Crypt as Cryptographic application
+ participant User as User network manager
+
+ QKD->>QKDN_C: Status information of QKD module and optionally of QKD link
+ Note over QKDN_C: Analyze the status information
+ KM->>QKDN_C: Information on key management
+ Note over QKDN_C: Analyze the information on key management
+ QKDN_C->>QKDN_M: Request topology and other supporting information
+ QKDN_M-->>QKDN_C: Topology and other supporting information
+ Note over QKDN_C: Decide the routing path
+ QKDN_C->>KM: Route information
+ QKDN_C->>QKDN_M: Route status change information
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Key relay rerouting control procedure. The diagram shows interactions between six entities: QKD module, KM, QKDN controller, QKDN manager, Cryptographic application, and User network manager. The process starts with the QKD module sending status information to the QKDN controller. The KM sends key management information to the QKDN controller. The QKDN controller analyzes this information and requests topology data from the QKDN manager. After receiving the topology data, the controller decides on a routing path and sends route information back to the KM. Finally, the controller sends route status change information to the QKDN manager.
+
+**Figure 10 – Key relay rerouting control procedure**
+
+Figure 10 illustrates a procedure for key relay rerouting control by a QKDN controller containing the following steps:
+
+- 1) A QKD module sends status information (e.g., fault, performance, availability) of the QKD module and optionally of a QKD link to a QKDN controller.
+- 2) A KM sends information on key management to the QKDN controller.
+
+The information in step 1 and step 2 are periodically updated by the QKD module and the KM so that the QKDN controller can successively monitor the status of QKD links, QKD modules, KM links and KMs.
+
+- 3) The QKDN controller analyzes the provided information and decides whether the rerouting of key relay is necessary or not.
+- 4) The QKDN controller sends updated route information to the KM and reports the route status change information to the QKDN manager.
+
+# 11 QKDN synchronization function considerations
+
+Similar to other existing types of communication networks, a QKDN also needs to support frequency and time synchronization.
+
+A quantum channel synchronization function is required to implement synchronization of quantum-state optical signals between QKD modules. It needs an ultra-high precision requirement (at picoseconds level) and cannot be fulfilled by the recent existing standardized network-based synchronization technologies.
+
+Except for the quantum channel synchronization, the synchronization for other QKDN functions can be supported by traditional network-based synchronization technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network time protocols (NTPv3 [b-RFC 1305] or NTPv4 [b-RFC 5905]) support synchronization with milliseconds precision. They can be used to satisfy classical channel synchronization requirements of QKDN.
+
+NOTE 2 – The QKDN synchronization function requirements and supporting technologies are further analysed in Appendix II.
+
+# **12 Security considerations**
+
+In order to prevent and mitigate security threats and potential attacks, issues of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non-repudiation, availability, and traceability need to be addressed, and appropriate security and privacy protection schemes should be considered in the QKDN, the user network, and interfaces between the two networks. Details are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## Annex A
+
+## Functional elements in the quantum layer
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure A.1 illustrates the relationship among the functional elements in a quantum layer. In Figure A.1, a centralized QKDN controller model is employed as an example.
+
+An optical switching/splitting and a quantum relay point in a QKD link are optional functional elements and do not need to be trusted. Depending on the implementation, these functional elements may be connected to a QKDN controller and a QKDN manager via specific reference points. Definitions of reference points, Qdist, Qsync, and Qqc, may vary depending on the implementation of the QKD link. Typical implementation examples are described below:
+
+### - **No intermediate functional elements in the QKD link:**
+
+In this case, two QKD modules are directly connected. Qdist, Qsync and Qqc are simple reference points between the two QKD modules.
+
+### - **Optical switching/splitting in the QKD link:**
+
+The optical switching/splitting functional element can typically switch/split a quantum channel and a classical channel for synchronization, and optionally switch/split the classical channel for key distillation when it is multiplexed with the quantum channel and the classical channel for synchronization in the same fiber.
+
+In this case, Qdist, Qsync and Qqc are also treated as the reference points between two QKD modules while these channels are connected through the optical switching/splitting functional element.
+
+### - **Quantum relay point in the QKD link:**
+
+A quantum relay point functional element is used for some QKD protocols or it acts as a quantum repeater for fully quantum networking as illustrated in clause 6.2 of [ITU-T Y.3800].
+
+For twin-field QKD (TF-QKD) and measurement device independent QKD (MDI-QKD) protocols, the quantum relay point acts as an intermediate measurement station receiving quantum signals sent from the QKD modules. For entanglement-based QKD protocols, the quantum relay point is an entanglement source which distributes entangled pairs to the QKD modules. In these cases, Qqc and Qsync are reference points between the QKD module and the quantum relay point. For TF-QKD and MDI-QKD protocols, Qdist is split into two reference points where one is in between the QKD module and the quantum relay point, and the other is in between the two QKD modules. For entanglement-based QKD protocols, Qdist is a reference point between the QKD modules.
+
+For fully quantum networking, the quantum relay point acts as the quantum repeater. The main role of the quantum repeater is to distill and distribute entanglement to the QKD modules. In this case, Qqc and Qsync are reference points between the QKD module and the quantum relay point. Qdist is split into two reference points: one is in between the QKD module and the quantum relay point, and the other is in between the two QKD modules. These two reference points are used as classical channels for entanglement distillation among the QKD modules and the quantum relay point, and, if necessary, also used for key distillation between the QKD modules. Details of these functions and exchanged information through the reference points may vary depending on protocols of the quantum repeater and their implementations.
+
+NOTE – The entanglement distillation is a protocol to distil entanglement from distributed quantum signals via local quantum operations and classical communication. The classical communication may be done through the reference point Qdist. The local quantum operations do not require any reference point.
+
+
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Common functionalities for reference points
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+At the reference points in clause 8, a QKDN may have the following common functionalities:
+
+### I.1 Session processing functionalities
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of session operations across a reference point, the following functionalities are expected to be provided by the QKDN:
+
+**Overload control:** It supports overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged.
+
+**Synchronization and audit:** It supports synchronization and audit of the session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+
+**Session state maintenance:** It enables the session state to be maintained using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+### I.2 Information exchange functionalities
+
+The following information exchange functionalities are provided for the reference points:
+
+**Request-response transactions:** It allows a requesting function or functional elements to request a transaction to be performed by a responding function and get a correlated response in return.
+
+**Notifications:** It supports the notification of asynchronous events between functions in two layers.
+
+**Reliable delivery:** It provides reliable delivery of messages.
+
+**Capability estimation:** It determines the capabilities of appropriate corresponding layer functions.
+
+**Cross layer security:** It supports the authentication between two layers such that requests from unauthenticated sources cannot be performed and such that each layer can verify the source sending notifications.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Synchronization function and implementation in QKD network
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Synchronization technology including frequency and time synchronization, is considered to play a fundamental supporting role in ICT networks, including a QKDN.
+
+Considering the trade-off between implementation cost and technology maturity, the selection of synchronization technology is suggested to match synchronization requirements. For example, the synchronization requirements on configuration query/delivery, life cycle management, information update and fault diagnosis in the existing information communication networks are usually at the level of tens of millisecond accuracy. In most instances, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) technology can fulfill this synchronization requirement, NTP is commonly applied in IP networks.
+
+In a typical prepare-and-measurement-based discrete variable QKD system, the transmitter for synchronization will send optical pulses synchronized to the quantum signal through a synchronization channel to the receiver. The detected synchronization signal with frequency-and-phase recovery is used as the trigger of a single photon detector (SPD) in the receiver. For typical continuous variable QKD, which is based on transmitter with gaussian modulation and a receiver with coherent detection, a physical layer synchronization channel is optional.
+
+The typical pulse width of the quantum signal and effective SPD detection response time window are at about the hundreds picoseconds level, the jitter of these signals and responses are usually limited to hundreds of picoseconds, which means the precision requirement of frequency synchronization between transmitter and receiver need to achieve sub-microsecond level.
+
+The current network-based frequency synchronization solutions cannot fulfill the precision requirement of the QKD link, and thus a point-to-point synchronization-channel-based frequency synchronization is the practical solution.
+
+For key supply of the QKDN, the QKD-key generation time information needs to be attached to the corresponding key metadata with other necessary information such as device ID. The QKD-key generation rate of commercially available QKD systems is typically at several tens Kbit/s, which means QKD-key generation time information will be updated at the tens of milliseconds level and thus NTP-based network frequency synchronization could be adequate for that precision requirement.
+
+If the QKD-key generation rate could be significantly enhanced in the future, the timing precision of these keys should be improved accordingly, other kinds of network time and synchronization solutions such as Precision Time Protocol (PTP) could be used. Furthermore, absolute time information provided by NTP can also be used by a QKDN control unit for alarm and performance monitoring.
+
+In a key management layer, a KM stores point-to-point key pairs generated by QKD modules and provides end-to-end keys through a key relay function. In key storage and relay procedures, a key life cycle needs to be managed according to security requirements, such as key authentication, backup, destruction, and storage time management. NTP-based network time-and-frequency synchronization information with tens of millisecond precision timing reference can be attached to the QKD-key metadata to indicate timestamp information such as generation time, relay time, storage time, provisioning time, and destruction time. For monitoring and reporting of alarm and performance information of the KM, it is also necessary to support NTP-based time synchronization with millisecond precision in the main control unit of the KM, so that the QKDN can realize unified time domain management of the entire network.
+
+In the QKDN control and management layer, a master clock can be co-located within a QKDN manager in the QKDN. It can provide the reference timing information to the other functions to implement unified time domain management of the QKDN. On this basis, the QKDN manager and/or controller can monitor the alarm information and performance parameters of the QKD module and KM in the QKDN, as well as the diagnosis and identification of the network link status and faults, and further provide the necessary time reference information for the interaction between the QKDN and a user network.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI GR QKD 007] ETSI Group Report GR QKD 007 (2018), *Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Vocabulary*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 18031] ISO/IEC 18031, *Information technology – Security techniques – Random bit generation*.
+- [b-RFC 1305] IETF RFC 1305 (1992), *Network Time Protocol (Version 3) Specification, Implementation and Analysis*.
+- [b-RFC 4301] IETF RFC 4301 (2005), *Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol*.
+- [b-RFC 5905] IETF RFC 5905 (2010), *Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification*.
+- [b-RFC 8446] IETF RFC 8446 (2018), *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3*.
+- [b-Shannon 1949] Shannon, Claude, 1949, *Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems*, *Bell System Technical Journal*, vol. 28, pp. 666–682.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3803
+
+(12/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Quantum key distribution networks
+
+# --- **Quantum key distribution networks – Key management**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3803
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+**Y.3800–Y.3999**
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3803
+
+# Quantum key distribution networks – Key management
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3803 provides help for the design, deployment, and operation of key management of a quantum key distribution network (QKDN). The overall structure and basic functions of a QKDN are first reviewed along with Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800, then the requirements of a QKDN are reviewed along with Recommendation ITU-T Y.3801. Functional elements and procedures of key management are then described.
+
+Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols provide the means to distribute symmetric random bit strings as a secure key that can be proven to be secure even against an eavesdropper who has unbounded computational ability. A basic element of QKD is a pair of QKD modules linked by a QKD link that allows two remote parties to share secure keys. A QKDN consists of two or more QKD links and trusted nodes (QKD nodes), where any pair of two QKD nodes can share secure keys via QKD links and key relay. In the end, these keys are supplied to cryptographic applications in user networks. To implement a QKDN and appropriately integrate with the user network, an overview of QKD technologies, including network capabilities, conceptual structure, layered model, basic functions and components, and its relation to the user network, is given in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800.
+
+To operate a QKDN efficiently and securely, key management is the highest priority issue because without this, most meaningful QKD operations and services cannot be realized. Key management includes, at least, storing keys generated by QKD modules, relaying keys between the nodes of the QKDN, and supplying keys to cryptographic applications upon requests from users, all in a secure manner. The standardization of these issues is essential to realize the interoperability for QKDN, ensuring security and widening applications of QKD.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3803 | 2020-12-07 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14408 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Key management, key relay, key supply, quantum key distribution, QKD, QKD network
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview of key management ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Functional elements of key management ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Agents for KM..... | 6 |
+| 7.2 KM link ..... | 7 |
+| 7.3 Reference points ..... | 7 |
+| 7.4 Security demarcation boundary ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Operations of key management ..... | 7 |
+| 8.1 Generation of a QKD-key in the quantum layer ..... | 8 |
+| 8.2 Management of KMA-key and KSA-key in the key management layer ..... | 9 |
+| 9 Alternative scheme of key relay ..... | 12 |
+| 10 Key file format..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography..... | 17 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3803
+
+# Quantum key distribution networks – Key management
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes key management for quantum key distribution (QKD) networks that address technical specifications to help the implementation and operation.
+
+In particular, the scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- an overview of key management in a quantum key distribution network (QKDN);
+- functional elements of key management;
+- operations of key management; and
+- key formats (key data and metadata).
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1714] Recommendation ITU-T X.1714 (2020), *Key combination and confidential key supply for quantum key distribution networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3800] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800 (2019), *Overview on networks supporting quantum key distribution*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3801] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3801 (2020), *Functional requirements for quantum key distribution networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3802] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802 (2020), *Quantum key distribution networks – Functional architecture*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3804] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3804 (2020), *Quantum key distribution networks – Control and management*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cryptographic hash function** [b-ETSI GR QKD 007]: Computationally efficient function that maps binary strings of arbitrary length to binary strings of fixed length, such that it is computationally infeasible to invert it, or to find two distinct values that hash into a common value.
+
+**3.1.2 hash value** [b-ETSI GS QKD 008]: Output of a cryptographic hash function.
+
+**3.1.3 key life cycle** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A sequence of steps that a key undergoes from its reception by a key manager (KM) through its use in a cryptographic application and until deletion or preservation depending on the key management policy.
+
+**3.1.4 key management** [ITU-T Y.3800]: All activities performed on keys during their life cycle starting from their reception from the quantum layer, storage, formatting, relay, synchronization, authentication, to supply to a cryptographic application and deletion or preservation depending on the key management policy.
+
+**3.1.5 key management agent (KMA)** [ITU-T Y.3802]: A functional element to manage keys generated by one or multiple quantum key distribution (QKD) modules in a QKD node (trusted node).
+
+NOTE – KMA acquires keys from one or multiple QKD modules, synchronizes, resizes, formats, and stores them. It also relays keys through key management agent (KMA) links.
+
+**3.1.6 key management agent link (KMA link)** [ITU-T Y.3802]: A communication link connecting key management agents (KMAs) to perform key relay and communications for key management.
+
+**3.1.7 key manager (KM)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) node to perform key management in the key management layer.
+
+**3.1.8 key manager link** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A communication link connecting key managers (KMs) to perform key management.
+
+**3.1.9 key supply agent (KSA)** [ITU-T Y.3802]: A functional element to supply keys to a cryptographic application, being located between a key management agent (KMA) and the cryptographic application.
+
+NOTE – Application interfaces for cryptographic applications are installed into the key supply agent (KSA). The KSA synchronizes keys, and verifies their integrity via a KSA link before supplying them to the cryptographic application.
+
+**3.1.10 key supply agent link (KSA link)** [ITU-T Y.3802]: A communication link connecting key supply agents (KSAs) to perform key synchronization and integrity verification.
+
+**3.1.11 quantum key distribution (QKD)** [b-ETSI GR QKD 007]: Procedure or method for generating and distributing symmetrical cryptographic keys with information theoretical security based on quantum information theory.
+
+**3.1.12 quantum key distribution-key (QKD-key)** [ITU-T Y.3802]: A pair of symmetric random bit strings generated by a pair of quantum key distribution (QKD) modules, particularly referring to random bit strings before being resized and formatted in a key manager (KM).
+
+**3.1.13 quantum key distribution link (QKD link)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A communication link between two quantum key distribution (QKD) modules to operate the QKD.
+
+NOTE – A QKD link consists of a quantum channel for the transmission of quantum signals, and a classical channel used to exchange information for synchronization and key distillation.
+
+**3.1.14 quantum key distribution module (QKD module)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A set of hardware and software components that implements cryptographic functions and quantum optical processes, including quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, synchronization, distillation for key generation, and is contained within a defined cryptographic boundary.
+
+NOTE – A QKD module is connected to a QKD link, acting as an endpoint module in which a key is generated. These are two types of QKD modules, namely, the transmitters (QKD-Tx) and the receivers (QKD-Rx).
+
+**3.1.15 quantum key distribution network (QKDN)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A network comprised of two or more quantum key distribution (QKD) nodes connected through QKD links.
+
+NOTE – A QKDN allows sharing keys between the QKD nodes by key relay when they are not directly connected by a QKD link.
+
+**3.1.16 quantum key distribution network controller (QKDN controller)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) network control layer to control a QKD network.
+
+**3.1.17 quantum key distribution network manager (QKDN manager)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) network management layer to monitor and manage a QKD network.
+
+**3.1.18 quantum key distribution node (QKD node)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A node that contains one or more quantum key distribution (QKD) modules protected against intrusion and attacks by unauthorized parties.
+
+NOTE – A QKD node can contain a key manager (KM).
+
+**3.1.19 user network** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A network in which cryptographic applications consume keys supplied by a quantum key distribution (QKD) network.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 key data:** Random bit strings that are used as a cryptographic key.
+
+**3.2.2 key management agent-key (KMA-key):** Key data stored and processed in a key management agent (KMA), and securely shared between a KMA and a matching KMA.
+
+**3.2.3 key supply agent-key (KSA-key):** Key data stored and processed in a key supply agent (KSA), and securely shared between a KSA and a matching KSA.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-----------|----------------------------------|
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IT-secure | Information Theoretically secure |
+| KM | Key Manager |
+| KMA | Key Management Agent |
+| KSA | Key Supply Agent |
+| OTP | One-Time Pad |
+| QBER | Quantum Bit Error Rate |
+| QKD | Quantum Key Distribution |
+| QKDN | Quantum Key Distribution Network |
+| RNG | Random Number Generator |
+| XOR | exclusive OR |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The phrase "is required to" indicates a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The phrase "is recommended" indicates a requirement that is recommended but not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# **6 Overview of key management**
+
+This Recommendation provides a description of key management for a QKDN, which is essential to design and realize networks supporting QKD technologies.
+
+Once keys are generated by QKD modules, they are stored securely as classical bit strings in a server called a KM, until they are supplied to a cryptographic application. The KM is located in the QKD node, which is trusted, and protected against intrusion and attacks by unauthorized parties. Keys are often resized and formatted into a key of an appropriate length for the cryptographic application.
+
+Point-to-point QKD links can be concatenated into a QKDN via the trusted QKD nodes to extend the reachability and availability of key supply. In the QKDN, keys can be relayed via the QKD nodes and shared between two parties, even if they are not directly connected by a QKD link. Keys are synchronized and authenticated in an appropriate manner, when they are transferred from a functional to another entity. These keys can be supplied to various cryptographic applications in the user network. All activities performed on keys during their life cycle, including their reception from the quantum layer, storage, formatting, relaying, synchronization, authentication, supply and deletion or preservation, are referred to as key management, which lies at the heart of QKD applications and services.
+
+Basic functions and layered structures of a QKDN are specified in [ITU-T Y.3800]. Figure 1 depicts basic key management operations in a QKDN. Each pair of QKD modules connected by a QKD link generates keys in its own way. Generated keys are transferred to KMs. The KMs manage the keys and supply them to cryptographic applications in the service layer of the user network. The keys can be relayed via KMs and shared between any designated QKD nodes. The QKDN controller performs routing control of key relay. The QKDN manager monitors the status of the whole of the QKDN and supports key life cycle management for the KMs, as well as routing and rerouting control of key relay for the QKDN controller.
+
+When QKD modules detect an alarm, such as an increase of their quantum bit error rates (QBERs), they alert the QKDN controller directly or indirectly via the KMs. The QKDN controller then reroutes the path for key relay to circumvent the faulty QKD link for successful key supply.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Basic key management operations in a QKDN. The diagram illustrates a three-layered architecture: the Quantum layer, the Key management layer, and the User network management layer. In the Quantum layer, four QKD nodes (trusted nodes 1-4) are shown, each containing a QKD module. These modules are interconnected by QKD links. In the Key management layer, each QKD module is connected to a Key Management (KM) module. The KMs are interconnected via KM links. A QKDN controller is shown in the Key management layer, managing the key relay process. In the User network management layer, a Network manager is shown, which interacts with the QKDN manager and the QKDN controller. Cryptographic applications are shown in the User network management layer, connected to the Network manager via an Application link. The diagram also shows key relays between KMs and the QKDN controller. The diagram is labeled Y.3803(20)\_F01.
+
+**Figure 1 – Basic key management operations in a QKDN**
+
+# 7 Functional elements of key management
+
+Figure 2 shows a functional architecture model of QKDN specified in [ITU-T Y.3802], highlighting the key management layer and reference points associated with it.
+
+
+
+Y.3803(20)\_F02
+
+Figure 2 – A functional architecture model of QKDN. The diagram shows four main layers: Service layer, QKDN control layer, Key management layer, and Quantum layer, along with a User network management layer and a QKDN management layer. The Service layer contains a Cryptographic application (APP) with interface Ax. The QKDN control layer contains a QKDN controller with sub-modules: Routing control, Session control, Configuration control, Access control, and Policy based control, plus a QKDN controller control and management module with interface Cx. The Key management layer contains a Key manager (KM) with sub-modules: KSA (Key supply), Key combination, KM control and management, KMA (Key replay), Key storage, and Key life cycle management, with interfaces Kx-1 and Kx-2. The Quantum layer contains a QKD module with sub-modules: Key distillation, QKD-key supply, QKD module control and management, Quantum channel synchronization, RNG, Quantum communication, and Channel multiplexing, with interfaces Qdist, Qsync, and Qqc. Below the QKD module is a QKD link with sub-modules: Quantum relay point and Optical switching/splitting. The User network management layer contains a User network manager with interface Ma. The QKDN management layer contains a QKDN manager with sub-modules: FCAPS functions\*, Control layer management, KM layer management, and Quantum layer management, with interface Mu. Various interfaces connect the layers: Ak between Service and QKDN control; Ck between QKDN control and Key management; Kq-1 and Kq-2 between Key management and Quantum; Cq between Quantum and QKDN management; Mk between Key management and QKDN management; Mq between Quantum and QKDN management; Cqrp and Cops between Quantum and QKDN management; Mqrp and Mops between QKD link and QKDN management. A vertical bar on the right indicates 'Cross-layer management orchestration'.
+
+**Figure 2 – A functional architecture model of QKDN**
+
+In order to design, implement, and execute the key management functions to fulfil the requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3801], it is convenient and practical to identify and define two functional elements in the KM, i.e., a key management agent (KMA) and a key supply agent (KSA) as illustrated in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+Figure 3 – Functional architecture model of the key management layer. The diagram shows a 'Key management layer' (dashed box) containing 'KM' (solid box). 'KM' is divided into 'KSA' (orange box) and 'KMA' (green box). 'KSA' contains 'Key supply' and 'Key combination'. 'KMA' contains 'Key replay', 'Key storage', and 'Key life cycle management'. 'KM control and management' is also within the 'KM' box. 'Cryptographic application' is at the top, connected to 'KSA' via 'Ak'. 'QKDN controller' is at the top right, connected to 'KM control and management' via 'Ck'. 'QKDN manager' is on the right, connected to 'KM control and management' via 'Mk'. 'QKD module' is at the bottom, connected to 'Key storage' via 'Kq-1' and 'Key life cycle management' via 'Kq-2'. 'KSA link' (Kx-2) and 'KMA link' (Kx-1) are on the left, connected to 'Key supply' and 'Key replay' respectively. A 'Key exchange' dashed box is also on the left. The reference 'Y.3803(20)\_F03' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 3 – Functional architecture model of the key management layer**
+
+The roles of these functional elements are described in clauses 7.1 to 7.4.
+
+## 7.1 Agents for KM
+
+a) KMA: It receives keys from QKD modules, and interconnects the QKD nodes by key relay, realizing the functions of:
+
+- key storage;
+- key relay;
+- key life cycle management,
+
+specified by requirements Req\_KM 1~9 and 11 of [ITU-T Y.3801].
+
+b) KSA: It is located between the KMA and a cryptographic application, and interfaces with the cryptographic application, realizing the function of
+
+- key supply,
+
+specified by requirement Req\_KM 10 of [ITU-T Y.3801]. It houses libraries of application program interfaces to support various cryptographic applications. It optionally includes the function of
+
+- key combination,
+
+specified in [ITU-T X.1714]. The function of key combination associates a key from the KMA with another provided by a key exchange method, in such a way that the security of the combined key is unchanged from that of the input key from the KMA, and outputs the combined key to the function of key supply. Details of the security aspects of the key combination function lie outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+c) In addition to the KMA and the KSA, the KM includes the function of
+
+- KM control and management,
+
+for communicating with the QKD module(s), the QKDN controller, and the QKDN manager to fulfil requirements Req\_KM 4, 5 and 9 of [ITU-T Y.3801].
+
+## 7.2 KM link
+
+According to the identification of the two functional elements, the KM link consists of the KMA link and the KSA link. The KMA and KSA have processors, storage, and communication interfaces.
+
+NOTE 1 – In a practical setting, the KMA and KSA, and the KMA link and KSA link can be implemented degenerately in a single server and a single link.
+
+NOTE 2 – There would be the case where a QKD node has only the KMA but not the KSA, for example, acting as a key relay node only.
+
+## 7.3 Reference points
+
+The reference points relevant to the KM ( $A_k$ , $K_{q-1}$ , $K_{q-2}$ , $K_{x-1}$ , $K_{x-2}$ , $C_k$ , $M_k$ ; see Figure 2) are specified in [ITU-T Y.3802].
+
+## 7.4 Security demarcation boundary
+
+A security domain is a common concept in information and network security. It is defined in [ITU-T Y.3800] as a boundary to demarcate one layer's responsibility on the keys to be supplied from another layer's responsibility on the use of the keys. It partitions a set of entities and parties that are subject to a single security policy. A security domain boundary often corresponds to a security responsibility demarcation point.
+
+A boundary can be identified between the KSA and the cryptographic application to demarcate responsibility for management and consumption of the keys. In this case, once the keys are supplied to the cryptographic applications, they use the keys under their own responsibility, while the KMAs and KSAs should delete or preserve the keys according to the key management policy. It is highly recommended that the cryptographic application not use the key more than once.
+
+# 8 Operations of key management
+
+Figure 4 depicts operations of key management based on the reference model, and illustrates how keys are managed and supplied to cryptographic applications.
+
+In the case shown in Figure 4, QKD nodes 1 and 3 are not directly connected by a QKD link. In order for the two nodes to share the key, key relay is performed between KMA2 and KMA3 by using the key generated in the QKD modules at QKD node 2 and 3. The key is finally supplied from KSA1 and KSA3 to the cryptographic application that requested the key. The QKDN controller performs routing control for key relay. The QKDN manager monitors the status of the whole QKDN and manages the QKDN, supporting the KMAs, the KSAs and the QKDN controller when necessary. To maintain interconnectivity and expandability in the QKDN, an appropriate key format for key data with added metadata containing various types of information needs to be introduced. A logical set of the key data and the metadata is referred to as a key file in this Recommendation.
+
+Based on the key file, the KMAs, the KSAs, and cryptographic applications communicate to each other the key data, the metadata and key management information. In addition, the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager communicate control and management information based on the metadata to the KMAs and the KSAs. In the following, basic key management procedures are described.
+
+Security issues and methods lie outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE 1 – In Figure 4, horizontal solid lines and vertical solid arrows represent KMA links and interfacing paths, respectively, on which keys are conveyed, and hence for which confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of the keys need to be considered. Horizontal dotted lines represent KSA links in which information on key synchronization and authentication are conveyed. Vertical dotted arrows from the cryptographic application to the KSA represent key requests. Other dotted arrows represent links for communicating QKDN control and
+
+management information between connected entities. For these dotted lines and arrows, integrity of the information is a primary concern.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional elements and operations of key management in a QKDN. It is organized into three main layers: the Quantum layer, the Key management layer, and the QKDN control layer.
+
+- Quantum layer:** Contains three QKD nodes (QKD node 1, QKD node 2, and QKD node 3). Each node consists of multiple QKD modules (e.g., Q1A1, Q1A2, Q1A3, Q1A4 for node 1). These modules are connected via QKD links to the Key management layer.
+- Key management layer:** Contains Key Management Agents (KMA1, KMA2, KMA3) and Key Storage Agents (KSA1, KSA2, KSA3). Each KMA is associated with a Storage unit (Storage 1, Storage 2, Storage 3). KMA links connect the KMAs, and KSA links connect the KSAs. A Key relay operation is shown between KMA2 and KMA3.
+- QKDN control layer:** Contains a QKDN controller and a QKDN manager. The QKDN controller manages the network, while the QKDN manager handles user network management. Cryptographic applications (1A, 3B) are connected to the KSAs and receive key requests.
+
+The diagram also shows the flow of keys and management information between these components, including key requests, key storage, and key relay operations.
+
+Figure 4: Functional elements and operations of key management. The diagram illustrates a Quantum Key Distribution Network (QKDN) with three nodes (QKD node 1, 2, and 3) and their interactions with cryptographic applications, a QKDN controller, and a QKDN manager.
+
+**Figure 4 – Functional elements and operations of key management**
+
+NOTE 2 – Figure 4 describes a QKDN in the simplest way with three nodes. In such a simplification, while key relay can be featured, a routing control aspect cannot be well represented, but it is not excluded.
+
+## 8.1 Generation of a QKD-key in the quantum layer
+
+In the quantum layer, a pair of QKD modules generates a pair of symmetric (identical) random bit strings in its own way based on an information theoretically secure (IT-secure) protocol of QKD. Each QKD module is installed in a secure and reliable node against security threats (trusted node).
+
+NOTE 1 – Conventionally, a sender (transmitter) and a receiver of keys or cipher texts are called "Alice" and "Bob", respectively, in the field of cryptography. In this Recommendation, Alice and Bob are often used to indicate QKD modules connected by a QKD link that share a key. In the case of QKD protocols in a so-called prepare-and-measure scheme, Alice and Bob are a sender and a receiver, respectively. In the case of QKD protocols based on measurement-assisted schemes, such as MDI-QKD and TF-QKD, mentioned in [ITU-T Y.3800], both Alice and Bob are transmitters, while receivers are located at an intermediate point on a quantum channel. In the case of entanglement-based QKD protocols, both Alice and Bob are receivers, while a transmitter of entangled quantum signals is located at an intermediate point on a quantum channel.
+
+NOTE 2 – A QKD protocol means a list of steps for establishing symmetric cryptographic keys with information-theoretical security based on quantum information theory in this Recommendation.
+
+The QKD protocol may differ for each pair of QKD modules, and each pair of QKD modules may be produced independently by a different vendor. In the following, the symmetric random bit string generated in the QKD module is referred to as a QKD-key, distinguished from a key which is re-sized
+
+and formatted in the KMA and the key in the KSA. Unit lengths of QKD-keys produced by different QKD module pairs may be different from each other.
+
+In each QKD module, metadata are generated and attached to the QKD-key, forming a key file. The pair of QKD modules transfer the QKD-key file to the corresponding KMAs.
+
+The metadata for a QKD-key are specified in item (1) of Table 1.
+
+## **8.2 Management of KMA-key and KSA-key in the key management layer**
+
+This clause specifies the operation executed in the key management layer, introducing two types of key data, i.e., KMA-key and KSA-key. The procedures include six main operations, which are explained in clauses 8.2.1 to 8.2.6. The order of these sub-clauses does not necessarily correspond to the actual temporal order of execution, which might vary depending on real situations and use cases.
+
+#### **8.2.1 Key acquisition, authentication, storage in KMA**
+
+Requirement Req\_KM 2 of [ITU-T Y.3801] is that a KMA receives the QKD-key files from QKD module(s), which is/are located in the same QKD node, via an interface at the reference point Kq-1, and to store them securely when storage is necessary. The lengths of the acquired QKD-key files may differ from each other. Therefore, as recommended by Req\_KM 3 of [ITU-T Y.3801], the KMA re-formats (combines or splits) the QKD-keys into keys of a prescribed unit length, and then temporarily stores them in a buffer.
+
+Before storing the buffered keys as key data, the pair of KMAs (say KMA1 and KMA2) which receive the pair of QKD-keys confirm the identity of the buffered keys. Therefore, as recommended by Req\_KM 8 of [ITU-T Y.3801], the KMA has capabilities of key synchronization, entity authentication and message authentication. The pair of KMAs authenticate each other via the KMA link. Then one of the KMAs (say KMA1) sends the matching KMA (say KMA2) a key-authentication request including a hash value or a message authentication code of the buffered keys as well as the QKD-key identifier (ID). Then KMA2 synchronizes (in bit position) and authenticates the buffered keys by comparing the hash values or the message authentication code in its hand with that from KMA1. Security details of the hash value communication lie outside the scope of this Recommendation. If the hash values or the message authentication codes coincide with each other, KMA1 and KMA2 finally store the buffered keys as key data, which is referred to as KMA-key, with metadata in the key storage directory. Otherwise, KMA1 and KMA2 abort the buffered keys.
+
+The metadata for KMA-key are specified in item (2) of Table 1.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Reception of key request from cryptographic application**
+
+A cryptographic application in the service layer sends a KSA a key request. The key request from cryptographic application may include information on a required security level, depending on key supply service policy, etc. Requirement Req\_KM 10 of [ITU-T Y.3801] is that the KSA receives key requests from authorized cryptographic applications via a key supply interface at the reference point Ak. The control of reception of key request(s) by the KSA can be supported by the QKDN controller, especially when key requests are sent from multiple cryptographic applications.
+
+The KSA then authenticates the cryptographic application by an appropriate means. Their certificate can be issued by an access control function of the QKDN controller, which manages an access control repository of registered functional components including cryptographic applications and KSAs. When the KSA and the cryptographic application establish authentication, they can exchange and share a common secret key for authentication for key request next time.
+
+NOTE – The KSA and the cryptographic application can keep a part of the key as a secret key for the next authentication.
+
+After the KSA authenticates the cryptographic application, the KSA and the KMA in the same node are recommended to authenticate each other. After authentication, the KSA informs the KMA of the
+
+requested information (e.g., key length, number of keys, node pair names or IDs, and KSA-key ID) for an individual key request. The KSA-key ID is a unique ID across the entire QKDN.
+
+#### 8.2.3 Key relay between KMAs
+
+As recommended by Req\_KM 6 of [ITU-T Y.3801], the KMAs support key relay through a key relay route between the two endpoint KMAs, employing highly secure encryption (e.g., one-time pad (OTP) [b-Shannon]). The key relay route is controlled by the QKDN controller as illustrated in Figure 1. The communication sessions between KMAs to establish the end-to-end key can be controlled by the QKDN controller.
+
+A typical case of point-to-point key relay using OTP, which is an IT-secure protocol for ensuring confidentiality of the keys is explained in the following paragraphs.
+
+The key data and metadata of the KMA-key are encrypted by exclusive OR (XOR) with the other key shared by the neighbouring pair of QKD modules in an OTP manner, and are then sent from the source KMA to the destination KMA, thus realizing IT-secure key relay (see Figure 4). After decryption in the destination KMA, key relay information consisting of the source KMA, the destination KMA and key relay time stamp is added to the source KMA-key metadata, and stored in the key storage as the metadata for relayed KMA-key at the destination KMA.
+
+When further relaying the key to the next destination node, it is encrypted just as before, including the key relay information. In this case, the key relay information is updated with the current node as the source KMA, the next destination node as the destination KMA, and new relay time stamp at the current node. This updated key relay information is added to the source KMA-key metadata, and stored in the second destination KMA.
+
+There is another option of key relay, namely, to use an extra random number generator (RNG) equipped in a KMA. The RNG in the source KMA generates a string of random numbers. The source KMA stores the random number string in its storage, and relays its copy to the destination KMA by the OTP-based key relay. Thus, a pair of symmetric random bit strings can be shared between the endpoint KMAs.
+
+NOTE 1 – In Figure 4, KMA1 and KMA2 read the required number of keys from their storage as key files with the corresponding metadata, "KM1A" and "KM3B", respectively. In KMA2, the latter key file is encrypted by XOR with the other key (shared by the neighbouring pair of QKD modules) with metadata "KM2A1" in an OTP manner, then sent to KMA3 via the KMA link, and finally decrypted by the key with metadata "KM3B1". The key is thus shared between KMA1 and KMA3.
+
+NOTE 2 – In the scheme shown in Figure 4, key relay is performed in a unit of a key file (metadata and key data) because implementation of key relay can be simplified, and the size of metadata is not long, typically a few 10s of bytes. For example, the relayed key file as a whole (the metadata "KM3B" and the key data) is encrypted by OTP using the other key data (with the metadata "KM2A1"). However, an option is not excluded in which metadata is not encrypted by the KMA-keys in an OTP manner.
+
+NOTE 3 – The RNG should be non-deterministic: This can be realized with conventional physical noise-based schemes as specified in [b-ISO/IEC 18031] or with quantum principle-based schemes (quantum noise RNG).
+
+As recommended by Req\_KM 7 of [ITU-T Y.3801], in addition to the OTP encryption method, the KMA supports another encryption method (e.g., AES [b-ISO/IEC 18033-3], [b-FIPS PUB 197]) for key relay according to key management policy. If the necessary number of keys for OTP-encrypted key relay is not available, a backup method with symmetric key cipher such as AES can be used for key relay.
+
+KMAs are recommended to create metadata to record an encryption method used for individual key relay, and use this metadata for key life cycle management of relayed KMA-keys.
+
+In each key relay, it should be confirmed whether the content (identity) of the key shared by the source and destination KMAs has been altered in transit. Therefore, as recommended by Req\_KM 8 of [ITU-T Y.3801], appropriate methods of entity and message authentication are employed to ensure
+
+authenticity and integrity for the KMAs and KMA-key, respectively. In particular, for integrity protection of the KMA-key, a hash value or a message authentication code of the KMA-key data can be used. Integrity of key management information exchanged between KMAs is protected by performing message authentication. The detailed options for ensuring authenticity and integrity lie outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+The metadata for a relayed KMA-key are specified in item (3) of Table 1.
+
+#### **8.2.4 Key supply from KSAs to cryptographic applications**
+
+After the KSA and the KMA authenticate each other, the KSA informs the KMA of the requested information (e.g., key length, number of keys, node pair names or IDs, KSA-key ID, and the security level of key). The KMA picks up the required number of keys from the storage of KMA-key data, optionally taking into account the metadata on key relay encryption method based on the requested security level and key supply policy.
+
+When the cryptographic application requests keys that have the same security level as QKD-keys, the KMA is recommended to select KMA-keys that were relayed by OTP encryption, according to the metadata in the key relay encryption method.
+
+The KMA then transfers this key to the KSA. The KSA receives this key, as exemplified in QKD nodes 1 and 3 in Figure 4.
+
+NOTE – In order to adjust the key data length in the KMA in accordance with the requested length by the KSA, KMA-key data may sometimes be split and one part supplied to the KSA. In such a case, the remaining key data may be used in the subsequent key requests from the KSA. Then information to identify the remaining key data is needed in addition to the original KMA-key ID. For this purpose, some bit strings can be taken from the remaining key data and used as a new KMA-key ID.
+
+The key received by the KSA is referred to as the KSA-key. In the KSA, the acquired KMA-key data can optionally be combined with another key provided by a key exchange method, and an output KSA-key is derived as specified in [ITU-T X.1714].
+
+After the key is transferred from the KMA to the KSA, the KMA records its metadata in its storage, and may send metadata to the QKDN manager for key life cycle management as required by Req\_KM 11 and Req\_M 9 of [ITU-T Y.3801]. In the KSA, cryptographic application name, application source and destination IDs, KSA-key ID, and KSA-key length and supply timestamp are examples of KSA metadata that can be retained after key supply.
+
+Finally, as recommended by Req\_KM 8 of [ITU-T Y.3801], a hash value or a message authentication code is calculated from the KSA-key data in each KSA of the node pair for an individual key request. The pair of the KSAs compares their hash values or message authentication codes, as well as the KSA-key ID, via a KSA link, then synchronizes and authenticates the KSA key. Security details of the hash value communication lie outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+After the preceding verification is completed, the key data with the KSA-key ID is supplied to the cryptographic application via the key supply interface at the reference point Ak, as required by Req\_KM 10 of [ITU-T Y.3801]. KSA metadata is recorded in the storage of the KSA or sent to the QKDN manager for key life cycle management as required by Req\_KM 11 and Req\_M 9 of [ITU-T Y.3801]. The cryptographic application identifies the key data based on the KSA-key ID and uses it.
+
+Once the keys are supplied to the cryptographic application, the KMAs and KSAs should apply the key management policy, such as deleting the key data from or preserving the key data in their storage, as required by Req\_KM 10 of [ITU-T Y.3801].
+
+The metadata for a KSA-key are specified in item (4) of Table 1.
+
+The control of sessions for key supply can be supported by the QKDN controller, especially when keys are supplied to multiple cryptographic applications.
+
+#### 8.2.5 Rerouting of key relay between KMAs
+
+Rerouting of key relay should be carried out, depending on the status of the key management layer or the quantum layer, to try to ensure continued availability of key supply. Typical cases include when the number of KMA-keys in the relay node(s) falls below a threshold, and when a high QBER prevents or reduces the rate of QKD key generation between the relay node(s) connected by a certain QKD link. For more details, see [ITU-T Y.3804].
+
+As required by Req\_KM 5 of [ITU-T Y.3801], the KMA provides information on key management, via the KM control and management function, to the QKDN controller and the QKDN manager.
+
+As recommended by Req\_KM 4 of [ITU-T Y.3801], the KM control and management function receives status information of the QKD module and optionally of the QKD link, such as QBER, key rate, QKD link status and alarm on fault, from QKD modules in the quantum layer.
+
+The QKDN controller acquires the information on key management, such as key consumption rates, shared number of keys in the KMAs and KMA link status from the KMAs, as well as status information of the QKD module and optionally of the QKD link from the QKD modules.
+
+Especially when a KMA is notified of an alarm on a QKD link connected to the relay node(s), the KMA forwards the alarm to the QKDN controller and the KMA continues key relay according to provision of rerouting by the QKDN controller.
+
+Rerouting methods directed from the QKDN controller may include the following four cases.
+
+- a) Manual: A key relay route is set manually on the KMAs.
+- b) Fixed rate: Based on the key generation rates of the QKD links, the required frequencies of key relay are evaluated for node pairs, and a key relay instruction list is prepared. The KMAs carry out key relay according to this list.
+- c) Data-traffic adaptive: The KMAs perform key relay automatically based on recent statistical records of key relay traffic.
+- d) Scheduled: When it is possible to predict changes of a certain condition (e.g., key consumption or key generation rate), key relay is scheduled in advance.
+
+#### 8.2.6 Key life cycle management
+
+As required by Req\_KM 11 of [ITU-T Y.3801], each KMA stores information on key management activities on which it works, including reception, storage, formatting, relaying, synchronization, authentication, supply and deletion or preservation of keys. For example, each KMA collects and stores metadata in KMA-key files, and also sends them to the QKDN manager. Each KSA stores metadata in KSA-key files, and sends them to the QKDN manager.
+
+The KMAs handle all transitions between phases of key life cycle, cooperating with the QKDN manager, which monitors, audits and keeps track of these workflows.
+
+When an unexpected fault is detected, for example, if some KMA-keys are suspected to have been leaked to unauthorized parties or compromised somehow, the fault management function of the QKDN manager analyses the cause by tracing the key life cycle management information, and supervises the QKDN controller and the KMAs to take countermeasures. In the worst case, the KMAs delete relevant keys that might have correlations with the keys that are suspected to have been compromised.
+
+# 9 Alternative scheme of key relay
+
+A key relay scheme to share a key between the source node and destination node is illustrated in Figure 5. The $Key_{AB}$ is generated between KMA-A and KMA-B. The $Key_{AB}$ is relayed from KMA-B to KMA-C by OTP encryption with the $Key_{BC}$ . It is relayed from KMA-C to KMA-D by OTP encryption with $Key_{CD}$ and finally supplied to KSA-D.
+
+![Figure 5: Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 1).](9c6461e1e94afae4dec455e69a2ce152_img.jpg)
+
+The diagram illustrates a key relay scheme from point to point in Case 1. A central 'QKDN controller' is connected to four key management nodes: KM-A, KM-B, KM-C, and KM-D. Each node contains a Key Storage Area (KSA) and a Key Management Area (KMA).
+ - KM-A: KSA-A contains $Key_{AB}$ . KMA-A contains 'Storage-A' with $Key_{AB}$ .
+ - KM-B: KSA-B is dashed. KMA-B contains 'Storage-B' with $Key_{AB}$ and $Key_{BC}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{AB} \oplus Key_{BC}$ .
+ - KM-C: KSA-C is dashed. KMA-C contains 'Storage-C' with $Key_{BC}$ and $Key_{CD}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{AB} \oplus Key_{BC}$ and $Key_{BC} \oplus Key_{CD}$ .
+ - KM-D: KSA-D contains $Key_{AB}$ . KMA-D contains 'Storage-D' with $Key_{CD}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{AB} \oplus Key_{CD}$ .
+ Links: 'KSA link' connects KSAs, and 'KMA link' connects KMAs. 'Key relay' (purple arrows) shows the flow of XORed keys from KMA-B to KMA-C and then to KMA-D.
+
+Figure 5: Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 1).
+
+Y.3803(20)\_F05
+
+**Figure 5 – Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 1)**
+
+In case 2, illustrated in Figure 6, a random bit string $Key_{RN}$ that is generated locally at KMA-A is used for key relay from KMA-A to KMA-D.
+
+![Figure 6: Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 2).](10781f43062bf3e9601a1e086710556c_img.jpg)
+
+The diagram illustrates a key relay scheme from point to point in Case 2. A central 'QKDN controller' is connected to four key management nodes: KM-A, KM-B, KM-C, and KM-D. Each node contains a Key Storage Area (KSA) and a Key Management Area (KMA).
+ - KM-A: KSA-A contains $Key_{RN}$ . KMA-A contains 'Storage-A' with $Key_{AB}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{RN}$ and $Key_{AB} \oplus Key_{RN}$ .
+ - KM-B: KSA-B is dashed. KMA-B contains 'Storage-B' with $Key_{AB}$ and $Key_{BC}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{AB} \oplus Key_{RN}$ and $Key_{BC} \oplus Key_{RN}$ .
+ - KM-C: KSA-C is dashed. KMA-C contains 'Storage-C' with $Key_{BC}$ and $Key_{CD}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{BC} \oplus Key_{RN}$ and $Key_{CD} \oplus Key_{RN}$ .
+ - KM-D: KSA-D contains $Key_{RN}$ . KMA-D contains 'Storage-D' with $Key_{CD}$ . The KMA shows $Key_{CD} \oplus Key_{RN}$ .
+ Links: 'KSA link' connects KSAs, and 'KMA link' connects KMAs. 'Key relay' (purple arrows) shows the flow of XORed keys from KMA-A to KMA-B, then to KMA-C, and finally to KMA-D.
+
+Figure 6: Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 2).
+
+Y.3803(20)\_F06
+
+**Figure 6 – Scheme of key relay from point to point in [ITU-T Y.3800] (case 2)**
+
+There are two problems for the schemes case 1 and case 2 of key relay from point to point in real application. One is that the XOR cipher text key and the corresponding decryption key may coexist on one key relay node, which has a security risk. The other is that the network has complex KMA
+
+links between nodes, which results in implementation difficulty. To help alleviate these problems, two modified schemes of key relay are described in the following.
+
+In contrast to the scheme in Figure 5, the scheme in Figure 7 is modified as follows:
+
+- 1) the KMA link of one node connects to the destination node rather than a neighbouring node;
+- 2) the XOR ciphertext key is directly sent to the destination node;
+- 3) the relaying key is decrypted at the destination node by XORing all the ciphertext received.
+
+
+
+Y.3803(20)\_F07
+
+Figure 7: Scheme of key relay with XORs uniformly processed at destination node. The diagram shows four nodes (KM-A, KM-B, KM-C, KM-D) connected to a central QKDN controller. Each node has a KSA (Key Storage Area) and a KMA (Key Management Area). KM-A has KSA-A with Key\_AB and KMA-A with Storage-A. KM-B has KSA-B (dashed) and KMA-B with Storage-B containing Key\_AB and Key\_BC. KM-C has KSA-C (dashed) and KMA-C with Storage-C containing Key\_BC and Key\_CD. KM-D has KSA-D with Key\_AB and KMA-D with Storage-D containing Key\_CD. KSA links connect KSA-A to KSA-B, KSA-B to KSA-C, and KSA-C to KSA-D. KMA links connect KMA-A to KMA-B, KMA-B to KMA-C, and KMA-C to KMA-D. Key relay links connect KMA-B to KMA-D and KMA-C to KMA-D. The XOR operations are performed at the destination node (KM-D).
+
+**Figure 7 – Scheme of key relay with XORs uniformly processed at destination node**
+
+The function of the key relay node is simplified under this scheme. Only the XOR ciphertext key is sent out by the key relay node, and no neighbouring relays are required. In this way, the relaying key does not go through the nodes along the route and yet its XOR ciphertext does not coexist with the corresponding decryption key on the same node.
+
+However, this scheme does not help to simplify the complex KMA links in the network. Therefore, it is only applied to some specific scenarios such as the trunk-line network for link length extension.
+
+In contrast to the scheme in Figure 7, the scheme in Figure 8 is modified as follows:
+
+- 1) XOR processes are all done in a centralized node, which will send the XOR ciphertext key to the destination node;
+- 2) KMA links are set between each KMA and the centralized KMA;
+- 3) a QKDN controller link is set between the QKDN controller and the centralized KMA.
+
+KMA links are simplified under this scheme, and only KMA links between the nodes and the centralized node exist, thus facilitating network implementation.
+
+
+
+Figure 8: Scheme of key relay with XORs collected at one centralized node. The diagram shows a QKDN controller at the top connected to a central KMA for key relay (Centralized node). Below this are four nodes: KM-A, KM-B, KM-C, and KM-D. Each node contains a KSA (Key Storage Area) and a KMA (Key Management Area). KM-A has KSA-A with Key\_AB and KMA-A with Storage-A. KM-B has KSA-B (dashed) and KMA-B with Storage-B containing Key\_AB and Key\_BC. KM-C has KSA-C (dashed) and KMA-C with Storage-C containing Key\_BC and Key\_CD. KM-D has KSA-D with Key\_AB and KMA-D with Storage-D containing Key\_CD. Green arrows labeled 'KMA link' connect the KSAs to the central KMA. Orange arrows labeled 'KSA link' connect the KSAs to the central KMA. Purple arrows labeled 'Key relay' show the flow of XORed keys from the KSAs to the central KMA. The central KMA contains the XORed keys: Key\_AB ⊕ Key\_BC and Key\_BC ⊕ Key\_CD. The diagram also shows the XOR operation being performed in the KMA of each node: Key\_AB ⊕ Key\_CD in KMA-D, and Key\_AB ⊕ Key\_BC in KMA-B and KMA-C.
+
+Figure 8 – Scheme of key relay with XORs collected at one centralized node
+
+# 10 Key file format
+
+A key file consists of key data in a prescribed size and metadata that includes items required for key management. Contents of metadata depend on QKDN architectures, for example, centralized architecture or distributed architecture, and also on use cases. Metadata of a key file may be stored in a distributed manner, e.g., on each KMA and KSA. Table 1 summarizes basic metadata items.
+
+Table 1 – Metadata information (basic information)
+
+| Metadata | Description | M/O |
+|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
+| (1) QKD-key | | |
+| QKD-key ID | ID of the QKD-key. | M |
+| Key length | Key length of the QKD-key | O |
+| QKD module ID | ID of the QKD module (Alice or Bob) that generates the QKD-key | O |
+| Matching QKD module ID | ID to identify the matching QKD module that constitutes the pair of Alice and Bob | O |
+| Generation time stamp | Time stamp of QKD-key generation at the pair of QKD modules | O |
+
+**Table 1 – Metadata information (basic information)**
+
+| Metadata | Description | M/O |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
+| Hash value | Hash value of the QKD-key data.(2) KMA-key | | |
+| KMA-key ID | ID of the KMA-key, which is the same for the pair of keys for Alice and Bob, and unique in a QKDN. A part of the bits of the hash value generated from the names of the pair of QKD modules is often used for this ID | M |
+| Key length | Key length of the KMA-key | O |
+| Key type | Index to specify either encrypting key or decrypting key | O |
+| KMA ID | ID of the KMA that stores the KMA-key | O |
+| Matching KMA ID | ID of the matching KMA | M |
+| Generation time stamp | Time stamp of the KMA-key generation at the KMA | O |
+| QKD module ID | ID to identify the QKD module that generates the QKD-key corresponding to the KMA-key data | O |
+| Matching QKD module ID | ID to identify the matching QKD module that constitutes the pair of Alice and Bob | O |
+| Hash value | Hash value of the KMA-key data.(3) Relayed KMA-key | | |
+| Source KMA ID | ID of source KMA of the key relay | O |
+| Destination KMA ID | ID of destination KMA of the key relay | O |
+| Key relay time stamp | Time stamp of the key relay | O |
+| Key relay encryption method | Encryption method used for the key relay | O |
+| KMA-key metadata | Metadata of KMA-key of the source KMA | M |
+| (4) KSA-key | | |
+| KSA-key ID | ID of the KSA-key | M |
+| Key length | Key length of the KSA-key | O |
+| Supply time stamp | Time stamp of the KSA-key supply from the KSA to a cryptographic application | O |
+| Application name | Name of cryptographic application | O |
+| Application source ID | Source ID of cryptographic application | O |
+| Application destination ID | Destination ID of cryptographic application | O |
+| O: Optional, M: Mandatory
NOTE – Some use cases will be studied, and metadata structures will be described in detail. New items of metadata, such as priority queuing control, quality of service control, and so on, will be described as extensions.
| | |
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI GR QKD 007] ETSI Group Report GR QKD 007 V1.1.1 (2018), *Quantum key distribution (QKD); Vocabulary*.
+- [b-ETSI GS QKD 008] ETSI Group Specification GS QKD 008 V1.1.1 (2010), *Quantum key distribution (QKD); QKD module security specification*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 18031] ISO/IEC 18031:2011, *Information technology – Security techniques – Random bit generation*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010, *Information technology Security techniques Encryption algorithms Part 3: Block ciphers*.
+- [b-FIPS PUB 197] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197 (2001), *Announcing the advanced encryption standard (AES)*.
+- [b-Shannon] Shannon, C.E. (1949). Communication theory of secrecy systems. *Bell Syst. Tech. J.* **28**, pp. 666–682.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3822-202409-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3822 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Quantum key distribution networks
+
+# --- **Quantum key distribution networks – Requirements for autonomic quality of service assurance**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3822
+
+# Quantum key distribution networks – Requirements for autonomic quality of service assurance
+
+## Summary
+
+The quantum key distribution network (QKDN) is expected to be able to provide optimized support for a variety of quantum key distribution (QKD) services. One of the challenges of the QKDN is to assure the network performance and different quality of service (QoS)/quality of experience (QoE) requirements of different application scenarios in an autonomic way. The autonomic capability for QoS in QKDNs will support the seamless intelligent decision-making closed loop of monitoring, learning, decision, and action sub-processes.
+
+To enable the autonomic QoS assurance in QKDNs, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3822 specifies an overview, a conceptual model, high-level requirements and functional requirements of autonomic QoS assurance for QKDNs.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3822 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16117 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Autonomic, QKD network (QKDN), quality of service (QoS), quantum key distribution (QKD), requirement.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL amc is in [ITU-T Y.3819].
+
+To realize autonomous QoS assurance in QKDNs, autonomous QoS cognition capabilities need to be enabled as a basis. The closed loop of autonomous QoS cognition is also shown in Figure 1. It includes autonomous QoS monitoring, autonomous QoS learning, autonomous QoS decision, and autonomous QoS action.
+
+- Autonomous QoS monitoring measures and analyses the QoS information over the quantum layer, key management layer, and control and management layer in QKDNs;
+- Autonomous QoS learning learns the knowledge based on the monitored QoS information;
+- Autonomous QoS decision selects the proper QoS policy while considering the learnt QoS knowledge;
+- Autonomous QoS action makes configurations on the underlay QKDN layers according to the made QoS decision.
+
+For realizing a specific objective of autonomous QoS assurance for QKDN, the basic autonomous QoS assurance cognition is utilized to realize a complete autonomous closed loop. The autonomous QoS assurance additionally includes autonomous QoS provisioning, autonomous QoS planning, autonomous QoS optimization and autonomous QoS protection/recovery. Hence, implementing different autonomous QoS assurance capabilities for QKDNs requires the operations of autonomous QoS monitoring, learning, decision and action in the basic autonomous QoS cognition. Moreover, to enable autonomous QoS assurance for QKDNs, autonomous QoS cognition, autonomous QoS provisioning and autonomous QoS planning are essential; autonomous QoS optimization and autonomous QoS protection/recovery are recommended.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the conceptual model of autonomous QoS assurance in QKDNs. It is structured as follows:
+
+- Autonomous QoS assurance** (indicated by a dashed box) contains:
+ - Autonomous QoS cognition** (indicated by a red box) which is a closed loop of four steps: **Autonomous QoS monitoring** → **Autonomous QoS learning** → **Autonomous QoS decision** → **Autonomous QoS action**.
+ - Four additional capabilities, each in a box with a red header **Autonomic QoS cognition**:
+ - Autonomic QoS planning**
+ - Autonomic QoS provisioning**
+ - Autonomic QoS optimization** (this box has a dashed border)
+ - Autonomic QoS protection/recovery**
+- Below the main structure is a blue bar representing the **Quantum layer, key management layer, and control and management layer in QKDN**.
+- A blue arrow points upwards from the blue bar to the **Autonomic QoS cognition** section.
+- A blue arrow points downwards from the **Autonomic QoS optimization** box to the blue bar.
+
+Y.3822(24)
+
+Conceptual model of autonomous QoS assurance in QKDNs diagram
+
+**Figure 1 – Conceptual model of autonomous QoS assurance in QKDNs**
+
+## **8 High-level requirements of autonomic QoS assurance for QKDNs**
+
+The high-level requirements of autonomic QoS assurance are the following:
+
+- QKDNaq is required to translate QoS requirements into autonomic QoS policy rules;
+- QKDNaq is required to support real, near-real, and/or non-real time autonomic QoS assurance decision making and operations;
+NOTE – Autonomic QoS assurance cognition supports three modes of operations: urgent, high-priority, and normal [ITU-T Y.3819].
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic closed loop of QoS monitoring, QoS learning, QoS decision and QoS action;
+- QKDNaq is required to adapt to different QKDN conditions without human intervention;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the orchestration of autonomic QoS assurance capabilities with different QoS objectives;
+- QKDNaq is required to support a QoS model and its associated QoS profile for different objectives of autonomic QoS assurance;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the interface to the QKDN QoS assurance functionalities;
+- QKDNaq is recommended to support the cross-layer autonomic QoS assurance.
+
+## **9 Functional requirements of autonomic QoS assurance for QKDNs**
+
+The functional requirements of autonomic QoS assurance for QKDNs are specified as follows. To realize QKDNaq, the functional requirement groups of autonomic QoS cognition, autonomic QoS planning and autonomic QoS provisioning are mandatory; the functional requirement groups of autonomic QoS optimization and autonomic QoS protection/recovery are recommended.
+
+### **9.1 Autonomic QoS cognition functional requirements for QKDNs**
+
+The functional requirements of autonomic QoS cognition include autonomic QoS monitoring requirements, autonomic QoS learning requirements, autonomic QoS decision requirements and autonomic QoS action requirements in QKDNs.
+
+#### **1) Autonomic QoS monitoring requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic QoS measurement of QKDN elements in the quantum layer, key management layer and QKDN control layer according to the QoS assurance requirements;
+- QKDNaq is required to support real-time autonomic QoS monitoring;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic QoS analysis and reporting.
+
+#### **2) Autonomic QoS learning requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic QoS learning of the monitored QoS information and QoS policies for adjusting the further QoS decision;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the QoS knowledge update in real-time, near-real-time or non-real-time;
+NOTE – The learnt information during the autonomic QoS learning is called QoS knowledge.
+- QKDNaq is required to support QoS knowledge information exchange repository;
+- QKDNaq is recommended to support machine learning algorithms.
+
+#### **3) Autonomic QoS decision requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic QoS policy selection for services under dynamic QKDN status;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic QoS policy adjustment based on QoS knowledge.
+
+#### **4) Autonomic QoS action requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support QoS configuration based on the QoS decision results (e.g., parameter adjustment in the quantum layer, routing configuration);
+- QKDNaq is recommended to support autonomic QoS action by interfacing with the QKDN control and management functions.
+
+### **9.2 Autonomic QoS planning functional requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic cross-layer monitoring of QoS data in the quantum and key management layers;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic cross-layer learning of traffic estimates and topology in the quantum and key management layers;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic selection of accurate models for control and user data (e.g., key information) transmissions;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic incorporation of the actual QKDN functional entities characteristics, functionalities and parameters;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic service-driven QoS planning;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic conversion of service models to traffic models;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic and accurate estimation of network coverage, capacity, and resource demands.
+
+### **9.3 Autonomic QoS provisioning functional requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic monitoring and learning of the QKDN QoS data from the quantum and key management layers;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic QoS policy generation based on the monitored and learnt QoS results;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomically translating the generated QoS policies to resource-facing key management and quantum layers' specific rules;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomically selecting and adjusting the QoS provisioning policy;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic provisioning of QoS-based routing and rerouting;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic service-driven QoS provisioning;
+- QKDNaq is required to support real-time or near-real closed-loop QoS provisioning operation;
+- QKDNaq is recommended to provision network and key-related QoS resources in an autonomic way.
+
+### **9.4 Autonomic QoS optimization functional requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic monitoring and learning of the results of QoS planning, QoS provisioning and QoS protection/recovery;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomically updating the QoS planning results to improve the user's QoE and optimize resource utilization;
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomically updating the QoS provisioning results to improve the user's QoE and optimize resource utilization;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic estimation of QoS optimization results;
+- QKDNaq is recommended to support the autonomic updating of the QoS protection/recovery results to improve the user's QoE and optimize resource utilization.
+
+### **9.5 Autonomic QoS protection/recovery functional requirements for QKDNs**
+
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomic interaction of fault management and QoS protection and recovery;
+- QKDNaq is required to support autonomically selecting and adjusting the QoS protection/recovery policy based on the monitored and learnt results of QoS protection/recovery information;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the autonomic routing and rerouting control based on the QoS protection/recovery policies and the fault information;
+- QKDNaq is required to support the real-time or near-real closed-loop operation of autonomic QoS protection/recovery;
+- QKDNaq is recommended to autonomically assure key request session recovery ratio, recovery wavelength reservation ratio and recovery time adapting to different network conditions.
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation describes the high-level and functional requirements of autonomic QoS assurance for QKDNs. Therefore, security requirements described in [ITU-T X.1710], security considerations described in [ITU-T Y.3801] and [ITU-T Y.3802], and general network security requirements and mechanisms in IP-based networks described in [ITU-T Y.2701 and ITU-T Y.3101] should be applied. Details are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.800] Recommendation ITU.T E.800 (2008), *Definitions of terms related to quality of service*.
+- [b-ITU-T P.10] Recommendation ITU-T P.10/G.100 (2017), *Vocabulary for performance, quality of service and quality of experience*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3800] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800 (2019), plus Corrigendum 1 (2020), *Overview on networks supporting quantum key distribution*.
+- [b-ETSI GR QKD 007] ETSI GR QKD 007 (2018), *Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); Vocabulary*.
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3825 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Quantum key distribution networks
+
+---
+
+# **Integration of quantum key distribution network and time-sensitive network – Framework**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3825
+
+# Integration of quantum key distribution network and time-sensitive network – Framework
+
+## Summary
+
+Time-sensitive networking (TSN) aims to provide a reliable, low-latency, and low-jitter traffic flow service for time-sensitive (i.e., bounded latency) applications such as industrial Internet of things (IIOT) services and factory automation applications. The quantum key distribution network (QKDN) can provide highly secure cryptographic services with low latency for time-sensitive network. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3825 provides a framework for integration of QKDN and time sensitive network, including an overview and scenarios, network capabilities, the conceptual network structure, basic functions and overall operational procedures for integration of QKDN and TSN.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3825 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16133 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Quantum key distribution (QKD), QKD network (QKDN), time-sensitive networking (TSN).
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3831 (12/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Quantum key distribution networks
+
+---
+
+**Integration of quantum key distribution network and user networks supporting end-to-end modern cryptography services –
+Functional architecture**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3831
+
+# Integration of quantum key distribution network and user networks supporting end-to-end modern cryptography services – Functional architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+In order to support QKD service to mobile objects (i.e., autonomous cars, mobile phones, etc.), it is challenging to establish and maintain a quantum channel in a stable manner with them and to support KSA-keys. Such a challenge calls for a solution to integrate the QKDN and user networks supporting modern cryptography services.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3826 addresses these challenges and specifies several architectural models, requirements, and a framework architecture for the integration. This Recommendation specifies a functional architecture for the integration of QKDN and UNemc. It defines a functional architecture, associated functions, reference points and some example operational procedures.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3831 | 2025-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16624 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Functional architecture, integration, modern cryptography, PQC (post quantum cryptography), QKD (quantum key distribution), QKDN (QKD network).
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4116
+
+(10/2017)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Requirements and use cases
+
+# --- **Requirements of transportation safety services including use cases and service scenarios**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4116
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4116
+
+# Requirements of transportation safety services including use cases and service scenarios
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4116 describes requirements for providing transportation safety services. The use cases and related service scenarios that are used to extract requirements for various IoT services and applications are also described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.4116.
+
+Accidents and disasters caused by the transportation means affect many lives and properties. Transportation safety can be influenced by defective vehicles (e.g., cars, trains, ships), environmental status (e.g., wind, snow, low temperatures), disruption to the transportation infrastructure (e.g., bridges, tunnels, roads) and human error. Transportation safety services based on Internet of things (IoT) technologies can reduce the occurrence of accidents and disasters, and save the lives and damage to properties in the case of natural disaster.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4116 | 2017-10-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13385 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Internet of things, platform use case, requirement, service scenario, transportation management centre, transportation safety services, transportation service.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at – Car collision – Car overturn – Traffic injury | Abnormal status of vehicle | – Sources of abnormality: engine and driving parts – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Abnormal status of transportation infrastructure | – Sources of abnormality: road, bridge, tunnel – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Bad weather conditions | – Kinds of bad weather: freeze, fog, rain – Unmanageable and unpredictable |
+| | | Driver tiredness | – Tiredness phenomena: sleepiness, de-concentration – Manageable and predictable condition: driver's sleepiness – Unmanageable condition: driver's de-concentration |
+
+**Table 2 – Characteristics of safety management for different transportation disaster types**
+
+| Type of transportation | Type of disaster | Cause of disaster | The characteristics of safety management |
+|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Railway | – Train collision – Train derailment – Traffic injury | Abnormal status of train | – Sources of abnormality: engine of locomotive, bogie – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Abnormal status of transportation infrastructure | – Sources of abnormality: railway, bridge, tunnel – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Bad weather conditions | – Kinds of bad weather: freeze, fog, rain – Unmanageable and predictable |
+| | | Driver tiredness | – Tiredness phenomena: sleepiness, de-concentration – Manageable and predictable condition: driver's sleepiness |
+| Maritime | – Ship collision – Ship sinking | Abnormal status of ship | – Sources of abnormality: engine and equipment for a voyage – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Bad weather conditions | – Kinds of bad weather: wind and waves, storm – Unmanageable and predictable |
+| | | Mate's tiredness | – Tiredness phenomena: sleepiness, de-concentration – Manageable and predictable condition: mate's sleepiness |
+| Air [unmanned aerial system (UAS)] | – Abnormal flying – UAS crash | Abnormal status of UAS | – Sources of abnormality: engine and driving parts – Manageable and predictable |
+| | | Bad weather conditions | – Kinds of bad weather: wind and rain, storm – Unmanageable and predictable |
+| | | Pilot condition | – Tiredness phenomena: carelessness – Manageable |
+
+### 7.1 Sensor requirements
+
+- 1) A sensor is required to be controllable by humans or things.
+- 2) Sensor calibration by remote is recommended.
+- 3) A sensor is recommended to be operated with minimum power to make the use of the power source generated by the energy harvester attached to a vehicle sufficient for sensor operation, as well as extending operational life and reducing maintenance cost.
+- 4) A sensor node can consist of multiple sensors and a communication module. It is recommended that an open interface be provided to manage the various sensors and to reduce operational and maintenance costs.
+- 5) The sensing period of a sensor is recommended to be adjustable according to the power status of the sensor node in order to save sensor power.
+
+- 6) A sensor is recommended to provide measured data with timing information.
+- 7) In the case of a wireless sensor network, the sensing period and transmission period of a sensor are recommended to be adjustable according to the channel capacity of the wireless sensor network in order to ensure sustainability of the sensing operation.
+
+### **7.2 IoT sensing network requirements**
+
+- 1) Sensors are recommended to support interconnectivity through a wireline or wireless network, enabling device to device (D2D) or machine to machine (M2M) communication.
+- 2) Sensors are recommended to enable cooperation with each other through a sensing network in order to support precise monitoring (e.g., for the purpose of anticipating disasters).
+- 3) An IoT sensing network is recommended to support connectivity to external heterogeneous networks, such as wireless local area networks (WLANs) and mobile networks, in order to enable service coverage extensions.
+- 4) An IoT sensing network is required to enable connectivity to a gateway [ITU-T Y.4101], which supports IP and non-IP addressing schemes.
+- 5) An IoT sensing network is recommended to support multicasting service for sensing data and control messages in order to decrease delay latency and to mitigate sensing network interference.
+- 6) An IoT sensing network is recommended to extend a service coverage area using dedicated multi-hop channel technology, e.g., based on a dedicated channel as specified in [b-IEEE 802.15.4] or other radio access technologies, such as WLAN, in the case of a multi-radio access technology (multi-RAT) environment.
+- 7) An IoT sensing network is recommended to be fault tolerant, including delay tolerance, in order that, in case of network disruption, sensing data from affected areas can still be collected.
+
+### **7.3 IoT sensing data delivery requirements**
+
+- 1) IoT sensing data are recommended to be compressed before transmission to reduce network load and, in case of wireless network, to decrease interference.
+- 2) IoT sensing data are recommended to be protected from unauthorized access.
+- 3) IoT sensing data are recommended to be transmitted with timing information, e.g., in the case of aggregation of various sensing data delivered from different networks.
+- 4) IoT sensing data are recommended to be delivered using standard formats, e.g., for the purpose of creating multiple application services using those data.
+- 5) The interface between a road vehicle and the transportation safety service platform is recommended to support standardized Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technologies [b-ITU-T Y.4407] to deliver IoT sensing data.
+- 6) The interface between a train and the transportation safety service platform is recommended to support standardized LTE-R [b-3GPP release 11] technologies to deliver IoT sensing data.
+- 7) The interface between a ship and the transportation safety service platform is recommended to support standardized e-navigation technologies [b-IMO] to deliver IoT sensing data.
+
+### **7.4 Transportation safety-related disaster monitoring requirements**
+
+- 1) In order to mitigate risks, it is required to accurately anticipate and detect disasters.
+NOTE 1 – IoT sensing data as described in Table 1 and images generated from CCTV or cameras may help in disaster prediction and detection (e.g., sensing data values above thresholds can be considered as indicators for the prediction and detection of disaster).
+
+- 2) The threshold values for estimation of anticipatory signs and disaster detection are recommended to be accessible for timely processing in vehicles.
+
+NOTE 2 – As an example, the transportation safety service platform may generate threshold values and deliver them to vehicles.
+
+- 3) IoT sensing data from vehicles and transportation infrastructure, as well as offline data, such as climate and disaster history, can optionally be used to increase the ability to anticipate disasters with high accuracy in real time.
+- 4) In order to reduce damage from disasters, collaboration among multiple IoT devices in vehicles and transportation infrastructure can optionally be realized to increase reliability and timeliness of disaster detection.
+
+NOTE 3 – The accuracy and reliability of disaster detection may be impacted by the accuracy of IoT sensing data, types of sensing data, and appropriate combination of multiple threshold values.
+
+### **7.5 Maintenance requirements of transportation infrastructure and vehicles**
+
+- 1) IoT transportation safety services are required to provide IoT-based information in order to manage transportation infrastructure and vehicle safety.
+- 2) Safety indexes created from IoT sensing data are recommended to be used in order to analyse transportation infrastructure and vehicle safety status.
+- 3) Safety indexes are recommended to be used to generate appropriate maintenance actions for transportation infrastructure.
+- 4) Transportation infrastructure safety modelling that classifies the transportation infrastructure according to its characteristics and determines points where IoT sensors have to be placed is recommended to estimate the health status of transportation infrastructure, predict disasters and establish maintenance strategy.
+- 5) It is recommended that transportation safety services and vehicle work together to provide the driver with early warning notifications of vehicle abnormal status. Transportation safety services can optionally help the driver to do maintenance off line.
+- 6) It is recommended that the transportation safety services and vehicle work together to provide the driver with forecasts of potentially abnormal safety status of vehicle. The transportation safety services can optionally help the vehicle manufacturer to enhance the vehicle's safety functions and performance.
+- 7) It is recommended that vehicles do the self-check automatically on fault triggers, event triggers, environment triggers, as well as according to the predefined schedule such as check period, check date, and manual check.
+- 8) It is recommended that vehicles do the online check to get comprehensive and professional examinations when unrecoverable faults have occurred in the self-check.
+
+NOTE – The online check, triggered by these faults, can be run on a periodic basis or non-periodic basis.
+- 9) It is recommended that vehicles do the appropriate online maintenance if problems have been found in the online check.
+
+### **7.6 Disaster simulation requirements**
+
+- 1) Disaster simulations based on IoT sensing data from vehicles and transportation infrastructure can be optionally used to increase the ability of disaster occurrence prediction and disaster type prediction, and, in case of disaster occurrence, to increase the ability of affected disaster area estimation for exact countermeasures.
+
+- 2) In order to improve accuracy of disaster simulation, combination of relevant IoT sensing data can be optionally used (e.g., from vehicles, transportation infrastructure and the surrounding environment).
+- 3) Simulations of the various transportation disaster types (e.g., crash because of bad weather, vehicle overturn and sinking) are required to prepare appropriate countermeasures.
+- 4) It is required to estimate the propagation velocity and area affected by dangerous materials in the case of accidents from vehicles carrying them, such as hydrofluoric acid or sulfuric acid.
+- 5) It is required to estimate the area affected by disaster by simulation.
+NOTE 1 – Information from spatiotemporal data modelling based on a geographic information system (GIS) and three-dimensional (3D) space information can optionally be used to improve the accuracy of estimation.
+- 6) In order to improve the ability to anticipate disasters, a disaster occurrence estimation model is recommended to be generated.
+NOTE 2 – IoT sensing data can be optionally used in support of modelling.
+
+### **7.7 Management requirements of transportation safety services**
+
+- 1) It is recommended to manage transportation safety comprehensively, including consideration of both vehicles and transportation infrastructure.
+- 2) In order to efficiently manage transportation safety, transportation management is recommended to collect and use current IoT sensing data, as well as relevant and appropriate accident history data and maintenance history data.
+- 3) In order to manage the maintenance record of vehicles, it is recommended that a vehicle repair centre automatically collect vehicle identification and repair history status when a vehicle enters the centre.
+- 4) In order to avoid accidents caused by driver tiredness, it is recommended that driver tiredness be monitored in real time while driving and appropriate action taken.
+- 5) When measuring tiredness, it is recommended that drivers collaborate with the transportation management centre in terms of providing relevant information about their tiredness and taking appropriate action.
+
+### **7.8 Application service requirements of transportation safety**
+
+- 1) It is recommended that composition of IoT sensing data be enabled for the creation of application services.
+- 2) For transportation safety service provisioning, relevant IoT sensing data (e.g., from vehicles and transportation infrastructure) are recommended to be composed to create virtual IoT sensors, as these can reduce the number of required physical sensors and their maintenance costs.
+- 3) In order to reduce the disaster damage risk, the establishment of emergency network facilities (e.g., wireless sensor networks) is recommended as countermeasure.
+- 4) For transportation safety service provisioning, analysis of relevant IoT sensing data (e.g., from train bogie and electric equipment, and transportation infrastructure) is recommended to generate a safety index in real time.
+- 5) Operation of condition-based maintenance (CBM) technology is recommended using IoT sensing data.
+NOTE – CBM monitors the actual conditions of vehicles and transportation infrastructure to decide what maintenance needs to be done. It may help disaster anticipation.
+
+- 6) In order to create smart logistics services, conflation of relevant IoT sensing data (e.g., from vehicle and transportation infrastructure) is recommended in order to produce a logistics satisfaction index.
+- 7) In order to calculate a logistics satisfaction index, use of historical delivery data from goods and delivery companies is recommended.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Use cases and service scenarios for transportation safety services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix describes various use cases illustrating the application service based on transportation safety services using IoT technologies.
+
+### I.1 Transportation safety management services
+
+#### I.1.1 Transportation status-monitoring service
+
+Safety assurance and cost effective management are important for all means of transportation, including car, bus, train and ship, in order to increase traffic capacity and provide fast transportation.
+
+Figure I.1 shows the management of different transportation services via a unified approach. This approach is particularly appropriate because different transportation services may be complementary and affect each other. An example scenario for such complementary services is one in which, because of a bus accident, passengers transfer from a bus to a train.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a unified transportation status-monitoring service architecture. At the center is a cloud icon representing an integrated open service platform. Four main components are connected to this central platform: 1. Road transportation management system: Includes icons for a car and a truck, and a server icon. 2. Maritime transportation management system: Includes an icon for a ship and a server icon. 3. Railway transportation management system: Includes an icon for a train and a server icon. 4. Transportation monitoring services: Includes an icon for a smartphone and a server icon. The entire system is interconnected via a central cloud, enabling data exchange between different modes of transport and management systems.
+
+Figure I.1 – Transportation status-monitoring service diagram
+
+Y.4116(17)\_Fl.1
+
+**Figure I.1 – Transportation status-monitoring service**
+
+In order to integrate all kinds of transportation information, management systems for road transportation, railway transportation and marine transportation are connected to an integrated open service platform.
+
+The transportation status-monitoring service provides the status of a transportation service for people in general, as well as for expert entities, such as transportation companies and disaster management centres.
+
+The transportation status-monitoring service provides expert entities with the status parameters of vehicles, such as temperature and vibration of vehicles, either in operating time or down time. In the case of a transportation status-monitoring service for expert entities, if there are some problems with vehicles, alert signals are generated to inform expert entities and related entities. The users of the transportation status-monitoring service (people in general or expert entities) can access status parameters at any time and place (e.g., using a PC or a smartphone).
+
+Tables I.1 and I.2 summarize the information offered by the transportation status-monitoring service to people in general and expert entities, respectively.
+
+**Table I.1 – Transportation information for people in general**
+
+| Vehicle type | Vehicle ID | Time tables | | Vehicle status information | | |
+|--------------|------------|--------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-------------|-----------|
+| | | Departure | Arrival | Current location | Timeliness | Accidents |
+| Bus | 100 | 10:30Intelligent transport systems – Framework for collaborative Telematics Applications for Regulated commercial freight Vehicles (TARV) – Part 7: Other applications. |
+| [b-ISO 15638-12] | ISO 15638-12:2014, Intelligent transport systems – Framework for cooperative telematics applications for regulated commercial freight vehicles (TARV) – Part 12: Vehicle mass monitoring. |
+| [b-ISO 15638-17] | ISO 15638-17:2014, Intelligent transport systems – Framework for cooperative telematics applications for regulated commercial freight vehicles (TARV) – Part 17: Consignment and location monitoring. |
+| [b-IEEE SCC2] | IEEE SCC42 website:http://standards.ieee.org/news/2014/ieee_scc42_transportation.html |
+| [b-IEEE 802.11p] | IEEE 802.11p, IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area network – Specific requirements, Part 11: wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications. |
+| [b-IEEE 802.15.4] | IEEE Std. 802.15.4-2015, IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks. |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4838] | IETF RFC 4838 (2015), Delay-Tolerant Networking Architecture. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc4838/ |
+| [b-IETF RFC 5050] | IETF RFC 5050 (2007), Bundle Protocol Specification. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5050/ |
+| [b-IMO] | International Maritime Organization (2017)http://www.imo.org |
+| [b-LPI] | World Bank (2015). LPI home.http://lpi.worldbank.org |
+| [b-GIS] | Wikipedia (2017). Geographic information system.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geographic_information_system |
+| [b-3GPP Release 11] | (3GPP) Specification release 11http://www.3gpp.org |
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4117
+
+(10/2017)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Requirements and use cases
+
+# --- **Requirements and capabilities of the Internet of things for support of wearable devices and related services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4117
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4117
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of the Internet of things for support of wearable devices and related services
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4117 describes characteristics, specific requirements and capabilities of the Internet of things (IoT) for support of wearable devices and related services.
+
+From an IoT requirement perspective, wearable device-related services (WDS) are classified in this Recommendation into four main classes: wearable device-related multimedia services (WDMS), wearable device-related health management services (WDHS), wearable device-related sport services (WDSS) and wearable device-related assistant services (WDAS). Wearable devices (WDs) can be categorized according to their usage (WDS class).
+
+Specific requirements and capabilities of the IoT to support the different WDs and WDS are provided. Furthermore, information concerning relevant use cases for WDs and WDS is provided in an appendix.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4117 | 2017-10-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13386 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Capabilities, characteristics, Internet of things (IoT), requirements, use cases, wearable devices, wearable device-related services.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Overview of the Internet of things . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4100] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4100/Y.2066 (2014), Common requirements of the Internet of things . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4401] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4401/Y.2068 (2015), Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things . |
+| [ITU-R P.525] | Recommendation ITU-R P.525 (2016), Calculation of free-space attenuation , incorporated to the Radio Regulations by reference. |
+| [IEC 60601-1-2] | IEC 60601-1-2:2014, Medical electrical equipment - Part 1-2: General requirements for basic safety and essential performance – Collateral Standard: Electromagnetic disturbances – Requirements and tests . |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 device** [ITU-T Y.4000]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing.
+
+**3.1.2 gateway** [b-ITU-T Y.4101]: A unit in the Internet of things which interconnects the devices with the communication networks. It performs the necessary translation between the protocols used in the communication networks and those used by devices.
+
+**3.1.3 Internet of things** [ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving, interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE 2 – In a broad perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications.
+
+**3.1.4 service** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined within this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 wearable device (WD)**: A category of devices that are incorporated into items of clothing or accessories, which can comfortably be worn or carried by the user.
+
+NOTE 1 – This Recommendation treats wearable devices as devices of the IoT (as defined in [ITU-T Y.4000]), considering that the communication between wearable devices and network may not require any human intervention.
+
+NOTE 2 – Wearable devices often have a variety of sensing abilities, but limited power capacity, constraining communication and data processing abilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – Wearable devices include devices usable by persons with disabilities.
+
+**3.2.2 wearable device-related assistant services (WDAS)**: A class of wearable device-related services specifically providing the user with services to improve personal efficiency.
+
+**3.2.3 wearable device-related health management services (WDHS)**: A class of wearable device-related services specifically providing the user with services for personal health management.
+
+**3.2.4 wearable device-related multimedia services (WDMS)**: A class of wearable device-related services specifically providing the user with multimedia content, virtual reality and social communication services.
+
+**3.2.5 wearable device-related services (WDS)**: With regard to the Internet of things (IoT), services built on the IoT and its capabilities that store, process and deliver data generated by wearable devices aiming to improve the life of the user.
+
+NOTE 1 – Examples of WDS objectives include, but are not limited to, monitoring of the physiological conditions, expansion of perception and improvement of the work efficiency of the user.
+
+NOTE 2 – Examples of data generated by wearable devices include user's physiological data, user's activity data and environmental data.
+
+**3.2.6 wearable device-related sports services (WDSS)**: A class of wearable device-related services specifically providing the user with services for sporting activity recording, analysis and planning.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| 2G | second Generation |
+| 3G | third Generation |
+| 4G | fourth Generation |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| EIRP | Equivalent Isotropically Radiated Power |
+| NFC | Near Field Communications |
+| NIR | Non-Ionizing Radiation |
+| PHR | Personal Health Record |
+| WD | Wearable device |
+| WDAS | Wearable Device-related Assistant Services |
+| WDHS | Wearable Device-related Health management Services |
+| WDMS | Wearable Device-related Multimedia Services |
+| WDS | Wearable Device-related Services |
+| WDSS | Wearable Device-related Sports Services |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+- The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+- The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+- The keywords "can optionally" and "may" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+## **6 Introduction to wearable devices and related services**
+
+Figure 1 provides an overview of WDs and WDS in the IoT.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of wearable devices and their related services in the IoT. At the center is a **User** wearing **Wearable devices** (Smart glasses, Smart clothing, Smart bracelet, Smart ring). These devices collect **Wearable device related data** (Physiological data, User's action data, Environmental data, etc.). This data is transmitted via an **IoT network** (ZigBee, Bluetooth) to **Wearable device related services**. These services include Monitoring of user's physiological condition, Expansion of user's perception, and Improvement of user's work efficiency. The services also provide **Analysis results** (Health advice, Exercise tips, Work plan, etc.) to **Other WDS users** (Doctor, Office assistant, Sports trainer, Game developers, etc.).
+
+Figure 1: Overview of wearable devices and wearable device-related services in the IoT. The diagram illustrates the flow of data and services between a user, wearable devices, an IoT network, and various services. A central 'User' is surrounded by 'Wearable devices' including smart glasses, smart clothing, a smart bracelet, and a smart ring. These devices collect 'Wearable device related data' (physiological, action, and environmental data) and send it to 'Wearable device related services' via an 'IoT network' (ZigBee, Bluetooth). The services include monitoring physiological condition, expanding perception, and improving work efficiency. The services also provide 'Analysis results' (health advice, exercise tips, work plan) to 'Other WDS users' (doctors, office assistants, sports trainers, game developers).
+
+Y.4117(17)\_F01
+
+**Figure 1 – Overview of wearable devices and wearable device-related services in the IoT**
+
+The fast development of semiconductor technology and mobile Internet has paved the way for the evolution of WDs. A WD can be seen as a kind of device [ITU-T Y.4000], such as a smart watch or virtual reality headset, with diverse sensing abilities that can be easily worn or carried by the user, as shown in Figure 1. By using information and communication technologies, WDS process the data generated by wearable devices including user physiological data, user action data, as well as environmental data. Objectives of these services include monitoring of the physiological conditions, expansion of perception and improvement of work efficiency of the user. In order to achieve these objectives, as an example, WDS provide analysis results, like health advice, exercise tips and work plans, to WDs and other WDS users, such as doctors and sport trainers. WDS interact with WDs via the IoT network as shown in Figure 1.
+
+The common requirements of the IoT [ITU-T Y.4100] are high-level requirements applicable to all IoT devices and related services. However, the special characteristics of WDs and WDS, as well as the requirements and capabilities of the IoT especially aiming for efficient support of WDs and WDS, need to be investigated.
+
+## 7 Characteristics of wearable devices and wearable device-related services
+
+In this clause, the common characteristics of WDs and WDS are described taking into consideration the use cases described in Appendix I.
+
+WDS are classified in this Recommendation into four main classes, as defined in clause 3: WDMS, WDHS, WDSS and WDAS. Different classes of WDS present specific characteristics. According to the categorization of WDS, the specific characteristics corresponding to the different classes of WDS are also described in this clause.
+
+### **7.1 Common characteristics of wearable devices and wearable device-related services**
+
+Some characteristics independent of the particular class of WDS can be abstracted as common characteristics.
+
+- Wearability: Unlike other devices that are agnostic to or rarely interact with users, WDs are carried by users and interact with them all the time. Convenience and comfort are the top considerations. The design of WDs needs to be small enough for convenience and portability.
+- Personal data protection: WDs and related services collect, transmit, and store lots of personal data. The confidentiality of data is fundamental for WDS, while data sharing is essential for the mutual interaction of users within a community.
+- Limited communication ability: Due to limitations of size, mass and power supply, WDs are not usually equipped with wide-bandwidth network access abilities. Most of them only support narrow-bandwidth connectivity technologies, e.g., Bluetooth and near field communications (NFC).
+- Limited storage space: According to use cases, WDs have limited storage space.
+- Limited power supply: Due to size and comfort requirements, WDs are only equipped with a small battery or even use solar or biological energy, which supply limited power.
+- Intelligence: As WDs can be carried by different users and work in different environments, they need adequate intelligence to adjust themselves to different usages.
+
+### **7.2 Characteristics of different classes of wearable device-related services and related wearable devices**
+
+Clauses 7.2.1 to 7.2.4 describe characteristics of the different classes of WDS as defined in clause 3.
+
+#### **7.2.1 Characteristics of wearable device-related multimedia services and related wearable devices**
+
+The characteristics of WDMS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Real-time processing: Normally, the bulk raw multimedia data collected by WDs in WDMS are required to be processed in real time. Such real-time processing includes pre-processing, compression, coding and transmission of the multimedia streams.
+- High power consumption: In WDMS, the power consumption of the WDs is relatively higher than in other classes of WDS, due to the massive quantities of data to be transmitted and real-time processing requirements.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Characteristics of wearable device-related sport services and related wearable devices**
+
+The characteristics of WDSS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Best effort delivery: Sports data can be temporarily stored and transmitted when network access is available. It is not necessary for WDs in WDSS to ensure real-time interaction with remote services.
+- Backend predominant analysis: Constrained by the size and fitness required by wearability in sports, the WDs in WDSS lack processing capability. Data analysis is generally realized in remote servers.
+- Diverse operational environment: The surrounding conditions may vary dramatically in WDSS. WDs are supposed to operate normally in different sporting activity situations.
+
+#### **7.2.3 Characteristics of wearable device-related health services and related wearable devices**
+
+The characteristics of WDHS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Always on and reliable: WDs in WDHS are always on and reliable, as health support is critical and intolerant of mistakes. Once an emergency takes place, warning messages or alerts must be generated and delivered in time.
+- High precision: Health monitoring needs high precision of physiological signals in WDHS. Such high precision needs to be maintained during the data processing and analysis phases.
+- Strict time delay tolerance: WDs in WDHS have strict time delay tolerance all the time, which is particularly crucial to ensure the timeliness of sensing data transmission in an emergency.
+
+#### **7.2.4 Characteristics of wearable device-related assistant services and related wearable devices**
+
+The characteristics of WDAS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Individualization: For WDs in WDAS, the services are customized to the individual accessing the services and independently from the WDs. The customization may concern the human/WDAS interface, access history, personal address book, to do list, etc.
+- Location awareness: Many services provided by WDAS are location based, such as navigation, patrol recording and location-based accommodation reservation. WDAS also pushes notifications according to WD positions.
+
+## **8 Specific requirements of the IoT for support of wearable devices and wearable device-related services**
+
+This clause describes the specific requirements of the IoT for the support of WDs and WDS that complement the common requirements of the IoT described in [ITU-T Y.4100].
+
+Clauses 8.1 and 8.2 provide common requirements of the IoT for WDs and WDS, respectively, and specific requirements of the IoT for different classes of WDS and related WDs.
+
+NOTE – The requirements are numbered for Recommendation management purposes. Each requirement is assigned two letters (CR, SR) to distinguish between common and specific requirements; a third letter (where it applies) indicates the specific WDS class (M, S, H and A) to which the requirement applies, and a number to enumerate all the requirements within the specific group identified by the two or three letters. In clauses 8.1 and 8.2, requirement identifications appear between square brackets "[ ]" and are inserted at the end of each paragraph describing the corresponding requirement(s).
+
+### **8.1 Common requirements of the IoT for wearable devices and wearable device-related services**
+
+The common requirements of the IoT for support of WDs and WDS are independent of any specific WDS class.
+
+NOTE 1 – The common requirements of the IoT identified in [ITU-T Y.4100] are a prerequisite for the support by the IoT of WDs and WDS, including those concerning security and confidentiality.
+
+The common requirements of the IoT for support of wearable devices and related services are as follows:
+
+- The IoT is required to support WDS communications for WDs with size and shape constraints. [CR1]
+NOTE 2 – Antennas and battery parameters are constrained by size or shape.
+- The IoT is recommended to support intelligent capabilities in order to provide good experience and accurate services to users according to their individual preferences, including historical data. [CR2]
+- The IoT is recommended to offer open and secure application programming interfaces (APIs), and associated management, for WDs and WDS. [CR3]
+
+NOTE 3 – As an example, this allows different actors of the ecosystem to access relevant data in a convenient and secure way.
+
+- The IoT is recommended to support energy saving management capabilities and low power communication protocols that can reduce WDS energy consumption. [CR4]
+
+NOTE 4 – This can extend the lifetime of power-constrained WDs.
+
+- The IoT is recommended to support WDs that comply with national or regional regulations regarding non-ionizing radiation (NIR). [CR5]
+- The IoT is required to support data sharing among different WDS and WDs. [CR6]
+
+NOTE 5 – Services and devices may need to use data from other devices or services. For example, two different WDHS may need to share information related to a patient who is a user of both services, e.g., in order to facilitate doctor's diagnosis.
+
+### **8.2 Specific requirements of the IoT for different classes of wearable device-related services and related wearable devices**
+
+#### **8.2.1 Specific requirements of the IoT for wearable device-related multimedia services and related wearable devices**
+
+The following are specific requirements of the IoT for support of WDMS.
+
+- The IoT is required to support high and reliable communication bandwidth for multimedia data transmission, like movies, voice and real-time online gaming. [SRM1]
+- The IoT is required to support real-time data processing, e.g., for support of video and music playing and online gaming. [SRM2]
+
+#### **8.2.2 Specific requirements of the IoT for wearable device-related sport services and related wearable devices**
+
+The following are specific requirements of the IoT for support of WDSS.
+
+- The IoT is required to support environment adaptability in order to cope with the different conditions of sporting activities, such as swimming and climbing. [SRS1]
+- The IoT is required to support remote processing capability in order to cope with sporting activity data analysis, storage, management, sharing and feedback, given the limited processing ability in WDs. [SRS2]
+- The IoT is required to support delay tolerant communications. [SRS3]
+
+NOTE – For example, WDs in a sports scenario may cache the gathered data and transfer them when the network is available or according to a predefined schedule.
+
+#### **8.2.3 Specific requirements of the IoT for wearable device-related health management services and related wearable devices**
+
+The following are specific requirements of the IoT for support of WDHS.
+
+- The IoT is required to support alarm mechanisms and warning messages according to WDHS requirements. [SRH1]
+
+NOTE 1 – Alarm mechanisms and warning messages are essential for close surveillance on abnormal states of patients or old people.
+
+- The IoT is required to provide accuracy both in sensing and analysis aspects according to WDHS requirements. [SRH2]
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, WDs should capture the precise status of patients and WDHS should also provide the correct analysis of captured data.
+
+- The IoT is required to provide reliable data communication in all possible communication environments (e.g., environments with healthcare devices, smart phones and WDHS). [SRH3]
+
+NOTE 3 – This is the precondition to use WDHS and related WDs for taking care of patients or old people.
+
+- The IoT is required to support WDHS communications for WDs compliant in terms of power constraints to an environment where medical electric equipment is present. [SRH4]
+
+NOTE 4 – Depending on the minimal possible distance to medical electric equipment ( $d$ ), the maximum value of equivalent isotropically radiated power (EIRP) shall not exceed $(E * d)^2 / 30$ [ITU-R P.525], where the limit of the electric field $E$ is specified in Table 9 of [IEC 60601-1-2].
+
+#### **8.2.4 Specific requirements of the IoT for wearable device-related assistant services and related wearable devices**
+
+The following are specific requirements of the IoT for support of WDAS.
+
+- The IoT is recommended to support network-assisted positioning. [SRA1]
+NOTE 1 – Network-assisted positioning provides a WD with its network location when the WD does not have locating capability.
+- The IoT is required to support voice communication and instant messaging communication capabilities. [SRA2]
+
+## **9 Specific capabilities of the IoT for support of wearable devices and wearable device-related services**
+
+This clause describes the specific capabilities of the IoT for the support of WDs and WDS which complement the capabilities of the IoT described in [ITU-T Y.4401].
+
+NOTE 1 – The capabilities of the IoT described in [ITU-T Y.4401] include support for security and privacy protection.
+
+The capabilities specified in this clause are deduced from characteristics and requirements mentioned in clauses 7 and 8. Some capabilities are deduced from corresponding characteristics and requirements, others are deduced by the analysis of multiple characteristics and requirements.
+
+NOTE 2 – The capabilities are numbered for Recommendation management purposes. Each capability is assigned two letters (CC, SC) to distinguish between common and specific capabilities; a third letter (where it applies) indicates the specific WDS class (M, S, H and A) to which the capability applies, and a number to enumerate all the capabilities within the specific group identified by the two or three letters. In clauses 9.1 and 9.2, the capability numbers appear between square brackets "[ ]" and are inserted at the end of each paragraph describing the corresponding capability(ies).
+
+### **9.1 Common capabilities of the IoT for wearable devices and wearable device-related services**
+
+The common capabilities of the IoT for support of wearable devices and wearable device-related services are independent of any specific WDS classes. The capabilities follow.
+
+- Wearable communications capability: Wearable communications capability provides communication technology support for WDs with size and shape limitations of antennas and battery. [CC1]
+- Intelligent capability: Intelligent capability provides data processing, analysis and self-learning ability. [CC2]
+- API management capability: API management capability provides standard APIs enabling access to data or services in a convenient and secure way. [CC3]
+- Effective energy management capability: Effective energy management capability provides the appropriate energy-saving scheme for data collection, transmission and processing. [CC4]
+
+- Radio frequency emission-constrained capability: Radio frequency emission-constrained capability enables communication with WDs that have constraints in terms of radiofrequency emissions. [CC5]
+- Data-sharing capability: Data-sharing capability enables data to be shared among different WDs and WDS according to the WD user data sharing control. [CC6]
+
+### **9.2 Specific capabilities of the IoT for different classes of wearable device-related services and related wearable devices**
+
+#### **9.2.1 Specific capabilities of the IoT for wearable device-related multimedia services and related wearable devices**
+
+The capabilities of WDMS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Real-time processing capability: Real-time processing capability realizes timely and efficient aggregation, processing and analysis of the multimedia data from WDs according to the specific WDMS requirements. This can ensure the quality of experience for users. [SCM1]
+- Enhanced communication capability: Enhanced communication capability can offer high bandwidth and reliable communication mechanisms. It enables collected and analysed data transmission with low latency and packet loss, providing an adequate guarantee for the quality of experience of users. [SCM2]
+
+#### **9.2.2 Specific capabilities of the IoT for wearable device-related sport services and related wearable devices**
+
+The capabilities of WDSS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Delay tolerant communication capability: Delay tolerant communication capability can enable WDs to transmit data to WDSS according to network availability. [SCS1]
+- Remote processing capability: Remote processing capability enables data aggregation, sampling, modelling, analysis and feedback. With this capability, the computing load and energy consumption of WDs can be significantly reduced. [SCS2]
+- Environmental adaptation capability: Environmental adaptation capability enables WDs to operate normally and reliably under diverse environmental conditions. [SCS3]
+
+NOTE – For instance, water resistance capability is needed for WDs operating underwater.
+
+#### **9.2.3 Specific capabilities of the IoT for wearable device-related health management services and related wearable devices**
+
+The capabilities of WDHS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Sensing accuracy and stability: Sensing accuracy and stability provides the capability of data sensing, collection, transmission and processing with accuracy and stability. [SCH1]
+- Alarm capability: Alarm capability enables detection of abnormal health parameters and offers timely warning or alarm messages. [SCH2]
+
+#### **9.2.4 Specific capabilities of the IoT for wearable device-related assistant services and related wearable devices**
+
+The capabilities of WDAS and related WDs follow.
+
+- Network-assisted locating capability: Network-assisted locating capability enables users to acquire their location information by the network. [SCA1]
+- Voice and instant messaging communication capability: Voice and instant messaging communication capability can enable users to communicate with WDAS or others WDAS users via voice and instant messaging. [SCA2]
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Use cases for wearable devices and wearable device-related services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Gateway for wearable device-related services
+
+With the growing number of WDs and WDS, issues related to communication, security, cost, power consumption and device management become more and more critical. Most WDs cannot store and analyse data locally because of their limited power and computing resources, and only support short-range communication protocols like Wi-Fi [b-IEEE 802.11] or Bluetooth [b-IEEE 802.15.1]. Reliable and secure gateway capabilities are needed to process collected data from WDs.
+
+Figure I.1 shows a use case of a gateway for WDS.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD; WDS[WDS] --- Network((Network)); Network -.->|2G/3G/4G| Gateway[Gateway]; Gateway -.->|Bluetooth/WiFi| WD1((WD)); Gateway -.->|Bluetooth/WiFi| WD2((WD)); Gateway -.->|Bluetooth/WiFi| WD3((WD));
+```
+
+Diagram of a Gateway for wearable device-related services. A WDS box is connected to a Network cloud. The Network cloud is connected to a Gateway box via a dashed line labeled '2G/3G/4G'. The Gateway box is connected to three WD ovals via a dashed line labeled 'Bluetooth/WiFi'. The label 'Y.4117(17)\_FI.1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Gateway for wearable device-related services**
+
+#### Use case description
+
+- a) Before using the service, the user needs to configure the gateway and WDs.
+- b) WDs can automatically connect to the network through the gateway or synchronize their data with the network according to WDS settings. All data generated by the WDs can then be sent to WDS through the gateway.
+
+In this use case, the gateway is capable of:
+
+- interconnecting networks with different technologies;
+- collecting, processing storing and relaying huge quantities of data from the WDs;
+- acting as a computation centre for power-hungry processes on behalf of the WDs;
+- acting as a firewall for security and confidentiality protection.
+
+### I.2 Wearable device-related multimedia services for broadcasting of car-racing games
+
+According to statistics, more than half of the data generated by the Internet is multimedia entertainment content. Audiences always want to get this content in a simple or creative way. WDs with multimedia functionality will greatly impact the multimedia industry.
+
+Figure I.2 shows a use case of WDMS for broadcasting of car-racing games.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Racers["racer (WDs)"] -- "Streaming data" --> Network
+ Network -- "Streaming data" --> WDMS
+ WDMS -- "Video broadcast" --> TVUsers["TV company users"]
+ WDMS -- "Video broadcast" --> WDWearers["Users wearing WDs"]
+ WDMS -- "Video broadcast" --> SocialMedia["Social media users"]
+
+```
+
+Y.4117(17)\_Fl.2
+
+Figure I.2: Wearable device-related multimedia services for broadcasting car racing games. The diagram shows a flow from racers wearing WDs (Wearable Devices) through a Network to WDMS (Wearable Device Multimedia Services), which then broadcasts video to TV company users, Users wearing WDs, and Social media users. Streaming data is also sent from the Network to WDMS.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Wearable device-related multimedia services for broadcasting car racing games**
+
+#### Use case description
+
+- Racers are equipped with helmets with camera and Wi-Fi, and the helmets maintain connection to the network throughout the whole game.
+- All streaming data recorded by helmets are received and processed by WDMS, then broadcast to different multimedia users.
+- Users can see the live broadcast on TV or on social media. In addition, users wearing WDs like smart glasses can see the scenes in the same way as the racers, no matter where they are.
+
+### I.3 Wearable device-related sport services for running exercise
+
+A WD can be used for sporting activity recording, e.g., accumulated number of steps, travelled distance and motion trail. With the availability of some extra information (e.g., sex, height, age of the runner), WDSS can suggest exercise plans based on the analysis of exercise records.
+
+Figure I.3 shows a use case for a running exercise with WDSS.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ WDs["WDs: Acceleration sensor, GPS location, Pedometer"] -- "Data" --> Network
+ Network -- "Data" --> WDSS
+ WDSS -- "Exercise records" --> SportsAnalysis["Sports analysis centre"]
+ SportsAnalysis -- "Exercise guidance" --> WDSS
+ WDSS -- "Exercise guidance" --> WDs
+
+```
+
+Y.4117(17)\_Fl.3
+
+Figure I.3: Wearable device-related sport services for running exercise. The diagram shows a flow from WDs (Wearable Devices) through a Network to WDSS (Wearable Device Sport Services), which then sends exercise records to a Sports analysis centre. The Sports analysis centre sends exercise guidance back to WDSS, which then sends it back to the WDs. The WDs contain an Acceleration sensor, GPS location, and Pedometer.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Wearable device-related sport services for running exercise**
+
+#### Use case description
+
+- a) A runner uses different WDs to collect running data, such as accumulated number of steps, travelled distance and motion trail. The collected running data are stored locally on the WDs.
+- b) A gateway collects all the running data and sends them to WDSS, and WDSS generate and store the running history data of the runner. As WDs may not always have network connectivity to the gateway, the collected data stored in the WDs may need the runner to enable their transmission.
+- c) With the permission of the runner, WDSS share the running history data with the sports analysis centre, normally a professional exercise agent like a gym or sporting club.
+- d) Exercise guidance, such as running trails, calorie consumption and total steps, developed by the sport analysis centre, is sent back to the runner.
+
+### I.4 Wearable device-related health management services for generation of personal health record related information
+
+WDs used in the health management domain can include sensors to measure a broad range of physiological parameters, including heart rate, blood pressure and oxygen levels, sleep and mood conditions, and potentially even complex measures such as stress or blood sugar levels. WDHS put together all the data related to an individual for the generation of a personal health record (PHR) – i.e., a complete and accurate record of an individual's health state and medical history – for health management and medical consulting. For WDHS, the promise of keeping patients out of hospital and providing timely health advice and feedback is a major responsibility.
+
+Figure I.4 shows a use case of WDHS for generation of PHR-related information.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the data flow for generating a Personal Health Record (PHR) using Wearable Device-Related Health Management Services (WDHS). At the bottom, a large oval labeled 'WDs' contains five smaller ovals representing different sensors: 'Blood sugar sensor', 'Weighing scale', 'Heart rate sensor', 'Blood pressure sensor', and 'Pedometer'. An upward arrow labeled 'Data' connects the 'WDs' to a box labeled 'WDHS'. From the 'WDHS' box, an upward arrow labeled 'PHR' points to a box labeled 'Medical agents'. A downward arrow labeled 'Health advice' points from the 'Medical agents' box back to the 'WDHS' box. A cloud-like shape labeled 'Network' is positioned between the 'WDs' and the 'WDHS' box, with the 'Data' arrow passing through it.
+
+Y.4117(17)\_FI.4
+
+Diagram illustrating the flow of data for generating a Personal Health Record (PHR) using Wearable Device-Related Health Management Services (WDHS).
+
+**Figure I.4 – Wearable device-related health management services for personal health record-related information generation**
+
+#### Use case description
+
+- a) The WDHS user uses different WDs to collect different physiological data, e.g., body mass and blood pressure measurements in the morning, activity-tracking data and burning calorie during the daytime and sleep patterns at night.
+- b) User data are sent to WDHS, which generate and store a PHR of the user.
+
+WDHS share the PHR with medical agents, like hospitals or recovery centres, with the user's permission, and forward health advice back to the WDHS user.
+
+### I.5 Wearable device-related assistant services for assistance of policemen on duty
+
+WDs can be easily worn or carried by users for professional use, e.g., in law enforcement. Through the interconnection with the police system, WDAS may greatly increase the work efficiency of the police. Figure I.5 shows a use case of WDAS assisting policemen on duty.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ PS[Police system] -- Lookup --> WDAS[WDAS]
+ WDAS -- Image --> N((Network))
+ N -- Commands --> WDs([WDs])
+ WDs --> F[Fugitive]
+ WDs --> SC[Stolen car]
+ WDs --> O[Overspeed]
+ WDs --> CA[Criminal activity]
+```
+
+Y.4117(17)\_FI.5
+
+Diagram illustrating the use case of WDAS assisting policemen on duty. The diagram shows a vertical flow of data and commands between the Police system, WDAS, Network, and WDs. The Police system sends a Lookup request to WDAS. WDAS sends an Image to the Network. The Network sends Commands to the WDs. The WDs detect activities such as Fugitive, Stolen car, Overspeed, and Criminal activity.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Wearable device-related assistant services to a policemen on duty**
+
+#### Use case description
+
+- a) Policemen on duty wear smart glasses or other appropriate WDs, and all suspected activities are recorded by WDs, e.g.,
+ - checking for speeds above limit with an integrated speed measuring system;
+ - suspected people or car tracking with an integrated camera.
+- b) Data collected by the WDs of policemen are sent to WDAS. WDAS classify the data and look up it in the police system.
+- c) WDAS forward specific commands back to the policemen, and assist them to take appropriate action, e.g.,
+ - generation of a traffic plan so that policemen can arrive at the identified site as soon as possible;
+ - real-time communication for police team work;
+ - real-time reporting to police headquarters.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4101 (2017), *Common requirements and capabilities of a gateway for Internet of things applications*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.11] IEEE Std 802.11-2016, *IEEE Standard for Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.15.1] ANSI/IEEE Std 802.15.1-2005, *IEEE Standard for information technology – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 15.1a: Wireless medium access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) specifications for wireless personal area networks (WPAN)*.
+- [b-GLOBALCOM] IEEE Global Communications Conference (2016), *A Real Time and Non-Contact Multiparameter Wearable Device for Health Monitoring*.
+- [b-ICNIRP-guidelines] International Commission on Non Ionizing Radiation Protection (1998), *Guidelines for limiting exposure to time-varying electric, magnetic and electromagnetic fields (up to 300 GHz)*.
+- [b-IEEE Access] IEEE Access (2016), *Context-Aware Scheduling in Personal Data Collection From Multiple Wearable Devices*.
+- [b-JSAC] IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (2016), *Assessing System-Level Energy Efficiency of mmWave-Based Wearable Networks*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4118-201806-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4118-201806-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2436c01ac2b33c764f2748132ce90646e750873d
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,718 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4118
+
+(06/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Requirements and use cases
+
+# --- **Internet of things requirements and technical capabilities for support of accounting and charging**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4118
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+## CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4118
+
+# Internet of things requirements and technical capabilities for support of accounting and charging
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4118 provides accounting and charging requirements for Internet of things (IoT) as well as an IoT accounting and charging technical capability framework, in order to assist in the standardization of accounting and charging technical mechanisms for IoT and to facilitate the development of the IoT market. The Recommendation focuses on the network layer capabilities and service support and application support layer capabilities, as well as business use cases applied to IoT.
+
+The use cases, requirements and technical capability framework provided in this Recommendation are from a technical point of view.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4118 | 2018-06-06 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13496 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Accounting and charging, B2C, B2B2C, characteristics, Internet of things, requirements, technical capability framework.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at ' to a 'Network resource provision' use case (oval) on the right, which is connected by a solid line to a 'Network provider' actor.](053f1077d592e6622cd21dc4bb4cb366_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ IoT_user[IoT user] --- IoT_service_provision([IoT service provision])
+ IoT_service_provision --- Service_provider[Service provider]
+ IoT_service_provision -.->|| Network_resource_provision([Network resource provision])
+ Network_resource_provision --- Network_provider[Network provider]
+
+```
+
+Y.4118(18)\_F03
+
+Figure 3: Model for the B2B2C use case of IoT. The diagram shows an IoT user at the top, connected by a solid line to an 'IoT service provision' use case (oval) on the left. This use case is connected by a solid line to a 'Service provider' actor. The 'IoT service provision' use case is also connected by a dashed arrow labeled '' to a 'Network resource provision' use case (oval) on the right, which is connected by a solid line to a 'Network provider' actor.
+
+**Figure 3 – Model for the B2B2C use case of IoT**
+
+The revenue flow of the B2B2C use case is shown in Figure 4. The IoT user will pay the service provider for the subscribed IoT service. The service provider will pay the network provider for the network resource usage related to the subscribed IoT service provision. When the IoT user subscribes multiple IoT services from multiple service providers, there will be multiple independent revenue flows for these service providers.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ IoT_user[IoT user] -- "Revenue from IoT service provision" --> Service_provider[Service provider]
+ Service_provider -- "Revenue from IoT service related network resource provision" --> Network_provider[Network provider]
+
+```
+
+Y.4118(18)\_F04
+
+Figure 4: Revenue flow for the B2B2C use case of IoT. The diagram shows three actors: IoT user, Service provider, and Network provider. An arrow labeled 'Revenue from IoT service provision' points from the IoT user to the Service provider. Another arrow labeled 'Revenue from IoT service related network resource provision' points from the Service provider to the Network provider.
+
+**Figure 4 – Revenue flow for the B2B2C use case of IoT**
+
+An application example for the B2C2C use case is given in Appendix I.1.
+
+## 6.3 The hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C
+
+Figure 5 shows the hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C model of the IoT, modelled via UML [b-UML]. As shown in Figure 5, in the hybrid use case, the service provider provides the IoT service to the IoT user. The network provider provides network resources through the service provider to the IoT user to support the subscribed IoT service and also provides other network resources directly to the IoT user to support the network resource usage not related to the subscribed IoT service.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ IoT_user[IoT user] --- IoT_service_provision(IoT service provision)
+ IoT_user --- Network_resource_provision(Network resource provision)
+ Service_provider[Service provider] --- IoT_service_provision
+ Network_provider[Network provider] --- Network_resource_provision
+ IoT_service_provision -.->|«include»| Network_resource_provision
+
+```
+
+Y.4118(18)\_F05
+
+Figure 5: The hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C model of IoT. The diagram shows three actors: IoT user, Service provider, and Network provider. The IoT user is connected to two use cases: 'IoT service provision' and 'Network resource provision'. The Service provider is connected to 'IoT service provision'. The Network provider is connected to 'Network resource provision'. A dashed arrow labeled '<>' points from 'IoT service provision' to 'Network resource provision'.
+
+**Figure 5 – The hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C model of IoT**
+
+The revenue flow of the hybrid use case is shown in Figure 6. The IoT user will pay the service provider for the subscribed IoT service. The service provider will pay the network provider for the network resource usage related to the subscribed IoT service. The IoT user will also pay the network provider for the network resource usage not related to the subscribed IoT service.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ IoT_user[IoT user] -- "Revenue from IoT service provision" --> Service_provider[Service provider]
+ IoT_user -- "Revenue from network resource provision not related to the subscribed IoT service" --> Network_provider[Network provider]
+ Service_provider -- "Revenue from network resource provision related to subscribed IoT service" --> Network_provider
+
+```
+
+Y.4118(18)\_F06
+
+Diagram illustrating the revenue flow for the hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C of IoT. An IoT user at the top provides revenue to a Service provider on the left (labeled 'Revenue from IoT service provision') and to a Network provider on the right (labeled 'Revenue from network resource provision not related to the subscribed IoT service'). The Service provider then provides revenue to the Network provider (labeled 'Revenue from network resource provision related to subscribed IoT service').
+
+**Figure 6 – Revenue flow for the hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C of IoT**
+
+NOTE – This use case also comprises the case of exceeding network resource usage for the subscribed IoT service since this usage can be seen as network resource usage not related to the subscribed IoT service (the exceeding usage not being specified in the subscription agreement).
+
+An application example for the hybrid use case of B2C and B2B2C is given in Appendix I.3.
+
+# 7 IoT accounting and charging characteristics
+
+This clause describes key IoT accounting and charging characteristics identified on the basis of the business use cases described in clause 6. These characteristics are general across the different applications and deployments of IoT and constitute the basis for the IoT accounting and charging requirements identified in clause 8.
+
+NOTE 1 – A given application or deployment of IoT does not have to support all or any of these characteristics.
+
+NOTE 2 – In actual deployments, different IoT services may be provided by the same service provider or multiple service providers. Clauses 7 and 8 of this Recommendation assume the more general situation of multiple service providers.
+
+## 7.1 Charging for both network resource usage and IoT services
+
+In IoT scenarios, both the network provider and the service provider provide services to the IoT users. Therefore, the network resources provided by the network provider and the various IoT services provided by the service providers may need to be charged.
+
+## 7.2 Split of charging for network resource usage
+
+The network resources used by a given IoT device may be consumed for multiple IoT services provided by different service providers.
+
+In some IoT scenarios, the network resource usage related to some of these IoT services will be charged to the corresponding service providers and the rest will be charged to the IoT user using the device. Therefore, the network resource usage by one IoT device may need to be split into multiple parts corresponding, respectively, to the IoT services charged to the IoT user using this device and the IoT services charged to the service providers responsible of that network resource usage.
+
+For example, in the telematics scenario shown in Figure 7, the network resource usage of the car diagnostics services will be charged to the car vendor, while the network resource usage of the infotainment services will be charged to the driver.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating an example scenario of charging split with respect to network resource usage. A red car is connected to a box labeled 'Network resource usage'. Two arrows originate from this box: one labeled 'Diagnostics services' pointing to a person icon labeled 'Car vendor', and another labeled 'Infotainment services' pointing to a person icon labeled 'Driver'. Below the 'Driver' icon is the text 'Y.4118(18)\_F07'.
+
+**Figure 7 – Example scenario of charging split with respect to the network resource usage**
+
+## **7.3 Aggregation of charging data records for charging related to network resource usage and IoT services**
+
+In some IoT scenarios, the service provider or the IoT user may need to be charged for the network resource usage and/or the IoT service usage by a large set of IoT devices. Billing based on the aggregation of the charging data records related to each IoT device with distinct items associated to each occurrence of network resource usage and IoT service usage may be adopted as a charging approach in such scenarios.
+
+## **7.4 Sharing of network resource pool**
+
+In some IoT scenarios, the service provider and/or the IoT user may need that the network provider provides a network resource pool. This allows the devices owned by the service provider and/or the IoT user to share the network resources of the pool.
+
+## **7.5 Dynamically differentiated charging rates for network resource usage**
+
+In some IoT scenarios, IoT devices may need that network resource related adjustments be made according to the requirements of the different IoT services using those network resources, which may lead to differences in charging of the network resource usage.
+
+As an example, the network provider may need to adjust the charging rates of the provided network resources according to the network context (such as time, location, status of the network), e.g. in order to encourage the IoT services to reduce their network load.
+
+In order to fulfil these requirements, the dynamic differentiated charging rates for network resource usage may be adopted as a charging approach in such scenarios.
+
+# **8 IoT accounting and charging requirements**
+
+If the characteristics listed in clause 7 are supported by an IoT deployment, the following should be considered where applicable.
+
+## **8.1 Accounting and charging requirements for IoT services**
+
+S-R-001: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support event based charging so that the usage of IoT services can be charged based on the chargeable event records (e.g., the records of service requests).
+
+NOTE 1 – The IoT platform provided by the service provider is a technical infrastructure that provides integration of generic and specific capabilities [ITU-T Y.4000], [ITU-T Y.4113]. The basic model of the network for the IoT described in [ITU-T Y.4113] provides more details about the IoT platform, including the relationship between IoT platform and network.
+
+S-R-002: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support session based charging so that the usage of session based IoT services can be charged based on the session records.
+
+NOTE 2 – This requirement is suitable for IoT platforms that support session based IoT services. The remote video monitoring service is an example of session based IoT services.
+
+S-R-003: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support subscription based charging so that the usage of subscribed IoT services can be charged based on the subscription records.
+
+S-R-004: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support the aggregation of IoT service charging records related to a given IoT user so that one bill can be made to the IoT user.
+
+S-R-005: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support the transformation of IoT service charging records into a standard format.
+
+S-R-006: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support various charging policies (e.g. fixed-rate and dynamic rate).
+
+S-R-007: The IoT platform provided by the service provider can optionally support the inclusion of the service usage related information (e.g. service usage time duration, service type) in the IoT service charging records.
+
+S-R-008: The IoT platform provided by the service provider is recommended to support recording and tracking mechanisms for the IoT service charging records so that the IoT user can identify specific IoT service usage related information.
+
+## **8.2 Accounting and charging requirements for IoT network resources**
+
+The requirements identified in this clause are derived from the IoT accounting and charging characteristics and can be seen as an extended set of the requirements in [ITU-T Y.2233] for IoT accounting and charging.
+
+N-R-001: The network is recommended to support the aggregation of the network resource charging records related to a given set of IoT devices so that one bill can be made to the IoT user.
+
+N-R-002: The network is recommended to support dynamic rate charging policies with respect to different network usage demands (e.g., different network access priority levels and different allowable network access time periods).
+
+N-R-003: The network is recommended to support the charging of the network resource usage related to a given set of devices that share the network resource of a pool.
+
+N-R-004: The network is recommended to support the transformation of the network resource charging records into a standard format.
+
+N-R-005: The network is recommended to support the split of the network resource charging records related to one device with respect to different target network addresses or access point names (APNs) according to the information provided by the IoT service providers (e.g., static network address, platform APN).
+
+NOTE – This requirement is for the purpose of distinguishing the network resources used for the IoT services provided by different service providers in order to support the B2C use case, the B2B2C use case and the hybrid B2B2C use case described in clause 6, i.e., the network resource usage related to an IoT service can be charged to the corresponding IoT service provider.
+
+N-R-006: The network is recommended to support recording of the network capability exposure events and generation of the corresponding network resource charging records so that the usage of such network capability exposure service can be charged.
+
+# 9 IoT accounting and charging technical capability framework
+
+## 9.1 Technical capability framework overview
+
+This clause identifies the technical capabilities for the support of accounting and charging in the IoT. These technical capabilities are derived from the IoT accounting and charging requirements provided in clause 8.
+
+Figure 8 shows these technical capabilities and their positioning with respect to the two relevant layers of the IoT reference model [ITU-T Y.4000].
+
+
+
+| Layer | Capabilities |
+|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| SSAS layer | IoT SCR collection IoT SCR aggregation IoT SCR transformation IoT SCR query SCR charging policy management IoT NRCR collection IoT NRCR aggregation Pool charging IoT NRCR splitting NRCR charging policy management Network layer capabilities in this Recommendation | Corresponding functions in [ITU-T Y.2233] | Required capability extensions |
+|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| IoT NRCR collection capability | Charging collection function | Support of the collection of the NRCR related to the network service in charge of exposing the network capabilities (clause 9.2.1) |
+| IoT NRCR aggregation capability | Charging gateway function | The aggregation of the NRCR (CIR) related to a given set of IoT devices, including the aggregation of splitted NRCR (clause 9.2.2) |
+| IoT NRCR splitting capability | Charging gateway function | The split of the NRCR (CIR) related to one device based on the network address or access point name used for the device access (clause 9.2.3) |
+| Pool charging capability | Account balance management function | Online charging of the network resource usage related to a set of devices (associated with one subscriber account) which are sharing the network resources of a given network resource pool (clause 9.2.4) |
+| NRCR charging policy management capability | Rating function | Dynamic rate charging policies with respect to different network usage demands of IoT applications (clause 9.2.5) |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-UML] Object Management Group (OMG, 2014), *Unified Modeling Language™ (UML®) Resource Page*.
+Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.4232 (01/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Requirements and use cases
+
+---
+
+**Requirements, capabilities and use cases of
+Internet of things infrastructures in roadside
+traffic perception system**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4232
+
+# Requirements, capabilities and use cases of Internet of things infrastructures in roadside traffic perception system
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4232 presents common and specific requirements and capabilities for IoT infrastructures. The roadside traffic perception system (RTPS), is a system composed of Internet of things (IoT) infrastructures, including sensing devices, cloud facilities, intelligent traffic lights and smart traffic signs. By utilizing IoT technologies, the roadside traffic perception system can enhance traffic safety and efficiency with the capabilities of its components.
+
+To enhance traffic safety and efficiency, IoT infrastructures in the RTPS need to collaborate using IoT technologies. Use cases of the RTPS are also given in the appendix.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4232 | 2025-01-15 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/16027 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cloud, intelligent traffic light, Internet of things infrastructure, roadside traffic perception system, RTPS, sensing devices, smart traffic sign.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4415
+
+(06/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Architecture of web of objects-based virtual home network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4415
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4415
+
+# Architecture of web of objects-based virtual home network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4415 describes an architecture of web of objects (WoO)-based virtual home network (VHN) in accordance with Recommendations ITU-T H.622.2 and ITU-T Y.4452. The service capabilities and framework of VHN are identified in Recommendation ITU-T H.622.2. Recommendation ITU-T Y.4452 identifies the functional framework of WoO to deploy Internet of things (IoT) services in the World Wide Web environment.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4415 | 2018-06-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13637 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Virtual home network, web of objects.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at Page |
+|------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation ..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview of WVHN..... | 2 |
+| 7 WVHN objects processing functions..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 WVHN VOs sub-level functions ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 WVHN CVOs sub-level functions ..... | 5 |
+| 8 WVHN service functions..... | 7 |
+| 8.1 WVHN service support functions ..... | 7 |
+| 8.2 WVHN user management functions..... | 9 |
+| 8.3 WVHN application support functions ..... | 10 |
+| 8.4 WVHN service DB functions ..... | 10 |
+| 9 Security and trust support in WVHN..... | 11 |
+| 9.1 Security support in WVHN ..... | 11 |
+| 9.2 Trust support in WVHN ..... | 11 |
+| Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4415
+
+# Architecture of web of objects-based virtual home network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes an architecture of web of object (WoO)-based virtual home network (WVHN) by identifying the followings:
+
+- overview of WVHN;
+- WVHN objects processing functions;
+- WVHN service functions;
+- security and trust support of WVHN.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T H.622.2] Recommendation ITU-T H.622.2 (2015), *Service capabilities and framework for virtual home networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4452] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4452 (2016), *Functional framework of web of objects*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4552] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4552/Y.2078 (2016), *Application support models of the Internet of things*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 composite virtual object (CVO)** [ITU-T Y.4452]: A collection of multiple VOs to abstract a service feature, operation or management function, to enable the mash-up and collaboration.
+
+**3.1.2 Internet of things (IoT)** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving, interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE 2 – From a broad perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications.
+
+**3.1.3 object** [b-ITU-T Y.4404]: An intrinsic representation of an entity that is described at an appropriate level of abstraction in terms of its attributes and functions.
+
+NOTE 1 – An object is characterized by its behaviour. An object is distinct from any other object. An object interacts with its environment including other objects at its interaction points. An object is informally said to perform functions and offer services (an object which makes a function available is said to offer a service).
+
+For modelling purposes, these functions and services are specified in terms of the behaviour of the object and of its interfaces. An object can perform more than one function. A function can be performed by the cooperation of several objects.
+
+NOTE 2 – Objects include terminal devices (e.g., used by a person to access the network such as mobile phones, Personal computers, etc.), remote monitoring devices (e.g., cameras, sensors, etc.), information devices (e.g., content delivery server), products, contents, and resources.
+
+**3.1.4 virtual home network (VHN)** [ITU-T H.622.2]: A VHN is a logical home network, built over public and/or private network resources, used to support home network services within a group of home members.
+
+**3.1.5 virtual object (VO)** [ITU-T Y.4452]: A virtual representation of a real-world object (e.g., sensor, device, task, process and information).
+
+**3.1.6 web of objects (WoO)** [ITU-T Y.4452]: A way to incorporate virtual objects on the World Wide Web and to facilitate the creation of IoT services.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------|
+| CVO | Composite Virtual Object |
+| DB | Database |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| RDF | Resource Description Framework |
+| VHN | Virtual Home Network |
+| VHN-RG | Virtual Home Network – Residential Gateway |
+| VO | Virtual Object |
+| WoO | Web of Objects |
+| WVHN | WoO-based virtual home network |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Overview of WVHN**
+
+The virtual home network (VHN), as defined in [ITU-T H.622.2], supports ubiquitous networking environments to allow the service coverage of a home network to expand diverse service features into a virtual group of home network users and resources. The web of objects (WoO) defined in [ITU-T Y.4452] provides a functional framework of Internet of things (IoT) in the World Wide Web environments. The WoO-based VHN (WVHN) is characterized by a collaboration of the capabilities and framework in VHN and WoO as shown in the configuration of Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1 – Configuration of the WVHN. The diagram illustrates the architecture of the WVHN (WoO based VHN). It shows a central 'WVHN service functions and objects processing functions (in accordance with ITU-T Y.4452)' block. This block is connected to a 'Network' cloud, which in turn connects to a 'WoO based IoT environment (in accordance with ITU-T Y.4452)' and a 'Cloud computing environment'. The 'WoO based IoT environment' contains a smartphone and a building icon. The 'Cloud computing environment' is represented by a yellow cloud. The 'WVHN service functions' block is also connected to four types of VHNs: 'ITU-T H.622.2 based VHN' (two instances, each shown as a house with internal components), 'VHN in travel (in accordance with ITU-T H.622.2)' (shown as a person in a vehicle), 'VHN in office/home (in accordance with ITU-T H.622.2)' (shown as a person at a desk), and 'VHN in connected car (in accordance with ITU-T H.622.2)' (shown as a car). A 'WoO based IoT device (in accordance with ITU-T Y.4452)' (smartphone) is also connected to the 'WVHN service functions' block. The entire system is labeled 'WoO based VHN (WVHN)' at the bottom. A red dashed box encloses the central components. A yellow star is placed near the connected car VHN. The reference 'Y.4415(18)\_F6-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Configuration of the WVHN**
+
+The WVHN provides VHN service functions of [ITU-T H.622.2] in alignment with the WoO framework identified in [ITU-T Y.4452]. WVHN allows users and administrators to control, orchestrate and create applications using WVHN objects processing functions and WVHN service functions indicated in Figure 6-2.
+
+The detailed descriptions on WVHN objects processing and service functions in Figure 6-2 are provided in clause 7 and clause 8, respectively.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture model of the WVHN. It is structured as follows from top to bottom:
+
+- VHN applications**: The top layer.
+- WVHN service functions**: A large block containing:
+ - WVHN application support functions** at the top.
+ - A middle layer with three interconnected components: **WVHN user management functions**, **WVHN service DB functions**, and **WVHN service support functions**.
+- WVHN objects processing functions**: A block below the service functions, containing two sub-levels:
+ - WVHN CVO sub-level functions**
+ - WVHN VO sub-level functions**
+- VHN-RG interface**: A layer below the processing functions.
+- VHN-RG**: Multiple Virtual Network Resource Gateways, each connected to a **Home gateway** (e.g., Home gateway 1, Home gateway N).
+- Devices**: Each VHN-RG is connected to multiple devices (e.g., device 1, device 1, ..., device n).
+
+A red dashed box encloses the **WVHN service functions** and **WVHN objects processing functions** layers, with a legend indicating: **[---] Scope of this Recommendation**.
+
+Y.4415(18)\_F6-2
+
+Architecture model of the WVHN diagram showing layers from VHN applications down to VHN-RG and devices, with a red dashed box indicating the scope of the recommendation.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Architecture model of the WVHN**
+
+# 7 WVHN objects processing functions
+
+WVHN objects processing functions are responsible for creation, control and management of virtualized objects of WVHN, e.g., production, registration, lifecycle management, storing and management of virtual objects (VOs) and composite virtual objects (CVOs) in [ITU-T Y.4452]. These functions enable multiple types of WVHN VOs and WVHN CVOs to share and cooperate with them on the Web of VHN.
+
+WVHN objects processing functions are further categorized into two sub-levels: WVHN VOs sub-level functions and WVHN CVOs sub-level functions based on [ITU-T Y.4452].
+
+## 7.1 WVHN VOs sub-level functions
+
+WVHN VOs sub-level functions are mainly responsible for creation and management of WVHN VOs and real-world objects as depicted in Figure 6-1. The major functions of VOs sub-level in WVHN are as follows.
+
+- WVHN VOs creation;
+- WVHN VOs management;
+- WVHN VOs registry;
+- WVHN VOs repository.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1: WVHN VOs sub-level functions diagram. The diagram shows two main functional blocks: 'WVHN VOs creation' and 'WVHN VOs management', both enclosed in a dashed box labeled 'WVHN VOs sub-level functions'. The 'WVHN VOs creation' block contains 'WVHN VOs factory' and 'WVHN VOs resource optimization'. The 'WVHN VOs management' block contains 'WVHN VOs container management' and 'WVHN VOs life cycle management'. Double-headed arrows connect the 'WVHN VOs factory' to 'WVHN VOs container management', and 'WVHN VOs resource optimization' to 'WVHN VOs life cycle management'. Outside the dashed box, there are two more blocks: 'WVHN VOs registry' and 'WVHN VOs repository'. Double-headed arrows connect 'WVHN VOs container management' to 'WVHN VOs registry', and 'WVHN VOs life cycle management' to 'WVHN VOs repository'. The identifier 'Y.4415(18)\_F7-1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – WVHN VOs sub-level functions**
+
+### 7.1.1 WVHN VOs creation
+
+WVHN VOs are created with semantically enriched descriptions and the interaction with stored data. The following functions are provided by WVHN VOs creation:
+
+- WVHN VOs factory: production of new VO instances;
+- WVHN VOs resource optimization: provides VOs resource optimization based on system knowledge necessary for VOs creation.
+
+### 7.1.2 WVHN VOs management
+
+WVHN VOs management provides the functions to manage the execution environment of WVHN VOs container management and WVHN VOs lifecycle management.
+
+- WVHN VOs container management: provides a runtime execution environment to monitor and control WVHN VOs;
+- WVHN VOs lifecycle management: supervises different states during its lifecycle, i.e., creation, execution, suspension and termination of WVHN VOs.
+
+### 7.1.3 WVHN VOs registry
+
+WVHN VOs Registry stores resource description framework (RDF) triples for the description of available WVHN VOs, which are structured using the metadata that is included in WVHN VOs information model in [ITU-T Y.4452].
+
+The information used in WVHN VOs registry is as follows:
+
+- a name and a list of functionalities of WVHN VOs;
+- access policies for WVHN VOs;
+- semantic ontology of WVHN VOs.
+
+### 7.1.4 WVHN VOs repository
+
+WVHN VOs repository provides semantically queryable collection of WVHN VOs templates and data. WVHN VOs templates are designed in accordance with VOs information model in [ITU-T Y.4452]. WVHN VOs instances are mapped with the WVHN VOs template in ontological dataset for later usage.
+
+## 7.2 WVHN CVOs sub-level functions
+
+WVHN CVOs sub-level functions are organized to support the control and management of WVHN CVOs in accordance with [ITU-T Y.4452] as indicated in Figure 7-2. The functions of WVHN CVOs sub-level are as follows.
+
+- WVHN CVOs creation;
+- WVHN CVOs management;
+
+- WVHN system knowledge management;
+- WVHN CVOs registry;
+- WVHN CVOs repository.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph WVHN_CVOs_sub_level_functions [WVHN CVOs sub-level functions]
+ subgraph WVHN_CVOs_creation [WVHN CVOs creation]
+ WVHN_CVOs_factory[WVHN CVOs factory]
+ WVHN_CVOs_composition[WVHN CVOs composition]
+ end
+ subgraph WVHN_CVOs_management [WVHN CVOs management]
+ WVHN_CVOs_container_management[WVHN CVOs container management]
+ WVHN_CVOs_life_cycle_management[WVHN CVOs life cycle management]
+ end
+ WVHN_system_knowledge_management[WVHN system knowledge management]
+ end
+ WVHN_CVOs_factory <--> WVHN_CVOs_container_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_composition <--> WVHN_CVOs_container_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_container_management <--> WVHN_CVOs_life_cycle_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_life_cycle_management <--> WVHN_system_knowledge_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_registry[WVHN CVOs registry] <--> WVHN_CVOs_container_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_registry <--> WVHN_CVOs_life_cycle_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_repository[WVHN CVOs repository] <--> WVHN_CVOs_container_management
+ WVHN_CVOs_repository <--> WVHN_CVOs_life_cycle_management
+
+```
+
+Y.4415(18)\_F7-2
+
+Figure 7-2 – WVHN CVOs sub-level functions. The diagram shows a central box labeled 'WVHN CVOs sub-level functions' containing three main components: 'WVHN CVOs creation' (with 'WVHN CVOs factory' and 'WVHN CVOs composition'), 'WVHN CVOs management' (with 'WVHN CVOs container management' and 'WVHN CVOs life cycle management'), and 'WVHN system knowledge management'. Arrows indicate interactions between these components and external entities: 'WVHN CVOs registry' and 'WVHN CVOs repository' are connected to the management and creation components, while 'WVHN system knowledge management' is connected to the management component.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – WVHN CVOs sub-level functions**
+
+### 7.2.1 WVHN CVOs creation
+
+WVHN CVOs creation is responsible for the creation of new WVHN CVOs with the mashup of appropriate WVHN VOs to fulfil the service request. To create WVHN CVOs, the requested WVHN CVOs templates are exposed by WVHN CVOs registry. WVHN CVOs templates are stored in WVHN CVOs repository, and are queried semantically based on the service request parameters.
+
+- WVHN CVOs factory: provides the function to create WVHN CVOs templates with respect to multiple WVHN VOs;
+- WVHN CVOs composition: provides a mechanism to form a mashup of multiple WVHN VOs in accordance with [ITU-T Y.4452].
+
+### 7.2.2 WVHN CVOs management
+
+WVHN CVOs management handles the lifecycle of WVHN CVOs and manages the software execution related with WVHN CVOs. It provides the function to store and update metadata of the instantiated WVHN CVOs.
+
+- WVHN CVOs container management: provides the management functions to bundle necessary software which are used during the execution of WVHN CVOs;
+- WVHN CVOs lifecycle management: supervises different states during WVHN CVOs lifecycle, i.e., creation, execution, suspension and termination of WVHN CVOs.
+
+### 7.2.3 WVHN system knowledge management
+
+WVHN system knowledge management performs functions related with knowledge of WVHN CVOs during WVHN CVOs execution. It provides intelligent mechanisms to enhance the reusability of WVHN CVOs.
+
+### 7.2.4 WVHN CVOs registry
+
+WVHN CVOs registry stores WVHN CVOs instances that are identified in the WVHN CVO registration process. WVHN CVOs instances are identified by the following WVHN CVOs information in terms of CVOs information model in [ITU-T Y.4452].
+
+- request parameters;
+- references of the associated WVHN VOs in WVHN CVOs;
+
+- access mechanism to the registered WVHN CVOs;
+- context parameters;
+- related WVHN VOs;
+- creation date of the WVHN CVOs instance.
+
+**7.2.5 WVHN CVOs repository**
+
+WVHN CVOs repository provides the function to store and manage WVHN CVOs templates and data. WVHN CVOs available for execution are published in WVHN CVOs repository.
+
+**8 WVHN service functions**
+
+WVHN services are created in accordance with customers’ favourite application features on the Web environment. The components in WVHN service functions are in alignment with [ITU-T H.622.2] as shown in Figure 6-2.
+
+- WVHN service support functions;
+- WVHN user management functions;
+- WVHN application support functions;
+- WVHN service database (DB) functions.
+
+**8.1 WVHN service support functions**
+
+WVHN service support functions register and manage WVHN service entities. These functions also create and manage multiple types of services defined in WVHN service DB.
+
+WVHN service support functions to support the development of WVHN services are illustrated in Figure 8-1 and described as follows:
+
+- WVHN service discovery and lookup;
+- WVHN service management and configuration;
+- WVHN service composition engine;
+- WVHN real-world knowledge and situation management;
+- WVHN service execution environment.
+
+
+
+To WVHN application support functions
+
+```
+
+ graph TD
+ subgraph WVHN_service_support_functions [WVHN service support functions]
+ SMC[WVHN service management and configuration]
+ SDL[WVHN service discovery and lookup]
+ RWK[WVHN real world knowledge and situation management]
+ SCE[WVHN service composition engine]
+ SEE[WVHN service execution environment]
+ end
+
+ DB[(WVHN service DB)]
+ ASF[To WVHN application support functions]
+
+ SMC <--> SDL
+ SDL <--> RWK
+ SMC <--> SCE
+ SDL <--> SCE
+ RWK <--> SCE
+ SMC <--> SEE
+ SCE <--> SEE
+ RWK --> DB
+ SCE --> DB
+ SMC --> ASF
+ SDL --> ASF
+ RWK --> ASF
+
+```
+
+**Figure 8-1 – WVHN service support functions**
+
+Y.4415(18)\_F8-1
+
+Figure 8-1 – WVHN service support functions
+
+**Rec. ITU-T Y.4415 (06/2018)** 7
+
+### **8.1.1 WVHN service discovery and lookup**
+
+WVHN service discovery and lookup function analyses the VHN service request based on WVHN user information and supports the discovery of services using query functions. It also maintains the cache logs to efficiently handle similar requests. It queries the services DB to access the requested services using service history, semantic matchmaking and service constraints in the discovery process.
+
+### **8.1.2 WVHN service management and configuration**
+
+In order to support WVHN services, WVHN service management and configuration function performs WVHN service request evaluation, WVHN service configuration, WVHN service registration, template management and controlling service execution.
+
+To achieve this function, necessary tasks are described as follows.
+
+- WVHN service request evaluation: includes mechanisms to parse and evaluate the service request so that most suitable services can be selected;
+- WVHN service control: involves in matching a service request to service instances and handles service management;
+- WVHN configuration management: includes functions to configure the service components based on service requirements, and matches service requests to the corresponding service templates;
+- WVHN service template management: includes mechanisms to create, manage and update the service templates;
+- WVHN service registration: handles service registry and provides an interface to external stack holders to add and modify service templates.
+
+### **8.1.3 WVHN service composition engine**
+
+WVHN service composition engine is responsible for the creation of complex and composite services to fulfil the WVHN user request. It includes the mechanisms to facilitate the creation of WVHN composite services to satisfy user requests.
+
+The four tasks to achieve a composition of WVHN services requested from WVHN application support functions are described as follows.
+
+- 1) WVHN service selection: chooses the appropriate services based on the service requirement and provides the selected services to the workflow management;
+- 2) WVHN service workflow management: supports the composition flow among various services based on their inputs and outputs;
+- 3) WVHN service binding: enables to associate with services to a composition graph;
+- 4) WVHN service coordination: identifies the dependency of services in accordance with a composition graph in order to avoid any conflict.
+
+### **8.1.4 WVHN real-world knowledge and situation management**
+
+WVHN real-world knowledge and situation management provides the mechanisms to manage the situational information, to represent the current, past situations and WVHN user data. It is responsible for real-world knowledge creation. It also provides situation detection, classification and recognition of WVHN service environments.
+
+WVHN situation management performs extraction of event streams to identify the relations among the features of interest through reasoning and learning mechanisms, and to classify the desired situations.
+
+The principal tasks to support this function are as follows:
+
+- WVHN user situation management: helps more efficient service selection in case of a user request with a similar service requirement using his situation information;
+- WVHN user characterization and profile management: handles several facts related to the human user which includes user profile, preference, context and policies;
+- Real-world knowledge library: provides methods to predict facts about the user based on his situation history and previous service requests;
+- WVHN user interest crawler: helps to identify user interest with respect to a service context.
+
+### **8.1.5 WVHN service execution environment**
+
+WVHN service goes through a number of different states during its lifecycle, i.e., service creation, execution, suspension and termination. WVHN service execution environment is responsible for service lifecycle management and execution. It constitutes of the following tasks for WVHN service execution.
+
+- WVHN service lifecycle management: handles service switching among different states from active to release state;
+- WVHN service cache: stores service references to the instances of recently used services;
+- WVHN service container: manages the service instances in the WVHN service execution environment.
+
+## **8.2 WVHN user management functions**
+
+WVHN user management functions support the management for WVHN application users and provide the capabilities to perform the following functions. Figure 8-2 shows a functional architecture of WVHN user management functions.
+
+- WVHN user access: allows users to access the system by authentication and authorization, in addition, it defines the service capabilities in terms of the level of the user and service template access rights through following two functions:
+ - WVHN user authentication: provides a user an acknowledgment signal to grant permission to the DB. The authentication mechanisms can be selected based on the state-of-the-art authentication requirements;
+ - WVHN user authorization: permits a WVHN service user (including service entities) to resources on WVHN with predefined policy definitions.
+- WVHN user identity management:
+ - Registration: registers the user for access to the application, but not to access services;
+ - Membership management: supports the creation, maintenance and release of WVHN service users, joining and leaving WVHN service users, and management of WVHN multicast service group membership;
+ - User service group management: provides the management functions on user service groups for WVHN;
+ - User profile management: provides the user profile information in alignment with user profile DB.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph WVHN_user_management_functions [WVHN user management functions]
+ subgraph WVHN_user_access [WVHN user access]
+ WVHN_user_authentication[WVHN user authentication]
+ WVHN_user_authorization[WVHN user authorization]
+ end
+ subgraph WVHN_user_identity_management [WVHN user identity management]
+ Registration[Registration]
+ Membership_management[Membership management]
+ User_profile_management[User profile management]
+ User_service_group_management[User service group management]
+ end
+ end
+ WVHN_user_authentication <--> WVHN_user_identity_management
+ WVHN_user_identity_management <--> WVHN_user_profile_DB[WVHN user profile DB]
+ WVHN_user_profile_DB --> WVHN_user_authentication
+ WVHN_user_profile_DB --> WVHN_user_identity_management
+
+```
+
+Figure 8-2: WVHN user management functions architecture diagram. The diagram shows a central box labeled 'WVHN user management functions' containing two sub-sections: 'WVHN user access' (with 'WVHN user authentication' and 'WVHN user authorization') and 'WVHN user identity management' (with 'Registration', 'Membership management', 'User profile management', and 'User service group management'). These are connected to a 'WVHN user profile DB' (represented by a database cylinder icon). Arrows indicate data flow between the access/identity management sections and the database. A label 'Y.4415(18)\_F8-2' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – WVHN user management functions**
+
+## 8.3 WVHN application support functions
+
+WVHN application support functions facilitate enhanced service utilization in alignment with WVHN application scenarios. These functions enable consistent WVHN service functions to span multiple home environments and multiple IoT devices. The features provided by WVHN application support functions are as follows.
+
+- user preference and feedback to update the configuration of WVHN service functions;
+- service capabilities to promote intelligent WVHN application environment;
+- consistent WVHN service provisioning to external entities and environment;
+- dynamic adaptation of WVHN services in the changing computing environment;
+- dynamic adaptation of WVHN user environment.
+
+## 8.4 WVHN service DB functions
+
+The WVHN service DB is an RDF graph DB that stores RDF triples for the description of available services. It allows the creation of a semantically enriched description of services, the interaction with stored data, and communication with rest of the units. Registration of the WVHN service is supported with the SPARQL endpoint to help the WVHN service management function access the service registry using SPARQL queries.
+
+WVHN service DB functions provide the following service repositories indicated in Figure 8-3:
+
+- WVHN service templates;
+- WVHN service registry;
+- WVHN user profile;
+- WVHN real-world knowledge.
+
+
+
+Y.4415(18)\_F8-3
+
+Figure 8-3: WVHN service database functions. The diagram shows a central 'WVHN service DB functions' block (enclosed in a red dashed box) containing 'WVHN service templates', 'WVHN service registry', 'WVHN user profile', and 'WVHN real world knowledge'. This central block is connected to 'WVHN application support functions' at the top, 'WVHN user management functions' on the left, and 'WVHN service support functions' on the right. All connections are bidirectional. The entire system is labeled 'WVHN service functions'.
+
+**Figure 8-3 – WVHN service database functions**
+
+# **9 Security and trust support in WVHN**
+
+## **9.1 Security support in WVHN**
+
+The security in WVHN is considered in accordance with WVHN objects processing functions (WVHN VO sub-level, WVHN CVO sub-level) and service functions depicted in Figure 6-2. WVHN needs the following considerations to support security and privacy in WVHN service and object processing functions.
+
+- WVHN object processing functions in WVHN VOs and CVOs to support security and privacy;
+- WVHN service functions to support secure and privacy protected service provision;
+- WVHN service functions to integrate different security policies and techniques related to the variety of WVHN service features;
+- WVHN objects processing and service functions to support mutual authentication and authorization.
+
+## **9.2 Trust support in WVHN**
+
+WVHN provides functions to share the home related application contents among home members in distributed environments. A trust provisioning in WVHN environment needs to guarantee the trustworthy sharing of contents generated by home members and devices.
+
+Trusted contents collection and aggregation of WVHN VOs and CVOs are necessary to support trustworthy relationship among WVHN members and objects (WVHN VOs and CVOs).
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4404] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4404/Y.2062 (2012), *Framework of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4417-202511-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4417-202511-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2f4b0494e47dd52ee6a148b6d6e1bf9c8cb9cf9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4417-202511-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# **ITU-T Y.4417 (11/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+---
+
+# **Framework of self-organization networking in Internet of things environments**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4417
+
+# Framework of self-organization networking in Internet of things environments
+
+## Summary
+
+Self-organization networking refers to autonomous networking established by individual IoT devices that effectively interact with their peers and perform self-control. In IoT environments, self-organization networking is required when heterogeneous devices belong to infrastructure-unsupported IoT area networks.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4417 specifies a framework of self-organization networking for IoT in a particular area of telecommunications. The Recommendation presents the concepts, characteristics, architecture, requirements and functionalities of self-organization networking.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4417 | 2018-06-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13639 |
+| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.4417 | 2025-11-13 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/16518 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Internet of things (IoT), self-organization networking.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.4421
+
+(10/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Functional architecture for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicle controllers using IMT-2020 networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4421
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4421
+
+# Functional architecture for unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicle controllers using IMT-2020 networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Widely-used civilian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) generate increasing requirements for communication and network capabilities, including seamless coverage, low latency, Gbps-level rate and high-accuracy positioning. Existing commercial products of civilian UAVs utilize a direct radio link, which is limited by service distance and quality. Therefore IMT-2020 can be employed for UAV communication. UAVs require simultaneous services with different characters, for which a brand new type of user terminal to IMT-2020 is required. Likewise, IMT-2020 is a novel communication network for UAVs since it was originally designed for ground coverage. With the purpose of implementing the support of civilian UAV operations in IMT-2020 networks and improving the quality of UAV application services, a set of functionalities is needed to bridge the gap for interoperation between unmanned aerial system (UAS) and IMT-2020 networks. Recommendation ITU-T Y.4421 provides a functional architecture for UAVs and UAV controllers using IMT-2020 networks and functionalities defined in the application layer, service and application support layer, and security capabilities. The motivation of this Recommendation is to solve the issues of civilian UAVs accessing and communicating in IMT-2020 networks using its transmission capabilities.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4421 | 2021-10-11 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/14738 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Functional architecture, IMT-2020, unmanned aerial vehicles.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,839 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4460
+
+(06/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Architectural reference models of devices for Internet of things applications**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4460
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| Y.3500–Y.3999 | |
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4460
+
+# Architectural reference models of devices for Internet of things applications
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T 4460 describes the architectural reference models of devices for Internet of things (IoT) applications, based on a classification of devices defined by processing power and communication capabilities. The architectural reference models described also includes the device's functional entities and the functional entities interaction for each device's architectural reference model.
+
+Processing power and communication capabilities define how the device communicates and interacts with other entities in an IoT solution. By correlating the processing and communication capabilities classifications, it is possible to enumerate three types of devices:
+
+- 1) low processing and low connectivity device – LPLC device;
+- 2) low processing and high connectivity device – LPHC device;
+- 3) high processing and high connectivity device – HPHC device.
+
+NOTE – Devices with no processing capabilities are also not considered on this Recommendation because they are simple devices (ID tags) that were defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.4108/Y.2213.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4460 | 2019-06-13 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13921 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architectural reference models, devices, interoperability, IoT.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at 2 | 100% | 2670 (Corn) |
+| Pivot 3 (112) | 27/03/2015 21:15 | 2 | 99% | 2657 (Corn) |
+| Pivot 5 (38) | 27/03/2015 21:11 | 2 | 100% | 2186 (Corn) |
+| Pivot 1 (22) | 25/03/2015 17:39 | New Dashboard
Windows
Doors
Alarms
| Registered Devices | | | | | | |
+| | Name | On/Off | Status | Temperature | Rain Probability | Raining | LPG level |
+| | Window 01 - Living Room | On | Open | 23.3 C | 22% | No | 0% Close |
+| | Window 02 - Living Room | On | Closed | 23.1 C | 22% | No | 0% Open |
+| | Window 03 - Kitchen | On | Open | 24.3 C | 22% | No | 0% Close |
+| | Window 04 - Kitchen | On | Closed | 24.3 C | 22% | No | 0% Open |
+| | Window 05 - Kitchen | On | Open | 24.1 C | 22% | No | 0% Close |
+
+**Figure I.5 – Smart windows system dashboard example**
+
+## I.3 Use case for architectural reference model of HPHC devices
+
+HPHC devices are suitable for IoT uses cases in environments with available direct internet connection, and where data analysis algorithms are required to be executed as close to the data source as possible, to allow time sensitive actions to be performed quickly. As one of the most significant IoT use cases that fits in these characteristics, the smart building sector presents high demand for connected objects that need the ability to perform analysis and act upon partial system outage scenarios, for example, when the network is not available.
+
+In the context of architectural reference model of HPHC devices, a smart building where the parking lot has limited number of parking spots is presented as a use case. The smart parking lot system consists of two monitoring devices with computer vision capabilities, where cars are detected based on neural networks that can sense cars in multiple form factors and in multiple weather conditions. This allows for the deployment of only two devices, one at the entrance and the other at the exit, to monitor 200 parking lot spaces and provides an example of the HPHC architecture. Figure I.6 shows the smart parking lot monitoring system example.
+
+
+
+The figure displays a smart parking lot monitoring system interface. At the top, there are two video feeds showing cars in a parking lot. Below the feeds, there is a date selector set to 02/16/2017 and a 'Generate' button. On the left, there is a list of weather conditions for Thursday (normal): 0-6 (h) with 22.8 °C and Clear; 6-12 (h) with 24.9 °C and Clear; 12-18 (h) with 32.1 °C and Clear; and 18-24 (h) with 22.4 °C and Rain. On the right, there is a bar chart titled 'Parking Behavior' showing the 'Number of occupied parking spaces' over time. The chart shows a peak in occupancy around 16:00, with approximately 200 cars parked.
+
+| Hour | Total Cars |
+|------|------------|
+| 7 | 0 |
+| 8 | 50 |
+| 9 | 120 |
+| 10 | 120 |
+| 11 | 120 |
+| 12 | 100 |
+| 13 | 130 |
+| 14 | 160 |
+| 15 | 180 |
+| 16 | 200 |
+| 17 | 180 |
+| 18 | 140 |
+| 19 | 20 |
+| 20 | 0 |
+| 21 | 0 |
+| 22 | 0 |
+| 23 | 0 |
+
+Figure I.6: Example of a smart parking lot monitoring system. The interface shows two live video feeds of cars in a parking lot, a date selector for 02/16/2017, a 'Generate' button, and a 'Parking Behavior' bar chart showing the number of occupied parking spaces over time. The chart shows a peak in occupancy around 16:00.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Example of a smart parking lot monitoring system**
+
+The monitoring devices are constructed using a multi-core processor and 1 Gb RAM. This processor and memory are part of a single-board computer; it also has a small 8-megapixel camera. The application software is hosted on an operating system, and both the neural networks and the picture capturing software modules are written in a high-level programming language.
+
+The device's software implements the HPHC architecture presented on this Recommendation, with the following functional entities:
+
+- **application execution engine functional entity:** services to update the neural networks car recognition models for improved detection are available for external servers that may improve the model based on historical data;
+- **device management functional entity:** services and functions that allow camera configuration, providing adaptation to external light changes due to changing light characteristics linked to weather conditions;
+- **information sharing functional entity:** provides interaction between the entrance and the exit cameras allowing better vehicle detection. The detection of cars entering and leaving in a short period of time signals a full parking lot, allowing the prediction models to self-correct;
+- **data analytics functional entity:** implements the functions for running the vehicle detection neural networks model;
+- **data storage functional entity:** stores data including parking lot predictions and images of positives (and in some cases negatives) to allow access from servers that can process the data for improving the detection and prediction models.
+
+
+
+The image consists of two side-by-side photographs. The left photograph is a close-up shot of a silver metal pole with a black camera mounted on it. The camera is angled downwards and to the right. In the background, there are green trees and a clear blue sky. The right photograph shows a similar camera pole in a parking lot. The camera is mounted on a silver pole and is angled towards a building. The building has a modern design with large windows and a flat roof. There are orange traffic cones on the ground in the foreground, and the sky is clear and blue.
+
+Two side-by-side photographs showing monitoring devices (cameras) installed in a parking lot. The left photo shows a close-up of a camera mounted on a pole. The right photo shows a wider view of the camera pole in a parking lot with a building in the background.
+
+**Figure I.7 – Monitoring devices field installation example**
+
+The primary function of this device is to detect cars, not motorcycles or service trucks, and keep a counter for the number of cars that entered the building; this allows drivers to avoid time wasted by entering the parking lot when it is full. On the described smart sensing devices, it is also possible to apply recurrent neural network models to predict times of parking lot fullness, providing users the probability of encountering a parking spot based on their estimated time of arrival. Figure I.7 shows the HPHC monitoring devices (cameras) deployed in a real scenario.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4050] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4050 (2012), *Terms and definitions for the Internet of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4100 (2014), *Common requirements of the Internet of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4101 (2017), *Common requirements and capabilities of a gateway for Internet of things applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4111 (2016), *Semantics based requirements and framework of the Internet of things*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4471
+
+(05/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Functional architecture of network-based driving assistance for autonomous vehicles**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4471
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+| | |
+|----------|---------------|
+| BIG DATA | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+|----------|---------------|
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------|---------------|
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+|-----------------------------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4471
+
+# Functional architecture of network-based driving assistance for autonomous vehicles
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4471 defines a reference functional architecture of network-based driving assistance (NDA) for autonomous vehicles. It clarifies the concept of NDA, specifies key functional entities and defines reference points between entities. The use cases and operational procedures are also provided in Appendices I and II, respectively.
+
+To improve the driving of autonomous vehicles, coordination between vehicles and infrastructures needs to be improved with network technologies to provide the increasing transportation services and application requirements. NDA can improve the safety and efficiency of automated driving with capabilities of cooperative perception and decisions.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4471 | 2021-05-17 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/14423 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Autonomous vehicle, edge computing, functional architecture, NDA, network-based driving assistance.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4481-202208-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4481-202208-I_PDF-E/raw.md
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@@ -0,0 +1,653 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.4481
+
+(08/2022)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Framework for data middle platform in Internet of things and smart sustainable cities**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4481
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.4481
+
+# Framework for data middle platform in Internet of things and smart sustainable cities
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4481 addresses a type of middle platform called the data middle platform (DM), which is expected to provide innovative digital data services to deliver data value. It allows the separation of the fundamental technical support capabilities from business-related services. The main purpose of a DM is to aggregate and manage cross-domain data into services.
+
+For Internet of things (IoT) and smart sustainable cities (SSC), a DM aims at providing common data services that can be reused in diverse application domains by governments, enterprises, organizations and individuals.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4481 | 2022-08-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15069 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Data middle platform, digital transformation, Internet of things, IoT, smart sustainable cities
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# **ITU-T Y.4490 (11/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+# --- **Framework of water supply system monitoring for smart fire protection**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4490
+
+# Framework of water supply system monitoring for smart fire protection
+
+## Summary
+
+Smart fire protection is important in smart cities. It ensures the safety of people's lives and property. The water supply system is the most commonly used system in firefighting systems. Smart fire protection facilities based on Internet of things (IoT) technologies have been developed to monitor the water supply status in real time. It is required to accurately obtain the key data of natural water sources, municipal water supplies and fire pools. Smart fire protection will realize the digital management of fire extinguishing water sources, providing reliable information for firefighting and rescue operations. They will also enhance the availability of fire-control information and enable the on-site fire brigade to quickly develop targeted water supply plans.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4490 addresses water supply system monitoring (WSSM) for smart fire protection. It specifies the reference model of WSSM and its requirements and framework.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4490 | 2023-11-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15684 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Internet of Things (IoT), smart fire protection, water supply system monitoring (WSSM).
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Reference model of water supply system monitoring (WSSM) ..... | 2 |
+| 7 Requirements of monitoring of water system..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Requirements of sensing device management..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Requirements of data processing..... | 4 |
+| 7.3 Requirements of decision-making support..... | 4 |
+| 7.4 Requirements of application and service support..... | 4 |
+| 7.5 Requirements of showcasing support..... | 5 |
+| 7.6 Requirements of security support..... | 5 |
+| 7.7 Requirements of maintenance support ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Framework of monitoring of water system ..... | 5 |
+| 8.1 Sensing functions..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Network functions ..... | 7 |
+| 8.3 Support functions..... | 7 |
+| 8.4 WSSM applications ..... | 8 |
+| 8.5 Security and management functions..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 10 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4490
+
+## Framework of water supply system monitoring for smart fire protection
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation addresses water supply system monitoring (WSSM) for smart fire protection. It specifies the reference model of WSSM and its requirements and framework.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.4201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4201 (2018), *High-level requirements and reference framework of smart city platforms*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 device** [ITU-T Y.4000]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing.
+
+**3.1.2 Internet of things (IoT)** [ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE 2 – From a broader perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------|
+| AMQP | Advanced Message Queuing Protocol |
+| BIM | Building Information Modelling |
+| CIM | City Information Modelling |
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------|
+| EWS | Early Warning Surveillance |
+| GIS | Geographic Information System |
+| ICT | Information Communication Technologies |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| ISM | Information Service Management |
+| MQTT | Message Queuing Telemetry Transport |
+| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance |
+| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition |
+| SCP | Smart City Platform |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| WSSM | Water Supply System Monitoring |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Reference model of water supply system monitoring (WSSM)
+
+The water supply system is commonly used in firefighting systems. Smart fire protection facilities based on IoT technologies have been developed to monitor the water supply status in real time.
+
+NOTE 1 – Smart fire protection refers to advanced fire protection which uses Internet of Things (IoT), information communication technologies (ICT), big data, artificial intelligence and other technologies in order to improve the efficiency of fire protection.
+
+WSSM aims to supervise, detect and alarm the operation processes of a water supply system based on IoT and ICT technologies. The WSSM realizes the digital management of fire extinguishing water sources (such as natural water sources, municipal water supplies and fire pools), providing reliable information for firefighting and rescue operations. It also enhances the availability of fire-control information, and enables the on-site fire brigade to quickly develop targeted water supply plans.
+
+The WSSM enables the monitoring of warnings and real-time data from different water sources online, improving the work efficiency compared with the traditional routine check offline. When there is a warning, a firefighter may accept instructions from the command centre through the WSSM.
+
+The WSSM reference model is designed to enable support of the functions of sensing data collection, command, dispatching, decision-making and disposal of firefighting and rescue. Figure 1 shows the WSSM reference model.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – WSSM reference model diagram. The diagram shows a layered architecture. On the left, a vertical box labeled 'Security and management capabilities' spans all layers. The main stack consists of four layers: 1. Application layer with three boxes: 'Application for fire EWS', 'Application for firefighting', and 'Application for fire rescue and fire drill'. 2. Service support and application support layer with four boxes: 'Data management support', 'Decision making support', 'Location-based service support', and 'Integrating visualization support'. 3. Network layer with four boxes: 'Wireless network', 'Wired network', 'Satellite network', and 'Private network'. 4. Sensing layer with two stacked boxes: 'IoT gateway' and 'Sensing devices'. To the right, a vertical box labeled 'External systems' is connected to the 'Service support and application support layer' by a double-headed arrow labeled 'Interfaces with external systems'. The reference 'Y.4490(23)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – WSSM reference model**
+
+The WSSM reference model is composed of four layers as well as cross-layer security and management capabilities, in line with the IoT reference model [ITU-T Y.4000]:
+
+- **Sensing layer:** This consists of sensing devices and gateways for data collection, scheduling and control execution. The sensing devices not only collect information on water quality and water characteristics such as water pressure, but also information on water supply facilities such as device failure. The gateways are eligible for the capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.4000].
+NOTE 2 – Although water quality information is not necessary for on-site firefighting, it is worth detecting sediment, particles, silt, etc., in order to avoid pipe blockage in the water mist system for firefighting or in other automatic sprinkler systems. The water should be free from fibrous or other matter in suspension liable to cause accumulations in the system piping [b-BSI 8489-1] and [b-CEN/TS 14972]. The automatic sprinkler systems have strict requirements for water quality to avoid nozzle blockage by particles [b-SAC-50974].
+- **Network layer:** This provides various networks to support the long-distance transmission of sensing data, including wireless networks, wired networks (such as Ethernet), private networks (such as virtual private networks (VPNs)) and satellite networks.
+- **Service support and application support layer:** This provides service support functions including data management, decision-making, location-based service support and integration of visualization technologies.
+- **Application layer:** This consists of typical firefighting applications, including applications for early warning surveillance (EWS), firefighting, fire rescue and drill:
+ - **Application for EWS:** This offers firefighting water EWS and firefighting water supply facility EWS, which enable the monitoring of information from sensing devices and thereby early warnings.
+ - **Application for firefighting:** This offers information service management (ISM) of the lifecycle process of the firefighting water supply and firefighting.
+ - **Application for fire rescue and drill:** This offers the automatic or semi-automatic generation of an evacuation plan, fire protection planning, and simulation and guidance for fire drills.
+- **Security and management capabilities:** These capabilities align with [ITU-T Y.4000]:
+
+- **Security capabilities:** These protect the WSSM from external threats by offering capabilities such as authorization, authentication and data confidentiality.
+- **Management capabilities:** These concern aspects such as sensing device management, configuration management and security management.
+
+The WSSM system interfaces enable communication with external systems.
+
+# **7 Requirements of monitoring of water system**
+
+## **7.1 Requirements of sensing device management**
+
+To coordinate the management of sensing devices, the WSSM is required to provide:
+
+- Access to data from sensing devices. The data include, but are not limited to, the water level in water tanks, the water pressure in pipelines and the water pressure in hydrants.
+- Operation of sensing devices, including, but not limited to, remote operation status switching and remote access setting.
+- Maintenance of sensing devices.
+- Support of the registration and configuration of the sensing devices.
+
+## **7.2 Requirements of data processing**
+
+To enable the transmission, processing and exchange of information using IoT communication, as well as the conversion of data transmission protocols, the WSSM is required to provide:
+
+- Support of basic IoT protocols (e.g., AMQP [b-ITU-T Q.3055], MQTT [b-ITU-T Q.3055]);
+- Processing of data, in addition to real-time processing of alert information;
+- Exchange of data with other systems, such as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and smart city platforms (SCP) [ITU-T Y.4201].
+
+NOTE – The monitoring system exchanges data (such as data on the water pressure or fire situation) with a SCADA system of a water plant through the interface shown in Figure 1, enabling the SCADA system to take further actions to schedule the water supply facilities (such as increasing water supply pressure).
+
+## **7.3 Requirements of decision-making support**
+
+To support decision-making processes to improve the efficiency of firefighting water supply system and for risk mitigation, the WSSM is required to provide:
+
+- Predictions for early risk based on the information on the fire alert and the on-site water supply status;
+- Simulations of fire drills based on current and past information;
+- Generation of water supply plans which can be distributed to firefighters;
+- Data mining and statistical analysis;
+- Integration with business intelligence systems and tools.
+
+## **7.4 Requirements of application and service support**
+
+To support firefighting applications, the WSSM is required to provide:
+
+- Early warning for water supply and for abnormal conditions of the water supply network as well as the facilities;
+- ISM of the lifecycle process of the firefighting water supply;
+- Evaluation of the results of fire drills.
+
+## **7.5 Requirements of showcasing support**
+
+To support the functionality of showcasing the status of water supply facilities and showcasing the fire alarm information collected from other systems, the WSSM is required to provide:
+
+- Information about supplied water, such as water pressure and water flow;
+- Operation status of water supply facilities, such as power supply and device failure;
+- Integration of building information modelling (BIM) and geographic information system (GIS).
+
+## **7.6 Requirements of security support**
+
+To ensure WSSM security, the WSSM is required to:
+
+- Encrypt or anonymize the critical data;
+- Guarantee the security and integrity of data;
+- Support authentication and authorization;
+- Manage the linkage and access to all the elements accessed through the WSSM;
+- Support confidential communications;
+- Guarantee non-repudiation in network security;
+- Control the configuration and registration.
+
+## **7.7 Requirements of maintenance support**
+
+The WSSM is required to:
+
+- Update the configurations or firmware of the IoT facilities;
+- Provide preventive maintenance and corrective maintenance.
+
+The WSSM is recommended to provide system tools to enhance the efficiency of daily activities, such as routine inspection, record and audit.
+
+# **8 Framework of monitoring of water system**
+
+The framework of the WSSM can be derived from the WSSM reference model, taking into account the requirements identified in clause 7.
+
+Figure 2 shows the framework of an WSSM.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Framework of WSSM, organized into layers and functional blocks. On the left, a vertical column lists 'Security and management capabilities' including Security, Monitoring, Audit, Logging, OAM, and Configuration. The main framework is divided into four horizontal layers, each with a blue header: 1. 'Application layer' (Application for WSSM) containing Firefighting water EWS, Firefighting water supply facilities EWS, Firefighting ISM, and Fire drill. 2. 'Service support and application support layer' (Support functions) containing Data management, Decision making, Location-based services, and Visualization integration. 3. 'Network layer' (Network functions) containing Wireless network, Wired network, Satellite network, and Private network. 4. 'Sensing layer' (Sensing functions) containing Gateway (Linkage, Networking, Monitoring and control) and Sensing devices (Sensing the information of the fire water supply characteristics, Sensing the information of water supply facilities). On the right, 'External systems' are connected to the main framework via 'Interfaces with external systems'.
+
+Figure 2 – Framework of WSSM. A hierarchical diagram showing the layers of the WSSM framework. On the left, 'Security and management capabilities' include Security, Monitoring, Audit, Logging, OAM, and Configuration. The main framework consists of four layers: 1. Application layer (Application for WSSM) with Firefighting water EWS, Firefighting water supply facilities EWS, Firefighting ISM, and Fire drill. 2. Service support and application support layer (Support functions) with Data management, Decision making, Location-based services, and Visualization integration. 3. Network layer (Network functions) with Wireless network, Wired network, Satellite network, and Private network. 4. Sensing layer (Sensing functions) with Gateway (Linkage, Networking, Monitoring and control) and Sensing devices (Sensing the information of the fire water supply characteristics, Sensing the information of water supply facilities). On the right, 'External systems' are connected via 'Interfaces with external systems'.
+
+Y.4490(23)
+
+**Figure 2 – Framework of WSSM**
+
+The WSSM framework offers the following:
+
+- **Sensing functions:** These offer mechanisms for collecting data from the sensing devices. They also enable the interconnection of sensing devices through gateways;
+- **Network functions:** These provide various networks to enable the long-distance transmission of sensing data;
+- **Support functions:** These enable the management of the whole lifetime of data, as well as providing capabilities of decision-making and other support services;
+- **Applications:** These constitute the core applications of the WSSM in firefighting, including but not limited to risk monitoring, early warning and fire drill;
+- **Security and management functions:** These provide generic support to other functions by offering services such as: security; monitoring; audits; logging; operation, administration and maintenance (OAM); and configuration [ITU-T Y.4201].
+
+## 8.1 Sensing functions
+
+### 8.1.1 Sensing devices
+
+The functions of sensing devices include:
+
+- Sensing the fire water supply characteristics, such as water pressure, water flow and water temperature;
+
+- Sensing the information of water supply facilities related to the fire water supply operation status, such as the power supply information, location information and device failure information;
+- Sensing the dynamic changes of the fire water supply while impacted by external factors such as collapse of buildings and earthquakes;
+- Offering strategies of data synchronization, such as strategies of autosynchronization and manual synchronization.
+
+### **8.1.2 Gateway**
+
+The gateway functions include:
+
+- Connectivity: It provides the functions to connect the sensing devices through different kinds of wired or wireless technologies.
+- Network control: It provides the functions to control the network of the sensing devices, such as authentication and authorization.
+- Monitoring and control: It provides the functions to monitor and control sensing devices, such as their operating status.
+
+The gateway also enables the provision of the following functions:
+
+- Data aggregation from different sensing devices based on different IoT protocols;
+- Data filtering to remove redundant information and thereby diminish network resource consumption;
+- Selection of the optimal network while the gateway is connected to multiple networks, based on different strategies such as selecting a network with the lowest round-trip time.
+
+## **8.2 Network functions**
+
+These functions support multiple networks for the long-distance transmission of sensing data, including wireless networks, wired networks (such as Ethernet), private networks (such as VPN) and satellite networks.
+
+## **8.3 Support functions**
+
+### **8.3.1 Data management support**
+
+Data management support functions include:
+
+- Metadata management: This provides a systematic way to operate data, consisting of metadata collection, metadata cleaning, and other basic data management abilities as defined in [ITU-T Y.4201].
+- Data processing: This provides the functions to convert data from input to output.
+- Data analysis: This provides the functions to analyse the data with statistical methods.
+- Ensuring the timeliness of the transmission of alert information.
+- Data integration of GIS, BIM and city information modelling (CIM).
+- Data sharing management, including the data processes of creation, authentication, authorization and publication.
+- Log audit. The log content includes but is not limited to the log time, log item and operator.
+
+### **8.3.2 Decision-making support**
+
+Decision-making support functions include:
+
+- Knowledge model management: This manages the data models for the domain knowledge, including but not limited to the fire water supply, firefighting, fire evacuation and fire drill;
+
+- Rule management: This offers the functions to manage the expert rules about the firefighting domains;
+- Decision-making engine: This provides support for optimizing the execution output based on a rule set.
+
+### **8.3.3 Location-based services support**
+
+Location-based services support functions include:
+
+- Location services: These provide basic location-based services such as tracking, routing and navigation [b-ISO 19132].
+- Geomatics services: These provide functions based on geographical information technologies, including location transformation, address parsing and map services.
+
+NOTE 1 – Geomatics services provide a unified representation from different depictions of location, which include common geographical coordinates of longitude, latitude and elevation, Cartesian coordinates, street addresses, shop names, postal codes, country codes and area codes [b-ITU-T F.747.7].
+
+- Information services: These provide comprehensive services integrated with the location, including data retrieval and location-based event management.
+
+NOTE 2 – Location-based event management includes, but is not limited to, event subscription, event warning and event disposal. An event can be triggered by certain conditions [b-ITU-T F.747.7].
+
+### **8.3.4 Visualization integration support**
+
+Visualization integration uses layers to simulate and present objects, and its functions include:
+
+- Static visualization: This refers to a static object visualization layer [b-ITU-T Y.4600], and it provides functions to present static objects in the firefighting domain, such as buildings and water sources.
+- Moving visualization: This refers to a moving objects visualization layer [b-ITU-T Y.4600], and it provides functions to present moving objects in the firefighting domain, such as fire engines and firefighters.
+- Layer combination: This provides functions to merge different layers based on the application requirements of WSSM.
+
+## **8.4 WSSM applications**
+
+The WSSM applications include:
+
+- Firefighting water EWS: This monitors the firefighting water, and offers early warning based on the information from the WSSM sensing devices;
+- Firefighting water supply facility EWS: This monitors the work status of water supply facilities, and offers early warning based on information from the WSSM sensing devices;
+- Firefighting ISM: This offers ISM of lifecycle process of the firefighting water supply;
+- Fire drill: This supports the automatic or semi-automatic generation of evacuation plan, fire protection planning, simulation and guide of the fire drill.
+
+## **8.5 Security and management functions**
+
+Security and management functions provide general support to the other functions by offering the following support functions [ITU-T Y.4201]:
+
+- Security: They provide security mechanisms such as authentication and authorization.
+- Monitoring: They collect and supervise sensing information.
+- Audit: They register who has accessed sensitive information.
+
+- Logging: They trace the execution of the applications and/or the WSSM.
+- Configuration: They allows access to the configuration of the WSSM and the changing of the execution parameters.
+- Operation, administration and maintenance (OAM): These are processes and tools that allow the WSSM to be operated, managed and maintained.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.747.7] Recommendation ITU-T F.747.7 (2014), *Requirements for network-based location information conversion for location-based applications and services.*
+- [b-ITU-T Q.3055] Recommendation ITU-T Q.3055 (2019), *Signalling protocol for heterogeneous Internet of things gateways.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4600] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4600 (2022), *Requirements and capabilities of a digital twin system for smart cities.*
+- [b-BSI 8489-1] BSI BS 8489-1:2016, *Fixed fire protection systems. Industrial and commercial watermist systems. Code of practice for design and installation.*
+- [b-CEN/TS 14972] CEN/TS 14972:2021, *Fixed firefighting systems – Watermist systems – Design, installation, inspection and maintenance.*
+- [b-ISO 19132] ISO 19132:2007, *Geographic information – Location-based services – Reference model.*
+- [b-SAC-50974] SAC GB 50974:2014, *Technical code for fire protection water supply and hydrant systems.*
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# **ITU-T Y.4491 (11/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+---
+
+# **Framework of blockchain-based self-organization networking in Internet of things environments**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4491
+
+# Framework of blockchain-based self-organization networking in Internet of things environments
+
+## Summary
+
+Self-organization networking (SON) is responsible for automatically planning, configuring, managing, optimizing and remedying networking. When building SON in an Internet of things (IoT) environment, an IoT device moves frequently and IoT service requirements change from time to time. In such an environment, it is difficult to manage IoT services and devices in a centralized manner. Blockchain supports dynamic trusted SON management and secure network resource sharing by using smart contract and consensus protocols.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4491 describes a framework for the support of SON in an IoT environment using blockchain.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4491 | 2023-11-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15685 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Blockchain, blockchain-based self-organization networking, Internet of Things (IoT), self-organization networking.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Self-organization networking in an IoT environment ..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Blockchain-based self-organization networking ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Requirements for self-organization networking using blockchain..... | 6 |
+| 7.1 General requirements..... | 6 |
+| 7.2 Functional requirements ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Architecture of blockchain-based self-organization networking..... | 8 |
+| 8.1 Functions of blockchain-based self-organization networking..... | 8 |
+| 8.2 Functional entities of blockchain-based self-organization networking..... | 9 |
+| Appendix I – Use cases of blockchain-based self-organization networking ..... | 12 |
+| I.1 Smart contract-based network autoconfiguration in an IoT environments .... | 12 |
+| I.2 Distributed ledger based routing table management in an IoT environments ..... | 12 |
+| Bibliography..... | 13 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4491
+
+# Framework of blockchain-based self-organization networking in Internet of things environments
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes a framework of blockchain-based self-organization networking (SON) in an IoT environment. In particular, the Recommendation includes:
+
+- An introduction to blockchain-based SON;
+- Requirements for SON using blockchain;
+- Architecture of blockchain-based SON in an IoT environment.
+
+Use cases of blockchain-based SON are provided in Appendix I.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3530] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3530 (2020), *Cloud computing – functional requirements for blockchain as a service*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4417] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4417 (2018), *Framework of self-organization network in Internet of things environments*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4560] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4560 (2023), *Blockchain-based data exchange and sharing for supporting Internet of things and smart cities and communities*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 blockchain** [b-ITU-T Y.Suppl.62]: A peer to peer distributed ledger based on a group of technologies for a new generation of transactional applications which may maintain a continuously growing list of cryptographically secured data records hardened against tampering and revision.
+
+NOTE 1 – Blockchains can help establish trust, accountability and transparency while streamlining business processes.
+
+NOTE 2 – Blockchains can be classified as three types (i.e., public, consortium and private) based on the relationship of the participants and the way to provide services.
+
+**3.1.2 blockchain data** [b-ITU-T Y.Suppl.62]: The data in a blockchain, such as distributed append-only ledgers, state information, permission policies etc.
+
+NOTE – Blockchain data may be distributed and be stored in blockchain peers. A blockchain peer may store whole or part of the data in a blockchain.
+
+**3.1.3 blockchain network** [ITU-T Y.3530]: A network to implement a blockchain platform among nodes.
+
+- 3.1.4 blockchain platform** [ITU-T Y.3530]: Implementation of blockchain to process data in a node.
+- 3.1.5 consensus** [b-ITU-T Y.Suppl.62]: Agreements to confirm the correctness of the blockchain transaction.
+- 3.1.6 constrained device** [b-ITU-T Y.4451]: A device that has constraints on characteristics such as limited processing capability, small memory capability, limited battery power, short range and low bit rate.
+- 3.1.7 device** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing.
+- 3.1.8 distributed ledger** [ITU-T Y.3530]: A type of ledger that is shared, replicated, and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner.
+- 3.1.9 infrastructure** [b-ITU-T Y.4407]: The basic facilities and systems comprised of network nodes (i.e., switches and/or routers) and the means to connect them (i.e., wired (cable or fibre) or wireless) for the purpose of communication between two end-points.
+- 3.1.10 Internet of things (IoT)** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.
+- 3.1.11 self-organization networking (SON)** [ITU-T Y.4417]: Autonomous networking established by individual devices, where the device can effectively interact with its peers and perform self-control for network organization and for joining networks according to its own status, own services and dynamic network circumstances in a decentralized infrastructure or an "infrastructure-less" network.
+- 3.1.12 smart contract** [b-ITU-T Y.Suppl.62]: Embedded logic that encodes the rules for specific types of blockchain transactions. A smart contract can be stored in the blockchain and can be invoked by specific blockchain applications.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| B-SON | Blockchain-based Self-Organization Networking |
+| BLE | Bluetooth Low Energy |
+| ECDSA | Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| IoT-CN | Internet of Things Coordinator Node |
+| IoT-DN | Internet of Things Device Node |
+| RAT | Radio Access Technology |
+| SON | Self-Organization Networking |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+The following conventions are used in this Recommendation:
+
+- The keywords **"is required to"** indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+- The keywords **"is recommended"** indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+- The keyword **"may"** indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+## 6.1 Self-organization networking in an IoT environment
+
+[ITU-T Y.4417] describes a framework of self-organization networking (SON) in an IoT network without the help of infrastructure.
+
+NOTE – An infrastructure-unsupported IoT network is independent on pre-existing infrastructure networks. [ITU-T Y.4417] [b-ITU-T Y.4407].
+
+SON in IoT environment refers to autonomic networking functionalities among heterogeneous networked IoT devices [ITU-T Y.4417] [b-ITU-T Y.3680]. SON performs various operations such as neighbour node discovery and routing for network configuration and communication services without relying on infrastructure.
+
+A SON network is intended to be a network that uses self-organization networking capabilities. A SON network supports four autonomic networking functionalities: self-configuration, self-healing, self-optimizing and self-protecting.
+
+Figure 1 shows the basic configuration of a SON network in an IoT environment.
+
+
+
+● IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE) □ Candidate IoT-CNs (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4) - - - - - Wireless connection
+ ● IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4) ■ IoT-CNs
+
+Y.4491(23)
+
+Figure 1: Basic configuration of a SON network in an IoT environment. The diagram shows three IoT-CNs (green squares) connected in a chain via dashed lines. Each IoT-CN is connected to several IoT-DNs (black and red circles) and Candidate IoT-CNs (white diamonds) via dashed lines. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: black circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE), red circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4), white diamond for Candidate IoT-CNs (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4), green square for IoT-CNs, and dashed line for Wireless connection. The reference Y.4491(23) is also present.
+
+**Figure 1 – Basic configuration of a SON network in an IoT environment**
+
+A SON network in an IoT environment consists of SON nodes, which are IoT devices with radio interfaces. The IoT devices may have diverse capabilities in terms of processing, memory, battery power, mobility and transmission ranges. An IoT device may use multiple radio access technologies. Some of the IoT devices that support multiple radio access technologies can act as IoT coordinator nodes (IoT-CN), while other IoT devices act as IoT device nodes (IoT-DN). Therefore, a SON network in an IoT environment is logically composed of two types of SON nodes: IoT-DN and IoT-CN.
+
+Figure 2 shows the creation process of two examples of SON networks in an IoT environment according to the radio access technologies of the IoT-DNs participating in the SON network.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: Examples of SON networks in an IoT environment. The diagram shows three horizontal planes. The top plane, labeled 'SON network #1 (e.g., BLE)', contains black IoT-DNs and green IoT-CNs connected by dashed lines. The middle plane, labeled 'IoT environment', shows a mix of black IoT-DNs, red IoT-DNs, and green IoT-CNs. The bottom plane, labeled 'SON network #2 (e.g., IEEE802.15.4)', contains red IoT-DNs and green IoT-CNs connected by dashed lines. Vertical dashed lines connect the IoT-DNs in the top and bottom planes to their counterparts in the middle plane. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: black circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE), red circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4), green square for IoT-CNs (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4), and dashed line for wireless connection. The reference 'Y.4491(23)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 2 – Examples of SON networks in an IoT environment**
+
+In Figure 2, IoT-DNs and IoT-CNs are scattered in the IoT environment area. The IoT-DNs firstly connect to an IoT-CN and the IoT-CN also connects to other IoT-CNs. Then, every IoT-CN builds a routing table for supporting peer-to-peer communications with the other IoT-DNs and, according to the radio access technologies of the IoT-DNs, two SON networks are created simultaneously. The two SON networks use the same radio technology among all their corresponding nodes (i.e., BLE based SON network and IEEE 802.15.4 [b-IEEE 802.15.4-2020] based SON network). All IoT-CNs and IoT-DNs in the same SON network share the same predefined optimization policies to configure the SON network functionalities [ITU-T Y.4417].
+
+## 6.2 Blockchain-based self-organization networking
+
+Blockchain is a distributed ledger which is characterized by digitally recorded data arranged in a successively growing chain of blocks, with each block being cryptographically linked and hardened against tampering and revision. A blockchain-enabled node creates a block with final and definitive (immutable) records of transactions. The block is also shared, replicated and synchronized among nodes in a distributed and decentralized manner [ITU-T Y.3530].
+
+The blockchain technology provides the following specific benefits: trustworthiness, transparency, highly resistance to outage, tamper-proofness, auditability and self-regulating ability. The blockchain technology can efficiently ensure the integrity, authenticity and auditability of all transactions [ITU-T Y.4560].
+
+Given these abilities, the blockchain technology can hence help make SON configuration data trusted in order to support autonomous networking functions in a SON network. The functions of SON (i.e., self-configuration and self-healing) can operate to recover a connection failure in the SON network,
+
+but these functions cannot dynamically and autonomically create the new connections. For the dynamic and automatic recovery of the SON network, the policy information for these functions needs to be maintained. The usage of the blockchain technology [ITU-T Y.3530] is one possible option to maintain policy information.
+
+This Recommendation describes a blockchain-based SON framework, which, among others, allows policy information to be maintained securely.
+
+Figure 3 shows a blockchain-based SON (B-SON) in an IoT environment. B-SON is based on a blockchain network consisting of IoT-CNs and application servers.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Blockchain-based self-organization networking in an IoT environment. The diagram shows a central 'Blockchain network' (dashed red box) containing three green squares representing 'IoT-CNs with blockchain'. Each IoT-CN is connected to an 'Application server' (orange server icon). Surrounding the blockchain network are several black circles representing 'IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE)' and two red circles representing 'IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4)'. Some IoT-DNs are connected to the IoT-CNs. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: black circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE), red circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4), white square for Candidate IoT-CNs with blockchain (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4), green square for IoT-CNs with blockchain, and orange server for Application server. Dashed lines represent connections. The reference Y.4491(23) is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 3 – Blockchain-based self-organization networking in an IoT environment**
+
+A B-SON network is intended to be a SON network that uses blockchain-based SON capabilities.
+
+In Figure 3, all IoT-CNs of the B-SON network support blockchain capabilities [ITU-T Y.3530]. Each IoT-CN is usually directly connected to an associated application server. The IoT-CN plays a role in the blockchain network with the help of an application server as it supports part of the blockchain capabilities.
+
+NOTE – The application servers work like a distributed database.
+
+On the other hand, there might be the case that just one of the IoT-CNs is directly connected to an application server. In this case, the remaining IoT-CNs have indirect connection via this application server to the blockchain network.
+
+The following four autonomous networking functions are supported by the B-SON network:
+
+- Self-configuration function: IoT-CNs can configure the network dynamically using smart contracts on blockchain depending on the SON capability of IoT-DNs and IoT-CNs.
+- Self-healing function: green-coloured IoT-CNs connect each other with the help of blockchain and an application server. As shown in Figure 2, IoT-DNs are connected to an IoT-CN in a star topology to configure a SON network. If an IoT-CN fails in the SON network, all IoT-DNs associated with the IoT-CN stop working. When an IoT-CN failure occurs, the candidate IoT-CNs restore network configuration information (e.g., routing table) from an adjacent IoT-CN in order to maintain network connectivity. If all IoT-CNs and candidate IoT-CNs are included in a blockchain network, this configuration information is received via the blockchain network.
+- Self-optimizing function: a blockchain network is maintained using consensus mechanisms. The B-SON network maintains the status of IoT-DNs and IoT-CNs, coordinator election rules and smart contracts in the blockchain network.
+
+- Self-protecting function: the blockchain technology supports secure identification management. Authentication, digital signature and consensus mechanisms in blockchain network support non-repudiation and secure join/leave in/from a B-SON network.
+
+Figure 4 shows two types of interworking between the internal blockchain network of a B-SON network and an external blockchain network composed of application servers. The left side of Figure 4 shows a case of IoT-CNs which cannot fully support the blockchain technology because of the lack of hardware capabilities: in this case, the blockchain functionalities are performed with the help of application servers in a separated external blockchain network. The right side of Figure 4 shows the case of IoT-CNs which can support blockchain technologies: in this case, just one of the IoT-CNs connects to an application server of an external blockchain network.
+
+
+
+a) Case A: Multiple interactions between IoT-CNs and application servers by one-to-one mapping
+
+b) Case B: An interaction between a IoT-CN and an application server
+
+● IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE) □ Candidate IoT-CNs with blockchain (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4) ▤ Application server
+● IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4) ■ IoT-CNs with blockchain - - - - - Connection
+
+Y.4491(23)
+
+Figure 4: Types of interworking between the B-SON network and blockchain network. The diagram consists of two parts, (a) and (b), each showing a cloud-like boundary containing an 'Internal blockchain network' (red dashed box) and an 'External blockchain network' (green dashed box). In (a), multiple IoT-CNs (green squares) are connected to multiple application servers (green rectangles) in the external network. In (b), only one IoT-CN is connected to one application server. A legend at the bottom identifies symbols: black circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., BLE), red circle for IoT-DNs (e.g., IEEE802.15.4), white square for Candidate IoT-CNs with blockchain (e.g., BLE + IEEE802.15.4), green square for IoT-CNs with blockchain, and green rectangle for Application server. Dashed lines represent connections. The reference Y.4491(23) is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4 – Types of interworking between the B-SON network and blockchain network**
+
+# 7 Requirements for self-organization networking using blockchain
+
+## 7.1 General requirements
+
+### 7.1.1 Support for heterogeneous IoT networks
+
+Heterogeneous IoT networks consist of heterogeneous IoT-CNs and IoT-DNs in terms of different radio access technology.
+
+- B-SON is required to support heterogeneous IoT-CNs and IoT-DNs in an IoT environment.
+- B-SON is recommended to build a B-SON network with homogeneous IoT-CNs and IoT-DNs in an IoT environment.
+- B-SON is required to manage predefined policy information to operate IoT services [ITU-T Y.4417] in an IoT environment.
+
+NOTE 1 – Policy information for the support of IoT services is usually predefined.
+
+- An IoT-CN is recommended to have the ability to support blockchain capabilities with the help of one or more application servers in a separate blockchain network.
+
+NOTE 2 – Heterogeneous IoT-CNs may support diverse radio access technologies.
+
+### **7.1.2 Decentralization of blockchain-based self-organization networking**
+
+- B-SON functions are required to be distributed to IoT-CNs according to the predefined policies to operate IoT services [ITU-T Y.4417].
+- The policy information for IoT services in B-SON network is recommended to be kept in the blockchain network with the help of application servers.
+- Data sharing between the B-SON network and blockchain network (e.g., via mechanisms such as interledger protocol [b-Hyperledger Quit]) is recommended to be supported.
+
+## **7.2 Functional requirements**
+
+### **7.2.1 Self-configuration functional requirements**
+
+- B-SON is required to support a self-configuration function for connectivity of IoT-DNs to IoT-CN.
+- B-SON is required to support a self-configuration function among IoT-CNs.
+- B-SON is recommended to support all procedures to initiate IoT-DN to IoT-CN networking (e.g., registration, authorization, access control, neighbour discovery) via the support of blockchain technology (e.g., smart contract).
+- A blockchain network composed of application servers is recommended to manage the networking information of a B-SON network (e.g., routing tables, IoT-DN information, IoT-CN information and routing path information).
+
+### **7.2.2 Self-healing functional requirements**
+
+- B-SON is required to have a self-healing function (e.g., neighbour IoT-CN discovery, network failure detection, election of new IoT-CN on behalf of failed IoT-CN) among IoT-CNs.
+- IoT-CN is recommended to obtain the self-healing information from neighbouring IoT-CNs and application servers.
+- A blockchain network composed of application servers is recommended to keep the information to support the recovery of a B-SON network.
+- The blockchain network composed of application servers is recommended to keep the information to support the IoT-CN election.
+
+### **7.2.3 Self-optimizing functional requirements**
+
+- B-SON is required to manage the performance information (e.g., delay, packet loss, throughput) for IoT services.
+- B-SON is recommended to manage the performance information for IoT services with the help of application servers.
+
+NOTE – Performance information for IoT services is compared with the predefined policy information in the blockchain network for possible IoT environment performance adjustment.
+- A blockchain network composed of application servers is recommended to use consensus mechanisms to support the self-optimizing function in a B-SON network.
+
+### **7.2.4 Self-protecting functional requirements**
+
+- B-SON is recommended to use smart contracts to support the decentralization of B-SON functions.
+- B-SON is recommended to use smart contracts to authenticate IoT-DNs and IoT-CNs to become members of a B-SON network.
+- B-SON is recommended to maintain access information (e.g., join and leave in/from a B-SON network).
+
+- B-SON is recommended to use smart contracts in IoT-CN's to support IoT services.
+- A blockchain network composed of application servers is recommended to support smart contracts of IoT-CN's for IoT services support.
+
+# 8 Architecture of blockchain-based self-organization networking
+
+## 8.1 Functions of blockchain-based self-organization networking
+
+B-SON provides autonomous functions through the cooperation of IoT-DNs and IoT-CN's as shown in Figure 3. The B-SON functional architecture shown in Figure 5 is an extension of the SON functional architecture described in [ITU-T Y.4417]. The B-SON functional architecture includes a blockchain function with four related functional entities. The three B-SON functions, i.e., coordination function [ITU-T Y.4417], networking function [ITU-T Y.4417] and blockchain function, support the requirements identified in clause 7 for the IoT environment.
+
+
+
+Y.4491(23)
+
+Figure 5 – B-SON functional architecture diagram. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is a yellow box labeled 'Predefined optimization policies based on requirements of IoT services', containing four sub-boxes: 'The policy information of self-configuration function', 'The policy information of self-healing function', 'The policy information of self-optimization function', and 'The policy information of self-protection function'. Below this is a large grey box labeled 'Blockchain-based self-organization networking (B-SON) functions'. Inside this box are three colored regions: a pink region for 'Coordination function' (containing 'Coordinator election FE', 'Initialization and configuration FE', and 'Identification FE'), a blue region for 'Networking function' (containing 'Routing and path discovery FE', 'Data forwarding and delivery FE', and 'Network recovery FE'), and a green region for 'Blockchain function' (containing 'Wallet FE', 'Consensus FE', 'Core blockchain FE', and 'Networking FE'). At the bottom is a blue box labeled 'Resources of IoT-DNs and IoT-CN's (e.g., multi-RAT, power)'. Arrows indicate interactions: solid arrows point from the top yellow box down to the B-SON functions box, and from the B-SON functions box down to the bottom blue box. Dashed arrows point from the bottom blue box up to the B-SON functions box, and from the B-SON functions box up to the top yellow box.
+
+**Figure 5 – B-SON functional architecture**
+
+The B-SON functional architecture is comprised of three functions:
+
+- **Coordination function:** this has the role of building network topologies with three functional entities (FEs), i.e., coordinator election, initialization and configuration, and identification.
+- **Network Function:** this enables data communication among IoT-DNs with three FEs: routing and path discovery, data forwarding and delivery, and network recovery.
+- **Blockchain Function:** this provides blockchain capabilities in support to the B-SON functions (i.e., coordination and network functions) with four FEs: wallet, consensus, core blockchain and networking.
+
+Predefined optimization policies of autonomous functions are built in terms of the requirements of specific IoT services. With the coordination function, IoT-CN's collect resource information from neighbouring IoT-CN's, such as remaining energy or processing performance. The coordination function elects coordinators and builds initialization and configurations to control network topologies,
+
+while the networking function builds routing paths for packet forwarding in terms of the elected coordinators and the policies for optimization. Then, data delivery beings [ITU-T Y.4417].
+
+The role of predefined optimization policies is to analyse the status and requirements for IoT services and decide an optimal policy based on the requirements. The determination of optimization policies is dependent on the requirements of IoT services. If IoT services require energy-efficient networking, all procedures are focused on energy saving. If the IoT services require high performance (e.g., high-speed or big-data processing), B-SON is configured for high-performance. Such policies can vary according to the characteristics of the IoT service requirements [ITU-T Y.4417].
+
+In Figure 6, the B-SON functions shown in Figure 5 are allocated to each IoT-DN or IoT-CN. These functions exchange the necessary information for constructing and maintaining a network through the blockchain. There are two cases according to the hardware capabilities (e.g., storage capacity, CPU speed, etc.) of IoT-DNs/IoT-CNs. The left of Figure 6 shows non-constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN with four blockchain FEs. The right of Figure 6 shows constrained IoT-DNs/IoT-CNs with the help of application servers to perform the blockchain function as described below.
+
+
+
+Figure 6 illustrates two cases of blockchain functional entity locations. The diagram is divided into two main sections, (a) and (b), each showing the interaction between IoT-DN/IoT-CN and an Application server.
+
+**Case (a): IoT-DN/IoT-CN with full blockchain function**
+
+- IoT-DN/IoT-CN:** Contains a "Self-organization networking functions" block and a "Blockchain function" block. The Blockchain function block includes "Wallet FE", "Consensus FE", "Core blockchain FE", and "Networking FE".
+- Resources of IoT devices (e.g., multi-RAT, power, etc.):** A blue box at the bottom of the IoT-DN/IoT-CN section.
+- Predefined optimization policies based on requirements of IoT services:** A yellow box at the top left, with a dashed arrow pointing to the IoT-DN/IoT-CN section.
+
+**Case (b): Constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN with parts of blockchain function**
+
+- Constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN:** Contains a "Self-organization networking functions" block and a "Sub-Blockchain function" block. The Sub-Blockchain function block includes "Wallet FE" and "Networking FE".
+- Resources of IoT devices (e.g., multi-RAT, power, etc.):** A blue box at the bottom of the Constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN section.
+- Predefined optimization policies based on requirements of IoT services:** A yellow box at the top right, with a dashed arrow pointing to the Constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN section.
+- Application server:** Contains a "Blockchain function" block (Wallet FE, Consensus FE, Core blockchain FE, Networking FE) and four self-management blocks: "Self-configuration", "Self-healing", "Self-optimization", and "Self-protection".
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- IoT-DN/IoT-CN with blockchain
+- Application server with blockchain
+
+Y.4491(23)
+
+Figure 6: Two cases of blockchain functional entity locations. The diagram illustrates two scenarios for B-SON functional entity allocation. Case (a) shows a non-constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN with a full blockchain function, including Wallet FE, Consensus FE, Core blockchain FE, and Networking FE. Case (b) shows a constrained IoT-DN/IoT-CN with a sub-blockchain function (Wallet FE and Networking FE) and an application server that handles the Consensus and Core blockchain FEs. Both cases are influenced by predefined optimization policies based on IoT service requirements. The application server also includes self-configuration, self-healing, self-optimization, and self-protection functions.
+
+**Figure 6 – Two cases of blockchain functional entity locations**
+
+## 8.2 Functional entities of blockchain-based self-organization networking
+
+### 8.2.1 Coordination function
+
+The coordination function has three FEs, i.e., coordinator election, initialization and configuration, and identification [ITU-T Y.4417]. The following describes how these FEs interact with the blockchain function.
+
+- Coordinator election FE: IoT-CNs manage neighbouring IoT-CNs and forward the data to target IoT-DNs. IoT-CNs act as a gateway for the neighbouring IoT-DNs. In B-SON, there may be many candidate IoT-CNs with multiple radio access interfaces. Some of them become coordinators according to a predefined optimization policy for IoT services. The blockchain function, in particular the consensus FE, interacts with this FE for the self-optimizing function. The consensus mechanisms are used to elect IoT-CNs. Therefore, B-SON maintains the neighbouring and forwarding information (e.g., lists of IoT-CNs/IoT-DNs, election rules, revocation lists, multiple radio access interfaces and networking capabilities of IoT-CNs/IoT-DNs).
+
+- Initialization and configuration FE: All IoT-DNs belong to one of the IoT-CN for management. Hence, the IoT-DNs are connected to one of the IoT-CN with star topology. These connections between sending and targeting IoT-DNs are exploited for data forwarding through the IoT-CN. The blockchain function, in particular core blockchain FE and networking FE, interacts with the initialization and configuration FE for the self-configuration function. Smart contract is triggered to configure B-SON network according to the predefined optimization policy.
+- Identification FE: The identification schemes in [ITU-T Y.4417] are not appropriate for IoT-CN and IoT-DN in a B-SON network. Therefore, new identification schemes are required. Even though these schemes are out of scope in this Recommendation, they support blockchain technologies to support secure identification management. The blockchain function, in particular wallet FE and core blockchain FE, interacts with the identification FE for self-protecting function. Authentication and digital signature mechanisms of blockchain [ITU-T Y.3530] may be used to support secure join and leave events in a B-SON network.
+
+### 8.2.2 Networking function
+
+The networking function has three FEs: routing and path discovery, data forwarding and delivery, and network recovery [ITU-T Y.4417]. The following describes how these FEs interact with the blockchain function.
+
+- Routing and path discovery FE: network topology among IoT-CN is created according to predefined optimization policies. The routing path is built in terms of the IoT-CN between a source IoT-DN and a destination IoT-DN. The blockchain function interacts with this FE for self-optimizing and self-configuration functions. The consensus mechanisms select appropriate IoT-CN to make routing path.
+- Data forwarding and delivery FE: data forwarding can be conducted with various traffic patterns (e.g., unicasting, multicasting and broadcasting). Data forwarding is managed by IoT-CN and data delivery to IoT-DN is done through IoT-CN. Blockchain function interacts with this FE for self-optimizing and self-configuration functions. The consensus mechanisms select appropriate IoT-CN for data forwarding and then smart contracts are triggered to select proper target IoT-DN.
+- Network recovery FE: There are two types of network node failures. One is the failure of IoT-CN and the other is the failure of IoT-DN. If an IoT-CN fails, one of the candidate IoT-CN is elected as new IoT-CN with the help of a blockchain network with application servers. Then, neighbouring IoT-DNs are recovered. The blockchain function interacts with this FE for self-healing service. All information for self-healing function is obtained from the B-SON network. Furthermore, if a connection between an IoT-CN and an IoT-DN fails, the IoT-CN tries to reconnect to the IoT-DN. When it finally turns out that the connection is closed, the IoT-CN does not manage information of the disconnected IoT-DN any longer. This information is kept in a revocation list on the blockchain network.
+
+### 8.2.3 Blockchain function
+
+The blockchain function has four FEs: wallet, consensus, core blockchain and network FEs. The following describes how these FEs interact with the coordination and networking functions.
+
+- Wallet FE: the FE manages the identification information for IoT services (e.g., identification of IoT-CN/IoT-DN, IoT services and smart contracts, currency, coupon and so on). The FE is not limited to specific identification schemes because IoT services may support different identification schemes.
+- Consensus FE: the FE selects IoT-CN with predefined optimization policies to support authentication and authorization for join and/or leave of IoT-CN. As shown in Figure 6, the FE is not located in IoT-CN. Therefore, application servers may have this role on behalf of IoT-CN.
+
+- Core blockchain FE: the FE manages the distributed ledger. This FE is not supported in constrained IoT-DNs. In this case, application servers join the blockchain network.
+- Networking FE: the FE manages the blockchain network. This network is composed of IoT-CNs, IoT-DNs and application servers.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases of blockchain-based self-organization networking
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 Smart contract-based network autoconfiguration in an IoT environments
+
+In a B-SON network, dynamic network configuration is possible between IoT-CNs (i.e., IoT coordinators). When constructing a SON network, the network configuration is initiated utilizing a smart contract. This configuration can be differentiated according to necessity of network resources in each IoT service. IoT-CN can configure the smart contract with network policy. When the network environment changes, it is possible to change the network configuration dynamically. And when a SON network failure occurs, the SON network can be restored or changed dynamically by network policy. This is because blocks in the blockchain store routing table, IoT device information, and routing path costs for network configuration. Smart contracts can be created for events such as addition, deletion and update of IoT-DNs and/or IoT-CNs.
+
+B-SON supports a distributed environment. IoT-CNs construct a blockchain network. So, an identical routing table is stored in all IoT-CNs. When an IoT-CN fails, the routing is changed to another IoT-CN, and it can be restored from the neighbouring IoT-CN. In a B-SON environment, various application configurations are possible. The routing table is distributed and executed to recover from the application failure.
+
+## I.2 Distributed ledger based routing table management in an IoT environments
+
+B-SON supports IoT device authentication and routing table validation. In an IoT environment, authentication of the IoT devices is important to construct a B-SON network. In fact, it is possible for a malicious IoT device to deliver incorrect routing tables, to set incorrect route paths or to communicate incorrect information of neighbour IoT devices during the process of constructing the B-SON network. This issue can be solved by the elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) [b-FIPS-186-3] using public and private keys in the B-SON network.
+
+The validity of information delivered by the participating IoT devices is verified. This verification can be addressed by transactions containing information for routing table, storing it in a block and validating it with a consensus mechanism.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3680] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3680 (2022), *Framework of human-like networking*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4407] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4407/Y.2281 (2011), *Framework of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4451] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4451 (2016), *Framework of constrained device networking in the IoT environments*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Suppl.62] Recommendation ITU-T Y.Suppl.62 (2020), *Overview of blockchain for supporting Internet of things and smart cities and communities in data processing and management aspects*.
+- [b-FIPS-186-3] FIPS 186-3, National Institute of Standards and Technology (2009), *Digital Signature Standard*.
+- [b-Hyperledger Quilt] Hyperledger Foundation (2019), *Hyperledger Quilt*.
+.
+- [b-IEEE 802.15.4-2020] IEEE 802.15.4-2020, *IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c048e2983cea752aaa47b45aa452c9297d96fe0
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@@ -0,0 +1,885 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.4499 (01/2025)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+---
+
+## **Framework for urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4499
+
+## Framework for urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4499 specifies a framework for urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing, including requirements, functional architecture, common procedures, as well as security and privacy considerations.
+
+Urban infrastructure includes the physical facilities and systems that a city must have for its operation and development. It has the characteristics of large quantity, wide distribution and high management difficulty. Crowdsourcing is the practice of engaging a group of people for a common goal. It can provide a scalable and financially viable way to monitor urban infrastructure.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4499 | 2025-01-22 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15680 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Crowdsourcing, IoT crowdsourcing, system, urban infrastructure monitoring.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL ;
+ - ✓ Infrastructure identifier (ID): ;
+ - ✓ Infrastructure status: ;
+ - ✓ Infrastructure location: ;
+ - ✓ Observation time: ;
+ - ✓ Attachment: .NOTE – For example, data type can be text, voice, image, video, etc.
+- Provide centralized processing, analysis and aggregation methods for different types of crowdsourcing data.
+- Provide lifetime management of crowdsourcing data, including data collection, data storage, data processing, data quality evaluation, data presentation, data transmission and data destruction.
+
+### **7.1.3 Access-related requirements**
+
+It is required that the UIM platform perform as follows.
+
+- Provide multiple accesses to crowdsourcing participants.
+
+NOTE – For example, multiple accesses include smart phone application access, telephone call, web page access, etc.
+
+## **7.2 Requirements for UE**
+
+It is required that UE perform as follows.
+
+- Collect crowdsourcing participant information and synchronize the information with the UIM platform.
+ - Receive data models and examples provided by the UIM platform and check whether the crowdsourcing data collected by the participants meet the requirements of the data models.
+ - Support multiple types of crowdsourcing data.
+ - Support for calling other capabilities of UE.
+- NOTE 1 – When calling other capabilities of UE, the participant is expected to be informed and allowed to choose whether to agree to call the capabilities. For example, the capabilities could be camera, photo album, positioning, microphone, etc.
+- Support multiple types of networks for transmitting crowdsourcing data.
+
+It is recommended for UE to perform as follows.
+
+- Support edge data processing to improve efficiency of information collection.
+- Support participants to choose appropriate time and network access to upload crowdsourcing data.
+
+NOTE 2 – Considering different networks used by participants, in order to save their network resources and costs, collected data can be stored locally in UE rather than uploaded to the UIM platform immediately. Participants can freely choose the appropriate time and network for data transmission (such as home broadband network or public network).
+
+# **8 Functional architecture of UIM based on crowdsourcing**
+
+## **8.1 The overall design**
+
+According to the characteristics of a large number of components and wide distribution of urban infrastructure, the scheme of UIM based on crowdsourcing can improve the efficiency of its existing method by using IoT equipment and mobility of ordinary users.
+
+As shown in Figure 2, the functional architecture of UIM based on crowdsourcing includes two parts: UIM platform and UIM UE. The core functions and capabilities are as follows.
+
+- 1) UIM platform: Aiming at the goal of UIM based on crowdsourcing, the platform provides FEs to handle crowdsourcing tasks, crowdsourcing data and UE access.
+ - a) Core functions:
+ - task-related functions involve maintenance and management of a crowdsourcing task;
+ - data-related functions involve maintenance and management of the UIM data collected by crowdsourcing participants;
+ - access-related functions involve heterogeneous device access management.
+ - b) Capabilities:
+ - maintain the infrastructure information involved in the task;
+ - maintain the crowdsourcing participant information;
+ - set incentives for participants to perform tasks and maintain incentive information;
+ - support different types of device access;
+ - support different types of crowdsourcing data;
+ - support data model specification and management for different data types;
+ - provide analysis algorithms and artificial intelligence (AI) for various types of crowdsourcing data.
+
+- 2) UIM UE: UE helps the participants perform crowdsourcing tasks and submit infrastructure status information. UE will enable FEs to handle participant management, task management, data management and human/machine interface (HMI) management.
+- a) Core functions
+ - Managing crowdsourcing participant information, managing crowdsourcing task information, collecting and locally processing infrastructure status information, and providing an HMI and interactions.
+ - b) Capabilities:
+ - support local data storage, so that participants can cache task information and infrastructure information in advance or collect urban infrastructure status information locally in the absence of communications;
+ - support data collection for at least one common data type;
+ - call other system capabilities of UE.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of UIM based on crowdsourcing. It is organized into three main horizontal layers within a dashed box labeled "Urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing".
+
+- Top Layer: Crowdsourcers** (represented by a box at the top).
+- UIM platform** (a large container box):
+ - Task related functions** (left side): Includes Requirement management FE, Participant management FE, Task management FE, and Incentive management FE.
+ - Data related functions** (middle): Includes Data model management FE, Data aggregation FE, and Data lifecycle management FE.
+ - Access related functions** (right side): Includes Heterogeneous device access FE.
+- UIM user equipment** (bottom layer): Includes Participant management FE, Task management FE, Data management FE, and HMI management FE. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the UIM platform and the user equipment.
+- Urban infrastructure** (bottom layer): Includes Electric cable, Manhole cover, Mail box, Public security camera, and an ellipsis indicating other infrastructure elements.
+
+Functional architecture of UIM based on crowdsourcing diagram
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional architecture of UIM based on crowdsourcing**
+
+## 8.2 UIM platform
+
+### 8.2.1 Task-related functions
+
+#### (1) Requirement management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.1, the main role of the requirement management FE is as follows.
+
+- Infrastructure information management:** In order to monitor urban infrastructure more accurately in crowdsourcing tasks, the requirement management FE maintains infrastructure information, including infrastructure ID, name, description, responsible departments, location and last time status.
+- Requirement decomposition:** In order to reduce the granularity of crowdsourcing tasks, improve the efficiency of task execution, and carry out accurate statistical analysis of task results, the requirement management FE decomposes UIM requirements. Requirement
+
+decomposition can be realized in three dimensions: the type of monitored infrastructure, the location of monitored infrastructure, and the type of crowdsourcing data to be collected.
+
+- c) **Requirement screening:** In order to ensure the feasibility of UIM based on crowdsourcing, the requirement management FE screens UIM requirements. The screening condition is the location of the infrastructure. The requirement management FE filters out infrastructure located in areas that are inaccessible or dangerous.
+
+NOTE – For example, inaccessible areas may include physically inaccessible locations, such as mountains, deep valleys, swamps, etc., and restricted access locations, such as military bases, nuclear power plants, areas during large-scale events, competitions and conferences, etc. Dangerous areas may include high-risk locations, such as volcanic craters, earthquake- or flood-affected areas, areas with high-voltage power lines, etc., and locations that can only be entered with special protective measures, such as locations where toxic chemicals, radioactive substances, or biohazardous materials are present.
+
+#### (2) Participant management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.1, the main role of the participant management FE is as follows.
+
+- a) **Participant grouping:** The participant management FE groups participants to achieve accurate matching between participants and tasks. Participant grouping can be realized in multiple dimensions and can be updated dynamically.
+
+NOTE 1 – For example, participant grouping dimensions can include the areas involved in historical tasks a participant has participated in, provided data types, task execution history and provided data quality. According to different dimensions, participants can be divided into multiple groups.
+
+- b) **Establishment of a reputation mechanism:** In order to reduce errors by non-expert participants, the participant management FE establishes a reputation mechanism, scoring participants based on the quality of the data they submitted for each task. Data from high-reputation participants are more credible and will be prioritized by the platform.
+
+NOTE 2 – The quality of crowdsourcing data will be evaluated in the data lifecycle management FE, and the evaluation result could be used in the reputation mechanism. For example, for each task, the participant management FE could give each participant involved in the task a score according to the crowdsourcing data evaluation result. The average score obtained by a participant in all tasks where he/she participates in could be used as reputation.
+
+#### (3) Task management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.1, the main role of the task management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Task generation:** According to the requirements of UIM based on crowdsourcing, the task management FE calculates the required elements and generates a performable task. The task can be specified as a tuple: {Monitored Infrastructure, Infrastructure Status Description, Monitoring Operations and Requirements, Infrastructure Location, Time-limit};
+
+NOTE 1 – The required elements can include the type of crowdsourcing data to be collected, the number of participants performing tasks and the crowdsourcing resources required to perform tasks. Because crowdsourcing is significantly affected by participant ability, task difficulty, incentives or other factors, the data from a single participant is usually unreliable or the participant is even unable to complete the task. So, the number of participants performing tasks usually maintains redundancy and credible results are obtained through the comparative analysis of redundant crowdsourcing data.
+
+✓ **Monitored infrastructure** is the name of one kind of infrastructure or a set of multiple kinds of infrastructure to be monitored using crowdsourcing.
+
+NOTE 2 – In one performable task, different infrastructures that can be put in a set may require similar monitoring skills, have similar degree of monitoring complexity, or be in proximate locations.
+
+✓ **Infrastructure status description** describes possible damage to the infrastructure.
+
+NOTE 3 – As an example, for road status monitoring, it is necessary to tell participants the types of road damage in the infrastructure status description, such as road cracks, road deformation and road peeling. Therefore, participants can better understand the conditions under which infrastructure status monitoring is required.
+
+- ✓ **Monitoring operations and requirements** contain a variety of perceptual operations that participants need to perform to monitor specific urban infrastructure and the relevant requirements for crowdsourcing data.
+
+NOTE 4 – For example, a monitoring operation can involve taking a photo or recording a video of the damaged infrastructure. Requirements can include the number of pixels in a photo or the format of the video.
+
+- ✓ **Infrastructure location** is the perceived area in which the monitored urban infrastructure is located.
+
+- ✓ **Time-limit** is the perceived timeliness of task execution.
+
+- b) **Task published:** The task management FE establishes a scheduling mechanism, using limiting conditions and machine learning algorithms to compute task demand. According to the task demand, the task management FE finds the appropriate participant group and publishes the task to them.
+
+NOTE 5 – For example, limiting conditions can include the total number of components of monitored infrastructure, revenue targets or estimated overheads. In addition, task demand can be the number of participants, data types, activity areas, etc.
+
+#### (4) Incentive management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.1, the main role of the incentive management FE is as follows.
+
+- a) **Incentive mechanism design:** In order to achieve maximum benefit with the minimum incentive, the incentive management FE designates a reasonable incentive mechanism, including incentives based on: urban infrastructure type, crowdsourcing data type, crowdsourcing data quality, etc.
+
+### 8.2.2 Data-related functions
+
+#### (1) Data model management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.2, the main role of the data model management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Data model management:** The data model management FE provides a data model to crowdsourcing participants to collect urban infrastructure status information.
+- b) **Example management:** In order to improve the quality of crowdsourcing data, the data model management FE provides corresponding examples according to the data model for different data types.
+
+#### (2) Data aggregation FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.2, the main role of the data aggregation FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Data filtering:** The data aggregation FE supports preliminary filtering of data sets that meet the task requirements. It can use keywords and infrastructure recognition from image or video to filter irrelevant and invalid data to improve the efficiency of data aggregation.
+- b) **Data registration:** Due to human mistakes of the participants and the difference between UE capabilities, there may be some errors or deviations in crowdsourcing data. Therefore, the data aggregation FE supports data registration to reduce errors or deviations.
+
+NOTE 1 – For example, to achieve spatial data registration of the infrastructure, the data aggregation FE can extract the features of infrastructure and the surrounding environment from the image or video submitted by crowdsourcing participants and establish the correspondence between data through feature matching and spatial change.
+
+#### (3) Data lifecycle management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.2, the main role of the data lifecycle management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Data quality evaluation:** The data lifecycle management FE develops a mechanism to evaluate crowdsourcing data provided by participants according to the results of data aggregation. In addition, the evaluation results can be related to the participant reputation and incentives.
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, data quality evaluation indicators can include the accuracy of the urban infrastructure status description, the accuracy of the urban infrastructure positioning, the correlation between images or videos and urban infrastructure status, as well as the clarity of urban infrastructure images or videos.
+
+- b) **Data presentation:** The data lifecycle management FE displays urban infrastructure status according to different dimensions.
+
+NOTE 3 – For example, data presentation dimensions can include the statistics of urban infrastructure status within a certain geographical range, the statistics of the urban infrastructure status of the same type and the statistics of the urban infrastructure status changes within a certain period of time.
+
+### 8.2.3 Access-related functions
+
+#### (1) Heterogeneous device access FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.1.3, the main role of the heterogeneous device access FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Access support:** The heterogeneous device access FE provides effective assistance for crowdsourcing data collection. It can provide applications for participants who use smart phones, tablets or other smart terminals to provide crowdsourcing data. It can provide voice navigation for participants who use telephone calls to provide crowdsourcing data and support the conversion of voice into text for data processing. It can provide web pages for participants who use web access to provide crowdsourcing data.
+
+## 8.3 UIM UE
+
+### (1) Participant management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.2, the main role of the participant management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Participant information collection and synchronization:** The participant management FE collects participant information needed by the UIM platform and synchronizes the information with the platform.
+
+NOTE 1 – Participant information includes required information and optional information. Required information is participant identification, which is specified by the participant, and UIM platform only checks for uniqueness. Optional information may include phone number, activity areas, preferred data types (such as pictures, text, audio, video, etc.), etc. It should be noted that participants can completely decide whether to provide optional information. Missing (or the lack of) optional information does not affect task execution.
+
+- b) **Participant operation log recording and synchronization:** The participant management FE collects the participant operational activities and records logs. The participant management FE regularly synchronizes participant operation logs with the UIM platform.
+
+By analysing the logs, the UIM platform can further optimize task-related functions and improve the incentive mechanism.
+
+### (2) Task management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.2, the main role of the task management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Task classification:** The task management FE classifies and presents the crowdsourcing tasks to participants according to multiple dimensions.
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, task classification dimensions can be the type of the urban infrastructure, the type of the incentive and the type of the crowdsourcing data to be collected.
+
+- b) **Task sorting:** The task management FE sorts the tasks published to participants according to multiple dimensions.
+
+NOTE 3 – For example, task sorting dimensions can include the urban infrastructure location, the incentive of the task, the effective time period of the task, the participant number of the task and the completion of the task.
+
+### (3) Data management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.2, the main role of the data management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Infrastructure information parsing:** For urban infrastructure with a barcode, QR code or other identification, data management FE needs to parse the infrastructure information that is convenient and accurate for data collection.
+
+- b) **Local data storage:** In order to help participants to check their participation in crowdsourcing tasks, the data management FE stores and displays the urban infrastructure data submitted to the UIM platform.
+
+- c) **Local data processing:** Before submitting the crowdsourcing data to the UIM platform, the data management FE locally processes the data to improve the efficiency of data processing in the platform.
+
+NOTE 4 – For example, local data processing can be image recognition (filtering out low-quality images), image clipping, image or video compression and speech recognition.
+
+- d) **Transmission reminder:** Data management FE calculates the total amount of crowdsourcing data that is needed for submission to the UIM platform. If the total amount exceeds a certain threshold, the UE can remind the participant to submit data using wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) connection, to avoid causing large transmission costs in cellular networks.
+
+### (4) HMI management FE
+
+According to the requirements specified in clause 7.2, the main role of the HMI management FE is as follows:
+
+- a) **Capability call:** In order to achieve the diversified crowdsourcing data collection of the urban infrastructure status, the HMI management FE supports the call of UE capabilities.
+
+# 9 Common procedures of UIM based on crowdsourcing
+
+## 9.1 Participant registration
+
+Before performing UIM tasks, crowdsourcing participants need to register in the UIM platform through UE, so that the registered participants can receive tasks published by the platform, submit urban infrastructure status data, and obtain corresponding incentives.
+
+UE provides participants with an interface to input information according to the registration requirements of the platform, collects participant information and synchronizes the information with the UIM platform, which verifies and manages the information.
+
+In particular, in order to accurately match tasks and participants and efficiently collect urban infrastructure status data, a UIM platform categorizes the participant into groups.
+
+The main steps in the procedure for a crowdsourcing participant to register are as follows (see Figure 3).
+
+- Step 1* A participant applies for registration through UE, fills in and submits relevant information according to the requirements of the platform.
+- Step 2* UE synchronizes the information with the UIM platform.
+- Step 3* The UIM platform accepts and records the information, categorizes the participants into groups and matches the groups and the task demand.
+- Step 4* The UIM platform feeds the registration results back to UE and publishes the tasks in progress to the participant according to match results.
+- Step 5* UE feeds the registration results back and presents the tasks to the participant.
+
+
+
+**Urban infrastructure monitoring
+based on crowdsourcing**
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CS as Crowdsourcer
+ participant UIM as UIM platform
+ participant UE as UE and participant
+ participant UI as Urban infrastructure
+
+ Note over UE: 1. Submit registering information
+ UE->>UIM: 2. Information synchronization
+ Note over UIM: 3. Record information, categorize the participant into groups and match the groups and the task demand
+ UIM->>UE: 4. Feed back registering results, and publish the tasks in progress
+ Note over UE: 5. Feed back registering results and present tasks
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the registration process. It features four main entities: Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure. The Crowdsourcer and Urban infrastructure are shown as external entities. The UIM platform and UE and participant are grouped together within a dashed box labeled 'Urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing'. The process flow is as follows: 1. The UE and participant submit registering information. 2. The UE and participant synchronize information with the UIM platform. 3. The UIM platform records the information, categorizes the participant into groups, and matches the groups with task demands. 4. The UIM platform feeds back registering results and publishes tasks in progress to the UE and participant. 5. The UE and participant feed back registering results and present tasks.
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for participant registration between Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure.
+
+**Figure 3 – Flow for participant registration**
+
+## 9.2 Task published
+
+After a task is generated, the UIM platform needs to find the appropriate participant group and publish the task to them. In order to ensure that the UIM task can be widely accepted and efficiently implemented, the UIM platform can give priority to the following participants when publishing tasks.
+
+- 1) The participant activity scope overlaps with the location of the monitored infrastructure.
+- 2) The participant UE has the capabilities required for the UIM task.
+NOTE 1 – For example, UE capabilities may include photographing, videotaping and positioning.
+- 3) The participant has participated in other tasks and can feed data back accurately and in a timely fashion.
+
+During the time limit of the task, the UIM platform needs regularly to count the tasks completed. If the task completion count is lower than expected, the UIM platform needs to reselect the participant group and publish the task.
+
+NOTE 2 – For example, task completion can be computed according to the number of participants involved in the task, the amount of effective urban infrastructure status data, and the number and geographic scope of infrastructure reflected by crowdsourcing data.
+
+The main steps in the procedure for task published are outlined as follows (see Figure 4).
+
+- Step 1* The UIM platform computes task demand, selects the appropriate participant group accordingly and publishes the task.
+- Step 2* UE receives the task and presents it to the participant. The participant can choose whether to accept the task.
+- Step 3* If the participant accepts the task, UE synchronizes the acceptance information with the UIM platform.
+- Step 4* The UIM platform regularly counts task completion, and republishes the task as needed (Step 1 to Step 3).
+
+
+
+**Urban infrastructure monitoring
+based on crowdsourcing**
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Crowdsourcer
+ participant UIM_platform as UIM platform
+ participant UE_and_participant as UE and participant
+ participant Urban_infrastructure as Urban infrastructure
+
+ UIM_platform->>UE_and_participant: 1. Compute task demand, select the appropriate participant group and publish the task
+ UE_and_participant->>UIM_platform: 2. Receive the task and present it to the participant
+ UE_and_participant->>UIM_platform: 3. Acceptance information synchronization
+ UIM_platform->>UIM_platform: 4. Regularly count task completion, and republish the task as needed
+
+```
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for task published. The diagram includes four lifelines: Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure. The UIM platform and UE and participant lifelines are grouped under a dashed box labeled 'Urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing'. The flow consists of four steps: 1. UIM platform to UE and participant: '1. Compute task demand, select the appropriate participant group and publish the task'; 2. UE and participant to UIM platform: '2. Receive the task and present it to the participant'; 3. UE and participant to UIM platform: '3. Acceptance information synchronization'; 4. UIM platform to UIM platform: '4. Regularly count task completion, and republish the task as needed'.
+
+**Figure 4 – Flow for task published**
+
+## 9.3 Data collection and transmission
+
+After accepting the task, participants can obtain urban infrastructure status information according to the task requirements, and complete data collection through the UE. In the process of data collection, the UE can provide the participant with the ability of infrastructure information parsing, positioning and image shooting to make crowdsourcing data more accurate. It can also provide the ability of local data processing. Through image recognition, image clipping and data compression, the UE can help reduce the cost of data transmission and the pressure of data processing on the platform.
+
+Before data transmission, UE needs to calculate the total amount of crowdsourcing data for transmission, check the current network connection and inform the participant.
+
+If UE connects to the UIM platform through a network that requires payment, it reminds the participant whether to transmit crowdsourcing data when Wi-Fi connection is available, thus avoiding additional costs.
+
+The main steps in the procedure for data collection and transmission are outlined as follows (see Figure 5).
+
+- Step 1* The participant obtains the corresponding urban infrastructure status information according to the task requirements.
+- Step 2* The UE locally processes urban infrastructure status information, calculates the total amount of data to be transmitted to the platform, and detects the current network environment.
+- Step 3* The UE prompts the participant to confirm the data to be transmitted. Meanwhile, if the total amount of data exceeds a certain threshold and the UE is connected through cellular network currently, UE can prompt the participant whether to transmit data now or transmit data when a Wi-Fi connection is available. The participant confirms the crowdsourcing data to be transmitted and selects the transmission method.
+- Step 4* The UE transmits data according to participant choice. If the participant selects data transmission via Wi-Fi, UE can locally store data and send it to the UIM platform when a Wi-Fi connection is available.
+- Step 5* The UIM platform receives and stores data for subsequent data processing.
+
+
+
+**Urban infrastructure monitoring
+based on crowdsourcing**
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CS as Crowdsourcer
+ participant UIM as UIM platform
+ participant UE as UE and participant
+ participant UI as Urban infrastructure
+
+ UI->>UE: 1. Obtain urban infrastructure status information
+ Note right of UE: 2. Process data locally,
+calculate total data amount,
+and detect current network
+environment
+ Note right of UE: 3. Prompt participant
+for data transmission
+ UE->>UIM: 4. Transmit data
+ UIM->>UIM: 5. Receive data
+
+```
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for data collection and transmission between Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure.
+
+**Figure 5 – Flow for data collection and transmission**
+
+## 9.4 Data processing
+
+After receipt, a UIM platform needs to process data to generate a list of urban infrastructure status within a specific area and specific time, including data pre-processing, data aggregation, result evaluation and verification, result publication and result update.
+
+Specifically, since crowdsourcing data comes from the general public, it is necessary to classify, format and filter the data during data pre-processing to ensure accuracy and consistency. The UIM platform can classify crowdsourcing data based on the infrastructure type in each task, and format
+
+different types of crowdsourcing data into a consistent format to integrate urban infrastructure status monitoring data from different sources. The UIM platform can also delete crowdsourcing data that is duplicated or unrelated to the monitored infrastructure and register abnormal data.
+
+The main steps in the procedure for data processing are outlined as follows (see Figure 6).
+
+- Step 1* The UIM platform classifies and formats crowdsourcing data, forms a dataset to be processed, selects algorithms for and performs data aggregation to generate a list of urban infrastructure status, then evaluates and validates data aggregation results.
+- Step 2* The UIM platform publishes the generated urban infrastructure status list to the crowdsourcer.
+- Step 3* The crowdsourcer receives the list and promptly handles infrastructure anomalies.
+- Step 4* The crowdsourcer feeds the real status of the monitored infrastructure back to the UIM platform.
+- Step 5* The UIM platform receives the feedback and in a timely fashion adjusts the data aggregation method to ensure the reliability of urban infrastructure status monitoring. It also regularly updates the urban infrastructure status list according to the received crowdsourcing data and sends the updated list to the crowdsourcer, if necessary.
+
+
+
+**Urban infrastructure monitoring
+based on crowdsourcing**
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CS as Crowdsourcer
+ participant UIM as UIM platform
+ participant UE as UE and participant
+ participant UI as Urban infrastructure
+
+ Note over UIM, UE: 1. Pre-process crowdsourcing data, select algorithms, perform aggregation, evaluate and validate aggregation result
+ UIM->>CS: 2. Send aggregation result to crowdsourcer
+ CS->>UE: 3. Receive the result and promptly handle infrastructure anomalies
+ UE->>UIM: 4. Give feedback to UIM platform
+ Note over UIM, UE: 5. Receive feedback, update aggregation result and send it to crowdsourcer if necessary
+ UIM->>CS:
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the data processing flow. It features four main entities: Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure. The UIM platform and UE and participant are grouped under the title 'Urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing'. The process follows five steps: 1. The UIM platform performs internal processing (pre-processing, aggregation, evaluation). 2. The UIM platform sends the aggregation result to the Crowdsourcer. 3. The Crowdsourcer receives the result and handles anomalies, then provides feedback to the UE and participant. 4. The UE and participant give feedback to the UIM platform. 5. The UIM platform receives the feedback, updates the aggregation result, and sends it back to the Crowdsourcer if necessary.
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for data processing between Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure.
+
+**Figure 6 – Flow for data processing**
+
+## 9.5 Participant performance feedback
+
+In order to enable participants to understand their participation in tasks, the UIM platform needs to regularly count and analyse their performance and give feedback to participants in a timely fashion. The specific feedback information includes the following.
+
+- 1) **Task participation information:** The number of accepted tasks, the number of executed tasks, types of monitored infrastructure, the number of monitored infrastructure, etc.
+- 2) **Data contribution information:** The times of data submission, total amount of submitted data, total amount of effective data, the type of submitted data, data quality, etc.
+
+According to their performance information, participants can clearly understand their contributions to UIM, which will increase the participant experience. Meanwhile, the UIM platform can in a timely fashion optimize participant grouping and incentive mechanism based on relevant information, further promoting task execution.
+
+The main steps in the procedure for participant performance feedback are outlined as follows (see Figure 7).
+
+- Step 1* The UIM platform regularly counts and analyses participant performance, including task participation information and data contribution information.
+- Step 2* The UIM platform feeds participant performance back to UE.
+- Step 3* The UE receives the performance feedback and presents it to the participant.
+- Step 4* The UIM platform optimizes participant grouping and incentive mechanisms according to participant performance.
+
+
+
+**Urban infrastructure monitoring
+based on crowdsourcing**
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CS as Crowdsourcer
+ participant UIM as UIM platform
+ participant UE as UE and participant
+ participant UI as Urban infrastructure
+
+ UIM->>UIM: 1. Regularly count and analyse participant performance
+ UIM->>UE: 2. Give participant performance feedback to UE
+ UE->>UE: 3. Receive the performance feedback and present it to the participant
+ UIM->>UIM: 4. Optimize participant grouping and incentive mechanism according to participant performance
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the flow for participant performance feedback. It features four main entities: Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure. The UIM platform and UE and participant are grouped within a dashed box labeled 'Urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing'. The process follows four steps: 1. The UIM platform regularly counts and analyses participant performance. 2. The UIM platform gives participant performance feedback to the UE. 3. The UE receives the performance feedback and presents it to the participant. 4. The UIM platform optimizes participant grouping and incentive mechanism according to participant performance.
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for participant performance feedback between Crowdsourcer, UIM platform, UE and participant, and Urban infrastructure.
+
+**Figure 7 – Flow for participant performance feedback**
+
+# 10 Security and privacy considerations
+
+Considering that UIM based on crowdsourcing obtains results by consolidating urban infrastructure status information provided by the general public, special attention needs to be paid when designing or developing a crowdsourcing-based UIM system in terms of security and privacy.
+
+It is required that the UIM platform and UE inherit the requirements on security and privacy for IoT-related crowdsourced systems, as addressed in [ITU-T Y.4205].
+
+It is required that the UIM platform ensure data minimization of the crowd, the data retention limits of the crowd, data desensitization and de-identification of the crowd, as mentioned in [ITU-T Y.4217].
+
+It is required that the UIM platform enable the anonymization of data uploaded by participants, as mentioned in [ITU-T Y.4217].
+
+It is required that the UIM platform enable the analysis and verification of data uploaded by crowdsourcing resources by data analysis capability in order to avoid a potential risk to the system, such as user privacy data theft, as mentioned in [ITU-T Y.4217].
+
+It is required that the UIM platform identify untrusted participants and restricts them from participating in tasks to ensure the accuracy of UIM results.
+
+NOTE – Participants deemed "untrusted" are those who intentionally submit incorrect urban infrastructure information for a certain purpose. For example, in order to quickly obtain more incentives, an untrusted participant may submit the same infrastructure picture for several different tasks.
+
+It is required that UE support data desensitization and de-identification processing in order to minimize the information transmitted to the platform, as mentioned in [ITU-T Y.4217].
+
+It is required that UE obtain an opt-in consent from crowdsourcing participants before collecting any data, as mentioned in [ITU-T Y.4217].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use case – Bus stop sign monitoring based on crowdsourcing
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+UIM based on crowdsourcing offers an efficient and participatory approach to monitor and maintain infrastructure status in the city, leading to an improved overall urban quality of life. As an example, under the influence of natural and human factors, bus stop signs may experience issues such as bracket damage, panel damage, faded or missing text or images, display screen failure, lighting failure and soiling. These problems can affect the readability and accuracy of transportation information and also have an impact on city's appearance.
+
+When the relevant management department needs to monitor bus stop signs as a crowdsourcer, the department need to submit a request for such monitoring and assign a corresponding incentive budget to the UIM platform. Additionally, if possible, the department can provide the UIM platform with information about bus stop signs within the designated monitoring area, including their IDs, names, descriptions, responsible departments, location and last known status.
+
+After receiving the monitoring requirement and bus stop sign information, the UIM platform maintains the information, decomposes and screens the requirement, and generates tasks (as shown in Figure I.1).
+
+Image: Figure I.1: Example of a task. A blue box with a folded top-right corner containing task details.
+
+**Task 1**
+
+- Monitored infrastructure: **Bus stop sign**
+- Infrastructure status description: **Bracket damage, panel damage, missing text, display screen failure, lighting failure, dirty stop sign, etc.**
+- Monitoring operations and requirements: **Report bus stop sign status, better with a picture (Not exceed 1 MB)**
+- Infrastructure location: **District A**
+- Time-limit: **XX - XX - XX (dd/mm/yy)**
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+**Figure I.1 – Example of a task**
+
+At the same time, in order to brief participants on how to complete the task, the UIM platform can provides a data model and examples (as in Figure I.2).
+
+Image: Figure I.2: An example to help participants effectively complete the task. A green box with a folded top-right corner containing example data.
+
+**Example 1**
+
+- ✓ Infrastructure name: < Bus stop of line XX >
+- ✓ Infrastructure status: < Missing test >
+- ✓ Infrastructure location: < XX station, XX street, XX district >
+- ✓ Observation time: < XX - XX - XX (dd/mm/yy) >
+- ✓ Attachment: < attachment.jpg >
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+**Figure I.2 – An example to help participants effectively complete the task**
+
+As shown in Figure I.3, after the task is generated, the UIM platform publishes the task to registered participants. Participants who accept the task can collect bus stop sign status information and transmit it to the UIM platform through UE. The UIM platform processes the data and provides the result to the crowdsourcer. Depending on the urgency and priority of the result, the bus stop sign management
+
+department takes appropriate action to fix the problem, such as dispatching maintenance crews or updating maintenance plans. The UIM platform also gives corresponding incentives to participants according to the bus stop sign status data provided.
+
+
+
+**Task n**
+
+**Task 3**
+
+**Task 2**
+
+**Task 1**
+
+- Monitored infrastructure: **Bus stop sign**
+- Infrastructure status description: **Bracket damage, panel damage, missing text, display screen failure, lighting failure, dirty stop sign, etc.**
+- Monitoring operations and requirements: **Report bus stop sign status, better with a picture (Not exceed 1 MB)**
+- Infrastructure location: **District A**
+- Time-limit: **XX - XX - XX (dd/mm/yy)**
+
+**Example n**
+
+**Example 3**
+
+**Example 2**
+
+**Example 1**
+
+- ✓ Infrastructure name: < Bus stop of line XX >
+- ✓ Infrastructure status: < Missing test >
+- ✓ Infrastructure location: < XX station, XX street, XX district >
+- ✓ Observation time: < XX - XX - XX (dd/mm/yy) >
+- ✓ Attachment: < attachment.jpg >
+
+2. Manage bus stop sign information, decompose monitoring
+requirement, screen requirement and generate tasks
+
+1. Release bus stop monitoring requirements
+
+5. Process crowdsourcing data and give feedback
+
+**Crowdsourcer**
+
+**UIM platform**
+
+1. Publish tasks and provide a data model and corresponding examples to participants
+
+4. Collect bus stop status information in the context of the task and transmit data
+
+**UE Participant**
+
+Urban infrastructure (Bus stop sign) monitoring based on crowdsourcing
+
+Y.4499(25)
+
+Diagram illustrating the workflow of bus stop sign monitoring based on crowdsourcing. It shows a Crowdsourcer interacting with a UIM platform, which in turn interacts with UE Participants. The process involves five steps: 1. Release monitoring requirements, 2. Manage information and generate tasks, 3. Publish tasks and examples, 4. Collect status information, and 5. Process data and give feedback. Detailed 'Task' and 'Example' cards show the data structure used.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Bus stop sign monitoring based on crowdsourcing**
+
+# **Appendix II**
+
+## **Terms and conditions**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Before participating in this kind of programme, citizens are requested to agree with the following terms and conditions related to urban infrastructure monitoring based on crowdsourcing:
+
+### (1) Possible required terms:
+
+- ✓ Comply with local laws and regulations;
+- ✓ Agree to set a participant identification;
+- ✓ Agree to provide real information of urban infrastructure status;
+- ✓ Agree to the use of infrastructure status information that they provide.
+
+For example, infrastructure status information provided by participants could be used for infrastructure maintenance, task allocation, calculation of incentives, service improvement, etc.
+
+### (2) Possible optional terms:
+
+- ✓ Choose whether to provide a phone number or other contact information;
+- ✓ Choose whether to provide activity area information;
+- ✓ Choose whether to provide preferred data types (such as pictures, text, audio, video, etc.);
+- ✓ Choose whether to provide preferred network types for data transmission (such as Wi-Fi, cellular network, etc.);
+- ✓ Choose whether to provide user equipment capabilities that can be called to complete tasks (such as positioning, camera, image/video access, voice recording, short message, etc.).
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..341f326216a40df9802b3826e153c3383319b3c2
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+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4500.13-201803-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,3098 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+# Y.4500.13/Q.3954
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+(03/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet of things and smart cities and communities –
+Frameworks, architectures and protocols
+
+SERIES Q: SWITCHING AND SIGNALLING, AND
+ASSOCIATED MEASUREMENTS AND TESTS
+
+Testing specifications – Testing specifications for next
+generation networks
+
+# --- oneM2M – Interoperability testing
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.13/Q.3954
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.13/Q.3954
+
+# oneM2M – Interoperability testing
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.13 specifies interoperability test descriptions for the oneM2M primitives.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|------------------------|------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4500.13/Q.3954 | 2018-03-01 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/13508 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Interoperability, oneM2M.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+NOTE – The structure and editorial style of this Recommendation depart slightly from those of ITU-T Recommendations to preserve existing cross-referencing from external documents.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at oneM2M- Functional architecture . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.4] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.4 (2018), oneM2M - Service layer core protocol specification . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.5] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.5 (2018), oneM2M -Management Enablement (OMA) . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.6] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.6 (2018), oneM2M -Management enablement (BBF) . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.8] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.8 (2018), oneM2M - CoAP protocol binding . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.9] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.9 (2018), oneM2M - HTTP protocol binding . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.10] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.10 (2018), oneM2M - MQTT protocol binding . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.11] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.11 (2018), oneM2M -Common terminology . |
+| [ITU-T Y.4500.15] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.4500.15 (2018), oneM2M -Testing framework . |
+| [IETF RFC 3986] | IETF RFC 3986 (2005), Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax .https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3986.txt |
+| [IETF RFC 7230] | IETF RFC 7230 (2014), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing .https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230 |
+| [ETSI TS 118 103] | ETSI TS 118 103 - V2.4.1 (2016), Security solutions . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in oneM2M TS-0011 [ITU-T Y.4500.11] apply.
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 Application entity** [ITU-T Y.4500.11]: Represents an instantiation of application logic for end-to-end M2M solutions.
+
+**3.1.2 Common services entity (CSE)** [ITU-T Y.4500.11]: Represents an instantiation of a set of common service functions of the M2M environments. Such service functions are exposed to other entities through reference points.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 hosting CSE**: CSE where the addressed resource is hosted.
+
+**3.2.2 M2M service provider domain**: Part of the M2M system that is associated with a specific M2M service provider.
+
+**3.2.3 mc**: Interface between the management server and the management client.
+
+NOTE – This interface can be realized by the existing device management technologies such as BBF TR-069, OMA DM, etc.
+
+**3.2.4 receiver CSE**: Any CSE that receives a request.
+
+**3.2.5 registree**: AE or CSE that registers with another CSE.
+
+**3.2.6 registrar CSE**: CSE where an application or another CSE has registered.
+
+**3.2.7 resource**: uniquely addressable entity in oneM2M architecture.
+
+**3.2.8 transit CSE**: any receiver CSE that is not a hosting CSE.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in oneM2M TS-0011 [ITU-T Y.4500.11] and the following apply:
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------------|
+| ACP | Access Control Policy |
+| AE | Application Entity |
+| AE-ID | Application Entity Identifier |
+| BBF | Broadband Forum |
+| CoAP | Constrained Application Protocol |
+| CSE | Common Services Entity |
+| CSE-ID | Common Service Entity Identifier |
+| DM | Device Management |
+| DUT | Device Under Test |
+| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| IN | Infrastructure Node |
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------|
+| IN-CSE | CSE which resides in the Infrastructure Node |
+| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
+| LWM2M | Lightweight M2M |
+| M2M | Machine to Machine |
+| Mca | Reference Point for M2M Communication with AE |
+| Mcc | Reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE |
+| MQTT | Message Queuing Telemetry Transport |
+| OMA | Open Mobile Alliance |
+| SP | Service Provider |
+| SUT | System Under Test |
+| TD | Test Description |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| XML | extensible Markup Language |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+The keywords "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not" in the present Recommendation are to be interpreted as described:
+
+Shall/Should not:
+
+### Requirements:
+
+- 1) Effect on this Recommendation: This Recommendation needs to describe the required feature (i.e., specify a technical solution for the requirement);
+- 2) Effect on products: every implementation (M2M solution that complies to this standard) must support it
+- 3) Effect on deployments: every deployment (M2M service based on this Recommendation) must use the standardized feature where applicable – otherwise e.g., interoperability problems with other services could arise.
+
+Should/Should not:
+
+### Recommendation:
+
+- 1) Effect on this Recommendation: This Recommendation needs to describe a solution that allows the presence and the absence of the feature.
+- 2) Effect on products: an implementation may or may not support it, however support is recommended
+- 3) Effect on deployments: a deployment may or may not use it, however usage is recommended
+
+May/Need not:
+
+### Permission/Option:
+
+- 1) Effect on this Recommendation: This Recommendation needs to describe a solution that allows the presence and the absence of the required feature;
+- 2) Effect on products: an implementation may or may not support it
+- 3) Effect on deployments: A deployment may or may not use it
+
+# 6 Testing conventions
+
+## 6.1 The test description proforma
+
+The testing methodology used in the present document is specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.15].
+
+A test description (TD) is a well detailed description of a process that aims to test one or more functionalities of an implementation. Applying to interoperability testing, these testing objectives address the interoperable functionalities between two or more vendor implementations.
+
+In order to ensure the correct execution of an interoperability test, the following information should be provided by the test description:
+
+- The proper configuration of the vendor implementations.
+- The availability of additional equipment (protocol monitors, functional equipment, etc.) required to achieve the correct behaviour of the vendor implementations.
+- The correct initial conditions.
+- The correct sequence of the test events and test results.
+
+In order to facilitate the specification of test cases an interoperability test description should include, at a minimum, the following fields as indicated Table 1.
+
+**Table 1 – Interoperability test description**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier | A unique test description ID. |
+| Objective | A concise summary of the test which should reflect the purpose of the test and enable readers to easily distinguish this test from any other test in the document. |
+| References | A list of references to the base specification section(s), use case(s), requirement(s) and TP(s) which are either used in the test or define the functionality being tested. |
+| Applicability | A list of features and capabilities which are required to be supported by the system under test (SUT) in order to execute this test (e.g., if this list contains an optional feature to be supported, then the test is optional). |
+| Configuration or architecture | A list of all required equipment for testing and possibly also including a reference to an illustration of a test architecture or test configuration. |
+| Pre-test conditions | A list of test specific pre-conditions that need to be met by the SUT including information about equipment configuration, i.e., precise description of the initial state of the SUT required to start executing the test sequence. |
+| Test sequence | An ordered list of equipment operation and observations. The test sequence may also contain the conformance checks as part of the observations. |
+
+The test descriptions are provided in proforma tables.
+
+The following different types of test operator actions are considered during the test execution:
+
+- A **stimulus** corresponds to an event that enforces a device under test (DUT) to proceed with a specific protocol action, such as sending a message.
+- A **configure** corresponds to an action to modify the DUT configuration.
+- An **IOP check** consists of observing that one DUT behaves as described in the standard: i.e., resource creation, update, deletion, etc. For each IOP check in the Test Sequence, a result can be recorded. The overall **IOP Verdict** will be considered OK if all the IOP checks in the sequence are OK.
+
+- In the context of Interoperability Testing with Conformance Checks, an additional step type, **PRO checks** can be used to verify the appropriate sequence and contents of protocol messages, this is helpful for debugging purposes. **PRO Verdict** will be PASS if all the PRO checks are PASS.
+
+## 6.2 Test description naming convention
+
+| TD/// | | |
+|--------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------|
+| = root | M2M | oneM2M |
+| | | |
+| = group | NH | No Hop : Testing on Mca reference point |
+| | NB | Non Blocking scenario |
+| | SH | Single Hop: management of remote resources on Mca + Mcc |
+| | MH | Multi Hop |
+| | SE | Security |
+| | | |
+| | | |
+| = sequential number | | 01 to 99 |
+
+## 6.3 Test settings
+
+*This clause contains some test requirements applied to the testing, some constraints, restrictions for executions or some recommendations.*
+
+*In order to ease test setup and execution, the common services entity (CSE) and application entity (AE) are requested to support the following settings:*
+
+- *Security shall be disabled as it is out of scope of this interoperability testing.*
+- *Resource names are pre-provisioned, except for content instance resources that are automatically assigned by the hosting CSE.*
+- *After each "Delete" primitive on a resource, the user shall check the resource is effectively deleted.*
+- *Unless it is indicated in the test cases prerequisites, by default, all the applications shall have the required access rights to manage resources on the CSE.*
+
+*In order to address the TBDs in the oneM2M CoAP binding specification [ITU-T Y.4500.8], basic extensible markup language (XML) and JavaScript object notation (JSON) media-type numbers shall be used in the contentFormat option.*
+
+In the test descriptions specified below, the following definitions of terms used for short-hand notation apply:
+
+Serialized representation: Refers to either an XML or a JSON representation of data in text-string format as defined in clauses 8.3 and 8.4 of [ITU-T Y.4500.4].
+
+Host address: Refers to the authority part of a target URI as defined in [IETF RFC 3986] and [IETF RFC 7230] which can be represented as an IP literal encapsulated within square brackets, an IPv4 address in dotted decimal form, or a registered name, and optionally extended by a port identifier.
+
+## 6.4 Pre-conditions
+
+#### 6.4.1 Registration
+
+The AE or CSE that originates the request has been successfully registered to its corresponding CSE. The registration of the AE includes the creation of resource under the of its registrar CSE. The registration of the CSE includes the creation of resource
+
+representing itself under the of its registrar CSE as well as the creation of resource representing the registrar CSE under its own resource. The creation of resource representing the registrar CSE can be achieved by remotely retrieving the resource of the registrar CSE.
+
+### 6.4.2 Security
+
+The originator and the receiver have successfully established a security association between each other. This may involve the exchange of keys and the establishment of a security connection.
+
+The security pre-condition also assumes that the originator has the appropriate access control privilege towards the requested resource.
+
+#### 6.4.3 Service subscription
+
+Service subscription means that the originator is allowed to be connected with the oneM2M system by contract between the owner of the application and the service provider of the oneM2M system. This may require a corresponding information record in the resource.
+
+#### 6.4.4 ID allocation
+
+ID allocation means that the originator has already acquired usable identity, either from its registrar CSE or the IN-CSE of the oneM2M system. The ID may be CSE relative or service provider (SP) relative. The ID is then further used as the identity of the originator to perform access control, charging, etc.
+
+#### 6.4.5 Existence of resource
+
+Existence of resource means the resource been addressed and has already been created.
+
+#### 6.4.6 Management session between management server and management client
+
+Before the device management using external technologies is executed, it is required that a management session has already been established between the management server and management client. If there is no existing management session, the IN-CSE shall request the establishment of a management session between the management server and management client.
+
+## 6.5 Binding message convention
+
+In HTTP/CoAP/MQTT binding messages, the present Recommendation defines the convention for :
+
+- * represents a resource name (i.e., resourceName attribute) of a resource instance in that resourceType. For example, / can represent "CSE1base/AE1" in structured resource ID format.*
+- * represents a value of a oneM2M request/response parameter. For example, can represent "0001" value of the Request ID parameter. Parameter names are case sensitive and in long names as specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.4].*
+- * represents an AE-ID or CSE-ID in MQTT Topic names.*
+
+The value will be given at an interoperability test event.
+
+In [ITU-T Y.4500.10], all oneM2M request/response parameters are carried in the MQTT message payload since it has no message header concept. Therefore, the message queuing telemetry transport (MQTT) message payload needs to be described more than hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) and constrained application protocol (CoAP) messages to describe those parameters in clause 8. In HTTP and CoAP binding messages, payloads are described as "empty" or " resource to be created" in a very abstract way.
+
+Since the representation can be XML or JSON, payload should be abstract to support XML and JSON. The following example is an XML representation and its abstraction for creating a resource.
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| XML payload example for MQTT binding | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <m2m:req xmlns:m2m="http://www.onem2m.org/xml/protocols" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.onem2m.org/xml/protocols CDT-requestPrimitive-v1_0_0.xsd"> <op>1</op> <to>CSE1Base</to> <fr>/CSE1/C_AE1</fr> <rqi>2001</rqi> <ty>3</ty> <nm>cont1</nm> <rti><rt>3</rt></rti> <pc> <cnt> <lbl>SmartMeter</lbl> <et>20141003T112033</et> </cnt> </pc> </m2m:req> |
+| Abstracted payload example for MQTT binding | op = 1 to = CSE1Base fr = /CSE1/C_AE01 rqi = 3001 ty = 3 name = cont1 rti.rt = 3 pc.cnt.lbl = SmartMeter pc.cnt.et = 20141003T112033 |
+| Abstracted payload example for MQTT binding adopting the payload convention | op = 1 to = <CSEBase> fr = <From> rqi = <Request ID> ty = 3 name = <Name> rti.rt = 3 pc = <Content> |
+
+# 7 Test description summary
+
+## 7.1 Tests list
+
+| Nb | Procedure/Resource | TD ID | TD description |
+|----|--------------------|--------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1 | CSEBase Management | TD_M2M_NH_01 | AE retrieves the CSEBase resource |
+| 2 | RemoteCSE | TD_M2M_NH_02 | Registree CSE registers to Registrar CSE |
+| 3 | | TD_M2M_NH_03 | Registree CSE retrieves RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE |
+| 4 | | TD_M2M_NH_04 | Registree CSE updates RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE |
+| 5 | | TD_M2M_NH_05 | Registree CSE deletes RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE |
+| 6 | Application Entity | TD_M2M_NH_06 | AE registers to its registrar CSE via an AE Create Request |
+| 7 | | TD_M2M_NH_07 | AE retrieves resource via an AE Retrieve Request |
+| 8 | | TD_M2M_NH_08 | AE updates attribute in resource via an AE Update Request |
+| 9 | | TD_M2M_NH_09 | AE de-registers by deleting resource via an AE Delete Request |
+| 10 | Container | TD_M2M_NH_10 | AE creates a container resource in registrar CSE via a container Create Request |
+| 11 | | TD_M2M_NH_11 | AE retrieves information of a container resource via a container Retrieve Request |
+| 12 | | TD_M2M_NH_12 | AE updates attribute in application resource via a container Update Request |
+| 13 | | TD_M2M_NH_13 | AE deletes a specific container resource via a container Delete Request |
+
+| Nb | Procedure/Resource | TD ID | TD description |
+|----|---------------------|--------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 14 | ContentInstance | TD_M2M_NH_14 | AE adds a contentInstance resource to a specific container in Registrar CSE via a contentInstance Create Request and the registrar CSE updates the parent resource with stateTag , and currentNrOfInstances , CurrentByteSize attributes correspondingly |
+| 15 | | TD_M2M_NH_15 | AE retrieves information of a contentInstance resource via a contentInstance Retrieve Request |
+| 16 | | TD_M2M_NH_17 | AE deletes contentInstance resource via a Delete Request and the registrar CSE updates the parent resource with currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute correspondingly |
+| 17 | | TD_M2M_NH_49 | AE deletes a resource in a and the Registrar CSE points a latest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the |
+| 18 | | TD_M2M_NH_50 | AE deletes a resource in a resource and the Registrar CSE points an oldest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the |
+| 19 | | TD_M2M_NH_51 | AE sends a CREATE request to a which contains attribute currentNrOfInstances whose value equals to that of maxNrOfInstances and Registrar CSE deletes the oldest from the parent and then creates the requested resource |
+| 20 | | TD_M2M_NH_71 | AE retrieves a resource of a and the Registrar CSE points a latest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the |
+| 21 | | TD_M2M_NH_72 | AE retrieves a resource of a and the Registrar CSE points a oldest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the |
+| 22 | Discovery | TD_M2M_NH_18 | AE discovers resources residing in Registrar CSE |
+| 23 | | TD_M2M_NH_19 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the label filter criteria |
+| 24 | | TD_M2M_NH_20 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE limiting the number of matching resources to the specified value. |
+| 25 | | TD_M2M_NH_21 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using multiple Filter Criteria |
+| 26 | | TD_M2M_NH_58 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the level filter criteria value set to 1 |
+| 27 | | TD_M2M_NH_59 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the level filter criteria value set to 2 |
+| 28 | | TD_M2M_NH_60 | AE1 discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the level filter criteria value set to 3 |
+| 29 | | TD_M2M_NH_61 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the offset filter criteria value set to 3 |
+| 30 | | TD_M2M_NH_62 | AE discovers all the accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using the offset filter criteria |
+| 31 | Subscription | TD_M2M_NH_22 | AE creates a subscription to Application Entity resource via subscription Create Request |
+| 32 | | TD_M2M_NH_23 | AE retrieves information about a subscription via subscription Retrieve Request such as expirationTime, labels, etc. |
+| 33 | | TD_M2M_NH_24 | AE updates information about a subscription via subscription Retrieve Request |
+| 34 | | TD_M2M_NH_25 | AE cancels subscription via an subscription Delete Request |
+| 35 | AccessControlPolicy | TD_M2M_NH_26 | AE creates an accessControlPolicy resource |
+| 36 | | TD_M2M_NH_27 | AE retrieves accessControlPolicy resource |
+| 37 | | TD_M2M_NH_28 | AE updates attribute in accessControlPolicy resource |
+| 38 | | TD_M2M_NH_29 | AE deletes accessControlPolicy resource |
+| 39 | | TD_M2M_NH_30 | AE delete request is rejected due to accessControlPolicy |
+| 40 | | TD_M2M_NH_73 | AE delete request is rejected due to accessControlPolicy (accessControlOriginators) |
+| 41 | | TD_M2M_NH_74 | AE delete request is allowed due to accessControlPolicy |
+| 42 | Group | TD_M2M_NH_31 | AE creates a group resource |
+| 43 | | TD_M2M_NH_32 | AE retrieves group resource |
+| 44 | | TD_M2M_NH_33 | AE updates attribute in group resource |
+| 45 | Node | TD_M2M_NH_34 | AE deletes group resource |
+| 46 | | TD_M2M_NH_35 | AE creates a node resource |
+| 47 | | TD_M2M_NH_36 | AE retrieves node resource |
+| 48 | | TD_M2M_NH_37 | AE updates attribute in node resource |
+
+| Nb | Procedure/Resource | TD ID | TD description |
+|----|--------------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 49 | PollingChannel | TD_M2M_NH_38 | AE deletes node resource |
+| 50 | | TD_M2M_NH_39 | AE creates a resource in registrar CSE via a Create Request |
+| 51 | | TD_M2M_NH_40 | AE retrieves information of a pollingChannel resource via a Retrieve Request |
+| 52 | | TD_M2M_NH_41 | AE updates attribute in pollingChannel resource via a Update Request |
+| 53 | | TD_M2M_NH_42 | AE deletes a pollingChannel resource via a Delete Request |
+| 54 | | TD_M2M_NH_43 | AE retrieves information of a pollingChannel resource via a Retrieve Request |
+| 55 | FanoutPoint | TD_M2M_NH_44 | AE creates a resource in each group member |
+| 56 | | TD_M2M_NH_45 | AE retrieves the resource from in each group member |
+| 57 | | TD_M2M_NH_46 | AE updates an resource of each member resource |
+| 58 | | TD_M2M_NH_47 | AE deletes a of each member |
+| 59 | Notification | TD_M2M_NH_48 | AE receives a notification request from the HOST CSE |
+| 60 | FlexContainer | TD_M2M_NH_52 | AE creates a flexcontainer resource in Registrar CSE via a flexcontainer Create Request |
+| 61 | | TD_M2M_NH_53 | AE retrieves information of a flexContainer resource via a flexContainer Retrieve Request |
+| 62 | | TD_M2M_NH_54 | AE updates attribute in application resource via a flexContainer Update Request |
+| 63 | | TD_M2M_NH_55 | AE deletes a specific container resource via a container Delete Request |
+| 64 | | TD_M2M_NH_56 | AE receives a notification request on flexContainer update from the HOST CSE |
+| 65 | | TD_M2M_NH_57 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in Registrar CSE using attribute filter criteria which has a customAttribute name and value assigned to it. |
+| 66 | External Management Operations | TD_M2M_NH_63 | AE creates a mgmtCmd resource |
+| 67 | | TD_M2M_NH_64 | AE retrieves mgmtCmd resource |
+| 68 | | TD_M2M_NH_65 | AE updates attribute (not with 'true' in execEnable attribute) in mgmtCmd resource |
+| 69 | | TD_M2M_NH_66 | AE updates attribute (with 'true' in execEnable attribute) in mgmtCmd resource |
+| 70 | | TD_M2M_NH_67 | AE deletes mgmtCmd resource |
+| 71 | | TD_M2M_NH_68 | AE retrieves execInstance resource |
+| 72 | | TD_M2M_NH_69 | AE updates attribute 'execDisable' to true in execInstance resource to cancel pending management command. |
+| 73 | | TD_M2M_NH_70 | AE deletes execInstance resource |
+| 74 | Synchronous request | TD_M2M_NB_01 | AE creates a container resource using non blocking synchronous request in registrar CSE |
+| 75 | | TD_M2M_NB_02 | AE retrieves a Container resource using non blocking synchronous request in registrar CSE |
+| 76 | | TD_M2M_NB_03 | AE updates a Container resource using non blocking synchronous request in registrar CSE |
+| 77 | | TD_M2M_NB_04 | AE deletes a Container resource using non blocking synchronous request |
+| 78 | Asynchronous request | TD_M2M_NB_05 | AE creates a container resource using non blocking asynchronous request |
+| 79 | | TD_M2M_NB_06 | AE retrieves a Container resource using non blocking asynchronous request |
+| 80 | | TD_M2M_NB_07 | AE updates a Container resource using non blocking asynchronous request |
+| 81 | | TD_M2M_NB_08 | AE deletes a Container resource using non blocking asynchronous request |
+| 82 | Retargeting | TD_M2M_SH_01 | AE creates a remote resource |
+| 83 | | TD_M2M_SH_02 | AE retrieves a remote resource |
+| 84 | | TD_M2M_SH_03 | AE updates a remote resource |
+| 85 | | TD_M2M_SH_04 | AE delete a remote resource |
+| 86 | Discovery | TD_M2M_SH_09 | AE discovers accessible resources residing in the remote Hosting CSE using multiple Filter Criteria |
+| 87 | Unauthorized operation | TD_M2M_SH_10 | AE delete request is rejected after access rights verification using retargeting. |
+| 88 | Notification | TD_M2M_SH_11 | AE receives a notification request from the remote hosting CSE |
+| 89 | mgmtObj | TD_M2M_SH_05 | AE creates a resource |
+| 90 | | TD_M2M_SH_06 | AE updates a resource |
+| 91 | | TD_M2M_SH_07 | AE retrieves a resource |
+
+| Nb | Procedure/Resource | TD ID | TD description |
+|-----|------------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 92 | | TD_M2M_SH_08 | AE deletes a resource |
+| 93 | Announcement | TD_M2M_SH_12 | AE1 announces itself to CSE2 |
+| 94 | | TD_M2M_SH_13 | AE1 announces a child container to CSE2 |
+| 95 | | TD_M2M_SH_14 | AE1 announces an Optional Announce attribute to CSE2 |
+| 96 | | TD_M2M_SH_15 | AE2 retrieves an Announced Resource |
+| 97 | | TD_M2M_SH_16 | AE2 retrieves the original resource representation of an announced resource |
+| 98 | fanOut | TD_M2M_SH_17 | AE creates a resource in each group member, where some memberIDs are on a remoteCSE |
+| 99 | | TD_M2M_SH_18 | AE retrieves a resource from each group member, where some memberIDs are on a remoteCSE |
+| 100 | | TD_M2M_SH_19 | AE updates a resource in each group member, where some memberIDs are on a remoteCSE |
+| 101 | | TD_M2M_SH_20 | AE deletes a resource from each group member, where some memberIDs are on a remoteCSE |
+| 102 | Secure AE Registration | TD_M2M_SE_01 | AE uses Provisioned Symmetric Key Security Association Establishment Framework to enable mutual authentication with the Registrar CSE. Registrar CSE performs AE authorization check on incoming AE registration request. |
+
+# 8 Configuration
+
+## 8.1 Test configuration
+
+#### 8.1.1 No hop
+
+##### 8.1.1.1 M2M\_CFG\_01
+
+The AE manages resources on the registrar CSE (Hosting CSE)
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ AE[AE] <-->|Mca| RegistrarCSE[Registrar-CSE]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.1.1-1
+
+Diagram of oneM2M entities model for M2M\_CFG\_01 showing AE and Registrar-CSE connected via Mca interface.
+
+##### 8.1.1.2 M2M\_CFG\_02
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ RegistreeCSE[Registree-CSE] <-->|Mcc| RegistrarCSE[Registrar-CSE]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.1.2-1
+
+Diagram of oneM2M entities model for M2M\_CFG\_02 showing Registree-CSE and Registrar-CSE connected via Mcc interface.
+
+#### 8.1.2 Single hop
+
+##### 8.1.2.1 M2M\_CFG\_03
+
+The AE manages resources on the remote CSE
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ AE[AE] <-->|Mca| RegistrarCSE[Registrar-CSE]
+ RegistrarCSE <-->|Mcc| HostingCSE[Hosting-CSE]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.2.1-1
+
+Diagram of oneM2M entities model for M2M\_CFG\_03 showing AE, Registrar-CSE, and Hosting-CSE connected via Mca and Mcc interfaces.
+
+##### 8.1.2.2 M2M\_CFG\_04
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ AE1[AE1] <-->|Mca| CSE1[CSE1]
+ CSE1 <-->|Mcc| CSE2[CSE2]
+ CSE2 <-->|Mca| AE2[AE2]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.2.2-1
+
+Diagram of M2M\_CFG\_05 architecture showing AE1, CSE1, CSE2, and AE2 with Mca and Mcc interfaces.
+
+##### 8.1.2.3 M2M\_CFG\_05
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ Registrar-CSE[Registrar-CSE] <-->|Mcc| Transit-CSE[Transit-CSE]
+ Transit-CSE <-->|Mcc| Hosting-CSE[Hosting-CSE]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.2.3-1
+
+Diagram of M2M\_CFG\_08 architecture showing Registrar-CSE, Transit-CSE, and Hosting-CSE with Mcc interfaces.
+
+##### 8.1.2.4 M2M\_CFG\_08
+
+This configuration concerns group management when the AE is using a group to fan out requests to multiple members. The connection between the AE and the group hosting CSE, the group hosting CSE and the member hosting CSE may be a multi hop connection following the definition in 8.1.3.
+
+This configuration is mapped to cases including:
+
+- AE sends a request addressing /fanOutPoint in the group hosting CSE, the group hosting CSE then further fans out the request to each member hosting CSE.
+- The member hosting CSE sends a notification to the group hosting CSE pertaining to the subscription made through the group hosting CSE. The group hosting CSE then further aggregates the notification and sends it back to the AE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ AE[AE] <-->|Mca| GroupHostingCSE[Group hosting CSE]
+ GroupHostingCSE <-->|Mcc| MemberHostingCSE[Member hosting CSE]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.2.4-1
+
+Diagram of M2M\_CFG\_09 architecture showing AE, Group hosting CSE, and Member hosting CSE with Mca and Mcc interfaces.
+
+##### 8.1.2.5 M2M\_CFG\_09
+
+This configuration concerns device management using external technologies.
+
+This configuration is mapped to cases including:
+
+- The AE sends a request addressing to IN-CSE. IN-CSE then further acts as a management server to send management commands to managed entity over the mc interface. The management command is defined in OMA DM, BBF TR069 or LWM2M.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ AE[AE] <-->|Mca| INCSE[IN-CSE management server]
+ INCSE <-->|mc| ManagedEntity[Managed entity Management client]
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.2.5-1
+
+Diagram of M2M\_CFG\_06 architecture showing AE, IN-CSE management server, and Managed entity Management client with Mca and mc interfaces.
+
+#### 8.1.3 Multi hops
+
+##### 8.1.3.1 M2M\_CFG\_06
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ AE1[AE1] <-->|Mca| Registrar-CSE[Registrar-CSE]
+ Registrar-CSE <-->|Mcc| Transit-CSE[Transit-CSE]
+ Transit-CSE <-->|Mcc| Hosting-CSE[Hosting-CSE]
+ style AE1 fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Registrar-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Transit-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Hosting-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.3.1-1
+
+Diagram of oneM2M entities model for 8.1.3.2. It shows AE1 connected to Registrar-CSE via Mca. Registrar-CSE, Transit-CSE, and Hosting-CSE are connected via Mcc. The reference Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.3.1-1 is at the bottom right.
+
+##### 8.1.3.2 M2M\_CFG\_07
+
+oneM2M entities model
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ AE1[AE1] <-->|Mca| Registrar-CSE[Registrar-CSE]
+ AE2[AE2] <-->|Mca| Hosting-CSE[Hosting-CSE]
+ Registrar-CSE <-->|Mcc| Transit-CSE[Transit-CSE]
+ Transit-CSE <-->|Mcc| Hosting-CSE
+ style AE1 fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style AE2 fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Registrar-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Transit-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+ style Hosting-CSE fill:#d3d3d3,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px
+
+```
+
+Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.3.2-1
+
+Diagram of oneM2M entities model for 8.1.3.2. It shows two AEs, AE1 and AE2, each connected to Registrar-CSE via Mca. Registrar-CSE, Transit-CSE, and Hosting-CSE are connected via Mcc. The reference Y.4500.13(18)\_F8.1.3.2-1 is at the bottom right.
+
+# 9 Test descriptions
+
+## 9.1 No Hop configuration testing
+
+### 9.1.1 CSEBase management
+
+##### 9.1.1.1 CSEBase Retrieve on Mca
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_01 | | |
+| Objective: | AE retrieves the CSEBase resource | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.3.2 CSEBase resource has been automatically created in CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a retrieve Request to CSE CSE with name {CSEBaseName} |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | Operation (op) = 2 (Retrieve) To (to) = Resource-ID of requested <CSEBase> resource, assumed CSE-relative here From (from) = AE-ID of request originator Request Identifier (rqi) = (token-string) |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | Response Status Code (rsc) = 2000 (OK) Request Identifier (rqi) = same string as received in request message Content (pc) = Serialized Representation of <CSEBase> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+#### 9.1.2 RemoteCSE management
+
+##### 9.1.2.1 RemoteCSE Create
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_02 | | |
+| Objective: | Registree CSE registers to Registrar CSE | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_02 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.2.1Pre-test conditions: | CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | Registree CSE is requested to send a RemoteCSE Create request to Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | op = 1 (Create) to = {CSEBaseName} fr = Registree CSE-ID rqi = (token-string) ty = 16 (RemoteCSE) pc = Serialized representation of <RemoteCSE> resource |
+| 3 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | rsc = 2001 (CREATED) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <RemoteCSE> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been created in registrar CSE. |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the corresponding resource has been also created in registree CSE. |
+| 6 | | IOP Check | Registree CSE indicates successful operation. |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.2.2 remoteCSE Retrieve
+
+| Interoperability test descriptionInteroperability test description | | | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_03 | | |
+| Objective: | Registree CSE retrieves RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_02 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.2.2Pre-test conditions: | CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} Registree CSE has created a remoteCSE resource on registrar CSE with name {RemoteCSEName} | | |
+| Test Sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | Registree CSE is requested to send a RemoteCSE retrieve request to Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | op = 2 (Retrieve) to = {CSEBaseName}/{remoteCSEName} fr = Registree CSE-ID rqi = (token-string) pc = empty |
+| 3 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: rsc = 2000 (OK) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <RemoteCSE> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | Registree CSE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.2.3 remoteCSE Update
+
+| Interoperability test descriptionInteroperability test description | | | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | | TD_M2M_NH_04 | |
+| Objective: | | Registree CSE updates RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE | |
+| Configuration: | | M2M_CFG_02 | |
+| References: | | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.2.3Pre-test conditions: | | • CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} • Registree CSE has created a remoteCSE resource on registrar CSE with name {RemoteCSEName} | |
+| Test Sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | Registree CSE is requested to send a RemoteCSE update request to Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 3 (Update) • to = {CSEBaseName}/{remoteCSEName} • fr = Registree CSE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = Serialized representation of updated <RemoteCSE> resource |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been updated in registrar CSE. |
+| 4 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: • rsc = 2004 (UPDATED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = Serialized representation of <RemoteCSE> resource |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | Registree CSE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.2.4 remoteCSE Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | | TD_M2M_NH_05 | |
+| Objective: | | Registree CSE deletes RemoteCSE from Registrar CSE | |
+| Configuration: | | M2M_CFG_02 | |
+| References: | | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.2.4Pre-test conditions: | | • CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} • Registree CSE has created a remoteCSE resource on registrar CSE with name {RemoteCSEName} | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | Registree CSE is requested to send a RemoteCSE delete request to Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 4 (Delete) • to = {CSEBaseName}/{remoteCSEName} • fr = Registree CSE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+| 3 | Mcc | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: • rsc = 2002 (DELETED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = empty |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been removed from registrar CSE. |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is also removed from registree CSE. |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | Registree CSE indicates successful operation. |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+#### 9.1.3 Application entity registration
+
+##### 9.1.3.1 AE Create
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_06 | | |
+| Objective: | AE registers to its registrar CSE via an AE Create Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.1.1Pre-test conditions: | CSEBase resource has been created in CSE with name {CSEBaseName} AE does not have an AE-ID, i.e., it registers from scratch | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a AE Create request to register to the Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 1 (Create) to = {CSEBaseName} fr = AE-ID rqi = (token-string) ty = 2 (AE) pc = Serialized representation of <AE> resource |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is created in registrar CSE. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | rscl = 2001 (CREATED) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <AE> resource |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.3.2 AE Retrieve
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_07 | | |
+| Objective: | AE retrieves resource via an AE Retrieve Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.1.2Pre-test conditions: | CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} AE has created a <AE> resource on registrar CSE with name {AE}bgf | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a AE retrieve request to Registrar CSE |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 2 (Retrieve) to = {CSEBaseName}/{AE} fr = AE-ID of request originator rqi = (token-string) |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: rscl = 2000 (OK) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <AE> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.3.3 AE Update
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_08 | | | | | |
+| Objective: | AE updates attribute in resource | | | | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | | | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.1.3 CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} AE has created a <AE> resource on registrar CSE with name {AE} | | | | | | |
+| Test sequence | | | | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description | | | |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send an AE Update Request | | | |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 3 (Update) to = {CSEBaseName}/{AE} fr = AE-ID rqi = (token-string) pc = Serialized representation of updated <AE> resource | | | |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been updated in registrar CSE. | | | |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: rsc = 2004 (UPDATED) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <AE> resource | | | |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation | | | |
+| IOP Verdict | | | | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.3.4 AE Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--|--|--|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_09 | | | | | |
+| Objective: | AE de-registers by deleting resource via an AE Delete Request | | | | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | | | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.1.4 CSEBase resource has been created in registrar CSE with name {CSEBaseName} AE has created a <AE> resource on registrar CSE with name {AE} | | | | | | |
+| Test sequence | | | | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description | | | |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send an AE Delete Request | | | |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 4 (Delete) to = {CSEBaseName}/{AE} fr = AE-ID rqi = (token-string) pc = empty | | | |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | Registrar CSE sends response containing: rsc = 2002 (DELETED) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = empty | | | |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been removed from registrar CSE. | | | |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation | | | |
+| IOP Verdict | | | | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | | | | |
+
+#### 9.1.4 Container management
+
+##### 9.1.4.1 Container Create
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_10 | | |
+| Objective: | AE creates a container resource in registrar CSE via a container Create Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.4.1Pre-test conditions: | AE has created an application resource <AE> on registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE sends a request to create a |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 1 (Create) to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <AE> resource fr = AE-ID rqi = (token-string) ty = 3 (Container) pc = Serialized representation of <container> resource |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is created in registrar CSE. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | rsc = 2001 (CREATED) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <container> resource |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.4.2 Container Retrieve
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_11 | | |
+| Objective: | AE retrieves information of a container resource via a container Retrieve Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.4.2Pre-test conditions: | AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a Retrieve Request for a |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | op = 2 (Retrieve) to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <container> resource fr = AE-ID rqi = (token-string) pc = empty |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | rsc = 2000 (OK) rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message pc = Serialized representation of <container> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.4.3 Container Update
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_12 | | |
+| Objective: | AE updates attribute in application resource via a container Update Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.4.3 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a container Update Request to update the lifetime of the resource. |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 3 (Update) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <container> resource • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = Serialized representation of updated <container> resource |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the < container > resource is updated in Registrar CSE. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2004 (Updated) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = Serialized representation of <container> resource |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.4.4 Container Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_13 | | |
+| Objective: | AE deletes a specific container resource via a container Delete Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.4.4 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a container Delete Request |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 4 (Delete) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <container> resource • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is deleted in registrar CSE. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2002 (DELETED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = empty |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been removed in registrar CSE. |
+| 6 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation. |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+#### 9.1.5 ContentInstance management
+
+##### 9.1.5.1 ContentInstance Create
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_14 | | |
+| Objective: | AE adds a contentInstance resource to a specific container in Registrar CSE via a contentInstance Create Request and the Registrar CSE updates the parent resource with stateTag , currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attributes correspondingly | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.19.2 • AE has created an application resource <AE> on registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE sends a RETRIEVE request with resultContent set to 1 (default value) to retrieve the resource and AE sends a request to create a < contentInstance > resource |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 1 (Create) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of < container > resource • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • ty = 4 (contentInstance) • pc = Serialized representation of <contentInstance> resource |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is created in Registrar CSE and AE sends a RETRIEVE request to the resource to check that if the Registrar CSE has updated stateTag , currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute correspondingly which is resulted from the successful creation of child resource. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2001 (CREATED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = Serialized representation of <contentInstance> resource |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful CREATE operation of and indicates Registrar CSE has updated stateTag , currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute correspondingly by checking the response of a request to the resource |
+| IOP Verdict | Set verdict to pass if IOP check goal is achieved exactly, otherwise verdict fail is set with corresponding error message. | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.5.2 ContentInstance Retrieve
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_15 | | |
+| Objective: | AE retrieves information of a contentInstance resource via a contentInstance Retrieve Request | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.19.3 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a contentInstance resource <contentInstance> as child resource of <container> resource | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE is requested to send a Retrieve Request for a |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 2 (Retrieve) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <contentInstance> resource • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2000 (OK) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = Serialized representation of <contentInstance> resource |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful operation |
+| IOP Verdict | | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.5.3 ContentInstance Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_17 | | |
+| Objective: | AE deletes contentInstance resource via a contentInstance Delete Request and the Registrar CSE updates the parent resource with currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attributes correspondingly | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.19.5 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a contentInstance resource <contentInstance> as child resource of <container> resource | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE sends a RETRIEVE request with resultContent set to 1 (default value) to retrieve the resource and AE is requested to send a contentInstance Delete Request |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 4 (Delete) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <contentInstance> resource • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+| 3 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource is deleted in Registrar CSE and AE sends a RETRIEVE request to the parent resource to check that if the Registrar CSE has updated currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute correspondingly which is resulted from the successful deletion of child resource. |
+| 4 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2002 (DELETED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = empty |
+| 5 | | IOP Check | Check if possible that the resource has been removed in registrar CSE. |
+| 6 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful DELETE operation of and indicates Registrar CSE has updated currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute correspondingly |
+| IOP Verdict | | Set the verdict to pass if both the is deleted and the Registrar CSE updated currentNrOfInstances , and CurrentByteSize attribute. Otherwise, set the verdict to fail with corresponding error message. | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.5.4 ContentInstance Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_49 | | |
+| Objective: | AE deletes a resource of a and the Registrar CSE points a latest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.22.2 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE • AE has created more than one contentInstances <contentInstance> as child of <container> on Registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE retrieves a resource in a and then sends a DELETE request to the resource of the |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 4 (Delete) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <latest> resource of a <container> • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2002 (DELETED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = representation of deleted <latest> resource of a <container> |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful DELETE operation of a resource and AE sends a RETRIEVE request to resource of a to check if the retrieved resource in the is different with that one that was retrieved before DELETE request of the resource in terms of resourceID and resourceName attribute value. |
+| IOP Verdict | Set the verdict to pass if IOP check goal is achieved, otherwise set the verdict to fail with corresponding error message. | | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.5.5 ContentInstance Delete
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | TD_M2M_NH_50 | | |
+| Objective: | AE deletes a resource of a and the Registrar CSE points an oldest among the existing contentInstances to the resource of the | | |
+| Configuration: | M2M_CFG_01 | | |
+| References: | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.22.2 • AE has created an Application Entity resource <AE> on Registrar CSE • AE has created a container resource <container> on Registrar CSE • AE has created more than one contentInstances <contentInstance> as child of <container> on Registrar CSE | | |
+| Test sequence | | | |
+| Step | RP | Type | Description |
+| 1 | | Stimulus | AE retrieves a resource of a and AE sends a DELETE Request to the resource of the |
+| 2 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • op = 4 (Delete) • to = {CSEBaseName}/URI of <oldest> resource of a <container> • fr = AE-ID • rqi = (token-string) • pc = empty |
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 3 | Mca | PRO Check Primitive | • rsc = 2002 (DELETED) • rqi = (token-string) same as received in request message • pc = representation of deleted <oldest> resource of a <container> |
+| | | | • |
+| | | | • |
+| | | | • |
+| 4 | | IOP Check | AE indicates successful DELETE operation of a resource and AE sends a RETRIEVE request to resource of a to check if the retrieved resource in the is different with that one that was retrieved before DELETE request of the resource in terms of resourceID and resourceName attribute value and |
+| IOP Verdict | | Set the verdict to pass if IOP check goal is achieved, otherwise set the verdict to fail with corresponding error message. | |
+| PRO Verdict | | | |
+
+##### 9.1.5.6 ContentInstance Create when currentNrOfInstance equals to maxNrOfInstances in parent resource
+
+| Interoperability test description | | | |
+|-----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identifier: | | TD_M2M_NH_51 | |
+| Objective: | | AE sends a CREATE request to a which contains attribute currentNrOfInstances whose value equals to that of maxNrOfInstances and Registrar CSE deletes the oldest from the parent and then creates the requested resource for the originator AE | |
+| Configuration: | | M2M_CFG_01 | |
+| References: | | [ITU-T Y.4500.1], clause 10.2.19.2 
