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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## F.747.1
+
+(06/2012)
+
+SERIES F: NON-TELEPHONE TELECOMMUNICATION
+SERVICES
+
+Audiovisual services
+
+# --- **Capabilities of ubiquitous sensor networks for supporting the requirements of smart metering services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T F.747.1
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+## ITU-T F-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **NON-TELEPHONE TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICES**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
+| TELEGRAPH SERVICE | |
+| Operating methods for the international public telegram service | F.1–F.19 |
+| The gentex network | F.20–F.29 |
+| Message switching | F.30–F.39 |
+| The international telemessage service | F.40–F.58 |
+| The international telex service | F.59–F.89 |
+| Statistics and publications on international telegraph services | F.90–F.99 |
+| Scheduled and leased communication services | F.100–F.104 |
+| Phototelegraph service | F.105–F.109 |
+| MOBILE SERVICE | |
+| Mobile services and multideestination satellite services | F.110–F.159 |
+| TELEMATIC SERVICES | |
+| Public facsimile service | F.160–F.199 |
+| Teletex service | F.200–F.299 |
+| Videotex service | F.300–F.349 |
+| General provisions for telematic services | F.350–F.399 |
+| MESSAGE HANDLING SERVICES | F.400–F.499 |
+| DIRECTORY SERVICES | F.500–F.549 |
+| DOCUMENT COMMUNICATION | |
+| Document communication | F.550–F.579 |
+| Programming communication interfaces | F.580–F.599 |
+| DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES | F.600–F.699 |
+| AUDIOVISUAL SERVICES | F.700–F.799 |
+| ISDN SERVICES | F.800–F.849 |
+| UNIVERSAL PERSONAL TELECOMMUNICATION | F.850–F.899 |
+| HUMAN FACTORS | F.900–F.999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T F.747.1**
+
+# **Capabilities of ubiquitous sensor networks for supporting the requirements of smart metering services**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T F.747.1 identifies the capabilities of ubiquitous sensor networks (USNs) for supporting the requirements of smart metering services. To this end, an overview of smart metering is described, with a clarification between smart grids and smart metering provided. This Recommendation takes into account a few typical use case scenarios of smart metering and identifies the general requirements and USN-based smart metering services to support these use cases. Finally this Recommendation defines USN capabilities based on identified requirements for providing smart metering services.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T F.747.1 | 2012-06-29 | 16 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Smart grid, smart metering, USN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2013
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview of smart metering ..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Smart grids and smart metering..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Technical overview of smart metering..... | 5 |
+| 6.3 USN-based smart metering services..... | 5 |
+| 7 Smart metering service scenarios ..... | 7 |
+| 7.1 Scenario I: Regularly scheduled remote meter reading..... | 7 |
+| 7.2 Scenario II: On-demand remote meter reading ..... | 8 |
+| 7.3 Scenario III: Demand response ..... | 9 |
+| 7.4 Scenario IV: Tariff configuration..... | 10 |
+| 7.5 Scenario V: Meter reading data aggregation..... | 11 |
+| 8 Network and USN requirements for smart metering services..... | 12 |
+| 8.1 Time synchronization ..... | 12 |
+| 8.2 Reliable information delivery..... | 12 |
+| 8.3 Minimal time delay..... | 12 |
+| 8.4 Real-time delivery of meter reading data ..... | 12 |
+| 8.5 Bidirectional communication between meters and operators..... | 13 |
+| 8.6 Security support including the authorization of operator and data confidentiality..... | 13 |
+| 8.7 Authentication of smart meters ..... | 13 |
+| 8.8 Meter reading data processing..... | 13 |
+| 8.9 Monitoring and management of smart meters..... | 13 |
+| 9 USN capabilities for smart metering services ..... | 13 |
+| 9.1 Time synchronization ..... | 13 |
+| 9.2 Reliable transmission..... | 13 |
+| 9.3 Scalability ..... | 14 |
+| 9.4 Mobility support..... | 14 |
+| 9.5 Delivery latency..... | 14 |
+| 9.6 Fault detection and recovery ..... | 14 |
+| 9.7 Security supporting confidentiality, integrity check, authorization and authentication ..... | 14 |
+| 9.8 Connectivity ..... | 14 |
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 9.9 Unicasting and multicasting ..... | 14 |
+| 9.10 Data aggregation..... | 14 |
+| 9.11 Distributed processing ..... | 15 |
+| 9.12 Monitoring and management of sensor nodes..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T F.747.1
+
+# Capabilities of ubiquitous sensor networks for supporting the requirements of smart metering services
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+The main purpose of this Recommendation is to identify the capabilities of ubiquitous sensor networks (USNs) which support the requirements of smart metering services. The scope of this Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- overview of smart metering
+- smart metering use case scenarios
+- requirements of smart metering services
+- USN capabilities for supporting the requirements of smart metering services.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T F.744] Recommendation ITU-T F.744 (2009), *Service description and requirements for ubiquitous sensor network middleware*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2221] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221 (2010), *Requirements for support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services in the NGN environment*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 sensor** [ITU-T Y.2221]: An electronic device that senses a physical condition or chemical compound and delivers an electronic signal proportional to the observed characteristic.
+
+**3.1.2 sensor network** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A network comprised of inter-connected sensor nodes exchanging sensed data by wired or wireless communication.
+
+**3.1.3 sensor node** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A device consisting of sensor(s) and optional actuator(s) with the capabilities of sensed data processing and networking.
+
+**3.1.4 ubiquitous sensor network (USN)** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A conceptual network built over existing physical networks which makes use of sensed data and provides knowledge services to anyone, anywhere and at any time, and where the information is generated by using context awareness.
+
+**3.1.5 USN gateway** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A node which interconnects sensor networks with other networks.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 demand response:** A smart metering feature that allows consumers to reduce or change their use patterns of electricity, gas and water during peak demand usually in exchange for a financial incentive.
+
+**3.2.2 sensor network gateway:** A sensor network element that connects a sensor network to another network with different architecture or protocols, permitting information exchange between them. See also USN gateway.
+
+NOTE – Sensor network gateway functionalities may include either address or protocol translation or both.
+
+**3.2.3 smart grid:** An electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies.
+
+**3.2.4 smart meter:** A device in a user's premises for monitoring and controlling electrical power, gas and water usage of home appliances based on demand response information from home appliances.
+
+**3.2.5 smart metering:** An operation to provide information to consumers and smart metering operators about energy consumption. The information includes how much energy the consumers are using or generating and how much it costs.
+
+**3.2.6 smart metering gateway:** See USN gateway.
+
+**3.2.7 utility:** An entity providing services such electricity, gas, water and heating to the general public and/or to industrial and commercial entities.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+USN Ubiquitous Sensor Network
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Overview of smart metering
+
+Smart meters are utility meters, for example electricity, gas, water and other meters, which may bring about the end of estimated bills and meter readings, and provide customers and energy distributors and suppliers with accurate information on the amount of a utility that is being used.
+
+Smart metering provides:
+
+- customers with the information they require to become energy savvy and make smarter decisions about their energy usage;
+- energy suppliers with the means to better understand and service their customers;
+- distributors with an effective tool to better monitor and manage their networks.
+
+In addition, smart metering enables those customers who choose to generate their own electricity (micro-generators) to be financially rewarded for their contribution to the national grid, and for distributors to better manage this contribution [b-ETSI TR 102 691].
+
+Smart metering may be regarded as one of the key technologies for smart grid systems.
+
+### **6.1 Smart grids and smart metering**
+
+A smart grid is a type of electrical grid that attempts to predict and intelligently respond to the behaviour and actions of all electric power users connected to it – suppliers, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently deliver reliable, economic and sustainable electricity services including:
+
+- enhancement of reliability
+- reducing peak demand
+- shifting usage to off-peak hours
+- lower total energy consumption
+- actively managing electricity charging
+- actively managing other usage to respond to other renewable resources.
+
+Smart grid technologies have already been used in other applications, such as manufacturing and telecommunications. In general, smart grid technology may be divided into seven areas: integrated communications, sensing and measurement, smart metering, advanced components, advanced control, improved interfaces and decision support, and smart power generation. In other words, smart meters are key components of smart grids and consequently, smart metering is one of the crucial features for smart grids.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Smart grid architecture, organized into several domains and their interactions:
+
+- Markets:** Includes Retailer/wholesaler, Aggregator, Energy market clearing house, and ISO/RTO participant. These are connected to the Internet/e-Business information network.
+- Operations:**
+ - RTO/ISO Ops:** Contains EMS, Enterprise bus, and RTO SCADA.
+ - Transmission Ops:** Contains EMS, WAMS, Enterprise bus, and Transmission SCADA.
+ - Distribution Ops:** Contains DMS, Asset Mgmt, Demand response, MDMS, Enterprise bus, Metering system, and Distribution SCADA.
+- Service providers:**
+ - Utility provider:** Contains CIS, Billing, and Internet/e-Business.
+ - Third-party provider:** Contains Retail energy provider, CIS, Billing, Home/building manager, Aggregator, and Others.
+- Bulk generation:** Includes Market services interface, Plant control system, and Generators. It connects to Wide area networks.
+- Transmission:** Includes Wide area networks, Substation LANs, Substation controller, Substation device, Data collector, and Electric storage.
+- Distribution:** Includes Field area networks, Field device, and Distributed generation.
+- Customer:** Includes Premises networks, Energy services interface, Meter, Customer equipment, Customer EMS, Electric vehicle, Distributed generation, Electric storage, Appliances, and Thermostat.
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- Domain: Represented by a rounded rectangle.
+- Actor: Represented by a rectangle.
+- Information network: Represented by a cloud shape.
+- Domain gateway actor: Represented by a rectangle with a thick border.
+- Comms path: Represented by a dashed line.
+- Comms path across owner/domain: Represented by a solid line.
+
+F.747.1(12)\_F01
+
+Smart grid architecture diagram showing domains: Markets, Operations (RTO/ISO, Transmission, Distribution), Service providers (Utility, Third-party), Bulk generation, Transmission, Distribution, and Customer. It includes actors like Aggregators, SCADA systems, and various interfaces, connected by information networks and communication paths.
+
+**Figure 1 – Smart grid architecture [b-NIST]**
+
+### 6.2 Technical overview of smart metering
+
+It is not only governments and utility companies, such as electricity, gas and water suppliers, but also researchers, that have been interested in automatic meter reading based on communication systems. Examples of smart metering benefits to customers, governments and utility companies are:
+
+- lower metering cost
+- energy savings for residential consumers
+- reliability of supply
+- various pricing schemes to attract new costumers
+- easier detection of fraud and of outages
+- automated billing.
+
+Smart metering comprises metering and exchange of meter information between smart meters and utility companies. Various technologies can be used for metering and exchanging meter information. For example, power-line communications have been used for delivering electricity power to consumers and for transmitting gas and water measurements to utility providers. Alternatively, mobile networks can be used for exchanging messages in an automatic meter reading system.
+
+Sensor network technologies may be used for metering and collecting information of utility usage, and communication networks can be used for exchanging the information. Figure 2 depicts an overall diagram of smart metering systems. The meter information, obtained from home appliances by sensor nodes is collected and delivered to operators of utility companies.
+
+The operators manage the collected information and inform consumers of variable pricing information or enforced load control messages. Such operators' actions may lead to consumers' reducing energy consumption.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of a smart metering system. On the left, a house labeled 'Smart home' contains a section labeled 'Appliances' with icons for a gas cylinder, a television, and a water tap. Below these are three circular nodes labeled 'Gas smart meter', 'Electricity smart meter', and 'Water smart meter'. These meters are connected to a 'Communication interface' at the bottom of the house. A line connects this interface to a cloud labeled 'Communication networks'. From the cloud, a line connects to a server rack labeled 'Smart metering operator'. The label 'F.747.1(12)\_F02' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 2: Overview of smart metering. The diagram shows a 'Smart home' containing 'Appliances' (Gas, Electricity, Water) connected to 'Smart meters' (Gas, Electricity, Water). These meters are connected to a 'Communication interface' which links to 'Communication networks' and finally to a 'Smart metering operator'.
+
+**Figure 2 – Overview of smart metering**
+
+### 6.3 USN-based smart metering services
+
+The smart metering services shown in Figure 3 require technological facilities to support metering, and to exchange metering information between smart meters and metering operators in utility control centres.
+
+The basic characteristic of USN applications and services are gathering data by sensor networks and data transmission to a remote server through communication networks. Also, control information is transmitted to sensor networks from the remote server. Furthermore, if USN middleware is deployed, the middleware can provide USN applications or sensor networks with various functions such as data query, data mining, event processing, sensor network metadata directory service, data filtering, context-aware rule processing and sensor network management.
+
+These USN features can be applied to smart metering services. Sensor nodes in sensor networks have the capabilities of metering and delivering metered information to a server at a utility control centre. USN middleware can provide functions which are required by an on-demand remote meter reading scenario and a demand response meter reading scenario.
+
+A smart metering system can be implemented by sensor nodes and USN middleware as follows:
+
+- Smart metering sensor nodes: Each sensor node may have smart metering capabilities, therefore, sensor nodes can act as smart meters supporting the processing of smart metering information for smart metering procedures, such as meter reading collection and tariff setting.
+- Smart metering gateway: A sensor network gateway or a USN gateway is capable of connecting a sensor network to another network with different architecture or protocols, permitting information exchange between them. Therefore a sensor network gateway or a USN gateway can be used as a smart metering gateway. A smart metering gateway is only responsible for delivering information between the sensor nodes (smart meters) and metering operators. In cases where a gateway has smart metering capabilities, it collects meter reading data and then delivers it to the metering operator(s).
+- USN middleware [ITU-T F.744]: USN middleware provides data filtering, data query, data mining and context-aware rule processing, etc. These features of USN middleware satisfy meter reading data processing requirements and can be applied to an on-demand remote meter reading scenario and a demand response meter reading scenario.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Smart metering services based on USN. The diagram illustrates a three-tier architecture. At the top, the 'Smart metering operator' is enclosed in a dashed box and contains several server icons and a cloud, with the label 'Servers a)'. This operator is connected to a central 'Transport network' cloud containing a mesh of nodes. Below the transport network, the 'Sensor networks' section is enclosed in a dashed box and includes two types of networks: a 'Smart home' and a 'Smart building'. Each network contains multiple 'Sensor node a) (smart metering)' icons. These sensor networks are connected to 'USN gateway a)' devices, which in turn connect to the transport network. A footnote at the bottom left states 'a) USN middleware is optionally included'. The bottom right corner is labeled 'F.747.1(12)\_F03'.
+
+**Figure 3 – Smart metering services based on USN**
+
+## 7 Smart metering service scenarios
+
+The following scenarios illustrate the use of smart metering services.
+
+### 7.1 Scenario I: Regularly scheduled remote meter reading
+
+Scenario I in Figure 4 describes procedures where meter reading data are delivered to smart metering operators at regularly scheduled intervals.
+
+- 1) A smart metering operator sends a message including schedule information to smart meters.
+- 2) Smart meters are configured with the schedule for measurement and data transfer.
+- 3) According to the schedule, smart meters measure energy consumption from home appliances and obtain measurement data.
+- 4) The smart meters deliver the data to the smart metering operator.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as Smart meter 1
+ participant A1 as Appliance 1
+ participant S2 as Smart meter 2
+ participant A2 as Appliance 2
+ participant SMO as Smart metering operator
+
+ SMO->>S1: Schedule information
+ SMO->>S2: Schedule information
+ S1->>S1: Setting schedule for measurement
+ S2->>S2: Setting schedule for measurement
+ S1->>S1: Meter reading
+ S1->>A1: Metering information
+ S2->>S2: Meter reading
+ S2->>SMO: Metering information
+ S1->>S1: Meter reading
+ S1->>A1: Metering information
+ S2->>S2: Meter reading
+ S2->>SMO: Metering information
+ S1->>S1: Meter reading
+ S1->>A1: Metering information
+ S2->>S2: Meter reading
+ S2->>SMO: Metering information
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Scenario I: Regularly scheduled remote metering. The diagram shows interactions between Smart meter 1, Appliance 1, Smart meter 2, Appliance 2, and Smart metering operator. The process involves the operator sending schedule information to both smart meters, which then set their own measurement schedules. Subsequently, each smart meter performs a meter reading and sends metering information to its respective appliance. Finally, each smart meter sends metering information to the smart metering operator.
+
+F.747.1(12)\_F04
+
+**Figure 4 – Scenario I: Regularly scheduled remote metering**
+
+### 7.2 Scenario II: On-demand remote meter reading
+
+Scenario II in Figure 5 describes the procedures for when smart meters measure energy consumption and deliver the results to a smart metering operator on demand.
+
+- 1) When a smart metering operator collects measurement data from the smart meters, the operator sends a task message for smart meters to collect measurement data.
+- 2) Smart meters verify the operator's message and, if the message is validated, they measure energy consumption.
+- 3) The resulting data are delivered to the smart metering operator.
+
+NOTE – Figure 5 does not include the flow for the message verification, as this can be performed in a number of ways.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as Smart meter 1
+ participant A1 as Appliance 1
+ participant S2 as Smart meter 2
+ participant A2 as Appliance 2
+ participant SO as Smart metering operator
+
+ SO->>S1: Control message with a task
+ S1->>S1: Meter reading
+ S1->>SO: Metering information
+ SO->>S2: Control message with a task
+ S2->>S2: Meter reading
+ S2->>SO: Metering information
+ SO->>S1: Control message with a task
+ S1->>S1: Meter reading
+ S1->>SO: Metering information
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Scenario II: On-demand remote meter reading. The diagram shows interactions between Smart meter 1, Appliance 1, Smart meter 2, Appliance 2, and Smart metering operator. The operator sends control messages to both smart meters. Each smart meter performs a self-read (Meter reading) and then sends Metering information to the operator.
+
+F.747.1(12)\_F05
+
+**Figure 5 – Scenario II: On-demand remote meter reading
+(excluding the verification step)**
+
+### 7.3 Scenario III: Demand response
+
+Scenario III illustrated in Figure 6 describes customers responding to the metering operator's demands.
+
+- 1) A smart metering operator sends a message including schedule information to smart meters.
+- 2) Smart meters are configured with the schedule for measurement and data transfer.
+- 3) When the number of home appliances turned on simultaneously is on the increase, the total amount of energy consumption also steeply increases.
+- 4) Information about the increasing amount of energy consumption is being reported to the smart metering operator at scheduled intervals, and the price of energy may also change according to the tariff policies (e.g., depending on supply and demand).
+- 5)
+ - (a) The smart metering operator sends a message to inform consumers of the price change.
+ - (b) The smart metering operator sends load control messages to enforce the reduction of energy consumption or to force shut off due to a management policy.
+- 6)
+ - (a) Smart meters display the message to the consumers, and the consumers may decide to reduce energy consumption, or the home appliances may be switched off by the consumer.
+ - (b) When receiving the load control messages, the smart meter displays the message and proceeds to shutting off the connected home appliance.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SMO as Smart metering operator
+ participant SM1 as Smart meter 1
+ participant A1 as Appliance 1
+ participant SM2 as Smart meter 2
+ participant A2 as Appliance 2
+
+ SMO->>SM1: Schedule information
+ SMO->>SM2: Schedule information
+ SM1->>SM1: Setting schedule for measurement
+ SM2->>SM2: Setting schedule for measurement
+ SM1->>A1: Meter reading
+ SM2->>A2: Meter reading
+ A2->>A2: Switched on
+ SM1->>SMO: Metering information
+ SM2->>SMO: Metering information
+ SMO->>SM1: Control message with the changed price information
+ SMO->>SM2: Control message to shut off electricity
+ SM1->>SM1: Display the price changes of electricity
+ A1->>A1: Display the price changes of electricity
+ Note over A1: Electricity consumption reduced by a consumer (or switched off)
+ SM2->>SM2: Display message for shut-off
+ A2->>A2: Shut off electricity
+ Note over A2: Automatically switched off
+ SM1->>A1: Meter reading
+ SM2->>A2: Meter reading
+ SM1->>SMO: Metering information
+ SM2->>SMO: Metering information
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Scenario III: Demand response. The diagram shows interactions between Smart meter 1, Appliance 1, Smart metering operator, Smart meter 2, and Appliance 2. Key events include: 1. Smart metering operator sends 'Schedule information' to both smart meters. 2. Both smart meters perform a self-action 'Setting schedule for measurement'. 3. Smart meter 1 sends 'Meter reading' to Appliance 1. 4. Smart meter 2 sends 'Meter reading' to Appliance 2, which then performs a self-action 'Switched on'. 5. Both smart meters send 'Metering information' to the Smart metering operator. 6. The Smart metering operator sends 'Price of electricity changes' to both smart meters. 7. The Smart metering operator sends a 'Control message with the changed price information' to Smart meter 1 and a 'Control message to shut off electricity' to Smart meter 2. 8. Smart meter 1 performs a self-action 'Display the price changes of electricity', which then triggers Appliance 1 to perform a self-action 'Display the price changes of electricity' and a note 'Electricity consumption reduced by a consumer (or switched off)'. 9. Smart meter 2 performs a self-action 'Display message for shut-off', which then triggers Appliance 2 to perform a self-action 'Shut off electricity' and a note 'Automatically switched off'. 10. Both smart meters send 'Meter reading' to their respective appliances. 11. Both smart meters send 'Metering information' to the Smart metering operator.
+
+F747.1(12)\_F06
+
+**Figure 6 – Scenario III: Demand response**
+
+### 7.4 Scenario IV: Tariff configuration
+
+Scenario IV, illustrated in Figure 7 describes how the price of energy consumption is decided and configured within the meters.
+
+- 1) A smart metering operator sends a message including schedule information to smart meters.
+- 2) Smart meters are set up with the schedule for measurement and data transfer.
+- 3) The smart meters regularly deliver meter reading data to the metering operator according to regularly scheduled intervals.
+- 4) The price of electricity may be dynamically changed by pricing policies (e.g., depending on supply and demand).
+- 5) When the price changes, a message including changed price information is delivered to all the smart meters concerned.
+- 6) The changed cost information may be shown on their displays, and the new cost is applied.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SMO as Smart metering operator
+ participant SM1 as Smart meter 1
+ participant A1 as Appliance 1
+ participant SM2 as Smart meter 2
+ participant A2 as Appliance 2
+
+ SMO->>SM1: Schedule information
+ SMO->>SM2: Schedule information
+ SM1->>SM1: Setting schedule for measurement
+ SM2->>SM2: Setting schedule for measurement
+ SM1->>SMO: Metering information
+ A1->>A1: Meter reading
+ SM2->>SMO: Metering information
+ A2->>A2: Meter reading
+ SMO->>SM1: Price of electricity changes
+ SMO->>SM2: Price of electricity changes
+ SM1->>SM1: Price of electricity changes
+ SM2->>SM2: Price of electricity changes
+ SM1->>SMO: Control message with the changed price information
+ SM2->>SMO: Control message with the changed price information
+ SMO->>SM1: Control message with the changed price information
+ SMO->>SM2: Control message with the changed price information
+ SM1->>SM1: Display the cost of electricity changes and new price applied
+ SM2->>SM2: Display the cost of electricity changes and new price applied
+ SM1->>SMO: Metering information
+ A1->>A1: Meter reading
+ SM2->>SMO: Metering information
+ A2->>A2: Meter reading
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Scenario IV: Tariff configuration. The diagram shows interactions between Smart meter 1, Appliance 1, Smart metering operator, Smart meter 2, and Appliance 2. The process starts with the Smart metering operator sending 'Schedule information' to both Smart meter 1 and Smart meter 2. Each smart meter then performs a self-action 'Setting schedule for measurement'. Smart meter 1 sends 'Metering information' to the Smart metering operator, while Appliance 1 performs a self-action 'Meter reading'. Similarly, Smart meter 2 sends 'Metering information' to the Smart metering operator, while Appliance 2 performs a self-action 'Meter reading'. The Smart metering operator then sends 'Price of electricity changes' to both smart meters. Each smart meter performs a self-action 'Price of electricity changes' and then sends a 'Control message with the changed price information' to the Smart metering operator. The Smart metering operator then sends 'Control message with the changed price information' to both smart meters. Each smart meter performs a self-action 'Display the cost of electricity changes and new price applied'. Finally, each smart meter sends 'Metering information' to the Smart metering operator, while each appliance performs a self-action 'Meter reading'.
+
+F.747.1(12)\_F07
+
+**Figure 7 – Scenario IV: Tariff configuration**
+
+### 7.5 Scenario V: Meter reading data aggregation
+
+This scenario describes the procedures of how meter reading data, obtained at scheduled intervals by smart meters, are collected at an aggregating smart meter (or at an aggregating smart metering gateway) and then delivered to metering operators.
+
+- 1) A smart metering operator sends the smart meters a message to request aggregated metering data.
+- 2) Smart meters are configured to obtain meter reading data.
+- 3) According to the schedule, smart meters measure energy consumption and obtain meter reading data from home appliances.
+- 4) The obtained meter reading data are collected in an aggregating smart meter (or aggregating smart metering gateway). This is represented by Smart meter 2 in Figure 8.
+- 5) Finally, meter reading data are transferred to a smart metering operator.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S1 as Smart meter 1
+ participant A1 as Appliance 1
+ participant S2 as Smart meter 2
+ participant A2 as Appliance 2
+ participant SMO as Smart metering operator
+
+ SMO->>S1: Schedule and task information
+ SMO->>S2: Schedule and task information
+ S1->>S1: Setting schedule for measurement
+ S2->>S2: Setting schedule for measurement
+ S1->>A1: Meter reading
+ A1->>S1: Metering information
+ S2->>A2: Meter reading
+ A2->>S2: Metering information
+ S2->>S2: Data aggregation
+ S2->>SMO: Aggregated metering information
+ S1->>A1: Meter reading
+ A1->>S1: Metering information
+ S1->>S1: Data aggregation
+ S1->>SMO: Aggregated metering information
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Scenario V: Meter reading aggregation. The diagram shows interactions between Smart meter 1, Appliance 1, Smart meter 2, Appliance 2, and Smart metering operator. The process starts with the Smart metering operator sending 'Schedule and task information' to both Smart meter 1 and Smart meter 2. Each smart meter then performs a self-action 'Setting schedule for measurement'. Smart meter 1 sends 'Meter reading' to Appliance 1, which then sends 'Metering information' to Smart meter 1. Smart meter 2 sends 'Meter reading' to Appliance 2, which then sends 'Metering information' to Smart meter 2. Smart meter 2 performs a self-action 'Data aggregation' and sends 'Aggregated metering information' to the Smart metering operator. Smart meter 1 sends 'Meter reading' to Appliance 1, which then sends 'Metering information' to Smart meter 1. Smart meter 1 performs a self-action 'Data aggregation' and sends 'Aggregated metering information' to the Smart metering operator. The diagram is labeled F.747.1(12)\_F08.
+
+**Figure 8 – Scenario V: Meter reading aggregation**
+
+## 8 Network and USN requirements for smart metering services
+
+This clause specifies the sub-set of smart metering service requirements that relate to sensor networks and USNs.
+
+### 8.1 Time synchronization
+
+In smart metering services, exchanged data uses time stamps between smart meters and the systems of smart metering operators. Therefore, accurate and secure time synchronization should be supported in smart metering systems.
+
+### 8.2 Reliable information delivery
+
+In smart metering services, meter reading data can be frequently transferred from distributed meters, and also operators can send many control messages to smart meters. If delivery has failed, the operators cannot collect all of the meter reading data from smart meters. Therefore, smart metering services are required to provide reliable information delivery, such as meter reading data and control messages described in the scenarios of clause 7.
+
+### 8.3 Minimal time delay
+
+In the case of on-demand remote meter reading, a meter reading request and response should be delivered to the requesting entity with a minimal time delay.
+
+### 8.4 Real-time delivery of meter reading data
+
+The demands of smart metering operators require real-time responses of interconnected consumer premises equipment. Additionally, meter reading data are required to arrive at the metering operators in real-time (e.g., step 3 of scenarios I and II). Smart metering services are required to guarantee real-time data exchange.
+
+### **8.5 Bidirectional communication between meters and operators**
+
+Meter reading data are delivered from smart meters to smart metering operators as shown in step 3 of scenarios I and II, and step 2 of Scenario III. Control messages are also sent to and from the operators and the smart meters (e.g., in step 5 of Scenario III and step 3 of Scenario IV). In order to achieve this, smart metering services are required to support bidirectional communication between meters and operators.
+
+### **8.6 Security support including the authorization of operator and data confidentiality**
+
+Operators need to control meters so that the meters take action in accordance with their instructions. In this case, the operators should be authorized by smart meters to take actions to secure against unauthorized access (step 2 of Scenario II).
+
+As metering information may include personal information, it should not be revealed to unauthenticated third parties. Therefore, it is required to secure metering information from access by unauthenticated third parties as well as to support the integrity check of the data exchanged.
+
+### **8.7 Authentication of smart meters**
+
+Smart meters should be authenticated by smart metering applications. Authentication of smart metering devices can be achieved directly by smart metering applications, or by the authenticated smart metering gateways.
+
+### **8.8 Meter reading data processing**
+
+Both operators and smart meters should be able to perform data processing on meter reading, such as filtering, validation and aggregation. In some cases, data mining processing is necessary, for example, analysing patterns and predicting some events.
+
+### **8.9 Monitoring and management of smart meters**
+
+Smart meters or smart metering gateways should be monitored proactively in order to attempt to prevent and to correct errors. In addition, the following management capabilities should be supported from the network side:
+
+- secure software and firmware provisioning
+- configuration management
+- auto-configuration functions for smart meter area networks
+
+During the operation of smart metering services, smart metering applications should be able to specify a regular reporting schedule (Scenario I) for specific parameters and specific metering devices. Also, smart metering applications should be able to modify the value of the requested time period. Smart metering applications should be able to change the tariff configuration of smart meters when needed.
+
+## **9 USN capabilities for smart metering services**
+
+### **9.1 Time synchronization**
+
+USN is required to support accurate and secure time synchronization among sensor nodes, sensor network gateways and smart metering applications.
+
+### **9.2 Reliable transmission**
+
+Smart metering requires reliability of metering information delivery to ensure correct results. Therefore, a USN is recommended to guarantee the reliable transmission of measurement data and message delivery.
+
+### **9.3 Scalability**
+
+New smart meters (sensor nodes) can be added to, or one of the existing meters (sensor nodes) can be removed from an existing smart metering group (sensor networks). Such a change should not degrade the performance of the smart metering service. Therefore, sensor networks in USNs are required to support scalability.
+
+### **9.4 Mobility support**
+
+In some cases, a consumer can change the location of home appliances. This change may require changes in a meters' position in the intra-sensor network or inter-sensor networks. Therefore, sensor networks in USNs are recommended to support the mobility of smart meters (sensor nodes).
+
+### **9.5 Delivery latency**
+
+Meter reading data should be delivered with a minimal time delay or within a pre-set time. Therefore, a USN is recommended to guarantee data delivery with a minimal time delay or within a pre-set time.
+
+### **9.6 Fault detection and recovery**
+
+Link failure between wireless nodes is possible due to the characteristics of wireless transmission. Such failure can present negative effects on the reliability and delivery latency of smart metering services. A USN is recommended to detect link failures and recover from such failures.
+
+### **9.7 Security supporting confidentiality, integrity check, authorization and authentication**
+
+Meter reading data and messages may be transferred to/from operators and meters by hop-by-hop transmission amongst sensor nodes. Therefore, hop-by-hop security among sensor nodes is recommended to be implemented and a USN is recommended to provide an integrity check of the data exchanged. In addition, the USN is recommended to provide smart meters with authorization capabilities for access to smart meters of smart metering operators.
+
+Smart meters should be authenticated by smart metering applications directly, or through a smart metering gateway. Therefore, a USN is recommended to provide an authentication capability to smart metering applications for the authentication of smart meters (sensor nodes).
+
+### **9.8 Connectivity**
+
+Meter reading data, obtained from each sensor node, are collected by a gateway, and then the collected meter reading data are delivered to smart metering operators through transport networks. In addition, control messages of the operators are also delivered to each sensor node. In order to achieve this, it is recommended that connectivity be guaranteed amongst sensor nodes, between sensor nodes and the gateway, and between the gateway and outer networks.
+
+### **9.9 Unicasting and multicasting**
+
+A unicast networking service is required to be supported amongst sensor nodes so that meter reading data are delivered to smart metering operators. Furthermore, control messages of the metering operators should be delivered to all sensor nodes. Therefore, multicast networking support is also required.
+
+### **9.10 Data aggregation**
+
+Meter reading data from smart meters is collected and aggregated at a smart meter (sensor node) or at smart metering gateways, prior to data transfer to smart metering operators. Therefore, USN sensor nodes and gateways are required to support data aggregation.
+
+### **9.11 Distributed processing**
+
+If there are a number of smart meters (sensor nodes) in a smart home or building, a large number of meter reading data sets may be sent at the same time to a smart metering operator. To prevent node and service failure because of burst data centralization, distributed processing is required.
+
+### **9.12 Monitoring and management of sensor nodes**
+
+Smart meters (sensor nodes) or smart metering gateways (sensor network gateways) are recommended to be monitored and managed proactively in order to attempt to prevent and correct errors including secure software and firmware provisioning and configuration management, as well as, auto-configuration functions for sensor networks.
+
+Smart metering applications may also require a change of parameters in the smart meter for regularly scheduled reporting, as well as for changing tariff configuration. For satisfying this requirement, a USN is recommended to support the remote configuration setting and re-setting of sensor nodes acting as smart meters.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI TR 102 691] ETSI TR 102 691 v1.1.1 (2010), *Machine-to-Machine communications (M2M); Smart Metering Use Cases*.
+- [b-Khalifa] T. Khalifa, Naik, K. and Nayak, A. (2011), *A Survey of Communication Protocols for Automatic Meter Reading Applications*, Communications Surveys and Tutorials, Vol. 13, No. 2; pp.168-182, IEEE.
+- [b-NIST] NIST SP-1108 (2010), *Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards*, Release 1.0, NIST.
+<[http://www.nist.gov/public\\_affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid\\_interoperability\\_final.pdf](http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/releases/upload/smartgrid_interoperability_final.pdf)>
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.1231
+
+(11/2000)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Architecture, access, network
+capabilities and resource management
+
+# --- **IP access network architecture**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1231
+
+(Formerly CCITT Recommendation)
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **IP access network architecture**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation provides the definitions of terminology regarding IP access, and the high-level IP network architecture and models for the IP services. It describes the access types and interfaces to be supported by the IP access network, the IP access network capabilities and requirements, and the IP access network functional models and possible arrangements.
+
+###### **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1231 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 24 November 2000.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2001
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 2.1 Normative references ..... | 1 |
+| 2.2 Informative references ..... | 2 |
+| 3 Definitions and abbreviations ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 4 Architectural model of IP access networks..... | 4 |
+| 4.1 General network architecture of IP network..... | 4 |
+| 4.2 IP access network reference model..... | 5 |
+| 5 Examples of functional models of IP Access Network..... | 6 |
+| 5.1 Use of PPP ..... | 6 |
+| 5.1.1 PPP tunnelling aggregation..... | 7 |
+| 5.1.2 PPP terminated aggregation..... | 8 |
+| 5.2 Use of Ethernet ..... | 9 |
+| 6 Examples of access types and interfaces in IP access network..... | 10 |
+| 7 Examples of functional requirements for IP Access..... | 10 |
+| Appendix I – Examples of IP mapping mechanisms ..... | 10 |
+| I.1 IP over PPP over ATM ..... | 10 |
+| I.2 IP over ATM..... | 11 |
+| I.3 IP over Frame Relay..... | 11 |
+| I.4 IP over PPP over PHY ..... | 11 |
+| I.5 IP over Ethernet ..... | 12 |
+| I.6 IP over PPP over Ethernet..... | 12 |
+| Appendix II – An example of functional model of CATV access..... | 13 |
+
+# **1 Scope**
+
+This Recommendation defines the functional IP Access Network architecture and the functions and requirements above the transport access functions defined in ITU-T Y.1001. The functional requirements for the Access Network Transport are defined for the handling and transport of digital bearer signals defined in ITU-T G.902.
+
+This Recommendation describes:
+
+- the definitions of terminology regarding IP access;
+- the high-level IP network architecture and models for the IP services;
+- the access types and interfaces to be supported by the IP access network;
+- the IP access network capabilities and requirements; and
+- the IP access network functional models and possible arrangements.
+
+The functional view of IP access network is independent of the access network transport functions described in ITU-T Y.1001.
+
+# **2 References**
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through references in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; all users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published.
+
+NOTE – A reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+## **2.1 Normative references**
+
+- [1] ITU-T Q.922 (1992), *ISDN data link layer specification for frame mode bearer services*.
+- [2] ITU-T I.363.5 (1996), *B-ISDN ATM Adaptation Layer specification: Type 5 AAL*.
+- [3] ITU-T I.414 (1997), *Overview of Recommendations on Layer 1 for ISDN and B-ISDN customer accesses*.
+- [4] ITU-T G.902 (1995), *Framework Recommendation on functional Access Networks (AN) – Architecture and functions, access types, management and service node aspects*.
+- [5] ITU-T Y.1001 (2000), *IP framework – A framework of convergence of telecommunications network and IP network technologies*.
+- [6] ITU-T Y.1401 (2000), *General requirements for interworking with Internet Protocol (IP)-based networks*.
+- [7] ISO/IEC 8802-2:1998, *Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 2: Logical link control*.
+
+## 2.2 Informative references
+
+- [8] IEEE Std 802.2 (1998), *Logical link control (802.2)*.
+- [9] IEEE Std 802.3 (1998), *CSMA/CD access method (802.3)*.
+- [10] Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications, Cable Modem to Customer Premise Equipment Interface Specification, SP-CMCI-I03-991115, Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.
+- [11] IETF RFC 894 (1984), *A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks*.
+- [12] IETF RFC 1042 (1988), *A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over IEEE 802 Networks*.
+- [13] IETF RFC 1334 (1992), *Password Authentication Protocols*.
+- [14] IETF RFC 2684 (1999), *Multiprotocol Encapsulation over ATM Adaptation Layer 5*.
+- [15] IETF RFC 1661 (1994), *The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)*.
+- [16] IETF RFC 1662 (1994), *PPP in HDLC-like Framing*.
+- [17] IETF RFC 1994 (1996), *PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP)*.
+- [18] IETF RFC 2138 (1997), *Remote Authentication Dial In User Services (RADIUS)*.
+- [19] IETF RFC 2225 (1998), *Classical IP and ARP over ATM*.
+- [20] IETF RFC 2364 (1998), *PPP over AAL5*.
+- [21] IETF RFC 2427 (1998), *Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay*.
+- [22] IETF RFC 2661 (1999), *Layer Two Tunnelling Protocol (L2TP)*.
+- [23] IETF RFC 2516 (1999), *A Method for Transmitting PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE)*.
+
+# 3 Definitions and abbreviations
+
+## 3.1 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.1.1 IP access network:** An implementation comprising network entities to provide the required access capabilities between an "IP user" and an "IP service provider" for the provision of IP services. "IP user" and "IP service provider" are logical entities which terminate the IP layer and/or IP related functions, and may also include lower layer functions, and may also include lower layer functions.
+
+**3.1.2 IP core network:** IP service provider's network, including one or more IP service providers.
+
+## 3.2 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| AF | Access Function |
+| ARP | Address Resolution Protocol |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| CHAP | Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol |
+| CMCI | Cable Modem to CPE Interface |
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| CMTS | Cable Modem Termination System |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| CPN | Customer Premises Network |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
+| DIX | Digital Intel Xerox |
+| DOCSIS | Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications |
+| EF | Edge Function |
+| FR | Frame Relay |
+| HFC | Hybrid Fibre and Coax |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPSEC | Internet Protocol Security |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| IWF | InterWorking Function |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| LLC | Logical Link Control |
+| L2TP | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol |
+| MAC | Medium Access Control |
+| MPLS | Multiprotocol Label Switching |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NSI | Network Side Interface |
+| NT | Network Termination |
+| PAP | Password Authentication Protocol |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| PCI | Peripheral Component Interface |
+| PHY | Physical Layer |
+| PON | Passive Optical Network |
+| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| RADIUS | Remote Access Dial In User Services |
+| RFI | Radio Frequency Interface |
+| RP | Reference Point |
+| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
+| TE | Terminal Equipment |
+| TEL | Telephone |
+| TFTP | Trivial File Transfer Protocol |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| VCI | Virtual Channel Identifier |
+
+VPI Virtual Path Identifier
+WAN Wide Area Network
+
+# 4 Architectural model of IP access networks
+
+## 4.1 General network architecture of IP network
+
+Figure 1a shows a general network architecture of IP network. In Figure 1a, the lines between various rectangles and ellipses represent connections that are bidirectional, that may be asymmetrical in bit rate, and that may be of differing media in the two directions. The reference points (RP) illustrated are logical separation between the functions and may not correspond to physical interfaces in certain network implementations. In certain network implementations, access and core networks may not be separable.
+
+
+
+T1317460-00
+
+Figure 1a: General network architecture of IP network. The diagram shows a symmetrical architecture. On the left, a group of three rectangles labeled 'TE', 'PC', and 'TEL' is connected to a large oval. Below this oval is a bracket labeled 'CPN'. This oval is connected to an oval labeled 'IP Access Network'. A dashed line labeled 'RP' separates the 'IP Access Network' from an oval labeled 'IP Core Network'. Another dashed line labeled 'RP' separates the 'IP Core Network' from a second oval labeled 'IP Access Network'. This second 'IP Access Network' is connected to another large oval, which is in turn connected to a group of three rectangles labeled 'TE', 'PC', and 'TEL'. Below this oval is a bracket labeled 'CPN'. The entire structure is symmetrical around the central 'IP Core Network'.
+
+**Figure 1a/Y.1231 – General network architecture of IP network**
+
+Figure 1b shows an example of relationship between IP network and PSTN/ISDN. In Figure 1b, some connections and InterWorking Function (IWF) between IP Access/Core network and PSTN/ISDN are shown as an example, but not all PSTN/ISDN connections may be necessary. A definition of IWF is described in ITU-T Y.1401 [6].
+
+
+
+T1317470-00
+
+Figure 1b/Y.1231: An example of relationship between IP network and PSTN/ISDN. The diagram shows a central PSTN/ISDN oval at the top. Below it are three IWF (Interworking Function) boxes, each connected to the PSTN/ISDN. These IWFs connect to three IP Access Network ovals, which are connected to an IP Core Network oval. The IP Access Networks are connected to three CPN (Customer Premises Network) ovals. Each CPN contains a TEL (Telephone) box, a PC (Personal Computer) box, and a TE (Terminal Equipment) box. The connections between the IP Access Networks and the IP Core Network are labeled RP (Residual Port).
+
+**Figure 1b/Y.1231 – An example of relationship between IP network and PSTN/ISDN**
+
+## 4.2 IP access network reference model
+
+Figure 2 shows an example of IP access network reference model. In some cases, the IP access Function (IP-AF) can be distributed within the IP Access Network. Examples of the IP-AF are described in clause 7.
+
+The functional requirements for the Access Network Transport are defined for the handling and transport of digital bearer signals defined in ITU-T G.902 [4].
+
+The functional view of IP access network is independent of the access network transport functions described in ITU-T Y.1001 [5].
+
+
+
+T1317480-00
+
+Figure 2/Y.1231: IP Access Network architecture example. The diagram shows a central IP Access Network box. Inside this box are three stacked components: IP Access Network System Management (top), IP Access Function (middle), and Access Network Transport Function (bottom). A dashed line labeled 'RP' for management interface connects the top of the IP Access Network box to a management interface. The IP Access Network box is connected to a CPN (Customer Premises Network) oval on the left and an IP Core Network oval on the right. The connections are labeled RP. The IP Core Network contains three stacked ovals: IP Service Provider 1, IP Service Provider 2, and IP Service Provider 3. A double-headed arrow at the bottom indicates the IP Access Network span.
+
+**Figure 2/Y.1231 – IP Access Network architecture example**
+
+# 5 Examples of functional models of IP Access Network
+
+## 5.1 Use of PPP
+
+In this clause, PPP is shown as an example for protocol used to carry IP over access network. PPP is a widely used protocol for dial-up IP access and ADSL access. PPP termination point in the network side interacts with AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) server (e.g. RADIUS server) and provides AAA functions.
+
+Figures 3a and 3b provide the following two options regarding PPP termination point in the network side:
+
+- 1) PPP tunnelling aggregation (PPP is terminated by IP service provider); and
+- 2) PPP terminated aggregation (PPP is terminated by the IP access function).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the PPP tunnelling aggregation architecture. It consists of three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User contains a PPP Termination Function. The IP Access Function is a central box. The IP Service Provider contains a PPP Termination Function, an AAA Client Function, and an AAA Server Function. A horizontal line connects the PPP Termination Function in the IP User to the PPP Termination Function in the IP Service Provider. The IP Access Function is positioned between them, with a vertical line connecting the PPP Termination Function in the IP Service Provider to the AAA Client Function, which in turn connects to the AAA Server Function.
+
+T1317490-00
+
+Figure 3a: PPP tunnelling aggregation architecture diagram.
+
+**Figure 3a/Y.1231 – PPP tunnelling aggregation**
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the PPP terminated aggregation architecture. It consists of three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User contains a PPP box. The IP Access Function contains a PPP box and an AAA Client box. The IP Service Provider is an empty box. A horizontal line connects the PPP box in the IP User to the PPP box in the IP Access Function. Another horizontal line connects the PPP box in the IP Access Function to the IP Service Provider. A vertical line connects the AAA Client box in the IP Access Function to an AAA Server box below it.
+
+T1317500-00
+
+Figure 3b: PPP terminated aggregation architecture diagram.
+
+**Figure 3b/Y.1231 – PPP terminated aggregation**
+
+### 5.1.1 PPP tunnelling aggregation
+
+This clause gives some examples of protocol stacks for the PPP tunnelling aggregation. In this case, "IP user" directly accesses the "IP service provider". Several transport systems can be cascaded without IP and PPP processing in the access network.
+
+#### Case 1) Layer 2 multiplexing in IP access network (e.g. direct IP access)
+
+This is a case that only Layer 2 multiplexing transport function such as ATM or FR are supported in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+Figure 4: Functional model of Layer 2 multiplexing. The diagram shows three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has IP, PPP, and PHY layers. The IP Access Function stack has a PHY layer and a diagonal section labeled 'ATM, FR etc.'. The IP Service Provider stack has IP, PPP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. Arrows indicate connections: IP to IP, PPP to PPP, and PHY to PHY. The IP Access Function's PHY layer connects to the IP User's PHY layer and the IP Service Provider's PHY layer.
+
+T1317510-00
+
+**Figure 4/Y.1231 – Functional model of Layer 2 multiplexing**
+
+#### Case 2) PPP tunnelling (e.g. L2TP [22])
+
+This is a case that L2TP function is used in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 5.
+
+
+
+Figure 5: Functional model of PPP tunnelling. The diagram shows three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has IP, PPP, and PHY layers. The IP Access Function stack has a PHY layer, a diagonal section labeled 'L2TP', and an IP (Note) layer. The IP Service Provider stack has IP, PPP, L2TP, IP (Note), ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. Arrows indicate connections: IP to IP, PPP to PPP, L2TP to L2TP, IP (Note) to IP (Note), and PHY to PHY. The IP Access Function's PHY layer connects to the IP User's PHY layer and the IP Service Provider's PHY layer.
+
+T1317520-00
+
+NOTE – This IP layer provides a transport function between IP access function and IP service provider.
+
+**Figure 5/Y.1231 – Functional model of PPP tunnelling**
+
+### 5.1.2 PPP terminated aggregation
+
+This clause gives some examples of protocol stacks for the PPP terminated aggregation. In this case, PPP is terminated in IP access network.
+
+#### Case 1) IP tunnelling (e.g. IPSEC)
+
+This is a case that IP tunnelling is used in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 6.
+
+
+
+T1317530-00
+
+Figure 6: Functional model of IP tunnelling. The diagram shows three protocol stacks: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has IP, PPP, and PHY layers. The IP Access Function stack is split into two paths: one with PPP and PHY layers, and another with IPSEC, IP (Note), ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. The IP Service Provider stack has IP, IPSEC, IP (Note), ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between corresponding layers across the stacks. A reference code T1317530-00 is at the bottom right.
+
+NOTE – This IP layer provides a transport function between IP access function and IP service provider.
+
+**Figure 6/Y.1231 – Functional model of IP tunnelling**
+
+#### Case 2-1) Layer 3 routing (e.g. IP router)
+
+This is a case that IP handling function such as IP router exists in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 7.
+
+
+
+T1317540-00
+
+Figure 7: Functional model of L3 routing. The diagram shows three protocol stacks: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has IP, PPP, and PHY layers. The IP Access Function stack is split into two paths: one with IP and PHY layers, and another with PPP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. The IP Service Provider stack has IP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between corresponding layers across the stacks. A reference code T1317540-00 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7/Y.1231 – Functional model of L3 routing**
+
+#### Case 2-2) Virtual router
+
+This is also a case that IP handling function exists in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 8.
+
+
+
+T1317550-00
+
+Figure 8/Y.1231 – Functional model of virtual router. This diagram shows the functional model of a virtual router. It consists of three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has three layers: IP, PPP, and PHY. The IP Access Function stack is divided into two parts: a left part with IP, PPP, and PHY layers, and a right part with IP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. The IP Service Provider stack has three layers: IP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY. Bidirectional arrows connect the IP layers of all three components. Bidirectional arrows connect the PPP layer of the IP User to the PPP layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP User to the PHY layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the ATM, FR etc. layer of the IP Access Function to the ATM, FR etc. layer of the IP Service Provider. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP Access Function to the PHY layer of the IP Service Provider. A label 'Multiple instances of IP routing tables for each virtual router' points to the IP layer of the IP Access Function.
+
+**Figure 8/Y.1231 – Functional model of virtual router**
+
+#### Case 3) MPLS (multiprotocol label switching)
+
+This is a case that IP transport function is translated by the lower layer such as ATM in IP access network. This functional model is shown in Figure 9. There is a case that "Label" stack is null in the user-plane, when the ATM VPI/VCIs are used as MPLS labels.
+
+
+
+T1317560-00
+
+Figure 9/Y.1231 – Functional model of MPLS. This diagram shows the functional model of MPLS. It consists of three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has three layers: IP, PPP, and PHY. The IP Access Function stack is divided into two parts: a left part with PPP and PHY layers, and a right part with Label, ATM, SDH etc., and PHY layers. The IP Service Provider stack has four layers: IP, Label, ATM, SDH etc., and PHY. Bidirectional arrows connect the IP layers of all three components. Bidirectional arrows connect the PPP layer of the IP User to the PPP layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP User to the PHY layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the Label layer of the IP Access Function to the Label layer of the IP Service Provider. Bidirectional arrows connect the ATM, SDH etc. layer of the IP Access Function to the ATM, SDH etc. layer of the IP Service Provider. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP Access Function to the PHY layer of the IP Service Provider.
+
+**Figure 9/Y.1231 – Functional model of MPLS**
+
+## 5.2 Use of Ethernet
+
+In this clause, Ethernet is an example of protocol used to carry IP over access network. Figure 10 shows examples of protocol stacks of Ethernet access.
+
+
+
+T1317570-00
+
+Figure 10/Y.1231 – Functional model of Ethernet use. This diagram shows the functional model of Ethernet use. It consists of three main components: IP User, IP Access Function, and IP Service Provider. The IP User stack has three layers: IP, Ethernet, and PHY. The IP Access Function stack is divided into two parts: a left part with IP, Ethernet, and PHY layers, and a right part with IP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY layers. The IP Service Provider stack has three layers: IP, ATM, FR etc., and PHY. Bidirectional arrows connect the IP layers of all three components. Bidirectional arrows connect the Ethernet layer of the IP User to the Ethernet layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP User to the PHY layer of the IP Access Function. Bidirectional arrows connect the ATM, FR etc. layer of the IP Access Function to the ATM, FR etc. layer of the IP Service Provider. Bidirectional arrows connect the PHY layer of the IP Access Function to the PHY layer of the IP Service Provider.
+
+**Figure 10/Y.1231 – Functional model of Ethernet use**
+
+# 6 Examples of access types and interfaces in IP access network
+
+Possible transmission mechanisms for user access are shown as follows:
+
+- ISDN:
+ - Basic rate access (B/2B/D channel);
+ - Primary rate (1544 kbit/s, 2048 kbit/s).
+- B-ISDN access (1544 kbit/s-622 080 kbit/s).
+- xDSL.
+- Wireless and Satellite.
+- PON, SDV, HFC and other optical systems.
+- CATV access.
+- LAN/WAN.
+
+Examples of IP mapping mechanisms on each transmission system are shown in Appendix I.
+
+An example of functional architecture of CATV access is shown in Appendix II.
+
+Further examples and overview are described in ITU-T I.414 [3].
+
+# 7 Examples of functional requirements for IP Access
+
+Possible IP access functions are as follows:
+
+- Dynamic selection of multiple IP service providers.
+- Dynamic allocation of IP address using PPP.
+- NAT.
+- Authentication (PAP [13], CHAP [17]).
+- Encryption.
+- Billing usage metering and interaction with RADIUS [18] server.
+
+# APPENDIX I
+
+## Examples of IP mapping mechanisms
+
+The following diagrams show protocol stacks for IP on various transmission systems. The detailed mapping mechanisms are described in the referenced documents.
+
+### I.1 IP over PPP over ATM
+
+Figure I.1 shows IP over PPP over ATM mapping mechanism which is defined in IETF RFC 2364, "PPP over AAL5" [20].
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|-------------------------------|
+| IP | |
+| PPP | (IETF RFC 1661/IETF RFC 2364) |
+| Encapsulation Header | (IETF RFC 2684) |
+| AAL5 | (ITU-T I.363.5) |
+| ATM | |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism for IP over PPP over ATM**
+
+### I.2 IP over ATM
+
+Figure I.2 shows IP over ATM mapping mechanism which is defined in IETF RFC 2225, "Classical IP and ARP over ATM" [19].
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|-----------------|
+| IP | (IETF RFC 2225) |
+| Encapsulation Header | (IETF RFC 2684) |
+| AAL5 | (ITU-T I.363.5) |
+| ATM | |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism
+for IP over ATM**
+
+### I.3 IP over Frame Relay
+
+Figure I.3 shows IP over FR mapping mechanism which is defined in IETF RFC 2427, "Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay" [21].
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|-----------------|
+| IP | |
+| Encapsulation Header | (IETF RFC 2427) |
+| LAPF | (ITU-T Q.922) |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.3/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism
+for IP over FR**
+
+### I.4 IP over PPP over PHY
+
+Figure I.4 shows PPP directly mapping to physical layer (e.g. ISDN, SDH).
+
+| | |
+|-----|-------------------------------|
+| IP | |
+| PPP | (IETF RFC 1661/IETF RFC 1662) |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.4/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism
+for IP over PPP**
+
+NOTE – Other mapping mechanisms may be used, for example to support the requirements of radio systems such as satellite systems.
+
+### I.5 IP over Ethernet
+
+Two types of Ethernet are commonly used. Two types of IP over Ethernet mapping mechanism are defined in separate IETF documents (IETF RFC 894 [11] and IETF RFC 1042 [12]).
+
+Figure I.5 shows IP mapping mechanism using Ethernet (IEEE 802.3 [9]/ISO/IEC 8802-2 [7]) and Figure I.6 shows IP mapping mechanism using Ethernet (IEEE 802.3 [9]/ISO/IEC 8802-2 [7]) with LLC.
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------|
+| IP | (IETF RFC 894) |
+| MAC | (IEEE 802.3/ISO/IEC 8802-2) |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.5/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism for IP over Ethernet (IEEE 802.3/ISO/IEC 8802-2)**
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------|
+| IP | (IETF RFC 1042) |
+| LLC | (IEEE 802.2) |
+| MAC | (IEEE 802.3/ISO/IEC 8802-2) |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.6/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism for IP over Ethernet (IEEE 802.3/ISO/IEC 8802-2) with LLC**
+
+### I.6 IP over PPP over Ethernet
+
+Figure I.7 shows IP over PPP over Ethernet mapping mechanism which is defined in IETF document (IETF RFC 2516 [23]).
+
+| | |
+|--------------------|-------------------------------|
+| IP | |
+| PPP | (IETF RFC 1661/IETF RFC 1662) |
+| Encapsulation Head | (IETF RFC 2516) |
+| MAC | (IEEE 802.3/ISO/IEC 8802-2) |
+| PHY | |
+
+**Figure I.7/Y.1231 – Mapping mechanism for IP over PPP over Ethernet**
+
+# APPENDIX II
+
+## An example of functional model of CATV access
+
+See Figure II.1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional model of CATV access, showing the interaction between three main components: CMTS, PCI Cable Modem, and Host CPE.
+
+**CMTS (Cable Modem Termination System):**
+
+- Layers: DHCP, TFTP, SNMP, Security Magmt, UDP, IP, ARP, Optional Router, Forwarder, DIX/802.2 LLC, DIX/802.3 MAC, DOCSIS Security, DOCSIS MAC, DOCSIS con-vergence, DOCSIS PHY.
+- Connections: Internet (via NSI Data Link and NSI PHY), RFI (via DOCSIS PHY).
+
+**PCI Cable Modem:**
+
+- Layers: DHCP, TFTP, SNMP, Security Magmt, UDP, IP, ARP, DIX/802.2 LLC, DIX/802.3 MAC, DIX/802.3 MAC filter, DOCSIS Security, DOCSIS MAC, DOCSIS con-vergence, DOCSIS PHY.
+- Connections: PCI PHY, PCI CMCI (to Host CPE).
+
+**Host CPE (Customer Premises Equipment):**
+
+- Layers: Internet Applications, services, and agents, UDP, IP, ARP, DIX/802.2 LLC, DIX/802.3 MAC, PCI PHY.
+- Connections: PCI CMCI (from PCI Cable Modem).
+
+**Interconnections:**
+
+- The CMTS connects to the Internet via NSI Data Link and NSI PHY.
+- The CMTS connects to the PCI Cable Modem via RFI (Radio Frequency Interface) through the DOCSIS PHY layer.
+- The PCI Cable Modem connects to the Host CPE via PCI CMCI (Cable Modem Control Interface).
+- The Host CPE connects to the PCI Cable Modem via PCI PHY (Physical Layer).
+
+Functional model of CATV access diagram showing CMTS, PCI Cable Modem, and Host CPE components and their interconnections.
+
+T1318100-01
+
+NOTE – This figure is extracted from Cable Television Laboratories, Inc.'s specification – Data-Over-Cable Service Interface Specifications (SP-CMCI-I03-991115 [10]) in order to give an example of Ethernet use to carry IP over the access network.
+
+**Figure II.1/Y.1231 – Functional model of CATV access**
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1241**
+
+(03/2001)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Architecture, access, network
+capabilities and resource management
+
+# --- **Support of IP-based services using IP transfer capabilities**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1241
+
+(Formerly CCITT Recommendation)
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Support of IP-based services using IP transfer capabilities**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation classifies IP-based services, introduces the concept of the IP service plane and presents resulting IP transfer capability attributes. This Recommendation describes the service level agreement and identifies the range of SLA attributes to be considered.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1241 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 1 March 2001.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+ATM, B-ISDN, Interworking, IP, Network, PSTN, Service Plane, Service Level Agreement (SLA), Transfer Capability.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2001
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations ..... | 3 |
+| 5 IP-based service..... | 3 |
+| 5.1 General..... | 3 |
+| 5.2 IP-based service classes and categories..... | 4 |
+| 5.3 Communication configurations..... | 5 |
+| 5.3.1 Point-to-point communication configuration..... | 5 |
+| 5.3.2 Unidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration..... | 5 |
+| 5.3.3 Unidirectional multipoint-to-point communication configuration..... | 5 |
+| 5.3.4 Multipoint-to-multipoint communication configuration ..... | 5 |
+| 5.3.5 Bidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration..... | 6 |
+| 5.4 IP service plane ..... | 6 |
+| 5.5 End-system model ..... | 8 |
+| 6 IP transfer capability attributes ..... | 8 |
+| 6.1 General..... | 8 |
+| 6.2 Attributes for IP transfer capability..... | 9 |
+| 7 Service level agreement..... | 9 |
+| 7.1 General..... | 9 |
+| 7.2 SLA components ..... | 9 |
+| 7.3 SLA attributes ..... | 10 |
+| 7.3.1 Service level objectives..... | 10 |
+| 7.3.2 Service monitoring ..... | 10 |
+| 7.3.3 Financial issues..... | 10 |
+| 7.4 Procedure for service level agreements ..... | 10 |
+| 8 Protocol reference model..... | 11 |
+| 9 Functional architecture ..... | 12 |
+| 9.1 Applications of functional groups ..... | 12 |
+| 9.1.1 IP interface functional group..... | 13 |
+| 9.1.2 IP routing and forwarding functional group..... | 13 |
+| 9.1.3 IP server functional group..... | 13 |
+| 9.1.4 IP client functional group..... | 13 |
+| 9.1.5 IP conversion functional group ..... | 13 |
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 10 Support of IP-based services by ATM ..... | 14 |
+| 10.1 Relationship with ATM transfer capabilities ..... | 14 |
+
+# Support of IP-based services using IP transfer capabilities
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies:
+
+- service plane concept for IP-based services;
+- support of IP-based services by ATM;
+- attributes for IP transfer capabilities to support IP-based services;
+- service level agreement for IP-based services.
+
+By introducing the concept of the service plane, the possible sets of attributes for IP transfer capabilities to support the IP-based services are given.
+
+Figure 1 shows the relationship of this Recommendation with related IP Recommendations.
+
+IP-based services may be supported on IP above any layer 1 and layer 2 transport capable of supporting IP. While Figure 1 shows ATM as the transport mechanism, other underlying transfer mechanisms can be used to provide the same IP-based services. The use of IP over these other transfer mechanisms is described in other Recommendations.
+
+
+
+Figure 1/Y.1241 – Relationship of IP-based services transport and interworking Recommendations. The diagram illustrates the relationship between different service planes and transport mechanisms. On the left, a stack of three layers is shown: 'IP-based service plane' at the top, 'IP transfer capabilities' in the middle, and 'IP Layer' at the bottom. Below this, another stack shows 'ATM transfer capabilities' and 'ATM Layer'. A bracket on the left groups the top two layers under 'Scope of Y.1241' and the bottom two layers under 'Scope of Y.1310'. On the right, a similar stack is shown: 'Telecoms' service plane' at the top, 'Non-IP transfer capabilities' in the middle, and 'PSTN, N-ISDN or ATM Protocol stack' at the bottom. A bracket at the top groups both stacks under 'Scope of Y.1401'. Dotted lines connect the service planes to their respective transfer capabilities and then to the underlying protocol stacks. The reference 'T1317840-01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1/Y.1241 – Relationship of IP-based services transport and interworking Recommendations**
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published.
+
+- [1] ITU-T I.211 (1993), *B-ISDN service aspects*.
+- [2] ITU-T I.313 (1997), *B-ISDN network requirements*.
+- [3] ITU-T I.321 (1991), *B-ISDN protocol reference model and its application*.
+- [4] ITU-T I.327 (1993), *B-ISDN functional architecture*.
+- [5] ITU-T I.371 (2000), *Traffic control and congestion control in B-ISDN*.
+- [6] ITU-T I.414 (1997), *Overview of Recommendations on layer 1 for ISDN and B-ISDN customer access*.
+- [7] ITU-T Y.1310 (2000), *Transport of IP over ATM in Public Networks*.
+- [8] ITU-T Y.1001 (2000), *IP Framework – A framework for convergence of telecommunications network and IP network technologies*.
+- [9] ITU-T Y.1401 (2000), *General requirements for interworking with Internet protocol (IP) based networks*.
+- [10] ITU-T Y.1231 (2000), *IP access network architecture*.
+- [11] ITU-T G.707/Y.1322 (2000), *Network node interface for the synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH)*.
+- [12] ITU-T I.371.1 (2000), *Guaranteed frame rate ATM transfer capability*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.1 service plane:** The service plane comprises:
+
+- a) service presentation functionality being presented to the end user;
+- b) service implementation aspects with which the end user interacts. For example, service invocation, control service level agreement function, etc.
+
+Note that a) and b) use the totality of the transfer capabilities including control and management functionalities.
+
+**3.2 IP-based service:** An IP-based service is defined as a service provided by the service plane to an end user (e.g. a host (end system) or a network element) and which utilizes the IP transfer capabilities and associated control and management functions, for delivery of the user information specified by the service level agreements.
+
+**3.3 IP network service:** An IP Network Service is defined as a data transmission service in which the data passed across the interface between the user and provider is transferred in the form of IP (Internet Protocol) packets (sometimes called datagrams). IP Network Service includes the service provided by using the IP Transfer Capabilities.
+
+**3.4 IP transfer capability:** IP Transfer Capability is defined as the set of network capabilities provided by the IP layer. It may be characterized by the traffic contract as well as performance attributes supported by control and management functions of the underlying protocol layers.
+
+**3.5 service level agreement:** Service Level Agreement (SLA) is a negotiated agreement between a customer and the service provider on levels of service characteristics and the associated set of metrics. The content of SLA varies depending on the service offering and includes the attributes required for the negotiated agreement.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| ABR | Available Bit Rate |
+| ABT | ATM Block Transfer |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| B-ISDN | Broadband Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| CoS | Class of Service |
+| CPN | Customer Premises Network |
+| DBR | Deterministic Bit Rate |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| GFR | Guaranteed Frame Rate |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IP-NE | IP Network Element |
+| IP-TE | IP Terminal Equipment |
+| IPTC | IP Transfer Capability |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switch |
+| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SAP | Service Access Point |
+| SBR | Statistical Bit Rate |
+| SDH | Synchronous Digital Hierarchy |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SLO | Service Level Objective |
+| SVC | Switched Virtual Circuit |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| UDP | User Data Protocol |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+| VoD | Video-on-Demand |
+| WWW | World Wide Web |
+
+# **5 IP-based service**
+
+## **5.1 General**
+
+An IP-based service is defined in clause 3.
+
+An IP-based service is specified according to the Service Level Agreement (SLA) attributes assigned (see clause 7). While an IP-based service usually has an end-to-end context it may be provided in situations in which part of the connection is IP-based network while another part of the connection is
+
+not IP-based. One typical example is a voice service, with voice over IP in an IP-based network interworking with the existing circuit switched voice network. Other examples of non IP-based network interworking with IP-based network to support an IP-based service end to end exist. Further information on IP interworking is given in ITU-T Y.1401 [9]. In the case of interworking, the SLA attributes will be specified only for the IP-based network portion of the connection.
+
+Figure 2 presents a reference framework illustrating applications of IP transfer capability and IP-based services. This figure is based on the figures introduced in ITU-T I.414 [6], ITU-T Y.1001 [8] and Y.1231 [10]. The following subclauses provide information regarding, IP-based services, service plane concept, IP-based service classes and categories and IP transfer capability attributes.
+
+
+
+```
+
+ graph LR
+ subgraph CPN1 [Customer Premises Network]
+ ES1[End System] --> IPNT1[IP-NT]
+ end
+ IPNT1 -- RP --- AF1[AF]
+ AF1 -- RP --- IPEF1[IP-EF]
+ subgraph ICN [IP Core Network]
+ IPEF1 --- IPEF2[IP-EF]
+ end
+ IPEF2 -- RP --- AF2[AF]
+ AF2 -- RP --- IPNT2[IP-NT]
+ subgraph CPN2 [Customer Premises Network]
+ IPNT2 --> ES2[End System]
+ end
+ CPN1 -- IP Transfer Capability --- CPN2
+
+```
+
+Detailed Description: The diagram illustrates the IP-based network reference framework. It shows two 'Customer Premises Networks' on the left and right, each containing an 'End System' connected to an 'IP-NT' (IP Network Termination). These connect via 'RP' (Reference Points) to 'AF' (Access Function) within an 'Access Network'. The Access Networks then connect via 'RP' to 'IP-EF' (IP Edge Function) which reside at the edges of the 'IP Core Network'. A double-headed arrow labeled 'IP Transfer Capability' spans across the entire architecture from one End System to the other. Clouds represent the service areas for 'IP-Based Service' at each end and the 'IP Core Network' in the center.
+
+AF Access Function
+ IP-EF IP Edge Function
+ IP-NT IP Network Termination
+ RP Reference Point
+
+NOTE – The box between RPs is covered in ITU-T Y.1231 and I.414. This arrangement is also aligned with ITU-T Y.1001.
+
+### Figure 2/Y.1241 – IP-based network reference framework
+
+Figure 2/Y.1241 – IP-based network reference framework
+
+#### 5.2 IP-based service classes and categories
+
+IP-based service classes are closely related to QoS classes which provide assurances to users on the service performance to be achieved in any given service contract. The IP-based services are specified and characterized by the SLA attributes assigned in the service contract.
+
+However, using similar concepts as in ITU-T I.211 [1], IP-based services can be categorized as "Interactive" and "Distributive".
+
+The interactive category is subdivided into three classes:
+
+- conversational services: such as internet telephony, remote login, electronic data exchange, videoconferencing, video telephony, home banking, tele-education and interactive games;
+- messaging services: such as electronic mail (e-mail), voice e-mail, video e-mail, and internet fax;
+
+4 ITU-T Y.1241 (03/2001)
+
+- retrieval services: such as web browsing (www, gopher), file downloading (ftp), internet VoD (Video-on-demand) and news retrieval.
+
+The distributive category is subdivided into two classes:
+
+- distribution services without user individual presentation control: such as broadcasting, multicasting and electronic newspaper;
+- distribution services with user individual presentation control: such as video-on-demand and news-on-demand.
+
+## **5.3 Communication configurations**
+
+Communication in IP-based networks can be divided in several configurations similar to B-ISDN as defined in ITU-T I.313 [2]. In this Recommendation configurations are classified as point-to-point, unidirectional point-to-multipoint, unidirectional multipoint-to-point, multipoint-to-multipoint and bidirectional point-to-multipoint.
+
+### **5.3.1 Point-to-point communication configuration**
+
+A point-to-point connection configuration may provide unidirectional or bidirectional symmetric or asymmetric communication between two parties. Examples of services applicable to point-to-point communication configuration are:
+
+- conversational services;
+- messaging services;
+- retrieval services;
+- distribution services with user individual presentation control.
+
+### **5.3.2 Unidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration**
+
+A unidirectional point-to-multipoint connection configuration may provide unidirectional communication between one-to-many parties. Examples of services applicable to unidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration are:
+
+- messaging services;
+- distribution services without user individual presentation control.
+
+### **5.3.3 Unidirectional multipoint-to-point communication configuration**
+
+A unidirectional multipoint-to-point connection configuration may provide unidirectional communication between many-to-one parties. Examples of services applicable to unidirectional multipoint-to-point communication configuration are:
+
+- messaging services;
+- distribution services without user individual presentation control.
+
+### **5.3.4 Multipoint-to-multipoint communication configuration**
+
+A multipoint-to-multipoint connection configuration may provide communication between many-to-many parties. Examples of services applicable to multipoint-to-multipoint communication configuration are:
+
+- conversational services;
+- messaging;
+- distribution services with or without user individual presentation control.
+
+### 5.3.5 Bidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration
+
+A bidirectional point-to-multipoint connection configuration may provide communication between one-to-many parties. Examples of services applicable to bidirectional point-to-multipoint communication configuration are:
+
+- conversational services;
+- messaging services with return path;
+- retrieval services;
+- distribution services with and without user individual presentation control.
+
+Table 1 provides examples of performance attributes for some IP-based services.
+
+**Table 1/Y.1241 – Examples of guaranteed performance attributes for IP-based services**
+
+| IP-based service class | IP-based service | Guaranteed performance attribute(s) for IP-based service |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| Conversational |
- • Internet telephony
- • Videoconferencing
- • Video telephony
- • Interactive games
| Loss, delay and delay variation |
+| | - • Internet shopping
- • Electronic data exchange
| Loss |
+| | | None |
+| Messaging | - • Voice e-mail
- • Internet fax
- • Video e-mail
- • Group e-mail
| None |
+| Retrieval | - • Web browsing
- • News retrieval
- • File downloading
| None |
+| | | Loss and delay variation |
+| Distribution Service without Individual presentation control | - • Electronic newspaper
- • Internet advertising
| None |
+| | | Loss |
+| Distribution Service with Individual presentation control | - • News-on-demand
- • Video-on-demand
| Loss and delay variation |
+
+## 5.4 IP service plane
+
+The service plane concept is introduced as a model to relate use of the following in the construction of IP-based services:
+
+- IP transfer capabilities;
+- control capabilities; and
+- management related capabilities.
+
+IP-based services, may be specified within a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between service provider and the customer. This concept is illustrated in Figure 3, which shows that the service plane utilizes the capabilities provided by the underlying transfer functions, as well as the control and management plane functions. Consequently the IP service plane incorporates more than a layer service as defined in a SAP (service access point) in the protocol stack. In specifying an IP-based service for use by a customer the terms and features of clauses 6 and 7 are used.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service plane concept for IP-based services, structured into four main layers:
+
+- IP Service plane:** Contains three service categories:
+ - Distribution Services (e.g. news-on-demand)
+ - Retrieval Services (e.g. web browsing)
+ - Conversational Services (e.g. IP telephony)
+- IP transfer capabilities:** Contains three transfer capabilities:
+ - Best effort
+ - IPTC y
+ - IPTC x
+- IP management plane:** Divided into two sub-planes:
+ - IP user plane
+ - IP control plane
+- Management plane:** Divided into two sub-planes:
+ - User plane
+ - Control plane
+
+Below the IP management plane, the **ATM transfer capabilities** are shown, including ABR, DBR, SBR, and ABT. The diagram is labeled T1317860-01.
+
+Figure 3: Service plane concept for IP-based services. The diagram shows a stack of four planes. The top plane is the 'IP Service plane' containing 'Distribution Services (e.g. news-on-demand)', 'Retrieval Services (e.g. web browsing)', and 'Conversational Services (e.g. IP telephony)'. The second plane is 'IP transfer capabilities' containing 'Best effort', 'IPTC y', and 'IPTC x'. The third plane is the 'IP management plane' divided into 'IP user plane' and 'IP control plane'. The bottom plane is the 'Management plane' divided into 'User plane' and 'Control plane'. The 'ATM transfer capabilities' plane is shown below the IP management plane, containing 'ABR', 'DBR', 'SBR', and 'ABT'. The diagram is labeled T1317860-01.
+
+NOTE – This figure shows ATM being used for transport. Other transport technologies (e.g. Frame relay, SDH, etc.) may also be applied using the same principle.
+
+**Figure 3 /Y.1241 – Service plane concept for IP-based services**
+
+## 5.5 End-system model
+
+Figure 4 shows an end-system model. In this model, the IP end-system has two types of interface points; one is the socket API (Application Programming Interface) and the other is the interface to the IP transfer capability. The socket API allows IP applications to use capability provided by TCP layer (e.g. TCP or UDP). The interface to the IP transfer capability provides access to desired IP transfer capabilities for a given IP-based service.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the IP end-system model. At the top, an 'IP-based Service' is indicated by an upward arrow. Below it, an 'IP Application' (represented by a grey oval) interacts with a 'Stream' (represented by a circle) within a 'TCP/UDP' layer (represented by a 3D box). A 'Datagram' (represented by a circle) is also shown within the 'TCP/UDP' layer. A 'Socket API' (represented by a rectangle) is positioned between the 'IP Application' and the 'TCP/UDP' layer. Below the 'TCP/UDP' layer is the 'IP protocol stack' (represented by a 3D box), which contains 'BE' (Best Effort), 'IPTC y', and 'IPTC x' (all represented by circles). A horizontal line connects the 'IP protocol stack' to an 'IP-NT' (IP Network Termination) block (represented by a grey 3D box). A dashed line encloses the 'IP Application', 'TCP/UDP', and 'IP protocol stack' components, with the label 'IP end-system' at the bottom. A horizontal line also connects the 'IP-NT' block to a reference number 'T1317870-01'.
+
+Diagram of the IP end-system model showing the flow from IP Application through TCP/UDP and IP protocol stack to IP-NT.
+
+BE Best Effort
+CPE Customer Premises Equipment
+IP-NT IP Network Termination
+
+NOTE – IP transfer capabilities include user, control and management plane functions.
+
+**Figure 4/Y.1241 – IP end-system model**
+
+# 6 IP transfer capability attributes
+
+## 6.1 General
+
+The IP transfer capabilities, as defined in another ITU-T Recommendation, can be used to characterize capabilities provided by the IP layer. The transport of data packets may be provided by an IP transfer capability (including a set of parameters) and a QoS class.
+
+Figure 2 depicts how the concept of IP transfer capability and IP QoS class can be applied. In this application, the IP Transfer Capability is specified at the RP (reference point) interface, e.g. the boundary between customer side and provider side. The IP QoS class characterizes the properties of the transport between two RPs, e.g. the ingress and the egress boundaries between customers and the network. Network operators could use these concepts to offer an IP-based service to their customers.
+
+The IP transfer capability, including all relevant parameter values, and the QoS class may be used in preparation of a SLA (see clause 7).
+
+## **6.2 Attributes for IP transfer capability**
+
+An IP transfer capability with an associated IP QoS class is intended to support an IP-based service with the desired performance attributes. In order to reach that objective, this Recommendation lists a number of properties which IP transfer capabilities (to be specified in other Recommendations) should have:
+
+- IP transfer capabilities should support IP-based Services as specified in this Recommendation;
+- IP transfer capabilities should be implicitly or explicitly declared at the moment the service is requested;
+- an IP transfer capability is not required to have a one-to-one correspondence with a given IP-based service. That is, there may be more than one IPTC which is able to support the requested IP-based service.
+
+# **7 Service level agreement**
+
+## **7.1 General**
+
+To support a given IP-based service a Service Level Agreement (SLA) is negotiated between a customer and a service provider. The SLA is a formal contract between the service provider and the customer that defines the terms of the service provider's responsibility to the customer, the type and extent of penalty if those responsibilities are not met and the price of the service provided. A service level agreement is a document, which may be written by the customer, service provider, or both, to define specific levels of service and the associated financial aspects.
+
+A complete SLA document may include the names of the parties involved, the terms of the agreement, the application and support services to be provided, the service level objectives, and the attribute values. The SLA may also include reporting requirements (including both the frequency of report generation and the level of reporting detail), penalties for non-compliance with the agreement, arbitration policies, modification terms, and responsibilities of both parties.
+
+## **7.2 SLA components**
+
+The SLA should be composed of three building blocks:
+
+- service level objectives;
+- service monitoring components;
+- financial compensation components.
+
+Service level objectives (SLOs) are specific service metrics, including service performance. Service monitoring involves either the customer or the service provider use of monitoring devices to ensure compliance to the terms of the contract. The financial component may include service price information as well as the penalties for the service provider's failure to meet the requirements of the SLA.
+
+## **7.3 SLA attributes**
+
+The following SLA attributes may be considered as appropriate in the development of a Service Level Agreement.
+
+### **7.3.1 Service level objectives**
+
+- IP transfer capability;
+- QoS Parameters or CoS provided;
+- availability – access blocking probability;
+- reliability – active system time, network failure rate;
+- interoperability;
+- delivery confirmation;
+- mobility and Portability support;
+- security – encryption, etc.;
+- bandwidth – constant, variable, etc.;
+- priority;
+- authentication – User ID for admission control;
+- signalling protocols – CR-LDP, etc.;
+- flexibility – scaling and global connectivity;
+- life of the SLA.
+
+### **7.3.2 Service monitoring**
+
+- QoS monitoring – comparison against objectives;
+- flow tracking – comparison against IPTC objectives;
+- tracking – time stamping at the beginning and end of session;
+- reports on service level objectives as necessary.
+
+### **7.3.3 Financial issues**
+
+- billing option – flat rate, timed, per transaction, per packet, etc.;
+- penalties for failing to deliver service level objectives by the service provider;
+- pricing;
+- early termination charges;
+- shortfall charges – early withdrawal from service by the customer.
+
+SLAs may be between the customer and the service provider or between the service provider and the provider of the network.
+
+## **7.4 Procedure for service level agreements**
+
+The following steps may be taken when developing and implementing a service level agreement.
+
+The procedure in the development of the SLA includes identification of:
+
+- the customer and associated service level;
+- network performance objectives;
+- ways to revise the network configuration and resource management;
+- ways to revise the service level agreement.
+
+The implementation of the SLA in the network occurs in the following steps:
+
+- design and provisioning of the network to satisfy the SLA;
+- configuration of ingress device as per information in the policy server to satisfy the SLA;
+- classification of the packets into different classes and collection of statistics regarding their performance at ingress device;
+- verification of the SLA based on the collected data from the ingress device.
+
+# **8 Protocol reference model**
+
+The protocol reference model for IP transport network is composed of a user-plane (U-plane), a control-plane (C-plane) and a management-plane (M-plane) similar to that of ITU-T I.321 [3]. Figure 5 shows the model for the IP-based network.
+
+The user-plane provides user information flow transfer on the IP-based network. In the layer architecture model, it consists of TCP/UDP layer, IP layer and lower transport layers. To meet the IP-based service features; the user-plane network capabilities include among others, connection types and IP transfer capabilities and ATM transfer capabilities in the case of ATM.
+
+The control-plane performs the call and connection control functions to support connection-oriented (e.g. MPLS) as well as connectionless services. It provides necessary signalling between the user and the network. To provide the IP-based services, the control-plane network capabilities include on-demand control capabilities of user-plane transfer functions, call/connection signalling, traffic negotiation, addressing, routing functions and user, terminal, and/or service identification.
+
+The management-plane has two types of management functions namely layer management and plane management. The layer management performs management functions on resources and parameters of lower layer transport protocol entities. It handles the general operation and maintenance of each protocol layer to meet the QoS requirements on user information flows. The plane management performs system management functions with coordination with the U-plane and the C-plane capabilities. With the help of plane management capabilities, the IP network provides the high-level client/server applications and user, terminal and/or service interaction. It also provides network-related and service-oriented high layer capabilities such as naming, information searching, data storing, information transaction, etc.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the protocol reference model for IP-based networks. It is divided into two main sections: Network Management and Element Management. The Network Management block is on the left, connected to the Element Management block on the right. The Element Management block is further divided into three planes: M-plane (Plane Management), C-plane (Call & Connection Control), and U-plane (User Applications). Below these planes are three layers: TCP/UDP Layer, IP Layer, and Lower Transport Layers. A Layer Management block is also shown, connected to the M-plane and the TCP/UDP Layer. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the Network Management and Element Management, and between the various components within the Element Management block.
+
+Figure 5/Y.1241 – Protocol reference model for IP-based networks. The diagram shows a Network Management block on the left connected to an Element Management block on the right. The Element Management block is divided into three planes: M-plane (Plane Management), C-plane (Call & Connection Control), and U-plane (User Applications). Below these planes are three layers: TCP/UDP Layer, IP Layer, and Lower Transport Layers. A Layer Management block is also shown, connected to the M-plane and the TCP/UDP Layer. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the Network Management and Element Management, and between the various components within the Element Management block.
+
+**Figure 5/Y.1241 – Protocol reference model for IP-based networks**
+
+# 9 Functional architecture
+
+In this Recommendation the functional architecture of IP-based networks is explained in a similar manner as in ITU-T I.327 [4].
+
+## 9.1 Applications of functional groups
+
+IP-based networks are comprised of two functional groups: the IP-network element (IP-NE) and the IP terminal equipment (IP-TE). The IP-NE functional group has the network intelligence to configure, register, control and manage the IP-based services. It may be interfaced to the Internet Service Provider's network. The functional groups can be categorized in three groups where each can be sub-categorized again. The following provides a list of these categories with a brief explanation for each one:
+
+- IP-Terminal Equipment (IP-TE): IP Interface Functional Group and IP Client Functional Group;
+- IP-Router: IP Interface Functional Group and IP Routing and Forwarding Functional Group (and IP Server Functional group optionally);
+- IP-Interworking Unit (IP-IWU): IP Interface Functional Group and IP Conversion Functional Group (and IP Server Functional group optionally).
+
+The list of functions for each functional group is not exhaustive. Also, not all specific functions in a functional group need to be present in all implementations.
+
+### **9.1.1 IP interface functional group**
+
+This functional group includes interface functions to generate and receive IP messages for the specific Internet applications. Examples of IP interface functions are:
+
+- generation and extraction of IP messages specific to end user applications;
+- buffering and resource allocation;
+- multiplexing and de-multiplexing;
+- provisioning of virtual circuits with or without signalling protocol handling;
+- traffic flow handling including usage parameter control;
+- physical transmission interface and adaptation functions;
+- transmission control including OAM functions.
+
+Additional functions specific to the transmission system or high-level services and applications may be required.
+
+### **9.1.2 IP routing and forwarding functional group**
+
+This functional group includes forwarding and routing functions to transfer IP messages to the destinations. Examples of IP routing and forwarding functions are:
+
+- storing and forwarding of IP messages;
+- routing information handling for static or dynamic routing;
+- topology information handling;
+- provisioning of QoS assured path.
+
+### **9.1.3 IP server functional group**
+
+This functional group includes the server-side functions for configuration and registration procedure of IP network. Examples of IP server functions are:
+
+- server-side functions for registration procedure of IP address and name;
+- server-side functions for registration procedure of IP multicast and broadcast group;
+- directory service with efficient and distributed storage;
+- response to the query of IP address and name;
+- maintenance of mapping between IP address and IP domain name.
+
+### **9.1.4 IP client functional group**
+
+This functional group includes the client-side functions for configuration and registration procedure in IP networks. Examples of IP client functions are:
+
+- client-side functions for registration procedure of IP address and name;
+- client-side functions for registration procedure of IP multicast and broadcast group;
+- query of IP address and name.
+
+### **9.1.5 IP conversion functional group**
+
+This functional group includes the functions for protocol conversion and format translation in IP network for the specific Internet applications. Examples of IP conversion functions are:
+
+- translation of IP protocol functionality, for example, to convert the UDP messages to the TCP messages or vice versa (e.g. transport gateway, signalling);
+- mapping of IP versions (e.g. IPv4, and IPv6, etc.);
+
+- conversion of connection types, for example, to translate one point-to-multipoint connection to multiple point-to-point connections;
+- change of transfer mode, for example, to translate the connectionless transfer mode to the connection-oriented transfer mode;
+- conversion of QoS provisioning, for example, to deliver the best effort service to the guaranteed service with high priority;
+- IP traffic control and management handling.
+
+# 10 Support of IP-based services by ATM
+
+ITU-T Y.1310 [7] specifies transport of IP over ATM in public networks and ITU-T Y.1401 [9] provides general requirements for Interworking with IP-based networks. For a detailed discussion regarding these subjects, the aforementioned and other relevant Recommendations should be consulted. This clause provides examples of IP performance attributes mapped to ATM QoSs to support IP-based services.
+
+## 10.1 Relationship with ATM transfer capabilities
+
+ITU-T I.371 [5] provides ATM transfer capability. Transfer capabilities carry varying QoS objectives. QoS objectives for IP-based services, like in ATM, are dependent on the sensitivity of transferred data to loss and delay. Hence, in this clause, loss, delay variation and delay attributes are chosen as a means to relate performance attributes for IP-based services to the ATM QoS classes as specified in ITU-T I.356.
+
+Clause 5.2 identifies IP-based services as to belong to two categories and five classes based on their performance attributes. Table 2 provides examples of how performance attributes of IP-based services can be related to ATM QoS classes.
+
+**Table 2/Y.1241 – Examples of relationship between performance attributes for IP-based services and ATM QoS classes**
+
+| Guaranteed performance attribute(s) for IP-based service | Possible mapping (s) to ATM QoS |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Loss, delay and delay variation | QoS class 1 (stringent class)
or
QoS class 5 (stringent bi-level class) for CLP = 0 cells |
+| Loss | QoS class 2 (tolerant class)
or
QoS class 3 (bi-level class) for CLP = 0 cells |
+| None | QoS class 4 (U class)
or
QoS class 3 (bi-level class) for CLP = 1 cells |
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.1292
+
+(09/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Architecture, access, network
+capabilities and resource management
+
+# --- **Customizable IP networks (CIP): Framework for the requirements and capabilities related to the customization of IP service networks by customers**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+###### **Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292**
+
+# **Customizable IP networks (CIP): Framework for the requirements and capabilities related to the customization of IP service networks by customers**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292 describes the framework for requirements and capabilities to enable the customization of IP networks and related IP service and IP transfer capability to meet the customer's needs. Such a framework includes the service requirements and functional requirements and capabilities as well as the architectural considerations.
+
+In addition, this Recommendation identifies the application scenarios and service procedures applicable to the context of customization using the capabilities made available to and/or performed by the customer of IP services.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292 was approved on 12 September 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedures.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2010
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Terms and Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions..... | 4 |
+| 6 Overview ..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Service aspects..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 General customization model..... | 4 |
+| 6.3 Service level agreements (SLAs) ..... | 5 |
+| 6.4 Menu-based network customization capabilities..... | 6 |
+| 6.5 Customer expectations..... | 7 |
+| 6.6 Network capability requirements ..... | 7 |
+| 7 Functional capabilities ..... | 8 |
+| 7.1 Overview ..... | 8 |
+| 7.2 Naming, addressing and identification capabilities..... | 8 |
+| 7.3 End-user grouping capability ..... | 9 |
+| 7.4 Application clustering capability..... | 9 |
+| 7.5 Information navigation and query capabilities ..... | 9 |
+| 7.6 Auto-discovery and auto-configuration capabilities ..... | 9 |
+| 7.7 Information access control and security capabilities..... | 10 |
+| 7.8 End-to-end transparency capability ..... | 10 |
+| 7.9 Connection configuration capability ..... | 11 |
+| 7.10 Routing and forwarding control capabilities ..... | 11 |
+| 7.11 Alternative path selection and multi-homing capabilities ..... | 12 |
+| 7.12 Mobility control and management capabilities ..... | 12 |
+| 7.13 Traffic measurement and usage parameter control capabilities ..... | 13 |
+| 7.14 SLA negotiation capabilities ..... | 13 |
+| 7.15 End-to-end QoS provision and priority assignment capabilities..... | 13 |
+| 7.16 Information storage and directory processing capabilities..... | 13 |
+| 7.17 Segment OAM and end-to-end OAM capabilities ..... | 14 |
+| 7.18 Virtual private network configuration capability ..... | 14 |
+| 7.19 Billing and charging capabilities ..... | 14 |
+| 7.20 Client/server management and agent management capabilities..... | 15 |
+| 8 Security considerations..... | 15 |
+
+| | Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Appendix I – Service procedures and applications scenarios ..... | 17 |
+| I.1 Customizable personal directory services ..... | 17 |
+| I.2 Customizable access control services..... | 20 |
+| I.3 Customizable end-to-end QoS services..... | 23 |
+| I.4 End-user customizable location monitoring services ..... | 26 |
+| I.5 Customizable home networking services ..... | 29 |
+| I.6 Client networking services with QoS and security..... | 31 |
+| Appendix II – Example of functional architecture and service creation scenario for end-user customizable VPN services..... | 34 |
+| Bibliography..... | 36 |
+
+# **Introduction**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292 describes the framework for requirements and capabilities to enable the customization of IP networks and related IP service and IP transfer capability to meet the customer's needs (see Recommendations ITU-T Y.1001 and ITU-T Y.1241).
+
+The framework provided in this Recommendation includes an architectural model, high-level service requirements and functional capabilities. In addition, this Recommendation identifies the application scenarios and service procedures applicable to the context of customization using the capabilities made available to and/or performed by the customer of IP services.
+
+In general, customization refers to the degree of manageability or controllability as exercised by the customer via a suitable agent. Such agent-based architecture is based on principles similar to those described in Recommendations ITU-T X.160 and ITU-T Y.130.
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.1292
+
+# Customizable IP networks (CIP): Framework for the requirements and capabilities related to the customization of IP service networks by customers
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- General overview and description of concepts related to the customization of IP services and related IP network aspects.
+- General model of a customizable IP network from the end user's perspective.
+- Definition of and requirements for the service capabilities offered to an end user for customization purposes.
+- Functional capabilities that can be controlled by the end user of a customizable IP network.
+
+In addition, Appendix I provides a description of application scenarios and service procedures used by the end user of a customizable IP network.
+
+Note that the scope is restricted to IP networks when IP layer networks as defined in [ITU-T G.809] and operation within the NGN transport stratum as defined in [ITU-T Y.2011] are considered.
+
+The detailed mechanisms for supporting the capabilities of a customizable IP network are not covered by the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T G.809] Recommendation ITU-T G.809 (2003), *Functional architecture of connectionless layer networks*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T M.60] Recommendation ITU-T M.60 (1993), *Maintenance terminology and definitions*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T M.3050.x] Recommendations ITU-T M.3050.x-series (2007), *Enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM)*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T M.3060] Recommendation ITU-T M.3060/Y.2401 (2006), *Principles for the Management of Next Generation Networks*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T Y.1001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1001 (2000), *IP framework – A framework for convergence of telecommunications network and IP network technologies*.
+<>
+
+- [ITU-T Y.1241] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1241 (2001), *Support of IP-based services using IP transfer capabilities*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T Y.1311] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1311 (2002), *Network-based VPNs – Generic architecture and service requirements*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T Y.1711] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1711 (2004), *Operation & Maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks*.
+<>
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+<>
+
+# 3 Terms and definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 customer** [ITU-T M.3050.x]: The customer buys products and services from the enterprise or receives free offers or services. A customer may be a person or a business.
+
+**3.1.2 IP service** [ITU-T Y.1001]: A data transmission service in which the data that is transferred across the interface between the user and provider is in the form of IP (Internet protocol) packets (sometimes called datagrams).
+
+NOTE – The IP (network) service includes the service provided using the IP transfer capability.
+
+**3.1.3 IP transfer capability** [ITU-T Y.1241]: IP transfer capability is defined as the set of network capabilities provided by the IP layer. It may be characterized by the traffic contract as well as the performance attributes supported by the control and management functions of the underlying protocol layers.
+
+**3.1.4 service level agreement** [ITU-T Y.1241]: Service level agreement (SLA) is a negotiated agreement between a customer and the service provider regarding the levels of service characteristics and associated set of metrics. The content of an SLA varies depending on the service offering and includes the attributes required for the negotiated agreement.
+
+**3.1.5 end user (user)** [ITU-T M.3050.x]: The end user is the actual user of the products or services offered by the enterprise. The end user consumes the product or service.
+
+NOTE – Typically, the (end) user is a person or a machine delegated by a customer to use the services and/or facilities of a telecommunication network.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 customize:** This involves ensuring the suitability to the individual requirements of a customer.
+
+**3.2.2 customizable:** This refers to the capability of being customized.
+
+**3.2.3 customizable IP network (CIP):** This is an IP network that is capable of being customized in accordance with and by the capabilities specified within this Recommendation.
+
+**3.2.4 customization:** This refers to the result of being customized.
+
+**3.2.5 manageable:** This refers to the capability of being managed.
+
+**3.2.6 manageability:** This pertains to the characteristic of being manageable.
+
+**3.2.7 CIP provider:** The provider using a customizable IP network.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| CBR | Constant Bit Rate |
+| CDR | Charging Data Record |
+| CIP | Customizable Internet Protocol network |
+| CIPA | Customizable Internet Protocol network Agent |
+| CoS | Class of Service |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| C-Plane | Control Plane |
+| DIB | Directory Information Base |
+| DNS | Domain Name Service |
+| eTOM | Enhanced Telecom Operations Map |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| HTTP | HyperText Transfer Protocol |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| M-Plane | Management Plane |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| P2P | Point-to-Point |
+| P2MP | Point-to-Multipoint |
+| PABX | Private Automatic Branch Exchange |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| QUA | Quality of Service User Agent |
+| RFID | Radio Frequency Identifier |
+| RGW | Residential Gateway |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SLS | Service Level Specification |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+| U-Plane | User Plane |
+| UPC | Usage Parameter Control |
+
+| | |
+|-----|-----------------------------|
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| VBR | Variable Bit Rate |
+| VNF | Virtual Networking Function |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| VTR | Video Tape Recorder |
+| XML | eXtensible Markup Language |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation, words such as manage and control (and derivatives thereof) are used in the general English dictionary sense rather than in the specific sense of the M-series or Q-series Recommendations. When specific usage in the sense of the M-series or Q-series Recommendations is required, specific indications are made.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+## 6.1 Service aspects
+
+The main objective of a CIP network is to provide customers with the ability to manage and control certain aspects of the IP service they have subscribed to and the related IP network technology facilitating the IP service.
+
+A certain degree of autonomy on the part of the customer and/or individual end user (within the customer organization) is desirable. For example, a customer will find it advantageous to be able to:
+
+- Select the set of end users, which may be human, terminal equipment or applications permitted to use the IP service within the given customer organization.
+- Create and customize services and network configurations (e.g., virtual private networks (VPNs)) with the relevant network resources provided by the customizable IP (CIP) provider to the customer.
+- Select, control and/or manage various features of the services. For example, the customer can negotiate the service level agreements (SLAs) offered by the CIP provider related to QoS and network performance objectives, as well as the security requirements and capabilities.
+
+In general, various degrees or levels of customization capabilities can be offered to the customer depending on the level of sophistication of the available customization capabilities.
+
+NOTE 1 – When the customer is an organization, several end users of this organization can be connected to the CIP network. In particular, several end users can be connected to the CIP network using the same UNI (user-to-network interface) as defined and provided by the CIP provider, i.e., at the interface deemed to demarcate the end of the CIP provider's jurisdiction and the beginning of the end user's jurisdiction, and within the scope of the customer in question.
+
+NOTE 2 – This Recommendation follows the general principles established in [ITU-T Y.1311], as applicable, although the scope is not restricted to VPN situations.
+
+### 6.2 General customization model
+
+Figure 1 illustrates the customization model applicable to a CIP network.
+
+Acting on behalf of its own organization and/or on behalf of the end users within the customer organization, the customer interacts with the CIP provider to achieve the desired customizations. The customer interacts with the CIP provider through the CIP agent.
+
+The customer may also delegate some customization responsibilities to its end users within the bounds of the privilege allocated to such end users. This is indicated by the broken arrows.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the general customization model. It features a central 'CIP Agent (CIPA) Customization Portal & Menu' box. To its left are 'Customer's Users' and 'Customer' boxes, connected by solid and dashed arrows. To its right is a 'Control & Management Functions' box, connected by solid and dashed arrows. Below the CIP Agent is the 'CIP Provider Network' oval. Above the CIP Agent is a 'Customized Network Services and capabilities' oval. A 'CIPA Reference Point' label is positioned between the Customer/Customer's Users and the CIP Agent. A 'Local Matter' label is positioned between the CIP Agent and the Control & Management Functions. Dashed red lines form a boundary around the CIP Agent, Control & Management Functions, and CIP Provider Network, with a legend below stating '----- Areas within scope'.
+
+Figure 1 – General customization model diagram. The diagram shows a 'Customer' and 'Customer's Users' interacting with a 'CIP Agent (CIPA) Customization Portal & Menu'. The CIP Agent is connected to 'Control & Management Functions' and the 'CIP Provider Network'. A 'Customized Network Services and capabilities' oval is also shown. Dashed red lines indicate areas within scope.
+
+**Figure 1 – General customization model**
+
+The agent concept shown in Figure 1 is similar to the principles described in [b-ITU-T X.160] and [b-ITU-T Y.130].
+
+The control and management functions used by the CIP agent may consist of a number of appropriate systems, such as the following:
+
+- Systems based on the NGN management principles specified in [ITU-T M.3060].
+- Systems based on the eTOM business framework specified in [ITU-T M.3050.x].
+
+The linkage between the CIP agent and such systems is out of scope of this Recommendation and may be subject to local considerations as described in [b-ITU-T X.160].
+
+### 6.3 Service level agreements (SLAs)
+
+The CIP provider supplies its customers (and related end users) with IP network connectivity services based on the negotiated SLAs [ITU-T Y.1241]. An SLA specifies the customer/end user requirements that the CIP provider is committed to.
+
+An SLA defines the level of the quality of services to be provided, setting performance objectives to be achieved by the CIP provider. It also defines the procedures and reports that must be provided to track and ensure compliance with the negotiated SLA.
+
+For given types of applications requiring more than best-effort types of SLA, the customer (and related end users) can optionally negotiate SLAs with performance requirements such as bandwidth, delay and loss performance.
+
+An SLA can ensure the performance and availability of the CIP network to the customer and its end users. Reliability and availability are the key objectives that the CIP provider may have to fulfil in order to support a negotiated SLA. The capabilities defined in a given negotiated SLA may be activated on demand (as a result of an end user's request) or provided at the subscription time. Depending on the SLA negotiated with the customer, the CIP provider may have to control and manage the corresponding resources in the underlying CIP network.
+
+### 6.4 Menu-based network customization capabilities
+
+#### 6.4.1 Introduction
+
+The capabilities provided by the CIP provider allow the customers (and even end users within the customer organization) to have different levels of control and management over the relevant network resources of the customizable network. Customer and end-user access to network capabilities are provided by a set of menus (e.g., available via a web portal). Depending on the service contract, such menus can allow the further specification of SLA parameters.
+
+Network capabilities can be negotiated through a menu system that can exhibit individual CIP features related to the network itself and/or services, as well as their combinations. Network features can include storage resources, bandwidth and processing time. Service resources include relevant resources required for the support of distance learning, telecommuting, electronic commerce, telemedicine and online entertainment. Other features, such as controlling/managing a group of end users forming a VPN, are accessible. In addition, some features can relate to associated supported technologies and service architectures such as resources related to databases, secure networks, the Internet or Java.
+
+The detailed mechanisms for the support of customization and related management and/or control mechanisms are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+#### 6.4.2 Levels of resource manageability
+
+One feature of customization is the ability to select the degree of resource manageability required. Table 1 introduces the concept of resource manageability levels. Note that the levels described in Table 1 are only examples of resource manageability levels that can be offered by a CIP provider.
+
+**Table 1 – Levels of resource manageability**
+
+| Level | Description | Features | Remarks |
+|-------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 0 | No manageability | No monitoring, no resource control | - • No mechanism to detect network faults and congestion
- • No mechanism to control network resources
|
+| 1 | Overall network resource manageability | Overall monitoring, no resource control | - • Notify the overall network fault and resource status by CIP provider
- • No resource control by the customer
|
+| 2 | Group-level resource manageability | Group-level resource monitoring and control | - • Notify the group-level network fault and resource status by CIP provider
- • Customer managing the group-level resources
|
+| 3 | Individual resource manageability | Individual-level resource monitoring and control | - • Notify the individual network fault and resource status for end-to-end connectivity
- • End user managing the end-to-end resources
|
+
+Manageability level 2 ("group-level resource manageability") corresponds to the case where network resources are to be manageable on the basis of end-user groups. A typical case is VPN where the corresponding network resources are shared between end users.
+
+A given network resource is considered as a single entity of manageability which can be dedicated to an individual end user (level 3) or shared between a group of end users (level 2).
+
+NOTE – The resource parameters and their corresponding granularity are implementation-specific and are therefore out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## **6.5 Customer expectations**
+
+Customization capabilities are provided by the CIP provider to assist the customer in fulfilling its service expectations.
+
+The customer may wish to negotiate performance parameters to ensure corresponding performance objectives such as the following:
+
+- Availability (e.g., 99.999%).
+- Response time (e.g., less than 5 ms to download a 1 Megabyte file).
+- Service-blocking probability, including network access blocking.
+- Service priority and QoS/CoS parameters.
+
+### **6.6 Network capability requirements**
+
+The degree of customization and manageability offered to the customer depends on capabilities, called network capabilities, supported and provided by the CIP provider. This clause identifies network capabilities that can be used in the context of this Recommendation.
+
+#### **6.6.1 General network capabilities**
+
+The capabilities to be provided by the CIP network provider include support for the following:
+
+- Creating/updating/deleting end-user profiles, including the end-user name, number, services subscribed to, etc.
+- Advertisement/solicitation of name, address and number.
+- Allocation of network addresses and address filtering.
+- Authorization/authentication to identify the end user (e.g., query for end-user identifier, password, certification).
+- Troubleshooting of network access problems.
+- End-to-end transparency between end users.
+- Name/number/service portability, navigation, name notification and name database management.
+- Accounting of the end user's service utilizations for billing.
+
+#### **6.6.2 Network capabilities related to performance parameters**
+
+Network capabilities can optionally include support for the customer to dimension, manage, control and monitor network performance parameters. The following are examples of parameters that can be considered relevant in this context:
+
+- Packet error rate, packet loss rate.
+- Round trip delay, one-way delay and delay variance.
+- Availability (e.g., system uptime, mean time to failure, mean time to repair).
+- Peak bandwidth, available bandwidth and minimum bandwidth.
+- Round trip delay of location identification for mobility.
+- Access blocking probability and service completion probability.
+- Traffic-related statistics (e.g., number of packets to be received or transmitted, number of packets discarded or received in error).
+
+#### 6.6.3 VPN-related network capabilities
+
+CIP provider capabilities include support for the capabilities outlined in [ITU-T Y.1311], such as the following:
+
+- Means to enable the customer to define VPN membership.
+- Accommodation of customer-defined VPN address schemes.
+- Means for a single customer site to belong concurrently to more than one VPN.
+- Means for the customer to define VPN topologies (ranging from hub-and-spoke, partial mesh to full mesh, for example).
+- Support for fixed and mobile end users.
+- Support for a wide range of routing protocols between the customer's premises routers and CIP provider's edge routers.
+- Means for supporting a variety of an end user's traffic (QoS) requirements as defined by the end user.
+- Means for supporting different modes of communication such as any-to-any (1:1), multicast (1:N, M:N) and broadcast (1:All).
+- Means to enable the customer to easily add, remove or change devices, sites, routes, traffic, etc.
+- Means to enable the customer to define SLAs per VPN and/or per VPN site and/or per VPN route.
+
+## 7 Functional capabilities
+
+## 7.1 Overview
+
+This clause provides a description of functional capabilities that can be considered to support the network capability requirements identified in clause 6.6. The functional capabilities are described according to end user perspectives and CIP provider perspectives. The functional capabilities provided by the CIP provider allow the customer (and end users within the customer organization) to customize its own IP network.
+
+### 7.2 Naming, addressing and identification capabilities
+
+An end user can be identified by his/her name, address and/or number. The physical attachment point, such as corresponding to a MAC address, can also be used to identify the end user. Binding mechanisms among the name, address, number and physical attachment point are required to identify the end user. If an end user moves, connectivity should be maintained. This implies handling the binding between the end-user permanent IP address (as home address) and end-user temporary IP address (as care-of-address). The temporary care-of-address identifies the IP address of the visited location while the permanent IP address identifies the end user.
+
+If end users announce their names to the CIP provider, the CIP provider identifies their names with address and location information allowing them to be reachable via their names. The domain name service (DNS) functions should allow some form of end user-identification. Real-time address translation and dynamic mapping between address and domain name server are required to support mobility. The following requirements for naming and addressing are necessary to support customizable IP services:
+
+- End user is identified by name, address and/or number.
+- Dynamic update and automatic configuration of the name service database are executed at the request of the customer.
+
+- Translations between private naming/addressing and global naming/addressing for end-to-end connectivity may be required while end users use their own private naming/addressing dedicated at a specific region or group. When the end user moves to another location, the corresponding registration servers are notified of the new end user's location.
+
+### **7.3 End-user grouping capability**
+
+End-user grouping is mainly used for multicast and VPN services. The CIP provider is required to support proper registration and membership distribution mechanisms in order to provide end-user grouping capability. The grouping capability is recommended to allow for the identification of end-user groups. End users may actively select, join or leave a given end-user group.
+
+### **7.4 Application clustering capability**
+
+Clustering is a common term for providing a service over multiple servers to increase fault tolerance and/or to support load sharing. Clustering can be used for large-scale and mission-critical applications that do not allow any downtime. Each server within the cluster aims at maintaining the same information and performs administrative tasks such as load-balancing, server failure determination and failover duty assignment. The end user can trigger application clustering by allocating multiple servers (e.g., computers) into a corresponding dedicated cluster.
+
+### **7.5 Information navigation and query capabilities**
+
+In the customizable IP network, various types of multimedia information may be associated with information content to allow fast and efficient navigation for end users. Multimedia information and applications available in the network are recommended to be accessed at a minimum by username and password.
+
+The database containing the multimedia information may be searched and sorted with the relevant directory structure.
+
+For information navigation and query capabilities, a set of descriptors describing various types of multimedia information and identifying its contents is used. The description of "information data" provides the means to deliver audiovisual data as objects with certain relations in time and space.
+
+To aid in information acquisition, short descriptions for raw information contents are essential. In principle, any type of information data may be retrieved by means of any type of data query. A search engine may be necessary to match the data query and information description. To help information acquisition, information processing and a storage platform may also be required (e.g., servers for messaging, retrieval and distribution).
+
+End users can activate the information navigation and query capabilities under the following cases:
+
+- Changing information contents and types of data.
+- Searching recursively to get detailed information.
+- Maintaining the history of information navigation and queries, etc.
+
+### **7.6 Auto-discovery and auto-configuration capabilities**
+
+Auto-discovery and auto-configuration capabilities are technologies that enable the CIP network to be customized quickly to the environments that they should manage. Deploying new services at a rapid pace necessitates implementing the discovery methodologies in an extensible manner such that newly discovered capabilities can be added step-by-step to the IP network. End users are able to configure their own network environments (e.g., VPN) by utilizing auto-discovery and auto-configuration.
+
+The CIP network is recommended to support the auto-discovery capability that, in particular, dynamically conveys the location information of the end user, consistent with and respecting privacy requirements. Auto-discovery capability can be useful for achieving service scalability. The following are its advantages:
+
+- Reduces downtime by eliminating the process of identifying the IP address and manually adding it in the backup unit.
+- Enhances safety by removing erroneous IP configurations.
+- Increases security by monitoring devices on the network.
+- Diminishes the complexity when modifying firmware and/or hardware equipment configuration.
+
+### **7.7 Information access control and security capabilities**
+
+End users may sometimes require the use of network paths with an appropriate level of security. Securing data traffic requires constructing a secure channel to end user's home (residential) networks. Access control and cryptographic functions are to be supported during registration and activation. IP-based VPN services can be used for providing security with an appropriate policy. The set of administrative policies determines both connectivity and QoS for VPN customers. End users can activate and deactivate access control with security associations.
+
+The packet filtering capability can provide reasonable protection and access control at the user-to-network interface; it can be applied to various gateway routers or intermediate network equipment between end users and the network. The packet filtering and security functions can be combined with specific protocols such as SIP, ITU-T H.323, FTP, etc.
+
+### **7.8 End-to-end transparency capability**
+
+One of the critical requirements is the support for seamless handover. End-to-end transparency is recommended to be maintained during handover since applications should run independently of the supporting infrastructure. The CIP provider's network is recommended to support the following three types of end-to-end transparency:
+
+- Location transparency
+With distributed computing technology, end users can gain access from anywhere regardless of the actual physical location of such servers.
+- Network transparency
+The application server executes the corresponding control process independently of specific network types and end-user terminals.
+- Protocol transparency
+Protocol transparency is achieved by providing a standardized user-to-network interface, realizing independent service control processes, shielding complex network technical details from the service provision platform, and developing open communication network interfaces.
+
+The three types of transparency may be chosen by the end user. If the end user requires end-to-end transparency, the CIP provider is recommended to check whether such end-to-end transparency can be supported. The CIP provider may have to restrict other functions, such as NAT or disguised traffic, that can disrupt the transparencies. In this case, there is a need to verify which functions disrupt location, network and protocol transparencies.
+
+### 7.9 Connection configuration capability
+
+The connection configuration capability allows the specification as to who is allowed to communicate with whom (e.g., end user, information service broker, information broker). There are three basic connection configurations: point-to-point, multicast and broadcast.
+
+Point-to-point connections may provide unidirectional and bidirectional, as well as symmetric and asymmetric, paths. For point-to-point connections, the CIP network can support the following features:
+
+- Establishment, modification or release at the request of two participating end users
+- Establishment with unicast addressing/naming capability.
+
+A broadcast connection may provide unidirectional communication between one end user and other end users. This connection is one-to-many (all) during a particular initiated session. A multicast connection is the one-to-many relationship continued for the duration of a given initiated session. In this connection, one end user is the root, and the other end users are leaves. The root can send one copy of each packet and address it to the group of leaves wishing to receive it. End users can establish their own network configuration depending on their private resources and service/applications. End users may try to optimize their private communication configuration considering the communication cost and performance.
+
+### 7.10 Routing and forwarding control capabilities
+
+Proper routing paths between the source and the destination are decided according to the traffic contract and overall network traffic condition. The routing paths between the source and the destination are selected by end users, e.g., best effort, VPNs, managed IP facilities. Based on the end users identified routing selection, future routings can occur based on a definite routing policy. For connectionless transfer, the router forwards the IP packets with their respective QoS information and end user requirements along a selected routing link.
+
+The routing algorithm can be classified according to routing decision processes that are generally applied to end-to-end or hop-by-hop connections. For network scalability and robustness, some combinations of routing decision processes may be used for specific connections or flows. The following are the routing requirements in customizable networks:
+
+- Capability to support QoS-enabled paths
+QoS-enabled paths are needed to support the end user's specific requirements (mobility, VPN, security, policy, QoS level, etc.).
+- Capability to provide alternative paths
+To cope with failure of a routing path, alternative routing paths should be provided.
+- Capability to exchange routing information for interconnecting situations
+Negotiate and select the QoS parameters to support end-to-end QoS requirements.
+- Capability to support scalable routing
+A trade-off between the amounts of routing database information required in the CIP network elements and the size of the CIP network.
+- Capability to support broadcast routing
+The CIP network is able to copy packets, thereby allowing sources to send packets to all receivers.
+- Capability to support multicast routing
+The CIP network is able to build packet distribution trees that allow sources to send packets to all receivers bound to the multicast spanning tree. The multicast tree is built according to network policies.
+
+### **7.11 Alternative path selection and multi-homing capabilities**
+
+To deliver reliable service, the end user may require a set of procedures to provide protection for the traffic carried on different paths and to support the selection of his/her physical/logical interface. To support such requirements, alternative path selection and multi-homing capabilities are essential.
+
+The alternative path selection capability guarantees seamless service by avoiding service deterioration in case of network faults. For the selection of the backup path, the CIP network maintains route information along the same original path and proceeds to set up the alternative path. The following are requirements for supporting alternative path selection capability (end users can select alternative path and multi-homing capabilities based on their preferences):
+
+- Alternative path discovery
+Depending upon the prior agreements made between the end user and the carrier, when a network fault occurs, end-user traffic may be automatically routed to an alternative path.
+- Multi-homing
+Providing multi-homing capability has some advantages, one of which is redundancy. This is similar to the alternative path effect. Entities such as end users, hosts, routers and subnets should be able to be insulated from certain failure modes within one or more network providers. A network with this capability is recommended to accommodate continuities in connectivity during failures. Another advantage is better performance. Through multi-homing, a network entity should be able to protect itself from performance deterioration. Multi-homing provides multiple interfaces on the end-to-end path.
+
+### **7.12 Mobility control and management capabilities**
+
+While most end users are moving, their connectivity should be controllable at any time. Efficient mobility control and management procedures are recommended to be developed in combination with security procedures. Mobile end users and terminals should be able to update their location database dynamically. This way, a mobile host is able to maintain and use the same IP address as it changes its point of attachment to the CIP network. The relevant registration protocol is used to authenticate the mobile IP end users. The location resolution and seamless handover procedures are enforced while IP end users or terminals are in motion. Supporting mobility control and management requires the following capabilities (end users can choose some capabilities during handover):
+
+- Capability to allow a mobile node to be reachable by having a permanent address:
+ - Address management function.
+ - Registration function.
+- Capability to know where a mobile node is:
+ - Network information advertising/detecting function.
+ - Registration function.
+ - Paging function.
+- Seamless handover capability.
+- Capability to allocate proper resources during handover.
+- Capability to support inter-domain mobility.
+- Capability to find the optimal routing path.
+- Capability to support AAA and security.
+
+### **7.13 Traffic measurement and usage parameter control capabilities**
+
+Usage parameter control (UPC) refers to the set of actions taken by the CIP network to monitor and control traffic. The operation of UPC involves checking whether or not input traffic conforms to the QoS objectives of a compliant connection. Note, however, that excessive policing actions on a connection may have side effects on the overall network performance deterioration. Therefore, safety margins should be engineered to limit the effect of UPC. Conforming traffic refers to the contracted performance guarantee. Traffic exceeding the conformance limit will receive appropriate treatment. The forwarding process can further be associated with service priority and service reliability parameters.
+
+The flow control of UPC guarantees that sources act as agreed upon during the call setup phase, after a call is accepted and a decision is made to penalize or not to penalize the traffic or connection when such arrival triggers a traffic overflow or violation. Actions (e.g., tagging or discarding) are taken if a source does not conform to its contract. Violation of the contract may occur in case of malfunctioning equipment, malicious end users or traffic delay.
+
+The customizable network should directly support traffic measurement and usage parameter control functions. End users may request permission to observe the results of traffic measurements and UPC functions when they experience performance deterioration. Likewise, end users can negotiate the UPC parameters with the CIP provider. The end user can control the QoS level based on these UPC parameters.
+
+### **7.14 SLA negotiation capabilities**
+
+The customizable network should be reliable and seamless to satisfy the negotiated SLAs. End users may also choose their service profiles and performance characteristics. The CIP provider is required to negotiate and agree with the end user on the technical details of specific instances of the service products being offered. The QoS parameters may be the same as those offered or customized to a specific service instance. There are always two SLAs, one for each direction. The SLA specification requires extensive monitoring of the available infrastructure.
+
+The end user can dynamically negotiate SLAs with the CIP provider and change the SLAs to the maximum extent supported by the CIP provider.
+
+### **7.15 End-to-end QoS provision and priority assignment capabilities**
+
+To enable the applications to work to the satisfaction of end users, performance guarantees are required for the resources they use. In particular, end-to-end QoS provision is necessary for many applications, e.g., upper bound for packet loss and maximum transmission delay in real-time audio streaming applications.
+
+The end user can optionally select end-to-end QoS. In this case, the CIP provider is recommended to guarantee end-to-end QoS as a contract with an end user.
+
+### **7.16 Information storage and directory processing capabilities**
+
+Directories play an important role in providing information access across networks. Directories are involved in many operations requiring access to information such as end user preferences, patient information, student records and public records.
+
+From the CIP provider's perspective, the capability to manage both end-user profiles (e.g., phone number, address and subscribed service lists) and network/service profiles (e.g., network configuration, topology and server lists) is required. If the CIP provider grants an end user the capability to manage his/her profile, the end user can manage personal information such as password, friends' address lists, etc.
+
+The CIP provider may provide information storage services for clients. Grid networks are an application environment that can provide these services in a secure, flexible and dynamic manner [b-Foster].
+
+End users may enlist the help of the CIP provider to configure their own storage and directory environments.
+
+### **7.17 Segment OAM and end-to-end OAM capabilities**
+
+The network requirements for both segment and end-to-end OAM capability have increasingly become pivotal in maintaining SLA contracts. To construct segment and end-to-end OAM flows from the perspective of an end system, MPLS OAM and MPLS ping/trace may be applicable [ITU-T Y.1711].
+
+The end user can activate the OAM flows regardless of whether or not the SLA contracts are satisfied.
+
+### **7.18 Virtual private network configuration capability**
+
+For customizable IP networks, policy-based control functions for providing VPN configuration individually and dynamically are necessary. VPN can be decomposed in multiple sub-VPNs, e.g., dedicated for voice, for on-demand streaming data, secure information, etc.
+
+To provide service-dependent routing/forwarding features for VPNs, the CIP network supports virtual networking.
+
+End users can configure their own virtual private network. Providing intelligent and dynamic VPN configurations require the following functions in the customizable network:
+
+- For dynamic reconfiguration in a VPN node, intelligent features will be required to select tunnel(s) for each end-system that should be connected to VPN.
+- Firewall policies can be chosen to ensure a high degree of security that controls incoming/outgoing unauthorized packets.
+- For QoS-capable VPNs, providing tailored communication services that can be differentiated in terms of performance, monitoring, accounting, security and privacy is important. For example, the ingress node in the CIP network can perform aggregate flow scheduling based on multiple individual flows within VPN.
+- Hierarchical mobility management (e.g., micro/macro mobility) may be necessary for mobility provision among VPN groups.
+- The ingress nodes of a VPN provide dynamic configuration filtering rules, with levels of granularity ranging from a single node to an entire VPN.
+
+### **7.19 Billing and charging capabilities**
+
+The billing and charging capabilities are based on the collecting of charging parameters. The charging parameters can be agreed by customers/end users during the SLA negotiation. The following parameters may be considered:
+
+- Connection mode.
+- Connection establishment and release time.
+- QoS class and priority.
+- Traffic parameters including constant bit rate (CBR) and variable bit rate (VBR).
+- Charging data records (CDRs) which include the number of packets to be delivered, tagged and discarded.
+
+### **7.20 Client/server management and agent management capabilities**
+
+Client/server management is required to support the scalable and efficient deployment of services. The following features can be supported in the customizable network:
+
+- Service portal acting as a broker for services with the ability to manage complex service relationships.
+- Separation of service control from service transport, thereby allowing the control of multiple and heterogeneous networks using a common control plane and providing a path to simpler network devices.
+- Support for multiple network technologies achieved by abstracting the service QoS requirements from the underlying technology.
+- Scalable and flexible architecture enabling plug and play (e.g., dynamic registration of new services through agent collaboration).
+- End user mobility enhancement, i.e., end users can access the system from multiple customer premises equipment (CPEs) as CPE agents collaborate with the service portal agent to provide the location information of the end user.
+- Distributed software entities (agents) that can cooperate in support of the trading model for the service supply chain.
+
+The CIP network allows end users to get client/agent/server management upon the demand of the end user. The following end users of the CIP network can be considered: service providers and service clients (clients of the service providers). If a service provider requires agent management for its clients, the CIP network supports the agents of the service provider. These agents are located at appropriate places over the CIP network, acting as service providers to clients. If the service client requires agent management, the CIP network provides a client to perform tasks as an agent. This agent plays two roles: as a server of a service end user and a client of a service provider. Once their specific tasks are executed, clients will release the agent resources of the CIP network.
+
+## **8 Security considerations**
+
+To ensure the secure use of a customizable IP network, the following items need to be considered:
+
+- Authentication: This is required to verify the claimed identity.
+- Authorization: This enables certain actions after the authentication. In particular, authorization ensures that only authorized persons or devices are allowed to access the CIP network elements, services and applications.
+- Confidentiality: Data should not be made available to unauthorized entities.
+- Integrity: This ensures that data is not modified in transition.
+- Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation requirements provide undeniable proof of shipment and/or receipt of data to prevent the sender from disavowing a legitimate message or the recipient from denying receipt.
+- Communication security: This function ensures that information flows only between authorized end points.
+- Availability: This function ensures that there is no denial of authorized access to the CIP network elements, services, applications, etc.
+- Privacy: This function ensures the right of individuals to control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored, and by whom, and to whom that information may be disclosed.
+
+In terms of mobility, there are inherent security risks. To be able to use the customizable IP network while avoiding the security risks associated with mobility requires identifying specific threats. The following lists the weak points and potential solutions related to mobility:
+
+- Using binding updates: The binding update in mobile IP solutions may be used to redirect routing of information from legitimate sources to destinations without the permission and knowledge of the sender. If not used carefully, it can cause some detrimental results in the case of mobile communications.
+ - Stealing data: If a rogue end user knows a mobile node's permanent address, he/she can send a binding update to a correspondent node or a database maintaining the binding update to change the route for the original mobile node's data into his/hers.
+ - Reflection and flooding attacks: When a sender and a destination are communicating that the sender sends a packet to the destination is perfectly acceptable; this usually results in the destination replying back to the sender. If the sender sends to the destination a packet that causes the destination to reply to another person, however, a reflection attack is said to occur. The attacker can flood another person's link using the reflection attack.
+ - Man-in-the-middle attacks are attacks on the binding update: This attack can be used on the communication path between two nodes by an attacker. An obvious method is to change the contents of a packet to cause some results that were not intended by the original sender of the packet. When the attacker is located on the path between a mobile node and a correspondent node, he/she can modify the content of the binding update, thereby possibly bringing about a reflection attack or hijacking an ongoing connection between mobile and correspondent nodes.
+- Attacks using packet header information: The packet includes destination information. Therefore, if an attacker is communicating with a mobile node, he/she may put another address in the header information field, thus causing the mobile node to forward the packets to another node and possibly causing reflection or flooding attack.
+
+As additional requirements on security, the following points for enhancing security are introduced as follows:
+
+- Securing communication between the mobile node and the correspondent node: Messages between a mobile node and a correspondent node are required for binding cache and binding update list management, especially in mobility management. The binding update acts as a redirection request. Therefore, a correspondent node should trust the mobile node to be able to accept this request.
+ - Message integrity: An attacker should not be able to modify the contents of the binding update message as well as the binding acknowledgment message.
+ - Avoiding the denial of service attack: To avoid this attack, correspondent nodes must ensure that they do not maintain the active attachment state per mobile node until the binding update is accepted.
+- Securing messages in the database for the binding update: The same attacks on the binding update to correspondent nodes are relevant when a mobile node is communicating with its binding update database. Database impersonation could be detrimental to the mobile and correspondent nodes. As such, the mobile node's communication should be secured using authentication.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Service procedures and applications scenarios
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes some of the service procedures for customizable IP services and applications. The application scenarios for the described customizable IP services are as follows:
+
+- Customizable personal directory services.
+- Customizable access control services.
+- Customizable end-to-end QoS services.
+- End-user customizable location monitoring services.
+- Customizable home networking services.
+- Client networking services with QoS and security.
+
+### I.1 Customizable personal directory services
+
+A customizable personal directory service is a service intended to provide end users with access to various personal directory-related information. Directory databases are repositories for information on network-based entities, e.g., applications, files, printers and people. In customer-managed IP network environments, the end user has his/her customized directory database in the network; even if the end user moves to a different location, he/she can access the directory anytime. Using query procedures with the directory service, the end user can also get some directory information of other end users such as an end user's telephone number as well as some location information.
+
+#### I.1.1 Objectives of customizable personal directory services
+
+One of the main objectives of supporting personal directory services in customizable networks is to have a customized personal directory for the management of end-user data. For each end user, a personal set of data is stored in the CIP network. Such end-user profiles should be accessible from every location in the network around which the end user can move. Another objective is to enable CIP providers to build specialized directory services into their applications.
+
+#### I.1.2 Functional model for customizable personal directory services
+
+Figure I.1 shows the functional model for the customizable personal directory services. This model includes agents and managers as well as a logical database to support directory services as follows:
+
+- Directory user agent (DUA) and directory service agent (DSA)
+The directory service is described as a distributed client server system. This is characterized by a number of hosts (servers, DSA) providing directory services to other hosts (end users, DUA).
+- Directory information base (DIB)
+As a single, logical, global directory database, DIB stores information on directory objects such as end-user profile, location data, etc.
+- Query manager and response manager
+The query manager and response manager are responsible for processing the query and response messages between DUA and DSA.
+
+The end user can directly access his/her own directory service to update and manage directory information for customized directory services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional model for customizable personal directory services, showing the interaction between three main components: User, Gateway, and Manageable IP network.
+
+- User:** A yellow box containing the **DUA** (Directory User Agent).
+- Gateway:** A pink box containing the **Query Manager** and **Response Manager**, which are connected by a bidirectional arrow.
+- Manageable IP network:** A light blue box containing the **Directory Service**, which includes the **DSA** (Directory System Agent) and the **DIB** (Directory Information Base). The DSA and DIB are connected by a bidirectional arrow.
+
+Arrows indicate the flow of information:
+
+
+- A bidirectional arrow connects the DUA in the User box to the Gateway box.
+- A bidirectional arrow connects the Gateway box to the Directory Service in the Manageable IP network box.
+- A bidirectional arrow connects the DUA in the User box directly to the DSA in the Directory Service.
+
+Functional model for customizable personal directory services diagram
+
+Note) DUA: Directory User Agent, DSA: Directory System Agent
+ DIB: Directory Information Base - user profile, location data etc
+
+**Figure I.1 – Functional model for customizable personal directory services**
+
+Personal directory services offer the following functionalities:
+
+- Creation and deletion of end-user information in a distributed database maintained in the network.
+- Downloading and removal of information.
+- Modifications of information in the end-user management database.
+- Retrieval of information contents from any location.
+- Retrieval of object identifiers for end users.
+- Reconfiguration of end-user information when the end user changes the home site (e.g., virtual home environment).
+
+#### **I.1.3 Service scenarios and procedures for customizable personal directory services**
+
+In general, a directory service should provide the following four types of service:
+
+- Mapping name → number or address
+ For example, the name of an object may be mapped onto its network address. Note that this is exactly the service provided by a phone book or through telephone inquiries.
+- Mapping number or address → set of names
+ This service is equivalent to a "yellow pages" function.
+- Mapping object → set of names
+ A set of objects is identified by one single name.
+- Secure communication
+ Authentication as well as mechanisms for electronic signatures are provided.
+
+In customizable personal directory services, the following scenarios are considered:
+
+- End user's access to his/her own directory.
+- Retrieval of information from a directory.
+
+The service procedures for accessing the end user's own directory are shown in Figure I.2. The end users directly communicate with their own directory in a customizable IP network. Once the authentication procedure is completed, the end users can modify and get their own end-user information from the directory. The directory also contains the end user's location information; such information is updated as the end user moves on to another location.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User as User (DUA)
+ participant DSA as Manageable IP network (DSA)
+ participant MS as Management System
+
+ User->>DSA: Login at user's directory service
+ DSA-->>MS: Authentication, Authorization (M1, M2)
+ MS-->>DSA:
+ DSA-->>User: Confirm
+ User->>DSA: Access of user's data
+ DSA-->>MS: Retrieval user's DIB (add, read, modify, delete etc) (M1, M3, M4)
+ MS-->>DSA:
+ DSA-->>User: Result
+ User->>DSA: Logout
+ DSA-->>User:
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the message flow for accessing the end user's own directory. It involves three main entities: User (DUA), Manageable IP network (DSA), and Management System. The process begins with the User (DUA) sending a 'Login at user's directory service' message to the Manageable IP network (DSA). The DSA then sends an 'Authentication, Authorization' message to the Management System, which is associated with events M1 and M2. The Management System responds to the DSA. The DSA then sends a 'Confirm' message back to the User (DUA). Next, the User (DUA) sends an 'Access of user's data' message to the DSA. The DSA sends a 'Retrieval user's DIB (add, read, modify, delete etc)' message to the Management System, associated with events M1, M3, and M4. The Management System responds to the DSA. The DSA then sends a 'Result' message back to the User (DUA). Finally, the User (DUA) sends a 'Logout' message to the DSA, and the DSA responds back to the User (DUA).
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flow for accessing the end user's own directory between User (DUA), Manageable IP network (DSA), and Management System.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Message flow for accessing the end user's own directory**
+
+The following are some of the possible fault management events that may be sent to the management system:
+
+- M1 Directory service unavailable due to a communication or database problem.
+- M2 Authentication failure; this event may be reported when fraud is suspected, e.g., based on a repeated pattern of failed login attempts within a relatively short period of time.
+- M3 Unauthorized end user; the following are two common cases:
+ - End-user information in the message does not match the end-user information for the existing authorization. This event is also important in fraud detection.
+ - The end user does not have sufficient authority to retrieve, modify or delete requested information.
+- M4 Unable to update the database in case of modify and delete operations.
+
+The service procedures for the retrieval of directory information are shown in Figure I.3. The end user sends a search query to the gateway with information to be searched (e.g., name). The query manager within the gateway selects the appropriate directory service system in the CIP network and sends the information request to the designated directory service system. After the retrieval of DIB information, the response manager in the gateway returns a response with the corresponding information (address, number, etc.) to the end user.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant DUA as User (DUA)
+ participant Gateway
+ participant DSA as Manageable IP network (DSA)
+
+ DUA->>Gateway: Query (name etc)
+ Note over DUA, Gateway: Search directory service system by Query Manager
+ Gateway->>DSA: Request Information
+ Note over DSA: Retrieval DIB of directory service (add, read, modify, delete etc)
+ DSA-->>Gateway: Return Information
+ Note over Gateway, DUA: Mapping name on information by Response Manager
+ Gateway-->>DUA: Response (address, number etc)
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flow for directory information retrieval between User (DUA), Gateway, and Manageable IP network (DSA).
+
+**Figure I.3 – Message flow for the retrieval of information in a directory**
+
+### **I.2 Customizable access control services**
+
+Customizable access control provides the end user with some controllability while accessing his/her own service profiles and transport capabilities (e.g., VPN).
+
+#### **I.2.1 Objectives of customizable access control services**
+
+Allowing for a profile-driven access control mechanism for traffic aggregates is one of the key features of customizable IP networks. This is because end-user applications involve data with different content and bandwidth/QoS requirements.
+
+#### **I.2.2 Functional model for customizable access control services**
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph Access_Gateway [Access Gateway]
+ SLA[SLA Negotiation Block]
+ TH[Transport Handling Block]
+ UAB[User Access Block]
+ SLA <--> TH
+ TH <--> UAB
+ end
+ EndUser[End User]
+ NGN[NGN Core Network]
+
+ EndUser --- BS1[Binding Stacks]
+ BS1 --- Access_Gateway
+ Access_Gateway --- BS2[Binding Stacks]
+ BS2 --- NGN
+ BS1 -.-> BS2
+ BS2 -.-> BS1
+
+```
+
+Legend:
+ — : Binding Stacks
+ - - - : Information Flow
+
+Functional model diagram showing End User, Access Gateway (with SLA, Transport, and User Access Blocks), and NGN Core Network connected by Binding Stacks and Information Flow.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Functional model for customizable access control services**
+
+Figure I.4 shows the functional model for customizable access control services. In particular, access gateway functions that enable provisioned access control to end users are identified. Access gateway functions consist of three major functional blocks described as follows:
+
+- **User access block**
+The user access block is where the end user's information request is logged first. Information deemed critical in managing the network is translated into a standard object format and forwarded to the transport handling block.
+- **Transport handling block**
+The transport handling block provides communications paths between the end-user access block and the SLA negotiation block. All information forwarded from the end-user access block is utilized by the transport handling block, which provides common data storage such that new access control information can be easily inserted into the access handling environment. Note that this is one of the key concepts in customizable access from the end users' viewpoint, i.e., the enforcement of service level agreements must be robust and reliable.
+- **SLA negotiation block**
+The SLA negotiation block supports the functionalities for handling SLA negotiation requests between the end user and the CIP provider based on the end user's profile for access control. Charging and billing procedures also form an important part of the functionality of the SLA negotiation block, which acts as the "front-end" for user-network communication and completes the binding for direct communication with the end user. Once this is done, the established session is updated, and a tag for billing and accounting processes is kept.
+
+The SLA negotiation block needs only to update its internal records and communicate the change in request to the CIP provider; an entirely new session establishment is unnecessary. Billing information is passed on to the end user once its session is completed.
+
+#### **I.2.3 Service procedures for customizable access control services**
+
+- **Negotiation of service profile information**
+Dynamic negotiation on service profile information occurs in the SLA negotiation block to which end users are linked. Therefore, access to the CIP network can be partitioned dynamically using the functional blocks of the access gateway for customizable access control.
+- **Service procedures for customizable access by the end user**
+Figure I.5 shows an example of the flow diagram for the end user-driven access control. The end user sends a request to the access gateway using service provision requests, with the end-user access block looking up the CIP network conditioning database and passing the request on to the transport handling block and finally to the SLA negotiation block. The SLA negotiation block must provide application multiplexing. There should also be a provision to accommodate changes in the end users' service level agreements dynamically in an ongoing established session as well as to admit the end-user profile during roaming. Session requirements are negotiated with the CIP provider while a set of default requested objects is maintained in the internal database. Based on the end user's requests, the access gateway opens a session with the CIP provider and negotiates with the CIP provider on the directory, access control and security.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant AG as Access Gateway
+ participant NE as Network Element
+ participant MS as Management System
+
+ User->>AG: Access request
+ AG->>NE: Open session control
+ NE-->>MS: M1
+ AG->>NE: Request service
+ NE-->>MS: M2
+ AG->>NE: SLA negotiation for service provisioning
+ NE-->>MS: M3
+ NE-->>AG: Accept and confirm
+ AG-->>MS: M4
+ AG->>User: Accept service request
+ AG->>User: Access granted
+ AG->>NE: Connection established
+ NE-->>MS: M5
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow between User, Access Gateway, Network Element, and Management System. The process starts with an 'Access request' from User to Access Gateway. The Access Gateway sends 'Open session control' to the Network Element, which triggers event M1. Then, 'Request service' is sent to the Network Element, triggering event M2. This is followed by 'SLA negotiation for service provisioning' (indicated by a bracket and vertical dots), which triggers event M3. The Network Element sends 'Accept and confirm' to the Access Gateway, triggering event M4, which then sends 'Accept service request' to the User. Finally, 'Access granted' is sent to the User, and 'Connection established' is sent to the Network Element, triggering event M5.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Example flow diagram for customizable access control services**
+
+For example, during session initiation, SLA negotiation and connection establishment, fault management events may be sent to the management system. The potential fault scenarios are as follows:
+
+- M1 Session initiation failure.
+- M2 Service request processing failure.
+- M3 SLA negotiation failure: SLA negotiation failure may occur as a result of fault in the service layer or transport layer in a rather complex message flow between a number of CIP network elements such as access gateway, bandwidth managers and policy managers. Therefore, further investigation is required regarding the breakdown of this event.
+- M4 SLA provision failure on the access gateway
+- M5 Connection establishment failure: The significance of this event is the determination of the management requirement for the connection (or connections) associated with a session.
+
+##### - Billing and accounting procedures
+
+The SLA negotiation block updates its reference database after the session is initiated and starts the system log module once the session is initiated. This is required for billing and accounting purposes. In particular, the logs are important for the collection and distribution of the end user's preferences, application requirements, CIP network device capabilities on the CIP provider side, and availing of the accounting policy information from the network operator. Once successful connection with the CIP provider is realized upon the authentication and verification of the end-user profile, the end-user access block is notified; the end user then starts receiving his/her service requests.
+
+##### - Support for mobility and seamless connectivity based on customizable access control
+
+Since the customizable access control scheme provides gateway access using IP addresses, supporting the cross network policy management for mobile end users during roaming is equally important. Such functional components provide the required policies governing end
+
+users accessing third-party networks and crossing geographical boundaries. It keeps in constant contact with other cross-network location registers of the geographically dispersed but interconnected networks, exchanging accounting, service feature profiles and control data for local and roaming subscribers. Within an established session, the SLA negotiation block updates its internal database and starts negotiating with the CIP provider in case of a change in the end user's service requests or profile without creating a new session or disrupting the flow in the established one. If the CIP provider does not entertain this new request, the SLA negotiation block notifies the end user of the unavailability of resources while continuing to service the earlier request. The end user has the choice to either go along with or terminate the ongoing session. After the end user has terminated the session, the SLA negotiation block makes a final write to its internal database regarding the session statistics and makes note of the accounting tag before releasing the session and passing on the information to the end-user access block and finally to the end user.
+
+### **I.3 Customizable end-to-end QoS services**
+
+#### **I.3.1 Objectives of customizable end-to-end QoS service**
+
+Customizable end-to-end QoS service intends to provide end users with QoS access and control to satisfy the support for multiple-type services. The end user negotiates with the CIP provider on how to get network resources for end-to-end QoS and handle faults and bottlenecks that may hinder end-to-end QoS. Specifically, the end user is able to negotiate with the CIP provider on service level provision.
+
+Target objectives of the customizable, end-to-end QoS service include:
+
+- Provide the end user with control of QoS parameters.
+- Provide the end user with the status of end-to-end QoS.
+- Allow the CIP provider to support various end-to-end QoS requests.
+- Allow the CIP provider to manage QoS in a non-homogeneous QoS network.
+
+Customizable, end-to-end QoS services offer the following requirements:
+
+- Creation, modification and removal of customizable, end-to-end QoS service profiles.
+- Notifying the end user of the negotiation on customizable, end-to-end QoS services dynamically.
+- Monitoring the network and ascertaining whether end-to-end QoS can be satisfied.
+- Provision of a network to satisfy end-to-end QoS based on the service profile.
+
+#### **I.3.2 Functional model and procedure for customizable end-to-end QoS service**
+
+This clause describes the functional model for accessing and managing end-to-end QoS service. Figure I.6 shows the functional model for the customizable end-to-end QoS service. This model includes a service managing block that is responsible for handling end-user requests and data, and an agent that negotiates on the provision with the CIP provider to satisfy end-to-end QoS.
+
+- Customizable end-to-end QoS end-user agent (QUA)
+QUA consists of the request functional block and negotiation functional block. The request manager receives the end user's request and verifies whether the request is valid within the network resources across the CIP network. The negotiation manager receives notifications from the customizable end-to-end QoS network manager (QNM), determines whether the end user's end-to-end QoS request is guaranteed, and re-negotiates with the end user regarding the handling of end-to-end QoS exceptions, if any.
+
+- Customizable end-to-end QoS network manager (QNM)
+QNM receives instructions from QUA. Bandwidth, delay, jitter, packet loss and other QoS guarantee mechanisms are then notified. QoS request mismatches are resolved during negotiations with the CIP network according to the nominal values of end-user requests pertaining to the allocation and increment of bandwidth, change of QoS mechanisms, tuning of QoS parameters to network-supported provision, rerouting and protection, etc.
+
+
+
+Y.1292(08)\_F1.6
+
+Figure I.6 – Functional model for the customizable end-to-end QoS service. The diagram shows a User on the left connected via a dashed line labeled 'UNI' to a 'Customer manageable IP network' box. Inside this box is a 'Manageable end-to-end QoS service' box, which contains an 'e2e QoS user agent' and an 'e2e QoS network manager'. Below this is a 'Network' box. A horizontal dashed line separates the 'Control plane' (top) from the 'User plane' (bottom). Arrows indicate communication: a dashed arrow from User to e2e QoS user agent, a solid arrow from e2e QoS user agent to e2e QoS network manager, a solid arrow from e2e QoS network manager to Network, and a solid arrow from Network back to e2e QoS network manager.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Functional model for the customizable end-to-end QoS service**
+
+In the procedures for the customizable end-to-end QoS service, the end user creates and registers customizable end-to-end QoS service with his/her initial requirements for end-to-end QoS. The end-to-end QoS end-user agent (QUA) can poll or obtain notification regarding QoS performance from an access node and an edge router of the CIP network. Bandwidth, delay, jitter and packet loss are the basic parameters for the customizable QoS performance. When the end-to-end QoS performance falls below the threshold level requested by the end user, QUA takes appropriate actions based on its stored default values to recover from such service level deterioration. If QUA is unable to negotiate with the CIP provider, the end user can re-negotiate the required QoS to request the guarantee of appropriate QoS levels.
+
+The interface between the end user and the customizable end-to-end QoS function provides messages to:
+
+- Create and delete the QoS profile in the customizable end-to-end QoS function.
+- Notify the end user of the deterioration in the QoS level.
+- Make a compromise between the end user and QoS function when the end user's requests cannot be satisfied.
+
+The interface between the customizable end-to-end QoS function and CIP network provides messages to:
+
+- Notify QoS performance change for the customizable end-to-end QoS function.
+- Take QoS action on the CIP network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant MESS as Manageable end-to-end service
+ participant MIPN as Manageable IP network
+
+ User->>MESS: create QoS profile
+ User->>MIPN: create end-to-end connection
+ Note over MIPN: {events occur}
+ MIPN->>MESS: notify QoS performance changing
+ MESS->>MIPN: default or negotiated QoS action
+ Note over MESS: {QoS level degrades}
+ Note over MESS: {if QoS action fails to recover}
+ MESS->>User: notify QoS level degrading
+ Note over User: {if user wants other QoS action}
+ User->>MESS: take negotiation procedure
+ MESS->>MIPN: new negotiated QoS action
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the message flows for a customizable end-to-end QoS service scenario. It involves three main entities: User, Manageable end-to-end service, and Manageable IP network. The process begins with the User creating a QoS profile and establishing an end-to-end connection with the Manageable IP network. Subsequently, the Manageable IP network notifies the Manageable end-to-end service of changing QoS performance. The service then initiates a default or negotiated QoS action. If the QoS level degrades and the action fails to recover, the service notifies the User of the degrading QoS level. If the User desires a different QoS action, a negotiation procedure is initiated between the User and the Manageable end-to-end service, resulting in a new negotiated QoS action being implemented by the Manageable IP network.
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flows for the customizable end-to-end QoS service scenario between User, Manageable end-to-end service, and Manageable IP network.
+
+**Figure I.7 – Message flows for the customizable end-to-end QoS service scenario**
+
+#### I.3.3 Service scenario of customizable end-to-end QoS service
+
+An end user requests the CIP provider for an end-to-end connection with his/her QoS requirements. If QoS deteriorates, the customizable end-to-end QoS service will consider the following actions:
+
+- Provide more network resources or reroute for end-to-end connection.
+- Re-negotiate QoS parameters for end-to-end connection with the end user.
+
+When the CIP network does not consist of homogeneous equipment to satisfy the same QoS level, the customizable end-to-end QoS service should know the different capabilities and select the appropriate QoS mechanism.
+
+The following three scenarios are considered:
+
+- **Scenario 1 (selection of TE capability)**
+Suppose an end user wants a specific bandwidth guaranteed for peer-to-peer connection, such as the VoIP network. First, the end user sends his/her connection request to the CIP network. The CIP network then receives this request and checks the status of available resources. Afterward, the CIP network responds to the end user with two options: best-effort delivery with admission control and guaranteed delivery available end-to-end communication path.
+- **Scenario 2 (priority assignment with cost option)**
+In this scenario, the end-to-end QoS service offers priority scheduling. In case of congestion on the end-to-end path, higher priority may be selected. When the status of the path becomes normal, the priority provision returns to the normal condition to save cost.
+- **Scenario 3 (re-negotiation of TE capability)**
+When QoS deteriorates, and all options are not applicable, end users are notified accordingly, and re-negotiation is held with the end user on how to satisfy end-to-end QoS.
+
+### I.4 End-user customizable location monitoring services
+
+The end-user customizable location monitoring service is a service that enables the management and monitoring of end users' location information anytime, anywhere and regardless of the access technology they are using (fixed, wireless).
+
+#### I.4.1 Objectives of the end-user customizable location monitoring service
+
+The main objective of the end-user customizable location monitoring service is that an end user retrieves other end users' location information from a location information functional database. In many cases, end users are interested in communicating with a given set of their interested peers. Another objective is to provide basic information support to other services, such as emergency services.
+
+#### I.4.2 Functional model for the end-user customizable location monitoring services
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional model for the end-user customizable location monitoring service. A central 'Manageable IP Network' (shaded pink) contains three databases: a green 'Customer-based Location Information Database' and two yellow 'Provider-owned Location Information Database A' and 'Provider-owned Location Information Database B'. A 'Customer' (blue box) is connected to the Customer-based database. Arrows show data flow from the Customer-based database to both Provider-owned databases. From Provider-owned Database A, arrows point to 'Unmonitored Customer A', 'Monitored Customer B', and 'Monitored Customer C'. From Provider-owned Database B, arrows point to 'Unmonitored Customer D' and 'Unmonitored Customer E'.
+
+Functional model for the end-user customizable location monitoring service diagram
+
+**Figure I.8 – Functional model for the end-user customizable location monitoring service**
+
+The following functions are required to support the end-user customizable location monitoring service:
+
+- Functions required on the end-user side
+ - Requests regarding other end users' locations as sent to the customizable IP network.
+ - Managing monitored end users' location information.
+- Functions required on the CIP network side
+ - Managing their respective end users' location information.
+ - Responding to end-user location requests
+
+As depicted in Figure I.8, two types of functional databases are required to support the end-user customizable location monitoring service: one is a CIP provider-owned location information database with the location information of CIP network end users. This database is an origin network location information database such as home location register/visitor location register, domain name system and home agent/foreign agent binding cache. Another is a customer-based location information database containing processed location information of customer end users. This database consists of various location information such as GPS location information and location information combined with other end-user information such as availability and connectivity.
+
+- CIP provider-owned location information database
+This functional block is used to maintain and manage the location information of all CIP network end users.
+- Customer-based location information database
+This functional block is used to request for, update, add and delete end-user location information to/from the CIP provider-owned location information database of the other end user.
+
+#### **I.4.3 Service scenarios of end-user customizable location monitoring services**
+
+An end user is interested in knowing the location information of its peers. In this scenario, security issues such as authentication, authorization and accounting are not covered by the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+The following two scenarios are identified:
+
+- End-user-to-end-user-based location information database to the CIP provider-owned location information database
+This scenario is a single-mode operation. An end user requests the other end user's location information once. If the end user-based location information database does not have the other location information, a request is issued to the CIP provider-owned location information database.
+- End-user-to-end user-based location information database to monitored end user
+This scenario is a continuous-mode operation. An end user requests for the other end user's location information periodically. After the single-mode operation, the end user-based location information database contains the monitored end user's location information. Therefore, the end user-based location information database issues a request to the monitored end user directly.
+
+In these two scenarios, the end-user-based location information database may not need to share its network resources directly with an end user. This is because the CIP provider-owned location information may be owned by the CIP provider. The CIP provider-owned location information database should manage all their respective end users' location information.
+
+The first scenario is a single-mode operation scenario whose service procedure is shown in Figure I.9. In this scenario, an end user requests for the other end user's location information from the end-user-based location information database with a single-mode start message. In the case where the end-user-based location information database does not have the corresponding requested end user's information, a request is issued to the CIP provider-owned location information database to such effect. After receiving the request message, the provider-owned location information database responds by sending location information to the end-user-based location information database. This information is processed by the end-user-based location information database; such processed information is then provided to the requesting end user.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Customer
+ participant CBLIDB as Customer-based Location Information Database
+ participant POLIDB as Provider-owned Location Information Database
+
+ Customer->>CBLIDB: Single-mode Start
+ CBLIDB->>POLIDB: Request information
+ POLIDB-->>CBLIDB: Response raw information
+ Note over POLIDB, CBLIDB: Finding procedure
+ CBLIDB-->>Customer: Response Information
+ Note over CBLIDB: Processing procedure
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the single-mode operation service scenario. It involves three entities: Customer, Customer-based Location Information Database (CBLIDB), and Provider-owned Location Information Database (POLIDB). The process begins with the Customer sending a 'Single-mode Start' message to the CBLIDB. The CBLIDB then sends a 'Request information' message to the POLIDB. The POLIDB responds with 'Response raw information' to the CBLIDB. This exchange is grouped under the 'Finding procedure'. Finally, the CBLIDB sends 'Response Information' back to the Customer, with the internal step of 'Processing procedure' indicated between the database and the customer.
+
+Sequence diagram for single-mode operation service scenario showing interactions between Customer, Customer-based Location Information Database, and Provider-owned Location Information Database.
+
+**Figure I.9 – Service procedure for the single-mode operation service scenario**
+
+The second scenario is a continuous-mode operation scenario whose service procedure is shown in Figure I.10. In this scenario, an end user requests for monitored end user's location information from the information database with a continuous-mode start message. The first operation is almost the same as the single-mode operation service scenario. Note, however, that the end user-based location information database continuously adds other monitored end users to the end-user list. The end-user-based location information database periodically provides the processed information to the end user. If the end-user-based location information database receives a stop message, however, this process stops; the end-user-based location database then deletes the monitored end user's information from its list.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Customer
+ participant CBLIDB as Customer-based Location Information Database
+ participant MonitoredCustomer as Monitored Customer
+
+ Customer->>CBLIDB: Continuous-mode Start
+ CBLIDB->>MonitoredCustomer: Request information
+ MonitoredCustomer-->>CBLIDB: Response raw information
+ Note over MonitoredCustomer, CBLIDB: Finding procedure
+ CBLIDB-->>Customer: Response Information
+ Note over CBLIDB: Processing and Add procedure
+
+ CBLIDB->>MonitoredCustomer: Request information
+ MonitoredCustomer-->>CBLIDB: Response raw information
+ Note over MonitoredCustomer, CBLIDB: Finding procedure
+ CBLIDB-->>Customer: Response Information
+ Note over CBLIDB: Processing procedure
+
+ CBLIDB->>MonitoredCustomer: Request information
+ MonitoredCustomer-->>CBLIDB: Response raw information
+ Note over MonitoredCustomer, CBLIDB: Finding procedure
+ CBLIDB-->>Customer: Response Information
+ Note over CBLIDB: Processing procedure
+
+ Customer->>CBLIDB: Stop
+ Note over CBLIDB: Delete procedure
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the continuous-mode operation service scenario. It involves three entities: Customer, Customer-based Location Information Database (CBLIDB), and Monitored Customer. The process starts with the Customer sending a 'Continuous-mode Start' message to the CBLIDB. The CBLIDB then enters a loop where it repeatedly sends 'Request information' to the Monitored Customer, receives 'Response raw information' back, and then sends 'Response Information' to the Customer. Each of these three cycles is grouped under a 'Finding procedure' bracket. The internal processing within the CBLIDB is labeled as 'Processing and Add procedure' for the first cycle and 'Processing procedure' for the subsequent two. Finally, the Customer sends a 'Stop' message to the CBLIDB, which triggers a 'Delete procedure' within the database.
+
+Sequence diagram for continuous-mode operation service scenario showing repeated interactions between Customer, Customer-based Location Information Database, and Monitored Customer.
+
+**Figure I.10 – Service procedure of continuous-mode operation service scenario**
+
+### **I.5 Customizable home networking services**
+
+#### **I.5.1 Objectives of the customizable home networking service**
+
+Home networking services can be defined as those providing home automation services, home entertainment services, security services and Internet service to the home. Home automation services are used to control lighting, appliances and climate control at home. Home entertainment services enable the end user to access audio, video and television services at home. Home networking services may also be extended to support the interconnection among various devices with radio frequency identifier (RFID) tags and increase the scale of network connections in comparison with the home networking services.
+
+#### **I.5.2 Functional model for the customizable home networking service**
+
+There are two modes of operation for home networking services: one is the local service access inside the home or within the home area network, which starts service invocation from inside the home and remote service access from external networks.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture for home networking services, divided into 'Outside Home' and 'Inside Home' sections by a vertical line. On the 'Outside Home' side, there is a cloud labeled 'Manageable IP Network' containing a 'Service Gateway'. To the left of the cloud, 'Customers' are shown with a person at a computer, a mobile phone, and a radio tower. On the 'Inside Home' side, a pink house outline contains a 'Home Network' with various devices. A 'RGW' (Residential Gateway) is positioned at the boundary between the 'Manageable IP Network' and the 'Home Network'.
+
+Architecture diagram for the home networking service in the customizable IP network.
+
+**Figure I.11 – Architecture for the home networking service in the customizable IP network**
+
+As shown in Figure I.11, service gateway functions within the customizable IP network act as the portal to allow remote access and control from the external network to the home network. The service gateway enables the remote end user to manage home networking services and devices via the residential gateway. The following functions and capabilities are provided by the service gateway to support home networking services:
+
+- End-user authentication and authorization.
+- Service management.
+- Service usage measurement.
+- Secure connection/session establishment.
+- Firewall function to protect against possible threats.
+- Home directory service function that collects and presents instances of home equipment, equipment services and contents to the end user.
+- Remote control function.
+- Remote configuration, management function.
+- Web service-based interface to have access and control.
+- Policy decision function to manage QoS.
+
+A residential gateway is a device that interconnects various home networking devices and acts as a mediator between the end user and service gateway. The residential gateway allows intelligent end user services to be created and managed within the home network as well. The details of the residential gateway functions are not addressed in this Recommendation, however.
+
+#### 1.5.3 Service scenario and procedures for customizable home networking services
+
+Figure I.12 shows an example of information flows of the home networking service to enable an end user to "turn on the lights" from a remote site. SIP, HTTP and SOAP are assumed to be available for use in delivering control messages to communicate between gateways and home devices. The following procedures show the information flows required for a "turn on the lights" home networking service:
+
+- 1) A remote end user is trying to log on to the service gateway to have access to home networking services.
+- 2) If the end user is successfully authenticated and authorized, then the service gateway returns an OK message to the end user.
+- 3) The end user sends a control message such as "turn on the light on the following device in the living room" to the service gateway.
+- 4) The service gateway then requests for a session establishment between the service gateway and residential gateway and home device to forward the control message.
+- 5) Once the session is successfully established, the service gateway sends to the home device the control message "turn on the light on the following device in the living room" via the residential gateway.
+- 6) The response from the home device is acknowledged.
+- 7) The OK control message is delivered back to the end user.
+- 8) The end user logs off to quit the home networking service.
+- 9) The session is terminated between the service gateway and residential gateway and home device.
+- 10) The session between the end user and service gateway is ended.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RC as Remote Customer
+ participant SG as Service GW
+ participant RG as Residential GW
+
+ RC->>SG: 1. Login (ID, PASSWD)
+ activate SG
+ SG-->>RC: 2. OK
+ deactivate SG
+
+ RC->>SG: 3. http://www.example.com/light?op=on
+ activate SG
+ SG->>RG: 4. Session Establishment
+ activate RG
+ RG-->>SG: 5. Turn on the lights
+ deactivate RG
+ SG-->>RC: 6. OK
+ deactivate SG
+
+ RC->>SG: 7. OK
+ activate SG
+ SG->>RC: 8. Logoff
+ deactivate SG
+
+ RC->>SG: 9. OK
+ activate SG
+ SG->>RG: 9. Session Termination
+ activate RG
+ RG-->>SG:
+ deactivate RG
+ deactivate SG
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for a home networking service. It involves three main entities: a Remote Customer, a Service Gateway (GW), and a Residential Gateway (GW). The process begins with the Remote Customer sending a login request (ID and password) to the Service GW. The Service GW authenticates and authorizes the user, returning an OK message. Next, the Remote Customer sends a control message (a URL to turn on a light) to the Service GW. The Service GW then initiates a session establishment with the Residential GW. The Residential GW sends a response (turn on the lights) back to the Service GW, which then forwards an OK message to the Remote Customer. The Remote Customer sends an OK message to the Service GW, which then sends a logoff message back to the Remote Customer. Finally, the Remote Customer sends an OK message to the Service GW, which then sends a session termination message to the Residential GW, and the session is terminated.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flows for a home networking service. The participants are Remote Customer, Service GW, and Residential GW. The process involves login, session establishment, control message delivery, and session termination.
+
+Figure I.12 – Example of information flows of the home networking service
+
+### I.6 Client networking services with QoS and security
+
+#### I.6.1 Objectives of the client networking service with QoS and security
+
+The customizable IP network supports functions to control QoS and security capabilities simultaneously or partly as requested by end users. The CIP network expects a secured path to be associated strictly with QoS provision for different types of services; hence the need to classify networking service features in QoS and security.
+
+An example of a client networking service with QoS and security is to provide authentication mechanisms at the level of aggregates of packets such as channels or flows such that these checks need not be done on individual packets. This suggests an architecture wherein authentication and other resource management decisions are initially processed to minimize the cost of subsequent decisions. Consequently, multilayered architecture to provide QoS and security procedures may be needed as shown in Figure I.13.
+
+
+
+Figure I.13: Example architecture for the client networking service with QoS and security. The diagram shows a three-layer architecture. The top layer is a green oval containing four green circles, labeled 'Client network A'. The middle layer is a light blue oval labeled 'Server layer network of NGN' and 'Manageable IP network/NGN', containing four blue circles and two vertical blue ovals. The bottom layer is a red oval containing four red circles, labeled 'Client network B'. Dotted green arrows point from the top green circles to the top blue circles, labeled 'Service QoS and security requirements with green'. Dotted red arrows point from the bottom red circles to the bottom blue circles, labeled 'Service QoS and security requirements with red'. Horizontal solid arrows connect the top green circles, and horizontal solid arrows connect the bottom red circles. Horizontal solid arrows connect the top blue circles, and horizontal solid arrows connect the bottom blue circles. Vertical dotted arrows connect the top green circles to the top blue circles, and the bottom red circles to the bottom blue circles, labeled 'Inter-layer interaction'. Red dotted arrows connect the top blue circles to the top vertical ovals, and the bottom blue circles to the bottom vertical ovals, labeled 'Intra-layer interaction'. A horizontal solid arrow connects the two vertical ovals. A label 'Y.1292(08)\_FI.13' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure I.13 – Example architecture for the client networking service with QoS and security**
+
+#### I.6.2 Overlay model for client networking services with QoS and security
+
+Figure I.14 shows the overlay model for client networking services with QoS and security. In particular, an example of overlay virtual networking is presented. Virtual networking is applied to the model based on independently multi-layered architecture wherein incoming packets are classified at the edge and packets for the secured QoS service are forwarded to policy-based overlay networks; thus providing secured networking and QoS managed functions through admission control and other control mechanisms. Based on the functional architecture, a networking feature is necessary to adopt QoS and security features efficiently.
+
+
+
+Figure I.14: Overlay model for client networking services with QoS and security. The diagram shows a multi-layered network architecture. At the top is a 'Client Network' (green oval) connected to a 'Control Server' (blue server icon). Below the Client Network is the 'Overlay Server Layer Network' (blue oval), which contains virtual nodes VN-1 through VN-8. These virtual nodes are mapped to physical nodes in the 'Server Layer Network' (blue oval), which includes Edge Nodes (EN1-EN5) and Server Layer Core Nodes (P1-P4). The 'Server Layer Network' is connected to a 'Manageable IP Network/NGN' (blue oval). A legend defines the components: EN: Edge Node, VER: Virtual client Edge Node, VCR: Virtual client Core Node, P: Server layer core Node, and a dashed red line for 'Overlay Path for Classified Packet'.
+
+Figure I.14 – Overlay model for client networking services with QoS and security
+
+An example of the routing management algorithms of the overlay model is presented in Figure I.15. This figure shows the procedure for virtual networking function (VNF) table construction. Control information is classified according to the incoming end-user information, with the control server making its own networking table in procedures c, d and e. The multiple virtual networking tables according to security level and required QoS level are applied to perform the routing functions over the overlay network. The primary goal of VNF provision on the overlay network is to provide multiple secured QoS paths at each level. The VNF routing function is performed independently of other VNF domains in the network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Classification of Service Type and Level for Incoming Packet] -- (a) --> B[Classification of Source & Destination Address]
+ A -- (b) --> C[Classification of Required Service QoS, Security]
+ B -- (c) --> D[Construction of Virtual Forwarding Information Base]
+ C -- (d) --> D
+ E[Policy Control Information Base Network Resource, Security] -- (e) --> D
+ D -- (f) --> F[Construction of Multiple VNF Virtual Networking Function Tables for QoS and Security]
+ style F stroke:#f00,stroke-width:2px
+
+```
+
+Figure I.15: Examples of table construction of virtual networking function in the overlay model. This flowchart illustrates the process of VNF table construction. It starts with 'Classification of Service Type and Level for Incoming Packet', which branches into (a) 'Classification of Source & Destination Address' and (b) 'Classification of Required Service (QoS, Security)'. Both (a) and (b) lead to (c) 'Construction of Virtual Forwarding Information Base'. Additionally, 'Policy Control Information Base (Network Resource, Security)' leads to (e) 'Construction of Virtual Forwarding Information Base'. The final step (f) is 'Construction of Multiple VNF (Virtual Networking Function) Tables for QoS and Security', which is highlighted with a red border.
+
+Figure I.15 – Examples of table construction of virtual networking function in the overlay model
+
+To make a forwarding information base from information on routing and policies, advanced control mechanisms are required to supply multilayered virtual client networking associated with end-user customizable networking features.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Example of functional architecture and service creation scenario for end-user customizable VPN services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+VPN will be one of the most promising services in NGN according to the rapid increase in VPN service demands. The framework for the dynamic creation of VPN service based on intelligent/active networking will promote a variety of VPN application services. In a network based on service negotiation, a node with intelligent/active features is able to represent a solution to manage the entire volume of different requests coming from consumers.
+
+
+
+Figure II.1: Example of the functional architecture for end-user customizable VPN services. The diagram illustrates the interaction between VPN Users, a Manageable NGN Network, and Various Server Networks. VPN Users (VPN A and VPN B) connect via UNIy to a VPN Service Provision module (Security, Mobility, QoS, Resource Mediation, Subscriber Control). This module connects to the Access Gateway (UNIx) of the Manageable NGN Network. The network is divided into C/M-Plane (Control and Management) and U-Plane (User Plane). The C/M-Plane includes Soft Switch Functions (AAA, Service Control, Addressing, Naming, Signaling, OAM) and Service Management/Call Center, User Profile Management, Charging/Billing, QoS/SLA Management, and Routing, Signaling, OAM. The U-Plane includes Edge BE Router, Core BE Router, Edge BE Router, Ingress LER, Core LSR, Egress LER/GW, Edge MCU, Core Multicast Node, Edge MCU or GW, L1/L2 Node, and L1/L2 Node/GW. The network is connected to Various Server Networks (Existing Wireline/Wireless Network, PSTN/Cable/TV Network) via NNix, NNiy, and NNiz interfaces. Control and Management Flows are shown as red arrows between the VPN Service Provision module and the C/M-Plane.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Example of the functional architecture for end-user customizable VPN services**
+
+Security is definitely one of the key issues in VPN scenarios. An intelligent and active feature in VPN networking will assume an important role to provide flexible means for customizing services appropriately. The intelligent/active features for security in VPNs are exploited for adaptive secure routing and service capability. In particular, the security capability of VPN is negotiated with the C/M-plane of the IP network; its service level will be assigned to VPN end users.
+
+As shown in Figure II.1, the control and management functions of the customizable IP network represented in a control flow between a service provision module of VPNs and the C/M-plane module of the customizable IP network are established to deliver networking service capabilities from/to VPNs. The C/M-plane of the CIP network will need to be characterized to provide the above-mentioned networking capabilities to VPNs.
+
+In addition to the above-mentioned features, the following capabilities are characterized to provide intelligent/active VPN services in the CIP network:
+
+- Mobility.
+- Static/dynamic QoS provision.
+- Resource mediation for VPN services.
+- Subscriber control on VPNs' service capabilities.
+
+- Security negotiation/provision.
+
+From a functional standpoint in the intelligent VPN of the IP network, VPN is an active flow activated by appropriately customizing additional intelligent/active features in a VPN access node. This is achieved via one underlying program and their injected programs, each associated with one of the intelligent/active VPN functions. The activation process is appropriately invoked vis-a-vis external topology, internal topology and the routing table of VPNs (with multiple virtual routing tables). By applying these parameters, a number of different VPNs are characterized by their own topology and management strategy.
+
+Figure II.2 shows an example of the functional architecture for implementing a customizable VPN. If VPNs are considered to be interconnected at different operators, implementation architecture for a customizable VPN may be as illustrated in Figure II.2. For example, the customizable VPN service requires the following three functions: service mediator, SLA mediator and access mediator.
+
+- Service mediator function
+ - AAA.
+ - Presentation.
+ - Subscription.
+- SLA mediator function
+ - Dynamic negotiation and re-negotiation of SLA.
+ - Synchronization with other SLA mediator.
+ - Communication with resource manager in the customizable IP network.
+- Access mediator function
+ - AAA.
+ - Directory transactions.
+ - Preference list handling.
+ - Service menu.
+ - End-user profile processing.
+ - Terminal types and mapping.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ VPN_A[VPN A] <--> SM[Service Mediator]
+ VPN_B[VPN B] <--> SM
+ SM <--> SLAM[SLA Mediator]
+ SLAM <--> AM[Access Mediator]
+ AM <--> VPN_A
+ AM <--> VPN_B
+ AM <--> NGN([Manageable NGN])
+ VPN_A <--> NGN
+ VPN_B <--> NGN
+
+```
+
+Figure II.2: Example of the implementation scenario for end-user customizable VPN. The diagram illustrates a functional architecture where two VPNs, VPN A and VPN B, are connected to a central Manageable NGN. Each VPN contains various devices like a laptop, a mobile phone, and a router. A Service Mediator is connected to both VPNs. An SLA Mediator is connected to the Service Mediator and the Access Mediator. The Access Mediator is connected to both VPNs. The Manageable NGN is at the bottom, connected to the Access Mediator and both VPNs.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Example of the implementation scenario for end-user customizable VPN**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H.323] Recommendation ITU-T H.323 (in force), *Packet-based multimedia communications systems*.
+<>
+- [b-ITU-T X.160] Recommendation ITU-T X.160 (1996), *Architecture for customer network management service for public data networks*.
+<>
+- [b-ITU-T Y.130] Recommendation ITU-T Y.130 (2000), *Information communication architecture*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 959] IETF RFC 959 (1985), *File Transfer Protocol (FTP)*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3261] IETF RFC 3261 (2002), *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol*.
+<>
+- [b-Foster] Foster I. (2003), *The Grid: Computing Without Bounds*, Scientific American Magazine, April, pp. 60-67.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1310**
+
+(03/2004)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Transport
+
+# --- **Transport of IP over ATM in public networks**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1310
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1310**
+
+# **Transport of IP over ATM in public networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+With the rapid growth of IP-based networks and applications in both private and public networks, it is necessary to consider arrangements to transport IP services over ATM in the public network environment.
+
+For the private network environment, the ATM Forum has specified Multi-Protocol Over ATM (MPOA) [ATM\_MPOA]. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has specified Classical IP Over ATM (C-IPOA) [CIP\_ATM] and Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP) [NHRP] and Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) [MPLS\_ARCH]. To ensure that public networks will interwork with each other supporting a set of services defined in this Recommendation, and to ensure the interworking of public and private networks, it is necessary to recommend the preferred approach for transporting IP over ATM in public networks.
+
+The approach adopted in this Recommendation is to identify generic requirements, key IP services and determine which IP over ATM approach is preferred for each service. It is preferable that the same approach is used for all services considered. This approach is recommended for all identified services using IP over ATM transport in public networks.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1310 was approved on 15 March 2004 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2004
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+# CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 2.1 Normative references..... | 1 |
+| 2.2 Informative references..... | 2 |
+| 3 Terms and definitions ..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Generic requirements..... | 5 |
+| 6 Framework architecture..... | 5 |
+| 6.1 Network architecture ..... | 6 |
+| 6.2 Protocol architecture..... | 8 |
+| 7 IP services..... | 10 |
+| 7.1 Mapping of IP QoS with ATM..... | 10 |
+| 7.2 IP Virtual Private Networks (IP-VPNs) ..... | 15 |
+| 8 Preferred network solution ..... | 17 |
+| 8.1 Recommended approach ..... | 17 |
+| 8.2 Framework for MPLS over ATM in public networks..... | 18 |
+| Appendix I – Approaches for IP over ATM ..... | 20 |
+| I.1 Classical IP over ATM ..... | 20 |
+| I.2 Multi-Protocol Over ATM (MPOA) ..... | 23 |
+| I.3 Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)..... | 25 |
+| Appendix II – Guidelines for mapping services to ATM connections ..... | 28 |
+| II.1 Mapping Intserv services to ATM connections..... | 28 |
+| II.2 Mapping Diffserv services over ATM ..... | 32 |
+| II.3 Intserv in MPLS over ATM ..... | 33 |
+| II.4 Diffserv in MPLS over ATM ..... | 33 |
+| Appendix III – Possible evolution scenarios to MPLS for IP over ATM in public
networks..... | 36 |
+| III.1 Introduction ..... | 36 |
+| III.2 Proposed scenarios ..... | 36 |
+| III.3 Hybrid ATM network..... | 37 |
+| Appendix IV – Example methods for IP-VPN support in MPLS/ATM public network..... | 46 |
+| IV.1 Introduction ..... | 46 |
+| IV.2 Scenario 1 ..... | 47 |
+| IV.3 Scenario 2 ..... | 49 |
+| BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... | 52 |
+
+
+
+# ITU-T Recommendation Y.1310
+
+# Transport of IP over ATM in public networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation addresses the transport of IP services over ATM. IP services in this Recommendation are defined as services provided at the IP layer. IP services in this Recommendation do not include those at the application layer (e.g., network banking).
+
+This Recommendation identifies the IP over ATM approach for public networks adopting ATM technology, including service provider networks and carrier networks, but does not preclude the same approach where applicable in access networks, private networks and end systems. Approaches taken into account include classical IPOA, MPOA, and MPLS. These approaches are described briefly in Appendix I.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+## 2.1 Normative references
+
+### 2.1.1 ITU-T
+
+- [I.321] ITU-T Recommendation I.321 (1991), *B-ISDN protocol reference model and its application*.
+- [I.326] ITU-T Recommendation I.326 (2003), *Functional architecture of transport networks based on ATM*.
+- [I.356] ITU-T Recommendation I.356 (2000), *B-ISDN ATM layer cell transfer performance*.
+- [I.361] ITU-T Recommendation I.361 (1999), *B-ISDN ATM layer specification*.
+- [I.364] ITU-T Recommendation I.364 (1999), *Support of the broadband connectionless data bearer service by the B-ISDN*.
+- [I.371] ITU-T Recommendation I.371 (2004), *Traffic control and congestion control in B-ISDN*.
+- [I.432] ITU-T Recommendations I.432.1 (1999), I.432.2 (1999), I.432.3 (1999) and I.432.4 (1999), *B-ISDN user-network interface – Physical layer specification*.
+- [Q.2931] ITU-T Recommendation Q.2931 (1995), *Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 2 – User-Network Interface (UNI) layer 3 specification for basic call/connection control*.
+- [Q.2941] ITU-T Recommendation Q.2941.2 (1999), *Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 2 – Generic identifier transport extensions*.
+- [Y.1311.1] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1311.1 (2001), *Network-based IP-VPN over MPLS architecture*.
+
+### 2.1.2 ISOC/IETF
+
+- [ATM\_MULTI] IETF RFC 2684 (1999), *Multiprotocol Encapsulation over ATM Adaptation Layer 5*.
+- [ATM\_VCID] IETF RFC 3038 (2001), *VCID Notification over ATM Link for LDP*.
+- [CIP\_ATM] IETF RFC 2225 (1998), *Classical IP and ARP over ATM*.
+- [CONTROL\_SER] IETF RFC 2211 (1997), *Specification of the Controlled-Load Network Element Service*.
+- [CR\_LDP] IETF RFC 3212 (2002), *Constraint-Based LSP Setup using LDP*.
+- [DIFF\_AF] IETF RFC 2597 (1999), *Assured Forwarding PHB Group*.
+- [DIFF\_ARCH] IETF RFC 2475 (1998), *An Architecture for Differentiated Services*.
+- [DIFF\_HEADER] IETF RFC 2474 (1998), *Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers*.
+- [DIFF\_EF] IETF RFC 2598 (1999), *An Expedited Forwarding PHB*.
+- [GUAR\_SER] IETF RFC 2212 (1997), *Specification of Guaranteed Quality of Service*.
+- [IP\_V4] IETF RFC 791 (1981), *Internet Protocol*.
+- [IP\_V6] IETF RFC 2460 (1998), *Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification*.
+- [LDP] IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*.
+- [MPLS\_ARCH] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+- [MPLS\_ATM] IETF RFC 3035 (2001), *MPLS using LDP and ATM VC Switching*.
+- [MPLS\_DIFF] IETF RFC 3270 (2002), *Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Support of Differentiated Services*.
+- [MPLS\_ENCAPS] IETF RFC 3032 (2001), *MPLS Label Stack Encoding*.
+- [NHRP] IETF RFC 2332 (1998), *NBMA Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP)*.
+- [RSVP\_AGG] IETF RFC 3175 (2001), *Aggregation of RSVP for IPv4 and IPv6 Reservations*.
+- [RSVP\_FUN] IETF RFC 2205 (1997), *Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) – Version 1 Functional Specification*.
+- [RSVP\_REFR] IETF RFC 2961 (2001), *RSVP Refresh Overhead Reduction Extensions*.
+- [RSVP\_TE] IETF RFC 3209 (2001), *RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP Tunnels*.
+- [TCP] IETF RFC 793 (1981), *Transmission Control Protocol*.
+- [UDP] IETF RFC 768 (1980), *User Datagram Protocol*.
+
+### 2.1.3 ATM Forum
+
+- [ATM\_MPOA] ATM Forum AF-MPOA-0087.000 (1997), *Multi-Protocol Over ATM Specification v1.0*.
+
+## 2.2 Informative references
+
+### 2.2.1 ISOC/IETF
+
+- [BGP\_VPN] IETF RFC 2547 (1999), *BGP/MPLS VPNs*.
+
+# 3 Terms and definitions
+
+This clause lists alphabetically the acronyms of the key terms used in this Recommendation and the references to their sources of definitions. Refer to clause 4 for the acronyms and to clause 2 for the references:
+
+| | |
+|---------|-------------|
+| CR-LDP | [CR_LDP] |
+| DS | [DIFF_ARCH] |
+| DSCP | [DIFF_ARCH] |
+| FEC | [MPLS_ARCH] |
+| LIB | [MPLS_ARCH] |
+| LSR | [MPLS_ARCH] |
+| MPLS | [MPLS_ARCH] |
+| PHB | [DIFF_ARCH] |
+| RSVP | [RSVP_FUN] |
+| RSVP-TE | [RSVP_TE] |
+| VPN | [BGP_VPN] |
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------|
+| AAL | ATM Adaptation Layer |
+| ABR | Available Bit Rate |
+| ABT | ATM Block Transfer |
+| AESA | ATM End System Address |
+| ARP | Address Resolution Protocol |
+| ATC | ATM Transfer Capability |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| ATMARP | ATM Address Resolution Protocol |
+| BGP | Border Gateway Protocol |
+| BUS | Broadcast and Unknown Server |
+| CE | Customer Edge |
+| CE | Customer Equipment |
+| C-IPOA | Classical IP over ATM |
+| CLP | Cell Loss Priority |
+| CLS | Controlled Load Service |
+| CoF | Coordination Function |
+| CR-LDP | Constraint-based Routing LDP |
+| DBR | Deterministic Bit Rate |
+| DS | Differentiated Services |
+| DSCP | Differentiated Service Code Point |
+| ER | Explicit Routing |
+| ES | End System |
+| FEC | Forwarding Equivalence Class |
+| FIB | Forwarding Information Base |
+
+| | |
+|---------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| GFR | Guaranteed Frame Rate |
+| GS | Guaranteed Service |
+| ILMI | Integrated Local Management Interface |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPOA | IP Over ATM |
+| IPSF | IP Service Functions |
+| IP-SSCS | IP-Service Specific Convergence Service |
+| IS | Integrated Service |
+| ISP | IP Service Provider |
+| LANE | Local Area Network Emulation |
+| LDP | Label Distribution Protocol |
+| LEC | LANE Client |
+| LECS | LANE Configuration Server |
+| LER | Label Edge Router |
+| LES | LANE Server |
+| LIB | Label Information Base |
+| LIS | Logical Internet Subnet |
+| LLC | Logical Link Control |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MAC | Medium Access Control |
+| MBS | Maximum Burst Size |
+| MCR | Minimum Cell Rate |
+| MPC | MPOA Client |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switch |
+| MPOA | Multi-Protocol Over ATM |
+| MPS | MPOA Server |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NHC | NHRP Client |
+| NHRP | Next Hop Resolution Protocol |
+| NHS | NHRP Server |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| OSPF | Open Shortest Path First |
+| PCI | Protocol Control Information |
+| PCR | Peak Cell Rate |
+| PDR | Peak Data Rate |
+| PE | Provider Edge |
+| PHB | Per Hop Behaviour |
+| PIM | Protocol Independent Multicasting |
+| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol |
+| PSC | Per Hop Scheduling |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RSVP | Resource Reservation Protocol |
+| RSVP-TE | Resource Reservation Protocol-Traffic Engineering |
+| SBR | Statistical Bit Rate |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+
+| | |
+|--------|---------------------------------------|
+| SNAP | Subnet Attachment Point |
+| SSCS | Service Specific Control Service |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network |
+| UDP | User Data Protocol |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| VPN-ID | VPN Identifier |
+| xDSL | x-Digital Subscriber Loop |
+
+# 5 Generic requirements
+
+This Recommendation places a number of generic requirements on IP over ATM approaches. Such requirements are applicable to all identified IP services. The mandatory generic requirements are as follows:
+
+- The recommended approach must be independent of the IP version supported.
+- The recommended approach must have sufficient scalability to support large networks. Items to be taken into account regarding scalability include:
+ - use of VCI and VPI values;
+ - complexity of routing calculation at Layer 2 and Layer 3;
+ - complexity of address resolution mechanism;
+ - control messaging load (e.g., frequency of setup and teardown of ATM connections, frequency of IP-related signalling messages);
+ - complexity of the packet classification mechanism needed to support QoS. The less granularity in the QoS (e.g., from per IP flow, to per IP flow aggregation, to per service, as in Diffserv) the simpler the packet classification mechanism.
+- The recommended approach must include the capability for efficient and scalable solutions to support IP multicasting over ATM networks.
+- The recommended approach must have sufficient robustness to support large networks. Items to be taken into account include:
+ - capability to support restoration systems.
+
+# 6 Framework architecture
+
+The framework architecture to support IP layer services over ATM is defined as comprising the network architecture and the protocol architecture to support the IP services required.
+
+## 6.1 Network architecture
+
+
+
+Reference Point Type 1 Reference Point Type 2
+
+R Edge Router
+
+T1315670-99
+
+Figure 6-1/Y.1310: Reference network architecture for IP over ATM. The diagram shows a central 'Public Network' enclosed in a dashed rectangle. Inside, an 'ATM CORE' is connected to an 'IP over ATM' block. Four 'Edge Router' (R) boxes are positioned at the corners of the core. Outside the dashed rectangle, four subscriber networks are shown: 'Access Network', 'Service Provider', 'Private Network', and 'Public Network'. 'Reference Point Type 1' is indicated at the boundary between the subscriber networks and the public network. 'Reference Point Type 2' is indicated at the interface between the subscriber networks and the edge routers. A legend shows 'R' in a box representing an 'Edge Router'. The reference number 'T1315670-99' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+NOTE 1 – Internet service providers may also provide the ATM core.
+
+NOTE 2 – Reference point types 1 and 2 can be a standardized reference point such as an ISDN S, T interface or a non-standardized interface.
+
+**Figure 6-1/Y.1310 – Reference network architecture for IP over ATM**
+
+The reference network architecture for IP over ATM is shown in Figure 6-1. This configuration illustrates possible scenarios to support IP services over ATM identified in this Recommendation. The dotted rectangle indicates a public network on which we focus. Note that the public network in this Recommendation is restricted to one which has an ATM core. The boxes inside the dotted rectangle describe the generic arrangement inside the public network. It includes an ATM core, IP over ATM capabilities, and edge routers. A number of different kinds of networks are described outside the dotted rectangle, with each identifying a scenario in which the public network provides a certain identified IP service to a certain type of a network. From the viewpoint of the public network, these networks are regarded as subscriber networks.
+
+In this figure, two types of distinct reference points are described. The reference point type 1 is the boundary between the public network and subscriber networks, and the reference point type 2 is the interface to the IP over ATM network inside the public network. The arrangement of the reference point type 1 may depend on the facilities of subscriber networks, and the definition of IP services provided. Interworking functions and/or adaptation functions may be required in edge routers. This Recommendation primarily focuses on the reference point type 2, and on the approach adopted inside the public network.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-2/Y.1310 – Reference configuration for IP services over ATM. The diagram shows two central ATM networks: 'Private IPOA' and 'Public IPOA'. Each IPOA contains an 'ATM switched capabilities' block and an 'IPSF(a)' block connected by a reference point 'P(b)'. The 'Private IPOA' is connected to two 'ISP' nodes (each with 'IPSF(a)') via 'Private UNI' interfaces (labeled 'M(b)') and to an 'ES(c)' node via a 'Private UNI' interface. The 'Public IPOA' is connected to two 'ISP' nodes (each with 'IPSF(a)') via 'Public UNI' interfaces (labeled 'M(b)') and to an 'ES(c)' node via a 'Public UNI' interface. The two IPOA networks are interconnected via a 'Public UNI' interface. A reference point 'P(b)' is also shown between the two IPOA networks. A small identifier 'T1315680-99' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+- a) IPSF: IP Service Functions.
+- b) P or M: on the basis of ITU-T Recommendation I.364.
+- c) ES: End System has a full IPOA protocol stack.
+
+**Figure 6-2/Y.1310 – Reference configuration for IP services over ATM**
+
+Figure 6-2 illustrates the reference configuration for IP services over public and private ATM networks. In the private and public IPOA networks, the provision of IP services is realized by means of ATM switched capabilities and IP Service Functions (IPSF). In this case, interfaces between ATM switched capability and IPSF shall be defined at the P or M reference points [I.364]. The IP Service Functions (IPSF) are those functions necessary to enable IP over ATM. A typical example of IPSF is address resolution service. As an end system, the IPSF is essentially a router with an ATM interface.
+
+The IPSF function can be implemented in the same equipment together with the ATM switched capabilities. In this case, there is no need to define the interface at the P reference point. The IPSF function and ATM switched capabilities can be also implemented in separate equipment. In this case, interfaces shall be defined at the M or P reference points depending whether the IPSF is located outside or inside the core ATM network.
+
+ISPs and End Systems (ES) outside the ATM networks may be connected to the private or public ATM networks. Each ES has a full IPOA protocol stack and is connected by way of private UNI for the private IPOA, or public UNI for the public IPOA.
+
+### 6.1.1 Network and service interworking
+
+In network interworking scenario the IP Protocol Control Information (PCI) and payload data are transferred transparently across the ATM network to another IP-based network by means of an interworking function (IWF) between the two networks. Typically the IWF simply encapsulates the IP packet by means of an adaptation function and transfers it transparently to the remote IWF. For current IP and ATM interworking, network interworking is the typical case, with ATM providing a backbone or core network for transport of Internet protocol. In this scenario, the ATM network may be viewed as an underlay transport for the Layer 3 (and above) protocols.
+
+For the case of service interworking, the IWF terminates the IP protocol and translates the PCI to the ATM network PCI for transfer, control and management functions. Since in general not all functions may be supported in one or other of the networks, the service interworking scenario may only be able to provide a "best fit" conversion between the two different technologies. However, this should not result in any loss of user data since this is not affected by the PCI conversion at the service interworking IWF.
+
+Figures 6-1 and 6-2 illustrate network interworking associated with IP over ATM.
+
+## 6.2 Protocol architecture
+
+### 6.2.1 General description of IPOA protocol reference model
+
+
+
+Figure 6-3/Y.1310 – Protocol reference model for IP over ATM. The diagram shows a symmetrical protocol stack for two communicating entities. At the top, a 'Network Management Functions' block spans both sides. Below it, the 'Application Layer' connects the two stacks. Each stack consists of: 'Layer Management Functions' (a vertical bar), 'TCP/UDP', 'IP', 'IP-SSCS', 'AAL5', 'ATM', and 'Physical' blocks. A central box labeled 'Signalling and Routing control functions IP and/or ATM control' is connected to the 'IP' and 'IP-SSCS' blocks of both stacks. At the bottom, an oval labeled 'CORE NETWORK IP over ATM' is connected to the 'Physical' blocks of both stacks. Bidirectional arrows indicate communication between adjacent blocks and between the central control functions and the IP/IP-SSCS blocks.
+
+**Figure 6-3/Y.1310 – Protocol reference model for IP over ATM**
+
+Figure 6-3 generalizes the protocol reference model for IP transport over ATM in public networks. It may be noted that the underlying protocol reference model concepts of layer management, network management and signalling and routing control are extended to include the Layer 3 and above functional blocks. It should be noted that the blocks shown in Figure 6-3 correspond to logical representations of the functions and therefore do not signify or constrain any particular network implementation.
+
+The interfaces between the functional blocks may either be internal, non-standardized communication between the sub-layers, or external, standardized protocols. Each layer in the general model has its associated layer management functional block. The layer management blocks are responsible for processing of management and Protocol Control Information (PCI) for that layer only. Communication of information between the layers may only occur through the network management function. This is performed via the Coordination Function (CoF) of the network management.
+
+All functional blocks do not need to be present in all network applications of IPOA. Thus, the blocks may be viewed as basic "building blocks" to enable any given network application of IPOA. However, the basic relationships and ordering between the different blocks must be maintained to ensure consistent interoperability.
+
+### **6.2.2 Functional description of IPOA protocol reference model**
+
+This clause describes only the IPOA-related functional blocks, since detailed descriptions of the physical, ATM and ATM control layer functions are dealt with in other Recommendations [I.321], [I.326], [I.361], [I.432] and [Q.2931]. The application layer block is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+#### **6.2.2.1 IP-SSCS/AAL5 functions**
+
+The IP-SSCS/AAL5 incorporates transfer functions required to map the IP packet onto the AAL5. The IP-SSCS/AAL5 functional block provides the encapsulation and multi-protocol multiplexing functions defined by the IEEE 802.2-based Link Layer Control/Subnetwork Attachment Point (LLC/SNAP) protocol as adopted by the IETF in [ATM\_MULTI].
+
+#### **6.2.2.2 IP layer functions**
+
+IP layer functions provide IP forwarding (IP datagram delivery) from a source to a destination over an interconnected system. IP forwarding is the process of receiving a packet and using a very low overhead decision process determining how to handle the packet. The packet may be delivered locally or forwarded externally. For traffic that is forwarded externally, the IP forwarding process also determines which interface the packet should be sent out on, and if necessary, either removes one media layer encapsulation and replaces it with another, or modifies certain fields in the media layer encapsulation.
+
+IPOA protocol architecture must be independent of IP version. Currently, there are two versions: IPv4 (IP version 4) and IPv6 (IP version 6). IP layer functions are equal to those defined by IETF in [IP\_V4] and [IP\_V6] according to IPv4 and IPv6, respectively.
+
+The IP layer function does not provide a reliable communication facility. There are no acknowledgements either end-to-end or hop-by-hop.
+
+Note that IP layer functions should not be changed to use IP-SSCS/AAL5 functions over ATM.
+
+#### **6.2.2.3 IP layer management functions**
+
+IP layer management function has two basic functions: addressing and fragmentation. IP layer functions use the addresses carried in the IP header to transmit IP datagrams toward their destinations. The selection of a path for transmission is resolved as using signalling and routing functions block. IP layer functions use fields in the IP header to fragment and reassemble IP datagrams when necessary for transmission.
+
+IPv4 protocol uses four basic key mechanisms in providing its service: type of service, time to live, options, and header checksum. IPv6 is a new version of the Internet protocol, designed as the successor to IPv4. The changes from IPv4 to IPv6 fall primarily into the following categories: expanded addressing capabilities, header format simplification, improved support for extensions and options, flow labelling capability and authentication and privacy capabilities. The IP layer management function does not provide error control for data, only a header checksum. There are no retransmissions. There is no flow control.
+
+#### **6.2.2.4 Transport layer functions**
+
+Transport layer includes connection-oriented type TCP functions and connectionless type UDP functions respectively. These depend on application programme type.
+
+TCP functions provide reliable connection service between pairs of processes. TCP functions are equal to those defined by IETF in [TCP]. TCP functions include the following facilities: basic data transfer, reliability, flow control, multiplexing, connections and precedence and security.
+
+UDP functions provide datagram transfer. UDP functions are equal to those defined by IETF in [UDP]. The UDP is transaction oriented, and delivery and duplicate protection are not guaranteed.
+
+Note that transport layer functions should not be changed to use IP layer functions over ATM.
+
+#### **6.2.2.5 Application layer functions**
+
+The application layer and its associated layer management functional blocks include user or network-specific applications such as HTTP, FTP, TELNET, etc. The description of application layer functions is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+Note that in the TCP/IP protocol architecture, the application layer function is generally taken to include the session and presentation layer functions.
+
+#### **6.2.2.6 Network management functions**
+
+The network management functions depend on the specific network application for IPOA. In general, they include the TMN (Telecommunications Management Network) functions associated with: fault management, performance management, configuration management, security management, etc.
+
+#### **6.2.2.7 Signalling and routing control functions**
+
+This includes the signalling and routing functional blocks in IP and/or ATM control. IP control and signalling encompasses various aspects of IP control including routing. ATM control includes ATM signalling and routing.
+
+# **7 IP services**
+
+A range of IP services is included in this Recommendation as a means to determine the preferred IP over ATM approach in public networks. Initially, mapping of IP QoS with ATM and VPN services are addressed. Additional services are for further study.
+
+## **7.1 Mapping of IP QoS with ATM**
+
+### **7.1.1 Introduction**
+
+Two major approaches for the support of QoS differentiation at the IP level are documented in the IETF: the Intserv paradigm, aimed at supporting per IP flow QoS differentiation, and the Diffserv paradigm, aimed at supporting "coarse" QoS differentiation for aggregations of IP flows.
+
+#### **7.1.1.1 The IP Intserv paradigm**
+
+The Intserv paradigm relies on explicit per IP flow QoS requests carried by the RSVP protocol and on flow admittance control at the RSVP capable routers along the path of the flow. In the Intserv paradigm, two services are defined: the Guaranteed Service – GS [GUAR\_SER] and the Controlled Load Service – CLS [CONTROL\_SER]. In GS the maximum queuing delay for the flow is controlled. To compute the maximum delay a datagram will experience, the latency of the path must be determined and added to the maximum queuing delay [GUAR\_SER]. CLS does not provide firm delay guarantees, but the service provided to the flow should be comparable to what the flow would experience in a lightly loaded network, even when it is not the case [CONTROL\_SER]. In practice, CLS requires long-term available bandwidth.
+
+Both services require that the characteristics of the flow be specified by means of a token bucket specification [RSVP\_FUN] and that excess traffic be treated as best effort.
+
+#### 7.1.1.2 The IP Diffserv paradigm
+
+The IETF Diffserv model is based on the concept of Per Hop Behaviours (PHB) [DIFF\_HEADER] and [DIFF\_ARCH]. The Diffserv PHBs are defined by a set of forwarding behaviours that each local router along the path adheres to. IETF has identified two main PHBs so far:
+
+- Expedited Forwarding (EF) PHB [DIFF\_EF]:
+The EF-PHB is characterized by a configurable amount of bandwidth that is not impacted by the other traffic sharing the link. The EF-PHB can be used to build an end-to-end service that requires low loss, low delay and low delay variation through Diffserv domains.
+- Assured Forwarding (AF) PHB group [DIFF\_AF]:
+The AF-PHB group is characterized by four AF classes, and each AF class is allocated a certain amount of forwarding resources such as buffer and bandwidth in a Diffserv node. Within each AF class, IP packets are marked with one of three possible drop precedence values. In case of congestion, the drop precedence of a packet determines the relative importance of the packet within the AF class. However, there is no standardized relationship between the relative performance of the four AF classes. The AF-PHB group can be used to ensure that the subscribed information rate of a service is guaranteed with high probability.
+
+### 7.1.2 Network model to support QoS-aware IP services
+
+This clause describes a network model to support QoS-aware IP services in IPOA networks. In the IETF framework, the end-to-end QoS is provided by coupling Intserv regions at the edge of the network with Diffserv regions in the core of the network. The network model proposed here, however, considers additional possibilities. Moreover, the link layer in this case is always assumed to be ATM.
+
+#### 7.1.2.1 Model description
+
+The possible network models to support QoS-aware IP services are illustrated in Figures 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3. In each case, the shaded area indicates the active function used.
+
+##### Case 1 – Intserv over ATM networks
+
+In this model, communication between two Intserv stub networks is supported over IPOA core networks. The IPOA devices in the core networks may provide both Intserv and Diffserv capabilities. However, only Intserv functionality of the IPOA devices will be activated to support end-to-end integrated services. Both service level agreements (SLA 1 and SLA 2) require that the requirements for Intserv service are satisfied.
+
+
+
+T1315700-99
+
+IP/ATM Networks IP/ATM Networks
+
+●—● SLA
+ <--> Data Flow
+
+Figure 7-1/Y.1310 – Network model to support Intserv over ATM. The diagram shows a network topology with two Intserv Stub networks connected via two Core Networks (Core Network 1 and Core Network 2). Each stub network contains a computer icon and is connected to an ATM node. The ATM nodes are connected to IP/ATM Networks, which are represented by boxes containing 'IS' and 'DS' labels. The connections between the stubs and the core networks are labeled SLA 1, SLA 2, and SLA 3. Data flow is indicated by dashed arrows between the IP/ATM Networks. A legend at the bottom left shows a solid line with dots for SLA and a dashed arrow for Data Flow.
+
+**Figure 7-1/Y.1310 – Network model to support Intserv over ATM**
+
+##### Case 2 – Diffserv over ATM networks
+
+In this model, communication between two Diffserv stub networks is supported over IPOA core networks. The IPOA devices in the core networks may provide both Intserv and Diffserv capabilities. However, only Diffserv functionality of the IPOA devices will be activated to support end-to-end differentiated services. Both service level agreements (SLA 1 and SLA 2) require that the requirements for Diffserv service are satisfied.
+
+
+
+T1315710-99
+
+IP/ATM Networks (ISP1) IP/ATM Networks (ISP2)
+
+●—● SLA
+ <--> Data Flow
+
+Figure 7-2/Y.1310 – Network model to support Diffserv over ATM. The diagram shows a network topology with two Diffserv Stub networks connected via two Core Networks (Core Networks 1 and Core Networks 2). Each stub network contains a computer icon and is connected to an ATM node. The ATM nodes are connected to IP/ATM Networks, which are represented by boxes containing 'IS' and 'DS' labels. The connections between the stubs and the core networks are labeled SLA 1, SLA 2, and SLA 3. Data flow is indicated by dashed arrows between the IP/ATM Networks. A legend at the bottom left shows a solid line with dots for SLA and a dashed arrow for Data Flow.
+
+**Figure 7-2/Y.1310 – Network model to support Diffserv over ATM**
+
+##### Case 3 – Intserv through Diffserv domains over ATM networks
+
+In this model, communication between two Intserv stub networks is supported over IPOA core networks. In the IPOA core networks, some domains may provide only Diffserv, and the others may provide both Intserv and Diffserv capabilities. In this case, the Intserv may be transparently transported over Diffserv only domains. In this case there are two types of service level agreement.
+
+
+
+T1315720-99
+
+Figure 7-3/Y.1310: Network model to support Intserv through Diffserv domains over ATM. The diagram shows two Intserv Stubs connected via three Core Networks (ISP1, ISP2, ISP3). Core Network 1 and 3 support both Intserv (IS) and Diffserv (DS) over ATM. Core Network 2 supports only Diffserv (DS) over ATM. The connection is segmented by four SLAs (SLA 1 to SLA 4). Data flow is indicated by dashed arrows, and a transparent link is shown between Core Networks 2 and 3. A legend defines the symbols: a solid line with dots for SLA, a dashed arrow for Data Flow, and a double line for Transparent Link.
+
+**Figure 7-3/Y.1310 – Network model to support Intserv through Diffserv domains over ATM**
+
+### 7.1.3 List of service mapping functions
+
+The service mapping functions do not depend on the architecture of the surrounding network but only on the way IP and ATM QoS is supported on both sides of the interface where the mapping is needed. Figure 7-4 thus displays the necessary set of possible IP services to ATM services mappings of the considered framework architecture (refer to clause 6).
+
+
+
+T1315730-99
+
+Figure 7-4/Y.1310: List of service mapping functions. This diagram shows mappings between Intserv (RFC 2211, 2212) and Diffserv (RFC 2475) domains and their respective ATM parameters and classes. On the left, Intserv maps to Extended ATM Parameters & QoS classes (UNI 4.0-PNNI) via functions 1 and 2. On the right, Diffserv maps to ATCs (I.371) & ATM QoS Classes (I.356) via functions 5 and 6. Cross-domain mappings are shown: Intserv to Diffserv via 3 and 4; Diffserv to Intserv via 10 and 11; Intserv to ATCs via 9 and 12; and ATCs to Intserv via 7 and 8.
+
+**Figure 7-4/Y.1310 – List of service mapping functions**
+
+Among all these mappings, only mappings 6 and 12 are addressed in this Recommendation. Note that in this case at the egress of this ATM portion, there is no need of a mapping function of type 5 or 10, as in the destination IP network the support of QoS is totally based on the IP level information which is transparently carried by the ATM portion. Mappings 5 and 10 might be
+
+required in the case of native ATM traffic having to cross or reach a pure IP network, and are for further study.
+
+Mappings 3 and 4 pertain to the IP domain only and are part of activity within the IETF, whereas all the mapping originating/terminating into the extended ATM parameters and QoS classes (supported in private ATM networks) is part of ATM Forum's work.
+
+### **7.1.4 Mapping of IP integrated services to ATM services**
+
+The issue of Intserv to ATM mapping arises whenever an IP flow requesting Guaranteed Services (GS) [GUAR\_SER] or Controlled Load Services (CLS) [CONTROL\_SER] must be supported by an ATM connection linking two Intserv capable routers, and it is independent from the specific approach to support IP over ATM.
+
+Two different kinds of mapping are foreseen: one to one mapping and many to one mapping.
+
+#### **7.1.4.1 One to one mapping**
+
+One to one mapping occurs when a single ATM connection is entirely devoted to the support of a single IP flow. Specifically, the mapping process consists of the choice of an ATM service (i.e., ATC and associated QoS class) that can satisfy the QoS commitments of the IP service (GS or CLS), and in that view, several mappings are possible. More generally, however, the mapping process can be additionally thought as a way to communicate to the ATM level additional information regarding the characteristics of the carried flow, so that the downstream ATM network can make use of this information to efficiently carry the connection (e.g., multiplex it with others). In that view, one can rank all the possible mappings, and some mappings are better than others.
+
+#### **7.1.4.2 Many to one mapping**
+
+Many to one mapping occurs when a single ATM connection can carry more than one IP flow. In that case the mapping process consists in the choice of an ATM service that can satisfy the QoS commitments of a set of IP flows. As IP flows normally start and end asynchronously, this mapping can be viewed as an aggregation process which on the basis of the flow's IP level characteristics (e.g., token bucket and requested QoS), decides on the possibility of carrying the flow together with others on an already existing ATM connection (while still meeting the QoS constraints of the IP flow), or on the need of re-negotiating the connection's parameters.
+
+Rules on how to take such a decision are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+#### **7.1.4.3 Mapping of Guaranteed Service (GS) to ATM**
+
+ATM does not require any extensions to perform these mappings. However, the mapping scheme chosen should satisfy the following requirements:
+
+- The chosen ATC must be one able to support delay requirements.
+- The chosen ATC must be one able to reserve some bandwidth for the flow.
+
+Appendix II provides suggestions on guidelines for implementation of the mappings.
+
+#### **7.1.4.4 Mapping of Controlled Load Service (CLS) to ATM**
+
+ATM does not require any extensions to perform these mappings. Appendix II provides suggestions on guidelines for implementation of the mappings. However, the mapping scheme chosen should satisfy the following requirement:
+
+- The chosen ATC must be one able to reserve some bandwidth for the flow.
+
+#### **7.1.4.5 Impact on ATM traffic management**
+
+For further study.
+
+#### **7.1.4.6 Impact on ATM signalling**
+
+For further study.
+
+#### **7.1.4.7 Impact on ATM routing**
+
+For further study.
+
+### **7.1.5 Mapping IP differentiated services to ATM services**
+
+The IP Differentiated Services (Diffserv) model uses the concept of Per Hop Behaviour (PHB) [DIFF\_HEADER] and [DIFF\_ARCH] to enable QoS-based IP services.
+
+The PHBs may be used as an important factor to define an IP service in the Diffserv domain. However, PHB itself is not related to end-to-end IP QoS services. So, the mapping between Diffserv and ATM should be based on IP services and ATM services. Specifically, IP services can be defined by a combination of PHB implementations with traffic characteristics at the edges of Diffserv domains, and ATM services can be defined by a combination of ATM transfer capabilities [I.371] with QoS classes [I.356].
+
+#### **7.1.5.1 Service mapping**
+
+To provide services to the customers, Diffserv providers must combine PHB implementations with traffic conditioners and service provisioning strategies. The PHB concept is not addressed in ATM. Thus, the PHBs to ATM Transfer Capability mapping does not seem to be suitable. So, a service mapping may be considered from a particular differentiated service to an ATM service instead. The service mapping from Diffserv to ATM is clearly provided by the negotiation between two network providers, based on the definition of the IP services considered.
+
+Therefore, the service mapping depends on the policy of service providers, and may vary among different service providers. Some examples of possible service mapping are given in Appendix II.
+
+The following requirement applies to service mapping:
+
+- No per connection minimum cell rate need be associated with the support of some Diffserv PHBs over ATM.
+
+There is also a need to consider qualitative or relative service. The solutions are for further study.
+
+#### **7.1.5.2 Impact on ATM traffic management**
+
+For further study.
+
+#### **7.1.5.3 Impact on ATM signalling**
+
+For further study.
+
+#### **7.1.5.4 Impact on ATM routing**
+
+For further study.
+
+## **7.2 IP Virtual Private Networks (IP-VPNs)**
+
+### **7.2.1 Scope of IP-VPN**
+
+The IP-VPN in this Recommendation is defined as the emulation of IP-based private wide area network facilities provided over a carrier-scale ATM transport network. Figure 7-5 shows the arrangements of the IP-VPN in this Recommendation. An example method to demonstrate IP-VPN support in an MPLS/ATM public network is provided in Appendix IV.
+
+
+
+----- Service provider/Customer interface
+
+CE Customer Equipment
+PE Provider Edge Router
+
+T1315740-99
+
+Figure 7-5/Y.1310 – Network model for IP-VPN. The diagram shows a network architecture with two Customer Equipment (CE) blocks on the left and right, and two Provider Edge Router (PE) blocks in the center. Each CE block contains three sub-blocks: IP (dashed border), DL, and phy. Each PE block contains three sub-blocks: IP, DL, and phy. The IP sub-blocks of the PE blocks are connected to the IP sub-blocks of the CE blocks. The DL sub-blocks of the PE blocks are connected to a central 'Logical NW' block. The phy sub-blocks of the PE blocks are connected to a central 'ATM NW' block. Dashed lines represent the 'Service provider/Customer interface'. A legend at the bottom left identifies CE as Customer Equipment and PE as Provider Edge Router. The reference T1315740-99 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-5/Y.1310 – Network model for IP-VPN**
+
+A customer site is connected to the service provider's network through a customer equipment device (CE). This can be a single host, a switch, or an IP router. On the other hand, the service provider's network connects the customer site with provider edge router (PE). When the CE is a router, we can configure in such way that it is a routing peer of the attached PE, but is not a routing peer of the CE at the other site. Routers at different sites do not directly exchange routing information with each other. This arrangement allows supporting very large VPNs easily, while the routing strategy for each individual site is greatly simplified. This capability is considered to be important for carrier-scale service providers who provide outsourced IP-VPN service.
+
+### 7.2.2 Definition of IP-VPN service
+
+The IP-VPN service enables customer sites to form groups: to and from which IP access is restricted. This group is called IP-VPN. A specific site may be a member of one or more IP-VPNs. Member sites of a specific IP-VPN can communicate among themselves using IP protocol. Specific sites can have additional capabilities that allow them to access to the sites outside the group, and/or to be accessed from the sites outside the group.
+
+### 7.2.3 Requirements for IP-VPN service
+
+#### 7.2.3.1 Requirements for user-plane
+
+##### 7.2.3.1.1 Support for opaque packet transport
+
+Opaque packet transport allows IP-VPN customers to use independent IP address inside their network. Service provider's network requires having the capability to route IP packets depending on VPN membership, even though they use overlapping address spaces. The functions to identify a VPN, (e.g., the use of VPN-ID) and/or the function to differentiate per-VPN packet forwarding may be required.
+
+##### 7.2.3.1.2 Support for data security
+
+Data security provides IP-VPN customers with a certain level of secured communication among the member sites of an IP-VPN. Service provider's network requires ensuring that the snooping of data, misdirection or misinsertion of unrelated packets is avoided. Filtering functions, encryption functions and functions for authorization may be required.
+
+##### 7.2.3.1.3 Support for QoS
+
+QoS allows IP-VPN customers to subscribe a certain level of assurances in the quality of communications among the member sites of an IP-VPN. Service provider's network requires having
+
+the capabilities to support arbitrary categories of QoS services as it does to provide general IP services. Clause 7.1 describes the capabilities in detail.
+
+#### **7.2.3.2 Requirements for control-plane**
+
+##### **7.2.3.2.1 Support for signalling logical network resources**
+
+Service provider should have the capability to signal its network resources to support the transport of IP packets for IP-VPN customers.
+
+##### **7.2.3.2.2 Support for transporting VPN-IDs**
+
+For further study.
+
+##### **7.2.3.2.3 Support for per-VPN routing**
+
+For further study.
+
+#### **7.2.3.3 Requirements for management-plane**
+
+##### **7.2.3.3.1 Interoperable VPN-ID**
+
+If an IP-VPN spans over several service providers, each provider's network may require to distinguish the traffic of the IP-VPN correctly. In this case, the generally accepted VPN-ID definition is necessary to reduce the processing of edge routers.
+
+##### **7.2.3.3.2 Support for IP-VPN membership management**
+
+Service provider should have the capability to manage the VPN membership information, such as which customer site belongs to which IP-VPN. This capability should have sufficient interoperability to be used in different service providers in order to support IP-VPN spans over several service providers.
+
+##### **7.2.3.3.3 Support for configuration of logical network resource**
+
+Services provider's network should have the capability to configure its network resources to support the transport of IP packets for IP-VPN customers. This capability should have sufficient interoperability to be used in different service providers in order to support IP-VPN spanning several networks.
+
+# **8 Preferred network solution**
+
+## **8.1 Recommended approach**
+
+Considering the generic requirements described in clause 5 as well as the services described in clause 7, it is recommended that MPLS [MPLS\_ARCH] be adopted as the single preferred approach for public networks. MPLS supports all the services identified. It is recognized that MPLS does not provide significant benefits over properly engineered classical IP over ATM (as described in I.1.2) for the support of the Intserv service. However, MPLS does not offer less than classical IPOA for the support of Intserv while also providing support for all other services.
+
+Additional motivations for the selection of MPLS as the single preferred approach include:
+
+### **8.1.1 Small networks versus large networks**
+
+It is very well known that MPOA is very well suited for small networks but has limitations when applied to large networks. This Recommendation is dedicated to service providers and is therefore targeting large networks. MPLS has been designed to accommodate the requirements of large networks in terms of flexibility, scalability and manageability.
+
+### **8.1.2 ATM versus non-ATM bearer**
+
+While the focus of this Recommendation is the transport of IP over ATM, it is useful to understand that large networks can use several distinct bearer technologies including ATM. In a wider scope, it is useful to choose a technology that is optimal for IP transport over ATM but at the same time optimal for IP transport over other link layer technologies. MPLS is probably the only possible strategy, which covers this wider scope.
+
+### **8.1.3 Static versus dynamic control**
+
+From a routing perspective, the MPLS architecture gives the opportunity to have, and at the same time, the possibility to choose between provisioned routing and dynamic routing. It is the network operator's choice on what approach to select.
+
+### **8.1.4 ATM versus non-ATM control in IPOA**
+
+It is preferable to have a generic control which is link layer independent. Also, ATM control can still be used on the same switches.
+
+### **8.1.5 Traffic engineering of IP services**
+
+ATM has the most complete set of functionality for traffic engineering known to date. However, overlay IP over ATM models may not efficiently use all ATM capabilities and may tend to be limited in scalability due to the well-known "n-squared" problem when a full mesh of PVCs is provisioned. MPLS borrows some of ATM technology's capabilities in terms of QoS, routing, resource management and other aspects, adding the notion of explicit routing to help map traffic demand onto network topologies. Thus, use of MPLS offers new and more traffic management features than before.
+
+### **8.1.6 Build on existing investments**
+
+Given the existing investment in ATM and other technologies, there is a clear need to carry IP traffic over ATM and other link layer protocols and therefore, a unifying switching technology is necessary. In today's carrier networks, ATM hardware is used in a provisioned mode to carry IP traffic, MPLS is seen as a logical evolution of C-IPOA in the near future, since explicit routing can build on the basis of existing provisioned PVCs and the architecture is flexible enough to accommodate potential network evolution.
+
+### **8.1.7 VPN services support**
+
+The main advantage of MPLS is the ability to provide connection-oriented services over connectionless or explicit routing, which makes it ideal for dynamic tunnelling. There is no unique way to provide MPLS-based VPNs, which makes comparison more difficult with other IPOA technologies.
+
+### **8.1.8 QoS aspects**
+
+There is a clear synergy between IP differentiated services and MPLS, since both evolved with service provider's requirements inherent in their design. The label, with its extended semantics can carry Diffserv related information, and end-to-end LSPs can guarantee consistency of QoS mechanisms within a specific MPLS domain through appropriate resource reservation mechanisms.
+
+## **8.2 Framework for MPLS over ATM in public networks**
+
+### **8.2.1 Architectural model**
+
+Figure 8-1 illustrates the general network model of MPLS/ATM core network. The public network is implemented as MPLS with ATM networks that are composed of Label Edge Routers (LERs) and Label Switching Routers (LSRs). The LER is located at the edge of the MPLS network as a MPLS aware ingress/egress router. The edge of the MPLS network may or may not coincide with
+
+
+
+#### - *Label Switching Path (LSP) control mode*
+
+The labels for an LSP are controlled in the following two ways:
+
+- Ordered LSP control, where an LSR only binds a label to a particular FEC if it is the egress LSR for that FEC, or if it has already received a label binding for that FEC from its next hop for that FEC.
+- Independent LSP control mode, where each LSR, upon noting that it recognizes a particular FEC, makes an independent decision to bind a label to that FEC and to distribute that binding to its label distribution peers.
+
+In this Recommendation, the ordered control mode is recommended for the following reasons:
+
+- In the independent control mode, since each LSR independently assigns labels to IP forwarding equivalence classes, it is possible that different LSRs may make inconsistent decisions. For the ordered control mode, this is not the case.
+- Compared to the independent control mode, in the ordered control mode, resources such as VCI/VPI can be utilized more efficiently.
+
+To satisfy the service provider's traffic engineering requirements, two signalling approaches are possible:
+
+- 1) MPLS/LDP with CR-LDP [CR\_LDP].
+- 2) MPLS/LDP with RSVP-TE extensions [RSVP\_TE, RSVP\_REFR, RSVP\_AGG].
+
+Service providers may choose which approach to use based on their own specific requirements, service needs, and deployment experience.
+
+Criteria for this choice might include functional capabilities, interoperability issues, operational and management complexity level.
+
+Note that setup protocols for complete support of provisioning end-to-end quality of service are not yet available.
+
+# **Appendix I**
+
+## **Approaches for IP over ATM**
+
+## **I.1 Classical IP over ATM**
+
+Classical IP and ARP Over ATM (C-IPOA) is defined in [CIP\_ATM]. Figure I.1 provides a functional description of classical IP over ATM.
+
+C-IPOA defines a mechanism for ATM networks to carry multiple types of protocols including IP over an ATM transport using AAL5 adaptation. In this approach, one of the two types of encapsulations can be chosen when an ATM VC (PVC or SVC) is established. They are IEEE 802.2 Link Layer Control/Subnet Attachment Point Encapsulation (LLC/SNAP Encapsulation) or VC-based multiplexing. LLC/SNAP encapsulation is the default packet format for IP datagrams. In LLC/SNAP multiplexing, protocol distinctions are made through the use of an LLC/SNAP protocol ID in every Layer 3 message, IP in this case. To reduce the encapsulation overhead, the VC-based multiplexing mechanism can be used. The protocol to be used on a VC is defined during VC setup time and is maintained throughout the VC connection time. This mechanism, however, does not provide the multi-protocol encapsulation capability available with LLC/SNAP encapsulation.
+
+Multi-protocol encapsulation alone, although necessary, is not sufficient to provide routing and forwarding of IP datagrams over ATM transports. Resolution of IP addresses to ATM native
+
+addresses is required. [CIP\_ATM] defines a classical IP over ATM model. Figure I.1 shows the functional blocks for building the signalling, management and user planes and the message flows between an IP host and an ATMARP server. An ATM network is partitioned into discrete administrative and functional domains called Logical IP Subnets (LISs). Each LIS functions independently of other LISs. All members (hosts and routers) within an LIS have the same IP network/subnet address prefix and address masks. In this model, the deployment of ATM is used as a direct replacement of wide area networks supporting IP. Thus, an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) type of server, called ATMARP is needed for the resolution of target IP addresses to target ATM addresses within a single LIS. The ATM addresses can either be E.164 addresses or ATM End System Addresses (AESAs). The ATMARP functions stay within a single LIS.
+
+In the classical model, hosts communicate among themselves directly via ATM within the same LIS using the ATMARP service for target address resolution. Communication outside the local LIS is provided via an IP router. The use of Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP) to communicate among LISs is an extension to the classical model (reference Figure I.1 and I.1.1). ATMARP is a query-response client-server protocol. ATMARP clients (ATM hosts) must be configured with or learned through ILMI of the ATM address of the ATMARP server before the query-response operation is possible. Prior to an ATMARP query-response operation, an ATMARP client needs the establishment of an SVC or uses a pre-configured PVC to register itself with the ATMARP server (Step 1 in Figure I.1). During an ATMARP operation, the client sends an ATMARP-Request message to the server over this VCC. The source IP and ATM addresses are included in the request message along with the target IP address. The server is expected to respond with the appropriate target ATM address in an ATMARP-Reply message if the IP address can be resolved. If otherwise, an ATMARP-NAK message will be returned (Steps 2 to 6 in Figure I.1). Once the target ATM address is resolved, communication between two hosts can commence by establishing an ATM VCC and performing data transfer (Steps 7 and 8 in Figure I.1). Each ATMARP client maintains a table keeping records of all the resolved address entries. A client must refresh this table with its server within the Aging period using the registration procedures. An inverse address resolution process (In ATMARP) is also provided by the classical model and is used to resolve the target IP address given the target ATM address of an LIS member.
+
+### **I.1.1 Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP)**
+
+NHRP, specified in [NHRP], extends the classical model by providing communication between multiple LISs. In NHRP, a source station (host or router), known as a source Next Hop Client (NHC), intending to communicate with a destination station known as the destination NHC (host or router), uses the NHRP request and response protocol to obtain the ATM address of the destination station. An NHRP request transverses through a series of NHRP servers (NHSs) following the path as defined by the routing protocol in use until it reaches the NHS serving the destination station, whereby an NHRP response is returned to the source station. A "shortcut" path is then established between the source and destination stations via a direct ATM virtual circuit. If the destination station is within the ATM network served by an NHS, it will be directly reached via this shortcut. If it is outside the network or for any policy constraint, an egress router "closest" to the destination will be connected via the NHS. If the destination host is not served by any NHSs, a negative NHRP response will be returned and routing to the destination will follow the normal routing protocol.
+
+### **I.1.2 Use of local ATM shortcut**
+
+NHRP turns particularly useful when QoS demanding IP flows (e.g., GS or CLS Intserv flows) have to be supported, as it eliminates IP hopping at each LIS boundary. However, it requires the introduction in the network of dedicated servers and adds the complexity of another query-response protocol. Moreover, the setup delay of the shortcut connection supporting the flow may be significant.
+
+Another way to avoid multiple IP hopping without requiring any additions to the classical model is to perform local ATM shortcuts at each LIS boundary [51]. This requires the LIS border routers to be hybrid IP/ATM devices, i.e., not only routers with ATM interfaces, but integrated IP/ATM switches capable of sharing some information between the two layers.
+
+Specifically, the basic functions that these hybrid devices should perform are:
+
+- the building and maintenance of an association map between IP flows and the ATM connections supporting them, both for the incoming and outgoing direction;
+- the local ATM shortcut on the basis of this association map.
+
+The effort of building such an association map, however, is only worthwhile for long lasting, QoS-demanding IP flows. GS or CLS Intserv flows requiring some QoS through RSVP signalling are the most straightforward example.
+
+Note that if the hybrid device is in charge of setting up ATM connections in response to the reception of RSVP signalling messages, then the building of the association map for the outgoing side is straightforward and does not require the usage of any particular standard mechanism: all that is needed is an internal communication between the IP and ATM components of the device. For the incoming side, on the contrary, the hybrid device needs to exploit some information that can be carried in the ATM signalling messages. Specifically, ITU-T Rec. Q.2941.2 [Q.2941] defines DSS2 signalling capability to carry, among others, Internet-related identifiers (i.e., an IPv4 or IPv6 session identifier, which identifies an IP flow). This information of course is available if an upstream analogous hybrid device takes care of filling the above-mentioned fields in ATM signalling messages.
+
+The table below lists if and how a hybrid device can exploit the association map and perform a local ATM shortcut, depending on the type of association between IP flows and ATM connections (one IP flow per ATM connection or many IP flows on a single ATM connection).
+
+In case 1, the maximum advantages are obtained: the IP flow is supported across several LIS by a concatenation of ATM connections, but, thanks to the possibility of on-the-fly forwarding, the resulting QoS is identical to the one that would be obtained on a direct ATM connection.
+
+In case 3 (VC merging case), there is only the advantage of avoiding IP level processing, but on-the-fly forwarding is unachievable. In the other two cases, IP processing is still needed and no performance gain is achievable on that hop.
+
+| | Incoming association | Outgoing association | IP processing required | On-the-fly forwarding allowed |
+|---|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
+| 1 | One to one | One to one | No | Yes |
+| 2 | Many to one | One to one | Yes | No |
+| 3 | One to one | Many to one | No | No |
+| 4 | Many to one | Many to one | Yes | No |
+
+In such a scenario, each hybrid device is responsible for the type of association for the outgoing side, according to a given policy. For example, it may decide to always set up a separate ATM connection for each GS IP flow, and thus have a one to one association, and to always merge CLS flows on a single ATM connection to save VCIs. A coordinated choice for the policies of the hybrid devices of a single administrative domain is of course highly desirable.
+
+
+
+ATMARP Server Host
+
+Management Function
+
+Management layers
+
+To ATM Network
+
+UNI/NNI
+
+T1315760-99
+
+Functional description of classical IP and ARP over ATM architecture. The diagram shows three main components: an IP Router on the left, an ATMARP Server in the center, and a Host on the right. The IP Router connects to an NHRP block and an IWF (IP over ATM) block. The IWF connects to the ATMARP Server. The Host connects to the ATMARP Server. All three components have a 'Management Function' block at the top. Below this, there are 'Management layers' and 'Data layers'. The Management layers include SIG, SSCOP/SSCF, and AAL5. The Data layers include ATM and PHY. The IP Router's data path is IP-SSCS, AAL5, ATM, and PHY. The Host's data path is APPL, TCP/UDP, IP, IP-SSCS, AAL5, ATM, and PHY. The ATMARP Server's data path is SIG, SSCOP/SSCF, AAL5, ATM, and PHY. Arrows indicate the flow of data and management messages between these components.
+
+MESSAGES BETWEEN SERVER AND HOST
+
+- 1) SETUP/CONNECT for VCC between host and ATMARP SERVER
+- 2) In ATMARP\_REQUEST
+- 3) In ATMARP\_REPLY
+- 4) ATMARP\_REQUEST
+- 5) ATMARP\_REPLY
+- 6) ATMARP\_NAK
+- 7) SETUP/CONNECT host/host
+- 8) Data Transfer
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1310 – Functional description of classical IP and ARP over ATM**
+
+## I.2 Multi-Protocol Over ATM (MPOA)
+
+[ATM\_MPOA] specifies a generic bridging and routing environment to transport multi-protocols (e.g., IP packets) over direct ATM VCCs. The technology combines the Local Area Network Emulation (LANE) technology with the Next Hop Resolution Protocol (NHRP) technology to provide an ATM shortcut paradigm. Figure I.2 illustrates the functional blocks of MPOA, showing the relationship between the control, management and data planes. The MPOA components in this figure are: NHS, NHC, MPC, MPS and LANE. Their functions are explained below.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of MPOA, divided into two main sections: Multi-Protocol Server (MPS) on the left and Multi-Protocol Client (MPC) on the right, separated by a vertical dashed line representing Control Functions.
+
+**Multi-Protocol Server (MPS) Side:**
+
+- Management Functions:** Includes IP Routing, IP-SSCS, LANE (LEC), AAL5, and ATM.
+- Control Functions:** Includes SIG, SSCOP/CF, AAL5, and ATM.
+- Physical Layer (PHY):** Connects to the IP Network (via NHS and PPP DLL/MAC) and the UNI/NNI To ATM Network.
+
+**Multi-Protocol Client (MPC) Side:**
+
+- Management Functions:** Includes APPL, TCP/UDP, IP Forward, MPC, IP-SSCS, LANE (LEC), AAL5, and ATM.
+- Control Functions:** Includes SIG, SSCOP/CF, AAL5, and ATM.
+- Physical Layer (PHY):** Connects to the UNI/NNI To ATM Network and the UNI/NNI To IP Network (Default Path) via a Shortcut Path.
+
+**Interactions and Paths:**
+
+- MPOA ARP:** Indicated by a double-headed arrow between the MPS and MPC sides, associated with:
+ - 1) MPOA Resolution Request/Response
+ - 2) MPOA Cache Imposition Request/Response
+- NHRP Resolution/Request:** Indicated by a long double-headed arrow spanning the entire width of the diagram.
+
+Functional description of MPOA architecture showing the interaction between Multi-Protocol Server (MPS) and Multi-Protocol Client (MPC) across various protocol layers.
+
+T1315770-99
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1310 – Functional description of MPOA**
+
+LANE forms an integral part of the MPOA protocol. LANE segregates a large ATM network into multiple domains, each of which can be emulated as a LAN segment. LANE specifies a set of protocols for LAN users to communicate among themselves within an ATM environment. These LANE users can be ATM-attached end systems or LAN-attached users. IP services are supported within this LAN environment. The LANE protocol operates between the ATM AAL5 and the network and LLC layers. LANE has four main LANE components: LANE Client (LEC), LANE Server (LES), Broadcast and Unknown Server (BUS) and LANE Configuration Server (LECS). A LEC (e.g., a LAN station) obtains configuration information from and registers with a LECS. A LES resolves MAC addresses of the LANE clients to their corresponding ATM addresses. The address resolution protocol (LE\_ARP) functions similarly to that used by IP ARP. At the stable stage, direct data ATM VCs are used to connect these clients for data transfer. BUS distributes client data before address resolution is complete and data paths are established or when a client does
+
+not know which direct data VC to use. IP packets are carried via LLC/SNAP encapsulation or via VC multiplexing as described earlier.
+
+The other integral component of MPOA is NHRP, which is described in I.1. The classical IP over ATM model has a constraint of serving a single LIS. NHRP extends this capability by allowing "shortcuts" across multiple LISs within an ATM network.
+
+## **I.3 Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS)**
+
+MPLS was developed to achieve fast and efficient data forwarding for Internet routers [MPLS\_ARCH]. Although architecturally targeted for multiple protocol applications, so far MPLS is primarily used for the IP protocol. In the connectionless IP environment, IP routers conventionally perform IP data forwarding on each datagram along a routed path to the destination based on a hop-by-hop routing decision. This next hop decision involves the examination of the IP packet header by the router to assign the packet to a Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC) and the mapping of the FEC to a next hop thus determining the direction of the routing path. This process can be simplified and made more efficient by an MPLS process. With MPLS, the assignment of an IP packet to a FEC is done once by the Ingress Label Switching Router (LSR) and the FEC is represented and encoded by a fixed length label. The label is attached to the IP packet header. The header is no longer used by subsequent routers for forwarding the packet. LSRs, along the label switching path (LSP), use the label to index a table that specifies the next hop and a new label. Old labels are replaced with new ones as the packet transverses the LSRs along the LSP towards the destination. Labels are locally significant and their coding is specified in [MPLS\_ENCAPS]. Labels represent the complete forwarding behaviour of a packet. It follows a hop-by-hop behaviour that includes choosing the next hop for the packet and the operation to be performed on the label, such as removal or replacement. Under normal situations, an LSP follows the same path as determined by normal IP routing protocols such as OSPF. MPLS can run over any link layer transport such as ATM, frame relay or Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). Figure I.3 depicts the protocol structure of MPLS running over ATM. The main MPLS protocol elements in this figure are LDP, LIB and FIB. LDP is described in the next paragraph. Label Information Base (LIB) and Forwarding Information Base (FIB) are information databases that contain label binding information and forwarding information on the labels [MPLS\_ARCH], [MPLS\_ENCAPS] and [LDP].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of MPLS, showing four protocol stacks and their interaction with Management Functions.
+
+- Control Functions:** LDP, LIB, FIB.
+- Transfer Functions:** APPL, TCP/UDP, IP Forwarding, IP-SSCS (LLC/SNAP), AAL5, ATM, PHY.
+- Management Functions:** A central block at the top, connected to all stacks via bidirectional arrows.
+
+**Stack 1: To ATM Network**
+
+- PHY (Physical Layer)
+- ATM (ATM Layer)
+- AAL5 (ATM Adaptation Layer 5)
+- IP-SSCS (IP-SSCS Layer)
+- IP (IP Layer)
+- TCP (TCP Layer)
+- LDP (Label Distribution Protocol)
+
+**Stack 2: To IP Network**
+
+- PHY (Physical Layer)
+- DLL or MAC/LLC (Data Link Layer)
+- IP Routing (IP Routing Layer)
+- LIB (Label Information Base)
+- LDP (Label Distribution Protocol)
+
+**Stack 3: To ATM Signalling Network**
+
+- PHY (Physical Layer)
+- ATM (ATM Layer)
+- AAL5 (ATM Adaptation Layer 5)
+- SSCOP/CF (Signalling System Control over ATM/CF)
+- Signalling (Signalling Layer)
+- FIB (Forwarding Information Base)
+
+**Stack 4: To ATM Network**
+
+- UNI/NNI (User Network Interface/Network-to-Network Interface)
+- PHY (Physical Layer)
+- ATM (ATM Layer)
+- AAL5 (ATM Adaptation Layer 5)
+- IP-SSCS (LLC/SNAP) (IP-SSCS (LLC/SNAP) Layer)
+- IP Forwarding (IP Forwarding Layer)
+- TCP/UDP (TCP/UDP Layer)
+- APPL (Application Layer)
+
+Figure I.3/Y.1310 – Functional description of MPLS. The diagram shows four protocol stacks connected to a central Management Functions block. The stacks are: 1. To ATM Network: PHY, ATM, AAL5, IP-SSCS, IP, TCP, LDP. 2. To IP Network: PHY, DLL or MAC/LLC, IP Routing, LIB, LDP. 3. To ATM Signalling Network: PHY, ATM, AAL5, SSCOP/CF, Signalling, FIB. 4. To ATM Network: UNI/NNI, PHY, ATM, AAL5, IP-SSCS (LLC/SNAP), IP Forwarding, TCP/UDP, APPL. The Management Functions block is at the top, with arrows indicating control and transfer functions between the stacks and the block.
+
+T1315780-99
+
+**Figure I.3/Y.1310 – Functional description of MPLS**
+
+NOTE – The use of ATM signalling is only required for MPLS to B-ISDN interworking.
+
+In order to provide a meaningful definition and common understanding of MPLS labels within an MPLS domain, an MPLS signalling protocol is required. This can be achieved by the use of the Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) [LDP], which provides a standardized MPLS signalling mechanism for allocating and distributing labels. As depicted in Figure I.3, MPLS can use LDP to build an LIB information base derived from the routing protocol in use and also sets up LSP connections between the corresponding ingress and egress LSR endpoints. LDP runs primarily over reliable TCP connections (except for the discovery process stated below which uses UDP). LDP has four phases of operation:
+
+- **Discovery:** To announce and maintain the presence of LSRs in the network.
+- **Session:** To establish and maintain sessions between LDP peers.
+- **Advertisement:** To perform label allocation and distribution.
+- **Notification:** For error reporting.
+
+When labels are distributed, certain mechanisms or modes can be chosen. For example, a mechanism is the downstream-on-demand label distribution, where labels are distributed by a downstream LSR in response to an explicit request from its upstream LSR. Other distribution mechanisms and modes are detailed in [LDP]. Other than LDP, pre-configuration or existing IP protocols such as RSVP and BGP can be extended to handle label distribution [MPLS\_ARCH].
+
+Constraint-based Routing (CR) is a mechanism used to deliver Traffic Engineering (TE) capability and QoS performance characteristics within a network. These requirements can be met by extending the "conventional" LDP [LDP] or Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) [RSVP\_FUN] for the support of Constraint-based Routed Label Switched Paths (CR-LSPs). Both extended protocols CR-LDP [CR\_LDP], RSVP-TE [RSVP\_TE] provide the following CR capabilities:
+
+- *Explicit Routing (ER)*: An explicit route can be defined as a list of nodes and established via signalling. This can divert from the conventional LSPs that are based on IP routing. Both strict and loose ERs are supported.
+- *Traffic Characterizations*: the traffic characteristics of a CR-LSP can be defined using traffic parameters [CR\_LDP, RSVP\_TE].
+- *Path Pre-emption*: During a path establishment, signalling provides this new path with the ability to pre-empt existing CR-LSPs, should such a need arise. Whether a new path can pre-empt an existing path depends on the setup priority of the new path and the holding priority of the existing path. This ability allows a network operator to satisfy network policy and engineering requirements within the available resources.
+- *Route Pinning*: This option allows a segment of a loose ER to be fixed.
+- *Resource Classes*: Network resources can be categorized by a network operator into "resource classes".
+
+ATM switches can be used as label switching nodes. When an ATM switch is used as a label switching node or router (called ATM-LSR), the label on which forwarding decisions are made is carried in the VCI/VPI field of the ATM cell header. To support label switching, an ATM-LSR must support the control and signalling protocol for label switching such as LDP and participate in a network layer routing protocol such as OSPF. ATM-specific routing and addressing are not needed. Between peer ATM-LSRs, a dedicated ATM virtual connection (dedicated VPI/VCI) must be established for LDP control signalling. As in conventional LSRs, other methods such as OSPF, RSVP, PIM can be used for label distributions. An ATM-LSR can perform label switching on a VPI, VCI or VPI/VCI field, depending if VC or VP merging is used for flow aggregation. Peer ATM-LSRs can be connected directly over an ATM link or remotely through an ATM cloud over an ATM virtual connection. In the latter case, ATM signalling will have to carry the binding information.
+
+Figure I.4 shows a protocol structure of ATM-based MPLS architecture. The MPLS/ATM architecture has two parts: one is MPLS routing module and the other is ATM forwarding module. The MPLS routing module includes IP routing protocol functional block supporting OSPF and BGP, TCP/IP protocol stack, and LDP and its running result, LIB used for label distribution and assignment. The ATM forwarding module is the ATM fabric.
+
+
+
+```
+
+ +-------------------------------------------------+
+ | Routing Protocol +-------+ |
+ | (OSPF, BGP) <----------> |Routing| <------- LDP |
+ | ^ | Table | | |
+ | | +-------+ | |
+ | v ^ v |
+ | +--------+ | +-----+|
+ | | TCP/IP | <----------------+ | LIB ||
+ | +--------+ +-----+|
+ | ^ | |
+ +------|--------------------------------------|---+
+ | v ATM Fabric v |
+ +-------------------------------------------------+
+ ^ |
+Label Path -------------------------------------+
+
+```
+
+LDP Label Distribution Protocol
+LIB Label Information Base
+
+T1315790-99
+
+Figure I.4/Y.1310: An example of MPLS implementation. The diagram shows a network architecture where a Routing Protocol (OSPF, BGP) interacts with a Routing Table and LDP. LDP interacts with a LIB (Label Information Base) and the ATM Fabric. TCP/IP interacts with the ATM Fabric and the Routing Table. A Label Path is shown originating from the ATM Fabric and passing through TCP/IP and the Routing Table. The reference T1315790-99 is noted.
+
+**Figure I.4/Y.1310 – An example of MPLS implementation**
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Guidelines for mapping services to ATM connections
+
+## II.1 Mapping Intserv services to ATM connections
+
+### II.1.1 Mapping of Guaranteed Service (GS) to ATM
+
+#### II.1.1.1 Network model for GS
+
+The network model assumed by [GUAR\_SER] is reported in Figure II.1.
+
+
+
+```
+
+[IP Source] -- [Reshaping buffer] -- (Wire) -- (Router Ci, Di) -- (Wire) -- (Router Cj, Dj) -- (Wire) -- [Destination]
+ r,p,b,m,M Rate R Rate R Rate R Rate R
+
+```
+
+IP Source, $r, p, b, m, M$
+Rate R Reshaping buffer
+Wire of Rate R
+Router $C_i, D_i$
+Wire of Rate R
+Router $C_j, D_j$
+Wire of Rate R
+Destination
+
+T1315800-99
+
+Figure II.1/Y.1310: Network model for GS. The diagram shows a sequence of components: IP Source (r, p, b, m, M) connected to a Rate R Reshaping buffer, which is connected to a Wire of Rate R. This wire connects to Router Ci, Di, which is connected to another Wire of Rate R, then to Router Cj, Dj, and finally to a Destination. The reference T1315800-99 is noted.
+
+**Figure II.1/Y.1310 – Network model for GS**
+
+The source of the IP flow requesting GS emits traffic according to its token bucket specification $(r, p, b, m, M)$ . After a transient phase, during which traffic may be carried as best effort, resources are allocated so that the network can be modelled as a sequence of "wires" of rate $R$ . Just before the first wire, all traffic instantaneously exceeding rate $R$ (even if conforming to the token bucket specification) is buffered and reshaped at the rate $R$ . By assuming this ingress reshaping at the allocated rate $R$ , the network model is considering the worst case-situation for what concerns delay variation. Wires are linked by devices (routers) that introduce a "distortion" from the ideal fluid model (a single wire of rate $R$ ). The distortion introduced by each router is taken into account by two terms called $C$ (rate dependent) and $D$ (rate independent) respectively. RSVP messages carry to the receiver the sum of all $C_i$ and $D_i$ values, so that it can compute an upper bound for the variable part of the delay. If the rate of the wires is $R$ this upper bound is:
+
+$$\frac{b-M}{R} \cdot \frac{p-R}{p-r} + \frac{M+C_{tot}}{R} + D_{tot} \quad \text{for } r \leq R < p^1 \quad (\text{II-1})$$
+
+$$\frac{M+C_{tot}}{R} + D_{tot} \quad \text{for } r \leq p \leq R \quad (\text{II-2})$$
+
+So, the receiver requests that the bandwidth reserved on wires be $R$ (by sending upstream an RSVP RESV message) in order to keep Equation II-1 or II-2 below a target value. Note that the delay in the reshaping buffer (see Figure II.1) is taken into account by the first term of Equation II-1, but if $R > p$ (as in Equation II-2) traffic will never be delayed in the reshaping buffer.
+
+#### II.1.1.2 Choice of the ATM service
+
+The problem of mapping arises when wires have to be replaced by ATM connections. Strictly speaking, if the wire model has to be respected, no choice would be possible as ATM connections always introduce a CDV that reflects on a delay variation for packets, whereas wires do not. In practice, the choice should be limited to those ATCs that can be associated to a QoS class that ensures limited CDV (i.e., QoS Class 1 [I.356] or QoS Class 5 [I.356]). This CDV can then be taken into account on the $D$ term of Equation II-1 or II-2.
+
+The ATCs DBR [I.371] and SBR1 [I.371] may be associated with QoS Class 1 [I.356]. The ATCs SBR2 [I.371] and SBR3 [I.371] may be associated with QoS Class 5 [I.356]. So, what criteria can be used to choose the ATM service? A first one may be to consider whether the IP flow, before being sent to the ATM level, is really reshaped at the IP level at a rate $R$ , as supposed by the model. If so, the most natural choice is to adopt a QoS class 1 DBR ATM connection with $\text{PCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } R)^2$ . Choosing an SBR connection with $\text{SCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } R)$ would require uselessly more resources than the DBR one, except in the case $\text{PCR} = \text{SCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } R)$ and $\text{MBS} = 0$ , that means falling in the DBR case again.
+
+On the contrary, if the ATM connection starting point is unaware of any IP level packet reshaping, the best mapping would be with a SBR connection with $\text{SCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } R)$ , $\text{PCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } p)$ , $\text{MBS} = [\text{ATM equivalent of } bp/(p-r)]$ . DBR would require more resources to accommodate conforming bursts of traffic up to the rate $p$ , and therefore it needs a $\text{PCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } p)$ or $\text{MCR} = (\text{ATM equivalent of } p)$ .
+
+Of the three SBR versions, the one that best matches the service model of GS is SBR3, which allows the tagging of non-conforming traffic. This allows to leave up to the ATM level all the complexity of treating the excess traffic as best effort, as requested by [GUAR\_SER]. Associated QoS class is QoS class 5 [I.356].
+
+---
+
+1 This formula remains the same even if the reshaping does not occur at the ingress but at one or more than one of the crossed routers.
+
+2 See II.1.1.3.
+
+**Table II.1/Y.1310 – Preferred GS to ATM mapping**
+
+| | | |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | ATM level is aware of an IP level packet reshaping at rate $R$ immediately before connection's starting point | ATM level is unaware of any IP level packet reshaping at rate $R$ immediately before connection's starting point |
+| Preferred ATC and QoS class | DBR class 1 | SBR3 class 4 |
+| Mapping between ATM traffic descriptors and token bucket's parameters | PCR = (ATM equiv. of $R$ ) | Note 1
Note 2
PCR = (ATM equiv. of $p$ )
SCR = (ATM equiv. of $R$ )
MBS = (ATM equiv. of $bp/(p - r)$ ) |
+| NOTE 1 – The parameter mapping to SBR is always valid when . However, in the GS the parameter can be set greater than (see Equation II-2). As PCR cannot be set below , it will result PCR = SCR = and there would be no reason to have an MBS > 0. So, in the case , the preferred mapping is the DBR with QoS class 1, with PCR = (ATM equivalent of ).
NOTE 2 – When SBR is used, there is an intrinsic inefficiency in the mapping scheme, due to the fact that the network model of GS considers "wires" of rate while SBR connections are much "better" than wires with rate , in the sense that they can absorb instantaneous bursts of traffic up to the rate , without relying on buffering the traffic exceeding . This inefficiency is reflected into an over-allocation for , due to the first term of Equation II-1 which is assumed by the GS model but in the real network could be non-existent or much smaller.
| | |
+
+#### II.1.1.3 ATM equivalents of token bucket parameters
+
+When translating token bucket's parameters into ATM traffic descriptors, one should recall that the former are expressed in bytes or in bytes/s, while the latter are in cells or cells/s. Furthermore, ATM and AAL overheads must be taken into account.
+
+An upper bound for the number of cells needed to carry an IP packet of $B$ bytes is:
+
+$$C(B) = (H + B + T + 47)/48 \quad (\text{II-3})$$
+
+where $H$ and $T$ are the AAL PDU header and trailer lengths and "47" accounts for the last cell which may be only partially filled.
+
+The ATM equivalents for the terms appearing in Table II.1 are listed in Table II.2. The assumption is that the token bucket specification is $(r, b, p, m, M)$ .
+
+**Table II.2/Y.1310 – ATM equivalents for GS to ATM mapping**
+
+| Mapping to DBR class 1 | Mapping to SBR3 class 4 |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PCR = \left\lfloor \frac{R}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ | $PCR = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ $SCR = \left\lfloor \frac{R}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ Note
$MBS = \left\lfloor \frac{bp}{m(p-r)} \right\rfloor C(m)$ |
+| NOTE – For how much time can a source conforming to the token bucket specification send "bytes" at the peak rate [bytes/s]? For seconds. How many bytes can it send, at the peak rate , before becoming "non-conforming"? . How many packets at most? . An SBR ATM connection carrying this traffic should therefore transmit this amount of packets "transparently" (i.e., at their peak rate), and therefore it should have the indicated MBS (in cells).
| |
+
+These equivalencies are worst case, i.e., are calculated assuming all the packets having the minimum declared length, thus considering the maximum possible overhead impact. A more realistic estimate can be done replacing $m$ in the above formulas with a value in the range $[m, M]$ , but this requires a detailed knowledge of the generating application's distribution of packet sizes.
+
+#### II.1.1.4 Accounting for CDVT
+
+After the packet segmentation is performed, cells belonging to a packet are simultaneously ready for transmission and may be sent at the line rate if no cell level reshaping is done. When no cell level shaping function to absorb the burst due to the packet segmentation is assumed to exist, it is necessary to account for this bursty behaviour by adding a proper value to the CDVT on the PCR parameter of the DBR or of the SBR connection. This value can be evaluated as:
+
+$$(C(M)-1) \left( \frac{1}{PCR} - \frac{1}{LCR} \right) \quad (\text{II-4})$$
+
+### II.1.2 Mapping of Controlled Load Service (CLS) to ATM
+
+Also for CLS the network model considered by [CONTROL\_SER] consists of a source whose traffic is described by a token bucket specification ( $r, p, b, m, \bar{M}$ ) and a sequence of routers linked by "wires" (see Figure II.1), but as there is no explicit guarantee on the delays there is not any specific formulae as Equation II-1 or II-2. When wires have to be replaced by ATM connections, the choice is no more limited to ATCs that can have limited CDV. As the requirement of CLS is simply to have a "long term"3 available bandwidth, and low losses, suitable ATM services may be:
+
+- DBR with class 2;
+- ABT with class 2;
+- ABR with class 3;
+- SBR1 with class 2;
+- SBR2 with class 3;
+- SBR3 with class 3;
+
+3 "Long term" means on timescales significantly larger than $b/r$ , where $b$ and $r$ are part of the token bucket's parameter of the source.
+
+- GFR1;
+- GFR2.
+
+Mapping with DBR with class 2 would require setting the PCR somewhere between (the ATM equivalent of $r$ and $p$ )4, i.e., finding an equivalent bandwidth for the single flow, but besides being an implementation specific issue, this also risks to be inefficient. Moreover, class 2 does not allow the ATM layer to take care about the best effort treatment of the traffic exceeding the token bucket's specification, as requested by [CONTROL\_SER].
+
+Mapping with ABT/dt with class 2, even if potentially attractive, has the drawback of the re-negotiation overhead at the burst level, probably unbearable. With longer term re-negotiations, the same drawback outlined for DBR applies.
+
+Mapping with ABR with class 3 could be performed by setting MCR = (ATM equivalent of $r$ ), but has the drawback that all the traffic instantaneously exceeding $r$ is treated as best effort. Setting MCR somewhere between (the ATM equivalent of $r$ and $p$ ) has the same drawback outlined for DBR without guaranteeing, anyway, that the ATM layer can make an exact discrimination between traffic conforming and non-conforming to the token bucket specification.
+
+Mapping with SBR1 with class 2 or SBR2 with class 3 allows the ATM level to know the maximum amount of information to perform an efficient statistical multiplexing, but as regards the treatment of the non-conforming part of the traffic it does not meet the expectation that it is treated as best effort.
+
+The remaining three mappings all meet both the goal of reflecting at the ATM level as closely as possible the traffic characteristics as specified by the token bucket specification and of providing a best effort treatment for exactly the portion of traffic exceeding it. The detailed ATM equivalents are reported in Table II.3.
+
+**Table II.3/Y.1310 – ATM equivalents for CLS to ATM mapping**
+
+| Mapping to SBR3 | Mapping to GFR1 or GFR2 |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| $PCR = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ | $PCR = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ |
+| $SCR = \left\lfloor \frac{r}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ | $MCR = \left\lfloor \frac{r}{m} \right\rfloor C(m)$ |
+| $MBS = \left\lfloor \frac{bp}{m(p-r)} \right\rfloor C(m)$ | $MFS = C(m)$ |
+| | $MBS = \max \left( \left\lfloor \frac{bp}{m(p-r)} \right\rfloor C(m), MFS \right)$ |
+
+The same considerations about the need of replacing $m$ with a value between $[m, M]$ and about the value to add to CDVT expressed at the bottom of II.1.1.4 apply.
+
+## II.2 Mapping Diffserv services over ATM
+
+This clause describes some possible examples of the differentiated service mapping to ATM services for information. IETF has just described application services that can be supported by each PHB or PHB group [DIFF\_AF] and [DIFF\_EF].
+
+4 See also II.1.1.3.
+
+### - *Leased line emulation service*
+
+It is also called the "premium service". This service can be implemented using the EF-PHB. This kind of service usually requires stringent low loss and delay guarantees. This service is also characterized by its peak rate. Accordingly, this service could easily be mapped to the DBR ATC using QoS class 1 in order to meet such loss and delay requirements. The peak rate can be mapped to the PCR parameter PCR of DBR ATC in a straightforward fashion.
+
+### - *Quantitative assured service*
+
+It is also called the "assured rate service". This service can be implemented using one of four AF-PHB classes. This service is characterized by a minimum rate guaranteed on a statistical basis. This service offers looser assurances than the leased line emulation service, but is still considered a quantitative service. In particular, it promises to deliver traffic with a high degree of reliability and with bounded latency, up to a negotiated rate. Accordingly, it seems to be a perfect fit to map this service to ABR ATC using QoS class 3. In this case, the MCR can be set equal to the service minimum rate.
+
+## **II.3 Intserv in MPLS over ATM**
+
+The traffic parameters of Intserv including $p$ , $r$ , $b$ and $R$ are defined in the RSVP objects such as *Tspec* and *Rspec*. If CR-LDP is used to support Intserv in MPLS over ATM networks, instead of RSVP, the following requirements must be considered:
+
+- When the RSVP/Intserv flow, including guaranteed service and controlled-load service, enters an ingress LSR in MPLS networks, the RSVP *Tspec* parameters such as $p$ , $r$ and $b$ must be reflected on the traffic parameters in the label request message of CR-LDP.
+- To support the guaranteed service, the RSVP *Rspec* parameters such as $R$ and $S$ must be reflected on the traffic parameters in the label mapping message of CR-LDP.
+
+The traffic parameter mapping from Intserv to CR-LDP depends on the traffic conditioning policy at the Ingress LSR.
+
+## **II.4 Diffserv in MPLS over ATM**
+
+This clause depicts an approach of supporting Diffserv in a MPLS ATM network. A Diffserv capable ATM-LSR should have the logical structure as specified in Figure II.2. It is worth noting that a transit ATM-LSR will usually not need the traffic conditioning element, but edge ATM-LSR must have this element to perform the packet classifying, marking, metering and shaping/dropping functions required by the Diffserv Architecture [DIFF\_ARCH].
+
+Either CR-LDP or RSVP-TE may be used as the signalling system.
+
+For details about the Traffic Conditioner, refer to the reference [DIFF\_ARCH].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the logical architecture of a Diffserv capable ATM-LSR. It is divided into two main sections: the Control Component and the Forwarding Component. The Control Component includes the Routing Protocol, TCP/IP, and LDP+CR-LDP/RSVP-TE (DSExtension). The Forwarding Component includes the Traffic Conditioner (Edge Only) and the ATM Mechanism. The Traffic Conditioner contains a classifier, meter, marker, and shaper/dropper. The ATM Mechanism is connected to the Forwarding Component. The diagram also shows the LIB (Label Information Base) and the LSP (Label Switched Path) connections.
+
+LIB Label Information Base
+
+T1317730-01
+
+Figure II.2/Y.1310 – Logical architecture of a Diffserv capable ATM-LSR. The diagram shows a logical architecture divided into two main sections: the Control Component and the Forwarding Component. The Control Component includes the Routing Protocol, TCP/IP, and LDP+CR-LDP/RSVP-TE (DSExtension). The Forwarding Component includes the Traffic Conditioner (Edge Only) and the ATM Mechanism. The Traffic Conditioner contains a classifier, meter, marker, and shaper/dropper. The ATM Mechanism is connected to the Forwarding Component. The diagram also shows the LIB (Label Information Base) and the LSP (Label Switched Path) connections.
+
+**Figure II.2/Y.1310 – Logical architecture of a Diffserv capable ATM-LSR**
+
+### II.4.1 LSP setup procedures
+
+The basic ATM MPLS Diffserv LSP setup procedure will include following actions:
+
+- On the edge of the ATM MPLS Diffserv Domain, the ATM LERs will deal with the service requests and perform the service classification action. Then the LERs will determine the PHB (per hop behaviour) that will be used by the service. Then, the ATM LER should map the PHB into (per hop scheduling, cell loss priority) pairs. The mapping relationships are specified in Table II.4.
+- According to the Diffserv requirements, using the MPLS signalling system (for instances, we can use the CR-LDP with Diffserv support [MPLS\_DIFF] as the signalling system) to perform the service provisioning process [DIFF\_ARCH] and set up a QoS aware LSP for the service. At this point, the forwarding tables on the LSRs along the LSP will have a new column for incoming PSCs.
+
+### II.4.2 Label forwarding procedure
+
+The basic label forwarding operation of ATM MPLS Diffserv scheme will include the following actions:
+
+- On the ingress of the ATM MPLS Diffserv domain, through the checking of the IP address and DSCP (differentiated service code point) value carried by the IP packet, the LERs determine the packet's FEC and PHB class.
+- The ingress ATM-LSR then performs the traffic conditioning, determine the outgoing CLP for the packet. When an ATM L-LSP has been set up, only the CLP field can be rewritten.
+
+- The ingress ATM-LSR then determines the outgoing VCI and interface number, performs the outgoing PSC for the packet, encapsulates the IP packet into an ATM packet and send it onto the outgoing interface.
+- In the MPLS Diffserv domain, the transit LSR checks the VCI and CLP field in the header of the ATM packet. By using the forwarding table, it determines the PSC required by the packet.
+- By using the mapping table shown in Table II.4, the transit LSR then determines the PHB required by the packet. Usually, the transit LSR will not perform the traffic conditioning actions, it just realizes the PHB for the packet and uses the forwarding table to forward the packet to the downstream LSR. If the transit LSR does need to perform the traffic conditioning actions, it uses the results of the traffic conditioning procedures to change the outgoing CLP for an ATM packet.
+- On the egress of the ATM MPLS Diffserv domain, the egress ATM LSR checks the VCI and CLP field in the header of the ATM packet. By using the forwarding table, it determines the PSC required by the packet. By using the mapping table shown in Table II.4, the transit LSR then determines the PHB required by the packet. Then it performs the traffic conditioning procedures and uses the results combined with the incoming PHB to determine the outgoing PHB and the outgoing DSCP value for the packet.
+- Then, the ATM egress will convert the ATM packet back to IP packet, which carries the IP address and DSCP field. (This field must be replaced by the DSCP got from the action above.)
+
+**Table II.4/Y.1310 – Mapping between the Diffserv PHBs and ATM pairs**
+
+| Diffserv PHBs | PSC | ATM CLP |
+|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------|
+| DF | DF | 0 |
+| CS n | CS n (Note 1) | 0 |
+| AF i1 (Note 2) | AFC i | 0 |
+| AF i2 | AFC i | 1 |
+| AF i3 | AFC i | 1 |
+| EF | EF | 0 |
+
+NOTE 1 – "n" ( $1 \leq n \leq 8$ ) refers to the number of IP precedence.
+
+NOTE 2 – "i" ( $1 \leq i \leq 4$ ) refers to the AF PHB class, for instance, when $i = 1$ , AFi1 will represent AF11 which belongs to the AF PHB class 1 and have the drop precedence 1.
+
+### II.4.3 The mappings between and PHB
+
+The following PHBs have been defined:
+
+**II.4.3.1 DF (Default PHB):** This PHB is used for the best effort packets or packets with unknown DSCP values.
+
+**II.4.3.2 CS (Class Selector PHB):** This PHB is used for backward compatibility with the existing 8-level IP precedence system.
+
+**II.4.3.3 EF (Expedite Forwarding PHB):** This PHB is used for the services that require low packet loss rate, low latency, low jitter and bandwidth guarantee. A packet with this PHB will get the highest service priority and premium service in the domain.
+
+**II.4.3.4 AF (Assured Forwarding PHB):** This PHB is used to classify the packets in the same connection with different drop precedence. IETF defined four AF classes, and within each class
+
+there are three PHBs with different drop precedence. Thus there are 12 AF PHBs in total. An application example of this PHB is when traffic exceeds a certain transmission rate; the excess packet will be assigned a PHB with a higher drop precedence. Another important requirement of this PHB is that the packets belonging to a single connection and the same PHB class cannot be reordered.
+
+Table II.4 shows the mapping between the PHBs and pairs. These mappings must be consistent on each LSR in an ATM Diffserv domain, and these mappings must be configurable.
+
+### **II.4.4 Implementation Considerations**
+
+The ATM MPLS LSRs should support the PHBs and the traffic conditioning rules of IP services. However, the detail packet treatment and traffic conditioning rules on the ATM MPLS LSRs are implementation issues.
+
+# **Appendix III**
+
+## **Possible evolution scenarios to MPLS for IP over ATM in public networks**
+
+## **III.1 Introduction**
+
+What are the potential routes to MPLS from current network infrastructure? This will be a function of the actual state as well as the services to be delivered by a specific carrier.
+
+In this Recommendation, we assume that MPLS will be deployed into existing ATM backbones. For the purposes of examining the MPLS evolution solutions, carriers will be classified by whether they are New versus Established, and whether they are full-service (data, voice, video, leased line) versus IP-centric. This is not a universal classification; it is rather a convenient way to categorize service providers based on the actual state of their network and its anticipated service offering.
+
+This appendix considers several types of existing infrastructure, and broad strategies for introducing MPLS into those network types. It then examines various technologies for operating MPLS over non-MPLS-capable ATM equipment, and makes recommendations about the use of those technologies.
+
+## **III.2 Proposed scenarios**
+
+Different scenarios are presented and discussed as follows:
+
+### **III.2.1 Established full-service carrier**
+
+We assume that an established carrier has a legacy of voice network and either transports the Data traffic over the TDM network or on a separate network. We also assume that such carrier is in the process of merging its data network and voice network over the same infrastructure.
+
+The existing carrier likely has a legacy ATM infrastructure that is being used for data traffic (IP or Frame Relay) and may be used for voice and video traffic or any other native ATM services. In this case, ATM is used as a multi-service switching technology.
+
+The existing carriage of IP in the carrier network is likely to be based on one of three cases:
+
+- using point-to-point ATM PVCs with RFC 2684 encapsulation [ATM\_MULTI];
+- using Classical IP over ATM;
+- using MPOA.
+
+In any case, it will be necessary to introduce MPLS into a network which currently uses only PVCs, SPVCs, SVCs, PVP, and SPVPs, and does not currently use VCs with MPLS control. The MPLS VCs may be termed "Label VCs (LVCs)" to distinguish them from SVCs with PNNI or similar control.
+
+### **III.2.2 Established voice service carrier**
+
+We assume that the carrier has a voice network only, traditional SS7/TDM without any substantial ATM investment and wants to carry both voice and data in the future using a cell-based MPLS infrastructure. What is the best evolution path?
+
+The voice carrier would probably in a first phase decide to keep the SS7 control and transfer the voice traffic from a TDM network onto a packet network. Assuming the likelihood of choosing a cell-based MPLS, data as well as voice traffic will be transported onto this MPLS-based network. The service provider has either the choice to keep both networks separated or work towards their progressive integration.
+
+### **III.2.3 IP-centric new carrier**
+
+The question here is whether or not it makes sense to do any ATM deployment. If the carrier chooses to deploy a cell-based MPLS, then there is little push towards having ATM control in the network. The main point would be to reuse ATM switching capabilities only.
+
+### **III.2.4 Full-service new carrier**
+
+The full-service new carrier will be offering voice, video, and leased lines services along with IP-centric services. Due to the varying traffic types, we assume that the carrier might choose to deploy an ATM infrastructure to integrate their service offering onto one network.
+
+Routers may be deployed at the edges of the network to support IP services, but the switched core will be ATM. Cell-based MPLS will be deployed in the core. Ships in the Night operation with ATM may be required to integrate MPLS and ATM based services. Explicitly routed MPLS will be required for traffic engineering, hop-by-hop MPLS would be required to handle traffic not carried within explicitly routed LSPs.
+
+## **III.3 Hybrid ATM network**
+
+This clause discusses three possible ways for integrating MPLS equipment with non-MPLS equipment in an ATM network. This clause assumes support of ATM switching in a current network. Support for MPOA and C-IPOA is not addressed in this clause; however, the techniques discussed here may apply.
+
+### **III.3.1 Technologies for hybrid ATM networks**
+
+During the introduction of ATM MPLS into an existing ATM network, it will sometimes be necessary to connect LSRs over traditional ATM equipment, forming a "hybrid" network. In hybrid networks, some switches and/or routers have MPLS capability and some do not. This clause discusses possible ways of implementing hybrid ATM networks: MPLS-over-PVCs, Virtual Trunks, and Virtual Connection Identifier Notification for LDP (VCID). These are illustrated in Figure III.1.
+
+
+
+ATM Switches without MPLS support
+
+Traditional ATM Network
+
+LER ATM
+
+ATM Edge LSR
+
+PVC or SPVC supporting MPLS traffic
+
+LER ATM
+
+ATM Edge LSR
+
+a) MPLS-over-PVCs
+
+ATM link supporting full MPLS
+
+ATM Label Switch Routers
+
+PVPs or SPVPs each used as a Virtual Trunk
+
+LER ATM
+
+ATM Edge LSR
+
+Traditional ATM Network
+
+b) Virtual Trunks
+
+ATM link supporting full MPLS
+
+ATM Label Switch Routers
+
+Multiple (S)PVCs or SVC using VCID
+
+LER ATM
+
+ATM Edge LSR
+
+Traditional ATM Network
+
+VC at each hop for signalling
+
+c) Virtual Connection Identifier Notification
+
+T1317740-01
+
+Figure III.1/Y.1310 – Technologies for hybrid networks. The figure consists of three diagrams: a) MPLS-over-PVCs, b) Virtual Trunks, and c) Virtual Connection Identifier Notification. Each diagram shows a traditional ATM network (shaded cloud) with LERs and LSRs. Diagram a) shows LERs connected to ATM switches via PVCs or SPVCs. Diagram b) shows LSRs connected via ATM links supporting full MPLS, with PVPs or SPVPs used as virtual trunks. Diagram c) shows LSRs connected via ATM links supporting full MPLS, with multiple (S)PVCs or SVCs using VCID.
+
+**Figure III.1/Y.1310 – Technologies for hybrid networks**
+
+#### III.3.1.1 MPLS-over-PVCs
+
+MPLS-over-PVCs is shown in Figure III.1 a). It can be used only to connect packet-based LSRs. It may not be used to connect ATM Label Switch Routers (ATM-LSRs) to each other. MPLS-over-PVCs connect packet-based Label Switch Routers (LSRs) by way of Permanent Virtual Circuit Connections (PVCs) over a traditional ATM network. Soft Permanent Virtual Circuit Connections (SPVCs) may also be used. (Any mention of a "PVC" with respect to MPLS-over-PVCs in this appendix equally applies to an SPVC.) The routers send MPLS packets to each other, with labels explicitly encapsulated along with the IP packet. This is called "packet-based labelling", as the MPLS label is applied to a whole packet, as opposed to individual cells. When packet-based labelling is used over PVCs, packets with many different labels are sent in the same PVC. This
+
+differs from ATM MPLS, where each different label is represented by a different VC, known as a "Label VC" (LVC). Packet-based labelling over PVCs is virtually identical to the case where MPLS Label Switch Routers (LSRs) are connected by links such as Packet-over-SONET, Packet-over-SDH, or any other point-to-point links. Note that MPLS-over-PVC does not use ATM MPLS on the ATM switches supporting the PVCs. This means that service providers must continue to provision and manage PVCs on a scale equal to the traditional IP over ATM approach.
+
+MPLS-over-PVCs uses the generic encapsulation that is described in the MPLS Label Stack Encodings specification [MPLS\_ENCAPS]. Possible link-layer encapsulations for the PVC include Null encapsulation and LLC/SNAP encapsulation. If the PVCs are carrying only MPLS packets, then Null encapsulation is recommended. Otherwise LLC/SNAP should be used, with a SNAP header containing the ethertypes specified for MPLS over LAN media [MPLS\_ENCAPS].
+
+#### **III.3.1.2 Virtual trunks**
+
+A different method of implementing hybrid ATM networks is the use of Virtual Trunks. Virtual trunks are based on Virtual Path (VP) connections. ATM MPLS normally involves labelling IP packets by putting them in different VCs in the same ATM trunk. Each different VC on the trunk represents a different label value. ATM LSRs treat virtual trunks almost identically to a physical trunk: each different VC within the VP represents a different label value. The difference is that the virtual trunk is not a physical trunk linking two adjacent LSRs. The virtual trunk is a Permanent Virtual Path Connection (PVP) or Soft Permanent Virtual Path Connection (SPVP) which connects ATM-LSRs by way of traditional ATM switches. Virtual trunks may also connect ATM edge LSRs to ATM-LSRs, or connect ATM edge LSRs to each other. Use of virtual trunks is illustrated in Figure III.1 b). Use of ATM MPLS with virtual trunks and VCI-based labels is described in the "MPLS using LDP and ATM VC Switching" document [MPLS\_ATM], and is in most respects identical to use of MPLS over physical trunks with VPI/VCI-based labels. A VC must be assigned to carry the LDP control traffic and this VC must use the LLC/SNAP encapsulation.
+
+#### **III.3.1.3 Virtual Connection Identifier Notification for LDP (VCID)**
+
+VCID allows PVCs, SPVCs, and Switched Virtual Circuit Connections (SVCs) to be used in ATM MPLS [ATM\_VCID]. (Here, "SVC" refers specifically to a dynamically-established VC in a traditional ATM network. VCs used directly by ATM MPLS are referred to here as "Label VCs", or "LVCs".) By contrast, MPLS-over-PVCs uses packet-based MPLS and not ATM MPLS, and Virtual Trunks uses PVP or SPVP connections and not PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs. VCID supports the use of PVCs, SPVCs and SVCs in similar network configurations to Virtual Trunks, as shown in Figure III.1 c). When VCID is used, a number of PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs are used to carry labelled packets between the ATM MPLS devices, with one VC per label. Because there is a distinct VC for each label, ATM MPLS packet forwarding can be used at the ATM MPLS devices using VCID.
+
+There must be a default VC pre-established on each LSR-to-LSR "hop", in order to carry IP routing and LDP. This VC is in addition to the VCs used by VCID to correspond to labels.
+
+### **III.3.2 Networks using MPLS-over-PVCs**
+
+#### **III.3.2.1 Use of MPLS-over-PVC technology**
+
+The simplest network structure using MPLS-over-PVCs is the full mesh shown in Figure III.2 a). Operation of IP routing protocols in an MPLS network of this structure leads to the same scalability issues as for traditional IP-over-ATM networks of similar structure. One solution to this is to use a partial mesh between the routers, but this would lead to the use of inefficient, multi-hop routes. Another alternative is to add extra ATM edge LSRs, as shown in Figure III.2 b), or possibly a redundant pair of them. The extra ATM edge LSRs reduce the size of the meshes. Note that the performance requirements on the extra LSRs will be quite high, as they will carry a large part of the network traffic. There is no direct way of using ATM-LSRs in a network using MPLS-over-PVCs.
+
+
+
+a) Hybrid network using only MPLS-over-PVCs
+
+b) Adding an extra LSR
+
+c) Migration towards a MPLS network
+
+d) Possible final stage: a MPLS network
+
+Non-MPLS ATM network
+
+MPLS link
+
+T1317750-01
+
+Figure III.2/Y.1310 – ATM MPLS networks using MPLS-over-PVCs. The figure consists of four diagrams (a, b, c, d) showing the evolution of an ATM MPLS network. Diagram (a) shows a hybrid network with LERs and LSRs connected via MPLS-over-PVCs (dashed red lines) within a non-MPLS ATM network (cloud). Diagram (b) shows an extra LSR added. Diagram (c) shows migration towards a MPLS network with some MPLS links (solid red lines) and some still using the ATM network. Diagram (d) shows the final stage as a MPLS network with all MPLS links. A legend at the bottom indicates that a cloud represents a 'Non-MPLS ATM network' and a solid red line represents a 'MPLS link'.
+
+**Figure III.2/Y.1310 – ATM MPLS networks using MPLS-over-PVCs**
+
+Some carriers might prefer to build an infrastructure for their MPLS traffic which is separate from their traditional ATM network. This MPLS network might use ATM MPLS. Alternatively, it might use packet-based MPLS, with packet-based LSRs and links such as PPP-over-SDH. Such a packet-based MPLS network might use MPLS-over-PVCs as a transitional stage, allowing a traditional ATM network to be used to carry MPLS traffic in the early stages of introduction of the packet-based MPLS network. In the course of growing this network, the MPLS-over-PVC links might be replaced with physical links. This possible future migration is shown in Figures III.2 c) and d).
+
+#### III.3.2.2 Equipment for MPLS-over-PVCs
+
+The core of an MPLS-over-PVCs network is a traditional ATM network which need only support PVCs or SPVCs. Virtually any ATM network can be used. The ATM edge LSRs should support the following:
+
+- one or more ATM network interface cards;
+- packet-based MPLS encapsulation over PVCs or SPVCs;
+- traffic shaping to the PVC or SPVC parameters.
+
+### III.3.3 Networks using virtual trunks
+
+#### - *Use of virtual trunks*
+
+A simple way of using virtual trunks is to use them to connect ATM edge LSRs without using any ATM-LSRs at all in the network, as illustrated in Figure III.3 a). This means that all MPLS packets are carried over virtual trunks, and no label switching actually occurs in the network. The ATM part of the network consists entirely of traditional ATM switches. More commonly, some switches in the ATM network will support the MPLS protocol stack, and some will not. Virtual trunks may be used to connect ATM-LSRs to ATM-LSRs, or to connect ATM edge LSRs to ATM-LSRs, as well as connecting ATM edge LSRs to each other. This is shown in Figure III.3 b).
+
+#### - *Migration to full MPLS*
+
+Figures III.3 a), b) and c) show a possible migration process for introducing MPLS to a traditional ATM network:
+
+ATM edge LSRs are added around the edge of a traditional ATM network; alternatively, MPLS function may be added to existing routers. This enables MPLS VPNs as well as leading to the next steps.
+
+Next, MPLS function is added to some ATM switches, or extra ATM-LSRs are added to the network. This reduces the number of virtual trunks required, and starts to reduce some of the scalability problems of hybrid networks.
+
+More ATM-LSRs are added, which further reduces the number of virtual trunks, and starts to introduce native ATM MPLS links as shown in Figure III.3 c). This step naturally leads to the final one.
+
+Ultimately, all ATM switches are ATM-LSRs, and no virtual trunks are used at all. The full network runs ATM MPLS, and has none of the disadvantages of hybrid networks. This is illustrated in Figure III.3 d).
+
+#### - *Other variations*
+
+LSRs and traditional ATM switches can be combined in many different ways. Figure III.4 shows some other hybrid network structures which may occur. Many other hybrid network structures are possible. An ATM MPLS network must include edge LSRs, but may use any nearly combination of zero or more ATM-LSRs and zero or more traditional ATM switches with virtual trunks.
+
+#### - *Requirements to support virtual trunks*
+
+Virtual trunks are implemented using Permanent Virtual Paths (PVPs) or Soft Permanent Virtual Paths (SPVPs).
+
+
+
+a) Hybrid network using only virtual trunks
+
+b) Adding an extra ATM-LSR
+
+c) Further simplification by adding more ATM-LSRs
+
+d) Full ATM MPLS
+
+Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk ATM MPLS link
+
+T1317760-01
+
+Four diagrams (a, b, c, d) illustrating the evolution of ATM MPLS networks using virtual trunks. Diagram (a) shows a hybrid network with LERs connected to a central cloud. Diagram (b) adds an LSR to the cloud. Diagram (c) adds more LSRs and uses solid red lines for some connections. Diagram (d) shows a full ATM MPLS network with all connections as solid red lines. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols: a cloud for 'Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk' and a solid red line for 'ATM MPLS link'. Cloud icon Solid red line icon
+
+**Figure III.3/Y.1310 – ATM MPLS networks using virtual trunks**
+
+
+
+a) MPLS core, with virtual trunks to edge LSRs
+
+b) MPLS switching near edge, with traditional ATM core
+
+— ATM MPLS link
+
+Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk
+
+T1317770-01
+
+Figure III.4/Y.1310 – Other hybrid network examples using virtual trunks on ATM-LSRs. The figure contains two diagrams, (a) and (b), and a legend. Diagram (a) shows a central cloud representing an MPLS core with three LSRs (LSR ATM) connected by red lines. Six LERs (LER ATM) are connected to the LSRs: two to each LSR. Diagram (b) shows a central cloud representing a traditional ATM core with two LSRs (LSR ATM) connected by red lines. Four LERs (LER ATM) are connected to the LSRs: two to each LSR. The legend indicates that a red line represents an 'ATM MPLS link' and a cloud with a red line represents a 'Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk'.
+
+**Figure III.4/Y.1310 – Other hybrid network examples using virtual trunks on ATM-LSRs**
+
+#### III.3.3.1 Supporting virtual trunks on traditional ATM switches
+
+The switches in the traditional ATM networks must support PVP or SPVP connections with ATM Forum or ITU-T traffic management types which match those used on the edge LSRs. The switches are not required to support MPLS.
+
+#### III.3.3.2 Supporting virtual trunks on edge LSRs
+
+ATM edge LSRs must meet the following requirements in order to support virtual trunks:
+
+- They must support one or more ATM network interface cards.
+- If a particular virtual trunk uses a VPI $x$ at the edge LSR, then the LDP signalling VC for the virtual trunk must be within $x$ . It may have VPI = $x$ , VCI = 32, instead of the normal default VPI = 0, VCI = 32 for LDP signalling [MPLS\_ATM]. However, other VCI values can be configured through mutual bilateral agreements.
+
+In order to support virtual trunks, ATM-LSRs must meet the same requirements as ATM edge LSRs:
+
+- If a particular virtual trunk uses a VPI $x$ at the ATM-LSR, then the LDP signalling VC for the virtual trunk must be within $x$ . It may have VPI = $x$ , VCI = 32, instead of the normal default VPI = 0, VCI = 32. However, other VCI values can be configured through mutual bilateral agreements.
+
+### III.3.4 Networks using VCID
+
+#### III.3.4.1 The concept of a "Logical Link"
+
+VCID uses multiple PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs to connect each pair of ATM MPLS devices across a traditional network [ATM\_VCID]. Despite the differences between VCID and virtual trunks, VCID can be used in similar network configurations to virtual trunks. Figure III.1 illustrated this. In Figure III.5, a concept is introduced which allows VCID to be directly compared to virtual trunks.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates two ways to represent VCID connections between ATM MPLS devices. Part (a) shows a detailed view of the connections, while part (b) shows a simplified representation.
+
+**a) Connections for VCID**
+
+This diagram shows three circular nodes representing ATM MPLS devices, each divided into 'LER' (Label Edge Router) and 'ATM' sections. The nodes are arranged in a line, with a central node and two outer nodes. A cloud-like shape represents the underlying network. Multiple red dotted lines connect the LER sections of the outer nodes to the ATM section of the central node. Labels with arrows point to these lines: 'VC at each hop for signalling purposes (See text)' points to the leftmost dotted line, and 'Multiple (S)PVCs or SVCs using VCID, for data forwarding purposes' points to the middle dotted line.
+
+**b) Simplified representation as a VCID "logical link"**
+
+This diagram shows the same three nodes and cloud, but the connections are simplified into a single red dashed line between the LER sections of the outer nodes and the ATM section of the central node. The identifier 'T1317780-01' is located at the bottom right of this diagram.
+
+Figure III.5/Y.1310 – Representing VCID connections as 'logical links'
+
+**Figure III.5/Y.1310 – Representing VCID connections as "logical links"**
+
+When connecting two ATM MPLS devices (ATM LSRs or ATM edge LSRs) with VCID, many PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs are required: one for signalling, and many for the MPLS labels. However, the group of PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs used by VCID between two ATM MPLS devices acts in place of a single ATM link in an ATM MPLS network. Consequently, it is useful to consider this group of PVCs, SPVCs or SVCs to be a single "logical link".
+
+Figure III.3 showed how virtual trunks could be used when introducing MPLS to a traditional ATM network. VCID "logical links" can be used in an exactly analogous way, as shown in Figure III.6. The variant network structures shown in Figure III.4 also apply equally well with VCID.
+
+
+
+a) Hybrid network using only VCID Logical Links
+
+b) Adding an ATM-LSR
+
+c) Further simplification by adding more ATM-LSRs
+
+d) Full ATM MPLS
+
+Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk
+
+ATM MPLS link
+
+T1317790-01
+
+Figure III.6/Y.1310 – ATM MPLS networks using VCID 'logical links'. The figure consists of four sub-diagrams (a, b, c, d) showing the evolution of an ATM MPLS network. Sub-diagram (a) shows a hybrid network with five LERs (LER ATM) connected to a central cloud representing a traditional ATM network. Sub-diagram (b) shows the addition of an LSR (LSR ATM) to the network. Sub-diagram (c) shows further simplification by adding more LSRs (LSR ATM) to the network. Sub-diagram (d) shows the final state as a full ATM MPLS network with three LSRs (LSR ATM) connected in a chain. A legend at the bottom indicates that a dashed red line represents a 'Traditional ATM network and a virtual trunk' and a solid red line represents an 'ATM MPLS link'.
+
+**Figure III.6/Y.1310 – ATM MPLS networks using VCID "logical links"**
+
+#### III.3.4.2 Supporting VCID on traditional ATM switches
+
+The switches in the traditional ATM networks must support PVC, SPVC or SVCs connections with ATM Forum or ITU-T traffic management types which match those used on the edge LSRs. They are not required to support VCID signalling or any MPLS functions.
+
+#### III.3.4.3 Supporting VCID on ATM edge LSRs
+
+The ATM edge LSRs must meet the following requirements:
+
+- They must support one or more ATM network interface cards.
+- They must support VCID in addition to the ATM MPLS protocols.
+
+# Appendix IV
+
+## Example methods for IP-VPN support in MPLS/ATM public network
+
+## IV.1 Introduction
+
+This appendix describes example methods for using MPLS to provide IP Virtual Private Network services in a public network. MPLS provides a flexible and scalable basis for building IP-VPN services. Clause 7.2 defines the IP-VPN service and some requirements for the service.
+
+[Y.1311.1] also provides requirements and architectural approach description for MPLS-based IP-VPN.
+
+It is understood that Service Providers will make design decisions to support IP-VPNs based on their internal network and customer requirements. This appendix describes example methods and is not intended to constrain the deployment of VPNs inside a carrier's network.
+
+Although the IP-VPN concept framed in the language of supporting enterprise customers by carriers, the same methods can be used by Service Providers to support other Service Providers (e.g., a carriers' carrier).
+
+Figure IV.1 illustrates a generic scenario for IP-VPNs:
+
+
+
+VPN management functions
+
+- VPN-ID processing
+- Virtual routing
+- Security
+- Traffic engineering
+- QoS, etc.
+
+Core Network (MPLS/ATM Network)
+
+CE - Customer Edge
+LER - Label Edge Router
+LSR - Label Switch Router
+PE - Provider Edge
+
+T1317800-01
+
+Figure IV.1: Generic scenario for IP-VPNs using MPLS. The diagram shows a central 'Core Network (MPLS/ATM Network)' containing several routers. On the left, a 'VPN Customer Site' is connected to a 'CE' (Customer Edge) router, which is connected to a 'LER ATM' (Label Edge Router) router. This LER is part of an 'LSP Tunnel' that passes through two 'LSR ATM' (Label Switch Router) routers and ends at a 'LER ATM' router on the right, which is labeled 'PE' (Provider Edge). The right side is connected to another 'VPN Customer Site' via a 'CE' router. A box on the left lists 'VPN management functions' including VPN-ID processing, Virtual routing, Security, Traffic engineering, and QoS, etc., with an arrow pointing to the left LER. A legend at the bottom left defines the abbreviations: CE - Customer Edge, LER - Label Edge Router, LSR - Label Switch Router, PE - Provider Edge. The reference T1317800-01 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.1/Y.1310 – Generic scenario for IP-VPNs using MPLS**
+
+The CE router is the customer edge router that interfaces a customer site with the service provider's network. The PE router is the service provider edge router that interfaces to customers' CEs.
+
+A site is a set of (sub)networks that are part of the customer's network and is connected to the VPN through one or more PE/CE links. A VPN is a collection of sites sharing common routing information. A site can be part of different VPNs.
+
+Figure IV.2 illustrates the case in which a Service Provider supports multiple VPNs. As shown, one site can belong to multiple VPNs. A site belonging to multiple VPNs may or may not provide transit between the two VPNs according to policy (how this is done is outside the scope of this Recommendation). If a site belongs to multiple VPNs, it must have an address space that is unique among the VPNs.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates three overlapping Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) represented by large ovals: VPN-A on the left, VPN-B at the bottom, and VPN-C on the right. Four sites are represented by smaller circles: Site-1 is located within VPN-A only; Site-2 is located within the intersection of VPN-A and VPN-B; Site-3 is located within the intersection of VPN-B and VPN-C; and Site-4 is located within VPN-C only. The intersection of all three VPNs (VPN-A, VPN-B, and VPN-C) is empty.
+
+T1317810-01
+
+Venn diagram showing three overlapping VPNs (VPN-A, VPN-B, VPN-C) and four sites (Site-1, Site-2, Site-3, Site-4). Site-1 is in VPN-A only. Site-2 is in both VPN-A and VPN-B. Site-3 is in both VPN-B and VPN-C. Site-4 is in VPN-C only.
+
+**Figure IV.2/Y.1310 – Illustration of multiple VPNs**
+
+## **IV.2 Scenario 1**
+
+This clause describes an example method of using MPLS to provide IP-VPN services in a public network. The MPLS and its LDP provide a very flexible and powerful basis for building IP-VPN services. As a normal LDP operation, basic LSP setup is according to a topology-driven method. This is a base LSP setup using base label. In this case, two levels of LSP tunnelling (label stacking) for intra-VPN routing are used.
+
+### IV.2.1 Simple network configuration
+
+#### IV.2.1.1 Architectural overview
+
+Figure IV.3 illustrates an example of configuration composed of LER and LSR for IP-VPN services in MPLS/ATM core network.
+
+
+
+VPN management functions
+
+- VPN-ID processing
+- Virtual routing
+- Security
+- Traffic engineering
+- QoS, etc.
+
+Core Network (MPLS/ATM Network)
+
+VPN Customer Site
+
+VPN Customer Site
+
+LER Label Edge Router
+
+LSR Label Switch Router
+
+T1317820-01
+
+Figure IV.3: Network model for IP-VPN support in MPLS/ATM public network. The diagram shows a central 'Core Network (MPLS/ATM Network)' containing three LSRs (Label Switched Routers) and two LERs (Label Edge Routers). The LERs are connected to 'VPN Customer Site's. A box on the left lists 'VPN management functions' including VPN-ID processing, Virtual routing, Security, Traffic engineering, and QoS, etc. Arrows indicate 'LSP Tunnel' connections between LERs and LSRs, and 'LPD' (Label Distribution Protocol) connections between LSRs and LERs. A legend at the bottom identifies LER as Label Edge Router and LSR as Label Switch Router.
+
+**Figure IV.3/Y.1310 – Network model for IP-VPN support in MPLS/ATM public network**
+
+### IV.2.2 Network components
+
+#### IV.2.2.1 LER (Label Edge Router)
+
+LER is a MPLS border router that is located at the edge of MPLS/ATM provider network. They serve as LSP tunnel ingress and egress points for IP traffic of VPN customers. If a LER is shared over many customers, it should perform virtual routing, which means a LER maintains separate forwarding tables for each VPN it serves, since their IP address spaces may not be distinct.
+
+#### IV.2.2.2 LSR (Label Switched Router)
+
+The MPLS/ATM core network is the provider's underlying network that is shared among customer IP-VPN services.
+
+#### IV.2.2.3 Operations for establishing IP-VPN areas
+
+The network provider wishing to offer IP-VPN service has first to configure the MPLS domain. An MPLS domain here means an IP-VPN area. An IP-VPN area consists of LERs and LSRs. As a normal LDP operation, basic LSP setup is according to a topology-driven method, which is defined as a base or level 1 LSP setup using base label. For intra-VPN routing, two levels of LSP tunneling (label stacking) are used.
+
+#### IV.2.2.4 VPN membership discovery
+
+Each LER discovers all other LERs in the VPN area that is serving the same IP-VPN. The LDP session initiation process is used as the method of LERs discovering their peers, since the ultimate intent of the scheme is to establish a second level of MPLS tunnels. Every LER sends an LDP hello message down every base network LSP that exits its LER. Hello messages are encapsulated with
+
+the base MPLS label so that they are carried all the way to the destination LER. The LDP hello message is a form of query to determine if a LER for the same VPN (a peer) resides at the destination LER. When a hello adjacency is registered, the relevant LER proceeds to initiate an LDP session with its peer. One of the two LERs will initiate a TCP connection to the other. After the TCP connection is in place, and the necessary initiation messages have been exchanged, then an LDP session between the peer LERs exists. Immediately after the LDP session is established, each of the two LERs offers the other a label for a LSP tunnel to itself. If the LSP tunnel is a nested tunnel, its label is pushed onto a packets label stack before the base network LSP label.
+
+#### **IV.2.2.5 VPN membership and reachability information dissemination**
+
+The LER learns the IP address prefixes of the customer sites it is directly connected to as exchanging routing information. The LER needs to find its peer LERs. It has to discover which other LERs in the VPN area serve its VPN. The LER offers to establish a direct LDP session with every other LER in the VPN area. But only LERs serving the same VPN will discover each other, and go on to establish LDP sessions with each other. LDP sessions will only be successfully established between LERs that are supporting the same VPN.
+
+#### **IV.2.2.6 Intra VPN reachability**
+
+The first traffic that will flow over the nested tunnels is the exchange of routing information between LERs. It is assumed that when a LER is first configured for an IP-VPN, part of the configuration information is the routing protocol that it should use "intra VPN". It would also be given any security credentials that it needs in order to participate as a neighbour router to the other LERs. After any discovery phase of the "intra VPN" routing scheme, each LER will be advertising the VPN customer specific address prefixes reachable through it.
+
+#### **IV.2.2.7 IP packet forwarding**
+
+As a result of routing exchanges between LERs, each LER will build a forwarding table that relates VPN customer specific address prefixes (FEC: Forward Equivalency Classes) to the next hop. When IP packets arrive whose next hop is a LER, the forwarding process pushes first the label for the peer LER (the nested tunnel label). Then the base label, for the first hop of the base network LSP that leads to the LER, is pushed onto the packet. The doubly labelled packet is then forwarded to the next LSR in the base network LSP. When the packet arrives at the destination LER, the outermost label may have changed several times but the nested label has not changed. As the label stack is popped, the nested label is used to direct the packet to the correct LER. At a LER, the nested label space used by each VPN has to be disjoint from all other VPNs supported by the same LER.
+
+## **IV.3 Scenario 2**
+
+This clause describes an example method of using MPLS and the Multiprotocol Border Gateway Protocol to provide IP-VPN services in a public network as defined in [BGP\_VPN]. This clause provides an overview. Details can be found in [BGP\_VPN].
+
+### **IV.3.1 Architectural overview**
+
+Figure IV.1 illustrates an example of a configuration composed of LER and LSR for IP-VPN services in a MPLS/ATM core network.
+
+Figure IV.4 illustrates the network model using [BGP\_VPN].
+
+### **IV.3.2 Network components**
+
+This clause introduces the network components for support of the IP-VPN and the terminology used.
+
+#### IV.3.2.1 Provider Edge (PE) Router
+
+The PE router is the service provider edge router that interfaces to customers' edge (CE) routers. For the purposes of this Recommendation, this router is an edge LSR (i.e., the interface between the customer and provider does not use MPLS).
+
+#### IV.3.2.2 Customer Edge (CE) Router
+
+The CE router is the customer edge router that interfaces to the service provider's edge (PE) routers. For the purposes of this scenario, the CE router does not implement MPLS and is an IP router. The CE does not have to support any VPN-specific routing protocols or signalling.
+
+#### IV.3.2.3 Provider (P) Router
+
+The P routers are the core Label Switch Routers.
+
+#### IV.3.2.4 Site
+
+A site is a set of (sub)networks that are part of the customer's network and is connected to the VPN through one or more PE/CE links. A site can be part of different VPNs.
+
+#### IV.3.2.5 Route distinguisher
+
+The provider assigns each VPN a unique identifier called a Route Distinguisher (RD) that is different for each Intranet or Extranet within the provider network. Forwarding tables in PE routers contain unique addresses, called VPN-IP addresses, constructed by concatenating the RD with the customer's IP addresses. VPN-IP addresses are unique for each endpoint in the service provider network, and entries are stored in forwarding tables for each node in the VPN (i.e., each PE router in the VPN).
+
+#### IV.3.2.6 Connection model
+
+Figure IV.4 below illustrates the connection model for the MPLS/BGP VPN.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the connection model for IP/VPNs using MPLS/BGP. It shows a central 'Provider Network' containing 'PE' (Provider Edge) and 'P' (Provider) routers. The PE routers are connected to 'CE' (Customer Edge) routers, which are associated with specific VPNs (VPN\_A and VPN\_B) and their IP addresses. The PE routers are also connected to the P routers, forming a meshed structure. The diagram is labeled 'iBGP sessions' and 'Provider Network'. A reference code 'T1317830-01' is visible at the bottom right.
+
+Diagram illustrating the connection model for IP/VPNs using MPLS/BGP. The diagram shows a central 'Provider Network' containing 'PE' (Provider Edge) and 'P' (Provider) routers. The PE routers are connected to 'CE' (Customer Edge) routers, which are associated with specific VPNs (VPN\_A and VPN\_B) and their IP addresses. The PE routers are also connected to the P routers, forming a meshed structure. The diagram is labeled 'iBGP sessions' and 'Provider Network'. A reference code 'T1317830-01' is visible at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.4/Y.1310 – Connection model for IP/VPNs using MPLS/BGP**
+
+P routers are in the core of the MPLS network. PE routers use MPLS to communicate with the core MPLS network and IP routing to communicate with the CE router. P and PE routers use an IP routing protocol (interior gateway protocol) for establishing IP routes through the MPLS core and LDP for label distribution between routers.
+
+PE routers use multiprotocol BGP-4 to communicate with each other to exchange labels and policy for each VPN. The PEs are BGP fully meshed (unless a route reflector is used). Specifically, since the PEs are in the same Autonomous System, they use internal BGP (iBGP).
+
+P routers do not run BGP and do not have any knowledge of the VPN. They use normal MPLS protocols and procedures.
+
+PE routers may exchange IP routes with CE routers via an IP routing protocol. Static routes can also be used. Normal routing procedures are used between the CE and PE routers. The CE router does not have to implement MPLS or have any special knowledge of the VPN.
+
+The PE routers distribute the customer routes to the other PE routers via iBGP. The VPN-IP address (constructed from the route distinguisher and IPv4 address) is used in BGP for distributing routes. Thus, different VPNs can use overlapping IPv4 address space without duplicate VPN-IP addresses.
+
+The PE routers map the routes learned from BGP into their routing tables for forwarding packets received from the CE routers into the correct LSP.
+
+Two levels of labels are used. The inside label is used to identify the correct VPN to the PE router. The outside label is used by the LSRs in the MPLS network to route the packets to the correct PE.
+
+#### **IV.3.2.7 Operations for establishing IP-VPN areas**
+
+The network provider wishing to offer IP-VPN service must design and provision the network according to the connectivity requirements.
+
+Each PE must be configured for the VPNs which they must support and the VPNs to which each attached CE belongs. An iBGP peering relationship must be configured between PE routers in the MPLS network or a route reflector. Normal iBGP scaling capabilities can be used.
+
+Normal routing protocol configuration must be done to communicate with the CE.
+
+Normal MPLS configuration (LDP, IGP, etc.) must be performed to communicate with the MPLS core network.
+
+The P routers should not have to be configured to support the VPN (beyond normal MPLS support).
+
+#### **IV.3.2.8 VPN membership and reachability information dissemination**
+
+The PE learns the IP address prefixes of the customer sites it is directly connected to by exchanging routing information via an IP routing protocol or via configuration (static routes).
+
+The PE exchanges VPN-IP address prefixes with its BGP peers to learn routes to destination VPN sites. The PE also exchanges labels via BGP with its PE router peers in order to identify the LSP to use for connectivity between PE routers. These labels are used as second level labels and are not seen by the P routers.
+
+PE routers maintain separate routing and forwarding tables for each VPN it supports. Each CE router attached to a PE router will use the appropriate routing table based on the interface to which it attaches.
+
+#### **IV.3.2.9 IP packet forwarding**
+
+As a result of routing exchanges between PEs, each PE will build a per-VPN forwarding table that relates VPN customer specific address prefixes to next hop PE routers.
+
+When IP packets arrive from a CE router, the PE router will check the forwarding table for the VPN identified with that interface. If a match is found, the router will proceed as follows:
+
+- If the next hop is a PE router, the forwarding process pushes first the label for the peer PE router (the nested tunnel label) identified by the routing table.
+- The PE router then pushes the base label on to the packet, for the first hop of the base network LSP that leads to the destination PE router. The doubly labelled packet is then forwarded to the next LSR in the base network LSP.
+- The P routers (LSRs) use the top-level labels and their routing tables to route the packet to the destination PE.
+
+- When the packet arrives at the destination PE router the outermost label may have changed several times but the nested label has not changed.
+- When the PE router receives a packet, it uses the embedded label to identify the VPN. At a PE router, the nested label space used by each VPN has to be disjoint from all other VPNs supported by the same PE router. The PE router checks the routing table associated with that VPN to determine over which interface to transmit the packet.
+
+If a match is not found in the VPN routing table, the PE router checks the Internet routing table (if this capability is available from the provider) for routability. If no route is found, the packet is dropped.
+
+VPN-IP forwarding tables contain labels that correspond to VPN-IP addresses. These labels route traffic to each site in a VPN. Because labels are used instead of IP addresses, customers can keep their private addressing schemes, within the corporate Internet, without requiring Network Address Translation (NAT) to pass traffic through the provider network. Traffic is separated between VPNs using a logically distinct forwarding table for each VPN. Based on the incoming interface, the switch selects a specific forwarding table, which lists only valid destinations in the VPN, thanks to BGP. To create Extranets, a provider explicitly configures reachability between VPNs. (NAT configurations may be required.).
+
+#### **IV.3.2.10 Security**
+
+Within the provider network, route distinguishers are associated with every packet by the PE router, so a user cannot "spoof" a flow or packet into another customer's VPN. Note that route distinguishers are not carried in user data packets. Users can participate in an Intranet or Extranet, only if they reside on the correct physical port and have the proper route distinguishers configured into the PE router. This setup makes virtually impossible to enter, and provides the same security levels users are accustomed to in a frame relay, leased-line, or ATM service.
+
+# **BIBLIOGRAPHY**
+
+This bibliography includes explicit references embedded in the RFCs listed in 2.1.2. Embedded references which are already included as primary references are not repeated in this appendix.
+
+- [1] POSTEL (J.): DoD Standard – Internet Protocol, *RFC 760, USC/Information Sciences Institute*, January 1980.
+- [2] POSTEL (J.): DoD Standard – Transmission Control Protocol, *RFC 761, USC/Information Sciences Institute*, January 1980.
+- [3] POSTEL (J.): Internet Control Message Protocol – DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification, *RFC 792, USC/Information Sciences Institute*, September 1981.
+- [4] POSTEL (J.): Service Mappings, *RFC 795, USC/Information Sciences Institute*, September 1981.
+- [5] POSTEL (J.): Address Mappings, *RFC 796, USC/Information Sciences Institute*, September 1981.
+- [6] BRADEN (R.): Requirements for Internet Hosts – Communication Layers, *STD 3, RFC 1122*, October 1989.
+- [7] RIVEST (R.): The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm, *RFC 1321*, April 1992.
+- [8] ALMQUIST (P.): Type of Service in the Internet Protocol Suite, *RFC 1349*, July 1992.
+
+- [9] BRADLEY (T.), BROWN (C.), MALIS (A.): Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay, *RFC 1490*, July 1993.
+- [10] MOY (J.): OSPF Version 2, *RFC 1583*, *Proteon Inc*, March 1994.
+- [11] SIMPSON (W.): The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), *STD 51*, *RFC 1661*, July 1994.
+- [12] REYNOLDS (J.), POSTEL (J.): Assigned Numbers, *RFC 1700*, October 1994.
+- [13] REKHTER (Y.), LI (T.): A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), *RFC 1771*, March 1995.
+- [14] BAKER (F.), Editor: Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers, *RFC 1812*, June 1995.
+- [15] SCHULZRINNE (H.), CASNER (S.), FREDERICK (R.), JACOBSON (V.): RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications, *RFC 1889*, January 1996.
+- [16] McCANN (J.), MOGUL (J.), DEERING (S.): Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6, *RFC 1981*, August 1996.
+- [17] BRADNER (S.): Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, *BCP 14*, *RFC 2119*, March 1997.
+- [18] BRADEN (R.) et al.: Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) – Version 1 Functional Specification, *RFC 2205*, September 1997.
+- [19] WROCLAWSKI (J.): The use of RSVP with IETF Integrated Services, *RFC 2210*, September 1997.
+- [20] WROCLAWSKI (J.): Specification of the Controlled-Load Network Element Service, *RFC 2211*, September 1997.
+- [21] SHENKER (S.), WROCLAWSKI (J.): General Characterization Parameters for Integrated Service Network Elements, *RFC 2215*, September 1997.
+- [22] SHENKER (S.), WROCLAWSKI (J.): Network Element Service Specification Template, *RFC 2216*, September 1997.
+- [23] HINDEN (R.), DEERING (S.): IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture, *RFC 2373*, July 1998.
+- [24] HEFFERNAN (A.): Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option, *RFC 2385*, August 1998.
+- [25] KENT (S.), ATKINSON (R.): Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, *RFC 2401*, November 1998.
+- [26] KENT (S.), ATKINSON (R.): IP Authentication Header, *RFC 2402*, November 1998.
+- [27] KENT (S.), ATKINSON (R.): IP Encapsulating Security Protocol (ESP), *RFC 2406*, November 1998.
+- [28] NARTEN (T.), ALVESTRAND (H.): Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs, *RFC 2434*, October 1998.
+- [29] DEERING (S.), HINDEN (R.): Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, *RFC 2460*, December 1998.
+- [30] CONTA (A.), DEERING (S.): Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification, *RFC 2463*, December 1998.
+- [31] AWDUCHE (D.) et al.: Requirements for Traffic Engineering Over MPLS, *RFC 2702*, September 1999.
+- [32] POSTEL (J.): Internet Name Server, *USC/Information Sciences Institute*, *IEN 116*, August 1979.
+
+- [33] SOLLINS (K.): The TFTP Protocol, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology, IEN 133*, January 1980.
+- [34] CERF (V.): The Catenet Model for Internetworking, *Information Processing Techniques Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, IEN 48*, July 1978.
+- [35] BBN Technical Report 1822, *Specification for the Interconnection of a Host and an IMP*, Bolt, Beranek, and Newman, Revised May 1978.
+- [36] SHOCH (J.): Inter-Network Naming, Addressing, and Routing, *COMPCON, IEEE Computer Society*, Fall 1978.
+- [37] SHOCH (J.): Packet Fragmentation in Inter-Network Protocols, *Computer Networks, Vol. 3, No. 1*, February 1979.
+- [38] STRAZISAR (V.): How to Build a Gateway, *IEEN 109, Bolt, Beranek and Newman*, August 1979.
+- [39] CERF (V.), KAHN (R.): A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication, *IEEE Transactions on Communications*, Vol. COM-22, No. 5, pp. 637-648, May 1974.
+- [40] DALAL (Y.), SUNSHINE (C.): Connection Management in Transport Protocols, *Computer Networks*, Vol. 2, No. 6, pp. 454-473, December 1978.
+- [41] DEMERS (A.), KESHAV (S.), SHENKER (S.): Analysis and Simulation of a Fair Queueing Algorithm, in *Internetworking: Research and Experience*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 3-26.
+- [42] ZHANG (L.): Virtual Clock: A New Traffic Control Algorithm for Packet Switching Networks, in *Proc. ACM SIGCOMM '90*, pp. 19-29.
+- [43] VERMA (D.), ZHANG (H.), FERRARI (D.): Guaranteeing Delay Jitter Bounds in Packet Switching Networks, in *Proc. Tricomm '91*.
+- [44] GEORGIADIS (L.), GUERIN (R.), PERIS (V.), SIVARAJAN (K.N.): Efficient Network QoS Provisioning Based on per Node Traffic Shaping, *IBM Research Report No. RC-20064*.
+- [45] GOYAL (P.), LAM (S.S.), VIN (H.M.): Determining End-to-End Delay Bounds in Heterogeneous Networks, *Proc. 5th Intl. Workshop on Network and Operating System Support for Digital Audio and Video*, April 1995.
+- [46] FLOYD (S.), JACOBSON (V.): Link-sharing and Resource Management Models for Packet Networks, *IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking*, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 365-386, August 1995.
+- [47] SHREEDHAR (M.), VARGHESE (G.): Efficient Fair Queueing using Deficit Round Robin, *Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 95*, 1995.
+- [48] BENNETT (J.), ZHANG (Hui): Hierarchical Packet Fair. Queueing Algorithms, *Proc. ACM SIGCOMM 96*, August 1996.
+- [49] STILIADIS (D.), VARMA (A.): Rate-Proportional Servers: A Design Methodology for Fair Queueing Algorithms, *IEEE/ACM Trans. on Networking*, April 1998.
+- [50] CONTA (A.), DOOLAN (P.), MALIS (A.): Use of Label Switching on Frame Relay Networks, *RFC 3034*, January 2001.
+- [51] NIKOLAOU (N.), RIGOLIO (G.), CASACA (A.), CIULLI (N.), STASSINOPOULOS (G.): Integration of IP and ATM for QoS and Multimedia Support, *4th International Distributed Conference (ICD 1999)*, 22-23 September 1999, Madrid, Spain.
+
+- [52] IETF RFC 2208 (1997), *Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) – Version 1 Applicability Statement – Some Guidelines on Deployment*.
+- [53] IETF RFC 3260 (2002), *New Terminology and Clarifications for Diffserv*.
+- [54] IETF RFC 3496 (2003), *Protocol Extension for Support of Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) Service Class-aware Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) Traffic Engineering*.
+- [55] IETF RFC 2382 (1998), *A Framework for Integrated Services and RSVP over ATM*.
+- [56] IETF RFC 3215 (2002), *LDP State Machine*.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and Next Generation Networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.1311.1
+
+(07/2001)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Transport
+
+# --- **Network-based IP VPN over MPLS architecture**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1311.1
+
+(Formerly CCITT Recommendation)
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Network-based IP VPN over MPLS architecture**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation specifies service requirements and a number of architectural approaches that are applicable to the provision of network-based virtual private networks by Service Providers using IP technology over an underlying MPLS-based infrastructure.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1311.1 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 13 July 2001.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Internetwork Protocol (IP), IP VPN, Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS), Virtual Private Network (VPN).
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2001
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from ITU.
+
+# CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Introduction..... | 1 |
+| 2 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 3 References..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Normative references ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Informative references ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 Network-based IP VPN over MPLS reference model..... | 4 |
+| 6 Service definition..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Functional definition of a "network-based IP VPN (over MPLS)" ..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Quantitative definition of a "network-based IP VPN (over MPLS)" ..... | 5 |
+| 7 Service requirements..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Multi-vendor interoperability ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Service management capabilities..... | 6 |
+| 7.2.1 Network connectivity ..... | 6 |
+| 7.2.2 Service monitoring ..... | 7 |
+| 7.2.3 Security management features..... | 8 |
+| 7.2.4 SLA and QoS management features..... | 9 |
+| 7.3 Security functions ..... | 10 |
+| 7.3.1 Introduction ..... | 10 |
+| 7.3.2 VPN isolation ..... | 12 |
+| 7.3.3 VPN user identification ..... | 12 |
+| 7.3.4 VPN user authentication..... | 13 |
+| 7.3.5 Securing the flows ..... | 13 |
+| 7.3.6 Peer identification..... | 13 |
+| 7.3.7 Peer authentication ..... | 14 |
+| 7.3.8 Site protection..... | 14 |
+| 7.4 Support of various Quality of Service requirements ..... | 14 |
+| 7.5 Support of various routing protocols (at edge and core levels of the SP network) .... | 15 |
+| 7.6 Scalable routing capabilities ..... | 16 |
+| 7.7 Auto-discovery..... | 16 |
+| 7.8 Support of various types of customer IP traffic ..... | 16 |
+| 7.9 Support of various VPN topologies ..... | 16 |
+| 7.10 Support of various customer access scenarios..... | 16 |
+| 7.11 CE access to PE ..... | 16 |
+| 7.12 Addressing requirements and support of various IP numbering schemes ..... | 16 |
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 7.13 Support of various service deployment scenarios..... | 17 |
+| 7.14 Support of alliances of VPNs..... | 17 |
+| 7.15 The solution should allow outsourcing of IP services (e.g. DNS, DHCP)..... | 18 |
+| 7.16 Reliability and fault tolerance..... | 18 |
+| 7.17 Efficiency (customer and network resource utilization)..... | 18 |
+| 7.18 No dependency on the physical or link layer of the Service Provider backbone ..... | 18 |
+| 7.19 (Economically and technically) smooth migration of customers from pre-existing VPN service offerings..... | 19 |
+| 7.20 Support of interworking functions between MPLS-based VPN technology and other VPN technologies ..... | 19 |
+| 7.21 Some numerical assumptions for a network-based IP VPN Service Provider offering..... | 19 |
+| 7.22 A VPN solution may support the following service requirements ..... | 19 |
+| 8 Framework architecture ..... | 20 |
+| 8.1 Learning customer-site reachability information..... | 20 |
+| 8.2 Distributing VPN reachability information ..... | 20 |
+| 8.3 Constrained distribution of routing information..... | 20 |
+| 8.4 LSP tunnelling establishment and usage ..... | 21 |
+| 9 Approaches for support of network-based IP VPN services ..... | 21 |
+| 9.1 BGP/MPLS VPN approach ..... | 21 |
+| 9.2 Virtual Router approach..... | 22 |
+| 9.2.1 Virtual Router ..... | 22 |
+| 9.2.2 VR-based VPN architecture building blocks..... | 23 |
+| 9.2.3 VR-based VPNs deployment scenarios..... | 23 |
+| 9.2.4 VPN reachability determination ..... | 25 |
+| 9.2.5 VPN membership and topology determination ..... | 26 |
+| 9.2.6 Operations and management ..... | 26 |
+| 9.2.7 Security considerations..... | 27 |
+| 9.2.8 VPN Quality of Service..... | 27 |
+| 9.2.9 Scalability ..... | 27 |
+| 9.2.10 Hierarchical relationship between VR-based VPNs..... | 27 |
+| 10 QoS approaches ..... | 31 |
+| 10.1 "Point-to-Cloud" SLS ..... | 31 |
+| 10.2 "Point-to-Point" SLS..... | 31 |
+| 10.2.1 "Point-to-Point" SLS via resource allocation policies..... | 32 |
+| 10.2.2 "Point-to-Point" SLS via resource allocation policies and additional mechanisms (explicit in-band admission control, constraint-based routing) | 32 |
+| 10.3 "CoS transparency" ..... | 33 |
+
+| | Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 11 Inter-Autonomous System (Inter-Service Provider) VPN ..... | 34 |
+| 12 Interworking..... | 34 |
+| 12.1 Interworking between different solutions ..... | 34 |
+| 12.1.1 Motivation for interworking among MPLS VPNs ..... | 34 |
+| 12.1.2 Assumptions ..... | 35 |
+| 12.1.3 Functional capabilities for interworking among MPLS VPNs..... | 36 |
+| 12.2 Service interworking with other VPN architectures ..... | 38 |
+| Annex A – MPLS VPNs over non-MPLS core network infrastructures ..... | 38 |
+| Appendix I – Examples of service interworking with other VPN architectures ..... | 39 |
+| Appendix II – Bibliography ..... | 41 |
+
+# ITU-T Recommendation Y.1311.1
+
+# Network-based IP VPN over MPLS architecture
+
+# 1 Introduction
+
+A crucial need exists to specify mechanisms to support IP virtual private networks over MPLS networks. Furthermore, it is clear that Recommendations must describe and specify ways of developing interoperable implementations in order to allow end-to-end service delivery across multi-vendor service provider infrastructures.
+
+Service providers have urgent needs to deploy IP VPN services over MPLS infrastructure and they require carrier-class and fully interoperable implementations.
+
+# 2 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides a general description of network-based IP VPN services and requirements including network architectures and interworking aspects between a set of possible approaches.
+
+The IP VPN service requirements and supporting network architectures are intended to provide input and guidelines for the definition of protocol enhancements which may be developed by the IETF and other standardization entities for the support of IP VPNs.
+
+Although this description primarily addresses MPLS-based networks, it is envisaged that some of these requirements may also apply to other IP-based network architectures using other technologies for the creation of network-based IP VPNs. Examples of these include GRE, IP within IP, IPSEC.
+
+Another Recommendation, ITU-T Y.1311, currently under development, will provide a generic architecture and service requirements for IP VPNs.
+
+# 3 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated are valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; all users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published.
+
+## 3.1 Normative references
+
+- [1] ITU-T Y.1241 (2001), *Support of IP based services using IP transfer capabilities*.
+- [2] ITU-T Y.1310 (2000), *Transport of IP over ATM in public networks*.
+
+## 3.2 Informative references
+
+- [3] IETF RFC 2764 (2000), *A Framework for IP Based Virtual Private Networks*.
+- [4] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+- [5] IETF RFC 2547 (1999), *BGP/MPLS VPNs*.
+- [6] IETF RFC 2917 (2000), *A Core MPLS IP VPN Architecture*.
+
+- [7] IETF RFC 2998 (2000), *A Framework for Integrated Services Operation over Diffserv Networks*.
+- [8] IETF RFC 2475 (1998), *An Architecture for Differentiated Services*.
+- [9] IEEE802.1Q (1998), *IEEE Standard for local and metropolitan area networks: virtual bridged local area network*.
+- [10] ITU-T Y.1311 (Draft), *IP VPNs – Generic architecture and service requirements*.
+- [11] ITU-T Y.iptc (Draft), *Traffic control and congestion control in IP networks*.
+- [12] ITU-T Y.1720 (Draft), *Protection switching for MPLS networks*.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| BAS | Broadband Access Server |
+| BGP | Border Gateway Protocol |
+| CE | Customer Edge (device) |
+| CHAP | Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol |
+| CoS | Class of Service |
+| CR-LDP | Constraint-based Routing Label Distribution Protocol |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
+| DLCI | Data Link Circuit Identifier |
+| DNS | Domain Name Server |
+| DS | Differentiated Services |
+| DSCP | Differentiated Service Code Point |
+| DSL | Digital Subscriber Line |
+| DVMRP | Distance Vector Multicast Routing Protocol |
+| EXP | MPLS Experimental Field |
+| FR | Frame Relay |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| GRE | Generic Routing Encapsulation |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
+| IGP | Interior Gateway Protocol |
+| IP VPN | IP Virtual Private Network |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPSEC | IP Security |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| IS-IS | Intermediate System to Intermediate System |
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| L2TP | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol |
+| LDAP | Lightweight Directory Access Protocol |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MD5 | Message Digest 5 |
+| MIB | Management Information Base |
+| MPLS | Multiprotocol Label Switching |
+| NAS | Network Access Server |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NNTP | Network News Transfer Protocol |
+| OAM | Operations, Administration and Maintenance |
+| OSPF | Open Shortest Path First |
+| P | Provider (Core router) |
+| PAP | Password Authentication Protocol |
+| PE | Provider Edge (router) |
+| PHB | Per Hop Behaviour |
+| PHP | Penultimate Hop Popping |
+| PIM | Protocol Independent Multicasting |
+| POS | Packet Over Sonet/SDH |
+| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial In User Service |
+| RIP | Routing Information Protocol |
+| RSVP | Resource Reservation Protocol |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SLS | Service Level Specification |
+| SMTP | Simple Mail Transfer Protocol |
+| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
+| SP | Service Provider |
+| TACACS | Terminal Access Controller Access Control System |
+| TCI | Tag Control Information |
+| TE | Traffic Engineering |
+| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network |
+| TOS | Type of Service |
+| VCC | Virtual Channel Connection |
+| VCI | Virtual Circuit Identifier |
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------|
+| VLAN | Virtual Local Area Network |
+| VoIP | Voice over IP |
+| VPI | Virtual Path Identifier |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| VPN-ID | VPN Identifier |
+| VR | Virtual Router |
+
+# 5 Network-based IP VPN over MPLS reference model
+
+
+
+Figure 1/Y.1311.1 – Network-based IP VPN over MPLS reference model. The diagram illustrates a network architecture where multiple customer sites (VPNs) are connected to a central Service Provider network. The central network consists of a Core layer with three providers (P1, P2, P3) and an Edge layer with three Provider Edge (PE) routers (PE1, PE2, PE3). The Core is labeled 'MPLS' and the Edge is labeled 'Edge layer'. The entire central network is labeled 'IP or MPLS'. Customer sites are represented by clouds with IP address ranges: VPN A/Site 1 (10.1.0.0/16), VPN A/Site 2 (10.2.0.0/16), VPN A/Site 3 (10.3.0.0/16), VPN B/Site 1 (10.1.0.0/16), VPN B/Site 2 (10.2.0.0/16), and VPN B/Site 3 (10.4.0.0/16). Each site is connected to the central network via a Customer Edge (CE) router (CEA1, CEA2, CEA3, CEB1, CEB2, CEB3). The connections between the CE routers and the PE routers are labeled 'IP or MPLS'. The connections between the PE routers and the Core are labeled 'MPLS'. The connections between the CE routers and the Core are labeled 'CPE layer'.
+
+**Figure 1/Y.1311.1 – Network-based IP VPN over MPLS reference model**
+
+NOTE – Figure 1 uses IPv4 address network prefix notation.
+
+# 6 Service definition
+
+## 6.1 Functional definition of a "network-based IP VPN (over MPLS)"
+
+A network-based IP VPN provides a layer 3 service to customers.
+
+A customer site is connected to the Service Provider network-based IP VPN, and the IP VPN takes care of routing packets to the correct customer destination. With a network-based IP VPN, the
+
+provider edge routers are responsible for learning and distributing among themselves the customer layer 3 reachability information.
+
+Consider a set of "sites" which are attached to a common network which may be called the "backbone". If some policy is applied to create a number of subsets of that set with the following rule: two sites may have IP interconnectivity over that backbone only if at least one of these subsets contains them both. The resulting subsets are "Virtual Private Networks" (VPNs). Two sites have IP connectivity over the common backbone only if there is some VPN which contains them both. Two sites which have no VPN in common have no connectivity over that backbone.
+
+If all the sites in a VPN are owned by the same enterprise, the VPN is a corporate "intranet". If the various sites in a VPN are owned by different enterprises, the VPN is an "extranet". A site can be in more than one VPN, e.g. in an intranet and in several extranets. In general, the use of the term VPN does not distinguish between intranets and extranets.
+
+Consider the case in which the backbone is owned and operated by one or more Service Providers (SPs). The owners of the sites are the "customers" of the SPs. The policies that determine whether a particular collection of sites is a VPN are the policies of the customers. Some customers will want the implementation of these policies to be entirely the responsibility of the SP. Other customers may want to implement these policies themselves, or to share with the SP the responsibility for implementing these policies.
+
+The mechanisms that may be used to implement these policies are a primary focus of this Recommendation. The described mechanisms are general enough to allow these policies to be implemented either by the SP alone, or by a VPN customer together with the SP. Most of the discussion is focused on the former case, however.
+
+The case of interest here is where the common backbone offers an IP service. The focus is not on the case where the common backbone is part of the public Internet, but rather on the case where it is the backbone network of an SP or set of SPs with which the customer maintains contractual relationships. That is, the customer is explicitly purchasing VPN service from the SP, rather than purchasing Internet access from it. (The customer may or may not be purchasing Internet access from the same SP as well.)
+
+The customer itself may be a single enterprise, a set of enterprises needing an extranet, an Internet SP, an application SP, or even another SP which offers the same kind of VPN service to its own customers.
+
+## **6.2 Quantitative definition of a "network-based IP VPN (over MPLS)"**
+
+The dimensioning parameters characterizing a network-based IP VPN service offer can be expressed as the number of expected customers, the number of expected users/sites (permanent and temporary access) per customer, the total number of expected IP VPNs to be deployed (a site may have more than one VPN).
+
+# **7 Service requirements**
+
+A VPN solution should support the following service requirements:
+
+## **7.1 Multi-vendor interoperability**
+
+- Multi-vendor interoperability at network element, network and service levels.
+- Support of Internet standards (including compatibility, modularity, backward compatibility, protocol extensions, etc.).
+
+- The solution should be multi-vendor interoperable within the SP network infrastructure and with the customer network equipment and services making usage of the VPN service offered by the SP.
+
+## 7.2 Service management capabilities
+
+Management functions are usually distributed according to the TMN model which identifies four macroscopic management layers (business, service, network and elements management).
+
+In case of VPN management, which evolves in this model, setting up the VPN and managing the deployed devices requires taking care of three main aspects:
+
+- connectivity: configuring, provisioning and managing the devices, especially when topology can change;
+- network monitoring (particularly performance and capacity monitoring) in order to meter resources usage and to anticipate scalability problems;
+- security: authentication, authorization and overall policies (including security risks introduced by policy inconsistency).
+
+Some examples of service management capabilities:
+
+- per VPN and per device MIB availability;
+- per VPN fault management (e.g. core network failures);
+- per VPN SLA management;
+- per VPN policy profiles management;
+- per VPN security profiles management;
+- management of various customer site connectivity scenarios;
+- management of various topologies;
+- management of various service deployment scenarios;
+- management of various types of customer IP traffic (IPv4, IPv6, unicast, multicast, etc.);
+- per VPN configuration should not impact other sites/VPNs;
+ - addition/Deletion of a site should not involve changing configuration on PEs other than the PE the site is connected to;
+ - addition/Deletion of a site of a given VPN should have no negative impact on other VPNs, including VPNs whose site(s) are connected to the same PE as the site that has been added/deleted.
+
+Automated operations and interoperability with standard management platforms should be pursued.
+
+NOTE – The specification of a management information base (MIB) describing the detailed configuration of network elements involved in the provisioning of VPN services is a key requirement in network provisioning, but will not be handled within the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+In order to facilitate the service management, a logical view of the network indicating VPN topology above the backbone topology is useful. It can be used for provisioning and verification of connectivity, verification of configuration/privacy, fault management and performance management.
+
+### 7.2.1 Network connectivity
+
+Following the VPN growth, new devices must be configured according to service templates defined by the provider and such a task is quite repetitive. The management system could centralize such a process to guarantee coherence of parameters and accelerate deployment by automating configuration.
+
+As VPN configuration and topology is highly dependent on the customer's organization, provisioning templates have to apply to the customer's specific requirements (remote accesses, security policy, QoS). The management system could rely on centralized information to get all needed parameters for optimal adaptation of templates to specific needs. It could even assure some path optimization in routing tables.
+
+Such a system may increase the network reactivity in case of failure or policy violation. It can reduce provisioning delay in case of current VPN configuration requested by the customer (add, modify, delete), which can be a very heavy task in terms of routing tables update.
+
+In a multi-domain environment, the end-to-end QoS depends on the QoS provided by each domain. In case of a VPN spanning across two domains, QoS provisioning may reach its limit and such a problem seems difficult to solve.
+
+#### **7.2.1.1 Verification of the connectivity**
+
+It is desirable that a capability to verify the connectivity between user sites within a VPN is provided. If a logical view of a VPN is provided and the result of this verification is shown in this view, the operator can understand the result easily.
+
+#### **7.2.1.2 Verification of configuration and privacy**
+
+It is desirable that a capability to verify the configuration and privacy of a VPN is provided. Privacy here means that the VPN cannot be accessed from outside of this VPN. If a logical view of a VPN is provided, and the result of this verification is shown in this view, the operator can understand the result easily.
+
+### **7.2.2 Service monitoring**
+
+Network monitoring in the VPN perspective includes the classical items such as fault management, service level management and accounting.
+
+#### **7.2.2.1 Fault management**
+
+As VPNs rely on a common network infrastructure, the network management system should provide means to inform the provider on the consequences of a device failure for the VPNs it supported. The NM should provide a logical view of the network indicating VPN topology above the backbone topology. It should provide pointers to the related configuration and customer's requirement information so as to ease fault isolation and take corrective action as impact on traffic engineering and security considerations may be important.
+
+To summarize, fault management includes:
+
+- customers information of failures;
+- faults detection (incidents reports, alarms, failures visualization, SLA violation);
+- faults localization (analysis of alarms reports, diagnosis);
+- incidents recording, logs (creation and following of the trouble ticket);
+- corrective actions (traffic, routing, resources, etc.).
+
+#### **7.2.2.2 Performance management**
+
+The performance management system should be able to monitor network behaviour in order to evaluate performance metrics that form part of the service level agreements. Multiple different VPN services are subscribed by the customers and the system should be able to deploy specific measurement techniques depending on the activated service components (security, multicast, remote access). These techniques may be either intrusive or non-intrusive depending on the parameters or service being considered.
+
+QoS deployment and SLA monitoring may be coupled by monitoring policies that:
+
+- describe QoS mechanisms and the associated metrics that should be activated;
+- control monitoring resources such as probes and remote agents.
+
+Remote agents may be a key to the network monitoring as it allows the collection of statistics directly at the network access points used by customers and mobile users. A logical view of the network indicating the VPN topology helps operators to understand the result of the performance management activities.
+
+To summarize, performance management includes:
+
+- real time performance measurements (indicators and thresholds initialization and modification, data collection);
+- real time monitoring (resources utilization), VPN status (up/down);
+- analysis (bandwidth, response time, availability, packet loss);
+- statistics and trends based on collected metrics.
+
+Additionally, the performance management system should have a "Dynamic bandwidth management" capability:
+
+- Dynamic bandwidth management should allow real time response to customer requests for changes of allocated bandwidth (control plane should be flexible to accommodate real time changes).
+
+Performances (e.g. bandwidth allocation) should be traceable.
+
+NOTE – Dynamic bandwidth allocation would normally occur within the ranges and bounds specified in the Service Level Agreement (SLA), possibly using internal SP mechanisms to check appropriate allocation.
+
+#### **7.2.2.3 Accounting**
+
+Being able to associate service profiles to customers, and to the resources providing these services may facilitate accounting which can be a key feature of subscribed services. The accounting system has to be able to sort among the huge amount of usage information and correlate this information to performance and fault management information to produce billing according to the real provided service. It should be noted that accounting requirements may conflict with security requirements.
+
+To summarize, accounting process includes:
+
+- measurements of resources utilization;
+- production of accounting information;
+- measurement storage (files creation and administration);
+- quotas control per customer (current consumption update, consumption authorizations checking).
+
+### **7.2.3 Security management features**
+
+The security management system of a VPN solution must include features to guarantee the security of network connections, the privacy and integrity of data.
+
+#### **7.2.3.1 Access control**
+
+Access control dictates the amount of freedom a VPN user has, and controls the access of other users to applications and different parts of the network.
+
+A VPN without access control only protects the security of the transported data but not the network. Access control capabilities protect the entire network to ensure that VPN users have complete access to the applications, but only to these resources.
+
+In case of negotiated customer bandwidth, the access control at network level should ensure that each customer doesn't violate his contract.
+
+#### **7.2.3.2 Authentication**
+
+Authentication is the process of verifying that the sender is actually who he says he is. The security management system should enforce authentication.
+
+Support for strong authentication schemes is particularly important to ensure the privacy of both VPN access point-to-VPN access point (PE-to-PE) and client-to-VPN Access point (CPE-to-PE) communications. This is particularly important to prevent VPN access point spoofing (e.g. PE fake to enter a specific, or a set of, VPN(s)) in the presence of auto-discovery mechanisms.
+
+Nomadic access implying dynamic evolution of PEs serving a specific VPN is another situation which requires such authentication schemes in the presence of autodiscovery mechanisms. A variety of authentication methods are available to meet the needs of particular VPN deployments, including username/password authentication, RADIUS or TACACS servers, LDAP directory servers, X.509 digital certificates, smart cards, etc.
+
+Scalability is critical when the number of nomadic/mobile clients is increasing. The authentication scheme implemented for such deployments must be both manageable and easily deployed for large numbers of users and VPN access points.
+
+#### **7.2.3.3 Data privacy**
+
+A VPN solution should protect the privacy of the data being transmitted. The security management system could participate in the enforcement of the data privacy.
+
+Data privacy could be provided by encryption or by other mechanisms, e.g. data separation.
+
+The solution may support multiple encryption algorithms and encryption schemes, including DES, 3DES, and the IPSec standards. Encryption, decryption, and key management could be included in profiles that may be enforced by a policy-based management system. It should be possible to activate encryption on specific services.
+
+#### **7.2.3.4 Dynamic advertisement of security information**
+
+The capability to dynamically advertise the security mechanisms to be applied to some specified user data traffic (per VPN, per route, etc.) would be a helpful management feature. This functionality should be provided in a scalable manner.
+
+The automatic communication of security information related to a certain part of the data traffic would be an added value to the VPN deployment model. This would mean that a PE device that peers with a certain customer site, would announce to its peer PE devices the security information (e.g. tunnel type) related to the traffic to be sent to the considered site.
+
+This announced security information could be associated to all the VPN traffic sent to the announcing PE, to the traffic sent to a specific VPN, or to the traffic sent to a specific VPN route.
+
+### **7.2.4 SLA and QoS management features**
+
+Service Level Agreements, per VPN and/or per VPN site, and/or per VPN route should include [1]:
+
+- Service Level Objectives comprising some or all of:
+ - IP Transfer Capability;
+ - QoS parameters;
+ - Availability;
+ - Reliability;
+ - Delivery confirmation;
+
+- Mobility and Portability support;
+- Security;
+- Bandwidth;
+- Priority;
+- Authentication;
+- Protocols supported;
+- Flexibility – scaling and connectivity;
+- Life of the SLA.
+- Service monitoring objectives:
+ - QoS monitoring – comparison against objectives;
+ - Flow tracking;
+ - Reports as necessary.
+- Financial compensation objectives:
+ - Billing option;
+ - Penalties;
+ - Pricing;
+ - Early termination charges.
+
+NOTE – General SLA requirements are more fully described in ITU-T Y.1241 [1].
+
+The Service Level Specification is a part of the more general Service Level Agreement. A Service Level Specification captures the transport properties required by the customer for a correlated set of packets between specified ingress and egress interface(s) to the VPN.
+
+A VPN customer should be able to negotiate the performance characteristics of one or more flows between its VPN sites with the VPN Service Provider.
+
+The following lists a number of conditions which should be met by a SLS negotiation procedure.
+
+The SLS negotiation procedure must allow for:
+
+- Original service requests, according to the components of the specified SLS.
+- Service acknowledgement, indicating agreement with the requested service level.
+- Service rejection but indicating the possibility of offering a closely related service (or indication of alternative DSCP to use for a particular service). The reply message may indicate the related offering by overwriting the proposed SLS attributes (hints).
+- Service rejection indicating the incapability of providing the service.
+- Service modification from both user and SP.
+- The negotiation procedure should be able to interact with feedback of events related to the service. For example performance degradation may result in renegotiation of the SLS.
+
+More details regarding possible parameters that constitute the SLS are given in 7.4.
+
+## **7.3 Security functions**
+
+### **7.3.1 Introduction**
+
+Security mechanisms deployed to support the IP VPN service offer should be as transparent as possible for the end-user except maybe for remote end-users accessing the IP VPN through ISDN, PSTN, xDSL or Internet for which AAA services may have to be deployed.
+
+Users of an IP VPN should be able, and allowed to, deploy their own internal security mechanisms, in addition to those deployed by the Service Provider, in order to secure specific applications or internal IP VPN traffic. Those internal security services should ideally have to conform to operator requirements, especially when Quality of Service SLA has been contracted between the customer and the SP. In such a case, the security solution deployed by the customer should not hide information used by the SP to set up Quality of Service features. Generally, the constraint for the SP, in accordance with the privacy feature of the IP VPN, is to ensure, as far as possible, that internal security mechanisms which could be deployed within an IP VPN have a good chance to be transparently supported by the IP VPN service offer.
+
+The IP VPN will generally be secured according to the customer's requirements in order to enforce the privacy characteristic of his IP VPN. This implies that the SP shall, in particular, ensure that:
+
+- Every equipment (e.g. router) involved in the set up of an IP VPN shall be able to identify and authenticate each other so that the traffic exchanged within the scope of an IP VPN can be routed. Depending on the nature of this traffic, and the nature of the equipment involved to process it, this identification and authentication would have to be achieved between CEs, and/or between CEs and PE/P routers, and/or between PE/P routers.
+- Privacy services shall be provided and integrated as a service element by the operator. Confidentiality and integrity services shall apply to:
+ - either, all IP VPN traffic exchanged above the IP backbone between the different sites;
+ - or, some limited IP VPN traffic identified by a combination of source and/or destination IP addresses and/ or protocols and/or applications (e.g. PE-PE security, per-route security, etc.);
+ - administration traffic since this latter can contain sensitive information related to IP VPN configuration, users, security, accounting.
+- Isolation of each IP VPN shall be strictly ensured and the operator shall at least have some visibility on intrusion attempts in order to stop those intrusions.
+- In the same way, access to the various equipment deployed to support the IP VPN service shall be strongly secured in order to prevent unauthorized users to access the IP VPN resources. In particular, the access to the (switching) resources which are managed by the SP will have to be secured to prevent any kind of malicious attack, that may well come from any kind of hacker (Internet users or others).
+- The security service elements offered should be flexible in order to accommodate the fact that some data may require stronger protection than other data.
+
+The following security functions should be considered in an IP VPN service offering:
+
+- isolation;
+- user identification;
+- user authentication;
+- security of the flow;
+- peer identification;
+- peer authentication;
+- site protection.
+
+These functions are described hereafter.
+
+### 7.3.2 VPN isolation
+
+From the service provider perspective, and at a high level of description, the VPN isolation function consists in ensuring that all traffic exchanged within the scope of an IP VPN remains unknown and protected from other users of the backbone, and insensitive with regard to traffic transported over the supporting IP backbone.
+
+From this perspective, the service provider shall ensure, when deploying the service, that it conforms to the following characteristics:
+
+- Only a set of predefined users can access the IP VPN.
+- QoS SLA shall be guaranteed whatever the state of the traffic experienced in the supporting IP backbone and especially when this traffic is generated by other customers within or outside the scope of the IP VPN service.
+- IP connectivity shall be deployed in such a way that only recorded IP VPN sites, and registered remote users, can exchange traffic within the IP VPN. This may lead peer equipment to identify/authenticate each other at different level of the IP VPN service.
+- Traffic exchanged might be secured thanks to encryption and/or authentication functions.
+- IP VPN management functions shall not impact other IP VPN or services.
+
+This isolation function is achieved by application of a combination of functions related to architecture, Quality of Service, security and administration functional domains. This set of functions, correctly deployed, constitutes a generic function called "VPN isolation". This function is nevertheless classified within the security domain due to the strong implication of security features in the realization of such a global isolation function.
+
+### 7.3.3 VPN user identification
+
+Among users of IP VPN can be found travelling people who are not permanently attached to one of the sites of the IP VPN. In order to control the access of those users to the IP VPN, it is necessary to identify them. This identification shall apply within the various deployment contexts which have been identified (intranet, extranet, etc.), keeping in mind that some of these users can have an access to several distinct IP VPNs. This identification function can be used to automate or trigger all technical actions which are necessary to establish the communication with the IP VPN the user wishes to connect to.
+
+Two main identification contexts have to be considered:
+
+- Identification in case of "mobility", whether it is an intra-site or inter-site mobility.
+- Identification when the user tries to reach his IP VPN from a public or private access point through a NAS/BAS server, or even from a network having an Internet access to which he has a temporary access.
+
+This function can be implemented by the IP VPN service provider either in totality, or partially. Roaming capabilities would probably have to be set up between the provider and the customer, who might well decide to perform the IP VPN user identification in the case where he does not accept to outsource the identification/authentication service. In fact, this identification will be used by the access service provider who needs to identify the user to provide the IP connectivity, and by the IP VPN user identification service in order to accept the IP VPN connection. The two mechanisms can be linked.
+
+In this case, the access provider and the IP VPN service provider resources have to cooperate and an agreement has to be reached on common identification specification.
+
+All information necessary to identify the users will have to be stored and should ideally be maintained by the customer. This information should be made available to the access provider for controlling the IP access.
+
+### 7.3.4 VPN user authentication
+
+The scope of this authentication function is the same as that above and concerns users in a remote access situation. This authentication function will consist in ensuring, with a good level of confidence, that the declared user is the one he/she is claiming to be.
+
+Various authentication protocols might be used for that purpose depending on the level of security wished by the customer, but at least PAP, CHAP and challenged mechanisms should be supported since they are currently widely used in a large range of equipment and services.
+
+This authentication function may be executed completely or partially by the IP VPN service provider. In the latter case, the authentication phase can be relayed to the customer access point according to the terms of the contract.
+
+### 7.3.5 Securing the flows
+
+Within the present context, which consists in deploying a VPN over a public IP backbone (which is part of the Internet), the sole routing functions are not sufficient to secure the flows of a given customer. As a matter of fact, even if the flows are correctly routed between the sites (including remote users), the corresponding traffic might be intercepted and consequently read or altered.
+
+Securing the flows should be enforced at the network layer to ensure the two main characteristics:
+
+- Privacy of the traffic, so that only authorized equipment can decrypt it.
+- Integrity, to protect recipients from alteration which could have been introduced during the transport.
+
+These two functions shall apply to, what is called here, the "data traffic" of the customer which includes the traffic exchanged between sites, between remote users and sites and even between remote users. But it shall also apply to "control traffic", which is not necessarily perceived by the customer but which is, nevertheless, essential to maintain his IP VPN.
+
+Even if it is strongly recommended to deploy those functions in an operational context, these functions shall not be considered as mandatory and should be activated only if requested by the customer. Also, those functions should be as flexible as possible so that they can be deployed independently from each other and applied to some part of the traffic (security level may differ depending the traffic which is considered, performance considerations may also lead to secure a subset of the traffic).
+
+### 7.3.6 Peer identification
+
+Traffic exchanged within the scope of IP VPN may involve several categories of equipment that need to cooperate together to provide the service. These network elements can be CE, firewalls, backbone routers, servers, management stations, etc.
+
+Each time two network elements need to cooperate, it is necessary for the peer to proceed to an identification (enforced by an authentication if needed, see below) before accepting to process the received traffic, or to provide the requested service. This identification can be used as a trigger to adapt the way the service will be provided but, in most cases, to control the access to the network resources.
+
+This peer identification function is intended here to apply only to network elements participating in the IP VPN setup. All identification needs related to users' applications, are not included here.
+
+Examples of such peer identification could apply to:
+
+- traffic between a CE and a service provider access point (P/PE access point);
+- traffic between CEs belonging to the same IP VPN;
+- routers dealing with route announcement (these routers could be a CE and P/PE router or two CEs exchanging routing information);
+
+- policy server and a network element;
+- management station and an SNMP agent.
+
+This identification function shall not be considered as an atomic function since, generally, it is distributed and probably implemented differently depending on network elements which are considered. But globally, the IP VPN service shall provide a peer identification function in defining, where it is necessary, how it shall be implemented, how secure it shall be, and the way to deploy and maintain identification information necessary to operate the service.
+
+### **7.3.7 Peer authentication**
+
+This function is the prolongation, in security terms, of the above function. It aims at authenticating the peer, following the same philosophy adopted for user identification and authentication.
+
+### **7.3.8 Site protection**
+
+As we saw before, a site might be involved in various ways within the scope of IP VPN. It can be part of an IP VPN deployed to support an Intranet (in that case he is interconnected with sites belonging to the same company), part of an IP VPN deployed between different companies to support an extranet, or both.
+
+Within this context, a site might be subject to various attacks coming from different sources. These potential sources are:
+
+- users connected to the supporting public IP backbone, since by definition an IP VPN is built over a public and shared IP infrastructure;
+- users from the Internet, if the IP backbone offers an Internet access;
+- users from remote sites belonging to the same IP VPN.
+
+Risks that a site may encounter are the following:
+
+- service denial (when a hacker acts in such a way that a service cannot be used: mail spamming and access line overloading for instance.);
+- viruses.
+
+#### **Intrusions**
+
+In order to prevent these risks, the IP VPN service provider shall deploy functions that control access to the site, thanks to the deployment of filtering functions provided by firewall for instance, but also in monitoring, alerting and eventually logging all suspicious activities in order to detect all possible attacks.
+
+## **7.4 Support of various Quality of Service requirements**
+
+The technical specification of the corresponding traffic parameters and QoS commitments are referred to as the "Service Level Specification" (SLS).
+
+- SLS for Best-effort.
+- SLS for DiffServ models:
+ - Point-to-Cloud SLS (Hose model)
+
+The solution should support a "point-to-cloud" SLS. This means that the traffic parameters as well as the QoS commitment are specified on the basis of traffic exchanged between a VPN Site and the MPLS VPN Backbone (as opposed to on the basis of traffic exchanged between two VPN Sites). This is also referred to as the "Hose" model. An MPLS VPN SLS which defines compliance to the traffic contract by measurement of all the packets transmitted from a given VPN Site towards the MPLS VPN backbone on an aggregate basis (i.e. regardless of the destination MPLS VPN Site of each packet) is an example of "point-to-cloud" SLS.
+
+### - Point-to-Point SLS (Pipe model)
+
+The solution should support a "point-to-point" SLS. This means that the traffic parameters as well as the QoS commitment are specified on the basis of traffic exchanged between two VPN Sites. This is also referred to as the "Pipe" model. "Point-to-point" SLSs are analogous to the SLS typically supported over layer 2 technologies such as Frame Relay and ATM. An MPLS VPN SLS which defines compliance to the traffic contract by separate measurement of the packets transmitted from a given VPN Site towards each remote destination VPN Site is an example of "point-to-point" SLS.
+
+### - Point-to-Multisite SLS and Multisite-to-Point SLS
+
+The solution should support a "point-to-multisite" SLS and a "multisite-to-point" SLS. This means that the traffic parameters as well as the QoS commitment are specified on the basis of traffic exchanged between a VPN Site and a subset of the other VPN sites.
+
+### - CoS transparency
+
+The solution should support "CoS transparency". This means that the public MPLS VPN service should be able to set the IP DS field at the egress of the MPLS VPN to the same value as it was on the ingress of the MPLS VPN service. Rationale for such requirement is provided in 10.3.
+
+- SLS for IntServ model.
+- Per VPN (measurable) SLAs.
+
+General SLA requirements for IP-based networks are described in ITU-T Y.1241 [1]. Some of these SLA components may be applicable for IP VPNs.
+
+- Strict QoS (guaranteed bandwidth VPN).
+- QoS support in more complex scenarios:
+ - Mapping of QoS Class between VPNs in case of VPN interworking.
+ - Mapping of QoS Class in case of Inter-Provider VPNs.
+
+The following describes which SLS parameters should be specified to enable the SP to support the defined VPN SLS types. The correlated set of packets is denoted as flow. The means by which packets are correlated to be part of a flow are described in the "Flow Descriptor".
+
+The service to be guaranteed to the flow over the VPN is bound by the scope of the service, indicating the set of ingress and egress interfaces between which the transport properties are to be guaranteed.
+
+In order to achieve the guaranteed transport properties, the flow should adhere to the traffic conformance parameters. Conforming traffic will receive performance guarantees as contracted. Traffic exceeding the traffic conformance test will receive an excess treatment.
+
+The transport service can further be associated with service schedule, and service reliability parameters.
+
+More detailed information can be found via references in Appendix II.
+
+## **7.5 Support of various routing protocols (at edge and core levels of the SP network)**
+
+- There should be no restriction on the routing protocols used between CE and PE routers.
+- The choice of Service Provider's IGP must not depend on the routing protocol(s) used between PE and CE routers. Furthermore, that choice should be flexible, not limited to a single routing protocol.
+
+## **7.6 Scalable routing capabilities**
+
+- The amount of routing and/or scheduling state in a P router must be independent of the total number of VPNs supported by a Service Provider, and of the number of VPN sites. In some specific scenarios, a trade-off introducing a limited amount of routing and/or scheduling state in a P router could be considered in order to provide additional capabilities, or value-add for the SP (e.g. multicast inside a VPN).
+- The amount of routing (and/or configuration) information on PE may depend only on the VPNs whose site(s) are connected to that PE.
+- The solution should support filtering of VPN routing information in the PE-to-PE and CE-to-PE configurations.
+
+## **7.7 Auto-discovery**
+
+The solution should support an auto-discovery mechanism that dynamically conveys VPN information between PEs. This mechanism can be used for different purposes, primarily for service scalability purposes (one example based on BGP is provided via references in Appendix II).
+
+## **7.8 Support of various types of customer IP traffic**
+
+- Unicast;
+- Multicast;
+- The solution should be able (easily extendable) to enable a service provider, having an IPv4 or an IPv6 backbone, to provide both IPv4 and IPv6 VPNs to its customers.
+
+## **7.9 Support of various VPN topologies**
+
+- The solution should support a wide range of inter-site connectivity ranging from hub-and-spoke to partial mesh and full mesh.
+
+## **7.10 Support of various customer access scenarios**
+
+- Permanent and temporary access:
+ - multi-homing;
+ - backdoor links;
+ - dial-in.
+- Support of customer access right outsourcing feature (the management system could rely on centralized information to get all needed parameters for optimal adaptation of templates to specific needs. This could reduce provisioning delay in case of current VPN configuration requested by the customer (add, modify, delete), which can be a very heavy task in terms of access tables update).
+
+## **7.11 CE access to PE**
+
+The solution should support various access technologies: PSTN, ISDN, xDSL, cable modem, Leased Lines, ATM, Frame Relay, Wireless local loop, mobile radio access, etc. (a wide range of bandwidth should be supported, according to the specific technology in use).
+
+## **7.12 Addressing requirements and support of various IP numbering schemes**
+
+- The solution must allow VPN address overlapping: IP addresses have to be unique only within a given VPN, but not across VPNs.
+- The solution should minimize the usage of IP addresses.
+
+- The solution should not preclude NAT.
+- Support of customer IP numbering schemes (private, globally unique, no scheme), (on-demand) support of a dynamic IP address allocation mechanism, support of an IP numbering outsourcing feature. (Support of customer IP numbering outsourcing feature: the management system could rely on centralized information to get all needed parameters for optimal IP numbering allocation. Such a system could increase the network flexibility in case of growth. This could reduce provisioning delay in case of current VPN configuration requested by the customer (add, modify, delete), which can be a very heavy task in terms of routing tables update. It could even allow cost-effective IP numbering resource optimization.)
+- A unique identifier for the VPN (as well as further identifiers, such as for VPN tunnels) might be appropriate in specific scenarios.
+
+## **7.13 Support of various service deployment scenarios**
+
+- Multiple VPNs per customer site.
+- VPN service coupled with Internet access per customer site.
+- The solution must support connectivity among sites belonging to the same or different organizations (Intranet/Extranet).
+- Inter-AS VPN.
+- Inter-Provider VPN (the solution must allow VPN to span multiple Service Providers).
+- Carrier or carriers (one scenario being hierarchical VPNs).
+
+## **7.14 Support of alliances of VPNs**
+
+NOTE – The "VPN alliance" terminology may be reviewed further.
+
+Network management, signalling and routing protocols shall support/enable:
+
+- the (easy) initial formation of a VPN alliance;
+- the (easy) joining of a new alliance member VPN;
+- the (easy) quitting of an alliance member VPN;
+- the (easy) termination of the entire VPN alliance.
+
+Any VPN may become member of a VPN alliance.
+
+While the alliance exists, there may eventually be different degrees of confidentiality with respect to intra-alliance and inter-alliance member communication.
+
+Solutions shall take into account items such as:
+
+- failing connectivity that causes partitions of the VPN alliance;
+- use of different VPN approaches internally by the alliance member VPNs;
+- use of different approaches for interconnecting the alliance member VPNs;
+- use of different routing and signalling protocols internally by the alliance member VPNs;
+- using private addressing within alliance member VPNs.
+
+It is expected that the possible usage of a VPN unique identifier for one particular alliance member VPN might play a role for identifying routes/tunnels, at least between different VPNs (that member may be called the VPN alliance leader).
+
+## **7.15 The solution should allow outsourcing of IP services (e.g. DNS, DHCP)**
+
+- The solution should allow the packaging of additional IP services provided by the VPN Service Provider itself, or by a third party service provider, for services such as DNS, FTP, HTTP, NNTP, SMTP, LDAP, VoIP, Videoconferencing, Application sharing, Streaming, E-commerce, and other services like backup.
+- The solution should allow the outsourcing of IP services. (The management system could rely on centralized information to get all needed parameters for optimal adaptation of IP services to specific needs. This could reduce provisioning delay in case of new version or VPN configuration requested by the customer (add, modify, delete). It could even allow cost-effective resource optimization by offering services to a large range of customers.)
+
+## **7.16 Reliability and fault tolerance**
+
+It is required to provide high reliability on the network to construct a VPN on the public network which satisfies the same quality as on leased lines.
+
+Survivability techniques, such as protection switching or restoration, are necessary for fast recovery from failure to enhance the reliability of the VPN.
+
+Requirements for protection switching are as follows:
+
+- Fault management, such as fault detection (see 7.2.2.1).
+- Both routing and resources are pre-calculated and allocated to a dedicated protection entity prior to failure to offer a strong guaranty of being able to re-build the required network resources post-failure.
+- Fast recovery time.
+- More general framework for protection switching for MPLS networks is provided in [12].
+
+## **7.17 Efficiency (customer and network resource utilization)**
+
+- Service Provider network Traffic Engineering.
+- Per VPN Traffic Engineering.
+
+Traffic Engineering is a key technology for carrier IP networks to control and optimize the networks in general. Traffic Engineering provides optimization of network resources in order to satisfy performance objectives of application services, these are performed taking into account the specific network characteristics which may impact service level objectives.
+
+Particularly, this applies to the provider provisioned IP VPN application service. Indeed, Traffic Engineering could contribute to provide resource and admission control for VPNs. In case of such usage, Traffic Engineering might check whether the requested service for new VPNs can be provided without deteriorating the previously installed VPNs with respect to QoS performance.
+
+Traffic Engineering also plays an important role in modifying and adjusting resources for existing and new VPNs, according to the demands of customers and the needs of the service providers.
+
+## **7.18 No dependency on the physical or link layer of the Service Provider backbone**
+
+MPLS is a technology which can be applicable to various physical layers or data link layers, such as SDH (Packet over SONET using PPP-framing), ATM, Frame Relay, Ethernet, etc. It is desirable that the functions provided on MPLS-based VPNs, such as QoS Control, OAM functionality are available irrespective of any physical layer or data link layer.
+
+## **7.19 (Economically and technically) smooth migration of customers from pre-existing VPN service offerings**
+
+- The solution should allow migration of customers without heavy disruption of service.
+- The solution should enable various customer migration scenarios e.g. "Partial migration" scenario: migration of some sites of a given VPN to a network-based IP VPN ensuring service continuity with the other legacy-VPN sites of this VPN.
+
+## **7.20 Support of interworking functions between MPLS-based VPN technology and other VPN technologies**
+
+The requirement of the data plane for the interworking nodes is:
+
+- Mapping of all the relevant information from one underlying VPN transport technology to the other underlying VPN transport technology.
+
+(A way for the information mapping is using encapsulation: there are various network-based VPN technologies and, in each technology, packets are encapsulated by the header which is specific to the technology. An identifier in the encapsulation header is used to separate the connection of the VPN user from connections of other VPN users in the network, and thus the end-to-end data integrity is maintained. The encapsulation header also has a field which presents the QoS class, and each node on the connection carries out the QoS control by seeing this field.)
+
+Other requirements for the data plane are for further study.
+
+In some cases (e.g. VPNs based on different technologies), requirements shown below may be taken into account:
+
+- Interworking of signalling protocol which is used by each VPN technology between MPLS-based VPN and other VPN technologies (this requirement may be also applied to interworking between one MPLS-based VPN and another MPLS-based VPN in which different signalling protocols are used).
+- Exchanging the routing information between MPLS-based VPN and other VPN technologies.
+
+## **7.21 Some numerical assumptions for a network-based IP VPN Service Provider offering**
+
+- Very large number (e.g. up to 10 000 000) of VPNs per Service Provider.
+- Wide range of number of sites per customer (depending on size or structure of the customer organization): ranging from few sites to 10 000 sites per VPN per customer.
+- Wide range of number of routes per VPN: ranging from few to 100 000 routes per VPN (this number may be limited by the choice of the routing protocol between CE and PE).
+- More than one VPN per site should be possible.
+- High values (to be estimated) of the frequency of configuration set-up and change should be supported (ex. real time provisioning of an on-demand videoconferencing VPN).
+
+## **7.22 A VPN solution may support the following service requirements**
+
+- Support of other service deployment scenarios:
+ - VPN over CE-to-CE MPLS.
+
+# **8 Framework architecture**
+
+The basic VPN network model is that the Customer Edge (CE) devices are connected to the Provider Edge (PE) routers. The connection must provide direct IP connectivity (one IP hop) between the CE devices and the PE routers. A CE device may be connected to a PE router via any type of data link (e.g. an ATM VCC, Frame Relay circuit, Ethernet, POS, L2TP session, GRE or IPSEC tunnel etc.).
+
+If a particular site has a single host, that host may be the CE device. If a particular site has a single IP subnet, the CE device may be a switch. In general, the CE device can be expected to be a router, which we call the CE router. The PE routers learn the IP addresses reachable at each customer site and distribute this information amongst themselves. The PE routers also establish and maintain tunnels of some sort between themselves that are used for forwarding VPN data traffic across the SP backbone. For the purpose of this Recommendation the tunnels are LSPs. Routers in the SP backbone that do not maintain any VPN state are termed P routers.
+
+The following distinct areas can be identified, and these are discussed below:
+
+- learning customer-site reachability information;
+- distributing VPN reachability information;
+- constrained distribution of routing information;
+- LSP tunnel establishment and usage.
+
+## **8.1 Learning customer-site reachability information**
+
+Mechanisms are needed to allow a PE router to discover the set of IP addresses reachable via a link to a directly connected CE device, and to allow a CE router to discover the set of IP addresses in other sites of the VPN to which the CE device is attached. These mechanisms include:
+
+- running a routing protocol (e.g. RIP, OSPF or BGP);
+- use of static configuration;
+- tracking dynamic address assignments if DHCP or PPP is used.
+
+There is a wide range of options with respect to the amount of routing information that a CE router receives from its directly connected PE router. At one end of the spectrum the PE router may just advertise a single route, default, to the CE router. At the other end of the spectrum the PE router may advertise all the routes it received from other sites.
+
+## **8.2 Distributing VPN reachability information**
+
+When a PE router has determined the set of destinations reachable via its directly connected CE device for a VPN, it must then distribute this information towards other PE routers that have customer sites attached for that VPN.
+
+The mechanisms available to do this are:
+
+- run an instance of a routing protocol for that VPN – the virtual router (VR) approach. The VR approach is discussed in more detail in 9.2.
+- piggyback the VPN reachability information on a backbone BGP. An approach using BGP is described in 9.1.
+
+NOTE – In theory one could piggyback this information on an IGP, however, the scalability considerations make this option non-viable.
+
+## **8.3 Constrained distribution of routing information**
+
+To meet the specified scalability goals, a PE router should be able to maintain just the routes for the VPNs whose sites are directly connected to that PE router. That, in turn, requires the ability to constrain the distribution of VPN routing information.
+
+When a PE router learns reachability information for a locally attached VPN customer site, this information must be distributed (subject to route filtering and/or route aggregation) to other PE routers that also have customer sites attached to the VPN. One element of a VPN solution is how, on a per VPN basis, each PE router determines a set of other routers to which it must distribute this reachability information.
+
+The mechanism used by BGP/MPLS VPN (see 9.1) is route filtering based on the BGP community attribute. More details can be obtained from [5].
+
+Possible mechanisms used by the Virtual Router approach to determine the set of other routers that are treated as routing peers are:
+
+- use of a directory which PE routers query;
+- explicit configuration via configuration management;
+- multicast approach;
+- piggybacking the information in a routing protocol used by the provider backbone (e.g. BGP).
+
+Another consideration is inter-site connectivity. It could range from a full mesh to a hub-and-spoke, or anything in between (e.g. partial mesh).
+
+Yet another consideration is that a link between a PE router and a CE device could be either established "on-demand", or could be relatively permanent. An example of an "on-demand" link would be a PPP session, where RADIUS could be used to associate the CE device with a particular VPN.
+
+In the Virtual Router approach, for a given VPN, determining the set of PE routers that have CE devices in that VPN is known as determining VPN membership. Also in this approach, one needs to construct a per VPN topology. The mechanism for constructing such a topology may be distinct from the mechanism used to actually distribute the reachability information between PE routers. For example, any of the mechanisms listed above can be used for this purpose.
+
+## **8.4 LSP tunnelling establishment and usage**
+
+An important aspect of the LSP tunnelling is whether an LSP is used to provide transport for a single VPN, or whether it is used to carry traffic for multiple VPNs. This is usually a trade-off between the extra resources needed to establish and maintain VPN-specific tunnels, against the fine-grained QoS control and any other advantages which may be obtained with dedicated LSPs.
+
+Another aspect of the LSP tunnelling is that the LSP tunnels form a network by themselves, i.e. LSP tunnels may be built to offer various topologies (from hub and spoke, to partial mesh and full mesh). Topology choices may depend on the different customer and SP requirements, such as supporting alternative ingress to egress paths, minimizing the number of tunnels to be managed and maintained. Different algorithms are available for determining tunnel topologies. Additional references can be found in Appendix II.
+
+# **9 Approaches for support of network-based IP VPN services**
+
+## **9.1 BGP/MPLS VPN approach**
+
+The approach described in this clause is described in [5].
+
+This approach includes:
+
+- Non-disruptive service configuration in the event of addition/deletion of new sites or extranet partners.
+- Optimal use of LDP for setting up label switched paths with minimal configuration.
+
+- Providing Internet access to customers when they have a single data link layer between them and the PE router, and the data link layer cannot support multiple logical IP addresses.
+- Support for backdoor links between sites in specific configurations.
+- Use of hub and spoke topology to build a management network.
+- The interaction in the PE between the Service Provider BGP and the instances of IGP (used to exchange routing information between the CE and the PE).
+
+## 9.2 Virtual Router approach
+
+This clause describes a network-based VPN solution based on the Virtual Router concept, which offers separate routing, forwarding, and Quality of Service on a per VPN basis.
+
+Several solutions have been put forward to achieve different levels of network privacy when building VPNs across a shared public backbone. Most of these solutions require separate per VPN or per VPN site forwarding capabilities and make use of IP or LSP tunnels across the backbone. This clause describes a network-based VPN architecture based on the virtual router concept, which offers separate routing, forwarding, and Quality of Service on a per VPN basis. This architecture complies with the IP VPN framework described in [3].
+
+Virtual Routers use the same mechanisms from a routing and data forwarding standpoint as physical routers and are easy to deploy, operate, and troubleshoot. VPN membership discovery is aided by the use of one of a number of mechanisms suggested in this clause. This approach attempts to draw the line between the SP and the VPN customer: the SP owns and manages layer 1 and layer 2 services while layer 3 services belong to the VPN and can be, at the discretion of the SP, manageable by the VPN customer. Data security issues are addressed by the use of either private LSPs, or the use of label stacks over shared LSPs, to keep the data belonging to specific VPNs confined to their domains.
+
+Any routing protocol can be used in the Virtual Router. This flexibility applies to the CE, to PE segments as well as in the PE to PE segments. Private data and routing information is exchanged between VPN sites through IP-based or MPLS-based tunnels across the backbone.
+
+### 9.2.1 Virtual Router
+
+A Virtual Router (VR) is an emulation of a physical router at the software and hardware levels. Virtual Routers have independent IP routing and forwarding tables and they are isolated from each other. This means that a VPN's IP addressing space can overlap with another VPN's address space. The IP addresses need only be unique within a VPN domain.
+
+A Virtual Router has two main functions:
+
+- Constructing routing tables describing the paths between VPN sites using any routing protocols (e.g. OSPF, RIP, or BGP).
+- Forwarding or switching packets to the next hops within the VPN domain.
+
+From the user point of view, a Virtual Router provides the same functionality as a physical router. Many virtual routers can coexist on the same PE router. From the CEs' point of view, the PE router performs the functions of many routers, forwarding packets to the correct destination, while isolating each VPN traffic in the same manner that individual routers do. Separate router capabilities provide each VPN CE link with the appearance of a dedicated router that guarantees isolation from other VPN traffic while running on shared switching and transmission resources.
+
+Virtual private networks are created by interconnecting VRs across the backbone and customer edge devices. The network administrator assigns a Virtual Router at every PE where the sites attach to the CE-based network. Virtual Routers belonging to the same IP VPN domain must have the same Virtual Private Network identifier (VPN-ID). The VPN-IDs provide VPN membership between VRs. To the CE access device, the Virtual Router appears as a neighbour router in the CE-based
+
+network, to which it sends all traffic for non-local VPN destinations. Each CE access device must learn the set of destinations reachable through its connection to the virtual router on the PE router; this may be as simple as a default route. Virtual Routers participating in a single VPN domain are responsible for learning and disseminating reachability information among themselves.
+
+### 9.2.2 VR-based VPN architecture building blocks
+
+Each Virtual Router is configured to support one VPN at a given time (although the VR might be configured to support many).
+
+It is recognized that any network-based VPN (using piggybacking reachability on the routing protocol or not) requires some form of tunnelling (e.g. MPLS).
+
+VPN sites are tunnelled through the use of MPLS tunnels. In this architecture, MPLS is used as a transport mechanism, even if other types of tunnelling are not excluded with this architecture. Furthermore, depending on the VPN deployment scenario, label stacking mechanism can be used. The tunnels can be statically configured or dynamically established (using existing mechanisms). Traffic sent through the tunnel is opaque to the underlying backbone technology used.
+
+A network-based IP VPN (over MPLS or not) consists of providing site-to-site private connectivity across a SP core-networking infrastructure. A virtual private network is composed of multiple VPN sites attached to private CE-based network. The CE device (e.g. a router) is connected to a PE.
+
+The PE provides to the CE-based network routing and forwarding capabilities across the backbone. The underlying backbone data link technology can be ATM, FR virtual circuits, or PPP.
+
+The private CE-based network, where the VPN sites are attached to access the PE router by connecting to a Virtual Router over an access link, can be ATM, FR virtual circuits, or a PPP connection. Routing tables associated with each Virtual Router define the site-to-site connectivity for that VPN.
+
+### 9.2.3 VR-based VPNs deployment scenarios
+
+Virtual Routers can be deployed in different configuration schemes. The following are three basic examples of deploying VR-based VPNs.
+
+**Example 1:** Direct VR connectivity using layer 2 connections, see Figure 2.
+
+Virtual Routers can be deployed directly over layer 2 connections (e.g. ATM).
+
+
+
+T1318140-01
+
+Diagram illustrating Direct VR connectivity using layer 2 connections. A large rectangle labeled 'PE' contains two ovals labeled 'VR1' and 'VR2'. Two horizontal lines connect the right side of each oval to a set of four horizontal lines on the right, which are collectively labeled 'Backbone'. The lines for VR1 are the top two, and the lines for VR2 are the bottom two.
+
+**Figure 2/Y.1311.1 – Example 1: Direct VR connectivity using layer 2 connections**
+
+**Example 2:** Using one Virtual Router on the backbone, see Figure 3.
+A Virtual Router can be used to connect each PE to a shared backbone.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a rectangular box representing a network environment. Inside the box, on the left, are three ovals labeled VR1, VR2, and VR3, stacked vertically. A vertical dashed line is positioned to the right of these three ovals. To the right of the dashed line is an oval labeled VRn. Solid lines connect VR1, VR2, and VR3 to VRn. Above the box, a horizontal arrow points to the left, labeled "VPN space". Below the box, a horizontal arrow points to the right, labeled "Backbone". The label "PE" is centered below the box. The identifier "T1318150-01" is located at the bottom right corner of the box.
+
+Diagram illustrating a Virtual Router (VRn) connecting multiple Virtual Routers (VR1, VR2, VR3) within a VPN space to a shared Backbone.
+
+**Figure 3/Y.1311.1 – Example 2: Using one Virtual Router on the backbone**
+
+**Example 3:** Using multiple Virtual Routers on the backbone, see Figure 4.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture where multiple Virtual Routers (VRs) are connected to a central backbone. The backbone is represented by a large rectangle divided into two sections by a dashed line. The top section is labeled 'Backbone' and contains three VRs (VR1, VR2, VR3) connected to a central VRi. The bottom section is also labeled 'Backbone' and contains three VRs (VR4, VR5, VR6) connected to a central VRj. Both VRi and VRj have bidirectional arrows pointing outwards from the backbone. The entire diagram is labeled 'PE' at the bottom center and 'T1318160-01' at the bottom right.
+
+Diagram illustrating the use of multiple Virtual Routers (VRs) on the backbone. The diagram is divided into two sections by a dashed line, both labeled 'Backbone'. The top section shows three VRs (VR1, VR2, VR3) connected to a central VRi. The bottom section shows three VRs (VR4, VR5, VR6) connected to a central VRj. Both VRi and VRj have bidirectional arrows pointing outwards from the backbone. The entire diagram is labeled 'PE' at the bottom center and 'T1318160-01' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4/Y.1311.1 – Example 3: Using multiple Virtual Routers on the backbone**
+
+### 9.2.4 VPN reachability determination
+
+By definition, virtual routers run different instances of routing protocols on a per VPN basis. Using tunnels (e.g. MPLS LSPs) reachability information is carried across the tunnels. The Virtual Router holds the routes only for the specific VPNs configured for that VR. This architecture does not use piggybacking VPN reachability information in the routing protocol running on the backbone (e.g. BGP).
+
+Clause 9.2.4.1 below describes one method to distribute reachability information among VRs.
+
+#### 9.2.4.1 Inter VR broadcast Link
+
+Virtual Routers need to send messages to all other VRs in other PEs in a particular VPN (for example, VRs need to send broadcast datagrams as mandated in routing protocols (OSPF broadcast mode, RIP V2 etc.)).
+
+In the traditional routed networks, when broadcast media such as Ethernet is available, and when routing protocols such as OSPF broadcast mode or RIP V2 are configured over these media, link resources are efficiently used and convergence times are minimized.
+
+In the case of VR based VPNs, a broadcast facility for a VR to send messages efficiently to all other VRs in the VPN could then be useful, particularly in case of large networks (e.g. high number of VPNs and PEs per VPN).
+
+One way to provide this broadcast facility is by the use of Multicast. More detailed information can be found via [6].
+
+### **9.2.5 VPN membership and topology determination**
+
+VR-based VPNs can be deployed in different configurations. The Virtual Router approach explicitly separates the mechanisms used for distributing reachability information from mechanisms used for achieving membership and topology determination. The VR-based architecture doesn't exclude the possibility that, on a single PE, multiple types of VR-based VPNs can coexist using different membership and topology discovery mechanisms.
+
+Among these mechanisms we can list:
+
+- Directory server approach which PEs query to determine their neighbours.
+- Explicit configuration via a management platform.
+- Multicast approach (more detailed information can be obtained via [6]).
+- Piggybacking VPN membership and topology using available routing protocols [3] (e.g. BGP).
+
+### **9.2.6 Operations and management**
+
+The key element in this clause is the fact that all existing operational and management tools and mechanisms can be used in the context of a VR-based solution. In general, the SP owns and manages layer 1 and layer 2 entities. To be specific, the SP controls physical switches or routers, physical links, logical layer 2 connections (such as DLCI in Frame Relay, VPI/VCI in ATM) and LSPs (and their assignment to specific VPNs). In the context of VPNs, it is the SP's responsibility to contract and assign layer 2 entities to specific VPNs. VPN Layer 3 entities can be managed either directly by the SP or, at the discretion of the SP, by the VPN customer. Examples of these entities include IP interfaces, choice of dynamic routing protocols or static routes, and routing interfaces. Note that although layer 3 configuration logically falls under the VPN user's area of responsibility, it is not necessary for the VPN user to execute it. It is quite viable for the VPN user to outsource the IP administration of the Virtual Routers to the SP.
+
+#### **9.2.6.1 VPN monitoring using VR-based solution**
+
+When a VPN user logs into a PE (directly or indirectly) to configure or monitor the VPN, the VR-based architecture allows the VPN user to log into the VR related to his specific VPN. The VPN user has only layer 3 configuration and monitoring privileges for the VR. Specifically, the VPN user has no configuration privileges for the physical network. This provides the guarantee to the SP that a VPN administrator will not be able to inadvertently, or otherwise, adversely affect the SP network.
+
+#### **9.2.6.2 VPN service availability with VR-based solution**
+
+In the VR-based architecture, it is possible for the SP to control and decide what VPN services get re-established first in case of PE service disruption (e.g. migration, upgrades, failures, etc.). The ability to not rely on piggybacking VPN reachability on the backbone routing protocol allows the VR-based solution to address per VPN availability requirements for applications running on top of the VPN network. This particular point is important when a large number of VPNs is supported on the PE.
+
+#### **9.2.6.3 VPN troubleshooting**
+
+In the VR context, SP (or the VPN customer) can use all existing troubleshooting tools with no modifications on a per VPN basis (e.g. ping).
+
+### **9.2.7 Security considerations**
+
+Different levels of data, routing and configuration security may be implemented using VR-based architecture.
+
+#### **9.2.7.1 Routing and data security**
+
+The use of existing routing protocols such as OSPF and BGP means that all the encryption and security methods (such as MD5 authentication of neighbours) are fully available in VRs. Furthermore, any private routing, forwarding and addressing manipulation are done within the virtual router context. Direct layer 2 connections (ATM, FR), or tunnelling mechanisms used (e.g. MPLS LSPs) provide different levels of data security.
+
+#### **9.2.7.2 Configuration security**
+
+Virtual Routers appear as physical routers to the VPN user. Existing security mechanisms as password, RADIUS, etc. can be available to the VPN user.
+
+### **9.2.8 VPN Quality of Service**
+
+The architecture adapts to different Quality of Service mechanisms to ensure site-to-site Quality of Service preservation on a per VPN basis. Packets received from a VPN site can receive Quality of Service treatment at the Virtual Router level, which directly impacts what egress backbone link to use. In this case, the Virtual Router may classify and police the packets on a per VPN basis.
+
+This model allows separate Quality of Service engineering of the VPNs and the backbone.
+
+### **9.2.9 Scalability**
+
+In this architecture, only the PEs are handling VPN type information.
+
+The internal backbone nodes (e.g. routers) are not VPN aware.
+
+Furthermore, for a network-based VPN solution, it is desirable to simplify the deployment and configuration of different VPNs with several sites sharing the same geographical location. Virtual Routers allow multiple private CE-based networks to connect to a single SP device.
+
+One advantage of the ability to contain the VPN address space, and the VPN routing and forwarding capabilities within the Virtual Router entity, is the possibility to distribute PE system resources on a per VPN basis. An example of such distribution is to apply different scheduling mechanisms for processing each VPN activity within the PE router. This distribution contributes in establishing a wide range of priority schemes among VPNs.
+
+### **9.2.10 Hierarchical relationship between VR-based VPNs**
+
+This clause describes one technique for building a hierarchical relationship between VR VPNs. An application of this technique enables the aggregation of many regional or local Service Provider VPN networks across a Hierarchical VPN tunnelling architecture. The approach presented here does not require any modifications of any existing routing protocols.
+
+A simplified example that shows a hierarchical relationship between Virtual Routed VPNs is shown in Figure 5.
+
+NOTE – Hierarchies can be extended to more than two levels.
+
+Hierarchical levels are designated numerically with the highest level designated as 0. Lower hierarchical levels are designated as Level 1, 2, etc. Higher level VPNs transport lower level VPNs. So:
+
+- Level 0 represents the highest hierarchical level. A Level 0 VPN transports lower level VPNs but is not itself transported by any other VPN;
+
+- Level 1 represents a VPN that is transported by a Level 0 VPN but is not itself transported across any lower or equal level VPN.
+
+
+
+Level 1 VPNs
+
+---
+
+VPN X
+
+---
+
+VPN Y
+
+---
+
+VPN Z
+
+---
+
+Level 0 VPN
+
+
+
+
+VPN A
+
+---
+
+
+
+---
+
+Level 1 VPNs
+
+---
+
+VPN X
+
+---
+
+VPN Y
+
+---
+
+VPN Z
+
+---
+
+T1318060-01
+
+Diagram illustrating Hierarchical VPN Levels. It shows a central 'Level 0 VPN' box labeled 'VPN A' flanked by two 'Level 1 VPNs' boxes. Each 'Level 1 VPNs' box contains three sub-boxes labeled 'VPN X', 'VPN Y', and 'VPN Z'. The diagram is labeled T1318060-01.
+
+**Figure 5/Y.1311.1 – Hierarchical VPN Levels**
+
+By assigning the VPNs depicted in Figure 5 to different hierarchical levels, a hierarchical relationship between the VPNs is created. For example, the highest hierarchical level is designated as "Level 0". In this example, VPN A is a level 0 VPN. Similarly, VPNs' X, Y and Z are part of the next lowest hierarchical level, designated "Level 1". Data within a Level 1 VPN is transported transparently across the Level 0 VPN.
+
+A possible realization of a Hierarchical VPN (similar to that depicted in Figure 5) can now be described using the VR model. This realization does not assume a single Service Provider only is involved. Specifically, in the examples which follow, SP1 and SP2 do not have to be the same Service Provider. MPLS Label stacking techniques are used to create the hierarchical levels and explain how the data is transported.
+
+Figure 6 shows an example of a Hierarchical VPN involving two Service Providers. This example assumes that SP1 provides an international backbone network that is utilized by SP2 to connect its geographically isolated regional (or local) networks. In this example, SP2 is providing two customer VPNs, X and Y. A two-level Hierarchical VPN is created to allow VPN X and VPN Y (i.e. level 1 VPNs in this hierarchy) to be transported (at level 0) across VPN A.
+
+
+
+VPN X
+
+VPN Y
+
+( )
+(SP2)
+(B)
+
+A
+
+SP1
+
+A
+
+A
+
+( )
+(SP2)
+(G)
+
+( )
+(SP2)
+(F)
+
+VPN X
+
+VPN Y
+
+VPN Y
+
+VPN X
+
+T1318070-01
+
+Diagram illustrating a Hierarchical VPN involving two Service Providers. A central oval labeled 'SP1' is connected to two 'VPN X' and 'VPN Y' boxes on the left and two 'VPN X' and 'VPN Y' boxes on the right. The connections are labeled 'A' and '(SP2) (B)' or '(SP2) (G)' and '(SP2) (F)'. The diagram is labeled T1318070-01.
+
+**Figure 6/Y.1311.1 – Hierarchical VPN**
+
+Figure 7 expands the diagram to show the relationship between SP2 and SP1. From this figure we can see that SP2 provides both the two end customer VPNs, and SP2 must also know about the backbone (VPN A) that it uses for transporting the hierarchy. On the other hand, SP1 needs to be concerned with just the Level 0 VPN A.
+
+
+
+T1318080-01
+
+Diagram illustrating the hierarchical relationship of Virtual Router Links (VRL). A central router (represented by a square) is connected to two customer VPNs, VPN X and VPN Y, on the left. Each connection is labeled 'VRL (VPN X => VPN A)' and 'VRL (VPN Y => VPN A)' respectively. The central router is also connected to SP1 PE (B) on the right, with the connection labeled 'VPN A'. The diagram shows that the central router acts as a hub, connecting customer VPNs to the backbone VPN A, which is then transported to SP1 PE (B).
+
+**Figure 7/Y.1311.1 – Hierarchical relationship of Virtual Router Links**
+
+Figure 7 also shows a relationship between a level 1 VPN (e.g. VPN X) and a level 0 VPN (e.g. VPN A). A Virtual Router Link (VRL) is used between the Level 1 and Level 0 VPNs. The VRL is explained in more detail in the next clause.
+
+In Figure 7, the hierarchical relationship is shown by the directional arrow indication (i.e. VPN X => VPN A). The lower level VPN X has an arrow pointing to the higher level VPN A, as indicated by VPN X => VPN A.
+
+#### 9.2.10.1 Virtual Router Link
+
+A VR can be connected to other VRs by a Virtual Router Link (VRL).
+
+Each end of VRL is logically bound to a VR. From the perspective of the VR, the VRL looks like one of its many links, some of which could be physical links.
+
+The user can define a set of rules on this VRL to control the relationship between two VPNs. This relationship could be hierarchical or peering.
+
+In the case of hierarchical VPNs, VRLs are configured between VRs with one end as the upper end of the hierarchy, and the other as the lower end.
+
+NOTE – Investigation into whether VRLs can be extended to cover point-to-point connections between VRs for control information exchange is for further study.
+
+#### 9.2.10.2 Label distribution
+
+VPNs can use any label distribution protocol. The only restriction is, within a specific VPN, the same protocol should be used in all its PE devices, so that they can interwork. This is restricted by the nature of the distribution protocol, not by the VPNs.
+
+Referring to Figure 6, SP1 provides the Level 0 VPN service (called VPN A) to SP2(B/G/F).
+
+The label distribution operates independently in each level of the VPN Hierarchy. Labels are distributed for the Level 0 VPN separately from the labels that are distributed for the Level 1 VPN. The following text describes the label distribution for each level of the hierarchical VPN.
+
+##### Level 0 (VPN A) label distribution
+
+The PEs of SP1 share the VPN A routing information between each other. In other words, the reachability information of SP2 edge routers is exchanged. LSP tunnels are set up in VPN A between the edge routers of SP2. For example, an LSP tunnel from SP2 (edge router B) is created to SP2 (edge router G).
+
+##### Level 1 (VPN X) label distribution
+
+The PEs of SP2 share the VPN X routing information with each other. In other words, the reachability information of the CE routers of VPN X is exchanged. LSP tunnels are set up in VPN X between the CE routers in SP2.
+
+Usage of Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP) requires penultimate and top-most labels to be allocated from the same label space (e.g. in this case, the allocation is from VPN A's label space). This implies in the case of Hierarchical VPNs, that an additional label (i.e. the penultimate label) will be necessary between the IGP label (i.e. top-most label) for the PE and VPN destination label. This is shown in 9.2.10.3 on Forwarding.
+
+In this example, it is indicated that A2 is the label for SP2-CE(G) in SP2-CE(B) and it is shown in 9.2.10.3 how A2 is used. (see Figure 8). This label is chosen from the VPN A Label space.
+
+Architecturally, Level 1 VPN X and Y are connected to Level 0 VPN A by a Virtual Router Link. Note that the edge routers of SP2 must have knowledge of all three VPNs (i.e. VPN X, VPN Y, and VPN A). When the VRL is configured for a hierarchical relationship, then the top level VPN will allocate a label for each VRL, i.e. to each VPNs, from its label space.
+
+#### 9.2.10.3 Forwarding
+
+User data from the lower level VPNs (e.g. Level 1 in Figure 8) are forwarded by the LSP tunnels of the upper level VPN (e.g. Level 0 in Figure 8). The label encoding shown in Figure 8 is explained below.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the label encoding for hierarchical VPN forwarding. It is divided into two main parts: a structural overview and a detailed data flow example.
+
+**Structural Overview:**
+
+- Level 1 VPNs:** On the left and right, there are columns representing Level 1 VPNs. Each column contains three entries: VPN X, VPN Y, and VPN Z, separated by horizontal lines.
+- Level 0 VPN:** In the center, there is a box representing Level 0 VPN, which contains the entry VPN A, separated by a double horizontal line.
+
+**Data Flow Example:**
+
+Below the structural overview, the data flow for "VPN X/Y/Z Data" is shown as a sequence of boxes:
+
+- The first row consists of three boxes: "Data", "Lx2", and "Data".
+- The second row consists of three boxes: "Ax2", "Lx2", and "Data".
+- The third row consists of four boxes: "A2", "Ax2", "Lx2", and "Data".
+
+The identifier "T1318090-01" is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+Diagram illustrating label encoding for hierarchical VPN forwarding. It shows Level 1 VPNs (X, Y, Z) connected to Level 0 VPN (A). Below, it shows the data flow and label stack for VPN X/Y/Z Data, including labels Ax2, Lx2, and A2.
+
+**Figure 8/Y.1311.1 – Label encoding**
+
+- 1) Customer data arrives at the VPN X CE router in SP2 (B) and is encapsulated in a MPLS frame.
+- 2) Label Lx2 is pushed on to the Label Stack. Lx2 is the peer VPN X CE label used to forward VPN X data to VPN X CE router in SP2 (G).
+- 3) Next, Label Ax2 is pushed on to the Label Stack. Ax2 is the peer VPN X attachment label with VPN A taken from VPN A's label space. This label is used by VPN A to forward data on the SP2 (G) VRL between VPN A and VPN X.
+- 4) Finally, Label A2 is pushed on to the Label Stack. This is the peer VPN A label used to forward data from the VPN A SP2 (B) PE router to the VPN A SP2 (G) PE router.
+
+In summary, the complete LSP path therefore to move customer data on VPN X from the SP2 (B) CE to the SP2 (G) CE is as follows:
+
+- a) Transport data across Level 0 (VPN A) using label A2.
+- b) Transport data across the VRL from Level 0 to Level 1 in SP2 (G) using label Ax2.
+- c) Transport data across Level 1 (VPN X) from SP2 (B) to SP2 (G) using label Lx2.
+
+# **10 QoS approaches**
+
+The following proposed approaches have been identified.
+
+## **10.1 "Point-to-Cloud" SLS**
+
+The IETF Differentiated Services architecture defines mechanisms which are DiffServ Traffic Conditioning and DiffServ PHBs. It also defines that various end-to-end Differentiated Services can be constructed by combining in specific ways some subset of these mechanisms along with specific resource allocation policies.
+
+It is expected that resource allocation policies (on a per DiffServ service basis) can be developed by network administrators which would allow, in combination with DiffServ Traffic Conditioning and PHB, support of "point-to-cloud" SLS.
+
+As an example, a network administrator may support a "point-to-cloud" SLS by:
+
+- activating Traffic Conditioning at each service boundary based on the traffic parameters of the corresponding individual SLS;
+- activating PHBs and allocating resources on each access link (for each PHB) based on the traffic parameters of the corresponding individual SLS;
+- activating PHBs in the network core and allocating resources for each PHB on an aggregate basis (i.e. independently of individual SLSs) for each PHB based on ongoing monitoring and provisioning cycles for each PHB on every link.
+
+DiffServ Traffic Conditioning, as well as DiffServ PHBs, can be supported on MPLS devices. Consequently, with an MPLS VPN infrastructure, Traffic Conditioning functions and PHBs can be activated at any point of the network (e.g. CE, PE, P devices) in a consistent manner regardless of whether this device is running MPLS or regular IP. In turn, this means that end-to-end DiffServ services can be built over a DiffServ-capable MPLS VPN backbone in the same way as they can be built over a non-MPLS DiffServ network. In turn, this means that "point-to-cloud" SLS can be supported over a DiffServ capable MPLS VPN backbone exactly in the same way as they can be offered over (non-MPLS) IP backbones.
+
+## **10.2 "Point-to-Point" SLS**
+
+Some applications expected to be transported over a public MPLS VPN service are anticipated to require "point-to-point" SLS.
+
+### 10.2.1 "Point-to-Point" SLS via resource allocation policies
+
+Although the end-to-end DiffServ services are still to be defined in detail in the IETF, it is expected that, in some environments, resource allocation policies (on a per-DiffServ service basis) can be developed by network administrators which would allow, in combination with DiffServ Traffic Conditioning and PHB, support of "point-to-point" SLS. As an example, a network administrator may support a "point-to-point" SLS by:
+
+- activating Traffic Conditioning at each service boundary based on the traffic parameters of the corresponding individual SLS;
+- activating PHBs and allocating resources on each access link (for each PHB) based on the traffic parameters of the corresponding individual SLS;
+- activating PHBs in the network core and allocating resources for each PHB on an aggregate basis (i.e. independently of individual SLSs) for each PHB based on significant over-provisioning combined with ongoing monitoring and provisioning cycles for each PHB on every link.
+
+Again, because the DiffServ mechanisms can be supported over MPLS in a transparent manner, in environments where resource allocation policies can be developed in order to offer "point-to-point" SLS, those can be applied to DiffServ-capable MPLS VPN backbones in exactly the same manner.
+
+### 10.2.2 "Point-to-Point" SLS via resource allocation policies and additional mechanisms (explicit in-band admission control, constraint-based routing)
+
+It is expected that, in some environments, "point-to-point" SLSs cannot be efficiently supported by relying solely on the DiffServ mechanisms combined with resource allocation policies. For instance, where Integrated Services (IntServ) services are to be supported from a given VPN Site to another given VPN Site with individual "point-to-point" commitments, and where backbone resources are scarce so that overprovisioning cannot be assumed, additional mechanisms, such as explicit in-band admission control as well as constraint based routing, would be required.
+
+Reference [7] provides a framework for supporting end-to-end IntServ services when a DiffServ cloud is used in the core. One approach discussed is to perform admission control on an aggregate basis in the core over the DiffServ resources.
+
+DiffServ mechanisms can be supported on an MPLS backbone in a manner which is compatible with MPLS Traffic Engineering (TE) signalling protocols. In particular, the MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs) can be established using MPLS Traffic Engineering (TE) signalling protocols. In this case, bandwidth requirements can be signalled by MPLS Traffic Engineering (TE) signalling protocols so that bandwidth reservation, as well as admission control, can be performed at LSP set-up. Also, those DiffServ LSPs can be constraint-based routed.
+
+MPLS Traffic Engineering can be made aware of DiffServ so that constraint-based routing can be performed separately for different classes requiring that different constraints be met.
+
+Thus, by combining DiffServ support over MPLS with the existing MPLS constraint-based routing mechanisms in accordance with the approach defined in [7], or DiffServ-aware TE approaches, end-to-end IntServ "point-to-point" SLS can be supported over a DiffServ/TE-capable MPLS VPN backbone. This proposed approach can be used even in environments where overprovisioning cannot be assumed.
+
+In case of heterogeneous backbones as in Annex A (not fully-MPLS backbones), additional mechanisms such as aggregation of RSVP for reservations across the non-MPLS backbone can be used to provide end-to-end SLS guarantees.
+
+## 10.3 "CoS transparency"
+
+Reference [8] states that the codepoints of the DS field may be changed within a DS domain by DS interior or DS boundary nodes. It is assumed that the same principle applies for the fields used in the context of the DiffServ over MPLS approach (e.g. the EXP field within the MPLS Shim Header).
+
+The modification of these fields is not sufficient in conjunction with the provisioning of IP VPNs, since the specific requirements of IP VPNs have not been taken into account. These specific requirements are:
+
+- VPN customers using applications with internal CoS solutions should have the possibility to utilize the solutions independent of the CoS solution supported by the SP infrastructure.
+- VPN customers supporting more CoS than the SP should have the possibility to use these classes within their physical private network sites.
+- A carrier's carrier service provided by a Network Provider may enable a SP (client of the mentioned network provider) to offer the IP VPN service to its customers. The unchanged transport of the indicated CoS is an essential requirement for the Network and Service Providers. By means of the CoS transparency feature, the SP can offer his own CoS solution to his customers regardless of the CoS solution supported by the Network Provider.
+
+Although an IP VPN can be considered as a kind of emulation of a physical private network, it is not feasible for the Network Provider to support all the various customers' or Service Providers' CoS solutions. Thus, the support of CoS Transparency ensures that the unchanged transmission of the CoS indicated by a customer or a SP is guaranteed across the Network Provider's MPLS network.
+
+DiffServ Tunnelling Models over MPLS include:
+
+- Uniform Tunnelling Model;
+- Pipe Tunnelling Model.
+
+The Pipe Model is such that the DiffServ information of packets transported over the Tunnel is not affected by the DiffServ information used over the Tunnel span.
+
+Operations of the Pipe Model without PHP (Penultimate Hop Popping) are illustrated in Figure 9.
+
+
+
+(M) represents the "LSP DiffServ information"
+(m) represents the "Tunnelled DiffServ information"
+
+Diagram of the Pipe model without PHP. It shows a packet's path through an MPLS network. The packet enters from the left, passes through a node where '(m) - Push' occurs, then through a series of nodes labeled '- Swap- (M) -'. The packet's header is shown as '(outer header) (P)' and '(inner header) (m)'. The packet exits the tunnel at a node labeled 'Pop - (m)-'. The diagram is labeled T1318170-01.
+
+**Figure 9/Y.1311.1 – Pipe model without PHP**
+
+One application of the "Pipe Tunnelling Model" is support of CoS Transparency over an MPLS VPN backbone.
+
+# 11 Inter-Autonomous System (Inter-Service Provider) VPN
+
+Network-based IP VPNs can span several ASs or SPs. The most common example is that of an international corporation which has offices in several countries around the globe and would like to outsource its IP services to an SP. Reality is such that it would be very rarely that such a corporation would be able to buy services from one SP who has points of presence near every site that the corporation has. Typically, some SPs span regions/countries and some have international presence. This means that the corporation needs to buy VPN services from different SPs depending on the local or branch office needs. This in turn means that interconnecting these geographically disparate VPN islands is of high value to the Provider with global presence. Of course, global presence may mean international presence to an SP aiming to provide connectivity to national Providers in various parts of the world; it could also mean national presence to a SP aiming to provide connectivity to regional Providers in a given country. The need for interworking is then a requirement.
+
+One way to provide VPN services to a corporation via several ASs (SPs) is by using the hierarchical VPN mechanism described in 9.2.10.
+
+However, no constraints are currently anticipated that will prevent this method from being extended to cover Inter-AS (SP) interconnection scenarios based on other VPN approaches.
+
+It should also be noted that capabilities for Inter-AS (SP) VPN scenarios based on the BGP/MPLS VPN approach are available in [5].
+
+# 12 Interworking
+
+## 12.1 Interworking between different solutions
+
+This clause outlines one possible solution of interworking between approaches described in this Recommendation.
+
+The following issues are taken into account:
+
+- Motivation for interworking among VPNs (see 12.1.1).
+- Assumptions of MPLS VPNs as elements for interworking (see 12.1.2).
+- Functional capabilities for interworking such as realization of security, mapping of the QoS class, dynamic routing information distribution (see 12.1.3).
+
+Scalability limitations of this solution may limit its applicability and therefore further work is needed.
+
+### 12.1.1 Motivation for interworking among MPLS VPNs
+
+Two cases are identified:
+
+**Case 1:** VPNs spread over multiple differently implemented MPLS networks owned by different VPN SPs. This follows the normal requirement and expectation that each VPN SP chooses its best VPN implementation out of multiple implementations.
+
+**Case 2:** VPNs spread over multiple differently implemented MPLS networks owned by a VPN SP. A VPN SP may deploy multiple MPLS networks (e.g. an old MPLS network and a new MPLS network). The VPN interworking removes the requirement that all user sites of one VPN need to be connected to the same MPLS network.
+
+In both cases, the interworking enables VPN SPs to provision VPN services flexibly. It is of benefit to VPN users as well.
+
+### 12.1.2 Assumptions
+
+The following MPLS network structure in Figure 10 is assumed to be present as a base to provide VPN services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the structure of an MPLS network. It shows a central box labeled "Backbone Network Implementing MPLS". To the left of this box is a box labeled "LSR" (Label Switched Router), and to the right is another box labeled "LSR". Lines connect the "User Sites" to the left "LSR" and the right "LSR" to the "User Sites". The entire diagram is labeled with the reference "T1318180-01" at the bottom right.
+
+Figure 10/Y.1311.1 – Structure of MPLS network
+
+**Figure 10/Y.1311.1 – Structure of MPLS network**
+
+Figure 11 depicts the interworking model.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the interworking model for two MPLS networks. It is divided into two main sections: "VPN A" at the top and "VPN B" at the bottom. Each section contains two "User Site" boxes connected to "LSR" (Label Switched Router) boxes. The "LSR" boxes are connected to "MPLS Network 1" and "MPLS Network 2". "MPLS Network 1" contains "Element W" and "Element Y", while "MPLS Network 2" contains "Element X" and "Element Z". The "MPLS LSP for VPN A" and "MPLS LSP for VPN B" are shown as horizontal lines connecting the "LSR" boxes across the "Interworking Interface". The diagram also shows "Data & Routing Information" being exchanged between the "LSR" boxes and the "MPLS Networks". The diagram is labeled with the reference "T1318190-01" at the bottom right.
+
+Figure 11/Y.1311.1 – Interworking model
+
+**Figure 11/Y.1311.1 – Interworking model**
+
+An "element" is each part of a VPN that is separated by an MPLS network. When a VPN spans multiple MPLS networks (domains), the part of the VPN belonging to a single MPLS network is called an "element".
+
+### **12.1.3 Functional capabilities for interworking among MPLS VPNs**
+
+#### **12.1.3.1 Functional capabilities for interworking**
+
+There are the following two types of VPN interworking:
+
+- Type (1): Interworking where each MPLS network is terminated and IP header look-up is executed at an egress/ingress LSR.
+- Type (2): Interworking without terminating MPLS and without IP header look-up at any egress/ingress LSR.
+
+As each existing MPLS VPN is implemented in a unique manner, it is difficult to realize type (2).
+
+Type (1) is easy to provision since it utilizes the LSR's function of IP header look-up. Therefore, we focus on type (1).
+
+The assumptions are that the connections at the interworking interface are provided by IP or MPLS.
+
+The following three functional capabilities are required to support VPN interworking:
+
+- Realization of security;
+- Mapping of the QoS class;
+- Dynamic routing information distribution in clauses 12.1.3.2, 12.1.3.3 and 12.1.3.4 respectively.
+
+#### **12.1.3.2 Realization of security**
+
+When MPLS VPNs span multiple MPLS networks, every VPN has a designated "connection" (e.g. ATM VC, MPLS LSP, etc.) at the interconnection boundaries of the MPLS networks. It is not permitted to transmit packets between any given connection and any other MPLS VPN (except where specific inter-VPN agreements have been made). This mechanism results in realization of security. The procedures by which such an assignment is established are specific to the solution used by the MPLS network implementation associated with the connection.
+
+The identity of VPN at each end is meaningful only in the context of the specific MPLS network associated with the connection. It is assumed that multiple VPNs do not share one connection.
+
+See Figure 11 above: there is a logical connection between the MPLS network 1 and MPLS network 2 used for constructing a VPN over both MPLS network 1 and MPLS network 2. The connection for the VPN is assigned to element "W", and "W" is meaningful only in the context of MPLS network 1. The other side of the connection is assigned to element "X", and "X" is meaningful only in the context of MPLS network 2.
+
+NOTE – It is recommended that bandwidth of a connection does not interfere with bandwidth of any other connections. Detailed QoS specifications of the connection are for further study.
+
+#### **12.1.3.3 Mapping of the QoS class**
+
+Attributes of a QoS class may be assigned to each connection. This enables provisioning of multiple QoS classes within each VPN. Class Identification in the IP Layer is needed only once.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates two MPLS networks, MPLS Network 1 and MPLS Network 2, connected by a link. MPLS Network 1 consists of a central box labeled 'Element W' flanked by two boxes labeled 'LSR'. MPLS Network 2 consists of a central box labeled 'Element X' flanked by two boxes labeled 'LSR'. A thick horizontal line connects the two networks, with the text 'Connections For different QoS Classes' centered below it. A reference code 'T1318200-01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram showing two MPLS networks connected by multiple connections for different QoS classes. MPLS Network 1 contains LSRs and Element W. MPLS Network 2 contains LSRs and Element X. The connection between them is labeled 'Connections For different QoS Classes'. Reference T1318200-01 is noted.
+
+**Figure 12/Y.1311.1 – Using multiple connections for multiple QoS classes for each VPN**
+
+An alternate method is to use the CoS field, a bit-pattern in a field such as EXP of the Shim header or DSCP (TOS) of the IP header, to identify a QoS class during packet transmission on the connection. The connection is shared by multiple QoS classes. A typical example of this mapping method is DiffServ. This method can reduce the number of connections, while QoS control on the connection is difficult.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates two MPLS networks, MPLS Network 1 and MPLS Network 2, connected by a link. MPLS Network 1 consists of a central box labeled 'Element W' flanked by two boxes labeled 'LSR'. MPLS Network 2 consists of a central box labeled 'Element X' flanked by two boxes labeled 'LSR'. A thick horizontal line connects the two networks, with the text 'Connections supporting CoS' centered below it. A reference code 'T1318210-01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram showing two MPLS networks connected by a single connection supporting CoS. MPLS Network 1 contains LSRs and Element W. MPLS Network 2 contains LSRs and Element X. The connection between them is labeled 'Connections supporting CoS'. Reference T1318210-01 is noted.
+
+**Figure 13/Y.1311.1 – Using CoS on a single connection for supporting multiple QoS classes for each VPN**
+
+#### 12.1.3.4 Dynamic routing information distribution
+
+Some mechanisms for routing control per VPN are required in each egress/ingress LSR. The connection between MPLS network 1 and MPLS network 2 of Figure 11 just transmit packets of standard IP routing. Routing information is then forwarded by the functional capability described in 12.1.3.2, as well as data. This enables dynamic routing information distribution within each VPN. Standard routing protocols such as BGP, OSPF, RIP, DVMRP, PIM can be used on the connections for every VPN.
+
+#### 12.1.3.5 Considerations about the scalability of the proposed interworking solution
+
+Figure 14 summarizes the functional capabilities for MPLS VPN interworking via IP over ATM. Note that this solution does not require any new protocols or modification of existing protocols.
+
+
+
+T1318220-01
+
+Figure 14/Y.1311.1 – Proposed VPN interworking by using IP over ATM. The diagram illustrates a network architecture for interworking between two VPNs (VPN A and VPN B) using MPLS Networks and an Interworking Interface. VPN A (top) contains User Sites connected to LSRs (Label Switched Routers) in MPLS Network 1 and MPLS Network 2. These LSRs are connected to an Interworking Interface. VPN B (bottom) contains User Sites connected to LSRs in the same MPLS Networks and Interworking Interface. The Interworking Interface consists of two VC (Virtual Circuit) blocks for Qos class 1 and Qos class 2. Data and Routing Information flows between the LSRs and the VC blocks. Element W and Element X are shown in the top LSRs, while Element Y and Element Z are shown in the bottom LSRs. Arrows indicate the flow of data and routing information, and a 'Prohibited to Transmit' message is shown between the LSRs and the VC blocks.
+
+**Figure 14/Y.1311.1 – Proposed VPN interworking by using IP over ATM**
+
+The solution in clause 12 focuses on static interworking (i.e. user-plane interworking) to deploy quickly. Dynamic interworking (i.e. control-plane or management-plane interworking) should be discussed to reduce manual configuration in the near future, thereby improving scalability.
+
+## 12.2 Service interworking with other VPN architectures
+
+Service interworking should take the following aspects into consideration:
+
+- data plane interworking;
+- control plane interworking;
+- management plane interworking.
+
+Appendix I provides informative material on this topic.
+
+# ANNEX A
+
+## MPLS VPNs over non-MPLS core network infrastructures
+
+This Recommendation addresses the support of IP VPN services over an MPLS architecture which does not require a fully-MPLS network infrastructure.
+
+A generic deployment scenario of not fully-MPLS network infrastructure is presented in Figure A.1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture where the edge layer is a mix of IP and MPLS, while the core network is split into MPLS and non-MPLS sections. The 'IP or MPLS Edge layer' is represented by a large light-gray oval containing several Provider Edge (PE) routers. These PE routers are connected to various Customer Edge (CE) routers, which are grouped into clouds representing different VPN sites: VPN A/Site 1, VPN A/Site 2, VPN A/Site 3, VPN A/Site 4, VPN B/Site 1, VPN B/Site 2, and VPN B/Site 3. The core network is shown as a central area with two distinct parts: a 'NON MPLS Core Network' (shaded gray) and an 'MPLS Core Network' (unshaded). The non-MPLS core contains two PE routers and two P (Provider) routers. The MPLS core contains four P routers. Connections show that some PE routers in the edge layer are linked to the non-MPLS core, while others are linked to the MPLS core, demonstrating the interworking between the two core types.
+
+T1318230-01
+
+Diagram of Not fully-MPLS network infrastructure showing a hybrid IP/MPLS edge layer connected to a core network with both MPLS and non-MPLS sections.
+
+**Figure A.1/Y.1311.1 – Not fully-MPLS network infrastructure**
+
+An example of a specific deployment scenario in which the non-MPLS portion of the network infrastructure is pure IP, is to use mechanisms such as MPLS-over-GRE or MPLS-over-IP.
+
+NOTE – In the case of not fully-MPLS network infrastructure, specific impacts on ability to meet all the requirements described in this Recommendation will be further studied.
+
+# APPENDIX I
+
+## Examples of service interworking with other VPN architectures
+
+Interworking should take the following aspects into consideration:
+
+- data plane interworking;
+- control plane interworking;
+- management plane interworking.
+
+### Data plane interworking
+
+In data plane interworking, information in the encapsulation header specific to the VPN architecture of the received packet is mapped to that of transmitted packet to satisfy the service requirement described in clause 7.
+
+Figure I.1 below shows the example of the encapsulation header used by several VPN architectures to identify the VPN users.
+
+| VPN architecture | Header | Identifier |
+|----------------------|-------------|----------------------|
+| MPLS | shim header | Label |
+| VLAN
(IEEE802.1Q) | TCI | VLAN ID |
+| IP over ATM | cell header | VPI/VCI |
+| IP over FR | FR header | DLCI |
+| L2TP | L2TP header | Tunnel ID/Session ID |
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1311.1 – Example of the headers used by VPNs**
+
+Note that the length of the identifier fields for different VPN architectures are not the same, therefore an accurate mapping should be defined.
+
+The information in the encapsulation header and the information in the Layer 3 header (i.e. IP header) have to be mapped to preserve VPN user identification.
+
+For example, mapping the combination of the Identifier in the encapsulation header and the destination IP address in the IP header of the received packet to the Identifier of the transmitted packet may be performed.
+
+Also the QoS class information of a packet can be handed over from end to end. As an example, in case of interworking between MPLS VPN and VLAN (explained later in this appendix), the node may map the user priority in the tag control information to the EXP field in the MPLS shim header (or the appropriate field in a non-shim MPLS header).
+
+### **Control plane interworking**
+
+Routing information specific to each VPN architecture needs to be exchanged between different VPN architectures to realize the mapping of the header information.
+
+### **Management plane interworking**
+
+To enhance interworking, it is desirable that management systems of different VPN architectures are interoperable.
+
+### **Example of interworking between MPLS VPN architectures and VLAN**
+
+The text below in this clause describes the interworking between MPLS VPN and VLAN specified by IEEE802.1Q [9] as an example of the interworking between different VPN architectures.
+
+Figure I.2 shows a network model of the interworking between MPLS VPN and VLAN. VLAN #As are located in physically separated places and mutually connected by the MPLS VPN, and VLAN #Bs are also located in physically separated places and mutually connected by the MPLS VPN in this model.
+
+#### **1) *From VLAN to MPLS***
+
+The node at the ingress of the MPLS VPN maps the VLAN ID assigned to each VLAN to the MPLS Label to separate the VPN users in the MPLS VPN, and maps the destination IP address prefix to the MPLS Label to route the packet to the appropriate destination.
+
+#### **2) *From MPLS to VLAN***
+
+The node at the egress of the MPLS VPN maps the MPLS Label to the VLAN ID assigned to each VLAN, and routes the packet to the appropriate destination by seeing the destination IP address.
+
+
+
+T1318240-01
+
+Figure I.2/Y.1311.1 – Network model of interworking between MPLS VPN and VLAN. The diagram shows an Ingress side and an Egress side connected via an MPLS-VPN core. On the Ingress side, two dashed boxes represent VLAN #A and VLAN #B. Arrows show traffic from these VLANs entering the Ingress Edge Router. The router uses 'Different labels (Identifying the Edge Router)' to route traffic into the MPLS-VPN core. The core uses 'Different labels (Identifying the VLAN)' to route traffic to the Egress Edge Router. On the Egress side, traffic is then mapped back to VLAN #A and VLAN #B. Below the diagram, two boxes define the label mapping. The Ingress Edge Router maps {VLAN ID, Destination IP Address, User Priority} to {Label (Identifying VLAN), Label (Identifying the Edge Router), Exp}. The Egress Edge Router maps {Label (identifying VLAN), Exp} to {VLAN ID, User Priority}.
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1311.1 – Network model of interworking between MPLS VPN and VLAN**
+
+# APPENDIX II
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [1] CARUGI (M.) *et al.*, *Service requirements for Provider Provisioned Virtual Private Networks*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [2] CALLON (R.) *et al.*, *A Framework for Provider Provisioned Virtual Private Networks*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [3] JACQUENET (C.), *Functional needs for the deployment of an IP VPN service offering: a service provider perspective*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [4] ROSEN (E.) *et al.*, *BGP/MPLS VPNs* (draft-rosen-rfc2547bis-03.txt), work in progress in IETF.
+- [5] OULD-BRAHIM (H.) *et al.*, *Network based IP VPN Architecture using Virtual Routers*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [6] OULD-BRAHIM (H.) *et al.*, *BGP/VPN: VPN Information Discovery for network based VPNs*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [7] MUTHUKRISHNAN (K.) *et al.*, *A Core MPLS IP VPN architecture*, (draft-muthukrishnan-rfc2917bis-00.txt), work in progress in IETF.
+- [8] KATHIRVELU (C.) *et al.*, *Hierarchical VPN over MPLS Transport*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [9] LE FAUCHEUR (F.) *et al.*, *MPLS Support of Differentiated Services*, work in progress in IETF.
+
+- [10] SUMIMOTO (J.), SUZUKI (M.), TABATA (O.), ESAKI (Y.), DOUKAI (M.), *MPLS VPN Interworking*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [11] WORSTER (T.) *et al.*, *MPLS Label Stack Encapsulation in IP*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [12] GODERIS (D.) *et al.*, *Service Level Specification Semantics and Parameters*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [13] REKHTER (Y.), TAPPAN (D.), ROSEN (E.), *MPLS Label Stack Encapsulation in GRE*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [14] LE FAUCHEUR (F.) *et al.*, *Requirements for support of DiffServ-Aware MPLS Traffic Engineering*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [15] LE FAUCHEUR (F.) *et al.*, *Extensions to IS-IS, OSPF, RSVP and CR-LDP for support of DiffServ-Aware MPLS Traffic engineering*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [16] BAKER (F.), ITURRALDE (C.), LE FAUCHEUR (F.), DAVIE (B.), *Aggregation of RSVP for IPv4 and IPv6 Reservations*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [17] AWDUCHE (D.), BERGER (L.), GAN (D.), LI (T.), SWALLOW (G.), SRINIVASAN (V.), *RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP Tunnels*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [18] JAMOUCSI (B.) *et al.*, *Constraint-Based LSP Setup using LDP*, work in progress in IETF.
+- [19] HUMMEL (H.), *Tree/Ring/Meshy VPN tunnel systems*, work in progress in IETF.
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,760 @@
+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1312**
+
+(09/2003)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Transport
+
+# --- **Layer 1 Virtual Private Network generic requirements and architecture elements**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1312
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1312**
+
+# **Layer 1 Virtual Private Network generic requirements and architecture elements**
+
+# **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation specifies service definition, service scenarios, service requirements and service architecture elements on Layer 1 Virtual Private Network (L1 VPN).
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1312 was approved on 13 September 2003 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Architecture, Layer 1, Layer 1 VPN, Requirement, Virtual Private Network, VPN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2004
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+# CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 Service definition and service reference model..... | 3 |
+| 5.1 Basic L1 service reference model and features ..... | 3 |
+| 5.2 L1 service categories, L1 VPN reference model and definition ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Service scenarios ..... | 5 |
+| 6.1 Multi-service backbone ..... | 5 |
+| 6.2 Carrier's carrier ..... | 6 |
+| 6.3 L1 resource trading..... | 6 |
+| 6.4 Inter-SP L1 VPN ..... | 7 |
+| 7 Service requirements ..... | 8 |
+| 8 Service architecture elements ..... | 10 |
+| 8.1 C-plane and U-plane combinations ..... | 10 |
+| 8.2 Description of service examples based on C-plane and U-plane
combination ..... | 11 |
+| 8.3 L1 VPN functional model ..... | 12 |
+| 9 Security aspects ..... | 16 |
+| Annex A – Functions performed by the CE in a L1 VPN ..... | 17 |
+| Appendix I – Relationship with L2/L3 VPNs..... | 18 |
+| I.1 Multipoint connectivity for L3/L2 VPN and layer 1 VPN..... | 18 |
+| I.2 C/U-planes for L3/L2 VPN and layer 1 VPN ..... | 18 |
+
+
+
+# ITU-T Recommendation Y.1312
+
+# Layer 1 Virtual Private Network generic requirements and architecture elements
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies service definition, service scenarios, service requirements and service architecture elements on Layer 1 Virtual Private Network (L1 VPN).
+
+L1 VPN has specific features compared to generic VPN described in ITU-T Rec. Y.1311, such as connections between CEs rather than tunnels between PEs, and C-plane/U-plane separation. In addition, L1 VPN has features such as connectivity restriction within limited CEs and per-VPN C-plane functionalities, which are achieved by additional functionalities to the basic L1 network. To this end, L1 VPN provides customers with large capacity U-plane resources with a different set of C-plane functionalities. Thus, new kinds of services are expected to emerge, including multi-service backbone, carrier's carrier and L1 resource trading.
+
+This Recommendation addresses service features of L1 VPN including those mentioned above, and also describes service requirements and service architecture elements. In addition, this Recommendation describes several scenarios where the merits of L1 VPN are well expected.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [1] ITU-T Recommendation G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [2] ITU-T Recommendation G.8080/Y.1304 (2001), *Architecture for the automatic switched optical network (ASON)*.
+- [3] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1311 (2002), *Network Based VPNs – Generic architecture and service requirements*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.1 L1 VPN:** A network formed by a set of CEs and network resources between CEs. A set of CEs is managed by the same authority. Network resources between CEs are provided by the service provider, and may include links, connections and C-plane functionalities. Refer to ITU-T Rec. Y.1311.
+
+**3.2 NB L1VPN:** Refer to ITU-T Rec. Y.1311.
+
+**3.3 CE:** The entity receiving U-plane and C-plane service provided by the network to which it is attached. Refer to ITU-T Rec. Y.1311.
+
+**3.4 PE:** The entity within the Network connected to CE, that provides service to customers. Refer to ITU-T Rec. Y.1311.
+
+- 3.5 P:** The entity within the network, and connected to P or PE devices. Refer to ITU-T Rec. Y.1311.
+- 3.6 link:** U-Plane resource connecting adjacent network devices in the same layer (in the OSI sense) and within the same layer network (in the G.805 sense), e.g. connecting CE and PE, PE and P.
+- 3.7 connection:** For L1 VPN, a connection is established between a pair of CEs. See Annex A for a more detailed description.
+- 3.8 customer:** The entity that has authority over a set of CEs within the same VPN (e.g. the owner of the CEs). The customer is the billable entity to which L1 VPN service is provided. The customer of a Layer 1 VPN has typically at least 3 CEs, while the customer of a private line service has exactly two CEs.
+- 3.9 shared U-plane:** U-plane in which link resources can be multiplexed (over time) between different VPNs. At any instant in time the resources are either dedicated to one VPN or are unallocated.
+- 3.10 dedicated U-plane:** U-plane in which link resources are allocated exclusively to a specific VPN.
+- 3.11 shared C-plane:** C-plane in which the same control resources are used by multiple VPNs.
+- 3.12 dedicated C-plane:** C-plane in which control resources are allocated exclusively to a specific VPN.
+- 3.13 Shared U-Plane Private Network (SUPN):** L1VPN with shared U-plane.
+- 3.14 Dedicated U-Plane Private Network (DUPN):** L1VPN with dedicated U-plane.
+- 3.15 Shared C-Plane Private Network (SCPn):** L1VPN with shared C-plane.
+- 3.16 Dedicated C-Plane Private Network (DCPN):** L1VPN with dedicated C-plane.
+- 3.17 site:** The network behind a CE, that is managed by the same authority as the CE.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|-----|----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| CE | Customer Edge |
+| CNM | Customer Network Management |
+| CSM | Customer Service Management |
+| DCN | Data Communication Network |
+| P | Provider |
+| PE | Provider Edge |
+| PM | Performance Measurement |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+
+# 5 Service definition and service reference model
+
+## 5.1 Basic L1 service reference model and features
+
+### 5.1.1 Basic L1 service reference model
+
+Figure 5-1 shows the reference network model where a customer edge (CE) is using a L1 service. Separation between the service provider and the customer is provided by L1 service interface. Basic L1 service provides U-plane resources between CEs in a point-to-point manner, i.e. connection oriented.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Basic L1 service reference model. It shows two Customer Edge (CE) nodes, represented as rectangles, connected to a central Service provider network, represented as an oval. Each connection is marked with a double vertical line, indicating a service interface. Below the diagram, the text 'L1 service interfaces' is written, with arrows pointing to the double vertical lines. The label 'Y1312\_F5.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 5-1/Y.1312 – Basic L1 service reference model diagram
+
+**Figure 5-1/Y.1312 – Basic L1 service reference model**
+
+### 5.1.2 Basic L1 services features
+
+Basic layer 1 service is characterized in terms that include:
+
+- Connectivity: between a pair of CEs;
+- Capacity: for example, bit rate for a TDM service;
+- Transparency: for example, for a SDH network, overhead transparency etc.;
+- Availability: the percentage of time that the quality service meets the agreed criteria. To achieve the required level of availability for the customer connections, the service provider's network may use restoration or protected resources;
+- Performance: e.g., number of error seconds per month.
+
+## 5.2 L1 service categories, L1 VPN reference model and definition
+
+### 5.2.1 L1 service categories
+
+Layer 1 services can be categorized based on the combination of connectivity features (U-plane) and service control capability (C-plane) available to the customer. A CE is associated with the service interface between a customer site and the network. Type 1 enables one connection between a pair of CEs. Type 2 enables multiple connections among a set of CEs. Type 2 may involve a variety of C-plane types depending on the customer. Table 5-1 shows the classification of the services. Layer 1 VPN can be defined as a subset of the Type 2 service category. Compared to Type 1 services, the Layer 1 VPN service has features such as separate policy per VPN and distribution of membership information. For either Type 1 or Type 2 services, connections are point-to-point and can be permanent, soft-permanent, or switched. For a static service, the network is responsible for the management of both the network infrastructure and the end user connections. For dynamic service, the network is only responsible for the configuration of the infrastructure; end user connections are established dynamically by the network.
+
+**Table 5-1/Y.1312 – Types of layer 1 services including layer 1 VPN**
+
+| Types of Layer 1 services | | |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Type 1
Single connection service (one customer between two CEs) | Static service | - Permanent connection service (classic private line service)
|
+| | Dynamic service | - Switched connection service
- Customer-controlled soft permanent connection service
|
+| Type 2
Multiple connection service (one customer; three or more CEs) | Static service | |
+| | Dynamic service
Layer 1 VPN | - Customer-controlled soft permanent connection service
- Switched connection service
- Separate policy per VPN, and distribution of membership information within the group of CEs
|
+| NOTE – Single connection service may be supported by multiple connections (e.g. protection purpose). | | |
+
+### 5.2.2 L1 VPN reference model
+
+Figure 5-2 shows a reference model for L1 VPN.
+
+
+
+Figure 5-2/Y.1312 – L1 VPN reference model diagram. The diagram illustrates a central 'Service provider network' containing a core 'P' (Provider) and several 'PE' (Provider Edge) routers. Two groups of 'CE' (Customer Edge) routers are shown, representing 'VPN#1' and 'VPN#2'. Arrows indicate connections from each CE router to a corresponding PE router. Labels 'L1 VPN service interfaces for Customer#1' and 'L1 VPN service interfaces for Customer#2' point to the interfaces between the CE and PE routers. The diagram is labeled 'Y.1312\_F5.2' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 5-2/Y.1312 – L1 VPN reference model**
+
+NOTE 1 – Customer may outsource management of VPN to a different organization. In this case, this organization has an authority to manage the VPN.
+
+NOTE 2 – The CE and PE are logical entities; the implementation is dependent on the network application. For example:
+
+- The CE and PE may be implemented in the same building, or even in the same equipment. In this case, the CE and PE are still regarded as logically separated entities.
+- There could be a network on the user side of CE, i.e. site.
+- The link between the CE and PE may be provided by the (static) network of another network operator.
+
+### 5.2.3 L1 VPN service definition and features
+
+A Layer 1 VPN is a VPN whose U-plane operates at layer 1. Thus, the L1 VPN service provides optical or TDM connections between CEs. In addition to the service features of basic L1 service described above, the Layer 1 VPN service has the following features:
+
+- U-plane: Layer 1 connectivity is provided to a limited set of CEs (This set of CEs forms the Layer 1 VPN membership.);
+- C-plane: Some level of control and management capability is provided to the customer.
+
+# 6 Service scenarios
+
+## 6.1 Multi-service backbone
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a multi-service backbone architecture. At the center is the 'Service provider network', represented by a large oval. To its left and right are three dashed-line boxes representing 'VPN#1', 'VPN#2', and 'VPN#3'. Each VPN box contains a 'CE' (Customer Edge) node. On the far left, 'Service A', 'Service B', and 'Service C' are shown as inputs to the CEs of VPN#1, VPN#2, and VPN#3 respectively. On the far right, 'Service A e.g. ATM', 'Service B e.g. IP', and 'Service C e.g. TDM' are shown as outputs from the CEs of VPN#1, VPN#2, and VPN#3 respectively. A dashed line encircles the three VPN boxes, labeled 'Boundary of L1 VPN service' and 'L1 VPN service demarcation'. Below this boundary, the text 'Higher layer services' is present. Arrows indicate connections from the CEs to the central Service provider network and from the network to the CEs. A reference code 'Y.1312\_F6.1' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+Diagram of a Multi-service backbone architecture showing a central Service provider network connected to multiple VPNs (VPN#1, VPN#2, VPN#3) and their respective CEs, with various services (Service A, Service B, Service C) and higher layer services.
+
+**Figure 6-1/Y.1312 – Multi-service backbone**
+
+Multi-service backbone is characterized in terms such that one service department of a carrier receiving the carrier's L1 VPN service provides different kinds of higher-layer service.
+
+The customer receiving L1 VPN service can offer its own services whose payloads can be any layer (e.g. ATM, IP, TDM). From the L1 VPN service provider point of view, these services are not visible and are not part of the L1 VPN service. That is, the type of service being carried within the L1 payload is not known by the service provider.
+
+The benefit is that the same L1 core network resources are shared by multiple services. A large capacity backbone network (U-plane) can be built economically by having the resources shared by multiple services, usually with flexibility to modify topologies, while separating the control functions. Thus, each customer can select a specific set of features that are needed to provide their own service.
+
+## 6.2 Carrier's carrier
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the 'Carrier's carrier' architecture. A large rectangle represents the 'Service demarcation' boundary. Inside this boundary, there are two nested ovals. The outer oval is labeled 'Service provider 1 network' and contains a central box labeled 'P' (Provider) and four boxes labeled 'PE' (Provider Edge). The inner oval is labeled 'Service provider 2 network' and contains four boxes labeled 'PE'. Arrows point from the 'PE' boxes in the inner oval to the 'PE' boxes in the outer oval, indicating connectivity. Outside the 'Service demarcation' boundary, there are four boxes labeled 'CE' (Customer Edge). Two 'CE' boxes are connected to the 'PE' boxes of the 'Service provider 2 network' via dashed lines, which are labeled 'L1 VPN service interfaces for Customer#1'. Another two 'CE' boxes are connected to the 'PE' boxes of the 'Service provider 1 network' via solid lines, which are labeled 'VPN#1'. A label 'Y.1312\_F6.2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram of Carrier's carrier architecture showing nested service provider networks and VPN interfaces.
+
+**Figure 6-2/Y.1312 – Carrier's carrier**
+
+Carrier's carrier is characterized in terms such that one carrier receiving another carrier's L1 VPN service provides its own service. In this service scenario, provider 1 and provider 2 in Figure 6-2 are in different organizations. Therefore, it is expected that more limited information is provided at the service demarcation point, and more strict control is carried out than in the case of multi-service backbone. For example, customers of L1 VPN service receive:
+
+- limited view of L1 VPN service provider network;
+- limited control over L1 VPN service provider network.
+
+One of the merits is that each provider can concentrate on a specific service. For example, provider 1 more focuses on L3 service, e.g. providing secure access to the Internet, while provider 2 more focuses on L1 service, i.e. providing a long haul bandwidth between cities. Provider 1 can construct its own network using L1 resources provided by the provider 2, usually with flexibility to modify topologies, and dedicated C-plane functionalities.
+
+## 6.3 L1 resource trading
+
+In addition to the scenarios where the second tier service provider is using a single core service provider as is mentioned above, it is possible for the second tier provider to have service from more than one service provider, as shown in Figure 6-3. In this service scenario, there are some benefits for the second tier service provider such as dynamic carrier selection based on the price and route redundancy.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating L1 resource trading architecture. An 'Intermediate network (Service provider 1)' is shown as a large oval containing two smaller ovals: 'Service provider 2 network' and 'Service provider 3 network'. Two 'CE' (Customer Edge) boxes are connected to the intermediate network. The connection from the left CE passes through 'Service provider 2 network' and then 'Service provider 3 network' before exiting the intermediate network. The connection from the right CE passes through 'Service provider 3 network' and then 'Service provider 2 network' before exiting. A dashed box labeled 'L1 VPN service demarcation' encloses the two service provider networks. A label 'VPN#1' is placed near the right CE. A label 'Service demarcation' is at the bottom of the intermediate network oval. The diagram is labeled 'Y.1312\_F6.3' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-3/Y.1312 – L1 resource trading**
+
+The following additional features are required to realize L1 resource trading.
+
+**Extended service provider resource notification:** Primary tier service providers that the second tier provider is able to obtain L1 service from have a capability to publish resource information to the second tier provider. This information can be used by the second tier provider to make decisions about which service provider to obtain L1 service from. An example of such information is pricing.
+
+**Service provider dual homing:** The second tier provider is aware that it can use different service providers as opposed to having two demarcation points to the same provider. This is needed for making decisions based on provider characteristics like price. It is also needed for making two requests that are to be obtained in separate service providers.
+
+With these additional capabilities, the second tier provider can support a function that enables an L1 resource trading service. Using resource information published by its service providers, a second tier provider can decide how best to use those providers. For example, if one service provider is no longer able to satisfy requests for service, the alternate service provider can be used. The second tier provider can choose to respond to price changes over time. Another example of second tier provider use is to reduce exposure to failures in each provider (improve availability).
+
+NOTE – There could be several service requirements derived from this service scenario. The detailed service requirements for L1 resource trading are for further study.
+
+## 6.4 Inter-SP L1 VPN
+
+In addition to the scenarios where a single connection between two CEs is routed over a single service provider, it is possible that a connection is routed over multiple service providers. This service scenario is called Inter-SP L1 VPN. For example, this scenario is beneficial in the case where an L1 VPN is constructed by receiving service from multiple regional providers. There could be variety of business relationships among providers and customers. In this case, the detailed business relationship among providers and customers is for further study. Also, there could be several service requirements derived from this service scenario. The detailed service requirements for inter-SP L1 VPN are for further study.
+
+# 7 Service requirements
+
+Table 7-1 shows the list of requirements for L1 VPN with categorization as mandatory or optional.
+
+**Table 7-1/Y.1312 – Service requirements for L1 VPN**
+
+| Item number | Service requirement | Mandatory | Optional |
+|-------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1 | Basic layer 1 service features | Connectivity, Capacity, Transparency, Availability, Performance. | |
+| 2 | Dynamic control of layer 1 connection | Soft-permanent, or switched. | |
+| 3 | Notification of connection rejection | Network notifying the originating CE giving a reason for the failure, in the case where the network can not complete a service request. | |
+| 4 | Subscription of multiple VPNs at the service interface | | Enabling CE to simultaneously make connections within different VPNs. |
+| 5 | Parallel connection with public network | | A CE or an entity in site is connected to the public network, as well as the L1 VPN service provider. |
+| 6 | Authentication | Validation of CE identity prior to allowing access to service. | |
+| 7 | Authorization | Preventing CE from performing unauthorized control of the network in the L1 VPN. | |
+| 8 | Accounting | | Recording the quantitative information on the usage. |
+| 9 | Connectivity restrictions | Restricting connectivity based on source and destination VPN membership. | |
+| 10 | Explicit link selection (NOTE – Typically only for DUPN) | | Customer specifying an explicit link or series of links (e.g. route). |
+| 11 | Distribution of membership information | | Network distributing list of current members. |
+| 12 | Distribution of member availability information | | Network distributing ability or willingness of current members to participate in the VPN. |
+| 13 | Transfer of resource information (NOTE – Typically only for DUPN) | | Network providing network topology view, performance, utilization, resource status. |
+| 14 | Transfer of connectivity information | | Network providing list of current active connections within the VPN. |
+
+**Table 7-1/Y.1312 – Service requirements for L1 VPN**
+
+| Item number | Service requirement | Mandatory | Optional |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 15 | Transparent transfer of control information between customer entities | | For example, topologies of isolated sites are shared when connected over a common provider. |
+| 16 | Network participation in customer domain routing | | For example, a common provider may use topology and status information of isolated sites to optimize routing. |
+| 17 | Per-VPN policy | Ability to enforce policy to each VPN instance | Example: link selection policy. Network enforcing some policy on link selection for a connection. When there are multiple policies available, a customer may be able to select which policy to be applied in connection request. |
+| 18 | Selection of L1 class of service (e.g. availability level) | | Customer requesting a class of service per connection basis, by which the network is mandated to select the survivability mechanisms corresponding to it. |
+| 19 | CNM | | The customer's ability to view and control the service across an interface to the management system. |
+| 20 | Per-CE policy and its management | | The customer's ability to modify per-CE policy. |
+| 21 | Transfer of performance information | | The network providing the performance information of a L1 connection provided by the service provider. (NOTE – may include C-plane status). |
+| 22 | Transfer of fault information | | The customer can receive fault information for the U-plane and C-plane resources. |
+| NOTE – Requirement #15 means control information transfer over control plane. When control information is transferred over a connection between CEs, transparent transfer of control information between CEs is realized without any service-related functions in the provider network. | | | |
+
+## **Naming:**
+
+A unique address within the context of the VPN must be assigned to each CE. This address is used by the CE when making connection requests. This address may be either:
+
+- i) A public address assigned by the network operator:
+
+In this case the CE may translate connection request for the local client address to the assigned public address. The network may use this public address directly for connection routing.
+
+- ii) Or A private address assigned by the Customer:
+
+In this case the network may translate the private address into a network address to support connection routing.
+
+By using AAA, each customer can receive a different set of features and functionalities mentioned herein. For example, customer A and customer B receive different membership information and resource information. Another example is that customer A receives resource information, but customer B does not, based on the contract. This forms the per-VPN C-Plane functionality feature.
+
+# **8 Service architecture elements**
+
+## **8.1 C-plane and U-plane combinations**
+
+The elements that constitute a VPN are the U-plane resources and C-plane resources defined below. The services realized vary greatly depending on whether these resources are shared by multiple VPNs, or dedicated to an individual VPN. It is thus necessary to clarify which type is assumed in referring to L1 VPN services.
+
+### **8.1.1 U-plane resources**
+
+U-plane resources are the network facilities used for the transport of user information and, include ports, physical interfaces, TDM channels or wavelengths (e.g. links).
+
+- a) "Shared U-plane resources" means that the resources are used by multiple VPNs in a time-sharing manner. In other words, a specific L1 resource is used for one VPN for a certain time, and is used for another VPN after the first VPN releases the link. A layer 1 VPN with shared U-plane resources is called a Shared U-Plane Private Network (SUPN).
+- b) "Dedicated U-plane resources" means that resources are VPN allocated exclusively to a VPN for its lifetime. A layer 1 VPN with dedicated U-plane is called a Dedicated U-Plane Private Network (DUPN).
+
+Note that connection management method in the U-plane is independent of whether the U-plane is shared or dedicated.
+
+### **8.1.2 C-plane resources**
+
+C-plane resources are connection control facilities including routing software processes and routing tables. These resources are used to realize specific algorithm and policy involved in the connection control of the U-plane resources. The function performed by these C-plane resources can be grouped into three broad categories:
+
+- i) Common support functions, for example:
+- Physical communications channel for signalling.
+- In General these functions are shared across multiple VPNs.
+- ii) Functions that do not require explicit knowledge of the L1 resources for example:
+- VPN membership;
+ - VPN policy;
+ - Transparent transfer of user control information.
+- These functions are always dedicated to a single VPN.
+- iii) Functions that require explicit knowledge of the L1 resources for example:
+- Link resource management;
+ - Routing topology.
+
+These functions may be either shared or dedicated.
+
+The classification of shared C-plane and dedicated C-plane are applied in the context of the functions described in iii) above. The classification of dedicated C-plane is only used in the case where none of the functions described in iii) are shared.
+
+- a) "Shared C-plane resources" means that the same C-plane resources (to support the functions identified in iii)) may be used for the control of multiple VPNs. A layer 1 VPN with shared C-plane resources is called a Shared C-Plane Private Network (SCPN).
+- b) "Dedicated C-plane resources" means that different C-plane resources are assigned to different VPNs (to support the function identified in iii)). A layer 1 VPN with dedicated C-plane resources is called a Dedicated C-Plane Private Network (DCPN).
+
+When the network provides service in a SUPN way, it would be enough to use SCPN. In this way, the customer can expect to receive L1 VPN service in an economical way.
+
+When the U-plane resources are shared, it is invalid to have the functions that manage U-plane resources dedicated per VPN (i.e. a dedicated C-plane).
+
+The customer of a DUPN may wish to take greater control over the management of his VPN. In such a case, resource availability information may be exchanged between CEs and the network, allowing CEs to make their own selection among the dedicated U-plane resources. In order to achieve this level of service, it may be necessary to dedicate C-plane resources to individual VPNs.
+
+On the other hand, it is possible to have dedicated U-plane resources while sharing C-plane resources. The customer relies on the network to control connections in a common way. A lightweight solution would be to make the network maintain the mapping between the U-plane and the VPN. An example would be a link colouring technique by which the network would keep track of link ownership through a unified mechanism.
+
+The C-plane uses the Data Communications Network (DCN), which is logically independent from the layer 1 U-plane. Items to be investigated both for C-plane and U-plane in order to address the above-mentioned features include:
+
+- Reliability: The availability of the U-plane must be monitored by the C-plane, which is built on a network that may be independent of the U-plane. A failure in the C-plane must not directly affect the availability of any already established U-plane connections. When the C-plane is restored, it must be able to resynchronize with the U-plane.
+- Routing: The route information relative to the U-plane must be held in the C-plane, which is built on a network that may be independent of the U-plane.
+
+| | | C-plane | |
+|---------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | | Shared
(Single instance) | Dedicated
(Multiple instance) |
+| U-plane | Shared
(Time division) |
SUPN/SCPN | Not valid |
+| | Dedicated |
DUPN/SCPN |
DUPN/DCPN |
+
+Y.1312\_F8.1
+
+**Figure 8-1/Y.1312 – U-plane – C-plane PN combinations**
+
+## 8.2 Description of service examples based on C-plane and U-plane combination
+
+### 8.2.1 DUPN
+
+DUPN is supported by a set of permanently allocated (or dedicated) resources. Details of the resources allocated to the partition can be made visible to the customer. Note that, in general, links
+
+presented to the VPN will transit other flexibility points in the network that are not visible in the abstraction provided to the VPN.
+
+**Topology** – If required, the geographic location of link ends and details of the route taken by the server layer (down to the duct level) can be provided as part of the service contract in the same way that the routing of dedicated private lines is provided today.
+
+**Link status** – Can be provided for links within the network and links between CE and PE via a CNM interface.
+
+**Routing policy** – The customer can provide routing constraints via the CNM interface.
+
+**Connection status and Performance Measurements (PMs)** – The PMs can be provided on a per-connection basis via a CNM interface. Note that in some cases, this interface is referred to as a *Customer Service Management (CSM)* interface.
+
+### 8.2.2 SUPN
+
+SUPN is supported by a set of resources that are allocated, on demand, from a common pool with a guarantee of the minimum available and maximum allowed capacity between customer sites defined in the service contract. The resources in the carriers network are not visible to the customer. The VPN partition is presented as a set of links connecting each customer site to a subnetwork that represents the partition within the carrier's network as shown in Figure 8-2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a Shared U-plane Private Network (SUPN). On the left, three customer sites (Customer site 1, Customer site 2, and Customer site 3) are represented by cloud icons. On the right, three customer sites (Customer site 4, Customer site 5, and Customer site 6) are also represented by cloud icons. In the center, a large oval represents the 'Partition in the carriers network abstracted as a complex subnetwork'. Two vertical dashed lines, each labeled 'UNI' (User Network Interface), separate the customer sites from the central network partition. Lines connect each customer site to the central network partition, passing through the UNI lines. The label 'Y.1312\_F8.2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram of Shared U-plane Private Network (SUPN) showing customer sites connected to a central carrier network partition.
+
+Topology - No details are provided.
+
+Link Status - Can be provided for links between CE and PE via a CNM interface.
+
+Connection status and PMs - The PMs can be provided on a per-connection basis via a CNM interface.
+
+Note that in some cases this interface is referred to as a CSM (Customer Service Management) interface.
+
+**Figure 8-2/Y.1312 – Shared U-plane Private Network (SUPN)**
+
+## 8.3 L1 VPN functional model
+
+Figure 8-3 shows the L1 VPN reference model including functional entities. Note that Figure 8-3 is a high level description of a functional model. Functional entities may be implemented by extended basic network control functional entities, such as signalling and routing, or may be implemented as separate functional entities. The functional entities in the network may be implemented in PE, P, or in the centralized fashion. Also, functional entities in the customer may be implemented in CE or in the centralized fashion. Details of functional entities are as follows.
+
+
+
+**Functional entities in the customer**
+
+- Explicit link selection
+- Selection of L1 class of service
+- Per-CE policy and its management
+- Transfer of fault information
+- Transfer of performance information
+- Notification of connection rejection
+- Authentication
+- Dynamic control of layer 1 connection
+- Transfer of connectivity information
+- Transfer of resource information
+- Transparent transfer of control information between customer entities
+- Network participation in customer domain routing
+- Distribution of membership availability information
+- Distribution of membership information
+- Basic L1 service features
+
+**Functional entities in the network**
+
+- Per-VPN policy
+- Authorization
+- Accounting
+- Connectivity restrictions
+- Per-CE policy and its management
+- Transfer of fault information
+- Transfer of performance information
+- Notification of connection rejection
+- Authentication
+- Dynamic control of Layer 1 connection
+- Transfer of connectivity information
+- Transfer of resource information
+- Transparent transfer of control information between customer entities
+- Network participation in customer domain routing
+- Distribution of membership availability information
+- Distribution of membership information
+- Basic L1 service features
+
+**Information flow**
+
+**Functional entities in the network (not directly communicating to customers)**
+
+- Membership maintenance
+- Customer domain routing information maintenance
+- Network topology information maintenance
+- Connectivity information maintenance
+- Mapping of class of service to survivability mechanisms
+- Link selection
+- Connection handling
+- Performance monitoring
+- Fault management
+- CE to VPN mapping
+
+Y.1312\_F8.3
+
+Figure 8-3/Y.1312 – L1 VPN reference model with functional entities. The diagram shows a network topology with CE, PE, P, and PE nodes. It includes two boxes for functional entities in the customer and network, and a third box for functional entities in the network (not directly communicating to customers). Arrows indicate information flow between the customer and network entities.
+
+**Figure 8-3/Y.1312 – L1 VPN reference model with functional entities**
+
+- 1) *Functional entities with information exchange between customer and network as indicated in the figure*
+
+The following service requirements are realized by functional entities which are accompanied with information exchange between customer and network.
+
+NOTE 1 – An actual information termination point may not reside in CE or PE. For example, proxies may be used. Thus, functional entities may not reside in CE or PE.
+
+- Basic L1 service features: This service feature is realized by CE sending information to network, and network sending information to CE.
+- Distribution of membership information: This service feature is realized by network detecting the addition/deletion (in terms of physical connectivity availability) of CE, and distributing information of this addition/deletion to the customer for that VPN.
+
+- Distribution of membership availability information: This service feature is realized by CE informing the network about the ability or willingness, and the network informing the customer of that VPN about this information.
+- Network participation in customer domain routing: This service feature is realized by customer informing the network about its domain's routing information (i.e. network topology information within site), and the network informing the customer of that VPN about this information. The network uses customer domain routing information in order to optimize routing.
+- Authentication: This service feature is realized by the customer requesting the network to validate their access to network service, and the network responding to the customer about its validity.
+- Transparent transfer of control information between customer entities: This service feature is realized by the customer transferring the control information to the network, and the network transparently transferring this control information to the customer.
+
+### 2) *Functional entities with information flow from network to customer as indicated in the figure*
+
+The following service features are realized by functional entities which are accompanied with information flow from network to customer.
+
+- Transfer of resource information: This service feature is realized by the network informing the customer about topology view, performance, utilization and resource status.
+- Transfer of connectivity information: This service feature is realized by the network informing the customer list of current active connections within the VPN. The network obtains information about the list of current active connections via functional entities for Dynamic control of Layer 1 connection.
+- Notification of connection rejection: This service feature is realized by the network informing the customer about a reason for failure, when the network can not complete a service request.
+- Transfer of performance information: This service feature is realized by the network informing the customer about performance information of a connection.
+- Transfer of fault information: This service feature is realized by the network informing the customer about fault information (working or failure). Here, fault information includes about a connection, and may include U-plane and/or C-plane resources dedicated for a specific VPN.
+
+### 3) *Functional entities with information flow from customer to network as indicated in the figure*
+
+The following service features are realized by functional entities which are accompanied with information flow from customer to network.
+
+- Dynamic control of layer 1 connection: This service feature is realized by the customer requesting the network to create, delete and modify connections. Note that when layer 1 connection control is realized by signalling type of mechanism, the information exchange becomes both ways, thus categorized as 1, since the remote CE receives the connection request that the local CE has sent.
+
+NOTE 2 – At the request of a customer to network for dynamic control of layer 1 connection, information such as customer's explicit request on link selection (e.g. explicit route), or class of survivability, may be included. This is one of the possible forms that realize service features of explicit link selection and selection of L1 class of service.
+
+- Per-CE policy and its management: This service feature is realized by the customer requesting the network to modify the per-CE policy.
+
+### 4) *Functional entities in the network*
+
+The following service features are realized by functional entities residing in the network.
+
+- Connectivity restrictions: This service feature is realized by network accepting or rejecting the request from the dynamic control of layer 1 connection.
+- Authorization: This service feature is realized by network preventing the user from performing unauthorized control of the network in the L1 VPN.
+- Accounting: This service feature is realized by network recording quantitative information on usage.
+- Per-VPN policy: This service feature is realized by network enforcing policy per VPN basis. The trigger to enforce policy may include request from a customer (e.g. via dynamic control of layer 1 connection) or failure.
+
+In addition to functional entities directly communicating to customers, there are several additional functional entities within the provider network that support the L1 VPN service. Those functional entities include:
+
+- Membership maintenance: The functional entity to maintain membership information, so that the provider can provide membership information to customers.
+- Customer domain routing information maintenance: The functional entity to maintain customer domain routing information, so that the provider can participate in customer domain routing.
+- Network topology information maintenance: The functional entity to maintain network topology information within the provider network, so that provider can route connections as well as provide topology information to customers.
+- Connectivity information maintenance: The functional entity to maintain connectivity information within the provider network, so that provider can provide connectivity information to customers.
+- Mapping of class of service to survivability mechanisms: The functional entity to map a requested class of service for a customer connection to the corresponding survivability mechanisms.
+- Link selection: The functional entity to manage resources within the provider network, including route selection algorithm and connection admission control mechanisms.
+- Connection handling: The functional entity to set up/delete/modify connections between CEs.
+- Performance monitoring: The functional entity to monitor the performance of U-plane connections (link and connection), e.g., by power monitoring, BER monitoring and overhead byte monitoring.
+- Fault management: The functional entity to handle faults within the network, including fault localization, recovery and notification.
+- CE to VPN mapping: The functional entity that maps CE and VPN.
+
+### 5) *Functional entities in the customer*
+
+The following service feature is realized by the functional entity residing in the customer.
+
+- Explicit link selection: This service feature is realized by the customer explicitly selecting a link or series of links to use for a connection that the customer likes to request, by using the resource information provided from the network.
+- Selection of L1 class of service: This service feature is realized by the customer requesting a class of service on a per-connection basis.
+
+Table 8-1 categorizes how each functional entity exchanges information, namely in U-plane, C-plane or M-plane. Note that U-plane, C-plane and M-plane in Table 6-1 means the plane over which the information can be transferred, rather than the plane to which the information belongs.
+
+**Table 8-1/Y.1312 – Mapping of functional entities with U/C/M plane**
+
+| Functional entity | U-plane | C-plane | M-plane |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|
+| Basic layer 1 service features | X | | |
+| Distribution of membership information | | X | X |
+| Distribution of membership availability information | | X | X |
+| Network participation in customer domain routing | | X | X |
+| Transparent transfer of control information between customer entities | | X | X |
+| Transfer of resource information | | X | X |
+| Transfer of connectivity information | | X | X |
+| Dynamic control of layer 1 connection | | X | X |
+| Authentication (see NOTE 1) | | X | X |
+| Notification of connection rejection | | X | X |
+| Transfer of fault information | | X | X |
+| Transfer of performance information | | | X |
+| Per-CE policy and its management | | | X |
+| NOTE 1 – When PE terminates information from CE for authentication, PE may communicate with the functional entity that actually performs the authentication (e.g., authentication server) in M-plane. | | | |
+| NOTE 2 – There is a variety of ways to realize the functional entities mentioned herein. Functional entities may be realized by a distributed system, or by a centralized system. | | | |
+
+# 9 Security aspects
+
+The information exchange between customer and network must be guaranteed in its integrity and confidentiality.
+
+In addition, the network must provide services only to valid customers, by means of authentication and authorization, as mentioned in clause 7.
+
+# Annex A
+
+## Functions performed by the CE in a L1 VPN
+
+This annex provides a more detailed description of the CE in the context of a L1 VPN.
+
+The CE is a container that is visible at the service interface between a customer site and the network. The CE is a logical construct that hides the implementation and topology of the customer site. Therefore, the network has no visibility of the location of the functions contained within the CE.
+
+The functions contained by the CE are:
+
+**Connection User (CU):** This entity is the (client) application that uses a trail and interacts directly with G.805 access points by presenting and receiving adapted information. This is the point at which the payload is assembled (and disassembled).
+
+**Customer Call Agent (CCA):** This is the entity that requests the network to establish or release connections for a CU or that accepts a connection establishment or release request from the network. It is also responsible for the transfer of the customer site topology between CEs or between the CE and the network.
+
+The CE is attached to the PE within the network by a link. When viewed from the network, the CE represents the logical termination of the bearer connections in the link and the control plane messages as shown in Figure A.1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationship between a Customer Equipment (CE) and a Network. On the left, a rectangular box labeled 'CE' contains two smaller rounded rectangles: 'CCA' (Customer Call Agent) at the top and 'CU' (Connection User) at the bottom. A vertical line, labeled 'Service interface' at the bottom, separates the CE from the Network on the right. The Network is represented by a large, curved, double-lined shape. Two horizontal lines connect the CE to the Network: a dashed line from CCA to the Network labeled 'Control (C-plane)', and a solid line from CU to the Network labeled 'Transmission (U-plane)'. The identifier 'Y.1312\_FA.1' is located at the bottom right of the Network shape.
+
+Diagram showing the relationship between the CE and the network. The CE is a container with CCA and CU functions. The CCA connects to the Network via the Control (C-plane). The CU connects to the Network via the Transmission (U-plane). The Service interface separates the CE from the Network.
+
+**Figure A.1/Y.1312 – Relationship between the CE and the network**
+
+A CE may participate in more than one VPN, it may also access the public network, in this case the link may also be shared.
+
+In the case of a nested L1 VPN shown in Figure A.2, the CU function is physically located in the end-CE. The CCA function associated with each CE is implemented within the customer site. The CCA makes a call request to the network in the context of the other CEs belonging to the same VPN that are also attached to that network. In this case, the CCA is also responsible for conveying the context of the original call request to the intermediated CCA. In the example network below, the CCA in CEp11 must convey the destination address (CEc2) provided by the originating CCA (in CEc1) to CEp12.
+
+In this case, provider 1 may share the VPN service from provider 2 among several customer VPNs. Provider 2 need not be aware of this sharing. Also the customer VPNs of provider 1 need not be aware that provider 1 is using a VPN from provider 2.
+
+
+
+Call request is in the context of the VPN service of provider 2 i.e. the (sub) call destination is CEp12
+
+Call request is in the context of the VPN service of provider 1 i.e. the (sub) call destination is CEc2
+
+Call request is in the context of the enterprise i.e. the destination is end-CEc2
+
+═ Layer 1 VPN service interface
+
+Y.1312\_FA.2
+
+Diagram of a nested VPN application showing three nested ovals: Enterprise (outer), Provider 1 (middle), and Provider 2 (inner). End-CEc1 connects to CEc1 in the Enterprise. CEc1 connects to CEp11 in Provider 1. CEp11 connects to CEp12 in Provider 2. CEp12 connects to CEc2 in Provider 1. CEc2 connects to End-CEc2 in the Enterprise. Red arrows indicate call request contexts: from End-CEc1 to End-CEc2 (Enterprise context), from CEc1 to CEp12 (Provider 2 context), and from CEp11 to CEc2 (Provider 1 context). A legend shows a double line for 'Layer 1 VPN service interface'.
+
+**Figure A.2/Y.1312 – Example of a nested VPN application**
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Relationship with L2/L3 VPNs
+
+## I.1 Multipoint connectivity for L3/L2 VPN and layer 1 VPN
+
+A layer 2 or 3 application may be associated with multiple Connection Users (CUs) (see Annex A). Each CU can support a point-to-point connection. Each connection exists between a pair of CUs (and not between more than two CUs). The basic requirement for layer 1 VPN is to support any-to-any point-to-point communication within the context of the VPN. Point-to-multipoint connectivity between the layer 2 or layer 3 applications using the CU is achieved by the use of multiple (layer 1) point-to-point connections.
+
+
+
+a) L3/L2 VPN
+
+b) L1 VPN
+
+Y.1312\_FI-1
+
+Two diagrams illustrating multipoint connectivity. Diagram (a) shows an L3/L2 VPN with a central node connected to multiple nodes, each with its own triangle representing a connection user. Diagram (b) shows an L1 VPN with a central node connected to multiple nodes, each with its own triangle representing a connection user. Both diagrams show a central node connected to multiple nodes, each with its own triangle representing a connection user.
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1312 – Multipoint connectivity for L3/L2 VPN and layer 1 VPN**
+
+## I.2 C/U-planes for L3/L2 VPN and layer 1 VPN
+
+The layer 1 U-plane transports the information of higher layers transparently. Therefore, unlike L3/L2 VPNs, it is not possible to decode control messages carried on the layer 1 U-plane. A physically separated C-plane network must be constructed in order to exchange control messages.
+
+
+
+a) L3/L2 VPN
+
+b) L1 VPN
+
+Figure I.2/Y.1312 – C/U-Planes for L3/L2 VPN and Layer 1 VPN. The diagram shows two scenarios: a) L3/L2 VPN and b) L1 VPN. In both, a Customer Equipment (CE) and a Provider Equipment (PE) are connected. In a) L3/L2 VPN, C-plane data and U-plane data are shown as separate flows between CE and PE. In b) L1 VPN, C-plane data and U-plane data are shown as separate flows, but the U-plane data flow is labeled 'Y.1312\_FI-2'.
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1312 – C/U-Planes for L3/L2 VPN and Layer 1 VPN**
+
+NOTE – In L2/L3 VPN, it would be possible to have a physically separated C-plane network, but that is not usual.
+
+The service demarcation is between the CE and the network. If there are nested service interfaces, as in the case of nested VPNs, then Customer Call Agents (CCAs) (see Annex A), will be nested also as described in Annex A. No assumption of an implementation on the service provider side is made.
+
+With layer 1 VPNs, in addition to the user plane and the control plane separation, the service is always connection-oriented. The CU is associated with the user plane. For any connection, there are exactly two CUs, one at each end. This is where the data from higher layers gets put into the layer 1 payload. The CCA is associated with the control plane. There is a CCA wherever there is an optical service interface across which a connection request can be made.
+
+Figure I.3 shows further differences between network-based L3/L2 VPNs and network-based layer 1 VPN with respect to the role of customer equipment.
+
+
+
+a) Network-based L3/L2 VPN
+
+b) Network-based L1VPN
+
+Figure I.3/Y.1312 – Network and customer equipment functional differences. The diagram compares the roles of network-based L3/L2 VPN and network-based L1VPN. On the left, 'Possible network's service' lists: Provision connectivity, Provide packet/frame routing, Provide security, Provide intra-VPN reachability info, Provide fault management, Provide performance management, etc. On the right, 'Customer equipment's role' lists: Connectivity request, Decide which connection to use to reach a particular site. Below this, 'Network's functions' lists: Provision connectivity, Provide security, Provide intra-VPN reachability info, Provide fault management, Provide performance management, etc. Arrows indicate that the network's functions are a subset of the possible network's services, and the customer equipment's role is a subset of the network's functions.
+
+**Figure I.3/Y.1312 – Network and customer equipment functional differences**
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and Next Generation Networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a blue globe with a red lightning bolt and the letters ITU in blue.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.1414
+
+(07/2004)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Interworking
+
+# --- **Voice services – MPLS network interworking**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1414
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1414**
+
+# **Voice services – MPLS network interworking**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation focuses on the required functions and procedures necessary for support of narrow-band voice services by MPLS networks. Details of the encapsulation of encoded audio streams in MPLS packets are specified.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1414 was approved on 29 July 2004 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+AAL type 2, Interworking, MPLS, Network, VoIP, Voice services, User Plane.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2004
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+# CONTENTS
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Voice services – MPLS network interworking..... | 4 |
+| 7 | General requirements..... | 5 |
+| | 7.1 User plane requirements ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.2 Control plane aspects..... | 6 |
+| | 7.3 Management plane aspects ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.4 Traffic management aspects ..... | 7 |
+| 8 | Functional group considerations for voice services – MPLS network interworking ... | 7 |
+| | 8.1 MPLS transport label..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 Interworking label ..... | 7 |
+| | 8.3 Common interworking indicators..... | 7 |
+| 9 | Voice over IP over MPLS..... | 9 |
+| 10 | Voice over MPLS using AAL type 2 SSCS for narrowband services ..... | 9 |
+| | 10.1 Transport label..... | 10 |
+| | 10.2 Interworking label ..... | 10 |
+| | 10.3 Common interworking indicators..... | 10 |
+| | 10.4 Payload ..... | 10 |
+| 11 | Voice over MPLS using MPLS Forum IA 1.0 ..... | 10 |
+| | 11.1 Transport label..... | 10 |
+| | 11.2 Interworking label ..... | 10 |
+| | 11.3 Common interworking indicators..... | 10 |
+| | 11.4 Payload ..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix I – Primary and control sub-frames used in MPLS Forum 1.0 ..... | 11 |
+| | I.1 Sub-frames..... | 11 |
+| | I.2 Primary Sub-frame ..... | 12 |
+| | I.3 Control sub-frame..... | 12 |
+| | I.4 Format of the primary sub-frame ..... | 13 |
+
+# **Introduction**
+
+This Recommendation focuses on the required functions and procedures necessary for support of narrow-band voice services by MPLS networks. Details of the encapsulation of encoded audio streams in MPLS packets are specified.
+
+## ITU-T Recommendation Y.1414
+
+# Voice services – MPLS network interworking
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation focuses on the required functions and procedures necessary for support of narrow-band voice services by MPLS networks. ITU-T Rec. Y.1261 [1] describes the service requirements and architecture for transport of voice services over MPLS networks.
+
+Narrow-band voice services include encoded audio streams, telephony call progress tones, fax, and optionally circuit mode data.
+
+This Recommendation specifies encapsulation of encoded audio in MPLS packets. Algorithms for encoding audio streams are beyond the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+This Recommendation includes three modes:
+
+- voice over IP over MPLS;
+- voice over MPLS using AAL type 2 SSCS [2] and [3] for narrow-band services; and
+- voice over MPLS using MPLS Forum IA 1.0 [4].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [1] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1261 (2002), *Service requirements and architecture for voice services over Multi-Protocol Label Switching*.
+- [2] ITU-T Recommendation I.366.2 (2000), *AAL type 2 service specific convergence sublayer for narrow-band services*, plus Corrigendum 1 (2002).
+- [3] ITU-T Recommendation I.363.2 (2000), *B-ISDN ATM Adaptation Layer specification: Type 2 AAL*.
+- [4] MPLS Forum Implementation Agreement MPLS Forum 1.0 (2001), *Voice Over MPLS – Bearer Transport*.
+- [5] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1411 (2003), *ATM-MPLS network interworking – Cell mode user plane interworking*.
+- [6] ITU-T Recommendation G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [7] ITU-T Recommendation G.711 (1988), *Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies*.
+- [8] ITU-T Recommendation G.723.1 (1996), *Speech coders: Dual rate speech coder for multimedia communications transmitting at 5.3 and 6.3 kbit/s*.
+- [9] ITU-T Recommendation G.726 (1990), *40, 32, 24, 16 kbit/s Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modulation (ADPCM)*.
+- [10] ITU-T Recommendation G.727 (1990), *5-, 4-, 3- and 2-bit/sample embedded adaptive differential pulse code modulation (ADPCM)*.
+
+- [11] ITU-T Recommendation G.729 (1996), *Coding of speech at 8 kbit/s using conjugate-structure algebraic-code-excited linear-prediction (CS-ACELP)*.
+- [12] ETSI EN 301 703 V7.0.2 (1999), *Digital Cellular Telecommunications System (Phase 2+) (GSM) Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR); Speech processing functions; General description (GSM 06.71 version 7.0.2 Release 1998)*.
+- [13] ITU-T Recommendation G.722 (1988), *7 kHz audio-coding within 64 kbit/s*.
+- [14] ITU-T Recommendation G.722.1 (2000), *Coding at 24 and 32 kbit/s for hands-free operation in systems with low frame loss*.
+- [15] ITU-T Recommendation G.722.2 (2003), *Wideband coding of speech at around 16 kbit/s using Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband (AMR-WB)*.
+- [16] ITU-T Recommendation G.711 Appendix I (1999), *A high quality low-complexity algorithm for packet loss concealment with G.711*.
+- [17] ITU-T Recommendation Q.23 (1988), *Technical features of push-button telephone sets*.
+- [18] ITU-T Recommendation Q.24 (1988), *Multifrequency push-button signal reception*.
+- [19] ITU-T Recommendation E.180/Q.35 (1998), *Technical characteristics of tones for the telephone service*.
+- [20] ITU-T Recommendation I.251.3 (1992), *Number identification supplementary services: Calling Line Identification Presentation*.
+- [21] ITU-T Recommendation Q.310-Q.332 (1988), *Specifications of Signalling System R1*.
+- [22] ITU-T Recommendation Q.400-Q.490 (1988), *Specifications of Signalling System R2*.
+- [23] ITU-T Recommendation Q.724 (1988), *Telephone user part signalling procedures, plus Amendment 1 (1993)*.
+- [24] ITU-T Recommendation T.4 (2003), *Standardization of Group 3 facsimile terminals for document transmission*.
+- [25] ITU-T Recommendation T.30 (2003), *Procedures for document facsimile transmission in the general switched telephone network*.
+- [26] ITU-T Recommendation V.17 (1991), *A 2-wire modem for facsimile applications with rates up to 14 400 bit/s*.
+- [27] ITU-T Recommendation V.29 (1988), *9600 bits per second modem standardized for use on point-to-point 4-wire leased telephone-type circuits*.
+- [28] ITU-T Recommendation V.18 (2000), *Operational and interworking requirements for DCEs operating in the text telephone mode*.
+- [29] IETF RFC 3032 (2001), *MPLS Label Stack Encoding*.
+- [30] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+- [31] IETF RFC 768 (1980), *User Datagram Protocol*.
+- [32] IETF RFC 3550 (2003), *RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications*.
+- [33] ATM Forum specification af-vmoa-0145.001 (2003), *Loop Emulation Service Using AAL2 Rev 1*.
+- [34] MPLS and Frame Relay Alliance 5.0.0 (2003), *I.366.2 Voice Trunking Format over MPLS, Implementation Agreement*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines or uses the following terms:
+
+**3.1 interworking:** See ITU-T Rec. Y.1411 [5].
+
+**3.2 interworking function (IWF):** See ITU-T Rec. Y.1411 [5].
+
+**3.3 ingress IWF:** The point where the voice services are encapsulated into an MPLS packet (Voice-to-MPLS direction).
+
+**3.4 egress IWF:** The point where the voice services are de-encapsulated from an MPLS packet (MPLS-to-voice direction).
+
+# 4 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------------------|
+| AAL2 | ATM Adaptation Layer 2 |
+| CAS | Channel Associated Signalling |
+| CCS | Common Channel Signalling |
+| CID | Channel Identifier |
+| CLI | Calling Line Identification |
+| CPS | Common Part Sublayer |
+| CPT | Call Progress Tone |
+| CRC | Cyclic Redundancy Check |
+| CU | Combined Use |
+| DTMF | Dual Tone Multi Frequency |
+| HEC | Header Error Control |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IWF | InterWorking Function |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| MTU | Maximum Transport Unit |
+| OAM | Operation And Maintenance |
+| PDU | Protocol Data Unit |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RFC | Request for Comments |
+| RTP | Real Time Protocol |
+| SSCS | Service Specific Convergence Sublayer (of AAL) |
+| STF | Start Field |
+| TDM | Time Division Multiplexing |
+| TTL | Time To Live |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------|
+| UUI | User-to-User Indication |
+| VoIP | Voice over IP |
+| VS | Voice Services |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation the term voice services is synonymous with narrow-band services, and includes 8 kHz digitized audio (carrying voice, telephony tones, fax and modem transmissions, etc). It optionally may include 16 kHz digitized audio ("wideband speech"), and 64 kbit/s data.
+
+In this Recommendation voice services are considered without regard to the physical interface over which they are provided. In particular, while this physical interface may be a TDM link carrying multiple voice-grade channels, other cases are frequently encountered.
+
+# 6 Voice services – MPLS network interworking
+
+Figure 6-1 provides a general network architecture for support of narrow-band voice services by MPLS networks. For the voice services-to-MPLS direction, the continuous voice services data (stream or frame) is encapsulated into an MPLS packet by the interworking function (IWF). For the MPLS-to-voice services direction, the voice services data is extracted from the MPLS packets.
+
+The MPLS network contains a number of Label Switching Routers (LSR), and Label Switched Paths (LSP). An example LSP is shown as a solid line in Figure 6-1.
+
+Figure 6-2 depicts the network functional architecture of voice services-MPLS network interworking using the diagrammatic techniques of ITU-T Rec. G.805 [6].
+
+Figure 6-3 shows the network reference model and protocol layers for user plane aspects of voice services-MPLS interworking.
+
+
+
+Y.1414\_F6-1
+
+○ LSR Label Switching Router
+— LSP Label Switched Path
+VS Voice Services
+
+Figure 6-1/Y.1414 – Reference architecture for voice services-MPLS network interworking. The diagram shows two 'End System' blocks (End System 1 and End System 2) connected to 'Voice services' clouds. These clouds connect to 'IWF' (Interworking Function) blocks, which are split into 'VS' (Voice Services) and 'MPLS' sections. The 'MPLS' sections connect to an 'MPLS' network cloud containing several 'LSR' (Label Switching Router) nodes. A solid line represents an 'LSP' (Label Switched Path) through the network. Below the diagram, a legend defines the symbols: a circle for LSR, a solid line for LSP, and 'VS' for Voice Services. A horizontal arrow at the bottom indicates the flow from 'Voice services' to 'MPLS network' and back. The identifier 'Y.1414\_F6-1' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-1/Y.1414 – Reference architecture for voice services-MPLS network interworking**
+
+
+
+AP Access Point
+CP Connection point
+TCP Termination Connection Point
+VS Voice Services
+
+Y.1414\_F6-2
+
+Figure 6-2/Y.1414 – Functional architecture of voice services-MPLS network interworking depicted according to the diagrammatic conventions of G.805. The diagram shows a sequence of components: VS CP, VS, MPLS /VS, AP, MPLS TCP, MPLS, MPLS TCP, AP, MPLS /VS, VS CP, VS. These are grouped into three sections: Voice services network (VS CP, VS), MPLS network (MPLS /VS, AP, MPLS TCP, MPLS, MPLS TCP, AP, MPLS /VS), and Voice services network (VS CP, VS). A legend defines: AP Access Point, CP Connection point, TCP Termination Connection Point, VS Voice Services. Reference: Y.1414\_F6-2.
+
+**Figure 6-2/Y.1414 – Functional architecture of voice services-MPLS network interworking depicted according to the diagrammatic conventions of G.805**
+
+
+
+Y.1414\_F6-3
+
+Figure 6-3/Y.1414 – Network reference model and protocol layers for voice services-MPLS user plane interworking. The top part shows a high-level view: Voice services cloud, IWF, MPLS cloud, IWF, Voice services cloud. Below this, a horizontal line is divided into three sections: circuit bundle, MPLS LSP, and circuit bundle. The bottom part shows a detailed protocol stack diagram with six blocks. The first and last blocks are labeled 'VS' and have a 'Physical' layer. The second and fifth blocks are labeled 'IWF' and have 'VS' and 'MPLS LSP stacks' layers, with a 'Link layer' and 'Physical' layer below. The third and fourth blocks are labeled 'MPLS LSP stacks' and have a 'Link layer' and 'Physical' layer. The diagram illustrates the interworking between voice services and MPLS LSP stacks through IWFs.
+
+**Figure 6-3/Y.1414 – Network reference model and protocol layers for voice services-MPLS user plane interworking**
+
+This Recommendation specifies voice services-MPLS network interworking for three of the possible solutions identified in Appendix II/Y.1261 [1]. The three solutions specified in this Recommendation are:
+
+- voice over IP over MPLS;
+- voice over MPLS using AAL type 2 SSCS for narrow-band services; and
+- voice over MPLS using MPLS Forum IA 1.0.
+
+# 7 General requirements
+
+A set of service requirements for Voice Services over MPLS have been identified in ITU-T Rec. Y.1261 [1]. This clause identifies specific requirements for the support of narrow-band voice services by MPLS networks.
+
+## 7.1 User plane requirements
+
+For transparent transfer of voice services in the user plane, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- The ability to encapsulate data from a telephony grade channel in an MPLS packet.
+- The ability to transport telephony grade audio according to ITU-T Recs G.711 [7], G.723.1 [8], G.726 [9], G.727 [10], G.729 [11] and Adaptive Multi-Rate (AMR) [12] coders.
+- Optional ability to encapsulate wideband speech.
+- Optional ability to transport wideband speech according to ITU-T Recs G.722 [13], G.722.1 [14] and G.722.2 [15] coders.
+- The ability to reliably detect packet loss, in order to support the concealment of packet loss events by suitable PLC algorithms, such as G.711 Appendix I [16].
+- The ability to transfer subscriber signalling, such as DTMF according to ITU-T Recs Q.23 [17] and Q.24 [18], call progress tones (CPT) according to ITU-T Rec. E.180/Q.35 [19], and calling line identification (CLI) [20] received either in the audio stream, or by suitable relay.
+- The ability to transfer inter-office signalling systems R1 according to ITU-T Rec. Q.310-332 [21], R2 according to ITU-T Rec. Q.400-490 [22], and continuity message COT as defined in ITU-T Rec. Q.724 [23], received either in the audio stream, or by suitable relay.
+- The ability to acquire, encapsulate and transfer CAS bits.
+- Optional support for transport of 64 kbit/s clear-channel data, in particular for CCS.
+- The ability to transfer standards-based fax (ITU-T Recs T.4 [24], T.30 [25], V.17 [26], and V.29 [27]), telephone mode text (ITU-T Rec. V.18 [28]), and voice-grade modem signals (V series modems), either in the audio stream (when remote timing allows), or by suitable relay.
+- Optional support for interworking with ATM-based AAL type 2 services, in particular IMT-2000 cellular systems, Loop Emulation Service and VoDSL.
+- The ability to exploit the entire MTU.
+
+## 7.2 Control plane aspects
+
+For transparent transfer of voice services, the following are to be signalled or provisioned:
+
+- Voice channel parameters (e.g., bandwidth, QoS, etc.).
+- Interworking LSP label(s) between IWFs.
+- Correlation of interworking labels for one or more bidirectional connections per interworking LSP. Mechanisms are to be defined.
+- Indication of encapsulation modes as either "Voice over IP over MPLS", "Voice over MPLS using AAL type 2 SSCS for narrow-band services" or "Voice over MPLS using MPLS Forum IA 1.0".
+- Association of each Interworking LSP label with a transport LSP label.
+
+## 7.3 Management plane aspects
+
+Interworking of defects between voice services and MPLS is out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## 7.4 Traffic management aspects
+
+The transport LSP shall be capable of providing the required QoS and aggregate bandwidth requirements for all voice services channels being transported. Each voice services channel may have different bandwidth requirements because of the choice of codec, and optional speech activity detection.
+
+# 8 Functional group considerations for voice services-MPLS network interworking
+
+The functional grouping is shown in Figure 8-1 and is specified in the following clauses.
+
+| |
+|------------------------------------------------|
+| MPLS transport label (4 octets) |
+| Interworking label (4 octets) Note |
+| Common Interworking Indicators (4 octets) Note |
+| Payload |
+
+NOTE – These fields are not present in Voice over IP over MPLS mode.
+
+**Figure 8-1/Y.1414 – Voice services over MPLS interworking functional groups**
+
+## 8.1 MPLS transport label
+
+Since LSPs are unidirectional while voice services (e.g., TDM) are inherently bidirectional, two transport LSPs in opposite directions are required.
+
+The 4-octet transport label identifies an LSP used to transport traffic between two IWFs. The transport label is a standard MPLS shim header, as specified in IETF RFC 3032 [29], that is processed at each LSR. When the Interworking label is present, the S bit is set to "0" for the MPLS transport label, indicating that this is not the bottom of the label stack. The setting of the EXP and TTL fields of the transport label is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## 8.2 Interworking label
+
+This clause only applies in the case where there is an Interworking label. Since LSPs are unidirectional while voice services (e.g., TDM) are inherently bidirectional, the association of two interworking LSPs in opposite directions will be required. The LSPs may have different label values.
+
+The Interworking function maintains context information that associates voice service channels with the Interworking LSP.
+
+The 4-octet Interworking label uniquely identifies one interworking LSP carried inside a transport LSP. More than one interworking LSP may be supported by one Transport LSP.
+
+The Interworking label is a standard MPLS shim header, as specified in IETF RFC 3032 [29], with its S bit set to 1, to indicate the bottom of the label stack. Since voice services-MPLS network interworking is a strict point-to-point application, the TTL value should be set to 2. The setting of the EXP field of the interworking label is for further study.
+
+## 8.3 Common interworking indicators
+
+The Common interworking indicators field is always present, except for the Voice over IP over MPLS mode. This 4-octet field consists of a one-octet control field, a one-octet length field and a two-octet sequence number field.
+
+### 8.3.1 Control field
+
+The first four bits of the control field shall be set to zero in order to facilitate correct operation with deployed MPLS switches that differentiate between IP and interworking LSP packets based on these four bits. The remaining bits of the control field are reserved, and shall be set to zero at ingress and ignored at egress.
+
+### 8.3.2 Length field
+
+The one-octet length field is comprised of a two bits reserved field and six bits called length indicator which indicates the length of the payload. When the LSP path includes an Ethernet link, a minimum packet size of 64 octets is required. This may require padding to be applied to the interworking packet payload in order to reach this minimum packet size. The padding size can be determined from the length indicator so that the padding can be removed at the egress.
+
+The length field is used as follows: If the packet's length (defined as the length of the voice payload plus the length of the common interworking indicators field) is less than 64 octets, the length indicator is set to the packet's length in octets. Otherwise the length field is set to zero.
+
+### 8.3.3 Sequence number field
+
+The Sequence number field is a two-octet field that is used to detect lost or misordered MPLS packets. This field is always present when the Common interworking indicators are used, and its use is mandatory. The combination of the sequence number field and the UUI (User-to-User Indication) or counter fields uniquely identifies the audio payload.
+
+The sequence number space is a 16-bit, unsigned circular space, set and processed as defined below.
+
+#### 8.3.3.1 Setting the sequence numbers
+
+The following procedures apply at the ingress IWF (voice services to MPLS direction):
+
+- The sequence number should be set to a random value for the first MPLS packet transmitted on the interworking LSP.
+- For each subsequent MPLS packet, the sequence number shall be incremented by 1, modulo $2^{16}$ .
+
+#### 8.3.3.2 Processing the sequence numbers
+
+The purpose of the sequence number processing is to detect lost or misordered MPLS packets. Misordered packets should be re-ordered if possible, and otherwise treated as lost. Packet loss shall trigger the packet loss concealment mechanism of the audio encoding (e.g., G.711 Appendix I).
+
+If an egress IWF detects excessive packet loss, it should inform the management plane, enabling it to take the appropriate actions. The threshold for informing the management plane is preconfigured.
+
+The following procedures apply at the egress IWF (MPLS to voice services direction):
+
+- The egress IWF maintains an expected sequence number.
+- The first packet received from the MPLS network is always considered to be the expected packet, and the expected sequence number is equated to its sequence number.
+- If the sequence number equals or is greater (in the cyclic sense) than the expected number, then the expected sequence number is set to the received number incremented by 1 modulo $2^{16}$ , otherwise the expected number is unchanged.
+
+# 9 Voice over IP over MPLS
+
+The intent of Voice over IP over MPLS is to take standard VoIP, and encapsulate it in MPLS packets, using standard procedures for the transport of IP over MPLS. The encoding of the VoIP packet is not defined in this Recommendation. The VoIP over MPLS packet is constructed by prepending an MPLS label stack to a VoIP packet. Standard procedures for transport of IP over MPLS must be used.
+
+The functional grouping for VoIP over MPLS is shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+
+
+| |
+|--------------------------------------|
+| MPLS transport label (RFC 3031) [30] |
+| IP |
+| UDP (RFC 768) [31] |
+| RTP (RFC 3550) [32] |
+| Audio payload |
+
+**Figure 9-1/Y.1414 – Functional grouping for VoIP over MPLS**
+
+# 10 Voice over MPLS using AAL type 2 SSCS for narrow-band services
+
+This clause defines mechanisms for conveying voice services as described in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 [2], using AAL type 2 Common Part Sublayer Packets (CPS-Packets) [3] directly over MPLS. CPS-Packets are encapsulated in the MPLS PDUs using the frame formats and procedures described in this clause.
+
+The payload for this mode consists of one or more variable-length AAL type 2 PDUs. A similar mechanism is described in [34]. Each AAL type 2 PDU contains 3 bytes of overhead and between 1 and 64 bytes of payload. If interworking with ATM-based AAL type 2 systems is required, the payload size may be restricted to be smaller than 64 octets (typically 45 or 44 octets). A packet may be constructed by inserting PDUs corresponding to all active channels, by appending PDUs ready at a certain time, or by any other means.
+
+
+
+| | | | |
+|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
+| MPLS transport label(s) | Interworking label | Common interworking indicators | Variable length payload |
+|-------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
+
+Diagram showing the packing of SSCS-PDUs into an MPLS packet. Four SSCS PDUs (SSCS PDU 1 to 4) are shown, each containing a CPS Hdr (with CID values 10, 20, 31, 20) and a payload. These are mapped to four CPS-Packets. These CPS-Packets are then mapped to a single MPLS packet structure consisting of: MPLS transport label(s), Interworking label, Common interworking indicators, and a Variable length payload.
+
+Y.1414\_F10-1
+
+**Figure 10-1/Y.1414 – Packing of SSCS-PDUs into MPLS with variable length PDU**
+
+Each MPLS packet will consist of an interworking label, Common interworking indicators, and one or more complete CPS packets, as shown in Figure 10-1. The maximum number of CPS packets per MPLS packet is determined by MPLS network limitations. A single MPLS Packet may contain any combination of Type 1 and Type 3 CPS packets.
+
+The CPS-PDU Header Start Field (STF) is not used because there are no partial CPS packets.
+
+The CID field of a CPS packet is 8 bits long. To ensure consistency with Table 4/I.363.2, CID value 0 is not used, and values 1-7 are reserved, thus limiting the number of AAL type 2 connections to 248. If interworking with VoDSL is required, then CID = 8 through CID = 15 are used for special purposes as specified in af-vmoa-0145.001 [33]. The same CID value may appear multiple times in a single MPLS packet. When this occurs, order shall be maintained.
+
+NOTE – MPLS and Frame Relay Implementation Agreement IA 5.0.0 [34] defines a mechanism that is similar to that described in this clause.
+
+## **10.1 Transport label**
+
+See 8.1.
+
+## **10.2 Interworking label**
+
+See 8.2.
+
+## **10.3 Common interworking indicators**
+
+See 8.3.
+
+## **10.4 Payload**
+
+The payload consists of one or more CPS packets, as defined in ITU-T Rec. I.363.2 [3].
+
+All mechanisms described in ITU-T Recs I.363.2 [3] and I.366.2 [2], may be used. In particular, CID encoding according to ITU-T Rec. I.363.2, encoding formats defined in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2, and transport of CAS and CCS signalling as described in ATM forum af-vmoa-0145.001 [33] may all be used. However, the overlap functionality defined in ITU-T Rec. I.363.2 is not required, the STF field is NOT used, and the AAL type 2 Timer\_CU and related functionalities are by default not required, but may be used.
+
+Computation of error detection codes, namely the HEC in the AAL2 PDU header and the CRC in the CAS packet, may be omitted, if an appropriate error detection mechanism is provided by MPLS. In such cases these fields shall be set to zero.
+
+# **11 Voice over MPLS using MPLS Forum IA 1.0**
+
+This mode is based on MPLS Forum Implementation Agreement 1.0 [4] and its subsequent revisions. Appendix I summarizes the frame structure for this mode.
+
+MPLS Forum IA 1.0 includes the definition of a header format, and supports various payload types including Audio, Dialed digits, Channel Associated Signalling and Silence Insertion Descriptor.
+
+The format and procedures are based on ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 AAL type 2 SSCS for narrow-band services. However, some of the sub-frame header fields are larger than the corresponding fields in AAL type 2, larger payloads are allowed and profiles are not employed.
+
+## **11.1 Transport label**
+
+See 8.1.
+
+## **11.2 Interworking label**
+
+See 8.2.
+
+## **11.3 Common interworking indicators**
+
+See 8.3.
+
+## 11.4 Payload
+
+The payload format is defined in MPLS Forum IA 1.0. The payload is encapsulated as described in clause 8.
+
+### 11.4.1 Format of the primary sub-frame
+
+The format is as specified in 5.2 of MPLS Forum IA 1.0 with the following modifications:
+
+#### *Channel Identifier (CID)*
+
+The CID value identifies the user of the channel. The voice services over MPLS channel is a bidirectional channel. The same value of channel identification shall be used for both directions.
+
+The value "0" is not used for channel identification. The values "1" through "7" are reserved.
+
+The values "8" through "255" are used to identify the users of the voice over MPLS.
+
+**Table 11-1/Y.1414 – Coding of the CID field**
+
+| CID value | Use |
+|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
+| 0 | Not used |
+| 1 | Reserved for Layer Management peer-to-peer procedures |
+| 2 | Reserved for Signalling |
+| 3 through 7 | Reserved |
+| 8 through 255 | Identification of voice over MPLS user entity. |
+
+NOTE – Future revisions of the MPLS Forum IA are expected to align with usage of CID in this clause.
+
+### 11.4.2 Procedures
+
+Procedures for processing voice over MPLS sub-frames are specified in MPLS Forum IA 1.0 and its annexes.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Primary and control sub-frames used in MPLS Forum 1.0
+
+This appendix provides an informative overview of the Sub-frame types that have been defined in MPLS Forum implementation agreement in order to transport multiplexed voice calls and control information in an MPLS LSP. Multiple voice calls may be transported over an Interworking LSP. Further details may be obtained from [4] and clause 11.
+
+## I.1 Sub-frames
+
+Two types of sub-frames are defined in [4], Primary and Control, and may be transmitted as required. Multiple primary sub-frames may be multiplexed within a single MPLS packet. The control sub-frames are not multiplexed and are sent separately; that is, only one control sub-frame at a time may be carried within an MPLS packet. Primary sub-frames and control sub-frames are not multiplexed together within a single MPLS packet.
+
+The maximum number of sub-frames per MPLS packet will be determined by the MPLS network limitations. When more than one sub-frame from a user connection is packed within an MPLS packet, their order should be maintained.
+
+A primary payload contains the traffic that is fundamental to the operation of a connection identified by a Channel Identifier (CID). It includes encoded voice and silence information descriptor(s). Primary payloads are variable length sub-frames.
+
+Control sub-frames may be sent to support the primary payload (e.g., dialled digits for a primary payload of encoded voice) and other control functions. These payloads are differentiated from the primary payload by a Payload Type value in the sub-frame header. A range of payload type values is assigned to primary payload and control payloads. Control sub-frames are fixed length and most of them are sent with a triple redundant transmission with a fixed interval between them. The CID and payload type fields are common to both primary and control payload formats.
+
+## I.2 Primary Sub-frame
+
+A primary payload contains the traffic that is fundamental to the operation of a connection identified by a Channel Identifier (CID). It includes encoded voice and silence information descriptor(s). Primary payloads are variable length sub-frames. The MPLS packet structure allowing the multiplexing of primary sub-frames is shown in Figure I.1.
+
+
+
+| | | | |
+|------------|--------------|--------|---------|
+| CID (NOTE) | Payload type | Length | Counter |
+|------------|--------------|--------|---------|
+
+| | | | |
+|------------|--------------|--------|---------|
+| CID (NOTE) | Payload type | Length | Counter |
+|------------|--------------|--------|---------|
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------|
+| Header | Primary payload |
+|--------|-----------------|
+
+• • •
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------|
+| Header | Primary payload |
+|--------|-----------------|
+
+Primary sub-frame
+Primary sub-frame
+
+| | | | |
+|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+| MPLS transport label(s) | MPLS interworking label | Common interworking indicators | Variable length payload containing multiple primary sub-frames |
+|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+Diagram of LSP structure for multiplexing primary sub-frames of voice calls. The diagram shows an MPLS packet containing a variable length payload. This payload is composed of multiple primary sub-frames. Each primary sub-frame consists of a 4-octet header and a primary payload. The header is further broken down into four fields: CID (NOTE), Payload type, Length, and Counter. Dashed lines indicate how the header and payload fields map into the sub-frame structure, and how multiple sub-frames are packed into the overall MPLS packet payload.
+
+NOTE – CID = Channel ID (see 11.4.1 for specification).
+
+Y.1414\_FI-1
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1414 – LSP structure for multiplexing primary sub-frames of voice calls**
+
+The multiplexing structure in this mode consists of an MPLS Transport Label, an Interworking Label, Common Interworking Indicators, and a Payload. The Payload may contain one or more primary sub-frames [4] consisting of a 4-octet header and variable length primary payload.
+
+The Channel ID (CID) allows up to 248 voice over MPLS calls to be multiplexed within a single interworking LSP.
+
+NOTE – A unique CID identifies each sub-frame but the primary sub-frames may be transmitted in any order whenever information for a channel is available. The same CID value may appear multiple times in a single MPLS packet.
+
+## I.3 Control sub-frame
+
+Control sub-frames may be sent to support the primary payload (e.g., dialled digits for a primary payload of encoded voice) and other control functions. These payloads are differentiated from the primary payload by a Payload Type value in the sub-frame header. A range of payload type values is assigned to primary payload and control payloads. Control sub-frames are fixed length and most of them are sent with a triple redundant transmission with a fixed interval between them. The CID and payload type fields are common to both primary and control payload formats.
+
+The control sub-frames that are currently defined are: Dialed digits and Channel associated signalling. The MPLS packet structure for control sub-frames of Voice over MPLS calls is shown in Figure I.2.
+
+
+
+| | | | |
+|------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
+| CID (NOTE) | Payload type | Timestamp | Length |
+|------------|--------------|-----------|--------|
+
+
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------|
+| Header | Control payload |
+|--------|-----------------|
+
+Control sub-frame
+
+| | | | |
+|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
+| MPLS
transport
label(s) | MPLS
interworking
label | Common
interworking
indicators | Payload containing single control sub-frames |
+|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
+
+Y.1414\_FI-2
+
+Diagram of MPLS packet structure for control sub-frames. The main packet structure consists of four fields: MPLS transport label(s), MPLS interworking label, Common interworking indicators, and a large Payload containing single control sub-frames. A callout box labeled 'Control sub-frame' points to the payload field. This callout box is divided into a 'Header' and a 'Control payload'. The 'Header' is further detailed in another callout box containing four fields: CID (NOTE), Payload type, Timestamp, and Length.
+
+NOTE – CID = Channel ID (see 11.4.1 for specification).
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1414 – LSP Structure for Control Sub-frame**
+
+## **I.4 Format of the primary sub-frame**
+
+To maintain word (32 bits) alignment, the payload information must be a multiple of 4 octets. If the payload is not a multiple of 4 octets, up to 3 PAD octets are included to make it word aligned.
+
+A primary payload is either a sequence of encoded voice sub-frames or a single Silence Insertion Descriptor sub-frame.
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and Next Generation Networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.1545.1
+
+(03/2017)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Quality of service and network
+performance
+
+# --- **Framework for monitoring the quality of service of IP network services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545.1
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| Y.3500–Y.3999 | |
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545.1
+
+# Framework for monitoring the quality of service of IP network services
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545.1 is a diagnostic reference for IP network quality of service (QoS) monitoring, and is primarily a guide used to assist regulators in monitoring the QoS of Internet provided by service providers (although subscribers and network service providers may also benefit).
+
+The Internet, known as the information superhighway, has established a worldwide borderless cyber society. Nowadays, the Internet is acknowledged worldwide as an essential component for electronic communication services. The rapid increase in the use of the Internet has changed the way people live, and has become an important factor in daily life.
+
+As reliance on Internet networks, in promoting socioeconomic development, increases the QoS of Internet networks also becomes very critical and important. However, occasionally the scenarios under which Internet is sold to customers is not fair and unfortunately Internet subscribers are not well informed on the Internet QoS provided to them by Internet service providers (ISPs).
+
+Therefore, this Recommendation highlights the necessity of testing the QoS of network services offered by ISPs, from a diagnostic and regulatory point of view. This Recommendation also addresses QoS evaluation scenarios, sampling methodology and testing tools for regulators. This Recommendation gives guidance to regulators about minimum QoS parameters for evaluating the quality of Internet services.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.1545.1 | 2017-03-01 | 12 | 11.1002/1000/13199 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Data rate, IP network service, QoS.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2017
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 4 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 4 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 5 |
+| 6 | Different aspects of quality of service ..... | 5 |
+| | 6.1 Four viewpoints of QoS..... | 5 |
+| | 6.2 QoS offered and QoS delivered..... | 6 |
+| 7 | Minimum set of parameters for evaluating the quality of IP network service ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.1 IP network service activation time ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.2 DNS response time ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.3 Number of IP network interconnection points ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.4 Round-trip delay (RTT to IP network interconnection points) ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.5 IP delay variation (one-way delay variation to IP network interconnection points)..... | 7 |
+| | 7.6 IP packet loss (one-way packet loss to IP network interconnection points) .. | 7 |
+| | 7.7 Data rate (download and upload) ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.8 Internet IP network service availability..... | 8 |
+| | 7.9 Radio coverage availability ..... | 8 |
+| 8 | Quality of service measurement methodologies..... | 8 |
+| | 8.1 Testing tools ..... | 9 |
+| | 8.2 Quality of service evaluation scenarios..... | 10 |
+| 9 | Sampling methodology..... | 12 |
+| | 9.1 Selecting access lines for each speed package ..... | 13 |
+| | 9.2 Selecting the measurement moments ..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix I – Evaluation scenario at international level ..... | 14 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 15 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545.1
+
+# Framework for monitoring the quality of service of IP network services
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation highlights the need for testing the quality of service (QoS) of IP network service offered by Internet service providers (ISPs), from a regulatory and diagnostic point of view. This Recommendation describes QoS evaluation scenarios and sampling methodology for both measuring and monitoring QoS. This Recommendation also gives guidance to regulators about the minimum set of QoS parameters necessary for evaluating the quality of IP network services.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T E.802 Amd.1] Recommendation ITU-T E.802 (2007) Amd.1 (2017), *Framework and methodologies for the determination and application of QoS parameters*.
+- [ITU-T E.804] Recommendation ITU-T E.804 (2014), *Quality of service aspects for popular services in mobile networks*.
+- [ITU-T G.1000] Recommendation ITU-T G.1000 (2001), *Communications Quality of Service: A framework and definitions*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1540] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1540 (2016), *Internet protocol data communication service – IP packet transfer and availability performance parameters*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1546] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1546 (2014), *Hand-over performance among multiple access networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1731] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1731 (2011), *OAM functions and mechanisms for Ethernet based networks*.
+- [IETF RFC 2681] IETF RFC 2681 (1999), *A Round-trip Delay Metric for IPPM*.
+- [IETF RFC 7398] IETF RFC 7398 (2015), *A Reference Path and Measurement Points for Large-Scale Measurement of Broadband Performance*.
+- [IETF RFC 7799] IETF RFC 7799 (2016), *Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with Hybrid Types In-Between)*.
+- [ETSI EG 202 057] ETSI EG 202 057-04 V1.2.1 (2008), *Speech Processing, Transmission and Quality Aspects (STQ); User related QoS parameter definitions and measurements; Part 4: Internet access*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 active methods of measurement** [IETF RFC 7799]: Active methods of measurement have the following attributes: Active methods generate packet streams. Commonly, the packet stream of interest is generated as the basis of measurement. Sometimes, the adjective "synthetic" is used to categorize active measurement streams [ITU-T Y.1731]. An accompanying packet stream or streams may be generated to increase overall traffic load, though the loading stream(s) may not be measured. The packets in the stream of interest have fields or field values (or are augmented or modified to include fields or field values) that are dedicated to measurement. Since measurement usually requires determining the corresponding packets at multiple measurement points, a sequence number is the most common information dedicated to measurement, and it is often combined with a timestamp. The source and destination of the packet stream of interest are usually known a priori. The characteristics of the packet stream of interest are known at the source (at least), and may be communicated to the destination as part of the method. Note that some packet characteristics will normally change during packet forwarding. Other changes along the path are possible, see [STDFORM]. When adding traffic to the network for measurement, active methods influence the quantities measured to some degree, and those performing tests should take steps to quantify the effect(s) and/or minimize such effects.
+
+**3.1.2 dedicated component (links or nodes)** [IETF RFC 7398]: All resources of a dedicated component (typically a link or node on the reference path) are allocated to serving the traffic of an individual subscriber. Resources include transmission time-slots, queue space, processing for encapsulation and address/port translation, and others. A dedicated component can affect the performance of the reference path or the performance of any sub-path where the component is involved.
+
+**3.1.3 IP network service** [b-ITU-T Y.1241]: An IP network service is defined as a data transmission service in which the data passed across the interface between the user and provider is transferred in the form of Internet protocol (IP) packets (sometimes called datagrams). IP network service includes the service provided by using the IP transfer capabilities.
+
+**3.1.4 IP-based service** [b-ITU-T Y.1241]: An IP-based service is defined as a service provided by the service plane to an end user (e.g., a host (end system) or a network element) and which utilizes the IP transfer capabilities and associated control and management functions, for delivery of the user information specified by the service level agreements.
+
+**3.1.5 managed and unmanaged sub-paths** [IETF RFC 7398]: Service providers are responsible for the portion of the path they manage. However, most paths involve a sub-path that is beyond the management of the subscriber's service provider. This means that private networks, wireless networks using unlicensed frequencies, and the networks of other service providers are designated as unmanaged sub-paths. The service demarcation point always divides managed and unmanaged sub-paths.
+
+**3.1.6 measurement point** [ITU-T Y.1540]: The boundary between a host and an adjacent link at which performance reference events can be observed and measured. Consistent with [b-ITU-T I.353], the standard Internet protocols can be observed at IP measurement points (MPs). [b-ITU-T I.353] provides more information about MPs, for digital services.
+
+**3.1.7 parameter** [b-ITU-T Y.1545]: A quantifiable characteristic of a service with specified scope and boundaries.
+
+**3.1.8 passive methods of measurement** [IETF RFC 7799]: Passive methods of measurement are based solely on observations of an undisturbed and unmodified packet stream of interest (in other words, the method of measurement MUST NOT add, change, or remove packets or fields or change field values anywhere along the path). Dependent on the existence of one or more packet streams to
+
+supply the stream of interest. Dependent on the presence of the packet stream of interest at one or more designated observation points. Some passive methods simply observe and collect information on all packets that pass observation point(s), while others filter the packets as a first step and only collect information on packets that match the filter criteria, and thereby narrow the stream of interest. It is common that passive methods are conducted at one or more observation points. Passive methods to assess performance metrics often require multiple observation points, e.g., to assess the latency of packet transfer across a network path between two observation points. In this case, the observed packets must include enough information to determine the corresponding packets at different observation points. Communication of the observations (in some form) to a collector is an essential aspect of passive methods. In some configurations, the traffic load generated when communicating (or exporting) the passive method results to a collector may itself influence the measured network's performance. However, the collection of results is not unique to passive methods, and the load from management and operations of measurement systems must always be considered for potential effects on the measured values.
+
+**3.1.9 probing packet** [b-ITU-T Y.1545]: An individual IP packet associated with active performance testing, i.e., a test packet [b-ITU-T Y.1543].
+
+**3.1.10 quality of service** [b-ITU-T E.800]: Totality of characteristics of a telecommunications service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs of the user of the service.
+
+**3.1.11 reference path** [IETF RFC 7398]: A reference path is a serial combination of hosts, routers, switches, links, radios, and processing elements that comprise all the network elements traversed by each packet in a flow between the source and destination hosts. A reference path also indicates the various boundaries present, such as administrative boundaries. A reference path is intended to be equally applicable to all IP and link-layer networking technologies. Therefore, the components are generically defined, but their functions should have a clear counterpart or be obviously omitted in any network architecture
+
+**3.1.12 resource transition point** [IETF RFC 7398]: This is a point between dedicated and shared components on a reference path that may be a point of significance and is identified as a transition between two types of resources.
+
+**3.1.13 service demarcation point** [IETF RFC 7398]: This is the point where a service managed by the service provider begins (or ends) and varies by technology. For example, this point is usually defined as the Ethernet interface on a residential gateway or modem where the scope of a packet transfer service begins and ends. In the case of a WiFi service, this would be an air interface within the intended service boundary (e.g., walls of the coffee shop). The demarcation point may be within an integrated endpoint using an air interface (e.g., long-term evolution user equipment (LTE UE)). Ownership does not necessarily affect the demarcation point; a subscriber may own all equipment on their premises, but it is likely that the service provider will certify such equipment for connection to their network or that a third-party will certify standards compliance.
+
+**3.1.14 shared component (links or nodes)** [IETF RFC 7398]: A component on the reference path is designated a "shared component" when the traffic associated with multiple subscribers is served by common resources.
+
+**3.1.15 subscriber** [IETF RFC 7398]: A subscriber is an entity (associated with one or more users) that is engaged in a subscription with a service provider. The subscriber is allowed to subscribe and unsubscribe to services and to register a user or a list of users authorized to enjoy these services. Both the subscriber and service provider are allowed to set the limits relative to the use that associated users make of subscribed services.
+
+**3.1.16 sub-path** [b-IETF RFC 5835]: A sub-path is a portion of the complete path where at least the sub-path Source and Destination hosts are constituents of the complete path. We say that such a sub-path is "involved" in the complete path.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 commercial Internet connectivity provider (CICP):** A company supplying a subscriber with Internet connectivity if it is contracted to do so, where Internet connectivity is comprised of enabling the transfer of IP packets between subscribers' terminal equipment or a residential gateway and the Internet.
+
+**3.2.2 hotspot:** A selected stationary access site in a pre-defined city where there is mobile network coverage. E.g.: pre-selected hotspots must be discussed and agreed on before the start of hotspot drive assignment on data services key performance indicators (KPIs).
+
+**3.2.3 Internet application:** An application operating above the IP layer, choosing one of the appropriate transport layers. Examples are VoIP, (additional) AAA, cloud service, e-mail, web-service, IPTV, and streaming. Some of these applications may comprise components of the CICP's complete service offering, at the discretion of the CICP.
+
+**3.2.4 probe:** Is an end-point test tool which uses probing packets to collect measurements.
+
+**3.2.5 supporting service:** An essential service to assist configuration of the IP layer, or operating above the IP layer. Examples are DHCP, DNS, and AAA.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| 3G | Third Generation |
+| 4G | Fourth Generation |
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| AS | Autonomous Systems |
+| CICP | Commercial Internet Connectivity Provider |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| GRA GW | Globally Routable Address Gateway |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
+| IMS | Internet Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPDV | Internet Protocol Packet Delay Variation |
+| IPER | Internet Protocol Packet Error Ratio |
+| IPLR | Internet Protocol Packet Loss Ratio |
+| IPTD | Internet Protocol Packet Transfer Delay |
+| IPTV | Internet Protocol Television |
+| ISP | Internet Service Provider |
+| IXP | Internet Exchange Point |
+| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
+| LTE | Long-Term Evolution |
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------|
+| MP | Measurement Point |
+| OAM | Operations, Administration and Maintenance |
+| PIA | Percent IP service availability |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RSRP | Reference Signal Received Power |
+| RSSI | Received Signal Strength Indicator |
+| RTT | Round-trip Time |
+| VoD | Video on Demand |
+| VoIP | Voice over Internet Protocol |
+| VoLTE | Voice over LTE |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Different aspects of quality of service
+
+### 6.1 Four viewpoints of QoS
+
+This Recommendation outlines the four viewpoints of QoS specified in [ITU-T G.1000], shown in Figure 1, and maps them with QoS requirements of IP-based network services. The vertical division between customer and service provider (commercial Internet connectivity provider (CICP)) corresponds to the service demarcation point.
+
+
+
+The diagram is enclosed in a rectangular frame and is divided vertically by a dashed line. The left side is labeled 'CUSTOMER' and the right side is labeled 'SERVICE PROVIDER'. Inside the 'CUSTOMER' section, there are two boxes: 'Customer's QoS requirements' at the top and 'QoS perceived by customer' at the bottom. Inside the 'SERVICE PROVIDER' section, there are two boxes: 'QoS offered by provider' at the top and 'QoS achieved by provider' at the bottom. Four blue arrows indicate the relationships: a horizontal arrow points from 'Customer's QoS requirements' to 'QoS offered by provider'; a vertical arrow points from 'QoS offered by provider' down to 'QoS achieved by provider'; a horizontal arrow points from 'QoS achieved by provider' to 'QoS perceived by customer'; and a vertical arrow points from 'QoS perceived by customer' up to 'Customer's QoS requirements'.
+
+Y.1545.1(17)\_F01
+
+Diagram illustrating the four viewpoints of QoS according to ITU-T G.1000, divided into Customer and Service Provider sections.
+
+**Figure 1 – Four viewpoints of QoS according to [ITU-T G.1000]**
+
+**Customer QoS requirements:** Each application/service available on the Internet requires a level of QoS for the Internet connection for it to operate satisfactorily. In turn, every subscriber has their preferred applications, and inherently a requirement of the level of QoS of their Internet service.
+
+**QoS offered or planned by service provider:** The QoS that the ISP pledges to offer to its subscribers. This should serve as a reference for both subscribers and the ISP when benchmarking the level of service provided. In most cases, at the point of sale, the service is primarily characterised in terms of upload/download speeds of the Internet connection and there are no QoS commitments included.
+
+**QoS achieved or delivered by service provider:** The actual level of the service delivered to the subscriber. A comparison between the QoS offered and the QoS delivered indicates the level of performance achieved by the ISP in terms of specific QoS parameters. By comparing the QoS delivered with the QoS advertised, the subscriber is better equipped to determine whether there is a significant mismatch between the promised and the delivered QoS for the subscribed services.
+
+**End-user perception:** End-users are generally not interested in technical aspects of their connection, but they are interested in what they can do with the connection, and the quality of their experience when accessing different applications/services over their Internet connection.
+
+### **6.2 QoS offered and QoS delivered**
+
+The QoS of the Internet offered (advertised) by ISPs is evaluated by:
+
+- ISPs for optimization purposes or;
+- Regulators, because occasionally the QoS promised by ISPs (in advertisements) is totally different from the QoS delivered.
+
+In some countries, service characteristics used by ISPs may not be satisfactory to define the service for the following reasons:
+
+- Services may be sold without providing a guaranteed minimum QoS to subscribers;
+- Subscribers are not given any guidelines on how service characteristics can be interpreted;
+- QoS figures provided by different ISPs are not comparable;
+- Subscribers are not well informed on the QoS that the Internet connection is able to provide.
+
+Therefore, to improve the situation, regulators are advised to:
+
+- Determine the set of QoS parameters required for monitoring the quality of Internet services;
+- Determine thresholds for each required monitored parameter;
+- Monitor the QoS delivered to the end users effectively by establishing a mechanism through which the parameters can be measured;
+- In cases where there is no competition in service provision, establish a mechanism by which the ISP's conformance to the contractual obligations with their subscribers can be validated;
+- Publish test results through detailed benchmarking reports;
+- Provide end users with a trusted tool, used by themselves, to test the main key performance indicators (KPIs).
+
+## **7 Minimum set of parameters for evaluating the quality of IP network service**
+
+### **7.1 IP network service activation time**
+
+Clause 7 of [ITU-T Y.1546] defines:
+
+- Successful IP activate time, (multiple measurements may be summarized using statistics such as the minimum, maximum, median, mean, variance, percentiles);
+- Incorrect IP activate ratio;
+- Failed IP activate ratio.
+
+These parameters apply to a set of individual attempts to access and utilize IP network services, and are supplied by the dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) server of the service provider. See Figure A.2/Annex A of [ITU-T Y.1546] for an illustration of DHCP IP activation. In another typical case, the parameters apply to the user equipment (UE) activation on 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) long term evolution (LTE), and Figure B.1 of [ITU-T Y.1546] illustrates an LTE IP activation (host connect (HC) -> host activation (HA)).
+
+### **7.2 DNS response time**
+
+[IETF RFC 2681] defines a round-trip delay metric for IP networks, and the metric definition has been adapted using the details of the domain name system (DNS) query packet type, such that the measurement yields DNS response time. See section 6 in [b-IETF ippm].
+
+Multiple per-subscriber measurements may be summarized using statistics such as the minimum, maximum, median, mean, variance, percentiles, etc.
+
+### **7.3 Number of IP network interconnection points**
+
+This metric is a count of the number of interconnection points to other autonomous systems (AS), based on creating a diagram of the network being measured according to the procedures specified in [IETF RFC 7398] where all interconnection points (designated globally routable address gateway (GRA GW)) are included, and counting the number of unique interconnection points in the diagram.
+
+Occasionally these interconnections occur at public Internet exchange points (IXPs). This diagram should be supplied by the IP network service provider, and is subject to verification using "traceroute" tests from representative subscriber locations.
+
+### **7.4 Round-trip delay (RTT to IP network interconnection points)**
+
+This metric measures the round-trip delay between subscribers' service demarcation points and the interconnection points to other autonomous systems. Occasionally these interconnections occur at public IXPs. [IETF RFC 2681] defines a round-trip delay metric for packet transfer between a known (host) source and remote destination.
+
+The target IXP IP addresses for measurement may be obtained using "traceroute" tests from representative subscriber locations, or the IP network service provider may provide the appropriate remote addresses.
+
+Multiple per-subscriber measurements may be summarized using statistics such as the minimum, maximum, median, mean, variance, percentiles, etc.
+
+The set of mean per-subscriber round-trip time (RTT) for each interconnection point (see clause 7.3) should be recorded as the range indicated by the minimum and maximum values.
+
+### **7.5 IP delay variation (one-way delay variation to IP network interconnection points)**
+
+The one-way delay variation performance parameter is defined in clause 6.2.2 of [ITU-T Y.1540]. See clause 7.4 for summarization on per-subscriber to interconnection point measurements, and across multiple interconnection points.
+
+### **7.6 IP packet loss (one-way packet loss to IP network interconnection points)**
+
+The one-way packet loss performance parameter is defined in clause 5.5.6 of [ITU-T Y.1540]. See clause 7.4 for summarization on per-subscriber to interconnection point measurements, and across multiple interconnection points.
+
+The IP service availability function defined in clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.1540], is also based on IP packet loss. See clause 7.2 of [ITU-T Y.1540] for summarization on per-subscriber to interconnection point measurements, and clause 7.4 above for summarization across multiple interconnection points.
+
+### **7.7 Data rate (download and upload)**
+
+**7.7.1 mean data rate achieved:** The average of the data transfer rate achieved for a given number of samples.
+
+Formula:
+
+$$\text{Mean Data Rate achieved} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^N H_i}{N}$$
+
+where:
+
+H1: data transfer rate (in kbits/s or Mbits/s) achieved when downloading or uploading a specified IP packet payload stream between two measurement points (e.g., server and probe)
+
+N: number of samples
+
+NOTE – Specification of the IP packet payload stream: The payload stream should consist of incompressible data. This is normally achieved by generating a sequence of random numbers. Another practical solution is to use a stored stream that is already compressed, e.g., from a zip or jpg file, or to use the digits of the number Pi. The payload stream should have at least twice the length (in kbit) of the theoretically maximum data transmission rate per second (in kbit/s) of the Internet access under consideration. Refer to the requirements in clause 6.12 of [ITU-T Y.1540], and the supporting material in Appendix IX of [ITU-T Y.1540].
+
+**7.7.2 % of the mean data rate:** Denotes the deviation between the data rate contracted/advertised and the data rate achieved.
+
+Formula:
+
+$$\% \text{ of Mean Data Rate} = \frac{\text{Mean Data Rate achieved}}{\text{Data Rate contracted}} \times 100\%$$
+
+NOTE – In this case, a given regulator can set a target of, for example 70%, 80%, of the maximum data rate contracted by the subscriber, depending on the country's information and communication technology (ICT) market.
+
+### 7.8 Internet IP network service availability
+
+**Definition:** Internet availability represents the fraction of time probability that an end user is able to access IP network packet transfer Internet services via access to their Internet connection. See clause 7 of [ITU-T Y.1540].
+
+Formula:
+
+Percent IP service availability (PIA)
+
+The percent IP service availability (PIA) is the percentage of total scheduled IP service time (the percentage of Tav intervals) that is (are) categorized as available using the IP service availability function (refer to clause 7 of [ITU-T Y.1540]).
+
+### 7.9 Radio coverage availability
+
+NOTE – This parameter seeks further study.
+
+## 8 Quality of service measurement methodologies
+
+Methods of measuring the IP network services provided by ISPs are categorized as active and passive methods of measurement [IETF RFC 7799]. This Recommendation focuses on the active methods of measurement.
+
+---
+
+1 It should be noted that H, the data transmission rate metric and method of measurement are still under discussion.
+
+### Active methods of measurement
+
+- Advantage:
+ - The data (probing packets) are originated from a controlled source with predefined settings and therefore types of services can be fully controlled;
+ - Easy benchmarking/comparison between measurements obtained from different Internet connections provided by different ISPs.
+- Disadvantage:
+ - Requires that the line under test be fully available;
+ - Test design must ensure that the line is idle before testing;
+ - Requires both sending and receiving probes (monitoring tools).
+
+#### Passive methods of measurement:
+
+- Advantages:
+ - The probe needs only one connection point to the network which means less hardware;
+ - Does not 'take over' the line under test, so is never an inconvenience to end users.
+- Disadvantages:
+ - Unknown traffic type makes it difficult to test maximum line capability;
+ - Difficult to average different tests as the data traffic is not consistent.
+
+### 8.1 Testing tools
+
+Testing tools adopted in the active testing method are hardware- and software-based tools (probes).
+
+**Hardware-based Tools:** in this case there are at least three options of implementation:
+
+- 1) First option: probes completely replace the end user's equipment and no other equipment can be connected to the Internet while the probe is performing measurements. This is applicable for both fixed and mobile Internet access.
+- 2) Second option: probes share Internet access with ordinary traffic. E.g., probes can be connected to a customer's residential gateway. Appropriate probes can monitor the end user's traffic behaviour and perform tests only when there is no traffic being transferred.
+- 3) Third option: a testing application programming interface (API) is embedded into the customer's residential gateway, through a firmware update, in order to act as a probe and test the fixed Internet connection.
+
+**Software-based tools:** in this case, there are at least three types of software-based tools:
+
+- 1) A web-based tool: download and execution of measurement software is initiated via the end user's web browser by accessing a specific webpage.
+- 2) A dedicated software client: measurement software is permanently installed on the end user's terminal equipment. In this case, different versions of software are needed to support different operating systems and terminal equipment.
+- 3) A testing API: an API can be included in the code of one popular website in order to perform test transparently every time the users access the website.
+
+Regardless of what type of test tool is chosen, the test tool specifications shall be sufficiently detailed so that two independent implementations of the test tools should measure statistically equivalent performance (with high confidence) when measuring the same network path under the same conditions.
+
+### 8.2 Quality of service evaluation scenarios
+
+Scenarios usually applied to evaluate the QoS of IP network service are:
+
+- Evaluation scenario at a national level (test server located at local Internet exchange point (IXP));
+- Evaluation scenario at the international level (test server located at an international IXP).
+
+Measurements are conducted on the selected QoS parameters that have impact on the user's experience when utilizing IP network services.
+
+This clause focuses on the evaluation scenario at a national level and the evaluation scenario at an international level is described in Appendix I.
+
+#### 8.2.1 Evaluation scenario at a national level
+
+In the evaluation scenario at a national level, the test server is located at the local IXP and probes are installed at the end user's point of view. Measurements can be carried on with or without involvement of ISPs by regulators and the measurement path includes a complete Internet connection from the customer to the test server located at the local IXP. ISPs or regulators can use standardized hardware- or software-based probes.
+
+The benchmarking/comparability of the ISPs can be best reached, in cases where all ISPs are connected in a similar way to the local IXP (or any central measuring point). This scenario allows regulators to conduct evaluation of the QoS experienced by subscribers provided by ISPs. In fact, tests initiated by probes are directed to the local IXP when testing local KPIs (such as download/upload mean data rate, latency).
+
+The measurement set-up that can be used to conduct measurement tests for QoS of Internet is given in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the measurement setup at a national level. On the left, a 'Test probe' (represented by a computer icon) is connected to an 'ISP' (represented by a cloud icon). The connection is labeled 'Access and core networks'. The ISP is connected to a 'Local test server' (represented by a server rack icon) via an 'IXP' (represented by a square icon). The connection between the ISP and the IXP is also labeled 'Access and core networks'. The IXP is connected to the 'Internet' (represented by a cloud icon), which is then connected to another 'IXP' (represented by a square icon). The connection between the Internet and the second IXP is also labeled 'Access and core networks'. The second IXP is connected to a 'Local test server' (represented by a server rack icon). A double-headed arrow labeled 'Measurement tests' spans the path from the Test probe to the first IXP. The diagram is labeled 'Y.1545.1(17)\_F02' in the bottom right corner.
+
+Diagram of measurement set-up at a national level showing a test probe connected to an ISP, which connects to a local IXP and a local test server.
+
+**Figure 2 – Measurement set-up at a national level**
+
+[IETF RFC 7398] provides details of reference paths and measurement points. This path goes beyond the details of the reference path in clause 3.1/Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.1540]. Figure 3 below, based partly on Figure 2 of [IETF RFC 7398], allows reference to measurement points by number.
+
+
+
+Diagram a) Subscriber managed residential gateway (unmanaged from CICP point of view). The network path consists of five components in boxes: Terminal equipment mp000, Residential gateway mp100, Access node mp110, Interconnection GRA GW mp190, and Transit GRA GW mp200. Solid lines connect mp000 to mp100, mp100 to mp110, and mp190 to mp200. A dashed line connects mp110 to mp190. Below the boxes, three sub-path labels are shown in shaded boxes: 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp000, 'Managed Sub-path' spanning mp100, mp110, and mp190, and 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp200.
+
+a) Subscriber managed residential gateway (unmanaged from CICP point of view)
+
+
+
+Diagram b) Residential gateway managed by CICP. The network path consists of five components in boxes: Terminal equipment mp000, Residential gateway mp100, Access node mp110, Interconnection GRA GW mp190, and Transit GRA GW mp200. Solid lines connect mp000 to mp100, mp100 to mp110, and mp190 to mp200. A dashed line connects mp110 to mp190. Below the boxes, three sub-path labels are shown in shaded boxes: 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp000, 'Managed Sub-path' spanning mp100, mp110, and mp190, and 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp200.
+
+Y.1545.1(17)\_F03
+
+b) Residential gateway managed by CICP
+
+**Figure 3 – Reference path of a CICP offering fixed Internet connectivity**
+
+Tests at the national level for a single IP network service provider should be conducted between mp100 and mp190 ideally. Tests which include the IXP would be conducted between mp100 and mp200, with the caveat that this testing scope includes components of two IP network service provider's domains, and possibly three domains if the IXP is operated by a third party. Both mp190 and mp200 are generally described as interconnection points in the metrics defined in clause 7.
+
+NOTE – National IXP locations may be in another country or on another continent, such that it may not be possible to test purely at the national level between some service providers (and it may be necessary to add a clause on regional level tests).
+
+Measurements from the subscriber's device (mp000) complicate the measurement of fixed IP network services. One or more private networks will influence the measurements, and more so if there are wireless networks involved. These private networks are referred to as the unmanaged sub-paths in [IETF RFC 7398].
+
+Wireless access networks connecting subscribers usually don't consist of residential gateways managed by a subscriber. This is shown in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+Diagram showing the reference path of a CICP offering wireless network Internet connectivity. The network path consists of four components in boxes: Terminal equipment mp000, Radio access node mp110, Interconnection GRA GW mp190, and Transit GRA GW mp200. A double-arc symbol (representing a radio link) connects mp000 to mp110. Solid lines connect mp110 to mp190 and mp190 to mp200. A dashed line extends from mp200. Below the boxes, three sub-path labels are shown in shaded boxes: 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp000, 'Managed Sub-path' spanning mp110 and mp190, and 'Unmanaged Sub-path' under mp200.
+
+Y.1545.1(17)\_F04
+
+**Figure 4 – Reference path of a CICP offering wireless network Internet connectivity**
+
+This figure may be generalized if "Radio" is omitted for the access node, such that it corresponds to Figure 3.
+
+The reference paths of CICPs to application servers do not depend on the access offered to a subscriber. For the sake of simplicity, only fixed access subscribers are used to illustrate the following reference paths.
+
+To be authorised for Internet connectivity operated by a CICP, a subscriber will have to authenticate. Thus, prior to communicating with the Internet, the subscriber requires access to an application service of the CICP. The generic reference path to a service offered by the CICP is shown in Figure 5 below:
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ TE[Terminal equipment mp000] --- RG[Residential gateway mp100]
+ RG --- AN[Access node mp110]
+ AN -.->|Managed Sub-path| ICICP[CICP internal GRA GW mp190]
+ ICICP --- CA[CICP application GRA GW mp195]
+ CA --- CAS[CICP application server mp199]
+
+```
+
+Y.1545.1(17)\_F05
+
+Figure 5: Reference path to a CICP application service. The diagram shows a sequence of network elements: Terminal equipment mp000, Residential gateway mp100, Access node mp110, CICP internal GRA GW mp190, CICP application GRA GW mp195, and CICP application server mp199. Below these elements are two horizontal bars: 'Unmanaged Sub-path' (shaded grey) and 'Managed Sub-path' (white). The path starts at Terminal equipment mp000, goes through Residential gateway mp100 and Access node mp110 (under the Unmanaged Sub-path), then through CICP internal GRA GW mp190, CICP application GRA GW mp195, and finally to CICP application server mp199 (under the Managed Sub-path). A dashed line connects Access node mp110 and CICP internal GRA GW mp190.
+
+**Figure 5 – Reference path to a CICP application service**
+
+Supporting services and applications (above the IP layer) offered by a CICP to a subscriber may include:
+
+- Authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) and IP address assignment (this service is not optional);
+- DNS;
+- Operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) service;
+- E-mail;
+- Voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) (like Internet multimedia subsystem (IMS) or voice over LTE (VoLTE));
+- Internet protocol television (IPTV) (multicast based, but also unicast based);
+- Cloud services;
+- An Internet portal (including web-based e-mail access);
+- Streaming services like video on demand (VoD) (progressive download);
+- Shopping (of e.g., equipment and services offered by the CICP);
+- Ad-servers and subscriber monitoring.
+
+Some applications may consist of several services which may be implemented on independent application servers. In general, signalling and application IP flows of a single application may be operated on separated hardware.
+
+## 9 Sampling methodology
+
+The number of probes to be used in testing the QoS of Internet measurements should be enough to guarantee that the data collected are representative for that region and sufficient from a statistical perspective. Further, the data collection plan should be designed to ensure that the results sufficiently reflect the QoS as perceived by the user.
+
+It is recommended that the selection of panellists (end-user access points, where to install probes) should take into consideration various factors such as technologies (e.g., xDSL, fibre optic, wireless networks), Internet data rate packages (depending on popularity), locations, and should be based on a voluntary process to avoid ISP traffic prioritization for those users being tested.
+
+The choice of satisfactory measurement tests, i.e., geographical locations of origin and destination of tests as well as traffic variations, is a crucial point with respect to the comparability and validation of the statistics to be calculated for the measured parameters.
+
+Test connections and data transfer attempts should be carried out in such a way that they match the traffic variations in the network. The measurements obtained in each test should be weighted by a factor according to the level of the traffic operator's network (% of bandwidth used) corresponding to the location and time when the test was conducted.
+
+Guidance on how to calculate the number of samples needed to perform QoS measurements for Internet services is available in Annex C of [ETSI EG 202 057 04] and in Amendment I of
+
+[ITU-T E.802]. Furthermore, post processing and statistical methods can be found in clause 11 of [ITU-T E.804].
+
+### **9.1 Selecting access lines for each speed package**
+
+In national QoS evaluation studies for Internet, the percentage of access lines (for each data rate package) of ISPs to be selected in rural, suburban and urban regions should be statistically representative.
+
+The sampling methodology should have a stable level for the confidence intervals obtained in various regions and for different ISPs. If the final results of the access lines per ISP correspond closely to the market share of the ISP, it is likely that the sampling criteria followed by the national measurement campaign are representative. In the case of under-representation of access lines offered by some ISPs, the best option will be to exclude those particular ISPs from the campaign.
+
+However, there is a difference between fixed and mobile access to Internet in selecting the access point. For mobile Internet, it is possible to measure QoS everywhere where coverage is ensured. In this case, a number of hotspots should be selected for the measurements across the country. This can be calculated depending on the size of the country, geographic coverage percentage and classification of rural, urban and suburban areas.
+
+On the side of fixed Internet, selection of access points for fixed ISPs is quite challenging, because in order to perform the measurements, in most cases, it is necessary to access the consumer premises. This problem is faced by both regulators and ISPs. However, this obstacle may be solved through development of cooperation between regulators, consumers and ISPs.
+
+Experience in this regard shows that to develop cooperation and attract sufficient numbers of volunteers, each attempt should be led by appropriate advertising campaigns and publication of information using various media channels.
+
+### **9.2 Selecting the measurement moments**
+
+The moments for the measurements should, in principle, cover high and low traffic, including peak hours. However, for simplicity, the measurements may cover only high-traffic hours, including peak hours. If the Internet access service (IAS) is working properly in peak hour (or at least in high traffic hours) the conclusion could be made that quality in low-traffic hours should be even more acceptable.
+
+The frequency of the measurements should be based on the number of users participating in the campaign, the option(s) taken for the overall set of measurements and the level of statistical error and confidence intervals acceptable for the project. Decisions in this regard should be taken after consulting all relevant options in order to best adapt the frequency [b-ECC Report 195].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Evaluation scenario at international level
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In this scenario, as shown in Figure I.1, test server is located at an international IXP (i.e., an IXP installed in another continent, or another country). Usually, the Internet connection that ISPs provide to customers is to the entire Internet. Therefore, the more bandwidth capacity in the ISPs' connections, the better the quality of the Internet connection provided by the ISPs will be.
+
+This scenario allows regulators to test the international data transmission KPIs (e.g., download/upload data rate, delay). This allows the comparison between the connectivity of IP-based services inside the country and outside (different countries/continents).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the evaluation scenario at an international level. It shows a 'Test probe' (represented by a computer icon) connected to an 'ISP' cloud. The ISP is connected to an 'IXP' (Internet Exchange Point) box, which is labeled 'Local test server'. This IXP is connected to the 'Internet' cloud, which is connected to another 'IXP' box, labeled 'International test server'. A double-headed arrow labeled 'Measurement tests' spans the distance between the Test probe and the International test server. The text 'Access and core networks' is positioned above the ISP and Internet clouds. The identifier 'Y.1545.1(17)\_F06' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram of the evaluation scenario at international level.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Evaluation scenario at international level**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.800] Recommendation ITU-T E.800 (2008), *Definitions of terms related to quality of service*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.353] Recommendation ITU-T Y.353 (1996), *Reference events for defining ISDN and B-ISDN performance parameters*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1241] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1241 (2001), *Support of IP-based services using IP transfer capabilities*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1541] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1541 (2011), *Network performance objectives for IP-based services*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1543] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1543 (2007), *Measurements in IP networks for inter-domain performance assessment*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1545] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545 (2013), *Roadmap for the quality of service of interconnected networks that use the Internet protocol*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5835] IETF RFC 5835 (2010), *Framework for Metric Composition*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF ippm] IETF draft-ietf-ippm-initial-registry (2017), Initial Performance Metric Registry Entries.
+<>
+- [b-ECC Report 195] ECC Report 195 (2013), *Minimum Set of Quality of Service Parameters and Measurement Methods for Retail Internet Access Services*.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1561**
+
+(05/2004)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Quality of service and network
+performance
+
+# --- **Performance and availability parameters for MPLS networks**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1561
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1561**
+
+# **Performance and availability parameters for MPLS networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation defines parameters that may be used in specifying and assessing the performance of speed, accuracy, dependability, and availability of packet transfer over a Label Switched Path on a Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. The defined parameters apply to end-to-end, point-to-point and multipoint-to-point LSP and to any MPLS domain that provides, or contributes to the provision of, packet transfer services.
+
+Two categories of MPLS networks are considered:
+
+- 1) TE-LSP: Traffic Engineering Label Switched Path, or configured LSP. These are point-point paths.
+- 2) LDP-based LSP: This includes point-to-point and multipoint to point LSPs.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1561 was approved on 7 May 2004 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2004
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+# CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 2 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 3 |
+| 5 Layered protocol reference model and performance model for MPLS..... | 4 |
+| 5.1 Network components..... | 5 |
+| 5.2 Exchange links and network sections..... | 7 |
+| 5.3 Measurement points and measurable sections..... | 7 |
+| 5.4 Packet transfer reference events (PREs)..... | 8 |
+| 5.5 Packet transfer outcomes ..... | 9 |
+| 6 Packet transfer performance parameters..... | 13 |
+| 6.1 Populations of interest ..... | 13 |
+| 6.2 Packet Transfer Delay (PTD) ..... | 14 |
+| 6.3 Packet Error Ratio (PER) ..... | 16 |
+| 6.4 Packet Loss Ratio (PLR) ..... | 16 |
+| 6.5 Spurious Packet Rate (SPR) ..... | 16 |
+| 6.6 Packet Severe Loss Block Ratio (PSLBR)..... | 16 |
+| 6.7 Recovery Time ..... | 17 |
+| 7 Availability ..... | 17 |
+| 7.1 Availability service function for connection-oriented services..... | 17 |
+| 7.2 Availability parameters ..... | 17 |
+| 8 Security ..... | 18 |
+| BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... | 18 |
+
+
+
+# Performance and availability parameters for MPLS networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation defines parameters that may be used in specifying and assessing the performance of speed, accuracy, dependability, and availability of packet (labelled or not – in the latter case, Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP) may cause loss of Label Switched Paths (LSP) identity at the network edges) transfer over an LSP on a Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) network. The defined parameters apply to end-to-end, point-to-point and multipoint-to-point LSP and to any MPLS domain that provides, or contributes to the provision of, packet transfer services in accordance with the normative references specified in clause 2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the scope of the recommendation, showing the flow of packets through an MPLS domain and an exchange link, and the resulting performance parameters and availability parameters.
+
+**Network section:** Shows an MPLS domain with two LS routers. Packets enter from the left, pass through a Boundary, and then through the MPLS domain. Measurement Points (MP) are indicated at the boundaries.
+
+**Exchange link:** Shows two Edge nodes connected by a Link. Packets enter from the left, pass through a Boundary, and then through the exchange link. Measurement Points (MP) are indicated at the boundaries.
+
+**Y.1561 – IP Packet Transfer Reference Events:** A central box representing the reference events for packet transfer.
+
+**Y.1561 – IP Packet Performance Parameters:** A table defining the performance parameters based on the reference events.
+
+| Function | Criterion | Speed | Accuracy | Dependability |
+|---------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------|----------|---------------|
+| Access | | | | |
+| User information transfer | | Y.1561 – IP Packet Performance Parameters | | |
+| Disengagement | | | | |
+
+**Y.1561 – Availability parameters:** A box representing the availability parameters, which are derived from the performance parameters. It is shown in a state of being "MPLS unavailable" or "MPLS available".
+
+MP Measurement Point
+
+(Clause 5/Y.1561)
+
+(Clause 6/Y.1561)
+
+(Clause 7/Y.1561)
+
+Y.1561\_F01
+
+Figure 1/Y.1561 – Scope of this Recommendation. The diagram illustrates the scope of the recommendation, showing the flow of packets through an MPLS domain and an exchange link, and the resulting performance parameters and availability parameters.
+
+Figure 1/Y.1561 – Scope of this Recommendation
+
+The scope of this Recommendation is summarized in Figure 1. The MPLS network performance parameters are defined on the basis of packet transfer reference events that may be observed at measurement points (MPs) associated with specified functional and jurisdictional boundaries. The
+
+measurement points may be at the ends of LSPs. For comparability and completeness, MPLS network performance is considered in the context of the $3 \times 3$ performance matrix defined in ITU-T Rec. I.350. Three protocol-independent communication functions are identified in the matrix: access, user information transfer and disengagement. Each function is considered with respect to three general performance concerns (or "performance criteria"): speed, accuracy and dependability. An associated two-state model provides a basis for describing MPLS network availability.
+
+The performance of MPLS networks providing access and disengagement functions (e.g., Resource ReserVation Protocol – Traffic Engineering, RSVP-TE) and supporting capabilities (e.g., Label Distribution Protocol, LDP, as per RFC 3036) may be addressed in separate Recommendations.
+
+Two categories of MPLS networks will be considered here:
+
+- 1) TE-LSP: Traffic Engineering Label Switched Path, or configured LSP. These are point-point paths. The paths are connection-oriented, explicitly routed, and fixed.
+- 2) LDP-based LSP: This includes point-to-point and multipoint to point LSPs. The paths behave more like IP, using the Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), such as Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) or Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) for routing. The LSPs are connectionless.
+
+The point-to-point and multipoint-to-point topologies are accommodated through the concept of *populations of interest*, defined in 6.1. The case of PHP causing loss of LSP identity is specifically addressed in 5.4, where there are three optional criteria for packet transfer reference events. Correspondence between ingress and egress reference events has been dealt with here to the same degree as in different Recommendations (e.g., ITU-T Rec. Y.1540), in 5.5.2.
+
+In this Recommendation, the general term *packet* refers to an IP packet with header and information field, or to other protocols with combinations of header and information fields, so long as there is a standard that describes the encapsulation as an MPLS packet.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- ITU-T Recommendation I.350 (1993), *General aspects of quality of service and network performance in digital networks, including ISDNs*.
+- ITU-T Recommendation I.353 (1996), *Reference events for defining ISDN and B-ISDN performance parameters*.
+- ITU-T Recommendation Y.1540 (2002), *Internet protocol data communication service – IP packet transfer and availability performance parameters*.
+- ITU-T Recommendation Y.1711 (2004), *Operation and maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks*.
+- IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+- IETF RFC 3032 (2001), *MPLS Label Stack Encoding*.
+- IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*.
+- IETF RFC 3107 (2001), *Carrying Label Information in BGP-4*.
+
+- IETF RFC 3429 (2002), *Assignment of the 'OAM Alert Label' for Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture (MPLS) Operation and Maintenance (OAM) Functions*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+- 3.1 Forwarding Equivalence Class (FEC):** A category of IP packets that receive the same forwarding treatment.
+- 3.2 Label Switched Path (LSP):** The path through one or more LSRs at one level of the hierarchy followed by a packet in a particular FEC.
+- 3.3 Penultimate Hop Popping (PHP):** An optional feature in MPLS, where the label stack may be popped (removed) at the penultimate Label Switching Router of the LSP, rather than at the LSP Egress.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| CE | Customer Edge Router |
+| CR-LDP | Constraint-based Routing – Label Distribution Protocol |
+| DSCP | Differentiated Services Code Point |
+| DST | Destination |
+| EL | Exchange Link |
+| EXP | Experimental |
+| FEC | Forwarding Equivalence Class |
+| IGP | Interior Gateway Protocol |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IS-IS | Intermediate System to Intermediate System |
+| LDP | Label Distribution Protocol |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MP | Measurement Point |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| NS | Network Section |
+| NSE | Network Section Ensemble |
+| OSPF | Open Shortest Path First |
+| PDV | Packet Delay Variation |
+| PE | Provider Edge Label Switching Router |
+| PER | Packet Error Ratio |
+| PHP | Penultimate Hop Popping |
+| PIA | Percent service availability |
+| PIU | Percent service unavailability |
+
+| | |
+|---------|-----------------------------------------------------|
+| PLR | Packet Loss Ratio |
+| PRE | Packet Transfer Reference Event |
+| PSLBR | Packet Severe Loss Block Ratio |
+| PTD | Packet Transfer Delay |
+| RSVP-TE | Resource ReserVation Protocol – Traffic Engineering |
+| RTPTD | Round Trip Packet Transfer Delay |
+| SLB | Severe Loss Block |
+| SPR | Spurious Packet Rate |
+| SRC | Source |
+| TLV | Type-Length-Value-tuple |
+| ToS | Type of Service |
+| TTL | Time To Live |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+
+# 5 Layered protocol reference model and performance model for MPLS
+
+Figure 2 illustrates the layered nature of MPLS transport service. The performance provided to layers above MPLS depends both on the MPLS layer performance and the layers below MPLS:
+
+- Lower layers that provide connection-oriented or connection transport supporting the MPLS layer.
+- The MPLS layer that transports packets. This layer has significance across the MPLS Domain(s), and provides the Label Switched Path (LSP). In the case where Penultimate Hop Popping is employed, the label stack is returned to the depth on ingress in the penultimate node.
+- Higher Layers, including the IP layer, that further enable end-to-end communication.
+
+This clause defines a generic MPLS transport network performance model, composed of network sections and exchange links that interconnect network sections. The performance parameters defined here may be applied to the unidirectional transfer of packets on a network section, or across a single MPLS Domain, as defined below (this is the scope of OA&M measurements, such as those defined in ITU-T Rec. Y.1711). The parameters may also be applied to combinations of network sections and exchange links, when the mapping between labels and routes has been distributed between AS according to standardized protocols, such as those defined in RFC 3107. The performance parameters are based on reference events and packet transfer outcomes, also defined below.
+
+In particular, Figure 2 illustrates one of the challenges of MPLS architectures, where the MPLS layer may not exist across the entire measurement path.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the layered model of performance for MPLS across different network components. It shows the flow from a Source (SRC) to a Destination (DST) through an Ingress edge node, one or more MPLS nodes, a Penultimate MPLS node, and an Egress edge node. Each node is represented by a stack of layers: IP layer, MPLS layer, and lower layers. At the Ingress edge node, MPLS labels are added, and at the Penultimate MPLS node, they are removed (Penultimate Hop Popping). The diagram also highlights 'Edge-to-edge measurement' between the Ingress and Egress edge nodes and the 'Loss of LSP identity (IP Layer present from edge-edge, but not Labels)' at the Penultimate node. A green curved arrow indicates the path of the packet through the layers. The diagram is labeled Y.1561\_F02.
+
+Figure 2/Y.1561 – Layered model of performance for MPLS. The diagram illustrates the layered model of performance for MPLS across different network components. It shows the flow from a Source (SRC) to a Destination (DST) through an Ingress edge node, one or more MPLS nodes, a Penultimate MPLS node, and an Egress edge node. Each node is represented by a stack of layers: IP layer, MPLS layer, and lower layers. At the Ingress edge node, MPLS labels are added, and at the Penultimate MPLS node, they are removed (Penultimate Hop Popping). The diagram also highlights 'Edge-to-edge measurement' between the Ingress and Egress edge nodes and the 'Loss of LSP identity (IP Layer present from edge-edge, but not Labels)' at the Penultimate node. A green curved arrow indicates the path of the packet through the layers. The diagram is labeled Y.1561\_F02.
+
+**Figure 2/Y.1561 – Layered model of performance for MPLS**
+
+As noted earlier, packets using protocols other than IP may be encapsulated with MPLS labels and transported over MPLS networks, but the PHP option would not be used and labels will be present from network edge-to-edge. In some cases, MPLS networks may provide transport between User-Network Interfaces (UNI), and offer an end-to-end transport service to higher-layer protocols.
+
+## 5.1 Network components
+
+Fundamental components of IP networks are defined in ITU-T Rec. Y.1540.
+
+The following network components have been defined in RFC 3031:
+
+**5.1.1 LSR (label switching router):** An MPLS node which is capable of forwarding native L3 packets.
+
+*NOTE* – As used here and in the definitions that follow, L3 refers to the IP layer.
+
+**5.1.2 MPLS domain:** A contiguous set of nodes which operate MPLS routing and forwarding and which are also in one Routing or Administrative Domain.
+
+**5.1.3 MPLS edge node:** An MPLS node that connects an MPLS domain with a node which is outside of the domain, either because it does not run MPLS, and/or because it is in a different domain. Note that if an LSR has a neighbouring host which is not running MPLS, that LSR is an MPLS edge node.
+
+**5.1.4 MPLS egress node:** An MPLS edge node in its role in handling traffic as it leaves an MPLS domain.
+
+**5.1.5 MPLS ingress node:** An MPLS edge node in its role in handling traffic as it enters an MPLS domain.
+
+**5.1.6 MPLS node:** A node which is running MPLS. An MPLS node will be aware of MPLS control protocols, will operate one or more L3 routing protocols, and will be capable of forwarding packets based on labels. An MPLS node may optionally be also capable of forwarding native L3 packets.
+
+This Recommendation also defines:
+
+**5.1.7 MPLS network:** A network that consists of one or more MPLS domains, having one or more LSPs from network ingress node to network egress node.
+
+
+
+Scope of OA&M measurements: single network section or MPLS domain
+
+MPLS domain
+
+MPLS domain
+
+Network section
+
+Exchange link
+
+Exchange link
+
+Exchange link
+
+Exchange link
+
+Network section
+
+Network section
+
+MPLS Edge Node, or MPLS Ingress Node, or LSR if both IP and MPLS are enabled
+
+MPLS node
+
+Label Switched Paths
+
+Network Section Ensemble (NSE)
+
+MPLS network
+
+Network Section may include Nodes on Customer Site
+
+Service Provider
+
+Access
+
+Access
+
+Y.1561\_F03
+
+Diagram illustrating MPLS network connectivity. It shows three 'Network section' ovals connected by 'Exchange link' lines. The first section contains 'MPLS nodes' and a 'Label Switched Path' (LSP) indicated by a dashed line. A legend identifies a circle as an 'MPLS node' and a dashed line as a 'Label Switched Path'. A note states: 'MPLS Edge Node, or MPLS Ingress Node, or LSR if both IP and MPLS are enabled'. Dimensions at the top indicate 'Scope of OA&M measurements: single network section or MPLS domain' and 'MPLS domain'. A 'Network Section Ensemble (NSE)' dimension spans the first two sections. A 'MPLS network' dimension spans all three. Below, a 'Service Provider' oval is shown with 'Access' nodes, and a note states: 'Network Section may include Nodes on Customer Site'.
+
+Figure 3/Y.1561 – MPLS network connectivity
+
+Table 1 gives the hierarchical relationship of the terminology used here.
+
+Table 1/Y.1561 – Node terminology
+
+| MPLS node | | | | | | | |
+|-----------|---------|---------|---------|---------------|--|--|--|
+| Edge node | | | | Interior node | | | |
+| Ingress | | Egress | | | | | |
+| LSR(IP) | Non-LSR | LSR(IP) | Non-LSR | | | | |
+
+## **5.2 Exchange links and network sections**
+
+### **5.2.1 Exchange Link (EL)**
+
+The link connecting:
+
+- 1) a source or destination host (or router) to its adjacent router, possibly in another jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as an access link, ingress link or egress link; or
+- 2) a router in one network section with a router in another network section.
+
+Note that the responsibility for an exchange link, its capacity, and its performance is typically shared between the connected parties.
+
+NOTE – "Exchange link" is equivalent to the term "label switched hop" as defined in RFC 3031.
+
+### **5.2.2 Network Section (NS)**
+
+A set of MPLS nodes together with all of their interconnecting links that together provide all or part of the MPLS network between an ingress node and an egress node, and are under a single (or collaborative) jurisdictional responsibility. Some network sections consist of a single host with no interconnecting links. Source NS and Destination NS are particular cases of network sections. Pairs of network sections are connected by exchange links.
+
+NOTE – "Network Section" is synonymous with the term "MPLS Domain" as defined in RFC 3031.
+
+## **5.3 Measurement points and measurable sections**
+
+### **5.3.1 Measurement Point (MP)**
+
+The boundary between a host or MPLS Edge Node and an adjacent link at which performance reference events can be observed and measured. Consistent with ITU-T Rec. I.353, any of the standard Internet protocols can be observed at measurement points.
+
+NOTE – The exact location of the MPLS MP within the protocol stack is for further study.
+
+A section or a combination of sections is measurable if it is bounded by a set of MPs. In this Recommendation, the following sections are measurable.
+
+### **5.3.2 Basic section**
+
+An EL, NS, a SRC, or a DST. Basic sections are delimited by MP.
+
+The performance of any EL or NS is measurable relative to any given unidirectional end-to-end MPLS network. The *ingress MPs* are the set of MPs crossed by packets from a FEC as they go into a basic section. The *egress MPs* are the set of MPs crossed by packets from that FEC as they leave that basic section.
+
+### **5.3.3 End-to-end MPLS transport on a label switched path**
+
+The set of EL and NS that provide the transport of packets transmitted from MPLS edge node to MPLS edge node on an MPLS network. The MPs that bind the end-to-end MPLS network are the MPs at the ingress node of the first MPLS domain and at the egress node of the last MPLS domain that form the label switched path (LSP).
+
+The end-to-end MPLS network performance is measurable relative to any given unidirectional label switched path. The *ingress MPs* are the MPs crossed by packets from a FEC as they enter the LSP. The *egress MPs* are the MPs crossed by packets from that FEC as they leave that LSP.
+
+### **5.3.4 Network section ensemble (NSE)**
+
+An NSE refers to any connected subset of NSs together with all of the ELs that interconnect them. The term NSE can be used to refer to a single NS, two NSs, or any number of NS and their
+
+connecting EL. Pairs of distinct NSEs are connected by exchange links. The term NSE can also be used to represent the entire end-to-end MPLS transport. NSEs are delimited by MP.
+
+The performance of any given NSE is measurable relative to any given unidirectional label switched path provided by the NSE. The *ingress MPs* are the set of MPs crossed by packets from a service as they go into an NSE. The *egress MPs* are the set of MPs crossed by packets from that service as they leave that NSE.
+
+## 5.4 Packet transfer reference events (PREs)
+
+In the context of this Recommendation, the following definitions apply on a specified end-to-end MPLS Network. The defined terms are illustrated in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+Figure 4: Example packet transfer reference events. The diagram shows a sequence of four edge nodes connected by exchange links. Each edge node is represented as a box divided into an 'MPLS layer' (top) and a 'Lower layer' (bottom). Below each edge node is a measurement point (MP). The first edge node contains packet A in its lower layer. An exchange link connects it to the second edge node, which contains packet B in its lower layer. Another exchange link connects the second to the third edge node, which contains packet C in its lower layer. A final exchange link connects the third to the fourth edge node, which contains packet D in its lower layer. A large circle labeled 'Network section' encompasses the second and third edge nodes and their connecting link. Arrows indicate the flow from left to right between the exchange links. The label 'Y.1561\_F04' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+NOTE 1 – Packet exit events for packets A and C.
+
+NOTE 2 – Packet entry events for packets B and D.
+
+**Figure 4/Y.1561 – Example packet transfer reference events**
+
+A packet transfer event occurs when:
+
+- a packet crosses a measurement point (MP);
+- standard procedures confirm that the packet header is valid, e.g., MPLS procedures are applied to validate the label(s), or other header procedures as appropriate;
+- the packet is a member of the FEC of interest, as determined by any of the following:
+ - the label value within the label contains the expected value and the TTL is non-zero; or (the cases below are applicable when PHP removes the label with LSP identity);
+ - in the Y.1711 OAM Connectivity Verification (CV) flow packet case, the packet payload contains the OAM function type codepoint, the OAM Payload consistent with the function type, and the Trail Termination Source Identifier field contains the expected LSP ID and the IP address of the expected SRC; or
+ - the source and destination address fields within the IP packet header represent the IP addresses of the expected SRC and DST (within the FEC). Information in the packet payload (e.g., inserted by a measurement system) may supplement the header information; or
+ - in the LSP-PING packet case, the MPLS echo request packet must be well-formed (valid) at all supporting layers, including the UDP layer and the request format in the UDP payload with the required FEC Stack Type-Length-Value-tuple (TLV).
+
+NOTE 1 – The applicability of Y.1711 OAM messages with PHP is given in RFC 3429. In summary, the ultimate node receiving the OAM packet must be an MPLS LSR to interpret the Y.1711 label and payload correctly. If the ultimate node has no MPLS label look-up or processing, then Y.1711 is not applicable.
+
+NOTE 2 – The MPLS label contains 3 EXP bits and the IP packet header contains information including Type of Service (ToS) or Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP). This information may affect packet transfer performance, and must be specified if used (set to non-default value).
+
+Packet transfer reference events are defined without regard to packet fragmentation. They occur for every packet crossing any MP regardless of the value contained in the "more-fragments flag". If fragmentation is necessary, an LSR may silently discard the packet (as per RFC 3032).
+
+Four types of packet transfer events are defined:
+
+### **5.4.1 Packet entry event into a node**
+
+A packet transfer entry event into a node occurs when a packet crosses a MP entering a node (LSR or MPLS edge node) from the attached EL.
+
+### **5.4.2 Packet exit event from a node**
+
+A packet transfer exit event from a node occurs when a packet crosses a MP exiting a node (LSR or MPLS edge node) into the attached EL.
+
+### **5.4.3 Packet ingress event into a basic section or NSE**
+
+A packet transfer ingress into a basic section or NSE event occurs when a packet crosses an ingress MP into a basic section or a NSE.
+
+### **5.4.4 Packet egress event from a basic section or NSE**
+
+A packet transfer egress event from a basic section or NSE occurs when a packet crosses an egress MP out of a basic section or a NSE.
+
+NOTE 1 – Packet entry and exit events always represent, respectively, entry into and exit from a node. Packet ingress events and egress events always represent ingress into and egress from a section or an NSE. To illustrate this point, note that an ingress into an EL creates an exit event from the preceding node, while an ingress into an NS is an entry event because, by definition, NSs always have nodes at their edges.
+
+NOTE 2 – For practical measurement purposes, Packet transfer reference events need not be observed within the protocol stack of the node. Instead, the time of occurrence of these reference events can be approximated by observing the packets crossing an associated physical interface. This physical interface should, however, be as near as possible to the desired MP. In cases where reference events are monitored at a physical interface, the time of occurrence of an exit event from a host is approximated by the observation of the first bit of the packet coming from the host or test equipment. The time of occurrence of an entry event into a host is approximated by the observation of the last bit of the packet going to the host or test equipment.
+
+## **5.5 Packet transfer outcomes**
+
+By considering packet transfer reference events, a number of possible transfer outcomes may be defined for any packet attempting to cross a basic section or an NSE. A transmitted packet is either *successfully transferred*, *errored* or *lost*. A delivered packet for which no corresponding packet was offered is said to be *spurious*. Figure 5 illustrates the packet transfer outcomes.
+
+The definitions of packet transfer outcomes are based on the concepts of *permissible ingress MP*, *permissible egress MP* and *corresponding packets*.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph Ingress_MP [ingress MP]
+ I1[PRE1]
+ I2[PRE1]
+ I3[PRE1]
+ I4[PRE1]
+ end
+ subgraph Egress_MP [egress MP]
+ E1[PRE2
+Valid header and error-free payload]
+ E2[PRE2
+Corrupted header or errored payload]
+ E3[PRE2
+Note]
+ E4[PRE2
+Note]
+ end
+ I1 -- "t ≤ Tmax" --> E1
+ I2 -- "t ≤ Tmax" --> E2
+ I3 -- "t ≤ Tmax" --> E3
+ I4 -- "Never delivered or delivered to an unpermitted egress MP" --> Lost1[Lost packet outcome]
+ I4 -- "t > Tmax" --> E4
+
+ E1 --- S1[Successful packet outcome]
+ E2 --- S2[Errored packet outcome]
+ E3 --- S3[Spurious packet outcome]
+ E4 --- S4[Lost packet outcome]
+
+```
+
+ingress MP
+
+egress MP
+
+PRE1
+
+$t \leq T_{\max}$
+
+PRE2
+Valid header and error-free payload
+
+Successful packet outcome
+
+---
+
+PRE1
+
+$t \leq T_{\max}$
+
+PRE2
+Corrupted header or errored payload
+
+Errored packet outcome
+
+---
+
+PRE2
+(Note)
+
+Spurious packet outcome
+
+---
+
+PRE1
+
+Never delivered or delivered to an unpermitted egress MP
+
+Lost packet outcome
+
+PRE1
+
+$t > T_{\max}$
+
+PRE2
+(Note)
+
+Lost packet outcome
+
+Y.1561\_F05
+
+Diagram illustrating packet transfer outcomes between an ingress MP and an egress MP. The diagram shows four scenarios: 1. Successful packet outcome: A packet with PRE1 at the ingress MP is transferred to the egress MP as PRE2 with a valid header and error-free payload, occurring within time t ≤ Tmax. 2. Errored packet outcome: A packet with PRE1 at the ingress MP is transferred to the egress MP as PRE2 with a corrupted header or errored payload, occurring within time t ≤ Tmax. 3. Spurious packet outcome: A packet with PRE1 at the ingress MP is transferred to the egress MP as PRE2 (Note), occurring within time t ≤ Tmax. 4. Lost packet outcome: A packet with PRE1 at the ingress MP is never delivered or delivered to an unpermitted egress MP, occurring within time t > Tmax. The diagram is labeled Y.1561\_F05.
+
+NOTE – Outcome occurs independent of packet contents.
+
+**Figure 5/Y.1561 – Packet transfer outcomes**
+
+### 5.5.1 Global routing information and permissible output links
+
+All packets (and fragments of packets) leaving a basic section should only be forwarded to other basic sections as *permitted* by the available global routing information.
+
+For performance purposes, the transport of an IP packet by an NSE will be considered successful only when that NSE forwards all of the packet contents to other basic sections as permitted by the currently available global routing information. If the destination address corresponds to a host attached directly to this NSE, the only permitted successful output is to forward the packet to the destination host.
+
+NOTE – Routing protocol procedures include updating of global routing information. A NS that was permissible may no longer be permissible following an update of the routing information shared between NSs. Alternatively, a NS that was not previously permissible may have become permissible after an update of the global routing information.
+
+At a given time, and relative to a given end-to-end MPLS network and a basic section or NSE:
+
+- an ingress MP is a *permissible ingress MP* if the crossing of this MP into this basic section or NSE is permitted by the global routing information;
+
+- an egress MP is a *permissible egress MP* if the crossing of this MP leads into another basic section that is permitted by the global routing information.
+
+### 5.5.2 Corresponding events
+
+Performance analysis makes it necessary to associate the packets crossing one MP with the packets that crossed a different MP. Connectionless routing means a packet may leave a basic section on any one of (possibly) several permissible egress MP. Packet fragmentation means that a packet going into a basic section may leave in fragments, possibly into several different other basic sections. Finally, connectionless routing may even send a packet or a fragment back into a basic section it has already traversed (possibly due to the updating of routing tables).
+
+An egress event is said to *correspond* to an earlier ingress event if they were created by the "same" packet. This concept applies whether the packet at the egress MP is the whole packet or just a fragment of the original. Figure 6 illustrates a case where a packet goes into NS C from NS B and is fragmented into two parts in NS C. One of the fragments is sent to NS D and the other to NS F. Both of these egress events *correspond* to the single ingress event. To avoid confusion resulting from packets re-entering the NSE, this concept of *correspondence* also requires that this be the first time (since its ingress) this particular content has departed from the NSE.
+
+The practical determination of whether reference events are corresponding is usually *ad hoc* and will often rely on consideration of the addresses, the global routing information, the packet identification field, other header information and the packet contents (e.g., the LSP-PING UDP layer and the request format in the UDP payload with the required FEC Stack TLV, or Y.1711 CV flow payload).
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a network topology where a packet originates from a source (SRC) and enters a network section (NS C) at point 'a'. Inside NS C, the packet is fragmented into two parts. One fragment exits NS C at point 'b' towards destination 'D', and the other fragment exits at point 'c' towards destination 'F'. The diagram illustrates that both egress events (b) and (c) correspond to the single ingress event (a). The network section is labeled 'Network Section C' and includes nodes 'B', 'D', 'E', and 'F'. The source is labeled 'SRC' and the destination is labeled 'DST'.
+
+Diagram illustrating packet fragmentation and corresponding events. A packet from SRC enters Network Section C (NS C) at point a), creating an ingress event. Inside NS C, the packet is fragmented into two parts. One fragment exits NS C at point b) towards destination D, and the other fragment exits at point c) towards destination F. Both egress events (b) and c) correspond to the single ingress event (a).
+
+A packet from SRC to DST enters NS C, creates an ingress event, is fragmented, and creates two corresponding egress events, b) and c).
+
+**Figure 6/Y.1561 – Corresponding events when fragmentation occurs**
+
+### 5.5.3 Notes about the definitions of successful, errored, lost and spurious packet outcomes
+
+Each of the following definitions of individual packet outcomes is based on observing packet reference events at MPLS measurement points. By selecting the appropriate measurement points, each definition can be used to evaluate the performance of a particular EL, a particular NS, a particular NSE, and they can be applied to the performance of end-to-end networks.
+
+These outcomes are defined without restriction to a particular packet type (EXP, ToS, DSCP, protocol, etc.). MPLS network performance will differ by packet type.
+
+In each definition, the possibility of packet fragmentation is accounted for by including the possibility that a single packet reference event could result in several subsequent events. Note that if any fragment is lost, the whole original packet is considered lost. If no fragments are lost, but some are errored, the entire original packet is considered errored. For the delivery of the original packet to
+
+be considered successful, each fragment must be successfully delivered to one of the permissible output EL.
+
+### 5.5.4 Successful packet transfer outcome
+
+A successful packet transfer outcome occurs when a single packet reference event at a permissible ingress $MP_0$ results in one (or more) corresponding reference event(s) at one (or more) egress $MP_i$ , all within a specified time $T_{max}$ of the original ingress event and:
+
+- 1) all egress $MP_i$ where the corresponding reference events occur are permissible; and
+- 2) the complete contents of the original packet observed at $MP_0$ are included in the delivered packet(s); and
+- 3) the binary contents of the delivered packet information field(s) conform exactly with that of the original packet; and
+- 4) the header field(s) of the delivered packet(s) is (are) valid.
+
+NOTE – The value of $T_{max}$ is provisionally set at 3 seconds. Some global end-end paths may require a larger value of $T_{max}$ . The value of 3 seconds has been used in practice.
+
+### 5.5.5 Errored packet outcome
+
+An errored packet outcome occurs when a single packet reference event at a permissible ingress $MP_0$ results in one (or more) corresponding reference event(s) at one (or more) egress $MP_i$ , all within $T_{max}$ time of the original reference event and:
+
+- 1) all egress $MP_i$ where the corresponding reference events occur are permissible; and
+- 2) the complete contents of the original packet observed at $MP_0$ are included in the delivered packet(s); and
+- 3) either:
+ - the binary contents of the delivered packet information field(s) do not conform exactly with that of the original packet; or
+ - one or more of the label or header field(s) of the delivered packet(s) is (are) corrupted.
+
+NOTE – Most packets with errored labels will be discarded or redirected by other MPLS layer procedures (e.g., based on corruption in the label value or other fields). Where relevant, packets with errored IP headers that are not detected by the header checksum at the IP layer will be discarded or redirected by other IP layer procedures. The result is that no reference event is created for the higher layer protocols expecting to receive this packet. Because there is no reference event, these packet transfer attempts will be classified as lost packet outcomes. Errored labels or headers that do not result in discarding or misdirecting will be classified as errored packet outcomes.
+
+### 5.5.6 Lost packet outcome
+
+The definition of a lost packet outcome is predicated on a definition for a *misdirected packet*.
+
+A misdirected packet occurs when a single packet reference event at a permissible ingress $MP_0$ results in one (or more) corresponding reference event(s) at one (or more) egress $MP_i$ , all within a specified $T_{max}$ time of the original reference event and:
+
+- 1) the complete contents of the original packet observed at $MP_0$ are included in the delivered packet(s); but
+- 2) one or more of the egress $MP_i$ where the corresponding reference events occur are not permissible egress MP.
+
+A lost packet outcome occurs when a single packet reference event at a permissible ingress $MP_0$ results in a misdirected packet outcome or when some or all of the contents of that packet do not result in any packet reference event at any egress MP within the time $T_{max}$ .
+
+### 5.5.7 Spurious packet outcome
+
+A spurious packet outcome occurs for a basic section, an NSE, on end-to-end when a single packet creates an egress event for which there was no corresponding ingress event.
+
+### 5.5.8 Packet severe loss block outcome
+
+A severe loss block (SLB) outcome occurs for a block of packets observed during time interval $T_{lb}$ at ingress $MP_0$ when the ratio of lost packets at egress $MP_i$ to total packets in the block exceeds $s1$ .
+
+The value of time interval $T_{lb}$ is provisionally set at 1 second. The value of threshold $s1$ is provisionally set at 0.15. Evaluation of successive blocks (time intervals) should be non-overlapping.
+
+NOTE – The values may change following further study and experience. Current values of $T_{lb}$ and $s1$ capture network events that may affect the operation of connectivity-sensitive applications. For example, degradation to video and audio applications may be well correlated with the SLB outcome as defined here.
+
+The minimum number of packets that should be used in evaluating the severe loss block outcome is $M_{lb}$ , and these packets should be spread throughout a $T_{lb}$ interval. The value of $M_{lb}$ is for further study.
+
+### 5.5.9 Consecutive SLB
+
+When the conditions required for a severe loss block (SLB) outcome occur in successive (non-overlapping) time intervals $T_{lb}$ at ingress $MP_0$ , then a Consecutive SLB outcome occurs.
+
+# 6 Packet transfer performance parameters
+
+This clause defines a set of information transfer performance parameters using the packet transfer outcomes defined in 5.5. All of the parameters may be estimated on the basis of observations made at MP that bound the basic section or NSE under test.
+
+## 6.1 Populations of interest
+
+Most of the performance parameters are defined over sets of packets called *populations of interest*. For the *end-to-end case*, the population of interest is usually the total set of packets traversing the Label Switched Path. The measurement points in the end-to-end case are the MP at the MPLS ingress node(s) where packets enter the LSP and at the MPLS egress node where packets exit the LSP.
+
+For a basic section or NSE and relative to a particular LSP, the population of interest at a particular permissible ingress MP is that set of packets traversing the LSP that are routed into the basic section or NSE across that specific MP. This is called the *specific-ingress case*, and applies to any point-to-point LSP, such as those created to provide MPLS-TE/RSVP-TE LSPs.
+
+The total population of interest for a basic section or NSE relative to a particular LSP is the total set of packets traversing the LSP that are delivered into the section or NSE across any of its permissible ingress MP. This is called the *ingress-independent case*, and does not apply with point-to-point MPLS-TE. This population is better suited to characterization of the multipoint-to-point LSP topology.
+
+Each of these performance parameters are defined without reference to a particular packet type (EXP, ToS, DSCP, protocol, etc.). Performance will differ by packet type and any statement about measured performance should include information about which packet type or types were included in the population.
+
+## 6.2 Packet Transfer Delay (PTD)
+
+Packet transfer delay is defined for all successful and errored packet outcomes across a basic section or an NSE. PTD is the time, $(t_2 - t_1)$ between the occurrence of two corresponding packet reference events, ingress event $PRE_1$ at time $t_1$ and egress event $PRE_2$ at time $t_2$ , where $(t_2 > t_1)$ and $(t_2 - t_1) \leq T_{\max}$ . If the packet is fragmented within the NSE, $t_2$ is the time of the final corresponding egress event. The end-to-end packet transfer delay is the one-way delay between the MP at the opposite ends of the LSP as illustrated in Figure 7.
+
+
+
+Figure 7/Y.1561 – Packet transfer delay events. The diagram illustrates the packet transfer delay events across a sequence of Network Sections (NS) and Edge Loops (EL). It shows a sequence of Measurement Points (MP1, MP2, MP3, MP4, MPn-1, MPn) and the corresponding ingress and egress events. The ingress event occurs at MP1 at time t1, and the egress event occurs at MPn at time t2. The packet is shown as a solid line between MP1 and MP2, and as dashed lines between subsequent MPs, indicating fragmentation and reassembly. The diagram is labeled Y.1561\_F07.
+
+**Figure 7/Y.1561 – Packet transfer delay events
+(illustrated for the end-to-end LSP transfer of a single packet)**
+
+### 6.2.1 Mean packet transfer delay
+
+Mean packet transfer delay is the arithmetic average of packet transfer delays for a population of interest.
+
+### 6.2.2 End-to-end 2-point Packet Delay Variation (PDV)
+
+The variations in packet transfer delay are also important. Streaming applications might use information about the total range of delay variation to avoid buffer underflow and overflow. Variations in delay will cause TCP retransmission timer thresholds to grow and may also cause packet retransmissions to be delayed or cause packets to be retransmitted unnecessarily.
+
+End-to-end 2-point packet delay variation is defined based on the observations of corresponding packet arrivals at ingress and egress MP (e.g., $MP_{DST}$ , $MP_{SRC}$ ). These observations characterize the variability in the pattern of packet arrival reference events at the egress MP with reference to the pattern of corresponding reference events at the ingress MP.
+
+The 2-point packet delay variation ( $v_k$ ) for a packet $k$ between SRC and DST is the difference between the absolute packet transfer delay ( $x_k$ ) of the packet and a defined reference packet transfer delay, $d_{1,2}$ , between those same MPs (see Figure 8): $v_k = x_k - d_{1,2}$ .
+
+The reference packet transfer delay, $d_{1,2}$ , is the absolute packet transfer delay experienced by the first packet between those two MPs (in this example, other reference delays are allowed).
+
+Positive values of 2-point PDV correspond to packet transfer delays greater than those experienced by the reference packet; negative values of 2-point PDV correspond to packet transfer delays less than those experienced by the reference packet. The distribution of 2-point PDVs is identical to the distribution of absolute packet transfer delays displaced by a constant value equal to $d_{1,2}$ .
+
+
+
+The diagram shows a sequence of packets (packet 0, packet 1, packet 2, ..., packet k) arriving at multiplexer MP1 and then being transferred to multiplexer MP2. A dashed horizontal line represents the time $t = 0$ .
+
+Variables:
+
+- $a_{1,k}$ Packet k actual arrival time at MP1
+- $a_{2,k}$ Packet k actual arrival time at MP2
+- $d_{1,2}$ Absolute packet 0 transfer delay between MP1 and MP2
+- $x_k$ Absolute packet k transfer time between MP1 and MP2
+- $v_k$ 2-point packet delay variation value between MP1 and MP2
+
+Equations shown in the diagram:
+
+$$x_k = a_{2,k} - a_{1,k}$$
+$$v_k = x_k - d_{1,2}$$
+
+The diagram also includes a small inset showing the relationship between $d_{1,2}$ , $v_k$ , and $x_k$ on a timeline.
+
+Y.1561\_F08
+
+Diagram illustrating 2-point packet delay variation between two multiplexers (MP1 and MP2).
+
+**Figure 8/Y.1561 – 2-point packet delay variation**
+
+#### 6.2.2.1 Using minimum delay or average delay as the basis for delay variation
+
+As illustrated in Figure 8, the delay variation of an individual packet is naturally defined as the difference between the actual delay experienced by that packet and a nominal (expected) delay. An alternative to using the first packet delay as the nominal delay is to use the average delay of the population of packets as the nominal delay. This has the effect of centring the distribution of delay variation values on zero (when the distribution is symmetrical).
+
+It simplifies the analysis of delay variation range to use the packet with the minimum delay as the reference delay, and this is a recognized alternative.
+
+#### 6.2.2.2 Interval-based limits on packet delay variation
+
+One method for summarizing the packet delay variation experienced by a population of packets is to pre-specify a delay variation interval, e.g., $\pm 30$ milliseconds, and then observe the percentage of individual packet delay variations that fall inside and outside of that interval. If the $\pm 30$ millisecond interval were used, application with fixed buffer sizes of at or near 60 milliseconds would then know approximately how many packets would cause buffer over- or underflow.
+
+NOTE – If this method is used for summarizing packet delay variation, the delay variant of individual packets should be calculated using the definition (using the average delay as nominal) in 6.2.2.1, instead of the definition of 6.2.2. Using the definition of 6.2.2, the pre-selected interval (e.g., the $\pm 30$ milliseconds) might occasionally be centred on an unusually large or small value.
+
+An objective for packet delay variation could be established by choosing a lower bound for the percentage of individual packet delay variations that fall within a pre-specified interval using the minimum delay as nominal. For example, " $\geq 95\%$ of packet delay variations should be within the interval $[0 \text{ ms}, +30 \text{ ms}]$ ".
+
+#### **6.2.2.3 Quantile-based limits on packet delay variation**
+
+An alternative for summarizing the delay variation of a population of packets is to select upper and lower quantiles of the delay variation distribution and then measure the distance between those quantiles. For example, select the 99.9% ile and then 0.1% ile, make measurements, and observe the difference between the delay variation values at these two quantiles. This example would help application designers decide how to design for no more than 1% total buffer over- and underflow.
+
+An objective for packet delay variation could be established by choosing an upper bound for the difference between pre-specified quantiles of the delay variation distribution. For example, "The difference between the 99.1% ile and the 0.1% ile of the packet delay variation should be no more than 100 milliseconds".
+
+#### **6.2.2.4 Secondary Parameters for packet delay variation**
+
+One or more parameters that capture the effect of packet delay variations on different applications may be useful. It may be appropriate to differentiate the (typically small) packet-to-packet delay variations from the potentially larger discontinuities in delay that can result from a change in the routing. Appendix II/Y.1540 describes additional delay variation parameters.
+
+### **6.2.3 Round-Trip Packet Transfer Delay**
+
+Round Trip Packet Transfer Delay (RTPTD) is defined as the sum of the one-way delays (PTD) for two LSPs. The pair of LSPs must exist between two MPs at the opposite ends of a basic section or NSE.
+
+Since PTD is the time, $(t_2 - t_1)$ between the occurrence of two corresponding packet reference events, the RTPTD only includes the packet transfer time in each direction. The time required to generate or re-generate a packet must not be included. In practice, this issue has been addressed by adding multiple timestamps in test packets (for example, see the Timestamp Request/Reply format in RFC 792).
+
+## **6.3 Packet Error Ratio (PER)**
+
+Packet error ratio is the ratio of total errored packet outcomes to the total of successful packet transfer outcomes plus errored packet outcomes in a population of interest.
+
+## **6.4 Packet Loss Ratio (PLR)**
+
+Packet loss ratio is the ratio of total lost packet outcomes to total transmitted packets in a population of interest.
+
+## **6.5 Spurious Packet Rate (SPR)**
+
+Spurious packet rate at an egress MP is the total number of spurious packets observed at that egress MP during a specified time interval divided by the time interval duration (equivalently, the number of spurious packets per service-second).1
+
+## **6.6 Packet Severe Loss Block Ratio (PSLBR)**
+
+A packet severe loss block ratio is the ratio of the packet severe loss block outcomes to total blocks in a population of interest.
+
+NOTE – This parameter can identify path changes due to failures routing updates, and may cause degradation to user applications.
+
+---
+
+1 Since the mechanisms that cause spurious packets are expected to have little to do with the number of packets transmitted across the sections under test, this performance parameter is not expressed as a ratio, only as a rate.
+
+## 6.7 Recovery Time
+
+The count of successive $T_{lb}$ that form a Consecutive SLB outcome at ingress $MP_0$ is defined as the Recovery Time.
+
+NOTE – As implied by its name, this parameter attempts to capture any form of transient event that interrupts the packet transfer on an LSP for more than one second. Such events may occur when "fast" recovery mechanisms do not restore connectivity with sufficiently small loss ratio.
+
+# 7 Availability
+
+MPLS service availability is applicable to edge-to-edge service, basic sections and NSE.
+
+The availability function (defined below) serves to classify the total scheduled service time for an MPLS service into available and unavailable periods. On the basis of this classification, both percent MPLS availability and percent MPLS unavailability are defined. Finally, a two-state model of MPLS service availability serves as the basis for defining related availability parameters.
+
+NOTE – Unless otherwise noted by a service provider, the scheduled service time for MPLS service is assumed to be 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
+
+This service function evaluates availability for the following uses:
+
+- connection-oriented packet transfer services;
+- continuous stream real-time applications, such as voice and video;
+- high-volume interactive packet services, where suspension of packet transfer may cause customer equipment to attempt restoration using alternate networks.
+
+We note that even on connectionless packet transfer networks some fraction of the total may be connection-oriented traffic. Thus, we define a single availability function.
+
+## 7.1 Availability service function for connection-oriented services
+
+Connection-oriented services require a more continuous packet transfer than other packet services. We have defined a Severe Loss Block (SLB) outcome where the value of time interval $T_{lb}$ is (provisionally) set at 1 second, and the value of the loss threshold $s_l$ is provisionally set at 0.15. Evaluation of successive blocks (time intervals) should be non-overlapping.
+
+Relative to a particular MPLS Ingress Node and Egress Node pair, the availability for *a basic section or an NSE in the specific-ingress case*, is evaluated as follows:
+
+The onset of unavailability begins with the occurrence of ten consecutive SLBs. These ten seconds are part of unavailable time. A period of unavailability ends with the occurrence of ten consecutive seconds, none of which are SLB. These ten seconds are part of available time. The ten-second criteria are supported using a sliding window with one-second granularity.
+
+## 7.2 Availability parameters
+
+### 7.2.1 Percent MPLS service unavailability (PIU)
+
+The percentage of total scheduled service time that is categorized as unavailable using the MPLS service availability function.
+
+### 7.2.2 Percent MPLS service availability (PIA)
+
+The percentage of total scheduled service time that is categorized as available using the MPLS service availability function.
+
+$$PIU = 100 - PIA$$
+
+NOTE – Because the PLR typically increases with increasing offered load from SRC to DST, the likelihood of exceeding the threshold $s^1$ increases with increasing offered load. Therefore, PIA values are likely to be smaller when the demand for capacity between SRC and DST is higher.
+
+# **8 Security**
+
+This Recommendation does not specify a protocol. Hence, there are a few areas where security issues may arise, and all are associated with implementation of the performance parameters in measurement systems.
+
+Measurement systems that assess the performance of networks according to the parameter definitions defined in this Recommendation should limit the measurement traffic to appropriate levels to avoid abuse (e.g., Denial of Service Attack). Administrations or Operators should agree on acceptable levels of measurement traffic in advance.
+
+Systems that monitor user traffic for the purpose of measurement must maintain the confidentiality of user information.
+
+Systems that attempt to make measurements may employ techniques (e.g., cryptographic hash) to determine if additional traffic has been inserted by an attacker appearing to be part of the population of interest.
+
+# **BIBLIOGRAPHY**
+
+- IETF RFC 792: Internet Control Message Protocol, *J. Postel*, September 1981.
+- Detecting MPLS Data Plane Failures, *IETF work in progress*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and Next Generation Networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1710**
+
+(11/2002)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Operation, administration and
+maintenance
+
+# --- **Requirements for Operation & Maintenance functionality for MPLS networks**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710**
+
+# **Requirements for Operation & Maintenance functionality for MPLS networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation provides the motivations and requirements for user-plane OAM (Operation and Maintenance) functionality for Multiprotocol Label Switched (MPLS) networks.
+
+### **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710 was revised by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 8 November 2002.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Defect, failure, LSP, MPLS, network performance, OAM, security, SLA.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2003
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Symbols and abbreviations ..... | 1 |
+| 5 Introduction ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Motivations for MPLS OAM functions..... | 2 |
+| 7 Requirements for MPLS OAM functions..... | 3 |
+
+
+
+## ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710
+
+# Requirements for Operation & Maintenance functionality for MPLS networks
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the motivations and requirements for user-plane OAM (Operation and Maintenance) [1] functionality for Multiprotocol Label Switched (MPLS) networks. MPLS OAM is designed to be independent of services.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [1] ITU-T Recommendation I.610 (1999), *B-ISDN operation and maintenance principles and functions*.
+- [2] ITU-T Recommendation M.20 (1992), *Maintenance philosophy for telecommunication networks*.
+- [3] ITU-T Recommendation G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [4] IETF RFC 3032 (2001), *MPLS Label Stack Encoding*.
+- [5] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation introduces some functional architecture terminology that is required to discuss the network components associated with OAM. Since functional architecture terminology may not be familiar to all readers, the relevant terms are defined below.
+
+**3.1 defect:** Interruption of the capability of a transport entity (e.g. network connection) to transfer user or OAM information [2].
+
+**3.2 failure:** Termination of the capability of a transport entity to transfer user or OAM information. A failure can be caused by a persisting defect [2].
+
+## 4 Symbols and abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations.
+
+| | |
+|-----|----------------------------|
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| FR | Frame Relay |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LSN | Label Switching Node |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------|
+| MPLS | Multiprotocol Label Switched |
+| NMS | Network Management System |
+| OAM | Operation and Maintenance |
+| OTN | Optical Transport Network |
+| SDH | Synchronous Digital Hierarchy |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+
+## 5 Introduction
+
+The motivations for this Recommendation arose from the need, expressed by network operators, for architecturally correct defect handling of MPLS Label Switched Paths (LSPs), noting that LSPs can support many different client layer networks (eg IP, FR, ATM) and can in turn be supported on many different server layer networks (eg SDH/SONET, OTNs). User-plane OAM mechanisms are also required to verify that LSPs maintain correct connectivity and can deliver customer traffic against measurable availability and network performance Service Level Agreements (SLAs).
+
+NOTE – Network performance metrics are not covered by this Recommendation.
+
+The requirements presented in this Recommendation include (but are not limited to):
+
+- Mechanisms to efficiently detect, identify, and localize defects arising within the MPLS layer networks.
+- Mechanisms for defect notification and defect handling, e.g. suppress alarm storms in nested LSP scenarios.
+- Specification of the criteria for defining the availability (entry/exit) of LSPs and the relationship of availability and network performance metrics.
+- Provide a trigger mechanism for protection switching when failures occur.
+
+## 6 Motivations for MPLS OAM functions
+
+It is recognized that OAM functionality is important in public networks for ease of network operation, for verifying network performance, and to reduce operational costs. OAM functionality is especially important for networks that are required to deliver (and hence be measurable against) network performance and availability objectives.
+
+The major motivations for MPLS OAM are further discussed below.
+
+- a) MPLS introduces a unique layer network capability, and hence there will be failure modes that are only relevant to MPLS layer networks. Lower-layer (server-layer) or higher-layer (client-layer) OAM mechanisms of non-MPLS technologies cannot act as a substitute for MPLS layer OAM functionality. This observation is also critical to ensure network layer technologies can evolve independently. The MPLS nesting capability (realized through label stack encoding [5]) allows the creation of multiple layer networks in their own right, within the framework of the MPLS technology. It should be noted that there is no fixed hierarchy in MPLS and, in theory (at least), the nesting depth can be unlimited. MPLS user-plane defects are those that are encountered during the transport of customer traffic.
+
+Although MPLS control-plane OAM functions may be available (though not always), Network Operators cannot rely exclusively on the control-plane to detect all user-plane defects. Some reasons for this are:
+
+- The user-plane carrying customer traffic and the control-plane carrying the signalling protocols might not necessarily have the same routing and they will certainly not be subject to the same processing within nodes or indeed the same failure mechanisms.
+
+Therefore, the behaviour of the control-plane protocols, or the control-plane it is transported over, cannot be relied upon to indicate the health of the user-plane carrying customer traffic.
+
+- It is possible for an MPLS network not to have control-plane signalling at all, i.e. when LSPs are set up statically.
+- The control-plane itself could fail but this might not have any impact on the customer traffic carrying user-plane.
+
+Further, as is required for the case of supporting (and being supported by) different client (and server layer) technologies, it is essential that the MPLS user-plane OAM mechanisms are independent of the control-plane protocols to allow each set of protocols to evolve independently. Indeed, in the general case, it should be observed that both the user-plane carrying the control-plane traffic, and the control-plane protocols themselves, need their own independent OAM mechanisms.
+
+The key requirement that should be deduced from the above discussion, is that operators want a single MPLS OAM solution that is architecturally correct and control-plane independent under all network scenarios.
+
+- b) Operators need an ability to determine LSP availability and network performance noting that network performance metrics are only meaningful when the LSP is in the available state. This information may also be used for accounting and billing purposes to ensure that customers are not inappropriately charged for degraded service or service outages.
+- c) Reduce operating costs, by allowing efficient detection handling, and diagnosis of defects. Lack of automatic defect detection and handling forces operators to increase their engineering and support workforce, hence increasing overall operating costs.
+- d) Reduce the duration of defects and thus improve the availability performance.
+- e) Demonstrate a commitment to providing customer traffic security/confidentiality by ensuring that any defects that result in misdirected customer traffic are detectable/diagnosable and lead to appropriate actions, e.g. squelching of traffic where relevant.
+- f) Minimize the number of defects that are not automatically detected and still require a customer to report a problem. Pro-active maintenance actions like this also help drive down operating costs by minimizing the opportunity for incorrect defect diagnosis, and (like the previous item) they also promote customer trust of an operator.
+- g) Allow differentiation of defects arising from lower layers from those originating from within the concerned LSP, in order to achieve more intelligent protection-switching actions.
+
+## **7 Requirements for MPLS OAM functions**
+
+The following requirements should be satisfied by MPLS OAM:
+
+- a) Both on-demand and continuous connectivity verification of LSPs to confirm that defects do not exist on the monitored LSPs.
+- b) If a defect occurs, it is necessary to detect it, diagnose it, localize it, notify the NMS and take corrective actions appropriate to the type of defect. The primary objective here is to reduce operating costs by minimizing service interruptions, operational repair times and operational resource. In some cases, service interruptions can be minimized by providing the network with sufficient information to take corrective actions to bypass the defect; for example, through protection switching or restoration.
+- c) The OAM mechanisms provided should ensure (as far as reasonably practicable) that customers should not have to act as failure detectors. It is therefore necessary that defects be detected and notified automatically.
+
+- d) At least the following defect types should be automatically detected, with well-defined entry/exit criteria and appropriate consequent actions:
+ - simple loss of LSP connectivity, be this from below or within the MPLS fabric (it should also be possible to distinguish between these);
+ - swapped LSPs;
+ - unintended LSP replication of one LSP's traffic into another LSP's traffic (with or without the offending LSP's traffic being impacted);
+ - unintended self-replication (e.g., looping, DoS attack).
+- e) A defect event in a given layer network should not cause multiple alarm events to be raised, nor cause unnecessary corrective actions to be taken in any higher level client-layer networks. This applies to all client layer network types that an MPLS LSP is required to carry. There should clearly never be any impact to network layers below the level at which the defect occurs.
+- f) OAM functions should be simple and easily configured (ideally, automatically) to allow efficient scaling to large size networks.
+- g) The use of MPLS OAM functions should be optional for the operator. Network operators should be able to choose which OAM functions to use and which LSPs they apply them to.
+- h) MPLS OAM functions should be backward compatible. Label Switching Nodes (LSNs) that do not support such functions should silently discard the OAM packets without disturbing the user traffic or causing unnecessary actions [5].
+- i) There should be a capability to measure availability and network performance of an LSP. Since network performance metrics are only meaningful when the LSP is in the available state, then the entry/exit of the available state, and all appropriate consequent action (like the starting/stopping of network performance metric aggregation), should be specified.
+- j) The OAM functionality of an MPLS layer network should not be dependent on any specific server or client-layer network. This is architecturally critical to ensure that layer networks can evolve (or new/old layer networks be added/removed) without impacting other layer networks.
+- k) The user-plane OAM functionality of an MPLS layer should be sufficiently independent on any specific control-plane such that changes in the control plane do not impose changes in user-plane OAM (including the case of no control-plane). Like the previous requirement, this is also architecturally critical to ensure that user-plane and control-plane protocols can evolve (or new/old control-plane protocols added/removed) without impacting each other.
+- l) Connectivity status assessment should not be dependent on the dynamic behaviour of customer traffic.
+- m) The OAM function should perform reliably even under degraded link conditions, e.g. error events. This requires bit error correction or detection mechanisms for OAM packets.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
+
+
+
+A standard 1D barcode consisting of vertical black bars of varying widths on a white background. Below the bars, the number '\* 2 3 0 5 1 \*' is printed in a small, sans-serif font.
+
+Barcode with the number \* 2 3 0 5 1 \* below it.
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+
+
+ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe.
+
+INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.1713**
+
+(03/2004)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – Operation, administration and
+maintenance
+
+# --- **Misbranching detection for MPLS networks**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1713
+
+---
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1713**
+
+# **Misbranching detection for MPLS networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+This Recommendation provides mechanisms for user-plane OAM (Operation and Maintenance) functionality in MPLS networks to augment ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 according to the requirements and principles given in ITU-T Rec. Y.1710. The current version of this Recommendation is designed primarily to support point-to-point and multipoint-to-point LSPs independent of the method of establishment.
+
+## **Source**
+
+ITU-T Recommendation Y.1713 was approved on 15 March 2004 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) under the ITU-T Recommendation A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Defect, failure, MPLS, OAM.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database.
+
+© ITU 2004
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | | Page |
+|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope | 1 |
+| 2 | References | 1 |
+| 3 | Bibliography | 1 |
+| 4 | Definitions | 2 |
+| 5 | Abbreviations | 3 |
+| 6 | Applicability and overview of functionality | 3 |
+| 7 | Identification of OAM packets from normal user-plane traffic | 4 |
+| 8 | OAM payload | 4 |
+| 9 | Handling of errored OAM packets | 4 |
+| 10 | FEC connectivity verification | 4 |
+| 11 | Defect type codepoints | 5 |
+| 12 | CV and FEC-CV source and sink processing | 5 |
+| 13 | FEC-CV processing at intermediate LSRs | 6 |
+| 14 | Common encoding rules | 6 |
+| 15 | Egress processing | 8 |
+| 16 | Coding and processing rules for RFC 3036 (LDP) LSPs | 10 |
+| 17 | Coding and processing rules for RFC 3209 (RSVP-TE) LSPs | 11 |
+| 18 | Coding and processing rules for RFC 3212 (CR-LDP) LSPs | 12 |
+| 19 | Polynomial specification | 12 |
+| 20 | Entry/Exit criteria and consequent actions | 13 |
+| 21 | Security aspects | 14 |
+| | Appendix I – Coding and processing rules for RFC 2547 (BGP/VPN) LSPs | 15 |
+| I.1 | Scenario 1: Aggregated label LSP | 15 |
+| I.2 | Scenario 2: Non-aggregated label LSPs | 15 |
+| | Appendix II – Use of FEC-CV to check connectivity and measure route availability | 16 |
+| | Appendix III – Setting $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ | 17 |
+| | Appendix IV – Issues with ECMP | 18 |
+| | Appendix V – Issues with PHP | 21 |
+
+
+
+## ITU-T Recommendation Y.1713
+
+# Misbranching detection for MPLS networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides mechanisms for user-plane OAM (Operation and Maintenance) functionality in MPLS networks according to the requirements and principles given in ITU-T Rec. Y.1710. The current version of this Recommendation is designed primarily to support point-to-point and multipoint-to-point LSPs independent of the method of establishment.
+
+The detection mechanism utilizes an additional OAM packet (known as FEC-CV) which uses protocol conventions in common with ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 (use of OAM alert label, the ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 administered PDU and code points). Usage and applicability is outlined in clause 6.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [1] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1711 (2004), *Operation & Maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks*.
+- [2] ITU-T Recommendation G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [3] ITU-T Recommendation M.20 (1992), *Maintenance philosophy for telecommunication networks*.
+- [4] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1710 (2002), *Requirements for Operation & Maintenance functionality for MPLS networks*.
+- [5] IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*. Category: Standards Track.
+- [6] IETF RFC 3209 (2001), *RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP Tunnels*. Category: Standards Track.
+- [7] IETF RFC 3212 (2002), *Constraint-Based LSP Setup using LDP*. Category: Standards Track.
+- [8] IETF RFC 3429 (2002), *Assignment of the 'OAM Alert Label' for Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture (MPLS) Operation and Maintenance (OAM) Functions*. Category: Informational.
+
+# 3 Bibliography
+
+- [9] IETF RFC 2547 (1999), *BGP/MPLS VPNs*. Category: Informational.
+
+# 4 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation introduces some terminology, which is required to discuss the functional network components associated with OAM. These definitions are consistent with G.805 terminology.
+
+**4.1 backward direction:** The backward direction is opposite to the forward direction.
+
+**4.2 client/server (relationship between layer networks):** [2] A term referring to the transparent transport of a client (i.e., higher) layer link connection by a server (i.e., lower) layer network trail.
+
+**4.3 defect:** [3] Interruption of the capability of a transport entity (e.g., network connection) to transfer user or OAM information. This Recommendation defines 2 types of defects and references defects defined in ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 (the detailed specifications are given later):
+
+dLOCV: Loss of Connectivity Verification defect
+
+dExcess: Receiving excess rate of CV
+
+dServer: Server layer defect
+
+Any server layer defect arising from a non-MPLS layer technology below the lowest MPLS layer network
+
+dFECfilter\_Mismatch: FEC filter mismatch defect
+
+dFECfilter\_Mismerge: FEC filter mismerge defect
+
+dTSSI\_Mismatch: Trail Termination Source Identifier Mismatch defect
+
+dTTSI\_Mismerge: Trail Termination Source Identifier Mismerge defect
+
+dUnknown: Unknown defect in the MPLS network
+
+dPeerME: Unspecified failure in a peer maintenance entity.
+
+**4.4 failure:** [3] Termination of the capability of a transport entity to transfer user or OAM information. A failure can be caused by a persisting defect.
+
+**4.5 forward direction:** The forward direction is the direction that traffic and the CV OAM packets flow on an LSP.
+
+**4.6 link connection:** A partition of a layer N trail that exists between two logically adjacent switching points within the layer N network.
+
+**4.7 subnetwork:** [2] A subnetwork is a contiguous topological region of a network delimited by its set of peripheral access points, and is characterized by the possible routing across the subnetwork between those access points. A network is the largest subnetwork and a node is the smallest subnetwork (at least in practical physical terms, though there are smaller subnetworks within nodes).
+
+**4.8 trail:** [2] A generic transport entity at layer N which is composed of a payload field (which can carry a packet from a client higher layer N-1 trail entity) with specific overhead added to ensure the forwarding integrity of the trail transport entity at layer N.
+
+**4.9 trail termination point:** [2] A source or sink point of a trail at layer N, at which the trail overhead is added or removed respectively. A trail termination point must have a unique means of identification within the layer network.
+
+**4.10 user-plane:** This refers to the set of traffic forwarding components through which traffic flows. CV or FEC-CV OAM packets are periodically inserted into this traffic flow to monitor the health of those forwarding components. The user-plane is also sometimes called the data-plane (especially in IETF). Note that control-plane protocols (e.g., for signalling or routing) and management-plane protocols will require their own user-plane, and their user-plane may or may not be congruent (to varying degrees) with the traffic bearing user-plane.
+
+# 5 Abbreviations
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| BDI | Backward Defect Indication |
+| BIP | Bit Interleaved Parity |
+| CR-LDP | Constraint-based Routing using Label Distribution Protocol |
+| CV | Connectivity Verification |
+| CV Packet | Connectivity Verification Packet |
+| DL | Defect Location |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| DT | Defect Type |
+| ECMP | Equal Cost Multi-Path |
+| FDI | Forward Defect Indication |
+| FEC | Forwarding Equivalence Class |
+| FFD | Fast Failure Detection |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| NMS | Network Management System |
+| OAM | Operations and Maintenance |
+| PHP | Penultimate Hop Popping |
+| RSVP | Resource Reservation Protocol |
+| TTL | Time to Live |
+| TTSI | Trail Termination Source Identifier |
+
+# 6 Applicability and overview of functionality
+
+In addition to the potential of forwarding problems misdirecting traffic within a specific MPLS level, MPLS provides the ability to define arbitrary hierarchy, but does not necessarily provide for synchronization mechanisms to ensure all hierarchical dependencies are satisfied prior to insertion of traffic into an LSP. A common example would be any overlay on an LDP [5] network that used independent label distribution mode. In independent mode an LSR in the core of the network may advertise a label binding for an FEC immediately upon learning of the FEC via any means (typically via an IGP advertisement) and this may be prior to having a viable downstream label binding or having LDP properly configured on all links that would be expected to be traversed by the LSP. This means that MPLS connectivity to the network egress for the FEC that applications of the MPLS level may depend on does not necessarily exist. The result is that the LDP label is popped in the core of the network, and the popping LSR may attempt to forward the application label. This may be a transient situation but is indicative of the types of problems that may occur.
+
+Therefore the ability to ubiquitously detect problems in the network requires the ability to detect misbranching independent of the specific application. Currently the Y.1711 CV PDU [1] permits this to be performed for p2p LSPs where the specific ingress is known, and FEC-CV PDU permits this to be performed for p2p and mp2p LSPs where the set of ingresses is not necessarily known.
+
+In summary the FEC-CV flow is generated at an unmonitored LSP's ingress LSR with a nominal frequency of 1 every $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ seconds (where $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ is a subnetwork wide configured value). The FEC-CV PDU contains a network unique access point identifier (TTSI) that identifies the PDU insertion point, and a common fixed length encoding of LSP function known as a FEC filter. This permits the LSP egress to verify correct forwarding (no misdirection) of the LSP ingress points according to LSP function. This extends Y.1711 misbranch/mismerge detection to:
+
+- i) MPLS LSPs where, as a function of the control plane, there is not a strict binding between access points and LSP egresses; and
+- ii) unmonitored LSPs where the egress does not have knowledge of the ingress access point TTSI.
+
+Common usage is to bind single FEC elements to LSPs; however, the FEC-CV PDU will support multiple FEC elements for those operators that choose to use multiple FEC elements per LSP. The fixed length encoding has practical limits with respect to the number of FEC elements that can be encoded in a single probe (which are outlined in the coding and processing rules clauses of this Recommendation). It is assumed that an LSR offering multiple FEC per label bindings will use multiple labels when required to offer more FECs than can usefully be encoded in a single FEC-CV PDU.
+
+# 7 Identification of OAM packets from normal user-plane traffic
+
+This Recommendation uses the globally reserved label value, herein referred to as the 'OAM Alert Label' defined in [8] and ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 [1].
+
+# 8 OAM payload
+
+OAM payload is as per ITU-T Rec. Y.1711.
+
+# 9 Handling of errored OAM packets
+
+Handling of errored OAM packets is as per ITU-T Rec. Y.1711.
+
+# 10 FEC connectivity verification
+
+The FEC Connectivity Verification (FEC-CV) function may be used in place of the CV when additional or alternate defect detection capability is required, in particular detecting problems with the ingress FTN or problems with other associated configuration information bound to the LSP. In this regard, the FEC-CV may be used on LSPs exclusively for the purpose of detecting FTN/configuration problems or may be combined with other sink processing functions to add FTN and/or configuration defects to the set of defects for which monitoring is performed.
+
+FEC-CV and CV may not be used interchangeably, the LSP ingress is configured to use one OR the other, not both. The LSP egress will treat receiving an unexpected function type as a dTTSI/FEC\_Mismerge or dTTSI/FEC\_Mismatch defect depending on the near end processing function.
+
+The FEC-CV payload structure is similar to the CV payload structure with inclusion of the Bloom Filter termed the "FEC Filter". The FEC Filter is an unstructured octet array.
+
+| Function Type
(08 hex) | Reserved
(all 00 hex) | LSP Trail Termination Source Identifier (TTSI), 16 octets v6 LSN ID
+ 4 octets LSP tunnel ID | FEC filter | Padding
(all 00 hex) | BIP-16 |
+|---------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------|----------|
+| 1 octet | 3 octets | 20 octets | 16 octets | 2 octets | 2 octets |
+
+**Figure 1/Y.1713 – FEC-CV payload structure**
+
+FEC-CV probes are inserted into LSPs at a configurable rate ( $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ ). Implementations should, as a minimum, support insertion rates ranging from one every second to one per minute and may permit longer insertion intervals.
+
+# 11 Defect type codepoints
+
+| Defect type | DT code (hex) | Meaning |
+|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| dFECfilter_Mismatch | 02 05 | dFECfilter_Mismatch is due to unexpected FEC filter observed in the incoming FEC-CV OAM packets OR due to unexpected Y.1711 CV or FFD OAM packet. Note that dFECfilter_Mismatch takes precedence over dLOCV defect condition which is also present. |
+| dFECfilter_Mismerge | 02 06 | dFECfilter_Mismerge is due to both unexpected and expected FEC filter observed in incoming FEC-CV OAM packet OR due to unexpected Y.1711 CV or FFD OAM packet received with expected FEC-CV OAM packet. |
+
+# 12 CV and FEC-CV source and sink processing
+
+CV, FFD\_CV and FEC-CV source generation and CV/FFD-CV/FEC-CV sink processing should be considered as independent functions. This functional decoupling allows operators the flexibility to use different degrees of LSP monitoring on a per LSP basis, e.g., say between those LSPs deemed as 'important' and those LSPs deemed 'less-important', or between LSPs that full defect processing and availability measurements can be performed on and those on which only a subset of defect detection can be implemented on by reason of the control plane used (e.g., LDP).
+
+CV and FEC-CV generation is a relatively trivial function (since it never varies) and is much simpler than CV/FEC-CV sink processing. Each form of CV has specific applicability and usage in the network can be configured in a complementary fashion. The expected usage is that CV is generated on P2P LSPs that have no requirement for FTN verification, and FEC-CV is used for P2P LSPs requiring FTN verification and with LSPs signalled via the use of the LDP protocol.
+
+Hence, CV OR FEC-CV generation could be enabled on all (or most) of the LSPs.
+
+The sink processing for CV could be decomposed into several 'degree classes' per LSP such as:
+
+- 1) No CV processing. Hence no defect processing, no availability measurements and no QoS measurements.
+- 2) A simple check of CV arrivals for unexpected function type (e.g., FEC\_CV) but without examining the TTSI (though it is assumed the TTSI is still generated). This cannot provide totally reliable connectivity verification since it cannot detect certain defects, and only provides partial detection of dMismerge/dMismatch.
+- 3) Only a very simple check for arrival of CV packets with an unexpected TTSI or unexpected function type (FEC-CV). This could be used on less important LSPs as a simple method for detecting leakage of important LSP traffic (into the less important LSP). However, there might be no other defect processing done (e.g., dLOCV) and no availability measurements.
+- 4) Full defect processing but no availability measurements. Note that if availability measurements are not being done, then QoS measurements are also strictly not possible (since these should only relate to when the LSP is in the available state).
+- 5) Full defect processing and availability measurements (this now also allows the option of QoS measurements too).
+
+Similarly the sink processing for FEC-CV could be decomposed into several 'degree classes' per LSP:
+
+- 1) No FEC-CV processing. Hence no defect processing, no availability measurements and no QoS measurements.
+- 2) A simple check of FEC-CV arrivals including unexpected function type (e.g., CV) without examining the FEC Filter or TTSI (though it is assumed that both are still generated). This cannot provide totally reliable connectivity verification since it cannot detect most defects, and only provides partial detection of dMismmerge/dMismatch.
+- 3) Only a very simple check for arrival of FEC-CV packets with an unexpected function type or unexpected FEC Filter1. This could be used on LDP LSPs as a simple method for detecting leakage or FTN misconfiguration.
+- 4) Full defect processing (including verification of both the FEC Filter and TTSI) but no availability measurements. Note that if availability measurements are not being done, then QoS measurements are also strictly not possible (since these should only relate to when the LSP is in the available state).
+- 5) Full defect processing (including verification of both the FEC Filter and TTSI) and availability measurements (this now also allows the option of QoS measurements too).
+
+# **13 FEC-CV processing at intermediate LSRs**
+
+FEC-CV PDUs normally are transferred by intermediate LSRs without inspection. LSRs inserting FEC-CV may choose to use manipulation of TTL values to limit the number of hops traversed by an FEC-CV probe and therefore probes may terminate at intermediate LSRs.
+
+When an FEC-CV probe terminates at an intermediate LSR due to a TTL exhaust condition and is associated with a valid LSP, the LSR will only perform a check for the dFECfilter\_Mismmerge or dFECfilter\_Mismatch defect conditions. When such a defect is detected at an intermediate LSR, the defect state is only considered to apply to the portion of the LSP that is upstream from the detecting LSR. This would translate to suppression of traffic associated with a specific incoming label map (ILM) entry.
+
+When there is no incoming label map for the LSP (no-ILM condition) the management system is notified and the TTSI may be retained to assist in diagnosis, but no other consequent actions are possible.
+
+# **14 Common encoding rules**
+
+A filter entry is a filter representation of a single token of information. A filter entry is specified as an application specific number of filter offsets that correspond to specific bits in the FEC filter.
+
+Filter offsets are expressed as a single value in the range 0-127. Each filter offset represents a single bit in the 16 byte FEC filter. The upper 4 bits of the offset constitute an octet offset from the first byte of the filter, and the lower 3 bits of the offset constitute a bit offset in the octet, zero referring to the LSB and 7 referring to the MSB. A filter is initially zeroed, and the bit corresponding to each filter offset is ORed with the filter.
+
+### **Generalized coding**
+
+Coding rules are based primarily on the maximum number of filter entries that the filter is expected to carry for a given application.
+
+---
+
+1 Note that TTSI for LDP-LSPs is information only useful to initiate diagnosis once a dMismatch/dMismmerge has been detected.
+
+Filter offsets are generated from the CRC-32 result. Generalized rules are provided for the generation of 2, 3, 4 and 5 filter offsets from CRC-32. Coding rules are designed to (in general) preserve the hamming distance of the CRC via inclusion of the majority of information.
+
+Although not used in this Recommendation, specification of two and five offsets is included for applications that may require either:
+
+- 1) Greater than 16 Filter Entries per LSP (2 filter offsets);
+- 2) One filter entry per LSP (5 filter offsets).
+
+### *Two offsets*
+
+Two filter offsets are generated by XORing together with the lower seven bits of the most significant and least significant octet pairs.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the generation of 2 filter offsets from CRC-32. A 32-bit CRC-32 register is shown with bits 31 down to 0. The most significant octet (bits 31-24) and the least significant octet (bits 7-0) are highlighted. The lower 7 bits of the most significant octet (bits 31-25) are XORed with the lower 7 bits of the least significant octet (bits 7-0) to produce a 7-bit filter offset. The diagram shows two such XOR operations, resulting in two 7-bit filter offsets. The first offset is labeled 'X Unused' and the second is labeled 'Y.1713\_F02'.
+
+**Figure 2/Y.1713 – Generation of 2 filter offsets from CRC-32**
+
+### *Three offsets*
+
+Three filter offsets are generated by segmenting the CRC-32 into three 10-bit entities, then XORing the 7th, 8th and 9th bits with the 4th, 5th and 6th respectively.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the generation of 3 filter offsets from CRC-32. A 32-bit CRC-32 register is shown with bits 31 down to 0. The register is segmented into three 10-bit entities. The 7th, 8th, and 9th bits of each entity are XORed with the 4th, 5th, and 6th bits respectively to produce three 7-bit filter offsets. The diagram shows three such XOR operations, resulting in three 7-bit filter offsets. The first offset is labeled 'X Unused' and the second is labeled 'Y.1713\_F03'.
+
+**Figure 3/Y.1713 – Generation of 3 filter offsets from CRC-32**
+
+### *Four filter offsets*
+
+Four filter offsets are generated via taking the lower 7 bits of each octet in the CRC-32 and XORing the 8th bit of each octet with the 7th.
+
+
+
+Y.1713\_F04
+
+Diagram showing the generation of 4 filter offsets from a 32-bit CRC-32. The CRC-32 is divided into four 7-bit segments. Each segment is XORed with a 7-bit offset. The remaining 4 bits of the CRC-32 are used as the 4 LSB of the 5th offset. The CRC-32 is then segmented on 9-bit boundaries and parity is performed on each to compute the upper 3 bits of the 5th offset.
+
+**Figure 4/Y.1713 – Generation of 4 filter offsets from CRC-32**
+
+### *Five filter offsets*
+
+Five filter offsets are generated by segmenting the CRC-32 into four 7-bit offsets and the remaining lower 4 bits are used as the 4 LSB of the 5th offset. The CRC-32 is then segmented on 9-bit boundaries parity performed on each to compute the upper 3 bits of the 5th offset.
+
+
+
+Y.1713\_F05
+
+Diagram showing the generation of 5 filter offsets from a 32-bit CRC-32. The CRC-32 is divided into four 7-bit segments. Each segment is XORed with a 7-bit offset. The remaining 4 bits of the CRC-32 are used as the 4 LSB of the 5th offset. The CRC-32 is then segmented on 9-bit boundaries and parity is performed on each to compute the upper 3 bits of the 5th offset.
+
+**Figure 5/Y.1713 – Generation of 5 filter offsets from CRC-32**
+
+# **15 Egress processing**
+
+Egress processing falls into one of two styles.
+
+### 1) *Reasonable subset*
+
+The egress will AND the received ingress filter with the logical inverse of the egress filter. A non-zero result indicates a dFECfilter\_Mismatch or dFECfilter\_Mismerge defect. If the egress has withdrawn a FEC element, it may tolerate a mismatch for an unspecified amount of time, and it MAY maintain a second filter containing the cumulative set of FEC elements offered for the LSP. If ANDing the received filter with the logical inverse of the cumulative filter yields a non-zero result, it indicates that the mismatch is not related to the withdrawal of the FEC element and dFECfilter\_Mismerge/dFECfilter\_Mismatch defect state may be entered immediately.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Start((Start)) --> D1{Ingress AND
+NOT egress = 0?}
+ D1 -- Y --> OK1([OK])
+ D1 -- N --> D2{Ingress AND
+NOT cumulative
+egress = 0?}
+ style D2 stroke-dasharray: 5 5
+ D2 -- Y --> D3{Is time since last
+filter entry
+change > T}
+ D2 -- N --> Defect([Mismerge or
+misbranch
+defect])
+ D3 -- N --> OK1
+ D3 -- Y --> OK2([OK, but control
+plane synch time
+excessive])
+
+```
+
+Y.1713\_F06
+
+Flowchart for 'Reasonable Subset' filter processing. It starts with a 'Start' node, leading to a decision 'Ingress AND NOT egress = 0?'. If 'Y', it goes to 'OK'. If 'N', it goes to a dashed decision 'Ingress AND NOT cumulative egress = 0?'. If 'Y', it goes to 'Is time since last filter entry change > T?'. If 'N', it goes to 'OK'. If 'Y', it goes to 'OK, but control plane synch time excessive'. If 'N' from the dashed decision, it goes to 'Mismerge or misbranch defect'. The label Y.1713\_F06 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6/Y.1713 – "Reasonable Subset" filter processing**
+
+### 2) *Exact match*
+
+The egress will directly compare the received ingress filter with the egress filter. A not-equal result indicates either dFECfilter\_Mismatch/dFECfilter\_Mismerge defect or a recent change has not propagated to the ingress. If the egress has changed the FEC filter, it may tolerate a mismatch for an unspecified amount of time. It MAY further perform filter testing to determine if the ingress filter is a subset of the current egress filter or cumulative egress filter in order to more quickly ascertain whether a genuine mismatch has occurred or is simply an artifact of hysteresis in the control plane. It indicates that the mismatch is not related to the withdrawal of the FEC element and dFECfilter\_Mismerge/Mismatch defect state may be entered immediately.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ Start([Start]) --> D1{Ingress = egress?}
+ D1 -- Y --> OK1([OK])
+ D1 -- N --> D2{Ingress AND NOT egress = 0?}
+ D2 -- Y --> D3{Is time since last filter entry change > T}
+ D2 -- N --> D4{Ingress AND NOT cumulative egress = 0?}
+ D3 -- N --> OK1
+ D3 -- Y --> OK2([OK, but control plane synch time excessive])
+ D4 -- Y --> OK2
+ D4 -- N --> Defect([Mismerge or misbranch defect])
+
+```
+
+Y.1713\_F07
+
+Flowchart for 'Exact Match' filter processing. It starts with a 'Start' oval, leading to a decision diamond 'Ingress = egress?'. If 'Y', it goes to an 'OK' oval. If 'N', it goes to a dashed decision diamond 'Ingress AND NOT egress = 0?'. If 'Y', it goes to another decision diamond 'Is time since last filter entry change > T'. If 'N', it goes to 'OK'. If 'Y', it goes to a third dashed decision diamond 'Ingress AND NOT cumulative egress = 0?'. If 'Y', it goes to 'OK, but control plane synch time excessive'. If 'N', it goes to a final oval 'Mismerge or misbranch defect'. A label 'Y.1713\_F07' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7/Y.1713 – "Exact Match" filter processing**
+
+# 16 Coding and processing rules for RFC 3036 (LDP) LSPs
+
+### *Coding rules for ingress*
+
+Each FEC element (as encoded per RFC 3036 [5] section 3.4.1) that is instantiated in the FTN table for the LSP is encoded as a filter entry consisting of three filter offsets.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ FEC[FEC element]
+ subgraph FilterEntry [Filter entry (3 filter offsets)]
+ FEC
+ end
+
+```
+
+Diagram showing a box labeled 'FEC element' with a bracket underneath it labeled 'Filter entry (3 filter offsets)'.
+
+Y.1713\_F08
+
+**Figure 8/Y.1713 – Filter entry for RFC 3036 LSPs**
+
+### *Coding rules for the egress*
+
+Each FEC element (as encoded per RFC 3036 section 3.4.1) that is offered to LDP peers for the LSP is encoded as a filter entry consisting of three (3) filter offsets.
+
+## *Egress processing*
+
+The egress will perform "reasonable subset" filter processing.
+
+### Limitations
+
+Using these coding rules, an upper limit of 10 FEC elements in a FEC filter is required to ensure greater than 99% probability of detecting all misbranching defects in a network supporting all of the applications outlined in this Recommendation.
+
+### *Insertion guidelines*
+
+In an LDP network, an LSR may have a plurality of paths associated with a given FEC some of which may not be in use at any given time as they are ingresses to non-optimal paths. This is nominally termed "liberal label retention". This Recommendation makes no representations with respect to FEC-CV insertion other than at a minimum FEC-CV insertion should be performed on LSP ingresses currently in use. If connectivity measurement and route availability is to be performed (see Appendix II), FEC-CV generation should only be enabled in the presence of a valid route for the FEC. The LSR may be configured to insert FEC-CV in all paths in order to more fully exercise the set of potential backup paths. Increasing the number of ingresses injecting FEC-CV into the network would permit the $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ to be reduced, as downstream merge points would still be expected to concentrate the arrival rate at the FEC egress points.
+
+## 17 Coding and processing rules for RFC 3209 (RSVP-TE) LSPs
+
+### *Coding rules for ingress*
+
+The ingress PE encodes the tunnel ID and extended tunnel ID extracted from the session object (section 4.6.1 of RFC 3209 [6]) as a filter entry, and the LSP ID extracted from the sender template (section 4.6.2 of RFC 3209) as a filter entry. Both filter entries are composed of 4 filter offsets. If the extended tunnel ID is zero, then the tunnel sender address from the sender template object must be substituted.
+
+During reroute and bandwidth increase procedures (section 4.3.4 of RFC 3209), the filter used contains the tunnel ID/extended tunnel ID filter entry and the old LSP ID filter entry until the RESV message confirming the path with the new LSP ID is received. At this point the ingress revises the filter to contain the tunnel ID/extended tunnel ID filter entry and the new LSP ID filter entry.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph FilterEntry1 [Filter entry 4 filter offsets]
+ A[Tunnel ID] --- B[Extended tunnel ID]
+ end
+ subgraph FilterEntry2 [Filter entry 4 filter offsets]
+ C[LSP ID]
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.1713\_F09
+
+Diagram showing filter entries for RFC 3209. On the left, a box is divided into two sections: 'Tunnel ID' and 'Extended tunnel ID'. A bracket below this box is labeled 'Filter entry (4 filter offsets)'. On the right, a box is labeled 'LSP ID'. A bracket below this box is labeled 'Filter entry (4 filter offsets)'.
+
+**Figure 9/Y.1713 – Filter entries for RFC 3209**
+
+### *Coding rules for the egress*
+
+The egress PE encodes the tunnel ID and extended tunnel ID extracted from the session object as a filter entry, and the LSP ID extracted from the sender template as a filter entry. If the extended tunnel ID is zero, then the tunnel sender address from the sender template object must be substituted. During reroute and bandwidth increase procedure (section 4.3.4 of RFC 3209), upon receipt of a path message with a new LSP ID, both the old and new LSP IDs will be encoded as filter entries along with the tunnel ID and extended tunnel ID so that the change of LSP IDs at the probe origin does not result in an error. Upon receipt of the Path-tear message for the old LSP ID, the filter will be revised to only contain the current LSP ID as a filter entry.
+
+## *Egress processing*
+
+The egress will perform "exact match" processing in normal operation, and "reasonable subset" processing during reroute and bandwidth increase procedures.
+
+### Limitations
+
+Not applicable. The number of filter entries associated with an RFC 3209 LSP is already bounded.
+
+### Insertion guidelines
+
+None.
+
+# 18 Coding and processing rules for RFC 3212 (CR-LDP) LSPs
+
+### Coding rules for ingress and egress LSRs
+
+
+
+Y.1713\_F10
+
+Diagram showing the structure of filter entries for RFC 3212. It consists of three identical blocks stacked vertically. Each block contains a rectangular box at the top labeled 'CR-LSP FEC element', a horizontal brace below it labeled 'Filter entry (3 filter offsets)', a second rectangular box labeled 'FEC element', another horizontal brace labeled 'Filter entry (3 filter offsets)', and a third rectangular box at the bottom labeled 'LSP ID TLV'. A final horizontal brace at the very bottom of the third block is also labeled 'Filter entry (3 filter offsets)'. The label 'Y.1713\_F10' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 10/Y.1713 – Filter entries for RFC 3212**
+
+The LSP ID (section 4.5 of RFC 3212 [7]) and each CR-LSP FEC element (section 4.10 of RFC 3212) and/or LDP FEC element (section 3.4.1 of RFC 3036) is encoded as a filter entry consisting of 3 filter offsets.
+
+### Limitations
+
+Using these coding rules, an upper limit of 10 FEC elements and the LSP ID TLV in a FEC filter is required to ensure greater than 99.9% probability of detecting all misbranching defects in a network supporting all of the applications outlined in this Recommendation.
+
+### Insertion guidelines
+
+None.
+
+# 19 Polynomial specification
+
+The 32-bit CRC used for the generation of FEC-CV filter entries is defined by the following generating polynomial:
+
+$$G(x)^2 = x^{32} + x^{30} + x^{28} + x^{21} + x^{19} + x^{15} + x^{12} + x^9 + x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$$
+
+Mathematically, the CRC is defined as the sum (modulo 2) of:
+
+- 1) the remainder of $(x^{31} + x^{30} + \dots + x + 1)x^k$ divided (modulo 2) by the generator polynomial, where k is the number of bits of the data over which the CRC is calculated; and
+- 2) the remainder of the division (modulo 2) by the generator polynomial of the product of the data over which the CRC is calculated, interpreted as a polynomial, multiplied by $x^{32}$ .
+
+2 $G(x) = (x+1)(x+1)(x^{10}+x^8+x^5+x^4+1)(x^{10}+x^9+x^8+x^3+x^2+x+1)(x^{10}+x^9+x^8+x^6+x^4+x^2+1)$ . $G(x)$ can be conveniently represented by the 33-bit hexadecimal integer 15028931F.
+
+Algorithmically, the CRC is defined by the following procedure:
+
+- 1) The first 32 bits of the data are complemented.
+- 2) The k bits of the data are then considered to be the coefficients of a polynomial $M(x)$ of degree k-1 written in big-endian format.
+- 3) $M(x)$ is multiplied by $x^{32}$ and divided by $G(x)$ , producing a remainder $R(x)$ of degree at most 31.
+- 4) The coefficients of $R(x)$ are considered to be a 32-bit, 4-octet sequence.
+
+# **20 Entry/Exit criteria and consequent actions**
+
+The defect entry/exit criteria associated with FEC-CV near end processing are:
+
+## **dServer entry criteria**
+
+dServer is not a valid defect state for FEC-CV processing for MPLS LDP levels.
+
+## **dLOCV entry criteria**
+
+Entry to the dLOCV condition for near end defect handling where FEC-CV availability processing is enabled occurs when there are no expected FEC-CV packets observed by the egress LSR for the TTSI/FEC combination for three consecutive $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ intervals.
+
+In terms of consequent actions:
+
+- The dLOCV DT codepoint is inserted into any FDI OAM packets sent forwards.
+
+## **dTTSI\_Mismatch entry criteria**
+
+dTTSI\_Mismatch is not a valid defect state for FEC-CV processing for LDP networks.
+
+### **dTTSI\_Mismerge entry criteria**
+
+dTTSI\_Mismerge is not a valid defect state for FEC-CV processing for LDP networks.
+
+### **dFECfilter\_Mismatch entry criteria**
+
+Entry to the dFECfilter\_Mismatch condition, and hence entry to the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State, occurs when there are any OAM packets observed in any period of three consecutive $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ intervals, each with an unexpected FEC filter or observed CV OAM packet type and there are no FEC-CV OAM packets observed with an expected FEC filter in the same period (i.e., dLOCV). It should be noted that the dTTSI\_Mismatch defect overrides the dLOCV defect (as would be the case, for example, with swapped LSPs). The DT codepoint 02 05 Hex (0x0205) is inserted in any FDI OAM packets sent forwards. The DL is also inserted in these FDI OAM packets. A local alarm is raised relevant to this defect condition and the TTSI in the unexpected FEC-CV or CV OAM probe captured locally (this may also be optionally sent to the NMS, similar to an exception report). The downstream traffic signal must also be suppressed.
+
+### **dFECfilter\_Mismerge entry criteria**
+
+Entry to the dFECfilter\_Mismerge condition, and hence entry to the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State, occurs when there are any FEC-CV OAM packets each with an unexpected FEC filter or observed CV OAM packet type, AND there are any FEC-CV OAM packets each with an expected FEC filter observed in any period of three consecutive $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ intervals (i.e., no dLOCV). The DT codepoint 02 06 Hex is inserted in any FDI OAM packets sent forwards. The DL codepoint is also inserted in these FDI OAM packets. A local alarm is raised relevant to this defect condition and the TTSI in the unexpected FEC-CV or CV OAM packet captured locally (this may also be optionally sent to the NMS, similar to an exception report). The downstream traffic signal could optionally be suppressed.
+
+## **dExcess entry criteria**
+
+dExcess is not a valid defect state for FEC-CV processing for MPLS LDP networks.
+
+## **dLOCV exit criteria**
+
+Exit of the dLOCV defect condition and hence exit of the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State for near end availability using FEC-CV occurs when there are:
+
+- $\geq 2$ but $\leq 4$ FEC-CV OAM packets observed each with an expected TTSI; and
+- no FEC-CV packets observed with an unexpected FEC filter or TTSI; and
+- no unexpected CV OAM packets observed,
+
+in any period of three consecutive $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ intervals.
+
+All the consequent actions invoked when entering the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State (i.e., sending of FDI and BDI OAM packets, the raising of local alarms and any suppression of traffic) are stopped when the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State is exited.
+
+### **dFECfilter\_Mismatch and dFECfilter\_Mismerge exit criteria**
+
+Exit of the dFECfilter\_Mismatch and dFECfilter\_Mismerge defect condition, and hence exit of the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State, occurs when there are:
+
+- no FEC-CV OAM packets observed with an unexpected FEC-filter; and
+- no unexpected CV OAM packets observed,
+
+in any period of three consecutive $T^{\text{FEC-CV}}$ intervals.
+
+All the consequent actions invoked when entering the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State (i.e., sending of FDI and BDI OAM packets, the raising of local alarms and any suppression of traffic) are stopped when the LSP Trail Sink Near-End Defect State is exited.
+
+# **21 Security aspects**
+
+This Recommendation does not raise any security issues that are not already present in either the MPLS architecture or in the architecture of the network layer protocol contained within the encapsulation. The MPLS architecture assumes trusted trail terminations within a given layer, and provides arbitrary hierarchy such that untrusted clients can be isolated from the trusted network. This is critical for OAM where untrusted ingresses may leverage OAM mechanisms to perform denial of service attacks on the network infrastructure.
+
+Misbranching detection enhances the security of MPLS networks as security breaches due to misforwarding of data between clients can be detected.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Coding and processing rules for RFC 2547 (BGP/VPN) LSPs
+
+### I.1 Scenario 1: Aggregated label LSP
+
+#### *Coding rules for ingress*
+
+The ingress PE encodes the BGP next hop information, the route distinguishers (RDs) associated with the LSP (label advertisement imported by BGP). The VPN-IPv4 next hop address, and RD are concatenated and then encoded as a filter entry consisting of five filter offsets.
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|
+| RD type = 0 | Administrator = 0 | Assigned number = 0 | BGP next hop | RD type | Administrator | Assigned number |
+| Ipv4 VPN BGP next hop | | | | Route distinguisher | | |
+| Filter entry (five filter offsets) | | | | | | |
+
+Y.1713.APPX.I\_F01
+
+**Figure I.1/Y.1713 – Filter entries for RFC 2547 aggregated labels**
+
+#### *Coding rules for egress*
+
+The egress PE encodes the BGP next hop information and the route distinguisher associated with the LSP (label advertisement exported by BGP) as a filter entry consisting of five filter offsets.
+
+#### *Egress processing*
+
+The egress will perform "exact match" filter processing.
+
+### I.2 Scenario 2: Non-aggregated label LSPs
+
+#### *Coding rules for ingress*
+
+The ingress PE encodes the BGP next hop information, the route distinguishers (RDs) associated with the LSP (label advertisement imported by BGP) and the next layer reachability information (NLRI or customer route). The VPN-IPv4 next hop address, RD, and NLRI for the customer route are concatenated and then encoded as a filter entry consisting of five filter offsets.
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------|--------|--------|
+| RD type = 0 | Administrator = 0 | Assigned number = 0 | BGP next hop | RD type | Administrator | Assigned number | Length | Prefix |
+| Ipv4 VPN BGP next hop | | | | Route distinguisher | | | NLRI | |
+| Filter entry (five filter offsets) | | | | | | | | |
+
+Y.1713.APPX.I\_F02
+
+**Figure I.2/Y.1713 – Filter entries for RFC 2547 "non-aggregated" labels**
+
+#### *Coding rules for egress*
+
+The egress PE encodes the BGP next hop information, the route distinguisher and the route associated with the LSP (label advertisement exported by BGP) as a filter entry consisting of five filter offsets.
+
+#### *Egress processing*
+
+The egress will perform "exact match" filter processing.
+
+NOTE – VPN layer tandeming mechanisms (one potential solution to inter-AS VPNs) may not propagate the egress PE address to the VPN layer ingress. This is for further study.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+## Use of FEC-CV to check connectivity and measure route availability
+
+An egress LSR may be configured to check connectivity, measure route availability and perform associated defect state processing on LSP connectivity set up with LDP for a given FEC. The LSR should be a unique egress point for the FEC such that any changes in network connectivity will still result in traffic transiting the egress LSR. The network must employ liberal label retention so that the number of ingress points used by a LSR will be fixed. Mechanisms to coordinate defect state processing for conservative label retention or to limit probe generation to the set of ingress points currently in use are for further study (a de-registration mechanism is required when an ingress is no longer used).
+
+When the egress LSR receives a valid FEC-CV probe for a FEC on which it is configured to perform state processing:
+
+- 1) It verifies that the FEC filter is valid for the LSP. If not normal defect processing occurs.
+- 2) It checks if it is currently tracking connectivity for the TTSI encoded in the FEC-CV probe. If not, then it will commence tracking for that TTSI and designate connectivity between the TTSI and the egress as working.
+- 3) If the LSR is already tracking connectivity for the TTSI in the probe, it will update the defect state for the TTSI accordingly.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD; Start([Start]) --> ReceiveFEC[Receive FEC-CV]; ReceiveFEC --> BloomFilter{Bloom filter verification}; BloomFilter -- Y --> TTSIKnown{Is TTSI known?}; BloomFilter -- N --> dMismerge([dMismerge]); TTSIKnown -- N --> CreateTTSI[Create new TTSI entry]; CreateTTSI --> UpdateDefect[Update defect state]; TTSIKnown -- Y --> UpdateDefect; UpdateDefect --> Done([Done]);
+```
+
+The flowchart illustrates the process of handling an FEC-CV probe. It begins with a 'Start' terminal, leading to a 'Receive FEC-CV' process. A decision diamond 'Bloom filter verification' follows. If the answer is 'Y' (Yes), the flow proceeds to another decision diamond 'Is TTSI known?'. If 'N' (No), it leads to a 'Create new TTSI entry' process, which then leads to 'Update defect state'. If 'Y' (Yes), it also leads to 'Update defect state'. If the initial 'Bloom filter verification' is 'N', the flow leads directly to a 'dMismerge' terminal. The 'Update defect state' process leads to a 'Done' terminal.
+
+Flowchart for FEC-CV probe handling
+
+Y.1713.APPX.II\_F01
+
+Figure II.1/Y.1713 – FEC-CV probe handling
+
+The rate of insertion of FEC-CV probes is configurable and must be a MPLS subnetwork wide common value. It is selected both to harmonize with mismerge and misbranching detection using fixed rate CV for P2P ER LSPs, and to minimize alarm generation as an artifact of normal connectionless network operation.
+
+The number of TTSIs for which an LSR implementation is required to maintain for defect state processing is unspecified.
+
+### *Alarm suppression*
+
+A full mesh of connectivity measurement probing in an LDP network can result in all peer edge devices generating alarms on the failure of a single edge device or failure of links directly attached to a peer edge device.
+
+To provide full failure coverage while not generating alarm storms, alarm generation must be coordinated with the IGP (and may require a "hold off" time in order to achieve this). Alarm suppression may be performed when the LSR ID in the TTSI corresponds to an address of one end of a numbered link for which the IGP has reported failure. Note that a node failure in this scenario will manifest itself as all numbered links to the ingress LSR failing and alarm suppression can be performed accordingly. Therefore the availability mechanism will only alarm on faults not detected or not recovered by the network.
+
+Alarm suppression for failure of a node that uses unnumbered links can similarly be performed as the TTSI would use the router loopback address in the LSR ID field, but alarm suppression for the silent failure of a single unnumbered link connecting an ingress to the network introduces a degree of uncertainty. The link is known by the tuple of the router loopback addresses at either end of the link, however any tracked TTSI value cannot be explicitly associated with a single link failure. *It can be used if the routing table indicates that the LSR ID (obtained from the TTSI) has become severed from the network (no viable route).* This is for further study.
+
+Alarm suppression for inter-area LSPs is for further study.
+
+## **Appendix III**
+
+## **Setting TFEC-CV**
+
+FEC-CV is primarily designed for use with MP2P LSPs. The implication being that a specific generation rate at any individual ingress will be multiplied by the number of ingresses when considering an arrival rate at an egress point. This is important when considering leakage into LSPs with Y.1711 CV based availability measurement enabled.
+
+It is possible to lower the generation rate of FEC-CV relative to CV while ensuring a high statistical probability of not flapping the CV near end availability state machine in a misbranch/mismerge scenario. However the generation rate used is a function of the network diameter, the number of probe sources relative to the number of potential misbranching points, and the density of meshing of VPN and PW labels. For this reason the generation rate of FEC-CV must be configurable.
+
+For example, given a network of 'm' edge devices and diameter 'n', we will make the following assumptions:
+
+- Probability of a misbranching defect is equal at each hop along the path (including the originating node).
+- Each hop away from the egress diminishes the number of ingress sources originating FEC-CV probes that would be affected by a misbranching defect local to the hop.
+
+- Probe sources are unsynchronized, therefore distribution of probe arrivals at the egress will be random.
+- Each edge NE is at a minimum dual homed on the network.
+
+
+
+Figure III.1/Y.1713: A line graph showing the Required probe rate (per second) on a logarithmic y-axis (0.001 to 1) versus the Number of edge devices on a logarithmic x-axis (2 to 1024). The graph is titled 'FEC-CV Insertion rate'. Four curves are shown for different values of ND: ND=1 (solid line), ND=2 (dashed line), ND=4 (dash-dot line), and ND=8 (dotted line). All curves show a decreasing trend as the number of edge devices increases. ND=1 has the lowest required probe rate, while ND=8 has the highest. A horizontal line is drawn at a required probe rate of 0.1. The graph is labeled 'Y.1713.APPX.III\_F01' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure III.1/Y.1713 – Required probe insertion rate**
+
+Figure III.1 (based upon the assumptions outlined above) shows the required probe insertion rate at each LSP ingress to ensure the egress state machine does not flap greater than 99% of the time (99% probability of probe arrival in any 2 second interval). It illustrates that for larger networks, the requisite rate of FEC-CV insertion in MP2P LSPs can be an order of magnitude or more lower than that of CV probe insertion with no side effects in defect handling on monitored LSPs. The rate of arrival of misdirected FEC-CV probes leaking into a CV monitored LSP will be sufficiently high to correctly hold the CV monitored LSP in the defect state.
+
+This model assumes no coupling between FEC-CV insertion points (completely random insertion), which in practice may not be a valid assumption. Therefore flexibility in determining the probe insertion rate is recommended.
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+## Issues with ECMP
+
+ECMP is an unspecified mechanism that inverses multiplexes LSP traffic over multiple parallel outgoing LSPs. Implementations may use proprietary mechanisms to spread the traffic while ideally preserving flow ordering to some degree of granularity. Use of FEC-CV in the presence of proprietary ECMP has implementation dependent implications (summarized here as informative in the absence of a normative reference for MPLS ECMP):
+
+- 1) Implementations using proprietary ECMP mechanisms that do not implement FEC-CV but preserve LSP path semantics (1:1 mapping between ingress and egress) will have the ECMP transfer function and downstream paths properly exercised by FEC-CV PDUs originating elsewhere in the network. What is meant by "preserve LSP path semantics" is that the LSR transfer function makes an explicit mapping between any incoming label switched hop (LSH) and a single outgoing LSH. An example of such an implementation is one that only considers the incoming interface and top label for downstream path selection.
+- 2) Implementations using proprietary ECMP mechanisms that do not implement FEC-CV AND do NOT preserve individual LSP semantics (such that the incoming payload on any
+
+individual LSH may map to any of a set of outgoing LSHs via any outgoing path selection mechanisms such as those based on payload examination) will not have the ECMP transfer function exercised and will only have a subset of the downstream parallel paths properly exercised by FEC-CV PDUs.
+
+- 3) Implementations using proprietary ECMP mechanisms that implement FEC-CV may treat the set of outgoing ECMP LSPs as ingresses and should insert FEC-CV probes such that the immediate set of downstream LSPs is properly exercised. How much of the network element's ECMP transfer function that is exercised by FEC-CV PDU generation is implementation dependent. In this way the testing of path permutations is distributed through the network rather than concentrated at the edge.
+
+This approach permits the required probe load to ensure all possible ECMP path combinations are tested to scale linearly with the number of ECMP ingress points when compared with the number of overall path permutations seen by the set of edge devices in the network. Each network element is responsible for testing only the immediately local set of paths and not the combinatorial set that arises from encountering multiple ECMP points across the network.
+
+Figure IV.1 illustrates the scaling issue:
+
+
+
+Figure IV.1: A network diagram illustrating ECMP. It shows a set of LSRs 'A' through 'D' on the left, connected to a core of LSRs 'E' through 'L', which are then connected to a set of LSRs 'M' through 'P' on the right. The connections are shown as a mesh, indicating multiple paths between adjacent LSRs. Specifically, LSRs 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' are connected to 'E' and 'F'. 'E' and 'F' are connected to 'G', 'H', and 'J'. 'G', 'H', and 'J' are connected to 'K' and 'L'. 'K' and 'L' are connected to 'M', 'N', 'O', and 'P'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.1713.APPX.IV\_F01' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.1/Y.1713 – ECMP example**
+
+Figure IV.1 illustrates a relatively trivial network. In Figure IV.1, there are a set of LSRs (A through D) that have connectivity to LSR 'N' across a core consisting of LSRs 'E' through 'L'. Traffic between LSRs 'A' and 'N' encounters ECMP implemented at 'A', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H' and 'J'. This results in 11 possible path permutations between LSRs 'A' and 'N':
+
+A-E-G-K-N;
+A-E-H-K-N;
+A-E-H-L-N;
+A-E-J-K-N;
+A-E-J-L-N;
+A-F-G-K-N;
+A-F-G-L-N;
+A-F-H-K-N;
+A-F-H-L-N;
+A-F-J-K-N; and
+A-F-J-L-N.
+
+With a total of 14 ECMP ingress points. Two at each of 'A', 'G', 'H' and 'J', and three at each of 'E' and 'F'. As more edge LSRs are considered (for example, 'B' through 'D') the number of core ECMP points in the core remains unchanged, but the number of path permutations seen by the edge of the network goes up.
+
+This is because LSP verification based exclusively on edge originated probes will replicate testing of ECMP points in the core:
+
+- Core ECMP points are shared by the edge devices.
+- The edge devices are unaware of each other.
+- No mechanisms exist to delegate testing of specific shared resources between the edge devices.
+
+As edge devices are added, the number of probes originated by the edge devices will go up significantly if each assumes responsibility for testing all reachable path permutations.
+
+For example, a network extrapolated from the above example with 100 edge devices may have 200 or so ECMP ingress points, but will face some 2000 potential path permutations between the set of LERs and any individual egress LER.
+
+It is not reasonable to delegate responsibility for testing shared resources to every edge LSR, therefore the goal should be to eliminate redundant probing of ECMP points shared by multiple edge devices. Probe insertion at each ECMP ingress provides comparable coverage with a significantly lower volume of network probing as responsibility for exercising path permutations is distributed through the network.
+
+The actual probe load generated is implementation dependent and dependent on the fault coverage desired within the load spreading LSR. The likely implementation of load spreading is on an ingress line card (to minimize the number of times data traverses the network element backplane), such that for a given FEC, the actual number of LSP ingresses to be considered is the number of outgoing load shared paths TIMES the number of input interfaces (which for liberal label retention will be all input interfaces). This suggests that there are multiple points where implementations may choose to perform FEC-CV probe insertion.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the implementation of load spreading in a Load Spreading LSR. It shows three input interfaces (I1, I2, I3) on the left and three output interfaces (O1, O2, O3) on the right. Each input interface has a 'Load spreading function' block. Each output interface has a 'Merge' block. The 'Load spreading function' blocks are connected to the 'Merge' blocks via a central switching fabric where every input function connects to every output function. The diagram is labeled 'Load spreading LSR' at the bottom. A legend at the bottom left shows a dashed box for 'Interface', a trapezoid for 'Load spreading function', and a parallelogram for 'Merge'. A reference code 'Y.1713.APPX.IV\_F02' is located at the bottom right.
+
+Diagram of Figure IV.2/Y.1713 showing the implementation of load spreading in an LSR. It depicts three input interfaces (I1, I2, I3) on the left and three output interfaces (O1, O2, O3) on the right. Each input interface receives an 'LSP for FEC \'A\'' and contains a trapezoidal 'Load spreading function'. Each output interface contains a parallelogram 'Merge' function. A full mesh of lines connects each load spreading function to every merge function. Labels indicate 'Input side insertion of FEC-CV' at the input stage and 'Output side insertion of FEC-CV' at the output stage. A legend at the bottom defines the symbols for Interface, Load spreading function, and Merge.
+
+**Figure IV.2/Y.1713 – Implementation of load spreading**
+
+Figure IV.2 assumes an implementation whereby load spreading is performed as an input function. In Figure IV.2 two potential FEC-CV insertion points are identified. One is on the output side which would result in 3 insertion points for FEC-CV PDUs for the LSP, one at each of output interfaces O1 through O3. One is on the input side which in the above example results in 9 insertion points for the FEC-CV PDUs, one for each output on each of input interfaces I1 through I3. Each FEC-CV PDU insertion point should uniquely be assigned a TTSI to facilitate fault isolation.
+
+Input side FEC-CV PDU insertion combined with TTL manipulation provides reasonable misbranching coverage and may be employed with PHPd LSPs. If the inserting LSR does not perform PHP on the LSP egress (e.g., knows the downstream LSR implements an MPLS user plane), FEC-CV PDUs with TTL = 1 may be inserted to verify the local NHLFE and next hop ILM correctness and synchronization with the control plane with no adverse effects for downstream LSRs.
+
+Use of TTL = 1 minimizes the overall disruption of traffic when a misbranching defect is detected. The node detecting the defect suppresses forwarding of traffic on the specific LSP. As the detection is close to the misbehaving LSR, only a portion of the overall traffic carried by the LSP would be suppressed in an LDP network.
+
+Other recovery actions are possible. When the TTSI indicates the source of the probe was an immediate upstream peer, the LSR may withdraw the label leaked into and offer a different label for the FEC in an attempt to separate value traffic from that leaked into. Exact mechanisms are for further study.
+
+# **Appendix V**
+
+## **Issues with PHP**
+
+Similar to ITU-T Rec. Y.1711, the FEC-CV probe has the most utility and is most simply implemented in the absence of PHP (labelled data plane extends end-to-end). However FEC-CV may still provide utility for implementations that choose to request PHP from the upstream node:
+
+- 1) The Penultimate hop node may choose to process the FEC-CV PDU such that misbranching detection spans all but the last (unlabelled) hop of the path.
+- 2) If the LSP terminating LSR receives OAM alert as a top label, it may process FEC-CV PDUs against a FEC filter that is the logical OR of all FEC filters offered by the LSR with the Implicit NULL label. For what is termed a "provider edge" LSR, this may only be one FEC (the LSRs own loopback address). Where there are multiple FECs, the probability of undetected error goes up in proportion to the number of FECs encoded in the common filter.
+
+Figure V.1 is illustrative of the worst case (LSP with one LDP FEC being PHPd to an LSR offering numerous FECs with the implicit null label).
+
+
+
+The graph illustrates the probability of detection for three different LSP ingress types as the number of LDP FECs encoded in the egress LSR filter increases. The y-axis represents the 'Probability of detection' from 0.6 to 1.0, and the x-axis represents 'LDP FECs encoded in the egress LSR filter' from 0 to 55. Three curves are shown: 'One LPD FEC' (solid line), 'TELSP' (dashed line), and 'BGP VPN LSP' (dotted line). All curves start at a probability of 1.0 for 0 FECs and decrease as the number of FECs increases. 'One LPD FEC' maintains the highest probability, followed by 'BGP VPN LSP', and then 'TELSP'.
+
+| LDP FECs encoded in the egress LSR filter | One LPD FEC | TELSP | BGP VPN LSP |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|-------|-------------|
+| 0 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
+| 10 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 |
+| 20 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.98 |
+| 30 | 0.98 | 0.92 | 0.96 |
+| 40 | 0.96 | 0.82 | 0.94 |
+| 50 | 0.94 | 0.72 | 0.92 |
+| 55 | 0.92 | 0.68 | 0.90 |
+
+Y.1713.APPX.V\_F01
+
+Line graph showing Probability of detection vs LDP FECs encoded in the egress LSR filter for One LPD FEC, TELSP, and BGP VPN LSP.
+
+**Figure V.1/Y.1713 – PHP worst case (by LSP ingress type)**
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification |
+| Series C | General telecommunication statistics |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks and open system communications |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and Next Generation Networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.1901
+
+(01/2009)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Internet protocol aspects – IPTV over NGN
+
+# --- Requirements for the support of IPTV services
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+### | | | |----------------------|----------------------| | IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | |----------------------|----------------------|
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901**
+
+# **Requirements for the support of IPTV services**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901 specifies the high level requirements to support IPTV services. These include IPTV requirements for service offering, network aspects, QoS and QoE, service and content protection, end system, middleware and content.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901 was approved on 23 January 2009 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2009-2012) under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Accounting and charging, content, content discovery and selection, home network, IPTV, IPTV architecture, IPTV service, IPTV terminal device, metadata, middleware, mobility, multicast, QoE, QoS, security, service and content protection, service discovery and selection, service navigation, traffic management.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2009
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 1.1 Organization ..... | 1 |
+| 1.2 IPTV domains..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 6 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 8 |
+| 6 Requirements ..... | 8 |
+| 6.1 General aspects ..... | 8 |
+| 6.2 QoS and performance aspects ..... | 13 |
+| 6.3 Security aspects including service and content protection ..... | 15 |
+| 6.4 Network related aspects..... | 20 |
+| 6.5 End systems and interoperability aspects ..... | 22 |
+| 6.6 Middleware, application and content aspects..... | 35 |
+| 6.7 Public interest ..... | 43 |
+| Appendix I – Public interest cross-reference ..... | 47 |
+| Bibliography..... | 49 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901
+
+# Requirements for the support of IPTV services
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the high level requirements to support IPTV services. These include IPTV requirements for service offering, network aspects, QoS and QoE, service and content protection, end system, middleware and content.
+
+## 1.1 Organization
+
+The taxonomy that articulates this Recommendation is therefore twofold:
+
+- A functional taxonomy, which aims at reflecting the fact that IPTV services are deployed and operated according to the combined activation of a set of elementary capabilities – IPTV traffic forwarding and routing, IPTV quality of service and quality of experience, IPTV security, IPTV middleware, etc.
+- Within each of the aforementioned functional areas, a further classification organizes the requirements into mandatory requirements, recommended requirements and optional requirements.
+
+## 1.2 IPTV domains
+
+Figure 1-1 shows the main domains that are involved in the provision of IPTV services [ITU-T Y.1910]. It is provided in this Recommendation to help the understanding of requirements which in some way relate to these domains. These domains do not define a business model. Also, one provider may play in multiple domains in the provision of an actual service.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the four main domains involved in IPTV service provision, connected by a horizontal line. Each domain is represented by a rounded rectangular box containing an icon and a label:
+
+- End-user:** Contains an icon of a computer monitor and a set-top box.
+- Network provider:** Contains an icon of a network router and a server rack.
+- Service provider:** Contains an icon of a server rack and a database cylinder.
+- Content provider:** Contains an icon of a globe and a film strip.
+
+The horizontal line connects the four domains, indicating their interdependence. The labels 'End-user', 'Network provider', 'Service provider', and 'Content provider' are positioned below their respective boxes.
+
+Diagram of IPTV domains showing four interconnected components: End-user, Network provider, Service provider, and Content provider.
+
+Y.1901(09)\_F1-1
+
+**Figure 1-1 – IPTV domains**
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the
+
+currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.1541] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1541 (2006), *Network performance objectives for IP-based services*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.1910] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 (2008), *IPTV functional architecture*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 aspect ratio** [b-ITU-T T.101]: The ratio of the width to the height of a rectangular area, such as the defined display area.
+
+**3.1.2 broadcast** [b-ITU-T M.60]: One-way transmission from one point to two or more other points.
+
+**3.1.3 content provider** [ITU-T Y.1910]: The entity that owns or is licensed to sell content or content assets.
+
+**3.1.4 elementary stream** [b-ITU-T H.222.0]: Generic term for either the coded video, the coded audio, or other coded bit stream in the PES packet.
+
+NOTE – PES stands for packetized elementary stream.
+
+**3.1.5 end-user** [ITU-T Y.1910]: The actual user of the products or services.
+
+NOTE – The end-user consumes the product or service. An end-user can optionally be a subscriber.
+
+**3.1.6 home network** [b-ITU-T H.622]: Home network is the collection of elements that process, manage, transport, and store information, thus enabling the connection and integration of multiple computing, control, monitoring, communication and entertainment devices in the home.
+
+**3.1.7 mobility** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment.
+
+**3.1.8 network provider** [ITU-T Y.1910]: The organization that maintains and operates the network components required for IPTV functionality.
+
+NOTE 1 – A network provider can optionally also act as service provider.
+
+NOTE 2 – Although considered as two separate entities, the service provider and the network provider can optionally be one organizational entity.
+
+**3.1.9 service information** [b-ITU-T J.200]: Data which describes programs and services.
+
+**3.1.10 service provider** [b-ITU-T M.1400]: A general reference to an operator that provides telecommunication services to customers and other users either on a tariff or contract basis. A service provider may or may not operate a network. A service provider may or may not be a customer of another service provider.
+
+NOTE – Typically, the service provider acquires or licenses content from content providers and packages this into a service that is consumed by the end-user.
+
+**3.1.11 subscriber** [b-ITU-T M.3050.1]: The subscriber is responsible for concluding contracts for the services subscribed to and for paying for these services.
+
+**3.1.12 subscription** [b-ITU-T Q.1741.3]: A subscription describes the commercial relationship between the subscriber and the service provider.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 accessibility feature:** An additional content component that is intended to assist people hindered in their ability to perceive an aspect of the main content. Examples: captions for the hard of hearing, subtitles in various languages, sign-language interpretation video and descriptive audio.
+
+**3.2.2 acquisition:** The process of obtaining content by the end-user.
+
+NOTE – For content with accessibility features, this means that the content will be available in a form that can be used by the end-user.
+
+**3.2.3 audio description:** This service provides a commentary describing the visual events pertinent to the content and augments the dialog in the content.
+
+NOTE – Audio description is primarily intended to assist users who are unable to see the video content clearly. The narrative passages fit between the dialogue and other significant audio content so as not to interfere with it. Ideally, the user can control the volume and spatial positioning of the audio or derive it from a separate output.
+
+**3.2.4 captions:** Captions provide a real-time on-screen transcript of the dialogue as well as any sound effects.
+
+NOTE – This service can be provided by means of either textual or graphical supplementary content. The captions and the dialogue are usually in the same language. The service is primarily to assist users having difficulty hearing the sound. Ideally, users may have some control over the position and size of the presentation. Different speakers are distinguished, usually by different colours.
+
+**3.2.5 channel:** Content formatted as a selectable set of data and transported as part of a data stream.
+
+**3.2.6 channel changing:** The act of changing from one channel to another.
+
+**3.2.7 client personal video recorder (cPVR):** Same as PVR except that the recording device is located at the end-user's premises.
+
+**3.2.8 content protection:** Ensuring that an end-user can only use the content they have already acquired in accordance with the rights that they have been granted by the rights holder.
+
+**3.2.9 content segment:** A continuous portion of a piece of content, for example, a single topic in a news programme.
+
+**3.2.10 content tracing:** A process to enable the identification of the (arbitrary) origin of content, and/or the responsible party (e.g., the end-user), to facilitate subsequent investigation in the event of unauthorized content copying or distribution.
+
+NOTE – Content tracing information may be attached to content either as metadata, or as a forensic watermark.
+
+**3.2.11 delivery network gateway functions (DNGF):** Set of functions that mediate between the network and service provider domains and the IPTV terminal function (ITF).
+
+NOTE – A device implementing the DNGF is commonly referred to as the residential gateway (RG) or delivery network gateway (DNG).
+
+**3.2.12 delivery network gateway (DNG):** A device implementing the DNGF.
+
+NOTE – DNG also is commonly referred to as the residential gateway (RG).
+
+**3.2.13 electronic program guide (EPG):** A structured set of data, intended to provide information on available content that may be accessed by end-users.
+
+**3.2.14 end system:** A single or set of consumer devices that support IPTV services (e.g., delivery network gateway, display).
+
+**3.2.15 Internet Protocol Television (IPTV):** Multimedia services such as television/video/audio/text/graphics/data delivered over IP-based networks managed to support the required level of QoS/QoE, security, interactivity and reliability.
+
+**3.2.16 IPTV terminal function (ITF):** The end-user function(s) associated with a) receiving and responding to network control channel messages regarding session set-up, maintenance, and tear-down, and b) receiving the content of an IP transport from the network and rendering.
+
+**3.2.17 IPTV terminal device:** A terminal device which has ITF functionality, e.g., a STB.
+
+**3.2.18 linear TV:** A television service in which a continuous stream flows in real time from the service provider to the terminal device and where the user cannot control the temporal order in which contents are viewed.
+
+**3.2.19 metadata:** Structured, encoded data that describe characteristics of information-bearing entities to aid in the identification, discovery, assessment, and management of the described entities.
+
+NOTE – EPG metadata has many applications and may vary in depth from merely identifying the content package title or information to populate an EPG to providing a complete index of different scenes in a movie or providing business rules detailing how the content package may be displayed, copied, or sold.
+
+**3.2.20 middleware:** A layer of software between applications and resources, which consists of a set of service enablers that allow multiple functionalities running on one or more devices in an IPTV system to interact across a network.
+
+**3.2.21 multi-channel audio:** Audio signal with more than two channels.
+
+**3.2.22 network personal video recorder (nPVR):** Same as PVR except that the recording device is located at the service provider premises.
+
+**3.2.23 package:** A collection of content components that in some combination (either all or a subset) together provide an end-user experience and are intended to be used together.
+
+NOTE – A package can be instantiated with or without audiovisual content depending on scenarios, in which audiovisual content and package can be tightly associated or can be loosely coupled enough to be handled (generation, delivery, consumption) independently.
+
+**3.2.24 pay per view (PPV):** A TV service where a particular program event (e.g., a hockey match) can be bought separately from any package or subscription. The transmission of the program event is made at the same time to everyone who has ordered it.
+
+**3.2.25 personal video recorder (PVR):** An end-user controlled device that records, stores and plays back multimedia content. PVR is also known as personal digital recorder (PDR).
+
+**3.2.26 picture-in-picture:** One program is displayed on the full-seized IPTV TD screen, one or more other programs are simultaneously displayed in inset windows.
+
+**3.2.27 place shifting:** A function which allows subscribers to see the content without placing limitations.
+
+**3.2.28 push VoD:** A TV service where multimedia content is packaged and delivered at the discretion of the service provider to the end-user's storage system.
+
+**3.2.29 random access point:** A point in the content from which playback can begin.
+
+NOTE – For example, in MPEG encoding, this would be an I-frame, as opposed to a P-frame or B-frame.
+
+**3.2.30 rights:** One or more legal or business entitlements to use or employ content, e.g., to view, record, redistribute content.
+
+**3.2.31 re-transmission broadcast service:** A service in which content is provided from various broadcasting environments including, but not limited to, terrestrial, satellite and cable, and re-transmitted into IP network simultaneously or otherwise.
+
+**3.2.32 SCP:** A combination of service protection and content protection.
+
+**3.2.33 service:** A set of functionalities enabled by a provider for end-users.
+
+NOTE – Example provisioned functionalities include IP connectivity with managed quality of service, video-on-demand.
+
+**3.2.34 service protection:** Ensuring that an end-user can only acquire a service, and, by extension, the content contained therein, that he or she is entitled to receive.
+
+**3.2.35 sign language interpretation:** A video service showing an interpreter who uses hand gestures and facial expression to convey the main audio content and dialogue to sign language and lip readers.
+
+NOTE – This service comes in the form of supplementary video content, usually smaller in image size to that of the main video content. Ideally, the user can control the position, size and background properties (solid or transparent and the colour, if solid). It is of sufficient temporal and spatial quality to enable sign reading and lip reading.
+
+**3.2.36 skin:** A customized graphical appearance (the visual aspect of a graphical user interface (GUI)) applied to certain software and websites for aesthetic reasons or ease of use.
+
+**3.2.37 subtitles:** Subtitles provide a real-time on-screen transcript of dialogue for the purpose of language translation or to clarify speech that is unclear.
+
+NOTE – This service can be provided by means of either textual or graphical supplementary content. The subtitles and the dialogue are usually in different languages. The assumed audience for subtitling is hearing people who do not understand the language of the dialogue.
+
+**3.2.38 supplementary content:** Video, audio, textual, graphical or other forms of content that can be optionally accessed by the end-user and rendered by the terminal. It has the following features:
+
+- It only works in conjunction with the main content.
+- It is synchronous with the main content.
+
+**3.2.39 terminal device (TD):** An end-user device which typically presents and/or processes the content, such as a personal computer, a computer peripheral, a mobile device, a TV set, a monitor, a VoIP terminal or an audiovisual media player.
+
+**3.2.40 terminal device protection:** Ensuring that a terminal device employed by an end-user in the reception of a service can reliably and securely use content while enforcing the rights of use granted for that content, and while physically and electronically protecting the integrity of the terminal device, and the confidentiality of the content and critical security parameters not otherwise protected by encryption or watermarking.
+
+**3.2.41 third party metadata:** Metadata provided by an entity (which may be a person) not directly tied to the primary service provider by whom the end-user is being served.
+
+**3.2.42 time shifting:** A function which allows playback of content after its initial transmission.
+
+**3.2.43 trick mode functionality:** The ability to pause, rewind or forward stored content.
+
+**3.2.44 TV with trick mode:** TV service with trick mode functionality.
+
+**3.2.45 universal design:** It is the design of the products and environments to be useable by all people, to the greatest extent possible by including accessibility features in the original design to prevent the need for adaptation after deployment.
+
+NOTE – The intent of universal design is to simplify life for everyone by making products, communications, and the built environment more usable by as many people as possible at little or no extra cost. Universal design benefits people of all ages and abilities.
+
+**3.2.46 usage environment description:** The usage environment description includes the description of end-user characteristics, terminal capabilities, network characteristics and natural environment characteristics.
+
+NOTE – These various dimensions of the usage environment description, which originate from end-users, can be used for accommodating, for example, the adaptation of contents for transmission, storage and consumption.
+
+**3.2.47 user privacy protection:** Ensuring that information considered to be private (or confidential) by an end-user be maintained in confidence, while remaining subject to mandatory disclosure due to legal processes.
+
+**3.2.48 video-on-demand (VoD):** A service in which the end-user can, on demand, select and view a video content and where the end-user can control the temporal order in which the video content is viewed (e.g., the ability to start the viewing, pause, fast forward, rewind, etc.).
+
+NOTE – The viewing may occur some time after the selection of the video content.
+
+**3.2.49 wireless network characteristics:** The characteristics of a wireless network expressed in terms of the current available bandwidth, packet loss and possibly other wireless network information parameters for a specific wireless link type, e.g., WLAN, cellular, WPAN or WMAN.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AES | Advanced Encryption Standard |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CBC | Cipher Block Chaining |
+| cPVR | Client PVR |
+| DNG | Delivery Network Gateway |
+| DNGF | Delivery Network Gateway Function |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| DRM | Digital Rights Management |
+| DTS | Digital Theatre System |
+| DVD | Digital Versatile Disc |
+| EAN | Emergency Alert Notification |
+| ECB | Electronic CodeBook |
+| ECM | Entitlement Control Message |
+| EMM | Entitlement Management Message |
+| EPG | Electronic Program Guide |
+| FCAPS | Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, and Security |
+| FTA | Free To Air |
+| GUI | Graphical User Interface |
+| HD | High Definition |
+| HE-AAC | High-Efficiency Advanced Audio Coding |
+| HTML | HyperText Markup Language |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPTV | Internet Protocol Television |
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------|
+| IPTV TD | Internet Protocol Television Terminal Device |
+| IPv4 | Internet Protocol version 4 |
+| IPv6 | Internet Protocol version 6 |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| ITF | IPTV Terminal Function |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MIKEY | Multimedia Internet KEYing |
+| MPEG | Moving Picture Experts Group |
+| n/cPVR | Network and Client PVR |
+| NAPT | Network Address Port Translation |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| nPVR | Network PVR |
+| OAMP | Operate, Administer, Maintain, and Provision |
+| OFB | Output FeedBack |
+| OS | Operating System |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PDR | Personal Digital Recorder |
+| PES | Packetized Elementary Stream |
+| PPV | Pay Per View |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| PVR | Personal Video Recorder |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| QoSM | Quality of Service Measurement |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| RG | Residential Gateway |
+| SCP | Service and Content Protection |
+| SD | Standard Definition |
+| SI | Service Information |
+| SIM | Subscriber Identification Module |
+| STB | Set Top Box |
+| TD | Terminal Device |
+| TS | Transport Stream |
+| TV | Television |
+| UCC | User Created Content |
+| UI | User Interface |
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| UMF | Uniform Media Formats |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
+| VBI | Vertical Blank Interval |
+| VoD | Video-on-Demand |
+| WAN | Wide Area Network |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+| WMAN | Wireless Metropolitan Area Network |
+| WPAN | Wireless Personal Area Network |
+| xDSL | Any of the various types of Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) |
+| XML | eXtensible Mark-up Language |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+Requirements are identified using the following conventions:
+
+- Requirement number xx in subclause n.m is of the form R n.m-xx;
+- Recommended requirement number yy in subclause n.m is of the form RR n.m-yy;
+- Optional requirement number zz in subclause n.m is of the form OR n.m-zz.
+
+NOTE – Future issues of this Recommendation should never reuse previously assigned numbers.
+
+# 6 Requirements
+
+## 6.1 General aspects
+
+### General requirements
+
+- R 6.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support multiple content resolutions and multiple content aspect ratios.
+- R 6.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to allow for a two-way communication between the end-user and the service provider.
+
+- R 6.1-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms to support on demand services.
+NOTE 1 – Further information regarding "on Demand service" can be found in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.5].
+- R 6.1-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support navigation capability for IPTV content.
+- R 6.1-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability of the ITF to display and allow user selection of program, content, and service descriptions.
+- R 6.1-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support service selection mechanisms.
+
+NOTE 2 – Further information regarding service selection can be found in clauses 6.6.5 and 6.6.6.
+
+### General recommendations
+
+- RR 6.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support content segmentation.
+- RR 6.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to ensure content and segment data integrity.
+- RR 6.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a mechanism for obtaining information pertaining to terminal device capabilities.
+- RR 6.1-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to present an open interface for 3rd party applications to use the capabilities and resources of the service and network functional components.
+- RR 6.1-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support 3rd parties metadata (e.g., content recommendations) in addition to metadata from service/content providers.
+- RR 6.1-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the display of multiple supplementary video streams and layouts.
+- RR 6.1-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support various encapsulation types including MPEG-2 TS.
+- RR 6.1-08: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the delivery of IPTV services to any type of IPTV terminal device, e.g., mobile phone, PDA, set top box.
+- RR 6.1-09: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support functions in order to adapt dynamically to changes in wireless networks characteristics when the service is delivered over a mobile network, e.g., bandwidth, packet loss rate.
+- RR 6.1-10: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support viewership data tracking while protecting the user's privacy as required in clause 6.3.6.
+NOTE 3 – For example, this tracking may allow content provider and service provider to provide audience rating service, track popular programs, craft and target specific advertisements to particular groups of users demonstrating certain surfing patterns.
+- RR 6.1-11: The IPTV architecture is recommended, if viewership data tracking is supported, to have the ability to configure it on a per user basis, a per content basis and a combination of both.
+- RR 6.1-12: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support (remote) software upgrade and (e.g., configuration data) download.
+- RR 6.1-13: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support XML encoding for application signalling.
+- RR 6.1-14: The IPTV architecture is recommended to have a means to allow content to be seen only by the appropriate audience. This means it may be triggered by the service provider and/or the user.
+
+- RR 6.1-15: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for allowing the integration of other telecommunication services (e.g., instant messaging, telephony) into IPTV services.
+
+### General options
+
+- OR 6.1-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support separate content and segment metadata storage and distribution.
+- OR 6.1-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the replacement of the content caching and distribution algorithm.
+- OR 6.1-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally support advertisement insertion.
+- OR 6.1-04: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the time-shift TV functionality.
+- OR 6.1-05: The IPTV architecture can optionally support usage environment description.
+- OR 6.1-06: The IPTV architecture can optionally support content presentation adaptation to the usage environment.
+
+### **6.1.1 Service offering**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.1.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability for the service provider to prevent the sending of bulk unsolicited content to end-users.
+- R 6.1.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support interactive services such as educational applications, entertainment applications (such as games), communications services (such as mail, chat, and messaging), and information services (such as stock and weather services).
+- R 6.1.1-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for the delivery of interactive and downloadable contents including games.
+- R 6.1.1-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms to block transmission of content to specified geographical areas whenever blackout requirements are applicable.
+- R 6.1.1-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support the service provider to be able to push content onto the terminal device (content requested or not by the end-user).
+- R 6.1.1-06: The IPTV architecture, if cPVR is supported, is required to support the service provider to be able to insert additional contents in content played from the cPVR.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.1.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow seamless IPTV service provision and operation across different networks supporting IPTV services.
+- RR 6.1.1-02: The IPTV architecture, if retransmission broadcast service is supported, is recommended to support geographical regionalization of content.
+- RR 6.1.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for the receipt of content from different sources, e.g., satellite, dedicated IP connections.
+- RR 6.1.1-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for the content provider to perform content management such as uploading content or deleting content or modifying the relevant attributes of content.
+- RR 6.1.1-05: The IPTV architecture, if retransmission broadcast service is supported, is recommended to provide comparable quality of experience to the end-user as the direct reception.
+- RR 6.1.1-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support real-time encoded and pre-encoded stored programs.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.1.1-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a cPVR function.
+- OR 6.1.1-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a nPVR function.
+NOTE – The nPVR function may be subject to national regulation as far as service and content protection aspects are concerned.
+- OR 6.1.1-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally support means for the content provider to define a set of language options for its content.
+- OR 6.1.1-04: The IPTV architecture can optionally support mechanisms to capture and utilize user profiles and preferences to target/restrict content items.
+- OR 6.1.1-05: The IPTV architecture can optionally convert video content from its stored format into one that is compatible with that required to be displayed on the devices implementing the ITF.
+- OR 6.1.1-06: The IPTV architecture can optionally support mechanisms that allow private entities, e.g., residential users, to act as content providers for the purpose of sharing their own content.
+- OR 6.1.1-07: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability to trace the source of incoming content, e.g., messages that have been a cause for complaint by an end-user.
+- OR 6.1.1-08: The IPTV architecture can optionally support for the insertion of content into VoD content.
+- OR 6.1.1-09: The IPTV architecture can optionally have the capability to support insertion of appropriately scoped advertisements (e.g., geographically or demographically).
+- OR 6.1.1-10: The IPTV architecture can optionally support mechanisms for targeted advertising (e.g., based on user profile preferences).
+
+### **6.1.2 Accounting and charging**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.1.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support IPTV services accounting and charging. This includes charging through various charging methods (such as prepay, post pay, advice of charge, and third-party charging).
+- R 6.1.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to not preclude the use of NGN charging architectures for all IPTV services accounting and charging functions.
+- R 6.1.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for the collection of data for accounting and reporting purposes, partner settlements, and reconciliation of end-user usage, such as service subscriptions, purchases, and transactions.
+- R 6.1.2-04: The IPTV architecture is required to include capabilities for transferring settlement information between service providers.
+- R 6.1.2-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support the acquisition of appropriate VoD accounting data, to fulfil licensing agreements.
+- R 6.1.2-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support the service provider to be able to authenticate, authorize and charge the subscriber.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.1.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow service providers to integrate IPTV services accounting and charging functions with accounting and charging components that can be used across multiple NGN services and applications.
+
+### 6.1.3 Service consumption
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.1.3-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support a means for the service provider to provide an integrated presentation of content received at the ITF via out-of-band (to IP) delivery methods and via IP networks, i.e., hybrid methods.
+- R 6.1.3-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms so that the end-user can filter unwanted contents.
+- R 6.1.3-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user with the ability to move between a free-to-air (FTA) and a pay per view (PPV) environment.
+- R 6.1.3-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user with the ability to choose a preferred language option (audio, subtitles, captioning, supplementary video and supplementary descriptive audio) from various languages that the content provider pre-defined and the service provider delivered.
+- R 6.1.3-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability for the end-user to turn on and off the audio, the subtitles, captioning, supplementary video, and supplementary descriptive audio at anytime without altering any of the default setting options.
+- R 6.1.3-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability to store and retrieve multiple profiles containing sets of user interface preference settings and language settings so that it will be easy to switch to different personal preferences for different viewers.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.1.3-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the capability for the subscriber to query his or her usage detail record lists.
+- RR 6.1.3-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the end-user to independently select a default language for each of the following: audio, subtitle, captioning, supplementary video and supplementary descriptive audio.
+- RR 6.1.3-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the capability for the end-user to switch audio, subtitles, captioning, supplementary video, and supplementary descriptive audio back and forth when the user is watching the program without having to change his or her preferred language settings.
+- RR 6.1.3-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the end-user, according to his or her rights, to replace an IPTV terminal device without inherently affecting his or her rights to consume content.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.1.3-01: If the end-user's language option cannot match the predefined content languages, the IPTV architecture is recommended to support the capability for the IPTV terminal device to present the content with default audio, default subtitles, default captioning, default supplementary video and default supplementary descriptive audio.
+
+### 6.1.4 Miscellaneous
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.1.4-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support a means to present the ITF with the time of day reference.
+- R 6.1.4-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for the service provider to operate, administer, maintain, and provision (OAMP) IPTV devices.
+- R 6.1.4-03: The IPTV architecture is required to facilitate the ability of the service provider to manage the IPTV services with regard to fault, configuration, accounting, performance, and security (FCAPS).
+
+- R 6.1.4-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms that allow IPTV services delivery from a 3rd party provider as defined in clause 3.
+- R 6.1.4-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support an extensible method for the service provider to query for the ITF's capabilities and status.
+- R 6.1.4-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support maintaining accurate time-based control for synchronization, e.g., lip-sync with video as judged by the general viewer at all times, pause and resume, random access.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.1.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow content usage statistics to be collected.
+- RR 6.1.4-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for the service provider to provide the functions for service usage and the prevention of the service abuse.
+- RR 6.1.4-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support capabilities for the end-user mobility allowing access to IPTV services by the end-user either in motion or not.
+- RR 6.1.4-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support capabilities for exchange of IPTV services related information between different IPTV service providers. The IPTV service related information can optionally include the source information, channel information, service start/end time, and QoS information.
+- RR 6.1.4-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended not to put any constraint on latency sensitive services.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.1.4-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a time reference that is traceable to national time standards.
+
+## **6.2 QoS and performance aspects**
+
+### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support a framework that identifies the components and measurement points for quality of service measurement (QoSM).
+- R 6.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support capabilities for management of capacity on service and network elements.
+- R 6.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism that allows for service-based transport QoS to be managed across multiple network provider domains.
+- R 6.2-04: The network that supports IPTV is required to support IP QoS classes and to satisfy associated performance requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.1541].
+
+NOTE 1 – [ITU-T Y.1541] recommends the selection of relevant QoS classes based on application requirements.
+
+### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support consistent QoS for the whole period of the IPTV service operation.
+- RR 6.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms by which network operators can integrate IPTV QoS management functions into a common QoS management framework with other services and applications.
+- RR 6.2-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to rely upon any relevant QoS capabilities (e.g., RACF [b-ITU-T Y.2111] and DiffServ [b-IETF RFC 2475]) when integrating IPTV services into NGN-based environments.
+
+- RR 6.2-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support transmission of video or data with sufficient quality for perception of sign language interpretation, including lip reading. This requires the transmission of a sufficient number of frames per second and sufficient spatial resolution to reproduce details of the signing person's hands, face, lips, eyes and body [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1].
+
+NOTE 2 – Perception of sign language interpretation depends on actual terminal device capabilities.
+
+### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.2-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the delivery of multiple services over the common IP transport with manageable IP quality of service (QoS).
+- NOTE 3 – Services can be delivered by multiple service providers or by a single provider.
+- OR 6.2-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support mechanisms for QoE/QoS parameters adjustment due to changes of content characteristics in a channel.
+ - OR 6.2-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a content delivery error recovery mechanism to achieve required level of QoE/QoS for unicast/multicast content delivery.
+
+### **6.2.1 Quality of experience**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.2.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for supporting appropriate resiliency in the service provider infrastructure to maintain high QoE.
+- R 6.2.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to allow the delivery of IPTV services with defined quality of experience (QoE) for the IPTV end-user.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.2.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support appropriate QoE for end-users eligible for uploading content to the service provider's network.
+ - RR 6.2.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support means to provide channel changing times with sufficient QoE.
+ - RR 6.2.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support capabilities to monitor audio and video quality.
+- NOTE – Further information regarding IPTV monitoring points can be found in [b-ITU-T G.1081].
+- RR 6.2.1-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support navigation of EPG menu items with sufficient QoE.
+
+### **6.2.2 Traffic management**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.2.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support traffic management mechanisms for the differential treatment of IPTV traffic.
+- R 6.2.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to configure QoS rules at the DNGF that govern traffic mapping (upstream or downstream) for the different IPTV services.
+- R 6.2.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for assigning IPTV traffic priorities.
+- R 6.2.2-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support the relevant mechanisms for IPTV traffic identification, classification and marking, policing and conditioning, scheduling and discarding.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.2.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for dynamic IPTV traffic load balancing so as to dynamically accommodate with the network load and congestion conditions at any given time, enabling delivery of IPTV services to end-users with the required level of quality.
+- RR 6.2.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to offer admission control mechanisms for IPTV traffic, including those generated by end-users, over the access and core network.
+
+## **6.3 Security aspects including service and content protection**
+
+### **6.3.1 General IPTV security**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support content protection as defined in clause 3.
+- R 6.3.1-02: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability where only authorized user(s) or device(s) are allowed to use the IPTV content, even after content is transferred to another security system.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.3.1-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support service and content protection (SCP) of end-user shared content.
+
+### **6.3.2 Service and content protection**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support associating content with protection and content management metadata to permit the expression of its rights of usage.
+- R 6.3.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support content usage rights metadata that distinguish among different rights of use including rendering (viewing), storage, (re)distribution, and combinations thereof.
+- R 6.3.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support protection of content that is distributed simultaneously to a very high number of subscribers (scalability).
+- R 6.3.2-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support protection of content that is transferred over multicast and/or over unicast streams.
+- R 6.3.2-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support the securing of stored content according to granted usage.
+- R 6.3.2-06: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability so as to keep identification information to identify IPTV content consistently, no matter which identification schemes are used and no matter which security system the content is transferred to.
+- R 6.3.2-07: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability whereby only trusted devices have granted rights.
+- R 6.3.2-08: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability so as to provide a secure environment for exchanging service and content protection interoperability data, e.g., authentication information, metadata, key information.
+- R 6.3.2-09: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability such that interoperability is not dependent on specific software or hardware.
+
+- R 6.3.2-10: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from requiring service and content protection mechanisms of either side of two interoperating SCP schemes to be openly specified to achieve interoperability.
+- R 6.3.2-11: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability which is flexible and extensible to support various business models.
+- R 6.3.2-12: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for service and content protection interoperability so as to maintain transparency to users.
+- R 6.3.2-13: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for multiple content and service protection mechanisms regardless of specific hardware or software requirements.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.3.2-01: If IPTV content employs a content tracing technology, then it is recommended that the tracing technology be imperceptible.
+- RR 6.3.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support service and content protection interoperability so as to not reduce the level of security when content is transferred to another security system.
+- RR 6.3.2-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support service and content protection interoperability among multiple security systems which use different security mechanisms, where the purpose is, respectively, to support seamless time shifting (subscribers can store the content and retrieve it later) and place shifting (subscribers can see the content anywhere).
+- RR 6.3.2-04: If IPTV employs a content tracing technology based on metadata for watermarking facilitation, it is recommended to embed relevant metadata in the content elementary stream using such provisions for "user data" as are provided in the specific codec.
+
+NOTE 1 – See [b-ITU-T H.262] for information on "user data".
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.3.2-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the inclusion of content tracing information.
+NOTE 2 – This content tracing information may contain the operator ID, content owner ID, IPTV terminal device ID, and other information.
+- OR 6.3.2-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support robust content tracing for offline (non real-time) content (e.g., VoD content).
+- OR 6.3.2-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally support robust content tracing for real-time content (e.g., broadcast content).
+- OR 6.3.2-04: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a means for conveyance of content tracing information (e.g., watermark facilitation metadata).
+NOTE 3 – Such provision may be made by the selection of appropriate standard profiles or by extensions to the existing standards.
+- OR 6.3.2-05: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the application of content tracing technology within the output of an IPTV terminal device for the purpose of uniquely identifying a session (e.g., channel, time/date), IPTV terminal device and/or network operator.
+NOTE 4 – Content tracing information optionally includes visible and invisible information.
+- OR 6.3.2-06: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow the retrieval of all the content tracing information from the content.
+
+#### 6.3.2.1 IPTV scrambling algorithms
+
+##### Scrambling algorithm requirements
+
+- R 6.3.2.1-01: Scrambling algorithms for broadcast stream are required to support the periodic update of necessary cryptographic keys.
+- R 6.3.2.1-02: Scrambling algorithms for IPTV are required to be built using publicly available and standardized cryptographic algorithms.
+
+##### Scrambling algorithm recommendations
+
+- RR 6.3.2.1-01: Scrambling algorithms for IPTV are recommended to have sufficiently large key entropy to protect the content from crypto-analysis (e.g., at least 128 bits for the AES symmetric algorithms).
+- RR 6.3.2.1-02: IPTV architecture is recommended to not preclude support of more than one scrambling scheme.
+- RR 6.3.2.1-03: Scrambling algorithms for IPTV are recommended to support updatable cryptographic parameters (e.g., key length, crypto periods, etc.) or cryptographic mode (e.g., CBC, OFB, ECB, etc.).
+
+###### Scrambling algorithm options
+
+- OR 6.3.2.1-01: Scrambling algorithms for IPTV can optionally apply cryptographic algorithms of different security strengths depending on the content value.
+
+### 6.3.3 Service security
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.3-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support service protection, as defined in clause 3.
+- R 6.3.3-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support authorization and authentication of end-user.
+NOTE – End-user may be subscriber.
+- R 6.3.3-03: The IPTV architecture is required to have the ability to use standard key management systems (e.g., MIKEY, EMM/ECM), to the extent that this is required for interoperability.
+- R 6.3.3-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability to update and query the SCP system concerning scrambling algorithms for IPTV and any other operator-selected scrambling algorithms.
+- R 6.3.3-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support rights management that is independent of specific content formats or specifications.
+- R 6.3.3-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for the secure delivery of rights and content access control information to the IPTV terminal devices.
+- R 6.3.3-07: The IPTV architecture is required to support content usage control (e.g., re-play rights and content access control information).
+- R 6.3.3-08: The IPTV architecture is required to support different modes of re-play rights and content access control information, e.g., limit on number of plays, time-limit on plays, restriction of fast forward or rewind.
+- R 6.3.3-09: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for transmitting signalling messages securely between the SCP server-side functions and the SCP client-side functions.
+
+- R 6.3.3-10: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to allow for the confidentiality of signalling messages between the SCP server-side functions and the IPTV terminal device SCP client-side functions.
+- R 6.3.3-11: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to allow for the authenticity of signalling messages between the SCP server-side functions and the IPTV terminal device SCP client-side functions.
+- R 6.3.3-12: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to allow for the integrity of signalling messages between the SCP server-side functions and the IPTV terminal device SCP client-side functions.
+- R 6.3.3-13: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to securely retrieve the SCP parameters (e.g., configuration, status) from IPTV terminal device.
+- R 6.3.3-14: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to securely update the SCP parameters (e.g., configuration) of the IPTV terminal device.
+- R 6.3.3-15: If the IPTV architecture employs a key management system, then the latter is required to be designed for scalability, reliability, and interoperability.
+- R 6.3.3-16: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for the installation and operation of multiple service protection solutions without any hardware replacement except removable devices (such as USB dongle and SIM cards).
+- R 6.3.3-17: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for an identification mechanism for available service protection solutions capable of satisfying related content protection requirements.
+- R 6.3.3-18: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for a SCP system discovery mechanism, such that whenever specific content requires a specific SCP system, the IPTV architecture may support a discovery mechanism and adapt to it.
+- R 6.3.3-19: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for a mechanism for the selection of a SCP system from the available SCP systems without any hardware replacement except removable devices.
+- R 6.3.3-20: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for secure downloading of a SCP system. The specific downloading can optionally depend on specific service protection requirements.
+- R 6.3.3-21: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support for verification and authentication of the downloaded SCP system mechanisms.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.3.3-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the capability for authenticating and authorizing end-users for content sharing services (e.g., content export and content redistribution), if content sharing is supported.
+- RR 6.3.3-02: If the IPTV architecture employs a key management system, then a hierarchical key management scheme is recommended to be considered to support scalability.
+- RR 6.3.3-03: If the IPTV architecture employs a key management system that uses a group key management protocol, then a hierarchical key management scheme and a key management algorithm alternative are recommended to be considered to support scalability.
+- RR 6.3.3-04: If the IPTV architecture employs a key management system that uses short term keys, then it is recommended that the media path is provisioned in such a way that NAT traversal and bandwidth constraints do not limit the key exchange.
+
+- RR 6.3.3-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the joint transmission of content and content tracing information such that the content and its respective content tracing information remain synchronized during transport.
+- RR 6.3.3-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support at least the same degree of protection (for purposes of controlling unauthorized access) to content tracing information as it is applied to the corresponding traced content.
+- RR 6.3.3-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to enable content confidentiality.
+- RR 6.3.3-08: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a "blackout mechanism", that is a mechanism for limiting viewing-rights of certain programs to certain groups of subscribers (e.g., to block viewing by residents of a specific area (for example, this may be useful for sporting events)).
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.3.3-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the capability to turn on and off content tracing function with flexibility (e.g., based on time, event, content, channel).
+
+### **6.3.4 Network security**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.4-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support capabilities of mitigating DoS attacks.
+- R 6.3.4-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support the provision of security measures to block illegal or unwanted traffic.
+- R 6.3.4-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support the network operators' capability to prevent that the network topology and resources are visible to unauthorized entities.
+- R 6.3.4-04: The IPTV architecture is required to be hardened against attacks on multicast capabilities.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.3.4-01: The multicast architecture is recommended to support the capability to authenticate a peer in the general or overlay (peer to peer) multicast environment.
+- RR 6.3.4-02: To protect the home network from malicious or unauthorized access, the IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to establish a firewall, with multiple levels of security and appropriate application level gateways.
+- RR 6.3.4-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support capabilities to use content label information to control content delivery.
+
+### **6.3.5 IPTV terminal device security**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.5-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support IPTV terminal device protection, as defined in clause 3.
+- R 6.3.5-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support a means to authenticate IPTV terminal devices.
+- R 6.3.5-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support physical tampering resistance for IPTV terminal devices.
+- R 6.3.5-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support a means to detect when physical tampering has occurred for IPTV terminal devices.
+- R 6.3.5-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support secure installation of the SCP operating code to IPTV terminal devices.
+
+- R 6.3.5-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support secure means for performing critical security enabling processes in IPTV terminal device, such as key management, content tracing, abortion of content playback in the event of a security related malfunction, detection of tampering, or other indication of misuse.
+- R 6.3.5-07: The IPTV architecture is prohibited from precluding support of the interchange of content between an IPTV terminal device and other (physical or logical) devices provided that the usage granted for this content includes such an interchange.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.3.5-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally provide physical protection (against probing or tampering of SCP function on the TD) of sensitive security enabling processes, as well as of critical data supporting those processes, and components involved in the processing, transmission and storage of any valued content in IPTV terminal device in case no logical protection (such as encryption or content tracing watermarks) is present. These processes include descrambling and content tracing.
+
+### **6.3.6 Subscriber security**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.3.6-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support user privacy protection, as defined in clause 3.
+- R 6.3.6-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to allow the IPTV terminal device SCP client-side functions to authenticate the SCP server-side functions.
+- R 6.3.6-03: The IPTV architecture is required to allow a subscriber to set an access control mechanism (e.g., a password) in order to restrict access to content and/or services.
+- R 6.3.6-04: The IPTV architecture is required to be capable of indicating why access to content and/or services has been denied to the end-user.
+- R 6.3.6-05: The IPTV architecture is required to allow for a mechanism for a subscriber to request extensions (e.g., more plays, more play-time) to digital rights associated with specific content instances.
+- R 6.3.6-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to ask for the end-user's permission when a non-anonymous use of the end-user privacy related information is involved.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.3.6-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a mechanism for parental rating, i.e., facilities for rating programs according to content.
+- RR 6.3.6-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms to support the enforcement of parental controls in a manner consistent with ratings defined by each country.
+- RR 6.3.6-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for the service provider to support the enforcement of parental controls on a user profile basis or a policy basis, e.g., time-limit.
+
+## **6.4 Network related aspects**
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability of both multicasting and unicasting transmission schemes.
+
+- RR 6.4-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support content delivery in several yet optional versions to be selected according to the capabilities of the IPTV terminal device receiving the content (e.g., access rate, resolution, supported formats).
+- RR 6.4-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability to identify wireless network characteristics information sent by the IPTV terminal device.
+
+### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.4-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support signalling capabilities for transmitting bandwidth related information.
+- OR 6.4-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally use the bandwidth related information to determine the appropriate content coding means to deliver the content.
+
+### **6.4.1 Network**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.4.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the management and enforcement of the service providers' transport policies by the network provider.
+- R 6.4.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism to appropriately distinguish different forms of traffic, e.g., data and voice.
+- R 6.4.1-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for NAT traversal.
+- R 6.4.1-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for assigning IP addresses and IP subnet masks to an attaching DNG.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.4.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for accessing and obtaining end-user location information.
+- RR 6.4.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the delivery of IPTV services over different access networks (e.g., cable, optical, xDSL, wireless).
+- RR 6.4.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support IPv4 and IPv6.
+- RR 6.4.1-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support both static and dynamic address allocation, numbering and naming schemes.
+
+### **6.4.2 Multicast distribution**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.4.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support multicast means of communication to all end-users.
+- R 6.4.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to allow the service provider to utilize the network providers' multicast delivery capabilities.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.4.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms that allow IPTV services to be distributed to specific groups of end-users.
+- RR 6.4.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for transmitting identification information related to end-users who want to receive or are selected to receive IPTV services.
+
+### 6.4.3 Mobility aspects
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.4.3-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for exchanging subscriber-related information between the visited network (where the end-user accesses the IPTV services) and the home IPTV service provider (where the end-user has its subscription to the IPTV services) in case mobility is supported.
+- R 6.4.3-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for discovering and selecting end-user's service profile from the IPTV terminal device or the home IPTV service provider that will be used by the end-user whenever it accesses such IPTV services from a visited network in case mobility is supported.
+- R 6.4.3-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for discovering and selecting IPTV services provided by the home IPTV service provider for roaming users in case mobility is supported.
+- R 6.4.3-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support capturing relevant control context information from the originating terminal device, and transferring them to the target terminal device in case mobility is supported.
+- R 6.4.3-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support nomadism for both personal mobility and terminal mobility.
+
+NOTE – Further information concerning nomadism, personal mobility and terminal mobility can be found in [b-ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.4.3-01: Where support for terminal mobility with service continuity exists, such support is also recommended for IPTV.
+
+### 6.4.4 Interworking between IPTV and PSTN/ISDN
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.4.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the relevant network facilities for processing PSTN/ISDN incoming/outgoing calls.
+- RR 6.4.4-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support voice encoding/decoding capabilities, as per PSTN/ISDN incoming/outgoing calls.
+- RR 6.4.4-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to be scalable as far as the processing of incoming/outgoing PSTN/ISDN calls per unit of time is concerned.
+- RR 6.4.4-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support real-time audio related to PSTN/ISDN incoming/outgoing calls, with a voice quality similar to that of PSTN/ISDN environments.
+- RR 6.4.4-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support call control service capabilities for the processing of incoming/outgoing PSTN/ISDN calls.
+
+## 6.5 End systems and interoperability aspects
+
+### 6.5.1 End-user aspects on IPTV services
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to choose and select one subtitle or closed caption flow from several that might be delivered with the IPTV content.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a mechanism through which end-users can make the content they produced/created available to other end-users.
+- RR 6.5.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for end-users to control who is able to view end-user originated content (e.g., every end-user versus a specific subset of end-users).
+
+#### **6.5.1.1 End-user aspects on linear TV**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to access different IPTV contents on different IPTV terminal devices if the network allows the simultaneous delivery of several contents (e.g., different IPTV contents).
+- R 6.5.1.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to select an additional audio associated with the main content, e.g., audio description.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user with the ability to select an audio alternative to receiving textual information (e.g., scrollbars).
+
+#### **6.5.1.2 End-user aspects on linear TV with trick mode**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the availability of accessibility features (captions, subtitles, descriptive audio and multiple video streams such as for sign-language) and their synchronization with the main content when viewing in normal playback.
+- R 6.5.1.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support the IPTV terminal device ability to record all available accessibility features (captions, subtitles, descriptive audio and multiple video streams such as for sign-language) with the main content, whilst retaining the synchronization of the original information.
+- R 6.5.1.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support the IPTV terminal device ability to synchronize multiple video streams, captions, and subtitles when the video stream is paused.
+- R 6.5.1.2-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support the IPTV terminal device ability to restart the previously selected associated accessibility features after a pause.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user ability to replay what has just been watched on a TV channel.
+- RR 6.5.1.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user ability to pause and later play in fast forward mode.
+- RR 6.5.1.2-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the IPTV terminal device ability to allow the end-user to select any of the recorded accessibility features.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.5.1.2-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the IPTV terminal device ability to render available accessibility features with the main content when viewing in playback.
+
+#### 6.5.1.3 End-user aspects on time-shift TV
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.3-01: The IPTV architecture, if time-shift TV is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to easily identify the TV channels delivering the selected content and the relative progress position in the delivery of this content.
+- R 6.5.1.3-02: The IPTV architecture, if time-shift TV is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to switch easily between the TV channels which are delivering or about to deliver the same content but at different delivery time using the remote control keys (e.g., channel up, channel down).
+
+#### 6.5.1.4 End-user aspects on VoD
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.4-01: The IPTV architecture, if VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to discover and browse content catalogue(s).
+- R 6.5.1.4-02: The IPTV architecture, if VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to select contents using a single criterion or a combination of criteria such as title, reference, genre, keyword, director, actor, etc.
+- R 6.5.1.4-03: The IPTV architecture, if VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to get the selected content streamed after authorization.
+- R 6.5.1.4-04: The IPTV architecture, if VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to pause and then resume watching the selected content.
+- R 6.5.1.4-05: The IPTV architecture, if VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to rewind or fast forward, with or without watching capability, the VoD content.
+
+#### 6.5.1.5 End-user aspects on push VoD
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.5-01: The IPTV architecture, if push VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user option to receive content without being disturbed (e.g., when watching a TV channel, recording a content on a PVR, downloading from the Internet, having a videoconference) and without disturbing activities of the devices engaged in providing a service (e.g., recording a content on a PVR).
+- R 6.5.1.5-02: The IPTV architecture, if push VoD is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to receive content with no impact on the storage allocated to the end-user.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1.5-01: The IPTV architecture, if push VoD is supported, is recommended to support the end-user option to be informed after push VoD content reception is completed, if not otherwise stated.
+
+#### 6.5.1.6 End-user aspects on PVR service
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.6-01: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to choose whether recording of a new version of content replaces the old version or will coexist with it.
+- R 6.5.1.6-02: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to check if the end-user IPTV terminal devices are suitable for playing back the recorded content.
+- R 6.5.1.6-03: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is required to support the end-user ability to set a preference to see or block a specific content or range of contents.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1.6-01: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to record the content according to the metadata received from a broadcaster and then discard unwanted elements when the broadcaster updates the metadata between scheduling and recording.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-02: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to record the content, even if there is a schedule change recoverable by the PVR (delayed broadcast, no overlap with other scheduled recording, etc.) without any specific end-user action.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-03: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support both the user profile and service profile management on the IPTV terminal device.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-04: The IPTV architecture, if nPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to manage the items stored for them or give an appropriate provider(s) permission to do so, e.g., items to be deleted next, permanently stored, etc.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-05: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to allow the PVR to automatically capture content based on the end-user viewing behaviour.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-06: The IPTV architecture, if cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to allow a service provider to remotely control the functionality of the PVR (e.g., to capture settings, profiles).
+- RR 6.5.1.6-07: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to select programmes for recording based on information provided by the service or content provider.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-08: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to move personal profiles to different PVRs in the same or other physical locations, e.g., when upgrading the devices or while viewing in a hotel when on holiday.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-09: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to automatically update time sensitive content (such as news and advertising) recorded on the PVR.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-10: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to make a selection after seeing promotional or advertising features which are part of the PVR content.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-11: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support an update of the PVR recordings.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-12: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to set preferences on the PVR that allow it to capture captions or subtitles and audio description in the native language of the end-user when programmes are transmitted in a foreign language.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-13: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to select content to be recorded depending on its characteristics such as broadcast quality, aspect ratio, etc.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-14: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to see relevant, timely interstitials (commercials and promotional) when time-shifted viewing of content.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-15: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to receive replacement of advertising interstitials in certain events (such as live sport) with relevant programme content.
+
+- RR 6.5.1.6-16: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to display text, images and other associated content that broadcasters make available as enhancements to their programmes.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-17: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to pause live incoming content on a n/cPVR so that it can be "resumed" later and allow the continued watching of the content in time-shift mode.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-18: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to amend the list of items scheduled to be recorded.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-19: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to set up and manage multiple personal profiles on their PVR associated with one or more service providers.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-20: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to navigate and explore content segments using indexes.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-21: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to capture a multi-stream offering in such a way that, when playing the content at a later date, the different streams remain synchronous.
+- RR 6.5.1.6-22: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user ability to select either audio, captions, subtitles or all to be recorded along with the video, and to store this selection as "preference".
+- RR 6.5.1.6-23: The IPTV architecture, if nPVR is supported, is recommended to support the end-user's rightful ability to check if any content searched for is playable on the IPTV terminal device.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.5.1.6-01: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally allow retrieval of content in a segmented manner.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-02: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to insert captured advertisements or promotions along with the content being played back.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-03: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to edit the recorded content.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-04: The IPTV architecture, if both of nPVR and cPVR are used together, can optionally support the end-user ability to utilize the capacity of nPVR as expanded capacity of cPVR for personal content.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-05: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to pause what is being watched, view any other material, and then resume the original material from where it was paused.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-06: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to capture content onto the portable device, if the portable device has recording capability, over a network and transfer that content with associated metadata to his or her home devices and other mobile devices with the permission of the service or content provider.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-07: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to decide whether to capture single or multiple episodes of a series or other programmed groupings.
+- OR 6.5.1.6-08: The IPTV architecture, if n/cPVR is supported, can optionally support the end-user ability to play games that include pre-recorded content.
+
+#### 6.5.1.7 End-user aspects on service information
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.1.7-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to see the associated information (e.g., by pressing a specific remote control key) and to act upon it (e.g., to follow the link, to make a choice, to bet, to return).
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.1.7-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user ability to tune to a TV channel from the displayed list of authorized TV channels.
+- RR 6.5.1.7-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user ability to configure or watch a short list of the TV channels among those authorized to watch (free or subscribed channels).
+- RR 6.5.1.7-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user ability to get information about the available TV channels (name, logos, owner, website).
+
+### 6.5.2 IPTV terminal device
+
+#### Terminal device requirements
+
+- R 6.5.2-01: The IPTV terminal device is required to support the decoding of at least one video and one audio format.
+- R 6.5.2-02: The IPTV terminal device is required to support system start-up and initialization function.
+- R 6.5.2-03: The IPTV terminal device is required to have the ability to select and receive multiple audio sources (e.g., one with audio description).
+- R 6.5.2-04: The IPTV terminal user interface is required to not rely on colour alone to convey information.
+- R 6.5.2-05: For multichannel audio transmissions, the IPTV terminal device is required to have an IEC 958 type II interface.
+- R 6.5.2-06: The IPTV terminal device without multichannel audio capabilities is required to implement multichannel audio decoders and downmix from multichannel to stereo.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow multiple services with different contents to be displayed on a single IPTV terminal device.
+
+#### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support the rendering of multiple IPTV contents and layouts.
+- RR 6.5.2-03: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support decoding of a variety set of video formats such as, but necessarily limited, to SD and HD.
+- RR 6.5.2-04: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support audio services.
+- RR 6.5.2-05: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support mono, stereo and multi-channel audio decoding capabilities.
+- RR 6.5.2-06: For multichannel audio transmissions, the IPTV terminal device is recommended to implement transcoding, e.g., from HE-AAC to DTS Surround or Dolby Digital Plus to Dolby Digital, if it is a multichannel audio capable terminal.
+- RR 6.5.2-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support IPTV terminal devices with the capability to choose the desired format of the content if there are multiple formats available.
+
+- RR 6.5.2-08: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to offer to the end-user a service navigation capability based on the metadata for the services available through each network.
+- RR 6.5.2-09: The GUI API module is recommended to include the following functions:
+ - Graphic design and display functions;
+ - UI control interface design and display functions;
+ - Image and video attribute set functions.
+- RR 6.5.2-10: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide a user setting enabling selection of an opaque background for any on-screen display, i.e., text that is overlaid onto video, thereby making it easier to read.
+- RR 6.5.2-11: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide a user setting to change the default colours of text and background for on-screen displays, i.e., as a minimum, a combination of white text on a black background is recommended to be offered.
+- RR 6.5.2-12: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide a user setting to change the default size of text for on-screen displays.
+- RR 6.5.2-13: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to inform the user of the timing when an action (for example, downloading content) is complete.
+- RR 6.5.2-14: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to display Arabic numerals (1, 2, 3, 4) rather than Roman numerals (I, II, III, IV) where applicable to the language used.
+- RR 6.5.2-15: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support the ability to display subtitles and captions in any character set of the content provider's choice.
+- RR 6.5.2-16: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to maintain the end-user's selected subtitle and caption styles/options/modes/formats, supplementary audio content and supplementary video content as far as possible when switching between services.
+- RR 6.5.2-17: Any on-screen displays are recommended to be available via external interfaces.
+- RR 6.5.2-18: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support diagnostic for IPTV terminal.
+- RR 6.5.2-19: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support subtitle and caption decoding and display.
+- RR 6.5.2-20: The IPTV terminal device, when permitted, is recommended to be able to acquire and save the audience rating information and send it to the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.2-21: The IPTV terminal device is required to support the ability to ask for the end-user's permission when a non-anonymous use of the end-user privacy related information is involved.
+- RR 6.5.2-22: The IPTV terminal device with multichannel audio capabilities is recommended to utilize audio control features, e.g., dynamic range control, programme reference level (or dialogue) normalization and downmix in the audio decoder.
+- RR 6.5.2-23: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support pause.
+- RR 6.5.2-24: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support an IP-based 2-way communication channel.
+- RR 6.5.2-25: The IPTV terminal device, if n/cPVR is supported, is recommended to support distributed personal video recorder functionality.
+- RR 6.5.2-26: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to communicate with the service provider in order to be aware of service availability.
+
+- RR 6.5.2-27: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to have the capability to decode and display captions in a separate window or overlaid with different colours, colours for different speakers as signalled by the content provider.
+- RR 6.5.2-28: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to be able to declare to media-providing entities its usage environment description, e.g., type of service, type of terminal, type of transmission medium, user preferences, available QoS level.
+- RR 6.5.2-29: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to be able to display the service logo.
+- RR 6.5.2-30: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support skip forward and skip backward (e.g., by time period, interval, location in content) in linear TV with trick mode.
+- RR 6.5.2-31: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support skip forward and skip backward (e.g., by time period, interval, location in content) in VoD service.
+- RR 6.5.2-32: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support skip forward and skip backward (e.g., by time period, interval, location in content) in client PVR service.
+- RR 6.5.2-33: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support skip forward and skip backward (e.g., by time period, interval, location in content) in network PVR service.
+- RR 6.5.2-34: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to allow the end-user the selection of subtitles or captions being displayed with a solid background or a transparent one.
+- RR 6.5.2-35: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to be able to declare its usage environment description to the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.2-36: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to select the preferred subtitle or closed caption flow when several such flows are available with the IPTV content.
+- RR 6.5.2-37: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to have the ability to select the preferred main and supplementary content associated with the main content.
+- RR 6.5.2-38: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to have the ability to discover and display any additional information (such as subtitles and captions) delivered with the TV channel.
+- RR 6.5.2-39: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support the end-user ability to set up and manage multiple user profiles.
+- RR 6.5.2-40: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to output video in accordance with accepted international standards.
+- RR 6.5.2-41: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support video scaling.
+- RR 6.5.2-42: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide native mode video output support, if it supports high definition outputs.
+- RR 6.5.2-43: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support a combination of video scaling and de-interlacing.
+- RR 6.5.2-44: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to be capable of outputting SD and HD video signals according to one or more of the existing interface standards for video signals, if it is HD-capable.
+- RR 6.5.2-45: The IPTV terminal device with multichannel audio capabilities is recommended to support downmix from multichannel to stereo.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.5.2-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability to store, cache, update, and run applications on devices that implement the ITF.
+
+- OR 6.5.2-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability for applications to be delivered to ITF implementing devices with a video service (i.e., streamed with the video), by user request over the two-way network connection, and by the service provider at the service provider's direction.
+- OR 6.5.2-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability of ITF implementing devices to serve as a master monitor or switcher application that can be updated by the service provider and that can manage the execution of other applications.
+- OR 6.5.2-04: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability for service provider-managed applications to be stored and executed in the devices implementing the ITF.
+- OR 6.5.2-05: The IPTV architecture can optionally support the ability for video service-associated applications to be stored and executed in the devices implementing the ITF.
+- OR 6.5.2-06: The IPTV architecture can optionally support user-requested applications to be stored and executed in the devices implementing the ITF.
+- OR 6.5.2-07: The IPTV architecture can optionally have the ability to arrange displays of multiple video sources in different layouts.
+
+##### Terminal device options
+
+- OR 6.5.2-08: When no relevant national regulations apply, the IPTV terminal device can optionally support the ability of presenting emergency messages in text, alert video and audio over normal program media streams, and also the ability of interrupting any audio stream, including the supplementary audio.
+NOTE – When relevant national regulations apply, the IPTV architecture is required to support national regulations.
+- OR 6.5.2-09: The IPTV terminal device can optionally support VBI capabilities.
+- OR 6.5.2-10: The IPTV terminal device can optionally support the modification of display duration.
+- OR 6.5.2-11: The IPTV terminal device can optionally enable the skin to contain properties of the graphical entities of the EPG interface such as fonts, icons, pointer, background pictures, and sound effect.
+- OR 6.5.2-12: The IPTV terminal device can optionally enable the specified skin style to be further customized according to graphical entities such as fonts, icons, pointer, background pictures, sound effect, etc.
+- OR 6.5.2-13: The IPTV terminal device can optionally download the skin on boot process.
+- OR 6.5.2-14: The IPTV terminal device can optionally enable the end-user to access the remote control functions via GUI.
+- OR 6.5.2-15: The IPTV terminal device can optionally render the UI with the end-user preferred skin.
+- OR 6.5.2-16: The IPTV terminal device can optionally support the capability to provide information regarding its bandwidth availability.
+- OR 6.5.2-17: The IPTV terminal device can optionally support the capability to allow the end-user to adjust the size of the subtitles or captions displayed.
+- OR 6.5.2-18: The IPTV terminal device can optionally have the ability to select from a range of languages, speed and verbosity for subtitles and captions.
+- OR 6.5.2-19: The IPTV terminal device can optionally be capable of responding to user preferences for adjusting audio dynamic range compression and control based on audio metadata.
+
+- OR 6.5.2-20: The IPTV terminal device can optionally be capable of supporting user or network selection among a minimum of three levels of audio dynamic range compression: uncompressed, intermediate and heavy.
+
+#### **6.5.2.1 Interfaces**
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.1-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide a human control interface (for example an infrared remote-control).
+- RR 6.5.2.1-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide means for feedback of control actions to the end-user by visual and/or audio indications selected by the end-user.
+- RR 6.5.2.1-03: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to provide end-user interface(s) for control and feedback of control actions by external devices or additional software, e.g., Braille interpretive device.
+
+#### **6.5.2.2 Provisioning**
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.2-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to be easy to install and configure for operation.
+- RR 6.5.2.2-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support self- and remote provisioning of services, including network configuration and device-specific service enabling tasks.
+
+#### **6.5.2.3 PVR control**
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.3-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support both internal and/or external control of PVR functionality.
+
+#### **6.5.2.4 Security and authentication functions**
+
+##### Terminal device requirements
+
+- R 6.5.2.4-01: The IPTV terminal device is required to support subscriber authentication and identification information management.
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.4-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support IPTV service authorization.
+- RR 6.5.2.4-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support software upgrade and download authentication.
+- RR 6.5.2.4-03: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support network security policy management.
+- RR 6.5.2.4-04: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support parental control related information management.
+- RR 6.5.2.4-05: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support content purchasing information management.
+- RR 6.5.2.4-06: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support API for service provider functions such as locking screen (which disables the displayed image to change for a certain amount of time until, e.g., all the resources needed to be shown are ready and can be synchronized).
+
+#### 6.5.2.5 SCP functions
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.5-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support the SCP functions in line with the recommendations made in [ITU-T Y.1910].
+- RR 6.5.2.5-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support rights management.
+- RR 6.5.2.5-03: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support decryption of media streams and data streams.
+- RR 6.5.2.5-04: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support access to security information.
+
+#### 6.5.2.6 End-user interaction functions
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.6-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support event reception and dispatching from end-user to service provider.
+
+#### 6.5.2.7 Terminal management
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.7-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support remote management.
+- RR 6.5.2.7-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support log management.
+- RR 6.5.2.7-03: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support software version management.
+- RR 6.5.2.7-04: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support media device parameter configuration, such as decoder parameter configuration.
+- RR 6.5.2.7-05: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support subscriber configuration, such as access account, service account.
+
+#### 6.5.2.8 System resource management functions
+
+##### Terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.8-01: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support monitoring and management of its own resources.
+- RR 6.5.2.8-02: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to support allocation and scheduling of its own resources to IPTV services.
+
+#### 6.5.2.9 Internet access functions
+
+##### Terminal device options
+
+- OR 6.5.2.9-01: The IPTV terminal device can optionally support Internet client management, such as web browser, e-mail and news client management.
+
+#### 6.5.2.10 Aspects related to ITF
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.2.10-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support a means to avoid sending to an ITF content that is unable to be rendered.
+- R 6.5.2.10-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms, inhibitors, and interfaces for the ITF to control the streaming of video content, i.e., trick modes.
+- R 6.5.2.10-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support IPTV terminal devices which constantly listen for emergency alert notification (EAN) messages.
+
+- R 6.5.2.10-04: If required by national authorities, the IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for the ITF to decode EAN messages specified by the authorities.
+- R 6.5.2.10-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for the ITF to synchronize between different content streams.
+- R 6.5.2.10-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability for the ITF to re-establish service without end-user intervention in the event of network outages.
+- R 6.5.2.10-07: The IPTV architecture is required to support channel change functionality in the ITF.
+- R 6.5.2.10-08: The IPTV architecture is required to support an extensible method for the service provider to query for the ITF's capabilities and status.
+- R 6.5.2.10-09: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for the service provider to manage the ITF, associated peripheral devices, e.g., display or storage devices, and physical devices that implement the ITF.
+- R 6.5.2.10-10: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability of the ITF to display and allow user selection of program, content, and service descriptions.
+- R 6.5.2.10-11: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability of the ITF to decode and display subtitle or closed caption information.
+- R 6.5.2.10-12: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability of the ITF to decode and display emergency alert information.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.2.10-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support automated configuration capabilities for the IPTV devices.
+- RR 6.5.2.10-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability of the ITF to declare its usage environment description to the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.2.10-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability of the ITF to obtain the usage environment description from the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.2.10-04: The ITF is recommended to support the status information report to the service provider.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.5.2.10-01: The ITF can optionally provide mechanisms to detect and report service consumption events that are not detectable elsewhere in the IPTV infrastructure.
+
+### **6.5.3 Remote management**
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.3-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the service provider to retrieve device information such as manufacturer name, model name and number, software version, firmware version and profiles supported.
+- RR 6.5.3-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the service provider to provide information related to the service provider, such as an URL for a home page or help desk. For example, to provide a means for the service provider to direct the end-user to a central information point which would allow the service provider to offer additional services or assistance in case of difficulty.
+- RR 6.5.3-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the service provider to retrieve statistical information of usage, e.g., channels watched and duration with the end-user's permission.
+
+- RR 6.5.3-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the service provider to access service transaction related information such as usage patterns, e.g., changing between linear IPTV channels.
+- RR 6.5.3-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the service provider to be able to configure and monitor device connectivity, e.g., access network and home network parameters.
+- RR 6.5.3-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the service provider to be able to access device, network and content metrics important for QoS, e.g., dropped packet rates, jitter, integrity of transport streams.
+
+### **6.5.4 Home network**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.5.4-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support IP filtering functions in the DNGF in order to prevent selected local multicast traffic on the home network side from appearing on the network side.
+- R 6.5.4-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms for transport of time of day to the home network.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to implement standard IP routing functions, per established IETF specifications.
+- RR 6.5.4-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to support the routing of IP packets between interfaces on network and home network sides. Specifically, this means:
+ - Routing is recommended to be supported between network interfaces and home network interfaces;
+ - Routing is recommended to be supported between different home network interfaces.
+- RR 6.5.4-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to support multiple logical IP interfaces (multiple attachment points at the IP layer) on any particular physical interface on the network side.
+- RR 6.5.4-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to assign IP addresses to devices in the home network.
+- RR 6.5.4-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to support channel change functions between the ITF and the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.4-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow multiple network providers for a single home network, i.e., the IPTV architecture is recommended to allow a single home network to connect to more than one network provider domain.
+- RR 6.5.4-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow different providers for the transport and service strata, i.e., the IPTV architecture must allow a single home network to be able to access separate network and service providers.
+- RR 6.5.4-08: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow for multiple providers for different or similar services, i.e., the IPTV architecture must allow a single home network to be able to access multiple service providers.
+- RR 6.5.4-09: The DNGF is recommended to support status information reporting to the service provider.
+- RR 6.5.4-10: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support the ability to perform bandwidth management of the home network attached to the DNG.
+
+- RR 6.5.4-11: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support the ability to control local traffic within the home network attached to the DNG.
+- RR 6.5.4-12: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support the ability to perform admission control functions to protect the home network from excessive and harmful traffic within the home network, and between network and home network.
+- RR 6.5.4-13: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support the ability for the DNGF to perform policing functions on incoming network traffic and drop offending traffic to protect the home network.
+- RR 6.5.4-14: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support IP traffic routing based on mechanisms to guarantee QoS for different service classes.
+- RR 6.5.4-15: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support mapping downstream traffic to corresponding local flows to provide QoS for the different services. This includes Layer 3 to Layer 2 mapping.
+- RR 6.5.4-16: The IPTV architecture (including DNGF) is recommended to support mapping upstream traffic generated within the home network to corresponding outgoing flows to provide QoS for the different services. This includes Layer 2 to Layer 3 mapping.
+
+#### Home network recommendations
+
+- RR 6.5.4-17: The home network functions in the end-user domain supporting IPTV services are recommended to support the authentication procedures required by the network and service providers.
+- RR 6.5.4-18: The DNGF is recommended to support NAT/NAPT capability to map IP address and port numbers between the public WAN and the LAN(s).
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.5.4-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support content sharing between devices in the home network.
+
+## **6.6 Middleware, application and content aspects**
+
+### **6.6.1 General**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to search for available content.
+- R 6.6.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability of receiving and processing the metadata for content available to the end-user coming from content providers.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.1-01: The IPTV architecture is not recommended to preclude support of the requirements related to the retransmission of the existing terrestrial, satellite and cable broadcast, such as regional and regulatory.
+- RR 6.6.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for the end-user to log announced information of interest.
+- RR 6.6.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the end-user to exchange user profile information among various devices.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.1-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support uniform media formats (UMF) for content provisioning, discovery, delivery and consumption.
+
+### 6.6.2 Middleware
+
+#### 6.6.2.1 General
+
+##### Middleware requirements
+
+- R 6.6.2.1-01: The IPTV middleware is required to support terminal device start-up and initialization function.
+- R 6.6.2.1-02: The IPTV middleware is required to support server-side device start-up and initialization function.
+- R 6.6.2.1-03: The IPTV middleware, if trick mode is supported, is required to support play, pause and stop functions.
+
+##### Middleware recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.2.1-01: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support application management (e.g., application lifecycles, application states).
+- RR 6.6.2.1-02: The IPTV middleware is recommended to be hardware and operating system (OS) independent.
+- RR 6.6.2.1-03: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support pause in a PVR capable terminal or system.
+- RR 6.6.2.1-04: The IPTV middleware is recommended to manage skip forward and skip backward functions (e.g., by time period, interval, location in content).
+- RR 6.6.2.1-05: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support executing of multiple simultaneous applications.
+- RR 6.6.2.1-06: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support a means to change the style of EPG.
+- RR 6.6.2.1-07: The IPTV middleware components are recommended to facilitate service processes interaction among IPTV devices (e.g., a server and its clients, such as STB, security system, or VoD server).
+- RR 6.6.2.1-08: The IPTV middleware is recommended to be able to manage the IPTV application profile information.
+- RR 6.6.2.1-09: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support presentation capabilities for multimedia data (e.g., audio, video, graphics, text and images) providing the browsing, the synchronization and the interaction of such data with the end-user.
+
+##### Middleware options
+
+- OR 6.6.2.1-01: The IPTV middleware can optionally support the decoding of service information (SI).
+- OR 6.6.2.1-02: The IPTV middleware can optionally support shortcut mechanism for selection.
+- OR 6.6.2.1-03: The IPTV middleware can optionally support metadata compression.
+
+#### 6.6.2.2 Middleware application programming interfaces
+
+##### Middleware requirements
+
+- R 6.6.2.2-01: The IPTV middleware is required to provide an API for stopping and starting the presentation of video and audio.
+- R 6.6.2.2-02: The IPTV middleware is required to provide an API to communicate with service providers to implement media transmission and media control functions.
+- R 6.6.2.2-03: The IPTV middleware is required to provide an API to access metadata information.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.2.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support an API to manage the resources for applications.
+
+##### Middleware recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.2.2-02: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support an API to access information on removable storage device (e.g., USB key).
+- RR 6.6.2.2-03: The IPTV middleware is recommended to support an API for controlling (e.g., selecting, showing and hiding) subtitle and closed captioning display.
+- RR 6.6.2.2-04: The IPTV middleware is recommended to include an API to access user preferences (e.g., accessibility features and display settings) available on a removable storage device (e.g., smartcard).
+- RR 6.6.2.2-05: The IPTV middleware is recommended to provide service enabling APIs.
+- RR 6.6.2.2-06: The IPTV middleware APIs are recommended to be open, flexible, granular, self-contained and components-based.
+- RR 6.6.2.2-07: The IPTV middleware is recommended to provide an API to support a variety of mixed media formats to be presented together (e.g., an HTML text page embedding a video stream).
+- RR 6.6.2.2-08: The IPTV middleware is recommended to provide an API to support picture-in-picture.
+- RR 6.6.2.2-09: The IPTV middleware is recommended to provide an API to manage captioning including the selection from a range of languages, speed and verbosity.
+
+##### Middleware options
+
+- OR 6.6.2.2-01: The IPTV middleware can optionally provide an API for recording programs locally.
+
+### **6.6.3 Metadata**
+
+#### **6.6.3.1 Metadata structure**
+
+##### Metadata requirements
+
+- R 6.6.3.1-01: The IPTV metadata is required to support the indication of which accessibility features are available for a TV programme, i.e., captions, subtitles in various languages, supplementary video and supplementary descriptive audio.
+- R 6.6.3.1-02: The IPTV metadata is required to support the description of accessibility features, including language.
+- R 6.6.3.1-03: The IPTV metadata is required to be able to describe contents and be extensible.
+
+##### Metadata recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.3.1-01: The IPTV metadata is recommended to be able to describe legacy channel number information specified by content providers.
+- RR 6.6.3.1-02: The IPTV metadata is recommended to be able to describe user preferences (e.g., for personal favourite channels).
+- RR 6.6.3.1-03: The IPTV metadata is recommended to support one or more UMF that integrate multiple representations about the content including media coding formats, SCP information and SCP tools information.
+- RR 6.6.3.1-04: The IPTV metadata for any given IPTV metadata instance is recommended to be uniquely identified by an ID.
+
+- RR 6.6.3.1-05: The IPTV metadata is recommended to support packages as per clause 3.
+- RR 6.6.3.1-06: The IPTV metadata is recommended to be able to describe the date of the last modification and the expiration period of metadata instance.
+- RR 6.6.3.1-07: The IPTV metadata is recommended to be able to describe the target audience.
+- RR 6.6.3.1-08: The IPTV metadata is recommended to be able to describe the user created content (UCC).
+
+##### Metadata options
+
+- OR 6.6.3.1-01: The IPTV metadata can optionally provide the following configuration information: type of service, type of terminal device, type of transmission medium, user preferences, available QoS levels, codecs, profiles, encoding configurations.
+- OR 6.6.3.1-02: The IPTV metadata can optionally be aligned with the metadata in existing broadcasting services.
+
+#### **6.6.3.2 Metadata for service navigation**
+
+##### Metadata requirements
+
+- R 6.6.3.2-01: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to provide general information about a piece of content that does not change regardless of how the content is published or broadcasted.
+NOTE – General information may include title, synopsis, parental control, rating, encrypted or not, price and conditions of availability like the number of plays in duration, credit list, actors, characters, key talent, key characters, writer, composer, conductor, review, critic's review, identification of the original content provider, and access means to a pricing server.
+- R 6.6.3.2-02: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support the description of various types and groups of programs series and shows.
+- R 6.6.3.2-03: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support the description of service providers (e.g., name, owner, logo).
+- R 6.6.3.2-04: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support the description of groups of consecutive schedule events together, which spans a given time period on a single service.
+- R 6.6.3.2-05: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support the description of contents that can be acquired on demand (as opposed to broadcast), including start time of which content is available, end time of which content is unavailable.
+- R 6.6.3.2-06: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support newly assigned channel numbers for the respective IPTV services and the legacy channel numbers and the (geographical) location of the original broadcasters when retransmitted from broadcast networks.
+- R 6.6.3.2-07: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is required to support the channel description including source type, service type and service provider.
+
+##### Metadata recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.3.2-01: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is recommended to be able to describe advertisement content (e.g., commercial video).
+- RR 6.6.3.2-02: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is recommended to be able to describe usage restriction, including regional restriction, output and DRM export control, trick mode (e.g., rewind, fast forward) enabled, maximum buffering size or duration.
+- RR 6.6.3.2-03: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is recommended to be able to describe metadata publisher, owner and copyrights sign.
+
+- RR 6.6.3.2-04: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is recommended to support various content rating standards (e.g., general audience (G), parental guide suggested (PG)).
+- RR 6.6.3.2-05: The IPTV metadata for service navigation is recommended to support the description of audience information (e.g., channel number before and after channel change, time of change and user information for EPG service, and package identification, time of play and user information for package service).
+
+#### **6.6.3.3 Metadata for package service**
+
+##### Metadata requirements
+
+- R 6.6.3.3-01: The IPTV metadata for package service is required to allow the description of single content items as well as the description of collection of content components defined as "package" as per clause 3.
+- R 6.6.3.3-02: The IPTV metadata for package service is required to describe synchronization (temporal information) and spatial information between content components to allow contents to be consumed as the service provider intended.
+
+##### Metadata recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.3.3-01: The IPTV metadata for package service is recommended to support the description of the various types of content components.
+
+#### **6.6.3.4 Metadata provisioning**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.3.4-01: The IPTV architecture is required to be able to support the service provider with the capability of creating or amending the metadata associated with a particular content.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.3.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the content provider to create and amend the metadata associated with its own contents.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.3.4-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow anyone with rights/permission to create and amend the metadata associated with a particular content (e.g., reviews, comments, synopsis, etc.).
+- OR 6.6.3.4-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally support multiple metadata formats.
+
+#### **6.6.3.5 Metadata delivery**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.3.5-01: The IPTV architecture is required to have a means to deliver the content metadata to the end-user, including terms and conditions (e.g., duration the viewer is entitled to consume the content, PPV, related expenses), available accessibility features (captions, subtitles, supplementary descriptive audio, and multiple supplementary video streams).
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.3.5-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support both multicast and unicast metadata delivery.
+- RR 6.6.3.5-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to be able to support fragmented metadata delivery.
+- RR 6.6.3.5-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support metadata protection (e.g., user preferences, usage history).
+
+- RR 6.6.3.5-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow metadata delivery independently of content delivery.
+- RR 6.6.3.5-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support both the push and pull model for metadata delivery.
+- RR 6.6.3.5-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a mechanism for the IPTV terminal device to know about metadata instance modifications.
+- RR 6.6.3.5-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a metadata delivery protocol over IP in addition to the already existing MPEG-2 TS-based transport.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.3.5-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support a mechanism to allow the user-customized content list to be updated.
+- OR 6.6.3.5-02: The IPTV metadata can optionally be provided in conjunction with the audiovisual contents.
+
+### **6.6.4 Content**
+
+#### **6.6.4.1 Content delivery**
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms for content downloading.
+- RR 6.6.4.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the delivery of multiple audio streams (e.g., one with audio description).
+- RR 6.6.4.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support fast forward and fast rewind of content at different speeds.
+- RR 6.6.4.1-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support both a pull and a push method of content delivery.
+- RR 6.6.4.1-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the download of content regardless of its type, e.g., audio, video, text, graphics.
+- RR 6.6.4.1-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to be able to distinguish geographic regions to offer targeted services (e.g., for targeted advertising).
+- RR 6.6.4.1-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the delivery of user created contents (UCC).
+
+##### Protocol recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.1-08: The content delivery protocols are recommended to support multiple policies for content distribution (e.g., scheduled content pushing, dynamic content pulling, multiple sources for content pulling).
+
+#### **6.6.4.2 Video**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.4.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to maintain video and audio in sync (accurate lip-sync) as judged by the general viewer at all times.
+
+##### Video requirements
+
+- R 6.6.4.2-02: The video format is required to support a wide range of temporal sampling standards, bit-rates and picture resolutions.
+
+##### Video recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.2-01: The video format is recommended to support interlaced and progressive format.
+
+#### **6.6.4.3 Audio**
+
+##### Audio requirements
+
+- R 6.6.4.3-01: The audio format is required to provide audio depth equivalent to existing broadcasts, i.e., requiring a sampling rate of 48 kHz at 16 bits. Other sample rates and bit-depths can be optionally supported.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.3-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support single (mono), dual (stereo) and multichannel (at least 5.1 surround sound) audio transmission. Different modes may be supported using different codecs.
+- RR 6.6.4.3-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support multiple language audio streams associated with each video.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.4.3-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support clean audio.
+
+#### **6.6.4.4 Content replay**
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.4-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to allow the playback of recorded content in the same way as the playback modes provisioned in a typical DVD, e.g., normal speed play, fast forward (at various speeds), fast rewind (at various speeds), pause, frame by frame advance, slow forward, slow backward.
+- RR 6.6.4.4-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support mechanisms to assist in locating random access points in the media stream.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.4.4-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow replacement of interstitial materials (e.g., advertisers and broadcasters, on replay of recorded content, want to replace interstitial material with more relevant interstitials based on parameters such as time of viewing, environmental triggers (such as weather, season, etc.) and number of times seen).
+- OR 6.6.4.4-02: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow the replacement of content (e.g., advertisement, expired content).
+- OR 6.6.4.4-03: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow advertisers to ensure that their commercials are seen only by the appropriate audience (e.g., where a minor is replaying content, a commercial for an alcoholic beverage is recommended to be skipped).
+
+#### **6.6.4.5 Content provisioning and management**
+
+##### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.4.5-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support a mechanism for the service provider to ingest and store VoD content.
+
+##### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.5-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to provide content providers with content management capabilities, such as uploading, deleting and replacing content.
+
+- RR 6.6.4.5-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the integration and interoperability of all components necessary for the acquisition and processing of content during the ingestion phase (e.g., applying SCP, insertion of commercials, encoding, editing).
+- RR 6.6.4.5-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a transfer interface between content provider and service provider that is independent of content formats.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-04: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support content streaming overlapped with content pulling.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-05: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support metadata for content provisioning.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-06: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support metadata for specifying re-encoding, transcoding of content and their output formats.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-07: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the ability to collect statistical information about content popularity, audience rating, connected time and other information according to user profiles.
+
+##### Content management and provisioning recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.4.5-08: The content management functions are recommended to be able to track each content program and segment location in the distributed media servers.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-09: The content management functions are recommended to be able to keep track of the content distribution sessions among media servers.
+- RR 6.6.4.5-10: The content management functions are recommended to keep statistical and historic data of content delivery and copy sessions. These data could be used for calculating content popularity and guiding future content distribution.
+
+##### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.4.5-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally offer the service provider and content provider the ability to specify and exchange content distribution metadata, including metadata for re-encoding, transcoding of content and their output formats.
+
+##### Content management and provisioning options
+
+- OR 6.6.4.5-02: The content management functions can optionally support request for bandwidth and congestion control capabilities.
+- OR 6.6.4.5-03: The content location management functions can optionally keep track of the real time content distribution sessions in order to provide distribution bandwidth control in the provider's core network.
+
+### **6.6.5 Service navigation**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.5-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support IPTV content selection through an electronic content guide.
+- R 6.6.5-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support IPTV service selection through an electronic service guide.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.5-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the end-user capability to view the service navigation information either sorted or filtered or both by time or other criteria.
+
+##### Service navigation system recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.5-02: The IPTV service navigation system is recommended to support exchange of information with other applications.
+- RR 6.6.5-03: The IPTV service navigation system is recommended to support consolidation of program/content information from multiple IPTV metadata service providers.
+- RR 6.6.5-04: The IPTV service navigation system is recommended to support IPTV service and content searching.
+- RR 6.6.5-05: The IPTV service navigation system is recommended to present always up-to-date information.
+
+##### Service navigation system options
+
+- OR 6.6.5-01: The IPTV service navigation system can optionally support the customized presentation of the service and content information.
+- OR 6.6.5-02: The IPTV service navigation system can optionally adapt the information presentation to various terminal types.
+- OR 6.6.5-03: The IPTV service navigation system can optionally allow the end-user to store metadata about user-customized content list.
+
+### **6.6.6 Service/content discovery and selection**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.6.6-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support capabilities for service discovery.
+- R 6.6.6-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support capabilities for the end-user to select the content to be delivered.
+- R 6.6.6-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability for the end-user to interact with service provider-managed services through a 2-way communication channel.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.6.6-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support several content selection modes (e.g., program navigation, channel switch, search).
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.6-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support profile/encoding negotiation capabilities to adapt to heterogeneous usage environments.
+
+### **6.6.7 Returned data**
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.6.7-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally allow demographic data to be obtained from the IPTV terminal device.
+
+NOTE – Usage of these data may include targeting/restricting content items and advertisements to specific groups of users.
+
+## **6.7 Public interest**
+
+### **6.7.1 Accessibility**
+
+Requirements in this clause are intended to benefit the people with disabilities or people with special needs and meet the minimum regulatory requirements.
+
+These requirements provide accessibility for people with temporary environmental dysfunctions to include people with varied or different languages, to those with learning difficulties and to those whose capabilities are diminished by age and degeneration. There are about 18% of people worldwide living with some kind of disability, including those related to aging; 10% live with life-
+
+altering disabilities, two thirds of which are in developing countries. Users with disabilities have a general need to be provided with means to control and use terminals and services in alternative ways and modes, suiting varied capabilities and preferences. Such requirements are best met by the inclusive design of the general provision of IPTV terminals and services [b-ITU-T TP.TACL] [b-ITU-T F.790].
+
+It is also noted that some of these accessibility features are presently mainstream in their use and have been included in other clauses in this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE 1 – Some of the following requirements below may have regulatory implications in some countries and may not be required for all IPTV applications. National regulations may place specific additional requirements that shall be honoured.
+
+NOTE 2 – Other needs for users with disabilities to use emergency telecommunication services are handled in clause 6.7.2.
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.7.1-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms to support subtitles and captions.
+- R 6.7.1-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support subtitles and captions' presentation in a separate window.
+- R 6.7.1-03: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to select and receive two (related) video sources simultaneously (e.g., one with sign language translation).
+- R 6.7.1-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to select and receive two (related) audio sources simultaneously (e.g., one with audio description).
+- R 6.7.1-05: The IPTV architecture is required to provide the end-user the ability to select and switch between supplementary content that is associated with the main video content, if available.
+- R 6.7.1-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to select preferred supplementary content for sign language with a selectable preferred on-screen layout.
+
+#### IPTV application and device requirements
+
+- R 6.7.1-07: The IPTV applications and devices are required to be designed using principles of universal design so that a wider population with users of varying capabilities can access such applications and devices.
+- R 6.7.1-08: The IPTV metadata is required to contain information about the provision of accessibility features.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.7.1-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support good quality audio transmission and reproduction to make it possible for people to perceive the sound well [ITU-T Y.1541].
+- RR 6.7.1-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support video transmission with sufficient quality for sign language perception if there is sign language in the contents [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1].
+- RR 6.7.1-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support video transmission with sufficient quality for lip reading perception [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1].
+
+#### IPTV application and device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.7.1-04: The recording of accessibility features is recommended to be done in such a way that, when watching the recording, they can be both switched on and switched off. Therefore, it is a good idea to record all accessibility feature streams and link them to the service as a whole.
+
+### **6.7.2 Emergency telecommunications and regulatory information services**
+
+#### Architecture requirements
+
+- R 6.7.2-01: The IPTV architecture is required to support emergency alert service, where required, by regulation or law of the country.
+- R 6.7.2-02: The IPTV architecture is required to support interfaces for receipt of suitably authorized emergency alert information (including any accessibility messages) where emergency alert service is provided.
+- R 6.7.2-03: The IPTV architecture is required to implement robust mechanisms for handling emergency telecommunications throughout the service and transport layers.
+- R 6.7.2-04: The IPTV architecture is required to support priority channel(s) for emergency telecommunications.
+- R 6.7.2-05: The IPTV architecture is required to support a high-priority interface to existing emergency telecommunications services (e.g., through PSTN or ISDN).
+- R 6.7.2-06: The IPTV architecture is required to support routing of emergency telecommunications from the end-user to appropriate emergency response service(s).
+- R 6.7.2-07: The IPTV architecture is required to support routing of emergency telecommunications from an emergency response service to end-user(s).
+- R 6.7.2-08: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability to give communication control to the emergency response service, thus only the emergency response service can terminate a communication and not the end-user.
+- R 6.7.2-09: The IPTV architecture is required to support the capability to give the end-user's geographical location to the emergency response service(s).
+- R 6.7.2-10: The IPTV architecture is required to support both authenticated and unauthenticated access to emergency telecommunication services.
+- R 6.7.2-11: The IPTV architecture is required to support emergency telecommunications with alternative and multimedia content, e.g., video, real-time text, voice and any combination thereof, as well as other forms of messaging.
+- R 6.7.2-12: The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to be notified and receive regulatory information services, e.g., EAN messages (un-associated with TV channels) whenever the IPTV terminal device is active (e.g., displaying an EPG or a channel).
+- R 6.7.2-13: The reception of regulatory information services is required to trigger mechanisms to draw the end-user attention.
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.7.2-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the capability of logging and forwarding emergency alert notifications.
+- RR 6.7.2-02: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support the delivery of the specific emergency messages to the corresponding user groups based on predefined policies (e.g., geographic location).
+
+- RR 6.7.2-03: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support identification of the alerting message sources and to support the classification of such messages upon predefined policies.
+
+#### IPTV terminal device recommendations
+
+- RR 6.7.2-04: The IPTV terminal device is recommended to process emergency messages (including any accessibility messages) if they are made available via the transmission infrastructure.
+
+### **6.7.3 Provider selection and number portability**
+
+#### Architecture recommendations
+
+- RR 6.7.3-01: The IPTV architecture is recommended to support a mechanism for end-users to select IPTV network providers, IPTV service providers, and IPTV content providers according to their preferences.
+
+#### Architecture options
+
+- OR 6.7.3-01: The IPTV architecture can optionally support number portability capabilities.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Public interest cross-reference
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+Here are listed the items in the "Public interest" clause 6.7 with a cross-reference to the individual requirements clauses in the main body they relate to.
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support mechanisms to support closed captioning.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.2-01
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.5.2-15, RR 6.5.2-19, RR 6.5.2-27
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability of the ITF to decode and display closed captioning information.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.7-01, R 6.5.2.10-11, R 6.6.2.2-03
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.5.2-38, RR 6.6.2.2-03
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to view the captions and vary its presentation in a separate window.
+
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.6.2.2-09
+- Related option(s): OR 6.5.2-17, OR 6.5.2-18
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to select and receive two (related) video sources simultaneously. (e.g., one with sign language translation).
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.2-01
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.1-06
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support the ability to select and receive two audio sources. (e.g., one with audio description).
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.1-02, R 6.5.1.2-01, R 6.5.2-03
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.6.4.1-02
+
+The audio transmission and reproduction is recommended to be of good quality to make it possible for people to perceive the sound well.
+
+- Related option(s): OR 6.6.4.3-01
+
+Video is recommended to be transmitted with sufficient quality for sign language perception if there is sign language in the contents.
+
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.2-04
+
+Video is recommended to be transmitted with sufficient quality for lip reading perception.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.6.4.2-01
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.2-04
+
+The ITU-T accessibility checklist is recommended to be applied to the work on IPTV [b-ITU-T TP.TACL].
+
+The IPTV applications and equipments are required to be designed using principles of universal design so that a wider population with users of varying capabilities can access such applications and equipment.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.2-04
+
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.5.1.1-01, RR 6.5.2-10, RR 6.5.2-11, RR 6.5.2-12, RR 6.5.2-13, RR 6.5.2-14, RR 6.5.2-17, RR 6.5.2-34, RR 6.5.2.1-02, RR 6.5.2.1-03
+- Related option(s): OR 6.5.2-10
+
+The IPTV metadata is required to contain information about the provision of accessibility features.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.6.3.1-01, R 6.6.3.1-02
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.6.3.5-01
+
+Any recording that the IPTV terminal makes is required to also include the appropriate accessibility features. The recording of accessibility features is recommended to be done in such a way that, when watching the recording, they can be both switched on and switched off. Therefore, it is a good idea to record all accessibility feature streams and link them to the service as a whole.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.2-02
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.5.1.2-03
+
+The IPTV architecture is required to support the end-user ability to be notified and receive regulatory information services (unassociated with TV channels) whenever the IPTV terminal device is active (e.g., displaying an EPG or a TV channel).
+
+The reception of regulatory information services is required to trigger mechanisms to draw the customer attention.
+
+The IPTV terminal device is recommended to process emergency messages if they are available in the transmission infrastructure.
+
+- Related requirement(s): R 6.5.1.2-02
+- Related recommendation(s): RR 6.5.1.2-03
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.790] Recommendation ITU-T F.790 (2007), *Telecommunications accessibility guidelines for older persons and persons with disabilities*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.1081] Recommendation ITU-T G.1081 (2008), *Performance monitoring points for IPTV*.
+- [b-ITU-T H.222.0] Recommendation ITU-T H.222.0 (2000) | ISO/IEC 13818-1:2000, *Information technology – Generic coding of moving pictures and associated audio information: Systems*.
+- [b-ITU-T H.262] Recommendation ITU-T H.262 (2000) | ISO/IEC 13818-2:2000, *Information technology – Generic coding of moving pictures and associated audio information: Video*.
+- [b-ITU-T H.622] Recommendation ITU-T H.622 (2008), *A generic home network architecture with support for multimedia services*.
+- [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1] ITU-T H-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (1999), *Application profile – Sign language and lip-reading real-time conversation using low bit rate video communication*.
+- [b-ITU-T J.200] Recommendation ITU-T J.200 (2001), *Worldwide common core – Application environment for digital interactive television services*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.60] Recommendation ITU-T M.60 (1993), *Maintenance terminology and definitions*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.1400] Recommendation ITU-T M.1400 (2006), *Designations for interconnections among operators' networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.3050.1] Recommendation ITU-T M.3050.1 (2007), *Enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM) – The business process framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1741.3] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1741.3 (2003), *IMT-2000 references to release 5 of GSM evolved UMTS core network*.
+- [b-ITU-T T.101] Recommendation ITU-T T.101 (1994), *International interworking for Videotex services*.
+- [b-ITU-T TP.TACL] ITU-T Technical paper: FSTP-TACL *Telecommunications Accessibility Checklist* (2006).
+(available at ).
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), *NGN release 1 requirements*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.5] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 5 (2008), *ITU-T Y.1900-series, Supplement on IPTV service use cases*.
+- [b-ATIS-0800002] ATIS standard ATIS-0800002 (2006), *IPTV Architecture Requirements*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2475] IETF RFC 2475 (1998), *An Architecture for Differentiated Services*.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a30980bac26080bba82a732cfc8a834820e03856
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@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2022
+
+(08/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+---
+
+**Functional architecture for the support of
+host-based separation of node identifiers and
+routing locators in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2022
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2022**
+
+# **Functional architecture for the support of host-based separation of node identifiers and routing locators in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2022 describes the functional architecture for the support of host-based of ID/locator separation in NGN. ID/locator separation in NGN is concerned with decoupling the semantics of IP addresses into the semantics of identifiers (node IDs) and locators (LOCs) as described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2015.
+
+This Recommendation defines the functional entities and the related reference points, based on the framework architecture provided in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012.
+
+This Recommendation covers only the host-based case of ID/locator separation (the separation of node ID and locator is done in the user equipment and not in the network).
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2022 | 2011-08-06 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Functional architecture, ID/LOC mapping, NGN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview and architecture of ID/LOC separation in the NGN ..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Overview of ID/LOC separation in the NGN..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Architecture overview ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Functional architecture ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 High level functions ..... | 6 |
+| 7.2 Functional entities ..... | 7 |
+| 7.3 Reference points ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Procedures of ID/LOC split in NGN ..... | 10 |
+| 8.1 Attachment procedure ..... | 10 |
+| 8.2 Communication establishment using node ID..... | 12 |
+| 8.3 Communication establishment for multihoming..... | 12 |
+| 8.4 Communication update when the LOC is changed ..... | 13 |
+| 8.5 Detachment procedures ..... | 14 |
+| 9 Security considerations ..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+# Functional architecture for the support of host-based separation of node identifiers and routing locators in next generation networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the functional architecture for the support of host-based node identifier (ID) and node locator (ID/locator) separation in next generation networks (NGN), based on the requirements provided in [ITU-T Y.2015].
+
+This Recommendation addresses the following aspects:
+
+- The functional architecture model for ID/locator separation in NGN.
+- Identification of functions including the definition of functional entities and reference points.
+- A description of relevant procedures and interactions with other components of the NGN functional architecture as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+This Recommendation covers only the host-based case of ID/locator separation, where the separation of node ID and locator is done in the user equipment (UE) and not in the network.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T X.509] | Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2005) ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2014] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2010), Network attachment control functions in next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2015] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2015 (2009), General requirements for ID/locator separation in NGN. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2720] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), NGN identity management framework. |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 address** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+
+**3.1.2 credential** [ITU-T Y.2720]: An identifiable object that can be used to authenticate the claimant is what it claims to be and to authorize the claimant's rights.
+
+**3.1.3 identifier** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects). Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization. They can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private IDs are normally not disclosed to third parties).
+
+**3.1.4 ID/LOC mapping** [ITU-T Y.2015]: ID/LOC mapping is an association between a node ID and one or more LOCs.
+
+NOTE 1 – A single node ID or several node IDs can be associated with many LOCs associated with a single terminal. The node ID to LOC mapping can have the one-to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-one relationship.
+
+NOTE 2 – ID/LOC mapping is also called ID/LOC binding.
+
+**3.1.5 ID/LOC mapping function** [ITU-T Y.2015]: An ID/LOC mapping function gets mapping information from an ID/LOC mapping storage function and uses the corresponding node ID and/or LOC in packet headers. The ID/LOC mapping function works in a close correlation with the transport user profile associated with the transport control function.
+
+NOTE – ID/LOC mapping functions can be physically located in an NGN terminal, an access border gateway, or any other NGN components.
+
+**3.1.6 ID/LOC mapping storage function** [ITU-T Y.2015]: An ID/LOC mapping storage function stores the mapping of NGN identifiers, node IDs and LOCs. This function also updates mapping information, as well as provides mapping information to other functions on request. The mapping storage function can be physically located in an NGN terminal or with other NGN components.
+
+**3.1.7 ID/LOC separation** [ITU-T Y.2015]: ID/LOC separation is decoupling the semantic of IP address into the semantics of node IDs and LOCs. Distinct namespaces are used for node IDs and LOCs so that they can evolve independently. LOCs are associated with the IP layer whereas node IDs are associated with upper layers in such a way that ongoing communication sessions or services shall not be broken by changing LOCs due to mobility and multihoming.
+
+NOTE – In the context of this Recommendation, a completely new namespace for node IDs can optionally be created that would leave the IP address space more or less intact for LOCs, allowing routing technologies to be developed independently of end-host mobility and end-host multihoming implications.
+
+**3.1.8 locator (LOC)** [ITU-T Y.2015]: A locator is the network layer topological name for an interface or a set of interfaces. LOCs are carried in the IP address fields as packets traverse the network.
+
+NOTE – IP addresses can gradually become pure LOCs. However, on the contrary, it cannot be said that a LOC is an IP address. An IP address may associate with the IP layer as well as upper layer protocols (such as TCP and HTTP), whereas a LOC will associate with only the IP layer and be used in IP address fields.
+
+**3.1.9 node ID** [ITU-T Y.2015]: A node ID is an identifier used at the transport and higher layers to identify the node as well as the endpoint of a communication session. A node ID is independent of the node location as well as the network to which the node is attached so that the node ID is not required to change even when the node changes its network connectivity by physically moving or
+
+simply activating another interface. The node IDs should be used at the transport and higher layers for replacing the conventional use of IP addresses at these layers. A node may have more than one node ID in use.
+
+NOTE – Unless otherwise specified, the term "ID" used in this Recommendation represents a node ID, not an NGN identifier specified in this or any other Recommendations.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| GSC-FE | General Services Control Functional Entity |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| ILCF | ID/LOC mapping Control Functions |
+| ILMF | ID/LOC Mapping Functions |
+| ILM-FE | ID/LOC Mapping Functional Entity |
+| ILMS-FE | ID/LOC Mapping Storage Functional Entity |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LOC | Locator |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NAC-FE | Network Access Configuration Functional Entity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Networks |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+| SCF | Service Control Functions |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TLM-FE | Transport Location Management Functional Entity |
+| TUP-FE | Transport User Profile Functional Entity |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# 6 Overview and architecture of ID/LOC separation in the NGN
+
+## 6.1 Overview of ID/LOC separation in the NGN
+
+According to the definition of NGN provided in [ITU-T Y.2001], the NGN framework is expected to support advanced architectural objectives over a unified IP network. NGN decouples IP-based services and transport, allowing them to be offered separately and evolve independently.
+
+ID/LOC separation allows the decoupling of the IP addresses' semantics into the semantics of node IDs and LOCs as described in [ITU-T Y.2015]. LOC(s) are associated with the IP layer, whereas node IDs are associated with upper layers related to the NGN service stratum and applications.
+
+Therefore, when ID/LOC separation is used in NGN, NGN specific functions are necessary to map the conventional NGN identifier to node IDs and to dynamically map the node ID to one or more LOCs. The relationship between the NGN identifier, node ID, and LOC(s), in order to support ID/LOC separation in the NGN functional architecture is described in Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: ID/LOCs separation in NGN. The diagram shows the mapping between NGN identifiers, node IDs, and LOCs. On the left, a box labeled 'End-user functions' is connected to three stacked boxes: 'Application', 'Service stratum', and 'Transport stratum'. The 'Transport stratum' box is highlighted in green. On the right, three labels are stacked vertically: 'NGN Identifier(s)', 'Node ID(s)', and 'LOC(s)'. Double-headed arrows connect 'NGN Identifier(s)' to 'Node ID(s)', and 'Node ID(s)' to 'LOC(s)'. Below the diagram is the label 'Y.2022(11)\_F6-1'.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – ID/LOCs separation in NGN**
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the stage mappings between NGN identifiers, node IDs, and LOC(s) as used in the context of ID/LOC separation in NGN.
+
+At the first stage, the mapping between the NGN identifier and the node ID takes place, while at the second stage the mapping between the node ID and the LOC takes place according to [ITU-T Y.2015].
+
+In the case of host-based ID/LOC separation, the Node ID is an identifier used to identify the UE while the LOC(s) corresponds to the IP address(es) of the UE which is used for addressing and routing. As shown in Figure 6-1, applications are not bound by the locator of the UE, but bound by the node ID of the UE. So each UE has a node ID, and one or more LOCs are allocated to the UE by the network when the UE attaches to the network.
+
+The network-based ID/LOC split approach (which is out of the scope of this Recommendation) means that the mapping of a node ID to a locator is not performed in the UE itself but in the network.
+
+## 6.2 Architecture overview
+
+This clause provides an overview of the architecture for the support of host based ID/LOC separation in NGN.
+
+The NGN functional architecture supporting ID/LOC split functions is described in Figure 6-2. Two new functional groups, ID/LOC mapping control functions (ILCF) and ID/LOC mapping functions (ILMF) are added to the transport control functions and the end-user functions, respectively.
+
+
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F6-2
+
+--- Control — Media - - - Management - - - IdM
+
+Figure 6-2: Architecture overview for ID/LOC separation in NGN. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture with three main horizontal layers: Applications at the top, Service stratum in the middle (green), and Transport stratum at the bottom (yellow). A vertical Management functions bar (pink) is on the left. Key components include:
+- Service stratum: Contains Application support functions, Service control and content delivery functions (including Service user profiles, Service control functions, and Content delivery functions), and ID/LOC mapping control functions (ILCF).
+- Transport stratum: Contains Network attachment and control functions (with Transport user profiles), Mobility management and control functions, resource and admission control functions, and Transport functions.
+- External entities: Functions from other service providers (connected via SNI) and Functions from other networks (connected via NNI).
+- User side: End-user functions including ID/LOC mapping functions (ILMF) connected via UNI.
+- IdM functions: A separate block (yellow) interacting with both strata.
+Interfaces: ANI (between Applications and Service stratum), SNI (Service Network Interface), UNI (User Network Interface), and NNI (Network Network Interface).
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Architecture overview for ID/LOC separation in NGN**
+
+The ILCF provides the control information and signalling required to implement ID/LOC mapping functions. It collects, stores, updates, and distributes ID/LOC mapping information. The ILMF performs ID/LOC mapping functions using ID/LOC mapping information obtained from the ILCF.
+
+# 7 Functional architecture
+
+Figure 7-1 shows the functional architecture for the support of ID/LOC separation in NGN. Details of the general NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] have been omitted to bring out only the relevant points.
+
+
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F7-1
+
+Functional architecture for host-based ID/LOC separation in NGN. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is 'Service control functions' containing 'SUP-FE'. Below it is 'Transport control functions' containing 'NACF' and 'ILCF'. 'NACF' includes 'TUP-FE', 'TLM-FE', 'TAA-FE', 'NAC-FE', and 'AM-FE'. 'ILCF' includes 'ILMS-FE'. To the right is 'RACF'. At the bottom is 'Transport functions' containing 'PE-FE'. On the left is 'End-user functions' containing 'ILMF' and 'ILM-FE'. Arrows indicate interactions: SUP-FE to NACF and ILCF; NACF to ILCF; ILCF to RACF; RACF to PE-FE; AM-FE to PE-FE; ILMF to ILM-FE; and ILM-FE to PE-FE.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Functional architecture for host-based ID/LOC separation in NGN**
+
+The ILCF includes the ID/LOC mapping storage functional entity (ILMS-FE), whereas the ILMF includes the ID/LOC mapping functional entity (ILM-FE).
+
+## 7.1 High level functions
+
+ID/LOC separation involves the following functions:
+
+- service control functions (SCF);
+- network attachment control functions (NACF);
+- ID/LOC mapping control functions (ILCF);
+- ID/LOC mapping functions (ILMF).
+
+#### 7.1.1 Service control functions (SCF)
+
+The SCF accommodates service user profiles. The SCF interacts with the ILCF to obtain the node ID of the UE.
+
+The procedure is as follows:
+
+- the SCF retrieves node locators and relevant session information from the ILCF;
+- the SCF sends a LOC query request to the ILCF, which responds with the LOC query response information containing the LOC and additional information relevant to the format of location information provided by the ILCF.
+
+NOTE – In an IMS-based architecture, the SCF interacts with the ILCF through P-CSC-FE, but in a non-IMS-based architecture, the SCF interacts with the ILCF through GSC-FE [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### 7.1.2 Network attachment control functions (NACF)
+
+When a UE attaches to the access network in NGN, the user authentication and authorization procedure is performed. When NGN supports host-based ID/LOC separation, the NACF allocates LOC to the UE and interacts with the ILCF to exchange ID/LOC mapping information.
+
+NOTE – The support of ID/LOC by NACF [ITU-T Y.2014] is for further study.
+
+#### **7.1.3 ID/LOC mapping control functions (ILCF)**
+
+ILCF stores, distributes and updates ID/LOC mapping information. The ILCF has direct interactions with the TLM-FE within NACF to exchange ID/LOC mapping information of the UE. The ILCF has the following responsibilities:
+
+- storing the authentication credentials [ITU-T Y.2720] of the UE, such as encryption keys [ITU-T X.509] and node IDs. The public cryptographic key, of a public/private key pair, is used to authenticate that the UE possesses the node ID, which in turn can be used to securely associate different locators with the same UE;
+- processing the registration information sent from the UE;
+- maintaining the binding of the node ID and LOC assigned to the UE;
+- updating the ID/LOC mapping dynamically.
+
+#### **7.1.4 ID/LOC mapping functions (ILMF)**
+
+The ILMF is located in the end-user functions. The ILMF performs ID/LOC mapping functions using ID/LOC mapping information obtained from the ILCF.
+
+## **7.2 Functional entities**
+
+The functional entities required for the support of ID/LOC separation in NGN are as follows:
+
+- ID/LOC mapping functional entity (ILM-FE);
+- ID/LOC mapping storage functional entity (ILMS-FE).
+
+#### **7.2.1 ID/LOC mapping functional entity (ILM-FE)**
+
+The ILM-FE is located in the ILMF and performs the ID/LOC mapping function in the UE. It obtains the ID/LOC mapping record from an ID/LOC mapping storage functional entity (ILMS-FE). The ILM-FE uses node IDs in the service stratum and applications and locators in layer 3 within the transport stratum. Using the node ID as a reference value, the ILM-FE can dynamically change, while continuously using the same node ID.
+
+#### **7.2.2 ID/LOC mapping storage functional entity (ILMS-FE)**
+
+ILMS-FE stores ID/LOC mapping records. It handles requests for ID/LOC mapping received from the ILM-FE, searches for the corresponding mapping in its record, and forwards the mapping information to the ILM-FE. It also handles update requests for ID/LOC mapping from authorized functional entities such as the NACF and UE, and carries out corresponding updates.
+
+## **7.3 Reference points**
+
+Figures 7-2.a and 7-2.b show the functions, the functional entities and the related reference points defined in this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-2.a: Reference points involved in ID/LOC mapping control functions in the IMS-based architecture. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is 'Service control functions' containing 'P-CSC-FE' and 'SUP-FE'. Below this is a large box containing 'NACF' (with 'TUP-FE', 'TLM-FE', 'TAA-FE', 'NAC-FE', and 'AM-FE'), 'ILCF' (with 'S1' and 'ILMS-FE'), and 'RACF'. 'Transport control functions' is indicated between the NACF and ILCF sections. Below this is 'Transport functions' containing 'PE-FE'. To the left is 'End-user functions' containing 'ILMF' and 'ILM-FE'. Reference points S2 and S3 are shown between TLM-FE and ILMS-FE, and between NAC-FE and ILMS-FE respectively. A line connects the 'End-user functions' box to the 'Transport functions' box. The label 'Y.2022(11)\_F7-2.a' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-2.a – Reference points involved in ID/LOC mapping control functions in the IMS-based architecture**
+
+
+
+Figure 7-2.b: Reference points involved in ID/LOC mapping control functions in the non-IMS-based architecture. The diagram is similar to Figure 7-2.a but with 'GSC-FE' instead of 'P-CSC-FE' in the 'Service control functions' box. The rest of the structure, including NACF, ILCF, RACF, Transport control functions, Transport functions (PE-FE), and End-user functions (ILMF, ILM-FE), remains the same. Reference points S2 and S3 are also present. A line connects the 'End-user functions' box to the 'Transport functions' box. The label 'Y.2022(11)\_F7-2.b' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-2.b – Reference points involved in ID/LOC mapping control functions in the non-IMS-based architecture**
+
+In an IMS-based architecture the SCF interacts with the ILCF through P-CSC-FE, but in a non-IMS-based architecture the SCF interacts with the ILCF through GSC-FE [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### 7.3.1 Reference point S1 between SCF and ILMS-FE
+
+S1 reference point enables SCF to retrieve information about the characteristics of the IP connectivity session from the ILCF. In an IMS-based architecture the S1 reference point is between the P-CSC-FE and ILMS-FE, but in a non-IMS-based architecture the S1 reference point is between the GSC-FE and ILMS-FE. The node ID of the UE is provided by the ILMS-FE. The following information flows are used on the S1 reference point:
+
+- Information query request: This information flow contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the SCF to the ILMS-FE.
+
+- Information query response: This information flow contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the ILMS-FE to the SCF.
+- Event registration request: This information flow also contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the SCF to the ILMS-FE.
+- Event registration response: This information flow contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the ILMS-FE to the SCF.
+- Notification event request: This information flow also contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the SCF to the ILMS-FE.
+- Notification event response: This information flow contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the ILMS-FE to the SCF.
+
+#### **7.3.2 Reference point S2 between TLM-FE and ILMS-FE**
+
+The S2 reference point allows the TLM-FE to register in the ILMS-FE the mapping between the LOC allocated to the UE and the node ID.
+
+The following information flows are used on the S2 reference point:
+
+- Mapping indication: This information flow contains the ID/LOC mapping of the UE and flows from the TLM-FE to the ILMS-FE to register the ID/LOC mapping in the ILMS-FE's record.
+- Mapping acknowledgment: This information flow contains the result of the operation of the mapping indication and flows from the ILMS-FE to the TLM-FE.
+- Mapping delete indication: This information flow contains the node ID and locator of the UE and flows from the TLM-FE to the ILMS-FE to delete the ID/LOC mapping in the latter's record.
+- Mapping delete acknowledgment: This information flow contains the result of the operation of the mapping delete indication and flows from the ILMS-FE to the TLM-FE.
+
+#### **7.3.3 Reference point S3 between UE and ILMS-FE**
+
+The S3 reference point between the UE and the ILMS-FE allows the UE to authenticate with the ILMS-FE, and to update the ID/LOC mapping in the ILMS-FE by exchanging the following information flows.
+
+- UE authentication request: This information flow from the UE to the ILMS-FE contains the node ID and authentication parameter generated by encrypting the node ID by the UE's private key.
+- UE authentication response: This information flow from the ILMS-FE to the UE contains the node ID and the result (success or failure) of the authentication request.
+- ID/LOC mapping registration request: This information flow is sent from the UE to the ILMS-FE to register the ID/LOC mapping in the ILMS database.
+- ID/LOC mapping registration response: This information flow contains the node ID and the result of the registration request is sent from the ILMS-FE to the UE.
+- ID/LOC mapping update request: This information flow containing the updated ID/LOC mapping is sent from the UE to the ILMS-FE when the UE changes its locator (e.g., as a result of mobility).
+- ID/LOC mapping update response: This information flow containing the node ID and the result of the update request is sent from the ILMS-FE to the UE.
+
+## 8 Procedures of ID/LOC split in NGN
+
+This clause describes the procedures related to host-based ID/LOC separation in NGN.
+
+### 8.1 Attachment procedure
+
+#### 8.1.1 ID/LOC mapping update initiated by the UE
+
+When a UE attaches to a network, the UE's node ID is used during authentication and authorization processes. The UE attaches to the network through the involvement of the ILMS-FE and the NACF.
+
+Figure 8-1 describes the signalling flow sequence related to ID/LOC mapping initiated by the UE.
+
+
+
+| | UE | AM-FE | NAC-FE | TLM-FE | SCFs | TUP-FE
or TAA-FE | ILMS-FE |
+|---------------------------------------------|----|-----------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|-----------------------------|---------|
+| A
Authentication
and
authorization | | A.1 Attach req | | A.2 Authentication req | | | |
+| | | | | A.3 Authentication resp | | | |
+| | | A.4 Attach resp | | | | | |
+| | | | | A.5 Authentication req | | | |
+| | | | | A.6 Authentication resp | | | |
+| | | | | | | | |
+| B IP
Configuration | | B.1 DHCP req | | | | | |
+| | | B.2 | B.3 Mapping notification | | | | |
+| | | | B.4 Mapping resp | | | | |
+| | | B.5 DHCP resp | | | | | |
+| | | | | | | | |
+| C ID/LOC
mapping | | | | C1.ID/LOC mapping registration req | | | |
+| | | | | C2.ID/LOC mapping registration resp | | | |
+| D Transport
location
management | | | | | | D.1 Transport location req | |
+| | | | | | | D.2 Transport location resp | |
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-1
+
+Figure 8-1: Signalling flow sequence in the UE initiated ID/LOC mapping registration. The diagram shows a sequence of messages between UE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, SCFs, TUP-FE or TAA-FE, and ILMS-FE across four phases: A (Authentication and authorization), B (IP Configuration), C (ID/LOC mapping), and D (Transport location management).
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Signalling flow sequence in the UE initiated ID/LOC mapping registration**
+
+##### Phase A: authentication and authorization
+
+- A.1) The UE sends an attachment request containing the node ID and user credential to the network with node ID.
+- A.2) The AM-FE forwards the user credential to the TAA-FE for authentication.
+- A.3, A.4) The TAA-FE responds to the AM-FE, which in turn responds to the UE with an attachment response.
+- A.5) The UE sends to the ILMS-FE an authentication request containing the encryption of the node ID by the UE's public key.
+- A.6) The ILMS-FE sends to the UE an authentication response containing the result of the authentication process.
+
+##### Phase B: IP configuration
+
+- B.1) The UE issues a DHCP request containing its node ID to the AM-FE.
+- B.2) The AM-FE forwards the request to the NAC-FE, which allocates the LOC.
+- B.3) The NAC-FE pushes a mapping notification message to the TLM-FE, containing the allocated LOC and other transport related parameters such as logical/physical port addresses.
+
+- B.4) The TLM-FE replies to the NAC-FE with the mapping notification response message.
+- B.5) The NAC-FE configures a new LOC and assigns it to the UE. The UE is now aware of the mapping between the node Id and the LOC.
+
+##### Phase C: ID/LOC mapping
+
+- C.1) The UE sends an ID/LOC mapping registration request to the ILMS-FE to register the ID/LOC mapping storage record.
+- C.2) The ILMS-FE replies to the UE with the ID/LOC mapping registration response.
+
+##### Phase D: Transport location management
+
+- D.1) The SCF queries the ILMS-FE for location information.
+- D.2) The ILMS-FE sends the location information to the SCF.
+
+#### 8.1.2 ID/LOC mapping initiated by the network
+
+This procedure enables the NACF to send the ID/LOC mapping registration request to the ILMS-FE after a new LOC has been allocated by the NACF.
+
+Figure 8-2 describes the signalling flow sequence where the network initiates the ID/LOC mapping signalling flow sequence.
+
+
+
+| | UE | AM-FE | NAC-FE | TLM-FE | SCFs | TUP-FE or TAA-FE | ILMS-FE |
+|------------------------------------|----|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------|-----------------------------|---------|
+| A Authentication and authorization | | A.1 Attach req | | | | | |
+| | | | | A.2 Authentication req | | | |
+| | | | | A.3 Authentication resp | | | |
+| | | A.4 Attach resp | | | | | |
+| | | | | A.5 Send authentication info | | | |
+| | | | | A.6 Authentication info ack | | | |
+| B IP Configuration | | B.1 DHCP req | | | | | |
+| | | | B.2 | B.3 Bind notification | | | |
+| | | | | B.4 Bind resp | | | |
+| | | B.5 DHCP resp | | | | | |
+| | | | | | | | |
+| C ID/LOC mapping | | | C.1 ID/LOC mapping registration req | | | | |
+| | | | | C.2 ID/LOC mapping registration req | | | |
+| | | | | C.3 ID/LOC mapping registration resp | | | |
+| | | C.6 | | | | | |
+| | | C.7 Registration inform resp | | | | | |
+| D Transport location management | | | | | | | |
+| | | | | | | D.1 Transport location req | |
+| | | | | | | D.2 Transport location resp | |
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-2
+
+Sequence diagram showing the ID/LOC mapping initiated by the network. The diagram involves seven entities: UE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, SCFs, TUP-FE or TAA-FE, and ILMS-FE. The process is divided into four phases: A (Authentication and authorization), B (IP Configuration), C (ID/LOC mapping), and D (Transport location management). Phase A includes steps A.1 to A.6. Phase B includes steps B.1 to B.5. Phase C includes steps C.1 to C.8. Phase D includes steps D.1 and D.2.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – ID/LOC mapping initiated by the network**
+
+As in Figure 8-1, Figure 8-2 also includes four phases. All the phases, except phase C, are similar in both figures.
+
+In phase C, ID/LOC mapping registration takes place. In Figure 8-1 the registration was initiated by the UE whereas in Figure 8-2, it is initiated on the network side by the TLM-FE.
+
+NOTE – Phases A, B and D are the same as the ones described in clause 8.1.1.
+
+##### Phase C: ID/LOC mapping
+
+- C.1) The NAC-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping registration request to the TLM-FE.
+- C.2) The TLM-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping registration request to the ILMS-FE to register the ID/LOC mapping storage record.
+- C.3) The ILMS-FE replies to the TLM-FE with the ID/LOC mapping registration response.
+- C.4) The TLM-FE replies to the NAC-FE with the ID/LOC mapping registration response.
+- C.5, C.6) After step C.1 the NAC-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping registration inform request to the AM-FE, which then sends an ID/LOC mapping registration inform request to the UE to inform it that the registration has been initiated by the network.
+- C.7, C.8) The UE replies to the AM-FE with the ID/LOC mapping registration inform response, then the AM-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping registration inform response to the NAC-FE.
+
+### 8.2 Communication establishment using node ID
+
+Figure 8-3 describes the communication establishment procedure using the node ID.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE1
+ participant DNS
+ participant ILMS-FE
+ participant UE2
+
+ UE1->>DNS: 1 DNS query
+ DNS->>ILMS-FE: 2 ID/LOC mapping query
+ ILMS-FE-->>DNS: 3 ID/LOC mapping response
+ UE1<-->UE2: 4 Communication establishment
+ UE1<-->UE2: 5 Communication through tunnel
+```
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-3
+
+Sequence diagram showing communication establishment between UE1, DNS, ILMS-FE, and UE2. The steps are: 1. DNS query from UE1 to DNS. 2. ID/LOC mapping query from DNS to ILMS-FE. 3. ID/LOC mapping response from ILMS-FE to DNS. 4. Communication establishment from UE1 to UE2. 5. Communication through tunnel from UE1 to UE2.
+
+**Figure 8-3 – Communication establishment procedures using node ID**
+
+The procedure described in Figure 8-3 includes the following:
+
+- 1) UE1 sends a DNS query towards the DNS server [b-IETF RFC 5205] to find the ILMS-FE of UE2.
+- 2) UE1 then issues an ID/LOC mapping query to the ILMS-FE including the Node ID of UE2 in order to obtain the LOC of UE2.
+- 3) The ILMS-FE sends a response to UE1 which includes the LOC of UE2.
+- 4) UE1 establishes communication with UE2 using the LOC of UE2.
+- 5) UE1 is able to communicate with UE2.
+
+### 8.3 Communication establishment for multihoming
+
+In the case of multihoming, the UE may have multiple valid LOCs. However, the UE still uses the same node ID to communicate with other UEs. The corresponding procedure for communication establishment is described in Figure 8-4.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE1
+ participant DNS
+ participant ILMSFE1 as ILMS-FE1
+ participant ILMSFE2 as ILMS-FE2
+ participant UE2
+
+ UE1->>DNS: 1 DNS query
+ UE1->>ILMSFE2: 2 ID/LOC mapping query request
+ Note over UE2: 3 LOC select
+ ILMSFE2->>UE1: 4 ID/LOC mapping query response
+ UE1->>UE2: 5 Communication establishment
+ UE1<-->UE2: 6 Communication through tunnel
+
+```
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-4
+
+Sequence diagram for communication establishment procedures using node ID when multihoming. The diagram shows interactions between UE1, DNS, ILMS-FE1, ILMS-FE2, and UE2. Step 1: UE1 sends a DNS query to DNS. Step 2: UE1 sends an ID/LOC mapping query request to ILMS-FE2. Step 3: UE2 selects a LOC and indicates it to ILMS-FE2. Step 4: ILMS-FE2 sends an ID/LOC mapping query response to UE1. Step 5: UE1 establishes communication with UE2. Step 6: Communication is established through a tunnel between UE1 and UE2.
+
+**Figure 8-4 – Communication establishment procedures using node ID when multihoming**
+
+In Figure 8-4, UE2 is multihomed. The procedure for communication establishment from UE1 to UE2 includes the following steps:
+
+- 1) UE1 sends a DNS query towards the DNS server in order to obtain the LOC of ILMS-FE associated with UE2.
+- 2) UE1 then issues an ID/LOC mapping query to ILMS-FE2 (i.e., the ILMS-FE associated with UE2).
+- 3) As it is multihomed, UE2 selects the LOC to be used for the communication with UE1 and indicates the selected LOC to ILMS-FE2.
+- 4) ILMS-FE2 sends a response to UE1 including the selected LOC of UE2.
+- 5) UE1 establishes a connection with UE2 using the selected LOC of UE2.
+- 6) Communication is established between UE1 and UE2.
+
+### 8.4 Communication update when the LOC is changed
+
+When the LOC of a UE changes (e.g., as a result of UE moving), the UE requests the ILCF to update its ID/LOC mapping. If the UE is communicating with another UE, it updates the communication with the new LOC.
+
+The related procedure is described in Figure 8-5.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE1
+ participant ILMSFE1 as ILMS-FE1
+ participant ILMSFE2 as ILMS-FE2
+ participant UE2
+
+ Note over UE1, UE2: Data transport
+ UE1->>ILMSFE1: 1 ID/LOC mapping update request
+ ILMSFE1->>UE1: 2 ID/LOC mapping update response
+ UE1->>UE2: 3 Communication update
+ UE1<-->UE2: 4 Communication through tunnel
+
+```
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-5
+
+Sequence diagram for communication update when the LOC is changed. The diagram shows interactions between UE1, ILMS-FE1, ILMS-FE2, and UE2. A green bar at the top indicates 'Data transport' between UE1 and UE2. Step 1: UE1 sends an ID/LOC mapping update request to ILMS-FE1. Step 2: ILMS-FE1 sends an ID/LOC mapping update response to UE1. Step 3: UE1 updates communication with UE2. Step 4: Communication is updated through a tunnel between UE1 and UE2.
+
+**Figure 8-5 – Communication update when the LOC is changed**
+
+The procedure described in Figure 8-5 includes the following four steps:
+
+- 1) After UE1 changes its LOC (e.g., as a result of mobility), UE1 sends an ID/LOC mapping update request to its ILMS-FE1, including its new LOC.
+- 2) ILMS-FE1 sends a response to UE1 after having updated the ID/LOC mapping record.
+- 3) UE1 updates its communication with UE2 in order to use the new LOC of UE1 and establishes a tunnel between them.
+- 4) UE1 communicates with UE2.
+
+### 8.5 Detachment procedures
+
+The detachment procedures allow:
+
+- a UE to inform the network that it does not want to access the network any longer; and
+- the network to inform the UE that it does not have access to the network any longer.
+
+#### 8.5.1 Detachment procedure initiated by the UE
+
+The UE initiated detachment procedure is described in Figure 8-6.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant NAC-FE
+ participant TLM-FE
+ participant ILMS-FE
+
+ UE->>AM-FE: 1 Detach request
+ AM-FE->>NAC-FE: 2 Detach request
+ NAC-FE-->>AM-FE: 3 Detach response
+ AM-FE-->>UE: 4 Detach response
+ NAC-FE->>TLM-FE: 5 LOC delete request
+ TLM-FE->>ILMS-FE: 6 ID/LOC mapping delete request
+ ILMS-FE-->>TLM-FE: 7 ID/LOC mapping delete response
+ TLM-FE-->>NAC-FE: 8 LOC delete response
+
+```
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-6
+
+Sequence diagram of the UE-initiated detachment procedure. The diagram shows five entities: UE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and ILMS-FE. The steps are: 1. UE sends '1 Detach request' to AM-FE. 2. AM-FE sends '2 Detach request' to NAC-FE. 3. NAC-FE sends '3 Detach response' to AM-FE. 4. AM-FE sends '4 Detach response' to UE. 5. NAC-FE sends '5 LOC delete request' to TLM-FE. 6. TLM-FE sends '6 ID/LOC mapping delete request' to ILMS-FE. 7. ILMS-FE sends '7 ID/LOC mapping delete response' to TLM-FE. 8. TLM-FE sends '8 LOC delete response' to NAC-FE. Steps 6 and 7 are enclosed in a dashed box.
+
+**Figure 8-6 – Detachment procedure initiated by the UE**
+
+The procedure described in Figure 8-6 includes the following steps:
+
+- 1, 2) UE sends a detach request to the AM-FE, and the AM-FE forwards the detach request to the NAC-FE.
+- 3, 4) The NAC-FE releases the related attachment information and sends a detach response to the AM-FE, which in turn responds to the UE.
+- 5) The NAC-FE sends a LOC delete request to the TLM-FE.
+- 6, 7) The TLM-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping delete request to the ILMS-FE to delete the ID/LOC mapping stored in the ILMS-FE. After deleting the record, the ILMS-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping delete response to the TLM-FE.
+- 8) The TLM-FE sends a LOC delete response to the NAC-FE.
+
+#### 8.5.2 Detachment procedure initiated by the network
+
+The detachment procedure initiated by the network is described in Figure 8-7.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AM-FE
+ participant NAC-FE
+ participant TLM-FE
+ participant ILMS-FE
+
+ NAC-FE->>AM-FE: 1 Detach request
+ AM-FE->>UE: 2 Detach request
+ UE->>AM-FE: 3 Detach response
+ AM-FE->>NAC-FE: 4 Detach response
+ NAC-FE->>TLM-FE: 5 LOC delete request
+ TLM-FE->>ILMS-FE: 6 ID/LOC mapping delete request
+ ILMS-FE->>TLM-FE: 7 ID/LOC mapping delete response
+ TLM-FE->>NAC-FE: 8 LOC delete response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the Detachment procedure initiated by the network. The participants are UE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and ILMS-FE. The steps are: 1. Detach request from NAC-FE to AM-FE; 2. Detach request from AM-FE to UE; 3. Detach response from UE to AM-FE; 4. Detach response from AM-FE to NAC-FE; 5. LOC delete request from NAC-FE to TLM-FE; 6. ID/LOC mapping delete request from TLM-FE to ILMS-FE; 7. ID/LOC mapping delete response from ILMS-FE to TLM-FE; 8. LOC delete response from TLM-FE to NAC-FE. Steps 6 and 7 are enclosed in a dashed box.
+
+Y.2022(11)\_F8-7
+
+**Figure 8-7 – Detachment procedure initiated by the network**
+
+The procedure described in Figure 8-7 includes the following steps:
+
+- 1, 2) The NAC-FE sends a detach information request to the AM-FE. After receiving the request, the AM-FE sends the detach information request to the UE.
+- 3, 4) After receiving the detach information request from the AM-FE, the UE sends a detach response to the AM-FE, which in turn responds to the NAC-FE.
+- 5) The NAC-FE sends a LOC delete request to the TLM-FE.
+- 6, 7) The TLM-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping delete request to the ILMS-FE. After deleting the record, the ILMS-FE sends an ID/LOC mapping delete response to the TLM-FE.
+- 8) The TLM-FE sends a LOC delete response to the NAC-FE.
+
+# 9 Security considerations
+
+The UE and the communication path between the UE and the ILCF may not be secured. So this communication could be subjected to attacks. The UE is required to use secured mechanisms when retrieving ID/LOC mapping records from the authenticated ID/LOC mapping storage functions.
+
+Security requirements are as follows:
+
+- R1 The ILMS-FE is required to be secured as per [ITU-T Y.2701].
+- R2 The ILM-FE is required to be secured as per [ITU-T Y.2701].
+- R3 The communication path between the ILM-FE and ILMS-FE is required to be secured as per [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5201] IETF RFC 5201 (2008), *Host Identity Protocol (HIP)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5205] IETF RFC 5205 (2008), *Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name System (DNS) Extensions*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5206] IETF RFC 5206 (2008), *End-Host Mobility and Multihoming with the Host Identity Protocol*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,847 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2024
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Functional requirements and architecture of the web service component in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2024
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2024**
+
+# **Functional requirements and architecture of the web service component in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2024 provides the functional requirements and architecture of the web service component using web technologies in next generation networks (NGNs). The web service component in NGN basically supports legacy web services and converged NGN services through the interworking with the internet protocol (IP) multimedia service component and/or the internet protocol television (IPTV) services component.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2024 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+NGN, web.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2013
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Overview of the web service component in NGN..... | 4 |
+| | 6.1 Web service component ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 Service classification using the web service component..... | 5 |
+| 7 | Requirements for the web service component in NGN ..... | 6 |
+| 8 | Functional architecture of the web service component ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.1 High-level NGN architecture with the web service component..... | 6 |
+| | 8.2 Functional entities for the web service component ..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Interworking between the web service component and other service components..... | 10 |
+| | 9.1 Interactions for the support of legacy web services ..... | 10 |
+| | 9.2 Interactions for the support of web-based conversation services..... | 10 |
+| | 9.3 Interactions for the support of web-based streaming services..... | 11 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix I – Relationship among NGN service specific components with the web service component in the NGN architecture ..... | 12 |
+| | Appendix II – Relationship of web service component functions with other NGN functions ..... | 13 |
+| | II.1 Relationship between ITU-T Y.2235 and ITU-T Y.2024 ..... | 13 |
+| | II.2 Related functions for the web service in NGN..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix III – Information flows for services using the web service component in NGN .... | 15 |
+| | III.1 Procedure for the support of legacy web services ..... | 15 |
+| | III.2 Procedure for the support of web-based conversation services..... | 16 |
+| | III.3 Procedure for the support of web-based streaming services ..... | 17 |
+| | Appendix IV – IETF activities related to the web service component in NGN ..... | 19 |
+| | IV.1 IETF real-time communication in web-browsers (RTCWeb)..... | 19 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 21 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2024
+
+# Functional requirements and architecture of the web service component in next generation networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to describe the functional requirements and architecture of the web service component in NGN using web technologies (e.g., HTML, HTTP, XML, SOAP, REST). The web service component in NGN basically supports legacy web services (e.g., web-browsing, e-mail, blogging, web-office services) and converged NGN services such as web-based conversational services through the interworking with the IP multimedia service component and/or web-based multimedia streaming service through the interworking with the IPTV services component.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- overview of the web service component in the support of legacy web services and converged NGN services;
+- requirements for the web service component in NGN;
+- functional architecture for the web service component in NGN;
+- interworking between web service component and other service components.
+
+This Recommendation mainly focuses on service control and content delivery functions in the service stratum of NGN. Details of web technologies are out of the scope.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions. |
+| [ITU-T Y.1901] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901 (2009), Requirements for the support of IPTV services. |
+| [ITU-T Y.1910] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 (2008), IPTV functional architecture. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2011] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2021] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2021 (2006), IMS for Next Generation Networks. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2031] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2031 (2006), PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2091] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks. |
+
+| | |
+|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2232] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2232 (2008), NGN convergence service model and scenario using web services . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2235] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2235 (2008), Converged web-browsing service scenarios in NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2702] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 application** [ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services.
+
+**3.1.2 functional architecture** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A set of functional entities and the reference points between them used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions.
+
+NOTE – The functional entities can be used to describe a set of reference configurations. These reference configurations identify which reference points are visible at the boundaries of equipment implementations and between administrative domains.
+
+**3.1.3 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.4 internet protocol television (IPTV)** [ITU-T Y.1901]: Multimedia services such as television/video/ audio/text/graphics/data delivered over IP-based networks managed to support the required level of QoS/QoE, security, interactivity and reliability.
+
+**3.1.5 NGN service stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer service-related data and the functions that control and manage service resources and network services to enable user services and applications (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]).
+
+**3.1.6 NGN transport stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]).
+
+**3.1.7 service** [ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+**3.1.8 web service** [ITU-T Y.2232]: A service provided using web services systems.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| APL-GW-FE | Application Gateway Functional Entity |
+| APL-SCM-FE | Application Service Coordination Manager Functional Entity |
+| AS-FE | Application Support Functional Entity |
+| CSCF | Call Session Control Function |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| FTP | File Transfer Protocol |
+| HTML | Hyper Text Mark-up Language |
+| HTTP | Hyper Text Transfer Protocol |
+| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| MMoIP | Multimedia over IP |
+| MRB-FE | Media Resource Broker Functional Entity |
+| MRC-FE | Media Resource Control Functional Entity |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NSIW-FE | Network Signalling Interworking Functional Entity |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| PCC-FE | Policy and Charging Control – Functional Entity |
+| PDF | Policy Decision Function |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| PWC-FE | Proxy Web Control – Functional Entity |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource Admission Control Function |
+| REST | Representational State Transfer |
+| RTCWEB | Real-Time Communication in WEB-browsers |
+| RTSP | Real Time Streaming Protocol |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| SCIM | Service Capability Interaction Manager |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SL-FE | Subscription Locator Functional Entity |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+| USIW-FE | User Signalling Interworking Functional Entity |
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| WMF | Web Media Function |
+| WMGC-FE | Web Media Gateway Control – Functional Entity |
+| WMRC-FE | Web Media Resources Control – Functional Entity |
+| WMT-FE | Web Media Transform – Functional Entity |
+| WSCF | Web Service Control Function |
+| WSDL | Web Service Definition Language |
+| WSGC-FE | Web Signalling Gateway Control – Functional Entity |
+| XML | Extensible Mark-up Language |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Overview of the web service component in NGN
+
+## 6.1 Web service component
+
+The NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] has three service components for the service control function: IPTV service component [ITU-T Y.1910], PSTN/ISDN emulation service component [ITU-T Y.2031] and IP multimedia service component [ITU-T Y.2021].
+
+- IP multimedia service component
+The IP multimedia service component supports mediated multimedia services. These services may include multimedia session services such as voice or video telephony or PSTN/ISDN simulation, and some non-session services such as subscribe/notify for presence information and the message method for message exchange.
+- PSTN/ISDN emulation service component
+The PSTN/ISDN emulation service component enables the support of legacy terminals connected through a gateway to an IP network. All PSTN/ISDN services remain available and identical (i.e., with the same operating characteristics) such that end users are unaware that they are not connected to a TDM-based PSTN/ISDN. Not all service capabilities and interfaces have to be present to provide PSTN/ISDN emulation.
+
+- IPTV service component
+
+Service control functions and content delivery functions can optionally be included in the IPTV service component of NGN. Thus, application functions, service control functions, and content delivery functions are included in the service stratum of the NGN architecture. IPTV service control functional block corresponds to NGN service control functions. However, NGN service control functions can optionally include other functionalities.
+
+Additionally, the web service component is newly added into the service stratum of the NGN architecture to support web-related capabilities as shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+- Web service component
+
+The web service component enables NGN services to support legacy web services and converged NGN services considering the web standard interfaces and protocols (e.g., HTML, XML, HTTP, SOAP, REST, WSDL).
+
+
+
+\* Note: Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport Stratum or End-User Functions.
+
+Figure 6-1: Web service component in NGN service specific components. The diagram illustrates the NGN architecture, divided into the Service Stratum and the Transport Stratum. The Service Stratum includes Applications, Management Functions, and various service components like S. User Profile Functions, Web Service Component, IPTV Service Component, PSTN/ISDN Emulation Service Component, and IP Multimedia Service Component. The Transport Stratum includes Network Attachment Control Functions (NACF), Mobility Management Control Functions (MMCF), Resource and Admission Control Functions (RACF), Access Network Functions, Edge Functions, and Core Transport Functions. Legacy Terminals and Customer Networks connect to the NGN End-User Functions via Gateways (GW). Other Networks are also connected to the Core Transport Functions. A note indicates that a Gateway (GW) may exist in either the Transport Stratum or End-User Functions.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Web service component in NGN service specific components**
+
+## 6.2 Service classification using the web service component
+
+NGN needs to support multi-service capabilities which support various composition services simultaneously. The network requires networking environment with NGN/web convergence.
+
+Depending on the type of service control, web services in the NGN can be classified as follows.
+
+- Legacy web services: Well-known web services using web in an NGN environment (e.g., web-browsing, e-mail, blogging and web-office services).
+- Converged NGN services: Interworking services with web and NGN
+ - Web-based IMS services (e.g., MMoIP using web) using interworking with IP multimedia service component
+ - Web-based streaming services (e.g., IPTV using web) using interworking with IPTV service component
+
+- Web-based composition services (e.g., MMoIP and IPTV using web) using interworking with the web service component and other service components.
+
+# 7 Requirements for the web service component in NGN
+
+The web service component in NGN has the following general requirements to support web-related applications/services.
+
+- It is required to support web-based application for satisfying interoperability across wired and wireless network environments.
+NOTE 1 – The web-based application support enablers allow enhanced utilization of device capabilities and network characteristics for web-based applications [ITU-T Y.2201].
+NOTE 2 – Web-based application support capabilities provide users with a consistent web environment which spans multiple network environments and multiple devices (PC, laptop and smart phone) [ITU-T Y.2201].
+- It is required to support web-based information and media types (e.g., text, audio, image, video) and related metadata formats.
+- It is required to provide the service control functions (e.g., service directory, classification, session management, protocol mapping, billing and charging on the web).
+- It is required to provide the media transformation functions (e.g., transcoding, filtering, QoS control and media gateway on the web).
+- It is required to support the interaction with existing NGN services and transport control functions (e.g., user profile function in service stratum and RACF, NACF in transport stratum).
+
+The web service component in NGN has the following requirements to support various types of services using web.
+
+- It can optionally support legacy web services in NGN environments.
+A number of well-known web services can optionally be supported by the web service component in NGN.
+NOTE 3 – The NGN basically supports legacy web services with no special requirements for the web service component.
+- It is required to support interworking with conversation services using web.
+NOTE 4 – The service capability interaction manager (SCIM) and Parlay gateway could be used for conversation services.
+NOTE 5 – Protocol interworking between HTTP and SIP is necessary to support the web-based IMS service.
+- It is required to support interworking with streaming services using web.
+NOTE 6 – The IPTV media delivery could be used for streaming services.
+
+# 8 Functional architecture of the web service component
+
+### 8.1 High-level NGN architecture with the web service component
+
+Figure 8-1 shows the NGN-web convergence architectural model for interconnecting NGN and web. The architecture mainly comprises the web service control function (WSCF) and the web media function (WMF). The WSCF performs adaptation function between the NGN service stratum and the web. The WMF performs interworking between the NGN transport stratum and the web.
+
+In Figure 8-1, the service components are related to each other and may contain a common or shared functionality.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: NGN architecture with web service component. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is 'Applications (3rd party applications)' connected via ANI to a green 'Service stratum'. This stratum contains 'Application support functions and service support functions', a 'Web Service Component' (with 'Web Service Control Functions' and a 'Directory'), and 'Service control functions' (including 'IPTV Service Component', 'PSTN/ISDN Component', and 'IMS Service Component'). Below this is a yellow 'Transport stratum' containing 'Transport control functions' (with 'NACF' and 'RACF') and 'Transport functions'. 'End-user functions' connect via UNI to the Service stratum. 'Other Service providers' (with 'Content') connect via SNI to the Service stratum. 'Other Networks' connect via NNI to the Transport stratum. A legend indicates blue hatched lines for 'Media' and dotted lines for 'Control'.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – NGN architecture with web service component**
+
+Figure 8-2 depicts related service components for various web services in NGN. The web service component interacts with the IPTV service component as well as the IP multimedia service component for converged NGN services. Common functionalities are a group of functional entities which are specified in another service component. There are four cases of the different service components in the figure as follows:
+
+- Case 1: Web service component;
+- Case 2: Web service component and IPTV service component;
+- Case 3: Web service component, IP multimedia service component and IPTV service component;
+- Case 4: Web service component and IP multimedia service component.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-2: Service classification according to different service control. The diagram shows the interaction between an End-User, three service components, and various services. The End-User (pink box) interacts with the Web Service Component (yellow box) via dashed arrows labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Web Service Component interacts with the Common Functionalities (green box) via dashed arrows labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Common Functionalities interact with the IPTV Service Component (cyan box) via dashed arrows labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The IPTV Service Component interacts with the IP Multimedia Service Component (red box) via dashed arrows labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The IP Multimedia Service Component interacts with the Services (dashed box) via dashed arrows labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Services include Legacy Web Services, Web-based Streaming Services, Web-based IMS Services, and Web-based Composite Services. A Content box is also shown within the Services. A Media Control bar (hatched) is at the bottom, with a legend indicating Media Control (hatched bar) and Media Control (dashed arrow).
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Service classification according to different service control**
+
+Appendix II describes related functions for the web service in NGN as common functionalities.
+
+### 8.2 Functional entities for the web service component
+
+The web service component comprises the following functional entities (FEs):
+
+The web service control functions include:
+
+- PWC-FE (proxy web control functional entity): PWC-FE performs functionalities as a proxy between the web server and the HTTP client through interaction with the directory, including profile information;
+- WSGC-FE (web signalling gateway control functional entity): WSGC-FE performs the functionalities of signalling gateway and session manager;
+- PCC-FE (policy and charging control functional entity): PCC-FE instructs PEC-FE and gets information of session flow or service usage from PEC-FE at the transport control functions;
+- WMRC-FE (web media resources control functional entity): WMRC-FE is in charge of controlling resources to the users.
+
+Web media functions include:
+
+- WMGC-FE (web media gateway control functional entity): WMGC-FE is controlled by the WSGC-FE in order to allow authorized media flow;
+- WMT-FE (web media transform functional entity): WMT-FE performs media adaptation according to different user devices and transport environments.
+
+Figure 8-3 depicts the functional entities of the web service component in NGN.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-3: Functional entities of the web service component in NGN. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is a light blue box for 'Application support functions and service support functions'. Below it is an orange box for 'Service control functions'. Inside this orange box is a green dashed box for 'Web Service Control Functions' containing a 'Directory' cylinder, 'PWC-FE', and 'WSGC-FE'. To the right of this is a green box for 'Other Service Components' (IPTV, PSTN/ISDN, IMS). Below the green dashed box is another green dashed box for 'Web Media Functions' containing 'WMGC-FE' and 'WMT-FE'. At the bottom is a yellow box for 'Transport control functions'. On the left is a pink box for 'End-user functions' and on the right is an orange box for 'Other Service Providers' containing a 'Content' box. Lines indicate connections between these components.
+
+**Figure 8-3 – Functional entities of the web service component in NGN**
+
+NOTE – The transport stratum of NGN is out of scope.
+
+#### 8.2.1 Web service control function (WSCF)
+
+Key capabilities for WSCF include:
+
+- Service directory: It holds a list of peer web server;
+- Service classification: It identifies service types for appropriate service control;
+- Signalling mapping and translation (adaptation function): It performs protocol conversion (e.g., between HTTP and SIP);
+- Session manager: It performs session management with session control functions;
+- Billing and charging: It performs traffic measurement/monitoring;
+- Use of web interfaces: It is used for search and discovery through queries to the directory/repository.
+
+Interactions between WSCF and other components [ITU-T Y.2021], [ITU-T Y.2031], [ITU-T Y.1910] are performed as follows:
+
+- NGN service control functions: CSCF, profile management;
+- Web media function: media delivery and conversion (gateway functions);
+- Web components: interface with web server and web service description languages as well as support of personalization and social networking using mesh-up, semantic and ontology;
+- Application support functions and service support functions: service creation, service composition.
+
+#### 8.2.2 Web media function (WMF)
+
+Key capabilities for WMF include:
+
+- Transcoding: conversion between different codecs;
+- Packet filtering: depending on IP addresses and port numbers;
+- QoS control: resource allocation and management, policing based on media flow parameters (e.g., packet size and bandwidth limits);
+- Media gateway: media delivery and conversion as well as transport interworking between NGN and web.
+
+Interactions with other components for WMF are performed as follows:
+
+- NGN transport control functions: interaction with RACF and NACF;
+- Web server: interface with the media transport protocol (e.g., RTSP).
+
+# 9 Interworking between the web service component and other service components
+
+This clause introduces interworking between the web service component and other service components to support the interactions among relevant functions to provide web services as well as web-based services.
+
+### 9.1 Interactions for the support of legacy web services
+
+The end user requests a web service to the web service control functions utilizing the HTTP protocol to communicate with the web server. Next, the web service control functions determine an appropriate web server to provide the request service with directory by referring service user profile functions. The web server creates a web service by transferring a service response message to the end user. At this time, if the web server cannot support the requested format from the end user, the web media functions can transcode the media data into a format appropriate for the end user's device.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ subgraph "Web service component"
+ WSCF[Web service control functions
+Directory]
+ WMF[Web media functions]
+ end
+ S[End-user]
+ UPF[(S. User profile functions)]
+ WS[Web server]
+
+ S -- "Service request/response" --> WSCF
+ WSCF -- "Service request/response" --> WS
+ WS -- "Service request/response" --> S
+ WSCF -- "Profile request / response" --> UPF
+ UPF -- "Profile request / response" --> WSCF
+ WSCF <--> |"Transformation request / response"| WMF
+```
+
+Y.2024(12)\_F9.1
+
+Figure 9-1: Legacy web services using the web service component. The diagram shows the interaction between an End-user, Web service control functions (containing a Directory), Web media functions, S. User profile functions, and a Web server. The Web service control functions are part of the Web service component. Arrows indicate the flow of service requests/responses, profile requests/responses, and transformation requests/responses.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Legacy web services using the web service component**
+
+## 9.2 Interactions for the support of web-based conversation services
+
+The end user requests a conversation service to the web service control functions utilizing the HTTP protocol to communicate with the IP multimedia service component. The IP multimedia service component creates a conversation service by a method of calling relevant APIs to interact with the IMS call server and then responds to the service request from the end user. At this time, if the IMS call server cannot support the requested codec from the end user, the web media functions can transcode the media data into a format appropriate for the end user.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-2: Web-based conversation services using the web service component. This diagram shows the interaction between an End-user, a Web service component, S. User profile functions, and an IMS service component. The Web service component is enclosed in a dashed box and contains 'Web service control functions' (with a 'Directory' cylinder inside) and 'Web media functions'. The End-user sends a 'Service request/response' to the Web service control functions. The Web service control functions send a 'Profile request/response' to 'S. User profile functions' and a 'Service request/response' to the 'IMS service component'. The 'IMS service component' sends a 'Service request/response' back to the Web service control functions. The Web service control functions and 'Web media functions' exchange 'Transformation request/response' messages. The reference 'Y.2024(12)\_F9.2' is located at the bottom right of the dashed box.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Web-based conversation services using the web service component**
+
+## 9.3 Interactions for the support of web-based streaming services
+
+The end user requests a streaming service to the web service control functions utilizing the HTTP protocol to communicate with the IPTV service component. The IPTV service component creates a streaming service by delivering video streaming to the end user. At this time, if the IPTV service component cannot support the requested video streaming format from the end user, the web media functions can transcode the media data into a format appropriate for the end user.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-3: Web-based streaming services using the web service component. This diagram is similar to Figure 9-2 but replaces the 'IMS service component' with an 'IPTV service component'. The End-user sends a 'Service request/response' to the 'Web service control functions' within the 'Web service component' (dashed box). The 'Web service control functions' send a 'Profile request/response' to 'S. User profile functions' and a 'Service request/response' to the 'IPTV service component'. The 'IPTV service component' sends a 'Service request/response' back to the 'Web service control functions'. The 'Web service control functions' and 'Web media functions' exchange 'Transformation request/response' messages. The reference 'Y.2024(12)\_F9.3' is located at the bottom right of the dashed box.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – Web-based streaming services using the web service component**
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+The security requirements within the functional requirements and architecture of the web service component in NGN are addressed by the security requirements for NGN in [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2702].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Relationship among NGN service specific components with the web service component in the NGN architecture
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix describes the relationship among NGN service specific components with the web service component in NGN.
+
+Figure I.1 describes the relationship with each service component of NGN.
+
+- The IP multimedia service (IMS-based) component is specified further in [ITU-T Y.2021].
+- The PSTN/ISDN emulation service (IMS-based and call server) component is specified further in [ITU-T Y.2031].
+- The IPTV service (IMS-based, non-IMS, and non-NGN) component is specified further in [ITU-T Y.1910].
+- The web service component will be specified in this Recommendation. In case of web-based, interworking with other service components will be necessary.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationship between service components in NGN architecture and their corresponding ITU-T recommendations. It is organized into two main columns: 'Service components in NGN architecture' and 'Related Recommendations for each service component'.
+
+**Service components in NGN architecture:**
+
+- Web service component (dashed pink box)
+- IPTV service component (blue box)
+- PSTN/ISDN emulation service component (green box)
+- IP multimedia service component (orange box)
+
+**Related Recommendations for each service component:**
+
+- ITU-T Y.2024:** Contains 'Web service' (yellow oval) and 'Web based (interworking with other service components)' (orange rounded rectangle).
+- ITU-T Y.1910:** Contains 'IMS based' (blue oval), 'Non-IMS' (green oval), and 'Non-NGN' (pink oval).
+- ITU-T Y.2031:** Contains 'IMS based' (blue oval) and 'Call server' (yellow oval).
+- ITU-T Y.2021:** Contains 'IMS based' (blue oval).
+
+**Relationships:**
+
+- The 'Web service component' is linked to 'Web service' and 'Web based' in ITU-T Y.2024.
+- The 'IPTV service component' is linked to 'IMS based', 'Non-IMS', and 'Non-NGN' in ITU-T Y.1910.
+- The 'PSTN/ISDN emulation service component' is linked to 'IMS based' and 'Call server' in ITU-T Y.2031.
+- The 'IP multimedia service component' is linked to 'IMS based' in ITU-T Y.2021.
+- There are bidirectional dashed arrows between 'Web based' and 'Web service', and between 'Web based' and 'IMS based' in ITU-T Y.2031.
+- There are bidirectional dashed arrows between 'Web based' and 'IMS based' in ITU-T Y.1910.
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- ITU-T Y.1910: IPTV functional architecture
+- ITU-T Y.2031: PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture
+- ITU-T Y.2021: IMS for next generation networks
+
+Y.2024(12)\_Fl.1
+
+Diagram showing the relationship between service components in NGN architecture and their corresponding ITU-T recommendations.
+
+Figure I.1 – Service components and relationships in NGN architecture
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Relationship of web service component functions with other NGN functions
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix identifies the mapping relationship with [ITU-T Y.2235] and common functionalities which include several FEs for authenticating/authorizing, protocol interworking, media adaptation and service/application support defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+### II.1 Relationship between ITU-T Y.2235 and ITU-T Y.2024
+
+Table II.1 shows the mapping relationship with the functions defined in [ITU-T Y.2235] and this Recommendation. It indicates that the FEs below perform almost the same role, respectively.
+
+**Table II.1 – Mapping between ITU-T Y.2235 and ITU-T Y.2024**
+
+| Recommendation ITU-T Y.2235 | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2024 |
+|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
+| Functional entities | Corresponding functional entities |
+| Web proxy function | PWC-FE |
+| Profile serving function | Directory |
+| Content transformation function | WMT-FE |
+
+### II.2 Related functions for the web service in NGN
+
+Some of the functions defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] are used for supporting the web service component as common functionalities. These functionalities include several FEs for authenticating/authorizing, protocol interworking, media adaptation and service/application support.
+
+#### II.2.1 Authentication-related FEs
+
+The following FEs could be used for authenticating and authorizing service access of IMS, IPTV, and web, as well.
+
+- Service authentication and authorization functional entity (SAA-FE): It provides authentication and authorization in the service stratum.
+- Subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE): It is used to find the address of the physical entity that holds the subscriber data for a given user identifier when multiple, separately addressable SUP-FEs have been deployed by the NGN operator.
+- Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE): It is responsible for storing user profiles, device profiles, subscriber-related location data, and presence status data in the service stratum. A user profile is a set of stored information related to authentication, authorization, mobility, location and charging. A device profile is a set of stored information related to the terminal (e.g., screen size and supported media).
+
+#### **II.2.2 Interworking related FEs**
+
+The following FEs could be used for protocol interworking between HTTP and RTSP, SIP and HTTP.
+
+- User signalling interworking functional entity (USIW-FE): It has the responsibility for the interworking and information screening functions for different types of application signalling at the subscriber side. It is assumed that protocol interworking happens, for example between HTTP and SIP, in this functional entity.
+- Network signalling interworking functional entity (NSIW-FE): It has the responsibility for the interworking for different types and profiles of application signalling at the trunking side. It is assumed that protocol interworking happens, for example between HTTP and SIP, in this functional entity.
+
+#### **II.2.3 Media control-related FEs**
+
+The following FEs could be used for controlling media adaptation of audio, video and web page.
+
+- Media resource control functional entity (MRC-FE): It controls the media resource processing functional entity (MRP-FE) by operating as a media resource control function. It should be used for enabling MRP-FE to transform the web content into an appropriate form according to the profile information
+- Media resource broker functional entity (MRB-FE): It assigns specific media server resources (i.e., MRC-FE and MRP-FE) to incoming calls at the request of service applications.
+
+#### **II.2.4 Application related FEs**
+
+The following FEs could be used for blending service features and making new converged services by interworking among IMS, IPTV and the web service component.
+
+- Application support functional entity (AS-FE): It supports generic application server functions including hosting and executing services.
+- Application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE): It serves as an interworking entity between the applications and the S-CSC-FE of the service stratum.
+- Application service coordination manager functional entity (APL-SCM-FE): It manages interactions between multiple applications and services. It should be used for providing the web-based composite services.
+
+# Appendix III
+
+## Information flows for services using the web service component in NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### III.1 Procedure for the support of legacy web services
+
+The information flow for legacy web service using the web service component with directory including profile information is shown in Figure III.1.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EndUser as End user
+ participant WSCF as Web service control functions
+ participant WMF as Web media functions
+ participant SUserProfile as S. User profile functions
+ participant WebServer as Web server
+
+ WSCF -->> WSCF : PWC-FE, Directory, WSGC-FE
+ WMF -->> WMF : WMGC-FE, WMT-FE
+
+ EndUser->>WSCF: Service request
+ WSCF->>Directory: Refer to directory
+ Directory-->>WSCF:
+ WSCF->>SUserProfile: Request profile information
+ SUserProfile-->>WSCF: Respond with profile information
+ WSCF->>WMGC-FE: Request Internet service
+ WMGC-FE->>WebServer: Request Internet service
+ WebServer-->>WMGC-FE: Respond with web contents
+ WMGC-FE->>WMT-FE: Request web contents transformation
+ WMT-FE-->>WMGC-FE: Respond with transformed web contents
+ WMGC-FE-->>WSCF: Respond with Internet service
+ WSCF-->>EndUser: Service response with formatted contents
+```
+
+Y2024(12)\_FIII.1
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for legacy web service using the web service component. The diagram involves an End user, a Web service component (containing Web service control functions and Web media functions), S. User profile functions, and a Web server.
+
+**Figure III.1 – Message flow for legacy web service using the web service component**
+
+The information flow is:
+
+- a) The end user requests the web service to get web contents utilizing HTTP protocol;
+- b) The web service component, especially PWC-FE, refers to directory to get a list of peer web servers;
+- c) PWC-FE requests profile to refer information of the end user;
+- d) Service user profile function responds with the profile of the end user;
+- e) PWC-FE determines a web server and requests web service to WSGC-FE with user profile;
+- f) WSGC-FE requests web service to the web server;
+- g) Web server responds with the requested web contents to WSGC-FE;
+- h) If the web server cannot support the requested format according to the user profile, WSGC-FE requests web contents transformation to WMT-FE through WMGC-FE;
+- i) WMT-FE transcodes web contents into a format appropriate for the end user's device and sends them to the WSGC-FE;
+- j) WSGC-FE responds with the formatted web contents to PWC-FE;
+
+k) PWC-FE responds to the end user.
+
+### III.2 Procedure for the support of web-based conversation services
+
+The information flow for the conversation service using the web service component with directory including profile information is shown in Figure III.2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the message flow for web-based conversation services. It involves the following components and their interactions:
+
+- End user**: Initiates a **Service request** to the **Web service control functions**.
+- Web service component**: Contains **Web service control functions** (PWC-FE, Directory, WSGC-FE) and **Web media functions** (WMGC-FE, WMT-FE).
+- S. User profile functions**: A database component for user profile information.
+- IMS service component**: The IP multimedia service component.
+
+The sequence of messages is as follows:
+
+- Service request** from End user to PWC-FE.
+- Refer to directory** from PWC-FE to Directory.
+- Request profile information** from PWC-FE to S. User profile functions.
+- Respond with profile information** from S. User profile functions to PWC-FE.
+- Request conversation service** from PWC-FE to WSGC-FE.
+- Request conversation service** from WSGC-FE to IMS service component.
+- Respond with conversational contents** from IMS service component to WSGC-FE.
+- Request conversational contents transformation** from WSGC-FE to WMT-FE.
+- Respond with transformed contents** from WMT-FE to WSGC-FE.
+- Respond with conversation service** from WSGC-FE to PWC-FE.
+- Service response with formatted contents** from PWC-FE to End user.
+
+A large blue arrow at the bottom indicates the overall **Conversation service** flow.
+
+Y.2024(12)\_FIII.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flows for web-based conversation services using a web service component.
+
+**Figure III.2 – The message flows for web-based conversation services using web service component**
+
+The information flow is:
+
+- The end user requests the conversation service to the web service component utilizing the HTTP protocol in order to communicate with the IP multimedia service component that interacts with the IMS call server;
+- The web service component, especially the PWC-FE, refers to directory to get a list of peer IMS call servers;
+- PWC-FE requests profile to get information of the end user;
+- The service user profile function responds with the profile of the end user;
+- PWC-FE selects an IMS call server and requests the conversation service to WSGC-FE with the user profile;
+- WSGC-FE converts protocol HTTP into SIP and requests conversation service to the IMS service component;
+- The IP multimedia service component creates a conversation service by calling the relevant APIs with IMS call server and responds to WSGC-FE. Also WSGC-FE converts protocol SIP into HTTP;
+
+- h) If the IMS call server cannot support the requested codec according to user profile, WSGC-FE requests transformation of conversational contents to WMT-FE through WMGC-FE;
+- i) WMT-FE transcodes contents into a format appropriate for the end user's device and sends them to the WSGC-FE;
+- j) WSGC-FE responds with formatted conversational contents to PWC-FE;
+- k) PWC-FE responds to the end user.
+
+### III.3 Procedure for the support of web-based streaming services
+
+The information flow for the web-based streaming service using the web service component with directory including profile information is shown in Figure III.3.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EndUser as End user
+ participant WSCF as Web service control functions
+PWC-FE, Directory, WSGC-FE
+ participant WMGF as Web media functions
+WMGC-FE, WMT-FE
+ participant SUserProfile as S. User profile functions
+ participant IPTV as IPTV service component
+
+ EndUser->>WSCF: Service request
+ WSCF->>Directory: Refer to directory
+ WSCF->>SUserProfile: Request profile information
+ SUserProfile-->>WSCF: Respond with profile information
+ WSCF->>WSGC-FE: Request streaming service
+ WSCF->>IPTV: Request streaming service
+ IPTV-->>WSCF: Respond with streaming contents
+ WSCF->>WMT-FE: Request streaming contents transformation
+ WMT-FE-->>WSCF: Respond with transformed contents
+ WSCF-->>EndUser: Respond with streaming service
+ WSCF-->>EndUser: Service response with formatted contents
+ EndUser-->>IPTV: Streaming service
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flows for web-based streaming services using a web service component. The diagram involves an End user, a Web service component (containing Web service control functions and Web media functions), S. User profile functions, and an IPTV service component.
+
+Y.2024(12)\_FIII.3
+
+**Figure III.3 – The message flows for web-based streaming services using web service component**
+
+The information flow is:
+
+- a) The end user requests the streaming service to the web service component utilizing the HTTP protocol in order to receive video streaming contents;
+- b) The web service component, especially the PWC-FE, refers to the directory to get a list of peer streaming servers;
+- c) PWC-FE requests profile to get information of the end user;
+- d) The service user profile function responds with the profile of the end user;
+- e) PWC-FE determines a streaming server and requests streaming service to WSGC-FE with user profile;
+
+- f) If the streaming server cannot support the HTTP protocol, WSGC-FE converts protocol HTTP into an appropriate protocol and requests streaming service to the IPTV service component;
+- g) The IPTV service component creates a streaming service with the streaming server and responds to WSGC-FE. Also WSGE-FE converts the protocol into HTTP;
+- h) If the streaming server cannot support the requested codec according to the user profile, WSGC-FE requests transformation of streaming contents to WMT-FE through WMGC-FE;
+- i) WMT-FE transcodes contents into an appropriate format to end user's device and sends them to the WSGC-FE;
+- j) WSGC-FE responds with formatted streaming contents to PWC-FE;
+- k) PWC-FE responds to the end user.
+
+# Appendix IV
+
+## IETF activities related to the web service component in NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### IV.1 IETF real-time communication in web-browsers (RTCWeb)
+
+There are a number of proprietary implementations that provide direct interactive rich communication using audio, video, collaboration and games between two peers' web-browsers, while these are not interoperable. Real-time communication in web-browsers (RTCWeb) working group in IETF attempts to standardize the basis for such communication so that interoperable communication can be established between any compatible browsers. The goal is to enable innovation on top of a set of basic components. One core component is to enable real-time media (e.g., audio and video), a second is to enable data transfer directly between clients.
+
+[b-IETF Real] describes web-based real-time communication use cases. Based on the use cases, [b-IETF Real] also derives requirements related to the browser and the API used by web applications to request and control media stream services provided by the browser.
+
+This appendix introduces two basic use cases even though a number of use cases are described in the above document.
+
+#### - Simple video communication service
+
+Two or more users have loaded a video communication web application into their browsers, provided by the same service provider, and logged into the service it provides. The web service publishes information about user login status by pushing updates to the web application in the browsers. When one online user selects a peer online user, a 1-1 video communication session between the browsers of the two peers is initiated. The invited user might accept or reject the session.
+
+During session establishment a self-view is displayed, and once the session has been established the video sent from the remote peer is displayed in addition to the self-view. During the session, each user can select to remove and re-insert the self-view as often as desired. Each user can also change the sizes of his/her two video displays during the session. Each user can also pause sending of media (audio, video, or both) and mute incoming media.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a video communication setup. On the left, a laptop labeled 'A' is shown with a video call interface on its screen. A callout box points to the screen with the text '• Resizable'. Below the laptop is a box containing the text '• HW A', '• OS A', and '• Browser A'. On the right, another laptop labeled 'B' is shown with a video call interface. Below it is a box containing the text '• HW B', '• OS B', and '• Browser B'. A central yellow cylinder labeled 'WS' (Web Service) is connected to both laptops by blue arrows. A yellow vertical bar labeled 'NAT' (Network Address Translation) is connected to the 'WS' component by a blue arrow and to the laptop 'B' by a green arrow. A green double-headed arrow connects the laptop 'A' and the 'NAT' component.
+
+Diagram illustrating the use case of simple video communication service. Two laptops, labeled 'A' and 'B', are connected via a central 'WS' (Web Service) component and a 'NAT' (Network Address Translation) component. Laptop A is labeled 'Resizable' and shows a video call interface. Laptop B is labeled 'HW B', 'OS B', and 'Browser B'. The diagram shows data flow between the laptops and the WS component, and between the WS component and the NAT component.
+
+Figure IV.1 – Use case of simple video communication service
+
+#### - Simple video communication service with inter-operator calling
+
+Two users have logged into two different web applications provided by different service providers. The service providers are interconnected by some means, but exchange no more information about the users than what can be carried using SIP.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a use case for simple video communication service with inter-operator calling. It shows two service providers, Service Provider A and Service Provider B, each providing a web application (Web app A and Web app B respectively). These web applications are connected to a central Web Services (WS) component. The WS components are interconnected by a double-headed blue arrow, indicating communication. Below the WS components, two users are shown. The user on the left is using a laptop and is connected to Web app A. The user on the right is also using a laptop and is connected to Web app B. A green double-headed arrow connects the two users, representing the video communication. A yellow vertical bar labeled 'NAT' (Network Address Translation) is positioned between the two users, indicating that the communication is routed through a NAT device.
+
+Diagram illustrating a use case for simple video communication service with inter-operator calling. Two service providers (A and B) are interconnected via Web Services (WS). Service Provider A includes Web app A, and Service Provider B includes Web app B. A user on the left (laptop) connects to Web app A, and a user on the right (laptop with headset) connects to Web app B. A NAT (Network Address Translation) device is shown between the two users, indicating the communication path through the NAT.
+
+**Figure IV.2 – Use case of simple video communication service with inter-operator calling**
+
+From the above introduction, the IETF RTCWeb attempts to identify and standardize web-browser's functionality running on the user side.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+[b-IETF Real] IETF (2012), *Web Real-Time Communication use-cases and Requirements*.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2026
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+---
+
+**Functional requirements and architecture of the
+next generation network for support of
+ubiquitous sensor network applications and
+services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2026
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2026**
+
+# **Functional requirements and architecture of the next generation network for support of ubiquitous sensor network applications and services**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2026 includes functional requirements and architecture of the next generation network (NGN) for the support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services. This Recommendation is based on the capabilities defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2026 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Frameworks, functional architecture, sensor(s), sensor network(s), USN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2013
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Functional requirements and functions of the NGN for USN applications and services ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 NGN functional requirements ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 Functional architecture model ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.3 Functions to support USN applications and services ..... | 5 |
+| 7 | Functional architecture of the NGN for USN applications and services..... | 8 |
+| | 7.1 Transport processing functional entities..... | 8 |
+| | 7.2 Transport control functional entities ..... | 8 |
+| | 7.3 Service control functional entities ..... | 9 |
+| | 7.4 Application support functions and service support functions ..... | 9 |
+| 8 | Security considerations..... | 9 |
+| | Appendix I – Analysis of service requirements and network capabilities defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221 ..... | 10 |
+| | I.1 Requirements for extensions to NGN capabilities ..... | 10 |
+| | I.2 Requirements supported by existing NGN capabilities..... | 12 |
+| | I.3 Mapping table of the requirements and the extended NGN functions ..... | 13 |
+| | I.4 Mapping table of the requirements and the existing NGN functions..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix II – USN middleware functions provided by NGN..... | 15 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 17 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2026
+
+# Functional requirements and architecture of the next generation network for support of ubiquitous sensor network applications and services
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation, which is based on [ITU-T Y.2012], covers extended features of the next generation network (NGN) for the support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services. This Recommendation describes functional requirements, a functional architecture and functional entities in order to support the NGN service requirements and capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2221].
+
+This Recommendation covers:
+
+- Functional requirements and functions to support the NGN capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2221]
+- A functional architecture and entities of the NGN to support USN applications and services
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2221] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221 (2010), *Requirements for support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services in the NGN environment*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 sensor** [ITU-T Y.2221]: An electronic device that senses a physical condition or chemical compound and delivers an electronic signal proportional to the observed characteristic.
+
+**3.1.2 sensor network** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A network comprised of interconnected sensor nodes exchanging sensed data by wired or wireless communication.
+
+**3.1.3 sensor node** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A device consisting of sensor(s) and optional actuator(s) with capabilities of sensed data processing and networking.
+
+**3.1.4 ubiquitous sensor network (USN)** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A conceptual network built over existing physical networks which makes use of sensed data and provides knowledge services to anyone, anywhere and at anytime, and where the information is generated by using context awareness.
+
+**3.1.5 USN end-user** [ITU-T Y.2221]: An entity that uses the sensed data provided by USN applications and services. This end-user may be a system or a human.
+
+**3.1.6 USN gateway** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A node which interconnects sensor networks with other networks.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ABG-FE | Access Border Gateway Functional Entity |
+| AN-FE | Access Node Functional Entity |
+| ASF&SSF | Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions |
+| AS-FE | Application Support Functional Entity |
+| CAF | Charging and Accounting Functions |
+| EN-FE | Edge Node Functional Entity |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| MLM-FE | Mobile Location Management Functional Entity |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management and Control Functions |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NAC-FE | Network Access Configuration Functional Entity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| OSE | Open Service Environment |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| SC&CDF | Service Control and Content Delivery Functions |
+| SCF | Service Control Functions |
+| SCP-FE | Service and Content Protection Functional Entity |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TLM-FE | Transport Location Management Functional Entity |
+| TRC-FE | Transport Resource Control Functional Entity |
+| TUP-FE | Transport User Profile Functional Entity |
+| USN | Ubiquitous Sensor Network |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Functional requirements and functions of the NGN for USN applications and services**
+
+### **6.1 NGN functional requirements**
+
+[ITU-T Y.2221] describes the NGN service requirements and capabilities to support USN applications and services, and clause 8.1 of [ITU-T Y.2221] specifically states the following requirements for extensions or additions to NGN capabilities to support USN applications and services:
+
+- Network management
+- Profile management
+ - Service profile
+
+NOTE 1 – Service profile requirement can be supported by existing NGN capabilities. See clause I.1.
+
+ - Device profile
+- Open service environment (OSE)
+ - Service registration and discovery
+ - Inter-working with service creation environments
+
+NOTE 2 – This Recommendation does not take these requirements into consideration. See clause I.1.
+- Quality of service (QoS)
+ - Application traffic control
+
+NOTE 3 – Application traffic control can be supported by existing NGN capabilities. See clause I.1.
+- Privacy
+
+NOTE 4 – This Recommendation does not take this requirement into consideration. See clause I.1.
+
+In addition to these capabilities, clause 8.2 of [ITU-T Y.2221] explains that the following capabilities are supported by the existing NGN capabilities to support USN applications and services:
+
+- Open service environment
+ - Service composition and coordination
+
+NOTE 5 – This Recommendation does not take this requirement into consideration. See clause I.1.
+- Quality of service
+ - Differentiated QoS and data prioritization
+- Connectivity
+- Location management
+- Mobility
+- Security
+- Identification, authentication and authorization
+- Accounting and charging
+
+Appendix I describes requirements for the support of USN applications and services in NGN and allocates the corresponding functions of NGN to satisfy the requirements.
+
+### 6.2 Functional architecture model
+
+Figure 1 depicts the overall diagram of USN architecture, which uses NGN as a backbone network.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the overall USN architecture, divided into three main sections: Sensor networks, Backbone Network, and USN applications and services. The Sensor networks section on the left shows a mesh of nodes connected by dashed lines. The Backbone Network section in the center features a cloud labeled 'NGN' with the text 'Observation data (sensor data)' inside. The USN applications and services section on the right shows two server icons labeled 'USN service provider'. Arrows indicate the flow of data and services: blue arrows show 'Observation data (sensor data)' being sent from the sensor networks to the NGN and then to the USN service providers; yellow arrows show 'Use of service' being sent from the USN service providers to the end-users (represented by mobile phone icons) via the NGN.
+
+Figure 1 – Overall USN architecture diagram
+
+**Figure 1 – Overall USN architecture**
+
+The sensor networks gather information about their physical surroundings and deliver this information to USN service providers through NGN. The USN service providers create USN services using this information and provide them to USN end-users via NGN. The USN end-users utilize USN services through NGN.
+
+As a backbone network, NGN provides the capabilities for the support of USN applications and services in the transport stratum functions, the service stratum functions, the management functions and the end-user functions.
+
+Figure 2 shows the overall functional architecture model of the NGN to support USN applications and services. More specifically, the figure shows the functions required for the support of USN applications and services. Appendix I describes requirements for the support of USN applications and services in NGN and allocates the corresponding functions of NGN to satisfy the requirements.
+
+
+
+Figure 2 – Overall functional architecture model. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture for USN applications using sensor networks. It shows a layered structure with three main strata: Service Stratum (green), Transport Stratum (yellow), and Management Functions (pink). The Service Stratum includes Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions, Service Control and Content Delivery Functions, and Content Delivery Functions. The Transport Stratum includes Network Attachment and Control Functions, Mobility Management and Control Functions, Resource and Admission control Functions, Transport Control Functions, and Transport Functions. The Management Functions block includes Identification, authentication and authorization, Profile management (Service Profile), Security, Sensor network management, Device profile management, Security (key management), Accounting management, Differentiated QoS and data prioritization, Connectivity, Location management, Identification, authentication and authorization, Security (Sensor Data), Application traffic control, Differentiated QoS and data prioritization, and Mobility. The diagram also shows interfaces: ANI (Application Network Interface) at the top, SNI (Service Network Interface) on the right, and UNI (User Network Interface) at the bottom. External functions from other service providers and other networks are shown on the right. A legend at the bottom indicates Control (dashed line), Media (solid blue line), Management (dotted line), and IdM (dashed orange line).
+
+**Figure 2 – Overall functional architecture model**
+
+As seen in Figure 2, there are no additional functions beyond [ITU-T Y.2012] to support requirements for USN applications and services. However, some NGN functions should be extended to support requirements in terms of functionalities. Clause 6.3 describes NGN functions to support USN applications and services.
+
+### 6.3 Functions to support USN applications and services
+
+This clause describes how the functional requirements identified in clause 6.1 are supported in the functional architecture model shown in clause 6.2. This clause focuses on the NGN capabilities which need the extensions of NGN functions to support USN applications and services.
+
+The extension of NGN functions means that the NGN functions defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] should support additional capabilities for the requirements of USN applications and services. The extension of NGN functions can be achieved by implementation of additional capabilities of each stratum function.
+
+#### 6.3.1 Transport stratum functions
+
+The transport stratum functions are required to be extended to support requirements of USN applications and services. The extensions of the transport stratum functions are given in the following clauses.
+
+##### 6.3.1.1 Transport functions
+
+The following functional requirements are supported by the existing capabilities of the transport functions [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- Application traffic control requirement:
+The access network functions, edge functions and core transport functions are used for satisfying an application traffic control requirement which requests the management of transaction volume generated by the USN end-users.
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+USN mission-critical applications and services should be carefully managed. For example, emergency notification of a fire case must be delivered by a time-critical and reliable way to appropriate national disaster monitoring systems. The access network functions, edge functions and core transport functions provide differentiated QoS and data prioritization capabilities.
+
+##### 6.3.1.2 Transport control functions
+
+There are no extended capabilities in the transport control functions to support USN applications and services. The following functional requirements are supported by the transport control functions [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+As described in clause 6.3.1.1, USN applications and services require differentiated QoS and data prioritization. The resource and admission control functions (RACF) provides this capabilities in cooperation with the transport functions.
+- Connectivity requirement:
+Both IP-based and non IP-based sensor networks can connect to NGN. When a non IP-based sensor network connects to NGN, an IP-capable gateway is used. The network attachment control function (NACF) provides connectivity to IP-based and non-IP based sensor networks through gateways.
+- Location management requirement:
+The NACF provides a location management capability at the IP layer. If a sensor network uses IP addresses directly or a USN gateway provides IP-based connectivity, the location information management of sensor networks at the IP layer is supported by the NACF.
+- Mobility requirement:
+The access network functions provide a mobility capability of a sensor network as well as mobility of a sensor node within a sensor network or across sensor networks. If a sensor network is based on IP technologies, the mobility management and control functions (MMCF) provide functions for the support of IP-based mobility of a sensor network as well as a sensor node.
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The NACF provides authentication of the USN end-users and authorization of network access.
+
+#### 6.3.2 Service stratum functions
+
+The service stratum functions are required to be extended to support requirements of USN applications and services. The extensions of the service stratum functions are given in the following clauses.
+
+##### **6.3.2.1 Service control and content delivery functions**
+
+The following functional requirements are supported by existing service control and content delivery functions [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization requirement:
+The service control functions (SCF) support authentication and authorization functions for the USN end-users at the service level.
+
+##### **6.3.2.2 Application support functions and service support functions**
+
+There are no extended capabilities in the application support functions and service support functions to support USN applications and services.
+
+The following functional requirements are supported by existing application support functions and service support functions [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization requirement:
+The application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF) provide authentication and authorization to access the services at the application level.
+- Profile management requirement for registration and discovery of service:
+[ITU-T Y.2221] specifies that the service profile for service registration and discovery requires the extension of NGN capabilities. However, [ITU-T Y.2012] defines that the ASF&SSF, especially the application support functional entity (AS-FE), provides generic application server functions such as service selection and service discovery.
+- Security:
+Application support functions and service support functions provide the protection of content (sensor data).
+
+#### **6.3.3 Management functions**
+
+The management functions are required to be extended to support requirements of USN applications and services. The extensions of the management functions are as follows:
+
+- Sensor network management requirement:
+IP-based and non-IP-based sensor networks using various types of wired and/or wireless connection can coexist in USN applications and services. Non-IP-based sensor networks are often managed through their gateway. IP-based sensor networks include the case of a single sensor node directly connected to NGN, although sensor networks are often managed as a set. The management functions are required to manage IP-based sensor networks as well as non IP-sensor networks.
+- Profile management (device profile) requirement:
+In USN applications and services, a device profile consisting of the information of sensor networks and/or sensor nodes should be provided and managed. As there are various types of sensors, sensor nodes and sensor networks, device profiles would help to manage a large number of heterogeneous nodes and networks. The information of device profiles may include sensor network identifier, device identifier, device types, capabilities and location. The management functions may support device profile management.
+
+However, the following functional requirements are supported by existing management functions [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- Security requirement:
+Security management of USN applications and services including key management is supported by the management functions.
+
+- Accounting and charging requirement:
+Different accounting and charging requirements might have to be addressed depending on the scenarios of USN applications and services. The management functions are required to support different accounting and charging policies according to different data transaction types of USN applications and services.
+
+#### **6.3.4 End-user functions**
+
+Existing end-user functions are required to support the following functions:
+
+- Security requirement:
+Sensor data security within a sensor network is provided by the end-user functions.
+
+# **7 Functional architecture of the NGN for USN applications and services**
+
+The extensions and additions of the functional entities defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] are required for the support of USN applications and services. Based on the functions described in clause 6.3, this clause identifies the extensions and additions of the functional entities of the NGN functional architecture illustrated in Figures 9-2, 9-3 and 9-4 of [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+### **7.1 Transport processing functional entities**
+
+#### **7.1.1 T-2: Access node functional entity (AN-FE)**
+
+- Application traffic control requirement:
+The AN-FE supports an application traffic control requirement which requests the management of transaction volume generated by the USN end-users.
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+The AN-FE supports different QoS and also supports data prioritization capabilities.
+
+#### **7.1.2 T-3: Edge node functional entity (EN-FE)**
+
+- Application traffic control requirement:
+The EN-FE supports an application traffic control requirement which requests the management of transaction volume generated by the USN end-users.
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+The EN-FE supports different QoS and also supports data prioritization capabilities.
+
+#### **7.1.3 T-5: Access border gateway functional entity (ABG-FE)**
+
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+The ABG-FE supports different QoS and also supports data prioritization capabilities.
+
+### **7.2 Transport control functional entities**
+
+#### **7.2.1 T-10: Network access configuration functional entity (NAC-FE)**
+
+- Connectivity requirement:
+The NAC-FE provides connectivity to IP-based and non-IP based sensor networks through gateways.
+
+#### **7.2.2 T-11: Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)**
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The TAA-FE provides authentication of the USN end-users and authorization of network access.
+
+#### **7.2.3 T-12: Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)**
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The TAA-FE provides authentication of the USN end-users and authorization of network access.
+
+#### **7.2.4 T-13: Transport location management functional entity (TLM-FE)**
+
+- Location management requirement:
+The TLM-FE provides location management capability at the IP layer. If a sensor network uses IP addresses directly or a USN gateway provides IP-based connectivity, the location information management of sensor networks at the IP layer is supported by the TLM-FE.
+
+#### **7.2.5 T-17: Transport resource control functional entity (TRC-FE)**
+
+- Differentiated QoS and data prioritization requirement:
+The TRC-FE provides different QoS and also supports data prioritization capabilities.
+
+#### **7.2.6 T-18: Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE)**
+
+- Mobility requirement:
+The MLM-FE provides functions for the support of IP-based mobility of a sensor network as well as a sensor node.
+
+### **7.3 Service control functional entities**
+
+#### **7.3.1 S-5: Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE)**
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The SUP-FE is responsible for storing user profiles, subscriber-related location data and presence status data in the service stratum. A user profile is required to be provided in support of authentication, authorization and so on.
+
+#### **7.3.2 S-6: Service authentication and authorization functional entity (SAA-FE)**
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The SAA-FE provides authentication and authorization in the service stratum.
+
+### **7.4 Application support functions and service support functions**
+
+#### **7.4.1 A-1: Application support functional entity (AS-FE)**
+
+- Profile management requirement for service registration and discovery:
+The AS-FE supports generic application server functions including hosting and executing services such as service selection servers and service discovery servers.
+
+#### **7.4.2 A-8: Service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE)**
+
+- Identification, authentication and authorization:
+The SCP-FE provides authentication and authorization in the service stratum.
+- Security:
+The SCP-FE provides the protection of the services and content (sensor data).
+
+# **8 Security considerations**
+
+Security considerations regarding the functional requirements and architecture of the NGN are addressed in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Analysis of service requirements and network capabilities defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Requirements for extensions to NGN capabilities
+
+[ITU-T Y.2221] defines the following requirements to be supported by extended NGN capabilities.
+
+| Requirements | Explanation |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Network management | - • It is required to manage IP-based sensor networks including the case of a single node directly connected to NGN.
- • It is required to manage non-IP-based sensor networks.
- • It is required to support configuration and reconfiguration of sensor networks for assurance of connectivity and lifetime management.
|
+| Profile management for service registration and discovery | - • It is recommended to use a standard set of USN service profiles to register and discover USN services.
NOTE – [ITU-T Y.2221] specifies that the service profile for service registration and discovery requires the extension of NGN capabilities. However, [ITU-T Y.2012] defines that the ASF&SSF, especially the application support functional entity (AS-FE), provides generic application server functions such as service selection and service discovery.
Therefore, a service profile requirement can be supported by existing NGN capabilities.
|
+| Profile management: Device profile | - • It is optional to use device profiles containing sensor network related information.
|
+| Open service environment: Service registration and discovery | - • It is required to support at least one USN service description language and its associated execution framework.
- • It is recommended to register and discover USN services based on a standard set of USN service profiles.
- • Registration and discovery of sensor network devices may be supported.
- • Context-awareness can be optionally supported in service discovery for USN applications and services.
NOTE – [ITU-T Y.2221] specifies that service registration and discovery using the service profile under OSE require the extension of NGN capabilities. However, [ITU-T Y.2012] defines that the ASF&SSF, especially the application support functional entity (AS-FE), provides generic application server functions such as service selection and service discovery.
Therefore, OSE service registration and discovery requirement can be supported by the existing NGN capability (i.e., ASF&SSF) instead of OSE.
|
+
+| Requirements | Explanation |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Open service environment: Inter-working with service creation environments | - It is recommended to support inter-working with other service creation environments for the creation of USN applications and services
NOTE – From the viewpoint of USN applications and services, NGN may be regarded as an intermediate network providing connectivity, data delivery and management. Service creation under OSE provides NGN service creation, not creation of USN applications and services. USN service creation is provided by other service providers and not the NGN.
Therefore this Recommendation does not take this requirement into consideration.
|
+| Quality of service: Application traffic control | - It is required to manage the transaction volume generated by USN applications and services.
- It is recommended to be able to avoid access concentration to a single resource.
NOTE – [ITU-T Y.2221] specifies that QoS-application traffic control requires the extension of NGN capabilities. However, [ITU-T Y.2012] defines that access network functions and edge functions provide QoS and traffic control.
Therefore QoS-application traffic control requirement can be supported by existing NGN capabilities.
|
+| Privacy | - There should be an option for privacy-enhanced multi-hop routing mechanisms (information on originating node identifier (ID), time and location should not be revealed – at least not totally – to intermediate nodes).
- There should be an operating option to de-correlate sensor activity patterns (revealing sensitive context information) from the ensuing communication traffic patterns.
NOTE – [ITU-T Y.2221] specifies that privacy protection should be supported by NGN. However, this requirement needs an end-to-end (from sensor node/sensor network to application) security mechanism. The main role of NGN for supporting USN applications and services is delivering sensor data to USN applications or delivering control data to sensor networks. From the USN point of view, NGN is an intermediate network and the components of NGN can also be regarded as intermediate nodes.
Therefore privacy protection that requires an end-to-end security mechanism cannot be supported by NGN functions and this Recommendation does not take this requirement into consideration.
|
+
+### I.2 Requirements supported by existing NGN capabilities
+
+[ITU-T Y.2221] defines the following requirements to be supported by existing NGN capabilities.
+
+| Requirements | Explanation |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Open service environment: Service composition and coordination | - • It is recommended to support service composition and coordination for creation of USN applications and services.
NOTE – From the viewpoint of USN applications and services, NGN may be regarded as an intermediate network providing connectivity, data delivery and management. Service composition and coordination under OSE provides NGN service composition and coordination, not USN applications and services. USN service composition and coordination is provided by other service providers than NGN.
Therefore this Recommendation does not take this requirement into consideration.
|
+| Quality of service: Differentiated QoS and data prioritization | - • It is recommended to provide differentiated QoS and data prioritization according to the specific USN service requirements.
|
+| Connectivity | - • It is required to support connectivity between sensor networks and infrastructure networks, regardless of the sensor network type, i.e., IP-based or non-IP-based and using various types of wired and/or wireless media connections. This includes the case in IP-based sensor networks of a single sensor node directly connected to the infrastructure networks.
|
+| Location management | - • Location information of sensor networks is recommended to be registered for USN applications and services. Registration can be static or dynamic.
- • Location information of an individual sensor node can be optionally registered for USN applications and services when the location information of a single sensor node is useful.
- • Location information is recommended to be trustworthy, hence location discovery and management is recommended to be secure.
|
+| Mobility | - • It is required to support network mobility when a sensor network moves across infrastructure networks.
- • Infrastructure networks are required to support intra-sensor network mobility and inter-sensor network mobility when location information of a moving sensor node is required to be traced.
|
+
+| Requirements | Explanation |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Security | - • It is required to support key management schemes for USN applications and services.
- • It is recommended to support scalable key management schemes for USN applications and services operating with large sensor networks.
- • It is recommended to provide security for the aggregated data when sensed data from two or more applications and services are integrated in infrastructure networks for the creation of new services.
- • The security approaches for the support of USN applications and services are recommended to be consistent with the general approach for security in NGN.
- • In addition to data security, the USN communication infrastructure is recommended to provide information transport security for protection against well-known passive and active attacks. Protocols for information transport are required to be resilient to attacks.
- • Depending on the specific USN application security requirements, a means for intrusion detection is required.
|
+| Identification, authentication and authorization | - • It is required to support identification, authentication and authorization for users to access USN applications and services based on the security level of service data.
- • It is required to support different levels of authentication for different types of data based on the requirements of USN applications and services.
- • The USN end-users can optionally identify and authenticate network providers and USN service providers.
|
+| Accounting and charging | - • It is required to support different accounting and charging policies according to different data transaction types of USN applications and services.
|
+
+### I.3 Mapping table of the requirements and the extended NGN functions
+
+Clause I.1 defines the NGN capabilities to be extended to satisfy the requirements of [ITU-T Y.2221]. This clause allocates proper functions of NGN which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] to support the capabilities.
+
+| Requirements | Corresponding functions |
+|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Network management | |
+| Profile management: Device profile | |
+
+### I.4 Mapping table of the requirements and the existing NGN functions
+
+Clause I.2 defines the existing NGN capabilities to satisfy the requirements of [ITU-T Y.2221]. This clause allocates proper functions of NGN which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] to support the capabilities.
+
+| Requirements | Corresponding functions |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Profile management for service registration and discovery | - • Application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF)
|
+| Quality of service: Application traffic control | - • Transport functions
- – Access network functions
- – Edge functions
- • Core transport functions
|
+| Quality of service: Differentiated QoS and data prioritization | - • Transport functions
- – Access network functions
- – Edge functions
- – Core transport functions
- • Transport control functions
- – Resource and admission control functions (RACF)
|
+| Connectivity | - • Transport control functions
- – Network attachment control functions (NACF)
|
+| Location management | - • Transport control functions
- – Network attachment control functions (NACF)
|
+| Mobility | - • Transport functions
- – Access network functions
- – Mobility management and control functions (MMCF)
|
+| Security | - • Management functions (security key management)
- • End-user functions (data security)
- • Application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF)
|
+| Identification, authentication and authorization | - • Transport control functions
- – Network attachment control functions (NACF)
- • Service control and content delivery functions (SC&CDF)
- – Service control functions (SCF)
- • Application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF)
|
+| Accounting and charging | - • Management functions (accounting management)
- – Charging and accounting functions (CAF)
|
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## USN middleware functions provided by NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+[b-ITU-T F.744] describes USN middleware as follows:
+
+- USN middleware is an intermediate entity which provides functions commonly required by different types of USN applications and services. USN middleware receives requests from USN applications and delivers those requests to appropriate sensor networks. Similarly, USN middleware receives sensed data or processed data from sensor networks and delivers them to appropriate USN applications. USN middleware can provide information processing functions such as query processing, context-aware processing, event processing, sensor network monitoring and so on.
+
+NOTE – Detailed descriptions and requirements related to USN middleware are given in [b-ITU-T F.744].
+
+From the description above, it is understood that USN middleware provides accessibility to sensor networks and data between sensor networks and USN applications and services. Also, USN middleware encompasses information processing functions which may be commonly required by various types of USN applications and services.
+
+As described in Appendix I, NGN may be regarded as an intermediate network providing connectivity, data delivery and management. From these facts, USN middleware functions can be implemented by NGN functions.
+
+Figure II.1 depicts the functional model of USN middleware given in [b-ITU-T F.744]. NGN functions may provide basic functions and advanced functions of USN middleware in each stratum of NGN.
+
+However, this Recommendation does not intend to clarify NGN functional entities for providing USN middleware functions. This is out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional model of USN middleware, organized into several layers and components:
+
+- USN applications**: Located at the top, connected to the Open application interface processing layer via the *Open application interface*.
+- Open application interface processing**: A horizontal block that serves as the entry point for applications.
+- Basic functions**: A vertical column containing:
+ - Query processing
+ - Sensor network metadata directory service
+ - Application-independent data filtering
+ - Sensor network management
+- Advanced functions**: A vertical column containing:
+ - Service discovery
+ - Sensor data mining processing
+ - Context-aware rule processing
+ - Event processing
+- Sensor network common interface processing**: A horizontal block at the bottom of the main processing stack, connected to **Sensor networks** via the *Sensor network common interface*.
+- Security service**: A vertical block on the right side of the main processing stack, spanning the height of the Basic and Advanced functions layers.
+- USN middleware**: Indicated by a large vertical double-headed arrow on the right, encompassing the entire middleware stack from the Open application interface processing layer down to the Sensor network common interface processing layer.
+
+Y.2026(12)\_FII.1
+
+Functional model of USN middleware diagram showing layers from USN applications to Sensor networks, including Open application interface processing, Basic/Advanced functions, Sensor network common interface processing, and Security service.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Functional model of USN middleware ([b-ITU-T F.744])**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.744] Recommendation ITU-T F.744 (2009), *Service description and requirements for ubiquitous sensor network middleware*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2040
+
+(02/2016)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Flow-based service continuity in multi-connection**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2040
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2040
+
+# Flow-based service continuity in multi-connection
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2040 describes the flow-based service continuity mechanism in a multi-connection environment. This Recommendation also covers scenarios, requirements, solutions, information flows and security. In the multi-connection environment, flow-based service continuity is the mechanism that allows the moving of IP flows from one access to another (target) access, thus minimising service disruption in the case of access loss, or when the access is no longer usable. Flow-based service continuity (FSC) includes two modes, the multi-connection user equipment (MUE) initiated flow-based service continuity mode and the network-initiated flow-based service continuity mode.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2040 | 2016-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12704 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Flow-based, multi-connection, service continuity.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2016
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Scenarios and requirements ..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Scenarios..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 Requirements..... | 4 |
+| 7 Flow-based service continuity mechanisms ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Overview ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Description of the mechanisms ..... | 6 |
+| 7.3 Capability requirements..... | 7 |
+| 7.4 Procedures ..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2040
+
+# Flow-based service continuity in multi-connection
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the flow-based service continuity mechanism in a multi-connection environment. This Recommendation also describes scenarios, requirements, information flow mechanisms and security of flow-based service continuity in a multi-connection environment. For information on other aspects outside of the scope of this Recommendation, such as security and charging for flow-based service continuity in a multi-connection environment, see [ITU-T Y.2251].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.2027] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2027 (2012), Functional architecture of multi-connection . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2028] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2028 (2015), Intelligent access selection in multi-connection . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2029] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2029 (2015), A multi-path transmission control in multi-connection . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2251] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2251 (2011), Multi-connection requirements . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 connection** [b-ITU-T X.200]: A connection is an association established for the transfer of data between two or more peer-(N)-entities. This association binds the peer-(N)-entities together with the (N-1)-entities in the next lower layer.
+
+**3.1.2 multi-connection** [b-ITU-T Y.2252]: The collection of several connections between two or more peer-(N)-entities simultaneously. At least one of the connections is associated with a physical layer connectivity different from the rest of the connections. All connections are coordinated with each other to provide service to higher layer entities.
+
+**3.1.3 multi-connection user equipment (MUE)** [ITU-T Y.2027]: A user equipment which can support two or more network connections simultaneously under the control of a network enhanced for multi-connection capability.
+
+**3.1.4 service continuity** [b-ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for a moving object to maintain ongoing service including over current states, such as user's network environment and session for a service.
+
+**3.1.5 service transfer** [ITU-T Y.2251]: Act of moving, one or more services or service components belonging to a single multi-connection UE, from one access network associated with one interface of the multi-connection UE to another access network(s) associated with other interface(s) of the multi-connection UE.
+
+**3.1.6 IP flow** [b-RFC 3917]: A flow is defined as a set of IP packets passing an observation point in the network during a certain time interval. All packets belonging to a particular flow have a set of common properties. Each property is defined as the result of applying a function to the values of:
+
+- 1) One or more packet header field (e.g., destination IP address), transport header field (e.g., destination port number), or application header field (e.g., RTP header fields [b-RFC 3550]);
+- 2) One or more characteristics of the packet itself (e.g., number of MPLS labels, etc.);
+- 3) One or more of fields derived from packet treatment (e.g., next hop IP address, the output interface, etc.).
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| 2G | Second Generation |
+| 3G | Third Generation |
+| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project |
+| AC-FE | Access Control FE |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| FSC | Flow-based Service Continuity |
+| IAS | Intelligent Access Selection |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| MC-FE | Multi-connection Coordination FE |
+| MAS-F | Multi-connection Application Support Function |
+| MMF | Multi-connection Media Function |
+| MPC-FE | Multi-connection Policy Control FE |
+| MR-FE | Multi-connection Registration FE |
+| MTC-FE | Multi-connection Terminal Control FE |
+| MUE | Multi-connection User Equipment |
+| MUP-FE | Multi-connection User Profile FE |
+| QOS | Quality of Service |
+| SC | Service Continuity |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this specification can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# **6 Scenarios and requirements**
+
+## **6.1 Scenarios**
+
+In the multi-connection environment, the multi-connection user equipment (MUE) has more than one active connection simultaneously, it can send and receive different IP flows of the same application through different accesses. In the case where one of the accesses is lost or is no longer usable, a mechanism is provided to move the IP flows to another (target) access in order to minimise service disruption. When an access is recovered, a mechanism is provided to move the IP flow over to the recovered access. Precedence is given to those accesses associated with policies. The covered scenarios include an MUE-initiated flow-based service continuity (FSC) scenario and a network-initiated FSC scenario.
+
+### **6.1.1 MUE-initiated FSC scenario**
+
+In the MUE-initiated FSC mode only the MUE controls the traffic routing for the associated multi-connections and applying policies for FSC rules.
+
+The MUE can request to move selected IP flows from an old access to a new access by sending one or more routing rules to the network. The routing rules specify the selected IP flows and the new access. The MUE determines the routing rules and provides them to the network. The network may either accept or reject the routing rules requested by the MUE, but it does not provide routing rules by itself.
+
+### **6.1.2 Network-initiated FSC scenario**
+
+In the network-initiated FSC mode, the network controls the traffic routing within the multi-connections. The network determines the routing rules and provides them to the MUE. The MUE may either accept or reject the network's request for routing rules (e.g., based on the suitability of the access link conditions), but the MUE does not provide routing rules by itself.
+
+## **6.2 Requirements**
+
+### **6.2.1 General requirements**
+
+In the multi-connection environment, the MUE may transfer one or multiple IP sub-flows seamlessly when the MUE moves out of coverage and the connection is lost, or when there is network congestion. This clause identifies requirements in order to provide service continuity to the user and the application during service transfer:
+
+- 1) Data forwarding mechanism: A data forwarding mechanism is required to keep data integrity.
+- 2) Mobility control mechanism: A mobility control mechanism is required to minimize the time during the flow transfer and maintain flow service continuity.
+- 3) Flow sequence numbers: sub-flow sequence numbers need to be added to each sub-flow. A flow sequence number is used for transmission control and data recovery at the receiving end.
+- 4) The multi-connection policy control functional entity (MPC-FE) should support specific policy decision algorithms to provide adaptive decision making, such as decomposed service transmission adjustment and service separation decisions.
+
+### **6.2.1 FSC capability discovery/negotiation requirement**
+
+A mechanism is defined for the MUE and the network to discover whether the network and the MUE respectively support FSC and to decide whether FSC is applied for multi-connection. The MUE and the access control functional entity (AC-FE) shall always be aware of which access Internet protocol (IP) flows are used in multi-connection.
+
+During initial multi-connection establishment over the first connection, the MUE triggers a FSC request. The intermediate network nodes indicate to the AC-FE whether they support FSC for the corresponding request. If an MPC-FE is deployed, the AC-FE communicates to the MPC-FE indicating whether or not the MUE and the network support FSC. The MPC-FE then takes the decision of whether or not FSC may apply to the multi-connection and communicates this decision to the AC-FE.
+
+If the network supports FSC and is willing to accept FSC for the multi-connection, the AC-FE confirms the FSC support in an "FSC accepted" indication sent back to the MUE in the multi-connection establishment accept message.
+
+### **6.2.2 Routing rules**
+
+It is recommended that a routing rule contains the following parameters:
+
+- Routing filter
+- Routing access information
+- Routing rule priority
+- Routing rule identifier
+
+A routing filter consists of IP header parameter values and/or ranges used to identify one or more IP flows.
+
+The routing access information identifies the access type where the IP flow shall be routed.
+
+For the purpose of matching user traffic against routing rules, filters are applied in the order designated by the routing rule priority.
+
+The routing rule identifier uniquely identifies a routing rule for one connection. The routing rule identifier is allocated by the entity creating the routing rule; i.e., by the MUE in MUE-initiated FSC mode and by the AC-FE in network-initiated FSC mode.
+
+#### **6.2.3 Delivery of routing rules**
+
+Routing rules are exchanged between the MUE and the AC-FE via control plane signalling.
+
+For the MUE-initiated FSC procedure, the routing rules are provided by the MUE to the network. The MUE does not apply new routing rules until the AC-FE has acknowledged them.
+
+For the network-initiated FSC procedure, the MPC-FE makes the decision on when and which flows should be moved to which connections. The MPC-FE learns about the multiple accesses supporting a multi-connection via event triggers from the AC-FE.
+
+# **7 Flow-based service continuity mechanisms**
+
+## **7.1 Overview**
+
+Both, the MUE-initiated FSC mode and the network-initiated mode are supported. The FSC mode applicable to multi-connection is determined during connection establishment. Routing rule installation is possible at any time during the lifetime of the multi-connection sessions. The routing rules can even be installed if there is no IP flow currently matching the routing filter in the routing rule.
+
+The AC-FE performs IP flow routing for downlink traffic. The MUE performs IP flow routing for uplink traffic.
+
+During the multi-connection sessions and when the policies determine that the IP flows should be moved and the target access is available for the MUE, it is possible to move individual IP flows from one access network to another.
+
+When an MPC-FE is deployed and supports FSC, the MPC-FE provides the AC-FE with access information as part of the policy control rules. The access information is used to control the accesses over which the matching traffic is sent.
+
+When an MPC-FE is not deployed or it is inactive for a multi-connection session, the AC-FE may apply static FSC related policies. The AC-FE static policy and control functionality is not based on subscription or user quota information.
+
+For FSC, the MUE and the AC-FE exchange routing rules. Routing rules describe the mapping between a set of IP flows (identified by a routing filter) and a routing access type (e.g., 3GPP or WLAN types) over which to route the IP flows. Routing rules are exchanged over the control plane.
+
+The AC-FE translates access information received in policy control rules into routing rules to be used between the MUE and the AC-FE. In cases where the MUE-initiated FSC is applied (and the policy control entity is deployed for the multi-connection) the AC-FE provides, upon subscription of the MPC-FE, the MPC-FE with notifications of the MUE requests for IP flow mapping to an access type. The MPC-FE analyses the received information (requested IP flow mapping to an access type), makes a policy decision and provides policy control rules to the AC-FE with corresponding access type values.
+
+The FSC-enhanced related functional entities are shown in Figure 7-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1: Multi-connection flow-based service continuity related functional entities. The diagram shows a network architecture with two main columns of functional entities. The left column includes Applications, Multi-connection application support function (MAS-F), Multi-connection policy control FE (MPC-FE), Multi-connection coordination FE (MC-FE), Multi-connection registration FE (MR-FE), and Multi-connection user profile FE (MUP-FE). The right column includes Applications, Multi-connection application support function (MAS-F), Service control function (SCF), Multi-connection media function (MMF), Access control FE (AC-FE), Access network, and Multi-connection terminal control FE (MTC-FE). Dashed lines represent interfaces: ANI between Applications and MAS-F; Pa between MAS-F and MPC-FE; As between MAS-F and SCF; Ps between MPC-FE and SCF; Pc between MPC-FE and MC-FE; Cm between MC-FE and MMF; Cr between MC-FE and MR-FE; Ma between MMF and AC-FE; Pu between MPC-FE and MUP-FE; Ru between MR-FE and MUP-FE; Sa between SCF and AC-FE; and Rt between MUP-FE and MTC-FE. Solid lines connect AC-FE to the Access network and the Access network to MTC-FE. The entities MPC-FE, AC-FE, and MTC-FE are highlighted with red borders. The reference Y.2040(16)\_F7-1 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Multi-connection flow-based service continuity related functional entities**
+
+## 7.2 Description of the mechanisms
+
+### 7.2.1 Description of the FSC mechanisms
+
+Following the above-mentioned requirements, two multi-connection FSC modes are supported, the MUE-initiated FSC mode and the network-initiated mode. The following clauses specify the functional characteristics of each mode and how they are selected.
+
+### 7.2.2 MUE-initiated FSC mode
+
+In the MUE-initiated FSC mode, the MUE controls the traffic routing among the multi-connections by applying its intelligent access selection (IAS) for FSC rules and/or the user-configured routing rules. When the IAS for FSC rules is used, the MUE can also control traffic routing outside the multi-connection access control functional entity.
+
+The MUE can request to move selected IP flows from one access to another access by sending routing rules to the network. These routing rules specify the selected IP flows and the new (target) access.
+
+The network cannot request FSC. The network may reject FSC requests from MUE due to subscription (or quota) limitations. When the network rejects an IP flow mobility request, the network shall provide to the MUE a specific cause value indicating why the request was rejected. This cause value may be used by the MUE to determine when and if this FSC operation can be requested again.
+
+### 7.2.3 Network-initiated FSC mode
+
+In the network-initiated FSC mode, the network controls the traffic routing within the multi-connection access control function entity.
+
+The network can request to move selected IP flows from one multi-connection access to another multi-connection access by sending routing rules to the MUE. The routing rules specify the selected IP flows and the new (target) connection.
+
+The MUE may reject (e.g., due to the local operating environment information) a FSC request from the network. When the MUE rejects a FSC request from the network, the MUE shall provide a cause value indicating the reason of the rejection. The cause value may be used by the network to determine when/if this FSC operation can be requested again.
+
+The MUE cannot request IP flow mobility. However, the MUE can indicate to the network when an access for multi-connection purposes can or cannot be used for traffic routing. For instance, in the case where the MUE wants to request a mapping of IP flows to a specific access type, the MUE provides the requested mapping to the network. However, this is not considered a routing rule provision, since the network is considered as the decision point for routing rules in the network-initiated FSC mode. The network then provides new or updated routing rules to the MUE, based on the request received from the MUE, unless the request is contrary to what is allowed by the subscription.
+
+#### **7.2.4 Mode selection**
+
+Multi-connection FSC can operate in one of the following modes:
+
+- MUE-initiated mode;
+- Network-initiated mode.
+
+The multi-connection FSC mode is selected with the following procedure:
+
+- When an FSC-capable MUE supports multi-connection IAS and it has a routing policy rule valid in the operators' network, then:
+ - If the routing policy rule includes at least one "routing policy for FSC" rule (irrespective of its validity), the MUE requests MUE-initiated mode and the network selects MUE-initiated mode;
+ - Otherwise, the MUE requests network-initiated mode and the network selects network-initiated mode.
+- When an FSC-capable MUE does not support multi-connection IAS or supports multi-connection IAS but it does not have a routing policy rule valid in the network, then:
+ - The MUE requests network-initiated mode and the network selects network-initiated mode.
+
+## **7.3 Capability requirements**
+
+### **7.3.1 FSC-enhanced MUE requirements**
+
+To support FSC, the following capabilities of the FSC-enhanced MUE are required:
+
+- Indicate support and request FSC for MUE multi-connection;
+- Request FSC mode to the network;
+- Send default accesses for FSC to the network (in MUE-initiated FSC mode);
+- Receive decisions from the network on whether FSC applies to a connection, on the FSC mode and on the default access;
+- Provide handover indication and FSC indication if an access is added for a multi-connection;
+- Exchange routing rules with the network;
+- Route IP flow(s) by using routing access information;
+- Notify to the network that a connection becomes "usable" or "Not usable" (in network-initiated FSC mode).
+
+### **7.3.2 FSC-enhanced AC-FE requirements**
+
+To support FSC, the following capabilities of the FSC-enhanced AC-FE are required:
+
+- Negotiate the capability to support FSC and the FSC mode if the MUE is connected to the network. This negotiation includes receiving the MUE request for FSC, as well as receiving the corresponding support indications from other entities in the network;
+- Receive MUE request on a default connection for FSC (in MUE-initiated FSC mode);
+- Route IP flow(s) by using the routing access information;
+- Exchange routing rules between network and MUE over control plane (protocols);
+- Receive UE notification that a connection has become "usable" or "Not usable" (in network-initiated FSC mode).
+
+### **7.3.3 FSC-enhanced MPC-FE requirements**
+
+To support FSC, the following capabilities of the FSC-enhanced MPC-FE are required:
+
+- The MPC-FE controls whether FSC may apply to a multi-connection;
+- The MPC-FE may request to be notified by the AC-FE when a connection is added or removed for the multi-connection;
+- The MPC-FE may request to be notified by the AC-FE when a connection becomes not "Usable" or "Usable" again;
+- The MPC-FE can send policy control rules including access type routing information per policy control rule to the AC-FE;
+- The MPC-FE may subscribe to notifications from AC-FE about the routing rules received from the MUE. If the routing rules received from the MUE comply with the user subscription, the MPC-FE installs or modifies policy control rules based on these notifications, only in MUE-initiated FSC mode;
+- The MPC-FE determines the desired access type routing information for a policy control rule and accordingly installs or modifies policy control rules to the AC-FE. The MPC-FE request may be rejected by the MUE due to local access conditions. In such cases, the MPC-FE is notified that the policy control rule cannot be fulfilled, only for network-initiated FSC mode.
+
+## **7.4 Procedures**
+
+#### **7.4.1 MUE initiated FSC**
+
+Multi-connection FSC operates in the MUE-initiated mode in the following manner. When a MUE is connected simultaneously to multiple access networks, the MUE can use multiple connections to send and receive IP flows. Because of the changes in the access network, sometimes the MUE needs to move one IP flow from one access to another. In that case, the MUE moves one or more IP flow(s) by providing a routing rule to the network, thus updating the routing rules. MUE initiated FSC is shown in Figure 7-2.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE
+ participant AC_FE1 as AC-FE(1)
+ participant AC_FE2 as AC-FE(2)
+ participant MR_FE as MR-FE
+ participant MC_FE as MC-FE
+ participant MPC_FE as MPC-FE
+ participant MMF
+
+ Note over MUE: 0. MUE is connected simultaneously to multiple access networks
+ MUE->>MR_FE: 1. The MUE sends connection update request message, which includes the routing rules requested by the MUE.
+ MR_FE->>MC_FE: 2. Updates connection information
+ MC_FE->>MPC_FE: 3. Notifies the MPC-FE about the updated routing rules.
+ MPC_FE-->>MC_FE: 4. The MPC-FE rejects or accepts the routing rules according to subscription data and modifies the corresponding policy rules.
+ MC_FE->>MMF: 5. Policy installation
+ MMF-->>AC_FE2: 6. Routing rules
+ AC_FE2-->>MMF: 7. ACK
+ Note over AC_FE1, AC_FE2: 8. The AC-FE performs the transport resource activation procedure or modification procedure and indicates which routing rule has been accepted.
+ Note over AC_FE1, AC_FE2: 9. Resource release/modification procedures are executed for the resources associated with the flows that were removed.
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for MUE initiated FSC showing interactions between MUE, AC-FE(1), AC-FE(2), MR-FE, MC-FE, MPC-FE, and MMF.
+
+Y.2040(16)\_F7-2
+
+**Figure 7-2 – MUE initiated FSC**
+
+0. The MUE is connected simultaneously to multiple access networks and it is using multiple connections to send and receive IP flows.
+1. The MUE sends a connection update request message to the multi-connection registration functional entity (MR-FE). The message contains the routing rules requested by the MUE.
+2. The MR-FE updates the information of the connection by using the connection update request message. Afterwards the MR-FE sends a connection information message to the multi-connection coordination functional entity (MC-FE).
+3. The MC-FE sends a transport resource modification request message to the MPC-FE. This message contains the updated routing rules for the MPC-FE.
+4. The MPC-FE rejects or accepts the routing rules according to subscription data and modifies the corresponding policy rules.
+5. The MC-FE makes and assigns related rules for access network for the multi-connection media function (MMF). In this way, the MMF installs the suitable rules.
+6. The MMF sends the new routing rules to the AC-FE(2).
+7. The AC-FE(2) updates the routing rules of the connection. Afterwards, it returns an ACK message to the MMF.
+8. The AC-FE(2) performs the transport resource activation procedure or modification procedure indicating which routing rule has been accepted.
+9. Resource release or modification procedures are finally executed, so the associated resources to the flows can be removed.
+
+### 7.4.2 Network initiated FSC
+
+The multi-connection FSC operates in network-initiated mode in the following manner. Based on the current status of an access network, one of the existing IP flows is moved from one access network to another automatically. Thus, the network is required to initiate the FSC and move one or more IP flows by providing a routing rule to the MUE updating the routing rules. Network initiated FSC is shown in Figure 7-3.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE
+ participant AC_FE1 as AC-FE(1)
+ participant AC_FE2 as AC-FE(2)
+ participant MR_FE as MR-FE
+ participant MC_FE as MC-FE
+ participant MPC_FE as MPC-FE
+ participant MMF
+
+ Note over MUE, AC_FE2: 0. MUE is connected simultaneously to multiple access networks
+ MPC_FE->>MC_FE: 1. Initiated connection modification to move specific flows
+ MPC_FE->>MMF: 2. Policy installation
+ MMF->>AC_FE2: 3. Routing rules
+ AC_FE2->>MUE: 4. Created/modified routing rules to the MUE
+ Note over MUE: 5. MUE determines to accept or reject the routing rules.
+ MUE->>AC_FE2: 6. MUE accepts the rule and sends ACK
+ AC_FE2->>MMF: 7. ACK
+ Note over MUE, AC_FE2: 8. Resource release/modification procedures are executed for the resources associated with the flows that were removed
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram for Network initiated FSC showing interactions between MUE, AC-FE(1), AC-FE(2), MR-FE, MC-FE, MPC-FE, and MMF.
+
+Y.2040(16)\_F7-3
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Network initiated FSC**
+
+0. The MUE is connected to multiple access networks simultaneously and uses multiple connections to send and receive IP flows.
+1. The MPC-FE determines based on policy information and current MUE state that connection modification should be initiated to move specific flows. The MPC-FE provides policy control rules with access type information.
+2. The MC-FE makes and assigns related rules for the access network to the MMF. The MMF installs the rules.
+3. The MMF sends the new routing rules to AC-FE(2).
+4. The AC-FE(2) determines if the new routing rules or the modified routing rules need to be sent to the MUE, based on the received policy control rules. The AC-FE sends the created or modified routing rules to the MUE.
+5. The MUE may accept or reject the routing rules. If the MUE rejects the routing rules, the MUE provides a cause value indicating why the request was rejected. This cause value may be used by the network to determine if the FSC operation can be requested again.
+6. The MUE applies the accepted routing rules and acknowledges the applied rules in the ACK message sent to the AC-FE(2).
+7. The AC-FE(2) indicates to the MMF whether or not the routing rule can be enforced.
+8. Resource release or modification procedures are executed for the resources associated with the removed flows.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.200] Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994), *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2252] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2252 (2012), *Identification and configuration of resources for multi-connection*.
+- [b-3GPP 23.261] 3GPP 23.261, *Network-Based IP Flow Mobility (NBIFOM); Stage 2 (Release 13)*.
+- [b-RFC 3550] IEF RFC 3550 (2003), *RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications*.
+- [b-RFC 3917] IETF RFC 3917 (2004), *Requirements for IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX)*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2051
+
+(02/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- General overview of IPv6-based NGN
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051**
+
+# **General overview of IPv6-based NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051 identifies a next generation network (NGN) which mainly operates with Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) features. This Recommendation provides the general requirements of IPv6-based NGN and its overall architecture.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051 was approved on 29 February 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+IPv6, NGN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at
+
+© ITU 2008
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview of IP-based networks..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Classification of IP-based networks ..... | 2 |
+| 6.2 Key features of IPv6-based networks compared with IPv4-based..... | 3 |
+| 7 Overview of IPv6-based NGN..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Definition of IPv6-based NGN..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Functional architecture of IPv6-based NGN ..... | 6 |
+| 7.3 Impact of using IPv6 to NGN..... | 7 |
+| 7.4 Relationships with other IP-based networks ..... | 7 |
+| 8 General requirements of IPv6-based NGN..... | 8 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 8 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is emerging to form the basis of the next generation networks (NGNs). It is expected that IPv6-based networks will replace IPv4-based networks in order to overcome the ultimate limitations of Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4). That is, NGNs will gradually migrate to IPv6-based NGNs.
+
+The NGN is a packet-based network to provide telecommunication services with the help of underlying transport-related technologies and various access technologies. IPv6 is a well-defined transport protocol to support the NGN transport functions. It provides considerable flexibility to NGN. These flexibilities are beneficial for improving network provisioning and operations, as well as the services to be offered to the NGN providers and users.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051
+
+# General overview of IPv6-based NGN
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation defines an IPv6-based NGN to support IPv6 addressing, signalling, multi-homing, and migration. Additionally, it identifies the overall architecture and general requirements for IPv6-based NGN. The scope of this Recommendation covers:
+
+- classification of IP-based networks
+- definition of IPv6-based NGN
+- functional architecture for IPv6-based NGN
+- general requirements for IPv6-based NGN
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 next generation network** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and to make use of multiple broadband, (QoS)-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 IPv6-based NGN:** This refers to NGN that supports addressing, routing protocols, and services associated with IPv6. An IPv6-based NGN shall recognize and process the IPv6 headers and options, operating over various underlying transport technologies in the transport stratum.
+
+**3.2.2 IPv6-based functions and FEs:** These are NGN functions and FEs which recognize and process the IPv6 protocol with its headers and options. They have their own specific roles including IPv6.
+
+**3.2.3 IPv6-enabled functions and FEs:** These are NGN functions and FEs which recognize the IPv6 protocol with its headers and options. They have their own specific roles in NGN except IPv6.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AH | Authentication Header |
+| ESP | Encapsulating Security Payload |
+| FE(s) | Functional Entity(-ies) |
+| ICMPv6 | Internet Control Message Protocol for the Internet Protocol Version 6 |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPsec | Internet Protocol Security |
+| IPv4 | Internet Protocol Version 4 |
+| IPv6 | Internet Protocol Version 6 |
+| NAC | Network Attachment Control |
+| NAPT | Network Address and Port Translation |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RA | Router Advertisement |
+| RAC | Resource and Admission Control |
+| RSVP | Resource ReserVation Protocol |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Overview of IP-based networks
+
+### 6.1 Classification of IP-based networks
+
+IP-based networks are classified into IPv4 and IPv6 according to the IP protocol types used. Their behaviours differ according to the features of each protocol version. This criterion to classify IP-based networks is also applied to differentiate instantiations of NGN, since NGN is based mainly on transport technologies employing IP.
+
+Taking consideration of this, IP-based networks relevant to NGN should be classified according to the following:
+
+- IPv6-based NGN: This is a NGN which supports addressing, routing, protocols and services associated with IPv6.
+- IPv4-based NGN: This is a NGN which supports addressing, routing protocol and services associated with IPv4.
+- IPv6-based non-NGN: This is an IPv6-based packet network which does not comply with NGN.
+- IPv4-based non-NGN: This is an IPv4-based packet network which does not comply with NGN.
+
+Figure 1 shows the various IP-based networks from a NGN point of view.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Classification of IP-based networks. The diagram shows two main categories: NGN (Next Generation Network) and Non-NGN. The NGN category is represented by a blue box containing two ovals: a pink oval for 'IPv4-based' and a green oval for 'IPv6-based', connected by a vertical double-headed dashed arrow. The Non-NGN category is represented by a yellow box containing two ovals: a pink oval for 'IPv4-based' and a green oval for 'IPv6-based', also connected by a vertical double-headed dashed arrow. Dashed arrows also connect the 'IPv4-based' oval of the NGN box to the 'IPv4-based' oval of the Non-NGN box, and the 'IPv6-based' oval of the NGN box to the 'IPv6-based' oval of the Non-NGN box. A label 'Y.2051(08)\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 1 – Classification of IP-based networks**
+
+### 6.2 Key features of IPv6-based networks compared with IPv4-based
+
+Clarifying the differences between IPv4 and IPv6 is very useful for identifying the operations of IPv4 and IPv6, which influence network design and service operations.
+
+Key features of IPv4 and IPv6 are summarized in Table 1.
+
+**Table 1 – Key features of IPv4 and IPv6**
+
+| | | IPv4 | IPv6 |
+|---------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| Packet Format | Size of IPv6 header | Variable size | Constant size |
+| | Optional headers | Optional headers | Extension headers and options |
+| Addressing | Addressing spaces | Lack of address spaces | Large address spaces |
+| | End-to-end communications | No | Yes |
+| | Types of addresses | Unicast, multicast and broadcast | Unicast, multicast and anycast |
+| | Scopes of addresses | Local and global | Link-local, local and global |
+| | Address configuration to an interface | A address | Multiple addresses |
+| | Address allocation to an equipment | Multiple interface/addresses | Multiple interfaces/addresses |
+| | Address Autoconfiguration | Using private addresses | Using public addresses |
+
+**Table 1 – Key features of IPv4 and IPv6**
+
+| | | IPv4 | IPv6 |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|
+| | Hierarchical addressing | – | Yes |
+| | Address Renumbering | – | Yes |
+| QoS | Management of service conflicts | Type of Service field | Traffic class field |
+| | Identification of traffic flows | None | Flow label field |
+| | Recognition of control/expedite data | None | Hop-by-Hop extension header |
+| Security | AH header | Optional | Mandated |
+| | ESP header | Optional | Mandated |
+| Mobility | Detection of new networks | – | RA messages |
+| | Generation of new addresses | – | Autoconfiguration |
+| | Mobility headers | – | Mandated |
+| | Option header: Destination option, routing, etc. | Optional | Mandated |
+
+There are key features of IPv6 which may significantly impact NGN in various ways, such as addressing schemes, QoS, security and mobility.
+
+- *Simplified packet format*
+IPv6 headers are simplified from IPv4 headers. Some IPv4 header fields have been dropped or made optional to limit their bandwidth cost. They also have a constant size to reduce the common processing cost of packet handling.
+- *Expanded addressing scheme*
+IPv6 addressing schemes have a large addressing space due to an increased size of the IP address fields to support more levels of addressing hierarchy, a much greater number of addressable nodes and interfaces, and a simpler autoconfiguration of addresses. The scalability of multicast routing is improved by adding a "scope" field to multicast addresses. In addition, a new type of address called an "anycast address" is defined and is used to send a packet to any of a group of nodes.
+- *QoS*
+A flow label and traffic class fields in IPv6 header are added to enable the labeling of packets belonging to particular traffic "flows" for which the sender requests special handling, such as non-default quality of service or "real-time" service. In addition, IPv6 hop-by-hop header with router-alert option will indicate the contents of IPv6 packets to support the selective processing of the intermediate nodes.
+- *Security support*
+IPv6 supports built-in IPsec services such as authentication, data integrity and data confidentiality using authentication header (AH) and encapsulating security payload (ESP) extension headers. These enable end-to-end security services via global IP addresses even though intermediate nodes do not understand the IPsec headers.
+
+- *Mobility support*
+IPv6 capabilities such as neighbour discovery, address resolution and reachability detection support the mobility services using destination option, routing and mobility extension headers.
+
+## 7 Overview of IPv6-based NGN
+
+### 7.1 Definition of IPv6-based NGN
+
+IPv6-based NGN is defined as a NGN which supports addressing, routing, protocols and services associated with IPv6. This applies not only to transport aspects in access and core networks but also includes other functions such as end user, transport control and application/service support functions in [ITU-T Y.2011] and [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+Taking into consideration these definitions and features, IPv6-based NGN could be identified as illustrated in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Y.2051(08)\_F02
+
+Figure 2: Overview of IPv6-based NGN architecture. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is the 'Application' layer. Below it is the 'Service stratum'. Below that is the 'Transport stratum', which contains a 'Core network' block. To the left of the 'Transport stratum' is a block for 'IPv6 enabled end-user functions'. Four access technologies are shown: 'xDSL access', 'Mobile access', 'Wireless access (WiMAX)', and 'Fibre access', all connected to the 'Core network'. Three large colored arrows indicate relationships: a green arrow labeled 'IPv6-based service/application' points from the Application layer to the end-user functions; a red arrow labeled 'IPv6 enabled processing' points from the Application layer down to the Core network; and a yellow arrow labeled 'IPv6-based IP connectivity' points from the Core network back to the end-user functions.
+
+**Figure 2 – Overview of IPv6-based NGN**
+
+As shown in Figure 2, there are three relationships among the NGN functions and FEs in order to describe the IPv6-based NGN.
+
+First, there is a relationship between end-user functions and transport stratum. IPv6-based NGN allows flexible use of various access infrastructures to maximize the benefits of using IPv6. One such example is the use of multi-homing and mobility features, that is, IPv6-based NGN user terminal or equipment has a capability to handle multiple heterogeneous access interfaces and/or multiple IPv6 addresses through single or multiple access interfaces during the mobility between one network and the other.
+
+Second, there is a relationship between end-user functions and applications. IPv6-enabled end-user functions may acquire the information through application in order to support a secure and robust IPv6 transport. One such example is key management for IP security.
+
+Finally, there is a relationship between the application and transport stratum. The application stratum could request the transport stratum to keep the high quality services. One such example is resource reservation.
+
+### 7.2 Functional architecture of IPv6-based NGN
+
+An IPv6-based NGN shall conform to NGN principles, so the general architecture shall be based on the NGN architecture identified in [ITU-T Y.2012]. IPv6-based NGN also comprises the transport stratum and the service stratum as shown in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Functional architecture of IPv6-based NGN. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is 'Applications'. Below it is the 'Service stratum' (green box) containing 'IPv6 enabled application support functions & service support functions' and 'Service control functions' (with 'Service user profiles'). Below that is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow box) containing 'IPv6 enabled network attachment control functions' (with 'Transport user profiles') and 'IPv6 enabled resource and admission control functions', both under 'Transport control functions'. At the bottom is 'IPv6-based transport functions'. A vertical purple bar on the left represents 'Management functions'. A vertical white bar on the left represents 'IPv6 enabled end-user functions'. On the right, a vertical stack of circles represents network types: 'IPv4 Non NGN' (light blue), 'IPv6 Non NGN' (light blue), 'IPv4 NGN' (orange), and 'IPv6 NGN' (orange). Interfaces are marked: 'ANI' (red line) between Applications and Service stratum; 'UNI' (red line) between Management functions and Transport stratum; 'NNI' (red line) between Transport stratum and the network types. Dashed lines represent control paths, and blue hatched lines represent media paths. A legend at the bottom indicates: dashed line for Control, blue hatched line for Media, and green dotted line for Management. Reference: Y.2051(08)\_F03.
+
+**Figure 3 – Functional architecture of IPv6-based NGN**
+
+Several functions in this architecture model are affected by the features of IPv6 protocol: transport functions, end-user functions, network attachment control (NAC) functions, resource and admission control (RAC) functions and application and service support functions.
+
+IPv6-based transport functions should be used to interconnect a variety of access networks and to transport the IPv6 services over the core transport network using the IPv6 multi-homing and hierarchical addressing features. These access networks might be homogeneous or heterogeneous. If they are heterogeneous, IPv6-based transport function shall support multi-homing capability to provide multiple network connections to the users over a variety of heterogeneous access networks. Therefore, all transport functions and functional entities (FEs) should fully support all of the IPv6 features.
+
+IPv6-enabled end-user functions should support IPv6 features to provide multiple network connections to the end-user.
+
+IPv6-enabled NAC functions should support IPv6 features such as autoconfiguration, multi-homing and detecting network attachment. The NAC functions are responsible for dynamic configuration of IPv6 addresses and other configuration parameters associated with user equipment. Therefore,
+
+autoconfiguration and multi-homing features should be provided by NAC functions to support the IPv6 mobility services.
+
+IPv6-enabled RAC functions should support IPv6 features from the viewpoint of QoS and IPv4/IPv6 migration. RAC functions should be able to process the IPv6 extension headers and options to support the high quality services. They also extend the network address translation function to support IPv4/IPv6 migration.
+
+IPv6-enabled application should support IPv6 features because IPv6 addresses should be included in application data. To deal with IPv6 nested application data, application layer gateway functions are required.
+
+### **7.3 Impact of using IPv6 to NGN**
+
+IPv6 is a well-defined transport protocol to support the NGN transport functions. This clause mainly identifies the impact of using IPv6 to an NGN from various viewpoints.
+
+- *Enhanced service capabilities*
+
+IPv6 enables congestion/flow control using additional QoS information such as flow label, etc. The flow label field of IPv6 header enables IPv6 flow identification independently of transport layer protocols. This means that new enhanced service capabilities can be introduced more easily in NGN.
+
+IPv6 supports better mobility by removing triangle routing problem.
+
+IPv6 supports secure networking using embedded IPv6 security solution such as ESP and AH.
+- *Any-to-any IP connectivity*
+
+IP connectivity will be one of the vital features in order to cope with the increasing number of end users/devices. Using globally routable IPv4 addresses to network millions of devices, such as sensors, is not feasible. On the other hand, IPv6 offers the advantages of localizing traffic with unique local addresses, while making some devices globally reachable by assigning addresses which are scoped globally. Therefore, the greatest potential of IPv6 will be realized in the objects-to-objects communications. IPv6 can satisfy this end-to-end principle of the Internet.
+- *Self-organization and service discovery using autoconfiguration*
+
+IPv6 can provide autoconfiguration capability using neighbour discovery protocol, etc. Through linking together the IP layer and lower layers, autoconfiguration enables with ease self-organization and service discovery of network management and reduces management requirements. In addition, address autoconfiguration of IPv6 protocol will facilitate NGNs to support dynamic address assignments and multiple user/network identities. That is, NGN end-users will be able to have multiple public and private identities by using the expanded addressing schemes of IPv6.
+- *Multi-homing using IPv6 addressing*
+
+IPv6 can handle multiple heterogeneous access interfaces and/or multiple IPv6 addresses through single or multiple access interfaces. Multi-homing can provide redundancy and fault tolerance.
+
+### **7.4 Relationships with other IP-based networks**
+
+IPv6-based NGN will be deployed gradually while near-term NGNs will be realized based mainly on IPv4. This implies that a similar study of IPv6 related issues is also required for NGNs which transition from IPv4-based NGN to IPv6-based NGN, and for the inter-communication between them, etc. This study should be extended to cover other IP-based networks which belong to non-NGN domains.
+
+Figure 4 explains the relationship of IPv6-based NGN with other IP-based networks. This figure identifies different communications relationship, taking into consideration the existence of other IP-based networks: intra-NGNs, inter-NGNs and interworking with non-NGNs.
+
+
+
+Figure 4: Relationships of IPv6-based NGN with other IP-based networks. The diagram shows three main network types: NGN 1 (yellow), NGN 2 (teal), and Non-NGN (yellow). NGN 1 contains IPv6-based and IPv4-based nodes. NGN 2 contains IPv6-based and IPv4-based nodes. Non-NGN contains IPv4-based and IPv6-based nodes. Communication groups are indicated by colored arrows: Group 1 (intra-NGN, blue dashed), Group 2 (inter-NGN, red dashed), Group 3 (interworking with non-NGN, purple dashed), and Group 4 (interworking between non-NGN, blue solid). Specific connections are labeled 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, 2c, 3a, 3b, 3c, 4a, 4b, and 4c. A legend at the bottom left defines the arrow types. A reference code Y.2051(08)\_F04 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 4 – Relationships of IPv6-based NGN with other IP-based networks**
+
+## 8 General requirements of IPv6-based NGN
+
+IPv6 supports not only extensions of IP address space but also various advanced features which influence NGN functions and relevant functional entities. This clause identifies the general requirements of IPv6-based NGN which is influenced by IPv6 features. It is recognized that IPv6-based NGN shall satisfy NGN Release 1 requirements. Additional IPv6 features identified in this clause will be considered in the context of NGN Release 2 requirements from IPv6 point of view.
+
+- IPv6-based NGN is required to support the IPv6 headers and their options.
+ - It should recognize and process IPv6 headers and options.
+- IPv6-based NGN is required to accommodate IPv6 addressing schemes.
+ - It should support IPv6 address scoping.
+ - It should support IPv6 autoconfiguration and neighbour discovery.
+ - It should support multi-homing using IPv6 features.
+- IPv6-enabled functions and FEs are required to support IPv6 headers and their options.
+ - They should recognize IPv6 headers and options.
+ - They should differentiate the QoS related control information from general IPv6 packet.
+- IPv6-based NGN is required to support the migration and interworking without affecting the service provided to users.
+ - It should support the interworking with IPv4-based NGN.
+ - It should support the interworking with IPv4-based and/or IPv6-based non-NGN.
+
+## 9 Security considerations
+
+This Recommendation does not require any specific security considerations and aligns with the security requirements in [b-ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2006), *NGN release 1 requirements*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2402] IETF RFC 2402 (1998), *IP Authentication Header*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2406] IETF RFC 2406 (1998), *IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2460] IETF RFC 2460 (1998), *Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification*. <>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2461] IETF RFC 2461 (1998), *Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)*. <>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2474] IETF RFC 2474 (1998), *Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2675] IETF RFC 2675 (1999), *IPv6 Jumbograms*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2711] IETF RFC 2711 (1999), *IPv6 Router Alert Option*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2766] IETF RFC 2766 (2000), *Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)*. <>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3493] IETF RFC 3493 (2003), *Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3587] IETF RFC 3587 (2003), *IPv6 Global Unicast Address Format*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3697] IETF RFC 3697 (2004), *IPv6 Flow Label Specification*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3775] IETF RFC 3775 (2004), *Mobility Support in IPv6*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4007] IETF RFC 4007 (2005), *IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4193] IETF RFC 4193 (2005), *Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4291] IETF RFC 4291 (2006), *IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4311] IETF RFC 4311 (2005), *IPv6 Host-to-Router Load Sharing*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4443] IETF RFC 4443 (2006), *Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification*.
+<>
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2053**
+
+(02/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Functional requirements for IPv6 migration in NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2053
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2053**
+
+# **Functional requirements for IPv6 migration in NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2053 provides feasible IPv6 migration scenarios and functional requirements necessary for them.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2053 was approved on 29 February 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedure.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+IPv4, IPv6, migration, NGN
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2008
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions..... | 2 |
+| 5.1 Native IPv6 device ..... | 2 |
+| 5.2 IPv6 transition mechanism ..... | 2 |
+| 5.3 Basic IPv6 transition mechanisms..... | 2 |
+| 6 IP as a transport function of NGN ..... | 2 |
+| 7 Basic approaches for interworking and migration..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Dual IP layer (Dual stack) ..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 Configured tunnelling..... | 3 |
+| 7.3 Network address translation and protocol translation ..... | 3 |
+| 8 Migration scenarios ..... | 4 |
+| 8.1 CASE 1 ~ 3 (NAT-PT cases) ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 CASE 4 ~ 7 (configured tunnelling cases) ..... | 6 |
+| 8.3 CASE 8 (NAT-PT case) ..... | 6 |
+| 8.4 CASE 9 (configured tunnelling cases) ..... | 7 |
+| 8.5 CASE 10 ~ 11 (dual stack cases) ..... | 7 |
+| 8.6 CASE 12 (native IPv6 case) ..... | 7 |
+| 9 Functional requirements for IPv6 migration at transport stratum ..... | 7 |
+| 9.1 Transport stratum functions..... | 7 |
+| 9.2 End-user functions..... | 12 |
+| 9.3 Other non-NGN network functions ..... | 12 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 12 |
+| Appendix I – IPv6 migrations in NGN ..... | 13 |
+| I.1 IPv6 transition mechanisms..... | 13 |
+| I.2 Example migration scenarios according to Table 1 ..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography ..... | 20 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2053
+
+# Functional requirements for IPv6 migration in NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to identify IPv6 migration scenarios and functional requirements necessary for them.
+
+NGN transport stratum provides IP connectivity services to NGN users, but the current NGN assumes no specific version of IP. It means that IPv4 and IPv6 could coexist in NGN while IPv4 is being replaced with IPv6. So the interim solution like IPv6 transition mechanism (see clauses 6 and 7) is required for this period.
+
+If the IPv6 transition mechanism is introduced to NGN, there could be various migration scenarios satisfying various application's requirements or service provider's requirements, and these migration scenarios will also impact on existing FEs of NGN.
+
+Thus, this Recommendation provides feasible IPv6 migration scenarios, and functional requirements required to support each scenario.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 host** [b-ITU-T Y.1540]: A computer that communicates using the Internet protocols. A host implements routing functions (i.e., it operates at the IP layer) and may implement additional functions including higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP in a source or destination host) and lower layer protocols (e.g., ATM).
+
+**3.1.2 router** [b-ITU-T Y.1540]: A host that enables communication between other hosts by forwarding IP packets based on the content of their IP destination address field.
+
+**3.1.3 dual IP layer** [b-IETF RFC 4213]: Dual IP layer is a technique for providing support for both Internet Protocols – IPv4 and IPv6 – in a node. Dual IP layer is also known as dual stack.
+
+**3.1.4 configured tunneling** [b-IETF RFC 4213]: The configured tunneling is a technique for establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 infrastructures (or vice versa).
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 node:** A node is a device that is connected as part of a computer network. Nodes can be computers, cell phones, or various other network appliances, such as routers, switches, and hubs.
+
+**3.2.2 subnet:** A subnet is a physical network served by one router, for instance an Ethernet network (consisting of one or several Ethernet segments or local area networks, interconnected by switches and bridges) or a virtual local area network (VLAN).
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
+| ALG | Application Layer Gateway |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| NAT-PT | Network Address Translation and Protocol Translation |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| SIIT | Stateless IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+### **5.1 Native IPv6 device**
+
+A device that only has IPv6 stack.
+
+### **5.2 IPv6 transition mechanism**
+
+An IPv6 transition mechanism means a mechanism that supports transition between IPv4 and IPv6. There are many kinds of IPv6 transition mechanisms available, and the user can choose one that fits into a deployment environment.
+
+### **5.3 Basic IPv6 transition mechanisms**
+
+Basic IPv6 transition mechanisms means "Dual IP layer" and "Configured tunneling" which can be implemented on the IPv6 node [b-IETF RFC 4213].
+
+## **6 IP as a transport function of NGN**
+
+NGN functions are divided into service stratum functions and transport stratum functions as described in [ITU-T Y.2011]. The transport stratum provides IP connectivity to NGN service stratum and users under the control of transport control functions. This means that IP plays the key role of transport function of NGN.
+
+In NGN, most of services are carried over IP, although IP itself may in turn be carried over a number of underlying technologies like ATM, Ethernet, etc. According to the NGN release 1, it is assumed that the version of IP is not fixed. This means that IPv4 and IPv6 could coexist in NGN
+
+while IPv4 is being replaced with IPv6, thus a mechanism that supports migration into IPv6 is required for this period.
+
+IETF introduced several IPv6 transition mechanisms as recommendations for migration to IPv6 [b-IETF RFC 4213]. These mechanisms could also be recommendations for the NGN which uses IP as a transport function. The study of IPv6 with NGN has not yet been completed.
+
+The IPv6 transition mechanisms used in this Recommendation are dual stack, configured tunnelling, and network address translation/protocol translation (NAT-PT) [b-IETF RFC 4213]. These mechanisms are explained in more details in clause 7.
+
+When the IPv6 transition mechanisms are introduced to NGN, various migration scenarios could be possible. This Recommendation also shows such feasible scenarios.
+
+## **7 Basic approaches for interworking and migration**
+
+The network consists of various IPv4-based and IPv6-based networks at different geographic locations which are connected via an underlying transport network.
+
+There are three major approaches in providing interworking and migration between the IPv4-based network and the IPv6-based network: dual IP layer, configured tunnelling and NAT-PT.
+
+For more information on these mechanisms, see Appendix I.
+
+### **7.1 Dual IP layer (Dual stack)**
+
+The node that has dual IP layer provides implementations of both versions of the Internet Protocol (IPv4 and IPv6) which are also enabled at the same time. This node can directly interoperate with IPv4-only node using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate with IPv6-only node using IPv6 packets. There will be no IP protocol conversion necessary when communicating with a dual stack node on either the media path or the signalling path. Details on dual IP layer node have been identified in [b-IETF RFC 4213].
+
+### **7.2 Configured tunnelling**
+
+The configured tunnelling is a technique for establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 infrastructures (or vice versa).
+
+In most deployment scenarios, the IPv6 routing infrastructure will be built up over time. While the IPv6 infrastructure is being deployed, the existing IPv4 routing infrastructure can still remain and can be used to carry IPv6 traffic. Tunnelling provides a way to utilize an existing IPv4 routing infrastructure to carry IPv6 traffic.
+
+Dual stack nodes can tunnel IPv6 packets over regions of IPv4 routing topology by encapsulating them within IPv4 packets. Tunnelling can be used in a variety of ways:
+
+- router-to-router;
+- host-to-router;
+- host-to-host.
+
+Configured tunnelling can be used in all of the above cases, but it is most likely to be used in router-to-router due to the need to explicitly configure the tunnelling endpoints.
+
+### **7.3 Network address translation and protocol translation**
+
+NAT-PT uses address translation like NAT and IPv6/IPv4 protocol translation as described in stateless IP/ICMP translation (SIIT) [b-IETF RFC 2765] to provide transparent routing to end-hosts in IPv6 realm trying to communicate with end-hosts in IPv4 realm and vice versa.
+
+The SIIT identifies a protocol translation mechanism that allows communication between IPv6-only and IPv4-only hosts via protocol independent translation of IPv4 and IPv6 packets, requiring no state information for the session.
+
+Some applications carry network addresses in payloads. The NAT-PT is application unaware and does not snoop the payload. Application layer gateway (ALG) could work in conjunction with the NAT-PT to provide support for many such applications.
+
+Generally the NAT-PT function is placed on the edge of network. If the NAT-PT function is placed in the core of the network, the overall performance of the network would decrease seriously because the NAT-PT function reconstructs all IP packets that pass through it.
+
+NAPT-PT extends the notion of translation one step further by also translating transport identifier (e.g., TCP and UDP port numbers, ICMP query identifiers). The NAPT-PT, which stands for "Network Address Port Translation + Protocol Translation", would allow IPv6 nodes to communicate with the IPv4 nodes transparently using a single IPv4 address. The TCP/UDP ports of the IPv6 nodes are translated into TCP/UDP ports of the registered IPv4 address.
+
+## **8 Migration scenarios**
+
+There are various IPv6 migration scenarios satisfying the user/application or provider requirements. In this clause, several migration scenarios from the transport stratum's viewpoint are shown. Each scenario is referred to in clause 9 to explain the functional requirements for the relevant functional entity (FE). See Table 1.
+
+###### *Legend for Table 1*
+
+- IPv6/dual stack: IPv6-only node, or dual stack node
+- IPv4/dual stack: IPv4-only node, or dual stack node
+- IPv4: IPv4-only node
+- IPv6: IPv6-only node
+- Blue cell: IPv6-enabled entity
+- Red cell: IPv4-enabled entity
+
+**Table 1 – Role of functional elements for various migration scenarios**
+
+| | | End-user
function
A | EN-FE | ABG-FE | IBG-FE | NACF | RACF | End-user
function
B |
+|------------|---------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|
+| NAT-PT | CASE 1 | IPv6/
dual stack | NAT-PT | IPv4 | IPv4 | – | Offer
NAT-
PT
control | IPv4/
dual stack |
+| | CASE 2 | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | NAT-PT | IPv4 | – | Offer
NAT-
PT
control | IPv4/
dual stack |
+| | CASE 3 | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | NAT-
PT | – | Offer
NAT-
PT
control | IPv4/
dual stack |
+| Tunnelling | CASE 4 | Tunnel
end-point | IPv4 | IPv4 | IPv4 | Offer
tunnel end-
point
information | – | IPv6/
dual stack |
+| | CASE 5 | IPv6/
dual stack | Tunnel
end-point | IPv4 | IPv4 | – | – | IPv6/
dual stack |
+| | CASE 6 | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | Tunnel
end-point | IPv4 | – | – | IPv6/
dual stack |
+| | CASE 7 | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | IPv6/
dual stack | Tunnel
end-
point | – | – | IPv6/
dual stack |
+| NAT-PT | CASE 8 | IPv6
Customer
Network
(NAT-
PT) | IPv4 | IPv4 | IPv4 | – | Offer
NAT-
PT
control | IPv4/dual
stack |
+| Tunnelling | CASE 9 | Dual
stack
Customer
Network
(tunnel
end-
point) | IPv4 | IPv4 | IPv4 | Offer
tunnel end-
point
information | – | IPv6/
dual stack |
+| Dual stack | CASE 10 | Dual
stack | Dual
stack | Dual
stack | Dual
stack | – | – | Dual
stack |
+| | CASE 11 | Dual
stack
Customer
Network | Dual
stack | Dual
stack | Dual
stack | – | – | Dual
stack |
+| IPv6 | CASE 12 | IPv6 | IPv6 | IPv6 | IPv6 | – | – | IPv6 |
+
+### **8.1 CASE 1 ~ 3 (NAT-PT cases)**
+
+From CASE 1 to CASE 3, both end-user functions have different versions of IP stack (or an end-user function is a dual stack, but a service/application only supports a different IP stack from the other end-user functions). NAT-PT enables end-user functions which have different IP stacks to communicate with each other by translating IPv6 packet into IPv4 packet (or vice versa). To do this, one of the FEs in the path between the end-user functions should provide the NAT-PT function.
+
+Usually, the NAT-PT function should not be placed on the core FE because it snoops and rebuilds all packets. If the NAT-PT function is placed on the core FE, the overall performance of the network could be decreased. So an interconnection border gateway FE (IBG-FE) is not recommended for a NAT-PT function.
+
+For CASE 1, the following requirements are defined:
+
+- EN-FE shall have dual stack.
+- EN-FE shall have public IPv4 address for IPv4 side, global scope IPv6 address for IPv6 side.
+- EN-FE shall have NAT-PT function.
+- EN-FE could have an appropriate ALG for a specific application.
+- RACF shall provide NAT-PT control functions.
+
+CASES 2 and 3 have the same requirements as CASE 1 except that the NAT-PT function is placed on ABG-FE or IBG-FE.
+
+### **8.2 CASE 4 ~ 7 (configured tunnelling cases)**
+
+From CASE 4 to CASE 7, both end-user functions are IPv6 nodes and networks between two end-user functions are IPv4 only. To communicate with each other in this situation, configured tunnelling mechanisms can be used. Configured tunnelling needs two tunnel end-points for encapsulation and decapsulation of IPv4 packets. Two FEs in the communication path should be tunnel end-point.
+
+For CASE 5, the following requirements are defined:
+
+- EN-FE shall have dual stack.
+- EN-FE shall have public IPv4 address for tunnel end-point, global scope IPv6 address for IPv6 side.
+- EN-FE shall have tunnel end-point function.
+- Tunnel end-point for the end-user function B could be any FE among EN-FE, ABG-FE, IBG-FE on the side of end-user functions B.
+
+CASES 6 and 7 have the same requirements as CASE 5 except that tunnel end-point for end-user function A is ABG-FE or IBG-FE.
+
+Sometimes, an end-user function itself could be a tunnel end-point. CASE 4 shows this case. In this case, NACF should provide information for other tunnel end-point.
+
+### **8.3 CASE 8 (NAT-PT case)**
+
+In this case, end-user function A has an IPv6 customer network, and the other end-user function is IPv4 node; thus end-user function A should have NAT-PT function. The other situations are the same as CASE 1 ~ 3.
+
+For CASE 8, the following requirements are defined:
+
+- End-user function A shall have dual-stack.
+- End-user function A shall have public IPv4 address for IPv4 side, global scope IPv6 address for IPv6 side.
+- End-user function A shall have NAT-PT function.
+- End-user function A could have an appropriate ALG for a specific application.
+- RACF shall provide NAT-PT control functions.
+
+### **8.4 CASE 9 (configured tunnelling cases)**
+
+In this case, end-user function A is an IPv6 customer network and the other end-user function is IPv6 node; thus end-user function A should be a tunnel end-point. The other situations are the same as CASE 4.
+
+### **8.5 CASE 10 ~ 11 (dual stack cases)**
+
+CASES 10 ~ 11 are the most ideal case. In this case, every FE has dual stack, so most of the applications/services can communicate with each other without any consideration of the specific IP version.
+
+### **8.6 CASE 12 (native IPv6 case)**
+
+CASE 12 is the final stage of IPv6 migration. In this case, every FE and every application/service is IPv6-only.
+
+## **9 Functional requirements for IPv6 migration at transport stratum**
+
+As described in clause 8, some FEs in transport stratum should support IPv6 transition function according to a specific IPv6 migration scenario. In this clause, the FEs related to IPv6 migration are identified and the functional requirements for these FEs are described.
+
+### **9.1 Transport stratum functions**
+
+The transport functions of NGN provide IP connectivity to the NGN service stratum and end-user equipments under the control of NACF and RACF components. Figure 9-1 shows an example configuration of NGN from the viewpoint of transport stratum.
+
+The set of FEs related to IPv6 migration could be different according to each possible migration scenario.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-1: An example configuration of NGN (view point at transport stratum). The diagram shows a central 'Core transport network' (a large oval) connected to various external networks. Above the core are 'Public Internet' and 'Other NGN'. Below the core are 'Access network' (multiple), 'Customer network', and 'End user terminal' (multiple). A legend on the left identifies four types of nodes: AN-FE (Access Node-Function Element, represented by a square with horizontal lines), EN-FE (Edge Node-Function Element, represented by a square with vertical lines), ABG-FE (Access Border Gateway Function Element, represented by a square with a cross-hatch pattern), and IBG-FE (Internal Border Gateway Function Element, represented by a square with a grid pattern). The core network contains NACF (Network Access Control Function) and RACF (Resource Access Control Function) at the top. The access networks connect to the core via EN-FE and ABG-FE nodes. The customer network connects to the core via AN-FE and IBG-FE nodes. End user terminals connect to the access networks. The diagram is labeled Y.2053(08)\_F9-1 in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – An example configuration of NGN (view point at transport stratum)**
+
+#### 9.1.1 Transport functions
+
+Transport functions are comprised of access transport functions and core transport functions. Among those transport functions EN-FE, ABG-FE, IBG-FE are related to IPv6 migration.
+
+##### 9.1.1.1 Access transport functions
+
+Access transport functions process end-users' access to the network as well as collecting and aggregating the traffic coming from these accesses towards the core network. Thus, tunnel end-point function and NAT-PT function are suitable for access transport functions.
+
+###### a) *Access node FE (AN-FE)*
+
+In this Recommendation, the AN-FE is assumed to be a layer 2 device; therefore, it is not involved in access protocol functionality.
+
+###### b) *Edge node FE (EN-FE)*
+
+The EN-FE in the access transport functions connects to core packet transport functions. In the case of connection to IP-based core transport functions, it shall be a layer 3 device with IP forwarding capabilities.
+
+The EN-FE could be a tunnel end-point and/or NAT-PT device in CASE 1 or CASE 5. In both cases, the EN-FE should be dual stack.
+
+- Tunnel end-point: An IPv6 end-user function tries to communicate with another IPv6 end-user function in other network over IPv4 core transport network, then the EN-FE should be a tunnel end-point (CASE 5). When the EN-FE receives IPv6 packets from IPv6 end-user functions, it encapsulates them in IPv4 header and forwards them to the other tunnel end-point.
+
+- Scenario CASE 5: End-user function A and end-user function B are IPv6 nodes. One tunnel end-point for end-user function A is EN-FE, and the other tunnel end-point could be either EN-FE or ABG-FE or IBG-FE on the side of the end-user function B. FEs in the path between both tunnel end-points are IPv4.
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- AN-FE
+- Dual stack EN-FE
+- ABG-FE
+- IPv4 traffic (red line)
+- IPv6 traffic (blue line)
+
+Figure 9-2: An EN-FE as tunnel end-point. This network diagram shows IPv4 and IPv6 end-user terminals connected to an Access network. The Access network contains AN-FE and Dual stack EN-FE nodes. A tunnel labeled 'IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel' connects the Access network to a Core transport network. The Core transport network includes an ABG-FE node and another Access network. A Customer network is also shown. Traffic paths for IPv4 (red) and IPv6 (blue) are indicated. Reference: Y.2053(08)\_F9-2.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – An EN-FE as tunnel end-point**
+
+- NAT-PT: If an EN-FE supports NAT-PT function, an IPv6 end-user function can communicate with other IPv4 end-user functions. When the EN-FE supports NAT-PT function, the EN-FE translates the IPv6 packets from the IPv6 end-user terminals into IPv4 packets or vice versa. If the EN-FE has NAT-PT function, it should be controlled by RACF [ITU-T Y.2111].
+- Scenario CASE 1: IPv6 end-user function A tries to communicate with IPv4-only end-user function B. EN-FE in the side of end-user function A has NAT-PT function. Other FEs in the path are IPv4.
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- AN-FE
+- NAT-PT EN-FE
+- ABG-FE
+- IPv4 traffic (red line)
+- IPv6 traffic (blue line)
+
+Figure 9-3: An EN-FE as NAT-PT. This network diagram shows IPv4 and IPv6 end-user terminals connected to an Access network. The Access network contains AN-FE and NAT-PT EN-FE nodes. A red arrow indicates IPv4 traffic path from the NAT-PT EN-FE through the Core transport network (containing an ABG-FE and another Access network) to the Customer network. Blue arrows indicate IPv6 traffic paths. Reference: Y.2053(08)\_F9-3.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – An EN-FE as NAT-PT**
+
+- Native IPv6 deployment: If there is no IPv4 end-user terminal attached to AN-FE(s) that an EN-FE manages, the EN-FE could be a native IPv6 device. If the EN-FE is upgraded to a native IPv6 device, it just forwards IPv6 traffic to the ABG-FE.
+ - Scenario CASE 2: If IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with other IPv4 end-user functions, the ABG-FE should be a NAT-PT device.
+ - Scenario CASE 6: If IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with other IPv6 end-user functions, the ABG-FE should be a tunnel end-point.
+
+##### 9.1.1.2 Core transport functions
+
+The core transport functions are responsible for ensuring information transport throughout the core network. Tunnel end-point function and NAT-PT function could be placed on ABG-FE and IBG-FE, but it is not recommended to place NAT-PT function on core transport FEs.
+
+###### a) Access border gateway FE (ABG-FE)
+
+The ABG-FE is a packet gateway between an access network and a core transport network. The EN-FE(s) which aggregate NGN user traffic connect to the ABG-FE. The ABG-FE could be a tunnel end-point and/or NAT-PT device in CASE 2 or CASE 6. In both cases, the EN-FE should be dual stack.
+
+- Tunnel end-point: If the EN-FE does not support tunnel end-point, the ABG-FE should be a tunnel end-point for IPv6 traffic from end-user terminals. In this case, the ABG-FE has more functions to execute than in CASE 5, because, additionally, the ABG-FE serves as a terminal end-point through which all IPv6 traffic from attached EN-FE(s) is concentrated.
+ - Scenario CASE 6: If the EN-FE is dual stack but does not support tunnel end-point or all end-user functions and the EN-FE are upgraded to the native IPv6 device, the ABG-FE should be a tunnel end-point for IPv6 traffic from end-user terminals. The other tunnel end-point could be either EN-FE or ABG-FE or IBG-FE on the side of the other end-user function.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-4: An ABG-FE as tunnel end-point. The diagram illustrates a network architecture where IPv6 traffic from multiple end-user terminals is tunneled over IPv4 through an ABG-FE into a core transport network. On the left, three 'IPv6 end user terminal' boxes connect to an 'Access network' circle. Inside this circle are 'AN-FE' (diagonal lines) and 'EN-FE' (horizontal lines) components. A 'Dual stack ABG-FE' (square with cross-hatch) is at the boundary of the 'Access network' and the 'Core transport network' circle. IPv6 traffic (blue lines) from the terminals enters the ABG-FE, is encapsulated into an 'IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel' (blue cylinder), and is sent to the core network. The core network connects to another 'Access network' circle, which then connects to a 'Customer network' box. A legend at the bottom left defines the symbols: AN-FE (diagonal lines), EN-FE (horizontal lines), Dual stack ABG-FE (cross-hatch), IPv4 traffic (red line), and IPv6 traffic (blue line). The reference 'Y.2053(08)\_F9-4' is noted near the second access network.
+
+**Figure 9-4 – An ABG-FE as tunnel end-point**
+
+- NAT-PT: If an IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with IPv4 end-user function and the EN-FE does not support NAT-PT, the ABG-FE should support NAT-PT function.
+
+- Scenario CASE 2: IPv6-only end-user function A tries to communicate with IPv4-only end-user function B. The EN-FE could be native IPv6 or dual stack. In this case, ABG-FE should have NAT-PT function. Other FEs are IPv4.
+- Native IPv6 deployment: If all EN-FE(s) and all ABG-FE(s) are upgraded to native IPv6 device;
+ - Scenario CASE 3: If IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with other IPv4 end-user functions, the IBG-FE should be a NAT-PT device.
+ - Scenario CASE 7: if IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with other IPv6 end-user functions, the IBG-FE should be a tunnel end-point.
+
+###### b) *Interconnection border gateway FE (IBG-FE)*
+
+The IBG-FE is a packet gateway used to interconnect an operator's core transport network with another operator's core transport network supporting the packet-based services (refer to Figure 9-1). In the initial stage, most of the IBG-FEs only support IPv4, but, in the end, core transport network would be completely dual stack and finally be native IPv6 (CASE 10, CASE 11, CASE 12). During this transitional period, if the ABG-FE attached to the IBG-FE is upgraded to native IPv6 device, the IBG-FE should be a tunnel end-point or NAT-PT (CASE 3, CASE 7).
+
+- Scenario CASE 7: If the ABG-FE is dual stack but does not support tunnel end-point or all end-user functions, EN-FE, and the ABG-FE are upgraded to the native IPv6 device, the IBG-FE should be a tunnel end-point for IPv6 traffic from end-user functions. The other tunnel end-point may be either IBG-FE, ABG-FE, or EN-FE on the side of the other end-user function.
+
+If an IPv6 end-user function wants to communicate with IPv4 end-user function and the ABG-FE does not support NAT-PT, the IBG-FE should support NAT-PT function (CASE 3). But it is not recommended that the NAT-PT function be used between the core transport networks.
+
+- Scenario CASE 3: IPv6-only end-user function A tries to communicate with IPv4-only end-user function B. The ABG-FE could be native IPv6 or dual stack. In this case, IBG-FE should have NAT-PT function. Other FEs are IPv4.
+
+#### 9.1.2 Transport control functions
+
+##### 9.1.2.1 Network access control functions (NACF)
+
+###### a) *Network access configuration FE (NAC-FE)*
+
+The NAC-FE is responsible for IP address allocation to terminals [ITU-T Y.2012] . It may also distribute other network configuration parameters like the address of DNS servers or signalling proxies, and so on. Thus, if the end-user function is tunnel end-point or dual stack the NAC-FE should provide the following additional information:
+
+- End-user function is dual stack: If an end-user function is dual stack, the NAC-FE shall allocate IPv6 and IPv4 address to the end-user function.
+- End-user function is tunnel end-point: If an end-user function is a dual stack terminal or a customer network, it could be a tunnel end-point (CASE 4, CASE 9). In this case the NAC-FE shall allocate the other tunnel end-point configuration information (refer to [b-IETF draft-03]).
+
+##### 9.1.2.2 Resource and admission control functions (RACF)
+
+The RACF [ITU-T Y.2111] defines related requirements and functional architecture covering aspects such as resource reservation, admission control and gate control, network address port translation (NAPT) and firewall control, and network address translation (NAT) traversal. Thus, if
+
+NAT-PT is used as IPv6 transition mechanism, RACF should consider requirements for NAT-PT scenarios (CASE 1, CASE 2, CASE 3, and CASE 8).
+
+### **9.2 End-user functions**
+
+#### **9.2.1 Terminal**
+
+An end-user terminal could be a tunnel end-point by itself (CASE 4). In this case, the other tunnel end-point could be another end-user terminal: EN-FE, ABG-FE, or IBG-FE.
+
+#### **9.2.2 Customer network**
+
+In this case, CPE of customer network could be a tunnel end-point or NAT-PT device (CASE 8, CASE 9).
+
+### **9.3 Other non-NGN network functions**
+
+If NGN user function tries to communicate with other non-NGN network functions, an appropriate entity of non-NGN network should do a similar role as the one described in clause 8.
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation does not require any specific security considerations and aligns with the security requirements in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## IPv6 migrations in NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### I.1 IPv6 transition mechanisms
+
+This clause shows three IPv6 transition architectures from the viewpoint of IPv6 transition mechanisms architecture.
+
+#### a) *Dual stack*
+
+
+
+NGN terminal
+
+Application protocols
+
+IPv6 Apps
+
+IPv4 IPv6
+
+EN-FE
+
+ABG-FE
+
+IBG-FE
+
+IPv6 IPv4
+
+IBG-FE
+
+ABG-FE
+
+EN-FE
+
+IPv6 Apps
+
+Y.2053(08)\_F1-1
+
+----- Nodes connected with this are adjacent at the application layer
+—— Nodes connected with this are L3 adjacent (IPv4)
+—— Nodes connected with this are L3 adjacent (IPv6)
+..... Nodes connected with this are L2 adjacent
+Routed IP network
+
+Diagram of a dual stack communication scenario in an NGN terminal. It shows two IPv6 Apps at the ends, connected via application protocols (dashed line). Below them is a chain of nodes: EN-FE, ABG-FE, IBG-FE, a routed IP network, IBG-FE, ABG-FE, EN-FE, and another IPv6 Apps. Nodes are connected via L3 adjacent (IPv4) and L3 adjacent (IPv6) lines. A legend explains the line styles: dashed for application layer, solid for L3 adjacent (IPv4), thick solid for L3 adjacent (IPv6), and dotted for L2 adjacent. A routed IP network symbol is also shown.
+
+**Figure I.1 – An example communication scenario with full dual stack**
+
+The most straightforward way for IPv6 nodes to remain compatible with IPv4-only nodes is by providing a complete IPv4 implementation. IPv6 nodes that provide complete IPv4 and IPv6 implementations are called "dual stack nodes". Dual stack nodes have the ability to send and receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. They can directly interoperate with IPv4 nodes using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate with IPv6 nodes using IPv6 packets.
+
+Figure I.1 shows the case where the IPv6 services communicate with each other on dual stack network.
+
+#### b) *Configured tunnel*
+
+
+
+Y.2053(08)\_FI-2
+
+Diagram of a configured tunnel scenario for IPv6 transition. It shows two NGN terminals at the ends, each with an 'App' layer and an 'IPv6' layer. A dashed line labeled 'Application protocols' connects the 'App' layers. A solid line labeled 'IPv6' connects the 'IPv6' layers, representing a configured tunnel. Below the tunnel, a series of IPv4 nodes are connected: EN-FE, ABG-FE, IBG-FE, a central 'Routed IP network' (represented by a circle with three internal nodes), another IBG-FE, ABG-FE, and a final EN-FE. Dashed lines connect the 'IPv6' layers of the EN-FE nodes to their respective 'IPv4' layers. A legend at the bottom explains the line styles: dashed for application layer adjacency, solid for L3 adjacency (IPv4), thick solid for L3 adjacency (IPv6), and dotted for L2 adjacency. A routed IP network icon is also shown.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Example communication scenario with a configured tunnel**
+
+In the initial stage of IPv6 transition, most of the nodes are IPv4-only. Thus, a small set of routers in the core transport network has IPv6 capabilities. The use of a configured tunnel is adequate during this step.
+
+In this case, there are dual stack nodes. IPv6 applications run on both end nodes communicating on IPv6 stack, and IPv6 packets are delivered over IPv4 stack of the core transport network. From this point of view, the L3 adjacency of EN-FE, tunnel end-point, is another EN-FE.
+
+In this scenario, the EN-FE aggregates traffic of IPv6 NGN terminals and it is a dual stack node. Some of the NGN terminals attached to the EN-FE want to use IPv6 services. A configured tunnel is the adequate way to provide IPv6 service to them because most of the core transport functional entities are IPv4-only. The two tunnel end-points are EN-FEs in this case. The EN-FE aggregates tunnel end-points from several NGN terminals which want to use IPv6 services.
+
+#### c) *NAT-PT*
+
+
+
+Y.2053(08)\_FI-3
+
+Diagram of a NAT-PT deployment scenario. It shows two NGN terminals at the ends, each with an 'App' layer and an 'IPv6' layer. A dashed line labeled 'Application protocols' connects the 'App' layers. A solid line labeled 'IPv6' connects the 'IPv6' layers. Below this, a series of IPv4 nodes are connected: EN-FE, ABG-FE, IBG-FE, a central 'Transit network' (represented by a circle with three internal nodes), another IBG-FE, ABG-FE, and a final EN-FE. Dashed lines connect the 'IPv6' layers of the EN-FE nodes to their respective 'IPv4' layers. A legend at the bottom explains the line styles: dashed for application layer adjacency, solid for L3 adjacency (IPv4), thick solid for L3 adjacency (IPv6), and dotted for L2 adjacency. A routed IP network icon is also shown.
+
+**Figure I.3 – An example deployment scenario with NAT-PT**
+
+The NAT-PT mechanism (IPv4/IPv6 translation) is usually for edge IPv6 island subnets. The IPv6 NGN terminals behind the NAT-PT box can communicate with other IPv6 NGN terminals or other IPv4 NGN terminals through it.
+
+The NAT-PT translates IPv6 header into IPv4 header or vice versa. The ALG translates application protocol header if it contains any IP layer information.
+
+All packets which pass through the NAT-PT box will be reconstructed if each end-node of the connection has a different version of the IP stack. This results in a decline of performance. So the NAT-PT mechanism usually is not to be used in the core network.
+
+### I.2 Example migration scenarios according to Table 1
+
+During the period of migration to IPv6, several types of nodes like dual stack, IPv6-only, IPv4-only nodes may coexist. In this clause, possible deployment scenarios during this period are introduced case by case.
+
+#### A) Scenario CASES 10, 11– Dual stack
+
+
+
+Figure I.4 – Dual stack node – dual stack node scenario. The diagram illustrates a network architecture for dual-stack nodes. It shows two main network domains, each containing a 'Core transport network' and multiple 'Access networks'. At the top of each domain is a teal oval containing 'NACF' and 'RACF'. A legend on the left identifies symbols: a striped rectangle for 'AN-FE', a grid rectangle for 'Dual stack EN-FE', a square with a cross for 'Dual stack ABG-FE', and a square with a circle for 'Dual stack IBG-FE'. It also defines line colors: red for 'IPv4 traffic', blue for 'IPv6 traffic', and a thick red line for 'IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel'. The diagram shows various 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks connected to the access networks. Traffic paths are shown with red and blue lines, indicating IPv4 and IPv6 flows respectively. Some paths use the thick red line to represent IPv6 over IPv4 tunneling. A 'Customer network' is shown at the bottom left. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2053(08)\_F1-4' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Dual stack node – dual stack node scenario**
+
+This scenario is the most ideal case. All end-user terminals and access/core transition FEs are dual stack and have IPv4/IPv6 routable address. IPv4 and IPv6 application can run on a dual-stack end-user terminal and can communicate with other applications which run on another dual-stack end-user terminal without any help from other IPv6 transition mechanisms.
+
+##### - DNS:
+
+In this case the role of DNS is important.
+
+The Domain Name System (DNS) is used in both IPv4 and IPv6 to map between hostnames and IP addresses. The DNS resolver library on dual stack node should be able to handle A and AAAA record. If a DNS query result contains A records and AAAA records at the same time, the resolver library may reorder the results returned to the application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to communicate with that specific node – IPv6 first, or IPv4 first.
+
+The applications should be able to specify whether they want IPv4, IPv6, or both records. This defines which address families the resolver looks up. Since most applications try the addresses in the order they are returned by the resolver, this can affect the IP version "preference" of applications.
+
+The issues and operational guidelines for using IPv6 with DNS are described in more detail in [b-IETF RFC 4472].
+
+#### B) *Scenario CASE 4 (CASES 5, 6, 7, 9 are similar cases) – Configured tunnelling*
+
+If the core transport network runs on IPv4, a configured tunnel can be used to forward IPv6 traffic to the destination access network.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a dual-stack network architecture where the core transport network is IPv4-based, and IPv6 traffic is forwarded via a configured tunnel. The legend defines the components and traffic types:
+
+- AN-FE**: Access Network - Fixed Edge (represented by a striped rectangle).
+- Dual stack EN-FE**: Dual Stack Edge Network - Fixed Edge (represented by a rectangle with horizontal and vertical lines).
+- IPv4 ABG-FE**: IPv4 Address Block Gateway - Fixed Edge (represented by a red square with a black cross).
+- IPv4 IBG-FE**: IPv4 Intra-Block Gateway - Fixed Edge (represented by a red square with a black circle).
+- IPv4 traffic**: Represented by a solid red line.
+- IPv6 traffic**: Represented by a solid blue line.
+- IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel**: Represented by a thick red line with a black cross.
+
+The network topology consists of two main sections, each containing a **Core transport network** (IPv4) and multiple **Access networks**. Above each core network is a teal oval containing **NACF** and **RACF** components. **Dual stack end user terminals** are connected to the access networks. Traffic flows are shown as follows:
+
+- IPv4 traffic (red lines)**: Flows from dual stack end user terminals through the access networks into the core transport networks, and vice versa.
+- IPv6 traffic (blue lines)**: Flows from dual stack end user terminals through the access networks into the core transport networks.
+- IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel (thick red lines with crosses)**: These lines represent the tunneling mechanism that encapsulates IPv6 traffic within IPv4 packets for transport across the IPv4 core network.
+
+Ellipses (...) indicate that there can be multiple access networks and end user terminals in each section. A reference code **Y.2053(08)\_FI-5** is located near the bottom right terminal.
+
+Network diagram for Scenario CASE 4 showing IPv4 core transport with configured tunneling for IPv6 traffic.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Dual stack node – dual stack node (IPv4 core transport) scenario**
+
+C) Scenario CASE 4 (CASES 5, 6, 7, 9 are similar cases) – dual stack $\leftrightarrow$ IPv4-only
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for IPv4 core transport. It features two main sections, each containing a 'Core transport network' and an 'Access network'. Above each core transport network is a teal oval containing 'NACF' and 'RACF'. The 'Access network' connects to 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks and 'Customer network' blocks. The 'Core transport network' connects to 'IPv4 end user terminal' blocks. A legend on the left defines the components: AN-FE (hatched rectangle), Dual stack EN-FE (hatched rectangle), IPv4 EN-FE (red hatched rectangle), IPv4 ABG-FE (red hatched rectangle), IPv4 IBG-FE (red hatched rectangle), IPv4 traffic (red line), IPv6 traffic (blue line), and IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel (red line). The diagram shows IPv4 traffic paths (red lines) connecting the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'IPv4 end user terminal' blocks via the 'Core transport network'. IPv6 traffic paths (blue lines) connect the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'Access network' and then to the 'Core transport network'. IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel paths (red lines) connect the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'Access network' and then to the 'Core transport network'.
+
+Network diagram for Figure I.6 showing IPv4 core transport in a dual-stack node scenario.
+
+Figure I.6 – Dual stack node – IPv4 node (IPv4 core transport)
+
+The following case is another example derived from C.
+
+D) Scenario CASE 4 (CASES 5, 6, 7, 9 are similar cases) – dual stack $\leftrightarrow$ IPv6-only
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for IPv6 core transport. It features two main sections, each containing a 'Core transport network' and an 'Access network'. Above each core transport network is a teal oval containing 'NACF' and 'RACF'. The 'Access network' connects to 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks and 'Customer network' blocks. The 'Core transport network' connects to 'IPv6 end user terminal' blocks. A legend on the left defines the components: AN-FE (hatched rectangle), Dual stack EN-FE (hatched rectangle), IPv6 EN-FE (blue hatched rectangle), IPv4 ABG-FE (red hatched rectangle), IPv4 IBG-FE (red hatched rectangle), IPv4 traffic (red line), IPv6 traffic (blue line), and IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel (red line). The diagram shows IPv6 traffic paths (blue lines) connecting the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'IPv6 end user terminal' blocks via the 'Core transport network'. IPv4 traffic paths (red lines) connect the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'Access network' and then to the 'Core transport network'. IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel paths (red lines) connect the 'Dual stack end user terminal' blocks to the 'Access network' and then to the 'Core transport network'.
+
+Network diagram for Figure I.7 showing IPv6 core transport in a dual-stack node scenario.
+
+Figure I.7 – Dual stack node – IPv6 node (IPv4 core transport)
+
+The following case is another example derived from C.
+
+E) *Scenario CASE 1 (CASES 2, 3, 8 are similar cases) – NAT-PT*
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- AN-FE
+- Dual stack EN-FE
+- Dual stack EN-FE (NAT-PT)
+- IPv4 ABG-FE
+- IPv4 IBG-FE
+- IPv4 traffic
+- IPv6 traffic
+- IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel
+
+Diagram components and flow:
+
+- Left Domain:** Core transport network, Access network, Customer network, IPv6 end user terminal, IPv4 end user terminal.
+- Right Domain:** Core transport network, Access network, IPv4 end user terminal, IPv6 end user terminal.
+- Core Transport Network:** Connects the two domains.
+- NAT-PT Configuration:** NACF/RACF provides parameters to NAT-PT devices in both domains.
+- Traffic Flow:** IPv6 traffic (blue) flows from IPv6 terminals to NAT-PT devices. IPv4 traffic (red) flows from NAT-PT devices to IPv4 terminals or through tunnels.
+
+Diagram illustrating IPv4 node - IPv6 node (IPv4 core transport) scenario. The diagram shows two network domains connected by a core transport network. Each domain contains a Core transport network and multiple Access networks. A Customer network is connected to the left Access network. End-user terminals (IPv6 and IPv4) are connected to the Access networks. A legend defines symbols for AN-FE, Dual stack EN-FE, Dual stack EN-FE (NAT-PT), IPv4 ABG-FE, IPv4 IBG-FE, IPv4 traffic, IPv6 traffic, and IPv6 over IPv4 tunnel. Dashed lines indicate NAT-PT configuration parameters from NACF/RACF to NAT-PT devices. Arrows show traffic flow: IPv6 traffic (blue) from IPv6 terminals to NAT-PT devices, and IPv4 traffic (red) from NAT-PT devices to IPv4 terminals or through tunnels.
+
+**Figure I.8 – IPv4 node – IPv6 node (IPv4 core transport)**
+
+IPv6 end-user terminal can communicate with IPv4 terminal through NAT-PT device. In this example, NAT-PT is installed on the EN-FE. NAT-PT can also be installed on ABG-FE or IBG-FE. The NAT-PT device translates IPv6 packets into IPv4 packets or vice versa.
+
+RACF manages NAT-PT translation policy and other configuration parameters. The RACF provides such information to NAT-PT device whenever it is necessary.
+
+
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1540] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1540 (2007), *Internet protocol data communication service – IP packet transfer and availability performance parameters*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2765] IETF RFC 2765 (2000), *Stateless IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm (SIIT)*, (Standards Track).
+- [b-IETF RFC 2766] IETF RFC 2766 (2000), *Network Address Translation – Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)*, (Standards Track).
+- [b-IETF RFC 4213] IETF RFC 4213 (2005), *Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers*, (Standards Track).
+- [b-IETF RFC 4472] IETF RFC 4472 (2006), *Operational Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS*.
+- [b-IETF draft-03] IETF draft-03, *IPv6 Tunnel Broker with the Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP)*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2055
+
+(03/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Framework of object mapping using IPv6 in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2055
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2055**
+
+# **Framework of object mapping using IPv6 in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2055 specifies the basic concept and requirements of object mapping using IPv6 in next generation networks (NGN) in order to provide networking capabilities to objects. This Recommendation also describes the mapping architecture, the relationship between identifiers and the relevant mechanisms for object mapping.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2055 | 2011-03-16 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+IPv6, mapping, NGN, object.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Overview of object mapping using IPv6 in NGN ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.1 Classification of identifiers for object identification and mapping ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 Basic concept of object mapping..... | 5 |
+| | 6.3 Requirements for object mapping using IPv6 ..... | 6 |
+| 7 | Mapping architecture and relationship between identities ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.1 Mapping architecture between identifiers ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.2 Mapping relationships between identifiers..... | 8 |
+| 8 | Mechanisms for object mapping..... | 10 |
+| | 8.1 ID bindings in NGN architecture ..... | 10 |
+| | 8.2 Object mapping mechanism ..... | 10 |
+| 9 | Security considerations..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix I – Examples of mapping between host and object(s)..... | 12 |
+| 1 | Host = Object (one-to-one mapping)..... | 12 |
+| 2 | Host ≠ Object (one-to-many mapping)..... | 12 |
+| | Appendix II – Network attachment control function (NACF) functional architecture..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix III – Information flows of explicit binding and implicit binding..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix IV – Examples for services using object mapping..... | 16 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 17 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2055
+
+# Framework of object mapping using IPv6 in next generation networks
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the requirements and the mechanisms for object mapping using IPv6 in next generation networks (NGNs). This Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- Basic concept and requirements of object mapping using IPv6;
+- Mapping architecture and relationships between identifiers;
+- Mechanisms for object mapping using IPv6.
+
+This Recommendation does not intend to develop any specific protocols for object mapping.
+
+As many new types of devices (i.e., objects) are connected to networks, this Recommendation assumes that IPv6 plays a key role in object-to-object communications. The objective of this Recommendation is to provide guidelines for mapping of information on objects for providing end-to-end connectivity in IPv6-based NGN.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T G.805] | Recommendation ITU-T G.805 (2000), Generic functional architecture of transport networks . |
+| [ITU-T X.800] | Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications . |
+| [ITU-T X.811] | Recommendation ITU-T X.811 (1995) ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework . |
+| [ITU-T Y.1540] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1540 (2011), Internet protocol data communication service – IP packet transfer and availability performance parameters . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2002] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2002 (2009), Overview of ubiquitous networking and of its support in NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2011] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), General principles and general reference model for next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2014] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2010), Network attachment control functions in next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2015] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2015 (2009), General requirements for ID/locator separation in NGN . |
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2051] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2051 (2008), *General overview of IPv6-based NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 address** [ITU-T Y.2091]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+
+**3.1.2 authentication** [ITU-T X.811]: Authentication provides assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.
+
+**3.1.3 authorization** [ITU-T X.800]: The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights.
+
+**3.1.4 binding** [ITU-T G.805]: A direct relationship between a "transport processing function" or "transport entity" and another "transport processing function" or "transport entity" which represents the static connectivity that cannot be directly modified by management action.
+
+**3.1.5 context** [ITU-T Y.2002]: The information that can be used to characterize the environment of a user.
+
+NOTE – Context information may include where the user is, what resources (devices, access points, noise level, bandwidth, etc.) are near the user, at what time the user is moving, interaction history between person and objects, etc. According to specific applications, context information can be updated.
+
+**3.1.6 host** [ITU-T Y.1540]: A computer that communicates using the Internet protocols. A host implements routing functions (i.e., it operates at the IP layer) and may implement additional functions including higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP in a source or destination host) and lower layer protocols (e.g., ATM).
+
+**3.1.7 identifier** [ITU-T Y.2091]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects). Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization. They can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private IDs are normally not disclosed to third parties).
+
+**3.1.8 identity** [ITU-T Y.2720]: Information about an entity that is sufficient to identify that entity in a particular context.
+
+**3.1.9 ID/LOC separation** [ITU-T Y.2015]: ID/LOC separation is decoupling the semantic of IP address into the semantics of node IDs and LOCs. Distinct namespaces are used for node IDs and LOCs so that they can evolve independently. LOCs are associated with the IP layer whereas node IDs are associated with upper layers in such a way that ongoing communication sessions or services shall not be broken by changing LOCs due to mobility and multi-homing.
+
+NOTE – In the context of this Recommendation, a completely new namespace for node IDs can optionally be created that would leave the IP address space more or less intact for LOCs, allowing routing technologies to be developed independently of end-host mobility and end-host multi-homing implications.
+
+**3.1.10 object** [ITU-T Y.2002]: An intrinsic representation of an entity that is described at an appropriate level of abstraction in terms of its attributes and functions.
+
+NOTE 1 – An object is characterized by its behaviour. An object is distinct from any other object. An object interacts with its environment including other objects at its interaction points. An object is informally said to perform functions and offer services (an object which makes a function available is said to offer a service). For modelling purposes, these functions and services are specified in terms of the behaviour of the object and of its interfaces. An object can perform more than one function. A function can be performed by the cooperation of several objects.
+
+NOTE 2 – Objects include terminal devices (e.g., used by a person to access the network such as mobile phones, Personal computers, etc.), remote monitoring devices (e.g., cameras, sensors, etc.), information devices (e.g., content delivery server), products, contents, and resources.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 mapping:** A technique for forming associations between logical and physical interfaces.
+
+**3.2.2 object mapping:** The process which an object identifier (object ID) is associated with an identifier (e.g., IPv6 address).
+
+**3.2.3 object ID:** The identifier which identifies an object.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------|
+| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity |
+| AR-FE | Access Relay Functional Entity |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| EPC | Electronic Product Code |
+| EUI | Extended Unique Identifier |
+| GW | Gateway |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IT | Information Technology |
+| LOC | Locator |
+| MAC | Medium Access Control |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NAC-FE | Network Access Configuration Functional Entity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| PoA | Point of Attachment |
+| RA | Router Advertisement |
+| RACF | Resource Admission Control Function |
+
+| | |
+|--------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| RS | Router Solicitation |
+| SCF | Service Control function |
+| SCM | Supply Chain Management |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| TLM-FE | Transport Location Management Functional Entity |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation, the keyword "NGN" indicates "IPv6-based NGN" as per [ITU-T Y.2051].
+In clause 6.3:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+## 6 Overview of object mapping using IPv6 in NGN
+
+### 6.1 Classification of identifiers for object identification and mapping
+
+Identifiers are used to facilitate reaching or using applications or services. There are many kinds of identifiers (IDs) such as ITU-T E.164 number code, EUI-64, MAC address or URI/URL. By using these identifiers, devices can be reachable to the other users and/or devices.
+
+Identifiers have two functions. One is to identify an object in the real world. The other is to be used as an address or number to uniquely identify the location of an entity on the network. Two or more entities on the network can communicate with each other using identifiers or addresses.
+
+An "Object ID" generally takes the form of an application-specific integer or pointer that uniquely identifies an object. This Recommendation considers an object as an end point of communication which is connected to the network excluding conventional terminal devices (e.g., used by a person to access devices such as mobile phones or personal computers). These objects include remote monitoring devices (e.g., cameras or sensors), information devices (e.g., content delivery server), products or contents.
+
+Appendix I provides examples of mapping relationships between host and object(s). In the examples shown in Appendix I, conventional terminal devices have a one-to-one mapping where a host is equal to an object. On the other hand, most of the other objects have a one-to-many mapping where a host is not equal to an object.
+
+This Recommendation mainly focuses on objects that have a one-to-many mapping relationship.
+
+Figure 6-1 represents the relationship between object and network attachment in IPv6-based NGN. In this figure, the point of attachment (PoA) represents a physical end point of network and a termination point of connection with IPv6 address. There are fixed or mobile objects to be attached to the IPv6-based NGN. In the context of mobility of persons and objects, there is not necessarily any permanent relationship between the identity of an object to be involved in a telecommunication activity and its location (i.e., the place where it can be found) [ITU-T Y.2011]. The location of a given telecommunication object can be represented by the physical PoA, where the said object may be reached or found. At the border between the object and PoA in the network, the relevant mapping or binding should be done using the related ID information for connecting to objects irrespective of location change in the fixed and mobile environment.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation is to consider the relationship with IPv6 address for association between the PoA and object(s) in IPv6-based NGN (see dotted box in Figure 6-1).
+
+
+
+● Point of attachment (PoA) ○ Object Y.2055(11)\_F6-1
+
+Diagram illustrating the relationship between object and network attachment in IPv6-based NGN. The diagram shows a central 'IPv6-based NGN' core connected to multiple 'Point of attachment (PoA)' nodes (black dots). These PoA nodes are connected to 'Object' nodes (white circles) via 'Object ID' and 'IPv6 address' mappings. The diagram also shows a person running, representing a mobile object, connected to the network through a PoA. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: a black dot for 'Point of attachment (PoA)' and a white circle for 'Object'. The text 'Y.2055(11)\_F6-1' is also present.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Relationship between object and network attachment in IPv6-based NGN**
+
+### 6.2 Basic concept of object mapping
+
+The identification and mapping of all objects for providing end-to-end connectivity is crucial. Identifiers are capable of identifying all relevant objects and facilitating object-to-object communication. In particular, globally unique identifiers enable a great many applications, including tracking, access control, and the protection of objects.
+
+As shown in Figure 6-2, the layered architecture of NGN requires specific processing capabilities at each layer. Each user or object in applications is identified by an identity such as a name with a set of attributes of an entity. An attribute can be thought of as metadata that belongs to a specific entity in a specific context, some of which could be highly private or sensitive. The identity should be associated with object IDs through identification and authorization for identity management. Each
+
+object ID also should be associated with an IPv6 address through mapping (binding) for object mapping.
+
+An ID resolution server such as domain name system (DNS) can provide a function to translate the identifier of an object into the IPv6 address to access ubiquitous networking services provided by database or application servers. From the IPv6-based NGN perspective, how to map (bind) the IPv6 address with other identifiers for providing end-to-end IP connectivity is critical.
+
+Identity processing is comprised of identity management, object mapping, and ID/LOC separation. This Recommendation focuses on object mapping using IPv6.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of object identification through identity processing in an IPv6-based NGN. It is structured into three main columns: Layered architecture, Identity processing, and Scope.
+
+- Layered architecture:** This column shows three distinct layers separated by dashed lines:
+ - Applications (Person, objects):** The top layer, represented by a yellow box.
+ - Services (Service stratum):** The middle layer, represented by a green box.
+ - Networks (Transport stratum):** The bottom layer, represented by an orange box.
+- Identity processing:** This column shows the flow of identity processing across the layers:
+ - User/object identities:** An oval at the top, associated with "Name (attributes)".
+ - Identification/authorization:** A purple box in the middle layer, connected to the top oval by a double-headed arrow.
+ - Object IDs:** An oval at the bottom of the middle layer, associated with "Device ID, content ID, telephone number, URL/URI, etc.".
+ - Mapping/binding:** A purple box at the bottom, connected to the Object IDs oval by a double-headed arrow.
+ - IPv6 address:** An oval at the bottom, associated with "Session/protocol ID, IPv6 address, MAC address, etc.".
+- Scope:** This column shows the scope of the process within an "IPv6-based NGN":
+ - Identity management:** A box at the top.
+ - Object mapping:** A box in the middle, highlighted with a dashed orange border.
+ - ID/LOC separation:** A box at the bottom.
+
+Reference: Y.2055(11)\_F6-2
+
+Figure 6-2: Object identification through identity processing in IPv6-based NGN. The diagram is divided into three main sections: Layered architecture, Identity processing, and Scope. Layered architecture shows three layers: Applications (Person, objects), Services (Service stratum), and Networks (Transport stratum). Identity processing shows a flow from User/object identities (Name attributes) through Identification/authorization to Object IDs (Device ID, content ID, telephone number, URL/URI, etc.), and then through Mapping/binding to IPv6 address (Session/protocol ID, IPv6 address, MAC address, etc.). Scope shows a vertical flow from Identity management to Object mapping (highlighted with a dashed orange border) to ID/LOC separation, all within an IPv6-based NGN context. A reference Y.2055(11)\_F6-2 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Object identification through identity processing in IPv6-based NGN**
+
+### 6.3 Requirements for object mapping using IPv6
+
+As described in clause 6.1, there are many kinds of identifiers. Using these identifiers, devices are recommended to be reachable to the other users or devices. For managing a large number of different identifiers to use IPv6 network infrastructure, it is recommended to use both the location information of the IPv6 address and the unique information of identifiers.
+
+Accordingly, it is recommended to combine the IPv6 address with identifiers for end-to-end connectivity. Based on the identifier, the current IPv6 address structure would be changed to include the information of identifiers. Thus, the efficient combining method between the IPv6 address and the object ID is required as an example of address mapping.
+
+Figure 6-3 shows address mapping (binding) with the IPv6 address for IPv6-based networking. The mechanism which maps/binds the IPv6 address and several identifiers can provide reachability to enable ubiquitous access to objects. Each identifier can be addressable in the IPv6-based NGN. The reachable scope can be defined by the IPv6 prefix used. Location computation software could directly communicate with devices from anywhere within the IPv6-based NGN.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating the mapping or binding between IPv6 address and object IDs in IPv6-based NGN. The diagram shows a layered architecture with three horizontal lines representing layers. At the top layer, there are several colored boxes representing object IDs: EUI-64 (orange), ITU-T E.164 (blue), Serial number (yellow), Device identifier (green oval containing three blue circles), URL (yellow), and VPN group (purple). At the bottom layer, there is a large yellow oval labeled 'IPv6-based NGN'. Dashed arrows point from each of the top-layer boxes down to the bottom-layer oval. A red text label 'Mapping/binding with IPv6 address' is positioned in the middle layer, with dashed arrows pointing from it to the 'Device identifier' box and the 'IPv6-based NGN' oval. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2055(11)\_F6-3' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – Mapping or binding between IPv6 address and object IDs in IPv6-based NGN**
+
+## **7 Mapping architecture and relationship between identities**
+
+### **7.1 Mapping architecture between identifiers**
+
+#### **7.1.1 Classification of network entities to be identified**
+
+Networks are comprised of entities and these network entities have a layered architecture which is used for naming, addressing and routing as shown in Figure 7-1.
+
+- Services (i.e., information related to applications/services such as object ID)
+- End points (i.e., IP termination points with globally unique identifier)
+- Location (i.e., IPv6 address)
+- Path (i.e., routing between network attachments).
+
+In particular, for object-to-object communications, information for several kinds of object on top of end points should be identified in the network.
+
+#### **7.1.2 Layered mapping architecture between identifiers**
+
+The architecture in Figure 7-1 has the following relationship at each layer.
+
+A service is an entity that is either an instance of a specific application service or a specific data object. The identity of the object persists over time and is not tied to the end system hosting the service or data. An application layer has a capability for object mapping.
+
+A Location is identified with some sort of network address or locator. These locators often depend on the network topology and technology used. The network layer includes the locator information of the host which resides in a node in a network. ID/LOC separation can be performed in this layer.
+
+A Path represents a physical route between physical devices for connectivity (e.g., PoA).
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1: Layered mapping architecture between identifiers. The diagram shows three layers: Application, Network layer, and Connectivity. In the Application layer, 'Object ID' (blue square) is mapped to 'Service' (dashed line) and then to 'Object ID' (blue square) on the right, labeled 'Object Mapping' in red. In the Network layer, 'IPv6 address' (yellow square) is mapped to 'Location' (dashed line) and then to 'IPv6 address' (yellow square) on the right, labeled 'ID/LOC Separation' in blue. In the Connectivity layer, 'Point of attachment' (green square) is mapped to 'Path' (solid line) and then to 'Point of attachment' (green square) on the right, labeled '(i.e., routing)'. Vertical lines connect the squares across layers, and a horizontal line connects the green squares in the Connectivity layer.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Layered mapping architecture between identifiers**
+
+One purpose of defining a layered architecture is to provide mappings (bindings) between entities at different levels. With mappings (bindings), identities of entities become location independent. Furthermore, different types of mobility, such as for nodes and services, become possible without resorting to add-on mechanisms.
+
+### 7.2 Mapping relationships between identifiers
+
+For object mapping, two mapping relationship could be considered as follows (see Figure 7-2):
+
+#### - Direct mapping
+
+An object at the application layer is directly reachable to the host entity at the PoA to which the IP is terminated. This object is located on top of the TCP/IP protocol stack (e.g., objects inside a server).
+
+#### - Indirect mapping
+
+An object at the application layer is remotely reachable through the non-IP interface to the host entity at the PoA to which IP is terminated. This object is located outside the physical network attachment to which IP is terminated.
+
+Indirect mapping can additionally support advanced mobility schemes, such as moving objects, and explicitly control middle boxes. Indirect means that the name of an entity does not bind "down" within the same node, but sideways to another location where an intermediary takes care of forwarding the communication to the entity's actual location. A simple application of this mechanism enables servers to operate behind a gateway without explicit configuration.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-2 illustrates two mapping relationships between identifiers. In (a) Direct mapping, a Host contains an Object ID (blue box), an IPv6 address (yellow box), and a Point of attachment (green box). The IPv6 address is connected to the Point of attachment, which is connected to an IP interface. In (b) Indirect mapping, a Host contains an IPv6 address (yellow box) and a Point of attachment (green box). The IPv6 address is connected to the Point of attachment, which is connected to an IP interface. A dashed arrow points from the IPv6 address to an Object ID (blue box) located outside the Host, which is connected to a Non-IP interface (e.g., air interface).
+
+Figure 7-2 – Mapping relationship between identifiers. (a) Direct mapping: A Host contains an Object ID (blue box), an IPv6 address (yellow box), and a Point of attachment (green box). The IPv6 address is connected to the Point of attachment, which is connected to an IP interface. (b) Indirect mapping: A Host contains an IPv6 address (yellow box) and a Point of attachment (green box). The IPv6 address is connected to the Point of attachment, which is connected to an IP interface. A dashed arrow points from the IPv6 address to an Object ID (blue box) located outside the Host, which is connected to a Non-IP interface (e.g., air interface).
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Mapping relationship between identifiers**
+
+#### 7.2.1 ID bindings under direct mapping
+
+The IPv6 address is a typical example of identifiers which are used for data transportation in IPv6-based NGN. Binding between the object ID and the IPv6 address is done in two ways, namely explicit binding and implicit binding.
+
+**Explicit binding** is a one-to-one association between the IPv6 address and the object ID. In most cases, it would be a mapping-table based mechanism. With each IPv6 address, the related object ID could be retrieved by checking against the mapping table. Explicit binding can also be used in the case of single IPv6 address mapping to multiple object IDs. In this case, the host is using the same IPv6 address to serve more than one service. The host sends the router solicitation (for stateless address configuration) or the DHCP request (for stateful address configuration) to request subnet prefix or IPv6 address. Next, the network attachment control function (NACF) [ITU-T Y.2014] allocates the subnet prefix or address; the service control functions may register the binding on the object ID and the IPv6 address. With this approach, the binding of object ID and IPv6 address is achieved at both the service stratum and transport stratum.
+
+**Implicit binding** is to implicitly embed the related object ID into the IPv6 address. Such information may be included in the subnet ID field of the IPv6 address. In the IPv6 network, every single device may have an address due to the huge addressing space. Some of these addresses may only be used for single services such as a remote monitoring device. In this case, the host sends router solicitation (for stateless address configuration) or DHCP request (for stateful address configuration) with service type information. According to some mapping relationship between the service type or ID and subnet prefix, router responses with router advertisement (for stateless address configuration) or DHCP response (for stateful address configuration) containing the subnet prefix of the corresponding service type/ID. For stateful address configuration, the host directly receives the IPv6 address with the embedded object ID information. For stateless address configuration, the host uses the received subnet prefix to generate an IPv6 address. With this approach, binding of object ID and IPv6 address is achieved implicitly.
+
+NOTE – ID binding under indirect mapping is out of scope in the Recommendation.
+
+## **8 Mechanisms for object mapping**
+
+### **8.1 ID bindings in NGN architecture**
+
+NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] is basically composed of the service stratum and transport stratum. Service stratum has service control functions and the application/service support functions. Transport stratum further comprises transport functions and transport control functions. There are two major functions, NACF and resource admission control function (RACF) [b-ITU-T Y.2111], in transport control functions. Appendix II presents NACF functional architecture for NGN.
+
+The ID bindings involve the interaction between the service stratum and transport stratum, especially the service control functions and network access control functions.
+
+Explicit binding may happen after the network access. It is loosely coupled to the IPv6 address provisioning procedures. Implicit binding most likely happens at the time of IPv6 address allocation. As IPv6 supports DHCP-based stateful address allocation and RS or RA-based stateless address allocation, both cases need to be taken care of.
+
+Appendix III provides information flows of explicit binding and implicit binding.
+
+### **8.2 Object mapping mechanism**
+
+Figure 8-1 shows the basic mechanism of sending a data packet to an object and mappings (bindings). The relevant procedures include:
+
+- Find a node on which the required object resides. This requires finding the object and end point through object ID registration. Name resolution using domain name system (DNS) is optionally required.
+- Find a network attachment point to which the node is connected. This requires finding a location. For this, a client obtains a binding information object ID and an IPv6 address.
+- Find a path from the client to object(s). The client can directly connect to object(s) using routing.
+
+For object mapping, the following mapping tables are required:
+
+- DNS\_table: includes mapping information between the domain name and the IPv6 address of gateway (GW).
+- Object\_GW\_table: includes mapping information between object IDs and the IPv6 address of GW.
+- Object\_Port\_table: includes mapping information between object IDs and port numbers.
+
+The detailed protocols for object mapping mechanism are out of scope in this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the object mapping mechanism in an IPv6-based NGN. It shows the interaction between a Client, an Information server, and various tables to route traffic to Objects.
+
+**DNS\_table**
+
+| Domain name | GW_IPv6 address |
+|-----------------|-------------------|
+| www.info.object | 2001::x:x:x:x:x:x |
+
+**Object\_GW\_table (many-to-one)**
+
+| Object ID | GW_IPv6 address |
+|-----------|-------------------|
+| X12345 | 2001::x:x:x:x:x:x |
+| X12346 | |
+| X12347 | |
+
+**Object\_Port\_table**
+
+| Object ID | Port |
+|-----------|------|
+| X12345 | 20 |
+| X12346 | 21 |
+| X12347 | 22 |
+
+The process involves the following steps:
+
+- Find location:** The Client sends a request to the Information server. The Information server performs **Name resolution** using the **DNS** table to find the GW\_IPv6 address.
+- Find object (end point):** The Information server uses the **Object\_GW\_table** to find the GW\_IPv6 address for the specific Object ID.
+- Find path:** The Information server uses the **Object\_Port\_table** to find the Port for the specific Object ID.
+- Connect to object(s) using routing path:** The Client connects to the Objects via the GW (Gateway) and Hosts.
+
+The Client is **Directly reachable to object(s)**.
+
+Y.2055(11)\_F8-1
+
+Figure 8-1 – Object mapping mechanism diagram showing the flow from a Client through an IPv6-based NGN to Objects, involving DNS, Information server, and various tables.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Object mapping mechanism**
+
+## 9 Security considerations
+
+Basic considerations on security architecture for NGN are addressed in [ITU-T Y.2001] while security requirements of the NGN are described in [ITU-T Y.2701]. Concerning the specifics of ubiquitous networking, the various kinds of terminals, devices and contents that can be involved will have to conform to the security requirements of the network they are willing to attach. When attaching to the NGN, the corresponding authentication and authorization requirements, as described in [ITU-T Y.2702], are applicable. These requirements can be applied to IPv6-based NGN.
+
+In this Recommendation, objects involved in the IPv6-based NGN have their own identities and are interconnected involving more interactions throughout a dynamic and heterogeneous environment. Accordingly, security, including the design of the security architecture for a secure information discovery and delivery to users including persons and objects, is very crucial.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Examples of mapping between host and object(s)
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix introduces an example of mapping relationships between the host and object(s).
+
+#### 1 Host = Object (one-to-one mapping)
+
+When a host is equal to an object, there is a one-to-one mapping relationship between the host and the object. Most of the information technology (IT) devices such as personal computer (PC) are included in this case.
+
+For example, if one uses a telephone device, the device as host can be allocated a telephone number as an ID for the service and be treated the same as an object.
+
+#### 2 Host $\neq$ Object (one-to-many mapping)
+
+When a host is not equal to an object, there is a one-to-many mapping relationship between the host and object(s).
+
+There are two kinds of one-to-many mapping as follows:
+
+As shown in Figure I.1-a, Host including objects such as content servers: a host includes many objects and these objects should be identified using content ID, etc.
+
+As shown in Figure I.1-b, Host with remote objects: a host has many remote objects and these objects should be identified using identifiers. In this case, each object might be a non-IP.
+
+
+
+A light green rectangular box labeled 'Host' at the bottom contains three blue ovals, each labeled 'Object', stacked vertically. Below the last oval are three dots '...'.
+
+Diagram (a) Host including objects (e.g., content server)
+
+(a) Host including objects (e.g., content server)
+
+
+
+A light green rectangular box labeled 'Host' on the left is connected by dashed lines to three yellow ovals on the right, each labeled 'Object'. The ovals are stacked vertically, with three dots '...' between the top and middle ovals, and between the middle and bottom ovals. Below the bottom oval is the text 'Remote objects (non IP)'.
+
+Diagram (b) Host with remote objects
+
+(b) Host with remote objects
+
+**Figure I.1 – Mapping between host and objects (one-to-many mapping)**
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Network attachment control function (NACF) functional architecture
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure II.1 describes the NACF functional architecture with the functional entities and the relevant reference points. The details for NACF are specified in [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the NACF functional architecture. At the top, a box labeled 'Service Control Functions' is connected to the NACF block via a dashed line labeled 'S-TC1'. The NACF block is a large rectangle containing several functional entities: HGWC-FE, TUP-FE, TAA-FE, AM-FE, TLM-FE, and NAC-FE. These entities are interconnected with reference points: Ni, Nb, Nc, Nx, Ng, Ne, Nd, Na, and Nk. To the right of the NACF block is the MMCF block, which contains NID-FE, MLM-FE, and HDC-FE. It is connected to the NACF block via reference points M1, M2, and M13. Below the MMCF block is the RACF block, which contains PD-FE. It is connected to the NACF block via reference point Ru. At the bottom, the 'Transport Functions' block contains AR-FE, PE-FE, and L2HE-FE/L3HEF. It is connected to the NACF block via reference points TC-T1 and TC-Ux. On the left, the CPE block contains TE and HGW. It is connected to the Transport Functions block via reference point T-U1. On the right, a vertical bar labeled 'Other NGNs' is connected to the Transport Functions block.
+
+Figure II.1 – NACF functional architecture diagram
+
+**Figure II.1 – NACF functional architecture**
+
+The NACF comprises the following functional entities:
+
+- Network access control functional entity (NAC-FE)
+- Access management functional entity (AM-FE)
+- Transport location management functional entity (TLM-FE)
+- Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)
+- Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)
+- Home gateway configuration functional entity (HGWC-FE)
+
+NOTE – Meaning of other terms used in Figure II.1: terminal equipment (TE), home gateway (HGW), access relay functional entity (AR-FE), policy enforcement functional entities (PE-FE), policy decision functional entity (PD-FE), network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE), mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE), handover decision and control functional entity (HDC-FE).
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Information flows of explicit binding and implicit binding
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure III.1 shows the information flow of explicit binding and Figure III.2 shows the information flow of implicit binding.
+
+In the explicit binding case, the host obtains the IPv6 address or subnet prefix as usual. Service control functions must be able to do the event registration of ID bindings when a user logs on to the service. Object ID is part of the information in this event registration request from SCF to TLM-FE via reference point S-TC1.
+
+In the implicit binding case, the host gives the implicit indication of the service type it would like to access at the time of sending the address allocation request. The subnet ID of the prefix is allocated to the host, based on the service type information. TLM-FE can notify the SCF via reference point S-TC1 about the binding of the address and object ID without waiting for the user to log on to the service.
+
+NOTE – S-TC1 indicates the relationship between service stratum functional entity and transport control functional entity in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow for explicit binding, divided into two scenarios: Stateful address configuration and Stateless address configuration. The participants involved are CPE, AR-FE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and SCF.
+
+**Stateful address configuration:**
+
+- 1. DHCP Request: CPE sends to AR-FE.
+- 2.1. DHCP Response: AR-FE sends to CPE.
+- 2.2 network location info: NAC-FE sends to TLM-FE.
+- 3. Registration of ID bindings: TLM-FE sends to SCF.
+
+**Stateless address configuration:**
+
+- 1. RS: CPE sends to AR-FE.
+- 2. Request prefix and configuration: AR-FE sends to AM-FE.
+- 3. network location info: AM-FE sends to TLM-FE.
+- 4. prefix and conf rsp: TLM-FE sends to AM-FE.
+- 5. RA /w subnet prefix: AM-FE sends to CPE.
+- 6. Registration of ID bindings: TLM-FE sends to SCF.
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for explicit and stateless address configuration between CPE, AR-FE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and SCF.
+
+Figure III.1 – Information flow of explicit binding
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CPE
+ participant AR_FE as AR-FE
+ participant AM_FE as AM-FE
+ participant NAC_FE as NAC-FE
+ participant TLM_FE as TLM-FE
+ participant SCF
+
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note left of CPE: Stateful address
+configuration
+ CPE->>AR_FE: 1. DHCP Req
+ AR_FE->>AM_FE:
+ AM_FE->>NAC_FE:
+ NAC_FE->>TLM_FE: 2. 1 inform address
+and subnet ID
+ TLM_FE->>SCF: 3. Notification of ID
+bindings
+ SCF-->>TLM_FE:
+ TLM_FE-->>NAC_FE:
+ NAC_FE-->>AM_FE:
+ AM_FE-->>AR_FE:
+ AR_FE->>CPE: 2.2 DHCP
+Response /w
+implicit binding
+ end
+
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note left of CPE: Stateless address
+configuration
+ CPE->>AR_FE: 1. RS
+ AR_FE->>AM_FE:
+ AM_FE->>NAC_FE:
+ NAC_FE->>TLM_FE: 2.1 inform subnet
+ID
+ TLM_FE->>SCF: 3. Notification of ID
+bindings
+ SCF-->>TLM_FE:
+ TLM_FE-->>NAC_FE:
+ NAC_FE-->>AM_FE:
+ AM_FE-->>AR_FE:
+ AR_FE->>CPE: 2.2 RA /w
+Implicit binding
+ end
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow of implicit binding for two types of address configuration: stateful and stateless. The participants involved are CPE, AR-FE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and SCF.
+
+**Stateful address configuration:**
+
+- CPE sends a "1. DHCP Req" to AR-FE.
+- The request propagates through AM-FE and NAC-FE.
+- NAC-FE sends "2. 1 inform address and subnet ID" to TLM-FE.
+- TLM-FE sends "3. Notification of ID bindings" to SCF.
+- The response flows back from SCF through TLM-FE, NAC-FE, and AM-FE to AR-FE.
+- AR-FE sends "2.2 DHCP Response /w implicit binding" back to CPE.
+
+**Stateless address configuration:**
+
+- CPE sends a "1. RS" (Router Solicitation) to AR-FE.
+- The request propagates through AM-FE and NAC-FE.
+- NAC-FE sends "2.1 inform subnet ID" to TLM-FE.
+- TLM-FE sends "3. Notification of ID bindings" to SCF.
+- The response flows back from SCF through TLM-FE, NAC-FE, and AM-FE to AR-FE.
+- AR-FE sends "2.2 RA /w Implicit binding" (Router Advertisement) back to CPE.
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow of implicit binding for stateful and stateless address configuration across CPE, AR-FE, AM-FE, NAC-FE, TLM-FE, and SCF.
+
+**Figure III.2 – Information flow of implicit binding**
+
+It is noted that for stateless address configuration, only the subnet prefix is sent via the router advertisement but not the whole address. In this case, the subnet prefix could be used as an ID for transport to be bound with an object ID. If there is a requirement on finer granularity of binding, it is possible to do the binding on the address and object ID. The host generates the address based on the received subnet prefix. Then it should inform the TLM-FE about that IPv6 address it generated. Following that, TLM-FE will notify the service control function with the enhanced or detailed binding information.
+
+## **Appendix IV**
+
+### **Examples for services using object mapping**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Using the object processing including identification and mapping, IPv6-based NGN can provide an integrated solution for personal location and management through identification/naming/ addressing including ID registration, location tracking, dynamic mobility control, and security using the following ubiquitous networking services:
+
+- IdM services for the management of the identity life cycle of objects including managing unique IDs, attributes, credentials, entitlements to consistently enforce business and security policies.
+- Context-aware services for improving the usability and providing personalized services based on context recognition through adapting the service to the context.
+- Location management services for real-time location tracking, monitoring, and information processing of moving objects similar to the supply chain management (SCM).
+- Directory services for searching and retrieving information from a catalogue of well-defined objects, and domain name services for translating human-readable names into the IPv6 addresses that the network equipment needs to deliver information.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2008), *Resource and admission control functions in next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2062
+
+(03/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Framework of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2062
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2062**
+
+# **Framework of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2062 describes the concept and high-level architectural model of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks (NGNs). It also presents requirements and a mechanism for identification of all objects and for providing connectivity to them.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2062 | 2012-03-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+NGN, object, ubiquitous networking.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Term defined in this Recommendation ..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Ubiquitous networking in NGNs ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 Overview of ubiquitous networking..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 Architectural model for ubiquitous networking ..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Basic concept of object-to-object communication ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.1 Objects in the ubiquitous networking environment..... | 7 |
+| | 7.2 Characteristics of objects..... | 7 |
+| 8 | Requirements of "connecting-to-anything" capability for ubiquitous networking..... | 8 |
+| | 8.1 General requirements for object-to-object communication..... | 8 |
+| | 8.2 Technical considerations for object-to-object communication ..... | 9 |
+| 9 | A mechanism for object-to-object communication: identity processing for connecting to anything..... | 10 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 12 |
+| | Appendix I – Characteristics and examples of objects in the ubiquitous networking environment..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix II – Ubiquitous networking applications and examples using object-to-object communication ..... | 15 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2062
+
+# Framework of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the concept and high-level architectural model of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking in next generation networks (NGNs). It also presents requirements and a mechanism for identification of all objects and for providing connectivity to them. This Recommendation covers the following items:
+
+- General overview of ubiquitous networking in NGNs from the end-user perspective
+- Basic concept and high-level architectural model for object-to-object communication using NGNs
+- Requirements and technical considerations of object-to-object communication for ubiquitous networking
+- A mechanism for object-to-object communication.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2002] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2002 (2009), *Overview of ubiquitous networking and of its support in NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2291] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2291 (2011), *Architectural overview of next generation home networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 context** [ITU-T Y.2002]: The information that can be used to characterize the environment of a user.
+
+NOTE – Context information may include where the user is, what resources (devices, access points, noise level, bandwidth, etc.) are near the user, at what time the user is moving, interaction history between person and objects, etc. According to specific applications, context information can be updated.
+
+**3.1.2 object** [ITU-T Y.2002]: An intrinsic representation of an entity that is described at an appropriate level of abstraction in terms of its attributes and functions.
+
+NOTE 1 – An object is characterized by its behaviour. An object is distinct from any other object. An object interacts with its environment including other objects at its interaction points. An object is informally said to perform functions and offer services (an object which makes a function available is said to offer a service). For modelling purposes, these functions and services are specified in terms of the behaviour of the object and of its interfaces. An object can perform more than one function. A function can be performed by the cooperation of several objects.
+
+NOTE 2 – Objects include terminal devices (e.g., used by a person to access the network such as mobile phones, Personal computers, etc.), remote monitoring devices (e.g., cameras, sensors, etc.), information devices (e.g., content delivery server), products, contents, and resources.
+
+**3.1.3 ubiquitous networking** [ITU-T Y.2002]: The ability for persons and/or devices to access services and communicate while minimizing technical restrictions regarding where, when and how these services are accessed, in the context of the service(s) subscribed to.
+
+NOTE – Although technical restrictions to access services and communicate may be minimized, other constraints such as regulatory, national, provider and environmental constraints may impose further restrictions.
+
+### **3.2 Term defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------|
+| ANI | Application to Network Interface |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| BT | Bio Technology |
+| CT | Content Technology |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IT | Information Technology |
+| ITS | Intelligent Transportation System |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| LTE | Long Term Evolution |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NT | Nano Technology |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RFID | Radio Frequency Identifier |
+| UNI | User to Network Interface |
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| WiMAX | Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+| xDSL | Various types of Digital Subscriber Lines |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+## 6 Ubiquitous networking in NGNs
+
+### 6.1 Overview of ubiquitous networking
+
+The term "ubiquitous networking" as defined in clause 3.1.3 is used for networking capabilities to support various classes of applications and services which require the "Any services, any time, any where and any objects" operation using NGN-enabled capabilities. This networking capability should support person-to-person, person-to-object (e.g., device and/or machine), and object-to-object communications.
+
+For object-to-object communication, an object delivers information (e.g., sensor-related information) to another object, with or without the involvement of persons.
+
+Figure 1 shows a general network configuration for ubiquitous networking. Objects around us are connected to the network and communicate through the establishment of end-to-end connectivity between them. Objects which are not moving are called fixed objects. Objects which move from one place to another are called mobile objects. Logical objects (e.g., contents in a server, resources, etc.) are considered as entities to be connected. These objects are connected to an NGN via wired or wireless interfaces in a fixed environment (e.g., home, building, etc.) or mobile environment (e.g., vehicle). In particular, some physical objects (i.e., fixed objects and/or mobile objects) are connected as logical objects through their virtual representation to be identifiable. A gateway can be used as an intermediate node between object(s) and a network. Depending on communication environment, a home network can reside in the position of gateway.
+
+
+
+Y.2062(12)\_F01
+
+— Wired interface - - - - Wireless interface G/W Gateway
+
+Figure 1: General network configuration for ubiquitous networking. The diagram shows a central NGN cloud connected to various components. At the top left, 'Fixed/mobile objects' connect to a 'G/W' (Gateway) within a 'Home network' cloud via wireless interfaces (dashed lines). A 'Fixed object' connects to the NGN cloud via a wired interface (solid line). A 'Mobile object' connects to the NGN cloud via a wireless interface. On the right, 'Logical objects in a server' are connected to the NGN cloud via a wired interface. At the bottom left, 'Objects in a home/building' connect to a 'G/W' via wireless interfaces, which then connects to the NGN cloud via a wired interface. At the bottom right, 'Other networks' connect to the NGN cloud via wireless interfaces, and a 'Moving vehicle' is shown connected to these other networks via a wired interface. A legend at the bottom indicates that solid lines represent wired interfaces, dashed lines represent wireless interfaces, and a box labeled 'G/W' represents a Gateway.
+
+**Figure 1 – General network configuration for ubiquitous networking**
+
+### 6.2 Architectural model for ubiquitous networking
+
+From the architectural model for ubiquitous networking in Figure 2 of [ITU-T Y.2002] (reproduced here as Figure 2), enhanced capabilities for ubiquitous networking in NGNs include:
+
+- Connecting-to-anything capabilities
+- Open web-based service environment capabilities
+- Context-awareness and seamless capabilities
+- Multi-networking capabilities
+- End-to-end connectivity over interconnected networks.
+
+Among the specified capabilities, "connecting-to-anything" is tightly related to functionalities on the end-user side of NGNs. This Recommendation focuses mainly on object-to-object communication to support the connecting-to-anything capability for ubiquitous networking on the end-user side.
+
+
+
+Y.2062(12)\_F02
+
+Figure 2: Connecting-to-anything in the architectural model for ubiquitous networking in an NGN. The diagram shows a three-layer architecture. At the top is 'Ubiquitous networking applications' containing 'Web service environments (IT + vehicle, health, etc.)'. This connects via an 'ANI' (Application Network Interface) to an 'Open interface (API)'. Below this is the 'NGN service and transport stratum' (yellow box) containing 'Context-awareness' (User and environmental status recognition), 'Seamlessness' (Any time, any where, any device, any content, always connected), and 'Multi-networking' (Unicast/multicast, multihoming, multi-interface, multi-path). This stratum connects via a 'UNI' (User Network Interface) to the 'End-user' (purple dashed box) containing 'Connecting to anything' (Personal device, RFID tag, sensor, smart card). It also connects via an 'NNI' (Network Network Interface) to 'Other networks' (green box) containing 'IPv4/IPv6 networks', 'Broadcasting networks', 'Mobile/wireless networks', and 'PSTN/ISDN'. A large orange arrow at the bottom indicates 'End-to-end connectivity' across the entire system.
+
+**Figure 2 – Connecting-to-anything in the architectural model for ubiquitous networking in an NGN**
+
+Figure 3 shows a high-level architectural model for object-to-object communication with an NGN based on architectural model for ubiquitous networking in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Y.2062(12)\_F03
+
+Figure 3: High-level architectural model for object-to-object communication with an NGN. The diagram shows a detailed view of the NGN architecture. At the top is 'Ubiquitous networking applications' connected via 'ANI' to the 'NGN' block. The 'NGN' block is divided into two main strata: the 'NGN service stratum' (green box) containing 'Application support functions and service support functions' and 'Service control and content delivery functions'; and the 'NGN transport stratum' (yellow box) containing 'Transport control functions' and 'Transport functions'. A 'Management functions' block (blue) is also shown. The 'NGN' block connects via a 'UNI' (User Network Interface) to the 'End-user functions' block. The 'End-user functions' block is divided into 'Objects' (purple box) containing 'Information storage', 'Information collection', 'Information processing', 'Communication', and 'Performing action'; and 'Gateway (Home network)' (white box) containing 'Applications' (Service, Transport) and 'H-TNI'. A 'IdM functions' block (orange) is also shown.
+
+NOTE – H-TNI [ITU-T Y.2291] in end-user functions can be used for objects-to-object communication.
+
+**Figure 3 – High-level architectural model for object-to-object communication with an NGN**
+
+Capabilities for ubiquitous networking are highly distributed and interact with infrastructure (e.g., an NGN) which interconnects with various types of objects. The infrastructure aims to continuously capture, manage and provide data about objects for applications. The following functions are required for object-to-object communication within an NGN.
+
+#### **End-user functions**
+
+End-user functions provide a set of functionalities with or without gateway (or home network) for connecting and collaborating objects on the end-user side. To support ubiquitous networking applications, objects support functions for information storage, information collection, information processing, communication, and performing actions.
+
+Depending on the type of objects (see clause 7.2 and Appendix I), objects which have limited functionalities collaborate among other objects to provide additional functionality. Furthermore, objects need unique identifiers or names that can be used as a link in order to find and manage data to support ubiquitous networking applications.
+
+#### **NGN transport stratum**
+
+Due to the heterogeneities of objects, (e.g., different types of interfaces without supporting IP), there are restrictions to supporting a direct communication and data exchange between the objects. One of the functions of the transport stratum is to provide a bridge across this technological gap with end-user functions.
+
+The transport stratum supports the exchange of messages among objects and the given applications. The transport stratum also maintains the list of objects and implements address mapping accordingly.
+
+#### **NGN service stratum**
+
+The usage context and the situation of objects are changed during the lifespan of the physical objects. For instance, as objects move along the supply chain, change owner and location, and are faced with changing environmental and regulatory conditions, the respective objects have to support different, often unpredictable, application scenarios. In close interaction with the transport stratum, the service stratum provides the required software repositories, as well as monitoring functionality to capture the current situation.
+
+The function to establish highly available, scalable, and secure information management enables to automatically decide which portion of data is relevant in a given usage scenario and context.
+
+The data that have been captured or processed at the transport stratum have also to be filtered or aggregated carefully depending on the data density and accuracy required by the respective applications. Filtering and aggregation of data can be applied at multiple semantic levels.
+
+To find the requested information that may reside in different data storage systems distributed, locally managed data repositories, as well as a naming service, are supported.
+
+#### **Ubiquitous networking applications**
+
+Ubiquitous networking applications utilize and enrich the information that the underlying infrastructure provides in many ways. Data that have been previously collected by objects and persisted in repositories are used to support various applications among various stakeholders.
+
+NOTE – IdM functions and management functions are common functionalities to be considered both on the end-user side and in NGN service/transport strata.
+
+## 7 Basic concept of object-to-object communication
+
+### 7.1 Objects in the ubiquitous networking environment
+
+The object means the user or other entity that are connected to the network. It includes almost everything around us, such as remote monitoring and information devices, machine, or content.
+
+As shown in Figure 4, the types of objects on the end-user side include the following:
+
+- Personal devices
+- Information devices
+- RFID or sensors
+- Contents
+- Appliances
+- Vehicles, trains, airplanes or any means of transportation.
+
+These objects associated with humans are connected to an NGN through the user to network interface (UNI) with heterogeneous networking environments in terms of network/access protocols and physical mediums. Various types of gateways and/or ad-hoc networks can be used to support connecting-to-anything capabilities with an NGN.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the concept of "connecting-to-anything" with an NGN. On the left, a vertical yellow bar represents the "Human" side, containing a list of object categories: Personal devices (PC, phone, PDA, TV, camera), Info.devices (Server, database, navigation, meter), RFID/sensors (RFID tag, e-tag, smart card), Contents (Audio, video, doc, book), Appliances (Home, office, medical, surveillance), and Vehicles (Car, train, airplane). These objects are connected to a central network layer. This layer includes "Network protocols" (- IP/non-IP), "Access protocols" (- xDSL, - Optical LAN, - WLAN, - WiMax, - LTE, - Femtocell, picocell (Different coverage)), "(Intermediate systems/networks)", a "Gateway" (Indoor/outdoor gateway, reader), "Ad-hoc networks" (Wireless sensor net, vehicle-to-vehicle net), and "Physical mediums" (Wired/wireless (Multiple interfaces)). A red line labeled "Connecting to anything" connects the objects to the central network layer. A dashed line labeled "UNI" (User to Network Interface) connects the central network layer to the "NGN" (Next Generation Network) on the right.
+
+Conceptual diagram for 'connecting-to-anything' with an NGN. The diagram shows a vertical stack of object categories on the left, connected to a central network layer, which then connects to an NGN on the right. The object categories are: Personal devices (PC, phone, PDA, TV, camera), Info.devices (Server, database, navigation, meter), RFID/sensors (RFID tag, e-tag, smart card), Contents (Audio, video, doc, book), Appliances (Home, office, medical, surveillance), and Vehicles (Car, train, airplane). The central network layer includes Network protocols (- IP/non-IP), Access protocols (- xDSL, - Optical LAN, - WLAN, - WiMax, - LTE, - Femtocell, picocell (Different coverage)), (Intermediate systems/networks), Gateway (Indoor/outdoor gateway, reader), Ad-hoc networks (Wireless sensor net, vehicle-to-vehicle net), and Physical mediums (Wired/wireless (Multiple interfaces)). The connection is labeled 'Connecting to anything' and 'UNI'.
+
+Figure 4 – Conceptual diagram for "connecting-to-anything" with an NGN
+
+### 7.2 Characteristics of objects
+
+Objects can be classified into several types as follows.
+
+- Physical object vs. logical object (e.g., content and resource)
+- Mobility: fixed object vs. mobile object
+- Tag: Active RFID vs. Passive RFID
+- Size: common (normal) devices vs. tiny (small) devices
+
+- Power (energy): power supplied vs. power limited (for emergency)
+- Manageability: managed by human vs. managed by device human intervened or not
+- Different networking capabilities: IP vs. non-IP
+ - In most cases, an unattended (constrained) device communicating with others objects in a potentially very large scale environment
+
+Objects in an ubiquitous networking environment have the following characteristics:
+
+- Heterogeneous access interfaces
+- Lightweight protocol for low power consumption
+- Different amount of information transactions.
+
+Appendix I provides characteristics and examples of each type of object according to the classification of objects in an ubiquitous networking environment.
+
+## **8 Requirements of "connecting-to-anything" capability for ubiquitous networking**
+
+### **8.1 General requirements for object-to-object communication**
+
+The following are general requirements for communications between objects in an NGN.
+
+- For connecting an object, it is required to identify each object to be connected to the network.
+- In the case of small-sized objects with limited power, the capabilities of the communication objects are less compared to high processing computing devices. To cope with such constraints on objects, it is required to use lightweight protocols which remove unnecessary loads.
+- For configuring objects automatically, it is recommended to provide a self-configuration functionality.
+- Auto-discovery is required to connect any objects which are in the range of communication.
+- Objects can be moved from one place to another and may be attached to another network with different technology. Object mobility management is required to provide seamless communication among mobile objects.
+- Network size is increasing as a lot of objects are connected into the network. Scalable solutions are required in order to cope with the increase of traffic and routing table size and the shortage of IP addresses.
+- To support end-to-end connectivity, each object is recommended to have a separate, unique IP address. Adequate address space enables the connection of large numbers of objects to the network. Otherwise, it is recommended that each object provide the direct connectivity to host or gateway with a unique IP address.
+- It is required to provide QoS and QoE of required level. Important objects need to handle on time and with some level of accuracy without communication errors for reliable services.
+- Security and privacy are required to be managed in the proper way as connection to many sophisticated objects might cause huge damage if security is breached.
+
+### **8.2 Technical considerations for object-to-object communication**
+
+Technical considerations for object-to-object communication of ubiquitous networking are as follows:
+
+#### **8.2.1 Identification**
+
+As there are various kinds of objects with different identifiers, it is required to support identification of each object and provide seamless communication through association with the network as well as the tracking of the object without restrictions of location.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Scalability**
+
+Scalability regarding addressing can be taken as an example. Object-to-object communication needs a huge number of IP addresses in order to uniquely identify each object. As a scalable solution, IPv6, which can accommodate as many objects as required to include in ubiquitous networking, can optionally be used.
+
+#### **8.2.3 Interoperability**
+
+Objects have different communication, information and processing capabilities. Each object is also subjected to very different conditions, such as power availability and a communication bandwidth requirement. The interoperability solution is required to be maintained to provide seamless interaction among objects. Otherwise, additional networking capabilities are required to be provided to support islands of objects in heterogeneous networks.
+
+#### **8.2.4 Service discovery**
+
+Suitable services for objects must be automatically identified. It is required to support an appropriate semantic means of describing their functionality. Self-configuration is required for each object to configure itself without manual/human intervention. For this, context information has critical roles to support context aware networking for changes of communication environments and to support semantic as the virtual representation of physical objects.
+
+#### **8.2.5 Data traffic**
+
+From the network perspective, it is difficult to handle a bulk amount of data if a large number of objects produce huge data depending on their applications/services. To solve this problem, it is required to develop solutions such as periodic communication between objects, data compression, and optimized traffic engineering.
+
+#### **8.2.6 Energy efficiency**
+
+As objects move around, it is difficult to connect to a power supply all the time and consequently they need to operate with a self-sufficient energy source. It is required to develop energy-efficient protocols to minimize power consumption and eliminate unnecessary communication procedure among objects.
+
+#### **8.2.7 Fault-tolerance**
+
+To maintain a robust, trustworthy and dynamic ubiquitous networking environment, it is required to support redundancy at several levels and ability in order to automatically adapt to abnormal conditions.
+
+#### **8.2.8 Security and privacy**
+
+Confidentiality, authenticity, and trustworthiness of communication partners are required to be maintained. Users may want to give objects limited service access so that they are not allowed to communicate in an uncontrolled manner.
+
+#### 8.2.9 Intelligence
+
+An object is required to cooperate intelligently with its environment. Sensing the current environment, and acting intelligently according to the situation, is required to support services using object-to-object communication. Objects act according to their predetermined set of actions or they collaborate with each other based on the current context.
+
+## 9 A mechanism for object-to-object communication: identity processing for connecting to anything
+
+Instead of existing network terminals, new types of devices, such as RFID, sensors or smart cards, lead the change for the ubiquitous networking which enables devices to communicate among themselves. Identification, naming, and addressing capabilities are essential for supporting 'connecting-to-anything' in the end-user domain.
+
+To support connecting-to-anything, there are specific technical considerations that take into account the following points:
+
+- identification of object(s)
+- finding/tracking the location of object(s)
+- providing the connectivity to the NGN in cooperation with naming and addressing.
+
+In ubiquitous networking, for object-to-object communications, information for several kinds of object on the top of end points should be identified in the network. A service is an entity that is either an instance of a specific application service or a specific data object. The identity of the object persists over time and is not tied to the end system hosting the service or data.
+
+Identification of all objects for providing end-to-end connectivity in the ubiquitous networking environment is crucial. Identifier(s) in ubiquitous networking is/are capable enough of identifying all relevant objects and facilitating object-to-object communications. In particular, the globally unique identifier(s) enable a great many applications, including tracking, access control and protection of objects.
+
+As shown in Figure 5, the layered architecture of an NGN requires specific processing capabilities at each layer. Each user and/or object in applications identifies by identity, like a name with a set of attributes of an entity. An attribute can be thought of as metadata that belongs to a specific entity in a specific context, some of which might be highly private or sensitive. The identity should be associated with object IDs (RFID, content ID, telephone number, URI, or URL) through identification and authorization. Each object ID should also be associated with communication IDs (session/protocol ID, IP address or MAC address) through mapping/binding.
+
+
+
+Layered architecture
+
+Human (User/service mobility)
+
+Objects (Device mobility)
+
+Network (Point of attachment)
+
+Identity processing
+
+User name (Attributes)
+
+Object IDs
+
+Communication IDs
+
+Identification/authorization
+
+Mapping/binding
+
+Identifiers
+
+Logical identities for services
+
+RFID, content ID, telephone number, URL/URI, etc.
+
+Session/protocol ID
+
+IP address
+
+MAC address
+
+Y.2062(12)\_F05
+
+Figure 5: Identity processing for connecting to anything. The diagram is divided into three columns: Layered architecture, Identity processing, and Identifiers. Layered architecture has three layers: Human (User/service mobility), Objects (Device mobility), and Network (Point of attachment). Identity processing shows a flow from User name (Attributes) to Object IDs to Communication IDs, with Identification/authorization and Mapping/binding processes. Identifiers lists Logical identities for services, RFID/content ID/telephone number/URL/URI, Session/protocol ID, IP address, and MAC address.
+
+**Figure 5 – Identity processing for connecting to anything**
+
+All objects (i.e., devices and contents) should be reachable by the other users/objects. Since managing a large number of different identification codes to use IP network infrastructure becomes vital, a mechanism is required to use both location information of the IP address and uniqueness of identification codes.
+
+For connecting to anything using object identification, Figure 6 shows object mapping/binding with the IP address for IP connectivity to all objects on the end-user side. It provides the global connectivity with an NGN to objects through the association (e.g., mapping/binding) between the identifier of the object and the IP address.
+
+
+
+Host (e.g., server)
+
+Object (e.g., content)
+
+IP address
+
+Object (e.g., device, product, sensor, etc.)
+
+Gateway
+
+IP address
+
+Non-IP interface
+
+IP interface
+
+NGN
+
+Identifier for object
+
+Mapping binding
+
+IP address
+
+Global connectivity with NGN
+
+Y.2062(12)\_F06
+
+Figure 6: Object mapping/binding with an IP address for connecting to anything. The diagram shows a Host (e.g., server) and a Gateway connected to an NGN. The Host contains Objects (e.g., content) and an IP address. The Gateway contains Objects (e.g., device, product, sensor, etc.) and an IP address. A Non-IP interface connects the Host and Gateway. An IP interface connects the Gateway to the NGN. A Mapping binding process links an Identifier for object to an IP address, leading to Global connectivity with NGN.
+
+**Figure 6 – Object mapping/binding with an IP address for connecting to anything**
+
+## **10 Security considerations**
+
+Basic considerations on security architecture for NGNs are addressed in [ITU-T Y.2001], while security requirements of the NGNs are described in [ITU-T Y.2701]. Concerning the specifics of ubiquitous networking, the various kinds of terminals, devices and contents that can be involved will have to conform to the security requirements of the network they are willing to attach. When attaching to the NGN, corresponding authentication and authorization requirements as described in [ITU-T Y.2702].
+
+In this Recommendation, objects involved in NGNs have their own identities and are interconnected involving more interactions throughout a dynamic and heterogeneous environment. Accordingly, security is very crucial, including the design of the security architecture for a secure information discovery and delivery to users, including persons and objects.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Characteristics and examples of objects in the ubiquitous networking environment
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Table I.1 shows characteristics and examples of each type of objects according to their classification. These objects are characterized by the following heterogeneities: order(s) of a magnitude bigger than the Internet, no computers or humans at endpoint, inherently mobile, disconnected, unattended, communication style and so on.
+
+**Table I.1 – Characteristics and examples of objects in the ubiquitous networking environment**
+
+| Types | | Characteristics | Examples |
+|--------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Size | Small objects | Small in size, short communication range. | Sensor, tiny devices. |
+| | Normal objects | No constraint in size. | Home appliances. |
+| Mobility | Mobile objects | Moveable, continuous change in context information. | Car, bus, and train. |
+| | Fixed objects | Do not move normally and can be connected to power grid. | Traffic light, building, bridge. |
+| Power | Objects without power supply | Do not have continuous power, battery with fixed period of uses. | Sensor in outdoor, RFID. |
+| | Objects with power supply | Connected with power supply, no need to be worried about energy consumption. | Home appliances. |
+| Connectivity | Objects connected to physical world | Objects are connected to physical world to provide data and information about some real time phenomenon.
Objects are not only able to sense physical information but also able to react according to need. | Environment sensors (measuring temperature, pressure, humidity, rain).
Actuators, robots, automatic application triggering depend on context information. |
+| | Intermittent connectivity | Objects communicate and collaborate intermittently (periodically or based on some contextual condition). | Sensor which sends data in every pre-defined time interval.
Actuator or robot which act according to its surrounding: increasing, lowering temperature, calling security, fire or emergency services based on environmental conditions. |
+| Ability | Ability to sense and actuate | Object sense the environment where it is subjected.
Object can also react based on sensed information. | Normal sensors, actuators (senses and react dynamically). (Note) |
+
+**Table I.1 – Characteristics and examples of objects in the ubiquitous networking environment**
+
+| Types | | Characteristics | Examples |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| People involvement | Object of interest of people | People can augment communication and computation properties on the physical objects. | Tagged food item, electric lamp with light sensor, video content with automatically pause and play capabilities, cup with thermometer. |
+| | Objects managed by devices not people | These objects are managed by other devices rather than people themselves. | Smart meter managing light sensors around home, Home automation system managing automatic door and windows system. |
+| Physical/ logical | Physical objects | All physical objects related to real time activities falls in this category. | Different sensors attached with physical objects (lamp, environment, tree). |
+| | Logical objects | Can be identified as a resource or a virtual object by using a unique identifier. | Contents and resources (e.g., software, computing power, storage). |
+| Object with tag | Object with active tag | Object can be tagged with active RFID tag. | Products attached with active RFID. |
+| | Object with passive tag | Passive tag can be attached to objects which need to be uniquely identified. | Items tagged with passive RFID in shipping company, supermarket. |
+| IP/ Non IP | IP enabled object | IP enabled objects are capable of having end to end connectivity. | Refrigerator in home which has own IP address, TV, electric lap with processing devices. |
+| | Non IP enabled object | Non IP enabled objects participate in network with the help of some gateway or middleware which acts on behalf of the objects. | Non IP objects: tiny devices, products with active or passive RFID tag. |
+| NOTE – Classification according to different roles/names can be considered as follows:
- – A sensor: device that measures a physical quantity and converts it to analogue or digital signal (e.g., power consumption and quality, vibration of an engine, pollution, temperature, motion detection).
- – An actuator: device that controls a set of equipment (e.g., control and/or modulates the flow of a gas or liquid, control electricity distribution, perform a mechanical operation).
| | | |
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Ubiquitous networking applications and examples using object-to-object communication
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In the ubiquitous networking environment, applications can be newly created through the integration and combination of technologies such as bio technology (BT), nano technology (NT) and content technology (CT). Therefore, it is necessary to combine BT, NT and CT as well as information technology (IT) using ubiquitous networking capabilities.
+
+Communication networks have been mainly supporting the evolution of information processing and service capabilities within IT industries. However, the capabilities of networks benefiting from ubiquitous networking should impact other industries such as the medical industry, education industry, finance industry, transportation/distribution industry, etc., resulting in new requirements for specific services taking IT into consideration.
+
+
+
+Y.2062(12)\_FII-1
+
+A circular diagram illustrating examples of ubiquitous networking applications. At the center is a yellow circle labeled 'Ubiquitous networking applications'. Surrounding this center are ten green arrows pointing clockwise, each labeled with an application area: Life, Disaster, Safety, Transportation, Education, Building, Supply chain, Health, and Life. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2062(12)\_FII-1' at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Examples of ubiquitous networking applications**
+
+As shown in Figure II.1, the technologies using connecting-to-anything capabilities can be used for the following applications/services in the convergence environment with IT:
+
+- IT + transportation: ITS, networked vehicle and telematics, navigation
+- IT + education: online cyber learning system
+- IT + building: IBS, home networking, etc.
+- IT + supply chain: supply chain management, distribution system
+- IT + health: remote diagnosis and medical experimentation
+- IT + life: environment management, equipment management
+- IT + disaster: disaster management, emergency alarming system
+- IT + safety: finance, commerce, public peace.
+
+For supporting ubiquitous networking applications, NGNs shall solve technical considerations which are specified in clause 8.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2068
+
+(03/2015)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2068
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2068
+
+# Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2068 provides a description of the basic capabilities of the Internet of things (IoT), based on the functional view, the implementation view and the deployment view of the IoT functional framework described in this Recommendation, in order to fulfil the IoT common requirements specified in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2066.
+
+This Recommendation also describes additional capabilities of the IoT for the integration of cloud computing and big data technologies with the IoT.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2068 | 2015-03-22 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12419 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Capability, deployment view, functional component, functional entity, functional framework, functional group, functional view, implementation view, Internet of things, IoT, IoT basic capabilities.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2015
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Concepts of the IoT functional framework..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 Openness and interoperability of the IoT capabilities..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 Completeness, implementability and applicability of the IoT capabilities .... | 3 |
+| | 6.3 The different views of the IoT functional framework ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | The IoT functional framework..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 The IoT functional framework in functional view ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 The IoT functional framework in implementation view ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.3 The IoT functional framework in deployment view..... | 9 |
+| 8 | The IoT basic capabilities..... | 11 |
+| | 8.1 Service provision capabilities..... | 11 |
+| | 8.2 Communication capabilities ..... | 12 |
+| | 8.3 Application support capabilities ..... | 13 |
+| | 8.4 Data management capabilities ..... | 13 |
+| | 8.5 Management capabilities ..... | 14 |
+| | 8.6 Connectivity capabilities ..... | 16 |
+| | 8.7 Security and privacy protection capabilities..... | 16 |
+| 9 | IoT capabilities for integration of key emerging technologies ..... | 17 |
+| | 9.1 Capabilities for integration of cloud computing technologies ..... | 17 |
+| | 9.2 Capabilities for integration of big data technologies..... | 18 |
+| 10 | Security considerations..... | 19 |
+| | Annex A – The IoT capabilities list..... | 20 |
+| | Appendix I – Matching analysis between requirements and capabilities of the IoT ..... | 37 |
+| | I.1 Matching analysis of non-functional requirements of the IoT ..... | 37 |
+| | I.2 Matching analysis of application support requirements of the IoT ..... | 38 |
+| | I.3 Matching analysis of service requirements of the IoT ..... | 38 |
+| | I.4 Matching analysis of communication requirements of the IoT ..... | 39 |
+| | I.5 Matching analysis of device requirements of the IoT ..... | 40 |
+| | I.6 Matching analysis of data management requirements of the IoT ..... | 41 |
+| | I.7 Matching analysis of security and privacy protection requirements of the IoT ..... | 42 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 43 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2068
+
+# Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the functional framework of the Internet of things (IoT) in three different views, the IoT basic capabilities, and additional capabilities for the integration of cloud computing and big data technologies with the IoT.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- concepts of the IoT functional framework;
+- the functional view, the implementation view and the deployment view of the IoT functional framework;
+- the IoT basic capabilities fulfilling the common requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066];
+- additional IoT capabilities for the integration of cloud computing and big data technologies with the IoT.
+
+All capabilities of the IoT specified in this Recommendation are numbered and summarized in Annex A.
+
+Appendix I provides an analysis of all capabilities of the IoT specified in this Recommendation in terms of matching with the common requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE – The detailed specification of the capabilities identified in this Recommendation is outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through references in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2060] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2060 (2012), Overview of the Internet of things . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2066] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2066 (2014), Common requirements of the Internet of things . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cloud computing** [b-ITU-T Y.3500]: Paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with self-service provisioning and administration on-demand.
+
+NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications, and storage equipment.
+
+**3.1.2 device** [ITU-T Y.2060]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing.
+
+**3.1.3 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.4 Internet of things (IoT)** [ITU-T Y.2060]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE 2 – From a broader perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications.
+
+**3.1.5 next generation network (NGN)** [b-ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.6 thing** [ITU-T Y.2060]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is an object of the physical world (physical things) or the information world (virtual things), which is capable of being identified and integrated into communication networks.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management and Control Functions |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions |
+| TaaS | Things as a Service |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "**is required to**" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "**is recommended**" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "**can optionally**" and "**may**" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# **6 Concepts of the IoT functional framework**
+
+### **6.1 Openness and interoperability of the IoT capabilities**
+
+The openness of the IoT capabilities refers to opening the networking and service-provisioning functionalities of the IoT to stimulate the innovation ability for IoT technologies and applications development. Through an open, shared, collaborative approach, IoT applications can be developed effectively for business, industry, and social community.
+
+The openness of IoT capabilities can be realized by encapsulating IoT capabilities into service-provisioning interfaces.
+
+The "open IoT capabilities" refer to the set of the IoT capabilities that are required to be opened to IoT applications or users. These IoT capabilities should have open interfaces that can be accessed by IoT applications or users.
+
+The interoperability of the IoT capabilities can be realized by specifying the service-provisioning interfaces in a standardized way.
+
+The "interoperable IoT capabilities" refer to the set of the IoT capabilities that are required to interact between different IoT functional elements, especially when deployed by different service providers. These IoT capabilities are distributed across different functional elements, and collaboration between these different functional elements fulfils their functionalities.
+
+## **6.2 Completeness, implementability and applicability of the IoT capabilities**
+
+The completeness of the IoT capabilities refers to the fact that the whole set of IoT capabilities can fulfil all the common requirements of the IoT [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE – There may not be one-to-one mapping between IoT common requirements and IoT capabilities (i.e., one common requirement may involve multiple capabilities).
+
+The implementability of the IoT capabilities refers to the set of the IoT capabilities that can be implemented in the functional elements described in, or reasonably derived from, specifications of existing networks.
+
+The applicability of the IoT capabilities refers to the set of the IoT capabilities that can be deployed in the functional elements of the IoT implementations.
+
+The IoT capabilities specified in this Recommendation should fulfil the requirements of completeness, implementability and applicability. These characteristics of the IoT capabilities specified in this Recommendation are validated by the IoT functional framework.
+
+### **6.3 The different views of the IoT functional framework**
+
+The IoT functional framework consists of the IoT functional elements and their relations. In this Recommendation, the IoT functional framework can be described via three distinct views, i.e., the functional view, the implementation view and the deployment view.
+
+NOTE 1 – The three views reflect three different phases of development of the IoT, namely the design phase, implementation phase, and deployment phase. Each view describes IoT capabilities aiming to fulfil the requirements encountered in different phases of development of the IoT.
+
+NOTE 2 – The IoT functional elements in the functional view are named "functional groups". The IoT functional elements in the implementation view are named "functional entities". The IoT functional elements in the deployment view are named "functional components".
+
+The functional view identifies functional groupings of IoT capabilities. The functional view of the IoT functional framework consists of the IoT "functional groups", and their relations. The functional view of the IoT functional framework is used to describe the completeness of the IoT capabilities by establishing the relations of the IoT capabilities with the common requirements of the IoT.
+
+NOTE 3 – Functional groupings help to simplify the specification and analysis of the IoT capabilities.
+
+The implementation view identifies capabilities of the IoT when implementation of functional groupings is realized. The implementation view of the IoT functional framework consists of the IoT "functional entities", and their relations. The implementation view of the IoT functional framework is used to describe the implementability of the IoT capabilities by establishing the relations of the IoT capabilities with the functional entities described in, or reasonably derived from, specifications of existing networks.
+
+The deployment view identifies capabilities of the IoT when deployment of functional entities is realized. The deployment view of the IoT functional framework consists of the IoT "functional components" (such as gateway for IoT as specified in [b-ITU-T Y.2067]) and their relations. The deployment view of the IoT functional framework is used to describe the applicability of the IoT capabilities by establishing the relations of the IoT capabilities with the functional components deployed in concrete IoT implementations.
+
+The capabilities identified via the three views are the "basic IoT capabilities" which fulfil the common requirements of the IoT [ITU-T Y.2066] (see clause 8). Additional capabilities which fulfil some common requirements of the IoT [ITU-T Y.2066] are identified for the integration of cloud computing and big data technologies with the IoT (see clause 9).
+
+# **7 The IoT functional framework**
+
+### **7.1 The IoT functional framework in functional view**
+
+The IoT functional framework in functional view is to describe the IoT capabilities at the functional level in order to guarantee that the IoT capabilities can fulfil all common requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066]. A practical way is to describe the IoT capabilities in groups corresponding to all categories of common requirements of the IoT as specified in [ITU-T Y.2066]. The IoT functional framework in functional view consists of groups of the IoT capabilities and their relationships.
+
+In this Recommendation, the groups of the IoT capabilities are named "IoT functional groups". The classification of the IoT functional groups is based on the following requirement categories specified in [ITU-T Y.2066]: application support requirements, service requirements, data management requirements, device requirements, communication requirements, security and privacy protection requirements, and non-functional requirements.
+
+IoT functional group names correspond to those of the requirement categories as follows: application support group, service provision group, data management group, connectivity group, communication group, security and privacy protection group and management group.
+
+#### **7.1.1 The IoT functional groups**
+
+The application support group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of application support requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 1 – Based on the specifications of the category of application support requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities cannot be used directly by IoT users, but can be used by service providers.
+
+NOTE 2 – IoT user, service provider, data manager and thing are the four IoT actors as described in clause 6 of [ITU-T Y.2066]. In this Recommendation, the term "thing" refers to "physical thing" as noted in clause 6.2.1 of [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The service provision group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of service requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 3 – Based on the specifications of the category of service requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by IoT users, service providers and things.
+
+The data management group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of data management requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 4 – Based on the specifications of the category of data management requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by data managers.
+
+The connectivity group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of device requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 5 – Based on the specifications of the category of device requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by data managers and things.
+
+The communication group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of communication requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 6 – Based on the specifications of the category of communication requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by IoT users, service providers and things.
+
+The security and privacy protection group is defined as a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil the requirements specified in the category of security and privacy protection requirements [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE 7 – Based on the specifications of the category of security and privacy protection requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by IoT users, things, service providers and data managers.
+
+The management group refers to a group of the IoT capabilities that can fulfil some non-functional requirements, such as manageability, reliability, high availability. The management group includes the capabilities for managing the operations related to application support, service provision, data management, connectivity, and communication of the IoT.
+
+NOTE 8 – Based on the specifications of the category of security and privacy protection requirements in [ITU-T Y.2066], this group of capabilities can be used by IoT users, service providers or data managers.
+
+#### **7.1.2 Relations among the IoT functional groups**
+
+Figure 7-1 describes the IoT functional framework in functional view constituted by the IoT functional groups and the relations among these groups. The connectivity group is within the device layer defined in [ITU-T Y.2060], the communication, data management, service, and application support groups are within the network layer and the service support and application support layer defined in [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1: The IoT functional framework in functional view. The diagram shows a central dashed box representing the 'Network layer and service support and application support layer' and the 'Device layer'. Inside, 'Application support' and 'Service provision' are at the top, 'Data management' and 'Communication' are in the middle, and 'Connectivity' is at the bottom. Arrows show bidirectional relationships between 'Application support' and 'Service provision', 'Data management' and 'Communication', and 'Connectivity' and both 'Data management' and 'Communication'. 'Connectivity' also has bidirectional arrows to 'Application support' and 'Service provision'. To the left is an orange box for 'Security and privacy protection' and to the right is a yellow box for 'Management', both with bidirectional arrows to the central framework. The label 'Y.2068(15)\_F7-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – The IoT functional framework in functional view**
+
+The connectivity group provides services to the data management group and communication group. The connectivity group can provide services to the communication group and data management group triggered by requests. The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of connectivity capabilities, and the management group configures and manages the other aspects of connectivity capabilities.
+
+The communication group provides communication services to the other functional group. The other functional groups use the communication services. The management group configures and manages the communication capabilities. The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of communication capabilities.
+
+The data management group provides services to the other functional groups. The other functional groups request and configure the data management services. The management group configures and manages the data management capabilities. The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of data management capabilities.
+
+The application support group requests services from the data management group and communication group, and these two groups can provide services to the application support group. The management group configures and manages the application support capabilities. The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of application support capabilities.
+
+The service provision group requests services from the data management group and communication group, and these two groups can provide services to the service provision group. The management group configures and manages the service provision capabilities. The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of the service provision capabilities.
+
+The security and privacy protection group configures and manages the security and privacy protection aspects of the capabilities in other functional groups.
+
+The management group configures and manages the capabilities, except the security and privacy protection aspects of these capabilities, in other functional groups.
+
+### 7.2 The IoT functional framework in implementation view
+
+In this Recommendation, the functional entities of the implementation view are only described by their capabilities without mentioning their detailed relationships.
+
+NOTE – There may be different implementation views based on different implementation approaches of the IoT. In this Recommendation, only one implementation view of the IoT functional framework is presented in order to describe and analyse the capabilities of the IoT. It is anticipated that there is no need to cover all possible implementation views of the IoT functional framework: the implementation view of the IoT is in fact only used for showing the implementability of the IoT capabilities, so one implementation view of the IoT is sufficient to show this possibility.
+
+#### 7.2.1 Structure of an implementation view
+
+An implementation view of the IoT functional framework consists of the functional entities of the IoT, and their high level relations. Figure 7-2 illustrates an implementation view of the IoT functional framework based on the IoT reference model specified in [ITU-T Y.2060] and the IoT common requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066], and building over functional entities described in the NGN functional architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the implementation view of the IoT functional framework, structured into three layers building upon the NGN functional architecture:
+
+- Service support and application support layer:** Contains IoT-specific entities (green) and NGN-based entities (purple/grey).
+ - IoT-specific: IoT service control, IoT data management.
+ - NGN-based: Application support, Service provision, Service control, Content delivery.
+- Network layer:** Contains IoT-specific and NGN-based entities.
+ - IoT-specific: IoT transport control.
+ - NGN-based: Transport control, Transport.
+- Device layer:** Contains IoT-specific entities.
+ - IoT-specific: IoT gateway, IoT device, End-user device.
+
+On the left, a green box represents **IoT security and privacy protection**. On the right, a yellow box represents **Management and identity management**. Bidirectional arrows indicate interactions between the layers and the side entities. The label **Y.2068(15)\_F7-2** is located at the bottom right.
+
+Figure 7-2: Implementation view of the IoT functional framework building over the NGN functional architecture. The diagram shows three layers: Service support and application support layer, Network layer, and Device layer. Each layer contains specific functional entities, some in green (IoT-specific) and others in purple/grey (NGN-based).
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Implementation view of the IoT functional framework building over the NGN functional architecture**
+
+There are two classes of functional entities in this implementation view of the IoT functional framework, one is for the functional entities already specified for the NGN [ITU-T Y.2012], and another is for the functional entities specific to the IoT.
+
+The functional entities that are illustrated by green boxes in Figure 7-2 are the functional entities specific to the IoT (to be specified in this Recommendation), while the functional entities illustrated by differently coloured boxes are the functional entities described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. Among the functional entities described in [ITU-T Y.2012], the functional entities illustrated by the same colour belong to a single functional layer except the Management and Identity Management functional entity that crosses all functional layers of the IoT reference model [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+Even if some end-user functions are already mentioned in NGN Recommendations, these Recommendations only cover specifications on interactions between end-user functions and other NGN functions. There is no specification of end-user functions. In the implementation view, the end-user functions are needed to be described in order to cover the possibility that the IoT device capabilities are implemented in end-user functional entities. The "End-User" functional entity of NGN Recommendations enhanced with some IoT device capabilities is named as "End-User Device" functional entity in this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE 1 – A smart phone configured with sensors and associated application software is an implementation of the End-User Device functional entity.
+
+With respect to the functional entities already specified for the NGN, the Transport and Transport Control functional entities are in the network layer, and the Application Support, Service Provision, Service Control and Content Delivery functional entities are in the service support and application
+
+support layer. The Management and Identity Management functional entity crosses all functional layers.
+
+With respect to the functional entities specific to the IoT, the IoT Device, the IoT Gateway and the End-User Device functional entities are in the device layer, the IoT Transport Control functional entity in the network layer, the IoT Data Management and the IoT Service Control functional entities in the service support and application support layer. The IoT Security and Privacy Protection functional entity crosses all functional layers.
+
+NOTE 2 – The functional entities described in this Recommendation located in the service support and application support layer are only related with the generic support capabilities specified in [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+#### **7.2.2 Functional entities of an implementation view**
+
+The Transport functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 includes the access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions, gateway functions, and media handling functions as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The Transport Control functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 includes resource and admission control functions (RACF), network attachment control functions (NACF), and mobility management and control functions (MMCF) as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The Service Provision functional entity and the Application Support functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 include functions such as the gateway, registration, authentication and authorization functions at the application level as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The Service Control functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 includes resource control, registration, and authentication and authorization functions at the service level for both mediated and non-mediated services as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The Content Delivery functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 receives content from the Application Support functional entity and Service Provision functional entity, stores, processes, and delivers it to the End-User Device functional entity using the capabilities of the Transport functional entity, under control of the Service Control functional entity as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The Management and Identity Management functional entity illustrated in Figure 7-2 includes management functions and identity management functions as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The IoT Device functional entity contains the capabilities of connecting and monitoring things, or controlling things that fulfil the device requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The IoT Gateway functional entity contains the capabilities of interconnecting devices with networks, buffering and transferring data, and configuring and monitoring devices that fulfil some device requirements and some data management requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] and [b-ITU-T Y.2067].
+
+The End-User Device functional entity contains the capabilities of time synchronization, collaboration among services or among devices, reliable and secure human body connectivity, automatic service, intelligent communication, and device mobility to fulfil some application support requirements, service requirements, communication requirements, and device requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+NOTE – As the above capabilities can be distributed in different functional entities, the capabilities contained in the End-User Device functional entity are named by prefixing them with the term "end-user" in order to distinguish them from capabilities residing in other functional entities.
+
+The IoT Data Management functional entity contains the capabilities of semantic annotating, aggregating, storing, and transporting data of things that fulfil the data management requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The IoT Transport Control functional entity contains the capabilities of configuring and monitoring communication modes, autonomic networking, content-aware communication, and location-based communication that fulfil some communication requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The IoT Service Control functional entity contains the capabilities of group management, time synchronization, collaboration among services, configuring and monitoring the semantic based services, autonomic services, location-based and context-aware services that fulfil some service requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The IoT Security and Privacy Protection functional entity contains the capabilities of performing the operations of security and privacy protection in communication, data management, and service provisioning. These capabilities fulfil some security and privacy protection requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+## 7.3 The IoT functional framework in deployment view
+
+In this Recommendation, the functional components specified in the deployment view of the IoT functional framework are only described by their capabilities without mentioning their detailed relationships.
+
+NOTE – There may be different deployment views based on different deployment approaches of the IoT. In this Recommendation, only one deployment view of the IoT functional framework is presented in order to describe and analyse the capabilities of the IoT. It is anticipated that there is no need to cover all possible deployment views of the IoT functional framework in the Recommendation: the deployment view of the IoT is in fact only used for showing the applicability of the IoT capabilities, so one deployment view of the IoT is enough to show this possibility.
+
+### 7.3.1 Structure of a deployment view
+
+A deployment view of the IoT functional framework consists of its functional components and their high level relations. Figure 7-3 illustrates a deployment view of the IoT functional framework based on the IoT reference model specified in [ITU-T Y.2060], the IoT common requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066], and the NGN components described in the NGN functional architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph S_SAL [Service support and application support layer]
+ IoT_SC[IoT service controller]
+ SP[Service platform]
+ IoT_DS[IoT data server]
+ SM[Service manager]
+ end
+
+ subgraph NL [Network layer]
+ IoT_NC[IoT network controller]
+ NM[Network manager]
+ ETN[Enhanced transport network]
+ end
+
+ subgraph DL [Device layer]
+ IoT_GW[IoT gateway]
+ DM[Device manager]
+ IoT_D[IoT device]
+ EUD[End-user device]
+ end
+
+ S_SAL <--> NL
+ NL <--> DL
+
+```
+
+Y.2068(15)\_F7-3
+
+Figure 7-3: Deployment view of the IoT functional framework building over the NGN components. The diagram shows three stacked layers: Service support and application support layer, Network layer, and Device layer, connected by bidirectional arrows. The Service support layer contains IoT service controller, Service platform, IoT data server, and Service manager. The Network layer contains IoT network controller, Network manager, and Enhanced transport network. The Device layer contains IoT gateway, Device manager, IoT device, and End-user device.
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Deployment view of the IoT functional framework building over the NGN components**
+
+The functional components that are illustrated by green boxes in Figure 7-3 are the functional components specific to the IoT (to be specified in this Recommendation), while the functional components illustrated by differently coloured boxes are the functional components described or partially described in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+The deployment view of the IoT functional framework is only a logical approach for deploying IoT capabilities, and the functional components described in the deployment view can be mapped to physical components of some practical IoT deployments.
+
+The functional components of this deployment view are classified respectively into device layer, network layer, and service support and application support layer as specified in [ITU-T Y.2060]. The cross-layer capabilities specified in [ITU-T Y.2060] are assigned to different functional components (such as Device Manager, Network Manager and Service Manager), distributed in each functional layer, in order to simplify the description and analysis of the IoT capabilities.
+
+The IoT Device, IoT Gateway, End-User Device, and Device Manager functional components belong to the device layer. The Enhanced Transport Network, IoT Network Controller, and Network Manager functional components belong to the network layer. The IoT Data Server, IoT Service Controller, Service Platform, and Service Manager functional components belong to the service support and application support layer.
+
+NOTE – The functional components described in this Recommendation in the service support and application support layer are solely related to generic support capabilities specified in [ITU-T Y.2060].
+
+#### **7.3.2 Functional components of a deployment view**
+
+The IoT Device functional component includes the capabilities of the IoT Device functional entity, capabilities of autonomic management and energy management, and capabilities of security and privacy protection.
+
+The IoT Gateway functional component includes capabilities of interconnecting IoT Devices with Enhanced Transport Network, capabilities of aggregating and transferring data of things as well as capabilities of the IoT Device functional component.
+
+The End-User Device functional component includes capabilities of existing networking terminal, and capabilities of the IoT Device functional components.
+
+The Device Manager functional component includes capabilities of identifying and managing devices within a defined domain, and capabilities of autonomic management.
+
+The Enhanced Transport Network functional component includes capabilities of transport and transport control as specified in [ITU-T Y.2012], and enhanced capabilities to fulfil some communication requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The IoT Transport Controller functional component includes capabilities of configuring, monitoring, and controlling functionalities of the IoT related communication performed in the Enhanced Transport Network to fulfil communication requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The Network Manager functional component includes capabilities of managing the Enhanced Transport Network, and capabilities of security and privacy protection in the Enhanced Transport Network.
+
+The IoT Data Server functional component includes capabilities of storing, querying and managing data of things, and contains database and data management related with data of things.
+
+The IoT Service Controller functional component includes capabilities of configuring, monitoring, and controlling functionalities of IoT application support and service provision performed in Service Platform to fulfil some application support requirements and service requirements of the IoT specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The Service Platform functional component includes capabilities of Application Support, Service Provision, Content Delivery, Service Control, and other enhanced capabilities to fulfil some application support requirements and service requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The Service Manager functional component includes capabilities of managing both Service Platform and the IoT Service Controller, and capabilities of Security and Privacy Protection for Service Platform and for the IoT Service Controller.
+
+# **8 The IoT basic capabilities**
+
+The IoT basic capabilities in this Recommendation refer to the capabilities that fulfil the common requirements of the IoT as specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+Clauses 8.1 to 8.7 describe the IoT basic capabilities. These same capabilities are numbered and summarized in Annex A.
+
+NOTE – In clauses 8.1 to 8.7, the capability numbers, as shown in Annex A, appear between square brackets at the end of the description of the corresponding capability.
+
+## **8.1 Service provision capabilities**
+
+Service provision capabilities include service prioritization, semantic based service, service composition, mobility service, autonomic service, location-based and context-aware service, service management, service discovery, service subscription, naming and addressing, virtual storage and processing capabilities, adaptable service provision, and service provision acknowledgement.
+
+- Service prioritization capability involves the abilities of providing services in different priorities, such as querying data or transferring data in different priorities [C-1-1].
+- Semantic based service capability involves the abilities of semantically annotating data or service, semantically querying data or semantically requesting services [C-1-2].
+
+NOTE – Semantic based service capability enables the description and exchange of semantics between services in order to support, for example, automatic service customization.
+
+- Service composition capability involves the abilities of creating new services or customized services based on existing capabilities and user specific requirements [C-1-3].
+- Mobility service capability involves the abilities of remote access to the IoT, and remote authentication of users [C-1-4].
+- Autonomic service capability involves the abilities of automatic capturing, transferring, and analysing data of things, and automatic service provisioning based on predefined rules or policies [C-1-5].
+- Location-based and context-aware service capability involves the abilities of automatically provisioning services based on location and context information, and predefined rules or policies [C-1-6].
+- Service discovery capability involves the abilities of discovering IoT users, services, devices and things [C-1-7].
+- Service subscription capability involves the abilities of subscribing the needed services and associated data of things by IoT users [C-1-8].
+- Naming and addressing capability involves the abilities of creating, updating, deleting, querying names and addresses of users, devices and things [C-1-9].
+- Virtual storage and processing capability involves the abilities of providing storage and processing resources in a scalable way [C-1-10].
+- The capability of adaptable service provision involves the abilities of extending service configurations to provide new services as required by applications or users of the IoT in order to be adaptable to different applications or users of the IoT [C-1-11].
+
+- The capability of service provision acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging the correct service provision requested by applications or users of the IoT in order to support reliable service provision in the IoT [C-1-12].
+
+## 8.2 Communication capabilities
+
+The communication group includes event-based communication, periodic communication, self-configuring for networking, self-healing for networking, self-optimizing for networking, self-protection for networking, multicast communication, unicast communication, broadcast communication, anycast communication, error control for communication, Quality of Service enabling communication, content-aware communication, location-based communication, transport acknowledgement and adaptable networking capabilities.
+
+- Event-based communication capability enables IoT devices and service provider to initiate communication based on predefined events [C-2-1].
+- Periodic communication capability enables IoT devices and service provider to periodically initiate communication based on predefined rules [C-2-2].
+
+NOTE 1 – In the perspective of network performance, it is required that the usage of event-based or periodic communication capabilities be avoided, unless there is a specific reason to communicate using these capabilities.
+
+- Unicast communication capability enables the IoT to transfer messages from the source entity to single destination entity [C-2-3].
+- Multicast communication capability enables the IoT to transfer messages from the source entity to a group of destination entities simultaneously [C-2-4].
+- Broadcast communication capability enables the IoT to transfer messages to all destination entities of a given domain [C-2-5].
+- Anycast communication capability enables the IoT to transfer messages to any of the destination entities of a given domain [C-2-6].
+- The capability of error control for communications involves the abilities of ensuring correct message transfer from source entity to destination entity [C-2-7].
+- Quality of Service enabling communication capability provides mechanisms to enable support of Quality of Service for message transfer from source entity to destination entity [C-2-8].
+- The capability of self-configuring for networking involves the abilities of automatically configuring networking parameters based on discovered network interfaces and predefined rules [C-2-9].
+- The capability of self-healing for networking involves the abilities of automatically recovering from fault status of networking based on monitoring and predefined rules [C-2-10].
+- The capability of self-optimizing for networking involves the abilities of automatically optimizing networking operations based on monitoring and predefined rules [C-2-11].
+- The capability of self-protecting for networking involves the abilities of automatically protecting networking entities from harmful operations based on predefined rules [C-2-12].
+- Content-aware communication capability involves the abilities of selecting path and routing of messages based on content and predefined rules [C-2-13].
+
+NOTE 2 – This capability can be used to block messages based on the specified content and predefined rules.
+
+- The capability of location-based communication involves the abilities of identifying locations and initiating communication control based on identified locations and predefined rules [C-2-14].
+
+- The capability of transport acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging the correct message delivery to support reliable communications as required by IoT applications [C-2-15].
+- The capability of adaptable networking involves the abilities of extending networking configurations for connecting to emerging communication networks of the IoT [ITU-T Y.2060] in order to be adaptable to different networking technologies [C-2-16].
+
+## 8.3 Application support capabilities
+
+The application support group includes programmable interface provision, group management, time synchronization, orchestration, user management, and application operation acknowledgement capabilities.
+
+- The capability of programmable interface provision involves the abilities of supporting new services or customized services based on existing capabilities and application specific requirements [C-3-1].
+- The capability of group management involves the abilities of creating, modifying, deleting, and querying IoT groups, and adding, modifying, deleting and querying IoT group members [C-3-2].
+- The capability of time synchronization involves the abilities of synchronizing the time among related functional components in a reliable way, in order to support global or local time stamping for applications [C-3-3].
+- Orchestration capability involves the abilities of automatic arrangement and coordination of service provisioning or device operations in order to fulfil application specific requirements [C-3-4].
+- User management capability involves the abilities of creating, querying, updating and deleting IoT user profiles, and authenticating, authorizing, registering and auditing IoT users [C-3-5].
+- The capability of application support operation acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging the correct operations requested by applications in order to support reliable application operations in the IoT [C-3-6].
+
+## 8.4 Data management capabilities
+
+The data management group includes data storage, data processing, data querying, data access control, open information exchange, semantic data operation and autonomic data operation capabilities.
+
+- The capability of data storage involves the ability of storing data of things based on predefined rules and policies [C-4-1].
+- The capability of data processing involves the ability of data fusion and mining based on predefined rules and policies [C-4-2].
+
+NOTE 1 – Data processing refers to a set of data operations in order to fulfil the application requirements. Data processing in the IoT includes collecting, representing, fusing, mining, and interpreting the data of things. From an application perspective, data processing can be regarded as data analysis that consists of data fusing and data mining. From an implementation perspective, the operation of data fusing includes data collection and data representation, and the operation of data mining includes data interpretation.
+
+- The capability of data querying involves the ability of querying information about things connected to the IoT [C-4-3].
+- The capability of data access control involves the abilities of controlling and monitoring data access operations by the owners of the data [C-4-4].
+
+- The capability of open information exchange involves the abilities of sending data to or receiving data from external data sources, e.g., data centres and data servers outside the IoT [C-4-5].
+- The capability of semantic data operation involves the abilities of semantic annotating, semantic discovering, semantic storing, and semantic composing data of things to fulfil the requirements of IoT users or applications [C-4-6].
+- The capability of autonomic data operation involves the abilities of automatically collecting, aggregating, transferring, storing, analysing data of things, and automatically managing these data operations for support of operating data of things in a scalable way [C-4-7].
+
+NOTE 2 – This capability can be used to face the impact of big data in the IoT.
+
+## **8.5 Management capabilities**
+
+The management group includes capabilities fulfilling the IoT interoperability requirements, capabilities fulfilling the IoT scalability requirements, capabilities fulfilling the IoT reliability requirements, capabilities fulfilling the IoT high availability requirements, and capabilities fulfilling the IoT manageability requirements.
+
+NOTE – The abilities involved in the management capabilities specified in this Recommendation may be operated in a remote way. Remote operation can be disabled based on security or other policy considerations.
+
+### **8.5.1 Capabilities fulfilling IoT interoperability requirements**
+
+The capabilities fulfilling the IoT interoperability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] include managing data models for exchanging data of things, managing service description, managing network configuration, managing device configuration, managing security policy, and managing privacy protection policy capabilities.
+
+- The capability of managing data models for exchanging data of things involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating data models for support of interoperability among IoT applications. This capability also includes the abilities of creating and updating data models for support of semantic interoperability among IoT applications [C-5-1].
+- The capability of managing service description involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating service description for support of service interoperability [C-5-2].
+- The capability of managing network configuration involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating network configuration for support of network interoperability [C-5-3].
+- The capability of managing device configuration involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating network configuration for support of device interoperability [C-5-4].
+- The capability of managing security policy involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating security policy for support of interoperability between different implementations of security policy [C-5-5].
+- The capability of managing privacy protection policy involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating privacy protection policy for support of interoperability between different implementations of privacy protection policy [C-5-6].
+
+### **8.5.2 Capabilities fulfilling the IoT scalability requirements**
+
+The capabilities fulfilling the IoT scalability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] include managing distributed processing and managing multiple domains.
+
+- The capability of managing distributed processing involves the abilities of managing IoT functional components in a distributed way for support of IoT scalability [C-5-7].
+- The capability of managing multiple domains involves the abilities of managing IoT functional components in multiple domains for support of IoT scalability [C-5-8].
+
+### **8.5.3 Capabilities fulfilling the IoT reliability requirements**
+
+The capabilities fulfilling the IoT reliability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] include redundant deployment enablement capability.
+
+- The capability of redundant deployment enablement involves the abilities of enabling deployment of redundant functional components of the IoT to guarantee reliability required in communication, service provision and data management [C-5-9].
+
+### **8.5.4 Capabilities fulfilling the IoT high availability requirements**
+
+The capabilities fulfilling the IoT high availability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] include service integrity check, data integrity check, device integrity check, security integrity check and user integrity check capabilities.
+
+- The capability of service integrity check involves the abilities of checking the service lifetime, the available resources required to provide the service in order to guarantee the high availability of service provisioning [C-5-10].
+- The capability of data integrity check involves the abilities of checking the data lifetime, the available attributes of the data, and the consistency of data in order to guarantee the high availability of data management [C-5-11].
+- The capability of device integrity check involves the abilities of checking the status of all functions of device to guarantee the high availability of IoT devices [C-5-12].
+- The capability of security integrity check involves the abilities of checking the consistency of security policies deployed in all functional components of the IoT to guarantee the high availability of security in the IoT [C-5-13].
+- The capability of user profile integrity check involves the abilities of checking the lifetime, subscription, privacy protection and availability of services subscribed to by users to guarantee the high availability of service provisioning and privacy protection for users [C-5-14].
+
+### **8.5.5 Capabilities fulfilling the IoT manageability requirements**
+
+The capabilities fulfilling the IoT manageability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] include managing devices, managing networks, managing services, managing data operations, managing security operations, managing privacy protection, managing user operations, and plug and play capabilities.
+
+- The capability of managing devices involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, diagnosing and recovering devices of the IoT, and updating device software to enhance capabilities of devices of the IoT [C-5-15].
+- The capability of managing networks involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, diagnosing and recovering networks of the IoT [ITU-T Y.2060], and updating network software to enhance capabilities of networks of the IoT [C-5-16].
+- The capability of managing services involves the abilities of describing, configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, recovering, and updating services of the IoT [C-5-17].
+- The capability of managing data operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing and recovering data operations, and updating software related with data operations to enhance capabilities of the IoT [C-5-18].
+- The capability of managing security operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, auditing, diagnosing and recovering security operations, and updating software related with security operations to enhance capabilities of the IoT [C-5-19].
+
+- The capability of managing privacy protection involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, auditing and recovering privacy protection, and updating software related with privacy protection to enhance capabilities of the IoT [C-5-20].
+- The capability of managing user operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, diagnosing and recovering operations of IoT users, and updating software related with operations of IoT users to enhance capabilities of IoT [C-5-21].
+- Plug and play capability involves the abilities of automatic configuring, connecting and activating devices of the IoT to enable on-the-fly semantic-based configuration and activation of IoT devices [C-5-22].
+
+## **8.6 Connectivity capabilities**
+
+The connectivity group includes identification-based connectivity, things' status notification device mobility capability, and adaptable connectivity capabilities.
+
+- The capability of identification-based connectivity involves the abilities of establishing the connectivity based on the identification of things [C-6-1].
+- The capability of things' status notification involves the abilities of automatic notification of the status of things and its changes based on predefined rules [C-6-2].
+- The capability of device mobility involves the abilities of keeping the connectivity with the IoT when a device moves [C-6-3].
+- The capability of adaptable connectivity involves the abilities of extending connectivity configurations to enable connectivity of new types of devices to the IoT in order to be adaptable to different device technologies [C-6-4].
+
+## **8.7 Security and privacy protection capabilities**
+
+The security and privacy protection group includes communication security capability, data management security capability, service provision security capability, security integration capability, mutual authentication and authorization capability, and security audit capability.
+
+- Communication security capability involves the abilities of supporting secure, trusted and privacy-protected communication [C-7-1].
+- Data management security capability involves the abilities of providing secure, trusted and privacy-protected data management [C-7-2].
+- Service provision security capability involves the abilities of providing secure, trusted and privacy-protected service provision [C-7-3].
+- Security integration capability involves the abilities of integrating different security policies and techniques related to the variety of IoT functional components [C-7-4].
+- Mutual authentication and authorization capability involves the abilities of authenticating and authorizing each other before a device accesses the IoT based on predefined security policies [C-7-5].
+- Security audit capability involves the abilities of monitoring any data access or attempt to access IoT applications in a fully transparent, traceable and reproducible way based on appropriate regulation and laws [C-7-6].
+
+NOTE – These security and privacy protection capabilities include also the ability of coping with the security and privacy protection issues for operations across different domains.
+
+# **9 IoT capabilities for integration of key emerging technologies**
+
+The following clauses describe the IoT capabilities for integration of some key emerging technologies, in alignment with the IoT capabilities list provided in Annex A. In the following clauses, the capability numbers, as shown in Annex A, are put between square brackets "[ ]" and inserted at the end of each paragraph describing the corresponding capability.
+
+Clauses 9.1 and 9.2 describe the additional IoT capabilities for integration of cloud computing technologies and big data technologies.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation does not prevent more additional capabilities for integration with the IoT of other emerging technologies, such as network function virtualization and software-defined networking, to be considered further.
+
+## **9.1 Capabilities for integration of cloud computing technologies**
+
+Owing to the high scalability, energy efficiency and deployment efficiency requirements of the IoT, there are some great challenges in the deployment of the IoT. Some key features of cloud computing technologies, such as virtualization and resource sharing, can help to improve scalability, energy efficiency (i.e., reduce the energy consumption) and deployment efficiency (e.g., reduce the memory and bandwidth usage) for the IoT. Additional capabilities for the integration of cloud computing technologies with the IoT are required.
+
+With the integration of cloud capabilities of the infrastructure capabilities type [b-ITU-T Y.3500] into the IoT, the IoT infrastructure can be deployed utilizing these cloud capabilities. In this way, the IoT infrastructure can increase its scalability for computing, data storage and other aspects, and also increase energy efficiency. The capability of accessing virtual processing resources and the capability of accessing virtual storage resources are required in order to integrate with cloud capabilities of the infrastructure capabilities type.
+
+- The capability of accessing virtual processing resources involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in infrastructure capabilities type of cloud to use processing resource deployed in cloud [C-8-1].
+- The capability of accessing virtual storage resources involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in infrastructure capabilities type of cloud to use storage resource deployed in cloud [C-8-2].
+
+With the integration of cloud capabilities of the platform capabilities type [b-ITU-T Y.3500] into the IoT, the IoT can deploy its platform according to this type of cloud capability. In such a way, the IoT can provide flexibility for the usage of IoT application support and service support capabilities, e.g., IoT application providers can more easily deploy IoT applications based on the platform of the IoT.
+
+With the integration of cloud capabilities of the application capabilities type [b-ITU-T Y.3500] into the IoT, the IoT can deploy IoT applications according to this type of capability. In such a way, IoT applications can be used more flexibly.
+
+Things as a Service (TaaS) can be considered as a cloud service category whose things-related services (e.g., accessing, subscription and notification of things-related data, and management and control of things-related devices) are provided to cloud service customers. TaaS offers cloud capabilities of the platform capabilities type and/or application capabilities type based on the IoT infrastructure. Via TaaS, IoT applications and/or IoT users can easily use the desired things-related services (e.g., get the desired things-related data, and control the desired things-related devices).
+
+In order to integrate cloud computing technologies for implementation of TaaS, the additional capabilities of publishing things as services, summarizing data of things, and synchronizing data with things are required.
+
+- The capability of publishing things as services involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in the platform capabilities type of cloud to deploy things-related services [C-8-3].
+- The capability of summarizing data of things involves the abilities of collecting and aggregating in the service support and application support layer of the IoT reference model [ITU-T Y.2060] the data of things related with the required things-related services for their provision to cloud users [C-8-4].
+- The capability of synchronizing data with things involves the abilities of creating, deleting, and updating the data of things just in time with respect to application requirements, based on the updated status of sensed things in order to guarantee the quality of TaaS [C-8-5].
+
+NOTE – The above identified capabilities of publishing things as services, summarizing data of things and synchronizing data with things are additional capabilities that are required for the integration of cloud computing technologies with the IoT in order to provide TaaS, they are not part of the IoT basic capabilities specified in clause 8 of this Recommendation.
+
+## 9.2 Capabilities for integration of big data technologies
+
+The development of the IoT causes rapid growth of IoT data. As there will be a large number of devices connected with the IoT and a large number of IoT services will flourish, there will be a large amount of IoT data created and used in the IoT.
+
+Major characteristics of IoT data relevant for the integration of big data technologies into the IoT are:
+
+- a) Massive quantity (volume): the IoT infrastructure connects countless physical things and virtual things. These interactions and data aggregations produce huge data in the information world [ITU-T Y.2060], including not only the data collected by sensors, but also other data of the IoT infrastructure, e.g., other data concerning devices and data concerning networks, platforms and applications.
+- b) Heterogeneity (variety): IoT data are heterogeneous (data types and sources). For instance, IoT data related to healthcare applications usually differ from those related to transportation applications, not only from a structure (i.e., format) point of view but also from a semantic point of view.
+- c) Coexistence of structured and un-structured data (variety): structured data and un-structured data coexist in the IoT. Structured data are generally more efficient than un-structured data for data management.
+- d) High speed of data generation and processing (velocity): the collection and aggregation at the IoT device layer of data from a huge number of data sources form constantly large and high speed flows; the support of IoT application requirements may require processing of the data of things at high speed, e.g., for applications requiring real-time decision making.
+- e) Frequent update or change of the values of data (volatility): the values of data of things are changed or updated frequently over a period of time as they have to reflect the status of things, and update the services related with things, just in time as required by IoT applications.
+- f) Contextualization: a lot of IoT data are meaningful only if they are collected and integrated with related contextual data in order to provide context-aware services.
+
+Data management capability of the IoT can be enhanced by big data technologies for transferring, storing, processing, validating and querying IoT data more efficiently, as well as for extracting information and actionable knowledge from IoT data. Besides, additional capabilities for the integration of big data technologies are also required.
+
+The required additional capabilities for the integration of big data technologies are the capabilities of adopting big data collection, adopting big data aggregation, adopting big data storage, adopting big data integration, adopting big data query, and adopting big data analysis.
+
+- The capability of adopting big data collection involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data collection [C-9-1].
+- The capability of adopting big data aggregation involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data aggregating from different sources in the device layer of the IoT reference model as specified in [ITU-T Y.2060] [C-9-2].
+- The capability of adopting big data storage involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data storing [C-9-3].
+- The capability of adopting big data integration involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data summarizing from different sources in the service support and application support layer of the IoT reference model as specified in [ITU-T Y.2060] [C-9-4].
+- The capability of adopting big data query involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data query [C-9-5].
+- The capability of adopting big data analysis involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data analysis [C-9-6].
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+Security is a fundamental aspect to be considered in IoT technical specifications. The security issues in IoT can be divided into two groups: one is about the usual security threats, and another is about privacy protection that is particularly significant in IoT. This Recommendation considers the security issues from both the IoT functional framework perspective and the IoT basic capabilities perspective.
+
+In the functional view of the IoT functional framework described in clause 7.1, the security and privacy protection functional group is specified. In the implementation view of the IoT functional framework described in clause 7.2, the IoT security and privacy protection functional entity is specified. In the deployment view of the IoT functional framework described in clause 7.3, the functional components of device manager, network manager, and service manager are specified to contain the capabilities of security and privacy protection.
+
+Among the IoT basic capabilities described in clause 8, the capabilities of security and privacy protection are described in clause 8.7, and the management capabilities related with security and privacy protection are described in clause 8.5. These capabilities fulfil the IoT common requirements on security and privacy protection specified in [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+# Annex A
+
+## The IoT capabilities list
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Tables A.1 to A.9 list and number the capabilities identified in this Recommendation.
+
+Tables A.1 to A.9 have similar formats.
+
+The first column is headed "capability number" and assigns a number to each IoT capability. The numbering rule for each IoT capability is as follows: C--. For example, the first IoT capability described in clause 8.1 is numbered C-1-1.
+
+The second column is headed "capability name" and gives the name of each IoT capability.
+
+The third column is headed "capability summary" and briefly describes what the capability does.
+
+The fourth column is headed as "related requirement(s)" and describes the common requirement(s) specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] to be fulfilled by the capability.
+
+NOTE – One IoT capability may fulfil several requirements, and several IoT capabilities may fulfil the same single requirement.
+
+The fifth column is headed "associated component(s)" and lists the functional components (from clause 7.3) associated with the IoT capability. This column can be used to validate that the IoT capability can be implemented and deployed.
+
+**Table A.1 – List of service provision capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|-------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
+| C-1-1 | Service prioritization | Service prioritization involves the abilities of providing services in different priorities, such as querying data or transferring data in different priorities. | Prioritization of services is required to fulfil the different service requirements of different groups of IoT users. | Service platform, IoT service controller |
+| C-1-2 | Semantic based service | Semantic based service involves the abilities of semantic annotating data or service, semantic querying data, or semantic requesting services. | Semantic based services are required to support autonomic service provisioning. | Service platform, IoT data server |
+| C-1-3 | Service composition | Service composition involves the abilities of creating customized services based on existing capabilities. | Service composition is required to support flexible service creation. | Service platform, service manager |
+
+**Table A.1 – List of service provision capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-1-4 | Mobility service | Mobility service involves the abilities of remote accessing service platform, remote authenticating users, and remote requesting services. | Mobility services are required to support service mobility, user mobility and device mobility. | Service platform, service manager |
+| C-1-5 | Autonomic service | Autonomic service involves the abilities of automatic capturing, transferring, and analysing data of things, and automatic providing services based on predefined rules or policies. | Autonomic services are required to enable automatic capture, communication and processing of data of things. | Service platform, service manager, IoT service controller |
+| C-1-6 | Location-based and context-aware service | Location-based and context-aware service involves the abilities of automatic providing services based on the location information and related context and predefined rules or policies. | Location-based and context-aware services are required to enable flexible, user customized and autonomic services based on the location information and/or related context. | Service platform, service manager, IoT service controller |
+| C-1-7 | Service discovery | Service discovery involves the abilities of discovering IoT users, services, devices and data of things. | Discovery services are required to support discover IoT users, services, devices and data of things. | Service manager, IoT data server, device manager |
+| C-1-8 | Service subscription | Service subscription involves the abilities of subscribing the needed services and associated data of things by IoT users. | Service subscription support is required to allow the IoT user to subscribe the needed services and associated data of things. | Service manager, IoT data server |
+| C-1-9 | Standardized naming and addressing | Standardized naming and addressing involves the abilities of creating, updating, deleting, querying names and addresses of users, devices and things. | Standardized naming and addressing is required to support interoperability among different domains. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+
+**Table A.1 – List of service provision capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| C-1-10 | Virtual storage and processing | Virtual storage and processing involves the abilities of providing storage and processing resources in a scalable way. | Virtual storage and processing capabilities are required to support storing and processing a large amount of data (big data). | Service platform, IoT data server |
+| C-1-11 | Adaptable service provision | The capability of adaptable service provision involves the abilities of extending service configurations to provide new services as required by applications or users of the IoT in order to be adaptable to different applications or users of the IoT. | Adaptability to the new technologies emerging in the future is required in the IoT. | Service platform, service manager |
+| C-1-12 | Service provision acknowledgement | The capability of service provision acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging the correct service provision requested by applications or users of the IoT to support reliable service provision in the IoT. | Reliability in capabilities of the IoT, such as reliability in communication, service and data management capabilities of the IoT, is required. | Service platform |
+
+**Table A.2 – List of communication capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-2-1 | Event-based communication | Event-based communication capability enables IoT devices and service provider to initiate communication based on predefined events. | Event-based communication between devices or between IoT users is required to be supported. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, service platform |
+| C-2-2 | Periodic communication | Periodic communication capability enables IoT devices and service provider to periodically initiate communication based on predefined events. | Periodic communication between devices or between IoT users is required to be supported. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, service platform |
+
+**Table A.2 – List of communication capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-2-3 | Unicast communication | Unicast communication capability enables transport network to transfer messages from the source entity to single destination entity. | The support of the unicast communication mode between IoT users or devices is required. | Enhanced transport network |
+| C-2-4 | Multicast communication | Multicast communication capability enables transport network to transfer messages from the source entity to a group of destination entities simultaneously | The support of the multicast communication modes is required to provide communication services within a group of IoT users or devices. | Enhanced transport network |
+| C-2-5 | Broadcast communication | Broadcast communication capability enables transport network to transfer messages to all nodes of a given network area | The support of the broadcast communication modes is required to support the collaboration among IoT users or devices. | Enhanced transport network |
+| C-2-6 | Anycast communication | Anycast communication capability enables transport network to transfer messages to any one node of a given network area. | The support of the anycast communication modes is required to support the collaboration among IoT users or devices. | Enhanced transport network |
+| C-2-7 | Error control for communications | Error control for communications capability involves the abilities of ensuring to transfer data correctly from end to end. | Error control for communications is required to be supported. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, IoT network controller |
+| C-2-8 | Quality of Service enabling communication | Quality of Service enabling communication capability provides some mechanisms to guarantee the delivery and processing of time-critical messages | Time-critical communications are required to be supported. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, IoT network controller |
+
+**Table A.2 – List of communication capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-2-9 | Self-configuring for networking | The capability of self-configuring for networking involves the abilities of automatically configuring networking parameters based on discovered networking interfaces and predefined rules. | Autonomic networking is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-2-10 | Self-healing for networking | The capability of self-healing for networking involves the abilities of automatically recovering from fault status of networking based on monitoring results and predefined rules. | Autonomic networking is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-2-11 | Self-optimizing for networking | The capability of self-optimizing for networking involves the abilities of automatically optimizing networking operations based on monitoring results and predefined rules. | Autonomic networking is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-2-12 | Self-protecting for networking | The capability of self-protecting for networking involves the abilities of automatically protecting entities of networking from harmful operations based on predefined rules. | Autonomic networking is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-2-13 | Content-aware communication | Content-aware communication capability involves the abilities of identifying content and selecting path and routing messages based on content, or blocking messages based on content. | Content-aware communication is required for support of path selection and routing of communications based on content. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, IoT network controller |
+| C-2-14 | Location-based communication | The capability of location-based communication involves the abilities of identifying locations and initiating communication based on predefined rules. | Location-based communication is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, IoT network controller |
+
+**Table A.2 – List of communication capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-2-15 | Transport acknowledgement | The capability of transport acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging correctly received messages to support reliable communications as required by IoT applications. | Reliability in capabilities of IoT, such as reliability in communication, service and data management capabilities of the IoT, is required. | Enhanced transport network, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-2-16 | Adaptable networking | The capability of adaptable networking involves the abilities of extending networking configurations to connect with emerging IoT to be adaptable to different networking technologies. | Adaptability to the new technologies emerging in the future is required in the IoT. | Enhanced transport network, network manager, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, device manager |
+
+**Table A.3 – List of application support capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| C-3-1 | Programmable interface provision | The capability of programmable interface provision involves the abilities of supporting new services or customized services based on existing capabilities and application specific requirements. | Programmable interfaces are required to be standardized to provide open access to application support capabilities. | Service platform |
+| C-3-2 | Group management | The capability of group management involves the abilities of creating, modifying, deleting, and querying IoT groups, and adding, modifying, deleting and querying IoT group members. | Group management is required. | Service platform |
+
+**Table A.3 – List of application support capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-3-3 | Time synchronization | The capability of time synchronization involves the abilities of synchronizing the time among related functional components in reliable way, in order to support global or local time stamping for applications. | Reliable time synchronization is required. | Service platform |
+| C-3-4 | Orchestration | Orchestration capability involves the abilities of automatic arrangement and coordination of service provisioning or device operations to fulfil application specific requirements. | Collaboration is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, service platform |
+| C-3-5 | User management | User management capability involves the abilities of creating, querying, updating and deleting IoT user profiles, and authenticating, authorizing, registering and auditing IoT users. | User management is required. | Service platform |
+| C-3-6 | Application support operation acknowledgement | The capability of application support operation acknowledgement involves the abilities of acknowledging correct operations requested by applications to support reliable application operations in the IoT. | Reliability in capabilities of the IoT, such as reliability in communication, service and data management capabilities of the IoT, is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+
+**Table A.4 – List of data management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| C-4-1 | Data storage | The capability of data storage involves the ability of storing data of things based on predefined rules and policies. | Storing data of things is required to be supported. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+
+**Table A.4 – List of data management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-4-2 | Data processing | The capability of data processing involves the ability of data fusion and mining based on predefined rules and policies. | Processing data of things is required to be supported. | IoT data server |
+| C-4-3 | Data querying | The capability of data querying involves the ability of querying historical information about things | Querying historical data of things is required to be supported. | IoT data server |
+| C-4-4 | Data access control | The capability of data access control involves the abilities of controlling and monitoring the data access operations by the owners of data. | Data access control by the data owners is required. | IoT data server |
+| C-4-5 | Open information exchange | The capability of open information exchange involves the abilities of sending data to or receiving data from external data sources, e.g., data centres and data servers outside the IoT. | Data exchange with entities outside the IoT is required to be supported. | IoT data server |
+| C-4-6 | Semantic data operation | The capability of semantic data operation involves the abilities of semantic annotating, semantic discovering, semantic storing and semantic composing data of things to fulfil the requirements of IoT users or applications | Semantic annotation and semantic access to data of things are required. Semantic storage, transfer and aggregation of data of things are required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-4-7 | Autonomic data operation | The capability of autonomic data operation involves the abilities of automatically collecting, aggregating, transferring, storing, analysing data of things, and automatically managing these data operations for support of operating data of things in a scalable way. | Scalability is required to be supported in the IoT in order to handle a large amount of devices, applications and users. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, IoT data server |
+
+**Table A.5 – List of management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-5-1 | Managing data models for exchanging data of things | The capability of managing data models for exchanging data of things involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating data models for support of interoperability among IoT applications. This capability also includes the abilities of creating and updating data models for support of semantic interoperability among IoT applications. | Interoperability is required to be ensured among heterogeneous IoT implementations. | IoT data server |
+| C-5-2 | Managing service description | The capability of managing service description involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating service description for support of service interoperability. | Interoperability is required to be ensured among heterogeneous IoT implementations. | Service manager, service platform |
+| C-5-3 | Managing network configuration | The capability of managing network configuration involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating network configuration for support of network interoperability. | Interoperability is required to be ensured among heterogeneous IoT implementations. | Network manager, enhanced transport network |
+| C-5-4 | Managing device configuration | The capability of managing device configuration involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating network configuration for support of device interoperability. | Support for heterogeneous device related communication technologies is required. | Device manager, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-5-5 | Managing security policy | The capability of managing security policy involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating security policy for support of interoperability between different implementations of security policy. | Interoperability is required to be ensured among heterogeneous IoT implementations. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+
+**Table A.5 – List of management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-5-6 | Managing privacy protection policy | The capability of managing privacy protection policy involves the abilities of creating, querying and updating privacy protection policy to support interoperability between different implementations of privacy protection policy. | Interoperability is required to be ensured among heterogeneous IoT implementations. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+| C-5-7 | Managing distributed processing | The capability of managing distributed processing involves the abilities of managing IoT functional components in a distributed way to support IoT scalability. | Scalability is required to be supported in IoT in order to handle a large number of devices, applications and users. | IoT data server, IoT service controller, service platform, service manager, IoT network controller, network manager, enhanced transport network, IoT gateway, device manager |
+| C-5-8 | Managing multiple domains | The capability of managing multiple domains involves the abilities of managing IoT functional components in multiple administrative domains to support of IoT scalability. | Scalability is required to be supported in IoT in order to handle a large number of devices, applications and users. | IoT data server, IoT service controller, service platform, service manager, IoT network controller, network manager, enhanced transport network, device manager |
+| C-5-9 | Redundant deployment enablement | The capability of redundant deployment enablement involves the abilities of enabling deployment of redundant functional components of the IoT to guarantee reliability required in communication, service provision and data management. | Reliability in capabilities of IoT, such as reliability in communication, service and data management capabilities of IoT, is required. | IoT data server, IoT service controller, service platform, service manager, IoT network controller, network manager, IoT gateway, device manager |
+
+**Table A.5 – List of management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-5-10 | Service integrity check | The capability of service integrity check involves the abilities of checking the service lifetime, the available resources required to provide the service in order to guarantee the high availability of service provisioning. | The IoT is required to provide high availability in service provisioning, data management, communication, sensing and actuating things. | Service manager |
+| C-5-11 | Data integrity check | The capability of data integrity check involves the abilities of checking the data lifetime, the available attributes of the data, and the consistency of data in order to guarantee the high availability of data management. | The IoT is required to provide high availability in service provisioning, data management, communication, sensing and actuating things. | IoT data server |
+| C-5-12 | Device integrity check | The capability of device integrity check involves the abilities of checking the status of all functions of device to guarantee the high availability of IoT devices. | The IoT is required to provide high availability in service provisioning, data management, communication, sensing and actuating things. | Device manager, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-5-13 | Security integrity check | The capability of security integrity check involves the abilities of checking the consistency of security policies deployed in all functional components of the IoT to guarantee the high availability of security in the IoT. | The IoT is required to provide high availability in service provisioning, data management, communication, sensing and actuating things. | Service manager, network manager, device manager, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-5-14 | User profile integrity check | The capability of user profile integrity check involves the abilities of checking the lifetime, subscription, privacy protection, and availability of services subscribed by users to guarantee the high availability of service provisioning and privacy protection for users. | The IoT is required to provide high availability in service provisioning, data management, communication, sensing and actuating things. | Service manager, network manager, device manager, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+
+**Table A.5 – List of management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| C-5-15 | Managing devices | The capability of managing devices involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, diagnosing, and recovering devices of the IoT, and updating software to enhance capabilities of devices of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Device manager |
+| C-5-16 | Managing networks | The capability of managing networks involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, diagnosing, and recovering networks of the IoT, and updating network software to enhance capabilities of networks of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Network manager |
+| C-5-17 | Managing services | The capability of managing services involves the abilities of describing, configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, recovering, and updating services of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Service manager |
+| C-5-18 | Managing data operations | The capability of managing data operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, and recovering data operations, and updating software related with data operations to enhance capabilities of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | IoT data server |
+| C-5-19 | Managing security operations | The capability of managing security operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, auditing, diagnosing, and recovering security operations, and updating software related with security operations to enhance capabilities of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+
+**Table A.5 – List of management capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-5-20 | Managing privacy protection | The capability of managing privacy protection involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, auditing, and recovering privacy protection, and updating software related with privacy protection to enhance capabilities of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+| C-5-21 | Managing user operations | The capability of managing user operations involves the abilities of configuring, monitoring, accounting and charging, optimizing, diagnosing, recovering operations of IoT users, and updating software related with operations of IoT users to enhance capabilities of the IoT. | Manageability is required to be supported in IoT in order to ensure normal operations. | Service manager, network manager, device manager |
+| C-5-22 | Plug and play capability | Plug and play capability involves the abilities of automatic configuring, connecting and activating devices of the IoT to enable on-the-fly semantic-based configuration and activation of IoT devices. | Plug and play capability is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager, service manager |
+
+**Table A.6 – List of connectivity capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-6-1 | Identification-based connectivity | The capability of identification-based connectivity involves the abilities of establishing the connectivity based on the identification of things. | Identification-based connectivity between a thing and the IoT is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-6-2 | Things' status notification | The capability of things' status notification involves the abilities of automatic notification of the status of things and its changes based on predefined rules. | Monitoring things in timely manner is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+
+**Table A.6 – List of connectivity capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-6-3 | Device mobility | The capability of device mobility involves the abilities of keeping the connectivity with the IoT when a device moves. | Device mobility is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, network manager |
+| C-6-4 | Adaptable connectivity | The capability of adaptable connectivity involves the abilities of extending connectivity configurations to connect with new types of devices of the IoT in order to be adaptable to different technologies in devices of IoT. | Adaptability to the new technologies emerging in the future is required in IoT. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, device manager |
+
+**Table A.7 – List of security and privacy protection capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-7-1 | Communication security | The capability of communication security involves the abilities of supporting secure, trusted and privacy-protected communication. | Communication security is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device, device manager, network manager, enhanced transport network |
+| C-7-2 | Data management security | The capability of data management security involves the abilities of providing secure, trusted and privacy-protected data management. | Data management security is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-7-3 | Service provision security | The capability of service provision security involves the abilities of providing secure, trusted and privacy-protected service provision. | Service provision security is required. | Service platform, service manager |
+| C-7-4 | Security integration | The capability of security integration involves the abilities of integrating different security policies and techniques related to the variety of IoT functional components. | Integration of different security policies and techniques is required. | Device manager, network manager, service manager |
+
+**Table A.7 – List of security and privacy protection capabilities**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-7-5 | Mutual authentication and authorization | The capability of mutual authentication and authorization involves the abilities of authenticating and authorizing each other before a device accesses IoT based on predefined security policies. | Mutual authentication and authorization is required. | Device manager, network manager |
+| C-7-6 | Security audit | The capability of security audit involves the abilities of monitoring any data access or attempt to access IoT applications in a fully transparent, traceable and reproducible way based on appropriate regulation and laws. | Security audit is required to be supported in IoT. | Device manager, network manager, service manager, IoT data server |
+
+**Table A.8 – List of capabilities for integration of cloud computing technologies**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| C-8-1 | Accessing virtual processing resources | The capability of accessing virtual processing resources involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in infrastructure capabilities type of cloud to use processing resource deployed in cloud. | Integration with cloud computing technologies is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-8-2 | Accessing virtual storage resources | The capability of accessing virtual storage resources involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in infrastructure capabilities type of cloud to use storage resource deployed in cloud. | Integration with cloud computing technologies is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-8-3 | Publishing things as services | The capability of publishing things as services involves the abilities of adopting the capabilities specified in platform capabilities type of cloud to deploy the services of things. | Integration with cloud computing technologies is required. | IoT data server, service platform |
+
+**Table A.8 – List of capabilities for integration of cloud computing technologies**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C-8-4 | Summarizing data of things | The capability of summarizing data of things involves the abilities of collecting and aggregating the data of things related with the required services to provide the service of things to cloud users. | Integration with cloud computing technologies is required. | IoT data server, service platform, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-8-5 | Synchronizing data with things | The capability of synchronizing data with things involves the abilities of creating, deleting, and updating the data of things just in time with respect to application requirements, based on the updated status of sensed things in order to guarantee the quality of TaaS. | Integration with cloud computing technologies is required. | IoT data server, service platform, IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+
+**Table A.9 – List of capabilities for integration of big data technologies**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
+| C-9-1 | Adopting big data collection | The capability of adopting big data collection involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data collection. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-9-2 | Adopting big data aggregation | The capability of adopting big data aggregation involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of summarizing big data from different sources in device layer. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT device, IoT gateway, end-user device |
+| C-9-3 | Adopting big data storage | The capability of adopting big data storage involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of storing big data. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT data server |
+
+**Table A.9 – List of capabilities for integration of big data technologies**
+
+| Capability number | Capability name | Capability summary | Related requirement(s) | Associated component(s) |
+|--------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| C-9-4 | Adopting big data integration | The capability of adopting big data integration involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of summarizing big data from different sources in server support and application support layer. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT data server, IoT gateway |
+| C-9-5 | Adopting big data query | The capability of adopting big data query involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data query. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT data server |
+| C-9-6 | Adopting big data analysis | The capability of adopting big data analysis involves the abilities of adopting the technologies of big data analysis. | Integration with big data technologies is required. | IoT data server |
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Matching analysis between requirements and capabilities of the IoT
+
+(This Appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Tables I.1 to I.7 provide matching analyses between requirements and capabilities of the IoT. The following provides a legend for the structure of these tables.
+
+The two columns headed "Requirement number" and "Requirement summary" are copied from the corresponding columns in the table in Annex A of [ITU-T Y.2066].
+
+The column headed "Capability number" contains one or multiple capability numbers provided in Annex A whose corresponding capabilities support the requirement listed in the same row.
+
+The column headed "Capability name" contains the name of the capabilities associated with the "Capability number" provided in the same row. These capabilities are described in clause 8 and support the requirement listed in the same row.
+
+### I.1 Matching analysis of non-functional requirements of the IoT
+
+Matching analysis results between non-functional requirements of the IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.1. Results show that all non-functional requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE – There are multiple capabilities associated with each row of Table I.1. These capabilities act together to support the requirement in the same row.
+
+**Table I.1 – List of matching analysis of non-functional requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| N1 | Interoperability is required. | C-5-1, C-5-2, C-5-3, C-5-4, C-5-5, and C-5-6. | Managing data models for exchanging data of things, managing service description, managing network configuration, managing device configuration, managing security policy, and managing privacy protection policy. |
+| N2 | Scalability is required. | C-4-7, C-5-7, and C-5-8. | Autonomic data operation, managing distributed processing, and managing multiple domains. |
+| N3 | Reliability is required. | C-1-12, C-2-15, C-3-6, and C-5-9. | Service provision acknowledgement, transport acknowledgement, application support operation acknowledgement, and redundant deployment enablement. |
+
+**Table I.1 – List of matching analysis of non-functional requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| N4 | High availability is required. | C-5-10, C-5-11, C-5-12, C-5-13, and C-5-14. | Service integrity check, data integrity check, device integrity check, security integrity check, and user profile integrity check. |
+| N5 | Adaptability is required. | C-1-11, C-2-16, and C-6-4. | Adaptable service provision, adaptable networking, and adaptable connectivity. |
+| N6 | Manageability is required. | C-5-15, C-5-16, C-5-17, C-5-18, C-5-19, C-5-20, and C-5-21. | Managing devices, managing networks, managing services, managing data operations, managing security operations, managing privacy protection, and managing user operations. |
+
+### I.2 Matching analysis of application support requirements of the IoT
+
+Matching analysis results between application support requirements of the IoT and the capabilities of the IoT that can fulfil those requirements are shown in Table I.2. Results show that all application support requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE – There may be multiple capabilities associated with a single row of Table I.2. Where multiple capabilities are listed, they act together to support the requirement in the same row.
+
+**Table I.2 – List of matching analysis of application support requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|--------------------|----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| A1 | Standardized programmable interfaces are required. | C-3-1 | Programmable interface provision |
+| A2 | Group management is required. | C-3-2 | Group management |
+| A3 | Reliable time synchronization is required. | C-3-3 | Time synchronization |
+| A4 | Collaboration is required. | C-3-4 | Orchestration |
+| A5 | User management is required. | C-3-5 | User management |
+| A6 | Resource usage accounting is required. | C-5-16, C-5-17, and C-5-18 | Managing networks, managing services, and managing data operations. |
+
+### I.3 Matching analysis of service requirements of the IoT
+
+Matching analysis results between service requirements of the IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.3. Results show that all service requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE – There may be multiple capabilities associated with a single row of Table I.3. Where multiple capabilities are listed, they act together to support the requirement in the same row.
+
+**Table I.3 – List of matching analysis of service requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| S1 | Prioritization of services is required. | C-1-1 | Service prioritization |
+| S2 | Semantic based services are required. | C-1-2 | Semantic based service |
+| S3 | Service composition is required. | C-1-3 | Service composition |
+| S4 | Mobility services are required. | C-1-4 | Mobility services |
+| S5 | Highly reliable and secure human body connectivity services are required. | C-1-12, C-2-15, C-3-6, C-7-1, C-7-2, and C-7-3. | Service provision acknowledgement, transport acknowledgement, application support operation acknowledgement, communication security, data management security, and service provision security. |
+| S6 | Autonomic services are required. | C-1-5 | Autonomic service |
+| S7 | Location-based and context-aware services are required. | C-1-6 | Location-based and context-aware service |
+| S8 | Service management is required. | C-5-17 | Managing services |
+| S9 | Discovery services are required. | C-1-7 | Service discovery |
+| S10 | Service subscription support is required. | C-1-8 | Service subscription |
+| S11 | Standardized naming and addressing is required. | C-1-9 | Standardized naming and addressing |
+| S12 | Virtual storage and processing capabilities are required. | C-1-10 | Virtual storage and processing |
+
+### **I.4 Matching analysis of communication requirements of the IoT**
+
+Matching analysis results between communication requirements of the IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.4. Results show that all communication requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+NOTE – There may be multiple capabilities associated with a single row of Table I.4. Where multiple capabilities are listed, they act together to support the requirement in the same row. In the case of the row identified by Requirement number "C3", each of the two identified capabilities can fulfil the requirement.
+
+**Table I.4 –List of matching analysis of communication requirements of IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| C1 | Event-based, periodic, and automatic communication modes are required to be supported. | C-2-1 and C-2-2. | Event-based communication and periodic communication. |
+| C2 | The support of the unicast, multicast, broadcast and anycast communication modes is required. | C-2-3, C-2-4, C-2-5 and C-2-6. | Unicast communication, multicast communication, broadcast communication, and anycast communication. |
+| C3 | The support of device initiated communications is required. | C-2-1 or C-2-2. | Event-based communication or periodic communication. |
+| C4 | Error control for communications is required to be supported. | C-2-7 | Error control for communications |
+| C5 | Time-critical communications are required to be supported. | C-2-8 | Time-critical communications |
+| C6 | Autonomic networking is required. | C-2-9, C-2-10, C-2-11 and C-2-12. | Self-configuring for networking, self-healing for networking, self-optimizing for networking, and self-protecting for networking. |
+| C7 | Content-aware communication is required. | C-2-13 | Content-aware communication |
+| C8 | Location-based communication is required. | C-2-14 | Location-based communication |
+| C9 | Support for heterogeneous device related communication technologies is required. | C-5-4 | Managing device configuration |
+| C10 | Support for heterogeneous network related communication technologies is required. | C-5-3 | Managing network configuration |
+
+### **I.5 Matching analysis of device requirements of the IoT**
+
+Matching analysis results between device requirements of IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.5. Results show that all device requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+**Table I.5 – List of matching analysis of device requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
+| D1 | Identification-based connectivity between a thing and the IoT is required. | C-6-1 | Identification-based connectivity |
+| D2 | Remote monitoring, control and configuration of devices are required. | C-5-15 | Managing devices |
+| D3 | Plug and play capability is required. | C-5-22 | Plug and play capability |
+| D4 | Monitoring things in a timely manner is required. | C-6-2 | Things' status notification |
+| D5 | Device mobility is required. | C-6-3 | Device mobility |
+| D6 | Device integrity checking is required. | C-5-12 | Device integrity check |
+
+### **I.6 Matching analysis of data management requirements of the IoT**
+
+Matching analysis results between data management requirements of the IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.6. Results show that all data management requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+**Table I.6 – List of matching analysis of data management requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
+| DM1 | Storing data of things is required to be supported. | C-4-1 | Data storage |
+| DM2 | Processing data of things is required to be supported. | C-4-2 | Data processing |
+| DM3 | Querying historical data of things is required to be supported. | C-4-3 | Data querying |
+| DM4 | Data access control by the data owners is required. | C-4-4 | Data access control |
+| DM5 | Data exchange with entities outside the IoT is required to be supported. | C-4-5 | Open information exchange |
+| DM6 | Integrity checking and life cycle management of data of things is required. | C-5-11 | Data integrity check |
+| DM7 | Semantic annotation and semantic access to data of things are required. | C-4-6 | Semantic data operation |
+| DM8 | Semantic storage, transfer and aggregation of data of things are required. | C-4-6 | Semantic data operation |
+
+### **I.7 Matching analysis of security and privacy protection requirements of the IoT**
+
+Matching analysis results between security and privacy protection requirements of the IoT and the supported capabilities of the IoT are shown in Table I.7. Results show that all security and privacy protection requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2066] are fulfilled.
+
+**Table I.7 – List of matching analysis of security and privacy protection requirements of the IoT**
+
+| Requirement number | Requirement summary | Capability number | Capability name |
+|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
+| SP1 | Communication security is required. | C-7-1 | Communication security |
+| SP2 | Data management security is required. | C-7-2 | Data management security |
+| SP3 | Service provision security is required. | C-7-3 | Service provision security |
+| SP4 | Integration of different security policies and techniques is required. | C-7-4 | Security integration |
+| SP5 | Mutual authentication and authorization is required. | C-7-5 | Mutual authentication and authorization |
+| SP6 | Security audit is required to be supported in the IoT. | C-7-6 | Security audit |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2061] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2061 (2012), *Requirements for support of machine-oriented communication applications in the next generation network environment*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2067] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2067 (2014), *Common requirements and capabilities of a gateway for Internet of things applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 102 690] ETSI TS 102 690 v1.2.1 (2013), *Machine-to-Machine communications (M2M); Functional architecture*,
+- [b-IoT-A D1.4] The Internet of things architecture (IoT-A, 2012), *Project Deliverable D1.4 – Converged architectural reference model for the IoT v2.0*,
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1034 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2070
+
+(01/2015)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Requirements and architecture of the home energy management system and home network services**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2070
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2070
+
+# Requirements and architecture of the home energy management system and home network services
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2070 provides the requirements and architecture of the home energy management system (HEMS) and home network (HN) services. The HEMS supports energy efficiency and reduction of energy consumption by monitoring and controlling devices such as home appliances, storage batteries and sensors connected to the HN from the HEMS application.
+
+While the algorithm for the energy efficiency and reduction of energy consumption runs in the HEMS application, the development of a platform (PF) is desired which provides common functions to enable the application to access the devices and to support the efficient development of applications. This is not only applies for the HEMS, but also for other HN services such as home security and healthcare. This Recommendation provides common requirements for the HN services to support the HEMS as the widely known HEMS is mainly considered one of the HN services. It also describes the reference architecture and the functional architecture including the functional relationship for the HEMS and the other HN services.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2070 | 2015-01-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12420 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Home energy management system, home network, home network service.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2015
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Overview..... | 4 |
+| | 6.1 HN service architecture ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 HEMS based on HN service architecture..... | 5 |
+| | 6.3 Merits of HN service architecture ..... | 7 |
+| 7 | Requirements ..... | 8 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements for the device..... | 8 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements for HGW..... | 8 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements for management PF ..... | 9 |
+| | 7.4 Requirements for security..... | 10 |
+| 8 | Reference architecture ..... | 10 |
+| 9 | Functional architecture ..... | 12 |
+| | 9.1 Device..... | 13 |
+| | 9.2 HGW..... | 14 |
+| | 9.3 Management PF ..... | 14 |
+| | 9.4 Application ..... | 15 |
+| 10 | Functional relationship ..... | 16 |
+| | 10.1 Device operation..... | 16 |
+| | 10.2 Application execution..... | 18 |
+| | 10.3 Management ..... | 19 |
+| 11 | Security support..... | 20 |
+| | 11.1 HEMS model for security..... | 20 |
+| | 11.2 Security functions..... | 21 |
+| | Appendix I – Deployment model with WoT..... | 23 |
+| | Appendix II – Examples of HN applications ..... | 25 |
+| | II.1 Home security..... | 25 |
+| | II.2 Customer support with controlling access right to device..... | 25 |
+| | II.3 Room facility coordination for better sleep..... | 26 |
+| | Appendix III – Security considerations based on [ITU-T X.1111] ..... | 27 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 30 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2070
+
+# Requirements and architecture of the home energy management system and home network services
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the requirements and architecture of the home energy management system (HEMS) and home network (HN) services. The HEMS supports energy efficiency and reduction of energy consumption by monitoring and controlling devices such as home appliances, storage batteries and sensors connected to the HN from the HEMS application with the HN service architecture. The HEMS is one of the HN services. The other HN services, such as home security and healthcare, are provided with the same architecture as the HEMS and by monitoring and controlling the devices from the application specific to the service. In this Recommendation, the requirements, the reference architecture and the functional architecture including functional relationship are described to support the HEMS and the other HN services.
+
+This Recommendation covers the followings:
+
+- overview of the HN service architecture for the HEMS and other HN services;
+- requirements for the device, home gateway (HGW) and management platform (PF) in the HN service architecture as well as the security required for the architecture;
+- reference architecture with four ways to connect to the devices from the HGW according to the device type: basic device (IP based and non-IP based) and non-basic device (connecting to the HGW directly or through the adapter);
+- functional architecture with the entities: device, HGW, management PF and application;
+- functional relationship with three functional categories in the functional architecture: device operation, application execution and management;
+- security model and functions for the HN services mainly describing the HEMS.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T X.1111] Recommendation ITU-T X.1111 (2007), *Framework of security technologies for home network*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 demand response** [b-FG-Smart Terminology]: A smart grid feature that allows consumers to reduce or change their electrical use patterns during peak demand, usually in exchange for a financial incentive. Mechanisms and incentives for utilities, business, industrial, and residential
+
+customers to cut energy use during times of peak demand or when power reliability is at risk. Demand response is necessary for optimizing the balance of power supply and demand.
+
+NOTE – Smart grid [b-FG-Smart Terminology]: A two way electric power delivery network connected to an information and control network through sensors and control devices. This supports the intelligent and efficient optimization of the power network.
+
+**3.1.2 device object** [b-ECHONET Lite]: A logical model of the information held by equipment devices or home electrical appliances such as sensors, air conditioners and refrigerators, or of control items that can be remotely controlled. The interface form for remote control is standardized. The information and control target of each device is specified as property, and the operating method (setting and browsing) is specified as a service.
+
+**3.1.3 home network** [b-ITU-T J.190]: A short-range communications system designed for the residential environment, in which two or more devices exchange information under some sort of standard control.
+
+**3.1.4 presence** [b-ITU-T Y.2720]: A set of attributes that characterize an entity relating to the current status.
+
+**3.1.5 smart meter** [b-FG-Smart Terminology]: Smart meter is a premise device to monitor and control of electrical power usage of home devices based on "demand response information" from home devices. But, it is not recommended that the smart meter controls directly per each premise appliances because of the private security policy. To control and manage the each premise appliances, it is required for home management system such as home gateway and home server to support the control and management.
+
+**3.1.6 web of things** [b-ITU-T Y.2063]: A way to realize the IoT where (physical and virtual) things are connected and controlled through the world wide web.
+
+**3.1.7 web resource** [b-W3C WCterms]: A resource, identified by a URI, that is a member of the web core.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 adapter:** An entity used to connect a non-basic device to the home gateway by converting the dedicated communications protocol to the IP based protocol and the dedicated data model to the abstract data model.
+
+**3.2.2 device management:** A variety of functionalities to manage a collection of the devices including primary capabilities: auto-configuration and dynamic service provisioning, software/firmware image management, software module management, status and performance monitoring, and diagnostics.
+
+**3.2.3 fault diagnosis:** An example of a maintenance action, which is a sequence of elementary maintenance activities carried out for a given purpose.
+
+**3.2.4 home controller:** A small computer for the application for the home energy management system to monitor and control the home equipment such as home appliances and storage batteries to reduce energy consumption.
+
+**3.2.5 home energy management system:** A computer system comprising a software platform providing basic support services and a set of applications providing the functionality needed for the effective operation of home equipment, such as home appliances and storage batteries, so as to assure adequate security of energy supply at minimum cost.
+
+**3.2.6 home gateway:** An always on, always connected device which acts as the central point connecting the devices on the home network to the applications on the wide area network, and
+
+monitors and performs actions on data flows within the home network as well as on bi-directional communication flows between the home network and the wide area network.
+
+**3.2.7 home network resource:** A device (e.g., home appliance, storage battery, sensor), a network device (e.g., hub and access point in the home network) and network capacity for data transmission among them for the home network services.
+
+**3.2.8 in-home display:** A user screen device to present home energy consumption information. Users can optionally control their home devices with its user interfaces.
+
+**3.2.9 managed agent:** A software program running on the device to set the configuration information and to collect the information of the device. The managed agent gets the information from the resource management function on the management platform for the configuration of the device and sends the collection of the internal status of the device to it for various home network services including remote management and fault diagnosis.
+
+**3.2.10 management platform:** A platform which has common functions providing the interface and the management for the home network applications, and the virtual device management and the resource management for the home gateway and the devices.
+
+**3.2.11 wide area network:** An IP based communication network that covers a wide geographical area including the Internet and accommodates devices and local area networks.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+| DB | Database |
+| DR | Demand Response |
+| EV | Electric Vehicle |
+| HEMS | Home Energy Management System |
+| HGW | Home Gateway |
+| HN | Home Network |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| IHD | In-Home Display |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| L2 | Layer 2 |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MAC | Message Authentication Code |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| PF | Platform |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| WAN | Wide Area Network |
+
+WoT Web of Things
+XML Extensible Markup Language
+XMPP Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation,
+
+- The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+- The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# **6 Overview**
+
+This overview clause describes the HN service architecture. The HEMS is one of the HN services. There are other HN services, such as the home security service, for example, which detects a suspicious person with the human aware sensors. The HEMS and other HN services are provided with the HN service architecture. Clause 6.1 describes the HN service architecture. Clause 6.2 describes how the HEMS is provided by the HN service architecture by replacing the HN applications with the HEMS application.
+
+With the more widespread deployment of HN services and the increase of the devices connected to the HN, it is more complicated and more difficult for application developers to develop applications for the HN; a deep knowledge about the HN devices and communications protocols is required. Therefore, the development of an architecture for the HN services to support the application developers is important and forms the background of this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE –The term “Internet” is used in the description in clause 6 to support a clear understanding by the reader. However, it should be understood as the wide area network (WAN), which includes the Internet. The term WAN is used from clause 7 onward in this Recommendation.
+
+## **6.1 HN service architecture**
+
+HN applications have been developed to run on dedicated home controllers, which are located in the home. As shown in Figure 6-1(a) individual access, every home controller connects to one or more devices (home equipment) such as home appliances and storage batteries, each of which has its own dedicated communication interface at the device interface. For this reason, each application needs to be developed to meet with the device interface of the connecting device in order to monitor and control the device.
+
+On the other hand, as the communications protocols are standardized, devices are connecting with the standardized protocol to the common PF, which works on the home controller as shown in Figure 6-1(b). In this, common access, diagram, it is possible to abstract the device interface by the common PF and the devices can be accessed from HN applications which are also connected to the common PF at the application interface.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: Two access types for HN services. (a) Individual access: Three home controllers, each with a specific application (A, B, C), connected via LAN or Wireless LAN to devices 1-4. (b) Common access: A single 'Common PF (Home controller)' connected via a serial interface to devices 1-4, with applications A, B, and C connected via an application interface.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Two access types for HN services**
+
+Figure 6-2 below shows an HN service architecture that is composed of two types of architecture.
+
+Figure 6-2(a) shows an architecture in which all of the devices and the home controller are placed inside the home, and the applications and the common PF work on the home controller. This is referred to as the aggregate type architecture in this Recommendation. Figure 6-2(b) shows an architecture in which the devices are located inside the home, but the applications can be placed on the Internet. The functions of the common PF are separately distributed to the HGW inside the home and the management PF on the Internet, instead of on the home controller. This architecture enables the applications to access the devices from the Internet. This architecture is referred to as the distribute type architecture in this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F6-2
+
+Figure 6-2: The HN service architecture. (a) Aggregate type architecture: Applications A, B, C are inside the home controller, which is connected to devices 1-3. (b) Distribute type architecture: Applications A, B, C are on the Internet, connected to a Management PF, which is connected to an Internet cloud, which is connected to an HGW. The HGW is connected to devices 1-3. A dashed line connects the Home controller in (a) to the HGW in (b). A bracket on the right labels the Internet cloud and HGW as 'Common PF'.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – The HN service architecture**
+
+Both types of the architecture are within the scope of this Recommendation since both architectures have the same functions of the common PF. In the following clauses, however, the distribute type architecture is mainly described.
+
+## 6.2 HEMS based on HN service architecture
+
+The HEMS, based on the HN service architecture, is described in this clause, clarifying the features of the architecture.
+
+#### 6.2.1 HEMS and HN service architecture
+
+The HEMS is generally considered to provide the following services:
+
+- Visualization of the energy consumption by the entire house, or by selected devices such as home appliances, storage batteries with power sensors and the smart meter.
+- Realization of energy-efficiency and/or cutting energy usage during peak demand by monitoring and controlling the devices.
+
+The HEMS application is one of the HN applications; therefore, the architecture for the HEMS can be the same as that for other HN services which are within the HN service architecture.
+
+The HN service architecture applied for the HEMS is shown in Figure 6-3. This is the distribute type architecture shown in Figure 6-2(b), where by the HEMS application replaces the HN applications.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ subgraph Outside_the_home [Outside the home (Internet)]
+ HEMS_app[HEMS application] <--> Management_PF[Management PF]
+ end
+ subgraph Inside_the_home [Inside the home (HN)]
+ HGW[HGW] <--> Device[Device]
+ end
+ IP_network((IP network))
+ Management_PF --> IP_network
+ IP_network --> HGW
+```
+
+Figure 6-3: HEMS based on HN service architecture diagram. The diagram shows a flow from left to right. On the far left is a box labeled 'HEMS application'. A double-headed arrow connects it to a box labeled 'Management PF'. Below these two boxes is the text 'Outside the home (Internet)'. A cloud labeled 'IP network' is connected to the 'Management PF' box by a single-headed arrow pointing left. A dashed vertical line separates the Internet side from the Home Network (HN) side. To the right of the dashed line is a box labeled 'HGW'. A single-headed arrow points from the 'IP network' cloud to the 'HGW' box. Below the 'HGW' box is the text 'Inside the home (HN)'. A double-headed arrow connects the 'HGW' box to a box labeled 'Device' on the far right. The identifier 'Y.2070(15)\_F6-3' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 6-3 – HEMS based on HN service architecture**
+
+In Figure 6-3, everything to the left of the HGW (on the left side of the dotted line) is considered the Internet (outside the home) and everything to right hand side is considered the HN (inside the home).
+
+Devices such as home appliances, storage batteries and power sensors connected to the HN are monitored and controlled from the HEMS application on the Internet in this architecture, and in order to do so, the HGW bridges the Internet and the HN. The HGW converts the various types of communications protocols used for communication with the devices to the protocol, which is used on the Internet for communication with the management PF. The management PF is placed on the Internet and provides a web-based application interface. The HEMS application runs through this interface.
+
+With the HGW and the management PF, it is possible for the HEMS application to discover and identify devices connected to the HN and to access them using their identifiers. In this way, the HEMS application monitors and controls the individual devices and enables the HEMS.
+
+By making use of a standardized communication protocol between the HGW and the management PF, the HEMS application does not need to take into consideration the interfaces of the devices or the communications protocols used between the HGW and the devices. The devices are represented as web resources by the management PF. Therefore this architecture supports application developers by allowing them to develop applications without deep knowledge about multiple device interfaces and communications protocols.
+
+#### 6.2.2 HEMS examples
+
+This clause describes two HEMS examples based on the HN service architecture; these show the features of the architecture.
+
+In Figure 6-4, devices such as a home appliance, e.g., an air conditioner, and power sensors are connected to an HGW in the home, using various networks and protocols such as standardized communications protocols and dedicated communications protocols depending on the interface of each device. A HEMS application runs on the Internet and connects to the devices through the HGW and the management PF. In this architecture, the HEMS application collects the electronic power consumption data of the home appliance from the power sensors through the HGW and the management PF, and sends the data to visualize the energy consumption in the web text-based format to the web browser on the in-home display (IHD). It may be also possible to make the system send
+
+the data to web browser on a smart phone so that the end users can refer to the energy consumption from outside the home.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F6-4
+
+Figure 6-4: Visualization of energy consumption with IHD. The diagram shows a system architecture divided into 'Outside the home (Internet)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'. On the Internet side, there is a 'HEMS application' and a 'Management PF' connected by a bidirectional arrow. The 'Management PF' is connected to an 'IP network' cloud. On the HN side, there is a 'HGW' connected to the 'IP network' cloud. The 'HGW' is connected to 'Home appliance' and 'Power sensor' by bidirectional arrows. An 'IHD' is also connected to the 'IP network' cloud. A dashed vertical line separates the Internet and HN sections.
+
+**Figure 6-4 – Visualization of energy consumption with IHD**
+
+This service may provide the end user with a visualization of the energy consumption in a graphical representation, e.g., for the past week. For this service, the management PF stores the data received from the power sensors and provides them to the HEMS application when required.
+
+In Figure 6-5, a HEMS application makes use of a utility company's service, such as the demand response (DR) service. This architecture enables new services by combining Internet-based services. This is the main feature of this architecture in which the application is placed on the Internet.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F6-5
+
+Figure 6-5: Energy consumption control with DR. The diagram shows a system architecture divided into 'Outside the home (Internet)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'. On the Internet side, there is a 'Utility company service' connected to a 'HEMS application' by a bidirectional arrow. The 'HEMS application' is connected to a 'Management PF' by a bidirectional arrow. The 'Management PF' is connected to an 'IP network' cloud. On the HN side, there is a 'HGW' connected to the 'IP network' cloud. The 'HGW' is connected to 'Home appliance' and 'Power sensor' by bidirectional arrows. A dashed vertical line separates the Internet and HN sections.
+
+**Figure 6-5 – Energy consumption control with DR**
+
+## 6.3 Merits of HN service architecture
+
+The previous clauses showed the HN service architecture and how to apply the architecture to the HEMS. Although some of the merits of the architecture are described in the previous clauses, they are also summarized below.
+
+As described in clause 6.1, the HN service architecture is composed of the aggregate type architecture (Figure 6-2(a)) and the distribute type architecture (Figure 6-2(b)), and both architectures have the same functions of the common PF. The merits of the HN service architecture (both the aggregate type architecture and the distribute type architecture) are described below in items 1) through 3).
+
+- 1) It enables application developers to develop applications with the application interface on the common PF (i.e., the home controller in the aggregate type architecture and the management PF in the distribute type architecture) to provide various services.
+- 2) It enables easier and lower-cost introduction of services for end users who can install by themselves devices that support plug-and-play functionality. It is not necessary for the end users to be concerned about the connections to the devices.
+- 3) It enables the common PF to maintain the entire system and the HN resources remotely. The common PF provides functions for auto-configuration of devices and for detection of faults
+
+occurring on the HN. These functions make the system more stable and provide services at a lower cost.
+
+The distribute type architecture has a function on the management PF to cooperate with devices and applications working on networks that have different policies. Thus, there are some additional merits to the distribute type architecture; these are described below in items 4) through 6).
+
+- 4) It avoids increasing hardware resources, such as central processing unit (CPU) or memory on the home controller which would lead to an increase in service costs when providing other HN services in addition to the HEMS. It enables modifying/adding applications on the Internet without hardware restrictions.
+- 5) It enables the applications to easily monitor and control the devices on the HN with the management PF, which provides the application programming interface (API) needed to access the devices. This access is enabled even in the case where a firewall and network address translation (NAT) protects the devices from illegal access from the Internet.
+- 6) It enables easy development of security-conscious applications by providing functions for the authentication and the authorization for the devices and the HGW, and the encryption for the HN.
+
+# **7 Requirements**
+
+This clause describes requirements for the device, the HGW and the management PF in the HN service architecture, as well as for the security required for the architecture. Since the functions of the HEMS are specified in clause 6.2, the following requirements are extracted for the HEMS. As the HN service architecture is applied not only for the HEMS but also for other HN services, the following are also requirements for these other HN services as well. The requirements for the applications are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## **7.1 Requirements for the device**
+
+The following are requirements for the device:
+
+- 1) requirement for device operation
+ - device object
+
+It is required to have a device object which is an abstract data model representing the functions of the device.
+
+NOTE – For a device that does not have a device object, the adapter or the HGW connecting to the device directly is required to have a device object.
+- 2) requirements for management:
+ - managed agent
+
+It is required to respond to the resource information collector function of the HGW.
+
+It is required to check the status of the device itself for fault diagnosis.
+
+It is required to set the configuration of the device and the network device such as the hub and the access point in the HN.
+
+## **7.2 Requirements for HGW**
+
+The followings are requirements for the HGW:
+
+- 1) requirement for device operation
+ - data format and protocol (hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)/Internet protocol (IP)) conversion
+
+It is required to convert the format of the device object to that of the virtual device and Internet protocol (IP) to HTTP as the protocol which delivers the format on the WAN with the secure communication to the management PF.
+
+### 2) requirements for management
+
+- resource information collector
+
+It is required to discover the devices that are newly connected to the HN, identify each of them and manage their status.
+
+It is required to collect the internal status of each device and other HN resources, and the traffic status of the HN in order to determine the cause of any fault when the HN service is not working well.
+
+### 3) requirements for application execution
+
+- application for disconnect
+
+It can optionally work autonomously, continuing to control devices and store data with a backup purpose application in case of network disconnection from the management PF.
+
+It can optionally take some tasks with the backup purpose application and work with the management PF.
+
+## 7.3 Requirements for management PF
+
+The followings are requirements for the management PF:
+
+### 1) requirements for device operation
+
+- virtual device
+
+It is required to provide a web-friendly representation corresponding to the device object.
+
+It is required to monitor and control the virtual device.
+
+It can optionally be enabled to take the plural functions in one physical device as plural virtual devices and the plural physical devices as one virtual device.
+
+NOTE – The physical device represents the device connected to the HN. The term physical device is used to distinguish it from a virtual device.
+
+### 2) requirements for management
+
+- resource management
+
+It is required to discover, activate, monitor and control the devices connected to the HGWs.
+
+It is required to identify the devices globally unique from the applications.
+
+It is required to register the HGW's profile, give the HGW an identifier, register the end user who owns the HGW and identify the HGW with the authenticated user information.
+
+### 3) requirements for application execution
+
+- application management
+
+It is required to have the capability of authenticating and authorizing applications with acceptance by the end user to connect to the devices.
+
+It can optionally store the data received from the devices through the HGW.
+
+- application interface
+
+It is required to have a web-based application interface for the HEMS and other HN services.
+
+## 7.4 Requirements for security
+
+The following are requirements for security:
+
+- secure communication
+
+It is required to securely communicate between the devices and the application through the WAN.
+
+NOTE – HEMS security requirements to support secure communication are listed in Table III.2.
+
+- device authentication
+
+It is required for the management PF to have the capability to authenticate the devices.
+
+## 8 Reference architecture
+
+This clause describes the reference architecture for the HEMS. This architecture can also be applied to other HN services.
+
+Figure 8-1 shows the distribute type reference architecture and the reference points of the architecture.
+
+In Figure 8-1, the left side of the HGW is the WAN (i.e., outside the home) and right side is the HN. The HGW is IP based and it bridges the WAN and the HN.
+
+This reference architecture is shown with the categorized devices; basic device and non-basic device. The basic device has a device object which is an abstract data model representing functions of the device. The interface of the basic device is provided to the HGW with the abstract data model and is represented in the management PF as virtual devices, which the applications monitor and control.
+
+There are some standardized specifications for the interface of the basic device. Some of them support IP based communications protocols and the others support non-IP based protocols. Therefore, the two types of basic devices are those having the interface for the IP based protocol and those having the interface for the non-IP based protocols.
+
+The non-basic device does not have the device object. Since it supports its dedicated interface, an adapter is required to connect a non-basic device to the HGW. If the HGW provides the function of the adapter, the non-basic device can be connected directly to the HGW.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Reference architecture and reference points. The diagram shows a distributed architecture. On the left, 'Outside the home (WAN)', there are three 'Application' boxes connected to a 'Management PF' box via a reference point 'P-A'. The 'Management PF' is connected to an 'IP network' cloud. The 'IP network' is connected to an 'HGW' (Home Gateway) box via a reference point 'P-N'. On the right, 'Inside the home (HN)', the 'HGW' is connected to four device categories: (a) 'IP basic device' via reference point 'P-H1'; (b) 'Non-basic device' via reference point 'P-D', with an 'Adapter' box between them; (c) 'Non-IP basic device' via reference point 'P-H2'; and (d) 'Non-basic device' via reference point 'P-D'.
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F8-1
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Reference architecture and reference points**
+
+In Figure 8-1, the following reference points are defined. The application interface in Figure 6-1 corresponds to the P-A reference point in Figure 8-1. The device interface shown in Figure 6-1 corresponds to the P-H1, the P-H2 and the P-D reference points in Figure 8-1.
+
+### 1) P-A reference point
+
+The P-A reference point allows the applications to access the management PF through web-based application interfaces and to monitor and control the physical devices connected to the HN as logical devices of web resources. This reference point enables the applications to create and delete the logical devices, and to read and update the properties for them.
+
+### 2) P-N reference point
+
+The P-N reference point allows the management PF to access the HGW, placed in the home, through the WAN. This reference point enables the management PF to activate the devices, to get their status, and control them by specifying the property's value as a function of the resource management.
+
+### 3) P-H1 reference point
+
+The P-H1 reference point allows the HGW to access the basic device with the IP based communications protocol (IP based basic device), and the adapter which converts the non-basic device connecting it to the basic device. This reference point enables the HGW to activate the devices, get the status of, and control them by specifying the property's value.
+
+### 4) P-H2 reference point
+
+The P-H2 reference point allows the HGW to access the basic device with the non-IP based communications protocol (non-IP based basic device). This reference point enables the HGW to activate the devices, get the status of, and control them by specifying the property's value.
+
+### 5) P-D reference point
+
+The P-D reference point allows the adapter and the function of the adapter equipped in the HGW to access the non-basic device with the dedicated communications protocol, which connects to the device interface. This reference point enables the HGW to activate the devices, get the status of, and control them by specifying the property's value.
+
+The devices in the home are connected to the HGW through the HN in one of four ways. The following is a description of the devices from (a) to (d) shown in Figure 8-1.
+
+Device (a) is an IP based basic device that connects directly to the HGW at the P-H1 reference point. It makes use of the IP based communications protocol between the device and the HGW as the device has an interface to connect to the protocol. [b-ECHONET Lite] is one of such communications protocols.
+
+Device (b) is a non-basic device and supports its dedicated interface. To connect to the HGW, this device requires an adapter which converts the dedicated communications protocol implemented by the interface of the device to the IP based protocol, and which converts the dedicated data model to the abstract data model. Therefore, device (b) will be recognized as a basic device by the adapter. A battery charger for electric vehicles (EVs) connecting to the HN with a serial interface is an example of this type of device.
+
+Device (c) is a basic device, but supports the non-IP based communications protocol only because the non-IP based communications protocol is used for communication directly with the HGW.
+
+Device (d) is a non-basic device and it is the same as device (b). In Figure 8-1, the device connects to the HGW directly since the HGW has functions of the adapter for device (d).
+
+The HGW has a function to discover the newly-installed devices automatically. The HGW receives notifications of the installation of the devices and alarms when malfunctions occur. This raises the system's reliability. It also allows the end users the ability to easily install devices and to get the HEMS and other HN services started. The HGW converts the various types of the communications protocols, used for communicating with the devices, to the protocols which are used on the WAN for communication with the management PF at the P-N reference point. For example, the communications protocol used for communication with the devices will be converted into HTTP.
+
+The communication between the HGW and the device (through the adapter) may not be encrypted regardless of whether the IP or non-IP based communications protocol is used. However, the communication between the HGW and the management PF through the WAN is encrypted or is on a secured communications protocol such as HTTP to ensure secure communication. HTTP can be utilized on the standardized device management protocol such as [b-BBF TR-069].
+
+The management PF is a server that provides the web-based application interface on the WAN. The applications run through the interface at the P-A reference point. By making use of the standardized communications protocol between the HGW and the management PF, the applications do not need to take into consideration the interface of the devices or the communications protocols used on the HN. The devices are represented as web resources by the management PF. In this way the application developers can develop applications without deep knowledge about the devices.
+
+NOTE – A deployment model with the web of things (WoT) specified in [b-ITU-T Y.2063] is shown in Appendix I.
+
+## 9 Functional architecture
+
+This clause describes the functional architecture for the HEMS. This architecture can also be applied to other HN services.
+
+Figure 9-1 shows the distribute type functional architecture for the IP based basic device. The functions in this architecture are composed of three categories: device operation, application execution and management. The details for each category are described in clause 10. Although the device is shown as an IP based basic device in Figure 9-1, this architecture can also be applied to other types of devices with the appropriate deployment of the functions between the HGW and the device. The architectures for each type of device are shown in clause 10.1.1 to 10.1.4. The architecture between the management PF and the application is the same for all types of devices as shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F9-1
+
+Figure 9-1: Functional architecture for IP based basic device. The diagram shows a distributed architecture across four main components: Applications, Management PF, HGW, and Device. The Applications component includes Home energy management, Home security, Healthcare, and Management applications. The Management PF includes Applications management, Virtual device, HTTP processing, and Resource management. The HGW includes Application for disconnect, Data format conversion, HTTP/IP conversion, and Resource info. collector. The Device includes Device object, IP packet processing, and Managed agent. Arrows indicate data flow: Applications to Management PF via Application interface and WAN; Management PF to HGW via Command, WAN, and Management; HGW to Device via Command, IP HN, and Management. A Management arrow points up to the Applications component. The diagram is divided into three sections: Application execution (Applications), Device Operation (Device), and Management (Management PF and HGW).
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Functional architecture for IP based basic device**
+
+The devices have their own proprietary functions. The functions are defined as profiles and are transmitted with communications protocols to the application via the HGW and the management PF. This architecture enables the application to monitor and control the devices.
+
+Although Figure 9-1 shows the IP based communications protocol for the IP based basic device, the IP based, the non-IP based and the dedicated communications protocols can be used for the communication between the HGW and the devices as described in clause 8. The commands transmitted between the HGW and the devices provide control methods for the HGW to the devices
+
+such as "GET" to get their status, "SET" to specify their properties and/or set the value and "INFORM" to request notification about their status and the events that have occurred in them. The HGW converts the communications protocol into HTTP and communicates to the management PF through the WAN.
+
+The communications protocol for device management such as [b-BBF TR-069] can be used between the HGW and the management PF. [b-BBF TR-069] refers to the generalized device data model with extensible markup language (XML) in [b-BBF TR-181] and this data model is communicated between them with commands such as "GET", "SET" and "INFORM". The XML format is specified for each communications protocol used between the HGW and the devices.
+
+The management PF stores device status and configuration data transmitted via the HGW. The management PF manages virtual devices and provides them to the application through a web-based application interface so that the application developers can develop applications to control the physical devices as web resources.
+
+The following clauses describe each entity. The functions of the device and the HGW are described for the IP based basic device. The functions for other types of devices are shown in clause 10.1.2 to 10.1.4. The functions for the management PF and the applications are common to all types of devices.
+
+NOTE – Examples of HN applications are described in Appendix II.
+
+### **9.1 Device**
+
+The IP based basic device provides the following functions:
+
+- 1) functions for device operation
+ - device object;
+ - IP packets processing.
+- 2) function for management
+ - managed agent.
+
+Device object and managed agent are described in the following clauses. IP packet processing is not described, as it does not require specific operations.
+
+#### **9.1.1 Device object**
+
+The basic device has the device object. It is composed of properties that specify the device functions which are independent of the implementation of the manufacturers. The properties are logical internal items to get the device status and to control the device functions, which can be remotely accessed and controlled from the application. The data form for the remote control is specified as the tuple of . Since the device object is specified for each type of device (e.g., home appliance, storage battery), existing home appliances made by different manufacturers would be remotely controlled in exactly the same way.
+
+For example, air conditioners have properties of operating status, temperature setting and operation mode, which are defined as the property configurations in [b-ECHONET Lite]. [b-SEP 2.0] and [b-ISO/IEC 14543-3-x] also define similar property configurations. The HGW specifies the property to get the data (value) from them. To configure or control them, it specifies the property and sets the appropriate value. For example, to set the targeted temperature of an air conditioner, it specifies the property, which is appointed for the targeted temperature and sets the appropriate value (e.g., 25 (degrees)).
+
+#### **9.1.2 Managed agent**
+
+The managed agent is a function for the management to keep the HN stable. It is important to get the information about all of the HN resources because lack of this information could cause failure of fault detection thus, making determination of the causes of the fault difficult. The managed agent holds the
+
+internal status of the device and transfers it on demand to the resource management function of the management PF via the resource information collector of the HGW. This detail is described in clause 10.3.
+
+### **9.2 HGW**
+
+The HGW bridges the WAN and the HN. It provides the following functions when it connects to the IP based basic device:
+
+- 1) function for device operation
+ - data format and protocol (HTTP/IP) conversion.
+- 2) function for management
+ - resource information collector.
+- 3) function for application execution
+ - application for disconnect.
+
+#### **9.2.1 Data format and protocol (HTTP/IP) conversion**
+
+This is a function of the device operation to convert the communications protocol. On the WAN, HTTP is usually utilized as the communications protocol. Thus, the HGW converts the communications protocol used on the HN to HTTP.
+
+The tuple of of the physical devices is communicated to the HGW through the HN and put into HTTP at the HGW for further communication with the management PF. It is widely known that [b-BBF TR-069] specifies the simple object access protocol (SOAP) based communications protocol; thus it is one of the candidate communications protocols for the device management between the HGW and the management PF. The extensible messaging and presence communications protocol (XMPP) is also a candidate.
+
+#### **9.2.2 Resource information collector**
+
+This is a management function used to collect information about the HN resources, for each of the HGW devices, and to deliver it to the resource management function on the management PF. This function also discovers the devices newly connected to the HGW, and sets the configuration for these devices. The HGW gives a unique identifier to each of the devices for management.
+
+#### **9.2.3 Application for disconnect**
+
+The application for disconnect function provides a backup purpose application to keep the devices connected to the HN working when the WAN is disconnected for any reason. If the WAN disconnects, this backup purpose application sets the proper configuration for the situation instead of the application running on the WAN. The application interface for this backup application is based on HTTP and provides the API, which manages the device object using the converted data format.
+
+## **9.3 Management PF**
+
+The management PF manages the physical devices as virtual devices and provides them as web resources to the application through the web-based application interface. The management PF provides the following functions:
+
+- 1) functions for device operation
+ - virtual device;
+ - HTTP processing.
+- 2) function for management
+ - resource management.
+- 3) functions for application execution
+
+- applications management;
+- application interface.
+
+These functions are described in the following clauses, except for HTTP processing: it is not described because it does not require specific operations.
+
+#### **9.3.1 Virtual device**
+
+The virtual device is the device representation corresponding to the device object of the basic device connected to the HN. The properties of the device are represented in XML format in order to be easily handled by the web applications. The function is described in clause 10.1.
+
+The virtual device provides two functions for the device abstraction. The first function provides abstraction of the devices' properties and the communication protocols. For example, if vendor A and vendor B give different properties to similar functions of their air conditioners, the management PF creates a virtual device by converting the property of the devices (e.g., air conditioners) to the same properties.
+
+The second function provides virtual separation to the plural virtual devices which are made from the plural functions in one physical device. For example, an air conditioner controlling its power based on its motion sensor has the property based on the data detected by the motion sensor. Thus, the air conditioner has two functions: air conditioning and motion sensing. Two virtual devices (i.e., air conditioning device and a motion sensing device) will be created from one physical device (i.e., air conditioner).
+
+#### **9.3.2 Resource management**
+
+The resource management on the management PF provides the function to gather information of the HN resources which the managed agent collects. It also manages the internal status of the device, the network device and the network capacity for each HGW to detect fault and to provide the fault processing. The details are described in clause 10.3.
+
+#### **9.3.3 Applications management**
+
+The applications management registers the information of the application and holds the relationships between the applications and the devices. This function delivers data from the devices to the appropriate applications. In addition, it has the historical data management function which stores the data received from the devices instead of the applications. The function provides the data of the devices, for example for the past 24 hours, in responding to the requirement of the application.
+
+#### **9.3.4 Application interface**
+
+The application interface is a web-based interface used to monitor and control the devices through the HGW from the application by accessing the virtual devices on the management PF as web resources. This makes it possible, therefore, for application developers to develop applications with this interface.
+
+This interface does not support the management as shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+## **9.4 Application**
+
+Although the architecture in this Recommendation does not require common functions for the applications, three functions in the applications which provide the following three operations that make use of the functions of the management PF are described in this clause. These three functions are: the device management function, the device operation function and the fault diagnosis function as shown in Figure 9-2. Every application in the application entity shown in Figure 9-1 can have these functions.
+
+The three functions are described below with their corresponding operation.
+
+- 1) function: device management, operation: registration
+
+The applications that access the devices are registered to the applications management function in the management PF. This operation is performed by the device management function in the application and enables exclusive control to the devices and specifies the application to which the data of the devices is delivered automatically.
+
+- 2) function: device operation, operation: monitor & control
+
+The device operation function in the application monitors and controls the devices by getting and setting the configurations. ON / OFF control to the devices is one example. This operation is performed by monitoring and controlling the virtual devices in the management PF which is described in clause 10.2. The operation from the virtual devices to the physical devices on the HN is described in clause 10.1.
+
+- 3) function: fault diagnosis, operation: fault detection
+
+The fault diagnosis function in the application gets the status and configuration data of the HN resources. This function connects to the resource management in the management PF and gets the HN related information detected by the resource management and provide it to those applications which need the information.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-2: Three operations for the HN applications. The diagram shows two main blocks: 'Applications' on the left and 'Management PF' on the right. The 'Applications' block contains 'HN application' (with sub-components 'Device management', 'Device operation', and 'Fault diagnosis') and an 'Application interface'. The 'Management PF' block contains 'Applications management', 'Virtual device', 'HTTP processing', and 'Resource management', along with an 'Application interface'. Three numbered operations are shown: (1) Registration from Device management to Applications management; (2) Monitor and control from Device operation to Virtual device; and (3) Fault detection from Fault diagnosis to Resource management. Arrows indicate the flow of data and control between these components.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Three operations for the HN applications**
+
+# 10 Functional relationship
+
+In this clause, details of the three functional categories: device operation, application execution and management shown in Figure 9-1 are described to clarify the relationship between the entities.
+
+## 10.1 Device operation
+
+The device operation provides a function to monitor and control the devices from the management PF. Since there are four ways to connect to the devices from the HGW according to the device types shown in Figure 8-1, four operations for each device type are described in the following clauses.
+
+#### 10.1.1 Operation for IP based basic device
+
+Figure 10-1 shows the functional architecture for the IP based basic device operation (i.e., device (a) in Figure 8-1). The IP based basic device has two functions; device object and IP packets processing. The virtual device on the management PF is the device representation corresponding to the device object of the basic device. The applications remotely monitor and control the devices by specifying the properties of the virtual devices through the application interface.
+
+The two-tuple of is the data form used to control the device. The device command is transferred to the HGW on the IP based communications protocol through the HN and to the
+
+management PF on the HTTP based protocol through the WAN. The HGW converts the device command between the HN and the WAN since the form of the tuples on the HN is different from that on the WAN. Therefore, the HGW has two functions: data format conversion that converts the form of the tuple, and protocol (HTTP/IP) conversion that converts the communications protocol on the HN to HTTP.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F10-1
+
+Figure 10-1: Functional architecture for IP based basic device operation. The diagram shows three main components: Management PF, HGW, and Basic device. Management PF contains an Application interface, Virtual device, and HTTP processing. HGW contains Data format conversion and HTTP/IP conversion. Basic device contains Device object and IP packet processing. Arrows show 'Command' flow from Management PF to HGW and from HGW to Basic device, and 'WAN' flow from Management PF to HGW and from HGW to Basic device. A dashed line labeled 'P-H1' separates HGW and Basic device.
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Functional architecture for IP based basic device operation**
+
+#### 10.1.2 Operation for non-IP based basic device
+
+Figure 10-2 shows the functional architecture for the basic device used to connect to the HGW with the non-IP based communications protocol (i.e., device (c) in Figure 8-1). In this case, the device command is transferred at the P-H2 reference point. The layer 2 (L2) frame processing function can be used to convert the non-IP based communications protocol, which the device supports, to the IP based protocol in the HGW. The communications protocol between the HGW and the management PF can be the same as the IP based basic device shown in Figure 10-1.
+
+The device interface of [b-SEP 2.0] supports the P-H2 reference point.
+
+
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F10-2
+
+Figure 10-2: Functional architecture for non-IP based basic device operation. The diagram shows three main components: Management PF, HGW, and Basic device. Management PF contains an Application interface, Virtual device, and HTTP processing. HGW contains Data format conversion, HTTP/IP conversion, and L2 frame processing. Basic device contains Device object and L2 frame processing. Arrows show 'Command' flow from Management PF to HGW and from HGW to Basic device, and 'WAN' flow from Management PF to HGW and from HGW to Basic device. A dashed line labeled 'P-H2' separates HGW and Basic device.
+
+**Figure 10-2 – Functional architecture for non-IP based basic device operation**
+
+#### 10.1.3 Operation for non-basic device with adapter
+
+Figure 10-3 shows the functional architecture for the non-basic device operation with the adapter (i.e., device (b) in Figure 8-1). This Recommendation defines the non-basic device for the existing devices that do not have the device object. The non-basic device does not have the device object, but has the dedicated interface, for example the serial interface, at the reference point P-D. The adapter has the device object and provides the same interface as the basic device. The adapter, placed between the device and the HGW, works to convert the non-basic device to be recognized as a basic device at the reference point P-H1. In this way, the adapter converts the dedicated protocol to the IP based protocol such as [b-SEP 2.0], [b-ECHONET Lite], [b-ISO/IEC 14543-3-x] and [b-BACnet]. The device object is provided in the device abstraction function. The device abstraction function also provides the device interface conversion function that converts the property of the device to the operational procedure to the device at the reference point P-D.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-3: Functional architecture for non-basic device operation with adapter. The diagram shows a Management PF box on the left containing an Application interface and Virtual device. It connects via Command and WAN to an HGW box containing Data format conversion and HTTP/IP conversion. The HGW connects via P-H1 (Command and IP HN) to an Adapter box. The Adapter box contains a dashed Device abstraction box with Device object, IP packet processing, and Device interface conversion. The Adapter connects via P-D (Dedicated protocol) to a Non-basic device box on the right. Reference Y.2070(15)\_F10-3 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-3 – Functional architecture for non-basic device operation with adapter**
+
+#### 10.1.4 Operation for non-basic device with adapter function in HGW
+
+Figure 10-4 shows the functional architecture for the non-basic device operation connecting directly to the HGW (i.e., device (d) in Figure 8-1). For the non-basic device, the HGW equips the function of the adapter (the device abstraction function) instead of placing the adapter to connect to the device directly. The device abstraction function inside the HGW provides the same interface as the basic device. The device abstraction function also supports the operational procedure at the reference point P-D and the non-basic device connects to the HGW directly as shown in Figure 10-4.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-4: Functional architecture for non-basic device operation with adapter function in HGW. The diagram shows a Management PF box on the left containing an Application interface and Virtual device. It connects via Command and WAN to an HGW box. Inside the HGW box, there are Data format conversion and HTTP/IP conversion blocks, which connect to a dashed Device abstraction box containing Device object, IP packet processing, and Device interface conversion. The Device abstraction box connects via P-D (Dedicated protocol) to a Non-basic device box on the right. Reference Y.2070(15)\_F10-4 is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-4 – Functional architecture for non-basic device operation with adapter function in HGW**
+
+## 10.2 Application execution
+
+Setting and getting the value of the property of the virtual device on the management PF by the application results in monitoring and controlling the physical devices connected to the HN. As shown in Figure 10-5, the application interface on the management PF converts the virtual device to the web resource, enabling the application to monitor and control the physical devices with the HTTP protocol.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-5: Functional architecture for application execution. The diagram shows a box on the left labeled 'Applications' containing 'Home energy management', 'Home security', and 'Healthcare'. This box is connected via two bidirectional arrows to a larger box on the right labeled 'Management PF'. The top arrow is labeled 'Application interface' and the bottom arrow is labeled 'WAN'. Inside the 'Management PF' box, there is a sub-box labeled 'Application management' containing 'Application DB' and 'Historical data management'. Below this sub-box is a 'Virtual device'. To the left of the 'Application management' sub-box is a dashed box labeled 'Web resource'. Arrows indicate data flow: from 'Applications' to 'Application interface', from 'Application interface' to 'Application DB', from 'Application DB' to 'Web resource', from 'Web resource' to 'Virtual device', and from 'Virtual device' back to 'Application interface'.
+
+**Figure 10-5 – Functional architecture for application execution**
+
+The applications management is composed of two functions: application database (DB) and historical data management.
+
+The application DB maintains a list of the applications connected to the management PF through the WAN. The application DB is used to deliver data to the targeted application from the HGWs and the other applications.
+
+The historical data management function is described in clause 9.3.3.
+
+## 10.3 Management
+
+The HN is sometimes very complex; many different types of technologies may co-exist in the HN. The devices connected to the HN are used in a variety of fields. The HN could have a complicated topology composed of various HN resources (e.g., devices and/or access points). It could be difficult to manage and maintain the HN for end users, since there is no administrator or technician in the home. Therefore, resource management is provided to support a variety of fault determination processes and fault recovery processes, including easy configuration with no administrators and with remote administrators.
+
+Figure 10-6 shows the functional architecture of the management for the HN with the basic devices. For the non-basic devices, which do not have the managed agent, the adapter or the HGW provides the managed agent.
+
+There is the resource management function in the management PF, which holds the information and configuration data of the HN resources. The HGW has the resource information collector function. It gets status, performance and configuration data of the HN resources, detects faults and provides fault processing. It also provides easy configuration procedures of the HN resources for end users. It configures the HN resources with minimum settings required for their operation. The managed agent on the device executes configuring and gathering the home environment information by the instruction from the resource information collector function on the HGW. The management application is the application for use by remote administrators such as call centers and customer support centers. It provides a function to display the entire resource information for faults diagnosis and to set the specified properties for recovery operation from such faults.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-6: Functional architecture for management for basic device. The diagram shows a Management PF box containing a Management application and a Service application, connected to a Resource management box. This is linked via an IP network cloud to an HGW box containing a Resource information collector. The HGW is then connected to three Device Managed agent boxes, each associated with an Access point. The diagram is labeled Y.2070(15)\_F10-6.
+
+**Figure 10-6 – Functional architecture for management for basic device**
+
+# 11 Security support
+
+This clause describes the security model and functions for the HN services, especially the HEMS. The general security requirements and technologies for the HN are described in [ITU-T X.1111]. This Recommendation applies the technologies in [ITU-T X.1111] to the HN service architecture to establish secure communications between the device and the application through the WAN. A HEMS model for security is shown in clause 11.1. As the result of the security considerations on the HEMS model in Appendix III, the security functional architecture is shown in clause 11.2.
+
+## 11.1 HEMS model for security
+
+This clause describes a HEMS model for security shown in Figure 11-1 which is based on the distribute type architecture shown in Figure 6-4. Since the HEMS is just one of the HN services, this model can also be applied to the general HN model.
+
+
+
+Figure 11-1: HEMS model for security. The diagram is divided into 'Outside the home (WAN)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'. In the WAN, there is a HEMS application connected to a Management PF. In the HN, there is an HGW connected to the Management PF. The HGW is also connected to an IHD, a Home appliance, and a Power sensor. The IHD is connected to an End user. The diagram is labeled Y.2070(15)\_F11-1.
+
+**Figure 11-1 – HEMS model for security**
+
+In Figure 11-1 the end user uses the web browser on an IHD to connect to the HEMS application with a secure connection. The web browser on the IHD connects to the HEMS application through a broadband router in the home. The HEMS application collects data of the devices (e.g., home appliance properties and power sensor properties) and controls them in response to instructions from the end user.
+
+The HN security is specified in [ITU-T X.1111] and this Recommendation refers to [ITU-T X.1111] as a framework for security technologies in the HN.
+
+The entities and the relationships in this model are required to be specified since they are different from those in [ITU-T X.1111]. There are six entities in this model: end user, IHD, HEMS application, management PF, HGW and device such as home appliance or power sensor. There are five
+
+
+
+Another solution is to provide the following entity authentication functions for the HGW and the device by the resource management in the management PF described in clause 10.3. When the HN is maintained to be secure, this is a simple and effective method to provide the entity authentication.
+
+### 1) HGW authentication
+
+The authentication information of the HGW is pre-registered in the management PF until the HGW connects to the management PF for the first time. When the first connection to the HGW is established, the resource management compares it with the pre-registered information. The information is managed in the resource management function.
+
+### 2) device authentication
+
+The information identifying the devices is pre-registered in the management PF until they connect to the HGW to accommodate the case where devices do not have the capability of the security functions. The device authentication is provided as a function and is used to determine consistency between their pre-registered information in the management PF and their data when they connect to the HGW.
+
+### 3) device access control
+
+The entity authentication function to the physical devices is provided as a function of access control to the virtual devices in the management PF.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Deployment model with WoT
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In [b-ITU-T Y.2063] the physical device on the WoT is divided into two categories: constrained device and fully-fledged device.
+
+- constrained device: A constrained device cannot connect to the Internet and has no functionality of the web. The device interacts with an agent of the WoT broker.
+- fully-fledged device: A fully-fledged device has the functionalities of the web. The device can interact, not only with the WoT broker, but also with the services on the web.
+
+The constrained device and the fully-fledged device do not have the device object and hence they correspond to the non-basic device described in this Recommendation. The constrained device communicates with the HGW through the adapter then further communicates with the management PF. The fully-fledged device can also communicate with the management PF by way of the HGW.
+
+In this Recommendation, the HGW, which has the function of the resource information collector, manages all of the devices connected to it through the HN including constrained devices and fully-fledged devices.
+
+[b-ITU-T Y.2063] defines the WoT broker and the physical devices can be accessed as web resources through it from the application. Its functional architecture is divided into the service layer and the adaptation layer where the service layer corresponds to the management PF and the adaptation layer corresponds to the HGW in this Recommendation.
+
+The web adaption function of the WoT broker supports only the adaptation of the communications protocol to the web protocol for communication between the physical devices and the WoT services. Therefore the web broker supports the P-D reference point only in this Recommendation. Figure I.1 shows the deployment model in which the HGW is connected to a constrained device and a fully-fledged device.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the deployment model with WoT, showing the interaction between the Management PF, the HGW, and the physical devices.
+
+**Management PF:** Contains an Application interface, Virtual device, and HTTP processing. It interacts with the HGW via Command and WAN interfaces.
+
+**HGW:** Contains Data format conversion, HTTP/IP conversion, Device object, IP packet processing, Device interface conversion, HTTP/IP packet processing, and L2 frame processing. It is connected to the Management PF via Command and WAN interfaces. It also interacts with the physical devices via IP HN and Non-IP HN interfaces. The P-D reference point is shown between the HGW and the Fully-fledged device.
+
+**Physical Devices:** The Fully-fledged device includes HTTP processing. The Constrained device includes L2 frame processing.
+
+Y.2070(15)\_F1.1
+
+Figure I.1: Deployment model with WoT. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of the WoT broker, divided into a Management PF and an HGW. The Management PF includes an Application interface, Virtual device, and HTTP processing. The HGW includes Data format conversion, HTTP/IP conversion, Device object, IP packet processing, Device interface conversion, HTTP/IP packet processing, and L2 frame processing. The HGW is connected to the Management PF via Command and WAN interfaces. The HGW is also connected to a Fully-fledged device and a Constrained device via IP HN and Non-IP HN interfaces, respectively. The Fully-fledged device includes HTTP processing, and the Constrained device includes L2 frame processing. The P-D reference point is shown between the HGW and the Fully-fledged device.
+
+Figure I.1 – Deployment model with WoT
+
+The management PF provides the virtual devices to the application developers to be treated as web resources through the web-based application interface so that they can develop applications for the mash-up service defined in [b-ITU-T Y.2063], which is a combined service integrating WoT services in a WoT broker with web services outside of the WoT broker.
+
+In this way the architecture in this Recommendation provides the HEMS and the other HN services with the WoT.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Examples of HN applications
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The distribute type architecture can be applied to various HN services. The following are examples of HN applications that support these services.
+
+### II.1 Home security
+
+A home security application detects threats using sensors installed in the home and alerts the security company to dispatch security guards. The sensors, such as human-aware sensors which detect suspicious persons, or fire sensors which detect a fire, are connected to the home security application through the HGW and the management PF.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture for a home security application. It is divided into two main sections by a vertical dashed line: 'Outside the home (Internet)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'.
+In the 'Outside the home (Internet)' section, there is a 'Security company' box at the top and a 'Home security application' box below it. A solid double-headed arrow connects them. A dashed arrow points from the 'Security company' box to a silhouette of a running person. Below the 'Home security application' box is a 'Management PF' box, connected to it by a solid double-headed arrow. To the right of the 'Management PF' box is an 'IP network' cloud, connected to it by a solid double-headed arrow.
+In the 'Inside the home (HN)' section, there is an 'HGW' (Home Gateway) box. A solid double-headed arrow connects the 'IP network' cloud to the 'HGW' box. From the 'HGW' box, two solid double-headed arrows point to two sensor boxes: 'Human aware sensor' and 'Fire sensor'.
+The label 'Y.2070(15)\_F11.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Architecture diagram for home security application showing components inside and outside the home.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Architecture with home security application**
+
+### II.2 Customer support with controlling access right to device
+
+Customer support is an important service as the HN is getting more complex with the variety of devices being connected. When the service does not work well, it is difficult to determine why and where the fault happens. The example shown in Figure II.2 assumes that two different customer support services are separately provided through the same management PF for each of the supporting devices (appliances) produced by companies A and B respectively.
+
+When the devices produced by more than two different companies are installed on the HN, the challenge for each device company is that each company could get fault information about the devices produced by the other company. Most of device companies prevent other companies from getting this information.
+
+Figure II.2 shows three services running on the management PF. In this case, the HN service provider's application is able to get diagnostic information, such as network disconnections through the management PF. The customer support service gets the detailed diagnostic information about the supporting device (e.g., the customer support service for company A gets the detailed fault information about the supporting device produced by company A). This service is provided because the management PF has a function for distributing information to the proper services.
+
+
+
+Figure II.2 – Architecture with customer support application. This diagram illustrates a system architecture divided into 'Outside the home (Internet)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'. On the Internet side, there are three service boxes: 'HN service provider's application' (containing 'Device management'), 'Customer support service for company A' (containing 'Fault diagnosis'), and 'Customer support service for company B'. These connect to a 'Management PF' box which contains an 'Application interface', 'Applications management', 'Virtual device', and 'Resource management'. A callout from 'Applications management' states: 'Applications management gets management information (network and system information)'. On the HN side, there is an 'HGW' (Home Gateway) box. A callout from the connection between the Internet and HN states: 'Resource management controls access right to devices.' The HN side also contains two appliance boxes: 'Home appliance by company A' (containing 'Device object') and 'Home appliance by company B', both of which contain a 'Managed agent'. An 'IP network' cloud connects the Internet and HN sides. A label 'Y.2070(15)\_FII.2' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Architecture with customer support application**
+
+### II.3 Room facility coordination for better sleep
+
+The room facility coordination service for better sleep maintains a suitable environment for sleep by adjusting room temperature, humidity and illumination by controlling the air conditioner and the lighting fixture. To achieve the condition for better sleep, sleep sensors monitor the sleep pattern, heart rate, breathing rate and snoring of the user to calculate the condition for better sleep.
+
+As the sleep sensor information is highly sensitive, the management PF strictly controls and delivers it to the proper service. In this case, the sleep monitoring service gets the data delivered from the sleep sensor exclusively. It provides the information about the suitable environment for better sleep to the room facility coordination service, as metadata, through an external interface. Then the room facility coordination service controls the air conditioner and the lighting fixture.
+
+
+
+Figure II.3 – Architecture with room facility coordination application for better sleep. This diagram shows a similar architecture to Figure II.2, divided into 'Outside the home (Internet)' and 'Inside the home (HN)'. On the Internet side, there are two service boxes: 'Sleep monitoring service' (containing 'Device operation') and 'Room facility coordination service' (containing 'Device operation'). These connect to a 'Management PF' box containing 'Application interface', 'Applications management', 'Virtual device', and 'Resource management'. A callout from 'Applications management' states: 'Applications management controls access right to devices.' On the HN side, there is an 'HGW' (Home Gateway) box. A callout from the connection between the Internet and HN states: 'Sleep sensor produces highly sensitive data.' The HN side contains three appliance boxes: 'Sleep sensor' (containing 'Device object'), 'Lighting fixture' (containing 'Device object'), and 'Air conditioner' (containing 'Device object'). An 'IP network' cloud connects the Internet and HN sides. A label 'Y.2070(15)\_FII.3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Architecture with room facility coordination application for better sleep**
+
+## Appendix III
+
+## Security considerations based on [ITU-T X.1111]
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+[ITU-T X.1111] defines entities, relationship between the entities, security threats and security requirements, and describes security functions based on them. In Figure 11-1, there are six entities from the end user to the device and five relationships between them. Table III.1 shows the relationships of the security threats to the HEMS model.
+
+**Table III.1 – Relationship of security threats to HEMS model**
+
+| Entity or relations | General security threats | | | | | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------------|
+| | Disclosure/
Eavesdropping | Interrup-
tion | Modification/
Injection | Unauthorized
access | Repudiation | Packet
abnormal-
forwarding |
+| Device | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| HGW | Y | Y | Y | Y | | Y |
+| MPF | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| Application | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| IHD | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| User/IHD | | | | Y | | |
+| IHD/Application | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| Application/MPF | Y | Y | Y | Y | | |
+| MPF/HGW | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
+| HGW/Device | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | |
+| NOTE – MPF and user stand for the management PF and the end user respectively. The notation "xxx/yyy" in the column of "Entity or relations" means the relation between xxx and yyy. The letter "Y" in a cell designates that a particular threat exists for a specific entity or relation. | | | | | | |
+
+Although in [ITU-T X.1111] there are descriptions about mobile-oriented security threats, these are out of the scope of this Recommendation; it focuses on the security from the HN application to the devices. Table III.2 shows the relationships between the HEMS security requirements, the threats and the functions based on the security requirements listed in [ITU-T X.1111].
+
+**Table III.2 – Relationship of HEMS security requirements, threats and functions**
+
+| Security requirement | General security threats | Security functions |
+|---------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Data confidentiality | Disclosure/Eavesdropping
Unauthorized access | Encryption
Access control
Key management |
+| Data integrity | Modification/Injection
Packet abnormal-forwarding | Integrity
Message authentication code (MAC)
Digital signature
Notarization
Key management |
+| Authentication | Disclosure/Eavesdropping
Interruption
Modification/Injection
Unauthorized access
Repudiation | MAC
Digital signature
Notarization
Key management |
+| Non-repudiation | Repudiation | Digital signature
Notarization
Key management |
+| Access control or authorization | Disclosure/Eavesdropping
Interruption
Modification/Injection
Unauthorized access | Encryption
MAC
Entity authentication
Digital signature
Access control
Key management |
+| Availability | Interruption | MAC
Entity authentication
Digital signature
Access control
Key management
Anti-availability |
+| Privacy security | Disclosure/Eavesdropping | Encryption
MAC
Entity authentication
Digital signature
Access control
Key management |
+| Communication flow security | Packet abnormal-forwarding | Integrity
MAC
Entity authentication
Access control
Key management |
+
+The relationship between the security functions and the HEMS model for security (see Figure 11-1) are sorted in Table III.3 based on the security functions listed in Table III.2.
+
+**Table III.3 – Relationship between security functions and model**
+
+| Entity or relations | | Security Function | | | | | | | | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------|-----|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
+| | | Encry
ption | Inte
grity | MAC | Entity
authe
nticati
on | Digital
signature | Notari
zation | Access
control | Key
manag
ement | Anti-
availab
ility |
+| Stored data | Device | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | – | – | – | Y |
+| | HGW | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
+| | MPF | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
+| | Application | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
+| | IHD | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
+| Communication data | User/IHD | Y | – | – | Y | Y | – | – | Y | Y |
+| | IHD/Application | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | – | Y | Y | Y |
+| | Application/MP
F | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
+| | MPF/HGW | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | – | Y | Y | Y |
+| | HGW/Device | Y | Y | Y | – | – | – | – | – | Y |
+| NOTE – MPF and user stand for the management PF and the end user respectively. The notation "xxx/yyy" in the column of "Entity or relations" means the relation between xxx and yyy. The letter "Y" in a cell designates that a particular security service can be provided by a corresponding security function. | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+When taking the relationship between the security functions and the model in Table III.3 into consideration, the security functions required for the entities in the architecture provided in this Recommendation are shown in Figure 11-2.
+
+The security functions are simplified into three functions shown in Figure 11-2, taking [b-ISO/IEC 27000] into account. They are the anti-availability, message authentication and entity authentication function. The common functions such as encryption and key management are omitted. The other functions are merged into the three functions. These functions correspond to the requirements of the information security: availability, integrity and confidentiality specified in [b-ISO/IEC 27000].
+
+NOTE – [b-ISO/IEC 27000] provides the information security management system. The requirements are defined as follows:
+
+- **availability**: property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity;
+- **integrity**: property of accuracy and completeness;
+- **confidentiality**: property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T J.190] Recommendation ITU-T J.190 (2002), *Architecture of MediaHomeNet that supports cable-based services*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2063] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2063 (2012), *Framework of the web of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 14543-3-x] ISO/IEC 14543-3-x:2006/2007, *Information technology – Home Electronic System (HES) architecture – Part 3-x*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 27000] ISO/IEC 27000:2014, *Information technology – Security techniques – Information security management systems – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-BACnet] ANSI/ASHRAE, *Standard 135-2004*.
+- [b-BBF TR-069] Broadband Forum (2011), *TR-069 Amendment, 4CPE WAN Management Protocol*.
+- [b-BBF TR-181] Broadband Forum (2012), *TR-181 Issue 2 Amendment 6, Device Data Model for TR-069*.
+- [b-ECHONET Lite] ECHONET Consortium, *ECHONET Lite Specification Version 1.10*.
+- [b-FG-Smart Terminology] ITU-T FG Smart Deliverable (2011), *Smart Grid Terminology*.
+- [b-SEP 2.0] ZigBee Alliance, *Smart Energy Profile 2.0 Application Protocol*.
+- [b-W3C WCterms] W3C (1999), *Web Characterization Terminology & Definitions Sheet*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2071
+
+(09/2015)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- Framework of a micro energy grid
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2071
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2071
+
+# Framework of a micro energy grid
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2071 provides the framework of a micro energy grid for interconnected local generation and distribution. After identifying key features and high-level requirements from the concepts of the micro energy grid, this Recommendation provides an architecture overview including the domain model, as well as the reference architecture, and describes control and management services for a micro energy grid. Finally, this Recommendation shows core systems and components for a micro energy grid.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2071 | 2015-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12581 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Advanced metering infrastructure, demand response, distributed energy resources, micro energy grid.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2016
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Overview of a micro energy grid..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Requirements for a micro energy grid..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Architecture overview of a micro energy grid..... | 6 |
+| 9 | Control and management services of a micro energy grid ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) service ..... | 9 |
+| | 9.2 Demand response (DR) management service..... | 10 |
+| | 9.3 Customer energy management service..... | 11 |
+| | 9.4 Distributed energy grid management service ..... | 12 |
+| 10 | Core systems and components for a micro energy grid..... | 13 |
+| | 10.1 Core systems for a micro energy grid..... | 13 |
+| | 10.2 Key components for selective delivery of distributed energy resources
information ..... | 16 |
+| | 10.3 Key components for calculating basic electricity charges..... | 16 |
+| 11 | Security considerations..... | 17 |
+| | Appendix I – Key functions for a micro energy grid..... | 18 |
+| | Appendix II – Deployment models for a micro energy grid..... | 19 |
+| | Appendix III – Operations and information flows for micro energy grid scenarios..... | 21 |
+| | III.1 Automated power trading..... | 21 |
+| | III.2 Real-time energy revenue calculation ..... | 22 |
+| | III.3 Customer energy management services provisioning ..... | 24 |
+| | Appendix IV – A mechanism for selective delivery of distributed energy resources
information from multiple slave devices ..... | 27 |
+| | Appendix V – A mechanism for calculating basic electricity charges for partitioned
owners in an aggregate building..... | 29 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 31 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2071
+
+# Framework of a micro energy grid
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the framework of a micro energy grid for interconnected local generation and distribution. After identifying key features and high-level requirements from the concepts of the micro energy grid, this Recommendation provides an architecture overview including the domain model as well as the reference architecture and describes control and management services for a micro energy grid. Finally this Recommendation shows core systems and components for a micro energy grid.
+
+This Recommendation covers:
+
+- Features and requirements of a micro energy grid;
+- Architecture overview of a micro energy grid;
+- Control and management services for a micro energy grid;
+- Core systems and components of a micro energy grid.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[[ITU-T X.1111](#)] Recommendation ITU-T X.1111 (2007), *Framework of security technologies for home network*.
+
+[[ITU-T Y.2701](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 aggregator** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A system in smart grid for collecting the energy generated by residences and micro grids.
+
+**3.1.2 building automation system (BAS)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A system capable of computerized monitoring and control of a building's lighting and mechanical systems, and monitoring for performance and potential failure.
+
+**3.1.3 customer** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: The end user of energy or services, who may also generate, store, and manage the energy. Traditionally, three customer types are discussed, each with its own domain: residential, commercial and industrial.
+
+**3.1.4 customer information system (CIS)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A software application for handling customer calls, billing, and related operations.
+
+**3.1.5 data collector** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A distributed processing device that has supervisory control or coordinates information exchanges from devices within a substation from a headend system.
+
+**3.1.6 demand response (DR)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A smart grid feature that allows consumers to reduce or change their electrical use patterns during peak demand, usually in exchange for a financial incentive. Mechanisms and incentives for utilities, business, industrial, and residential customers to cut energy use during times of peak demand or when power reliability is at risk. Demand response is necessary for optimizing the balance of power supply and demand.
+
+**3.1.7 distributed energy resources (DER)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: Energy generation and energy storage facilities located at the customer premises, or power transmission and distribution systems.
+
+**3.1.8 energy management system (EMS)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A computer system comprising a software platform providing basic support services and a set of applications providing the functionality needed for the effective operation of electrical generation and transmission facilities so as to assure adequate security of energy supply at minimum cost.
+
+**3.1.9 energy services interface (ESI)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A set of functions consisting of gateway functions and functions required for smart grid applications to control and manage the smart grid services in the customer premises.
+
+**3.1.10 energy storage** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: Energy storage provides storage functions of electricity using various types of batteries.
+
+NOTE – One example usage of energy storage is used to respond effectively to a dynamic price mechanism from a utility network. The electric energy is stored in the storage during a relatively lower price period, while the stored electric energy may replace the higher price of electric power from the utility network.
+
+**3.1.11 meter data management system (MDMS)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: Meter data management (MDM) refers to a key component in the smart grid infrastructure that is in the process of being evolved and adopted by utility companies. An MDM system (MDMS) performs long term data storage and management for the vast quantities of data that are now being delivered by smart metering systems. This data consists primarily of usage data and events that are imported from the head end servers that manage the data collection in advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) or automatic meter reading systems.
+
+An MDMS will typically import the data, then validate, cleanse and process it before making it available for billing and analysis. The more flexible the MDM application, the better it is able to integrate to existing enterprise applications and help to streamline utility business processes. Benefits can be seen in billing, customer service, outage management and analysis of utility operations.
+
+**3.1.12 sensor** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: Sensors are a significant component of the electrical grid; sensors are used in several ways: temperature monitoring, security, providing data for peak demand adjustment. They are integral components of a smart grid.
+
+**3.1.13 service provider** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: An organization providing smart grid related services to electrical customers and utilities.
+
+**3.1.14 smart grid** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: The "Smart Grid" is a two way electric power delivery network connected to an information and control network through sensors and control devices. This supports the intelligent and efficient optimization of the power network.
+
+**3.1.15 smart meter** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: Smart meter is a premise device to monitor and control electrical power usage of home devices based on "Demand Response (DR) information" from home devices. But, it is not recommended that the smart meter controls directly per each premise appliance because of the private security policy. To control and manage each premise appliance, it is required for a home management system such as a home gateway and a home server to support the control and management.
+
+**3.1.16 substation** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: The site where equipment for switching or regulating electrical voltage is located.
+
+**3.1.17 supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: A computer system that monitors an industrial, infrastructure, or facility-based control process.
+
+**3.1.18 utility provider** [b-ITU-T FG-Smart]: An organization that provides electric power, gas and water. In smart grid, a utility company supplies electric power.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 micro energy grid (MEG):** A group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that act as a single controllable entity with respect to the utility grid. A micro energy grid can connect and disconnect from the utility grid to enable it to operate in utility grid-connected mode or island-mode.
+
+NOTE – A utility grid is a commercial electric power distribution system that takes electricity from a generator, transmits it over a certain distance, then takes the electricity down to the consumer through a distribution system.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| AMI | Advanced Metering Infrastructure |
+| ATS | Automatic Transfer Switch |
+| BAS | Building Automation System |
+| BEMS | Building Energy Management System |
+| CHP | Combined Heat and Power |
+| CIS | Customer Information System |
+| CTTS | Closed Transition Transfer Switch |
+| DER | Distributed Energy Resources |
+| DR | Demand Response |
+| EMS | Energy Management System |
+| ESI | Energy Services Interface |
+| HAN | Home Area Network |
+| HEMS | Home Energy Management System |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MDM | Meter Data Management |
+| MDMS | Meter Data Management System |
+| MEG | Micro Energy Grid |
+| NAN | Neighbourhood Area Network |
+| RER | Renewable Energy Resource |
+| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation,
+
+- The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+- The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview of a micro energy grid
+
+The concept of a micro energy grid (MEG) is introduced so as to enhance the local reliability and flexibility of electric power systems, which may consist of multiple distributed energy resources (DER), customers and energy storage facilities. The MEG is considered as a small electric power system able to operate as a physical island or interconnected with the utility grids.
+
+NOTE – Due to increasing shortages in fossil fuels and the impelling pressures from environmental protection, new high efficiency energy generation sources such as fuel cells and micro gas turbines, as well as renewable energy resources (RERs) such as wind and solar power, are becoming the most important DER.
+
+In the MEG, there is an entity known as a prosumer that consumes and produces electricity, operates or owns a power system that contains sources, loads and energy storage, while optimizing the economic decisions regarding its energy utilization. The prosumer can be an owner of DERs and storage as well as a consumer as outlined below:
+
+- DER owner: An owner who operates a DER which is connected to the MEG.
+- Consumer: A consumer of electricity that may be a private individual, a business building, a large industrial / manufacturing industry or a transportation system. The consumer acts as a customer and may operate smart appliances which are flexible in demand.
+- Storage owner: A provider of storage capacity for storing and delivering energy.
+
+Therefore, the prosumer consumes, produces and stores energy and participates in a market externally. In addition, the prosumer operates a power system and economically optimizes its energy use internally. Stemming from the MEG concept and the roles of prosumers, the MEG can provide the following benefits:
+
+- Power is generated where it is needed,
+- Ease of renewable energy integration,
+- Local control and ownership,
+- Reduction in transmission losses and carbon footprint,
+- Stand-alone grid and operation in isolation mode in case of blackout,
+- Ease of finance and faster to build.
+
+To support the MEG, the following features should be considered, [b-IEEE 1547.x] and [b-DOE MEG]:
+
+- **Autonomy:** The MEG includes generation, storage and loads and can operate autonomously in utility grid-connected mode and islanded mode.
+- **Stability:** Independent local control of generators, batteries and loads of the MEG is based on frequency droops and voltage levels at the terminal of each device.
+
+NOTE – The MEG can operate in a stable manner during nominal operating conditions and during transient events, no matter whether the larger utility grid is up or down.
+
+- **Compatibility:** The MEG is completely compatible with the existing utility grid. MEGs may be considered as functional units that support the growth of the existing system in an economically and environmentally friendly way.
+- **Flexibility:** The expansion and growth rate of the MEG does not need to follow any precise forecasts. The lead times of corresponding components (e.g., fossil-fueled and renewable generators, storage systems and others) are short and the MEG can grow incrementally. The MEG is also technology-neutral and able to cope with a diverse mixture of renewable and fossil-fueled generators.
+- **Scalability:** The MEG can simply grow through the additional installation of generators, storage facilities and loads. Such an extension usually requires an incremental new planning of the MEG and can be performed in a parallel and modular manner in order to scale up to higher power production and consumption levels.
+- **Efficiency:** Centralized as well as distributed MEG supervisory controller structures can optimize the utilization of generators, manage charging and discharging energy storage units and manage consumption. In this way energy management goals can be profoundly optimized in economic as well as environmental respects.
+- **Economics:** The economics of heat recovery and its application by combined heat and power (CHP) systems is very important to the evaluation of the MEG. In addition, the utilization of RERs helps to reduce fuel costs and CO2 emissions.
+- **Peer-to-peer model:** The MEG can support a true peer-to-peer model for operation, control and energy trade. In addition, interactive energy transactions with the centralized utility grid are also possible with this model.
+
+# 7 Requirements for a micro energy grid
+
+The MEG must meet several requirements to enable seamless operation. The MEG has the following high-level requirements:
+
+- It is required to provide open interfaces to easily support new applications and services to various stakeholders (e.g., service provider, consumer, etc.);
+- It is required to support decentralized control for distributed generation and consumption;
+- It is required to measure the demand, generation and status of each MEG component at various locations across the network;
+- It is required to automatically configure and install new devices or systems for the MEG;
+- It is required for a communication network to carry data across the various resources;
+- It is required to interact with operators or any client or server to demonstrate and archive the MEG real-time data and receive the required commands and information;
+- It is required to ensure interoperability between different information/communication models used in the MEG services, [b-NIST] and [b-IEEE 2030];
+- It is required to self-organize systems and dynamically coordinate controllers for the recovery in the case of a problem (e.g., a blackout);
+- It is required to support highly secure and safe communications for the MEG services;
+- It can be optionally required to minimize the total operation costs subject to different constraints and apply them automatically to the MEG components.
+
+MEG networks have the following high-level requirements. MEG networks are required to support:
+
+- Fault tolerance for reliability;
+
+- Seamless transfer between wired and wireless networks;
+- Self-healing via topological reconfigurations;
+- Communication security;
+- Multi-point to multi-point data transfer in forming mesh network.
+
+# 8 Architecture overview of a micro energy grid
+
+The smart grid including the MEG may be considered as a conceptual model which has three top domains and nine specific domains as follows:
+
+- **Smart power grid:** generation, transmission and distribution;
+- **Smart service:** market, operation and service provider;
+- **Smart prosumer:** DER, customer and transportation.
+
+NOTE – DER and transportation are considered as separate domains from the NIST 7 domain model, [b-NIST].
+
+For an MEG; generation, transmission and transportation are among nine specific domains that are not directly related to the MEG. In addition, the MEG provides the integrated operation and management of generation, consumption and customer services. Thus, the MEG service provider can include operation and the service provider. Figure 8-1 shows the simplified 6-domain model for an MEG drawn from the 9-domain model described above. This 6-domain model represents interactions and communication paths among domains.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: 6-domain model for a micro energy grid. The diagram shows six domains arranged in two rows. The top row, under the heading 'Smart energy service', includes 'Markets' (blue box with charts), 'Operation' (blue box with server icons), and 'Service providers' (blue box with a person icon). The bottom row includes 'Distribution' (red box with power lines, labeled 'Micro energy grid'), 'DER' (yellow box with wind turbines), and 'Customer' (yellow box with a house and server, labeled 'Smart prosumer'). Dashed lines represent communication paths between all domains in a mesh topology. A legend at the bottom left shows a solid line for 'Domain' and a dashed line for 'Communication path'. The identifier 'Y.2071(15)\_F8-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – 6-domain model for a micro energy grid**
+
+The reference architecture designed for an MEG takes into account this 6-domain model for an MEG.
+
+
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F8-2
+
+Figure 8-2: Reference architecture for a micro energy grid. The diagram is divided into six main domains: Market, Operation, Service providers, Distribution, DER, and Customer. The Market domain includes an Energy market clearing house connected to an Internet/e-business cloud. The Operation domain includes Micro grid EMS, Demand response, MDMS, and an Enterprise bus, all connected to an Internet/e-business cloud and a Distribution SCADA cloud. The Service providers domain includes a Utility provider (Billing, CIS) and a Third-party provider (Retail energy provider, Billing, CIS, Aggregator, Home/building manager, Others), all connected to an Internet/e-business cloud. The Distribution domain includes Sensors and measurement devices, Grid-Tie switch/controller, and Protection and control devices, all connected to a Micro grid area networks cloud. The DER domain includes Electric power generation, Electric power storage, Heat generation, Heat storage, and a DER gateway/EMS, all connected to a Micro grid area networks cloud. The Customer domain includes an Energy services interface, Meter, Appliances, Customer equipments, Environment sensors, and a Customer EMS, all connected to a Premises networks cloud. Communication paths are shown as solid red lines for paths across domains and dashed black lines for paths within domains. A legend at the bottom defines the symbols: Domain (white box), Domain gateway actor (blue box), Information network (cloud), Communication path (dashed line), and Actor (black box).
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Reference architecture for a micro energy grid**
+
+As shown in Figure 8-2, the reference architecture for an MEG consists of domains, information networks, actors and communication paths as follows:
+
+- **Domain:** market, MEG service provider (operation and service provider), distribution, DER and customer;
+- **Information network:** various types of networks for information delivery and resource sharing;
+- **Actor:** devices, systems, or programs that make decisions and exchange information necessary for performing applications;
+- **Communication path:** logical paths for data exchange between actors and/or between actors and information networks. It consists of communication paths within domains and communication paths across domains.
+
+The following information networks exist:
+
+- **Internet/e-business:** conventional public information networks such as Internet;
+- **Enterprise bus:** each system for integrated operation and management services of the MEG is interconnected;
+- **Micro grid area networks:** energy generation and distribution equipment within the MEG, related operating systems and meters in the customer side are interconnected.
+
+- **Premises networks:** networks for prosumers having the roles of consumer, DER owner and storage owner, they can be made of both public networks and private networks.
+
+Each domain has related actors as follows:
+
+- **Market domain:** Energy market clearing house;
+- **Operation domain:** Micro grid EMS, demand response management system, meter data management system (MDMS), asset management and distribution supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA);
+- **Service provider domain:** Billing, customer information system (CIS), energy provider, aggregator and home/building manager;
+- **Distribution domain:** Substation, Grid-Tie interface, data collector and field device;
+- **DER domain:** Electric power generation, electric power storage, heat generation, heat storage and heat sensor;
+- **Customer domain:** Energy services interface (ESI), meter, sub-meter, customer energy management system, customer appliance and equipment, environment sensor and building automation system (BAS).
+
+For an MEG, there are various systems and devices as follows:
+
+- **Distributed energy resource (DER)**
+A DER includes distributed generation which is connected to the MEG.
+NOTE – Photovoltaic systems, small wind turbines, heat or electricity storage, combined heat and power (CHP) and controllable loads are examples of DER. These devices provide intelligence to be monitored and controlled to support DER applications which increase the efficiency of energy supply and reduce the electricity delivery cost and carbon footprint.
+- **Storage**
+Storage provides an electricity reserve to the MEG.
+NOTE – Batteries, super capacitors and flywheels to match generation with demand are examples of storage in MEG. According to different energy sources, there can be electric power storage and heat storage, etc. Storage can supply generation deficiencies, reduce load surges, reduce network losses, etc.
+- **MEG control system**
+An MEG control system consists of different subsystems of the MEG operator to ensure the control and management tasks of the MEG and the aggregation of supply and demand.
+- **Home/building energy management system (HEMS/BEMS)**
+A HEMS/BEMS acts at the interface between the smart home/building and the MEG. Each customer is controlled by a HEMS/BEMS which communicates in-house with electronic appliances and to the outside with the MEG control system. The HEMS/BEMS aggregates the services of the electronic appliances in the household and provides them to the MEG.
+- **Network device**
+An intelligent electrical device (e.g., so-called smart devices) in the MEG that can be supervised and controlled.
+NOTE – Sensors and circuit-breakers or switches are examples of network devices.
+
+## 9 Control and management services of a micro energy grid
+
+This clause describes typical application services for control and management of MEGs and shows the reference model for each application service.
+
+As shown in Figure 9-1, there are four typical application services for control and management of an MEG: advance metering infrastructure (AMI), demand response (DR) management, customer energy management system and distributed energy grid management.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR; A([Control and management of micro energy grid]) --- B[Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) service]; A --- C[Demand response (DR) management service]; A --- D[Customer energy management service]; A --- E[Distributed energy grid management service];
+```
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F9-1
+
+Diagram showing four typical application services for control and management of a micro energy grid (MEG). A central yellow oval labeled 'Control and management of micro energy grid' is connected by lines to four stacked green rectangular boxes on the right. The boxes are labeled: 'Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) service', 'Demand response (DR) management service', 'Customer energy management service', and 'Distributed energy grid management service'.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Four typical application services for control and management of an MEG**
+
+A reference model for each MEG application service is designed to support interoperability among systems which are developed independently for application services. From the related applications and data information flows, the reference model represents the actors' configuration of each domain and the interfaces among actors.
+
+### **9.1 Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) service**
+
+AMI is an infrastructure for the collection and management of energy (e.g., electricity, gas, heat, etc.) consumption measurement data for each building within the MEG domain. Using bidirectional communications, it can provide real-time pricing information to customers for saving on energy consumption. AMI also provides an environment for the production and resale of renewable energy (e.g., solar, water, wind, etc.).
+
+Figure 9-2 shows the configuration of actors in each domain (e.g., MEG service provider, distribution, DER and customer) and the relationships among actors as a reference model for AMI services based on the reference architecture for an MEG.
+
+
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F9-2
+
+Figure 9-2: A reference model for AMI services. The diagram is divided into six main domains: Market, Operation, Service providers, Distribution, DER, and Customer. The Market domain contains the Energy market clearing house. The Operation domain contains MDMS, Distribution SCADA, and Metering system. The Service providers domain is split into Utility provider (Billing, CIS) and Third-party provider (Billing, CIS, Retail energy provider). The Distribution domain contains Sensors and measurement devices. The DER domain contains DER gateway/EMS. The Customer domain contains Energy services interface, Meter, and Customer EMS. Lines indicate data flow and connections between these components across the domains.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – A reference model for AMI services**
+
+### 9.2 Demand response (DR) management service
+
+In the case where power reliability is at risk or where energy use within the MEG domain is at peak demand, DR management services provide mechanisms or incentives to reduce energy use. In this way DR management services optimize the balance of energy supply and demand within the MEG domain.
+
+Figure 9-3 shows the configuration of actors in each domain and the relationships among actors as a reference model for a DR management service based on the reference architecture for an MEG.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a reference model for Demand Response (DR) management services, organized into six main functional areas:
+
+- Market:** Contains the 'Energy market clearing house'.
+- Operation:** Contains 'MDMS', 'Distribution SCADA', and 'Demand response'.
+- Service providers:** Divided into two sub-sections:
+ - Utility provider:** Contains 'Billing' and 'CIS'.
+ - Third-party provider:** Contains 'Billing', 'CIS', and 'Retail energy provider'.
+- Distribution:** Contains the 'Grid-Tie switch/controller'.
+- DER (Distributed Energy Resource):** Contains 'Electric power generation', 'Electric power storage', 'DER gateway/EMS', 'Heat generation', and 'Heat storage'.
+- Customer:** Contains 'Energy services interface', 'Appliances', 'Customer equipments', and 'Customer EMS'.
+
+Interconnections show data and control flows between these components, such as the 'Energy market clearing house' interacting with 'MDMS' and 'Distribution SCADA', and the 'DER gateway/EMS' acting as a central hub for DER components and connecting to the 'Customer' and 'Service providers'.
+
+A reference model for DR management services diagram showing Market, Operation, Service providers, Distribution, DER, and Customer components and their interconnections.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F9-3
+
+**Figure 9-3 – A reference model for DR management services**
+
+### 9.3 Customer energy management service
+
+A customer energy management service provides remote control and monitoring services of the building's mechanical and electrical equipment (e.g., ventilation, lighting, power systems, fire systems and security systems) in a particular area. These services include energy supply status monitoring, efficiency diagnosis of equipment, automatic data reporting of the building automation system (BAS) to save energy consumption of buildings with data from various kinds of energy sources (e.g., heating and cooling, electricity, renewable energy, etc.).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a reference model for a customer energy management service, structured into two rows and three columns of domains. The top row includes Market, Operation, and Service providers. The bottom row includes Distribution, DER (Distributed Energy Resource), and Customer. Actors within these domains are connected by lines representing relationships.
+
+- Market:** Contains the Energy market clearing house.
+- Operation:** Contains Demand response and MDMS.
+- Service providers:** Contains a Third-party provider and a Home/building manager.
+- Distribution:** Contains Sensors and measurement devices and a Grid-Tie switch/controller.
+- DER:** Contains Electric power generation, Electric power storage, a central DER gateway/EMS, Heat generation, and Heat storage.
+- Customer:** Contains an Energy services interface, a Meter, Appliances, a Customer EMS, Environment sensors, and Customer equipments.
+
+Key connections include:
+
+
+- Energy market clearing house (Market) connecting to MDMS (Operation).
+- Demand response (Operation) connecting to Home/building manager (Service providers).
+- MDMS (Operation) connecting to Home/building manager (Service providers).
+- Home/building manager (Service providers) connecting to Energy services interface (Customer).
+- Sensors and measurement devices (Distribution) connecting to DER gateway/EMS (DER).
+- Grid-Tie switch/controller (Distribution) connecting to DER gateway/EMS (DER).
+- DER gateway/EMS (DER) connecting to Customer EMS (Customer).
+- Energy services interface (Customer) connecting to Meter (Customer).
+- Energy services interface (Customer) connecting to Appliances (Customer).
+- Customer EMS (Customer) connecting to Environment sensors (Customer).
+- Customer EMS (Customer) connecting to Customer equipments (Customer).
+
+Figure 9-4: A reference model for a customer energy management service. The diagram is organized into two rows and three columns of domains. Top row: Market (Energy market clearing house), Operation (Demand response, MDMS), and Service providers (Third-party provider, Home/building manager). Bottom row: Distribution (Sensors and measurement devices, Grid-Tie switch/controller), DER (Electric power generation, Electric power storage, DER gateway/EMS, Heat generation, Heat storage), and Customer (Energy services interface, Meter, Appliances, Customer EMS, Environment sensors, Customer equipments). Lines indicate inter-domain relationships between actors.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F9-4
+
+**Figure 9-4 – A reference model for a customer energy management service**
+
+Figure 9-4 shows the configuration of actors in each domain and the relationships among actors as a reference model for a customer energy management service based on the reference architecture for an MEG.
+
+### 9.4 Distributed energy grid management service
+
+A distributed energy grid management service provides the environment to support optimized supply management and grid operations through integrated surveillance control for energy resource management, energy grid operation and internal network information within the MEG domain.
+
+Figure 9-5 shows the configuration of actors in each domain and the relationships among actors as a reference model for a distributed energy grid management service based on the reference architecture for an MEG.
+
+
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F9-5
+
+Figure 9-5: A reference model for distributed energy grid management service. The diagram is divided into six main functional areas: Market, Operation, Service providers, Distribution, DER (Distributed Energy Resources), and Customer. The Market area includes the Energy market clearing house. The Operation area includes Demand response, Micro grid EMS, and Distribution SCADA. The Service providers area includes a Utility provider (with CIS) and a Third-party provider (with an Aggregator). The Distribution area includes Sensors and measurement devices, Grid-Tie switch/controller, and Protection and control devices. The DER area includes Electric power generation, Electric power storage, DER gateway/EMS, Heat generation, and Heat storage. The Customer area includes the Energy services interface. Connections show the flow of information and control between these components, such as the Energy market clearing house interacting with the Distribution SCADA and the Aggregator, and the DER gateway/EMS interacting with the Micro grid EMS and the Energy services interface.
+
+**Figure 9-5 – A reference model for distributed energy grid management service**
+
+# **10 Core systems and components for a micro energy grid**
+
+### **10.1 Core systems for a micro energy grid**
+
+Figure 10-1 shows a configuration of core systems to support an MEG. The customer premises network domain includes a power trading system, an energy revenue calculating system and a customer energy management service provisioning system including other devices (e.g., customer energy devices, smart meter, control point and grid linked inverter, etc.). These systems are connected to each other through a customer premises network (e.g., home network, building network, etc.). Through the Internet, several kinds of servers are also interconnected to support various applications/services for an MEG.
+
+NOTE 1 – the control point receives power purchasing and selling prices from the users and provides the accounting information about power purchasing and selling to the users.
+
+NOTE 2 – the grid linked inverter converts power input to and output from the power storage system/device in accordance with requests from the power trading system while interlocked with the utility grid.
+
+NOTE 3 – Energy revenue means income from the sale of energy generated from energy resources in the MEG to utility grids. Energy profits or net income generally implies total revenue minus total expenses in a given period.
+
+
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F10-1
+
+Figure 10-1: Configuration of core systems to support a micro energy grid. The diagram shows a central 'Internet' cloud connected to various servers: Accounting server, Power market server, Real-time energy pricing information providing server, Customer energy management service provider server, and Customer energy management service advertisement server. Below the Internet cloud is the 'Customer premises network' cloud, which is connected to a Power trading system, Customer energy management service provisioning system, Control point, Smart meter, and Grid linked inverter. The Customer premises network is also connected to three identical blocks representing energy measurement and storage: Block 1 (Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 1, Energy revenue calculating system, Renewable energy source), Block 2 (Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 2, Energy revenue calculating system, Electronic device including electric power storage device), and Block 3 (Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 3, Energy revenue calculating system, Electronic power storage device).
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Configuration of core systems to support a micro energy grid**
+
+A **power trading system** calculates power usage and sales charges of users with power prices that change in real-time based on time synchronization in an MEG environment and automatically purchases and sells power in accordance with power trading prices set by the users.
+
+The power trading system includes the following components:
+
+- **Time synchronous unit:** This unit synchronizes at least one of a power market server and a smart meter and an authorized time information providing server with time so that the users may purchase or sell power at desired prices among power prices that change in real-time.
+- **Power trading price setting unit:** This unit sets power purchasing and selling prices that are input by the users as reference prices for power trading.
+- **Power purchasing and selling price monitoring unit:** This unit receives power purchasing and selling price information from the power market server or a utility service provider system, monitors power purchasing and selling prices that change in real-time based on the received power purchasing and selling price information. The unit then compares the received power purchasing and selling prices with the reference prices for power trading that are set by the power trading price setting function in order to analyse the comparison result.
+- **Inverter and power storage system controller:** This controls the power conversion of an inverter as well as the charging and discharging of the power storage system/device in order to purchase and sell power at the reference prices set when the power purchasing and selling prices received by the power purchasing and selling price monitoring unit match the reference prices set by the users.
+- **Accounting and information output unit:** This unit outputs accounting information about power purchases and sales based on power charger information generated by purchasing power at the reference prices when the users request to purchase power or in real-time and also outputs incentive information obtained by selling power.
+
+An **energy revenue calculating system** is used for calculating energy revenues of electric power devices based on real-time pricing.
+
+The energy revenue calculating system includes the following components:
+
+- **Time synchronizing unit:** This unit communicates with a real-time energy pricing information providing server and an authorized time information providing server. It receives time information from the real-time energy information providing server which is the authorized time information providing server. Then, the time synchronizing unit synchronizes time between the energy revenue calculating system and the real-time energy pricing information providing server, based on the received time information.
+- **Real-time energy pricing information synchronizing unit:** This unit receives real-time energy sale price information that changes in real-time from the real-time energy pricing information providing server. It synchronizes an energy sale price previously stored in the energy revenue calculating system with the received real-time energy sale price, based on a price change schedule received from the real-time energy pricing information providing server. The unit then stores the synchronized energy sale price in a database.
+- **Energy flow and outflow measuring unit:** This unit measures an amount of energy that flows into and out of electric power devices (e.g., a renewable energy source, an electric power storage device, an electric device including an electric power storage device). In Figure 10-1, the renewable energy source, the electric device and the electric power storage device are connected to one another over a customer premises network. The amount of energy is determined using measuring devices included in each of the renewable energy source, in the electric device including an electric power storage device and in the electric power storage device.
+- **Real-time energy revenue calculating unit:** This unit calculates energy revenues with respect to each of the renewable energy source, the electric device including an electric power storage device and the electric power storage device for a predetermined time period, based on the synchronized energy sale price and the measured amount of energy.
+- **Real-time energy revenue output unit:** This unit outputs the energy revenues calculated by the real-time energy revenue calculating unit so that a user verifies the information about the energy revenues through the electric power devices in real-time. It provides the energy revenues with the renewable energy source, the electric device and the electric power storage device, which are connected to one another over a customer premises network.
+
+A **customer energy management service provisioning system** allows a service user to selectively subscribe to a variety of the customer energy management services under an MEG environment, automatically searches for the customer energy devices that are capable of interworking with a subscribed service and forwards the customer energy management messages to the customer energy devices, thereby provisioning the customer energy management service provider server of the third party at a remote location.
+
+A customer energy management service provisioning system includes the following components:
+
+- **Customer energy management service subscription unit:** This unit receives the service advertisement information from the customer energy management service advertisement server, extracts a list of the customer energy management services and supplies the service user with the list of the customer energy management services that the subscription of the service user allows. Furthermore, when the service user requests to subscribe to a service, the customer energy management service subscription unit mutually authenticates with the customer energy management service provider server which provides the service selected by the service user and receives a secret key for encryption and decryption of the message.
+
+- **Security memory area management unit:** This unit manages a secret key that is received by the customer energy management service subscription unit and a memory area for securely storing security information related to the service provisioning.
+- **Customer energy device management unit:** This unit searches for customer energy devices on the customer premises network to assign unique identifiers (IDs) to the searched devices and transmits a list of the searched customer energy devices to the customer energy management service provider server.
+- **Encryption/decryption processing unit:** This unit encrypts and decrypts the message, which is transmitted to and received from the customer energy management service provider server, using the secret key which is managed by the security memory area management unit.
+- **Customer energy management message processing unit:** This unit performs a data processing operation such as data conversion on the customer energy management message being transmitted and received between the customer energy management service provider server and the customer energy devices, to provide the processed message to the customer energy devices.
+
+### 10.2 Key components for selective delivery of distributed energy resources information
+
+This clause illustrates the system for delivering only selected information from a distributed energy management server in real-time after collecting DER information from multiple slave devices such as switch controllers (e.g., automatic transfer switch (ATS), closed transition transfer switch (CTTS), etc.) and sensors for checking vibration, temperature, noise, etc.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ UG[Utility grid] --- S[Switch]
+ S --- DER[Distributed energy resources]
+ subgraph SDDS [Selective delivery system of distributed energy resources information]
+ SC[Switch controller]
+ DER_FF[Distributed energy resources data feeder]
+ DER_MS[Distributed energy resources management server]
+ SENS[Sensors]
+ SC --- DER_FF
+ SENS --- DER_FF
+ DER_FF --- DER_MS
+ end
+ S --- SC
+
+```
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F10-2
+
+Figure 10-2: System architecture of key components for selective delivery of distributed energy resources information. The diagram shows a 'Utility grid' connected to a 'Switch', which is connected to 'Distributed energy resources'. A 'Selective delivery system of distributed energy resources information' box contains a 'Switch controller' connected to the 'Switch'. Inside this box, 'Sensors' are connected to a 'Distributed energy resources data feeder', which is connected to a 'Distributed energy resources management server'.
+
+**Figure 10-2 – System architecture of key components for selective delivery of distributed energy resources information**
+
+Figure 10-2 shows the selective delivery system with key components for DER information with multiple slave devices. A switch controller enables the DER to interwork with the utility grid. It also controls the switch for independently establishing the MEG and receives DER status information. Sensors are installed near the DER in order to sense vibration, noise and temperature, etc. A DER data feeder collects information from the switch controller and sensors and delivers only selected information to the DER management server from among the subscribed data. The DER management server receives the subscribed data from the DER data feeder and utilizes the information to manage the DER.
+
+### 10.3 Key components for calculating basic electricity charges
+
+This clause illustrates the system for calculating basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building based on periodic electricity usages from smart meters and shares owned by a partitioned owner in an MEG environment of aggregate buildings.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ UCRS[Utility company electricity reading system] --- Internet((Internet))
+ UCRS --- UCM[Utility company smart meter]
+ Internet --- ABC[Aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system]
+ UCM --- ABC
+ ABC --- CPN((Customer premises network))
+ CPN --- SM1[Smart meter]
+ CPN --- SM2[Smart meter]
+ CPN --- SM3[Smart meter]
+ CPN --- SM4[Smart meter]
+ CPN --- SM5[Smart meter]
+
+```
+
+Y.2071(15)\_F10-3
+
+Figure 10-3: System architecture of key components for calculating basic electricity charges per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building. The diagram shows a Utility company electricity reading system connected to the Internet, which in turn connects to the Aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system. The Utility company smart meter also connects to the Aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system. The Aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system connects to the Customer premises network, which then connects to multiple Smart meters.
+
+**Figure 10-3 – System architecture of key components for calculating basic electricity charges per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building**
+
+Figure 10-3 shows the system with key components for calculating basic electricity charge considering shares owned by a partitioned owner and peak demand electricity of an individual owner based on electricity usages.
+
+The **aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system** periodically collects electricity usages of partitioned owners and calculates basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner. Smart meters provide the meter reading information periodically to the aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system. A customer premises network is used for communications between the aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system and smart meters. The aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system also receives the total charge of electricity usages of an aggregate building from the utility company smart meter and related information for electricity usage from the utility company electricity reading system via Internet.
+
+## 11 Security considerations
+
+The security considerations in an MEG should be in accordance with the security requirements in [\[ITU-T X.1111\]](#) and [\[ITU-T Y.2701\]](#).
+
+An MEG should consider various security aspects in terms of physical security, system security, and operation security as follows:
+
+- Verifying the identity of an entity (e.g., user, process, or device) for accessing to resources in an MEG system;
+- Determining the adequacy of security requirements and ensuring compliance with the established security policy and procedures for an MEG;
+- Authorization to use various services in an MEG system;
+- Supporting cryptography and validation mechanisms for data integrity in an MEG;
+- Providing the privacy considerations with respect to an MEG.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Key functions for a micro energy grid
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix shows key functions for an MEG from the functional model of a smart grid [b-ITU-T FG-Smart-Arch].
+
+The functional model of a smart grid identified the principle functional groups for a smart grid, including the end-user functions, the application functions, the smart metering functions, the energy control functions, the power grid functions, the network functions, the management functions and the security functions. These functions can be applied for an MEG. Specifically the power grid functions and the energy control functions are quite important in supporting core roles for distributed energy characteristics of an MEG. Other functions can be used commonly by both the smart grid and MEG without significant changes.
+
+For an MEG, key functions within each functional group are shown in Table I.1.
+
+**Table I.1 – Key functions for an MEG from the functional model of a smart grid**
+
+| | Functional group | Key functions |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1 | Customer functions | - • Local energy generation and storage
- • Home/building energy management and automation
- • Electric vehicle charging
- • Energy demand response
|
+| 2 | Micro energy grid functions
(Power grid functions*) | - • DER
- • Distributed energy storage
- • Integration of distributed renewable generation
- • Efficient intelligent energy distribution
|
+| 3 | Network functions | - • Reliability and failure protection
- • End-to-end reliable data transport
- • End-to-end communication management
- • QoS control and management
|
+| 4 | Smart metering functions | - • Meter control, maintenance
- • Meter reading and data management
|
+| 5 | Micro energy control functions
(Energy control functions*) | - • Monitoring and management of DER
- • Electric vehicle charging
- • Management of energy capacity planning
|
+| 6 | Application functions | - • AMI service support
- • DR service support
- • Group-BEMS service support
- • MEG management service support
|
+| 7 | Management functions | - • Application management
- • Device management
- • Network management
|
+| 8 | Security functions | - • Identification and authentication
- • Audit and accountability
- • Access control
- • Data integrity
- • Privacy preserving
|
+| *: This symbol stands for the functions' names in the functional model of a smart grid. | | |
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Deployment models for a micro energy grid
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Communication networks connect various power systems for generation, transmission, distribution and consumption and the information and operation software platforms. Information containing the real-time data that reflects the status of the utility grid is transmitted and exchanged bi-directionally among the grid operators, consumers and ecosystem operators.
+
+In general, smart grid networks can be categorized into several logical components based on their coverage, such as home area networks (HANs), local area network (LANs), neighbourhood area network (NANs), wide area networks (WANs) and access networks as shown in Table II.1.
+
+**Table II.1 – Major components of smart grid networks** (source: [b-ITU-T FG-Smart])
+
+| Term | Definition |
+|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Wide area network | A wide area network (WAN) is a communication network that covers a wide geographical area and accommodates terminals and LANs. This is typically called a "back haul" network in a smart grid environment. |
+| Local area network | A local area network (LAN) is a network that connects computers and devices in a limited geographical area such as a home, a computer laboratory, an office building and a closely positioned group of buildings. |
+| Home area network | In smart grid applications, home area networks (HANs) refer to the networks in the homes that interconnect energy devices, including appliances, energy management stations, plug-in electrical vehicle chargers and energy sources. |
+| Access network | An access network refers to a network which connects subscribers to their immediate service provider. It is contrasted with the core (or transport) network in a wide area network. |
+| Neighborhood area network | A neighborhood area network (NAN), is an access network that allows a smart grid end-device and home area networks to connect to a wide area network. |
+
+The MEG concept is the division of a large scale utility grid into small community utility grids. Each of these small community grids contains local traditional power generation and RERs; i.e., dividing the large metropolitan smart grid area into smaller segments. Each of the segments is an autonomous stand-alone grid that can be called an MEG. This MEG can be managed locally and can be integrated to the larger grid to trade power and exchange information when needed.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ WAN([Wide area network]) --> MGAN([Micro grid area networks])
+ WAN --> NAGN([Neighborhood area networks])
+ MGAN --> DA([Distributed automation])
+ MGAN --> EV([Electric vehicle])
+ NAGN --> PMGN([Private micro grid networks])
+ NAGN --> INVN([In-vehicle networks])
+ NAGN --> BN([Building networks])
+ NAGN --> RHN([Residential home networks])
+ MGAN --> PMGN
+ MGAN --> INVN
+ MGAN --> BN
+ MGAN --> RHN
+
+```
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FII.1
+
+A hierarchical diagram showing the deployment model for micro energy grid networks. At the top is 'Wide area network'. It branches into 'Micro grid area networks' and 'Neighborhood area networks'. 'Micro grid area networks' contains 'Distributed automation' and 'Electric vehicle'. 'Neighborhood area networks' is empty. Both 'Micro grid area networks' and 'Neighborhood area networks' connect to four bottom-level nodes: 'Private micro grid networks', 'In-vehicle networks', 'Building networks', and 'Residential home networks'.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Deployment model for micro energy grid networks**
+
+Figure II.1 shows an example of a deployment model for MEG networks which consists of micro grid area networks, private micro grid networks and customer premises networks (e.g., building networks, residential home networks, etc.) which provide the communications between the appliances and equipment with the customers' premises.
+
+# Appendix III
+
+## Operations and information flows for micro energy grid scenarios
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### III.1 Automated power trading
+
+The following illustrates detailed operations for a time synchronization based automated power trading method for real-time pricing:
+
+- **Operation 1:** The power trading system synchronizes at least one of the power market server and the smart meter and the time information providing server with time in order to purchase or sell power at the prices set by the users in real-time pricing.
+- **Operation 2:** The power trading system receives power purchasing and selling prices by the users to set the received power purchasing and selling prices as the reference prices for power trading.
+- **Operation 3:** The power trading system receives power purchasing and selling prices that change in real-time based on the power purchasing and selling price information and compares the power purchasing and selling prices to the predetermined reference prices for power trading.
+- **Operation 4:** When the power purchasing and selling prices reach the reference prices, the power trading system controls the power conversion of the inverter and the charge and discharge of the power storage system/device in order to purchase and sell power at the reference prices.
+
+Figure III.1 is an information flow diagram illustrating a time synchronization based automated power trading method for real-time pricing.
+
+1. In order to calculate the power using and selling charges of the users with the power prices that change reflected in real-time based on time synchronization and to automatically purchase and sell power in accordance with the power trading prices set by the users, a smart meter first synchronizes a power market server with time information.
+2. A power trading system receives time information from the smart meter whose time is synchronized with the power market server so that the time information coincides.
+3. When the users set the power trading prices in the power trading system through a control point, the power trading system receives power purchasing and selling price information from the power market server to monitor power purchasing and selling price in real-time.
+4. The power trading system controls the power conversion of a grid linked inverter when the power purchasing and selling prices reach the reference prices set by the users.
+5. The power trading system controls the charge and discharge of a power storage system.
+6. The smart meter informs an accounting server of a changing amount of input and output power.
+7. When the users request accounting information through the control point, the power trading system requests the accounting server to verify the accounting information.
+8. Subsequently, the accounting server verifies and analyses the power input and output amount history information from the smart meter in order to analyse user accounting information.
+9. The accounting server transmits the analysed information to the power trading system.
+10. Then, the power trading system transmits the transmitted information to the control point so that the accounting information is output.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CP as Control point
+ participant PTS as Power trading system
+ participant GLI as Grid linked inverter
+ participant PStS as Power storage system
+ participant SM as Smart meter
+ participant PMS as Power market server
+ participant AS as Accounting server
+
+ SM->>PMS: Synchronize time
+ PTS->>SM: Synchronize time
+ CP->>PTS: Set power trading prices
+ PTS->>PMS: Monitor power purchasing and selling prices in real-time
+ PTS->>GLI: Perform power conversion
+ PTS->>PStS: Perform charging and discharging
+ SM->>AS: Inform power input and output amount
+ CP->>PTS: Request real-time accounting information
+ PTS->>AS: Request real-time accounting information
+ AS->>SM: Check power input and output history
+ AS->>PTS: Respond to real-time accounting information request
+ PTS->>CP: Respond to real-time accounting information request
+
+```
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FIII.1
+
+Figure III.1: An information flow diagram for automated power trading. The diagram shows seven entities: Control point, Power trading system, Grid linked inverter, Power storage system, Smart meter, Power market server, and Accounting server. The flow of information is as follows: 1. Synchronize time: Smart meter to Power market server, and Power trading system to Smart meter. 2. Set power trading prices: Control point to Power trading system. 3. Monitor power purchasing and selling prices in real-time: Power trading system to Power market server. 4. Perform power conversion: Power trading system to Grid linked inverter. 5. Perform charging and discharging: Power trading system to Power storage system. 6. Inform power input and output amount: Smart meter to Accounting server. 7. Request real-time accounting information: Control point to Power trading system. 8. Request real-time accounting information: Power trading system to Accounting server. 9. Check power input and output history: Accounting server to Smart meter. 10. Respond to real-time accounting information request: Accounting server to Power trading system. 11. Respond to real-time accounting information request: Power trading system to Control point.
+
+**Figure III.1 – An information flow diagram for automated power trading**
+
+### III.2 Real-time energy revenue calculation
+
+The following illustrates detailed operations for calculating the energy revenues of electric power devices based on real-time pricing:
+
+- **Operation 1:** In order to calculate the energy revenues of electric power devices under a micro energy grid based real-time pricing environment, an energy revenue calculating system receives accurate authorized time information from a real-time energy pricing information providing server or an authorized time information providing server and synchronizes time information of the energy revenue calculating system with the received time information.
+- **Operation 2:** The energy revenue calculating system receives real-time energy sale price information and price change schedule information from the real-time energy pricing information providing server and continuously synchronizes information about an energy sale price stored in the energy revenue calculating system with the received energy sale price information.
+- **Operation 3:** The energy revenue calculating system measures the amount of energy that flows into and out of electric power devices, for example, a renewable energy source, an electric power storage device or an electric device including an electric power storage device, which interwork with the energy revenue calculating system.
+- **Operation 4:** The energy revenue calculating system calculates real-time energy revenues based on the amount of energy that flows into and out of the electric power devices at a current point in time or for a predetermined time period and the received real-time energy sale price information.
+
+Figure III.2 is an information flow diagram illustrating a method for calculating energy revenues of electric power devices based on real-time pricing.
+
+1. When an energy revenue calculating system is provided in a renewable energy source, an electric device including an electric power storage device and an electric power storage device, an operation of the energy revenue calculating system calculates for the entire system
+
+the energy revenues of the electric power devices under a micro energy grid based real-time pricing environment.
+
+2. The energy revenue calculating system receives accurate authorized time information from a real-time energy pricing information providing server (or an authorized time information providing server) and synchronizes time information of the energy revenue calculating system with the received time information.
+3. The energy revenue calculating system receives real-time energy sale price information and information about a price change schedule from the real-time energy pricing information providing server and continuously synchronizes information about an energy sale price stored in the energy revenue calculating system with the received energy sale price information.
+4. The energy revenue calculating system measures the amount of energy that flows into and out of the renewable energy source, the electric device including an electric power storage device and the electric power storage device.
+5. The energy revenue calculating system calculates the real-time energy revenues, based on information about the amount of energy measured at a current point in time, or for a predetermined time period and the received real-time energy price information.
+6. The energy revenue calculating system provides information about the real-time energy revenues so that a user may verify the information about the energy revenues through a corresponding electric power device, for example, the renewable energy source, the electric device including an electric power storage device, the electric power storage device, or a mobile terminal of a user.
+
+
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FIII.2
+
+Figure III.2: An information flow diagram for real-time energy revenue calculation. The diagram shows five main components in boxes: 'Energy revenue calculating system', 'Renewable energy source', 'Electric power storage device', 'Electric device including electric power storage device', and 'Real-time energy pricing information providing server'. The flow of information is as follows: 1. 'Synchronize time' and 'Synchronize energy sale price information' are bidirectional arrows between the 'Energy revenue calculating system' and the 'Real-time energy pricing information providing server'. 2. 'Measuring inflow and outflow of energy' is a self-loop arrow on the 'Energy revenue calculating system'. 3. 'Calculate real-time energy revenues' is a self-loop arrow on the 'Energy revenue calculating system'. 4. 'Provide information about real-time energy revenues' is a bidirectional arrow between the 'Energy revenue calculating system' and the 'Renewable energy source'. 5. 'Provide information about real-time energy revenues' is a bidirectional arrow between the 'Energy revenue calculating system' and the 'Electric power storage device'. 6. 'Provide information about real-time energy revenues' is a bidirectional arrow between the 'Energy revenue calculating system' and the 'Electric device including electric power storage device'.
+
+**Figure III.2 – An information flow diagram for real-time energy revenue calculation – 1**
+
+Figure III.3 is an information flow diagram illustrating a method of calculating energy revenues of electric power devices based on real-time pricing.
+
+1. The energy revenue calculating system integrally manages energy revenues of electric power devices, without being part of the electric power devices, for example, a renewable energy source, an electric device including an electric power storage device and an electric power storage device. In addition the energy revenue calculating system operates under a micro energy grid based real-time pricing environment.
+2. The energy revenue calculating system receives accurate authorized time information from a real-time energy pricing information providing server (or an authorized time information
+
+providing server) and synchronizes time information of the energy revenue calculating system with the received time information.
+
+3. The energy revenue calculating system receives real-time energy sale price information and information about a price change schedule, from the real time energy pricing information providing server and may continuously synchronize energy pricing information of the energy revenue calculating system with the received energy sale price information.
+4. The energy revenue calculating system collects information about an amount of energy that flows into and out of each of the renewable energy sources, the electric device including an electric power storage device, the electric power storage device, from a first energy inflow and outflow measuring device, a second energy inflow and outflow measuring device and a third energy inflow and outflow measuring device.
+5. The energy revenue calculating system calculates the energy revenues of the electric devices based on the received real-time energy sale information and the collected information about the amount of the energy that flows into and out of each of the electric power devices.
+6. The energy revenue calculating system directly outputs information about the energy revenues, or provides output information to a mobile terminal of a user so that the user verifies the information about the energy revenues of the electric power devices.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ERS as Energy revenue calculating system
+ participant E1 as Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 1
+ participant E2 as Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 2
+ participant E3 as Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 3
+ participant RSE as Real-time energy pricing information providing server
+
+ ERS->>RSE: Synchronize time
+ ERS->>RSE: Synchronize energy sale price information
+ E1->>ERS: Measuring inflow and outflow of energy
+ E2->>ERS: Measuring inflow and outflow of energy
+ E3->>ERS: Measuring inflow and outflow of energy
+ ERS->>ERS: Calculate real-time energy revenues
+ ERS->>ERS: Output real-time energy revenues
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow for real-time energy revenue calculation. The diagram involves five entities: Energy revenue calculating system, Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 1, Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 2, Energy inflow and outflow measuring device 3, and Real-time energy pricing information providing server. The process starts with time and price synchronization between the system and the server. Then, each measuring device sends energy flow data to the system. Finally, the system calculates and outputs the real-time energy revenues.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FIII.3
+
+**Figure III.3 – An information flow diagram for real-time energy revenue calculation – 2**
+
+### III.3 Customer energy management services provisioning
+
+The following illustrates detailed operations for securely provisioning the customer energy management services by the customer energy management service provisioning system.
+
+- **Operation 1:** In the operation of receiving an advertisement of the customer energy management services, the customer energy management service provisioning system receives the service advertisement information from the customer energy management service advertisement server and provides a list of the customer energy management services to a service user.
+- **Operation 2:** In the operation of performing an authentication by the customer energy management service provider server, the customer energy management service provisioning system mutually authenticates with the customer energy management service provider server, that provides the service to which the user requests to subscribe and then receives a secret key for the encryption and decryption of the message.
+
+- **Operation 3:** In the operation of searching for the customer energy devices, the customer energy management service provisioning system searches for the customer energy device on the customer premises network in order to assign unique identifiers to the searched customer energy devices and transmits a list of the searched customer energy devices to the customer energy management service provider server.
+Accordingly, the customer energy management service provider server receives the list of the customer energy services and generates the customer energy management message on the basis of the list of the customer energy devices in order to transmit the message to the customer energy management service provisioning system.
+- **Operation 4:** In response to the message, in the operation of transferring the customer energy management message, the customer energy management service provisioning system performs an encryption/decryption of the message between the customer energy management service provider server and the customer energy devices and exchanges the encrypted/decrypted message.
+
+Figure III.4 is an information flow diagram illustrating a method of securely provisioning customer energy management services under a smart grid environment.
+
+1. The customer energy management service information from the third party service providers is registered in the customer energy management service advertisement server and the customer energy management service advertisement including the registered services is sent to the customer energy management service provisioning system of the user who desires to subscribe to one or more the services.
+2. The customer energy management service provisioning system receives a list of the customer energy management services that are registered in the customer energy management service advertisement server and pushes the received list of the customer energy management services to a mobile terminal of the service user.
+3. In response, the service user reviews the list of the customer energy management services and selects a desired service to make a request for a subscription to the selected service.
+4. When there is the subscription request to the customer energy management service from the service user, the customer energy management service provisioning system transmits a subscription request message to the customer energy management service of the customer energy management service provider server in order to process the subscription request to the service to which the user wants to subscribe from among the list of the customer energy management services.
+5. When the subscription request message to the customer energy management service is transmitted, a mutual authentication for the performance of the customer energy management and an exchange of the secret key for the encryption and decryption of the customer energy management message are performed between the customer energy management service provider server and the customer energy management service provisioning system.
+6. Subsequently, when the exchange of the secret key between the customer energy management service provider server and the customer energy management service provisioning system is successfully completed, the customer energy management service provisioning system searches the customer energy device for energy production, energy consumption or energy management connected to the customer premises network.
+7. When the customer energy devices are searched, the customer energy management service provisioning system makes a list of the searched customer energy devices and encrypts the list.
+8. The customer energy management service provisioning system transmits the encrypted list of the customer energy devices to the customer energy management service provider server.
+
+9. The customer energy management service provider server generates the customer energy management message capable of performing the customer energy management of the customer energy devices on the basis of the list of the customer energy devices and transmits the encrypted customer energy management message to the customer energy management service provisioning system.
+10. The customer energy management service provisioning system decrypts the encrypted customer energy management message that has been received using the secret key that has been received during the operation of the authentication and key exchange.
+11. The customer energy management service provisioning system relays the customer energy management message decrypted to the customer energy devices that are specified.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant AS as Customer energy management service advertisement server
+ participant PS as Customer energy management service provider server
+ participant SYS as Customer energy management service provisioning system
+ participant DEV as Customer energy device
+
+ AS->>SYS: Receive customer energy management service advertisement
+ Note right of SYS: Output list of
+customer energy
+management services
+ SYS->>PS: Request to subscribe to customer
+energy management service
+ PS->>SYS: Perform authentication and
+exchange security key
+ Note right of SYS: Search customer
+energy devices
+ SYS->>DEV:
+ Note right of SYS: Encrypt list of
+customer energy
+devices
+ PS->>SYS: Transmit encrypted list of
+customer energy devices
+ PS->>SYS: Transmit customer energy
+management message
+ Note right of SYS: Decrypt customer
+energy management
+message
+ SYS->>DEV: Relay decrypted message
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the process of provisioning customer energy management services. It involves four main components: the advertisement server, the provider server, the provisioning system, and the customer energy device. The process begins with the advertisement server sending a service advertisement to the provisioning system. The provisioning system then outputs a list of services and sends a subscription request to the provider server. After authentication and key exchange, the provider server transmits an encrypted list of devices to the provisioning system. The provisioning system searches for these devices, decrypts the management message, and finally relays the decrypted message to the customer energy device. The provider server also performs a final transmission of the management message to the provisioning system.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow for customer energy management services provisioning between four entities: Customer energy management service advertisement server, Customer energy management service provider server, Customer energy management service provisioning system, and Customer energy device.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FIII.4
+
+**Figure III.4 – An information flow diagram for customer energy management services provisioning**
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+## A mechanism for selective delivery of distributed energy resources information from multiple slave devices
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix illustrates a mechanism for delivering only selected information from a distributed energy management server in real-time after collecting DER information from multiple slave devices. This mechanism can be used for security management and control of DER (e.g., an emergency generator) which are connected to utility grids.
+
+Based on Figure 10-2 in clause 10.2, the DER data feeder has the following functionalities.
+
+- **Slave connection:** As a master in master/slave communications, it maintains connections among slaves (e.g., the switch controller and multiple sensors).
+- **Slave data collection:** It collects data stored in the registries of multiple slave devices using a polling method.
+- **Hash table management:** It stores and maintains related values in an appropriate hash table after calculating a hash key with collected data.
+- **Subscribed data configuration:** It configures and maintains related items of data which the DER management server wants to subscribe to.
+- **Slave data conversion:** In the case where the subscribed data of the DER management server are changed, the DER data feeder converts the data format in order to deliver the changed data to the DER management server.
+- **Subscribed data delivery:** It delivers the data packet requested through the subscription of the DER management server.
+
+Figure IV.1 illustrates details of the selective delivery mechanism of DER information from multiple slave devices in a micro grid environment.
+
+- **Step 1 – Slave connection and subscription establishment:** It establishes master/slave connections with slave devices (e.g., the switch controller and sensors) and configures related items of subscription request data from the DER management server.
+- **Step 2 – DER collection:** It collects DER management information from multiple slave devices.
+- **Step 3 – Hash table data storing:** It calculates a hash key of collected data and stores the key in a hash table.
+- **Step 4 – Subscription establishment data change check:** It checks if the subscription request data of the energy resources management server among data in the hash table are changed.
+- **Step 5 – Hash table data reading:** If the subscription request data are changed, it reads the data from the hash table.
+- **Step 6 – Subscription data transform:** It transforms the data format for the energy resources management server to receive.
+- **Step 7 – Subscription data packet delivery:** It delivers the subscription data packet to the energy resources management server in a real-time manner.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Slave connection/
+subscription
+establishment] --> B[Distributed energy
+resources collection]
+ B --> C[Hash table
+data storing]
+ C --> D{Subscription
+establishment
+data change}
+ D -- No --> C
+ D -- Yes --> E[Hash table
+data reading]
+ E --> F[Subscription data
+transform]
+ F --> G[Subscription data
+packet delivery]
+
+```
+
+The flowchart illustrates the selective delivery mechanism of distributed energy resources information from multiple slave devices. The process begins with 'Slave connection/subscription establishment', followed by 'Distributed energy resources collection', and then 'Hash table data storing'. A decision diamond 'Subscription establishment data change' follows. If the answer is 'No', the process loops back to 'Hash table data storing'. If the answer is 'Yes', the process proceeds to 'Hash table data reading', then 'Subscription data transform', and finally 'Subscription data packet delivery'.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FIV.1
+
+Flowchart illustrating the selective delivery mechanism of distributed energy resources information from multiple slave devices.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – Selective delivery mechanism of distributed energy resources information from multiple slave devices**
+
+# Appendix V
+
+## A mechanism for calculating basic electricity charges for partitioned owners in an aggregate building
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix illustrates a mechanism for calculating the basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building based on periodic electricity usages from smart meters and shares owned by a partitioned owner in a micro grid environment of aggregate buildings.
+
+Based on Figure 10-3 in clause 10.3, the system for basic electricity charge calculation per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building has the following functionalities.
+
+- **Network connection:** An aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system is connected with smart meters of partitioned owners through a customer premises network in order to deliver the electricity usage information which a smart meter measures.
+- **Input of basic information for an aggregate building:** The information for shares owned by a partitioned owner and for the monthly basic electricity charge of an aggregate building are input.
+- **Electricity usage collection per a portioned owner:** It periodically collects the measurement information of electricity usage from smart meters of partitioned owners.
+- **Storing of electricity usage and basic/peak electricity charge:** It stores the collected information for electricity usage as well as the calculated information for the basic electricity charge and the peak electricity charge.
+- **Calculation of the basic electricity charge per a portioned owner:** It calculates the basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner during a month or a year using the stored information.
+- **Output of electricity information and basic electricity charge information:** It outputs electricity information and basic electricity charge information for a partitioned owner based on contracted electricity and peak demand electricity.
+
+Figure V.1 shows details of the mechanism for calculating basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building based on electricity usages of partitioned owners.
+
+- **Step 1 – Aggregate building information input:** As an input, the information for shares owned by a partitioned owner and for contract electricity with a utility company are given.
+- **Step 2 – Power usage information collection:** The information for electricity usage is periodically collected and stored from smart meters of partitioned owners in an aggregate building.
+- **Step 3 – Peak demand electricity calculation and announcement:** Using the information collected in Step 2, it calculates and announces the peak demand electricity which is the maximum value among average electricity usages of every hour.
+- **Step 4 – Basic electricity charge calculation:** So that the owner of an aggregate building collects a basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner, it requests the balance of basic electricity charge from the aggregate building basic electricity charge calculation system based on the total charge of the aggregate building from a utility company.
+- **Step 5 – Basic electricity charge calculation and output:** Based on all information collected in the previous steps, it calculates the basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner and gives the information to the owner.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[Aggregate building information input] --> B[Power usage information collection]
+ B --> C[Peak demand electricity calculation/announcement]
+ C --> D{Basic electricity charge balance request}
+ D -- No --> B
+ D -- Yes --> E[Basic electricity charge calculation/output]
+
+```
+
+The flowchart illustrates the mechanism for calculating basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building. It begins with 'Aggregate building information input', which leads to 'Power usage information collection'. This step leads to 'Peak demand electricity calculation/announcement', which then leads to a decision diamond: 'Basic electricity charge balance request'. If the answer is 'No', the process loops back to 'Power usage information collection'. If the answer is 'Yes', the process proceeds to 'Basic electricity charge calculation/output'.
+
+Y.2071(15)\_FV.1
+
+Flowchart illustrating the mechanism for calculating basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building.
+
+**Figure V.1 – Mechanism for calculating basic electricity charge per a partitioned owner in an aggregate building**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T FG-Smart] FG-Smart Deliverable (2011), *Deliverable on Smart Grid Terminology*.
+- [b-ITU-T FG-Smart-Arch] FG-Smart Deliverable (2011), *Deliverable on Smart Grid Architecture*.
+- [b-IEEE 1547.x] IEEE 1547.x series, *IEEE Standard for Distributed Resources Interconnected with Electric Power Systems*, and all other new and revised parts of this standard.
+- [b-IEEE 2030] IEEE 2030 (2011), *IEEE Guide for Smart Grid Interoperability of Energy Technology and Information Technology Operation with the Electric Power System (EPS), and End-Use Applications and Loads*.
+
+- [b-DOE MEG] DOE MEG (2006), *Microgrids Research Assessment – Final Report*, May – Navigant Consulting for US Department of Energy and Energy Commission of the State of California.
+- [b-NIST] NIST (2012), *NIST Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, Release 2.0*, February.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2083-201408-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2083-201408-I_PDF-E/raw.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7237bfd110bd3d3724e62f693a38d3f22f972cfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2083-201408-I_PDF-E/raw.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1099 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2083
+
+(08/2014)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Frameworks and functional
+architecture models
+
+# --- **Multimedia telephony over distributed service networking**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2083
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2083
+
+# Multimedia telephony over distributed service networking
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2083 describes the distributed service networking (DSN) functional architecture intended to support multimedia telephony (MMTel) services based on the DSN service requirements. The main objective of this Recommendation is to define a high level MMTel service architecture over DSN and a set of capabilities and information flows which support MMTel services.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2083 | 2014-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12280 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Distributed service networking, DSN, multimedia telephony, MMTel.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2015
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Functional architecture ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Basic communication procedures ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Application level procedures ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Overlay level procedures ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Overload control considerations in MMTel ..... | 17 |
+| 8.1 Overload control flows by using a backup node ..... | 17 |
+| 8.2 Overload control by initiating a node joining..... | 22 |
+| 9 Supplementary services support ..... | 22 |
+| 10 Mobility support ..... | 22 |
+| 11 Interworking ..... | 22 |
+| 12 Charging ..... | 23 |
+| 13 Security considerations ..... | 23 |
+| 14 Network management..... | 23 |
+| Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2083
+
+# Multimedia telephony over distributed service networking
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies a cost-effective, flexible, scalable and reliable system which provides multimedia telephony (MMTel) services to users connected to a distributed service networking (DSN) network. It describes the requirements and functional architecture for supporting MMTel services over DSN, defines detailed information flows related to MMTel service provisioning, node management and overload control. It also describes the support for supplementary services, mobility, interworking, charging, and network management in an MMTel system over DSN.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T M.3060] Recommendation ITU-T M.3060/Y.2401 (2006), *Principles for the Management of Next Generation Networks*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1707] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1707/Y.2804 (2008), *Generic framework of mobility management for next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1708] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1708/Y.2805 (2008), *Framework of location management for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1709] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1709/Y.2806 (2008), *Framework of handover control for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2080] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2080 (2012), *Functional architecture for distributed service networking*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2173] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2173 (2008), *Management of performance measurement for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2206] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2206 (2010), *Requirements for distributed service networking capabilities*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2211] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2211 (2007), *IMS-based real-time conversational multimedia services over NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2233] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2010), *Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control node** [b-ITU-T Y Suppl.10]: A DSN node which provides service control and transport control functionalities.
+
+**3.1.2 distributed service networking** [ITU-T Y.2206]: An overlay network which provides distributed and manageable capabilities to support various multimedia services.
+
+**3.1.3 DSN node** [ITU-T Y.2206]: A node used in DSN providing distributed functionalities, including distributed routing and distributed storage.
+
+**3.1.4 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.5 user profile** [ITU-T Y.2080]: In the context of the DSN functional architecture, a collection of information that specifies the subscribed services and access privileges related to a DSN service user. The data in the user profile is called user profile data.
+
+NOTE – A user profile may include the following attributes: user ID and other data related to authentication and authorization, user preferences, service status, service class, usage and/or contribution information, or subscriber accounting characteristics, etc.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 admitting node:** During the process of node joining, the admitting node of the joining node is responsible for the portion of the namespace which will reside in the joining node.
+
+**3.2.2 bootstrap node:** During the process of node joining, the bootstrap node of the joining node is the node that the joining node contacts. The bootstrap node validates the joining node's credentials and forwards the connecting request from the joining node to its admitting node.
+
+**3.2.3 proxy node:** The proxy node of user equipment (UE) is the first contact point of UE. The proxy node locates the serving node and forwards session control messages between the serving node and UE.
+
+**3.2.4 responsible node:** During the process of node leaving, the responsible node of the leaving node is the node that should take over the portion of the namespace that the leaving node is currently responsible for.
+
+**3.2.5 serving node:** The serving node of UE is the DSN node which processes session control messages from UE. It is responsible for a range of user profile storage, and supports user authentication, session initiation and termination.
+
+NOTE – The different descriptions of nodes are a relative concept; the DSN node is homogenous, and a node may act as different kinds of nodes depending on different sessions, different joining nodes, etc. For example, a node may act as a serving node to a certain end-user function (EF), but may also act as a proxy node to another EF.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------|
+| DSN | Distributed Service Networking |
+| EF | End-user Function |
+| ID | Identification |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| MMTel | Multimedia Telephony |
+| NEF | Node Enrolment Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RLF | Resource Location Function |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+Within this Recommendation, the keywords "multimedia telephony" and "MMTel" indicate the same service as "IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) based real time conversational multimedia services" defined in [ITU-T Y.2211].
+
+## **6 Functional architecture**
+
+Figure 6-1 depicts a functional architecture, based on the distributed service networking (DSN) architecture of [ITU-T Y.2080], which can be used to support multimedia telephony (MMTel) services. The service control function (SCF) includes registration, authentication, authorization, media resources controlling and service user profiles, and it interacts with the resource location function (RLF) for resource location. All the DSN nodes in the MMTel service overlay have the same functional capabilities, including RLF and SCF. DSN nodes need to be enrolled by a node enrolment function (NEF) to construct the MMTel service overlay. The related functions and reference points are identified in [ITU-T Y.2080].
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1 – MMTel service architecture over DSN. The diagram shows a network architecture with a central 'DSN MMtel overlay' cloud. On the left, an 'EF' (End User Function) connects to a 'DSN node (proxy node)' via interface C6. The proxy node contains 'SCF' and 'RLF' components connected by interface C7. The proxy node connects to the overlay via interface C2. On the right, the overlay connects to another 'DSN node (serving node)' via interface C2. The serving node also contains 'SCF' and 'RLF' components connected by interface C7. The serving node connects to a 'NEF' (Network Exposure Function) via interface C1. The NEF connects to an 'MF' (Management Function) via a management interface (dotted line). A legend indicates that dashed lines represent 'Control' and dotted lines represent 'Management'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2083(14)\_F6-1' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – MMTel service architecture over DSN**
+
+# 7 Basic communication procedures
+
+The MMTel service allows multimedia conversational communications between two or more users. It provides for the real-time bidirectional conversational transfer of voice, video or optionally other types of data.
+
+The MMTel communication is point to point between communicating terminals, or between a terminal and a network entity. This communication is usually symmetric, but in special cases the media components present in each direction may be different, or they may be the same, but with different bit rates and quality of service (QoS). Normally, the MMTel communication service is realised by a session control protocol.
+
+According to whether a session control function is included, the procedures for MMTel communication can be categorized as application level procedures and overlay level procedures. The application level procedures consist of the user registration and session related procedures such as session initiation and session termination (release). The overlay level procedures contain the node management procedures which include node joining and node leaving.
+
+### 7.1 Application level procedures
+
+This clause describes the DSN application level procedures which implement the basic communication services including user registration, session initiation and session release.
+
+NOTE 1 – The term "user" in the following procedure represents DSN user equipment (UE). The end-user function (EF) is a most primary function of DSN UE, which supports access to the DSN overlay network and service by exchanging session initiation protocol (SIP) messages with the SCF of a proxy node. UE may also include other functions.
+
+The detailed procedures are described as follows. For easy understanding, the description of procedures in this Recommendation use the SIP protocol as an example, but are not limited to SIP.
+
+NOTE 2 – Session initiation with supplementary services provisioning and session release due to abnormal reasons are similar to those specified in next generation network (NGN) IMS, so they are not defined in this Recommendation.
+
+#### 7.1.1 User registration
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF_A as EF A
+ participant Proxy_node as Proxy node
+SCF RLF
+ participant RLFs_overlay as RLFs overlay
+ participant Serving_node as Serving node
+SCF RLF
+
+ EF_A->>Proxy_node: 1. SIP Register
+ Proxy_node->>RLFs_overlay: 2. Resource location query
+ RLFs_overlay->>Serving_node: 3. Resource location query
+ Serving_node->>RLFs_overlay: 4. Resource location response
+ RLFs_overlay->>Proxy_node: 5. Resource location response
+ Proxy_node->>Serving_node: 6. SIP Register
+ Note over Serving_node: Authentication
+ Serving_node->>Proxy_node: 7. SIP 200 OK
+ Proxy_node->>EF_A: 8. SIP 200 OK
+```
+
+The diagram shows the user registration process. EF A sends a SIP Register message to the SCF of the Proxy node. The Proxy node's RLF then initiates a resource location query through the RLFs overlay to the Serving node. The Serving node's RLF responds with a resource location response, which is relayed back to the Proxy node's RLF. The Proxy node's SCF then forwards the SIP Register message to the SCF of the Serving node. The Serving node performs authentication and returns a SIP 200 OK message to the Proxy node, which then forwards it to EF A.
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the User registration flow between EF A, Proxy node, RLFs overlay, and Serving node.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – User registration flow**
+
+NOTE – Both RLF and SCF are included in proxy node and serving node; they may exist in two separate physical entities in some deployment scenarios.
+
+User registration flow, shown in Figure 7-1, is described as follows:
+
+- 1) EF A sends a SIP register to the SCF of the proxy node;
+- 2) The RLF of the proxy node locates the serving node for the user by using a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay algorithm (e.g., Chord, Kademlia), and then sends a resource location query message to the overlay to find the address of the serving node;
+- 3) The RLFs in the overlay route the resource location query message to the serving node;
+- 4-5) When the serving node has received the resource location query message, its RLF will return a response to the RLF of the proxy node;
+- 6) The SCF of proxy node records the address that is retrieved from the resource location query, and its SCF forwards the register message to the serving node directly;
+- 7) The SCF of the serving node authenticates EF A by its user profile retrieved locally or remotely (e.g., from centralized user profile storage), and records registration data for EF A, and then returns a SIP 200 OK message to the proxy node indicating that registration was successful;
+- 8) The proxy node forwards the SIP 200 OK message to EF A indicating that registration was successful.
+
+#### 7.1.2 Session related procedures
+
+##### 7.1.2.1 Session initiation
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the session initiation process across several network entities: EF A, two Proxy nodes (each containing SCF and RLF), two Serving nodes (each containing SCF and RLF), an Overlay network, and EF B. The process follows these steps:
+
+1. SIP Invite: EF A sends to the first Proxy node.
+2. SIP Invite: The first Proxy node forwards to the first Serving node.
+3. Resource location query: The first Serving node's RLF sends to the Overlay.
+4. Resource location query: The Overlay forwards to the second Serving node's RLF.
+5. Resource location response: The second Serving node's RLF sends back to the Overlay.
+6. Resource location response: The Overlay forwards back to the first Serving node's RLF.
+7. SIP Invite: The first Serving node's SCF sends directly to the second Serving node's SCF.
+8. SIP Invite: The second Serving node's SCF sends to the second Proxy node.
+9. SIP Invite: The second Proxy node forwards to EF B.
+10. SIP 200 OK: EF B sends back to the second Proxy node.
+11. SIP 200 OK: The second Proxy node forwards to the second Serving node's SCF.
+12. SIP 200 OK: The second Serving node's SCF forwards to the first Serving node's SCF.
+13. SIP 200 OK: The first Serving node's SCF forwards to the first Proxy node.
+14. SIP 200 OK: The first Proxy node forwards to EF A.
+15. SIP ACK: EF A sends to the first Proxy node.
+16. SIP ACK: The first Proxy node forwards to the first Serving node.
+17. SIP ACK: The first Serving node forwards to the second Serving node.
+18. SIP ACK: The second Serving node forwards to the second Proxy node.
+19. SIP ACK: The second Proxy node forwards to EF B.
+
+Media transfer occurs after step 19. The diagram is labeled Y.2083(14)\_F7-2.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the general flow for session initiation between EF A, Proxy nodes, Serving nodes, and an Overlay network.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – General flow for session initiation**
+
+NOTE – Both RLF and SCF are included in proxy node and serving node.
+
+General flow for session initiation, shown in Figure 7-2, is described as follows:
+
+- 1) EF A sends a SIP invite message to its proxy node;
+- 2) EF A's proxy node checks the address of EF A's serving node, and then forwards the SIP invite message to the serving node;
+- 3) The RLF of EF A's serving node computes EF B's serving node ID, and sends a resource location query message to the overlay to find the address of the EF B's serving node;
+- 4) The RLFs in the overlay route the resource location query message using a P2P routing algorithm to the serving node for EF B;
+- 5-6) When EF B's serving node has received the resource location query message, its RLF will return its address to EF A's serving node;
+- 7) EF A's serving node records the address of EF B's serving node in its connection table, which is the table to record other serving node's ID and address pairs, and then its SCF forwards the SIP invite message directly to EF B's serving node;
+- 8) The SCF of EF B's serving node sends the SIP invite message to EF B's proxy node;
+- 9) The SCF of EF B's proxy node forwards the request (SIP invite) to EF B;
+
+- 10-11) Following the resource reservation and media negotiation, EF B returns a SIP 200 OK message to EF B's serving node;
+- 12) EF B's serving node forwards the SIP 200 OK message to EF A's serving node directly;
+- 13-14) EF A's serving node forwards the SIP 200 OK message to EF A;
+- 15-19) After receiving the SIP 200 OK message, EF A returns a SIP ACK message to EF B, and then, EF A and EF B establish a connection.
+
+##### 7.1.2.2 Session release
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF_A as EF A
+ participant Proxy1 as Proxy node
+SCF RLF
+ participant Serving1 as Serving node
+SCF RLF
+ participant Serving2 as Serving node
+SCF RLF
+ participant Proxy2 as Proxy node
+SCF RLF
+ participant EF_B as EF B
+
+ EF_A->>Proxy1: 1. SIP Bye
+ Proxy1->>Serving1: 2. SIP Bye
+ Serving1->>Serving2: 3. SIP Bye
+ Serving2->>Proxy2: 4. SIP Bye
+ Proxy2->>EF_B: 5. SIP Bye
+ EF_B-->>Proxy2: 6. SIP 200 OK
+ Proxy2-->>Serving2: 7. SIP 200 OK
+ Serving2-->>Serving1: 8. SIP 200 OK
+ Serving1-->>Proxy1: 9. SIP 200 OK
+ Proxy1-->>EF_A: 10. SIP 200 OK
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the session release process. It shows five entities: EF A, two Proxy nodes (each containing SCF and RLF), two Serving nodes (each containing SCF and RLF), and EF B. The flow is as follows: 1. EF A sends a SIP Bye message to the first Proxy node. 2. The first Proxy node forwards it to the first Serving node. 3. The first Serving node forwards it to the second Serving node. 4. The second Serving node forwards it to the second Proxy node. 5. The second Proxy node forwards it to EF B. 6. EF B returns a SIP 200 OK message to the second Proxy node. 7. The second Proxy node returns it to the second Serving node. 8. The second Serving node returns it to the first Serving node. 9. The first Serving node returns it to the first Proxy node. 10. The first Proxy node returns it to EF A.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the general flow for session release between EF A and EF B through a DSN overlay.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-3
+
+**Figure 7-3 – General flow for session release**
+
+To release the session in the DSN overlay, a SIP Bye is initiated by EF A and traverses the overlay to the other end of communication, EF B, as shown in Figure 7-3.
+
+### 7.2 Overlay level procedures
+
+This clause describes the node management procedures in the overlay level when there is a node joining or leaving the DSN.
+
+#### 7.2.1 Node joining
+
+##### 7.2.1.1 Node joining without on-going and new sessions in the admitting node
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the node joining flow between five entities: NEF, Joining node, Bootstrap node, Admitting node, and Related nodes. Each entity has a vertical dashed line representing its timeline. The flow is as follows:
+
+- 1. Enrolment request: From Joining node to NEF.
+- 2. Enrolment response: From NEF to Joining node.
+- 3. Connect request: From Joining node to Bootstrap node.
+- 4. Connect response: From Bootstrap node to Joining node.
+- 5. Resource location query: From Joining node to Bootstrap node.
+- 6. Resource location query: From Bootstrap node to Admitting node.
+- 7. Resource location response: From Admitting node to Bootstrap node.
+- 8. Resource location response: From Bootstrap node to Joining node.
+- 9. Join request: From Joining node to Admitting node.
+- 10. Join response: From Admitting node to Joining node.
+- 11. Store request: From Joining node to Admitting node.
+- 12. Store response: From Admitting node to Joining node.
+- 13. Routing information: From Joining node to Admitting node.
+- 13. Routing information: From Admitting node to Related nodes.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-4
+
+Sequence diagram showing the node joining flow between NEF, Joining node, Bootstrap node, Admitting node, and Related nodes.
+
+**Figure 7-4 – Node joining flow without on-going and new sessions in the admitting node**
+
+Node joining flow without on-going and new sessions in the admitting node, shown in Figure 7-4, is described as follows:
+
+- 1) The joining node sends an enrolment request to the NEF to request configuration and bootstrap information to join the DSN overlay;
+- 2) The NEF authenticates the joining node and assigns a node ID for it, then returns the necessary configuration and bootstrap information;
+- 3) The joining node tries to connect to one or more bootstrap nodes to join the DSN overlay. The address of the bootstrap node can be provided by the NEF, pre-stored in the joining node, or looked up through a DNS service;
+- 4) The bootstrap node returns a response to set up the connection with the joining node;
+- 5) The joining node records the address of the bootstrap node in its connection table, then according to a specific P2P algorithm, the joining node sends a resource location query request through the bootstrap node to connect to the admitting node which is currently responsible for the namespace that the joining node should take over;
+- 6) The bootstrap node forwards the resource location query to the admitting node;
+- 7-8) The admitting node responds to the resource location query request through the bootstrap node;
+- 9) After receiving resource location response, the joining node sets up a direct connection with the admitting node. The joining node sends a join request to the admitting node to announce it will join into the overlay;
+
+- 10) The admitting node checks that the joining node will take over part of its own name space and returns a response;
+- 11) The admitting node starts transferring the data to the joining node;
+- 12) The joining node responds for successful store action. Step 11 and 12 repeat until all necessary data are successfully transferred;
+- 13) The joining node sends its routing information to the admitting node and other related DSN nodes which should update their routing information.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2 Node joining with on-going sessions in admitting node
+
+On-going sessions are maintained by the admitting node, while user profiles are transferring from the admitting node to the joining node. In order to maintain the continuity of session control, the session control is left in the admitting node until the current session is terminated.
+
+The following flow in Figure 7-5 shows the example of node joining with the consideration of on-going sessions.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant JN as Joining node
+SCF, RLF
+ participant AN as Admitting node
+SCF, RLF
+ participant RN as Related nodes
+RLFs
+
+ Note over AN: On-going session for user A-X
+ Note over AN: 1. Set-up flag for user A-X
+ AN->>JN: 2. Store request
+ JN-->>AN: 3. Store response
+ JN->>AN: 4. Routing update
+ AN->>RN: 4. Routing update
+ AN->>JN: 5. User A's service finished
+ Note over AN: ...
+ AN->>JN: 6. User X's service finished
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the node joining flow with on-going sessions. The diagram involves three main entities: Joining node (SCF, RLF), Admitting node (SCF, RLF), and Related nodes (RLFs). The flow starts with an 'On-going session for user A-X' in the Admitting node. Step 1: 'Set-up flag for user A-X' is performed in the Admitting node. Step 2: 'Store request' is sent from the Admitting node to the Joining node. Step 3: 'Store response' is sent from the Joining node to the Admitting node. Step 4: 'Routing update' is sent from the Joining node to the Admitting node, and then from the Admitting node to the Related nodes. Step 5: 'User A's service finished' is sent from the Admitting node to the Joining node. Step 6: 'User X's service finished' is sent from the Admitting node to the Joining node. Ellipses indicate intermediate steps between 5 and 6.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-5
+
+**Figure 7-5 – Node joining flow with on-going sessions in the admitting node**
+
+- 1) On-going sessions for users A through X are maintained on the admitting node while data is transferred; flags are set in the user's profile to denote that their session control will remain in the admitting node;
+- 2-4) Data transfers from the admitting node to the joining node, and the joining node send its routing information to the admitting node and other related DSN nodes which should update their routing information;
+- 5) When user A's service is finished in the admitting node, an inform message is sent to the joining node to change the flag for user A's profile. Subsequently, a new service of user A can be handled in the joining node;
+- 6) Step 5) repeats when service is finished in the admitting node until the last user (i.e., user X) finishes its service transfer.
+
+##### 7.2.1.3 Node joining with new session establishment in the admitting node
+
+This clause describes the scenario in which a user, e.g., user A, sends a request to connect to user B, even though the user profile has been transferred to the joining node and user B still has an on-going session in the admitting node.
+
+The following flow in Figure 7-6 shows the influence of node joining on such kinds of session establishment.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows the interaction between four entities: Serving node (SCF, RLF), Overlay, Joining node (SCF, RLF), and Admitting node (SCF, RLF). The flow is as follows:
+
+1. Invite (for user B) is sent from user A to the Serving node.
+2. Resource location query is sent from the Serving node to the Overlay.
+3. Resource location query is sent from the Overlay to the Joining node.
+4. Resource location response is sent from the Joining node to the Overlay.
+5. Resource location response is sent from the Overlay to the Serving node.
+6. Invite (for user B) is sent from the Serving node to the Joining node.
+7. Invite (for user B) is sent from the Joining node to the Admitting node.
+
+A note indicates that User B still has an on-going session in the admitting node. Another note indicates that a flag in user B denotes its service control in the admitting node.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-6
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the node joining flow with new session establishment in the admitting node.
+
+**Figure 7-6 – Node joining flow with new session establishment in the admitting node**
+
+- 1) After the node join, there is a session request from user A to user B. An invite message is sent to user A's serving node;
+- 2-6) The joining node that is responsible for the user profile of user B is found using an overlay algorithm. A connection is set up and the invite message is forwarded to the joining node;
+- 7) The flag in the user profile denotes that the service control is still on the admitting node, the invite message is forwarded to the admitting node, and the admitting node will handle the invite message.
+
+#### 7.2.2 Node leaving
+
+Node leaving includes graceful leaving and ungraceful leaving. Graceful leaving means that before leaving, the leaving node will send an announcement to the other nodes, so that the work or data in the leaving node will be transferred to the other nodes. Ungraceful leaving means that the node leaves without informing the other nodes and the work or data cannot be transferred from the leaving node to the other nodes.
+
+##### 7.2.2.1 Graceful leaving
+
+Flows of graceful leaving for different cases are illustrated in this clause.
+
+###### 7.2.2.1.1 Graceful leaving without on-going and new session establishment request in the leaving node
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant L as Leaving node (RLF)
+ participant R as Responsible node (RLF)
+ participant Rel as Related nodes (RLFs)
+ L->>R: 1. Leave request
+ R-->>L: 2. Leave response
+ L->>R: 3. Store request
+ R-->>L: 4. Store response
+ L->>Rel: 5. Routing update information
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the graceful leaving process. It involves three entities: a Leaving node (containing an RLF), a Responsible node (containing an RLF), and Related nodes (containing multiple RLFs). The process follows five steps: 1. The Leaving node sends a 'Leave request' to the Responsible node. 2. The Responsible node sends a 'Leave response' back to the Leaving node. 3. The Leaving node sends a 'Store request' to the Responsible node. 4. The Responsible node sends a 'Store response' back to the Leaving node. 5. The Leaving node sends 'Routing update information' to the Related nodes.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the graceful leaving flow between a Leaving node, a Responsible node, and Related nodes.
+
+**Figure 7-7 – Graceful leaving flow without on-going and new sessions in the leaving node**
+
+Graceful leaving flow without on-going and new sessions in the leaving node, shown in Figure 7-7, is described as follows:
+
+- 1) The leaving node sends a leave request to the responsible node; this node will be responsible for the name space of the leaving node after it leaves;
+
+NOTE 1 – The leaving node uses the overlay algorithm to determine the ID of the responsible node.
+
+- 2) The responsible node responds to the leave request;
+- 3) The leaving node stores its resource information to the responsible node;
+- 4) The responsible node responses for successful store;
+
+NOTE 2 – Step 3 and 4 can repeat until all necessary data are successfully transferred;
+
+- 5) The leaving node sends its routing update information to other related DSN nodes which should update their routing information.
+
+NOTE 3 – The update message can also be sent by the responsible node.
+
+###### 7.2.2.1.2 Graceful leaving with on-going sessions in the leaving node
+
+When a node choses to leave the overlay gracefully, it transfers the entire user profile to a responsible node. However, there could still be on-going sessions maintained by the leaving node. In order to maintain the continuity of session control, the session control remains in the leaving node until the current session is terminated.
+
+The following flow in Figure 7-8 shows the example of node graceful leaving with the consideration of on-going sessions.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RN as Responsible node
+ participant LN as Leaving node
+ participant RelN as Related nodes
+
+ Note over LN: On-going session for user A - X
+ Note over LN: 1. Set-up flag for user A - X
+ LN->>RN: 2. Store request
+ RN-->>LN: 3. Store response
+ RN->>RelN: 4. Routing information
+ LN->>RN: 5. User A's session is terminated
+ Note over LN: ...
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-8
+
+Sequence diagram showing the graceful leaving process with on-going sessions in a leaving node. The diagram involves three main entities: Responsible node (containing SCF and RLF), Leaving node (containing SCF and RLF), and Related nodes (containing RLFs). The process starts with an 'On-going session for user A - X' in the Leaving node. Step 1: 'Set-up flag for user A - X' is performed in the Leaving node. Step 2: 'Store request' is sent from the Leaving node to the Responsible node. Step 3: 'Store response' is sent from the Responsible node to the Leaving node. Step 4: 'Routing information' is sent from the Responsible node to the Related nodes. Step 5: 'User A's session is terminated' is sent from the Leaving node to the Responsible node. Ellipses indicate that this process repeats for other users.
+
+**Figure 7-8 – Graceful leaving with on-going sessions in the leaving node**
+
+- 1) For on-going sessions for user A through X on the leaving node while data is transferred, flags are set in their user profiles to denote that their session control will remain in the leaving node;
+- 2-4) The user profiles are transferred from the leaving node to the responsible node and the responsible node sends its routing information to its related DSN nodes which should update their routing information;
+- 5) When user A's session is terminated in the leaving node, an inform message is sent to the responsible node to change the flag for user A's profile. Therefore, the new service of user A can be handled in the responsible node.
+
+NOTE – Step 5) repeats when there is a session terminated in the leaving node, until the last user (i.e., user X) finishes its session in the leaving node.
+
+###### 7.2.2.1.3 Graceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node
+
+The following flow in Figure 7-9 shows the case when there is an on-going session to the user on the leaving node, and at the same time there is a new session establishment request to the user.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UserA as From user A
+ participant Serving as Serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Overlay as Overlay
+(RLFs)
+ participant Responsible as Responsible node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Leaving as Leaving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+
+ UserA->>Serving: 1. Invite (for user B)
+ Serving->>Overlay: 2. Resource location query
+ Overlay->>Responsible: 3. Resource location query
+ Responsible-->>Overlay: 4. Resource location query
+ Overlay-->>Serving: 5. Resource location query
+ Serving->>Responsible: 6. Invite (for user B)
+ Note over Responsible: Flag in user B denotes its service control in leaving node
+ Responsible->>Leaving: 7. Invite (for user B)
+ Note over Leaving: User B still has on-going session in the leaving node
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating graceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node. The diagram shows four lifelines: Serving node (SCF, RLF), Overlay (RLFs), Responsible node (SCF, RLF), and Leaving node (SCF, RLF). 1. Invite (for user B) is sent from user A to the Serving node. 2. Resource location query is sent from the Serving node to the Overlay. 3. Resource location query is sent from the Overlay to the Responsible node. 4. Resource location query is sent from the Responsible node to the Overlay. 5. Resource location query is sent from the Overlay to the Serving node. 6. Invite (for user B) is sent from the Serving node to the Responsible node. A note indicates 'Flag in user B denotes its service control in leaving node'. 7. Invite (for user B) is sent from the Responsible node to the Leaving node. A note indicates 'User B still has on-going session in the leaving node'.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-9
+
+**Figure 7-9 – Graceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node**
+
+- 1) During the process of node leaving, there is a session request from user A to user B. An invite message is sent to user A's serving node;
+- 2-6) The responsible node is found responsible for the user profile of user B using the overlay algorithm. Connection is set up and the invite message is forwarded to the responsible node as described in session initiation flow;
+- 7) The flag in the user profile denotes that the service control is still on the leaving node, then the invite message is forwarded to the leaving node.
+
+##### 7.2.2.2 Ungraceful leaving
+
+In ungraceful leaving, data cannot be transferred from the leaving node to the responsible node. In order to avoid data loss due to ungraceful leaving, DSN requires a backup algorithm to keep at least one extra copy of data for each DSN node. Therefore, the resource of the leaving node can be fetched from its backup node to its responsible node when ungraceful leaving occurs, although in some special cases, the responsible node itself acts as the backup node at the same time. In addition to the leaving node's own data, the backup data stored in the leaving node will be lost as well. Therefore, the related nodes should re-back up their data.
+
+###### 7.2.2.2.1 Node ungraceful leaving procedure without on-going sessions and new sessions establishment request on the leaving node
+
+If the leaving node recovers in a short time, the backup node can handle the sessions and there is no need to perform data moving. A failover timer is set up and data moving occurs only when the failover timer expires. See Figure 7-10 below.
+
+
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the node ungraceful leaving flow without on-going and new sessions in the leaving node. The diagram shows four lifelines: Leaving node, Responsible node, Backup node, and Related nodes. The Leaving node becomes unavailable. A 'Node failure detected' event triggers a sequence of steps: 1. Failover timer set-up, 2. Activate backup resources of the leaving node as if they are resources of itself, 3. Route update (a long horizontal arrow spanning all lifelines), 4. Failover timer expire, 5. Store request (from Backup node to Responsible node), 6. Store response (from Responsible node to Backup node), and 7. Update (a long horizontal arrow spanning all lifelines). A bracket on the right indicates the 'Failover time' period covering steps 1 through 4. The diagram is labeled Y.2083(14)\_F7-10.
+
+**Figure 7-10 – Node ungraceful leaving flow without on-going and new sessions in the leaving node**
+
+- 1) Once a node leaving has been detected, a failover timer is set up in the backup nodes which have the backup of the resource for the leaving node;
+- 2) Backup nodes activate the backup resources to handle the request for these resources during the failover time;
+- 3) Route updates among the overlays are initiated to set up the paths to the backup nodes for the backup resource access. If the leaving node recovers during this time, it will take over the resources again;
+- 4) The failover timer expires;
+- 5-7) Data is transferred from the backup nodes to the responsible node and updates among overlays about the topology change are made. Note that if the backup node is the responsible node, the data transfer is not needed.
+
+###### **7.2.2.2.2 Node ungraceful leaving with on-going sessions in the leaving node**
+
+The node's ungraceful leaving may seriously influence the on-going sessions controlled by the leaving node. All the dynamic status data for these sessions will be lost. For example, the charging information will be corrupted as it only refers to the last updated version of the leaving node.
+
+###### **7.2.2.2.3 Node ungraceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node**
+
+The following flow in Figure 7-11 shows the case of a new session establishment request, to the users in the leaving node, before the overlay topology updated is finished.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant A as 1. Invite (for user B) from A
+ participant SN as Serving node (SCF, RLF)
+ participant O as Overlay (RLFs)
+ participant RN as Responsible node (SCF, RLF)
+ participant LN as Leaving node (SCF, RLF)
+ Note over LN: User B is on here
+
+ A->>SN
+ SN->>O: 2. Resource location query
+ O->>LN: 3. Resource location query
+ Note over LN: [Failure: No Reply]
+ O-->>O: 4. The update of the overlay topology
+ O->>RN: 6. Resource location query
+ RN-->>O: 7. Resource location response
+ O-->>SN: 8. Resource location response
+ SN->>RN: 9. Invite (for user B)
+
+ Note over SN, O, RN: If overlay connection establishment expires, the session will fail
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-11
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating node ungraceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node. The diagram shows four main entities: Serving node (SCF, RLF), Overlay (RLFs), Responsible node (SCF, RLF), and Leaving node (SCF, RLF). The process starts with an invite from user A to the Serving node. A resource location query is sent to the Overlay, which then sends a query to the Leaving node. The Leaving node fails to respond. The Overlay updates its topology and informs the Responsible node. A callout states: 'If overlay connection establishment expires, the session will fail'. A second resource location query is sent from the Overlay to the Responsible node, which responds. Finally, the invite is forwarded to the Responsible node. A note at the bottom right reads 'Y.2083(14)\_F7-11'.
+
+**Figure 7-11 – Node ungraceful leaving with new session establishment in the leaving node**
+
+- 1) After node ungraceful leaving, there is a session request from user A to user B. An invite message is sent from user A's serving node;
+- 2-3) Before the overlay topology update is finished, the resource location query message is sent to the leaving node, but there is no reply;
+- 4) While waiting for the reply, the overlay topology detects the node failure and is updated and the responsible node takes the place of the leaving node. The summation of the failover time and the overlay topology update time must be less than the overlay connection establishment time (this time includes the retransmission interval and final set-up time);
+- 5-8) If the overlay connection establishment does not expire before the network update finishes, the resource location query message is resent and the responsible node replies and the overlay connection is set up;
+- 9) The invite message is forwarded to responsible node.
+
+NOTE 1 – There is an assumption in the above flow that the overlay topology update time must be less than the time of the overlay connection establishment. Moreover, the time of the overlay connection establishment must be less than the time of the invite message retransmission. If these two assumptions cannot be satisfied, the session will fail.
+
+NOTE 2 – The overlay topology update is triggered by the overlay routing maintenance algorithm. For example, if a node does not receive the heart-beat message from its neighbour in the routing table for a certain period of time, it will assume this neighbour has left the overlay and will initiate the topology update.
+
+#### 7.2.3 Session set-up procedure when serving node changes
+
+Node joining and leaving will cause serving nodes to change for some users. The following flows in Figure 7-12 and Figure 7-13 show two kinds of solutions for session set-up when the serving node changes.
+
+##### 7.2.3.1 Previous serving node locates the new serving node
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EF_A as EF A
+ participant Proxy as Proxy node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Previous as Previous serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant New as New serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Overlay as Overlay
+
+ Note over Previous: 1. EF A's serving node changed
+ EF_A->>Proxy: 2. SIP Invite (to EF B)
+ Proxy->>Previous: 3. SIP Invite
+ Note over Previous: 4. Resource location query
+ Previous->>Overlay: 4. Resource location query
+ Overlay->>New: 5. Resource location query
+ New-->>Overlay: 6. Resource location response
+ Overlay-->>Previous: 7. Resource location response
+ Previous-->>Proxy: 8. SIP Redirect
+ Proxy->>New: 9. SIP Invite
+ Note over New: Locate EF B's serving node
+ New->>Overlay: 10. SIP Invite
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-12
+
+Sequence diagram showing the process where a previous serving node locates a new serving node for EF A. The diagram involves EF A, Proxy node (SCF, RLF), Previous serving node (SCF, RLF), New serving node (SCF, RLF), and Overlay. The sequence of events is: 1. EF A's serving node changed; 2. SIP Invite (to EF B) from EF A to Proxy node; 3. SIP Invite from Proxy node to Previous serving node; 4. Resource location query from Previous serving node to Overlay; 5. Resource location query from Overlay to New serving node; 6. Resource location response from New serving node to Overlay; 7. Resource location response from Overlay to Previous serving node; 8. SIP Redirect from Previous serving node to Proxy node; 9. SIP Invite from Proxy node to New serving node; 10. SIP Invite from New serving node to Overlay. A box labeled 'Locate EF B's serving node' is shown within the New serving node's lifeline.
+
+**Figure 7-12 – Previous serving node locates the new serving node**
+
+- 1) EF A's serving node changed due to node joining or leaving;
+- 2) EF A sends a SIP invite request to its proxy node in order to establish session with EF B;
+- 3) Since the proxy node has no information about the change of EF A's serving node, it will forward the request to the previous serving node;
+- 4-7) The previous serving node finds that it no longer serves EF A. Then it initiates a resource location query in the overlay to obtain EF A's current serving node;
+- 8) The previous serving node returns a SIP Redirect message which includes the address of the current serving node to the proxy node;
+- 9) EF A's proxy node forwards the SIP invite request to the new serving node;
+- 10) EF A's new serving node locates EF B's serving node and forwards the SIP invite request to EF B's serving node.
+
+##### 7.2.3.2 Proxy node locates the new serving node
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant EFA as EF A
+ participant Proxy as Proxy node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Previous as Previous serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Overlay as Overlay
+(RLFs)
+ participant NewServing as New serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+
+ Note over Proxy, Previous: 1. EF A's serving node changed
+ EFA->>Proxy: 2. SIP Invite (to EF B)
+ Proxy->>Previous: 3. SIP Invite
+ Previous-->>Proxy: 4. SIP Failure
+ Note over Proxy, Overlay, NewServing: 5. Resource location query
+ Proxy->>Overlay: 5. Resource location query
+ Overlay->>NewServing: 6. Resource location query
+ NewServing-->>Overlay: 7. Resource location response
+ Overlay-->>Proxy: 8. Resource location response
+ Proxy->>NewServing: 9. SIP Invite
+ Note over NewServing: Locate EF B's serving node
+ NewServing->>NewServing: 10. SIP Invite
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F7-13
+
+Sequence diagram showing the flow for a proxy node locating a new serving node. The diagram involves five entities: EF A, Proxy node (SCF, RLF), Previous serving node (SCF, RLF), Overlay (RLFs), and New serving node (SCF, RLF). The process starts with EF A sending a SIP Invite to the Proxy node. The Proxy node forwards it to the Previous serving node. The Previous serving node returns a SIP Failure message. The Proxy node then initiates a Resource location query to the Overlay, which forwards it to the New serving node. The New serving node returns a Resource location response to the Overlay, which then forwards it to the Proxy node. Finally, the Proxy node forwards the SIP Invite to the New serving node, which then locates EF B's serving node and sends a SIP Invite to it.
+
+**Figure 7-13 – Proxy Node locates the new serving node**
+
+Proxy node locates the new serving node flow, shown in Figure 7-13, is described as follows:
+
+- 1) EF A's serving node changed due to node joining or leaving;
+- 2) EF A sends an SIP invite request to its proxy node in order to establish a session with EF B;
+- 3) EF A's proxy node forwards the request to the previous serving node;
+- 4) The previous serving node finds that it no longer serves EF A, then it returns a SIP failure message which notifies EF A that its serving node has changed;
+- 5-8) The proxy node initiates a resource location query in the overlay to obtain EF A's new serving node;
+- 9) EF A's proxy node forwards the SIP invite request to the new serving node;
+- 10) EF A's new serving node locates EF B's serving node and forwards the SIP invite request to EF B's serving node.
+
+# 8 Overload control considerations in MMTel
+
+When an overload happens, the overloaded node can be offloaded by using a backup node or by adding a new node when all the backup nodes are unavailable to offload the traffic. This clause describes these procedures only in the context of recommended solutions.
+
+### 8.1 Overload control flows by using a backup node
+
+When using a backup node, the backup node will ask for permission to handle the calls which should be handled by the overloaded node. The way of asking for permission can be proactive or reactive; proactive means that the backup node asks for permission in advance, while reactive means that the backup node asks for permission when new call arise.
+
+#### 8.1.1 Proactively overload control flows
+
+##### 8.1.1.1 Offloading by a backup node
+
+This procedure applies when the serving node is overloaded; it chooses an available backup node and offloads its traffic to it.
+
+This procedure, shown in Figure 8-1, describes the offloading flow of an overloaded node.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows the interaction between three nodes: Overload node, Backup node A, and Backup node B (being overloaded). Each node has SCF and RLF components. The flow is as follows:
+
+1. Load sharing request: Overload node sends to Backup node B.
+2. Load sharing refuse: Backup node B sends back to Overload node.
+3. Load sharing request: Overload node sends to Backup node A.
+4. Check the backup user profile range: Backup node A performs a self-action.
+5. Permission request: Backup node A sends to Overload node.
+6. Set flags for the users who have no on-going sessions: Overload node performs a self-action.
+7. Permission response: Overload node sends to Backup node A.
+8. Ready to serve for these users indicated in the permission response: Backup node A performs a self-action.
+9. Some on-going sessions completed: Overload node performs a self-action.
+10. Store request: Overload node sends to Backup node A.
+11. Store response: Backup node A sends back to Overload node.
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F8-1
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the offloading flow of an overloaded node to a backup node.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Overload control by informing backup node to offload on overloaded node**
+
+- 1) If the serving node is overloaded, it sends a load sharing request message to one of its backup nodes (e.g., backup node B);
+- 2) If backup node B cannot support the request, it refuses the offload request;
+
+NOTE – The serving node may have more than one backup node, and if one of the backup nodes whose load is close to a threshold or has already reached it, it should refuse the load sharing request.
+
+- 3) The serving node chooses another backup node (e.g., backup node A) and sends it a load sharing request message;
+- 4) If backup node A is not overloaded, it checks its backup user profile range;
+- 5) Backup node A sends a permission request to the overloaded serving node with a request to serve all the users whose user profiles are stored in the backup nodes;
+- 6) The overloaded serving node sets flags for the users who have no on-going sessions indicating they will be served by the backup node. The flags may include the address of the backup node;
+
+- 7) The overloaded serving node sends a permission response to the backup node which includes the user identities the backup node should be responsible for;
+- 8) The backup node is ready to serve the users indicated in the permission response;
+- 9-11) When on-going sessions have finished on the serving node, and it is still overloaded, the serving node transfers the profiles of the users whose sessions have just finished to the backup node and those users will be served in the backup nodes after their user profiles have transferred.
+
+##### 8.1.1.2 Session establishment during offloading
+
+Figure 8-2 shows the session establishment procedure after the overloaded node has offloaded part of the user profile to its backup nodes as described in clause 8.1.1.1.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Upstream as Upstream node
+SCF | RLF
+ participant Serving as Serving node
+SCF | RLF
+ participant Backup as Backup node
+SCF | RLF
+
+ Note over Upstream, Serving: Serving node is overloaded, and it is known by upstream node
+ Note over Upstream: 1. Upstream node selects
+backup node based on
+overload control algorithm
+ Upstream->>Upstream: 2. INVITE (to user A)
+ Upstream->>Backup: 3. INVITE (to user A)
+ Note over Backup: 4. Judge whether it can
+take charge of user A
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note right of Backup: Option 1:
+ Backup->>Backup: 5. INVITE (to user A)
+ end
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note right of Backup: Option 2:
+ Backup->>Serving: 5. INVITE (to user A)
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F8-2
+
+Sequence diagram showing session establishment procedure on an overloaded node with pre-informing backup node. The diagram involves three nodes: Upstream node (SCF, RLF), Serving node (SCF, RLF), and Backup node (SCF, RLF).
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Session establishment procedure on overloaded node with pre-informing backup node**
+
+- 1) The serving node which is responsible for user A's profile is overloaded and the overload status of the serving node is known by the upstream node. According to the overload control mechanism, the upstream node selects the backup node(s) of the serving node using the overlay algorithm;
+
+NOTE 1 – Based on the load information that is carried in the keep-alive messages (i.e., the heartbeat message), the upstream node can be aware of the overload status of the serving node.
+
+NOTE 2 – If the serving node has more than one backup node and each backup node is only responsible for some of the users, the upstream node should be aware of the range of users which each backup node is responsible for. There may be different approaches, e.g., exchange keep-alive message between the upstream node and the downstream node which carries the range information among several backup nodes. Another method is that the upstream node could calculate the target backup node of the serving node by using the global unified routing algorithm.
+
+- 2) The upstream node receives an invite message designated to user A;
+- 3) The upstream node forwards the invite message to the backup node;
+- 4) The backup node judges whether user A should be taken charge of based on the range information it received from the overloaded serving node;
+
+There will be two possibilities depending on whether user A is under the control of the backup node. Following are the flows for the two different cases.
+
+Option 1:
+
+- 5) The backup node finds itself responsible for user A, and then the backup node will handle the invite message.
+
+Option 2:
+
+- 5) If the backup node is not responsible for user A, it forwards the invite message to the overloaded serving node and the serving node will handle the invite message;
+
+#### 8.1.2 Reactive overload control flows
+
+Figure 8-3 shows the session establishment procedure. When the target serving node is overloaded, the overloaded node prepares to offload to the backup nodes after it receives the session establishment requests.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Upstream as Upstream node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Serving as Serving node
+(SCF, RLF)
+ participant Backup as Backup node
+(SCF, RLF)
+
+ Note over Upstream: Serving node is overloaded, and it is known by upstream node
+ Upstream->>Serving: 1. INVITE (to user A)
+ Note over Upstream: 2. Upstream node selects backup node based on overload control algorithm
+ Upstream->>Backup: 3. INVITE (to user A)
+ Backup->>Serving: 4. Ask for permission
+ Note over Serving: 5. Set flags for the users who has no on-going sessions
+ Serving->>Backup: 6. Permission response
+ Note over Backup: 7. Ready to serve for these users indicated in the permission response
+
+ Option 1:
+ Backup->>UserA: 8. INVITE (to user A)
+
+ Option 2:
+ Backup->>Serving: 8. INVITE (to user A)
+
+```
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F8-3
+
+Sequence diagram showing session establishment procedure on an overloaded node without pre-informing the backup node. The diagram involves three nodes: Upstream node (SCF, RLF), Serving node (SCF, RLF), and Backup node (SCF, RLF). The process starts with the upstream node receiving an INVITE for user A. It then selects a backup node based on an overload control algorithm and forwards the INVITE. The serving node asks the backup node for permission. The backup node responds with a permission response, indicating it is ready to serve. Two options are shown: Option 1, where the backup node sends an INVITE to user A, and Option 2, where the backup node forwards the INVITE back to the serving node.
+
+**Figure 8-3 – Session establishment procedure on overloaded node without pre-informing backup node**
+
+- 1-2) The serving node which is responsible for user A is overloaded, and the overload status of the serving node was known by the upstream node; the upstream node receives a invite message designated to user A, according to the overload control mechanism; the upstream node selects a backup node of the serving node using the overlay algorithm;
+- 3) The upstream node forwards the invite message to the backup node;
+
+- 4) The backup node receives the invite message, then sends a permission request message to the overloaded serving node for permission to serve all the users whose user profiles are stored as backup in it;
+- 5) The overloaded serving node sets flags for these users who have no on-going sessions and indicates that they will be served by the backup node;
+
+NOTE – The flags may include the address of the backup node. If the serving node has more than one backup node, the flags will be synchronized to all backup nodes. When the serving node is in full-load state it cannot reply to any messages, so the backup node may refuse the invite according to local policy when time has expired.
+
+- 6) The overloaded serving node sends a response to the backup node which includes the user identities the backup node should be responsible for;
+- 7) The backup node is ready to serve the users indicated in the permission response;
+
+There will be two possibilities depending on whether user A is served by the backup node. Following are the flows for the two different cases.
+
+Option 1:
+
+- 8) The backup node finds it is responsible for user A and it will handle the invite message.
+
+Option 2:
+
+- 8) If the backup node is not responsible for user A, it forwards the invite message to the overloaded serving node and the serving node will handle the invite message.
+
+#### 8.1.3 User profile synchronization after overloaded node recovery
+
+This procedure, shown in Figure 8-4, applies when the serving node has recovered from an overloaded state.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ON as Overload node (SCF, RLF)
+ participant BA as Backup node A (SCF, RLF)
+ participant BB as Backup node B (SCF, RLF)
+
+ Note over ON: 1. Serving node has recovered from overload state
+ ON->>BA: 2. Recovery
+ ON->>BB: 2. Recovery
+ BA->>ON: 3. User profile
+ BB->>ON: 3. User profile
+ Note over ON: 4. Update the user profile and record the user identities being served by the backup nodes
+ ON->>BA: 5. Store response
+ ON->>BB: 5. Store response
+ Note over BA: 6. Some on-going sessions are completed
+ BA->>ON: 7. User profile
+ Note over ON: 8. Update the user profile
+ ON->>BA: 9. Store response
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the synchronization process. The Overload node (containing SCF and RLF) recovers from its overloaded state. It sends 'Recovery' messages to both Backup node A and Backup node B. Both backup nodes respond with 'User profile' information. The Overload node updates its profile and records the user identities being served by the backup nodes, then sends 'Store response' messages to both backup nodes. Later, when some on-going sessions are completed at Backup node A, it sends another 'User profile' message to the Overload node. The Overload node updates its profile again and sends a final 'Store response' message to Backup node A.
+
+Sequence diagram showing user profile synchronization flow after overloaded node recovery between an Overload node and two Backup nodes (A and B).
+
+Y.2083(14)\_F8-4
+
+**Figure 8-4 – User profile synchronization flow after overloaded node recovery**
+
+- 1) The serving node has recovered from an overloaded state;
+- 2) The recovered node sends a message with recovery information to all its backup nodes in order to get the user profiles which may be updated during the overloading period;
+- 3) The backup nodes acknowledge the recovery messages by transferring the updated user profiles to the serving node. The message also includes information about the identifiers of those users being served by the backup nodes;
+- 4) The serving node receives and stores the latest user profiles, and records the identifies of those users being served by the backup nodes;
+- 5) The serving node sends the store response to the backup nodes;
+- 6-7) After the on-going sessions have finished on the backup nodes, the backup nodes send the user profiles which are updated in the on-going sessions to the serving node;
+- 8) The serving node receives and stores the latest user profile;
+- 9) The serving node sends the store response to the backup nodes.
+
+### **8.2 Overload control by initiating a node joining**
+
+If all the backup nodes are not available to offload the traffic for the serving node, a joining node will be added to offload the traffic. The procedures for node joining are illustrated in clause 7.2.1.
+
+## **9 Supplementary services support**
+
+There is no difference between NGN IMS and DSN in supporting supplementary services and services interaction which provides the relationship between different services. Detailed definition and description of the supplementary services are specified in [ITU-T Y.2211]. In DSN MMTel, the SCF in the serving node with user profile is aware of the supplementary service subscription of a user and provides access to the supplementary services. The SCF works in conjunction with the specified application server to provide the supplementary service to the user.
+
+## **10 Mobility support**
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.2206], mobility in DSN can be categorized as terminal mobility and personal mobility. Terminal mobility is the ability of a terminal to access DSN services from different locations while in motion, and the capability of the network to identify and locate that terminal. Personal mobility is the ability of a user to access DSN services at any terminal on the basis of a personal identifier, and the capability of the network to provide those services delineated in the user's service profile.
+
+Basically, there is no difference between NGN IMS and DSN in mobility support.
+
+Detailed definition and description of the terminal mobility are specified in [ITU-T Q.1706], [ITU-T Q.1707], [ITU-T Q.1708] and [ITU-T Q.1709].
+
+Detailed definition and description of the personal mobility are specified in [ITU-T Q.1706], [ITU-T Q.1707].
+
+## **11 Interworking**
+
+Under the control of SCF, DSN can reuse the gateway functions (e.g., IBG-FE, TMG-FE, SG-FE) defined in NGN to interwork with networks including DSN, NGN, PSTN/ISDN, etc.
+
+## **12 Charging**
+
+[ITU-T Y.2233] provides charging functions which can be used by DSN MMTel. The DSN node and interfaces between DSN MMTel system and charging system should follow the principles in [ITU-T Y.2233].
+
+## **13 Security considerations**
+
+Security considerations are not addressed in this Recommendation.
+
+## **14 Network management**
+
+[ITU-T M.3060] contains the management requirements, general principles and architectural requirements for managing NGNs to support business processes to plan, provision, install, maintain, operate and administer NGN resources and services. The management requirements for MMTel identified in this clause can be viewed as specialized functions of the network management function (NMF) block defined in [ITU-T M.3060].
+
+[ITU-T Y.2173] specifies requirements, reference measurement network model, high-level and functional architectures, and procedures for performance measurement management. Data collection and measurement functions, such as configuration data collection, fault information collection, performance data collection and MMTel service QoS measurement can be viewed as specialized functions of NGN performance measurement defined in [ITU-T Y.2173].
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y Suppl.10] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 10 (2010), *ITU-T Y.2000-series – Supplement on distributed service network (DSN) use cases*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1412 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2121
+
+(01/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Quality of Service and
+performance
+
+# --- **Requirements for the support of flow-state-aware transport technology in NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue. To the right of the globe, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller blue font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121**
+
+# **Requirements for the support of flow-state-aware transport technology in NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121 specifies the requirements for the support of the flow-state-aware (FSA) transfer capability in a next generation network (NGN). The FSA transfer capability provides QoS controls that operate on a per-flow basis, allowing flows to receive different treatment depending on signalled parameters. These parameters are requested using in-band signalling. The parameters contained in these signals are included in the "flow state" maintained on each flow at each FSA node.
+
+Service options that may be selected include requested support of the highest available end-to-end (or FSA edge-to-edge) rate for data transfer. Another option is immediate transmission, wherein a flow may start or assume a new rate immediately on the understanding that the network is required to provide a guaranteed rate as soon as possible. This is required to be provided when network resources permit. Yet another option is for a negotiated guaranteed rate. These services are targeted at access scenarios where media flows may result in temporary congestion and where best effort would not act selectively on the last few flows that had contributed to the onset of congestion. These services may also be applied to flow aggregates, providing the possibility of highest available rate between the aggregation end-points or the option of supporting immediate aggregate rate changes that act in conjunction with per-flow controls.
+
+### **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121 was approved on 25 January 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2008
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Overview ..... | 4 |
+| 6 Requirements ..... | 6 |
+| 6.1 Dynamic provisioning requests from an FSA signalling edge function..... | 6 |
+| 6.2 Network and FSA signalling edge function responses to flow-state-aware requests ..... | 9 |
+| 6.3 Signalling requirements ..... | 10 |
+| 6.4 Admission decision ..... | 14 |
+| 6.5 General architectural requirements on the management of transport connections carrying flow-state-aware traffic and other traffic ..... | 14 |
+| 6.6 Security considerations and requirements ..... | 15 |
+| Annex A – Dynamic provisioning requests from an FSA signalling edge function..... | 16 |
+| A.1 Negotiations for a user-end-system without signalling capability ..... | 16 |
+| A.2 Authorization ..... | 16 |
+| A.3 Service context ..... | 17 |
+| Annex B – Signalling requirements ..... | 19 |
+| B.1 Second QoS structure attached ..... | 19 |
+| B.2 Authorization information attached ..... | 19 |
+| B.3 Flow aggregation request ..... | 19 |
+| B.4 FSA node operation ..... | 19 |
+| Appendix I – Supplementary information on information exchanges via requests from an FSA signalling edge function and associated responses..... | 20 |
+| I.1 Flow identifier ..... | 20 |
+| I.2 In-band signalling negotiations ..... | 20 |
+| I.3 Preference indicator request ..... | 21 |
+| I.4 Authentication ..... | 21 |
+| I.5 Priority of packet discard, including service context use of preference indicator values..... | 23 |
+| I.6 Congestion notification ..... | 23 |
+| Appendix II – Supplementary information to signalling requirements ..... | 24 |
+| II.1 Recognition of QoS signalling packets ..... | 24 |
+| II.2 Form of QoS information ..... | 24 |
+| II.3 Performance requirements for requests and responses..... | 24 |
+| II.4 Release of resources no longer required..... | 25 |
+| II.5 QoS signalling parameters..... | 25 |
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| II.6 Service contexts..... | 25 |
+| II.7 Preference indicator..... | 26 |
+| II.8 Delay priority..... | 26 |
+| II.9 Burst tolerance..... | 26 |
+| II.10 Flow identifier fields ..... | 26 |
+| Appendix III – Illustrative QoS support for different preference indicator values..... | 28 |
+| III.1 Preference resolution for maximum rate (MRS) flows ..... | 28 |
+| III.2 Preference resolution for available rate (ARS) flows..... | 28 |
+| Appendix IV – Supplementary information relating to requirements on the management
of transport connections carrying flow-state-aware traffic and other traffic..... | 29 |
+| IV.1 General architectural assumptions..... | 29 |
+| IV.2 General issues on the management of access links shared by FSA and
non-FSA traffic..... | 30 |
+| IV.3 Combined flow-level and aggregate flow-level FSA controls ..... | 33 |
+| Appendix V – Example implementation principles associated with FSA nodes..... | 38 |
+| Appendix VI – Out-of-band signalling with a central admission entity ..... | 40 |
+| Bibliography..... | 42 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121
+
+# Requirements for the support of flow-state-aware transport technology in NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides flow-state-aware requirements in support of per-flow service options providing for edge-to-edge QoS and transport resource control (including resource reservation and admission control) in next generation networks (NGNs). The pertinent protocol specifications and measurement requirements will be described in separate Recommendations. Note that network management functionality is outside the scope of this Recommendation. Also out of scope are any edge functions at network domain boundaries needed for interworking QoS support between FSA and non-FSA networks. Similarly, out of scope are any edge functions at network domain boundaries needed for interworking between two FSA networks, where one uses in-band signalling exclusively for all FSA service support, and the other uses out-of-band signalling for resource reservation and clear-down coupled with in-band signalling to establish the agreed flow state in the involved FSA nodes. Administrations may require operators and service providers to take into account national regulatory and national policy requirements in implementing this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.1221] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1221 (2002), *Traffic control and congestion control in IP-based networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+- 3.1 aggregation end-point:** An end-point within the network which attaches or deletes the common flow aggregate identifiers to ensure commencement/cessation of common routing and QoS treatment of packets. This end-point also initiates/terminates in-band signalling to control flow state information retained for treatment of the flow aggregate.
+- 3.2 available rate service (ARS):** The name of one of the flow-state-aware (FSA) transport services. ARS is primarily for applications that can flexibly adapt to the current available capacity and can quickly adjust their sending rate as the available capacity changes.
+- 3.3 flow:** A unidirectional sequence of packets with the property that, along any given network link, a flow identifier has the same value for every packet.
+
+**3.4 flow aggregate:** A hierarchical flow construct that is associated with a group of flows. The carried flows may extend beyond the flow aggregate. Except for the end nodes, flow aggregate forwarders in general do not know that they are carrying flows within the flow aggregate. All packets belonging to a given flow aggregate are commonly routed between aggregation end-points.
+
+**3.5 flow admission control:** The determination, for authorized requests, of whether or not to accept a given flow.
+
+**3.6 flow identifier:** A vector comprising the values of a number of elements taken from the IP, TCP/UDP header fields, encapsulation header, and label fields attached to a packet. The flow identifier for a flow within a single FSA network is unique. Clause II.10 describes some examples of suitable identifiers purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+**3.7 flow state:** A set of values stored per flow identifier at each flow-state-aware node. This set of values determines controls applied on a per-flow basis, dealing with forwarding rate, delay and congestion recovery.
+
+**3.8 flow-state-aware node:** A network node that is capable of maintaining flow state and applying per-flow QoS controls, based on recognizing flow identifier and associated signals.
+
+**3.9 flow-state-aware signalling edge function:** A function that provides the origin and/or termination of the flow-state-aware end-to-end signalling path, and participates in requests and responses on behalf of a user-end-system (UES) application or management action. It may be located, for example, in the UES or at a network edge node where it serves as the signalling end-point of multiple users and associated applications. Alternatively, it may be located at an aggregation end-point where it supports the signalling requirements of flow aggregates. Out of scope is a network domain edge function required for interworking QoS support between FSA and non-FSA networks. Similarly, out of scope is a network domain edge function that may be required when two FSA networks interwork, where one uses in-band signalling exclusively for all FSA service support, and the other uses out-of-band signalling for resource reservation and clear-down coupled with in-band signalling to establish the agreed flow state in the involved FSA nodes.
+
+**3.10 guaranteed rate service (GRS):** The name of one of the flow-state-aware (FSA) transport services. GRS is for applications that require guaranteed bandwidth for the duration of the flow.
+
+**3.11 in-band signalling:** A mode of signalling where the signalling messages are within the flow of the data packets, and follow a path that is tied to the data packets. Signalling messages are routed only through nodes that are in the data path.
+
+**3.12 maximum rate service (MRS):** The name of one of the flow-state-aware (FSA) transport services. MRS is for applications that want packet loss characteristics to be sufficient for streamed services as soon as possible but are unwilling to wait or be rejected by network admission control if network resource for this target QoS is not available immediately.
+
+**3.13 out-of-band signalling:** A mode of signalling where the signalling messages are not in the same flow of the data packets, and may follow a different path to the data packets and are routed to one or more nodes that are not in the data path.
+
+**3.14 preference indicator:** A parameter used to determine whether to admit a flow in case of network overload. In a network overload state, the flow with the lower preference indicator value may be rejected while the one with higher preference indicator value may still be admitted.
+
+**3.15 QoS structure:** The block of QoS signalling information in a signalling packet.
+
+**3.16 variable rate service (VRS):** The name of one of the flow-state-aware (FSA) transport services. VRS is for applications that want an ARS and can flexibly take advantage of additional available capacity, but with a minimum capacity consistent with MRS transport characteristics, allowing the option of immediate transmission at or above this minimum rate.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|-------------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| ACK | Acknowledge (TCP response) |
+| ANF | Access Node Function |
+| ABR | Available Bit Rate |
+| ARS | Available Rate Service |
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| BA | Behaviour Aggregate |
+| BRAS | Broadband Remote Access Server |
+| Diffserv | Differentiated Services |
+| DSL | Digital Subscriber Line |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| eFSA | egress FSA |
+| FR | Fixed Rate |
+| FSA | Flow-State-Aware |
+| GRS | Guaranteed Rate Service |
+| GRE | Generic Routing Encapsulation |
+| iFSA | ingress FSA |
+| IPv4 | Internet Protocol version 4 |
+| IPv6 | Internet Protocol version 6 |
+| L2TP | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol |
+| LAC | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol Access Concentrator |
+| LNS | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol Network Server |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching |
+| MRS | Maximum Rate Service |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NAT | Network Address Translator |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-Network Interface |
+| NR | Network Rate |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PD-FE | Policy Decision Functional Entity |
+| PE-FE | Policy Enforcement Functional Entity |
+| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol |
+| PT | Payload Type |
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| PHB | Per-Hop Behaviour |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| RM | Resource Management |
+| RTP | Real-time Transport Protocol |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SYN | Initiation Flag of Transmission Control Protocol connection |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UES | User-End-System |
+| UNI | User-Network Interface |
+| VP | Virtual Path |
+| VRS | Variable Rate Service |
+
+# 5 Overview
+
+To meet specific network performance requirements, a network operator needs to implement capabilities such as those specified in [ITU-T Y.1221], which now includes clause 6.5 describing a conditionally dedicated bandwidth transfer capability.
+
+To implement this transfer capability as defined in [ITU-T Y.1221], a network needs to provide specific user plane functionality at the UNI and NNI. This Recommendation specifies the flow-state-aware (FSA) requirements for such functionality.
+
+Appendix V provides example implementation principles associated with FSA nodes purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+In terms of QoS aspects of flow-state-aware transfer, a network may be provisioned to meet performance requirements either statically or dynamically. The provisioning would be applied on a per-flow basis. This Recommendation defines the requirements for such provisioning.
+
+Static network provisioning is typically performed by a network management system. Static provisioning takes into account both overall network performance requirements and performance requirements for individual customers based on traffic contracts between the customer and the network operator.
+
+Dynamic network provisioning at a UNI and/or NNI node allows the ability to dynamically request a traffic contract for an IP flow (as defined in [ITU-T Y.1221]) from a specific source node to one or more destination nodes. In response to the request, the network determines if resources are available to satisfy the request and provision the network. Clause 6.5 of [ITU-T Y.1221] describes the case of dynamic provisioning within a flow-state-aware network, initiated by a flow-state-aware source node.
+
+QoS requirements (as would be applied to services supported by flow-state-aware transfer) go beyond just the delay and loss that can occur in the transport of IP packets. The requirements include:
+
+- bandwidth/capacity needed by the application, and
+- the priority that bandwidth is maintained during congestion and is restored after various failure events.
+
+To achieve the required QoS for FSA transfer, networks must incorporate the following functions:
+
+- 1) Functions supporting the FSA packet forwarding behaviours that are applied per flow.
+- 2) Flow admission control recognizing and processing requests for associated FSA transport services.
+- 3) Functions supporting the signalling for allocating necessary resources for each flow.
+
+Figure 1 shows the main functions which are involved in establishing and ceasing FSA transfer and ensuring the correct provisioning of resources to meet QoS objectives.
+
+![Figure 1: Overview of FSA functions. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of FSA transfer. On the left, 'Non-FSA end-system functions' connect to 'End-system FSA functions', which include an 'FSA signalling edge function' and 'FSA QoS functions'. These connect to a 'UNI' (User Network Interface). From the UNI, a 'Data path and in-band signals' line leads to 'FSA forwarding functions (FSA node)', which includes 'FSA QoS functions' and 'In-band signal processing functions'. Above the UNI, two ovals represent 'Service control functions as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]' and 'Resource and admission control functions as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]', connected to the UNI via 'Out-of-band signals'. Below the UNI, an 'Aggregation end-point function' connects to a 'Flow aggregate' cylinder, which then connects to an 'FSA node' (represented by a green and grey rectangle). The FSA node connects to another 'Flow aggregate' cylinder, which finally connects to a 'To/from far-end aggregation end-point function, via NNI(s) if required'. A reference 'Y.2121(08)_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.](5a4e62bead259c258d069fd3663ea670_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 1: Overview of FSA functions. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of FSA transfer. On the left, 'Non-FSA end-system functions' connect to 'End-system FSA functions', which include an 'FSA signalling edge function' and 'FSA QoS functions'. These connect to a 'UNI' (User Network Interface). From the UNI, a 'Data path and in-band signals' line leads to 'FSA forwarding functions (FSA node)', which includes 'FSA QoS functions' and 'In-band signal processing functions'. Above the UNI, two ovals represent 'Service control functions as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]' and 'Resource and admission control functions as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]', connected to the UNI via 'Out-of-band signals'. Below the UNI, an 'Aggregation end-point function' connects to a 'Flow aggregate' cylinder, which then connects to an 'FSA node' (represented by a green and grey rectangle). The FSA node connects to another 'Flow aggregate' cylinder, which finally connects to a 'To/from far-end aggregation end-point function, via NNI(s) if required'. A reference 'Y.2121(08)\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 1 – Overview of FSA functions**
+
+Two alternative methods of signalling are shown in Figure 1. One method uses in-band signalling exclusively, the other method uses out-of-band signalling for resource reservation and clear-down coupled with in-band signals to establish agreed flow state in each FSA node. Definitions of the terms "in-band signalling" and "out-of-band signalling" are included in this Recommendation to describe the meaning of such terms when linked to the concept of a flow rather than pre-established channels designated for signalling or content transport. It is a network operator or service provider choice on what options are supported, but any FSA network shall be capable of at least passing every type of FSA in-band signal transparently to allow interoperation with networks that exclusively use such signals.
+
+The requirements in this Recommendation cover the following areas:
+
+- Requirements associated with flow-state-aware dynamic provisioning requests initiated by a flow-state-aware signalling edge function, for example located in a UES. See clause 6.1.
+- Resource modification. See clause 6.1.
+- Response to flow-state-aware requests. See clause 6.2.
+- iFSA function answer to network response to flow-state-aware requests. See clause 6.2.
+- Form of a verifiable flow-state-aware request. See clause 6.3
+- Request performance requirements (e.g., negotiation delays). See clause 6.3.
+- Release of resources no longer required. See clause 6.3.
+- Error reporting. See clause 6.3.
+
+- Preference indicator resolution. See clause 6.4.
+- Parameters and values for transport connections. See clause 6.5.
+- Security considerations and requirements. See clause 6.6.
+
+# **6 Requirements**
+
+All of the requirements are numbered consecutively across all subordinate clauses using the format R-#.
+
+### **6.1 Dynamic provisioning requests from an FSA signalling edge function**
+
+#### **6.1.1 Flow identifier**
+
+- R-1) Signalling from the FSA signalling edge function is required to always carry the flow identifier.
+- R-2) The flow identifier is required to be used at each flow-state-aware node along the data path to recognize which data packets belong to which flow.
+- R-3) Aggregation end-points are required to be able to create a flow aggregate identifier and notify the next FSA signalling nodes about the flow aggregate identifier.
+ - Aggregation end-points are required to be able to aggregate selected flows into fewer flow aggregates, based on some criteria such as the FSA transport services parameters (see clauses 6.1.4, 6.1.6 and 6.1.7) and the path in the network.
+- R-4) Aggregation end-points are required to be able to change the flow aggregate identifier to which a flow belongs.
+ - For example, if aggregation is based on a common preference indicator value (see clause 6.1.4) and a flow violates the contract, it causes an automatic reallocation of a flow to a different aggregate.
+
+Further information on the flow identifier is provided in clause I.1. This is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.1.2 Signalling negotiations**
+
+- R-5) For applications on UESs with an FSA signalling edge function and wanting service to be supported via an FSA transport service, the FSA signalling edge function is required to forward an in-band signalling request across the user-network interface whenever a new flow is starting.
+ - All other per-flow negotiations involving signals to or from an FSA signalling edge function, such as response, confirmation and close, may be conducted using either in-band signalling or out-of-band signalling. In-band signalling is recommended as the default for all negotiations between an FSA signalling edge function and one or several FSA nodes in the end-to-end data path (see also clause 5).
+- R-6) For UES's not capable of, or not willing to, support flow-state-aware signalling, an ingress edge node may provide the option that it generates flow-state-aware signalling requests on behalf of the UES. In this case, the edge node performs the FSA signalling edge function.
+- R-7) If a UES without the FSA signalling capability wants this option to be actively supported, it is required to register for the FSA transport services with information of its device type if such information has not been pre-configured. The method for registration is for further study.
+- R-8) The ingress edge nodes may provide the option of alternative choices of pre-defined parameters to be used in the request signal and may determine whether a flow should belong to a specific choice within such alternatives.
+
+- R-9) The ingress edge nodes may determine the FSA parameters by mapping from the IP level flow descriptor, which is distributed by a central admission entity such as the RACF through the authorization and admission procedure.
+- R-10) In order to perform signalling requests on behalf of an end-system, an edge node should maintain the registered users for future active identification, by means suitable for each network.
+- R-11) The edge node may aggregate the flows into a flow-aggregate if appropriate.
+- R-12) Edge nodes should be able to aggregate signalling messages of end-to-end flows into aggregated signalling messages, and de-aggregate the aggregated signalling messages into signalling messages of the end-to-end flows. In order to do this, edge nodes should be able to:
+- set an indication in every signalling packet that downstream FSA nodes may ignore such packets but transparently forward them;
+ - remove this indication at any downstream FSA node where end-to-end signalling packets are to be restored.
+
+See also clauses A.1 and I.2. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.1.3 Requested rate**
+
+- R-13) The new flow request is required to specify the requested rate.
+
+#### **6.1.4 Preference indicator**
+
+Preference indicator values may be used by different network operators for the development of different service propositions. The policy associated with a preference indicator value depends on the service context (see also clause 6.2.6).
+
+- R-14) The new flow request is required to specify a preference indicator value.
+- R-15) A well-known value is required to be used in a request signal to signify to downstream FSA nodes that the flow is a flow aggregate containing multiple flows of different preference indicator values.
+
+See also clause I.3. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.1.5 Authorization and enforcement**
+
+- R-16) The new flow request may contain authorization information.
+- R-17) It is required that QoS-related transport resources are not provided for new flow-state-aware requests unless they can be associated with an authorization.
+- R-18) If the request is admitted, admission decisions are enforced as follows:
+- The ingress edge node, which performs signalling on behalf of registered UESs, is required to map the traffic descriptors distributed by a central admission entity to the FSA parameters, prior to sending the request.
+ - Policy enforcement is required to occur for all resource requests related to a guaranteed rate (GRS) or maximum rate (MRS) flow request (see clause 6.1.6).
+ - Policy enforcement is required to occur for all resource requests related to the MRS component of a variable rate (VRS) flow, i.e., for resource requests related to the minimum rate of a VRS flow (see clause 6.1.6).
+
+See also clause A.2.
+
+#### 6.1.6 FSA transport service requirements
+
+##### R-19) Available rate (ARS)
+
+The FSA signalling edge function is required to initiate and then frequently repeat a request, consistent with the requirements listed in clauses 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3, such that:
+
+- each such request is required to include the requested rate whose value is pre-configured. For FSA signalling edge functions in the UES, the configured value for the requested rate is recommended to take account of the highest rate that the source application can sustain, as well as entitlement captured in service profile information;
+- the rate of sending data is required to be controlled by the source to be always less than the latest offered rate (as provided to the source, utilizing the response requirement listed in clause 6.2.4). If the sending rate is sustained at a value above the offered rate, packet discards may be applied;
+- the signalling edge function is required to always update the source with the latest offered rate.
+
+See also clause A.3.1.
+
+##### R-20) Guaranteed rate (GRS)
+
+- In this context, the required response to the signal for a new flow with a requested rate, as described further in the requirements listed in clauses 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 below, indicates either: rejection of the flow or acceptance of the flow with an assignment of the flow to the "discard last" packet discard priority (see clause 6.2.2).
+- If the sending rate is sustained at a value above the guaranteed rate (the requested rate), packet discards may be applied.
+
+See also clause A.3.2.
+
+##### R-21) Maximum rate (MRS)
+
+- In this service context, the required response to the requested rate indicates either rejection of the flow or acceptance of the flow with conditional guarantee of the requested rate in accordance with the principles of clause 6.5 of [ITU-T Y.1221].
+- In the case where the in-band signalling response is used, MRS is required to support user applications transmitting immediately after sending an in-band request signal. This is termed the "immediate transmission" option. However, this is subject to authorization and also subject to the flow rejection requirements discussed in clause 6.2.3.
+- Where the immediate transmission option is supported, applications can transmit at any rate up to the requested rate specified in the in-band new flow request signal. If the sending rate is sustained at a level above this rate, packet discards may be applied.
+- Where the immediate transmission option is not supported, applications are recommended to wait for an in-band response signal (see clause 6.3) prior to entering the data transmission phase.
+
+See also clause A.3.3.
+
+##### R-22) Variable rate (VRS)
+
+- The initial requested rate (consistent with the requirements listed in clauses 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3) is required to be interpreted as the minimum rate. In other words, policing is required to never reject packets sent at or below this rate, subject to authorization and subject to the rejection requirements in clause 6.2.3.
+- Subsequent request signals that follow the initial request signal are required to be interpreted as requests for bandwidth over and above this minimum rate. The additional
+
+bandwidth is required to be assigned to a flow through the available rate transport service.
+
+- The policed rate is recommended to be updated following each ARS request/response but is required to never be set to a rate less than the rate specified in the minimum rate requested.
+
+See also clause A.3.4.
+
+#### **6.1.7 Resource modification**
+
+- R-23) Resource modification request is recommended to be done through in-band signalling as a default. It is required to further contain the requested rate, preference indicator value and service context.
+- R-24) For the ARS and VRS context, the source is required to wait for the network response to the requested rate before changing its sending rate upwards.
+
+## **6.2 Network and FSA signalling edge function responses to flow-state-aware requests**
+
+### **6.2.1 Requiring the flow identifier to reference the per-node flow state**
+
+- R-25) Each accepted flow identifier is required to be assigned a flow state, including a packet discard priority value, at each FSA node along the data path.
+
+#### **6.2.2 Packet discard priority assignment requirements**
+
+- R-26) The packet discard priority is not included in signalling information.
+- R-27) The packet discard priority is required to allow for the possibility of distinguishing between at least two values, namely "discard first" and "discard last".
+
+#### **6.2.3 Flow rejection response**
+
+- R-28) The flow rejection response may be conveyed through in-band or out-of band signalling. In-band signalling is recommended to be the default.
+- R-29) The rejection response is recommended to be used to reject any flow according to network operator policies.
+
+#### **6.2.4 Flow acceptance response to requested rate**
+
+- R-30) The acceptance response is required to confirm that all FSA nodes along the edge-to-edge route have either accepted or modified the requested rate from the source (or otherwise the rejection response is required to be sent).
+- R-31) The acceptance response may be an in-band signal or an out-of-band signal. In-band signalling is recommended to be the default.
+
+#### **6.2.5 Flow acceptance response to preference indicator**
+
+- R-32) The acceptance response is required to confirm that all FSA nodes along the edge-to-edge route have either accepted or modified the requested value for preference indicator from the source (or otherwise the rejection response is required to be sent).
+
+#### **6.2.6 Priority of packet discard, including service context use of the preference indicator**
+
+- R-33) Flows in the "discard last" state are required to always have priority with respect to the available buffer capacity.
+- R-34) When congestion conditions are such that congestion persists even after the removal of packets of all flows with the "discard first" priority, the network should re-mark additional flows as "discard first", starting in order from the lowest preference indicator value.
+- R-35) For any service contexts, it may be possible (subject to network operator conditions) for a UES to establish a pre-assigned requested rate for any preference indicator value.
+
+See also clause I.5. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.2.7 Congestion notification**
+
+- R-36) An FSA node is required to send a congestion notification signal to the iFSA function (from any congested network node) as determined by:
+- Whether congestion conditions require that the ARS flow rate be immediately reduced to avoid packet discards.
+ - Whether congestion conditions are so severe that it may be desirable to suppress the sending of congestion notifications if they would exacerbate the problem. The mechanisms for achieving this are for further study.
+- R-37) The congestion notification signal is required to be sent to the eFSA function if the congested network node can only communicate control signals in the direction of the flow forwarding path. After receiving the congestion notification, the eFSA function is required to forward the message to the iFSA function, using either in-band or out-of-band signalling.
+- R-38) This congestion notification signal may be sent using either in-band or out-of-band signalling. In-band signalling is recommended to be the default.
+- R-39) It is required that a congestion notification signal is not generated within a congested FSA node for the purposes of forwarding to and notifying an end-system of packet losses. Detection of packet losses in end-systems shall be provided for by the applications themselves and/or protocols operating at the end-to-end level.
+
+See also clause I.6. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+## **6.3 Signalling requirements**
+
+#### **6.3.1 Form of flow-state-aware signalling packets**
+
+- R-40) Signalling packets are required to be uniquely marked so that the FSA signalling edge functions and the FSA nodes can easily recognize them.
+- R-41) Data packets are required to be uniquely marked so that they are recognizable as data packets under FSA forwarding treatment.
+
+See also clauses II.1 and II.2. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.3.2 Performance requirements for requests and responses**
+
+- R-42) Signalling exchanges are required to be completed fast enough so as to meet the needs of frequent ARS rate adjustments during the lifetime of a flow and to meet the needs of the MRS immediate transmission option.
+
+See also clause II.3. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.3.3 Release of resources no longer required for GRS**
+
+- R-43) For obtaining the exact start time for the utilization of resources, an in-band confirmation signal may be sent from the FSA signalling edge function in the iFSA (i.e., the edge function that sent the initial request), so that all nodes in the path know the final capacity that is agreed upon.
+- R-44) For obtaining the exact ending time for the utilization of resources, an in-band "close" signal may be sent from the FSA signalling edge function in the iFSA to ensure all nodes know that the capacity can be released.
+
+See also clause II.4. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.3.4 Protection against lost signalling packets**
+
+Requirements R-45 and R-46 follow from the observation that, for all services, it is important that the sender know if the initial signalling packet was lost.
+
+- R-45) If a response is required and is not received within a predetermined retransmission time-out period, the iFSA function may send a second request.
+- R-46) For GRS, to ensure against lost in-band signals (if sent) conveying either a "confirmation" or "close" indication, the FSA signalling edge function in the eFSA (which may be in the UES) is required to resend the response if data arrives before a confirmation is received and is required to send an in-band confirmation signal to a received in-band "close" signal.
+
+#### **6.3.5 Service contexts**
+
+- R-47) The service context information is recommended to be included in all request, response and confirmation signals.
+- R-48) There are four service contexts: GRS, MRS, VRS and ARS. Each service context is required to have a code.
+
+##### **GRS**
+
+- R-49) When the destination receives a GRS request, it is required to send a response back to the iFSA function with the requested rate received or, if desired, a lower rate.
+- R-50) The initiating FSA signalling edge function is required to send a confirmation after receiving the response telling all FSA nodes the final agreement.
+- R-51) The eFSA function is required to confirm the close to ensure that there are no lost close packets.
+- R-52) The iFSA function is required to send an additional close signal (see clause 6.3.8) after a short timeout has elapsed indicating either the close signal or its confirmation has been lost.
+
+##### **MRS**
+
+- R-53) The sender need not wait for a response and can send at the requested rate immediately after the request.
+- R-54) The eFSA function is required to send a response reflecting the rate received, or a lower rate if desired.
+- R-55) No confirmation is required.
+
+##### **VRS**
+
+- R-56) The initial minimum rate request and response is required to be treated like an MRS request.
+- R-57) The eFSA function is required to send a response with a rate no higher than received.
+- R-58) No confirmation is required.
+
+##### **ARS**
+
+- R-59) The iFSA function is recommended to send a request with a requested rate set to the maximum rate that can be supported by the end equipment or application.
+- R-60) The FSA nodes are required to forward the request with the rate reduced to a rate they can support.
+- R-61) The destination is required to return the rate value received or some lower rate to the iFSA function in a response packet.
+
+- R-62) The sender is required to conform to the offered rate received in the response.
+- R-63) Frequently the iFSA function may send a new request to see if a higher rate is available.
+- R-64) The network FSA nodes may send to the iFSA function signalling packets specifying a new lower rate.
+- R-65) No confirmation is required.
+
+See also clause II.6. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### 6.3.6 Preference indicator
+
+- R-66) This parameter is recommended to be included in all requests, responses and confirmation signals.
+
+See also clause II.7. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### 6.3.7 Delay priority
+
+- R-67) This parameter is required to be included in all requests, responses and confirmations.
+
+See also clause II.8. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### 6.3.8 Signalling type
+
+- R-68) Every QoS signalling packet is required to specify the signalling type.
+
+- R-69) There are at least five types of in-band signalling packets as follows:
+
+- **Request:** The start of the signalling process is a request packet. A signalling code point is required to indicate a request.
+- **Response:** When the eFSA function receives a request packet which may have been modified by the network, it is recommended that it returns a response packet containing all the requested parameters and how they have been modified. A signalling code point is required to indicate a response.
+- **Confirm:** For GRS there needs to be a confirm packet. A signalling code point is required to indicate a confirm. A confirm packet is required to be used to confirm the GRS response packet including setting the fixed rate (FR) indication, as further illustrated for information purpose in clause II.5.2. This ensures all FSA nodes know the final rate. A confirm packet is also required to be used after the GRS close packet to ensure that all FSA nodes actually received the close and remove any guarantees.
+- **Renegotiate:** A signalling code point is required to indicate a renegotiate. Depending upon the application, the iFSA function may wish to try for a different or higher rate, preference, delay priority or burst tolerance. To do this and minimize confusion for the FSA nodes and the eFSA function, it is important to use a different code rather than "request". Thus renegotiate requests a new QoS for the ongoing flow. It should be noted that increasing the delay priority may cause out of order packets due to the queue change, and thus this type of change would be at the sender's risk.
+- **Close:** For GRS, all the FSA nodes in the path must be informed that the reserved bandwidth can be released. A signalling code point is required to indicate a close. For MRS, ARS and VRS, the FSA nodes shall time out the flow if no packets are seen for a given period.
+
+In conjunction with a central admission entity such as the RACF, response, confirmation, and close may be omitted. See also Appendix VI. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.3.9 Signalling aggregation indication**
+
+- R-70) **Ignore indication.** An ignore indication is required to be included within every signalling packet. This indication enables aggregated signalling, such that the end-to-end signalling messages are hidden from (ignored by) the core nodes. The edge nodes of an aggregation region are required to set this indication to show whether to ignore signalling by downstream nodes.
+
+#### **6.3.10 Charging direction indication**
+
+- R-71) In order to allow services where the flow is paid for by the receiver, it is required that there be a signalling code point to indicate the charging direction. This indication could be set by the iFSA function. If configuration or policy associated with the eFSA function conflicts with the indicated charging direction, the response from the eFSA function may clear the indication and such a conflict between requests and responses may be treated as appropriate to network policy (e.g., revert to sender is charged). This means that all flows are required to be identified as to the paying party.
+
+#### **6.3.11 QoS structure extension**
+
+- R-72) It is required that any QoS signalling packet carries an indication that enables an outgoing request for a flow in one direction to be included in the same signalling packet that carries a response in the opposite direction, where these both relate to flows between the same two end-points.
+
+See also clause B.1.
+
+#### **6.3.12 Authorization information attached**
+
+- R-73) It is required that there is an indication within a signalling packet that authorization information is present.
+
+See also clause B.2.
+
+#### **6.3.13 Flow aggregation request**
+
+- R-74) It is required that a request signal carries an indication allowing FSA nodes to recognize that the request relates to a flow aggregation.
+
+See also clause B.3.
+
+#### **6.3.14 Burst tolerance**
+
+- R-75) It is required that there is some tolerance to rates that exceed the requested rate for a short duration. A parameter defining such a tolerance is required to be included in all requests, responses and confirmations.
+
+See also clause II.9. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.3.15 QoS approval indication**
+
+- R-76) An FSA node is required to set the QoS approval indication if it has approved the request from a flow.
+- R-77) An FSA node may clear this indication to inform the iFSA and/or eFSA functions that the request is not approved.
+
+#### **6.3.16 FSA signalling edge function**
+
+- R-78) The eFSA function is required to create and send a response to a request to show the acceptance or rejection of a flow request, or modify the request so that it can be accepted.
+- When the iFSA function receives a response that indicates a modified request, it may notify the application.
+
+#### **6.3.17 FSA node requirements**
+
+##### **6.3.17.1 FSA node operation**
+
+- R-79) The ingress edge FSA node is required to be responsible for checking an attached authorization indication and also for determining if the preference indicator value requested is authorized for this user.
+- R-80) All FSA nodes receiving a flow request are required to check their available capacity and resources and adjust downward the requested rates, delay priority, preference indicator value, and burst tolerance requested to what they believe they can support with reasonable assurance.
+- R-81) For available rate (ARS) and variable rate (VRS) services, any FSA node along the path may send a message indicating that the rate needs to be lowered.
+- It is recommended for this message to go to the iFSA function, but if this is difficult, it is required to be sent to the terminating FSA signalling edge function which is required to then send a response to the iFSA function.
+
+See also clause B.4.
+
+## **6.4 Admission decision**
+
+This clause defines minimum requirements for managing the admission decision process.
+
+#### **6.4.1 Admission decision for maximum rate (MRS) flows**
+
+- R-82) The decision process is required to be fast enough to support the immediate transmission capability, taking account of preference indicator value and available capacity.
+
+See also clause III.1. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.4.2 Admission decision for available rate (ARS) flows**
+
+- R-83) The decision process is required to be capable of supporting frequent rate update requests on each ARS flow.
+
+See also clause III.2. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+#### **6.4.3 Admission decision for variable rate (VRS) flows**
+
+- R-84) VRS flows are expected to be treated like ARS flows except for their minimum guaranteed capacity which is required to be treated like MRS. Thus, the admission decision for VRS flows is a combination of the one for the MRS and the one for the ARS.
+
+#### **6.4.4 Admission decision for guaranteed rate (GRS) flows**
+
+- R-85) Total capacity assigned for GRS flows on a port is required to be checked before the admission decision.
+
+## **6.5 General architectural requirements on the management of transport connections carrying flow-state-aware traffic and other traffic**
+
+- R-86) Flow-state-aware QoS controls are required to be agnostic to the underlying transport technology.
+- R-87) A given network link (between two network nodes) may be configured so that it is not dedicated to carrying flow-state-aware traffic only.
+
+See also clause IV.1. The information added in this appendix is purely for information and as an aid to understanding.
+
+## 6.6 Security considerations and requirements
+
+- R-88) **Authentication:** User authentication is addressed in clause 6.1.5. FSA nodes within a domain may authenticate to peer FSA nodes within the domain. FSA nodes communicating as peers across a domain boundary should authenticate with each other.
+- R-89) **Authorization:** Authorization is addressed in clause 6.1.5.
+- R-90) **Data confidentiality:** It is required that no additional data confidentiality requirements are imposed through the use of flow-state-aware transport technology. It is required that, in the case where user flows have data confidentiality requirements and invoke ARS, MRS, VRS or GRS, the parameters describing the in-band request signal are not encrypted.
+- R-91) **Data integrity:** Flow-state-aware parameters may be protected against unauthorized modification while in transit. Flow-state-aware parameter requests may be protected against replay attacks, in conjunction with data integrity protection binding a set of flow-state-aware parameters to a specific flow.
+- R-92) **Accountability:** It is recommended that flow-state-aware service invocations are logged, including the identity of the entity requesting the service, the actual service request, and actual service granted.
+- R-93) **Availability/accessibility:** Flow-state-aware services are required to respect the priority preference of each authenticated entity in making admission decisions.
+- R-94) **Privacy:** It is recommended that flow-state-aware services ensure the privacy of user-specific policy profiles defining QoS parameter limits and privileges.
+- R-95) **Protection against network attacks, from within or outside:** It is recommended that flow-state-aware services include mechanisms to protect against malformed service invocations and to mitigate denial of service (DoS) attacks.
+
+## Annex A
+
+## Dynamic provisioning requests from an FSA signalling edge function
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### A.1 Negotiations for a user-end-system without signalling capability
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.1.2.
+
+With respect to requirement R-8, as stated there, the edge nodes may have pre-defined parameters. Each new flow may be monitored, and if the flow under observation reaches some threshold that determines which parameter choice to use, the node generates an in-band signalling request. This starts negotiation for the flow.
+
+Thus, if a data packet from a registered UES is received, the edge node records the flow identifier as an 'unidentified flow identifier' and monitors for the unidentified flows. If conditions are met (parameters are set *a priori*), the edge node puts the unidentified flow into the 'identified flow' list with proper request items a UES would request (requested rate, preference indicator value, and service context), and then performs signalling as a UES with flow-state-aware capability would do. The signalling functions further required are performed by the edge node. The edge node may aggregate the flow into a flow-aggregate if appropriate.
+
+### A.2 Authorization
+
+According to the principles of [ITU-T Y.2111], the following requirements may be derived for the authorization of flow-state-aware in-band request signals while recognizing the fast processing nature of services created by FSA nodes. It is based on a "two-phase scheme" as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]: authorization is performed in one step (see Figure A.1), followed by reservation and commitment in another step (see Figure A.2).
+
+Before the UES forwards the in-band signal associated with a new flow request, it first initiates the QoS authorization procedure. This procedure (see Figure A.1) may be triggered by a service-establishment signalling message (e.g., a SIP invite message) that in turn instigates an SCF request to the PD-FE. The PD-FE may, as a result, generate an authorization token as optional for a given service and send it to the SCF. The SCF may forward the authorization token in the service signalling message to the UES (see Figure A.1).
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UES
+ participant PD-FE
+ participant SCF
+ Note over SCF: 1. Trigger
+ SCF->>PD-FE: 2. Resource initiation request (authorization)
+ Note over PD-FE: 3. Authorize QoS resource
+ PD-FE->>SCF: 4. Resource authorization response (authorization token)
+ SCF->>UES: 5. SCF service signalling (authorization (token))
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the SCF-requested QoS initial authorization procedure. It involves three entities: UES (User-End-System), PD-FE (PD-Function-Edge), and SCF (Service-Context-Function). The process begins with a '1. Trigger' event at the SCF. This triggers a '2. Resource initiation request (authorization)' message from the SCF to the PD-FE. The PD-FE then performs a local action '3. Authorize QoS resource'. Following this, the PD-FE sends a '4. Resource authorization response (authorization token)' message back to the SCF. Finally, the SCF sends a '5. SCF service signalling (authorization (token))' message to the UES. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2121(08)\_FA.1' at the bottom right.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the SCF-requested QoS initial authorization procedure between UES, PD-FE, and SCF.
+
+Figure A.1 – SCF-requested QoS initial authorization procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UES
+ participant PE-FE
+ participant PD-FE
+
+ UES <--> PE-FE : Path-coupled QoS signalling
+ Note over PE-FE: 1. Trigger
+ PE-FE->>PD-FE: 2. Resource decision request
+ Note over PD-FE: 3. Policy decision
+ PD-FE-->>PE-FE: 4. Resource decision response
+ UES <--> PE-FE : Path-coupled QoS signalling
+
+```
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FA.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing the resource reservation procedure following a UES request. The diagram involves three entities: UES, PE-FE, and PD-FE. The process starts with 'Path-coupled QoS signalling' between UES and PE-FE. Then, a '1. Trigger' occurs at PE-FE. This is followed by a '2. Resource decision request' from PE-FE to PD-FE. PD-FE then performs a '3. Policy decision'. Next, a '4. Resource decision response' is sent from PD-FE back to PE-FE. Finally, another 'Path-coupled QoS signalling' occurs between UES and PE-FE. The diagram is labeled Y.2121(08)\_FA.2.
+
+**Figure A.2 – Resource reservation procedure following a UES request**
+
+### A.3 Service context
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.1.6.
+
+Figure A.3 summarizes the grouping of new flow requests and responses into service contexts. This greatly increases the utility of the flow-state-aware capability as supported through the underlying requests and responses related to [ITU-T Y.1221].
+
+| Requests and responses used for ARS | Requests and responses used for GRS | Requests and responses used for MRS | Requests and responses used for VRS |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
+| Basic requests and responses of clause 6.5 of [ITU-T Y.1221], dealing with the association of a flow state with a flow identity, together with a requested maximum rate and preference indicator. | | | |
+
+**Figure A.3 – Service options**
+
+#### A.3.1 Available rate (ARS)
+
+Utilizing the service context rules of clause 6.1.6, the transfer capability described in clause 6.5 of [ITU-T Y.1221] provides support for an available rate service (ARS), similar to that described in clause 6.2.4 of [b-ITU-T I.371]. In [b-ITU-T I.371] it is stated that, in ABR, the UES regularly polls the network for the currently available bandwidth by sending resource management (RM) cells conveying a requested rate to the network. RM cells are a form of in-band signal.
+
+#### A.3.2 Guaranteed rate (GRS)
+
+This service context (termed the guaranteed rate or GRS context) may be offered for applications requiring guaranteed bandwidth for the entire duration of the flow. Additional requirements apply to this service to ensure the reservation is aborted if not all nodes can support the request and to ensure that clear down of reservations is completed successfully at the end of the flow.
+
+#### A.3.3 Maximum rate (MRS)
+
+In effect the service offer is that the requested flow may proceed, with this "as soon as possible" condition on meeting the loss component of the requirement. We term this the maximum rate service (MRS). As stated in clause 6.5.2 of [ITU-T Y.1221], while in "discard first" status, a flow may be subject to a higher probability of packet discards during moments of congestion. It is up to the application to choose to terminate the flow or continue and compensate for any bursts or losses as and when they occur.
+
+#### **A.3.4 Variable rate (VRS)**
+
+The service context rules of clause 6.1.6 may be offered as a service that supports applications that require a minimum rate and have some degree of elasticity above this minimum.
+
+# **Annex B**
+
+## **Signalling requirements**
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### **B.1 Second QoS structure attached**
+
+This clause references requirement R-72.
+
+When the eFSA function (which may be in the end-system) receives a QoS signalling request and desires to establish a return connection, it may proceed as follows. This FSA signalling edge function may send both a response to the request and also a QoS signalling request for the opposite direction in the same packet. This fits ideally into the normal TCP start-up handshake where the first packet is a SYNC and would include the forward request, the next packet is the SYNC/ACK which would contain the forward response and the reverse request, and the third packet is an ACK which would carry the reverse response.
+
+### **B.2 Authorization information attached**
+
+This clause references requirement R-73.
+
+It is important to allow a cryptographic authorization header to be attached to each flow request so that the network can verify the user and the user's privileges.
+
+### **B.3 Flow aggregation request**
+
+This clause references requirement R-74.
+
+There is a strong need in all networks for flow aggregation which groups and maps some of the flows into a smaller set of flow aggregates. With the full capabilities of the signalling available to specify the flow aggregate, a flow aggregate may be one of GRS, MRS, VRS or ARS, with any rate, preference indicator, and delay priority desired. It may utilize encapsulating IP header (IPv4 or IPv6), MPLS label, VLAN ID, or the likes to specify the destination such that, with this header, the flow aggregate could be routed across any transport network to its destination. At the egress FSA node, a flow aggregate would be terminated and all the traffic inside the flow aggregate directed to the specified address. A signalling edge function may request flow aggregation.
+
+### **B.4 FSA node operation**
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.3.17.1.
+
+With reference to these requirements, when a compliant FSA node receives an in-band signalling packet, it is required to inspect the QoS structure to determine what action it needs to take, if any. If this is a new flow, it is required to check the capacity of the output port and determine what rate it can accept.
+
+Note that, with respect to requirement R-80, it is not necessary for FSA nodes to guarantee support under all possible conditions, only that they have high confidence that they can support the resulting request under normal operating conditions.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Supplementary information on information exchanges via requests from an FSA signalling edge function and associated responses
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### I.1 Flow identifier
+
+[ITU-T Y.1221] describes the combination of parameters "source IP address", "destination IP address", "source and destination port numbers", "protocol" and "experimental/Diffserv value" as a basis for a flow identifier.
+
+Requirement 1 is derived from clause 6.5.1 of [ITU-T Y.1221], where it can be inferred that signalling from the FSA signalling end function always carries flow identifier information that is the same as that carried in the header of each data packet of the flow. This information about the flow identifier is required to be used at each flow-state-aware node along the data path to recognize which data packets belong to which flow.
+
+Ingress edge nodes may support the option to aggregate selected flows into fewer flow aggregates, based on some criteria such as the service context (see clause 6.1.6), the preference indicator value (see clause 6.1.4), and the path in the network.
+
+An alternative method for carrying the flow identifier, or especially for carrying a flow aggregate identifier, may be through the multi-protocol label switching (MPLS) label. [b-RFC 3270] describes two standard methods to map the Diffserv behaviour aggregates (BAs) onto MPLS label switched paths (LSPs).
+
+For networks without MPLS functions, an encapsulating protocol (e.g., IP in IP encapsulation [b-RFC 2003] or generic routing encapsulation (GRE) [b-RFC 2748]) header with IPv4 address may be used as the identifier for flow aggregates within a single administrative network domain.
+
+### I.2 In-band signalling negotiations
+
+Requirement R-5, while not fully explained in clause 6.5.1 of [ITU-T Y.1221], supports the signalling performance requirement R-42. It also facilitates service options such as available rate as discussed further in clause 6.1.6.
+
+Again referring to requirement R-5, there is a reference to the same terminology in clause 6.5.1 of [ITU-T Y.1221], i.e., that there is an in-band signal.
+
+Requirement R-7 envisages an edge node that is used for flow negotiations on behalf of a UES. To perform this function, the edge node may utilize information about the UESs that was obtained during registration. The following steps describe this in more detail:
+
+- 1) UES registers itself for flow identification with its IP address to an edge node. Or an access node (e.g., access node function (ANF) in access transport) registers its attached UESs for the flow identification with their IP addresses and end nodes information to an edge node.
+- 2) The UES information may be terminal type (if the terminal is a user terminal), or application type (if the terminal is an application server).
+- 3) The edge node stores the IP address and end node information.
+- 4) When this edge node receives a packet with an unknown identifier from a registered UES, it retrieves the UES registration information. It may monitor the flow for additional information to determine the flow characteristics and perform signalling as necessary.
+
+The following are a few examples of possible end nodes which would benefit from active flow identification.
+
+- VoIP terminals.
+- Mobile handheld devices (including cellular phones, PDAs, etc.): Traffic from such terminals may be either voice, streaming video, or message (text or multimedia). The voice and streaming video are with distinct encoding rates. If an end node registers as a mobile handheld device, the edge node may utilize this information together with information obtained by monitoring a few packets to determine the characteristics of the flow.
+- Media streaming servers: If such a server is the source of consecutive packets with a relatively regular interval, the edge node may infer that the flow is a media stream. The encoding rate information may be retrieved from information stored during registration.
+- Emergency services-related equipments: Light-weight emergency or military equipments may not have the capability to support flow-state-aware signalling. Registration information may enable a node to assign such equipment the pertinent service contexts, rates and priorities.
+
+One of the possible ways to expedite the identification is to look at the upper layer header (e.g., RTP payload type (PT) field in the header), only when the end node of the packet is configured to be registered. The PT field provides detailed information on whether the flow contains audio or video, the type of encoding, and the encoding rate.
+
+### **I.3 Preference indicator request**
+
+The higher preference indicator values may be reserved for such purposes as emergency services and military commands, etc.
+
+### **I.4 Authentication**
+
+The following service scenarios illustrate authentication aspects of flow-state-aware transport and service.
+
+#### **Scenario 1: Mobile user access**
+
+With reference to Figure I.1, a mobile user access scenario is shown. For example, a terminal (end-A) could connect to a public WLAN hotspot (node 1 of Figure I.1). It may establish an IPsec tunnel to an IPsec gateway (node 2) to access enterprise services. However, assuming IPv4 is used, flow-state-aware QoS controls cannot be applied to the QoS experience obtained along the IPsec tunnel. If IPsec is used, there is no way for the FSA nodes to recognize the flow since the ports and protocol are hidden. Thus with IPsec and IPv4, the protocol cannot be used and only Diffserv is available. IPsec can be used with IPv6 and FSA protocols.
+
+With IPv4, to make use of flow-state-aware QoS, end-A may make use of split IPsec tunnelling, whereby:
+
+- non-FSA traffic destined to the service provider domain is sent via IPsec,
+- flow-state-aware traffic bypasses IPsec.
+
+Thus, in Figure I.1, the FSA IPv4 end-A is shown gaining access to an FSA content services platform (e.g., a content distribution and delivery platform) that is accessible from a flow-state-aware node 1.
+
+
+
+Figure I.1 – Scenario 1: Mobile user access. This diagram shows a network architecture for mobile user access. On the left, 'FSA End-A' is connected via 'WLAN' to 'Node 1', which contains an 'FSA' block. Node 1 has a green arrow pointing to 'AAA'. An 'IPsec tunnel' connects Node 1 to 'Node 2', which contains an 'IPsec GW' block. Node 2 also has a green arrow pointing to 'AAA'. A dashed line connects the 'FSA' block in Node 1 to an oval labeled 'FSA content services'. The identifier 'Y.2121(08)\_Fl.1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Scenario 1: Mobile user access**
+
+#### Scenario 2: Broadband access
+
+Figure I.2 shows end-A connected over DSL to a BRAS. This BRAS acts as an LAC and forwards the traffic by using L2TP to a second BRAS acting as an LNS. Node 1 may issue a RADIUS request to obtain attributes for the tunnel to be established (e.g., [b-RFC 2868]). The second BRAS terminates the PPP state machine and may issue a RADIUS request to perform user authentication. Policy enforcement is generally only done in node 2. Part of that policy enforcement could be a flow aggregate with associated control that manages downstream traffic (towards end-A) at the point where it is aggregated and manages upstream requested rate (GRS, MRS or VRS) requests and ARS-controlled back-pressure.
+
+An alternative arrangement is shown in Figure I.3. Here, the L2TP tunnel is replaced by a flow-state-aware flow aggregate. The objective is to handle any packet discards, either upstream or downstream at the flow aggregate entrance. For example, the sudden insertion of an upstream emergency call may cause this.
+
+
+
+Figure I.2 – Broadband services via an L2TP tunnel. This diagram illustrates broadband access via an L2TP tunnel. 'End-A' is connected via 'DSL' to 'Node 1', labeled 'BRAS acting as an LAC'. Node 1 has a green arrow pointing to 'AAA (for tunnel attributes)'. A dashed line labeled 'L2TP' connects Node 1 to 'Node 2', labeled 'LNS'. Node 2 has a green arrow pointing to 'AAA (for user authentication)' and contains a yellow box labeled 'Flow-state-aware tunnel control'. A dashed line connects Node 2 to an oval labeled 'Services'. The identifier 'Y.2121(08)\_Fl.2' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Broadband services via an L2TP tunnel**
+
+
+
+Figure I.3 – Flow aggregate with FSA outer header established by in-band signals between nodes 1 and 2. This diagram shows an alternative broadband access arrangement. 'End-A' is connected via 'DSL' to 'Node 1', labeled 'BRAS'. Node 1 has a yellow box labeled 'FSA encapsulated'. A dashed line connects Node 1 to 'Node 2'. Node 2 has a green arrow pointing to 'AAA (for user authentication)' and is connected to an oval labeled 'Services'. The identifier 'Y.2121(08)\_Fl.3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Flow aggregate with FSA outer header established by in-band signals between nodes 1 and 2**
+
+Network management commands are used to trigger nodes 1 and 2 to exchange in-band flow-state-aware signals. These establish, say, a flow aggregate with GRS service context including a defined capacity (requested rate). All IP packets from end-A or from "services" are encapsulated with an outer packet header bearing the flow identifier of the aggregate flow. Flow-state-aware packets sent by end-A are QoS-managed along the aggregate flow at node 1. Similarly, flow-state-aware "services" packets are managed along the aggregate flow at node 2.
+
+### **I.5 Priority of packet discard, including service context use of preference indicator values**
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.2.6.
+
+Typically, a flow with a high preference indicator value may be established even when network capacity is already fully loaded with flows of lower preference priorities.
+
+For example, an MRS flow with a high preference indicator value could be established for emergency services, where transmission could begin immediately, without even waiting for a network response, provided the authorization was accepted. This would be one possible service context. Another context may allow parental configuration of content so that certain types of content or certain user identities determine the preference indicator value.
+
+Therefore, two parameters (preference indicator and packet discard priority) determine the probability of packet discard. The relationship between the nodal behaviours and these parameters in flow-state-aware network nodes are as follows:
+
+- Admission decisions are not governed by packet discard priority. But newly admitted flows are usually marked as "discard first". Depending upon policy, some newly admitted flows (for example, those with a high preference indicator value) may be immediately marked "discard last".
+- Packet discard (buffer management) decisions are governed by packet discard priority, but this may be influenced by preference indicator as follows:
+ - when packet discard is necessary, if there are packets with "discard first" priority, drop those packets;
+ - if buffer congestion persists, remark additional flows with the lowest preference indicator values as "discard first".
+
+### **I.6 Congestion notification**
+
+This clause references requirements in 6.2.7.
+
+It is desirable that the implementation has queue buffers that are large enough to absorb the remaining round-trip delay prior to the rate reduction.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Supplementary information to signalling requirements
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### II.1 Recognition of QoS signalling packets
+
+This clause references requirement R-40.
+
+There is always a need to identify some in-band signalling packets. However, in-band signalling need only be done at the start of a flow.
+
+The exact method for identification of data packets is for further study.
+
+### II.2 Form of QoS information
+
+This clause references requirement R-40.
+
+The requirement R-40 follows from the fact that data packets, by chance, could include information that looks similar to the information in a signalling packet. Therefore, a unique marking for signalling packets is required.
+
+FSA nodes should be able to read and modify a QoS structure within a signalling request and, if used, a response, confirmation or close in real time at any port speed. Port speeds are never faster than the logic speeds currently possible for simple operations such as reading and/or writing packets into memory, checking sum checks, operating linked lists, reading and interpreting fixed length fields, etc. Usually, the serial input stream is first converted to a parallel word stream so that standard CMOS logic can keep up. Thus, so long as the QoS structure follows some simple rules, any port speed currently feasible for high speed FSA nodes could be processed.
+
+The following text illustrates an example implementation, not the only implementation, facilitating fast processing.
+
+**II.2.1** All information fields are in a fixed location in the QoS structure.
+
+**II.2.2** All numerical values which need to be treated as a number are structured as an integral number of bytes and are byte aligned.
+
+- If the number is 2 bytes, it is dual byte aligned and if 4 bytes it is quad byte aligned. This is because the parallel input stream in IP is quad byte aligned and it would require more steps to shift and mask to find a value.
+
+**II.2.3** IP protocols also works with 8-byte boundaries and thus the total QoS structure is a multiple of 8 bytes.
+
+- Also, the number of 8-byte groups required is as small as possible to reduce overhead and processing.
+
+**II.2.4** Since overhead is of great importance, options within the QoS structure may be packed to a byte.
+
+### II.3 Performance requirements for requests and responses
+
+This clause references requirement R-42.
+
+The immediate transmission option relies on the fast establishment of flow state at every FSA node such that, in the extreme, the request packet arrives at an FSA node and is immediately followed by the first data packet of the flow.
+
+### **II.4 Release of resources no longer required**
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.3.3.
+
+An FSA node may need to reject new traffic when too many absolute capacity guarantees are no longer required but are not yet released.
+
+### **II.5 QoS signalling parameters**
+
+Clauses II.5.1 and II.5.2 provide information for illustrative purposes relating to an example implementation, not the only implementation.
+
+#### **II.5.1 IPv6 header**
+
+The QoS structure in IPv6 may be chosen to be a hop-by-hop option.
+
+#### **II.5.2 Rates**
+
+**II.5.2.1** As an example implementation, two rates may be utilized, one that is network-selected (network rate or NR) and one that is an application requirement (fixed rate or FR). NR would be used where the application requires to send buffered data where the rate may vary (typically TCP). FR would be used where a fixed rate must be available at all times.
+
+**II.5.2.2** These may have multiple uses and may be used together so as to support the four types of service (GRS, MRS, ARS and VRS). As an example:
+
+**II.5.2.2.1 GRS:** The GRS could use the FR field to specify the requested rate with the NR field set to zero.
+
+**II.5.2.2.2 MRS:** The MRS could use the FR field to specify the requested rate with the NR field set to zero.
+
+**II.5.2.2.3 ARS:** The ARS could use the NR rate to specify the requested rate, setting the NR rate to the maximum rate that the application or computer can support. The FR field could be set to zero.
+
+**II.5.2.2.4 VRS:** The VRS could use the NR plus FR rates to specify the requested rate. The FR portion could carry the minimum required rate (lowest value) for the flow. The NR rate could be set as in the ARS service (see clause II.5.2.2.3).
+
+**II.5.2.3** The lowest rate may be low enough that the FSA node would not find any significant value in reserving or managing a flow to a lower rate.
+
+- The lowest rate could be 1 kbit/s.
+
+**II.5.2.4** Zero may be represented since NR or FR may be zero.
+
+### **II.6 Service contexts**
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.3.5.
+
+#### **GRS**
+
+Guaranteed rate has the most stringent requirement and is for the equivalent of a leased line where the rate is permanent until closed.
+
+GRS requires commitments from FSA nodes even in the absence of traffic.
+
+#### **MRS**
+
+The second type of flow is maximum rate where a network timeout after a period of no data is sufficient. MRS may be used for video, voice or other streaming media whenever the QoS requirement is for low loss and low delay variance, but where such requirements allow for a network-conditional guarantee that facilitates immediate transmission. The conditional guarantee is
+
+that the network is required to support the loss/delay QoS targets as soon as possible, while allowing the immediate transmission to continue.
+
+#### **ARS**
+
+This service is typically used for TCP flows but can be used with any protocol. It offers an available rate that can be immediately supported across the network.
+
+#### **VRS**
+
+This service offers a minimum rate with the conditional guarantee and immediate transmission characteristics of MRS. Additionally, it allows an application to exploit the latest available rate so that it may send at a higher rate but need never send at a lower rate than the MRS value. For example, a stock trade may be required to be transacted or reported in some known and acceptable time but faster is better.
+
+### **II.7 Preference indicator**
+
+This clause references requirement R-66.
+
+The preference indicator is a parameter used to determine which flows should be admitted in the case of a network overload. The overload could be on an access line that has too many video requests, or it could be due to trunk or network equipment failures. This type of capability is necessary as the network moves toward streaming media flows (GRS and MRS) and away from available rate flows. It has always been implemented in telephone and military networks. However, since the Internet was mostly TCP to start, it has not been required or standardized before. Now it is required. The number of preference priorities needs to be sufficient for the multiple military and civilian emergency systems, corporate priorities, and home priorities. Assigning the preference codes is beyond the scope of these requirements but the number of levels needs to be set.
+
+### **II.8 Delay priority**
+
+This clause references requirement R-67.
+
+Although absolute delay is not controllable in a network due to the speed of light, delay variance or jitter can be controlled and may have different requirements for different services. Typically, video and voice require lower delay variance than file transfer but there may be many other services with many different requirements.
+
+### **II.9 Burst tolerance**
+
+This clause references requirements R-75.
+
+The rates negotiated in GRS, MRS, VRS and ARS are maximum rates and the UES is free to send at lower rates. But if the transmission rate momentarily exceeds the agreed rate, it is typical in packet networks to include some burst tolerance.
+
+### **II.10 Flow identifier fields**
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.1.1.
+
+#### **IPv6 flow identifier field**
+
+The following is an example implementation for illustrative purposes. In IPv6, the 20-bit sender flow label may be used as part of the vector of parameters that identify the correct flow from a response packet. The triplet source address, destination address and the flow label could together identify a flow. The response has the same source and destination address (reversed) but the sender's flow label is still required to identify the matching request. Thus, in this example, there would be a 20-bit source flow label field in the response packet. The eFSA function fills this in from the request.
+
+#### **IPv4 flow identifier fields**
+
+The following is an example implementation for illustrative purposes. In IPv4, if unencrypted, the source address, destination address, source port, destination port and protocol could define the flow. When the eFSA function sends a response, these fields are all in the packet although source and destination are reversed. Thus, the sender needs no extra information to identify the flow. It may be noted that most senders are behind NAT devices and the source address and source port have been changed, perhaps several times, by the time the eFSA function gets the request. However, they are all restored by the time the response gets to the iFSA function. Thus, no extra issues are raised by NAT.
+
+However, if the iFSA function moves (mobile user), the eFSA function will not recognize the new source address and source port. Nor does the iFSA function know what the source address and port were that the eFSA function recorded. Therefore, in order to support mobility of the source, a simple solution is for the eFSA function to copy the source address and source port it receives in the request into the response. The iFSA function could save this information as the identifier of the flow. Then when the iFSA function moves, it makes a new QoS request and includes the saved original source address and port in the request instead of zero in these fields. The network treats this as a new request and times out the old one. However, the eFSA function can see that these fields are not zero and match up the original source address and port with ongoing flows and thus determine that this is a continuation of the flow.
+
+An example implementation could utilize two fields for IPv4, the "original source address" (32 bits) and the "original source port" (16 bits). Since IPv6 requires 32 bits of header information, this space can be used for the IPv4 original source address. Then the IPv4 original source port can be placed in the same 20-bit space that IPv6 requires for the source flow label.
+
+# **Appendix III**
+
+## **Illustrative QoS support for different preference indicator values**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### **III.1 Preference resolution for maximum rate (MRS) flows**
+
+This clause references requirement R-82.
+
+The preference indicator value of a newly admitted MRS flow may alter the QoS support of MRS flows which have lower preference indicator values. If necessary, when there is insufficient capacity to support all MRS flows, some or all of the flows with lower preference indicator values may continue to transmit as in the case of the immediate transmission option. For such flows, the network is required to revert to the conditional guarantee that loss/delay targets are supported as soon as possible.
+
+### **III.2 Preference resolution for available rate (ARS) flows**
+
+This clause references requirement R-83.
+
+With ARS traffic (typically TCP), the network decides on the rate it could support for each flow. There may be different classes of ARS traffic where some flows are permitted more capacity, but within a class it is assumed that the goal would be for rate equality or fairness. When a new ARS flow is received, the network equipment would examine the available capacity for the class and assign what it believed was a fair rate to the flow. Typically, the process would allow the total ARS traffic in the class to utilize as much of the class capacity as is presumed to be safe and thus most of the time there would be a preference decision to be considered.
+
+Requirement R-83 does not specify how much more or less capacity is given to flows of different preference indicator values, and that may well be a function that the network operator may wish to control. This requirement however leads to a very simple process, the preference indicator value can be converted to a weight by a function or a table lookup so that a weight is determined for each flow. Then each new flow could be assigned a weighted fraction of the total capacity. One measurement is required, the sum of the flow weights in process. The new flow would then receive its weight times the total safe capacity divided by the sum of the active flow weights. This is one solution that illustrates how a large number of separate preference indicator values could be supported without the computation and memory requirements increasing with the number of such values.
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+## Supplementary information relating to requirements on the management of transport connections carrying flow-state-aware traffic and other traffic
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### IV.1 General architectural assumptions
+
+This clause references requirements in clause 6.5
+
+The main requirement is that flow-state-aware QoS controls are agnostic to the underlying transport technology. This can be Ethernet, ATM or any other choice of the network provider, and may be a mixture of different transport technologies at different locations.
+
+#### Additional assumptions
+
+A given network link (between two network nodes) may not be dedicated to carrying flow-state-aware traffic only.
+
+Where a given network link is carrying a mixture of flow-state-aware traffic and other traffic, the FSA node may assume that part of the capacity of that link is guaranteed to be available for flow-state-aware traffic. The role of FSA QoS control should be to control the utilization of that capacity among the competing flows taking account of FSA services (ARS, MRS, VRS, GRS). The network may achieve capacity guarantees in various ways, including:
+
+- IP-layer scheduling functions to manage and limit the capacity available to the non-FSA traffic, together with FSA QoS controls to limit the capacity available to the FSA traffic. Note that this method may allow for the dynamic "borrowing" of unused capacity by either FSA or non-FSA traffic as discussed in the next bullet.
+- FSA management of link capacity does not imply a dedicated FSA management function per link. For example, consider the broadband access scenario shown in Figures IV.1 and IV.2. These illustrate an arrangement where a single FSA access QoS functional entity is capable of managing both DSL and Ethernet link capacity limits. Clearly the scale capabilities of this arrangement will be vendor-specific. In the case of Figure IV.2, the FSA access QoS management functional entity is shown as being combined with an Ethernet VLAN switch. Of course, these two functions could also be split. The main difference with Figure IV.1 is that all traffic, FSA and non-FSA, passes through FSA QoS control management. The non-FSA traffic is either passed transparently or managed, e.g., throttled (as necessary), if the network provider chooses to offer such a service.
+- Figures IV.1 and IV.2 also illustrate the requirement that FSA management of link capacity is required to take into account the capacity reserved on that link for non-FSA traffic on both the DSL and Ethernet links, i.e.,:
+ - the non-FSA traffic within (in the scenario of Figures IV.1 and IV.2) an Ethernet VLAN carrying a mix of FSA and non-FSA traffic, or
+ - the additional non-FSA traffic on the physical link towards an access node, in dedicated non-FSA VLANs.
+
+Note that, within a single VLAN, dynamic "borrowing" of capacity between FSA and non-FSA traffics may be performed by the FSA access QoS functional entity.
+
+
+
+Figure IV.1: FSA control of some of the access VLANs. This diagram shows a network topology where an Access node (yellow box) is connected to a Core edge (orange box) and an Ethernet switch (green box). A DSL line (blue line) enters the Access node. The Ethernet switch is connected to the Core edge and an FSA QoS control block (teal box). Two paths are indicated: 'Non-FSA VLAN paths' (orange arrow) and 'FSA VLAN paths' (purple arrow). The FSA VLAN paths show traffic from the DSL line passing through the Access node, then through the Ethernet switch, and finally through the FSA QoS control block before reaching the Core edge. The Non-FSA VLAN paths show traffic bypassing the FSA QoS control block. The diagram is labeled Y.2121(08)\_FIV.1.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – FSA control of some of the access VLANs**
+
+
+
+Figure IV.2: FSA IP-layer inspection and management of all access links. This diagram shows a network topology where an Access node (yellow box) is connected to a Core edge (orange box) and an Ethernet switch (green box). A DSL line (blue line) enters the Access node. The Ethernet switch is connected to the Core edge and an FSA QoS control block (teal box). Two paths are indicated: 'FSA VLAN paths' (purple arrow) and 'Non-FSA VLAN paths' (orange arrow). The FSA VLAN paths show traffic from the DSL line passing through the Access node, then through the Ethernet switch, and finally through the FSA QoS control block before reaching the Core edge. The Non-FSA VLAN paths show traffic bypassing the FSA QoS control block. The diagram is labeled Y.2121(08)\_FIV.2.
+
+**Figure IV.2 – FSA IP-layer inspection and management of all access links**
+
+### **IV.2 General issues on the management of access links shared by FSA and non-FSA traffic**
+
+With reference to Figure IV.3 below, an access link is shown with downstream traffic being forwarded on to it from an edge FSA node. The downstream traffic consists of both FSA and non-FSA components.
+
+Figure IV.3 shows a grooming process that consists of two stages. Stage 1 is the separate grooming of FSA flows (with the non-FSA traffic by-passing this stage). Stage 2 is the grooming of the FSA traffic with the non-FSA traffic.
+
+It will be appreciated that this description of a two-stage process could be realized without actually implementing two physically separate stages. The description has been chosen for clarification of QoS management, and not to suggest any particular implementation.
+
+Similarly, although Figure IV.3 shows both FSA and non-FSA capabilities in an edge FSA node, this does not suggest an actual implementation. The stage 1 function could be implemented within the edge FSA node or external to it.
+
+In more detail, stage 1 may groom traffic for one or several Ethernet VLANs or ATM VPs according to different policies, including:
+
+- Provider-specific requirements on preference indicator handling.
+- Aggregate maximum rate limit per VLAN or VP and UES maximum rate limit for downstream traffic.
+- A multiple-provider shared access with an overall maximum rate limit and with equal or preferential policies on ARS rate allocation or MRS discard first.
+
+
+
+Figure IV.3: Conceptual 2-stage grooming of FSA + non-FSA for a shared access link. The diagram shows an 'Edge router' box containing two stages. 'Stage 1: FSA aggregation' is a yellow box with an orange inner box. 'Stage 2: FSA + non-FSA' is a green box. Arrows show traffic flow: 'Non-FSA traffic' enters from the right, goes through Stage 1, then Stage 2, and finally exits to the left as 'Access link (showing the downstream aggregate flow)'. The label 'Y.2121(08)\_FIV.3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.3 – Conceptual 2-stage grooming of FSA + non-FSA for a shared access link**
+
+As shown in Figure IV.4 below, stage 1 grooms the FSA traffic into virtual access links corresponding to one or several different access products. In addition, several of these virtual access links may share a single physical access link. The method of sharing may allow:
+
+- strict adherence to the maximum rate on each of these virtual access links;
+- a virtual access link borrows unused physical link capacity (in terms of what is pre-set as the notional physical link capacity assigned for stage 1). It returns to its guaranteed maximum rate as other virtual links demand more.
+
+In the simplest of these cases (strict adherence to each assigned maximum rate), the stage 1 grooming process:
+
+- manages ARS rate shares within any virtual link on the basis of the available maximum rate of that virtual link, subtracting any GRS or MRS discard last rates from the total available;
+- manages MRS packet discards to ensure strict adherence to the maximum rate.
+
+In the alternative case, MRS packet discards may be reduced if there is some unused physical capacity. An alternative, and possibly more complex, arrangement would allow ARS rates to exploit the unused capacity and rapidly relinquish it as demands from other virtual links increase.
+
+
+
+Figure IV.4: FSA traffic groomed into different virtual access links at stage 1. The diagram shows a stack of horizontal bars representing virtual access links. The bars are colored: dark blue (Product type 1), light green (Product type 3), grey (Product type 2), and red (Product type 4). A curved arrow labeled 'Managed notional physical link limit' spans across the stack. Arrows point to the top and bottom of the stack, labeled 'Max rate 1' and 'Max rate n' respectively. A vertical orange bar on the right is labeled 'Stage 1'. The label 'Y.2121(08)\_FIV.4' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.4 – FSA traffic groomed into different virtual access links at stage 1**
+
+The stage 2 grooming process forwards these virtual access links onto a number of physical access links, combining this traffic with the non-FSA traffic. Prior to stage 2, the non-FSA traffic may also
+
+be groomed into one or several virtual access links per physical access link (e.g., associated with one or several Ethernet VLANs).
+
+If the FSA traffic is groomed into Ethernet VLANs at stage 1 and if the non-FSA traffic has also been groomed into Ethernet VLANs, then stage 2 grooming could be performed by an Ethernet switch. In this case, for QoS reasons, there should be strict adherence to the maximum rate of each virtual access link. Where several virtual access links share the same physical access link, the sum of their maximum rates should be managed to be less than the physical link capacity.
+
+On the other hand, it was noted that one type of access product may borrow unused capacity and may temporarily exceed its guaranteed maximum rate. To perform stage 2 grooming in this case, it is necessary to take account of congestion. One option is to perform stage 2 grooming in the edge FSA node. Another possibility is to perform this function in an external function that may or may not be FSA-capable (if the latter, then this external function may also simultaneously perform stage 1 – see, for example, Figure IV.2).
+
+#### IV.2.1 Case 1: FSA-aware stage 2
+
+Consider Figure IV.5, which shows the case of an FSA-aware stage 2. It is assumed that any reduction in bandwidth available to a virtual access link at the output of stage 2 may not immediately cause a reduction in the output load from stage 1. Therefore, on an FSA virtual access link that is allowed to borrow unused bandwidth above its guaranteed maximum, the simplest procedure is:
+
+- stage 2 allows unused capacity to be used for forwarding packets of this virtual access link, but reduces the aggregate forwarding rate to the guaranteed maximum rate when necessary;
+- MRS "discard first" packets may be discarded if there are too many packets waiting to be forwarded at stage 2;
+- the sum of the rates of all GRS flows added to the sum of MRS flows in "discard last" state (including the MRS component of VRS) should not exceed the guaranteed maximum rate of the virtual access link;
+- stage 2 should reduce ARS rates as appropriate when it is necessary to reduce the aggregate rate of the virtual access link to its guaranteed maximum rate.
+
+Therefore, stage 2 supports all guaranteed bandwidth flows (whether in FSA or non-FSA virtual access links). This is provided that the call acceptance process does not allow any guaranteed bandwidth flow to be accepted if it should cause a virtual access maximum rate to be exceeded (and provided the sum of the set of maximum rates does not exceed a physical link rate).
+
+
+
+Figure IV.5: Case 1 – FSA-aware stage. The diagram shows a data flow from right to left. On the far right, a horizontal line represents the input. This line enters an orange box labeled 'Stage 1: FSA aggregation'. The output of Stage 1 is a horizontal line that enters a green box labeled 'Stage 2: FSA-aware'. Below this line, the text 'Non-FSA traffic' is written. The output of Stage 2 is a horizontal line that exits the green box to the left. This line is labeled 'Access link (showing the downstream aggregate flow)'. A callout arrow points to the boundary between Stage 1 and Stage 2 with the text 'Scheduler supports guaranteed maximum rate of any virtual access link (both for FSA and non-FSA traffic)'. In the bottom right corner of the diagram area, the text 'Y.2121(08)\_FIV.5' is present.
+
+**Figure IV.5 – Case 1 – FSA-aware stage**
+
+#### IV.2.2 Case 2: Non-FSA-aware stage 2
+
+This case requires more complexity in the marking of packets so that stage 2 correctly discards excess packets when it has to limit the virtual access link to its guaranteed maximum rate. One possibility is that MRS "discard first" packets are marked differently to MRS "discard last" packets
+
+(requiring the marking to be changed on a flow if the "discard first" state changes to "discard last"). Then stage 2 operates as follows:
+
+- stage 2 allows unused capacity to be used for forwarding packets of this virtual access link, but reduces the aggregate forwarding rate to the guaranteed maximum rate when necessary;
+- packets appropriately marked for discard are required to be discarded if there are too many packets waiting to be forwarded at stage 2;
+- the sum of the rates of all GRS + ARS flows added to the sum of VRS + MRS flows in "discard last" state should not exceed the guaranteed maximum rate of the virtual access link.
+
+This implies that only MRS "discard first" packets are exploiting the excess unused capacity on the physical link. With these restrictions, the same statement may be made that a non FSA-aware stage 2 supports all guaranteed bandwidth flows (whether in FSA or non-FSA virtual access links). Again, this is provided that the call acceptance process does not allow any guaranteed bandwidth flow to be accepted if it should cause a virtual access maximum rate to be exceeded (and provided the sum of the set of maximum rates does not exceed a physical link rate).
+
+### **IV.3 Combined flow-level and aggregate flow-level FSA controls**
+
+It may be anticipated that network providers may want to combine FSA controls at the flow level and aggregate flow level. This creates the opportunity of providing variable-rate aggregation products that are adapted to the needs of the service providers and their customers.
+
+The following text describes examples of variable rate aggregation products for the purposes of clarifying requirements only:
+
+- products that connect between (see Figure IV.6):
+ - an access product service edge point, carrying traffic to/from a service provider point of presence;
+ - an access product service edge point, carrying traffic to/from a given set of user-end-systems;
+- connecting between the service edge points of access products that carry traffic to/from enterprise sites (see Figure IV.7);
+- assigning capacity to the aggregate based on the latest available rate, where the flow level consists of only a set of ARS flows that share this capacity on a basis that recognizes preference indicator values (see Figure IV.8);
+- assigning capacity to the aggregate based on a minimum (MRS-requested) rate plus an available rate top-up. Here the set of flows can be MRS, VRS and ARS and, again, the capacity sharing of the top-up portion recognizes preference indicator values (see Figure IV.9);
+- assigning capacity (perhaps to cover sudden needs) based on a new MRS-requested aggregate rate while recognizing that this new rate may not be instantly available. However it is required to be made available as soon as possible and, meanwhile, the policed rate is required to be adjusted to the new need. Here the flow level consists of a set of MRS flows only, and discard control again recognizes preference indicator values (see Figure IV.10);
+- assigning capacity based on a new GRS-requested aggregate rate, with the possibility that this request may be rejected. Accepted requests may remove some of the capacity available to other services and trigger flow-level controls to operate and modify, for example, ARS rates (again taking preference indicator values into account). (see Figure IV.11).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for FSA variable capacity controls. It features two identical FSA edge components, each consisting of a green box labeled 'FSA edge' and an orange box below it. A dashed line connects the two green boxes, labeled 'Variable-rate for aggregate and flow-level'. Below the left FSA edge, an orange box labeled 'Service provider point of presence' is connected to the orange box of the FSA edge by a solid line. An arrow points from this orange box to the green box, labeled 'Service edge point of access product'. Below the right FSA edge, a grey box labeled 'End users' is connected to the orange box of the FSA edge by a solid line. An arrow points from this grey box to the green box, labeled 'Service edge point of UES access product'. A curved dashed line connects the two green boxes, passing above the dashed line connecting them.
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FIV.6
+
+Diagram of FSA variable capacity controls supporting the connection between a service provider and specified user-end-systems.
+
+**Figure IV.6 – FSA variable capacity controls supporting the connection between a service provider and specified user-end-systems**
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for enterprise site-to-site FSA controlled variable capacity. It features two identical FSA edge components, each consisting of a green box labeled 'FSA edge' and an orange box below it. A dashed line connects the two green boxes, labeled 'Variable-rate for aggregate and flow-level'. Below the left FSA edge, a green box labeled 'Entreprise site "A"' is connected to the orange box of the FSA edge by a solid line. An arrow points from this green box to the green box, labeled 'Service edge point of access product for enterprise site A'. Below the right FSA edge, a green box labeled 'Entreprise site "B"' is connected to the orange box of the FSA edge by a solid line. An arrow points from this green box to the green box, labeled 'Service edge point of access product for enterprise site B'. A curved dashed line connects the two green boxes, passing above the dashed line connecting them.
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FIV.7
+
+Diagram of Enterprise site-to-site FSA controlled variable capacity.
+
+**Figure IV.7 – Enterprise site-to-site FSA controlled variable capacity**
+
+
+
+Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls
+
+Available aggregate capacity
+
+ARS flow
+
+ARS flow
+
+ARS flow
+
+Flow-level control
+
+Aggregate flow dynamic rate control (showing its logical separation from flow level controls)
+
+ARS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FIV.8
+
+The diagram illustrates the logical-level coupling between flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls for an ARS aggregate access. It features two green rectangular blocks. The left block, labeled 'Flow-level control', receives three horizontal arrows from the left, each labeled 'ARS flow'. Above this block is the text 'Available aggregate capacity' with a downward arrow pointing to the top of the block. The right block, labeled 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control (showing its logical separation from flow level controls)', receives a single horizontal arrow from the right. Above this block is the text 'ARS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)' with a double-headed horizontal arrow. A dashed curved arrow connects the top of the 'Flow-level control' block to the top of the 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control' block, labeled 'Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls'. A solid horizontal arrow points from the right side of the 'Flow-level control' block to the left side of the 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control' block.
+
+Diagram of ARS flows within an ARS aggregate access showing flow-level and dynamic rate control blocks.
+
+**Figure IV.8 – ARS flows within an ARS aggregate access**
+
+
+
+Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls
+
+Available aggregate capacity
+
+ARS flow
+
+VRS flow
+
+MRS flow
+
+Flow-level control
+
+Aggregate flow dynamic rate control (showing its logical separation from flow-level controls)
+
+VRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FIV.9
+
+The diagram illustrates the logical-level coupling between flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls for a VRS aggregate access. It features two green rectangular blocks. The left block, labeled 'Flow-level control', receives three horizontal arrows from the left, labeled 'ARS flow', 'VRS flow', and 'MRS flow' from top to bottom. Above this block is the text 'Available aggregate capacity' with a downward arrow pointing to the top of the block. The right block, labeled 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control (showing its logical separation from flow-level controls)', receives a single horizontal arrow from the right. Above this block is the text 'VRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)' with a double-headed horizontal arrow. A dashed curved arrow connects the top of the 'Flow-level control' block to the top of the 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control' block, labeled 'Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls'. A solid horizontal arrow points from the right side of the 'Flow-level control' block to the left side of the 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control' block.
+
+Diagram of ARS, VRS and MRS flows within a VRS aggregate access showing flow-level and dynamic rate control blocks.
+
+**Figure IV.9 – ARS, VRS and MRS flows within a VRS aggregate access**
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating MRS flows within an MRS aggregate, showing logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls. The diagram is divided into two main sections: a top section for the 'Aggregate flow sending edge' and a bottom section for the 'Aggregate flow receiving edge'. Each section features a 'Local flow-level discard control' block on the left and an 'Aggregate flow' block on the right. In the top section, three 'MRS flow' arrows enter the local block, which is also influenced by 'Available aggregate capacity'. A solid arrow labeled 'iFSA' connects the local block to the aggregate block. A dashed arrow labeled 'MRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)' points from the aggregate block back to the local block. In the bottom section, three 'MRS flow' arrows exit the local block. A solid arrow labeled 'Receiving FSA edge' connects the aggregate block to the local block. A dashed arrow labeled 'MRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)' points from the aggregate block back to the local block. A dashed curved arrow at the top indicates 'Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls' between the two sections. On the right, a box contains 'FSA core functions (if deployed) responsive to aggregate flow signalling' and 'FSA core functions (if deployed) operating local flow-level discard control', connected by a downward arrow. A dashed line connects the aggregate blocks of both sections to this box. The reference 'Y.2121(08)\_FIV.10' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure IV.10 – MRS flows within an MRS aggregate**
+
+It may be noted in Figure IV.10 that each FSA node is making a local decision about the rate that could be supported on reception of an MRS aggregate rate increase request. Unlike ARS, the sending end may immediately send at the new requested aggregate rate. However, network providers may choose to prevent any sending node from increasing a rate beyond some pre-determined maximum rate or beyond some pre-determined maximum allowable percentage increase above a current rate. Other policy options may be applied.
+
+
+
+Logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls
+
+Available aggregate capacity
+
+ARS flow
+
+VRS flow
+
+MRS flow
+
+GRS flow
+
+Flow-level control
+
+Aggregate flow dynamic rate control (showing its logical separation from flow-level controls)
+
+GRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)
+
+Y.2121(08)\_FIV.11
+
+Diagram illustrating the logical-level coupling of flow-level and dynamic aggregate rate controls. It shows two green blocks: 'Flow-level control' on the left and 'Aggregate flow dynamic rate control' on the right. Four input flows (ARS, VRS, MRS, GRS) enter the first block. A solid arrow connects the two blocks. A dashed arrow labeled 'Available aggregate capacity' points from the top of the first block to the top of the second. Another dashed arrow labeled 'GRS aggregate rate requests/responses (signalling)' points from the top of the second block to the right. The second block has an output arrow to the right.
+
+**Figure IV.11 – GRS negotiated aggregate rate changes**
+
+# Appendix V
+
+## Example implementation principles associated with FSA nodes
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+The principles below describe an example implementation, not the only possible implementation of an FSA node:
+
+- 1) The FSA node determines the identifier of each QoS signalled flow.
+- 2) Having identified a flow, some memory of the flow is required. This memory may be as little as a saved hash entry and a bit to indicate if the flow is "discard last" or "discard first". It may also contain the QoS information for the flow that was in the initial in-band signalling packet.
+- 3) The FSA node also needs to be monitoring the loading of the port on which the flow is exiting the FSA node. From this load information, it must determine what capacity is available for a new flow. There are many techniques for doing this and deciding what rate an ARS flow may have or if a MRS flow should be "discard first", "discard last", or must be denied altogether.
+- 4) The FSA node only needs to route this first packet of the flow to determine what route it should take, what QoS it should have, and if it is subject to denial of service (DoS).
+- 5) Once a flow has been accepted at a rate, if the rate is saved in the state information, then the flow may be policed to that rate. If no rate information is kept, the policing could be based on the total port load and, for ARS, this plus the number of flows may be sufficient. For GRS the rate is required since the total commitment must be controlled. For MRS and the MRS portion of VRS, the rate would need to be saved if per-flow policing is required, but if only flow acceptance is needed then the "discard first" bit would be sufficient.
+- 6) The flow entries need to be cleared out if no packets arrive for a period, thus there also needs to be a time stamp for the last packet arrival.
+
+Figure V.1 shows an example implementation of an FSA node where the data flow follows the path through the switching logic and the first packet is routed with normal L3 FSA node logic.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD; In[Input port transceiver] --> FL[Flow lookup, shaping and policing]; FL <--> S3[Standard L3 routing]; FL <--> SM[Flow state memory]; FL --> S[Switching]; S --> OFM[Output flow management]; OFM --> Out[Output port transceiver]; Out --> Y2121[\"Y.2121(08)_FV.1\"];
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the data flow within an FSA node. It starts with an 'Input port transceiver' at the bottom, which feeds into a 'Flow lookup, shaping and policing' block. This block has bidirectional connections to 'Standard L3 routing' (above) and 'Flow state memory' (to the left). The 'Flow lookup, shaping and policing' block then feeds into a 'Switching' block. The 'Switching' block feeds into an 'Output flow management' block, which in turn feeds into an 'Output port transceiver'. Finally, the 'Output port transceiver' has a downward arrow pointing to the reference 'Y.2121(08)\_FV.1'.
+
+Block diagram of an FSA node implementation showing data flow from input transceiver through flow lookup, switching, and output transceiver.
+
+**Figure V.1 – Example implementation illustrating an FSA node**
+
+Once the packet is identified with a flow record which includes the agreed rate, the flow can be policed and thus the total output load on a port controlled to any desired loading. New flows can be accepted by examining the remaining capacity and assigning a rate to the flow. MRS flows may be controlled not to exceed some load limit, but if too many arrive, they could be accepted as "discard first" or rejected if necessary. Thus, the ability to support the envisioned QoS signalling protocol only requires a modest memory and logic capability which need not add any significant cost to the FSA node, and in fact saves cost by reducing the routing logic.
+
+**Appendix VI**
+
+**Out-of-band signalling with a central admission entity**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+Under assumption that a central admission entity such as RACF performs the admission function accurately, the messaging overhead for the response and the confirmation is not required. This we call the simplified FSA signalling.
+
+The simplified FSA signalling can further benefit by combining with the proxy signalling. In this case, any registered UES for FSA treatment, without having the FSA signalling capability, can simply initiate a call. Then through the call-level authorization and admission process, the IP-level traffic parameters (e.g., RACF traffic descriptor) are notified to the RACF. The RACF then distributes the traffic descriptor to the appropriate ingress edge node, which is the signalling proxy. The proxy maps the IP-level traffic descriptor distributed by the RACF to the FSA parameters, prior to sending the start packet. The UESs then do not have to register the individual FSA parameters to the proxy. The simplified signalling procedure is depicted in Figure VI.1.
+
+
+
+Detailed description of Figure VI.1: The diagram shows the interaction between several entities: UES (User Equipment Station), SCF (Service Control Function), NACF (Network Attachment Control Function), and RACF (Resource and Admission Control Function). Below them is a 'Flow aggregation network' consisting of several FSA (Flow State Aware) nodes and an nFSA node leading to the 'core'. The signalling steps are numbered: 1. Service request from UES to SCF. 2. Resource request from SCF to RACF. 3. Policy and resource check within RACF. 4. Subscription check between RACF and NACF. 5. Resource commitment and flow descriptor distribution from RACF to the first FSA node (ingress edge node). 6. Resource confirm from RACF to SCF. 7. Service acceptance from SCF to UES. 8. Start packet and subsequent data packets from UES through the FSA nodes.
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UES
+ participant SCF
+ participant RACF
+ participant NACF
+ participant FSA as Ingress FSA Node
+ participant Network as Flow Aggregation Network
+
+ UES->>SCF: 1. Service request
+ SCF->>RACF: 2. Resource request
+ Note over RACF: 3. Policy and resource check
+ RACF<->>NACF: 4. Subscription check
+ RACF->>FSA: 5. Resource commitment and flow descriptor distribution
+ RACF->>SCF: 6. Resource confirm
+ SCF->>UES: 7. Service acceptance
+ UES->>Network: 8. Start packet and subsequent data packets
+
+```
+
+**Figure VI.1 – Simplified signalling procedure**
+
+Figure VI.1 – Simplified signalling procedure
+
+- 1) A UES requests a service for a call.
+- 2) The SCF requests for available resource to the RACF.
+- 3) The RACF checks the applicable policy to the call, thus to the flow, then checks for the available resources in the network.
+- 4) The RACF also checks for the subscription status.
+- 5) Upon passing the checks, the RACF decides to admit and commit resource to the call. The RACF also distributes the IP-level flow descriptor. If any of the ingress edge nodes work as a signalling proxy, then such an edge node maps the IP level flow descriptor into the FSA QoS parameters such as service context, burst tolerance and delay priority. Those FSA parameters are stored in the ingress edge node.
+- 6) The RACF then confirms the available resource.
+- 7) The SCF notifies the UES of the service acceptance.
+
+40 Rec. ITU-T Y.2121 (01/2008)
+
+- 8) The UES generates the in-band FSA request signal. Every FSA in the path recognizes it, and stores the FSA parameters for the flow. If the ingress edge node performs as a proxy, the UES just transmits the ordinary data packet. The ingress edge node realizes the first data packet sent from the UES and generates the start packet using the FSA parameter mapped from the IP-level flow descriptor.
+
+It is likely that the central admission entity examines only the requested data rate of a flow, which corresponds to the requested rate in FSA. Other parameters such as preference indicator, service context, burst tolerance and delay priority can be inferred from the IP-level flow descriptor received from the central admission entity.
+
+In summary, the negotiation procedure can be through the complete in-band signalling (including the response and the confirmation) or the in-band signalling plus the authorization signalling to the central admission entity. In the latter case, the start packet can be generated at the ingress edge node by mapping the central admission entity IP level descriptor (such as RACF traffic descriptor) to FSA parameters.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T I.371] ITU-T Recommendation I.371 (2004), *Traffic control and congestion control in B-ISDN*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2003] IETF RFC 2003 (1996), *IP encapsulation within IP*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2748] IETF RFC 2748 (2000), *The COPS (Common Open Policy Service) Protocol*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2868] IETF RFC 2868 (2000), *RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3270] IETF RFC 3270 (2002), *Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Support of Differentiated Services*.
+<>
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2213
+
+(09/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+---
+
+**NGN service requirements and capabilities for
+network aspects of applications and services
+using tag-based identification**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2213
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, followed by "International Telecommunication Union" in a smaller font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2213**
+
+# **NGN service requirements and capabilities for network aspects of applications and services using tag-based identification**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2213 describes high-level service requirements and NGN capability requirements needed to support applications and services using tag-based identification. Several examples of applications and services using tag-based identification are also described with scenarios. The scope of this Recommendation is limited to applications and services using tag-based identification and they are distinguished by the following three mandatory elements: ID tag, ID terminal and identifier.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2213 was approved on 12 September 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedure.
+
+### **Keywords**
+
+Bar code, capabilities, capability requirements, ID tag, ID terminal, identifier, identifier resolution, RFID, service requirements and tag-based identification.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2009
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 Tag-based identification applications and services description and high-level
reference service architecture ..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Basic characteristics of tag-based identification applications and services ... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Impact of tag-based identification applications and services on the
network..... | 5 |
+| 6.3 Reference service architecture model..... | 5 |
+| 7 Service requirements of tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 6 |
+| 7.1 Multi-identifier interpretation requirements..... | 6 |
+| 7.2 Identifier resolution ..... | 6 |
+| 7.3 ID terminal and ID tag management ..... | 7 |
+| 7.4 Content distribution control..... | 7 |
+| 7.5 Privacy management ..... | 7 |
+| 7.6 Location-based services support..... | 8 |
+| 7.7 Service quality control..... | 8 |
+| 7.8 Application transaction and traffic requirements ..... | 8 |
+| 8 NGN capabilities for tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 8 |
+| 8.1 Requirements for extensions or additions to NGN release 1 capabilities ..... | 9 |
+| 8.2 Requirements supported by existing NGN release 1 capabilities ..... | 10 |
+| Appendix I – Non-NGN high-level service requirements ..... | 11 |
+| I.1 General requirements for identifiers..... | 11 |
+| I.2 Requirements for identification of identifier schemes ..... | 11 |
+| I.3 Requirements related to application data encoding..... | 11 |
+| I.4 Requirements for identification service interworking..... | 12 |
+| I.5 Requirements for location information management..... | 12 |
+| I.6 Requirements related to management of application mobility..... | 12 |
+| I.7 Requirements related to traceability..... | 12 |
+| I.8 Requirements related to identifier filtering ..... | 13 |
+| Appendix II – Classification of tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 14 |
+| II.1 Overview of tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 14 |
+| II.2 Classification of tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 15 |
+| II.3 Examples of tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 15 |
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| II.4 Evaluation of tag-based identification applications and services..... | 16 |
+| Appendix III – Example scenarios of tag-based identification applications and services..... | 20 |
+| III.1 Closed-domain tag-based identification applications and services..... | 20 |
+| III.2 B2B tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 21 |
+| III.3 B2C tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 22 |
+| III.4 B2B2C tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 23 |
+| III.5 C2C tag-based identification applications and services ..... | 24 |
+| Bibliography ..... | 25 |
+
+## Introduction
+
+Numerous applications have already incorporated identifiers to support differentiated services, where identifiers are mainly used for logical identification. Emerging applications, whose examples are described in Appendices II and III, require also that logical identification be associated with physical objects. This Recommendation expects that a relationship between physical and logical objects is maintained and assumes that applications and services using tag-based identification are based on such a relationship. This relationship makes a wide variety of business opportunities available: for example, passport numbers may be applied to physical objects for identification and each physical object, i.e., passport, may be associated with a logical object such as a text content, application program, mobile executable code, or data record.
+
+Applications and services using tag-based identification adopted and deployed widely in various business fields have used identifiers as a means for identifying physical and logical objects. Consequently, their market volume is being expanded dramatically. In addition to use cases of identifier in business fields, physical and logical objects with an identifier can enable applications and services using tag-based identification in consumer fields as well.
+
+Existing applications and services using tag-based identification have been exploited in business-to-business (B2B) fields, but currently they are expanding to business-to-consumer (B2C) and business-to-business-to-consumer (B2B2C) fields as shown in clause II.3. Both B2B and B2C/B2B2C tag-based identification applications and services basically have similar service requirements. Additionally, B2C/B2B2C-specific service requirements and related challenges for NGN are also examined in this Recommendation, such as privacy management, identifier resolution, management, etc.
+
+Identifier information in such applications and services using tag-based identification works as the key information used to retrieve related contents, execute certain application programs, point to a specific information resource, make an association with a specific object, and so on. The identification feature supporting hyperlink-like access will enable NGN applications and services to be performed and provided to consumers in easier and more convenient ways. For example, consumers do not have to type a URL in a phone user interface because the tag-based identification supports that automatically.
+
+Since a number of applications and services using tag-based identification are expected to be deployed widely in NGN, the NGN architecture framework and the NGN functional entities have to support them.
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2213
+
+## NGN service requirements and capabilities for network aspects of applications and services using tag-based identification
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation covers extensions to NGN release 1 capabilities in order to support tag-based identification applications and services in the NGN environment and builds upon [b-ITU-T Y.Sup1] and [ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+The scope of this Recommendation is limited to tag-based identification applications and services distinguished by the following three mandatory elements: ID tag, ID terminal and Identifier. These applications and/or services use identifiers only read from ID tags by ID terminals.
+
+This Recommendation covers:
+
+- description and scope of tag-based identification applications and services with some example scenarios;
+- high-level service requirements of tag-based identification applications and services; and
+- extended or new NGN capabilities based on the high-level service requirements.
+
+Functional requirements and related NGN architecture extensions for support of the described capabilities are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T X.668] Recommendation ITU-T X.668 (2008) | ISO/IEC 9834-9:2008, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Procedures for the operation of OSI Registration Authorities: Registration of object identifier arcs for applications and services using tag-based identification.*
+
+[ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), *NGN release 1 requirements.*
+
+[ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1.*
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 application network interface (ANI)** [b-ITU-T Y.2012]: Interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between applications and NGN elements. The ANI offers capabilities and resources needed for realization of applications.
+
+**3.1.2 end user** [b-ITU-T M.3050.1]: The actual user of the products or services offered by the enterprise. The end user consumes the product or service.
+
+**3.1.3 identifier** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects). Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization.
+
+NOTE – Identifiers can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private identifiers are normally not disclosed to third parties).
+
+**3.1.4 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: The identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element) that may be resolved/translated into an address.
+
+**3.1.5 service** [b-ITU-T Z.100]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+**3.1.6 user** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: It can be an end user, a person, a subscriber, a system, an equipment, a terminal (e.g., FAX, PC), a (functional) entity, a process, an application, a provider, or a corporate network.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 associated information:** The information which is associated with an identifier.
+
+NOTE – Example associated information instances are URL, URN, IP address, E.164 number, etc.
+
+**3.2.2 B2B tag-based identification applications and services:** This term refers to tag-based identification applications and services based on business relationships which involve exchanges of identification information between business partners.
+
+**3.2.3 B2B2C tag-based identification applications and services:** This term refers to tag-based identification applications and services based on integrated business relationships of B2B and B2C which involve exchanges of identification information.
+
+**3.2.4 B2C tag-based identification applications and services:** This term refers to tag-based identification applications and services based on business relationships which involve exchanges of identification information between business and consumer.
+
+**3.2.5 C2C tag-based identification applications and services:** This term refers to tag-based identification applications and services based on business relationships which involve exchanges of identification information between consumers.
+
+**3.2.6 forward identifier resolution:** A function to resolve an identifier into an associated information.
+
+**3.2.7 identifier resolution:** A function to resolve an identifier into associated information (see "Forward identifier resolution") and vice versa (see "Reverse identifier resolution").
+
+**3.2.8 identifier scheme:** It is a numbering scheme that specifies the format and structure of the identifiers used within that scheme.
+
+**3.2.9 ID tag:** A physical object which stores one or more identifiers and optionally application data such as name, title, price, address, etc.
+
+NOTE – It may have a communication capability with an ID terminal depending on implementations.
+
+**3.2.10 ID terminal:** A device with a data reading and optional writing capability which reads (and optionally writes) identifier(s) and optionally application data from/into an ID tag.
+
+NOTE – The data reading (and optionally writing) capability depends on implementations.
+
+**3.2.11 reverse identifier resolution (or backward identifier resolution):** A function to resolve an associated information into a corresponding identifier. It is the reverse operation of the forward identifier resolution.
+
+**3.2.12 tag-based identification:** The process of specifically identifying a physical or logical object from other physical or logical objects by using identifiers stored on an ID tag.
+
+**3.2.13 tag-based identification applications and services:** Applications and services which use tag-based identification.
+
+**3.2.14 tag-terminal interface:** A communication interface between ID tag and ID terminal. The ID terminal reads identifier(s) and optionally application data from the ID tag and/or writes them into the ID tag.
+
+NOTE – The interface medium may be infrared, RF, camera, optical scanner, and galvanic current. Communication techniques depend on the interface medium.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1D | 1-Dimension |
+| 2D | 2-Dimension |
+| ANI | Application Network Interface |
+| B2B | Business-to-Business |
+| B2B2C | Business-to-Business-to-Consumer |
+| B2C | Business-to-Consumer |
+| C2C | Consumer-to-Consumer |
+| DB | Database |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| ENUM | TElephone NUmber Mapping |
+| FAX | Facsimile |
+| GPS | Global Positioning System |
+| ID | Identification |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IrDA | Infrared Direct Access |
+| ISBN | International Standard Book Number |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MAC | Medium Access Control |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| OECD | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development |
+| OID | Object Identifier |
+| PC | Personal Computer |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| POS | Point Of Sale |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RF | Radio Frequency |
+| RFID | Radio Frequency Identification |
+
+| | |
+|-----|-------------------------------|
+| SCM | Supply Chain Management |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| TTI | Tag Terminal Interface |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| URN | Uniform Resource Name |
+| WAP | Wireless Application Protocol |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Tag-based identification applications and services description and high-level reference service architecture**
+
+There are many applications and services which use identifiers over various operation layers. Here are examples: MAC address is a data link layer identifier; IP is a network layer identifier; port number is a transport layer identifier; cookie identifiers associated with web applications are session layer identifiers; and passport numbers are application layer identifiers.
+
+This Recommendation does not cover all the applications and services using identifiers but is limited to applications and services using tag-based identification. Clause 6.1 describes the basic characteristics of tag-based identification applications and services covered in this Recommendation. Clause 6.2 describes some expected impacts on NGN. Clause 6.3 describes a high-level reference service architecture model.
+
+### **6.1 Basic characteristics of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+Use of identifiers in this Recommendation involves consideration of the following four elements:
+
+- identifier;
+- ID tag;
+- ID terminal; and
+- associated information.
+
+Every tag-based identification application and service is described using the following three mandatory elements: Identifier; ID tag; and ID terminal. Applications and services which are not based on these three elements are out of scope of this Recommendation. The associated information element is optional.
+
+Using this approach, RFID is a wireless communication technology used to transmit the identifiers stored in an RFID tag to an RFID terminal. Where the RFID tag is an ID tag, the RFID terminal is an ID terminal, the identifier stored in the RFID tag is just an identifier, and the information associated with the identifier is associated information.
+
+#### **6.1.1 Identifier**
+
+The identifier is described in clause 3.
+
+#### **6.1.2 ID tag**
+
+The identifier is required to be stored on the ID tag. The ID tag, which acts as a storage medium, is required to be read by the ID terminal. Examples of ID tags are 1D or 2D barcode tags, smartcards and RFID tags.
+
+#### **6.1.3 ID terminal**
+
+The ID terminal is required to read the identifier stored on the ID tag and the identifier is required to be transmitted to the ID terminal. The ID terminal is required to have a data reader. Examples of data reading techniques are RF, camera, optical scanner, IrDA, galvanic wire-line, manual key-in, etc.
+
+Additionally, the ID terminal may have a capability to write identifier(s) and optionally application data on ID tags.
+
+#### **6.1.4 Associated information**
+
+The identifier may be associated with application/service-related information. Such associations may be maintained by a directory service. An identifier may have multiple associations.
+
+### **6.2 Impact of tag-based identification applications and services on the network**
+
+According to the assumption of growth of telecommunications data traffic, transactions are expected to increase significantly when wide adoption of tag-based identification applications and services are achieved. On the other hand, even though total traffic will show dramatic growth during the course of dissemination of broadband services, traffic generated by tag-based identification applications and services will make up only small part of the total traffic. That is, tag-based identification applications and services will show a tremendous number of transactions but with a relatively small amount of traffic. Such transaction increases have various impacts on NGN.
+
+Network resource management is necessary to cope with such transaction increases generated by tag-based identification applications and services, and to avoid access concentration on specific resources, in addition to the appropriate traffic management of NGN.
+
+### **6.3 Reference service architecture model**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services are provided through NGN as shown in Figure 1. Three interfaces called TTI, UNI and ANI are involved; however, the TTI is out of scope of NGN. Tag-based identification applications and services are provided to end users through the following three operations with the above interfaces: identifier reading, forward identifier resolution and information access from ID terminal's point of view.
+
+An ID terminal reads identifier(s) from an ID tag via TTI. It requests forward identifier resolution(s) and receives corresponding associated information. If the associated information received is a URL, the ID terminal accesses the information content pointed by the URL. Thus, the forward identifier resolution is followed by a content retrieval operation through NGN.
+
+
+
+id identifier
+r-id reader identifier
+w-id writer identifier
+o-id others' identifier
+TTI Tag Terminal Interface
+UNI User Network Interface
+ANI Application Network Interface
+
+Y.2213(08)\_F01
+
+Figure 1 – Reference service architecture model. The diagram illustrates the architecture of a tag-based identification system. On the left, a 'Tag' with an 'id' is connected to an 'ID terminal' via a 'TTI' (Tag Terminal Interface). The 'ID terminal' contains a 'Network attachment' block with four components: 'Reader1' (r-id), 'Reader2' (r-id), 'Writer' (w-id), and 'Others' (o-id). This terminal connects to the 'NGN Scope' via a 'UNI' (User Network Interface). The 'NGN Scope' is a large dashed box containing two main strata: the 'Service stratum' (yellow) with 'Application support functions & service support functions' and 'Service control functions', and the 'Transport stratum' (green) with 'Transport control functions' and 'Transport functions'. The 'NGN Scope' connects to an 'ID terminal' on the right via an 'ANI' (Application Network Interface). A legend at the bottom left defines the identifiers: id (identifier), r-id (reader identifier), w-id (writer identifier), o-id (others' identifier), TTI (Tag Terminal Interface), UNI (User Network Interface), and ANI (Application Network Interface). The reference Y.2213(08)\_F01 is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Reference service architecture model**
+
+## 7 Service requirements of tag-based identification applications and services
+
+The following are high-level service requirements for tag-based identification applications and services. These requirements identify the required extensions to the set of NGN release 1 capabilities. Requirements in Appendix I do not impact NGN capabilities and they are provided for informative purposes in order to develop tag-based identification applications and services over the NGN environment.
+
+### 7.1 Multi-identifier interpretation requirements
+
+An identifier constituted by sub-identifier elements is required to be interpreted into sub-identifiers by its structure information. An ID terminal is required to contain the structure information of the supported identifiers.
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirement to support multi-identifier interpretation:
+
+- identifier structure information may be provided to an ID terminal.
+
+### 7.2 Identifier resolution
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following identifier resolution requirements:
+
+- 1) it is recommended to provide forward identifier resolution from an identifier to associated information;
+- 2) support of a reverse identifier resolution from associated information to a corresponding identifier may be provided (see Note 1);
+
+NOTE 1 – The reverse identifier resolution provides a means to find a specific identifier of an object and its location in the physical world, from the associated information of the object. This is like searching for a book and its location in a library by using the library catalogue.
+
+- 3) it is recommended to support one-to-one association between an identifier and associated information;
+
+- 4) support of one-to-many associations between an identifier and associated information instances may be provided (see Note 2);
+
+NOTE 2 – The one-to-many associations enable different usages of an identifier among users of the identifier. For example, manufacturers may use identifiers for production planning and material/parts inventory control while retailers may use the same identifiers for store inventory management, out of stock alerts, anti-theft, etc., and consumers may use the same identifiers for product information retrieval.
+
+- 5) different associated information for an identifier may be resolved according to usage context of the identifier, for example, who/when/where/why, which is called context-dependent forward identifier resolution (see Note 3).
+
+NOTE 3 – Even though the same identifiers may be read by different users, each user is expecting different services and/or different information. Different services and different information are usually managed by different resources in different network locations. Therefore, the context-dependent forward identifier resolution is necessary to support this scenario. This forward identifier resolution will respond with different network addresses according to the context even though the same identifier is read.
+
+### **7.3 ID terminal and ID tag management**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirements for remote management of ID terminals and ID tags:
+
+- 1) it is recommended to manage ID terminals so as to read identifiers and relevant information from ID tags;
+- 2) it is recommended to manage some types of ID tags' operation mode (e.g., active RFID tags may be booted up and/or put in sleeping mode remotely);
+- 3) it is recommended to manage ID terminal and ID tag aspects such as:
+ - radio operations;
+ - networking operations;
+ - software update;
+ - time synchronization;
+ - device identifiers (e.g., r-id, w-id and o-id in Figure 1);
+ - identifier structure information;
+ - filtering rules update; and
+ - location registration and management;
+- 4) when ID terminals and ID tags are managed locally, ID terminals and ID tags may report management information such as that related to the aspects listed above.
+
+### **7.4 Content distribution control**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirement for content distribution control:
+
+- it is recommended that facilities for control of information content distribution be supported (to accommodate possible commercial, regulatory and privacy requirements).
+
+### **7.5 Privacy management**
+
+Some of the NGN services may have privacy impact for the users. Privacy invasions caused by usage of identifiers, ID tags and ID terminals may be summarized as follows: association threats, location threats, and information leakage threats. As an example, RFID technology may facilitate access to information pertaining to the merchandise that individuals wear and/or carry, and may
+
+create an opportunity for abuse of this information such as tracking an individual's location or invading his/her privacy.
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirements:
+
+- 1) it is recommended to meet the guidelines described in [b-OECD-Privacy-Protection];
+NOTE 1 – National situations may add other guidelines and obligations.
+- 2) it is recommended to provide a privacy protection capability as specified in [ITU-T Y.2201];
+- 3) it is recommended to manage PII protection policies in consistency with the general approach for security in NGN [ITU-T Y.2701]; and
+- 4) the security approach for support of tag-based identification applications and services is recommended to be consistent with the general approach for security in NGN [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+NOTE 2 – As the variety of NGN services is very wide, it is not possible to define good practices for all the possible situations. Furthermore, privacy impacts of a particular service may not be obvious. So, it is recommended to do a privacy impact assessment to identify privacy risks and take measures to mitigate them.
+
+### **7.6 Location-based services support**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirements:
+
+- 1) location information of ID terminal and/or ID tag is recommended to be registered (either statically or dynamically);
+- 2) location information of ID terminal and/or ID tag may be provided if requested by tag-based applications and services.
+
+### **7.7 Service quality control**
+
+There are many tag-based identification applications and services for business and consumer purposes. Some of them can be combined and interworked via various business agreements and partnerships. Such tag-based identification applications and services may have different service quality requirements.
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirement on service quality control:
+
+- it is recommended to provide different service qualities according to service quality requirements.
+
+### **7.8 Application transaction and traffic requirements**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services place the following requirements on both NGN and application/service provider's resources:
+
+- 1) it is required to manage the transaction volume generated by tag-based identification applications and services; and
+- 2) it is recommended to be able to avoid access concentration to single resources.
+
+## **8 NGN capabilities for tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services use NGN release 1 capabilities but require some extended or new capabilities. The requirements given below are provided from a high-level perspective and are not intended to constitute precise functional requirements for NGN entities.
+
+### **8.1 Requirements for extensions or additions to NGN release 1 capabilities**
+
+Based on the high-level service requirements described in clause 7, this clause specifies requirements for extensions or additions to NGN release 1 capabilities.
+
+#### **8.1.1 Multi-identifier interpretation**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.1, the following requirements are required to support the multi-identifier interpretation:
+
+- 1) NGN is required to support the OID-based identification scheme specified by [ITU-T X.668] in order to distinguish identifier schemes unambiguously for tag-based identification applications and services; and
+- 2) NGN may provide structure information of identifier schemes.
+
+#### **8.1.2 Identifier resolution**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.2, the following requirements are recommended to support identifier resolution capabilities of NGN:
+
+- 1) NGN is recommended to provide forward identifier resolution;
+- 2) NGN may provide reverse identifier resolution;
+- 3) NGN may provide identifier resolution of multiple associations between an identifier and multiple associated information instances;
+- 4) NGN may provide context-dependent forward identifier resolution, depending on usage context of identifiers;
+- 5) NGN identifier resolution is recommended to scale in order to handle increased demand for identifier resolutions; and
+- 6) NGN identifier resolution is prohibited from being affected by a single point of failure.
+
+#### **8.1.3 Privacy management**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.5, tag-based identification applications and services place the following requirement on NGN:
+
+- NGN is recommended to adopt good privacy practices and provide a PII protection capability.
+
+This capability is recommended to be consistent with the general approach for security in NGN [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+#### **8.1.4 Content distribution control**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.4, tag-based identification applications and services place the following requirement on NGN for control of content distribution:
+
+- NGN is recommended to support capability for content distribution control.
+
+#### **8.1.5 Device management**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.3, following requirements are recommended to support remote device management of ID terminals and ID tags:
+
+- 1) NGN is recommended to support remote device management of ID terminal and ID tag aspects such as those listed in clause 7.3; and
+- 2) NGN may receive updated management information of ID terminal and ID tag aspects such as those listed in clause 7.3.
+
+#### **8.1.6 Profile management**
+
+##### **8.1.6.1 User profile**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.5, tag-based identification applications and services may use NGN release 1 user profile management capability with some extensions of user profile attributes as follows:
+
+- NGN is recommended to support user profile management satisfying privacy management requirements.
+
+##### **8.1.6.2 Device profile**
+
+Based on the service requirements in clause 7.3, tag-based identification applications and services may use NGN release 1 device profile management capability with some extensions of device profile attributes as follows:
+
+- NGN is recommended to support device profile management enabling remote management of ID terminal and ID tag aspects such as those listed in clause 7.3.
+
+#### **8.1.7 Quality of service**
+
+The transaction and traffic-related requirements in clause 7.8 place these additional requirements on NGN QoS capabilities:
+
+- 1) NGN is required to support QoS capabilities to sustain the transaction volume caused by tag-based identification applications and services; and
+- 2) NGN is recommended to support QoS capabilities to be able to avoid access concentration to single resources (e.g., identifier resolution).
+
+### **8.2 Requirements supported by existing NGN release 1 capabilities**
+
+Based on the high-level service requirements described in clause 7, this clause specifies requirements supported by existing NGN release 1 capabilities.
+
+#### **8.2.1 Service quality control**
+
+The service quality control requirement specified in clause 7.7 is supported by existing NGN release 1 QoS capabilities.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Location management**
+
+NGN release 1 provides location management capability which determines and reports information regarding the location of users and devices within NGN.
+
+The requirements in clause 7.6 are supported by existing NGN release 1 location management capability.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Non-NGN high-level service requirements
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes high-level service requirements which enable new application/service provider functions and which will not affect the functional capabilities of the NGN. These requirements apply to tag-based identification applications and services. [b-ITU-T F.771] includes some service requirements from the point of view of multimedia information access.
+
+### I.1 General requirements for identifiers
+
+An identifier is a fundamental component of tag-based identification applications and services. Applications and services may be triggered by identifiers. Identifiers have the following requirements:
+
+- 1) identifiers are required to be unique, i.e., the identifier scheme is required to allow for uniqueness of identifiers;
+- 2) identifiers may have a life time;
+NOTE – The lifetime requirement depends on applications and services.
+- 3) identifiers may be managed by an identifier lifecycle management capability;
+- 4) identifiers may be validated. For example, life time or revocation of identifiers may require validation of the identifiers;
+- 5) identifiers may be used for registration or authorization [b-ITU-T Y.2091];
+- 6) identifiers may be either "public to all networks", "shared between a limited number of networks", or "private to a specific network" [b-ITU-T Y.2091]; and
+- 7) an identifier may be used by more than one application/service.
+
+### I.2 Requirements for identification of identifier schemes
+
+Identifiers may be assigned using different identifier schemes and the identifiers created are required to allow for unique identification of the scheme used to create the identifier.
+
+ID terminals of tag-based identification applications and services have the following requirement:
+
+- identifiers assigned by a certain identifier scheme are required to be distinguishable from identifiers assigned by other identifier schemes, because NGN may handle various identifier schemes.
+
+### I.3 Requirements related to application data encoding
+
+Identifier information may be encoded optionally with other application data like title, name, price, etc., into an ID tag. The following requirement allows for application data processing:
+
+- application data is required to be encoded in a standardized way on ID tags that are used by tag-based identification applications and services.
+
+For example, tag-based identification service providers can be retail shops, pubs, restaurants, taxi drivers associations, museums, galleries, movie production companies, and so on. They may want to provide enhanced and differentiated services to their consumers, which might require varying amounts of information to be captured as application data items, e.g., price, name, title, or location to be stored locally on the ID tag. To make this possible, application data needs to be stored in a standardized format (e.g., [b-ISO/IEC 15961] and [b-ISO/IEC 15962]).
+
+### **I.4 Requirements for identification service interworking**
+
+Various tag-based identification applications and services have already been deployed with their own service network and without cooperative relationships because an identifier has been implemented in various fashions (e.g., ID tag types such as 1D or 2D barcode, RFID tags, contact or contactless smart cards) and service networks have been established separately. The following requirements are intended to facilitate interworking among these service networks:
+
+- an interworking capability is recommended to be provided to allow interworking of different tag-based identification applications and services.
+
+Following example application cases are possible:
+
+- B2C tag-based identification applications and services can be combined with B2B into B2B2C application and service models.
+- Bar code-triggered and RFID-triggered tag-based identification applications and services might be established independently but they may correspond to the same object. Integration requires interworking between these two tag-based identification applications and services.
+
+### **I.5 Requirements for location information management**
+
+Location-based application models need location information. In particular, they need location information with regard to a device. For example, applications may require ID terminal location information or ID tag location information, and will know who is to use this location information.
+
+With regard to use of location information, the ID terminal and ID tag locations can be usually assumed as being the same, because the user has to read ID tags usually within a few metres at a maximum. However, how to get the location information for the ID terminal and ID tag is different because:
+
+- 1) user location, that is an ID terminal location, can be provided with an accuracy to about 10 metres by using GPS-based solutions; to a few hundreds of metres by using cell information from cellular networks; and variable accuracy depending on access network technologies used, as specified in [ITU-T Y.2201]; and
+- 2) ID tag location may be included in the ID tag itself, or retrieved from a service provider via an identifier.
+
+### **I.6 Requirements related to management of application mobility**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following management of application mobility requirement:
+
+- application mobility is recommended to be provided among different tag-based identification applications and services, because an ID tag might be moved among them with a requirement that their communication associations be retained.
+
+Application mobility means a communication association is handed over to other applications. A typical example is given for a transportation application. A sophisticated transportation system may charge for a single fare for the route from A to C via B where two transportation fare applications are associated from A to B and B to C. So, the association of a fare application between A and B has to be handed over to the other fare application between B and C in order to support the single fare association.
+
+### **I.7 Requirements related to traceability**
+
+Traceability relates to object traceability and usage traceability. The object traceability can be seen as syntactic tracking of an object so every read point during the life time of the object can be traced regardless of application-perspective usages.
+
+The usage traceability can be seen as semantic tracking of an object so how the object has been treated and what the object has been used for could be traced.
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following traceability-related requirements:
+
+- it is recommended to provide the information on what ID terminals have read an ID tag for an object; and
+- it is recommended to provide the information on what tag-based identification applications and services have read an ID tag for an object.
+
+### **I.8 Requirements related to identifier filtering**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have the following filtering requirements:
+
+- users, applications modules, middleware functions, or lower-layer read functions do not have to process unnecessary ID tags or identifier schemes. Proper filtering is recommended to be provided.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+## Classification of tag-based identification applications and services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes an application and service trend toward the social infrastructure, classification of relevant applications and services and some typical applications and service examples. It also describes how to identify tag-based identification applications and services that are covered by this Recommendation, by evaluating them with respect to the key elements identified in clause 6.1.
+
+### II.1 Overview of tag-based identification applications and services
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services have already been widely adopted as business applications since its innovation. Recently, B2B tag-based identification applications and services have rapidly evolved.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the development model of tag-based identification applications and services, showing the progression from Core region to Business region to Social infrastructure. The model is divided into three main regions: Core region (red), Business region (blue), and Social infrastructure (green). A large green arrow points from the Core region towards the Social infrastructure, indicating the direction of development.
+
+**Core region (red):** This region is associated with the 'Necessity' category. It includes applications such as Manufacturing, Shipping, Inventory, Auto-check, Anti-theft, and Use by date management. A callout box provides an example: 'A certain company's case' showing 'Theft 1~3.5%' and 'Out of stock 10~11%', concluding that 'Tag-based identification prevents 100 million USD loss'.
+
+**Business region (blue):** This region is associated with the 'Convenience' category. It includes applications such as SCM, Advertisement comparison, Web site linkage, Electronic catalog, Multi-function remote controller, and Name card management. A callout box states: 'Tag-based identifications for the merchandise management are used for the other purposes of the specific users.'
+
+**Social infrastructure (green):** This region is associated with the 'Safety' category. It includes applications such as Recall alert, Automatic material search, Lost and found, Recycle enhancement, Environment management, and Baggage control. A callout box states: 'ID tags are attached to almost everything, then, services for general public are created. (e.g., services by municipal government)'.
+
+The diagram also shows a progression of applications from left to right: Manufacturing → Shipping → Inventory → Auto-check → Anti-theft → Use by date management → Advertisement comparison → Web site linkage → Electronic catalog → Multi-function remote controller → Name card management → Recall alert → Automatic material search → Lost and found → Recycle enhancement → Environment management → Baggage control.
+
+Y.2213(08)\_FII.1
+
+Diagram illustrating the development model of tag-based identification applications and services, showing the progression from Core region to Business region to Social infrastructure, with various applications and services categorized by Necessity, Convenience, and Safety.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Tag-based identification application development toward social infrastructure**
+
+Figure II.1 shows a development model of tag-based identification applications and services from an application perspective. B2B applications are realized at first because they may be expected to justify the large investment of the initial implementations. An industrial entity (in many cases, the manufacturer of an object) starts the assignment of identifier to an object and the attachment of an ID tag to that object. For example, many entities are going to use the same identifier and ID tag for different purposes throughout the supply chain management (SCM). Manufacturers use these identifiers and ID tags for production control; transport companies for shipping control; wholesalers for inventory control; and retailers for inventory control; auto check-out; and anti-theft measures, respectively. This "core region" of tag-based identification applications adopted by a relevant industry is facilitated by the business necessity.
+
+Once ID tags for objects are widely adopted by industries and resolving functions from identifiers to services and relevant databases are commonly used, many new derivatives of the "core region" applications are created by third parties for B2C/B2B2C applications; these are identified as "Business Region" in Figure II.1. The same identifiers and ID tags applied by the industrial entities
+
+(i.e., manufacturers) are not only used for the primary industrial purposes (e.g., SCM), but also for the benefits of consumers (e.g., electronic information (instruction manual and/or catalogue) delivery of the product triggered by an identifier, home delivery management of the physical object, and so on). The convenience for consumers becomes the driving force for these new B2C/B2B2C applications.
+
+In the further adoption of tag-based identification applications, it works for the improvement of social benefit. For example, information on the hazardous material used in consumer products is easily obtained by knowledge of the identifiers, which promotes enhancement of recycling and reduction of the environmental burden by the proper disposal by consumers. Tag-based identification applications are also quite effective for recall alerts and collection of the recalled products. In addition, ID tag-equipped "smart medicine" enables automatic alarms, when any ill effects occur with simultaneous usage of two medicines. In this stage, tag-based identification applications are incorporated into the social infrastructure.
+
+Throughout the development to the wider usage of the tag-based identification applications and services in Figure II.1, interoperability among B2B and B2C/B2B2C tag-based identification applications and services is an essential issue and the same or interoperable technical standards are utilized by multiple entities for multiple purposes.
+
+### **II.2 Classification of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+Tag-based identification applications and services can be classified according to two viewpoints: business relationships and usage types.
+
+From the business relationship viewpoint, tag-based identification applications and services can be classified into closed domain, B2B, B2C, B2B2C and C2C categories.
+
+From the usage type viewpoint, tag-based identification applications and services can be classified into reader-based and tag-based categories. The tag-based category does not apply to B2B applications.
+
+The reader-based type refers to the case where a user terminal is equipped with an identifier reader which is used to read an identifier from an ID tag. But the tag-based type refers to the case where a user terminal has an attached ID tag and other readers read an identifier from the terminal's ID tag.
+
+### **II.3 Examples of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+The feature of identification has been used in a barcode form for a long time for business purposes in retail shops, logistics, automotive and aviation, pharmaceutical industries, inventory management, manufacturing and processing, supply chain management, transportation, etc.
+
+Such identification is used:
+
+- to identify products at retail shops; and
+- to identify and route products, monitor delivery paths of products, exchange product-related information between business partners, and so on.
+
+The former type corresponds to a single enterprise scope without exchanging real-time business information between business partners. So, it can be just called a tag-based identification business application. Typical examples include:
+
+- inventory management;
+- security and access control;
+- agriculture;
+- library;
+- parking management.
+
+The latter type corresponds to a business relationship among multiple business partners. So, it can be called a B2B tag-based identification application because identification information is exchanged in a B2B manner. Typical examples include:
+
+- supply chain management;
+- food chain management;
+- manufacturing and processing;
+- transport and logistics;
+- pharmaceutical industry.
+
+Additionally identifier users may be human consumers. Information services and value-added services may be provided to consumers when the identifier information is processed. Such tag-based identification applications are called B2C tag-based identification applications. Examples of these include:
+
+- personal welfare and safety;
+- sports and leisure;
+- bus and subway route search;
+- advertisement and detail information retrieval;
+- on-line shopping;
+- payment;
+- drug safety;
+- location-based information service.
+
+Additionally a business partnership may integrate B2B with B2C applications so that B2B2C business associations may be developed. Examples of B2B2C tag-based identification applications include:
+
+- food chain information service;
+- home delivery service;
+- product origin check.
+
+Moreover C2C applications are also possible. A typical example is the case where a cell phone user uses his cell phone, which contains both an ID terminal and an ID tag, to read an identifier and application data from other cell phones. For example, one of two movie tickets, which a man bought and of which associated data was stored in his cell phone, could be transferred to a cellular phone of his girl friend. In this example, a movie ticket transfer can be performed directly between two terminals without the use of any network communication. Additionally, a movie ticket exchanged and displayed on a receiver's screen can have embedded advertisement information content which was provided via a network operation. Resultant applications will depend on implementations. So, C2C interactions may also be involved in, and require network functions.
+
+Example scenarios of tag-based identification applications and services are described in Appendix III.
+
+### **II.4 Evaluation of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+This clause provides examples of how to evaluate applications and services in the context of the key elements, so as to determine if they are covered by this Recommendation.
+
+**Table II.1 – Evaluation of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+| Application or service | Evaluation in the context of the key elements |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| General telecommunication service in which an E.164 identifier for the called party is used.
| Identifier: E.164
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifier is stored in human brain, a phone book, an electronic form, or otherwise.
ID terminal: Applicable: it is the telephone. The identifier is transmitted via manual key-in or dialing at the telephone.
Associated information: Applicable: an E.164 identifier can be mapped to a set of information resources via the ENUM technique so that an identifier resolution process may be followed.
Conclusion: [Invalid] As all of the three mandatory features are not present, it is not a tag-based service.
|
+| In the above service scenario an old father uses an identifier reader-equipped phone or terminal; an ID tag embedding an E.164 phone number for his son is affixed to a photograph for the son; he aims or touches his phone or ID terminal at/to the photograph; and then he gets an automated calling to his son.
| Identifier: E.164
ID tag: Applicable: an ID tag containing the identifier is affixed to the photograph.
ID terminal: Applicable: it is the phone or the ID terminal. The identifier is transmitted via RF, camera, or other identifier reading techniques to the phone or terminal.
Associated information: Not applicable.
Conclusion: [Valid] As all of the three mandatory elements are present, it is a tag-based service.
|
+| Internet network equipment use the IP addressing scheme to identify a termination point of datagram routing, resulting in distinguishing an IP network node over the global Internet.
| Identifier: IP address
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifier is stored at network equipment.
ID terminal: Not applicable: the identifier is transmitted on-line between network equipment, not between ID tag and ID terminal.
Associated information: Applicable: IP addresses can be mapped to domain names and DNS provides resolution of their mapping relationships.
Conclusion: [Invalid] As both an ID tag and an ID terminal are not involved, it is not a tag-based application.
|
+| TCP/IP applications use the IP and port addressing scheme to identify a transport end point.
| Identifier: A pair of IP/port of source and destination nodes
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifiers are stored in running application programs in computer systems.
ID terminal: Not applicable: the identifiers are transmitted on-line between the application programs, not between ID tag and ID terminal.
Associated information: Not applicable.
Conclusion: [Invalid] As both an ID tag and an ID terminal are not involved, it is not a tag-based application.
|
+
+**Table II.1 – Evaluation of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+| Application or service | Evaluation in the context of the key elements |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Web browsers use cookie identifiers to identify a semantic association over TCP connections in networked computer systems.
| Identifier: Cookie number
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifier is stored in running application programs in computer systems.
ID terminal: Not applicable: the identifier is transmitted on-line between the application programs, not between ID tag and ID terminal.
Associated information: Not applicable.
Conclusion: As both an ID tag and an ID terminal are not involved, it is not a tag-based application.
|
+| Book applications use ISBN (International Standard Book Number) to identify books.
| Identifier: ISBN
ID tag: Applicable: the identifier is stored mostly at a cover page of book in a barcode form.
ID terminal: Applicable: the identifier is transmitted via an optical scanner, that is, ID terminal.
Associated information: Applicable: the identifier is related to an information resource. An identifier resolution between them is required via a query process with a database system or via a communication protocol with a remote directory service.
Conclusion: [Valid] As all of the mandatory elements are present, it is a tag-based application.
|
+| Many applications use URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) to identify a network resource with describing access protocol, transport point, access authority, network and file system location, and query and fragment information.
| Identifier: URI: URI itself can be used as an identifier.
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifier is stored in running application programs in computer systems.
ID terminal: Not applicable: the identifier is transmitted on-line between the application programs.
Associated information: Not applicable: the identifier is self-descriptive by the URI specification.
Conclusion: [Invalid] As all of the mandatory elements are not present, it is not a tag-based application.
|
+| The government uses an identifier scheme to identify their people.
| Identifier: Passport number, for example.
ID tag: Applicable: the identifier is stored on a cover page in the passport.
ID terminal: Applicable: the identifier is transmitted via an optical scanner
Associated information: Applicable: an identifier resolution is required via a query process with a database system or via a communication protocol with a remote directory service.
Conclusion: [Valid] As all of the mandatory elements and other optional elements as well are present, it is a tag-based application.
|
+
+**Table II.1 – Evaluation of tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+| Application or service | Evaluation in the context of the key elements |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Every network node uses a MAC address to identify network nodes within a LAN scope. | Identifier: MAC address
ID tag: Not applicable: the identifier is stored in node systems.
ID terminal: Not applicable: the identifier is transmitted on-line between the node systems.
Associated information: Not applicable.
Conclusion: [Invalid] As all of the mandatory elements are not present, it is not a tag-based application. |
+| NOTE – "[Valid]" means the application or service is considered as a tag-based identification application or service by the evaluation result, and "[Invalid]" means the opposite case. | |
+
+## Appendix III
+
+## Example scenarios of tag-based identification applications and services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### III.1 Closed-domain tag-based identification applications and services
+
+The following tag-based identification applications operate within an enterprise scope which is not limited geographically. So they can work in a closed domain of a nation-wide or global enterprise network. The enterprise scope means identification operations are not associated with outer parties as shown in Figure III.1.
+
+A company installs multiple ID terminals within its factory. A proprietary inventory management system within a small work domain, for example, a library, can use this network configuration.
+
+
+
+Figure III.1: Small scale enterprise-scope configuration. The diagram shows an ID tag on the left emitting radio waves towards two ID terminals. These terminals are connected to a central cloud labeled 'Local network'. This network is then connected to a computer system consisting of a monitor, keyboard, and mouse, which is also linked to a 'Local DB' (database) represented by a cylinder icon. The label 'Y.2213(08)\_FIII.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure III.1 – Small scale enterprise-scope configuration**
+
+An enterprise network can be expanded nationwide in a closed domain as shown in Figure III.2.
+
+
+
+Figure III.2: Large scale enterprise-scope configuration. The diagram shows an ID tag on the left emitting radio waves towards two ID terminals. These terminals are connected to a central cloud labeled 'Local/Global network'. This network is connected to two computer systems, each with a monitor and keyboard. Each computer system is linked to a 'Middleware' block, represented by a grey arrow pointing right. These middleware blocks are then connected to a large vertical purple box labeled 'Enterprise system'. Inside this box are several stacked light blue boxes representing different system components: 'Transport Mgmt', 'Warehouse Mgmt', 'Order Mgmt', 'Visibility system', 'Production scheduling', 'POS', 'Shelf inventories', and 'Enterprise system' at the bottom. The label 'Y.2213(08)\_FIII.2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure III.2 – Large scale enterprise-scope configuration**
+
+#### III.1.1 Inventory management
+
+A simple inventory management system is installed in a warehouse stocked with materials for manufacturing or products for sale. ID tags can be attached to item-level end products, packaged boxes, transport packages, and freight containers. Such managed objects have a transport route made by conveyer belts, transport robots, forklifts, etc. ID terminals are installed at control and monitoring points in transport routes and read identifiers from managed objects. This system allows
+
+every incoming and outgoing object to be tracked automatically and shortages of materials can be prevented.
+
+Usually such inventory management does not operate solely within the warehouse but typically interworks with other business application systems such as procurement, sales, manufacturing, transportation, etc., as shown in Figure III.2. Using these applications, a manufacturer can enjoy better performance of its business operations.
+
+#### III.1.2 Parking management
+
+A parking lot may adopt a tag-based parking management for parking fee, parking permit, etc. ID tags are attached to cars and an ID terminal at a gate reads identifier information from ID tags. Then the cars can be identified and parking fees can be calculated according to parking times. Entrance control also is possible with the tag-based parking management application.
+
+A parking business company may have to handle multiple parking lots distributed in a city or nation where network functions will be needed.
+
+### III.2 B2B tag-based identification applications and services
+
+Most existing tag-based identification applications and services correspond to the B2B type and have used identification information in a barcode form. But RF-based identification, called RFID, has been evolved dramatically with low cost solutions and is being adopted for various business applications.
+
+A typical B2B network configuration can be depicted as shown in Figure III.3. In this case, the large scale enterprise-scope configuration is expanded to other business partners that may have their own distributed work forces. Thus, multiple networked enterprise networks are combined and then a globally networked B2B business partnership is made where identifiers are required to be globally unique.
+
+
+
+Y.2213(08)\_FIII.3
+
+Figure III.3 – Globally networked B2B configuration model. The diagram illustrates a globally networked B2B configuration model. It features two identical local network clusters on either side, each containing 'Local network' clouds, 'ID application systems' (represented by server and laptop icons), and wireless communication symbols. These local networks are connected to a central 'NGN' (Next Generation Network) cloud. Above the NGN cloud is an 'ID resolution system' icon. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2213(08)\_FIII.3' at the bottom center.
+
+**Figure III.3 – Globally networked B2B configuration model**
+
+#### III.2.1 Supply chain management
+
+The supply chain management has a huge business flow with various business partners. So, application scenarios could be realized in a variety of implementation cases. The following chain is a simple case.
+
+A company manufactures home appliances to which ID tags are attached and transports them to its warehouse in which inventory management is performed. A wholesale company orders a set of appliance goods. The manufacturer transports them from its warehouse to a warehouse of the wholesale company and then sends the wholesale company a message containing the following: the shipment notice, identifiers for the shipped appliances (read by ID terminals at the warehouse gate of the manufacturer), the volume shipped, the driver's information, etc. Such transportation is usually provided by a transport business company between the manufacturer and the wholesale company. At an entrance gate of the warehouse of the wholesale company, ID terminals read ID
+
+tags from the appliance goods off loaded from a freight container and an SCM application of the wholesale company gathers all identifiers and analyses them to determine whether all the goods have arrived or not. Then the wholesale company responds with a reception notice to the transport company and the manufacturer.
+
+In this scenario, identification information is exchanged between the manufacturer and transporter, the transporter and wholesaler, and the manufacturer and wholesaler in a mesh relationship. The more business partners involved, the more such chained relationships are created.
+
+#### III.2.2 Manufacturing and production management
+
+A manufacturer needs various materials to make goods at a factory and the materials are usually supplied by business partners. ID tags are affixed to materials and boxes of packaged materials in a transport unit. A supplier's ID terminals read identifiers from the materials and boxes at the originating shipping location. The supplier sends the identifiers to the manufacturer and the manufacturer receives them. ID terminals of the manufacturer read identifiers from the materials and/or transport boxes off loaded from a freight container and the manufacturer analyses the identifiers to determine whether all items were received or not. Received materials will go into a warehouse and sometime later will go out to manufacturing lines consisting of a set of conveyer belts. Materials should be routed to a proper conveyer belt. ID terminals at routing points read identifiers from the materials and provide appropriate signals to routing devices.
+
+### III.3 B2C tag-based identification applications and services
+
+Figure III.4 shows a B2C network configuration model. Consumer terminals are connected to the service provider network which maintains and provides information contents to consumers. The information contents may be made by the service provider or content providers which are established into a logically single business domain. So the B2C model is realized as shown in Figure III.4.
+
+
+
+Figure III.4 – Globally networked B2C configuration model. The diagram illustrates a network architecture where consumer terminals (represented by a mobile phone and a laptop) connect to a Service provider cloud. The Service provider cloud contains an ID resolution system and WAP/Web servers. This Service provider cloud is connected to a central NGN (Next Generation Network) cloud, which also contains an ID resolution system. The NGN cloud is then connected to a Content providers cloud, which contains WAP/Web servers. Arrows indicate the flow of data and connectivity between these components.
+
+**Figure III.4 – Globally networked B2C configuration model**
+
+In the B2C model, an ID terminal may be equipped additionally with an ID tag with which different types of tag-based identification applications and services can be provided as in clause III.3.3. User property is dynamic for consumer applications because service targets are human end users, but it is static for business applications because service targets are business logics of the business applications. Such different user properties produce different service characteristics as follows:
+
+- Within a B2B environment, application information is exchanged between application systems in standardized procedures, methods, presentation styles, data structures and formats, etc., which keep used for a long time. Then an automated work process can be provided. Such service property requires a formatted data syntax which should not be changed frequently.
+- Within a B2C environment, information is exchanged between business application and human. Since human users are arbitrary and may have different feelings and requirements,
+
+an agreement on service procedures, methods, presentation styles, data structures and formats, etc., is almost impossible. So a service provider chooses a way to adapt them and provides resulting contents to end users. The contents, however, might be changed frequently by trend, culture, events, accidents, news, etc.
+
+#### III.3.1 Bus and subway route search
+
+A bus passenger reads ID tags attached to bus stop signs, gets aware of his location from the tags, inserts his destination at an input interface, and then acquires the optimum route via subways and/or buses to the destination. If he is at an inappropriate location to take a bus or subway, he gets directions on how to go to the proper location as well as the optimum route.
+
+#### III.3.2 Mobile shopping
+
+A consumer looks around a shopping mall to buy something. His cell phone equipped with an ID terminal reads ID tags attached to a shelf or items for buying and presses "order" using a shopping application user interface. In the end, he pays for chosen items as in on-line shopping. The mall packs and delivers the ordered items to his pre-registered postal address.
+
+#### III.3.3 Tag-based payment
+
+This application is a use case of payment based on ID tag, ID terminal and identifier.
+
+When a passenger gets on a bus, he places his ID tag-attached terminal near a bus fare device and pays for the bus fare. The fare system may be connected to the network or work in the batch mode for further work flow processing. A detail payment process depends on implementations but an identifier of the passenger is transmitted to the fare device all the time.
+
+### III.4 B2B2C tag-based identification applications and services
+
+This type of applications is a combined case between B2B and B2C applications as shown in Figure III.5. A B2B domain in the right side of Figure III.5 is connected to the B2C domain in the left side. Information resources made by the B2B domain are transmitted to the B2C domain by which they may be processed and/or upgraded for an enhanced service and then provided to consumers. The broker/gateway could be inserted into the B2C domain for intermediary proxy services such as identifier resolution, media transformation, content translation, filtering, etc.
+
+
+
+Y.2213(08)\_FIII.5
+
+Figure III.5 – Globally networked B2B2C configuration model. The diagram illustrates a globally networked B2B2C configuration model. On the left, a 'Service provider' cloud contains 'WAP/Web servers' and a 'Broker/Gateway'. A mobile phone is shown communicating with the service provider. In the center is the 'NGN' (Next-Generation Network) cloud, which contains an 'ID resolution system'. On the right, a 'Local network' cloud contains 'ID application systems' and is connected to the NGN. Arrows indicate data flow: from the service provider to the NGN, from the NGN to the local network, and from the local network back to the NGN. A small label 'Y.2213(08)\_FIII.5' is located below the NGN cloud.
+
+**Figure III.5 – Globally networked B2B2C configuration model**
+
+#### III.4.1 Food chain information service
+
+In case of vegetable goods, a tag-based distribution application scenario involving vegetable farms to wholesale markets or vegetable stores is very similar to the previous B2B cases. As before, business-oriented information including identifiers read from ID tags is exchanged between and used by business partners.
+
+In B2B2C models, a single business corporation can care for both B2B and B2C applications or another business company provides B2C services by inter-operation with B2B applications by a business partnership contract.
+
+At a vegetable store, a consumer browses vegetables to find better quality goods and his cell phone equipped with an ID terminal reads an identifier from a chosen vegetable to check the place of origin, harvest date, quality certification, etc. Then he can decide to buy better vegetables with such information which is prepared by a contracted business operation between B2B and B2C domains.
+
+#### **III.4.2 Home delivery service**
+
+This is a kind of postal service. A consumer asks a post office to send a postal package to someone. The office affixes an ID tag for delivery control in various transportation networks where many transportation agents may be involved with reading and using identifiers for routing decisions for proper delivery. That is, identification information is used in a B2B domain.
+
+The sender reads an identifier from a receipt issued by the post office and checks delivery status for the postal package. A post man delivers the package to a receiver and his information terminal equipped with an ID terminal reads the identifier from the delivered package and sends a delivery confirmation message to the sender.
+
+### **III.5 C2C tag-based identification applications and services**
+
+#### **III.5.1 Business card exchange**
+
+The consumer-to-consumer relationship can be realized by an intervention of business domains or a direct connection between consumers. It depends on implementations.
+
+A user terminal may have ID terminal as well as ID tag. That is, it works sometimes as a terminal and sometimes as a tag. When a user meets someone for the first time, he aims his terminal at or touches it to the other person's terminal to read identification information consisting of identifier, name, contact address, etc. Using this process business card information can be exchanged.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.771] Recommendation ITU-T F.771 (2008), *Service description and requirements for multimedia information access triggered by tag-based identification*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.3050.1] Recommendation ITU-T M.3050.1 (2004), *Enhanced Telecom Operations Map – The business process framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.501] Recommendation ITU-T X.501 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-2:2005, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Models*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup1] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2006), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on NGN release 1 scope*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2007), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Z.100] Recommendation ITU-T Z.100 (2002), *Specification and Description Language (SDL)*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15961] ISO/IEC 15961 (2004), *Information technology – Radio frequency identification (RFID) for item management – Data protocol: application interface*.
+<[http://www.iso.org/iso/iso\\_catalogue/catalogue\\_tc/catalogue\\_detail.htm?csnumber=30528](http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=30528)>
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15962] ISO/IEC 15962 (2004), *Information technology – Radio frequency identification (RFID) for item management – Data protocol: data encoding rules and logical memory functions*.
+<[http://www.iso.org/iso/iso\\_catalogue/catalogue\\_tc/catalogue\\_detail.htm?csnumber=30529](http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=30529)>
+- [b-OECD-Privacy-Protection] OECD (1980), *OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data*.
+([http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en\\_2649\\_34255\\_1815186\\_1\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html))
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2216
+
+(03/2010)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **NGN capability requirements to support the multimedia communication centre service**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2216
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2216**
+
+# **NGN capability requirements to support the multimedia communication centre service**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+The objective of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2216 is to identify and describe the service requirements of the multimedia communication centre (MCC) service and related extended or new NGN capability requirements.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2216 | 2010-03-16 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Capability requirements, MCC service, NGN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2010
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|----------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Description of the MCC service ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Service requirements ..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Communication requests queuing ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Communication control operations for MCC agents..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Management operations for supervisors..... | 6 |
+| 7.4 Charging ..... | 7 |
+| 7.5 Quality of service ..... | 7 |
+| 7.6 MCC agent management ..... | 7 |
+| 7.7 Video sharing between MCC agents and customers ..... | 7 |
+| 7.8 Video conferencing ..... | 7 |
+| 7.9 Web and application collaboration..... | 8 |
+| 7.10 User context information ..... | 8 |
+| 7.11 Communication congestion handling ..... | 8 |
+| 8 NGN capability requirements ..... | 9 |
+| 8.1 MCC application support ..... | 9 |
+| 8.2 MCC media resource management ..... | 11 |
+| 8.3 MCC communication control ..... | 12 |
+| 8.4 MCC codec support..... | 13 |
+| 8.5 MCC quality of service management..... | 13 |
+| 9 Security considerations ..... | 13 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2216
+
+# NGN capability requirements to support the multimedia communication centre service
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to identify and describe the service requirements of the multimedia communication centre (MCC) service and related extended or new NGN capability requirements.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- description of the MCC service;
+- service requirements of the MCC service;
+- NGN capability requirements to support the MCC service.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T G.711] | Recommendation ITU-T G.711 (1988), Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies. |
+| [ITU-T G.722.2] | Recommendation ITU-T G.722.2 (2003), Wideband coding of speech at around 16 kbit/s using Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband (AMR-WB). |
+| [ITU-T G.723.1] | Recommendation ITU-T G.723.1 (2006), Dual rate speech coder for multimedia communications transmitting at 5.3 and 6.3 kbit/s. |
+| [ITU-T G.729 – Annex A] | Recommendation ITU-T G.729 – Annex A (2006), Reduced complexity 8 kbit/s CS-ACELP speech codec. |
+| [ITU-T H.263] | Recommendation ITU-T H.263 (2005), Video coding for low bit rate communication. |
+| [ITU-T H.264] | Recommendation ITU-T H.264 (2005), Advanced video coding for generic audiovisual services. |
+| [ITU-T M.3050.1] | Recommendation ITU-T M.3050.1 (2007), Enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM) – The business process framework. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN. |
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.2233] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2008), Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2702] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ATIS.3GPP.26.071V600-2006] | 3GPP TS 26.071 V6.0.0 (2004), Mandatory speech CODEC speech processing functions; AMR speech CODEC; General description . |
+| [GB/T20090.2] | GB/T20090.2-2006 (2006), Information Technology – Advanced Coding of Audio and Video Part 2: Video . |
+| [ISO/IEC 14496-2] | ISO/IEC 14496-2:2004, Information Technology – Coding of audio-visual objects – Part 2: Visual . |
+| [TIA-127-C] | TIA-127-C (2007), Enhanced Variable Rate Codec, Speech Service Options 3, 68, and 70 for Wideband Spread Spectrum Digital Systems . |
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 customer** [ITU-T M.3050.1]: The customer buys products and services from the enterprise or receives free offers or services. A customer may be a person or a business.
+
+NOTE – In MCC service, the customers can experience advanced customer services offered by enterprises communicating through the NGN.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 enterprise:** The enterprise is responsible for delivering products and services to the customer.
+
+NOTE – In MCC service, by using the multimedia communication centre capabilities provided by NGN, each enterprise can provide its own advanced customer services, like business consultation, sales promotion, etc.
+
+**3.2.2 MCC agent:** An MCC agent is a NGN end-user who acts as an enterprise's agent in the MCC service. The MCC agent uses an NGN terminal to communicate with customers and perform communication control operations, such as holding or transferring communications, etc.
+
+**3.2.3 MCC applications:** MCC applications are a set of applications provided and deployed by an enterprise in order to support its MCC service offer to its customers.
+
+NOTE – The MCC applications organize and manage the mechanisms set and controlled by each enterprise in the MCC service. For example, the mechanisms can allow policy control of communication requests queuing, and management of media resources, etc. MCC applications interact with NGN entities to provide MCC service to customers.
+
+**3.2.4 MCC service:** A service that enables customers to have multimedia communications through the NGN with enterprises by multiple means and that provides advanced features for the customer-enterprise interaction.
+
+NOTE – The multiple means can be multimedia conversational communications, web and application collaboration, content pushing and sharing, etc. Advanced features include enhanced communication control, communication queuing, etc.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------|
+| AMR | Adaptive Multi-Rate |
+| AMR-WB | Adaptive Multi-Rate Wideband |
+| ANI | Application Network Interface |
+| ASR | Automatic Speech Recognition |
+| AVS | Audio Video coding Standard |
+| DTMF | Dual Tone Multi-Frequency |
+| EVRC | Enhanced Variable Rate Codec |
+| IM | Instant Message |
+| IVR | Interactive Voice Response |
+| IVVR | Interactive Voice and Video Response |
+| MCC | Multimedia Communication Centre |
+| MPEG-4 | Moving Picture Experts Group 4 |
+| NAPT | Network Address Port Translation |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-Network Interface |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| TTS | Text to Speech |
+| UNI | User to Network Interface |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the Recommendation.
+
+## **6 Description of the MCC service**
+
+The MCC service provides customers with a way to access information services or customer services of an enterprise. Through the MCC service, all communication requests to one enterprise
+
+can be centralized and managed efficiently so that enhanced customer services can be provided. Customers can communicate with the enterprise's MCC agents and/or interactive voice response/interactive voice and video response (IVR/IVVR) system using multiple media. The MCC service also allows enterprises to provide product support or manage information inquiries from customers, as well as to make telemarketing, sales, etc. via outgoing communications.
+
+Figure 1 shows an overview of the MCC service and the relationship between the various roles in the MCC service. These roles include enterprises, MCC agents, MCC applications, the NGN provider, and customers.
+
+In particular, in Figure 1:
+
+- the "partnership relationship" between enterprises and the NGN provider means that enterprises use the multimedia communication centre capabilities offered by the NGN provider;
+- the "business relationship" between enterprises and customers means that enterprises provide the customer service through the MCC service, e.g., enterprises do marketing and interact with customers, and customers get product information from the enterprises;
+- the "network-end user relationship" between the NGN provider and customers means that customers are the end users of the NGN.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – MCC service overview diagram. A large light-green oval contains three main components: 'Enterprises' at the top, 'NGN provider' at the bottom-left, and 'Customers' at the bottom-right. The 'Enterprises' box contains two sub-boxes: 'MCC agents' (purple) and 'MCC applications' (orange). Three orange curved arrows connect these components in a cycle: one from 'Enterprises' to 'NGN provider' labeled 'Partnership relationship', one from 'Enterprises' to 'Customers' labeled 'Business relationship', and one from 'NGN provider' to 'Customers' labeled 'Network-end user relationship'. The text 'MCC service' is centered within the oval.
+
+**Figure 1 – MCC service overview**
+
+In summary, the MCC service is provided to customers through the support of an NGN provider, enterprise MCC agents and enterprise MCC applications.
+
+Some features and examples of MCC service operations are given below:
+
+Each enterprise deploys a number of MCC agents. In case none of the MCC agents is available to answer to a communication request, the MCC service supports the communication request waiting
+
+in queuing lines. Different types of communication requests are queued in different queuing lines associated to different groups of agents. For example, a customer's communication request for product purchase is queued in the queuing line associated to the group of MCC agents in charge of product sales. Each enterprise may have several groups of MCC agents in charge of different types of communication requests from customers.
+
+MCC agents may be managed by supervisors. Through their monitoring terminals, the supervisors can monitor the communications between the MCC agents and the customers. The supervisors can also perform some other management operations, such as recording the communications between the MCC agents and the customers, intercepting the communications being handled by MCC agents, and taking over the communications.
+
+The communications can also involve customers and IVR/IVVR equipment. When a customer initiates a communication, a series of interactive responses are automatically provided to him/her. The responses can use audio, video, picture or other types of media. After the customer presses specific keys on his/her terminal, the media stops playing and the process moves into the next step set up by the enterprise, such as routing the communication to the corresponding MCC agent. The interactive process can also be simplified by using automatic speech recognition (ASR). Some advanced specialized resources, such as text to speech (TTS), voice recordings, etc., can be also provided for an enhanced customer experience.
+
+## **7 Service requirements**
+
+### **7.1 Communication requests queuing**
+
+In the MCC service, queuing of the communication requests is needed. For example, when ten customers are communicating simultaneously with an enterprise that has only five MCC agents, five of the customers have to wait in the queuing line. As soon as any MCC agent is free, the first request in the queuing line will be distributed to the MCC agent.
+
+An enterprise can have several queuing lines. The queuing lines are associated with different groups of MCC agents. For example, communication requests for the purchase of products will be queued up in the queuing line that is associated to the group of MCC agents in charge of product sales.
+
+Queuing lines are organized according to different policies, such as the first-come-first-served customer priority. Due to the different requirements of enterprises, policies have to be able to be different from one enterprise to another, i.e., each enterprise can configure and manage its own queuing line policies.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is required to queue up the incoming communication requests according to the different policies.
+- 2) It is required to provide capabilities for enterprise access to configuration and management of its queuing lines and associated policies.
+- 3) It is required to distribute the communication requests to the proper MCC agents.
+
+### **7.2 Communication control operations for MCC agents**
+
+An MCC agent can perform some communication control operations after a communication has been set up, like holding the communication, transferring the communication, parking the communication, disconnecting the communication and consulting the communication. It can also push multi-media content to the customers, such as voice, video, text, etc.
+
+NOTE 1 – Parking a communication means that the MCC agent puts the communication on hold. This MCC agent is then no longer associated with this communication, which can be retrieved by other MCC agents.
+
+NOTE 2 – Consulting a communication means that the MCC agent puts the communication on hold and, launches another communication with another MCC agent or IVR/IVVR or any other NGN end-user. Then the customer cannot hear/see the communication between the MCC agent and the new "consulted" party.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to disconnect, hold, park and transfer an established communication.
+- 2) It is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to perform consultation operations. An MCC agent may perform the following types of consultation operations:
+ - communicate with another MCC agent;
+ - communicate with an IVR/IVVR system;
+ - communicate with any other NGN end user.
+- 3) It is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to transfer the communication to multiple types of destinations, including: another MCC agent, the IVR/IVVR, the queuing lines and any end users in the NGN.
+- 4) It is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to push multi-media content to customers.
+- 5) It is required to support multiple simultaneous active sessions between a customer and an MCC agent. After a session has been established between a customer and an MCC agent, another session can be launched by the customer or the MCC agent according to the communication requirements. While establishing this latter session, special resources may be applied according to the communication requirements.
+
+### **7.3 Management operations for supervisors**
+
+The MCC agents' activities, including the communications with customers, are under the management of supervisors. Supervisors can record, monitor, join and intercept communications.
+
+In the MCC service, two monitoring patterns may be supported: the conferencing monitoring pattern and the direct monitoring pattern, as described below.
+
+- *Conferencing monitoring pattern*
+
+When the monitoring request is received, a conference among the supervisor, the monitored MCC agent and the customer is created and the supervisor can hear/see the communication between the monitored MCC agent and the customer.
+- *Direct monitoring pattern*
+
+When the monitoring request is received, the monitored MCC agent's terminal initiates the monitoring function, then the terminal sends the communication between the monitored MCC agent and the customer to the supervisor's terminal in real-time fashion, and the supervisor experiences the received communication.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is required to support recording the voice/video of the communication between an MCC agent and a customer.
+- 2) It is required to support supervisors to monitor, join and intercept the ongoing communication handled by other MCC agents.
+- 3) It is recommended to support coaching for MCC agents. When an MCC agent is communicating with a customer, a supervisor can hear/see the communication between the MCC agent and the customer and at the same time the supervisor has a separate communication channel with the MCC agent to support the MCC agent. The customer cannot have access to the communication between the supervisor and the MCC agent.
+
+### **7.4 Charging**
+
+Enterprises have to be charged by the NGN provider for using NGN resources. There are several policies to charge enterprises, including according to the number of the enterprise's MCC agents, according to the number of the enterprise's incoming/outgoing communications and according to the number of times the enterprise's advertisements are played.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirement:
+
+- 1) It is required to support multiple charging policies for enterprises.
+
+NOTE – This requirement is supported by the capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2233].
+
+### **7.5 Quality of service**
+
+The quality of service (QoS) of the MCC service needs to be carefully managed. Usually, the MCC service is used by enterprises to provide product support and respond to information inquiries from consumers. If the MCC service is not supported with sufficient QoS, then the business of the enterprises may be impacted.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirement:
+
+- 1) It is recommended to provide multiple QoS levels of MCC service to enterprises.
+
+NOTE – Resource allocation for each enterprise depends on the QoS level assigned to the enterprise.
+
+### **7.6 MCC agent management**
+
+The MCC agents of an enterprise are often divided into several groups according to the different services provided by the MCC agents. Thus, an enterprise can have several groups of MCC agents. MCC agents are managed through their attributes, e.g., the information on the group of MCC agents, etc.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirement:
+
+- 1) It is required to support MCC agent management.
+
+### **7.7 Video sharing between MCC agents and customers**
+
+Video sharing allows one or more MCC agents and one or more customers to watch a video clip at the same time. For example, during a voice communication between an MCC agent and a customer, if the customer/agent cannot communicate appropriately with the other side, he/she can use video sharing to play a video clip to the other side. After sharing the video, they can continue talking.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirement:
+
+- 1) It is required to support video sharing among one or more MCC agents and one or more customers.
+
+### **7.8 Video conferencing**
+
+Three or more parties, which include at least one MCC agent acting as a sponsor, can communicate by video conference. The sponsor of the conference can see all the parties on his/her screen. The sponsor has the right to invite other customers into the conference as well as to release their participation from the conference. The sponsor can record videos of (part of) the conference.
+
+Moreover, subconferencing may be used: two or more participants communicate in a main conference, while two or more of them also communicate in a private conference and can still hear/see the main conference in the background. However, the other participants in the main conference cannot hear/see the private conference.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is required to support video conferencing, which includes at least one MCC agent among the conference participants.
+- 2) Subconferencing can optionally be supported.
+
+### **7.9 Web and application collaboration**
+
+Web and application collaboration allow an MCC agent to interact with a customer or another MCC agent via multiple types of collaboration:
+
+- web collaboration implements collaboration through a web browser;
+- application collaboration implements collaboration through other means except web browsing, e.g., application collaboration via the use of instant messages (IM), file transfer, whiteboard sharing, etc.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is recommended to provide MCC agents or customers with the capability to initiate web and application collaboration anytime during the communication.
+- 2) It is recommended to support information sharing in the process of web and application collaboration.
+- 3) It is recommended to support MCC agents' awareness of users' context information when launching web and application collaboration.
+
+### **7.10 User context information**
+
+In the MCC service, when a customer makes an incoming communication or an MCC agent makes an outgoing communication, the MCC applications acquire the customer's user context information. The customer's user context information includes the customer's communication state information (e.g., busy, mobile phone not in service etc.), the customer's specific context information (e.g., at lunch, in a meeting, etc.) and the customer's location information. For the incoming communication requests, they are distributed to the appropriate MCC agents according to the user context information. For example, if the enterprise's MCC agents are located in different places, when a customer initiates a communication request to the enterprise, this communication request might be handled by the nearest MCC agent. For outgoing communications, by using the customer's user context information, MCC agents can determine when and how to make an outgoing communication to the customers.
+
+The MCC service has the following requirements:
+
+- 1) It is required to support distribution of the incoming communication requests to the appropriate MCC agents according to the customers' user context information.
+- 2) It is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to make outgoing communications according to customers' user context information.
+- 3) It is required to support access to customers' user context information by MCC agents and MCC applications.
+
+### **7.11 Communication congestion handling**
+
+In the MCC service, when communication congestion occurs because of resource limitations to handle the communication, the communication is rejected and an appropriate notification is sent to the NGN. The NGN plays an appropriate announcement to customers trying to access the service.
+
+- 1) It is recommended to support a communication congestion handling mechanism in the MCC service.
+
+## 8 NGN capability requirements
+
+This clause describes capability requirements additional to those in [ITU-T Y.2201] for the support of the MCC service in NGN.
+
+The MCC service requires interaction between the NGN and MCC applications. NGN is deployed and managed by the NGN provider, while MCC applications are deployed and managed by the enterprises.
+
+Figure 2 shows the capability groupings for support of the MCC service (shown using hatched boxes) positioned within the NGN architecture overview [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- Control (dashed line)
+- Media (dotted line)
+- Management (dashed line)
+
+Figure 2: Capability groupings for support of the MCC service. The diagram illustrates the NGN architecture overview, showing the interaction between MCC applications and the NGN service stratum and transport stratum. The NGN is divided into three main layers: the Service stratum (green), the Transport stratum (yellow), and the Management functions (purple). The Service stratum contains MCC application support (hatched), MCC communication control (hatched), and MCC quality of service management (hatched). The Transport stratum contains MCC codec support (hatched). The Management functions layer includes End-user functions (MCC agents and customers) and Other networks. The diagram shows the flow of control (dashed lines), media (dotted lines), and management (dashed lines) between these components. The ANI (Application Network Interface) connects MCC applications to the Service stratum. The UNI (User Network Interface) connects End-user functions to the Transport stratum. The NNI (Network Network Interface) connects Other networks to the Transport stratum. The MCC media resource management (hatched) is a vertical component spanning the Service and Transport strata. The legend indicates: Control (dashed line), Media (dotted line), and Management (dashed line).
+
+Y.2216(2010)\_F02
+
+**Figure 2 – Capability groupings for support of the MCC service**
+
+### 8.1 MCC application support
+
+#### 8.1.1 Communication request queuing
+
+According to the service requirements in clause 7.1, the NGN has to support queuing up the incoming communication requests according to the queuing policies. Moreover, the MCC service has to support queuing up all kinds of communication requests, including web and application collaboration communication requests. The NGN also has to provide capabilities for enterprise access for configuring and managing the enterprise's queuing lines associated policies.
+
+These service requirements are implemented by MCC application support capabilities of the NGN service stratum through the interactions via ANI with MCC applications. Through the interactions, MCC application support capabilities get the policies of queuing lines from MCC applications,
+
+while MCC applications also get the information and status of the queuing lines from MCC application support capabilities.
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following communication request queuing requirements:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support the interactions for communication request queuing between MCC applications and MCC application support capabilities.
+- 2) The NGN is required to support queuing of the incoming communication requests according to queuing policies.
+- 3) The NGN is required to support queuing of multiple communication requests from one single customer.
+- 4) The NGN is required to support queuing of the incoming communication requests according to the customer's user-context information so that the communication requests will be distributed to the appropriate MCC agents.
+- 5) The NGN is recommended to support queuing of web and application collaboration communication requests initiated by the customer.
+
+#### **8.1.2 Communication request distribution**
+
+According to the service requirements in clause 7.1, communication requests are distributed to the proper MCC agents. In single session communications, once one of the proper MCC agents is free, his/her availability is notified to the MCC applications, and then the MCC applications request the MCC application support capabilities to pick up one of the communication requests in the queuing lines and perform the processing in order to distribute the communication request to the MCC agent. On the other hand, in multiple-session communications, the requests of the following sessions will be directly distributed to the same MCC agent (the one involved in the already established session(s)).
+
+These service requirements are implemented by MCC application support capabilities of the NGN service stratum through the interactions via ANI with MCC applications. Through the interactions, MCC application support capabilities will be requested by MCC applications to distribute the communication requests to the proper MCC agents.
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following communication request distribution requirements:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support the interactions for communication request distribution between MCC applications and MCC application support capabilities.
+- 2) The NGN is required to support multiple session communications from a single customer to be distributed directly to the same MCC agent without waiting time.
+- 3) The NGN is recommended to support web and application collaboration communication requests to be distributed directly to the appropriate MCC agents without waiting time.
+
+#### **8.1.3 Communication control operations for MCC agents**
+
+According to the service requirements in clause 7.2, the NGN is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to disconnect, hold, park, transfer and consult an established communication. The MCC agents perform these communication control operations by accessing the MCC applications through the interface between MCC agents and MCC applications. Then MCC applications notify MCC application support capabilities in order to complete the communication control operations for MCC agents.
+
+These service requirements are implemented by MCC application support capabilities of the NGN service stratum through the interactions via ANI with MCC applications. Through the interactions,
+
+MCC application support capabilities will be requested by MCC applications to complete the communication control operations for MCC agents.
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following communication control requirements:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support the interactions for communication control operations of MCC agents between MCC applications and MCC application support capabilities.
+- 2) In case of multiple session communications between one customer and one MCC agent, the NGN is required to support any of the sessions of the multiple session communications to be interrupted without affecting the other ongoing sessions.
+- 3) The NGN is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to perform communication control operations according to customers' user context information.
+- 4) The NGN is required to provide MCC agents with the capability to inquire customers' user context information.
+- 5) The NGN is recommended to provide MCC agents with the capability to extend an existing one-to-one communication to a conference by initiating communication(s) towards other customers or MCC agents.
+
+#### **8.1.4 MCC agents' terminal management**
+
+MCC agents' terminals are managed by MCC application support capabilities. An identification is assigned to an MCC agent's terminal, and the MCC agent registers the terminal to the MCC application support capabilities using the assigned identification.
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following MCC agents' terminal management requirement:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support identification assignment and registration for MCC agents' terminals.
+
+#### **8.1.5 Web and application collaboration handling**
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following web and application collaboration handling requirement:
+
+- 1) The NGN is recommended to support interactions between the web and application collaboration functions and MCC application support capabilities to establish web and application collaboration communications.
+
+#### **8.1.6 Communication congestion handling**
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following communication congestion handling requirement:
+
+- 1) The NGN is recommended to support the MCC application support capabilities' notification to the NGN service control function when communication congestion occurs in the MCC service.
+
+### **8.2 MCC media resource management**
+
+The MCC service can provide various media resources to customers, like IVR/IVVR, ASR, TTS, announcement playing, recording resources, etc. For different enterprises, the mechanisms of managing these media resources are different. The mechanisms of media resource management are provided by MCC applications, and are set and managed by the enterprises themselves. So the MCC applications need to interact with the media resource management in NGN. In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following media resource management requirement:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support an interface between MCC applications and the NGN to manage media resources.
+
+In addition, in order to support the MCC service, the NGN has other media resource management requirements as follows:
+
+- 2) The NGN is required to support NAT/NAPT between the media resources in NGN and MCC applications.
+- 3) The NGN is required to support video-related operations, including lip synchronization (synchronization between video and voice), video corruption (returning the specific cause of failure when a video communication fails).
+- 4) The NGN is required to support media stream control by customers, including video pausing, stopping, replaying, slowing and speeding, etc.
+- 5) The NGN is required to support DTMF recognition when media is played to the customers.
+- 6) The NGN is required to support playing media to all or part of the participants during a conference.
+- 7) The NGN is recommended to support multiple audio formats: AMR/AMR2 [ATIS.3GPP.26.071V600-2006], [ITU-T G.711], [ITU-T G.723.1], [ITU-T G.729 – Annex A], AMR-WB [ITU-T G.722.2], EVRC/EVRC-B [TIA-127-C].
+- 8) The NGN is recommended to support media forking in a conference.
+NOTE – In this Recommendation, media forking means that the sponsor in the conference can hear/see the voice/video from all the other participants, but the other participants can only hear/see the voice/video from the sponsor.
+- 9) The NGN is recommended to support distributed media resource deployment and enable customers to communicate with the appropriate media resources when they experience the MCC service.
+
+### **8.3 MCC communication control**
+
+#### **8.3.1 Communication control operations for MCC agents**
+
+According to the requirements in clauses 7.2 and 8.1.3, NGN has the following requirements of communication control operations for MCC agents in order to support the MCC service:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support communication control to disconnect, hold, park, transfer and consult a communication according to the request from MCC application support capabilities.
+- 2) The NGN is recommended to support the correlation of sessions for multiple session communications involving one customer.
+
+#### **8.3.2 Management operations for supervisors**
+
+According to the service requirements in clause 7.3, supervisors manage MCC agents.
+
+In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following requirements of management operations for supervisors:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support the capability of media recording.
+- 2) The NGN is required to support the capability of monitoring communications.
+- 3) In case of a multiple session communication between one customer and a single MCC agent, the NGN is required to support any session of the multiple session communication to be monitored and recorded.
+- 4) The NGN is required to support the capability of joining communications.
+- 5) The NGN is required to support the capability of interrupting communications.
+
+- 6) The NGN is recommended to support the capability of MCC agent coaching.
+- 7) The NGN can optionally support the capability of direct monitoring.
+
+#### **8.3.3 Communication routing**
+
+The NGN has the following requirement in order to support the MCC service:
+
+- 1) The NGN is required to support the capability of routing communications according to customers' user context information.
+
+### **8.4 MCC codec support**
+
+In order to support the MCC service when different types of codecs are used, the NGN has the following requirements for codec support:
+
+- 1) The NGN is recommended to support audio transcoding between AMR [ATIS.3GPP.26.071V600-2006], EVRC/EVRC-B [TIA-127-C], [ITU-T G.711], [ITU-T G.723.1] and [ITU-T G.729 – Annex A].
+- 2) The NGN is recommended to support video transcoding between MPEG-4 advanced simple profile [ISO/IEC 14496-2], [ITU-T H.263], [ITU-T H.264] and AVS [GB/T20090.2].
+
+### **8.5 MCC quality of service management**
+
+The MCC service is recommended to provide multiple QoS levels to enterprises. In order to support the MCC service, the NGN has the following quality of service management requirement:
+
+- 1) The NGN is recommended to support resource allocation for enterprises according to the required different QoS levels.
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+The security requirements for the MCC service are addressed by the security requirements for NGN in [ITU-T Y.2701] and the authentication and authorization requirements for NGN in [ITU-T Y.2702]. No additional security requirements have been identified for the MCC service.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2240
+
+(04/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **Requirements and capabilities for next generation network service integration and delivery environment**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2240
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2240
+
+# Requirements and capabilities for next generation network service integration and delivery environment
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2240 provides requirements and capabilities for a service integration and delivery environment in NGN (NGN-SIDE) in order to support the following main functionalities in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem:
+
+- integration of resources from different domains (e.g., telecommunication domain (fixed and mobile networks), broadcasting domain, internet domain or content provider domain) over NGN;
+- adaptation and abstraction of resources from different domains;
+- resource brokering for mediation among applications and resources;
+- support of application development environment for application developers;
+- support of different service interfaces across ANI, UNI, SNI and NNI for exposure of NGN-SIDE capabilities and access to resources in different domains;
+- provision of mechanisms for the support of diverse applications including cloud services, machine to machine, and ubiquitous sensor network applications;
+- provision of mechanisms for the support of applications making usage of context based information;
+- provision of mechanisms for content management.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2240 | 2011-04-22 | 13 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Adaptation, API, brokering, NGN, NGN-SIDE, resources, resource adaptation, SDP, service creation, service delivery, service delivery management, service enablers, service execution, service integration.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 5 |
+| 6 | NGN-SIDE ecosystem..... | 5 |
+| | 6.1 NGN-SIDE users ..... | 6 |
+| | 6.2 NGN-SIDE provider..... | 6 |
+| | 6.3 NGN-SIDE resource providers..... | 7 |
+| 7 | NGN-SIDE functional framework..... | 7 |
+| | 7.1 NGN-SIDE layered view..... | 7 |
+| | 7.2 NGN-SIDE functional view ..... | 8 |
+| 8 | NGN-SIDE requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.1 Applications related requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.2 NGN-SIDE integration related requirements ..... | 12 |
+| | 8.3 NGN-SIDE adaptation related requirements..... | 14 |
+| | 8.4 NGN-SIDE security related requirements..... | 15 |
+| 9 | NGN-SIDE capabilities ..... | 15 |
+| | 9.1 NGN-SIDE capabilities related to the NGN-SIDE integration layer..... | 15 |
+| | 9.2 NGN-SIDE capabilities related to the NGN-SIDE adaptation layer..... | 20 |
+| 10 | NGN-SIDE interfaces requirements ..... | 25 |
+| | 10.1 NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture..... | 25 |
+| | 10.2 NGN-SIDE interfaces..... | 27 |
+| 11 | Security considerations ..... | 30 |
+| | Annex A – Relationship between capabilities of NGN-SIDE and [ITU-T Y.2234]
capabilities ..... | 31 |
+| | Appendix I – Business deployment scenarios in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem..... | 35 |
+| | I.1 Actors mapping to business roles ..... | 35 |
+| | I.2 Business deployment scenarios ..... | 36 |
+| | Appendix II – Application scenarios involving NGN-SIDE ..... | 39 |
+| | II.1 Third-party application scenario "Book a trip" ..... | 39 |
+| | II.2 NGN-SIDE in-house application scenario "Enhanced Conference" ..... | 41 |
+| | II.3 M2M/USN application scenarios ..... | 43 |
+| | Appendix III – Cloud services and supporting role played by NGN-SIDE..... | 45 |
+| | III.1 NGN-SIDE support of cloud software as a service..... | 45 |
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| III.2 NGN-SIDE support of cloud platform as a service..... | 45 |
+| III.3 NGN-SIDE support of cloud infrastructure as a service ..... | 46 |
+| III.4 NGN-SIDE support of communications as a service ..... | 46 |
+| III.5 NGN-SIDE support of network as a service ..... | 46 |
+| Appendix IV – Survey of API related standardization efforts..... | 47 |
+| IV.1 Open mobile alliance (OMA) ..... | 47 |
+| IV.2 GSM association (GSMA) ..... | 49 |
+| IV.3 Java Community Process..... | 51 |
+| IV.4 Wholesale Applications Community (WAC)..... | 51 |
+| IV.5 World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)..... | 52 |
+| IV.6 Organization for the advancement of structured information standards
(OASIS)..... | 57 |
+| IV.7 Open Grid Forum (OGF)..... | 58 |
+| IV.8 Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF)..... | 58 |
+| IV.9 Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA)..... | 59 |
+| Bibliography..... | 60 |
+
+# Introduction
+
+NGN-SIDE main objectives, characteristics and features are as follows:
+
+- NGN-SIDE supports a multi-fold telecommunication business model and is paving the way for a comprehensive eco-system for all the stakeholders in the NGN value chain;
+- NGN-SIDE puts NGN providers in the centre to control the whole NGN value chain and provides numerous opportunities for NGN providers to enhance NGN end-users access to applications;
+- NGN-SIDE provides an environment that enables the development of applications that fully leverage underlying NGN and non-NGN resources such as:
+ - enabling developers to create compelling applications that take full advantage of a variety of resources such as service enablers, network capabilities, device enablers, content, other applications;
+ - providing access to a wide range of tools and technologies that can be used to develop rich applications.
+
+NGN-SIDE can be viewed as the next generation service delivery platform (SDP), which is, in the context of this Recommendation, targeted for NGN, but whose framework can conceptually be applicable to other telecommunication environments (e.g., mobile networks).
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2240
+
+# Requirements and capabilities for next generation network service integration and delivery environment
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to provide requirements and capabilities for a service integration and delivery environment (SIDE) in NGN (NGN-SIDE) in order to support the following main functionalities in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem:
+
+- integration of resources from different domains (e.g., telecommunication domain (fixed and mobile networks), broadcasting domain, internet domain or content provider domain) over NGN;
+- adaptation, including abstraction and virtualization, of resources from different domains;
+- resource brokering for mediation among applications and resources;
+- support of the application development environment for application developers;
+- support of different service interfaces across ANI, UNI, SNI and NNI for exposure of NGN-SIDE capabilities and access to resources in different domains;
+- provision of mechanisms for the support of diverse applications including cloud services, machine-to-machine, and ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications;
+- provision of mechanisms for the support of applications making usage of context based information;
+- provision of mechanisms for content management.
+
+In this Recommendation, clause 6 provides an overview of the NGN-SIDE ecosystem, clause 7 describes the NGN-SIDE functional framework, clause 8 identifies NGN-SIDE requirements, clause 9 describes NGN-SIDE capabilities, clause 10 provides NGN-SIDE interface requirements, clause 11 provides security considerations and Annex A provides relationship between capabilities of NGN-SIDE and [ITU-T Y.2234].
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.805] Recommendation ITU-T X.805 (2003), *Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2221] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2221 (2010), *Requirements for support of ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications and services in the NGN environment*.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2233] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2010), *Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2234] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2234 (2008), *Open service environment capabilities for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2704] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2721] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2721 (2010), *NGN identity management requirements and use cases*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2722] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722 (2011), *NGN identity management mechanisms*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 application** [b-ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services.
+
+**3.1.2 application network interface (ANI)** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between applications and NGN elements. The ANI offers capabilities and resources needed for the realization of applications.
+
+**3.1.3 application programming interface (API)** [b-ITU-T I.312]: An API provides a set of interfaces from an application environment to an execution environment. The execution environment provides services to the application environment.
+
+**3.1.4 functional architecture** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A set of functional entities and the reference points between them used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions.
+
+**3.1.5 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.6 next generation network (NGN)** [b-ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.7 NGN service stratum** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: This refers to that part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer service-related data and the functions that control and manage service resources and network services to enable user services and applications.
+
+**3.1.8 NGN transport stratum** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities.
+
+**3.1.9 ubiquitous sensor network** [ITU-T Y.2221]: A conceptual network built over existing physical networks which make use of sensed data and provide knowledge services to anyone, anywhere and at anytime, and where the information is generated by using context awareness.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 machine-to-machine applications:** Applications enabled by the communications between two or more machines that need limited or no direct human intervention.
+
+**3.2.2 NGN service integration and delivery environment (NGN-SIDE):** An open environment in NGN integrating resources from different domains and delivering integrated services to applications over NGN.
+
+NOTE – These domains include, but are not limited to, telecommunication domain (e.g., fixed and mobile networks), Internet domain, broadcasting domain and content provider domain.
+
+**3.2.3 service enabler:** A function or closely related set of functions made available over one or more well-defined interfaces to other consuming software applications.
+
+NOTE 1 – A service enabler may support end-user services, provide operations functionality, or be used directly by other service enablers. Service enablers generally utilize underlying resources to perform their tasks and have interfaces for their own lifecycle management.
+
+NOTE 2 – An example of functionality that a service enabler may provide is a location service or a fault management service.
+
+NOTE 3 – In the context of NGN-SIDE, a service enabler is made available over well-defined interfaces to be used by NGN-SIDE users (e.g., application providers), including its usage as resource abstracted by NGN-SIDE (e.g., an underlying NGN service enabler [ITU-T Y.2201]).
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ANI | Application Network Interface |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| BCAST | Broadcasting |
+| BPEL | Business Process Execution Language |
+| CaaS | Communications as a Service |
+| CAMEL | Customized Applications for Mobile networks Enhanced Logic |
+| CP | Content Provider |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+| CRBT | Customized Ring Back Tone |
+| DM | Device Management |
+| DRM | Digital Rights Management |
+| DVB | Digital Video Broadcasting |
+| IaaS | Infrastructure as a Service |
+| ID | Identifier |
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IN | Intelligent Network |
+| INAP | Intelligent Network Application Part |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPTV | IP Television |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| IT | Information Technology |
+| J2EE | Java2 Enterprise Edition |
+| J2SE | Java2 Standard Edition |
+| JAIN | Java APIs for Integrated Networks |
+| JDBC | Java Data Base Connectivity |
+| JMS | Java Message Service |
+| JTAPI | Java Telephony Application Program Interface |
+| LCS | Location Service |
+| M2M | Machine-to-Machine |
+| MBMS | Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service |
+| MMS | Multimedia Messaging Service |
+| NaaS | Network as a Service |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NGN-SIDE | NGN Service Integration and Delivery Environment |
+| NGSI | Next Generation Service Interface |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| OSA | Open Service Access |
+| OSE | Open Service Environment |
+| PaaS | Platform as a Service |
+| PIM | Personal Information Management |
+| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network |
+| PSA | Parlay Service Access |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| REST | Representational State Transfer |
+| RSS | Really Simple Syndication |
+| SaaS | Software as a Service |
+| SDK | Software Development Kit |
+| SDP | Service Delivery Platform |
+| SDPaaS | Service Delivery Platform as a Service |
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------------|
+| SIDE | Service Integration and Delivery Environment |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SMS | Short Message Service |
+| SNI | Service Network Interface |
+| SOA | Service Oriented Architecture |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| STB | Set-Top-Box |
+| UDH | User-Data Header |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| USN | Ubiquitous Sensor Network |
+| WAP | Wireless Application Protocol |
+| WIN | Wireless Intelligent Network |
+| XaaS | Everything as a Service |
+| XML | Extensible Markup Language |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement needs not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+The keywords "application(s)", "service enabler(s)", "computing", "storage", "connectivity", "network capability(ies)", and "content" refer to specific types of resource as described in clause 7.1.
+
+# 6 NGN-SIDE ecosystem
+
+The NGN service integration and delivery environment (NGN-SIDE) aims to support an ecosystem for all the stakeholders in the NGN value chain.
+
+Figure 6-1 shows the key business roles involved in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem and the business relationships among them.
+
+NOTE 1 – Some business deployment scenarios of the NGN-SIDE ecosystem, including description of relevant actors, are described in Appendix I.
+
+
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F6-1
+
+Diagram illustrating the business role relationships in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem. The diagram shows three main components connected vertically: NGN-SIDE users (top), NGN-SIDE provider (middle), and NGN-SIDE resource providers (bottom). The NGN-SIDE users cloud contains Application providers, Application developers, and Other NGN-SIDE users. The NGN-SIDE provider is a central blue oval. The NGN-SIDE resource providers cloud contains Content providers, Other resource providers, Application providers, and Service enabler providers. Vertical lines connect the top cloud to the middle oval, and the middle oval to the bottom cloud.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Business role relationships in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem**
+
+NOTE 2 – Although NGN-SIDE resource providers and NGN-SIDE users are part of the NGN-SIDE ecosystem, they are external to NGN-SIDE itself. The following clauses describe the different key business roles involved in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem, i.e., NGN-SIDE users, NGN-SIDE provider, and NGN-SIDE resource providers.
+
+## 6.1 NGN-SIDE users
+
+The NGN-SIDE users use the services offered by the NGN-SIDE provider, including resource exposure. Resources exposed by the NGN-SIDE provider to a NGN-SIDE user include NGN-SIDE provider's and NGN-SIDE resource providers' exposed resources. NGN-SIDE users include the following specific roles:
+
+- application provider: in the perspective of NGN-SIDE user, the role which uses capabilities and resources exposed by the NGN-SIDE provider for offering application(s) to customers;
+- application developer: the role which uses capabilities and resources exposed by the NGN-SIDE provider for developing applications;
+- other NGN-SIDE users: other roles (e.g., other service providers) which use capabilities and resources exposed by the NGN-SIDE provider.
+
+NOTE – An NGN-SIDE user can also be an NGN-SIDE resource provider. For example, this can be the case for an application provider (see clause 6.3).
+
+## 6.2 NGN-SIDE provider
+
+The NGN-SIDE provider manages the NGN-SIDE ecosystem. In particular, the NGN-SIDE provider performs the following main functions:
+
+- access and integration of resources provided by NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+
+- support and control of the service integration and delivery infrastructure;
+- offering of services, including resource exposure, to NGN-SIDE users.
+
+## 6.3 NGN-SIDE resource providers
+
+The NGN-SIDE resource providers provide resources to the NGN-SIDE provider. NGN-SIDE resource providers include the following specific roles:
+
+- content provider: the role that is responsible for providing content to the NGN-SIDE provider according to commercial agreements;
+- application provider: the role that is responsible for providing application(s) as resource(s) to the NGN-SIDE provider;
+- service enabler provider: the role that is responsible for providing service enabler(s) to the NGN-SIDE provider;
+- other NGN-SIDE resource providers: other roles that provide resources to the NGN-SIDE provider (e.g., providers of network capabilities, providers of computing, connectivity, storage resources).
+
+NOTE – A NGN-SIDE resource provider can also be a NGN-SIDE user. For example, this can be the case for an application provider (see clause 6.1).
+
+# 7 NGN-SIDE functional framework
+
+## 7.1 NGN-SIDE layered view
+
+Figure 7-1 shows the layered view of NGN-SIDE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ A[NGN-SIDE user layer] --- B[NGN-SIDE layer]
+ B --- C[NGN-SIDE resource layer]
+
+```
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F7-1
+
+Figure 7-1: NGN-SIDE layered view diagram showing three stacked layers: NGN-SIDE user layer (top, grey), NGN-SIDE layer (middle, green), and NGN-SIDE resource layer (bottom, white).
+
+**Figure 7-1 – NGN-SIDE layered view**
+
+The layered view of NGN-SIDE includes the following layers:
+
+- the NGN-SIDE user layer, which uses the services offered by the NGN-SIDE layer, including resource exposure. It includes users accessing the NGN-SIDE, such as applications and other users. Applications include the following: a) NGN UE hosted applications, hosted in the NGN end user domain; b) Third-party applications, hosted by NGN-SIDE users (e.g., application providers); and c) NGN-SIDE in-house applications, hosted by the NGN-SIDE provider. Application scenarios involving NGN-SIDE are described in Appendix II;
+- the NGN Service Integration and Delivery Environment layer (NGN-SIDE), which corresponds to NGN-SIDE;
+- the NGN-SIDE resource layer, which includes resources accessible by NGN-SIDE, such as applications, service enablers, network capabilities, connectivity, computing, storage, and content.
+
+## 7.2 NGN-SIDE functional view
+
+Figure 7-2 shows a functional view of NGN-SIDE according to the layers in Figure 7-1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional view of NGN-SIDE, organized into four main layers connected by a central vertical line:
+
+- NGN-SIDE user layer:** Contains a box labeled "Applications".
+- NGN-SIDE layer:** This layer is divided into two sub-layers:
+ - NGN-SIDE integration layer:** Contains three columns of functional blocks:
+ - Column 1: Application development support, Resource repository, Testing environment, and Service creation.
+ - Column 2: Access control, Service orchestration, Resource registry, Service dispatcher, Policy decision, Resource manager, and Service execution.
+ - Column 3: Policy management, Content management, Charging, Management of role related information, Application provisioning, Context management, and Service delivery management.
+ - NGN-SIDE adaptation layer:** Contains a "Resource brokering" block at the top, and two "Adaptors" blocks below it: "Adaptors for NGN" and "Adaptors for non-NGN".
+- NGN-SIDE resource layer:** Contains two boxes: "Resources offered by NGN" and "Resources offered by non-NGN".
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F7-2
+
+Figure 7-2 – NGN-SIDE functional view diagram
+
+**Figure 7-2 – NGN-SIDE functional view**
+
+As shown in Figure 7-2 the NGN-SIDE layer is comprised of the following two layers:
+
+- NGN-SIDE integration layer;
+- NGN-SIDE adaptation layer.
+
+#### 7.2.1 NGN-SIDE integration layer
+
+In order to reduce the complexity of integrating resources, the NGN-SIDE integration layer provides a unified way for the NGN-SIDE users to access the resources offered by NGN and non-NGN.
+
+As shown in Figure 7-2, the NGN-SIDE integration layer supports the following functional groups:
+
+- service creation functional group;
+- service execution functional group;
+- service delivery management functional group.
+
+The following clauses provide a description of the functional groups supported by the NGN-SIDE integration layer.
+
+##### **7.2.1.1 Service creation functional group**
+
+The service creation functional group provides capabilities to realize an application development environment for application developers. This functional group includes the following capabilities:
+
+- the application development support which is responsible for providing secure access to NGN-SIDE capabilities and resources from NGN-SIDE resource providers, secure storage of developers' applications, access to the testing environment and various application developer's support functions and mechanisms such as development management tools or API definitions. The application development support capability also provides design tools which are responsible for service creation according to application requirements;
+- the resource repository which is responsible for providing resource information reusable to develop new applications;
+- the testing environment which is responsible for providing an application simulation environment to verify if a new application can work correctly.
+
+##### **7.2.1.2 Service execution functional group**
+
+The service execution functional group provides capabilities to support the service execution environment. The service execution functional group processes service requests received from the NGN-SIDE user layer and as a result, sends back responses to the NGN-SIDE user layer. While processing the service requests, service execution invokes the NGN-SIDE adaptation layer for requested resources. This functional group includes the following capabilities:
+
+- The access control which provides functions related to control and manage access to NGN-SIDE by applications and translates standardized or proprietary APIs and protocols across different NGN-SIDE service interfaces.
+NOTE 1 – NGN-SIDE service interfaces are described in clause 10.2.
+NOTE 2 – Access control is only applicable during application execution.
+- The service dispatcher which provides the following functionalities:
+ - a) API and protocol transformation from applications to common message structure;
+ - b) business event handling;
+ - c) message routing and exchange to or from NGN-SIDE users;
+ - d) coordination policy enforcement based on interaction with policy decision for service level monitoring such as QoS control.
+- The service orchestration which is responsible for:
+ - a) composing service logic in static and dynamic mode;
+ - b) executing the service logic.
+- The policy decision which provides policy decision making for access control, resource consumption, application schedule and traffic control functions according to the service level agreements (SLAs) between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resources. Other capabilities interact with the policy decision capability to acquire policy decision results, and then enforce the policies accordingly.
+
+- The resource registry which provides mechanisms to register or de-register, discover, and ensure governance of resources. Resource registry maintains a catalogue of the description of the resources available. At run-time, the resource registry is accessed to locate the resources.
+- The resource manager which performs the controlling function for the pool of resources hosted by the NGN-SIDE provider. The resource manager also assigns the required resources to NGN-SIDE in-house applications.
+
+NOTE 3 – The role of the resource manager in managing resources external to the NGN-SIDE provider is for further study.
+
+##### **7.2.1.3 Service delivery management functional group**
+
+The service delivery management functional group provides capabilities to realize the management of different aspects, provisioning of applications and charging for ensuring proper functioning of the service creation and service execution functional groups and providing associated delivery functionalities. This functional group includes the following capabilities:
+
+- the policy management which provides support for managing, including storing of agreed policies. Policies include SLAs between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resources and end-user's preferences. The policy management capability synchronizes policy related information with the policy decision capability;
+- the management of role-related information which provides centralized access, and management of information related to the different NGN-SIDE roles;
+- the content management which provides mechanisms to handle content for its appropriate access by NGN-SIDE users;
+- the charging capability which coordinates charging for NGN-SIDE, including the triggering (online and offline) of all charging events during service delivery, interacting as appropriate with the NGN accounting and charging capabilities [ITU-T Y.2201];
+- the application provisioning which provides deployment mechanisms for NGN-SIDE in-house applications in a secure way;
+- the context management which collects context information and exposes context information to other entities in a secure way.
+
+#### **7.2.2 NGN-SIDE adaptation layer**
+
+NGN-SIDE adaptation layer includes resource brokering and resource adaptors.
+
+The resource brokering mediates among resources and applications located in NGN-SIDE resource layer and NGN-SIDE user layer respectively.
+
+Upon requests received from the NGN-SIDE integration layer, the resource brokering identifies the appropriate resource from the NGN-SIDE resource layer.
+
+Upon requests received from the NGN-SIDE resource layer, the resource brokering identifies the appropriate application in the NGN-SIDE user layer.
+
+The resource brokering also interacts with the NGN-SIDE integration layer (i.e., policy decision) to enforce the resource related policies such as scheduling of resources.
+
+The resource adaptors include adaptors for NGN and adaptors for Non-NGN.
+
+The resource adaptors perform adaptation of resources from the NGN-SIDE resource layer, i.e., resources from NGN and Non-NGN, based on NGN-SIDE integration layer's request as a result of its processing of the service request. The resource adaptors perform adaptation of control plane and media plane related resources.
+
+# 8 NGN-SIDE requirements
+
+This clause describes NGN-SIDE requirements.
+
+## 8.1 Applications related requirements
+
+A. NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for application provisioning, addressing and routing:
+
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to provide mechanisms to publish an NGN-SIDE in-house application so that it can be accessible from various domains.
+
+NOTE 1 – This may include publishing a domain name for Internet domain, assigning a special access number (e.g., an ITU-T E.164 number) for telecommunication domain;
+
+- 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support standard addressing mechanisms for applications (e.g., URL or ITU-T E.164 address);
+- 3) NGN-SIDE is required to provide a mechanism to send requests originated from NGN-SIDE or resources to applications, and vice versa.
+
+B. NGN-SIDE is required to provide mechanisms to support ubiquitous sensor network (USN) applications [ITU-T Y.2221] and machine-to-machine (M2M) applications as defined in clause 3.
+
+C. NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide mechanisms to support the following cloud service categories:
+
+- 1) application services (SaaS);
+- 2) platform services (PaaS);
+- 3) communication services (CaaS);
+- 4) resource services (IaaS);
+- 5) network services (NaaS).
+
+NOTE 2 – Details about cloud service categories can be found in Appendix III.
+
+D. NGN-SIDE is recommended to enable applications and functionalities supported by NGN-SIDE as a cloud service (SDPaaS).
+
+NOTE 3 – SDPaaS can be viewed as the capability provided to the users of cloud services to use applications and functionalities supported by NGN-SIDE as well as the capability provided to a provider of cloud services to deploy, control and manage NGN-SIDE functionalities.
+
+E. NGN-SIDE can optionally provide the following functionalities to support cloud services:
+
+- 1) mediation functionalities between users of cloud services (as NGN-SIDE users) and providers of cloud services (as NGN-SIDE resource providers). These mediation functionalities include SLA negotiation, monitoring, security, screening, adaptation, provisioning and integration of cloud services;
+
+F. NGN-SIDE can optionally be deployed, as internal resources and functionalities, in a distributed fashion using cloud computing mechanisms (e.g., virtualization, distributed file system, distributed cache or distributed database).
+
+NOTE 4 – This deployment can provide IaaS support by the NGN-SIDE infrastructure itself.
+
+NOTE 5 – An overview of characteristics and models of cloud computing technology and the relationship of these models with NGN-SIDE are described in Appendix III.
+
+## **8.2 NGN-SIDE integration related requirements**
+
+- A. NGN-SIDE is required to provide an open environment for the integration of resources from different domains:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support integration of resources supplied by the same NGN-SIDE resource provider and from different NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is recommended to support the composition of resources offered by the NGN-SIDE provider as well as resources offered by different NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to provide standardized mechanisms to access the resources located in different NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 4) NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide an abstract standardized description of resources located in different NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 5) NGN-SIDE is required to provide NGN-SIDE users with a physical location independent resource identification scheme for accessing the resources exposed by NGN-SIDE.
+- B. NGN-SIDE is required to support features for a configurable, manageable, scalable and reliable service execution environment:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to provide mechanisms for SLA control according applications' SLAs;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support traffic control related functions based on applications' SLAs for the invocation of resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to support service level monitoring functions and resource monitoring functions (e.g., monitoring of resources' availability, devices' overload, network congestion level) for resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 4) NGN-SIDE is required to provide functions for application execution's scalability and reliability;
+ - 5) NGN-SIDE is required to support virtualization mechanisms to expose connectivity, computing and storage resources.
+- C. NGN-SIDE is required to provide access control:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support access from applications to NGN-SIDE functionalities and to exposed resources in a secure and controlled way.
+- D. NGN-SIDE is required to support charging functionalities related to resource consumption and application usage.
+- E. NGN-SIDE is required to support service orchestration features as follows:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support static service orchestration according to the pre-defined service logic;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support a mechanism to select the appropriate resource responding to dynamic context information changes such as those of end user context, device context, network context;
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to support a mechanism to generate a service logic meeting the NGN-SIDE user's demand (e.g., cost and execution requirements);
+ - 4) NGN-SIDE is required to support a mechanism for adaptive orchestration to ensure the application's reliability when some resources are not available.
+
+- F. NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for resource registration, discovery and routing:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to provide mechanisms for resource registration, including a standard schema for registration-oriented resource description, including unique resource identification and resource addressing;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to provide a routing mechanism to locate the required resources and establish a path to access the resources.
+- G. NGN-SIDE is required to provide the following content handling mechanisms:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to provide real-time content recording, processing, including encryption, decryption, content protection and digital rights management (DRM);
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to provide content delivery mechanisms;
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to provide content storage, caching, adaptation (including codec conversion, format conversion).
+- H. NGN-SIDE is required to support an agile service creation environment:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to use a standard schema for uniform service creation-oriented resource description within NGN-SIDE;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support at least one standardized description language for service logic (i.e., the logic of the services to be provided by NGN-SIDE);
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms to notify application developers about the availability of new or updated resources;
+ - 4) NGN-SIDE is required to support the application testing environment for application developers;
+ - 5) NGN-SIDE is required to support online and offline design tools for application developers;
+ - 6) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for the creation of personalized applications based on the end-user's context information, including language, location, presence and other customized information;
+ - 7) NGN-SIDE is required to support the protection of property rights in terms of ownership and usage for both application developer and NGN-SIDE.
+- I. NGN-SIDE is required to support application developer related requirements:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support the application developer's management including the developer's registration, auditing, authentication and authorization;
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support various charging modes (e.g., revenue sharing or quota limitation) for application developers.
+- J. NGN-SIDE is required to support service delivery management functionalities as follows:
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for context management as follows:
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to support standardized data format and semantics of context information following [ITU-T Y.2201];
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to manage context entities related information and access to context information (e.g., operations of registration, query, subscription, notification, update and availability discovery ) in NGN and non-NGN;
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to support security and reliability for context information following [ITU-T Y.2201];
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to support charging function based on context information following [ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+- 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support charging features as specified in [ITU-T Y.2233], including event-based online/offline charging.
+- 3) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for the management of role-related information as follows:
+ - NGN-SIDE is required to support the management (i.e., add, modify, delete, operations) of role-related information by the NGN-SIDE provider;
+ - NGN-SIDE is required to support the management (i.e., add, modify, delete operations) of subscription related information between different roles by the NGN-SIDE provider;
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to support the policy-based access of NGN-SIDE role related information;
+ - NGN-SIDE is recommended to support policy based access of application end users' subscription related information.
+- 4) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms for content management as follows:
+ - NGN-SIDE is required to support content profiling to handle content according to content usage in different NGN-SIDE users' environments;
+ - NGN-SIDE is required to support the extraction of appropriate information (e.g., size, type or publisher) from content;
+ - NGN-SIDE is required to support content dispatching to content storage resources.
+
+## **8.3 NGN-SIDE adaptation related requirements**
+
+- A. NGN-SIDE is required to support adaptation for exposure of resources, including virtualized resources from different domains as follows:
+ - 1) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms to expose telecommunication domain resources. This includes mechanisms to expose NGN capabilities, including NGN service enablers, as specified in [ITU-T Y.2201];
+ NOTE – NGN service enablers are a subset of the NGN capabilities specified in [ITU-T Y.2201].
+ - 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms to expose Internet domain resources;
+ - 3) NGN-SIDE is required to support mechanisms to expose broadcasting domain resources;
+ - 4) NGN-SIDE is required to support exposure of composite resources, such as composite applications and services, offered by a given NGN-SIDE resource provider;
+ - 5) NGN-SIDE is required to support the exposure of legacy services (e.g., PSTN/IN based services);
+ - 6) NGN-SIDE is recommended to support the exposure of contents offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers.
+- B. NGN-SIDE is required to support brokering of NGN and non-NGN resources offered by different NGN SIDE resource providers in a secure and controllable way as follows:
+ - 1) The resource brokering is required to manage interactions among all available resources, including cloud resources, offered by different NGN-SIDE resource providers;
+ - 2) The resource brokering is required to take into account context information (including end user's context information) when selecting a resource to fulfill a request from the NGN-SIDE integration layer.
+
+## **8.4 NGN-SIDE security related requirements**
+
+A. NGN-SIDE is required to support the following:
+
+- 1) NGN-SIDE is required to fulfill the NGN security requirements according to [ITU-T Y.2201], [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2702];
+- 2) NGN-SIDE is required to support security mechanisms according to [ITU-T Y.2704] for the following dimensions: access control, authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, communication security, data integrity, availability and privacy;
+- 3) When NGN-SIDE is not supported by the NGN provider, NGN-SIDE is required to fulfill general security requirements according to [ITU-T X.805] dimensions;
+- 4) NGN-SIDE is required to provide a security environment for the NGN-SIDE user, so that the NGN-SIDE user can set up a trust domain for context aware applications;
+- 5) NGN-SIDE is required to provide a privacy schema to enable the NGN-SIDE user's protection for access and selection of NGN-SIDE user related context information;
+- 6) NGN-SIDE is required to have mechanisms to manage, control and distribute context related information, according to the NGN-SIDE provider's privacy policies and related agreements with NGN-SIDE users and the NGN-SIDE resource providers supplying context information;
+- 7) NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide identity management support to NGN-SIDE users via integration of NGN identity management network based capabilities according to [ITU-T Y.2201], [ITU-T Y.2720], [ITU-T Y.2721] and [ITU-T Y.2722] with Identity Management capabilities provided by applications and/or other resources.
+
+# **9 NGN-SIDE capabilities**
+
+This clause describes the capabilities of NGN-SIDE according to the NGN-SIDE layered view.
+
+Part of the functionalities provided by NGN-SIDE is supported via the capabilities identified in [ITU-T Y.2234]. Specific relationships between the capabilities defined in this Recommendation and the capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2234] are provided in Annex A.
+
+## **9.1 NGN-SIDE capabilities related to the NGN-SIDE integration layer**
+
+#### **9.1.1 Application development support**
+
+This capability enables application developers to develop applications using resources exposed by NGN-SIDE.
+
+An application developer can develop applications using online or offline design tools.
+
+In the online application development mode, the application developer interacts with the application development support and develops applications using online tools accessible via the application development support.
+
+In the offline application development mode, the application developer uses offline tools (e.g., software development kits (SDKs), plug-ins) via the application development support and develops applications.
+
+NOTE – SDKs are used to facilitate the development of applications by application developers.
+
+The following types of SDK are considered:
+
+- device SDK, which provides a set of development tools for the creation of UE hosted applications residing on UEs;
+
+- network SDK, which provides a set of development tools for the creation of applications (third-party applications or NGN-SIDE in-house applications).
+
+The application development support capability is required to:
+
+- provide an easy and secure access to resource repository;
+- provide developers' applications with customer and contextual data to deliver an enhanced user experience;
+- support integrated development management tools;
+- provide access to the application developers' community;
+- support access to the testing environment;
+- support purchasing and payment mechanisms as well as revenue sharing models;
+- provide support functionality for secure storage of developers' applications;
+- provide rules, guidelines, sample applications and API definitions for rapid application development;
+- support the collection and exposure of customer's feedback and ratings about applications;
+- support security mechanisms to assure protection of intellectual property.
+
+### **9.1.2 Resource repository**
+
+The resource repository capability is required to provide functionalities for the storage of information related to the registered resources. Information related to the registered resources includes various suitable packaging tools (e.g., Java SDK, .NET SDK and Eclipse) for application developers.
+
+The resource repository capability is recommended to:
+
+- provide a version management mechanism to allow registered resource automatic upgrade;
+- provide a common mechanism to interact with the resource registry capability for cooperation on resource related information retrieval and storage.
+
+#### **9.1.3 Testing environment**
+
+This capability provides a testing environment to application developers to allow testing of application operation (e.g., support of application tracing, debugging).
+
+The testing environment capability:
+
+- can optionally support tools and capabilities for simulation of NGN-SIDE capabilities as appropriate for testing;
+- is recommended to not impact the operations of NGN-SIDE;
+- is recommended to support resource simulation by NGN-SIDE itself within the testing environment.
+
+#### **9.1.4 Access control**
+
+The access control capability provides translation of APIs and protocols across different NGN-SIDE service interfaces as well as access from applications to functionalities or resources exposed by NGN-SIDE.
+
+The access control capability is required to support the following functionalities:
+
+- API and protocol translation between different service interfaces and NGN-SIDE;
+- authentication of NGN-SIDE users requesting usage of exposed functionalities or resources;
+
+- policy-based authorization of NGN-SIDE users requesting usage of exposed functionalities or resources;
+- handling and relaying of service requests or events from applications or resources towards NGN-SIDE;
+- handling and relaying of responses from applications or resources;
+- triggering of charging events for applications accessing functionalities or resources exposed by NGN-SIDE.
+
+#### 9.1.5 Service orchestration
+
+This capability is required to provide mechanisms for:
+
+- composing resources (resources provided by the NGN-SIDE provider as well as registered resources from other domains) to create new composite resources;
+- executing composite resources.
+
+Composing resources is the process of generation of the service logic (i.e., the logic of the service to be provided by NGN-SIDE) taking into account the requirements from the end-user (user of the application), including the consideration of context information, and dynamic changes of resources.
+
+Executing composite resources includes parsing and running the service logic.
+
+NOTE – The execution process also includes ensuring reliability and continuity of the service to be provided by NGN-SIDE, when a resource to be composed is not available (e.g., the resource hosting device is powered off or its connection to NGN-SIDE is broken).
+
+#### 9.1.6 Resource registry
+
+This capability provides the functionalities related to the registration, deregistration, discovery, and governance of resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers. Registration-oriented resource descriptions, including unique resource identification and resource addressing, are published in resource registry.
+
+This capability defines a mechanism for a resource of an NGN-SIDE resource provider to be registered within NGN-SIDE, so that this resource can be located and accessed by applications.
+
+The resource registry capability provides the following functionalities:
+
+- The resources offered to NGN-SIDE by NGN-SIDE resource providers are required to be registered in the resource registry. The resource registry is required to support resource update as well as resource deregistration.
+- When there is a resource deregistration request (e.g., if a resource is not needed anymore), the resource registry capability is required to ensure the application running instances' reliability.
+- The resource registry capability is required to provide a resource discovery mechanism which allows NGN-SIDE users (e.g., applications) to choose an appropriate resource. Resources are discovered based on static configuration and dynamic information.
+
+NOTE – The static information used for selection may include user identity information (e.g., user name or binding address) which is generally invariable; the dynamic information used for selection may include other user information, such as user's presence and location, user's access network bandwidth, which is subject to change.
+
+- The resource registry capability is required to provide resource governance in terms of the management of all registered resources, including resource life cycle management, resource portfolio management, resource performance monitoring. For example, when a resource is updated, the resource registry capability is responsible for updating the resource repository and the application running instances about this update.
+
+#### **9.1.7 Service dispatcher**
+
+This capability provides unified message routing and message exchange mechanisms within NGN-SIDE.
+
+The message routing mechanisms provide route calculation for requests and responses between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resource providers. Message routing can be based on various criteria, e.g., context, policies.
+
+The message exchange mechanisms control the message flow between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resource providers.
+
+The service dispatcher interacts with policy decision to enforce policies for service level monitoring such as QoS control.
+
+The service dispatcher also provides API and protocol transformation from applications to common message structure and business event handling and vice versa.
+
+The service dispatcher capability is required to:
+
+- support the exchange and routing of messages between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resource providers. This includes support of message flows involving multiple application providers;
+- interact with policy decision to enforce policies for service level monitoring such as QoS control;
+- support API and protocol transformation from applications to common message structure, and handling of business events, and vice versa.
+
+#### **9.1.8 Policy decision**
+
+The policy decision provides the policy decision making function and interacts with other capabilities to provide the policy decision results for policy enforcement. The policy decision capability is required to:
+
+- synchronize policy related information with the policy management capability;
+- interpret policy rules provided by the policy management capability;
+- interact with other capabilities (e.g., service dispatcher, resource brokering) for policy decisions, according to policy related information.
+
+#### **9.1.9 Resource manager**
+
+The resource manager performs the controlling functions for all resources in order to satisfy the application's requirements. During the deployment of NGN-SIDE in-house applications, the application provisioning capability communicates with the resource manager which assigns the resources (including computing, connectivity, and storage) internal to NGN-SIDE according to the application's requirements (SLAs) and the NGN-SIDE provider's policies. The resource manager capability is required to assign the resources (including computing, connectivity, and storage) internal to NGN-SIDE according to the application's requirements (SLAs) and the NGN-SIDE provider's policies.
+
+#### **9.1.10 Policy management**
+
+The policy management capability provides the management of policies [ITU-T Y.2201], used for access, provisioning, logging and management of resources. The policy management capability is required to provide policy management functionalities, including storing policy related information such as SLAs between NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resources and end-user's preferences provided by end users at subscription time.
+
+#### 9.1.11 Content management
+
+Content can be provided as resources to NGN-SIDE by different NGN-SIDE resource providers (e.g., content providers and end users). The content management capability is required to provide the following functionalities:
+
+- extraction of appropriate information (including size, type, publisher, location) from content, enabling the NGN-SIDE provider to ensure the integrity of the content itself;
+- profiling of content as appropriate to enable its delivery to different NGN-SIDE users' environments, such as content for specific applications (e.g., WAP applications, CRBT applications, web applications), content for specific end-user equipment, content for specific end-user locations;
+- dispatching of content to content storage resources in order to expose content to applications.
+
+NOTE – Content storage resources can be supported within NGN-SIDE or outside of NGN-SIDE.
+
+#### 9.1.12 Charging
+
+This capability coordinates charging for NGN-SIDE, interacting as appropriate with the NGN accounting and charging capabilities [ITU-T Y.2201]. The charging capability is required to support charging modes and mechanisms as specified in [ITU-T Y.2233], including:
+
+- support of revenue sharing among the various actors involved in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem (e.g., support of individual application developers);
+- support of event-based online or offline charging in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem.
+
+#### 9.1.13 Management of role-related information
+
+The management of role-related information capability makes role-related information available to other NGN-SIDE capabilities (e.g., to access control for role authentication and authorization).
+
+Role-related information includes basic information for all roles (e.g., NGN-SIDE user – resource provider relationship), role specific information (e.g., preference profiles), subscription related information (e.g., end user-application provider subscription relationship information for in-house applications). The management of role related information capability:
+
+- is required to provide policy-based access and centralized management (i.e., add, modify or delete operations) of role-related information, including information on role inter-relationship, concerning the different roles involved in the NGN-SIDE ecosystems;
+- can optionally support storage of role-related information.
+
+#### 9.1.14 Application provisioning
+
+The application provisioning capability is used for the deployment of applications in a secure way by the NGN-SIDE provider when they are available for deployment.
+
+NOTE – This capability is used for NGN-SIDE in-house applications. This capability provides application packaging, publishing, deployment, lifecycle management and monitoring functions. The application provisioning capability is required to provide:
+
+- a standard format for application packaging, including directory structure, compression format, configuration format;
+- a standard schema for application provisioning;
+- a publishing mechanism to make an application accessible in different domains, e.g., assigning a domain name to the application for Internet user access, assigning an SMS access code for PLMN user access;
+- a deployment mechanism which allows the assignment of an application server in the NGN-SIDE provider domain for application hosting;
+
+- access means for control of application lifecycle, including application setup, revocation, update, version management and tracing log.
+
+#### **9.1.15 Context management**
+
+The context management capability collects, aggregates and manages context information related to different context sources, exposing context information, including to other NGN-SIDE entities, according to the NGN-SIDE provider's policies.
+
+Context information includes different types of context related information such as service, end-user, device and network context:
+
+- the service context may include service availability, service QoS, service performance;
+- the end-user context may include the end-user's identity, end-user's presence, end-user's end location, end-user's preferences and end-user's social status;
+- the device context may include device status (e.g., device's presence, device's capabilities) and device's runtime parameters (e.g., CPU, memory, load, performance);
+- the network context may include network conditions (e.g., bandwidth, traffic, topology) and network performance.
+
+The context management capability is required to:
+
+- collect and aggregate context information related to different context sources;
+- expose context information, including to other NGN-SIDE capabilities, according to the NGN-SIDE provider's policies.
+
+### **9.2 NGN-SIDE capabilities related to the NGN-SIDE adaptation layer**
+
+#### **9.2.1 Resource brokering**
+
+This capability provides the interaction between applications and resources for the downward invocation of resources and the upward triggering of applications. It also interacts with the NGN-SIDE integration layer capabilities (e.g., policy decision) to enforce the resource related policies such as scheduling of resources. The resource brokering capability provides the following functionalities:
+
+- For the downward request from the application side, the resource brokering is required to interact with policy decision in order to decide which resources should be invoked among the candidate resources and to mediate among the resources according to the context information (e.g., end-user's preferences, resource conditions, device status).
+- For the upward request from the resource side, the resource brokering is required to control the application's trigger sequence and mediate among the applications and resources according to policies (including the NGN-SIDE provider's policies, context information, and application provider's policies).
+- The resource brokering is recommended to provide brokering of cloud resources from a single or multiple domains.
+
+NOTE – Details about requirements for support by the resource brokering of cloud resources are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+#### **9.2.2 Adaptors**
+
+The resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers may vary, based on the underlying resource technology used by the NGN-SIDE resource providers. This makes it difficult for application developers to develop new applications based on direct usage of such diverse and complex underlying resources.
+
+The NGN-SIDE adaptation layer adapts resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers such as their own service logic and service control, and related protocols, in order to provide uniformly adapted resources (e.g., control and media format) for interaction with the NGN-SIDE integration layer. NGN-SIDE resource providers use standardized or proprietary interfaces called "NGN-SIDE resource interfaces" (clause 10.2) to offer resources to NGN-SIDE. These interfaces are adapted by NGN-SIDE.
+
+The NGN-SIDE adaptation layer provides adaptation capabilities, called adaptors, hiding the details of the resources in the NGN-SIDE resource layer as shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F9-1
+
+Figure 9-1: Adaptation of resources in NGN-SIDE. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is the 'Application layer'. Below it is the 'NGN-SIDE integration layer'. Inside the integration layer is the 'Resource brokering' layer. Below resource brokering is the 'NGN-SIDE adaptation layer', which contains five boxes: 'Adaptors for NGN domain', 'Adaptors for Internet domain', 'Adaptors for other domains (broadcasting, etc.)', 'Adaptors for other telecommunication domains (i.e., PSTN/IN, PLMN)', and 'Adaptors for content provider domain'. Below the adaptation layer is the 'NGN-SIDE resource layer', which contains five boxes: 'Resources offered by NGN domain', 'Resources offered by Internet domain', 'Resources offered by other domains (broadcasting, etc.)', 'Resources offered by other telecommunication domains (i.e., PSTN/IN, PLMN)', and 'Resources offered by content provider domain'. Vertical lines connect the Application layer to the integration layer, the integration layer to the adaptation layer, and the adaptation layer to the resource layer.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Adaptation of resources in NGN-SIDE**
+
+The NGN-SIDE adaptation layer includes adaptors for resources available in the NGN-SIDE resource layer. The adaptors perform adaptation at both control plane and media plane level.
+
+Figure 9-2 shows the approach for adaptation of resources offered by the NGN-SIDE resource layer.
+
+
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F9-2
+
+Figure 9-2: Resource adaptation in NGN-SIDE. The diagram shows two hierarchical layers. The top layer, 'Abstracted applications', contains 'Abstracted applications', 'Abstracted service enablers', 'Abstracted network capabilities', 'Abstracted content', 'Other abstracted resources (abstracted IdM resources, abstracted USN resources, abstracted M2M resources, etc.)', 'Virtualized connectivity', 'Virtualized computing', and 'Virtualized storage'. The bottom layer, 'Applications', contains 'Applications', 'Service enablers', 'Network capabilities', 'Content', 'Other resources (IdM resources, USN resources, M2M resources, etc.)', 'Connectivity', 'Computing', and 'Storage'. A vertical line connects the two layers, indicating abstraction and mapping.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Resource adaptation in NGN-SIDE**
+
+Resources shown in Figure 9-2 such as service enablers, network capabilities, applications, connectivity, computing, storage, content and other resources (including USN resources and M2M resources), can be offered by NGN or non-NGN.
+
+NGN-SIDE is required to abstract connectivity, computing and storage resources by using virtualization mechanisms.
+
+NGN-SIDE is required to abstract network capabilities, service enablers, applications, content and other resources by using a standardized description mechanism, i.e., common message structure, common media format, unique mapping scheme between resources and common message structure.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support the adaptation of resources to support M2M applications, including:
+
+- support of M2M adaptors for accessing M2M devices (e.g., directly or via M2M gateways) [b-ETSI-102.689].
+NOTE 1 – NGN-SIDE acts in this approach as middleware for M2M (resources for support of M2M applications are abstracted in NGN-SIDE);
+- support of M2M adaptors for accessing M2M related resources.
+NOTE 2 – NGN-SIDE acts in this approach as a mediator between M2M applications and M2M middleware.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support the adaptation of resources to support USN applications [ITU-T Y.2221], including:
+
+- support of USN adaptors for accessing sensor networks (e.g., directly or via USN gateways).
+NOTE 3 – NGN-SIDE acts in this approach as USN middleware (NGN capabilities for support of USN applications [ITU-T Y.2221] are abstracted in NGN-SIDE);
+- support of USN adaptors to USN middleware as described in [ITU-T Y.2221].
+NOTE 4 – NGN-SIDE acts in this approach as a mediator between USN applications and USN middleware. NGN-SIDE is recommended to support adaptation of resources to support the various cloud service categories, including support of adaptors for accessing cloud resources (including connectivity, computing, and storage). The following clauses provide details about adaptors for resources offered by NGN and Non-NGN.
+
+##### 9.2.2.1 Adaptors for resources offered by NGN
+
+Figure 9-3 shows the approach for adaptation of resources specifically offered by NGN.
+
+
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F9-3
+
+Figure 9-3: Adaptation examples of resources offered by NGN. The diagram shows two hierarchical levels. The top level is a large box containing two sub-boxes. The left sub-box is labeled 'Adaptors for NGN capabilities' and contains six smaller boxes: 'Adaptor for messaging', 'Adaptor for context awareness', 'Adaptor for presence', 'Adaptor for location', 'Adaptor for session', and 'Adaptors for other NGN capabilities'. The right sub-box is labeled 'Adaptors for other NGN resources'. The bottom level is a similar large box. The left sub-box is labeled 'NGN capabilities' and contains six smaller boxes: 'Messaging', 'Context awareness', 'Presence', 'Location', 'Session', and 'Other NGN capabilities'. The right sub-box is labeled 'Other NGN resources'. A vertical line connects the two large boxes.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – Adaptation examples of resources offered by NGN**
+
+NOTE – NGN resources include NGN capabilities, as described in [ITU-T Y.2201], and other NGN resources.
+
+Figure 9-3 shows only some examples of NGN capability adaptors. The actual scope of adaptation depends on the NGN-SIDE provider's policies and, in case the NGN-SIDE provider and the NGN provider are distinct, on the agreements with the NGN provider.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide adaptors for at least the following service enablers [ITU-T Y.2201]:
+
+- message handling;
+- presence;
+- location management;
+- session handling;
+- accounting and charging.
+
+##### 9.2.2.2 Adaptors for resources offered by non-NGN
+
+Figure 9-4 shows the approach for adaptation of resources specifically offered by non-NGN.
+
+
+
+Diagram illustrating adaptation examples of resources offered by Non-NGN. The diagram shows two main sections connected by a vertical line. The top section is a large box containing four sub-boxes, each representing a domain: 'Adaptors for telecommunication domain' (with SMS, MMS, IN, and other telecommunication resources), 'Adaptors for Internet domain' (with e-mail, search, map, and other Internet resources), 'Adaptors for content provider domain' (with media and other content resources), and 'Adaptors for broadcasting domain' (with DVB and other broadcasting resources). The bottom section is a similar large box containing four sub-boxes representing the actual resources: 'Telecommunication domain' (SMS, MMS, IN, other telecommunication resources), 'Internet domain' (e-mail, search, map, other Internet resources), 'Content provider domain' (Media, other content resources), and 'Broadcasting domain' (DVB, other broadcasting resources).
+
+Y.2240(11)\_F9-4
+
+**Figure 9-4 – Adaptation examples of resources offered by Non-NGN**
+
+NGN-SIDE supports the adaptation of telecommunication domain resources, Internet domain resources, broadcasting domain resources and content provider domain resources.
+
+- A. In order to access resources from the telecommunication domain, NGN-SIDE is:
+ - i) required to provide adaptors for the following resources:
+ - SMS resources;
+ - MMS resources;
+ - LCS resources;
+ - WAP gateway resources.
+ - ii) recommended to provide adaptors for the following resources:
+ - intelligent network resources (e.g., adaptation for INAP, WIN, CAMEL based interfaces);
+ - IMS based network resources.
+- B. In order to access resources from the Internet domain, NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide adaptors for at least the following Internet resources:
+ - Internet e-mail resources;
+ - file transfer resources;
+ - search resources;
+ - RSS resources
+ - map resources;
+ - web services resources;
+ - social network services resources.
+
+- C. In order to support adaptation for content provider domain, NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide content adaptation for different content types, and support of format adaptation, codec adaptation, and code and packaging adaptation according to the corresponding standards:
+- format adaptation provides data conversion from one coding format to another one as per context (e.g., binary coding to text coding);
+ - codec adaptation provides media translation from one codec format to another one (e.g., ITU-T G.711 codec format to ITU-T G.729 codec format);
+ - code and packaging adaptation provides file and packaging format adaptation (e.g., bitmap to gif, rar to zip).
+- NOTE – Content can be adapted from different sources, such as directly from a content provider or indirectly from a content delivery service provider.
+- D. In order to access resources from broadcasting domain, NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide adaptors for the corresponding resources, including adaptation for enablers from DVB, OMA and 3GPP (e.g., OMA BCAST [b-OMA-BCAST] or 3GPP MBMS [b-3GPP-MBMS]).
+- E. NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide adaptors for streaming resources from different domains.
+- F. In order to access cloud resources, NGN-SIDE is recommended to provide adaptors for the cloud resources.
+
+# **10 NGN-SIDE interfaces requirements**
+
+## **10.1 NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture**
+
+Figure 10-1 shows the NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture. At the top is an 'Applications' block connected via an 'ANI' (Application Network Interface) line. Below this is the 'Service stratum' (green box) containing the 'NGN-SIDE layer'. Inside the NGN-SIDE layer are sub-blocks: 'Services creation', 'Services execution', and 'Services delivery management' within an 'NGN-SIDE integration layer'; 'Resource brokering'; and 'Adaptors' within an 'NGN-SIDE adaptation layer'. To the left of the service stratum are 'IdM functions' and 'End-user functions'. To the right are 'Functions from other service providers' (connected via 'SNI') and 'Functions from other networks' (connected via 'NNI'). Below the service stratum is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow box) containing 'Transport control functions' and 'Transport functions'. A vertical 'Management functions' bar (pink) is on the far left. The diagram uses a legend to define line types: dashed black for 'Control except SIDE', solid blue for 'Media', dashed pink for 'Management', dashed yellow for 'IdM', dotted green for 'Control for SIDE', and solid green for 'Media for SIDE'.
+
+Figure 10-1 – NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture
+
+**Figure 10-1 – NGN-SIDE positioning within the NGN reference architecture**
+
+The NGN-SIDE functional components are positioned inside the NGN service stratum. The NGN-SIDE adaptation layer enables the abstraction of resources, including the resources of the NGN transport stratum (e.g., transport control functions and transport functions related resources) and the NGN service stratum (e.g., service control functions and content delivery functions related resources).
+
+NOTE 1 – This Recommendation assumes one single NGN-SIDE per NGN domain.
+
+"Control for SIDE" in Figure 10-1 represents the control level interfaces between NGN-SIDE and relevant entities outside the NGN service stratum. In particular:
+
+- "Control for SIDE" at the ANI between applications and NGN-SIDE represents the interface to third-party applications.
+- "Control for SIDE" at the NNI between other networks and NGN-SIDE represents the interface to other networks (e.g., to access NGN-SIDE in another NGN, resources in other networks).
+- "Control for SIDE" at the UNI between end-user functions and NGN-SIDE, represents the interface to end-user functions (e.g., to access resources located in the end-user side, to expose NGN-SIDE capabilities to applications in the end-user side).
+
+26 Rec. ITU-T Y.2240 (04/2011)
+
+- "Control for SIDE" at the SNI between other service providers and NGN-SIDE represents the interface to other service providers (e.g., content providers).
+
+"Media for SIDE" in Figure 10-1 represents the media level interfaces between NGN-SIDE and relevant entities outside the NGN service stratum.
+
+NOTE 2 – "Control for SIDE" and "Media for SIDE" interfaces between NGN-SIDE and NGN service stratum are implicit but not shown in Figure 10-1. In line with [ITU-T Y.2012], it is possible for identity management (IdM) functions to reside in different planes (e.g., user, control and management) and different strata of the architecture (e.g., service stratum and transport stratum). Although IdM functions are shown in Figure 10-1 as a stand-alone group of functions, this is not intended to impose any implementation design or restrictions for IdM functions.
+
+NGN-SIDE may provide support for IdM (e.g., IdM related to NGN-SIDE users, NGN-SIDE resource providers and NGN-SIDE provider). In particular, NGN-SIDE capabilities such as resource registry, resource repository, access control, management of role-related information may provide support for IdM mechanisms [ITU-T Y.2722].
+
+In addition, NGN-SIDE may also provide adaptation of IdM resources (via appropriate adaptors), including NGN IdM resources, and may also expose IdM resources to NGN-SIDE users. Although management functions are shown in Figure 10-1 as a stand-alone group of functions, this is not intended to impose any implementation design or restrictions for management functions. In particular, NGN-SIDE supports some management functions in the service delivery management functional group.
+
+## **10.2 NGN-SIDE interfaces**
+
+The NGN-SIDE interfaces extend the NGN interfaces [ITU-T Y.2012], i.e., ANI, UNI, SNI, and NNI, for its interaction with NGN-SIDE users and NGN-SIDE resource providers.
+
+The NGN-SIDE interfaces can be categorized as follows:
+
+- NGN-SIDE resource interfaces;
+- NGN-SIDE service interfaces.
+
+As far as the interfaces among NGN-SIDE internal capabilities, this Recommendation does not identify reference points among NGN-SIDE internal capabilities. However, it is not precluded that NGN-SIDE uses standard interfaces among NGN-SIDE internal capabilities, in order to facilitate NGN-SIDE internal capabilities' reusability, portability, accessibility.
+
+### **10.2.1 NGN-SIDE resource interfaces**
+
+Figure 10-2 shows interaction between NGN-SIDE and resources from NGN-SIDE resource providers. In this perspective, NGN-SIDE consumes resources offered by NGN-SIDE resource providers.
+
+NGN-SIDE resource interfaces refer to the standardized or proprietary interfaces exposed by NGN-SIDE resource providers. NGN-SIDE adapts these interfaces to access resources as described in clause 9.2.2.
+
+NOTE – This Recommendation assumes that NGN-SIDE accesses resources via standardized or proprietary interfaces. Mapping between resource interfaces and NGN interfaces [ITU-T Y.2012] is not provided in this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-2: Interaction between NGN-SIDE and resources. The diagram shows a green rounded rectangle labeled 'NGN-SIDE' at the top. Below it, a vertical line labeled 'Resources interfaces' connects to a larger rounded rectangle labeled 'Resources'. Inside the 'Resources' box, there are six smaller rounded rectangles arranged in two rows: 'IdM', 'PRES', 'SMS' in the top row, and 'LOC', 'MMS', and three dots '...' in the bottom row. The reference 'Y.2240(11)\_F10-2' is at the bottom.
+
+**Figure 10-2 – Interaction between NGN-SIDE and resources**
+
+### 10.2.2 NGN-SIDE service interfaces
+
+This section identifies the NGN-SIDE service interface requirements in terms of APIs, related protocols and technologies across NGN ANI, UNI, SNI, and NNI. Figure 10-3 shows a high level view of the relationship of NGN-SIDE with NGN ANI, UNI, SNI, and NNI.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-3: Service interfaces supported by NGN-SIDE. The diagram shows a large green rounded rectangle labeled 'NGN-SIDE' in the center. Above it, three white rounded rectangles represent 'UE hosted applications', 'Third party applications', and 'Other service providers (e.g., content provider)'. Vertical lines connect these to the NGN-SIDE box, labeled 'UNI', 'ANI', and 'SNI' respectively. To the right, a vertical rounded rectangle labeled 'Other networks' is connected to the NGN-SIDE box by a dashed line labeled 'NNI'. The reference 'Y.2240(11)\_F10-3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-3 – Service interfaces supported by NGN-SIDE**
+
+NGN-SIDE service interfaces support:
+
+- NGN UE hosted applications, which access NGN-SIDE via UNI [ITU-T Y.2012];
+- Third-party applications, which access NGN-SIDE via ANI [ITU-T Y.2012];
+- NGN-SIDE in-house applications, which may access NGN-SIDE via ANI [ITU-T Y.2012], but access via proprietary interfaces is not precluded.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to implement standardized APIs, protocols, and technologies to realize the service exposure towards applications.
+
+NOTE – Appendix IV provides an overview of API related efforts in the standardization arena.
+
+##### 10.2.2.1 General requirements of NGN-SIDE service interfaces
+
+NGN-SIDE is required to provide NGN-SIDE users with access to NGN-SIDE via the NGN-SIDE service interfaces (i.e., ANI, UNI, NNI, SNI) for usage of the services offered by the NGN-SIDE provider.
+
+The NGN-SIDE integration layer processes the service request received from the invoked NGN-SIDE service interface according to the service request's communication needs. The NGN-SIDE adaptation layer is invoked according to the service request's processing results in order to provide adaptation for the requested resource and then the service response is sent to the NGN-SIDE service interface.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to expose standardized APIs to enable support of the different cloud service categories, including:
+
+- application services (SaaS);
+- platform services (PaaS);
+
+- communication services (CaaS);
+- resource services (IaaS);
+- network services (NaaS).
+
+NOTE 1 – Support of the different cloud service categories through exposure of standardized APIs at the different NGN-SIDE service interfaces is for further study.
+
+NOTE 2 – In order to support the different cloud service categories, NGN-SIDE can offer, but is not limited to, cloud APIs as specified in [b-OGF-OCCI], [b-DMTF-OVF] and [b-SNIA-CDMI].
+
+NOTE 3 – Support of APIs listed in the following subclauses across other NGN-SIDE service interfaces is not precluded.
+
+##### **10.2.2.2 Service interface requirements across ANI**
+
+NGN-SIDE ANI service interface is required to provide the interaction between applications and NGN-SIDE. The service requests initiated by applications are sent to the NGN-SIDE integration layer via ANI.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support standardized APIs at the ANI for exposing NGN-SIDE resources to applications.
+
+NOTE – NGN-SIDE can support, but is not limited to, the following APIs across ANI:
+
+- Parlay service access (PSA) APIs [b-OMA-PSA] [b-3GPP 29.199];
+- Parlay APIs [b-3GPP 29.198];
+- next generation service interfaces (NGSI) APIs [b-OMA-NGSI];
+- RESTful bindings for Parlay X web services (ParlayREST) APIs (See [b-OMA-ParlayREST1.0] and [b-OMA-ParlayREST2.0]);
+- GSMA One APIs [b-GSMA-OneAPI] [b-OMA-PXPROF];
+- J2SE APIs, J2EE APIs, JAIN APIs, JTAPI, JDBC APIs, JMS APIs, IMS services APIs, IMS communication enablers (ICE) [b-JCP-JSR];
+- social networks service APIs [b-Twitter], [b-Facebook].
+
+##### **10.2.2.3 Service interface requirements across UNI**
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support standardized APIs at the UNI for exposing NGN-SIDE resources and functions to applications whose application logic is located in the NGN end user functions (e.g., NGN UE hosted applications).
+
+NOTE – NGN-SIDE can support, but is not limited to, the following APIs across UNI:
+
+- WAC/OMTP (Wholesale Application Community/Open Mobile Terminal Platform)'s BONDI APIs [b-OMTP-BONDI];
+- WAC/JIL (Wholesale Application Community/Joint Innovation Lab) Widget System Handset APIs [b-JIL-API];
+- W3C's WebApps (web applications) APIs and widgets [b-W3C-WebApps];
+- W3C's DAP (device API and policy) [b-W3C-DAP];
+- W3C's UWA (ubiquitous web applications) [b-W3C-UWA];
+- OMA CSEA(client-side enabler API) [b-OMA-CSEA];
+- HTML5 and Xhtml5 [b-W3C-HTML5];
+- Java Micro Edition JSRs [b-Java ME-JSR].
+
+##### **10.2.2.4 Service interface requirements across NNI**
+
+NGN-SIDE NNI service interface is used to provide interaction with other NGN-SIDEs, NGNs and non-NGNs.
+
+The following service interfaces are relevant for the interaction of NGN-SIDE with other domains at NNI level:
+
+- service interface between two distinct NGN-SIDEs (that is, located in two distinct NGN domains);
+- service interface between NGN-SIDE and other NGNs which have no NGN-SIDE support;
+- service interface between NGN-SIDE and Non-NGNs.
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support standardized protocols and APIs at the NNI for exposing NGN-SIDE resources and functions to other networks.
+
+NOTE – NNI Interworking with other (non-NGN) telecommunication domain networks (PSTN, PLMN) follows the existing NGN related NNI specifications (NGN-SIDE is not directly involved in this interworking scenario).
+
+##### **10.2.2.5 Service interface requirements across SNI**
+
+NGN-SIDE is recommended to support standardized protocols and APIs at the SNI for exposing NGN-SIDE resources to other service providers (e.g., such as content providers, data information providers and application service providers).
+
+NOTE – NGN-SIDE can support, but is not limited to, the following protocols, APIs and technologies across SNI:
+
+- some parlay service access (PSA) APIs (for both control and media), including "Multimedia streaming control", "Multimedia multicast session management", "Content management" [b-OMA-PSA] and [b-3GPP 29.199];
+- Protocols and APIs for IPTV service support [b-ITU-T Y.1910].
+
+# **11 Security considerations**
+
+The security requirements of NGN-SIDE are provided in clause 8.
+
+# **Annex A**
+
+## **Relationship between capabilities of NGN-SIDE and [ITU-T Y.2234] capabilities**
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure A.1 shows the relationship between the OSE capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2234] and the NGN-SIDE capabilities defined in this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE – In Figure A.1, relationships between OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] and NGN-SIDE capabilities are highlighted using arrows.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph NGN_SIDE_layer [NGN-SIDE layer]
+ subgraph UserLayer [NGN-SIDE user layer]
+ Applications_User[Applications]
+ end
+
+ subgraph IntegrationLayer [NGN-SIDE integration layer]
+ subgraph ServiceCreation [Service creation]
+ AppDev[Application development support]
+ ResRepo[Resource repository]
+ TestEnv[Testing environment]
+ end
+ subgraph ServiceExecution [Service execution]
+ AccCtrl[Access control]
+ ServOrch[Service orchestration]
+ ResReg[Resource registry]
+ ServDisp[Service dispatcher]
+ PolDec[Policy decision]
+ ResMan[Resource manager]
+ end
+ subgraph ServiceDelivery [Service delivery management]
+ PolMan[Policy management]
+ ContMan[Content management]
+ Charging[Charging]
+ RoleMan[Management of role related information]
+ AppProv[Application provisioning]
+ CtxMan[Context management]
+ end
+ end
+
+ subgraph AdaptationLayer [NGN-SIDE adaptation layer]
+ ResBrok[Resource brokering]
+ AdaptNGN[Adaptors for NGN]
+ AdaptNonNGN[Adaptors for Non-NGN]
+ end
+
+ subgraph ResourceLayer [NGN-SIDE resource layer]
+ ResNGN[Resources offered by NGN]
+ ResNonNGN[Resources offered by Non-NGN]
+ end
+ end
+
+ subgraph OSE [OSE]
+ Applications_OSE[Applications]
+ ServMan[Service management - Note 1]
+ ServComp[Service composition]
+ ServDev[Service development support - Note 1]
+ ServDisc[Service discovery]
+ ServReg[Service registration]
+ PolEnf[Policy enforcement - Note 3]
+ ServCoord[Service coordonation]
+ Interwork[Interworking with service creation environnemts - Note 4]
+ end
+
+ Applications_User --> IntegrationLayer
+ IntegrationLayer --> AdaptationLayer
+ AdaptationLayer --> ResourceLayer
+
+ %% Connections to OSE
+ Applications_OSE --- ServMan
+ Applications_OSE --- ServComp
+ IntegrationLayer -.-> OSE
+ AdaptationLayer -.-> Interwork
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationship between ITU-T Y.2240 (NGN-SIDE) and ITU-T Y.2234 (OSE) capabilities. It is structured into several layers and components:
+
+- NGN-SIDE user layer:** Contains 'Applications'.
+- NGN-SIDE integration layer:** A large green box containing three main functional groups:
+ - Service creation:** Includes 'Application development support', 'Resource repository', and 'Testing environment'.
+ - Service execution:** Includes 'Access control', 'Service orchestration', 'Resource registry', 'Service dispatcher', 'Policy decision', 'Resource manager', and 'Service execution'.
+ - Service delivery management:** Includes 'Policy management', 'Content management', 'Charging', 'Management of role related information', 'Application provisioning', and 'Context management'.
+- NGN-SIDE adaptation layer:** Contains 'Resource brokering', 'Adaptors for NGN', and 'Adaptors for Non-NGN'.
+- NGN-SIDE resource layer:** Contains 'Resources offered by NGN' and 'Resources offered by Non-NGN'.
+- OSE (Open Service Environment):** A separate box on the right containing various capabilities:
+ - Service management (Note 1)
+ - Service composition
+ - Service development support (Note 1)
+ - Service discovery
+ - Service registration
+ - Policy enforcement (Note 3)
+ - Service coordonation
+ - Interworking with service creation environnemts (Note 4)
+
+Figure A.1: Relationship between ITU-T Y.2240 and ITU-T Y.2234 capabilities. The diagram shows the NGN-SIDE architecture layers and their mapping to OSE capabilities.
+
+Y.2240(11)\_FA.1
+
+NOTE 1 – It is for further study whether the OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] service management capability relates to other NGN-SIDE capabilities.
+
+NOTE 2 – It is for further study whether the OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] service development support capability relates to other NGN-SIDE capabilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – The OSE policy enforcement capability as described in [ITU-T Y.2234] relates to the NGN-SIDE policy decision and policy management capabilities. It is for further study whether the OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] policy enforcement capability also relates to the policy enforcement in NGN-SIDE as realized by the NGN-SIDE service dispatcher and resource brokering capabilities.
+
+NOTE 4 – The OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] capability for "Interworking with service creation environments" can be conceptually realized by using NGN or non-NGN adaptors with the collaboration of other capabilities in NGN-SIDE. With such adaptors, resources created in other service environments such as IN resources, IMS resources can be made available to NGN-SIDE. Once adapted, these resources can be used in the same way as any other resources in NGN-SIDE, i.e., be used by service creation, service execution and service delivery management functional groups. Therefore although not shown in Figure A.1, the OSE [ITU-T Y.2234] capability for "Interworking with service creation environments" also relates to other NGN-SIDE capabilities.
+
+**Figure A.1 – Relationship between ITU-T Y.2240 and ITU-T Y.2234 capabilities**
+
+Table A.1 provides details about the mapping between the NGN-SIDE capabilities and the capabilities defined in [ITU-T Y.2234]. It is worth to note this mapping is a capability level mapping, in line with the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+**Table A.1 – Details about the mapping between ITU-T Y.2240 and ITU-T Y.2234 capabilities**
+
+| ITU-T Y.2240 capabilities | ITU-T Y.2234 capabilities | Main additional functions in ITU-T Y.2240 not covered in [ITU-T Y.2234] |
+|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Access control | Part of "Service management" | Access control additionally provides other functionalities including: - – access control for resources offered by non-NGN;
- – API and protocol translation between different service interfaces and NGN-SIDE.
|
+| Service orchestration | Service composition | Service orchestration additionally covers: - – service logic composition for resources offered by non-NGN
|
+| Resource registry | Service discovery, Service registration, part of "Service coordination", part of "Service development support", and part of "Service management" | Resource registry additionally covers: - – registration of resources offered by non-NGN
|
+| Application provisioning | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Resource brokering | Part of "Service coordination" | Resource brokering additionally supports: - – brokering for Non-NGN resources and cloud resources;
- – brokering for applications triggering based on events from underlying resources
|
+| Policy decision | Part of "Policy enforcement" | Policy decision additionally supports: - – synchronization of policy related information with other capabilities
|
+| Service dispatcher | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Application development support | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Resource repository | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Testing environment | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Policy management | Part of "Policy enforcement" | Policy management additionally supports: - – management and storing of policy rules
|
+| Content management | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Charging | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Management of role-related information | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Context management | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Resource manager | No equivalent capability | As specified in clause 9 |
+
+**Table A.1 – Details about the mapping between ITU-T Y.2240 and
+ITU-T Y.2234 capabilities**
+
+| ITU-T Y.2240
capabilities | ITU-T Y.2234
capabilities | Main additional functions in ITU-T Y.2240
not covered in [ITU-T Y.2234] |
+|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Adaptors for NGN | No equivalent capability
(Note) | As specified in clause 9 |
+| Adaptors for
non-NGN | No equivalent capability
(Note) | As specified in clause 9 |
+| NOTE – See also Figure A.1 and its Note 4. | | |
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Business deployment scenarios in the NGN-SIDE ecosystem
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix identifies business deployment scenarios in the NGN-SIDE eco-system. Firstly, identification of typical actors (not an exhaustive set) is provided based upon business roles identified in clause 6 of this Recommendation. Secondly, business deployment scenarios are provided.
+
+### I.1 Actors mapping to business roles
+
+The following identifies different actors of the NGN-SIDE ecosystem and the business roles that they can play:
+
+- The "NGN provider" actor. In the context of NGN-SIDE, the "NGN provider" actor plays the role of NGN-SIDE resource provider (e.g., for resources such as NGN capabilities, NGN service enablers). Depending on the business scenario, the "NGN provider" actor can also play the role of NGN-SIDE provider. If playing the role of NGN-SIDE provider, the "NGN provider" actor can also play the roles of application developer and application provider for NGN-SIDE in-house applications.
+- The "integration provider" actor. The "Integration provider" actor plays the role of NGN-SIDE provider; Depending on the business scenario, the "integration provider" can also play the role of application provider.
+- The "third-party application provider" actor. The "third-party application provider" actor plays the role of application provider but is distinct from the NGN provider (although it may be a different NGN provider). Examples of third-party application providers include end-users, web-based application providers.
+
+NOTE 1 – The "third-party application provider" actor can also play the role of application developer or NGN-SIDE resource provider.
+
+- The "third-party resource provider" actor. The "third-party resource provider" actor plays the role of NGN-SIDE resource provider but is distinct from the NGN provider (although it may be a different NGN provider). Examples of third-party resource providers include PLMN providers, PSTN and ISDN providers, application providers, other NGN providers, end-users.
+
+NOTE 2 – The "third-party resource provider" actor can also play the role of application provider.
+
+- The "content provider" actor. The "content provider" actor plays the role of content provider, but is distinct from the NGN provider. Examples of such providers include IPTV content providers, end users.
+- The "Third-party application developer" actor. The "third-party application developer" actor plays the role of application developer, but is distinct from the NGN provider. Examples of third-party application developers include end users.
+
+NOTE 3 – The "third-party application developer" actor can also play the role of application provider.
+
+NOTE 4 – End-users may include NGN end users and end users from other domains.
+
+### I.2 Business deployment scenarios
+
+This clause identifies business deployment scenarios where the NGN-SIDE provider role is played by either the "NGN provider" actor or the "integration provider" actor as described in clause I.1.
+
+NOTE – In the following figures:
+
+- actors are represented using yellow coloured rounded boxes;
+- the NGN-SIDE provider role is represented using blue coloured ovals;
+- roles other than the NGN-SIDE provider role are represented using grey coloured ovals.
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates an example of business deployment scenario where the NGN provider plays the role of NGN-SIDE provider.
+
+
+
+Y.2240(11)\_Fl.1
+
+Figure I.1: NGN provider as NGN-SIDE provider. The diagram shows a central 'NGN-SIDE provider' (blue oval) connected to various actors. At the top, 'NGN-SIDE users' include 'Application developer' and 'Application provider' (grey ovals) within 'Third party application developer' and 'Third party application provider' (yellow rounded boxes). At the bottom, 'NGN-SIDE resource providers' include 'Content provider', 'Service enabler provider', and 'Third party resource provider' (grey ovals) within yellow rounded boxes. In the center, an 'Integration provider' (yellow rounded box) contains 'Resource provider (in-house)' and 'Resource provider (NGN capabilities)' (grey ovals). All actors are connected to the central 'NGN-SIDE provider'.
+
+**Figure I.1 – NGN provider as NGN-SIDE provider**
+
+In the scenario shown in Figure I.1, in addition to the NGN-SIDE provider role, the "NGN Provider" actor is also playing the role of NGN-SIDE resource provider for the resources it owns as well as the role of an application provider since providing so-called "NGN-SIDE in-house applications". In addition, since playing the role of NGN-SIDE provider, the "NGN provider" actor can:
+
+- access and integrate resources of actors such as "content provider" and "third-party resource provider";
+- expose NGN-SIDE capabilities and resources to actors such as "third-party application developer" and "third-party application provider".
+
+Figure I.2 illustrates an example of business deployment scenario where an "integration provider" actor (distinct from the "NGN provider") plays the role of NGN-SIDE provider.
+
+
+
+**NGN-SIDE users**
+
+**Integration provider**
+**NGN-SIDE provider**
+
+**NGN-SIDE resource providers**
+
+Y.2240(11)\_FI.2
+
+Diagram illustrating the NGN-SIDE provider as an integration provider. The diagram shows a central 'Integration provider' box (yellow) containing an 'NGN-SIDE provider' oval (blue). Above the central box are three 'NGN-SIDE users' boxes (yellow), each containing an 'Application developer' or 'Application provider' oval (brown) and labeled 'Third party application developer' or 'Third party application provider'. Below the central box are four 'NGN-SIDE resource providers' boxes (yellow), each containing a 'Resource provider (NGN capabilities)', 'Application provider', 'Service enabler provider', or 'Application provider' oval (brown), and labeled 'NGN provider', 'Content provider', 'Third party resource provider', or 'Third party resource provider'. Lines connect the central box to all surrounding boxes.
+
+**Figure I.2 – NGN-SIDE provider as an integration provider
+(distinct from NGN provider)**
+
+In the scenario shown in Figure I.2, since playing the role of NGN-SIDE provider, the "integration provider" actor can:
+
+- access and integrate resources of actors such as "NGN provider", "content provider" and "third-party resource provider";
+- expose NGN-SIDE capabilities and resources to actors such as "third-party application developer" and "third-party application provider".
+
+Figure I.3 illustrates an example of business deployment scenario where the "integration provider" actor also plays the role of application provider. This scenario is similar to the scenario shown in Figure I.2 but allows the "integration provider" to be an application provider.
+
+
+
+NGN-SIDE users
+
+- Third party application developer:** Contains an oval labeled "Application developer".
+- Third party application provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Application provider".
+- Third party application provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Application provider".
+
+**Integration provider:** A central yellow box containing:
+
+- An oval labeled "Application provider".
+- A blue oval labeled "NGN-SIDE provider".
+
+NGN-SIDE resource providers
+
+- NGN provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Resource provider (NGN capabilities)".
+- Content provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Application provider".
+- Third party resource provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Service enabler provider".
+- Third party resource provider:** Contains an oval labeled "Application provider".
+
+Y.2240(11)\_FI.3
+
+Diagram illustrating the NGN-SIDE provider as an integration provider and application provider. The diagram shows NGN-SIDE users at the top, connected to a central NGN-SIDE provider box. This box is also connected to NGN-SIDE resource providers at the bottom. The central box is labeled 'Integration provider' and contains an 'Application provider' and the 'NGN-SIDE provider'.
+
+**Figure I.3 – NGN-SIDE provider as an integration provider and application provider**
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Application scenarios involving NGN-SIDE
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix provides application scenarios involving NGN-SIDE.
+
+### II.1 Third-party application scenario "Book a trip"
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| NGN-SIDE users | 1) Application called "Book a trip" provided by a "third-party application provider" actor named 'Travel Agency A'. |
+| NGN-SIDE resources | 1) MMS resources provided by an NGN provider called 'Network Operator A'.
2) Application called "Booking & Info" provided by a "third-party resource provider" actor named 'Booking Agency A'. This application returns the flight and the hotel reservation reference number, related tourist information.
3) Application called "Weather Info" provided by a "third-party resource provider" actor referred as 'Meteorological agency'. This application provides the weather report associated with a specific location.
4) Application called "Map" provided by a "third-party resource provider" actor named 'Map Resource Provider'. This application returns the map data. |
+| Actors | 1) 'End-user A': the end-user of the Application called "Travel agency";
2) 'Network Operator A': the NGN provider who provides the MMS service to end-user A;
3) 'Booking Agency A': the NGN-SIDE resource provider who registers the exposed application "Booking & Info" to NGN-SIDE;
4) 'Map resource provider': the NGN-SIDE resource provider who registers the exposed application "Map" to NGN-SIDE;
5) 'Meteorological Institute': the NGN-SIDE resource provider who registers the application "Weather Info" as a resource in NGN-SIDE;
6) 'Travel Agency A': the third-party application provider who provides the application named "Book a trip". |
+| Analysis of the usage model | |
+| Main objective of the scenario in terms of usage model | This scenario shows how NGN-SIDE can support third-party applications. |
+| NGN-SIDE key features | 1) Third-party deploys an application over NGN-SIDE which is accessed by the end-user using MMS resources.
2) NGN-SIDE provides a way for third-party applications to access the resources registered in NGN-SIDE. |
+
+
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Benefits for relevant business roles | - 1) NGN-SIDE benefits the third-party resource providers providing controlled, managed and secure means to access to their own resources and thus generating revenues related to the use of these resources.
- 2) NGN-SIDE benefits the application providers providing single access means to discover NGN-SIDE exposed resources that can be used for developing applications and also providing a flexible and simple way to deploy an application which makes usage of resources from different domains.
- 3) NGN-SIDE benefits the NGN provider providing a service integration and delivery environment in an efficient and economical way.
|
+| Derived NGN-SIDE requirements | The NGN-SIDE requirements which can be derived from this application scenario are described in clause 8.1 (requirements A.2 and A.3) and clause 8.2 (requirements F.1 and F.2). |
+
+### II.2 NGN-SIDE in-house application scenario "Enhanced Conference"
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| NGN-SIDE user(s) | 1) NGN-SIDE in-house application. |
+| NGN-SIDE resources | - 1) Video conference resources which provide the video conference related capabilities including initiating a video conference, inviting a user to join a conference, and recording a conference.
- 2) IPTV resources which provide IPTV related capabilities including EPG capability and streaming capability.
- 3) Mobile streaming resources which provide mobile streaming related capabilities including streaming capability and management capability.
|
+| Actors | - 1) 'End-user A': end-user who pays a 4 persons' video conference and invite his or her team to join the video-conference.
- 2) 'End-user B': end-user who is a member of End-user A's team but not involved in the video-conference.
- 3) 'End-user C': end-user who is a member of End-user A's team, and who is participating to the video-conference.
- 4) 'End-user D': end-user who is a member of End-user A's team, and who is participating to the video-conference.
- 5) 'End-user E': end-user who is a member of End-user A's team, and who is participating to the video-conference.
- 6) 'End-user F': end-user who is a member of End-user A's team, and who is participating to the video-conference.
- 7) 'Network operator A': the resource provider providing IPTV, video-conference and mobile streaming resources.
- 8) 'Application developer A': the application developer accessing NGN-SIDE resources (from 'Network operator A') to build a new NGN-SIDE in-house application.
|
+| Analysis of the usage model | |
+| Main objective of the scenario in terms of usage model | NGN-SIDE supports a convergent application which uses resources from multiple domains (IPTV resources, Video conference resources, Mobile streaming resources). |
+| NGN-SIDE key features | NGN-SIDE provides the following content handling mechanisms:
- – NGN-SIDE provides real-time content recording, and processing.
- – NGN-SIDE provides content delivery mechanisms.
- – NGN-SIDE provides content storage and adaptation (including codec conversion, format conversion).
|
+
+
+
+Figure II.2 – NGN-SIDE in-house application scenario 'Enhanced Conference'. The diagram illustrates the architecture and interactions for an enhanced conference application. Key components include: End-user A (initiator), Application provider, Application portal, NGN-SIDE (containing Resource registry, Context management, Service orchestration, Service dispatcher, Storage capability, Content adaptation capability, and Adaptor), Telecommunication (containing Mobile streaming capability and Mobile streaming resource), and various end-users (C, D, F, E) using different devices (mobile phone, STB). Numbered arrows (1-10) indicate the sequence of operations: 1. Resource registration; 2. Application publication; 3. User request; 4. Notification; 5. User response; 6. Invitation; 7. Service orchestration; 8. Content adaptation; 9. Resource selection; 10. Streaming.
+
+Y.2240(11)\_FII-2
+
+**Figure II.2 – NGN-SIDE in-house application scenario "Enhanced Conference"**
+
+- 1) The resources (mobile streaming resource, video conference resource, EPG and streaming resources) are registered in the NGN-SIDE by 'Network operator A'.
+- 2) A NGN-SIDE in-house application called "Enhanced Conference" is published on the Application portal making use of the resources offered by NGN-SIDE, e.g., mobile streaming resource, EPG resource, IPTV streaming resource, video conference resource, storage resource, content adaptation resource and context management resource.
+- 3) 'End-user A' orders a video conference through the application portal facilities. 'End-user A' invites his or her team including 'End-user C', 'End-user D', and 'End-user F' to join the conference and invites 'End-user B' and 'End-user E' to watch the live conference.
+- 4) When the conference is successfully created, the "Enhanced Conference" application sends a conference notification to the different end-users invited to participate in the conference. NGN-SIDE then selects the method used for notification (e.g., SMS, IM, E-mail or the initiation of a call) according to the end-users' presence and preference using the NGN-SIDE "management of role related information" capability and the context management capability.
+- 5) 'End-user C', 'End-user D' and 'End-user F' receive the invitation and join the conference.
+- 6) 'End-user B', using a mobile phone, receives the invitation from "Enhanced Conference" application, which notifies whether 'End-user B' wants to watch the live meeting.
+- 7) 'End-user E', using a set top box (STB) to watch TV, receives the invitation from "Enhanced Conference" application, which notifies whether 'End-user E' wants to watch the live meeting.
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | 8) When 'End-user B' and 'End-user E' select 'Yes', the "Enhanced Conference" application uses the storage capability offered by NGN-SIDE to record the meeting.
9) The "Enhanced Conference" application requests NGN-SIDE to convert the real-time media from the format used in the video conference to a mobile streaming format to 'End-user B'. Once done, the Mobile streaming system then streams the video meeting to 'End-user B'.
10) The "Enhanced Conference" application requests NGN-SIDE to convert the real-time media from the video conference format to an IPTV streaming format compatible with 'End-user E' terminal capabilities. 'End-user E' receives a notification, and a new channel related to the conference appears on his or her STB's service guide (EPG). 'End-user E' then selects the live meeting.
|
+| Benefits for relevant business roles | Without NGN-SIDE, the deployment of this application would be very complex and the video conference would have to connect to each system (e.g., mobile streaming system, IPTV system).
1) NGN-SIDE acts for access control and service integration.
2) NGN-SIDE also provides application specific capabilities, including media control, storage and content adaptation functions.
|
+| Derived NGN-SIDE requirements | The NGN-SIDE requirements which can be derived from this application scenario are described in clause 8.2 (requirements G.1, G.2 and G.3). |
+
+### II.3 M2M/USN application scenarios
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| NGN-SIDE users | 1) M2M/USN NGN-SIDE in-house application |
+| NGN-SIDE Resources | 1) USN resources including USN gateways and USN middleware.
2) M2M resources including M2M gateways and M2M core.
|
+| Actors | 1) 'Customer A': end user of the M2M/USN in-house application.
2) 'Operator A': actor playing the role of NGN-SIDE provider;
3) 'Application developer': actor developing the new NGN-SIDE in-house application;
4) 'M2M Provider': actor providing M2M resources to NGN-SIDE;
5) 'USN Provider': actor providing M2M resources to NGN-SIDE.
|
+| Analysis of the usage model | |
+| Main objective of the scenario in terms of usage model | NGN-SIDE supports M2M and USN applications which use resources from multiple domains (including M2M and USN resources). |
+| NGN-SIDE key features | NGN-SIDE provides a set of capabilities to support different M2M and USN applications; NGN-SIDE supports adaptation of M2M and USN resources. |
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Scenario description
| Image: Figure II.3 – M2M/USN application scenario in NGN-SIDE. The diagram illustrates the interaction between various components in an NGN-SIDE environment. At the top, 'Customer A' and 'Application developer' are shown. The 'NGN-SIDE' cloud contains 'Application provisioning', 'Application development support', 'Service orchestration', 'Service dispatcher', and 'Resource registry'. 'Adaptors' connect these to external 'M2M/USN application' and 'USN middleware'. Below, the 'M2M core' and 'USN core' are shown, with 'M2M devices' (wireless and wired) and 'USN devices' (mobile, RFID, sensor networks) connected via 'M2M gateways' and 'USN gateways'. Numbered arrows (1-4) indicate the flow of operations described in the text.
Y.2240(11)_FII-3
|
+| | Figure II.3 – M2M/USN application scenario in NGN-SIDE
- 1) NGN-SIDE registers M2M resources from the 'M2M provider' and USN resources from the 'USN provider'.
- 2) 'Application developer' develops a new NGN-SIDE in-house application using the NGN-SIDE service creation environment and the registered M2M resources, USN resources and other NGN-SIDE resources.
- 3) 'Customer A' signs a contract with the NGN-SIDE provider to purchase this new M2M/USN in-house application.
- 4) The application invokes M2M provider's resources through M2M gateways or M2M core, USN provider's resources through USN gateways or USN middleware.
|
+| Benefits for relevant business roles
| - 1) NGN-SIDE can make use of M2M/USN resources which can be combined with other NGN-SIDE resources to support different M2M and USN applications.
|
+| Derived NGN-SIDE requirements
| The NGN-SIDE requirement which can be derived from this application scenario is described in clause 8.1 (requirement 'B').
|
+
+## **Appendix III**
+
+## **Cloud services and supporting role played by NGN-SIDE**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Cloud computing characteristics and models are currently under study in the ITU-T Study Groups.
+
+Everything as a service (XaaS), broad term that embraces all the cloud computing based service categories, is a concept of resource outsourcing at different levels.
+
+The main objective of this appendix is to provide an overview about how NGN-SIDE can support different cloud service categories.
+
+Further studies and developments are required to specify the details of cloud services support by NGN-SIDE as well as the possible roles of NGN-SIDE in a cloud ecosystem.
+
+XaaS includes the following major cloud service categories:
+
+- software as a service (SaaS);
+- platform as a service (PaaS);
+- infrastructure as a service (IaaS);
+- communications as a service (CaaS);
+- network as a service (NaaS).
+
+### **III.1 NGN-SIDE support of cloud software as a service**
+
+Cloud software as a service (SaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud service user to use the cloud service provider's applications running on a cloud infrastructure.
+
+NOTE – All applications have the common characteristic to be non real time and may be of different kinds, including multimedia telephony services, IT applications and may be accessible from different user devices. The cloud service user does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure with the possible exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.
+
+The NGN-SIDE application provisioning capability allows publication of NGN-SIDE in-house applications. Applications can be offered by NGN-SIDE as SaaS, and NGN-SIDE users can invoke these applications through the NGN-SIDE platform.
+
+### **III.2 NGN-SIDE support of cloud platform as a service**
+
+Cloud platform as a service (PaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud service user to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure user-created or acquired applications developed using platform tools supported by the cloud service provider.
+
+NOTE – Platform tools may include programming languages and tools for application development, interface development, database development, storage and testing. The cloud service user does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, but has control over the deployed applications and possibly application hosting environment configurations.
+
+The NGN-SIDE integration layer's functionalities (e.g., service creation functional group, service execution functional group and service delivery management functional group) can be offered by NGN-SIDE as PaaS.
+
+The PaaS service offered by NGN-SIDE allows developers to develop their applications and upload them via the NGN-SIDE application development support capability to NGN-SIDE, which provides an execution environment for the applications.
+
+### **III.3 NGN-SIDE support of cloud infrastructure as a service**
+
+Cloud infrastructure as a service (IaaS) is the capability provided by the cloud service provider to the cloud service user to provision processing, storage, intra-cloud network connectivity services (e.g., VLAN, firewall, load balancer, application acceleration), and other fundamental computing resources of the cloud infrastructure where the cloud service user is able to deploy and run arbitrary application.
+
+NOTE 1 – The cloud service user does not manage or control the resources of the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems, deployed applications, and possibly limited control of select networking components (e.g., host firewalls).
+
+The IaaS service can be provided to NGN-SIDE users by usage of NGN-SIDE provider's resources and/or NGN-SIDE resource providers' resources from NGN and other domains.
+
+NOTE 2 – A cloud computing compatible approach (e.g., virtualization, distributed file system, distributed dispatch, distributed cache, distributed database, search engine) can be used to manage NGN-SIDE provider's resources;
+
+NOTE 3 – The NGN-SIDE resource brokering capability can be used to manage NGN-SIDE resource providers' resources (e.g., connections, computing, storage) in a cloud computing compatible approach.
+
+### **III.4 NGN-SIDE support of communications as a service**
+
+Cloud communications as a service (CaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud service user to use communication and collaboration services.
+
+NOTE – Communication and collaboration services include IMS based services, voice over IP, instant messaging, video conferencing, for both fixed and mobile devices. CaaS may be seen as a specific type of SaaS.
+
+The NGN-SIDE application provisioning capability allows publication of NGN-SIDE in-house applications.
+
+Applications can be offered by NGN-SIDE as CaaS, and NGN-SIDE users can invoke these applications through the NGN-SIDE platform.
+
+### **III.5 NGN-SIDE support of network as a service**
+
+Cloud network as a service (NaaS) is the capability provided to the cloud service user to use transport connectivity services or inter-cloud network connectivity services.
+
+NOTE 1 – NaaS services include flexible and extended VPN, bandwidth on demand, end-to-end SLA/QoS, cloud backup. NaaS can be seen as a specific type of IaaS.
+
+The NaaS service can be provided to NGN-SIDE users by usage of NGN-SIDE provider's resources or NGN-SIDE resource providers' resources from NGN and other domains.
+
+NOTE 2 – A cloud computing compatible approach (e.g., virtualization, distributed file system, distributed dispatch, distributed cache, distributed database, search engine) can be used to manage NGN-SIDE provider's resources.
+
+NOTE 3 – The NGN-SIDE resource brokering capability can be used to manage NGN-SIDE resource providers' resources (e.g., connections, computing, storage) in a cloud computing compatible approach.
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+## Survey of API related standardization efforts
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix provides a survey of API related standardization efforts.
+
+NOTE – The content of this appendix is derived from publicly available documents from relevant standards development organizations (SDOs).
+
+### IV.1 Open mobile alliance (OMA)
+
+This clause identifies the open mobile alliance (OMA) initiatives in the area of APIs.
+
+#### IV.1.1 OMA NGSI
+
+The main objective of the OMA next generation service interface (NGSI) enabler is to define a set of new services for deployment across individual, corporate and general societal user communities. NGSI stimulates the usage of various service enablers into new services and applications.
+
+OMA NGSI key features include call enhancements, identity control, preferences, enhanced conference experience, multimedia list handling, access to service provider data, service recommendations, and context management. The NGSI V1\_0 APIs include:
+
+- NGSI-1 – Generic Data Management Interface
+- NGSI-2 – Generic Data Change Notification Interface
+- NGSI-3 – Address List Change Notification Interface
+- NGSI-4 – Call Control Extension Interface
+- NGSI-5 – Call Notification Extension Interface
+- NGSI-6 – Call Handling Extension Interface
+- NGSI-7 – Multimedia Conference Extension Interface
+- NGSI-8 – Multimedia List Handling Interface
+- NGSI-9 – Context Entity Discovery Interface
+- NGSI-10 – Context Information Interface
+- NGSI-11 – Service Registration Interface
+- NGSI-12 – Service Discovery Interface
+- NGSI-13 – Identity Resolution Interface
+- NGSI-14 – Identity Management Interface
+
+For details, the latest OMA NGSI drafts are available at:
+
+<[http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public\\_documents/ARCH/Permanent\\_documents/](http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public_documents/ARCH/Permanent_documents/)>
+
+#### IV.1.2 OMA Parlay REST
+
+The OMA Parlay REST API specifications under development are intended to define RESTful bindings for Parlay X web services. Until now, the work has progressed on the following APIs:
+
+- ThirdPartyCall [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- TerminalStatus [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- TerminalLocation [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- ShortMessaging [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- Payment [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+
+- MultiMediaMessaging [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- CallNotification [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- AudioCall [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- DeviceCapabilities [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- Presence [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+- AddressListManagement [b-OMA- ParlayREST2.0]
+
+For details, the latest OMA REST drafts are available at:
+
+<[http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public\\_documents/ARCH/Permanent\\_documents/](http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public_documents/ARCH/Permanent_documents/)>
+
+#### IV.1.3 OMA CSEA
+
+OMA Client-Side Enabler API (CSEA) defines the enabler requirements for Javascript-callable API's for web applications to access a set of OMA enablers in the following two work areas:
+
+- OMA enablers focused on access to content, as a typical web application need, initially limited to DCD (Dynamic Content Delivery) and Push);
+- OMA enablers supplementing the web application experience with key capabilities enabling application personalization and contextualization (initially limited to DPE (Device Profile Evolution)).
+
+The scope of this work is being limited to requirements specification in order to allow OMA to define the requirements and determine a roadmap for realization of the requirements through specific API's.
+
+For details, the latest OMA CSEA Candidates are available at:
+
+<[http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public\\_documents/CD/Permanent\\_documents/](http://member.openmobilealliance.org/ftp/Public_documents/CD/Permanent_documents/)>
+
+#### IV.1.4 OMA PSA
+
+3GPP, jointly with the Parlay Group and ETSI, developed application programming interfaces (APIs) for open service access (OSA). 3GPP CT5 closed on June 2008 and the work was transferred to open mobile alliance (OMA), Architecture (ARC) parlay service access (PSA) group. The OMA ARC PSA group is now responsible for the completion of the Parlay/Parlay X Release 8 work.
+
+The Parlay API specification ([b-3GPP TS 29.198]) is structured in the following Parts:
+
+| | | |
+|-----------|----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+| 29.198-1 | Part 1: | Overview |
+| 29.198-2 | Part 2: | Common Data Definitions |
+| 29.198-3 | Part 3: | Framework |
+| 29.198-4 | Part 4: | Call Control Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-5 | Part 5: | User Interaction Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-6 | Part 6: | Mobility Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-7 | Part 7: | Terminal Capabilities Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-8 | Part 8: | Data Session Control Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-9 | Part 9: | Generic Messaging SCF, NOTE- specification withdrawn |
+| 29.198-10 | Part 10: | Connectivity Manager Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-11 | Part 11: | Account Management Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+
+| | | |
+|-----------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 29.198-12 | Part 12: | Charging Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-13 | Part 13: | Policy Management Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-14 | Part 14: | Presence and Availability Management (PAM) Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-15 | Part 15: | Multi-media Messaging (MM) Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+| 29.198-16 | Part 16: | Service Broker Service Capability Feature (SCF) |
+
+The Parlay X API specification (PSA 1.0, [b-3GPP TS 29.199]) is structured in the following Parts:
+
+| | | |
+|-----------|----------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| 29.199-1 | Part 1: | "Common" |
+| 29.199-2 | Part 2: | "Third party call" |
+| 29.199-3 | Part 3: | "Call Notification" |
+| 29.199-4 | Part 4: | "Short Messaging" |
+| 29.199-5 | Part 5: | "Multimedia Messaging" |
+| 29.199-6 | Part 6: | "Payment" |
+| 29.199-7 | Part 7: | "Account management" |
+| 29.199-8 | Part 8: | "Terminal Status" |
+| 29.199-9 | Part 9: | "Terminal location" |
+| 29.199-10 | Part 10: | "Call handling" |
+| 29.199-11 | Part 11: | "Audio call" |
+| 29.199-12 | Part 12: | "Multimedia conference" |
+| 29.199-13 | Part 13: | "Address list management" |
+| 29.199-14 | Part 14: | "Presence" |
+| 29.199-15 | Part 15: | "Message Broadcast" |
+| 29.199-16 | Part 16: | "Geocoding" |
+| 29.199-17 | Part 17: | "Application driven Quality of Service (QoS)" |
+| 29.199-18 | Part 18: | "Device Capabilities and Configuration" |
+| 29.199-19 | Part 19: | "Multimedia streaming control" |
+| 29.199-20 | Part 20: | "Multimedia multicast session management" |
+| 29.199-21 | Part 21: | "Content management" |
+| 29.199-22 | Part 22: | "Policy" |
+
+For details, specifications are available at: <>
+
+### IV.2 GSM association (GSMA)
+
+The GSM association (GSMA) OneAPI is an initiative to define a commonly supported API to allow mobile (and other network) operators to expose useful network information and capabilities to Web application developers. It aims to reduce the effort and time needed to create applications and content that is portable across mobile operators. The project aims to reuse existing standards (or a proper subset thereof) as well as advise standards bodies as to what web developers expect from
+
+network operator APIs, so that such standards can evolve accordingly. The project is a work in progress.
+
+For details, the latest drafts are available at:
+
+<>
+
+#### **IV.2.1 Version 1.0 APIs/ OMA PXPROF**
+
+The following APIs are OMA candidate releases (PXPROF: OneAPI Profile of the Parlay X SOAP Web Services V1.0). GSMA will reuse the following OMA candidate release APIs for the GSMA version 1.0 APIs:
+
+- SMS RESTful API – send and receive SMS via your application;
+- MMS RESTful API – send and receive MMS via your application;
+- Location RESTful API – get the location of one or more mobile network users;
+- Payment RESTful API – charge mobile network users for your services.
+
+NOTE – A minor change from the original OMA API is implemented in GSMA version 1.0.
+
+#### **IV.2.2 Version 0.91 beta APIs**
+
+##### a) RESTful APIs:
+
+- SMS RESTful API v0.91
+- MMS RESTful API v0.91
+- Location RESTful API v0.91
+- Payment RESTful API v0.91
+
+##### b) Web Services APIs:
+
+- SMS Web Service API
+- MMS Web Service API
+- Location Web Service API
+- Payment Web Service API
+
+#### **IV.2.3 Phase 2 APIs**
+
+OneAPI 2.0:
+
+- APIs to make delivery of video content to user equipment (UE). This includes functions for:
+ - Data Connection profile to identify bearer and network;
+ - Remaining Credits Look-Up to see if the user can afford the stream;
+ - Determining the supported video codecs on the handset.
+- In-app billing;
+- Click-to-call to set up calls between two or more people;
+- Call notification where a web application can be informed of events in a phone call (caller busy, diverts).
+
+#### **IV.2.4 Phase 3 APIs**
+
+OneAPI 3.0:
+
+- SMS triggering via user-data header (UDH) and other triggering or provisioning technologies such as USSD;
+- QoS to ensure a good quality, jitter-free video stream between a web server and handset.
+
+### IV.3 Java Community Process
+
+The Java Community Process (JCP) is the mechanism for developing standard technical specifications for Java technology [b-JCP-JSR].
+
+JSRs by Platform are JSRs relate to one or more of the Java platforms, including Java Enterprise Edition, Java Standard Edition and Java Micro Edition:
+
+- The Java Enterprise Edition offers APIs and tools for developing multitier enterprise applications. The JSRs in this list are part of the Java EE platform as component or umbrella JSRs.
+- The Java Standard Edition offers APIs and tools for developing desktop and server-side enterprise applications. The JSRs in this list are part of the Java SE platform as component or umbrella JSRs.
+- The Java Micro Edition specifically addresses the vast consumer space, which covers the range of extremely tiny commodities such as smart cards or a pager all the way up to the set-top box, an appliance almost as powerful as a computer.
+
+JSRs by Technology:
+
+- OSS/J (Operations Support System through Java) is providing a set of APIs focused on operations and business support systems for service provider networks.
+- JAIN (Java APIs for Integrated Networks) is providing a set of APIs focused on emerging network protocols and architectures driven by convergence of traditional telecommunications and IPs networks.
+- XML(Extensible Markup Language) is a universal syntax for describing and structuring data independent from the application logic. Several JSRs focus on developing Java technology APIs specifically targeted at building XML-based applications.
+
+For details, the latest JSRs are available at: <>
+
+### IV.4 Wholesale Applications Community (WAC)
+
+#### IV.4.1 WAC/OMTP
+
+The wholesale applications community (WAC)/open mobile terminal platform (OMTP) BOND I initiative is addressing the way in which the existing Web 2.0 environment is moved onto mobile devices. Mobile devices offer new capabilities to Web service developers which make them very desirable, but present new security issues. BOND I uses Web technologies and builds upon them to provide new APIs to key mobile phone functionalities like contacts, calendar, messaging location.
+
+BOND I API Specification version 1.1 approved Release defines the composite specifications to allow Web applications (widget and Web pages) to interoperate over BOND I defined execution environment (widget runtime and Web user agent). BOND I API Features v1.1:
+
+1. The BOND I module
+2. The Application Launcher module: applauncher
+3. The Messaging module: messaging
+4. The User Interaction module: ui
+5. The File System module: filesystem
+6. The Gallery module: gallery
+7. The Device Status module: devicestatus
+8. The Application Configuration module: appconfig
+9. The Geolocation module: geolocation
+10. The Camera module: camera
+
+11. The Telephony module: telephony
+12. The PIM module: pim
+13. The Contact module: contact
+14. The Calendar module: calendar
+15. The Task module: task
+
+For details, the latest APIs are available at: <>.
+
+#### **IV.4.2 WAC/JIL**
+
+The WAC/JIL (Joint Innovation Lab) API provides a mechanism to access services available on the handset. Access to these services is via a semi-object-oriented paradigm in which functions and parameters are accessed via objects that correspond to the handset.
+
+The WAC/JIL API provides access to handset services in the following categories:
+
+- Telephony: for initiating phone calls and accessing call records
+- PIM: for accessing contacts and calendar information
+- Multimedia: for accessing multi-media capabilities such as the camera
+- Device: for accessing information about the phone, including the file system
+- Messaging: for sending SMS, MMS, and email messages and accessing messages on the phone
+
+Access to these categorized services is via a JavaScript object-containment name spacing mechanism. In this mechanism, all services are accessed via a hierarchical identification scheme in which the widget object is the top-level entry point. For details, the latest APIs are available at: .
+
+### **IV.5 World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)**
+
+#### **IV.5.1 W3C Web Applications**
+
+The mission of the Web Applications Working Group [b-W3C-WebApps], part of the Rich Web Client Activity, is to provide specifications that enable improved client-side application development on the Web, including specifications both for application programming interfaces (APIs) for client-side development and for markup vocabularies for describing and controlling client-side application behaviour.
+
+The target environments for the Web Applications Working Group's deliverables include desktop and mobile browsers as well as non-browser environments that make use of Web technologies. The group seeks to promote universal access to Web applications across a wide range of devices and among a diversity of users, including users with particular accessibility needs. The APIs must provide generic and consistent interoperability and integration among all target formats, such as HTML, XHTML, and SVG.
+
+The working group is focusing on the following deliverables:
+
+- A. Asynchronous DOM Mutation Notification (ADMN):
+a performance-sensitive asynchronous mechanism to provide script notifications of changes to the DOM, such as the addition, removal, or alteration of elements, attributes, and text content, to replace DOM Mutation Events.
+- B. Clipboard Operations for the Web 1.0: Copy, Paste, Drag and Drop (ClipOps):
+a detailed model for rich clipboard operations in User Agents, with consideration for different environments; this may be developed as part of the HTML5 specification.
+
+- C. Database and Offline Application APIs:
+a set of objects and interfaces for client-side database functionality. Currently, the following specifications comprise the WebApps Database APIs:
+- Web Storage: an API for persistent data storage of key-value pair data in Web clients.
+ - Indexed Database API: an API for a database of records holding simple values and hierarchical objects.
+ - Programmable HTTP Caching and Serving: an API for off-line serving of requests to HTTP resources using static and dynamic responses.
+ - Web SQL Database: an API for storing data in databases that can be queried using a variant of SQL.
+- D. Document Object Model (DOM):
+a set of specifications defining objects and interfaces for interaction with a document's tree model. These deliverables include:
+- DOM Level 3 Events: A generic platform- and language-neutral event system which allows registration of event handlers, describes event flow through a tree structure, and provides basic contextual information for each event.
+ - DOM Level 4 Core: A platform- and language-neutral interface that allows programs and scripts to dynamically access and update the content, structure, and style of documents, with specific considerations for the browser-based Web platform.
+- E. File API:
+an API for representing file objects in Web applications, as well as programmatically selecting them and accessing their data. This may include file writing and file system APIs. This replaces the File Upload specification.
+- F. Progress Events:
+event types used for monitoring the progress of uploads and downloads.
+- G. Selectors API, Level 1 and Level 2:
+an interface for matching and retrieving Element nodes in a DOM according to flexible criteria.
+- H. Server-Sent Events:
+an API for opening an HTTP connection for receiving push notifications from a server in the form of DOM events. The API is designed such that it can be extended to work with other push notification schemes such as Push SMS.
+- I. Secure Cross-Domain Resource Sharing:
+mechanisms for selective and secure cross-domain scripting. For more details, see the WebApps WG Comparison of CORS and UMP. Currently, there are two different specifications for defining proposed mechanisms:
+- Cross-Origin Resource Sharing, extending the design of the Same Origin Policy.
+ - Uniform Messaging Policy, describing a mechanism upon which a variety of access-control mechanisms can be implemented.
+- J. Web Interface Definition Language (Web IDL):
+language bindings and types for Web interface descriptions.
+- K. Web Messaging:
+a secure messaging system to allow discovery of and communication between cross-domain documents, including `postMessage` and `MessageChannel`.
+
+- L. Web Sockets API:
+an API that enables Web pages to use the Web Sockets protocol for two-way communication with a remote host.
+- M. Web Workers:
+an API that allows Web application authors to spawn background workers running scripts in parallel to their main page, allowing for thread-like operation with message-passing as the coordination mechanism.
+- N. Widgets:
+a set of specifications that describe various aspects of widgets, interactive single purpose applications for displaying and/or updating local data or data on the Web, packaged in a way to allow a single download and installation on a user's machine or mobile device. Currently, the following specifications comprise Widgets:
+ - Widgets Packaging and Configuration: a packaging format and configuration format for widgets.
+ - The Widget Interface: APIs to store preferences and access widget package metadata.
+ - Widgets Digital Signature: a means for widget packages to be digitally signed using a custom profile of the XML-Signature Syntax and Processing Specification.
+ - Widgets Updates: a version control model that allows widgets to be kept up-to-date over [HTTP].
+ - Widgets Access Request Policy: a means to request access to URI-identifiable resources (e.g., resources on the Web).
+ - Widgets URI Scheme: a URI scheme for use inside widgets or other such applications of Web technology that do not run on the Web.
+ - Widgets View Mode: a media feature and API related to presentation mode.
+ - Widgets Embedding: a mechanism to allow embedding of packaged applications within other Web content, such as referencing via the HTML object element.
+- O. XML Binding Language (XBL2):
+a language and set of APIs to allow for rich real-time transformations of documents
+- P. XMLHttpRequest (XHR), Level 1 and 2:
+an API for client-server data transfer to specify what is currently implemented and to extend its capabilities.
+
+For details, the latest APIs are available at: <>.
+
+#### IV.5.2 W3C DAP
+
+The mission of the Device APIs and Policy Working Group [b-W3C-DAP] is to create client-side APIs that enable the development of Web applications and Web widgets that interact with device services such as calendar, contacts, or camera. Additionally, the group focuses on producing a framework for the expression of security policies that govern access to security-critical APIs.
+
+The working group is focusing on the following specifications:
+
+- A set of Personal Information Management (PIM) APIs that includes:
+ - Calendar API, an API to access a calendar service (e.g., to add an entry, to edit an entry, to delete an entry)
+ - Tasks API, an API to access a personal task management or organizer service (e.g., to add, edit, delete a task)
+
+- Contacts API, an API to access a contacts or address book service (e.g., to add an entry, to edit an entry, to delete an entry)
+- Camera API, an API to manage a device's camera (e.g., to take a picture);
+- Messaging API, an API to access a message service (e.g., to create a message, to send a message, to delete a message). The API is agnostic to the underlying messaging service (e.g., e-mail, SMS, MMS);
+- System Information and Events API, an API to access various system services (e.g., battery level, network status);
+- FileSystem API, an API to access the file system and perform basic operations (Create, Read, Update, Delete) and more complex operations (e.g., mount, unmount) – this API is developed in coordination with the Web Applications Working Group File Upload specification;
+- Application Launcher API, an API to discover, identify and launch the platform's native applications;
+- Application Configuration API, an API to manage application settings and user preferences;
+- User Interaction API, a set of APIs that gives a widget or website far better control of how it manifests itself on different platforms. This is intended to include minimize/maximize functions, window size, alerting mechanisms;
+- Communication Log API, an API to access information about past communication events, such as sent emails, SMS, MMS, call events;
+- Gallery API, an API to manage the local media file storage;
+- Security Policy Framework, to express security policies that govern access of Web applications and widgets to security-critical APIs, including:
+ - Identification of APIs;
+ - Identification of Web Applications and Widgets;
+ - Definition of a policy description language for security policies;
+ - Expression of security policies that govern access of Web applications and widgets to security-critical APIs.
+
+For details, the latest APIs are available at: <>.
+
+#### IV.5.3 W3C UWA
+
+The UWA Working Group [b-W3C-UWA] focuses on extending the Web to enable distributed applications of many kinds of devices including sensors and effectors. Application areas include home monitoring and control, home entertainment, office equipment, mobile and automotive.
+
+The working group is focusing on the following specifications:
+
+- Recommendations
+ - Composite Capability/Preference Profiles (CC/PP): Structure and Vocabularies 1.0
+A CC/PP profile is a description of device capabilities and user preferences. This document describes the structure of a CC/PP profile and shows how vocabularies for these capabilities are used.
+- Candidate Recommendations
+ - Delivery Context Client Interfaces (DCCI)
+DCCI defines a framework for client-side access to a hierarchy of device properties together with a means to set event handlers for notifications of changes to property values. W3C Candidate Recommendation published in December 2007.
+
+- Content Selection for Device Independence (DISelect) 1.0
+This document defines a markup for selecting between versions of content. W3C Candidate Recommendation published in July 2007.
+- Delivery Context: XPath Access Functions 1.0
+This document defines a suite of XPath functions for access to the delivery context. W3C Candidate Recommendation published in July 2007.
+- Composite Capability/Preference Profiles (CC/PP): Structure and Vocabularies 2.0 (CC/PP 2.0)
+This working draft updates the CC/PP 1.0 Recommendation by making it in line with the latest revision of RDF, and ensures its interoperability with OMA's UAProf2.
+- Delivery Context Ontology
+It describes an OWL ontology for device properties as a basis for adaptation to the context in which an application is executed.
+- Device Independent Authoring Language (DIAL)
+This working draft describes a markup language for the filtering and presentation of Web page content available across different delivery contexts.
+- Content Selection (DISelect) Primer 1.0
+- Core Presentation Characteristics: Requirements and Use Cases
+This working draft describes the requirements for core presentation characteristics and covers a number of use cases.
+- Working Group Notes
+ - Authoring Techniques for Device Independence
+This provides a summary of several techniques and best practices that website authors and solution providers may employ when creating and delivering content to a diverse set of access mechanisms.
+ - Device Independence Principles
+This discusses the general principles associated with device independence.
+ - Authoring Challenges for Device Independence
+This discusses the challenges associated with authoring materials that can be accessed by a wide range of device with very different capabilities. It includes a set of high level requirements for systems that support device independence.
+
+For details, the latest APIs are available at: .
+
+#### IV.5.4 HTML5 and XHTML5
+
+HTML5 is a standard for structuring and presenting content on the World Wide Web. The new standard incorporates features like video playback and drag-and-drop that have been previously dependent on third-party browser plug-ins such as Adobe Flash, Microsoft Silverlight, and Google Gears.
+
+HTML5 specifies scripting application programming interfaces (APIs). There are also new APIs, such as:
+
+- The canvas element for immediate mode 2D drawing. See Canvas 2D API Specification 1.0 specification
+- Timed media playback
+- Offline storage database (offline Web applications). See Web Storage
+
+- Document editing
+- Drag-and-drop
+- Cross-document messaging. See HTML5 Web Messaging <>
+- Browser history management
+- MIME type and protocol handler registration.
+- Microdata. See HTML Microdata <>
+
+HTML5 has both a regular text/html serialization and an XML serialization, which is known as XHTML5. In addition to the markup language, the specification includes a number of application programming interfaces. The Document Object Model is extended with APIs for editing, drag-and-drop, data storage and network communication.
+
+For details, the latest HTML5 specifications are available at: <>.
+
+### **IV.6 Organization for the advancement of structured information standards (OASIS)**
+
+Organization for the advancement of structured information standards (OASIS) standards [b-OASIS] are mostly related to basic service oriented architecture (SOA) and web services (WS) technologies. Although OASIS has no specific activities regarding the development of APIs, the text below is provided for general information.
+
+OASIS produces web services standards along with standards for security, e-business and standardization efforts in the public sector and for application-specific markets.
+
+OASIS continues to develop and enhance standards for some of the essential underpinnings of web services, such as managing distributed services, implementing service registry and security, and, at a higher level, for implementing business processes. The web services description language (WSDL) [b-W3C-WSDL] developed in OASIS is typically used to express the web services descriptions and interface syntax.
+
+As well, some standard languages such as in particular business process execution language (BPEL) [b-OASIS-WS-BPEL] are developed by OASIS. BPEL can be used to compose web services although initial BPEL specification is not suitable for composing web services to be used in conjunction with telecommunication services, due to its poor real time and asynchronous support as well as lack of support of some important features such as availability, reliability, security. OASIS is defining (within its open composite services architecture (Open CSA) member section) a collection of standards and related items to allow for pre-defined building of services from sub components, including "on-the-fly" runtime assembly. The Open CSA member section advances open standards that simplify SOA application development. OASIS is defining (within its WS discovery and WS devices profile (WS-DD) Technical Committee):
+
+- A lightweight dynamic discovery protocol to locate Web services that composes with other web service specifications.
+- A binding of SOAP to user datagram protocol (UDP), including message patterns, addressing requirements, and security considerations.
+- A profile of web services (WS) protocols consisting of a minimal set of implementation constraints to enable secure WS messaging, discovery, description, and eventing on resource-constrained end-user domain.
+
+OASIS is considering (within its IDtrust Technical Committee) to address the issue related to the exchange of common reputation data for social networking and trust establishment. The aim is to focus on common data format for social networking.
+
+OASIS is trying to realize the full advantages of SOA to the telecommunications industry (within its telecommunications services member section (OASIS Telecom)). OASIS Telecom was chartered with a clear focus on telecommunication services in a SOA framework. The specific telecommunications related issues that the OASIS Telecom is addressing include:
+
+- security (incremental security in a telecommunication environment);
+- SLAs, including mechanisms to predict the composite SLA associated with an aggregate service that may include multiple SOA components;
+- service availability and reliability models for composed services, in particular for mission-critical telecommunication services.
+
+### **IV.7 Open Grid Forum (OGF)**
+
+#### **IV.7.1 OGF OCCI**
+
+The Open Grid Forum (OGF) open cloud computing interface (OCCI) working group will deliver an API specification for remote management of cloud computing infrastructure, allowing for the development of interoperable tools for common tasks including deployment, autonomic scaling and monitoring. The scope of the specification will be all high level functionality required for the life-cycle management of virtual machines (or workloads) running on virtualization technologies (or containers) supporting service elasticity.
+
+The new API for "IaaS" is allowing:
+
+- consumers to interact with cloud computing infrastructure on an ad-hoc basis (e.g., deploy, start, stop, restart);
+- integrators to offer advanced management services;
+- aggregators to offer a single common interface to multiple providers;
+- providers to offer a standard interface that is compatible with available tools;
+- vendors of grids and clouds to offer standard interfaces for dynamically scalable service delivery in their products.
+
+### **IV.8 Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF)**
+
+#### **IV.8.1 DMTF VMAN**
+
+The distributed management task force, virtualization management initiative (DMTF VMAN Initiative) includes a set of specifications that address the management lifecycle of a virtual environment. VMAN's open virtualization format (OVF) specification provides a standard format for packaging and describing virtual machines and applications for deployment across heterogeneous virtualization platforms. VMAN's profiles standardize many aspects of the operational management of a heterogeneous virtualized environment.
+
+The key properties of the format are as follows:
+
+- optimized for distribution;
+- optimized for a simple, automated user experience;
+- supports both single VM and multiple;
+- portable VM packaging;
+- vendor and platform independent;
+- extensible – OVF is immediately useful and extensible;
+- localizable – OVF supports user-visible descriptions in multiple locales.
+
+The DMTF's Open Cloud Standards Incubator focuses on standardizing interactions between cloud environments by developing cloud resource management protocols, packaging formats and security mechanisms to facilitate interoperability.
+
+The Open Cloud Standards Incubator addresses the following aspects of the lifecycle of a cloud service:
+
+- description of the cloud service in a template;
+- deployment of the cloud service into a cloud;
+- offering of the service to consumers;
+- consumer entrance into contracts for the offering;
+- provider operation and management of instances of the service;
+- removal of the service offering.
+
+### **IV.9 Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA)**
+
+#### **IV.9.1 SNIA CDMI**
+
+Storage networking industry association (SNIA) leads the storage industry worldwide in developing and promoting standards, technologies, and educational services to empower organizations in the management of information.
+
+The cloud storage initiative (CSI) is promoting the adoption of cloud storage as a new delivery model that provides elastic, on-demand storage billed only for what is used.
+
+The cloud data management interface (CDMI) defines the functional interface that applications will use to create, retrieve, update and delete data elements from the cloud. As part of this interface the client will be able to discover the capabilities of the cloud storage offering and use this interface to manage containers and the data that is placed in them. In addition, metadata can be set on containers and their contained data elements through this interface. This interface is also used by administrative and management applications to manage containers, accounts, security access and monitoring and billing information, even for storage that is accessible by other protocols. The capabilities of the underlying storage and data services are exposed so that clients can understand the offering.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T I.312] Recommendation ITU-T I.312/Q.1201 (1992), *Principles of intelligent network architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), *Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1910] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 (2008), *IPTV functional architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-3GPP 29.198] 3GPP 29.198 (2009-12), *Open Service Access (OSA); Application Programming Interface (API), Parts 1-16, V9.0.0*.
+- [b-3GPP 29.199] 3GPP 29.199 (2009-12), *Open Service Access (OSA); Parlay X Web Services, Parts 1-22, V9.0.0*.
+- [b-3GPP-MBMS] 3GPP TS 26.346 V9.4.0 (2010-09), *Third Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Multimedia Broadcast/Multicast Service (MBMS); Protocols and codecs (Release 9)*.
+- [b-DMTF-OVF] Distributed Management Task Force (2010), *Open Virtualization Format DSP0243 Version: 1.1.0*.
+- [b-ETSI-102.689] ETSI TS 102 689 V1.1.1 (2010), *Machine-to-Machine communications (M2M); M2M service requirements*.
+- [b-Facebook] Facebook API documentation.
+<>
+- [b-GSMA-OneAPI] GSMA OneAPI specifications.
+<>
+- [b-Java ME-JSR] Java Micro Edition Java Specification Requests (JSRs).
+<>
+- [b-JCP-JSR] Java Community Process (JCPSM) Java Specification Requests (JSRs). <>
+- [b-JIL-API] JIL (2010), *JIL Widget System High Level Technical Specification Handset APIs Version: 1.2.2*.
+- [b-OASIS] OASIS <>
+- [b-OASIS-WS-BPEL] OASIS Standard (April 2007), *Web Services Business Process Execution Language Version 2.0*.
+<>
+- [b-OGF-OCCI] Open Grid Forum Open Cloud Computing Interface (OCCI) working group Specification documents.
+<>
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [b-OMA-BCAST] | OMA Mobile Broadcast Service V1.1 (2010).
< http://www.openmobilealliance.org/technical/release_program/bcast_V1_1.aspx > |
+| [b-OMA-PSA] | OMA Parlay Service Access V1.0 (2010).
< http://www.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release_program/psa_v1_0.aspx > |
+| [b-OMA-NGSI] | OMA Parlay Service Access V1.0 (2011).
< http://www.openmobilealliance.org/Technical/release_program/ngsi_v1_0.aspx > |
+| [b-OMA-ParlayREST1.0] | OMA (2010-07), RESTful bindings for Parlay X Web Services (ParlayREST), V1.0 . |
+| [b-OMA-ParlayREST2.0] | OMA (2010-12), RESTful bindings for Parlay X Web Services (ParlayREST), V2.0 . |
+| [b-OMA-PXPROF] | OMA (2010-06), OneAPI Profile of the Parlay X SOAP Web Services V1.0 . |
+| [b-OMA-CSEA] | OMA (2010-07), Client-Side Enabler API V1.0 – Status: Candidate Enabler. |
+| [b-OMTP-BONDI] | OMTP (2010-02), BONDI API Specification – Version 1.1 Candidate . |
+| [b-SNIA-CDMI] | Storage Networking Industry Association (2010-04), Cloud Data Management Interface . |
+| [b-Twitter] | Twitter API documentation.
< http://dev.twitter.com/doc > |
+| [b-W3C-WebApps] | W3C Web Applications (WebApps) Working Group API Specifications and Widget Specifications website.
< http://www.w3.org/2008/webapps/wiki/PubStatus > |
+| [b-W3C-DAP] | W3C Device APIs Working Group Specifications.
< http://www.w3.org/2009/dap/ > |
+| [b-W3C-UWA] | W3C Ubiquitous Web Applications (UWA) Working Group Specifications.
< http://www.w3.org/2007/uwa/docs/ > |
+| [b-W3C-HTML5] | W3C (10 June 2008), HTML 5 A vocabulary and associated APIs for HTML and XHTML . |
+| [b-W3C-WSDL] | W3C (26 June 2007), Web Services Description Language (WSDL), Version 2.0 Part 0 = Prime, W3C Recommendation .
< http://www.w3.org/TR/wsdl20-primer/ > |
+
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2242
+
+(12/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **Service function chaining in mobile networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242
+
+# Service function chaining in mobile networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242 specifies a method of coordinating existing and ongoing works on service function chaining in mobile networks (specified in [IETF RFC 7665], [IETF RFC 8300] and [b-ONF TS-027]) by introducing a chain orchestrator as a new entity.
+
+NOTE – [b-3GPP TS 23.203] is another well-known specification on service function chaining.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242 also covers the case when relevant network functions are virtualized.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242 aims to describe the requirements, architecture, functional entities, reference points and information flows of service function chaining in mobile networks.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2242 | 2018-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13804 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Chain orchestrator, mobile network, service function chaining
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2019
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Convention..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Introduction..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Requirements for service function chaining in a mobile network..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements for orchestration of service function chains at a practical
service level..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements for definition and enforcement of a service function
chaining policy ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements for management of service function chaining ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.4 Requirements for lifecycle management of a service function path ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.5 Requirements for reliability, flexibility and scalability of service function
chaining ..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Architecture, functional entities and reference points for service function chaining
in a mobile network ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 Architecture ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.2 Functional entities ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.3 Reference points ..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Information flows for service function chaining in mobile network..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Creation of a new chain ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.2 Update a chain ..... | 9 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 11 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2242
+
+# Service function chaining in mobile networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies a method of coordinating existing and ongoing works on service function chaining in mobile networks (specified in [IETF RFC7665], [IETF RFC 8300] and [b-ONF TS-027]) by introducing a chain orchestrator as a new entity.
+
+The Recommendation also covers the case when relevant network functions are virtualized.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3150] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3150 (2018), *High-level technical characteristics of network softwarization for IMT-2020*.
+- [IETF RFC 7665] IETF RFC 7665 (2015), *Service function chaining (SFC) architecture*.
+- [IETF RFC 8300] IETF RFC 8300 (2018), *Network service header (NSH)*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 functional entity** [b-ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.2 network softwarization** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: An overall approach for designing, implementing, deploying, managing and maintaining network equipment and/or network components by software programming.
+
+NOTE – Network softwarization exploits the nature of software such as flexibility and rapidity all along the lifecycle of network equipment and/or components, for the sake of creating conditions that enable the re-design of network and services architectures, the optimization of costs and processes, self-management and bring added values in network infrastructures.
+
+**3.1.3 orchestration** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, the processes aiming at the automated arrangement, coordination, instantiation and use of network functions and resources for both physical and virtual infrastructures by optimization criteria.
+
+**3.1.4 service function** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.41]: A function, specifically representing network service function, that is responsible for specific treatment of received packets other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router (e.g., IP forwarding and routing functions) on the network path between a source host and destination host.
+
+**3.1.5 service function chain** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.41]: A chain that defines an ordered set of abstract service functions and ordering constraints that must be applied to packets and/or frames and/or flows selected as a result of classification and/or policy.
+
+**3.1.6 service function chaining** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.41]: A mechanism of building service function chains and forwarding packets/frames/flows through them.
+
+**3.1.7 service function path** [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.41]: A path that defines an ordered set of specific instantiations of service functions that packets and/or frames and/or flows must visit within a specific service function chain.
+
+NOTE – A service function path is determined among the relevant service function paths within a specific service function chain, satisfying capacity and QoS requirements of service functions and their connecting links. There is typically a 1: n relationship between a service function chain and a service function path.
+
+**3.1.8 service routing** [b-ITU-T Y.2085]: A unified service supporting platforms built on DSN. It supplies the service registration, publication, discovery, triggering and access mechanisms, and enhanced capabilities to optimize the service provision.
+
+**3.1.9 user plane** [b-ITU-T Y.1714]: This refers to the set of traffic forwarding components through which traffic flows.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| ACK | Acknowledgement |
+| APN | Access Point Name |
+| DPI | Deep Packet Inspection |
+| DSN | Distributed Service Networking |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunication 2020 |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IP-CAN | Internet Protocol-Connectivity Access Network |
+| NSH | Network Service Header |
+| OTT | Over The Top |
+| PDN | Packet Data Network |
+| SDN | Software-Defined Network |
+| SFC | Service Function Chain |
+| SFP | Service Function Path |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UP | User Plane |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+
+# 5 Convention
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this specification can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Introduction
+
+With the popularity of mobile devices and the rise of cloud-based over-the-top (OTT) services and content distribution, service provider networks need to transform their functionalities and capabilities. Service providers need networks to become more agile and efficient to address the challenges brought by the exponential growth of bandwidth, and also hope to open up new markets shared by innovative services and new business models. Network softwarization has become the technological choice for mobility, virtualization and cloud services [ITU-T Y.3150].
+
+At present, the mobile network needs to provide users with personalized services, e.g., video optimization, web cache, HTTP header enhancement, network acceleration and load balancing. In the existing deployment of the mobile network, network topologies of network services are relatively static and they are not flexible to add or remove personalized services.
+
+Service function chaining has been proposed to meet traffic handling needs of different users when service providers are in a network environment that combines the mobile and cloud networks [b-3GPP TS 23.203]. There is high demand in the mobile user access environment. A service function chaining system analyses different types of services and processes traffic sequentially. The system imposes a down flow control strategy for controlling the flow through a controller, and controls the service function chain (SFC) flow of various traffic streams. Service function chaining provides an elastic and automatic service deployment mechanism. Personalized services can be flexibly orchestrated into SFCs meeting the needs of different users. At the same time, service function chaining reduces deployment costs, increases network traffic processing capacity and improves the utilization rate of network resources.
+
+The following items should be considered and included (although this list is not exhaustive):
+
+- key functional requirements and management requirements of service function chaining in a mobile network;
+- the architectural framework, key functionalities and reference points of service function chaining in the mobile network.
+
+# **7 Requirements for service function chaining in a mobile network**
+
+Service function chaining in a mobile network will enable operators to orchestrate an SFC at a practical service level, manage each service function path (SFP) related to the SFC, define and enforce a service steering policy and charge a third party.
+
+## **7.1 Requirements for orchestration of service function chains at a practical service level**
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to orchestrate and define an SFC that is an ordered set of service functions. Traffic flow must go through them according to traffic steering policies.
+
+## **7.2 Requirements for definition and enforcement of a service function chaining policy**
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to define and modify a service function chaining policy that defines a way to steer traffic in service function chaining.
+
+NOTE 1 – The SFC may contain third party service functions.
+
+The mobile network is required to support a chaining policy that differentiates the treatment of traffic depending on sessions, direction of traffic and user equipment (UE).
+
+NOTE 2 – A chaining policy contains the characteristic information of the SFC.
+
+## **7.3 Requirements for management of service function chaining**
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to manage service function chaining.
+
+Third parties can optionally create one or more logical SFCs to meet the needs of multiple service function flows.
+
+The basic management functions of service function chaining are required to include creating, viewing, modifying and deleting SFCs.
+
+- 1) Creating SFC: Specify the source address and destination address, and add predefined network function nodes sequentially.
+- 2) Viewing SFC: Display the names, network function nodes, status (pending, approved, rejected or enabled), and running time of SFCs.
+- 3) Modifying SFC: Modify a defined SFC, including increasing or deleting physical nodes in the chain or change the chain node order.
+- 4) Deleting SFC: Delete a logical SFC.
+
+The mobile network is recommended to have the capability to orchestrate service functions that are provided by a third party.
+
+The mobile network is recommended to have the capability to expose management capability to the third party through a unified interface under the control of mobile network operators.
+
+The third party can optionally orchestrate service functions (i.e., modifying or viewing existing SFCs).
+
+### **7.4 Requirements for lifecycle management of a service function path**
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to create a SFP that is an ordered set of instantiated service functions, which a traffic flow must visit within a specific SFP (i.e., an SFP is an actual forwarding path as an instantiation of an SFC).
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to monitor the current status of each SFP, and dynamically update the SFP based on certain policies.
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability to remove any existing SFP.
+
+### **7.5 Requirements for reliability, flexibility and scalability of service function chaining**
+
+The mobile network is required to have the capability for redundancy, fault tolerance and restoration capacity for service function chaining.
+
+The mobile network is required to have the flexibility to enhance service performance and scalability for service function chaining.
+
+# **8 Architecture, functional entities and reference points for service function chaining in a mobile network**
+
+### **8.1 Architecture**
+
+Service function chaining in a mobile network includes two functional areas: a management and control area and a data-forwarding area.
+
+The management and control area provides the following functions:
+
+- Policy control of traffic steering: defines and updates a traffic steering policy per UE or per flow.
+- Traffic classifier: classifies the traffic based on steering policy and assist the management and control area to realize traffic forwarding or routing based on a pre-defined SFP.
+- Chain orchestrator: defines and updates an SFC.
+- Controller function: defines and updates the routing/switching rules of SFCs, and monitor the availability of each SFC.
+
+A service function chaining rule is determined among the relevant service function chaining rules within a specific service function chaining policy, defining a way to steer traffic in service function chaining (i.e., A service function chaining rule is a part of a service function chaining policy).
+
+The data-forwarding area provides the following functions:
+
+- service routing/switching function: performs traffic routing/switching based on service function chaining policies;
+- service functions: value-added service functions provided by operators or a third party, e.g., video optimizer, uniform resource locator (URL) filter and firewall.
+
+NOTE – Service functions can be virtualized [b-ITU-T Y.3011].
+
+See Figure 1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a network architecture for service function chaining (SFC) in a mobile network. It is divided into two main logical areas: a 'Management and control area' (outlined in red) and a 'Data forwarding area' (outlined in blue).
+
+- Management and control area:** Contains the 'Chain orchestrator' at the top, which connects to the 'Controller' and 'Policy control'. 'Policy control' connects to the 'Uplink classifier' and 'Downlink classifier'. The 'Controller' connects to the 'Service routing/switching' layer.
+- Data forwarding area:** Shows traffic flow from 'Mobile access' through 'Traffic 1' and 'Traffic 2' into the 'Mobile network UP function' (part of the 'Mobile core network'). From there, traffic enters the 'Service routing/switching' layer consisting of 'Service router 1', 'Service router 2', and 'Service router 3'. Each router is linked to a corresponding 'Service function': 'Video optimizer', 'URL filter', and 'Firewall'. After processing, traffic passes through a 'Downlink classifier' to the 'Service provider'.
+
+Figure 1 – Network architecture for service function chaining in a mobile network
+
+Figure 1 – Network architecture for service function chaining in a mobile network
+
+There are two service chain routing specifications. The first uses a software-defined network (SDN) OpenFlow [b-ONF TR-027] to configure an SDN switch or a router to achieve traffic routing based on chain information. The second uses a network service header (NSH) [IETF RFC 7665], [IETF RFC 8300] that includes SFP information to achieve traffic routing by enhancing the switch or router to support NSH processing.
+
+There are two kinds of service routing mechanism to be used according to each specification mentioned in the previous paragraph. If NSH is used to realize service routing, it can carry policy information from an uplink classifier to a downlink classifier. In this case, no interface between a policy control and the downlink classifier is needed. If SDN technology is used to realize the service routing, an interface between the policy control and the downlink classifier is needed, which allows the downlink classifier to obtain the service routing policy for downstream traffic.
+
+**8.2 Functional entities**
+**8.2.1 Chain orchestrator**
+
+To create an SFC, a chain orchestrator:
+
+- performs the orchestration of services functions: designs which service functions are included in an SFC, while defining the sequence of the service functions in the SFC if the SFC contains more than one service function;
+- assigns a chain identifier to the designed chain;
+- requests a controller to create, update, delete or monitor SFPs by transferring chain information to the controller to manage SFPs after creating the SFC;
+- sends SFC information created by the chain orchestrator to a policy control and sends a request to the policy control to create a new chain policy with chain rules that can include the identifier of the SFC.
+
+To update an SFC, a chain orchestrator:
+
+- gathers SFP status information from the controller when the SFC requires updating or deletion, and modifies or deletes the SFC based on the status of the existing SFC;
+
+6 Rec. ITU-T Y.2242 (12/2018)
+
+- designs which service functions are included in the updated SFC, while defining the sequence of service functions in the updated SFC if the SFC contains more than one service function;
+- assigns a new chain identifier to the updated chain;
+- requests a controller to update, delete or monitor SFPs by transferring the updated chain information to the controller to manage new SFPs after the SFC is updated;
+- sends an updated request to policy control to update a chain policy.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Policy control function**
+
+The policy control function:
+
+- obtains the current status, time information, UE network information and some other related information about the SFC;
+- creates, updates or deletes a chain policy according to the information obtained in the previous entry;
+- transfers the chain policy to an uplink classifier or a downlink classifier to enforce the chain policy and steer the traffic;
+- transfers the updated chain policy to the classifiers to let them update the path;
+- defines and updates load balancing and optimization rules for the SFC (e.g., an instruction for bypassing the service function when it is unavailable in the SFC).
+
+#### **8.2.3 Controller**
+
+The policy controller:
+
+- monitors routers, switches and network service servers connected with routers or switches under automatic control;
+- enables SFPs based on chain information.
+
+#### **8.2.4 Classifier**
+
+The classifier:
+
+- obtains the chain policy from the policy control function;
+- (an uplink classifier) receives chain policies created by the policy control and transfers the policies to a mobile network user plane (UP) function;
+- (an uplink classifier) provides SFC-related information to a downlink classifier by adding the information to an upstream flow or providing the information to the policy control that transfers the information to the downlink classifier;
+- (a downlink classifier) receives a downstream flow, applies the SFC rule to the flow to steer the flow going through the related service functions, and receives the SFC rule from the policy control function or the uplink classifier.
+
+NOTE – Classifiers can be deployed either in an International Mobile Telecommunication 2020 (IMT-2020) advanced packet data network (PDN) gateway or IMT-2020 network user plane function (UPF) or outside PDN gateway.
+
+#### **8.2.5 Mobile network user plane function**
+
+The mobile network UPF:
+
+- identifies a data flow to be processed and routes the flow in mobile core networks to a corresponding SFC according to the SFC rule information in the chain policy.
+
+### 8.3 Reference points
+
+See Figure 2.
+
+
+
+Y.2242(18)\_F02
+
+Figure 2: Reference points of service function chaining in a mobile network. The diagram shows a network architecture with the following components and interactions: Chain orchestrator (top), Policy control, Service function, Controller, Uplink classifier, Service routing function, Downlink classifier, Mobile access, and Service provider. Reference points C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5 are indicated. C1 connects Chain orchestrator and Policy control. C2 connects Chain orchestrator and Controller. C3 connects Policy control and Downlink classifier. C4 connects Policy control and Uplink classifier. C5 connects Controller and Service routing function. Bidirectional arrows show interactions between Mobile access and Uplink classifier, Uplink classifier and Service routing function, Service routing function and Downlink classifier, and Downlink classifier and Service provider. Unidirectional arrows show interactions from Chain orchestrator to Policy control and Controller, and from Service function to Service routing function.
+
+**Figure 2 – Reference points of service function chaining in a mobile network**
+
+#### 8.3.1 Reference point C1
+
+A policy control function interacts with a chain orchestrator via the reference point C1 to get the SFC information created by the chain orchestrator and sends the response to the chain orchestrator.
+
+#### 8.3.2 Reference point C2
+
+A controller interacts with the chain orchestrator via the reference point C2 to get the SFC information created by the chain orchestrator to enable a SFP and sends the response to the chain orchestrator.
+
+#### 8.3.3 Reference point C3
+
+A downlink classifier interacts with the policy control function via the reference point C3 to receive the chain rules from the policy control function or transferred by way of the policy control function from an uplink classifier, and sends the response to the policy control function, then applies a service chain rule to the flow.
+
+#### 8.3.4 Reference point C4
+
+The uplink classifier interacts with the policy control function via the reference point C4 to receive the chain rules created by the policy control function and provides the chain-related information to the policy control function, which transfers the information to the downlink classifier.
+
+#### 8.3.5 Reference point C5
+
+The controller interacts with service routing functions to send the SFP information to enable the SFP, and get the information of switches or /routers under the control of the controller.
+
+# 9 Information flows for service function chaining in mobile network
+
+## 9.1 Creation of a new chain
+
+See Figure 3.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant CO as Chain orchestrator
+ participant PC as Policy control
+ participant UP as UP function (mobile network)
+ participant C as Controller
+ participant SR as Service router
+
+ CO->>C: 1. Enable a new chain
+ C->>SR: 2. Configure the routing rule
+ SR-->>C: 3. Ack the completion of configuration
+ C-->>CO: 4. Ack of the new chain
+ CO->>PC: 5. Create chain policy
+ PC->>UP: 6. Enable the chain policy
+ UP-->>PC: 7. Ack
+ PC-->>CO: 8. Ack the completion of creation
+
+```
+
+Y.2242(18)\_F03
+
+Sequence diagram showing the creation of a new chain between Chain orchestrator, Policy control, UP function (mobile network), Controller, and Service router.
+
+**Figure 3 – Creation of a new chain**
+
+The main steps for a new SFC are as follows.
+
+1 A chain orchestration creates a new SFC and asks a controller to enable a new SFP(s).
+
+The creation of the SFC will include the following features.
+
+- The service functions that are included in the SFC.
+- The routing order in the service function, if the SFC is composed of more than one service function.
+
+2 The controller configures the related service routers with the forwarding rules.
+
+3 Service routers reply to the controller with an acknowledgement (ACK) completion.
+
+4 The controller replies to the chain orchestration with an ACK completion.
+
+5 After the creation of the new SFC, the chain orchestration sends a request to a policy control function to create a new chain policy with chain rules. Chain rules can include the identifier of a traffic flow, service characteristics, the identifier of Internet protocol-connectivity access network (IP-CAN) connectivity, the SFC identifier and the permission status plus whether it enables the deep packet inspection (DPI) of the downlink classifier or directly includes traffic match information (e.g., IP five tuples). The traffic identifier can be derived from the traffic match information in a mobile UP function.
+
+Service characteristics can be application layer match information (e.g., URL). The IP-CAN connectivity identifier can be access point name (APN) information in IMT-2020 networks, which can be preconfigured. The identifier of the SFC is used to steer the matched traffic along the SFP.
+
+6 The policy control notifies the mobile UP function of the new chain policy for the target flows. When the traffic flow comes into the mobile UP function, the mobile UP function detects and matches it with the service chain rules and steers the traffic along the corresponding SFP.
+
+7 The mobile UP function replies to the policy control with an ACK completion.
+
+8 The policy control replies to the chain orchestration with an ACK completion.
+
+## 9.2 Update a chain
+
+See Figure 4.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Controller
+ participant Chain orchestrator
+ participant Policy control
+ participant UP function as UP function (mobile network) and uplink/downlink classifier
+
+ Controller->>Chain orchestrator: 1. Notify the status of chain
+ Chain orchestrator-->>Controller: 2. Ack
+ Chain orchestrator->>Controller: 3. Update the chain path
+ Controller-->>Chain orchestrator: 4. Ack
+ Chain orchestrator->>Policy control: 5. Update the chain policy
+ Policy control->>UP function: 6. Update the chain policy
+ UP function-->>Policy control: 7. Ack
+ Policy control-->>Chain orchestrator: 8. Ack
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the steps for updating a chain policy between four entities: Controller, Chain orchestrator, Policy control, and UP function (mobile network) and uplink/downlink classifier.
+
+Y.2242(18)\_F04
+
+**Figure 4 – Update chain policy**
+
+The main steps for updating an SFC are as follows.
+
+- 1 A controller collects the status of an SFC. If there is a problem, the controller notifies a chain orchestrator with the status of the SFC.
+- 2 The chain orchestrator replies to the controller with an ACK completion.
+- 3 The chain orchestrator decides to update the SFC or SFP based on the status of the existing SFC or SFP, and send an update request to the controller.
+
+The modification of the SFC or SFP will include the following features:
+
+- The service functions that are included in the SFC or SFP.
+- The routing order in the service function, if the SFC or SFPs is/are composed of more than one service function.
+
+- 4 The controller replies to the orchestrator with an ACK completion after the controller finishes updating the SFC or SFPs.
+
+- 5 The chain orchestrator sends an update request to a policy control function. The policy control updates a chain policy based on one or more pieces of information (i.e., current status, time information, UE network information or other related information about the existing SFC) it obtains.
+
+Status information may include SFC availability information, availability information of the value-added service functions in SFC, manageable flow size and latency of the value-added service functions in SFC.
+
+The UE network information may include UE location information and flow destination.
+
+When obtaining status information, the policy control first sends the subscription of the SFC status information for status monitoring. The status information of the current SFC will then be sent to the policy control.
+
+When updating a chain policy, there are several possibilities for the update, as follows.
+
+- For a chain policy based on status and time information, the policy control updates the chain policy according to the flow status in a different time period.
+- For a chain policy based on status and UE network information, the policy control updates the chain policy according to different location of the UE and flow destination.
+
+- For a chain policy based on time and UE network information, the policy control updates the chain policy according to the location of the UE in a different time period and the flow destination.
+- For a chain policy based on status, time and UE network information, the policy control updates the chain policy according to the different location of the UE in a different time period and the different flow destination.
+- 6 A mobile UP function updates a routing rule or path based on the updated chain policy from the policy control function.
+
+After getting the chain policy, the classifier will find the pending flow based on the service chain rule information in the policy, and then guide the pending flow to the corresponding SFC.
+
+The service chain rule information will include one or more of the following information types:
+
+- user flow identifier;
+- service characteristics;
+- downlink DPI status (whether started);
+- SFC identifier.
+
+For an uplink flow, the service chain rule information will first classify the uplink information and select an SFC identifier for the flow, then append the selected SFC information on the flow and guide the flow to the corresponding SFC.
+
+Based on the uplink flow information, the classifier will, as a preliminary, determine and retain the downlink flow characteristic and the SFC identifier.
+
+For a downlink flow, if DPI is needed, the classifier will first detect the downlink flow, determine the flow characteristic and then map the detection result with the rule information or selected characteristic according to the rule information. Then the classifier will select the SFC identifier based on the preliminarily determined flow characteristic from the uplink flow information and the determined downlink flow characteristic after DPI, and guide the flow to the corresponding SFC based on the identifier. If DPI is not needed, the classifier will select and append the SFC identifier based on the preliminarily determined flow characteristic and SFC identifier from the uplink flow, then guide the downlink flow to the corresponding SFC based on the identifier.
+
+After the flow has been handled by all the value-added service functions, the SFC identifier will be deleted by the classifier.
+
+- 7 The mobile UP function replies to the policy control function with an ACK completion.
+- 8 The policy control function replies to the policy chain orchestrator with an ACK completion.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+This Recommendation is recognized as an enhancement of IP-based mobile networks. Thus, it is assumed that security considerations in general are based on the security of IP-based networks, which are required to follow the security considerations specified in clauses 7 and 8 of [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1714] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1714 (2009), *MPLS management and OAM framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2085] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2085 (2016), *Distributed service networking service routing*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.41] ITU-T Y series Recommendations – Supplement 41 (2016), *ITU-T Y.2200-series – Deployment models of service function chaining*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.203] 3GPP TS 23.203 V14.6.0 (2018), *Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Policy and charging control architecture*.
+- [b-ONF TS-027] ONF TS-027 (2015), *L4-L7 service function chaining architecture*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2244
+
+(12/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects: Service
+capabilities and service architecture
+
+# --- **Service model for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2244
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2244
+
+# Service model for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage
+
+## Summary
+
+A cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage is critical in that it supports decision making of agricultural producers by providing relevant information such as predicted crop production or expected profits for consulting or other agricultural information. A service model is required to derive necessary service features that support these aims. Therefore, Recommendation ITU-T Y.2244 describes the service model for a cultivation plan service including reference architecture, service requirements, and related capabilities..
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2244 | 2019-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14126 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cultivation plan service, pre-production stage.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2020
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Concept of cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Service requirements for cultivation plan service ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements for measured data ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements for log data ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements for expertise data ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.4 Requirements for data analysis..... | 5 |
+| | 7.5 Requirements for cultivation plan consultation..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Reference architecture for Cultivation Plan Service ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.1 Data collection function ..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 Data analysis function ..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Network capabilities ..... | 9 |
+| 10 | Service scenarios ..... | 9 |
+| 11 | Security considerations..... | 10 |
+| | Appendix I – An example of big data analysis for profit prediction ..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix II – Examples of detailed information flows for service scenarios..... | 13 |
+| | II.1 Service scenario for agricultural information enquiry..... | 13 |
+| | II.3 Service scenario for agricultural information update ..... | 15 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 18 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2244
+
+# Service model for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation covers, for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage, the following:
+
+- service requirements;
+- reference architecture;
+- service scenarios.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] ITU-T Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4401] ITU-T Recommendation Y.4401/Y.2068 (2015), *Functional framework and capabilities of the Internet of things*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4806] ITU-T Recommendation Y.4806 (2017), *Security capabilities supporting safety of the Internet of things*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 agricultural producer** [b-ITU-T Y.4450]: The service role that actually produces agricultural products to be supplied to distributors or consumers.
+
+**3.1.2 big data** [b-ITU-T Y.3600]: A paradigm for enabling the collection, storage, management, analysis and visualization, potentially under real-time constraints, of extensive datasets with heterogeneous characteristics.
+
+NOTE – Examples of datasets characteristics include high-volume, high-velocity, high-variety, etc.
+
+**3.1.3 Internet of things (IoT)** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies.
+
+**3.1.4 machine learning (ML)** [b-ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed.
+
+**3.1.5 service user** [b-ITU-T T.135]: A person, an organization or any intermediate entity using the services provided by a service provider.
+
+**3.1.6 smart farming service provider** [b-ITU-T Y.4450]: The service role that provides the requested smart farming services, such as providing a portal or consulting based on data gathered from agricultural fields, to requesting users.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 agricultural information:** All information regarding agricultural processes, such as raw data from farm fields, markets, yearly log data and expertise information.
+
+**3.2.2 agricultural information repository:** An information repository that holds all information including measured data from farm fields and markets, log data, and expertise data, predicted or calculated information relevant to smart farming to support cultivation plan consultation for service users.
+
+**3.2.3 big data analysis:** Scrutiny performed on massive volume of data with the purpose of obtaining meaningful results, such as trends or preferences.
+
+**3.2.4 cultivation plan:** A scheme of service users' decisions on every aspects of agricultural production, such as selected crops, seeding time and seeding amount, before cultivation starts.
+
+**3.2.5 data accumulation functional entity:** A functional entity that collects log data from an environment monitoring function and a knowhow base management function to provide cultivation plan consultation and related information to service users.
+
+**3.2.6 data analysis function:** A function that analyses collected data by analytical means such as big data analysis or machine learning, and produces meaningful results to help the consultation process.
+
+**3.2.7 data collection function:** A function that collects measured data, log data, expertise data through functional entities inside itself.
+
+**3.2.8 environment monitoring functional entity:** A functional entity that collects cultivation data (e.g., temperature, humidity and pH), market status data (stock amount, price of crops and market demand), and production cost data (e.g., water usage, power usage and payroll information) for data analysis to be used for cultivation plan consultation.
+
+**3.2.9 expertise data:** Values gathered from skilled service users, experts, service user communities that will help cultivation.
+
+**3.2.10 knowhow base management functional entity:** A functional entity that gathers expertise data from experts, skilled service users or service user communities to provide cultivation plan consultation and related information to service users.
+
+**3.2.11 log data:** Values tracked from past consultation, past cultivation records, final profits per variety of crop, etc.
+
+**3.2.12 measured data:** Values recorded from sensors or measurement facilities, or gathered from agricultural product markets or distribution networks, or government agencies or statistic offices including cultivation data, market status data, production cost data.
+
+**3.2.13 plan consulting function:** A function that interacts with service users, farmers or enterprises to help service users to make decisions by providing relevant information or analysed results to resolve their concerns.
+
+**3.2.14 service provider:** An organization owning or controlling one or more systems and using them to provide services.
+
+NOTE – Based on [b-ITU-T T.135].
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+5G Fifth Generation
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| DRM | Digital Rights Management |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LoRa | Long Range |
+| ML | machine learning |
+| NB-IoT | Narrowband IoT |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally," "could" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+In the body of this document, the words shall, shall not, should, and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted, respectively, as is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 Concept of cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage
+
+Smart farming at the pre-production stage is critical, because it aims to increase the final profit to the agricultural producer. An agricultural producer's plan at the pre-production stage on crop type, seeding time and seeding area can result in success or failure after cultivation. These decisions on a cultivation plan can be based on agricultural information or cultivation plan consultation provided by service providers. Therefore, a cultivation plan service can help agricultural producers with cultivation plans by providing agricultural information or cultivation plan consultation, as appropriate. Agricultural information is provided to service users when agricultural producers decide the cultivation plan. Alternatively, cultivation plan consultation is provided to service users when service providers decide the cultivation plan. These aspects of a cultivation plan service are shown in Figure 1.
+
+
+
+Conceptual diagram for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage. The diagram shows two main components: 'Service users' and 'Service providers', connected by a 'Network'. The 'Service users' box contains 'Planning before cultivation' (with a speech bubble), 'Farmers' (with a person and cow icon), and 'Enterprises' (with a factory icon). The 'Service providers' box contains 'Big data analysis' (in a red box), 'Agricultural information repository' (a blue cylinder), and 'Measured data', 'Log data', and 'Expertise data' (with three dots between them). A dashed arrow labeled 'Cultivation plan consultation/ agricultural information' points from the 'Service providers' to the 'Service users'. A solid double-headed arrow connects the 'Service users' and 'Service providers' through the 'Network' cloud at the bottom. The identifier 'Y.2244(19)\_F01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Conceptual diagram for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage**
+
+Cultivation plan consultation can be provided based on big data analysis by collecting measured data, log data and expertise data via a network. Big data in the agricultural information repository are analysed by applying available analysis methods. The analysed results then need to be provided to the service users. The following information from the agricultural information repository can be provided to help service users to make decisions:
+
+- current status of the cultivation for the intended types of the crops;
+- expected monthly and yearly weather;
+- market status of the intended types of the crops;
+
+In addition, service providers could provide cultivation plan consultation to service users on the following items:
+
+- Suggested types of the crop for seeding;
+- Suggested time for seeding;
+- Suggested area for seeding;
+- Expected amount of production from the minimum to the maximum;
+- Expected profits from the minimum to the maximum;
+
+The big data analysis in Figure 1 utilizes various types of data such as production cost, market status and cultivation to provide the expected profit or other information for cultivation plan consultation. This analysis requires a model, such as machine learning (ML) or regression process, for prediction and calculation that inputs the production cost, market status and cultivation data. The output of the analysis is used as input for cultivation plans.
+
+Clause 7 describes service requirements for cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage that take these aspects into account.
+
+## **7 Service requirements for cultivation plan service**
+
+Various types of data are required to support the cultivation plan service. Three types of such data are shown in Figure 1: measured data; log data; and expertise data. These data types must be classified more in detail to cope with various consulting demands and necessity of various agricultural information. Considering these various data types, it is required to have service requirements as follows:
+
+### **7.1 Requirements for measured data**
+
+Cultivation Plan Service demands the following requirements for gathering measured data:
+
+- cultivation data from various sensors or measurement facilities located at the farms or measuring fields are required to be delivered to the agricultural information repository of service provider via any means in the network side;
+- market status data from various sources related with agricultural product markets or distribution networks are required to be delivered to the agricultural information repository of service provider via any means in the network side;
+- production cost data from various sources related with government agencies or statistic offices are required to be delivered to the agricultural information repository of service provider via any means in the network side;
+- the means to deliver all types of data to the agricultural information repository of service provider are recommended to support capabilities described in clause 9.
+
+### **7.2 Requirements for log data**
+
+Cultivation plan service demands the following requirements for manoeuvring log data:
+
+- log data of consultation, past cultivation records, final profits per variety of crop, etc. from the agricultural information repository can optionally be updated when any changes occur at or any input are delivered to the agricultural information repository;
+- log data from the agricultural information repository can optionally be applied to data analysis function for feedback from the previous consultation cases via any means in the network side.
+
+### **7.3 Requirements for expertise data**
+
+Cultivation plan service demands the following requirements for managing expertise data:
+
+- expertise data from various sources such as skilled service users, experts, service user communities, etc. are required to be delivered to the agricultural information repository of service provider via any means in the network side;
+- expertise data can optionally be delivered to the agricultural information repository for establishing agricultural information base via any means in the network side.
+
+### **7.4 Requirements for data analysis**
+
+Big data analysis demands the following requirements for dealing with various data types:
+
+- cultivation data stored in the agricultural information repository are required to be provided for predicting production results such as crop production amount;
+- production cost and market status data in the agricultural information repository are required to be provided for calculating required target values;
+- calculated or predicted results are required to be provided for cultivation plan consultation.
+
+### **7.5 Requirements for cultivation plan consultation**
+
+Cultivation plan service demands the following requirements for delivering consultation contents including analysed results:
+
+- analysed results such as crop production, profit per agricultural producer, etc. are required to be delivered to the service users;
+- any data or contents requested by service users are required to be delivered to the service users.
+
+Classification and types of the data for cultivation plan service are listed in Table 1.
+
+**Table 1 – Classification and types of data for a cultivation plan service**
+
+| Types | | Attributes | Usages |
+|----------------|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Measured data | Cultivation data | - – Cultivating area
- – Growth cycle
- – Status of growth (colour, size, No. of leaves, etc.)
- – Predicted climate data (temperature, humidity, etc.)
- – Soil data (soil nitrogen concentration, vapour concentration, pH, etc.)
- – Cultivation methods (hydroponics, soil cultivation, transplantation, direct planting, etc.)
- – etc.
| - – Grasping the current status of the crop cultivation
|
+| | Market status data | - – Stock amount
- – Price of crops
- – Market demand
- – etc.
| - – Aligning with the market trends
|
+| | Production cost data | - – Power usage
- – Water usage
- – Fertilizer usage
- – Worker salary
- – etc.
| - – Grasping the total production cost
|
+| Log data | | - – Past consultation
- – Past cultivation records
- – Yearly final profits per variety of crop,
- – etc.
| - – Grasping the total Feedback from the previous consulting cases, etc.
|
+| Expertise data | | - – Expected production per cultivation area
- – Expected profit per cultivation area
- – Necessities for biennial cultivation
- – etc.
| - – Establishing agricultural information base, etc.
|
+
+An example of data usage for big data analysis is given in Appendix I.
+
+# 8 Reference architecture for Cultivation Plan Service
+
+Considering the service requirements in the previous clause, the required functions, i.e., data collection function, data analysis function, and plan consulting function, for cultivation plan service are defined as shown in Figure 2.
+
+The data collection function consists of environment functional entity, data accumulation functional entity, and knowhow base management functional entity. The environment monitoring functional entity gathers and delivers measured data including cultivation data such as temperature, humidity and pH. The measured data also include market status and production cost. The data accumulation functional entity gathers all information related to past service processes, such as the past cultivation records and final profits per variety of crop, to form log data. The knowhow base management
+
+functional entity gathers and delivers expertise data from experts, skilled service users or service user communities. All gathered information is stored in the agricultural information repository, then transferred to the data analysis function, which analyses the gathered data and produces meaningful results that will help the service process. The agricultural information repository and related surrounding functions are required to have their security ensured, especially for data transferred and processed in these functions. Analysed results are transferred to the plan consulting function that interacts with service users or agricultural producers, who enquire about agricultural information or request cultivation plan consultation via a network owned by a network provider to help them to make decisions.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph Service_provider [Service provider]
+ PCF[Plan consulting function]
+ subgraph Data_analysis_function [Data analysis function]
+ PFE[Prediction functional entity]
+ CFE[Calculation functional entity]
+ PFE <--> CFE
+ end
+ ARI[(Agricultural information repository)]
+ subgraph Data_collection_function [Data collection function]
+ EME[Environment monitoring entity]
+ DAFE[Data accumulation functional entity]
+ KBMFE[KnowHow base Mgmt. functional entity]
+ end
+ PCF --> Data_analysis_function
+ Data_analysis_function --> ARI
+ ARI --> PCF
+ Data_collection_function --> ARI
+ end
+
+ ARI -- Measured data --> EME
+ ARI -- Log data --> DAFE
+ ARI -- Expertise data --> KBMFE
+
+ EME --> DAFE
+ DAFE --> KBMFE
+
+ KBMFE --> ARI
+
+ subgraph Network [Network]
+ SU[Service users]
+ end
+
+ SU -- Request/inquiry --> PCF
+ PCF -- Cultivation plan consultation/agricultural information --> SU
+ SU -- Request/inquiry --> Network
+ Network --> PCF
+ Network --> ARI
+ Network --> EME
+ Network --> DAFE
+ Network --> KBMFE
+
+```
+
+Y.2244(19)\_F02
+
+Figure 2 – Reference architecture for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage. The diagram shows a Service provider box containing a Plan consulting function, a Data analysis function (with Prediction and Calculation functional entities), and an Agricultural information repository. A Data collection function (with Environment monitoring, Data accumulation, and KnowHow base Mgmt. functional entities) feeds into the repository. Service users interact with the Plan consulting function via a Network, sending requests/inquiries and receiving decisions and cultivation plan consultations. The repository also receives measured data, log data, and expertise data from the data collection function.
+
+**Figure 2 – Reference architecture for a cultivation plan service at the pre-production stage**
+
+The functions shown in the Figure 2 are explained in the clauses 8.1 to 8.3.
+
+### 8.1 Data collection function
+
+The data collection function collects all types of data listed in Table 1. These collected data will be transferred to an agricultural information repository and used for big data analysis. The data collection function consists of the functional entities specified in clauses 8.1.1 to 8.1.3.
+
+#### 8.1.1 Environment monitoring functional entity
+
+The environment monitoring functional entity carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- gathering data like cultivation data measured from agricultural fields (e.g., climate data, soil data and production cost data ( water usage, power usage));
+- gathering statistical data like market status data from the corresponding agencies (e.g., stock amount and price of crops);
+- updating measured data in the agricultural information repository.
+
+#### **8.1.2 Data accumulation functional entity**
+
+The data accumulation functional entity carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- capturing log data from previous consultation cases;
+- collecting and maintaining log data, such as past cultivation records and final profits per variety of crop.
+
+#### **8.1.3 Knowhow base management functional entity**
+
+The knowhow base management functional entity carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- gathering expertise data from experts, skilled service users or service user communities;
+- updating expertise data in the agricultural information repository.
+
+### **8.2 Data analysis function**
+
+The data analysis function receives all relevant data from an agricultural information repository and applies big data to analyse them. Analysing the data collected requires a clear description to provide meaningful results, such as expected profit or expected production, to agricultural producers at the pre-production stage. Hence, the data analysis function consists of a calculation functional entity and a prediction functional entity as shown in Figure 2. The prediction functional entity and calculation functional entity can interact or intercommunicate to produce final results. An example of data analysis for profit prediction is given in Appendix I.
+
+#### **8.2.1 Prediction functional entity**
+
+The prediction functional entity carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- potential delivery of cultivation data (cultivating area, climate data, soil data, cultivation method, etc.) stored in the agricultural information repository to this functional entity for the prediction of production results, such as crop production amount;
+- optional application of any means to predict production results, i.e., ML and statistical regressions, to this functional entity;
+- delivery of predicted results to a plan consulting function or calculation functional entity.
+
+#### **8.2.2 Calculation functional entity**
+
+The calculation functional entity carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- potential delivery of production cost data (power usage, water usage, fertilizer usage, worker salary, etc.) and market status data (stock amount, market demand, price of crops, etc.) in the agricultural information repository to this functional entity for the calculation of the required target values;
+- production of required results, calculated by any means according to the corresponding formulas, from input from the agricultural information repository or prediction functional entity;
+- delivery of calculated results to the plan consulting function or prediction functional entity.
+
+### **8.3 Plan consulting function**
+
+The plan consulting function carries out the following functionalities:
+
+- receiving enquiries from service users such as agricultural producers or distributors;
+- composing and delivering cultivation plan consultation contents after processing the analysed results;
+- inclusion of cultivation plan consultation contents potentially including:
+ - recommended types of crop for seeding;
+
+- recommended time for seeding;
+- recommended area for seeding;
+- current status of cultivation of intended types of the crop;
+- expected monthly and yearly weather;
+- expected amount of production from minimum to maximum;
+- expected profits from minimum to maximum.
+
+The plan consulting function can estimate crop production or profit from the data analysis function, as shown in the example given in Appendix I.
+
+## 9 Network capabilities
+
+The high-level network capabilities for the support of a cultivation plan service are as follows.
+
+- *End-to-end connectivity over interconnected networks*: It is critical to develop a solution to provide end-to-end connectivity between relevant users or terminals over interconnected heterogeneous networks such as next generation networks (NGNs), other networks based on the Internet protocol (IP), broadcasting networks, mobile or wireless networks (fifth generation (5G) [b-ETSI TS 137], narrowband IoT (NB-IoT), long range (LoRa) [b-ETSI TR 103]) and public switched telephone network or integrated services digital networks.
+- *Networking capabilities*: Provision of relevant control functions of network connectivity and transport resource control functions, mobility management or authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.3].
+- *IoT service providers offer products and services to end users with wide area embedded connectivity*. To ensure quality and reliability of services, they also need to ensure quality and reliability of embedded network connectivity of each IoT device. With 10s or 100s of 1 000s of deployed devices, it is difficult to monitor and manage network connectivity manually by enterprise customers and IoT service providers through traditional customer care services provided by network operators. An IoT transport network is recommended to have a solution for efficient and scalable operation and maintenance.
+- *Big data*: A large amount of data will be transferred from those sensors and cameras to the IoT platform. All data will undergo collection, transfer, pre-processing, storage and analysis. ML finds insights hidden in IoT data without explicitly being told where to look or what to conclude, resulting in better, faster discoveries and action.
+
+## 10 Service scenarios
+
+A cultivation plan service can be provided in various ways. Appendix II provides examples of detailed information flows associated with the following service scenarios.
+
+- *Agricultural information enquiry*: To support agricultural producers who want to grasp the exact status of the agricultural field at the pre-production stage by providing agricultural information for a plan to cultivate.
+- *Cultivation plan consultation*: To support agricultural producers to make a decision on a cultivation plan at the pre-production stage.
+- *Agricultural information update*: To update the agricultural information repository to the latest version for a more effective cultivation plan with benefits to service users who contribute to this update.
+
+## **11 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation is recognized as an enhancement to IP-based networks. Thus, it is assumed that security considerations are in general based on the security of IP-based networks and thus conformity to the security considerations identified in clauses 7 and 8 of [ITU-T Y.2701] is required. The data in an agricultural information repository should be treated as public information to be secured. In addition, it is also required to consider the security of agricultural data collected and processed with the capabilities of [ITU-T Y.4401] and [ITU-T Y.4806].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### An example of big data analysis for profit prediction
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In this example, the data analysis function includes a profit calculation functional entity and a production prediction functional entity, which can have ML and regression processes internally for predicting crop production. The production prediction functional entity demands cultivation data, including:
+
+- cultivated area;
+- climate data;
+- soil data;
+- cultivation method.
+
+Profit calculation functional entity demands market status data, including:
+
+- stock amount;
+- market demand;
+- price of crops.
+
+The profit calculation functional entity also demands production cost data, including:
+
+- power usage;
+- water usage;
+- fertilizer usage;
+- worker salary.
+
+Figure I.1 shows the architecture of big data analysis from the aspect of providing expected profit and predicted production of crop values.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture for big data analysis for profit prediction values, organized into three main components: the Agricultural information repository, the Data analysis function, and the Plan consulting function.
+
+**Agricultural information repository** (represented by a cylinder) contains three categories of data:
+
+- Market status data**: Stock amount, Market demand, Price of crops, and other related data (indicated by vertical dots).
+- Production cost data**: Power usage, Water usage, Fertilizer usage, Worker salary, and other related data (indicated by vertical dots).
+- Cultivation data**: Cultivating area, Climate data, Soil data, Cultivation method, and other related data (indicated by vertical dots).
+
+**Data analysis function** (represented by a rounded rectangle) contains two functional entities:
+
+- Profit calculation functional entity**: Receives input from Market status data and Production cost data. It outputs the **Expected profit**.
+- Production prediction functional entity**: Receives input from Cultivation data. It outputs the **Predicted production**.
+
+The **Plan consulting function** (represented by a rounded rectangle) receives the **Expected profit** and **Predicted production** outputs from the Data analysis function.
+
+Y.2244(19)\_FI.1
+
+Architecture diagram for big data analysis for profit prediction values. It shows data flow from an Agricultural information repository to a Data analysis function, which then outputs to a Plan consulting function.
+
+**Figure I.1 – An architecture of big data analysis for profit prediction values**
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Examples of detailed information flows for service scenarios
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### II.1 Service scenario for agricultural information enquiry
+
+Agricultural producers may wish to estimate the status of an agricultural field at the pre-production stage using agricultural information that will be used to plan the crop. It is therefore possible that agricultural information enquiries would be the most frequently required service at the pre-production stage. Figure II.1 shows the information enquiry workflow.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SU as Service user
+ participant PCF as Plan consulting function
+ participant DAF as Data analysis function
+ participant AIR as Agricultural information repository
+
+ SU->>PCF: 1) Service request
+ PCF->>PCF: 2) AAA procedure
+ PCF->>SU: 3) Service granted
+ SU->>PCF: 4) Service type for information inquiry
+ PCF->>DAF: 5) Information inquiry
+ DAF->>AIR: 6) Check information availability
+ AIR-->>DAF: 8) Searched information
+ DAF-->>PCF: 10) Service information
+ PCF-->>SU: 12) Service response
+ PCF->>PCF: 11) Service format aligning
+ DAF->>DAF: 9) Compliance checking
+ AIR-->>AIR: 7) Information searching
+```
+
+Y.2244(19)\_FII.1
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow for an agricultural information enquiry between four entities: Service user, Plan consulting function, Data analysis function, and Agricultural information repository.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Information flow for an agricultural information enquiry**
+
+The following assumptions are made:
+
+- 1) the service user is subscribed to a smart farming service provider and will be charged on a usage basis by each service provider;
+- 2) digital rights management (DRM) processing for licence transaction between service providers is hidden;
+- 3) the flows shown in Figure II.1 are at high level and not meant to show actual protocol procedures.
+
+Descriptions of flow follow:
+
+- 1) the service user requests agricultural information by service user activity for service activation;
+- 2) the plan consulting function then carries out the AAA procedure for the requesting service user;
+- 3) if the AAA result is OK, the plan consulting function then sends to the service user a service granted message – otherwise, it sends a service rejected message;
+- 4) after receiving a service granted message, the service user sends a service type for information enquiry including the service type that the service user wants;
+- 5) the plan consulting function forwards the information enquiry to the data analysis function;
+
+- 6) the data analysis function then checks data availability in the agricultural information repository;
+- 7) the agricultural information repository queries the appropriate data for the requested check;
+- 8) the agricultural information repository returns data retrieved to the data analysis function;
+- 9) the data analysis function checks compliance of the information returned;
+- 10) the data analysis function delivers the compliance-checked information to the plan consulting function;
+- 11) the plan consulting function aligns the format of the information received to prepare the response;
+- 12) the plan consulting function sends a service response message with the service contents including the information requested.
+
+### II.2 Service scenario for cultivation plan consultation
+
+The cultivation plan might be the most important to the people involved in the farming fields at the pre-production stage. Therefore, the cultivation plan consultation will be very helpful for them to make a decision at the pre-production stage regarding the following issues:
+
+- types of crop for seeding;
+- time for seeding;
+- area for seeding;
+- expected amount of production from minimum to maximum;
+- expected profits from minimum to maximum.
+
+In the process of service provision, service users can get additional information to inform their decisions as follows:
+
+- expected monthly and yearly weather;
+- expected amount of production from minimum to maximum;
+- expected profits from minimum to maximum.
+
+The information flow for this service scenario is shown in Figure II.2.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant S as Service user
+ participant P as Plan consulting function
+ participant D as Data analysis function
+ participant A as Agricultural information repository
+
+ S->>P: 1) Service request
+ Note over P: 2) AAA procedure
+ P->>S: 3) Service granted
+ S->>P: 4) Consultation type
+ P->>D: 5) Required data inquiry
+ D->>A: 6) Check data availability
+ Note over A: 7) Data searching
+ A->>D: 8) Searched data
+ Note over D: 9) Data analysis for consultation
+ D->>P: 10) Analysed results
+ Note over P: 11) consultation contents arrangement
+ P->>S: 12) Consultation contents
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of messages in a cultivation plan consultation service. It involves four participants: Service user, Plan consulting function, Data analysis function, and Agricultural information repository. The process begins with a service request from the user to the plan consulting function, followed by an AAA procedure and a service grant. The user then provides a consultation type to the plan consulting function, which sends a required data inquiry to the data analysis function. The data analysis function checks data availability in the agricultural information repository, which performs data searching and returns searched data. The data analysis function then performs data analysis for consultation and sends analysed results to the plan consulting function. Finally, the plan consulting function arranges consultation contents and sends the consultation contents back to the service user.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow for cultivation plan consultation between four entities: Service user, Plan consulting function, Data analysis function, and Agricultural information repository.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Information flow for cultivation plan consultation**
+
+The following assumptions are made:
+
+- 1) the service user is subscribed to a smart farming service provider and will be charged on a usage basis by each service provider;
+- 2) DRM processing for licence transaction between service providers is hidden;
+- 3) the flows shown in Figure II.2 are at high level and not meant to show actual protocol procedures.
+
+Descriptions of flow follow:
+
+- 1) the service user requests cultivation plan consultation by service user activity for service activation;
+- 2) the plan consulting function then carries out the AAA procedure for the requesting service user;
+- 3) if the AAA result is OK, the plan consulting function then sends to the service user a service granted message – otherwise, it sends a service rejected message;
+- 4) after receiving a service granted message, the service user sends a consultation type for data enquiry including the service type that the service user wants (consultation type is chosen by the service user, and can include a recommendation for crop type, seeding time, area or profit prediction);
+- 5) the plan consulting function forwards the required data enquiry to the data analysis function;
+- 6) the data analysis function then checks data availability in the agricultural information repository;
+- 7) the agricultural information repository queries the appropriate data for the requested check;
+- 8) the agricultural information repository returns data retrieved to the data analysis function;
+- 9) the data analysis function analyses the searched data by various means;
+- 10) the data analysis function delivers the analysed results to the plan consulting function;
+- 11) the plan consulting function formats the analysed results to produce the consultation contents;
+- 12) the plan consulting function sends the consultation contents to the service user.
+
+### **II.3 Service scenario for agricultural information update**
+
+Agricultural information must be updated to the latest version for more effective cultivation plan service. Service users with expertise data can contribute to this update in exchange for the benefit of service use.
+
+The information flow for this service scenario is shown in Figure II.3.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SU as Service user
+ participant PCF as Plan consulting function
+ participant DAF as Data analysis function
+ participant AIR as Agricultural information repository
+
+ SU->>PCF: 1) Service request
+ activate PCF
+ PCF->>DAF: 2) AAA procedure
+ deactivate PCF
+ PCF->>DAF: 3) Update effect inquiry
+ activate DAF
+ DAF->>AIR: 4) Check update space
+ deactivate DAF
+ AIR->>SU: 4) Service granted
+ deactivate AIR
+ SU->>PCF: 5) Update information
+ activate PCF
+ PCF->>AIR: 6) Updating
+ deactivate PCF
+ AIR->>DAF: 7) Update complete
+ deactivate AIR
+ DAF->>SU: 8) Access the value of update
+ deactivate DAF
+ SU->>DAF: 9) Update results
+ deactivate SU
+
+```
+
+Y.2244(19)\_FII.3
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for an agricultural information update between four entities: Service user, Plan consulting function, Data analysis function, and Agricultural information repository.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Information flow for an agricultural information update**
+
+The following assumptions are made:
+
+- 1) the service user is subscribed to a smart farming service provider and will be rewarded on the update after assessing its value;
+- 2) DRM processing for licence transaction between service providers is hidden;
+- 3) the flows shown in Figure II.3 are at high level and not meant to show actual protocol procedures.
+
+Descriptions of flow follow:
+
+- 1) the service user requests agricultural information update by service user activity for service activation – this request includes summary of information update that the service user will submit (the update can be one of agricultural knowhow, such as procedures, timing or amounts for fertilization and pesticides.);
+- 2) the plan consulting function then carries out the AAA procedure for the requesting service user;
+- 3) if the AAA result is OK, the plan consulting function then enquires about the effect of the update on the data analysis function and if the result is under the predefined level, goes to step 9 – if the AAA result is not OK, it sends a service rejected message to the service user;
+- 4) the data analysis function then checks the storage space in the agricultural information repository – if there is space available for the update, a service granted message is transferred to the service user;
+- 5) after receiving the service granted message, the service user sends update information including summary of information update that the service user will submit (update information can be one of agricultural knowhow, such as procedures, timing or amounts for fertilization and pesticides.);
+- 6) the agricultural information repository updates the data entries with the received update information;
+- 7) the agricultural information repository returns an update complete message to the data analysis function;
+- 8) the data analysis function assesses the value of the update and decides the level of reward;
+- 9) the data analysis function delivers the update results including the rewards to the service user.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T T.135] ITU-T Recommendation T.135 (2007), *User-to-reservation system transactions within T.120 conferences*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3172] ITU-T Recommendation Y.3172 (2019), *Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*. [b-ITU-T Y.3600] ITU-T Recommendation Y.3600 (2015), *Big data – Cloud computing based requirements and capabilities*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4000] ITU-T Recommendation Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.4450] ITU-T Recommendation ITU-T Y.4450/Y.2238 (2015), *Overview of Smart Farming based on networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.3] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 3 (2008), *ITU-T Y.2000-series – Supplement on service scenarios for convergence services in a multiple network and application service provider environment*.
+- [b-ETSI TR 103] ETSI TR 103 526, V1.1.1 (2018), *System reference document (SRdoc); Technical characteristics for low power wide area networks chirp spread spectrum (LPWAN-CSS) operating in the UHF spectrum below 1 GHz*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 137] ETSI TS 137 141, V15.8.0 (2019), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS); LTE; 5G; NR, E-UTRA, UTRA and GSM/EDGE; Multi-standard radio (MSR) base station (BS) conformance testing*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.2250 (04/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects:
+Interoperability of services and networks in NGN
+
+---
+
+**Requirements and framework of human-oriented message service for smart learning in future networks**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2250
+
+# Requirements and framework of human-oriented message service for smart learning in future networks
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2250 specifies the requirements of human-oriented message service in the context of interaction between the service user and smart learning devices. Based on these requirements, a framework of the human-oriented message service for smart learning is developed. The requirements and framework provide a convenient and simple implementation for the message interaction between the service user and the smart learning devices in future networks.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2250 | 2024-04-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15865 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Message service, network, requirements, smart learning devices.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2024
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Overview of HoMS for smart learning in future network ..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Background and motivation ..... | 2 |
+| 6.2 Concept of HoMS..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of HoMS for smart learning in future networks ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 The service requirements for HoMS ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 The network requirements of HoMS ..... | 8 |
+| 7.3 The devices management requirements of HoMS..... | 8 |
+| 8 Framework of HoMS for smart learning in future networks..... | 9 |
+| 8.1 Identity assignment entity..... | 10 |
+| 8.2 Message storage entity ..... | 10 |
+| 8.3 Message data processing entity ..... | 11 |
+| 8.4 Device management entity ..... | 11 |
+| 8.5 Smart learning content material interface entity ..... | 12 |
+| 8.6 SL device server interface entity ..... | 12 |
+| 9 Security considerations for HoMS..... | 12 |
+| Appendix I – Use cases and procedure of human-oriented message service for smart learning ..... | 14 |
+| I.1 Procedure of HoMS for smart learning ..... | 14 |
+| I.2 Contact the printer to print files by human-oriented message service ..... | 15 |
+| Bibliography..... | 17 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2250
+
+# Requirements and framework of human-oriented message service for smart learning in future networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and framework of human-oriented message service in the context of interaction between the service user and smart learning devices in future networks.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Concept of human-oriented message service for smart learning;
+- Requirements of human-oriented message service for smart learning;
+- Framework of human-oriented message service for smart learning.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T E.101] Recommendation ITU-T E.101 (2009), *Definitions of terms used for identifiers (names, numbers, addresses and other identifiers) for public telecommunication services and networks in the E-series Recommendations.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2241] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2241 (2017), *Service framework to support web objects based ubiquitous self-directed learning.*
+- [ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things.*
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 device** [ITU-T Y.4000]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing.
+
+**3.1.2 mobile device** [b-ITU-T X.1087]: A small, hand-held computing device with a subscriber identity module (SIM) card, typically having a display screen with touch input and/or a miniature keyboard and is not heavy.
+
+**3.1.3 service user** [b-ITU-T T.135]: A person, an organization or any intermediate entity using the services provided by a service provider.
+
+**3.1.4 ubiquitous self-directed learning (uSDL)** [ITU-T Y.2241]: A self-directed learning (SDL) process in a ubiquitous computing environment.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 human-oriented message service (HoMS):** A service that supports intelligent message interaction between the service user and smart learning devices by providing human semantic recognition and learning materials coordination.
+
+**3.2.2 smart learning device (SL device):** Devices that carry out educational functions, fostering interactive and personalized learning experiences.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| APP | Application Platform |
+| AR | Augmented Reality |
+| ASR | Automatic Speech Recognition |
+| COD | Content Objects Database |
+| HoMS | Human-oriented Message Service |
+| IoT | Internet of things |
+| MSISDN | Mobile Subscriber ISDN Number |
+| NLG | Natural Language Generation |
+| NLU | Natural Language Understanding |
+| SL | Smart Learning |
+| SMS | Short Message Service |
+| SOC | State of Charge |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement needs not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" and "may" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview of HoMS for smart learning in future network
+
+## 6.1 Background and motivation
+
+For smart learning (SL) in the future network, there will be a substantial number of interactions between human and smart learning devices, such as classroom speakers, library printers, educational robots, digital blackboards, and learning-enhanced augmented reality (AR) glasses. Since these smart
+
+learning devices (SL devices) are controlled through different application platforms (APP), service users are often required to install multiple APPs to control each SL device. However, it is difficult and inconvenient for learners who lack professional knowledge, especially for young children to manage different APPs directly. Furthermore, the current message interactions between service users' mobile devices and the SL devices are not human-oriented. The messages initiated by the SL devices are difficult to understand for humans without data processing and artificial intelligence (AI) transformation. Similarly, human commands expressed within the message cannot be directly accepted by the SL devices. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the message service capability on the network side to facilitate human-oriented message interaction between service users and the SL devices. This improvement would enable more intuitive and user-friendly control and communication, enhancing the overall learning experience in the smart learning environment.
+
+## 6.2 Concept of HoMS
+
+The human-oriented message service (HoMS) provides intelligent message interaction between service user mobile device and smart learning devices by providing human semantic recognition and learning materials coordination. The conceptual diagram of HoMS is shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+The service users of HoMS include learners, teachers, and various other individuals seeking smart learning services. They utilize their mobile devices to both send and receive human-oriented messages, facilitating communication and interaction with the SL devices.
+
+The HoMS platform serves as a central hub for receiving human-oriented message requests sent by various sources, including the service user's mobile device, SL devices and SL device service platforms. HoMS is to process and facilitate message analysis and forwarding services to ensure effective exchange of information and efficient services.
+
+The SL device service platform refers to the application platform to which the SL devices are connected and managed. This platform facilitates the intelligent integration and management of the SL devices including SL devices management, SL devices data collection, SL devices operation status monitoring, SL device maintenance management, and other aspects.
+
+The SL devices refer to the Internet of things (IoT) devices and other devices equipped with communication capabilities that provide intelligent learning services for learners, teachers, and other service users. Examples of SL devices include classroom speakers, library printers, educational robots, learning-enhanced AR glasses and more.
+
+
+
+Conceptual diagram of human-oriented message service for smart learning (HoMS). The diagram shows three main components: 'Smart learning service users' (containing Teacher and Learners), 'HoMS platform' (a central blue cylinder), and 'Smart learning devices service platform' (containing two server icons). These are connected to the 'IMT-2020 network' (a grey cloud at the bottom). Solid blue double-headed arrows connect the users to the HoMS platform, the HoMS platform to the service platform, and the service platform to the smart learning devices. A red dashed arrow labeled 'Human-oriented message' points from the smart learning devices back to the users. The smart learning devices are represented by icons of a watch, game controller, robot, clock, and AR glasses. The reference 'Y.2250(24)' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Conceptual diagram of human-oriented message service for smart learning**
+
+# **7 Requirements of HoMS for smart learning in future networks**
+
+## **7.1 The service requirements for HoMS**
+
+According to the message initiator and message receiver of the message, the HoMS service model is divided into five categories:
+
+- The human-oriented message is transmitted from the service user's mobile device to the SL device;
+- The human-oriented message is transmitted from the SL device to the service user's mobile device;
+- The human-oriented message is transmitted from one service user's mobile device to another service user's mobile device;
+- The human-oriented message is transmitted from the SL device to the HoMS platform;
+- The human-oriented message is transmitted from the HoMS platform to the SL device or service user or the SL device service platform.
+
+The following clauses define the service requirements for each message model.
+
+### **7.1.1 Service requirements for messages transmitted from the service user's mobile device to the SL device**
+
+It is required that the human-oriented message is sent from the service user's mobile device to the SL device.
+
+It is recommended that the recipient within the human-oriented message is represented by the identity of the SL device.
+
+It is recommended that the service users use the mobile device's short message service (SMS) interface to contact multiple SL devices without the need to install additional SL device service platforms that control the SL devices.
+
+It is required that the message content supports various media types, including text, image, audio, video, files, and geolocation.
+
+It is recommended that both the contents and the command expression within the human-oriented message are edited and expressed in human natural language on the service user's mobile device. The command expression serves to record the service user's text input and voice input through the service user's mobile device, which can reflect the service user's control intention towards the SL devices. Service users are relieved from the necessity of composing control commands in machine languages to control the SL devices.
+
+It is required that the identity of the SL device and the identity of the service user be encrypted during transmission.
+
+It is required the HoMS platform supports the semantic recognition capabilities to identify the service user's semantics based on the message content.
+
+It is required to carry out semantic recognition capability to determine the target SL device with which the service user wishes to interact with, and to analyse what specific operation the service user wishes the SL device to execute.
+
+It is recommended that natural language understanding (NLU) techniques are applied for identifying the text messages, automatic speech recognition (ASR) techniques are applied for identifying the audio messages, and image artificial intelligence (AI) recognition models are applied for recognizing the image content in messages.
+
+It is recommended to establish the control command knowledge graph for each SL device.
+
+The control command knowledge graph is recommended to contain information about the relationship between the service user's command expression and the SL device's control command.
+
+It is recommended to apply AI models to analyse the SL device's control command knowledge graphs and service user's command expression in order to achieve the SL device's control command.
+
+It is recommended to provide real-time feedback on message delivery status.
+
+NOTE 1 – This includes notifications for successful deliveries, failures, or instances where message delivery is temporarily suspended.
+
+In cases of delivery failure, the HoMS is recommended to provide clear indications of failure reasons.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform sends one confirmation message to the service user mobile device before transmitting the control command to the SL device in order to ensure accuracy.
+
+It is recommended that the confirmation message content includes both the identified user intention and a description of the control commands for SL devices.
+
+It is recommended that the service user is capable of verifying the accuracy of the identified user intention and control command description within the confirmation message and then send back a response message from a mobile device to the HoMS as confirmation.
+
+It is required that the HoMS platform generates the SL device's control command and transmits it to the target SL device to realize control over the SL device based on the semantic recognition of the human-oriented message.
+
+It is required that the SL device's control command be transferred from the HoMS platform to the address identifier of the target SL devices service platform first, and then the SL devices service platform transfers the control command to the SL device.
+
+It is recommended that educational learning content materials be stored on the educational content objects database (COD) [ITU-T Y.2241]. The learning materials includes image content, video content, audio content, text content, etc.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform supports interaction with the *ubique* learning system educational COD when the service user expresses in the message access to the learning materials stored on the educational COD.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS is capable of discerning service priority where multiple service users concurrently send messages to control a single SL device.
+
+It is recommended to advise the service users to re-describe the content and resend the message if the service user's intention cannot be recognized and understood by the HoMS platform.
+
+In scenarios where the capabilities of HoMS do not align with the specific requirements of a service user, the HoMS platform is recommended to send one message in order to notify the user that the requested service cannot be supported.
+
+It is recommended to support the storage of messages if the terminated SL device is off-line or unavailable.
+
+NOTE 2 – If the service user wishes to resend the human-oriented message to the SL device, then the stored message is recommended to be triggered manually. This proactive approach ensures that no communication is lost.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS provides multi-device message content synchronization. If the user logs in to the new mobile devices, the message history content is required to be synchronized between multi-devices after user permission.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform engages in an analysis requests inconsistency when the HoMS platform receives multiple concurrent requests from different service users to control the same SL device.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform undertakes comprehensive coordination and moderation of the service request rather than directly forwarding these requests to the respective SL device server platforms. The following features are recommended to be considered:
+
+It is recommended to consider the user profile and optimize the control of the SL device to accommodate the comfort learning needs of all users.
+
+NOTE 3 – When multiple learners express a desire to adjust the brightness of lighting within a classroom in the human-oriented message, the HoMS platform, situated on the network side, is recommended to gather information such as the seat position, the eyes vision, the age, or any other pertinent characteristic of these learners. Subsequently, the HoMS platform intelligently predicts and recommends an appropriate brightness level for the lighting.
+
+It is recommended to consider the service priority of service users and carry out differentiated control priority over SL devices to promote effective smart learning.
+
+NOTE 4 – In situations when controlling the digital blackboard, the service priority of the teacher is higher than the learners. When several learners and teachers express a desire to remark something on the digital blackboard in the human-oriented messages concurrently, the HoMS platform on the network side should prioritize the teacher's request and ensure its prompt transmission to the digital blackboard service platform. This prioritization guarantees that the teacher has the necessary remark access to facilitate effective teaching.
+
+It is recommended to consider the smart learning environment when adjusting the SL devices and ensure the environment is conducive to effective teaching and learning experiences.
+
+NOTE 5 – In the context of adjusting the brightness of a digital notebook, the HoMS platform situated on the network side is recommended to analyse the ambient lighting conditions within the entire classroom. Following this analysis, the HoMS platform predicts the optimal brightness level of the notebook. Subsequently, the HoMS platform transmits this predicted brightness request to the digital notebook service platform.
+
+### **7.1.2 Service requirements for messages transmitted from the SL device to the service user's mobile device**
+
+It is required that the message is sent from the SL device to the service user's mobile device.
+
+It is recommended that the sender within the HoMS message is represented by the identity of the SL device or the alias name of the SL device.
+
+It is required that the SL device is capable of reporting data and giving feedback to the related SL device service platform based on the command expression requested in the message.
+
+NOTE 1 – As an illustration, when a user requests information about a printer error reason, the printer transmits the error code to the printer service platform, which has the capability to manage and control the printer. This allows the HoMS to provide the user with the specific error details they are seeking.
+
+It is required that the SL device service platforms are capable of interacting with the HoMS platform in order to transmit the feedback data reported by the SL devices to the HoMS platform.
+
+According to the service users' request, the HoMS platform is recommended to utilize natural language generation (NLG) to translate the feedback data initially expressed in the machine languages into human natural language.
+
+It is required that the HoMS platform forwards the translated feedback data to the service user's mobile device.
+
+It is required that the HoMS messages displayed on the service users' mobile devices are expressed in human natural language.
+
+It can optionally support sending suggestion lists from SL devices to the service users.
+
+The suggestion list can optionally offer a variety of choices to service users in order to provide clear, straightforward options.
+
+NOTE 2 – For instance, if a learner wearing AR equipment experiences visual fatigue, the learner sends a human-oriented message to the AR equipment to adjust the resolution. The AR equipment responds to a message containing the suggestion list containing different resolution settings, allowing the learner to choose a suitable resolution from the provided choices.
+
+It is recommended to transmit the message containing the selected suggestion from the SL device to the HoMS platform.
+
+The HoMS platform is recommended to identify the suggested choice and relay the command to the relevant SL device service platform for controlling the SL devices according to the service user's selection.
+
+### **7.1.3 Service requirements for messages transmitted from a service user's mobile device to another service user's mobile device**
+
+It is required that the message sender is the service user's mobile device, and the message receiver is another service user's mobile device.
+
+It is required that service users are able to send both point-to-point message and group message to other service users through the HoMS.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform is capable of recognizing the identity of the message receiver as the user's mobile device mobile subscriber ISDN number (MSISDN) [ITU-T E.101].
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform is capable of transmitting the message to the receiver directly without identifying the service user's semantics or intent within the message.
+
+It is recommended that the message content supports audio call messages.
+
+### **7.1.4 Service requirements for messages transmitted from the SL device to the HoMS platform**
+
+It is required that the message sender is the SL device and the recipient is the HoMS platform.
+
+It is required that the SL device is capable of reporting SL device status data to the relevant SL device service platform that controls this SL device.
+
+It is required that the SL device service platform transfers SL device status data to the HoMS platform immediately once they receive the device status data.
+
+It is recommended that the SL device status data includes but is not limited to the current geographic location, network connection status, operation status, or the remaining power of the SL device.
+
+The SL device status data reporting period is recommended to be flexible and adjustable.
+
+NOTE – Some SL devices have limited computing and storage capabilities, and the power supply unit's life cycle is short. Therefore, it is recommended that the SL device status data reporting period should be as long as possible, to save the power consumption and data flow consumption of the SL device.
+
+Based on the SL device status, the HoMS platform is recommended to assess and inform service users whether the SL device can provide services normally.
+
+### **7.1.5 Service requirements for messages transmitted from the human-oriented message service platform**
+
+It is required that the HoMS platform is capable of sending broadcast message in order to handle massive communications efficiently without long latency.
+
+It is required that the broadcast message is initiated by the HoMS platform.
+
+It is required that the broadcast message receivers can be service users' mobile device, SL devices or the SL device service platform.
+
+The broadcast message received by the learner, teacher or other service users' mobile device is required to be expressed in human natural languages.
+
+To prevent malicious attacks, it is required that only authorized administrators have the ability to send broadcast messages.
+
+## **7.2 The network requirements of HoMS**
+
+It is required to provide a safe and stable network access service for service users to utilize HoMS.
+
+It is recommended that the payload size of the human-oriented message can be optimized to ensure efficient multimedia file transformation capability.
+
+It is recommended that the network latency of human-oriented message transmission is capable of supporting multiple delay capabilities for different scenarios. For emergency broadcast messages and real time control messages, the network is recommended to support ultra-low latency transmission.
+
+It is recommended that the network reliability of human-oriented message transmission is capable of supporting multiple reliability capabilities for different scenarios. For remote-control messages, the network is recommended to support extremely high reliability.
+
+It is recommended that the control plane resource should be lightweight to minimize power consumption and data flow on the SL devices.
+
+It is recommended to support extremely high resource efficiency for large scale connections.
+
+It is required that the network between the HoMS platform and service user mobile devices be accessible.
+
+It is required that the network between the HoMS platform and the SL device service platforms be interoperable.
+
+It is required that the HoMS platform provide an interface with the core network.
+
+## **7.3 The devices management requirements of HoMS**
+
+Direct interaction with the communication network: Devices are able to gather and upload information directly (i.e., without using gateway capabilities) to the communication network and can directly receive information (e.g., commands) from the communication network [ITU-T Y.4000].
+
+It is required that the SL device is capable to register with the HoMS platform and get its identity.
+
+The identity of the SL device is required to be searched by all authorized service users.
+
+It is recommended that the SL devices report status to the HoMS platform within specific intervals. The SL device status report encompasses vital information, including but not limited to network connectivity, geographical location, stage of charge (SOC), any fault status, etc.
+
+It is required that the SL devices implement a licensing mechanism that defines which service users have permission to control this SL device through human-oriented messages.
+
+It is required that the HoMS is capable of controlling the message and call notification intelligently, to reduce the notification frequency and avoid disturbing other learners.
+
+It is recommended to place multiple devices that are accessed via the same MSISDN into one cluster.
+
+It is recommended to provide SL device cluster management and set message service notifications priority and call service notifications priority for service users.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform obtains the message service notification priority and call service notification priority for all devices in the device cluster when receiving messages and calls from other devices.
+
+It is recommended for the HoMS platform to transmit the message request or call request to the SL device with the higher service notification priority according to the service notification priority information.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform evaluates whether to continue transmitting the message request or call request to the SL device with a lower notification priority based on the status of the SL device with a higher notification priority.
+
+NOTE – This evaluation aims to reduce the notification frequencies and minimize disturbances.
+
+It is recommended to forward the message request and call request to the SL device with lower service notification priority, even when the SL device with higher service notification priority is involved. These conditions include:
+
+- When the SL device with higher service notification priority is disconnected from the network.
+- When the SL device with higher service notification priority shuts down or is out of service.
+- When the SL device with higher service notification priority has no responses or answers.
+- When the SL device with higher service notification priority rejects the message request and call request initiatively. In addition, the SL device with higher service notification priority and the mobile device with lower service notification priority are in different locations.
+
+It is recommended not to forward the message request and call request to the low priority SL device when the high priority SL device meets any of the following conditions:
+
+- The SL device with higher service notification priority has responses for the received message/call.
+- The SL device with higher service notification priority rejects the message/call request. In addition, both the SL device with higher service notification priority and the SL device with lower service notification priority are in the same locations.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform is capable of judging whether the message request and call request received on the SL device with higher service notification priority is actively rejected by the service user or not.
+
+It is recommended that the SL devices report message rejection and call rejection actions to the HoMS platform.
+
+When a message or call rejection is received from an SL device with higher service notification priority, the HoMS is recommended to conclude that the rejection was initiated by the service user.
+
+It is recommended that the HoMS platform appropriately reroute the request to the SL device with lower service notification priority if a rejection is confirmed to be user-initiated.
+
+If the HoMS platform does not receive any message rejection and call rejection request from the SL device with higher service notification priority within a certain time slot, the HoMS platform is recommended to conclude that the rejection of the message/call was not initiated by the service user but due to technical issues or network failures.
+
+If no rejection is detected, the HoMS platform is recommended to explore alternative options to ensure that the message or call reaches its intended recipient, such as forwarding it to the lower priority SL device.
+
+# **8 Framework of HoMS for smart learning in future networks**
+
+The framework of HoMS for smart learning is shown in Figure 8-1. The HoMS framework mainly consists of an identity assignment entity, message storage entity, message data processing entity, SL device management entity and interfaces between COD and SL device servers. The network interface and communication principle between the SL devices and the related SL device platform adheres to
+
+the IoT communication framework defined by [ITU-T Y.4000], ensuring robust and standardized connectivity. The network interface and communication principle between service users and the HoMS platform leverages the IMT-2020 network standards, as specified in [b-ITU-T Y.3104] and [b-ITU-T Y.3108]. The network connection between the HoMS platform and the SL devices service platforms is interconnected. This Recommendation defines the entities in the solid line blocks.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph Service_user [Service user]
+ MD[Mobile device]
+ IMT2020[IMT-2020]
+ end
+ subgraph HoMS_platform [HoMS platform]
+ MS[Message storage]
+ MDP[Message data processing]
+ IA[Identity assignment]
+ ILM[Interface of learning material COD]
+ DM[Device management]
+ ISLDS[Interface of SL device server]
+ end
+ subgraph SL_devices_service_platforms [SL devices service platforms]
+ SLA[SL device A]
+ SLB[SL device B]
+ SLC[SL device C]
+ end
+
+ Service_user <--> HoMS_platform
+ HoMS_platform <--> SL_devices_service_platforms
+ SL_devices_service_platforms --- SLA
+ SL_devices_service_platforms --- SLB
+ SL_devices_service_platforms --- SLC
+
+```
+
+Y.2250(24)
+
+Figure 8-1: The framework of HoMS for smart learning in future networks. The diagram shows a 'Service user' (dashed box) containing a 'Mobile device' and 'IMT-2020' connected to the 'HoMS platform' (solid box). The HoMS platform contains six modules: 'Message storage', 'Message data processing', 'Identity assignment', 'Interface of learning material COD', 'Device management', and 'Interface of SL device server'. The HoMS platform is connected to 'SL devices service platforms' (solid box) which are connected to three 'SL device' boxes (A, B, and C, dashed boxes). A reference 'Y.2250(24)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – The framework of HoMS for smart learning in future networks**
+
+## 8.1 Identity assignment entity
+
+In line with the requirements defined in clause 7, the identity assignment entity is responsible for assigning identification to SL devices and maintaining a record of their corresponding service platform address information. It ensures that human-oriented messages are delivered to the intended devices and ensure a smooth system operation. It encompasses the following functionalities:
+
+- Assigning identifier: This entity assigns a globally unique, anonymous, and revocable identifier to each SL device. The identifier is used to differentiate and identify each SL device within the HoMS and enabling precise targeting of human-oriented messages.
+- Storing SL devices information: The entity is responsible for storing relevant information about the SL devices, including SL devices service platform address information. Additionally, it establishes and maintains the SL device identity mapping, which associates the SL device identity with its corresponding service platform address information (physical and logical address information).
+- Searching for target devices: When the human-oriented message request is received, the identity assignment entity conducts a search within the device relationship, mapping to identify the target SL device's identity and its associated service platform address information. This process ensures that the message is directed to the intended device accurately.
+
+## 8.2 Message storage entity
+
+In line with the requirements defined in clause 7, the message storage entity carries out functionalities as follows:
+
+- Cloud storage and synchronization: This entity provides a mechanism for storing, synchronizing, and backing up human-oriented message resources and user data. It leverages cloud-based storage solutions to ensure that these resources and data are securely stored and accessible from multiple devices and locations. This functionality enables users to access their messages and data from different devices and ensures that their information is safely stored in case of device loss or failure.
+- Quick retrieval: It facilitates efficient uploading and downloading of message content and user data. By offering quick retrieval capabilities, service users can conveniently access their messages and data, enabling seamless communication and efficient management of information.
+
+## 8.3 Message data processing entity
+
+In line with the requirements defined in clause 7, the message data processing entity carries out functionalities as follows:
+
+- Human-oriented message content analysis: This entity involves the use of AI models to analyse the messages or input from service users. Its primary functionality is to recognize the semantics and intent within the messages, thus providing a more human-oriented response to the service users. It goes beyond simple keyword matching and aims to comprehend the service user's needs and context.
+- Human-oriented message content generation: This entity performs the conversion of natural language control commands into machine operation instructions. It also involves translating structured data or machine language-based operation commands into understandable human language using NLG techniques. This ensures that the responses are user-friendly and easy to understand.
+- Distributed message actions or commands: Once the human-oriented message content analysis is complete and human-friendly responses are generated, this entity distributes the requisite actions or commands to the related SL devices services platform. Through communication with these platforms, it ensures the execution of necessary actions, thereby fulfilling the user's request based on a comprehensive analysis.
+- User profile management: This entity collects user characteristics and preferences to predict their service requests more accurately.
+
+## 8.4 Device management entity
+
+In line with the requirements identified in clause 7, the device management entity is responsible for managing the complete life cycle of SL devices, including provisioning, configuration, monitoring, and maintenance. Its main functionalities include:
+
+- SL devices provisioning management: This entity manages the process of adding new SL devices to the system. It includes tasks such as SL device registration, authentication and authorization. This entity also maintains a repository of knowledge graphs detailing the capabilities of each SL device.
+- Configuring and updating SL devices: This entity ensures the correct configuration of SL devices. It creates and manages clusters for multiple SL devices. This management includes adding, removing, and updating SL devices as required.
+- Monitoring SL devices: The entity monitors the behaviour of SL devices to detect abnormalities, analyse performance metrics, and spotting potential technical issues. Its functionality also includes generating alerts or notifications for timely intervention.
+- Coordination and moderation: Device management entity intelligently analyses incoming requests from different service users who are controlling the same device. It evaluates these requests for consistency and determines whether to coordinate or moderate the requests based on the predefined requirements. The entity also coordinates and moderates service requests based on user profiles, service priority, and other features. It intelligently matches the suitable SL devices for each user and coordinates requests to ensure efficient use of the HoMS system resources.
+- Service notification priority management: When a service user initiates a human-oriented message/call to an SL device within the cluster, the entity obtains the human-oriented message/call service notification priority of all SL devices in a cluster and maintains this information, and then uses the service priority information to determine the SL device with the higher service notification priority.
+
+## 8.5 Smart learning content material interface entity
+
+The smart learning content material interface entity is responsible for managing the delivery of learning material to learners through various devices and platforms. Its main functionalities include:
+
+- Smart learning material management: This entity provides the interface to get access to the COD and enables the management of learning materials such as texts, images, audio, and videos through human-oriented message. It also allows service users to edit the contents of the learning materials using human-oriented message and enhance accessibility and navigation for learners. By enabling content modification, this entity empowers educators and content creators to tailor the learning material to better suit the diverse needs of the learners.
+- Content distribution and delivery: This entity allows for the distribution and delivery of learning materials to learners through the human-oriented message across different channels, including mobile devices and SL devices.
+
+## 8.6 SL device server interface entity
+
+The SL device server interface entity is a component that connects SL device service platforms with the HoMS platform. It helps to provide a seamless and secure learning experience for the HoMS platform to get access to multiple SL device service platforms, enabling them to access learning content and interact with the HoMS platform from anywhere, anytime. Its main functionalities include:
+
+- SL device management: The entity establishes and manages connections between the HoMS platform and various SL device servers. It enables SL device service platforms to access the COD and interact with the HoMS platform.
+- User authentication: The entity is responsible for authentication of SL device service platforms, ensuring that only authorized entities gain access to the HoMS platform. It also manages the permissions and access levels of SL device service platforms, controlling their interaction with different aspects of the HoMS platform.
+- Data synchronization: The entity is responsible for synchronizing data between the HoMS platform and the connected SL devices service platforms. It ensures that the data input by learners on their devices is accurately and immediately updated within the HoMS platform, fostering a dynamic and responsive learning environment.
+- SL device security: The entity enhances the security of the HoMS platform by implementing security measures such as encrypting the data transmitted between SL device service platforms and the HoMS platform, monitoring access activity, and ensuring system integrity.
+
+# 9 Security considerations for HoMS
+
+By addressing these security considerations below, the HoMS can provide a secure and confidential communication platform for users.
+
+**Data confidentiality:** Implement data protection measures to protect sensitive information from unauthorized disclosure.
+
+**User authentication and access control:** Implement user authentication mechanisms to ensure that only authorized individuals can access the human-oriented message service. Additionally, enforce access control policies to restrict users' access to appropriate human-oriented message content and features based on their roles and permissions. This ensures protection from unauthorized access.
+
+**Message encryption:** Employ end-to-end encryption for human-oriented messages transmitted between users' devices and the HoMS platform.
+
+Secure transmission channels: Utilize secure protocols for data transmission between users' mobile device, the HoMS platform and the SL device service platforms.
+
+Application security: Employ secure coding practices and conduct regular security assessments of the human-oriented message service application. This helps identify and mitigate any vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorized access or compromise the system.
+
+Threat detection and monitoring: Implement real-time monitoring of access logs, and system logs to identify and respond to any suspicious or malicious behaviour promptly.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases and procedure of human-oriented message service for smart learning
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 Procedure of HoMS for smart learning
+
+(1) SL device network connection:
+
+The SL device (the light in a classroom): Fulfill the network authentication and registration.
+
+The HoMS platform-identity assignment entity: Assign the identity to the light. The light within the classroom gets its identity.
+
+(2) Learner A and learner B simultaneously adjust the classroom light intensity:
+
+Learner A initiates one new human-oriented message by typing or searching the SL device identity in the message receiver bar. Learner A sends one message to the light, with the content presented in either text or audio format, for instance, "Please increase the brightness of the light".
+
+Learner B sends one human-oriented message to the light, with the content presented in either text or audio format, for instance, "I think the light is too bright".
+
+(3) The messages sent by learner A and learner B are transferred to the HoMS platform for AI analysis.
+
+The HoMS platform analysis the message content. Based on the semantic recognition result, the HoMS platform will get learners' intentions:
+
+| The message sender | The SL device to be controlled | The control intention |
+|--------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
+| Learner A | Light in the classroom | Enhance the brightness |
+| Learner B | Light in the classroom | Lower the brightness |
+
+Since the learners' commands are opposite, the HoMS platform carried out AI models to analyse learner A and learner B's features and the smart learning environment comprehensively. Factors considered include:
+
+- Seat position of learner A and learner B.
+- Visual acuity of their eyes.
+- Brightness of the computer screen.
+- The overall brightness of the classroom.
+
+The HoMS platform decides on a moderate intensity of light that caters to the different needs of the two learners.
+
+(4) The HoMS platform then communicates with the service platform that controls the classroom lights and conveys the control command to adjust the light intensity to a specific level. The control command will be expressed in machine language, for instance, < service= turned on, data: "entity\_id: light. 007, brightness\_pct=20%" >.
+
+(5) The light service platform receives a control command from the HoMS platform, followed by transmitting machine instructions to control the light remotely. As a result, the classroom light is adjusted to the specified intensity level, satisfying the preferences of both learner A and learner B.
+
+(6) The HoMS platform applies natural language generation (NLG) or AI dialogue models to generate the natural language response. These responses are sent as a suggestion list to learner A and learner B. On the mobile devices, learners will be presented with a suggestion choice list: "If the
+
+brightness is suitable for you?" Allowing them to select their preferred brightness level based on the suggestions, ensuring that the chosen brightness is suitable for their needs.
+
+
+
+Figure I.1 shows two mobile device screens illustrating a human-oriented message service for controlling classroom light brightness. The left screen, labeled 'Learner A mobile device', shows a message from 'Receiver: Classroom Light No.3' asking 'Please turn up the brightness of the light.' Below it, a response bubble says 'The light brightness has been adjusted. Is the brightness suitable for you now?' with 'Yes' and 'No' buttons. The right screen, labeled 'Learner B mobile device', shows a message from 'Receiver: Classroom Light No.3' saying 'I think the light is too bright.' Below it, a response bubble asks 'Do you want the light to be darker?' with 'Yes' and 'No' buttons. Both screens show a status bar at the top with the time 15:23 and signal/battery icons. A small blue bar is visible at the bottom of the right screen.
+
+**Figure I.1 – The message example for multiple learners control the brightness of the classroom light by HoMS**
+
+## I.2 Contact the printer to print files by human-oriented message service
+
+(1) SL device (the printer in a library) reports its status data to the SL device service platform (printer server), and then the printer server forwards the status data to the HoMS platform. For instance, if the printer's ink volume is depleted, it triggers a status update indicating that the printer ink volume is empty, so the library printer is out of service currently. The service status of this SL device on the HoMS platform indicates that it is currently out of service.
+
+(2) Learner C sends a human-oriented message to the printer in the library, with the content presented in either format of text or audio. For instance, "I need to print the mathematics notebook assigned by the mathematics teacher today".
+
+(3) The message sent by learner C will be transferred to the HoMS platform for AI analysis. The HoMS platform discerns the learner C's intention:
+
+| The message sender | The SL device to be controlled | The control intention |
+|--------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Learner C | Printer in the library | Print a document. The document is stored on the ubique learning system. The file name includes "mathematics notebook". |
+
+(4) The HoMS platform applies NLG to generate a response message, which is sent to learner C: "The printer is out of service; would you like to check other printers nearby?" The message also includes the suggested choice list showing "Yes" and "No".
+
+(5) In case learner C replies "No", then the HoMS platform will not transmit the printing control command to the printer service platform.
+
+(6) In case learner C replies "Yes", then the HoMS platform proceeds to recommend an alternative printer nearby and provides the identity of this new printer.
+
+(7) Learner C then sends one new human-oriented message to the new printer and the HoMS platform applies the AI analysis to extract the semantics from learner C's message. The HoMS platform searches the learning materials stored on the educational content objects database (COD) of a self-directed *ubique* learning system. It predicts the most relevant files that learner C wants printed based on the file name keywords, context analysis and knowledge graph.
+
+- (8) The HoMS platform applies the natural language generation (NLG) to compose a response message and sends it to learner C. The message also includes the suggestion choices list with the predicted file name. When learner C receives that message with the suggestion list, the learner can confirm which file they want to print. Subsequently, the HoMS platform sends a print property suggestion choice list to learner C, allowing learner C to confirm details, such as the copy numbers, print colour, pages, and other property settings.
+- (9) After learner C confirms their print settings, the HoMS platform communicates with the service platform that controls this new printer and sends the print control command.
+- (10) The service platform of the new printer receives the print control command sent from the HoMS platform and then controls the new printer to print the notebook assigned by the mathematics teacher.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T T.135] Recommendation ITU-T T.135 (2007), *User-to-reservation system transactions within T.120 conferences.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.1087] Recommendation ITU-T X.1087 (2016), *Technical and operational countermeasures for telebiometric applications using mobile devices.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3104] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3104 (2018), *Architecture of the IMT-2020 network.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3108] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3108 (2019), *Capability exposure function in IMT-2020 networks.*
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2281
+
+(01/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Service aspects:
+Interoperability of services and networks in NGN
+
+# --- **Framework of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2281
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2281**
+
+# **Framework of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2281 describes the framework of networked vehicle services and applications in the context of next generation networks (NGN). This Recommendation identifies the relationship between NGN and a networked vehicle as well as requirements taking into consideration the necessity of supporting networked vehicle services and applications using NGN. In addition, a framework architecture of NGN-capable networked vehicle and intelligent transport systems (ITS) infrastructure is described to support the communication features of an NGN harmonized with the networked vehicle.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2281 | 2011-01-28 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+ITS, networked vehicle, NGN, vehicle communication.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2011
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | High-level view of a networked vehicle..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Services and communication features of networked vehicles ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.1 Networked vehicle services and applications..... | 5 |
+| | 7.2 Communications features ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.3 Relationship between networked vehicle services and applications with
communication features..... | 7 |
+| 8 | Requirements for networked vehicle services and applications using NGN..... | 8 |
+| | 8.1 Requirements for a networked vehicle communicating with ITS
infrastructure..... | 8 |
+| | 8.2 NGN requirements for networked vehicle services and applications ..... | 12 |
+| 9 | Framework architecture of the networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure ..... | 14 |
+| | 9.1 Reference architecture of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS
infrastructure..... | 14 |
+| | 9.2 Overview architecture of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS
infrastructure..... | 16 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 16 |
+| | Appendix I – Use cases of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN..... | 17 |
+| | Appendix II – Comparison between ITS station reference architecture and NGN
functional architecture ..... | 19 |
+| | II.1 Features and detailed functions of ITS station reference architecture ..... | 19 |
+| | II.2 Analysis between two architectural models ..... | 20 |
+| | II.3 Features and functions for a networked vehicle ..... | 22 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+A vehicle is one of the important components utilizing network capabilities in terms of vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to home (V2H) communications. In that context, a networked vehicle can cooperate with next generation networks (NGNs) to support more advanced services and applications such as road safety applications, road traffic related applications, multimedia services and location-based implementation of these services.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2281
+
+# Framework of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes a framework for networked vehicle services and applications assuming operation in an area where telecommunication services are provided by NGN. This Recommendation identifies features and requirements for the provision of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN. This Recommendation also provides a framework architecture to support these features and requirements.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), *Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2291] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2291 (2011), *Architectural overview of next generation home networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-R M.1453-2] Recommendation ITU-R M.1453-2 (2005), *Intelligent transport systems – Dedicated short range communications at 5.8 GHz*.
+- [ITU-R M.1457-9] Recommendation ITU-R M.1457-9 (2010), *Detailed specifications of the terrestrial radio interfaces of International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000)*.
+- [ETSI EN 302 665] ETSI EN 302 665 V1.1.1 (2010), *Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Communications Architecture*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.2 intelligent transport systems (ITS)** [b-ITU-R Handbook]: ITS is defined as systems utilizing the combination of computers, communications, positioning and automation technologies to improve the safety, management and efficiency of terrestrial transport systems.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 infrastructure:** The basic facilities and systems comprised of network nodes (i.e., switches and/or routers) and the means to connect them (i.e., wired (cable or fibre) or wireless) for the purpose of communication between two end-points.
+
+**3.2.2 networked vehicle:** A vehicle capable of providing communication between entities within the vehicle as well as between entities within the vehicle and ITS infrastructure or other communication networks such as NGN using various access technologies.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------|
+| ABS | Automatic Break System |
+| AM | Amplitude Modulation |
+| ANI | Application to Network Interface |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CALM | Communication Access to Land Mobile |
+| DMB | Digital Multimedia Broadcasting |
+| DRM | Digital Rights Management |
+| DSRC | Dedicated Short Range Communications |
+| DVB-T | Digital Video Broadcasting – Terrestrial |
+| DVD | Digital Versatile Disc |
+| ECM | Engine Control Module |
+| ECU | Electronic Control Unit |
+| FM | Frequency Modulation |
+| FMC | Fixed Mobile Convergence |
+| GNSS | Global Navigation Satellite System |
+| GPS | Global Positioning System |
+| H2V | Home to Vehicle |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
+| IMT | International Mobile Telecommunications |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| ITS | Intelligent Transport Systems |
+| IVN | In-Vehicle Network |
+| MAC | Media Access Control |
+| MM | Multifunction Mobile |
+
+| | |
+|-------|-----------------------------------------|
+| MP3 | Moving Picture 3 (digital audio format) |
+| NAPT | Network Address Port Translation |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NGN | Next Generation Networks |
+| NNI | Network to Network Interface |
+| OBD | On Board Diagnostics |
+| OBU | On Board Unit |
+| OEM | Original Equipment Manufacturer |
+| PDA | Personal Digital Assistant |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RFID | Radio Frequency Identification |
+| RTK | Real-Time Kinematic |
+| SMS | Short Message Service |
+| SNI | Server to Network Interface |
+| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
+| SP | Service Platform |
+| SPI | Service Programming Interface |
+| SRC | Seamless Radio Connectivity |
+| TCM | Transmission Control Module |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UNI | User to Network Interface |
+| USB | Universal Serial Bus |
+| UWB | Ultra-Wideband |
+| V2G | Vehicle to Grid |
+| V2H | Vehicle to Home |
+| V2I | Vehicle to Infrastructure |
+| V2I2V | Vehicle to Infrastructure to Vehicle |
+| V2V | Vehicle to Vehicle |
+| VGP | Vehicle Gateway Platform |
+| VoD | Video on Demand |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation, the "I" in the keywords "V2I" and "V2I2V" stands for ITS infrastructure.
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# **6 High-level view of a networked vehicle**
+
+Intelligent transport systems (ITS) provide capabilities, using information and communication technologies (ICT), to support safe and efficient use of transport infrastructure and transport means (e.g., car, train, plane or ship) for transportation of goods and humans.
+
+A vehicle (i.e., bus, car, lorry (truck) or van), which is one of the most dominant means of transportation, is either moving or stationary.
+
+A moving vehicle requires various capabilities including the support of networked vehicle services and applications such as road safety, traffic status, automatic toll road billing and emergency information. The support of such networked vehicle services and applications normally requires the use of communication capabilities supported by telecommunication infrastructures such as NGN, dedicated short range communication (DSRC) [ITU-R M.1453-2] or IMT-2000 [ITU-R M.1457-9]. Considering the importance of such communications to/from a networked vehicle, QoS/QoE, security and mobility, together with other factors, should be supported by the above-mentioned networking infrastructures.
+
+A stationary vehicle requires, from time-to-time, static operation such as maintenance and/or upgrade of devices. While in a stationary mode, networked vehicle communication generally needs support from residential home networks (e.g., that of the vehicle owner) and/or other networks (e.g., that of a repair workshop).
+
+Thus, key features of NGN such as fixed mobile convergence (FMC) support providing QoS and security play an important role. Figure 6-1 shows a high-level conceptual view of the relationship between a networked vehicle and external networks using NGN capabilities. In this figure, a networked vehicle is composed of personal devices and on-board equipments, etc. Roadside station and central station (e.g., traffic information centre) are examples of elements within ITS infrastructure.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1: High-level view of a networked vehicle using NGN capabilities. The diagram shows a 'Networked vehicle' box containing 'Personal devices' and 'On-Board equipments'. This box is connected to a central 'NGN' oval. Below the vehicle box is the 'ITS infrastructure' box, which includes a 'Roadside station' and a 'Central station (traffic info. centre)'. To the right of the NGN oval is the 'External networks' box, which includes 'Internet', 'Home', and 'Repair workshop'. A dashed line connects the vehicle box to the ITS infrastructure box. The label 'Y.2281(11)\_F6-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – High-level view of a networked vehicle using NGN capabilities**
+
+# 7 Services and communication features of networked vehicles
+
+## 7.1 Networked vehicle services and applications
+
+From the service and application aspects related to a networked vehicle, the following perspective can be considered:
+
+- 1) **Vehicle maintenance-oriented services/applications (SA-1):** The primary objective of these services/applications is the management of the vehicle itself. Possible vehicle management-oriented services/applications include:
+ - Remote vehicle diagnosis: This service/application supports the remote monitoring of the vehicle status based on the status of the relevant vehicle devices and management of internally controlled and monitored diagnostics. Security and privacy protection of remotely monitored vehicle information is recommended to be ensured.
+ - Vehicle data/software provisioning and update
+- 2) **Road safety services/applications (SA-2):** The primary objective of these services/applications is the improvement of road safety. However, it is recognized that in improving road safety these services/applications may offer secondary benefits which are not directly associated with road safety. These services/applications are built upon the reporting of road-related situations such as vehicle accidents or vehicle malfunctioning. Possible co-operative road safety services/applications include:
+ - "Driving assistance – Co-operative awareness" covers use cases such as 'Emergency vehicle warning', 'Slow car warning', 'Intersection collision warning' [b-ETSI TR 102 638];
+ - "Driving assistance – Road Hazard Warning" covers use cases such as 'Collision risk warning', 'Wrong way driving warning', 'Vehicle accident', 'Traffic condition warning', 'Road adhesion', 'Road visibility', etc. [b-ETSI TR 102 638].
+
+- 3) **Passenger-oriented services/applications (SA-3):** The primary objective of these services/applications is to provide passengers in the vehicle with telecommunication-oriented services/applications such as interpersonal conversational services, audiovisual services (e.g., IPTV services), informational services (e.g., about the presence of locally based services or/and points of interest), access to Internet.
+ - These services/applications are provided using devices either already built in the vehicle and/or temporarily operated within a vehicle through communication inside the vehicle or to/from outside the vehicle. The vehicle owner can download or upload multimedia data through a head unit (i.e., built-in on-board unit (OBU)) with networking capability or personal stations such as a smart phone.
+- 4) **Traffic efficiency services/applications (SA-4):** The primary objective of these services/applications is the improvement of traffic flow. However, it is recognized that improving traffic flow may offer secondary benefits not directly associated with traffic management. These services/applications provide for collecting and delivering of real-time traffic information by exchanging vehicle probe data periodically among vehicles and traffic information centres. The time stamp, the vehicle speed and location are some of the core elements of vehicle probe data, and should be transmitted to the centre in predetermined time periods. Possible applications include:
+ - "Speed management" covering use cases such as 'Regulatory/contextual speed limits' and 'Traffic light optimal speed advisory' [b-ETSI TR 102 638];
+ - "Co-operative navigation" covering use cases such as 'Traffic information and recommended itinerary', 'Enhanced route guidance and navigation' and 'Limited access warning and detour notification' [b-ETSI TR 102 638].
+- 5) **Vehicle-oriented services/applications (SA-5):** The primary objective of these services/applications is the support of vehicle logistics and freight-oriented applications. These applications include applications such as fleet management and vehicle parking management applications.
+
+### 7.2 Communications features
+
+Two types of communications are considered, within a networked vehicle and to/from outside a networked vehicle:
+
+- 1) **Communication inside a networked vehicle:** This is a case in which communications are made inside a networked vehicle. The following types of communication can be distinguished:
+ - **Communication among objects which are equipped components of a networked vehicle:** This is the case where objects of a networked vehicle (such as engine control module (ECM), transmission control module (TCM), automatic break system (ABS)) communicate among themselves and/or communicate with a central vehicle control/monitoring platform.
+ - **Communication with devices temporarily operating within a networked vehicle:** This is the case of any devices temporarily operating in a networked vehicle (typically devices belonging to passengers such as a smart phone, an MP3 player or a personal digital assistant (PDA)). These devices may communicate among themselves and/or with equipment of the networked vehicle (such as a car radio, or a TV set).
+- 2) **Communication from/to outside of a networked vehicle:** This is the case where communication is established between a given networked vehicle and other objects located outside of the networked vehicle. The following types of communication can be distinguished:
+
+- **Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication:** This is relevant both to ad hoc communication and communication through various mobile access networks. This communication occurs between a networked vehicle and another networked vehicle to propagate safety critical information within a short period of time while the networked vehicle is moving. V2V communication is classified into two categories. One is direct communication between moving networked vehicles by using point-to-point, point-to-multipoint, or multi-hop routing. The other is vehicle to infrastructure to vehicle (V2I2V) multi-hop communication having more than two-hops by way of either a roadside station or a mobile network infrastructure. V2V direct communication mode is out of scope of this Recommendation.
+- **Vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications:** This relates to communication between a networked vehicle and an ITS infrastructure through networks such as NGN, international mobile telecommunications (IMT)-2000, wireless local area network (WLAN), or dedicated short range communications (DSRC).
+- **Vehicle-to-home (V2H) communications:** This relates to communications between a networked vehicle and a residential home network through networks such as NGN. When the networked vehicle is parked in a home, the networked vehicle could be treated as an element of the home network. There are two cases: one is for handling it as the owner's home device (i.e., belonging to the same owner as the home), and the other is to treat it as a visiting device (i.e., the one that does not belong to the owner of the home, but which is allowed as a visitor).
+- **Vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communications:** This relates to communications between a networked vehicle and utility grids for smart charging. Ethernet over power-line adapter or IMT-2000/DSRC can be used for this type of communication.
+
+## 7.3 Relationship between networked vehicle services and applications with communication features
+
+A key aspect of a networked vehicle is its ability to communicate while transporting persons or goods. Therefore, at a given time, a networked vehicle can be considered as a moving equipment and/or device. In addition, a networked vehicle may also stay in a specific place such as in a car park or garage for a certain period of time. In this situation, a networked vehicle can also be considered as a fixed equipment and/or device.
+
+Based on whether the network vehicle is a moving vehicle or a stationary vehicle (as described in clause 6), Table 7-1 provides the summary of the relationship between networked vehicle services and the applications described in clause 7.1 with communication features identified in clause 7.2.
+
+**Table 7-1 – Relationship between networked vehicle services and applications with communication features**
+
+| Situation of networked vehicle | Communication aspects | | | | |
+|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------|
+| | Inside vehicle | | Outside vehicle | | |
+| | Between on-board equipments | Between a vehicle and temporary devices | V2V | V2I | V2H/V2G |
+| Moving vehicle | SA-1, SA-2 | SA-1, SA-3 | SA-2 | SA-1, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5 | SA-1, SA-3 |
+| Stationary vehicle | SA-1, SA-3 | SA-3 | N/A | SA-1, SA-3, SA-5 | SA-1, SA-3 |
+| N/A = Not Applicable | | | | | |
+
+From these key communication aspects, a networked vehicle can be considered as follows:
+
+- a fast moving 'terminal and/or residential home network' interacting with several end devices;
+- a service platform which monitors/controls the networked vehicle operation (including remote operation) and also supports multimedia services and applications by passengers such as video on demand (VoD), music within a networked vehicle;
+- a communication platform for V2V, V2I and V2H communications.
+
+Those features are the basic input for the requirements identified in clause 8.
+
+# **8 Requirements for networked vehicle services and applications using NGN**
+
+A networked vehicle is a vehicle with various devices, including those belonging to the vehicle occupants. It should be possible to connect to a networked vehicle through various networks, including NGN. This clause identifies requirements of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN.
+
+## **8.1 Requirements for a networked vehicle communicating with ITS infrastructure**
+
+#### **8.1.1 General requirements**
+
+This clause identifies requirements for a networked vehicle in terms of general aspects of telecommunication.
+
+##### - **Maintenance of positioning information**
+
+A networked vehicle is required to maintain positioning information obtained from the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) or other sources. Requirements include:
+
+- i) collection and management of the networked vehicle's positioning information calculated from various sources such as a GNSS receiver (i.e., real-time kinematic (RTK)), a wireless network (e.g., WLAN, ZigBee, ultra-wideband (UWB)) and sensors (e.g., Gyro, radio frequency identification (RFID), accelerometer);
+- ii) periodic reception of positioning information, and transmission of information either periodically, based on position triggers or as a response to a server application request.
+
+##### - **Ad hoc network connectivity**
+
+Networked vehicle occupant devices connect smoothly to the networked vehicle.
+
+- i) a networked vehicle is required to support ad hoc network connectivity with networked vehicle occupant devices such as an MP3 player, a PDA, a mobile phone, etc., for various value-added services (e.g., user's operation via the mobile phone, multimedia sharing, the user's phone address book);
+- ii) a networked vehicle is recommended to support multiple communication interfaces such as Bluetooth, ZigBee, and WLAN.
+
+##### - **IPv6 support**
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to support IPv4 and is recommended to support IPv6 packet delivery over ITS communication.
+
+##### - **Network management**
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to have network management functionality in order to differentiate services according to the networked vehicle's priority in terms of services.
+
+##### - **Operational requirements**
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to handle multiple clients for the on-board diagnostics (OBD) system, to minimize the risk of collisions (i.e., send multiple requests at the same time).
+
+#### 8.1.2 Service and application aspects requirements
+
+##### - **Use of networked vehicle data and ITS infrastructure**
+
+Devices can receive the input from in-vehicle controls and restrict access to vehicle/nomadic devices, depending on authorization.
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to collect in-vehicle electronic control unit (ECU) and sensor data as well as to translate it into a standardized format for the purposes of networked vehicle services and applications.
+
+#### 8.1.3 Communication aspects requirements
+
+##### - **Seamless access to networks**
+
+Since a communication link is continuously changing due to the mobility of a networked vehicle, enabling seamless access to networks requires autonomous switching between the "best" available communication systems at the current time and location. Therefore, the following measures are required to support seamless access:
+
+- i) a networked vehicle is required to have interfaces to one or more wide area networks such as NGN, and one or more ad hoc networks for networked vehicles including short range radio communication;
+- ii) since NGN supports multiple access technologies and mobility as basic functionality, a networked vehicle is required to provide the capability for initiating end-user functions to access the NGN services and the management of IP connectivity.
+
+##### - **Security**
+
+Security is an issue because of complex technologies and sharing of sensitive information of a networked vehicle. Information of a networked vehicle should be protected from any malicious use such as invoking of malfunction, abuse of private information, etc. Therefore, the following steps are identified as requirements to support security:
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to keep security through protocols and cryptographic mechanisms deployed in the components of the vehicle.
+
+##### - **Latency**
+
+Vehicle safety applications allow a degree of latency depending on safety services requirements and on the network characteristics. Safety applications as 'pre-crash warning' or 'lane changing assistance' require real-time communication processing with accompanying vehicles. To exchange the emergency information and invoke safety critical controls for the networked vehicle or alert the driver, low latency communication should be supported. On the contrary, safety services as a moving road work and an approaching emergency networked vehicle can tolerate seconds of latency.
+
+- i) A networked vehicle supporting stringent safety applications is required to support low latency communication to exchange emergency warning information within a certain period of time (e.g., end-to-end latency $\leq 100$ ms) to assure the reliability of communication with nearby moving vehicles.
+
+##### - **Beaconing of vehicle information**
+
+A networked vehicle providing safety applications could gather its own vehicle information and transmit the information to its neighbouring networked vehicles through beacons. Vehicle information includes globally unique networked vehicle's identifier (e.g., MAC address), location, speed, etc. The beacon protocol is applied between networked vehicles and also between a networked vehicle and a roadside station to exchange positions of nearby moving vehicles.
+
+- i) a networked vehicle is required to transmit vehicle information periodically to its neighbouring networked vehicles;
+- ii) a networked vehicle is required to be able to receive vehicle information periodically from its neighbouring networked vehicles. It is also required to maintain its neighbouring networked vehicles' information. The roadside station is recommended to be able to receive/transmit networked vehicles' beacon information.
+
+##### - **Multi-hop communication**
+
+In case of beaconing of vehicle information, it is necessary to extend the original emergency messages' propagation range. To do so, it is recommended to devise a multi-hop communication technique. By means of the multi-hop communication, a networked vehicle can communicate with another networked vehicle which is outside of its propagation range.
+
+- i) a networked vehicle and a roadside station exchange probe data collected from each networked vehicle and roadside sensors. The traffic and road status information is propagated to networked vehicles by using multi-hop communication;
+- ii) a networked vehicle is required to support multi-hop communication with hop count parameters depending on the distance from an "event" or "time" since the event may be just as relevant.
+
+##### - **Vehicle ad hoc routing**
+
+To support multi-hop communication, a message should be forwarded from a networked vehicle to other networked vehicles based on the routing schemes. A number of ad hoc routing algorithms can be applied application by application.
+
+- i) A networked vehicle is required to support ad hoc routing for the following purposes:
+ - to exchange the networked vehicle's positioning information with the neighbouring networked vehicles;
+ - to deliver advanced traffic information to the networked vehicles that follow;
+ - to receive traffic/roadside information from the infrastructure.
+
+##### - **Network address translation**
+
+NGN is required not to preclude solutions for access of a networked vehicle to an NGN with network address translation (NAT)/network address port translation (NAPT) and firewalls in the user environment where the assignment of IP addresses to networked vehicle can optionally be done by the user network. These addresses need not be routable in the NGN.
+
+A networked vehicle's access to the NGN is required to support the following configurations:
+
+- i) direct connectivity and interaction between the networked vehicle and the NGN;
+- ii) indirect connectivity and interaction between individual devices in a networked vehicle and the NGN.
+
+##### - **Vehicle-to-home (V2H) communication**
+
+The requirements for a networked vehicle's access to the home network are as follows:
+
+- i) A networked vehicle's access to the home network is recommended to be enabled by access services provided within the home network (locally and/or through interconnected NGN).
+- ii) A networked vehicle's access to the home network is recommended to support:
+ - security, management and QoS for interoperability with home networks;
+ - device provisioning and service configuration including remote access.
+
+#### **8.1.4 Accessibility requirements**
+
+Accessibility is required to ensure that the specified services and features are also usable as much as possible by people with disabilities. This clause describes accessibility requirements for networked vehicle services and features by applying the checklist defined in [b-ITU-T Technical Paper].
+
+- Control of devices through a user interface
+ - i) A networked vehicle is recommended to have a multi-modal interface controlling the ITS infrastructure for driving assistance.
+- Control of services
+ - i) A networked vehicle is recommended to have alternative ways to control networked vehicle services and applications. For example, real-time traffic information obtained from a roadside station can change the driving route guided from ITS infrastructure under a co-operative system.
+- Media transport
+ - i) a networked vehicle is recommended to support text transport properties to present various safety/infotainment messages and alarms to drivers;
+ - ii) a networked vehicle is recommended to support audio transport properties to present various safety messages and alarms to drivers;
+ - iii) a networked vehicle is recommended to support video transport properties to present multimedia traffic information and record the scene of accidents.
+- Media entry by the user
+ - i) Video entry properties are recommended to be selected so that it is possible to present video with network supported quality for multimedia traffic information. This property is recommended to be selected so that it is possible to record video pre/post scene of accidents and incidents automatically.
+
+- Media presentation to the user
+ - i) a networked vehicle is recommended to support various ways of presenting information according to the user (or passenger) situation such as text and graphic (including multimedia) presentations for a person with hearing difficulties, and sound and vocal presentation of information for a person with visual difficulties;
+ - ii) a networked vehicle, when provided with the above media presentation requirement, is required to support emergency information following the above media presentation to the user (or passenger) in the networked vehicle.
+- User and device profile management
+ - i) A networked vehicle is recommended to support the user and device profile management. The profiles should themselves be configurable, or be configured through exterior sources such as NGN or personal devices to assist disabled people.
+- Video resolution for sign language and lip reading
+ - i) A networked vehicle is recommended to support a high quality video resolution for sign language and lip reading good visual reproduction of movements [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1].
+
+### 8.2 NGN requirements for networked vehicle services and applications
+
+NGN is recommended to allow the simultaneous use of multiple types of access technologies by a single networked vehicle. Therefore, the coordination of the multiple connections is required for networked vehicle services and applications from the network point of view.
+
+It should be noted that it is not intended to preclude the attachment of terminal equipment which could enable interface adaptation to varying user requirements, including the needs of people with disabilities, using commonly provided user interface devices.
+
+#### - **Maintenance of positioning information**
+
+Since positioning information is essential for networked vehicle services and applications, the networked vehicle is recommended to maintain the positioning information obtained from GNSS or other sources.
+
+- i) NGN is recommended to support network-based positioning when a networked vehicle requests its own positioning information to a location server in the core network.
+
+#### - **IPv6 support**
+
+- i) NGN is recommended to support IPv6 network access for the roadside station and the OBU in a networked vehicle.
+
+NOTE 1 – NGN domains may support user equipment using IPv4 only, IPv6 only, or both at the user-network interface.
+
+NOTE 2 – In NGN, it is assumed that IPv6-based user equipment can also support IPv4 at the user-network interface.
+
+#### - **Network management**
+
+- i) NGN is recommended to support network management (e.g., simple network management protocol (SNMP)) with roadside station for exchange of network-attached devices conditions that need administrative attention.
+
+#### - **Use of networked vehicle data and ITS infrastructure**
+
+The OBU located within a networked vehicle can receive input from in-vehicle controls and restrict access to personal station, depending on authorization.
+
+- i) NGN is required to support secure transmission of networked vehicle data by using advanced security mechanisms such as confidentiality, anonymity, and traceability.
+
+#### - **Priority**
+
+A networked vehicle is required to support a priority scheme by the type of service and also the type of client for the networked vehicle.
+
+For this purpose, the following steps are identified as NGN requirements:
+
+- i) NGN is required to support "Prioritization" of networked vehicle transmission requests in two different levels: 'Concurrent channel access requests' within a single device' and 'Concurrent medium access requests among different devices';
+ - Concurrent channel access: Prioritization among networked vehicle applications which request channel access concurrently;
+ - Concurrent medium access: Prioritization among networked vehicle stations which try to access the physical communication channel simultaneously.
+- ii) NGN is required to provide negotiation mechanisms between the networked vehicle and NGN to ensure the end-to-end networked vehicle service/application with different priorities.
+
+NOTE 3 – As an example, signalling an airbag deployment in a traffic accident should have a higher priority than downloading an entertainment video.
+
+NOTE 4 – Service/application priority should be identified by means of QoS and security control.
+
+#### - **QoS**
+
+QoS can be a key criterion for choosing an available network by the user policy according to charging, network environments such as different access interfaces. Therefore, the following steps are identified as requirements:
+
+- i) NGN is required to support per-flow, per-session, and per-service-class QoS control granularity for the networked vehicle.
+- ii) NGN is required to support mechanisms prioritizing the delivery of emergency telecommunications of the networked vehicle and vehicle control information.
+
+#### - **Location-based services**
+
+NGN is required to be able to receive location information, GNSS-based or network-based, of a networked vehicle in real time, as well as to manipulate this information dynamically in order to implement location-based services. Location information of the networked vehicle can be optionally provided upon request by an authorized service provider.
+
+#### - **Network address translation**
+
+NGN is required not to preclude solutions for access of a networked vehicle to an NGN with NAT/NAPT and firewalls in the user environment where the assignment of IP addresses to the networked vehicle can optionally be done by the user network. These addresses need not be routable in the NGN.
+
+#### - **Accessibility**
+
+- i) Control of devices through a user interface:
+ - NGN is recommended to support bidirectional connectivity to the networked vehicle to support the multi-modal commands for driving assistance. For example, the name of the driving destination can be input to the navigation system through the communication network with the help of an assistant in the service centre while driving.
+- ii) Control of services:
+ - NGN is recommended to support bidirectional connectivity to the networked vehicle to support the control of services for driving assistance.
+
+#### iii) NGN requirements on accessibility [ITU-T Y.2201]:
+
+Users with disabilities have a general need to be provided with means to control and use terminals and services in alternative ways and modes, suiting varied capabilities and preferences. Such requirements are best met by the inclusive design of the general provision of terminals and services.
+
+- NGN is required to provide the means needed for the invocation of relay services. Relay services translate between various modes of telecommunication that are of interest for people with disabilities (e.g., sign language, lip reading, text, voice). Invocation of relay services can optionally be based on user preferences, address resolution or user commands.
+- NGN is required to have the capability to invoke relay services by either party in an emergency telecommunication.
+
+NOTE 5 – Other needs for users with disabilities to use emergency telecommunication services are handled in clause 20.4 of [ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+# 9 Framework architecture of the networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure
+
+This clause specifies an overall framework architecture of the networked vehicle.
+
+Figure 9-1 shows a configuration model involving a networked vehicle including its communication types. The figure shows how networked vehicles relate to the ITS infrastructure and also to external networks such as a residential home network and an utility grid network for power distribution and transmission.
+
+
+
+Y.2281(11)\_F9-1
+
+Figure 9-1: Overall configuration model of networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure using NGN' and 'External networks'. In the first section, a central cloud labeled 'NGN' is connected to 'ITS infrastructure (roadside station, central station)' on the left, 'Networked vehicle #1' and 'Networked vehicle #2' on the right, and 'V2I' and 'V2V' interfaces. In the second section, the 'NGN' cloud is connected to 'Residential home network' and 'Utility grid network' via 'V2H' and 'V2G' interfaces respectively. There are also three dots below the utility grid network, indicating other external networks. The label 'Y.2281(11)\_F9-1' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Overall configuration model of networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure**
+
+While [ETSI EN 302 665] shows a peer-to-peer communication model using ITS-specific systems such as an ITS station router and ITS station gateways, it does not show how to use public communication networks such as NGN. Hence, this Recommendation identifies the use of NGN, thereby minimizing interoperability problems between peer-to-peer and public network scenarios. These interoperability features are especially important in the support of QoS, mobility and security with various multimedia services.
+
+## 9.1 Reference architecture of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure
+
+Based on the overall configuration model in Figure 9-1, it is possible to derive the reference architecture of the networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure. Figure 9-2 is a reference architecture model of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure based on the ITS station reference architecture model defined by [ETSI EN 302 665].
+
+Functions for the support of networked vehicle services and applications are mapped into the ITS reference architecture which is defined in [ETSI EN 302 665]. The ITS reference architecture explains the generic functionalities that can be adopted in ITS stations. Figure II.1 shows the ITS station reference architecture defined in [ETSI EN 302 665].
+
+
+
+Y.2281(11)\_F9-2
+
+Figure 9-2: Reference architecture of NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure. The diagram shows a central stack of five layers: Applications, Serv/Appl support functions, Service control functions, Transport control functions, and Transport functions. Each layer contains specific functional blocks. The Applications layer includes 'Applications' (Road Safety, Traffic Effic., Others). Serv/Appl support functions includes 'Facilities' (Application support, Information support). Service control functions includes 'Facilities (Session/communication support)'. Transport control functions includes 'Networking and transport' and 'ITS TP/Local and GEO'. Transport functions includes 'Access' (Station-Ext.I/F, Station-Int.I/F). This central stack is flanked by 'Management' on the left and 'Security' on the right. At the bottom of each side are 'ITS specific' blocks. Bidirectional arrows connect the central layers to the side blocks. The entire architecture is titled 'NGN capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure'.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Reference architecture of NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure**
+
+The key features of the functions used in Figure 9-2, based on the ITS reference architecture in [ETSI EN 302 665], are as follows:
+
+- **Applications:** These functions manage networked vehicle services and applications with a function of classification, prioritization and channel assignment in the context of ITS communications.
+- **Facilities:** These functions provide support to networked vehicle services and applications which can share generic functions and data such as session support.
+- **Networking and transport:** These functions provide networking protocols such as GeoNetworking [b-ETSI TS 102 636], IPv6 networking and communication access to land mobile financial information exchange adapted for streaming (CALM FAST) and also provide TCP/UDP and dedicated ITS communication protocols.
+- **Access:** These functions define the various access technologies which can be supported by the networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure.
+- **Management:** These functions support management functions for congestion control, cross-interface, networking and application/service support.
+- **Security:** These functions provide security functions for ITS communication protocol and applications.
+
+## 9.2 Overview architecture of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure
+
+[ITU-T Y.2012] specifies the NGN functional architecture and related functional entities. From the NGN's aspects, the NGN overview architecture consists of "End user functions", "Service stratum", "Transport stratum", "Management functions" and "NGN-based applications". The functions of the NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure, which is defined in clause 9.1, is located in the overview architecture, as shown in Figure 9-3.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of an NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure. It is organized into several layers and components:
+
+- NGN-based applications (Top):** Includes "Vehicle specific applications" (highlighted in purple), "Multimedia", "IPTV", "LOC", and "IM/Presence".
+- Interface:** The "ANI" (Application Network Interface) connects the applications to the NGN.
+- NGN Core (Middle):**
+ - Serv/Appl support functions:** Includes "Service control functions" and "Service stratum".
+ - Transport control functions:** Includes "Transport functions" and "Transport stratum".
+- Other networks (Right):** Connected to the NGN via the "NNI" (Network-to-Network Interface).
+- NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure (Left):** This block represents the vehicle's internal functions, categorized into:
+ - Applications:** "Applications" (Road Safety, Traffic Effic., Others).
+ - Serv/Appl support functions:** "Facilities" (Application support, Information support).
+ - Service control functions:** "Facilities" (Session/communication support).
+ - Transport control functions:** "Networking and transport" (ITS TP/Local and GEO).
+ - Transport functions:** "Access" (Station-Ext.I/F, Station-Int.I/F).
+ - Management functions:** A vertical block on the far left.
+ - ITS specific:** Two yellow boxes, one on the left and one on the right of the vehicle infrastructure.
+ - Security:** A vertical block on the right side of the vehicle infrastructure.
+- Interfaces:**
+ - UNI (User Network Interface):** Connects the vehicle infrastructure to the NGN.
+ - Management (dashed line):** Connects the Management functions block to the vehicle infrastructure.
+- Legend:**
+ - Control: Solid line
+ - Media: Double line
+ - Management: Dashed line
+
+Y.2281(11)\_F9-3
+
+Figure 9-3: Overview architecture of NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure in cooperation with NGN. The diagram shows the integration of vehicle-specific applications with the NGN core and other networks.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – Overview architecture of NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure in cooperation with NGN**
+
+In Figure 9-3, the networked vehicle related to the support of NGN capabilities is located in the end user functions. Vehicle-specific applications in the NGN-based applications are supported through the NGN for situations such as an emergency call or a public telecommunication.
+
+NOTE – The NGN-capable networked vehicle and ITS infrastructure are the end user function in the NGN perspective [b-ITU-T Y.2291], the residential home network is located in the 'Other networks' box in Figure 9-3.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+Security is an important issue for a networked vehicle. Different levels of security requirements need to be applied according to the environment where the networked vehicle is located, for example, when it is moving or stationary in a home network environment. Security requirements identified in [ITU-T Y.2201], [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2702] are applicable whenever the networked vehicle operates in NGN environments. Other cases of security requirements are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases of networked vehicle services and applications using NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+For the development of NGN capabilities and functional model to support networked vehicle services and applications, it is useful to look at usage flows of networked vehicle services and applications as well as to identify relevant mechanisms. In this regard, this appendix introduces "Use cases of the networked vehicle" using the service configuration model, as shown in Figure I.1.
+
+
+
+Y.2281(11)\_FI-1-App-I
+
+Figure I.1: Service configuration model of a networked vehicle. The diagram shows a 'Networked vehicle' box containing 'OEM devices', 'Equipped end user devices', and 'Passenger devices' on the left, connected to a 'Service platform' (with 'Communication platform' and 'Multimedia service platform') in the center. This is connected to an 'NGN' box, which is then connected to a list of services on the right: 'Vehicle related services', 'Public telecom service (inc. GPS, etc.)', 'Enterprise services', and 'Private services (inc. Home based services)'. All connections are bidirectional.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Service configuration model of a networked vehicle**
+
+Taking into account the communication features and above service configuration model, following classification of use cases can be derived as shown in Figure I.2.
+
+
+
+Y.2281(11)\_FI-2-App-I
+
+Figure I.2: Classification of use cases for communication of a networked vehicle. This diagram is similar to Figure I.1 but includes numbered use cases. On the left, 'OEM devices' is linked to use case ⑧, 'Equipped devices' to ④, and 'Passenger MM devices' to ④. On the right, services are linked to use cases: 'Vehicle-related services' to ①, 'Public telecom service (inc. GPS, 2G/3G, etc.)' to ② and ③, 'Enterprise services' to ⑤, and 'Private services (inc. Home-based services)' to ⑥ and ⑦. The central 'Service platform' and 'Communication networks' boxes are connected to these use cases via dashed lines.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Classification of use cases for communication of a networked vehicle**
+
+Each use case is explained in Table I.1.
+
+**Table I.1 – Use cases of networked vehicle**
+
+| Use Case | Objectives | Examples | NGN/Networked vehicle supports |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1 | Monitoring, operation and maintenance of networked vehicle | - Monitoring of networked vehicle status by communication with OEM devices
- Optimization of networked vehicle operation and maintenance
- Upgrade of relevant drivers for OEM devices and networked vehicle support system (may be VGP)
| - Broadband with managed capability
- Security
- Mobility management
|
+| 2 | Use of public telecom services by using equipped terminal devices | - Radio programmes over FM/AM
- GPS services
- Telephone voice services
- Internet access services
- TV over mobile (e.g., DMB/DVB-T etc.)
- Other public services, as appropriate
| - Broadband
- QoS
- Security
- Mobility management
|
+| 3 | Use of public telecom services by using passenger-owned terminal devices | | |
+| 4 | Sharing of resources and capabilities between equipped MM devices and passenger-owned MM devices | - Sharing music/video stored in passenger device(s) to vehicle music player (including the other direction)
- Distributing video to the rear seat viewers and vice versa
- Network gaming inside the networked vehicle (using vehicle equipped devices and passenger devices)
| - Mounting devices into VGP with open I/F
- Content protection (e.g., DRM)
- Content distribution
|
+| 5 | Extension of business life while seated in a networked vehicle | - Use of company presence services (similar as Messenger)
- Use of electronic signature to approve enterprise administration
| |
+| 6 | Extension of home life while seated in a networked vehicle by using equipped devices | - Seamless use of personal/family scheduling
- Seamless use of information from a networked vehicle to information stored in a home and vice versa
| - VPN
- Security
- Connectivity to home network
|
+| 7 | Extension of home life while seated in a networked vehicle by using portable devices | | |
+| 8 | Use of public telecommunication access network for less stringent safety services | - Change of road conditions
| - Security
- Mobility management
|
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Comparison between ITS station reference architecture and NGN functional architecture
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## II.1 Features and detailed functions of ITS station reference architecture
+
+[ETSI EN 302 665] defines the ITS communication architecture using the following configuration and features of the ITS station reference architecture:
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the ITS station reference architecture. It is enclosed in a rectangular box with the title "ITS station reference architecture" at the top. Inside the box, there are six main components represented by gray rectangles. On the left is a large vertical rectangle labeled "Management". On the right is a large vertical rectangle labeled "Security". In the center, there are four horizontal rectangles stacked vertically: "Applications" at the top, followed by "Facilities", "Networking and transport", and "Access technologies" at the bottom. Bidirectional arrows connect "Management" to each of the four central components. Similarly, bidirectional arrows connect "Security" to each of the four central components. Additionally, bidirectional arrows connect the four central components to each other in a vertical stack: Applications to Facilities, Facilities to Networking and transport, and Networking and transport to Access technologies.
+
+Y.2281(11)\_FII-1-App-II
+
+Diagram of the ITS station reference architecture showing Management, Applications, Facilities, Networking and transport, Access technologies, and Security components with their interconnections.
+
+**Figure II.1 – ITS station reference architecture**
+
+ITS station reference architecture is the functionality contained in ITS stations which are part of ITS sub-systems such as personal ITS sub-system (e.g., in hand-held devices), central ITS sub-system (part of an ITS central system), vehicle ITS sub-system (in cars, trucks, etc., in motion or parked) and roadside ITS sub-system (on gantries, poles, etc.). ITS station is the functional entity specified by the ITS station reference architecture, and it is composed of six entities such as 'Access' representing OSI layers 1 and 2, 'Networking and Transport' representing layers 3 and 4, 'Facilities' representing layers 5, 6 and 7, 'Applications', 'Security' and 'Management'.
+
+Detailed functions in each layer have been also identified in [ETSI EN 302 665], as shown in Figure II.2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the ITS station reference architecture with detailed functions, organized into four main layers: Applications, Facilities, Networking and transport, and Access. The architecture is flanked by two functional areas: Management and Security.
+
+- Applications Layer:** Contains three boxes: Road safety, Traffic efficiency, and Other applications. Below these are three ovals: MA (Management Applications), FA (Facilities Applications), and SA (Security Applications).
+- Facilities Layer:** Contains three boxes: Application support, Information support, and Session/communication support. Below these are two ovals: MF (Management Facilities) and SF (Security Facilities).
+- Networking and transport Layer:** Contains two boxes: ITS transport and TCP/UDP. Below these are four boxes: ITS local network, Geo-routing, Other protocols, and IPv6 + mobility extensions. Below these are two ovals: MN (Management Networking) and SN (Security Networking).
+- Access Layer:** Contains two boxes: Station-external interfaces and Station-internal interfaces. Below these are five boxes: e.g., IR, MM, M5; e.g., GPS; e.g., Bluetooth; e.g., 2G/3G/...; and e.g., Ethernet. Below these are two ovals: MI (Management Interfaces) and SI (Security Interfaces).
+
+The Management functional area (left) includes a vertical bar labeled "Management information base (MIB)" and four boxes: Application management, Station management, Cross-layer management, and Regulatory management. The Security functional area (right) includes a vertical bar labeled "Security" and three boxes: Firewall and intrusion management, Authentication, authorization, profile management, and Security management information base (S-MIB) (identity, crypto-key and certificate management). A Hardware security module (HSM) is located at the bottom right.
+
+Arrows indicate data flow and interactions between components. For example, MA and FA are connected by a double-headed arrow. MF and SF are connected by a double-headed arrow. MN and SN are connected by a double-headed arrow. MI and SI are connected by a double-headed arrow. A long arrow at the bottom connects the MI and SI ovals, passing through the HSM.
+
+Y.2281(11)\_FII-2-App-II
+
+Figure II.2 – ITS station reference architecture with detailed functions. The diagram shows a layered architecture with Applications, Facilities, Networking and transport, and Access layers, flanked by Management and Security functional areas. It includes various management information bases (MIBs) and a hardware security module (HSM).
+
+**Figure II.2 – ITS station reference architecture with detailed functions**
+
+## II.2 Analysis between two architectural models
+
+An analysis of features and detailed functions, shown in clause II.1, reveals that the ITS station reference architecture has a structure quite similar to the functional architecture model of NGN, although some of the terminology ("Facilities", "Transport" and "Access technologies") in the ITS station reference architecture is used in a different way in NGN. Considering this different usage of terminology, this appendix shows a way to harmonize the ITS station reference architecture model into the functional architecture model of the networked vehicle over NGN, based on the analysis of features and detailed functions. Table II.1 shows a summary of the analysis between the ITS station reference architecture and the NGN functional architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+**Table II.1 – Features and comparison between ITS station reference architecture and NGN functional architecture**
+
+| ITS station reference architecture | Corresponding NGN functional architecture | Rationale |
+|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Access technologies | Transport functions | Even called "Access technologies" but this part generally represents the transport function itself. NGN applies at "Station external IF" but not at "Station internal IF". |
+| Networking and transport | Transport control functions | This generally handles networking protocols such as IPv6, TCP/UDP, etc., so it should correspond to "Transport control functions". |
+| Facilities | Service control and service/application support functions | "Facilities" is the most difficult part to map because of the different usage of naming, but it is mainly involved in "session support" and "ITS application". Thus, this should correspond to "Service/application support functions" in NGN. |
+| Applications | Applications | This part mainly involves providing ITS applications, so it corresponds to "Application functions" in NGN. |
+| Management | Management | Mostly the same but need to consider ITS specific requirements should be considered. |
+| Security | Security | Mostly the same but need to consider ITS specific requirements should be considered. |
+
+Based on Table II.1, a possible mapping of the ITS station reference architecture into the NGN functional architecture can be depicted, as shown in Figure II.3.
+
+
+
+Y.2281(11)\_Fil-3-App-II
+
+Figure II.3: Correspondence between the ITS station reference architecture and the functions of NGN functional architecture. The diagram shows two side-by-side block diagrams connected by a double-headed yellow arrow. The left diagram, titled 'ITS station reference architecture', shows a central stack of four boxes: 'Applications', 'Facilities', 'Networking and transport', and 'Access technologies'. These are flanked by two vertical bars labeled 'Management' on the left and 'Security' on the right. Double-headed arrows connect the central stack to the side bars, and vertical double-headed arrows connect the boxes in the stack. The right diagram, titled 'NGN corresponding functional architecture', shows a similar structure with a central stack of four boxes: 'Applications', 'Service/Application support functions', 'Transport control functions', and 'Transport functions'. These are also flanked by 'Management' and 'Security' side bars, with double-headed arrows indicating connections and internal relationships.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Correspondence between the ITS station reference architecture and the functions of NGN functional architecture**
+
+One of the fundamental considerations is to address the support of ITS specific aspects driven by service requirements, operation, administration and management of ITS. When ITS specific services need NGN capabilities, NGN functions should be incorporated into ITS station features, as shown in Figure II.4. Most of the detailed functions in the ITS station reference architecture are well mapped with the relevant functions of the NGN functional architecture, except for "Information support", the role of which is not clear, and the difference between "Application support" and "Communication support".
+
+## **II.3 Features and functions for a networked vehicle**
+
+A networked vehicle should be operated as a part of ITS as well as a part of communication objects, used for public and private communication services and applications. This means that a networked vehicle should have enough capabilities to support ITS specific features and general communication features. Therefore, it is highly anticipated that combined (or harmonized) functions to support both features would be incorporated into a networked vehicle.
+
+In this regard, the ITS station reference architecture covers the ITS specific service features but not enough to support communication features, specifically the need to adopt capabilities from the communication functions to support mobility, security, management capability and connectivity. It is anticipated to use capabilities provided by NGN for such features rather than develop different functions because a networked vehicle is also a part of communication objects, whether it is moving or stationary. Therefore, functions for a networked vehicle, especially over the NGN environment, are harmonized using both the ITS station reference architecture and the NGN functional architecture, as shown in Figure II.4.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the arrangement of relevant NGN functions into the ITS station reference architecture. It is organized into four main functional layers, each with associated management and security components.
+
+- Applications Layer:** Includes Road safety, Traffic efficiency, Other applications, and Applications. It is managed by MA (Management Agent) and FA (Facilities Agent), and secured by SA (Security Agent).
+- Facilities Layer:** Includes Application support, Information support, and Session/communication support. It is managed by MF (Management Function) and NF (Network Function), and secured by SF (Security Function). Key components include Serv. Appl. cont. and Serv. cont.
+- Networking and transport Layer:** Includes ITS transport, TCP/UDP, ITS local network, Geo-routing, Other protocols, and IPv6 + mobility extensions. It is managed by MN (Management Node) and SN (Security Node). Key components include MMCF, NACF, and RACF.
+- Access Layer:** Includes Station-external interfaces (e.g., IR, MM, M5) and Station-internal interfaces (e.g., GPS, BlueTooth, 2G/3G/..., Ethernet). It is managed by MI (Management Interface) and SI (Security Interface). Key components include NGN access and NGN security.
+
+The architecture is supported by two main functional areas:
+
+- Management:** Includes Management information base (MIB), NGN management, Station management, Cross-layer management, and Regulatory management.
+- Security:** Includes Firewall and intrusion management, Authentication, authorization, profile management, Security management information base (S-MIB) (identity, crypto-key and certificate management), NGN security, and Hardware security module (HSM).
+
+Interconnections are shown between MA, FA, SA, MF, NF, MN, SN, MI, SI, and MS (Management and Security) components across the layers.
+
+Y.2281(11)\_FII-4-App-II
+
+Figure II.4 – Arrangement of the relevant NGN functions into the ITS station reference architecture. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture with Applications, Facilities, Networking and transport, and Access layers, all interconnected by Management and Security functions. Key components include MA, FA, SA, MF, NF, MN, SN, MI, SI, and MS, along with various management and security modules like NGN management, NGN security, and HSM.
+
+**Figure II.4 – Arrangement of the relevant NGN functions into the ITS station reference architecture**
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H-Sup.1] ITU-T H-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2009), *Application profile – Sign language and lip-reading real-time conversation using low bit rate video communication.*
+- [b-ITU-T Technical Paper] ITU-T Technical Paper (2006), *Telecommunications Accessibility Checklist.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2291] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2291 (2011), *Architectural overview of next generation home networks.*
+- [b-ITU-R Handbook] ITU-R Handbook (2006), *Land Mobile (including Wireless Access) – Volume 4: Intelligent Transport Systems*, 109 p,
+.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1452-1] Recommendation ITU-R M.1452-1 (2009), *Millimetre wave radiocommunication systems for intelligent transport system applications.*
+- [b-ETSI TR 102 638] ETSI TR 102 638 V1.1.1. (2009), *Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular communications; Basic Set of Applications; Definitions.*
+- [b-ETSI TS 102 636] ETSI TS 102 636 (in force), *Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Vehicular communications; Geonetworking.*
+- [b-ISO 21217] ISO 21217:2010, *Intelligent transport systems – Communications access for land mobiles (CALM) – Architecture.*
+- [b-Intelligent] *Intelligent Transport Systems Standards* (2008), Artech House.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2320
+
+(09/2015)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+# --- **Requirements for virtualization of control network entities in next generation network evolution**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2320
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2320
+
+# Requirements for virtualization of control network entities in next generation network evolution
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2320 provides requirements for virtualization of control network entities (VCN) in next generation network (NGN) evolution. The support of virtualization capabilities in NGN evolution – i.e., the application of virtualization techniques to NGN – enables a virtualized running environment (for control network entities) in NGN evolution.
+
+The requirements provided in this Recommendation include the requirements of virtual infrastructures, virtualized network entities, and VCN management systems.
+
+These requirements are built upon the virtualization scenarios provided in the appendix.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2320 | 2015-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12583 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Control network entity, management, network entity, VCN, virtualization, virtualization of control network entities, virtual infrastructure, virtual machine , virtual machine monitor, VM, VMM.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, i.e., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2016
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Requirements of VCN in next generation network (NGN) evolution..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 Virtual infrastructure related requirements ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 VCNE related requirements ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.3 VCN management system related requirements ..... | 4 |
+| | Appendix I – Scenarios concerning virtualization of control network entities in NGN evolution ..... | 6 |
+| | I.1 Auto-deployment of control network entity ..... | 6 |
+| | I.2 Scaling ..... | 7 |
+| | I.3 Self-healing..... | 8 |
+| | I.4 Hardware change without interrupting the service..... | 9 |
+| | I.5 Change of VCN system ..... | 10 |
+| | I.6 Virtualized resource provision ..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix II – Considerations concerning the virtualization of NGN entities..... | 12 |
+| | II.1 The virtualization technology provides benefits to the NGN..... | 12 |
+| | II.2 The implementation of virtualized NGN entities requires enhancements..... | 12 |
+| | II.3 Virtualized NGN control network entities will co-exist with non-virtualized NGN entities..... | 12 |
+| | II.4 The virtualization of NGN entities starts from the control network entities.. | 12 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 13 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2320
+
+# Requirements for virtualization of control network entities in next generation network evolution
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides requirements for virtualization of control network entities (VCN) in NGN evolution. The support of virtualization capabilities in NGN evolution – i.e., the application of virtualization techniques to NGN – enables a virtualized running environment (for control network entities) in NGN evolution.
+
+It is the common understanding that good performances can be achieved in network environments with virtualization of control network entities.
+
+The requirements provided in this Recommendation include the requirements of virtual infrastructures, virtualized network entities, and VCN management systems. These requirements are built upon the virtualization scenarios provided in Appendix I.
+
+Considerations concerning the virtualization of NGN entities are provided in Appendix II.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+None.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 live migration:** The process of moving a running virtual machine (VM) between different physical machines without interrupting the operating system and applications in the virtual machine.
+
+NOTE – Central processing unit (CPU), memory, storage, and network connectivity of the virtual machine are transferred from the original physical machine to the destination machine.
+
+**3.2.2 virtualized control network entity (VCNE):** A control network entity deployed on virtualized infrastructure (i.e., across one or multiple virtual machines (VMs)).
+
+NOTE – A VCNE is composed of one or several components, and each component is hosted by a virtual machine (VM) which provides the virtualized computation environment running over the physical resources.
+
+**3.2.3 virtualized control network entity descriptor (VCNED):** A configuration template that describes a virtualized control network entity (VCNE) in terms of its deployment and operational behaviour, and is used in the management of the lifecycle of a VCNE instance.
+
+NOTE – Some examples of the VCNE information elements include:
+
+- description of virtual resources;
+- description of virtual machine (VM) configuration for the VMs pertaining to the VCNE;
+- reference information of VM image(s);
+- minimum and maximum number of VCNE instances which can be created to support scale out and scale in;
+- VM initiation and termination workflow;
+- connectivity of VMs for a specific VCNE in case multiple VMs are created.
+
+**3.2.4 virtualized control network entity package:** An archive that includes a virtualized control network entity descriptor (VCNE), the virtual machine (VM) image(s) associated with the virtualized control network entity (VCNE), as well as additional artefacts.
+
+NOTE – Artefacts can be used to check the integrity and to prove the validity of the archive.
+
+**3.2.5 virtual machine (VM):** The virtualized computation environment that behaves like a physical server.
+
+NOTE – A VM has all its ingredients (processor, memory, storage, and network) of a physical server and is generated by a virtual machine monitor (VMM). Virtual machines are capable of hosting a virtualized control network entity (VCNE) component.
+
+**3.2.6 virtual machine image:** A file that can be interpreted by a virtual machine monitor (VMM) as a system hard disk drive.
+
+NOTE – The operating system is pre-installed in the virtual machine (VM) image and, optionally, the control network entity software is pre-installed in the operating system.
+
+**3.2.7 virtual machine monitor (VMM):** The software function that partitions the underlying physical resources and initiates virtual machines. It is also known as a hypervisor.
+
+NOTE – This software may run either directly on top of the hardware (bare metal hypervisor) or on top of a hosting operating system (hosted hypervisor).
+
+**3.2.8 virtual machine template:** A file that describes the hardware configuration of a virtual machine.
+
+NOTE – The hardware configuration may describe the amount of CPU core, the number and speed of network interface cards (NICs), the size of the memory, the size of storage, etc.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| ATCA | Advanced Telecommunication Computing Architecture |
+| CPCI | Compact Peripheral Component Interconnect |
+| CPU | Central Processing Unit |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NIC | Network Interface Card |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| VCN | Virtualization of Control Network entities |
+| VCNE | Virtualized Control Network Entity |
+| VCNE D | VCNE Descriptor |
+
+| | |
+|-----|-------------------------|
+| VM | Virtual Machine |
+| VMM | Virtual Machine Monitor |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+The following conventions apply in this Recommendation:
+
+**Affinity:** This term is used to describe the relationship among different VMs, i.e., whether the different VMs are located in the same physical server or not, whether the different VMs are located in the same rack or not, etc.
+
+**Network entity:** This term is intended as the practical, physical implementation of a single or a group of functional entities, as described in [ITU-T Y.2012], depending on the specific implementation and deployment policies.
+
+## 6 Requirements of VCN in next generation network (NGN) evolution
+
+The VCN system enables the VCN in NGN evolution.
+
+NOTE 1 – Appendix II provides considerations concerning the virtualization of NGN entities.
+
+Figure 1 shows the VCN system from a high level perspective: it includes the virtual infrastructure, the virtualized control network entities (VCNEs) running on the virtual infrastructure, and the VCN management system.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the VCN system architecture. At the top, three overlapping boxes represent 'Virtualized control network entity'. Below these, a larger box labeled 'Virtual infrastructure' contains a 'Virtualization layer' and three resource components: 'Computing' (represented by server racks), 'Storage' (represented by two cylinders), and 'Network' (represented by a switch and a router). To the right of the virtual infrastructure is a separate box labeled 'VCN management system'. The label 'Y.2320(15)\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure 1: Overview of the VCN system. The diagram shows a stack of three 'Virtualized control network entity' boxes at the top. Below them is a 'Virtual infrastructure' box containing a 'Virtualization layer' and three resource blocks: 'Computing' (server racks), 'Storage' (cylinders), and 'Network' (switch and router). To the right is a 'VCN management system' box. The label 'Y.2320(15)\_F01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Overview of the VCN system**
+
+The virtual infrastructure includes the hardware resources (computing, storage, and network resources) and the virtualization layer on top of them. The main functions of the virtualization layer are:
+
+- abstraction of the hardware resources and decoupling of the software from the underlying hardware;
+- allocation of virtual resources from hardware (physical) resources;
+- provision of virtual resources to the VCNE software for VCNE to execute on.
+
+NOTE 2 – The virtualization layer can be realized via a virtual machine monitor (VMM).
+
+A virtualized control network entity (VCNE) consists of one or more components.
+
+The VCN management system is used to support the virtualization capabilities of the VCN system (see scenarios in Appendix I). The VCN management system performs the management of the virtual infrastructure, including availability, allocation, release, fault, and performance management of
+
+virtualized resources, as well as fault, configuration, and performance management of physical facilities. It also performs the management of the virtualized control network entities, including lifecycle management of VCNEs such as VCNE on-boarding, instantiation, scaling and termination, as well as fault configuration and performance management of VCNE.
+
+### **6.1 Virtual infrastructure related requirements**
+
+The virtual infrastructure is required to:
+
+- support deployment of the VMs to physical server(s) according to the affinity policy defined in the VCNE descriptor (VCNED);
+- support initiation and termination of VMs according to the virtual machine (VM) initiation and termination workflow defined in the VCNED;
+- support resource usage monitoring for each of the VCNEs, every VM, and all physical servers;
+- support live migration;
+- provide shared storage for the VM images;
+- support the automatic regeneration of VMs when active VMs crash;
+NOTE – The crash of a VM may be caused by the crash of the host server, the related VMM, or the VM itself. When the crash is caused by the server or the VMM, the VCN system should support the VM regeneration on another server. When the crash is caused by the VM itself, the VM can be regenerated on the same server.
+- be able to create or delete VMs;
+- be able to adjust VM capacity (including computing, storage, and networking capacity).
+
+### **6.2 VCNE related requirements**
+
+In order to support the capabilities provided by virtualization, the software implementation requires adequate design enhancements.
+
+NOTE – The requirements of virtualized control network entities addressed in this Recommendation deal with the virtualization aspects of the control network entities, the aspects specific to each control network entity are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+- a) VCNEs are required to support control network entity load monitoring and reporting to the management system.
+- b) The VCNEs are required to support high availability. The following is required:
+ - i) Failure of part of the related VMs does not affect any function of the control network entity.
+ - ii) Adding new VMs does not affect any function of the control network entity.
+ - iii) Adjusting VM capacity (including computing, storage, and networking capacity) does not affect any function of the control network entity.
+
+### **6.3 VCN management system related requirements**
+
+The VCN management system is required to:
+
+- be able to trigger scaling based on control network entity load or virtual infrastructure resource usage;
+- support the on-boarding of VCNE packages;
+NOTE 1 – The VM images in the package can contain the software of control network entities, or only contain the operating system.
+- be able to use VCNED for management of the lifecycle of VCNE instances;
+
+- support resource allocation for the virtualized control network entities according to their virtual resource requirements while the VCN system creates new virtualized control network entities;
+- support resource recycling for the virtualized control network entities while, for example, the VCN system deletes existing virtualized control network entities, or removes VMs from virtualized control network entities, or reduces computing, storage, and networking capacity of VMs of virtualized control network entities, etc.;
+- support prioritization of resource adjustment requests according to operation policy in order to manage potential resource adjustment conflicts;
+- provide VM templates that satisfy different capacity requirements of different control network entities;
+- perform the fault, configuration, and performance management of the physical facilities.
+
+NOTE 2 – The VM templates may be pre-designed based on the configuration of physical facilities and the capacity requirements of different control network entities.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Scenarios concerning virtualization of control network entities in NGN evolution
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+NOTE – Figure 1 is a basis for all scenarios described in this appendix. Details are introduced in the various subclauses in order to describe the specific aspects of each scenario.
+
+### I.1 Auto-deployment of control network entity
+
+#### Description
+
+Auto-deploying a VCNE means creating its software instance. The software instance can be deployed onto a single VM or multiple VMs. A VCNE descriptor is used as the reference to modify or complement the parameters in a VCNE instantiation request. The operator can deploy the network entities by delivering the VM images remotely. It is not necessary for operators to deploy the hardware and maintain the network element on-site.
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+The construction of the VCN system has been completed and the VM images have been stored in the VM image database which can be viewed and selected by the operators; the VCNE has been uploaded onto a repository.
+
+#### Operational flows
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the operational flow for deploying a control network entity. It shows an operator (laptop) interacting with an Images database (cylinder) and a set of servers (each containing a VM and VMM). The process is divided into three main steps: 1. Selects the desired images (from the database to the operator), 2. Configures the VMs (from the operator to the servers), and 3. Images and Configuration (from the database and operator to the servers). The servers are labeled 'Server' and contain 'VM' and 'VMM' components. Below the servers are a 'Storage device' (cylinder) and a 'Network device' (cube). A text box above the servers states: '4., 5., 6. The VMs are deployed, they start-up, and then compose the control network entity'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2320(15)\_FI.1'.
+
+Diagram illustrating the Control network entity deployment process. An operator interacts with an Images database and a set of servers. The process involves selecting images, configuring VMs, and deploying them to servers, which then compose the control network entity.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Control network entity deployment**
+
+1. According to the VCNE descriptor, the operator reserves the needed virtual resources for creating VMs and selects the desired VM images from the VM image database.
+2. The operator configures the VMs based on the VCNE descriptor. The configuration may include the virtual hardware, the IP addresses, and the affinity among different VMs.
+3. The images and the corresponding VM configurations are delivered to the virtual infrastructure.
+4. The VMs are deployed to the physical servers, and the location of the VMs conforms to the pre-defined affinity policy.
+5. The VMs start up. The configuration (including the IP address and the virtual hardware, etc.) conforms to the pre-defined parameters.
+6. The virtual machines compose the control network entity.
+
+NOTE – There are two options to construct the control network entity from the VMs.
+
+Option one: The software of the control network entity has been set-up in each VM image. After the VMs start-up, the software of the control network entity runs immediately, and those VMs compose the network entity.
+
+Option two: Only part of the software has been set up in one or more VM images (In most cases, the software is for the operation and maintenance to the control network entity, we can call it O&M sub-entity.), other VMs just run the operating system, those VMs will download the required software from the O&M sub-entity, set up the software, and then those VMs and the O&M VMs compose the control network entity.
+
+### I.2 Scaling
+
+#### I.2.1 Scale out (automatic and on-demand)
+
+##### Description
+
+In a telecommunication network with virtualized control network entities, scale out (or scale horizontally) means to add more VMs to one VCNE, either automatically by the VCN system when the total VM usage or the service load service load exceeds the pre-configured upper threshold for this VCNE, or on-demand when the operator expects a VM usage or the service load increases for this VCNE. The following scenario uses VM as a trigger.
+
+##### Pre-conditions
+
+The control network entity (i.e., proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE)) has been deployed in the VCN system. There are multiple VMs constructing the control network entity, each VM runs a piece of software and increasing or decreasing the amount of VMs can increase or decrease the capacity of the network entity.
+
+##### Operational flows
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ subgraph Server1 [Server]
+ VMM1[VMM]
+ VM1[VM1]
+ VM2[VM2]
+ VM1 --- VMM1
+ VM2 --- VMM1
+ end
+ subgraph Server2 [Server]
+ VMM2[VMM]
+ VM3[VM3]
+ VM4[VM4]
+ VM3 --- VMM2
+ VM4 -.- VMM2
+ end
+ Storage((Shared storage))
+ Net[Network device]
+
+ Server1 <--> Storage
+ Server2 <--> Storage
+ Server1 <--> Net
+ Server2 <--> Net
+
+ Step1[1. Service load exceeds upper threshold] --> Step2[2. New VM is generated]
+ Step2 --> Step3[3. New VM takes part of the service load]
+```
+
+3. New VM takes part of the service load.
+
+1. Service load exceeds upper threshold
+
+2. New VM is generated
+
+VM1 VM2 VMM Server
+
+VM3 VM4 VMM Server
+
+Shared storage Network device
+
+Y.2320(15)\_FI.2
+
+Diagram illustrating the general procedure for scaling out. The diagram shows two servers, each with a VMM and two VMs (VM1, VM2 on the left; VM3, VM4 on the right). A shared storage unit and a network device are also shown. Arrows indicate data flow between the servers, storage, and network device. The process is described in three steps: 1. Service load exceeds upper threshold, 2. New VM is generated, and 3. New VM takes part of the service load.
+
+**Figure I.2 – General procedure for scaling out**
+
+1. The VM usage or the service load exceeds the pre-configured upper threshold.
+2. The VCN system detects that the threshold is reached and a new VM is generated in the VCN system. The new VM runs a piece of the network entity software.
+3. The new VM takes part of the service load.
+
+#### I.2.2 Scale in (automatic and on-demand)
+
+##### Description
+
+In a telecommunication network with virtualized control network entities, scale in means to remove existing VMs from one VCNE either automatically by the VCN system when the total VM usage or service load is below the pre-configured lower threshold for this control network entity, or on-demand when the operator expects a VM usage or service load decrease for this VCNE. The following scenario takes VM usage as example for the trigger.
+
+##### Pre-conditions
+
+The control network entity (i.e., P-CSC-FE) has been deployed in the VCN system. There are multiple VMs constructing the control network entity. Each VM runs a piece of software and increasing or decreasing the amount of VMs can increase or decrease the capacity of the network entity.
+
+##### Operational flows
+
+
+
+1. Service load is below lower threshold
+
+2. VCN system stops the traffic going to VM3
+
+3. VM3 is shut down or deleted
+
+VM1 VM2 VM3
+
+VMM VMM
+
+Server Server
+
+Shared storage Network device
+
+Y.2320(15)\_Fl.3
+
+Diagram illustrating the general procedure for scaling in. The diagram shows two servers, each with a VMM and VMs. VM1 and VM2 are on the left server, and VM3 is on the right server. VM3 is marked with a red 'X', indicating it is being shut down or deleted. Arrows show traffic flow from a network device to the servers and shared storage. The diagram is labeled with three steps: 1. Service load is below lower threshold, 2. VCN system stops the traffic going to VM3, and 3. VM3 is shut down or deleted.
+
+**Figure I.3 – General procedure for scaling in**
+
+1. The VM usage or the service load is below the pre-configured lower threshold.
+2. The VCN system detects the threshold is reached and it stops the traffic going to one of the VM (in this scenario, it is VM3).
+3. When no traffic is handled by VM3, VM3 is shut down or deleted.
+
+NOTE 1 – If there are no more VMs running on a given server, the server can be powered off by the VCN system.
+
+NOTE 2 – Scaling includes scaling up and down; enhancing or reducing the configuration (i.e., computing, storage, and bandwidth) of VMs. Scaling up and down is not frequently used in the VCN.
+
+### I.3 Self-healing
+
+NOTE – In this scenario, self-healing supports the service continuity when part of the computing, network, or storage devices stop.
+
+#### Description
+
+When VMs crash (the reason may come from the hardware, VMM or VM itself), the same VM can be re-constructed automatically and immediately. This feature can be used to ensure the high reliability of control network entities from the perspective of the VMs.
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+Pre-conditions are that the control network entity has been deployed in the VCN system; images of the control network entities (i.e., P-CSC-FE) are stored in a shared storage. There may be multiple VMs composing the control network entity. To ensure the reliability, the VCN system is designed in a way that if part of the VMs crash, it does not influence the service. For example:
+
+- Two VMs form a pair, where one VM is the acting one which is the processing service, and another one is standing by. When the acting one crashes, the one which is standing by will take over the work and become the acting one.
+- All the VMs form a pool, and they are all acting VMs. When part of the VMs crash, the running VMs will take over the work.
+
+
+
+3. the VCN system detects the VM failure
+
+1. The acting VM crashes
+
+2. The stand-by VM takes over the work
+
+4. A new VM1 is regenerated
+
+5. Optional session synchronization
+
+VM1, VM2, VMM, Server, Shared storage, Network device
+
+Y.2320(15)\_FI.4
+
+Diagram illustrating high reliability guaranteed by VM regeneration. The diagram shows three servers, each with a VMM and a VM. Server 1 has VM1 (crashed, marked with a red X). Server 2 has VM2 (stand-by). Server 3 has VM1 (regenerated). A shared storage and a network device are also shown. Arrows indicate data flow between the servers, shared storage, and network device. The process is numbered 1 to 5: 1. The acting VM crashes, 2. The stand-by VM takes over the work, 3. the VCN system detects the VM failure, 4. A new VM1 is regenerated, 5. Optional session synchronization.
+
+**Figure I.4 – High reliability guaranteed by VM regeneration**
+
+The following flow, as seen in Figure I.4, illustrates the first example:
+
+1. One of the acting VMs crashes.
+NOTE 1 – The crash may be caused by the failure of a physical server, VMM, or the VM itself.
+2. The crash is detected and the stand-by VM takes over the work, becoming the acting VM.
+NOTE 2 – Crash detection, and take over by the stand-by VM are both application-level issues.
+3. The VCN system also detects the failure of VM and regenerates the same VM immediately and automatically on another physical server.
+4. The new VM starts up and works as the stand-by VM.
+5. Optionally, if service continuity is required, the sessions running in VM2 and subsequent newly created sessions need to be synchronized to the stand-by VM.
+
+### I.4 Hardware change without interrupting the service
+
+#### Description
+
+When one physical server (i.e., server A) needs to be changed or upgraded, the VMs running on the server can be live-migrated to one or more other physical servers. In this scenario, using server B as an example, after all the VMs have been migrated to server B, server A can be changed or upgraded. The VMs are later be migrated back from server B to server A.
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+Pre-conditions are that one or more VMs of some control network entity are running on server A.
+
+#### Operational flows
+
+
+
+4. VM live migration from server B to server A
+
+2. VM live migration from server A to server B
+
+3. Server A is changed
+
+1. Server A needs to be changed
+
+VM
+
+VMM
+
+Server A
+
+Server B
+
+Shared storage
+
+Network device
+
+Y.2320(15)\_FI.5
+
+Diagram illustrating hardware change without interrupting the service. It shows two servers, Server A and Server B, each with a VM and a VMM. A shared storage and a network device are connected to both servers. The process involves: 1. Server A needs to be changed. 2. VM live migration from server A to server B. 3. Server A is changed. 4. VM live migration from server B to server A.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Hardware change without interrupting the service**
+
+1. Physical server A needs to be changed.
+2. The VMs running on server A are live-migrated to server B.
+NOTE – VM live migration requires that the image of the VM is stored in a shared storage which can be accessed from the original server and the destination server.
+3. Server A is changed.
+4. The VMs are migrated back from server B.
+
+### I.5 Change of VCN system
+
+#### Description
+
+When the VMs of some network elements running on one kind of VCN system need to be moved to another VCN system, the VMs should be able to run on the new VCN system.
+
+NOTE 1 – The VCN system includes the VMM and the management system of the VMM.
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+Pre-conditions are that the VMs of some network elements run on one kind of VCN system (i.e., VCN system 1).
+
+#### Operational flows
+
+
+
+1. VM needs to be moved to VCN system 2
+
+3. VM runs on virtualization VCN system 2
+
+2. VM is shut down, the images and descriptions are delivered to VCN system 2
+
+VM
+
+VMM1
+
+Server 1
+
+Management system 1
+
+VM
+
+VMM2
+
+Server 2
+
+Management system 2
+
+Y.2320(15)\_FI.6
+
+Diagram illustrating the change of VCN system. It shows two VCN systems, VCN system 1 and VCN system 2. VCN system 1 includes VM, VMM1, Server 1, and Management system 1. VCN system 2 includes VM, VMM2, Server 2, and Management system 2. The process involves: 1. VM needs to be moved to VCN system 2. 2. VM is shut down, the images and descriptions are delivered to VCN system 2. 3. VM runs on virtualization VCN system 2.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Change of VCN system**
+
+1. The VMs running on VCN system 1 need to be moved to VCN system 2.
+NOTE 2 –VCN system 1 is replaced by VCN system 2.
+2. The VMs should be shut down and the image and description of the VMs should be delivered to VCN system 2 by the management system 2.
+NOTE 3 – Normally, live migration cannot be implemented between different VCN systems.
+NOTE 4 – The description of a VM includes the information of the VM, such as the virtual hardware configuration and the VM image.
+3. The VMs run on VCN system 2.
+
+### I.6 Virtualized resource provision
+
+#### Description
+
+According to the service capacity requirements (i.e., supporting 1 million subscribers at 0.1 erl) and the configuration of the physical server (i.e., the computing speed of the central processing unit (CPU)), the VCN system can provide appropriate VM templates from which the user can choose. This mechanism can enhance the efficiency of the deployment of control network entities.
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+The pre-conditions are that the user needs to deploy a control network entity with certain capacity requirements (i.e., a serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE) which supports 1 million users at 0.1 erl) and that the VCN system has stored some different VM templates that can satisfy different capacity requirements.
+
+#### Operational flows
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant VCN as VCN system
+ User->>VCN: 1. Requires deploying a control network entity
+ VCN-->>User: 2. Offers one template or a combination of templates
+ Note over User: 3. Deploys the control network entity based on the provided template
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a User (represented by a person at a laptop) and a VCN system (represented by a box). The flow is as follows:
+
+
+- The User sends a request to the VCN system: "1. Requires deploying a control network entity".
+- The VCN system responds to the User: "2. Offers one template or a combination of templates".
+- The User performs the final action: "3. Deploys the control network entity based on the provided template".
+
+ The diagram is labeled Y.2320(15)\_FI.7 in the bottom right corner.
+
+Diagram illustrating the operational flow for virtualized resource provision between a User and a VCN system.
+
+**Figure I.7 – Virtualized resource provision**
+
+1. The user requires deploying a control network entity that should satisfy a given capacity.
+2. The VCN system offers the most appropriate VM template (or a combination of different VM templates) which is able to satisfy the capacity requirements.
+NOTE – If neither of the single VM templates can satisfy the required capacity, a combination of different VM templates may be provided.
+3. The user then deploys the control network entity based on the provided VM template.
+
+## **Appendix II**
+
+## **Considerations concerning the virtualization of NGN entities**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### **II.1 The virtualization technology provides benefits to the NGN**
+
+The NGN functional specifications have essentially focused on the NGN functional reference architecture, the capabilities of the different functional entities (FEs) and the reference points between those FEs.
+
+The implementation aspects of the NGN (i.e., the hardware or the operating system) are out of the scope of the NGN functional specifications. From an implementation perspective, it has to be noted that the hardware infrastructure of the NGN functionalities is actually experiencing constant changes, from compact peripheral component interconnect (CPCI) devices or UNIX servers, to general purpose servers, such as advanced telecommunication computing architecture (ATCA) servers, and virtualization technologies have been introduced more and more.
+
+The virtualization of network entities can bring various benefits, such as quick deployment, energy saving, hardware sharing, etc. In such a virtualization perspective, the NGN functional architecture needs to be enhanced, i.e., the way to manage and allocate virtual and physical resources needs to be designed, and the interactions between network entities and virtualization infrastructure need to be considered. Accordingly, the virtualization functions, including virtual infrastructure functions and management functions, become an integral part of NGN evolution.
+
+### **II.2 The implementation of virtualized NGN entities requires enhancements**
+
+Virtualization does not imply modification of the functions of the NGN entities which are virtualized, such as session control of voice calls or mobility management. However, in order to support the capabilities provided by virtualization (i.e., adding or removing VMs in real-time), the software implementation of virtualized network entities requires adequate design enhancements. For example, the virtualized control network entities in a VCN system should support high availability, as well as enhanced load balancing and rebalancing capabilities (i.e., to adapt to VM changes, such as VM addition or removal for scaling).
+
+### **II.3 Virtualized NGN control network entities will co-exist with non-virtualized NGN entities**
+
+Virtualized NGN control network entities won't replace the non-virtualized NGN entities when they are deployed. In most cases, the VCN systems will work in hybrid networks composed of both non-virtualized entities and virtualized entities, and the VCN systems will have to comply with the architecture and interfaces of non-virtualized infrastructure.
+
+### **II.4 The virtualization of NGN entities starts from the control network entities**
+
+The VCN is the starting point for the support of virtualization capabilities in NGN evolution. It is commonly understood that good performance in network environments with VCNs can be achieved.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ETSI GS NFV 001] ETSI GS NFV 001 V1.1.1 (Oct. 2013), *Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Use Cases*.
+- [b-ETSI GS NFV 003] ETSI GS NFV 003 V1.2.1 (Dec. 2014), *Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Terminology for Main Concepts in NFV*.
+- [b-ETSI GS NFV 004] ETSI GS NFV 004 V.1.1.1 (Oct. 2013), *Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Virtualisation Requirements*.
+- [b-ETSI GS NFV-MAN 001] ETSI GS NFV-MAN 001 V1.1.1 (Dec. 2014), *Network Functions Virtualisation (NFV); Management and Orchestration*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2342
+
+(12/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+# --- **Scenarios and capability requirements of blockchain in next generation network evolution**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2342
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'.
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+
+## **Enhancements to NGN** **Y.2300–Y.2399**
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+Y.3000–Y.3499
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2342
+
+# Scenarios and capability requirements of blockchain in next generation network evolution
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2342 presents an analysis of the motivations and scenarios of blockchain used in the next generation network evolution (NGNe). The general high-level requirements of blockchain in NGNe are put forward. Detailed descriptions of the use cases are listed in the appendix. This Recommendation provides the framework of the blockchain for NGNe and specifies the capability requirements that meet the needs of next generation network (NGN) and the blockchain framework. The framework provided in this Recommendation is intended for NGNe as defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2340, however, it could be applied as appropriate to other types of telecom networks (e.g., IMT-2020 and Future Network).
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2342 | 2019-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14128 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Blockchain, consensus, decentralization, general framework, ledger, network evolution, next generation, smart contract.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2020
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|----------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Introduction of NGNe-BC ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.1 Background and motivations ..... | 3 |
+| | 6.2 NGNe-BC overview ..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Scenarios and requirements of NGNe-BC..... | 5 |
+| | 7.1 Scenario description ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.2 General high-level requirements of NGNe-BC ..... | 6 |
+| | 7.3 General requirements of NGNe..... | 8 |
+| 8 | General framework and capability requirements of NGNe-BC ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.1 General framework of NGNe-BC ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.2 NGNe-BC application layer capability requirements..... | 9 |
+| | 8.3 NGNe-BC platform layer capability requirements..... | 9 |
+| | 8.4 NGNe-BC network layer capability requirements ..... | 11 |
+| | 8.5 NGNe-BC infrastructure layer capability requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.6 NGNe-BC management capability requirements..... | 11 |
+| | 8.7 NGNe-BC Cross layer capability requirements ..... | 13 |
+| 9 | Security consideration ..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix I – Use Cases of NGNe-BC..... | 15 |
+| | I.1 NGNe-BC use case of international roaming..... | 15 |
+| | I.2 NGNe-BC use case of mobile number portability ..... | 16 |
+| | I.3 NGNe-BC use case of data sharing..... | 18 |
+| | I.4 NGNe-BC use case of network elements management..... | 20 |
+| | I.5 NGNe-BC use case of MSISDN as a service ..... | 22 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2342
+
+# Scenarios and capability requirements of blockchain in next generation network evolution
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the framework of the blockchain for next generation network evolution (NGNe) and specifies the capability requirements that meet the needs of next generation network (NGN) and the blockchain framework. This Recommendation covers the following aspects:
+
+- Motivations and scenarios of the blockchain in the next generation network evolution (NGNe).
+- High-level requirements of the blockchain in the NGNe based on the scenarios.
+- General framework and capability requirements of the blockchain in the NGNe.
+
+This Recommendation also provides an appendix describing:
+
+- Use cases of blockchain in the NGNe.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2340] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2340 (2016), *Next generation network evolution phase 1 – Overview*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 Next Generation Network (NGN)** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network which is able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.2 block** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: Individual data unit of a blockchain, composed of a collection of transactions and a block header.
+
+NOTE – A block may be immutable and may be considered as the digital entity described in clause 3.2.2 in [b-ITU-T X.1255], however, it can be applied to other networks or other computational facilities.
+
+**3.1.3 blockchain** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: A type of distributed ledger which is composed of digitally recorded data arranged as a successively growing chain of blocks with each block cryptographically linked and hardened against tampering and revision.
+
+**3.1.4 consensus** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: Agreement that a set of transactions is valid.
+
+**3.1.5 consensus mechanism** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: Rules and procedures by which consensus is reached.
+
+**3.1.6 distributed ledger** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: A type of ledger that is shared, replicated, and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner.
+
+**3.1.7 participant** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: An actor who can access the ledger: read records or add records to.
+
+**3.1.8 smart contract** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: Program written on the distributed ledger system which encodes the rules for specific types of distributed ledger system transactions in a way that can be validated, and triggered by specific conditions.
+
+**3.1.9 transaction** [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1]: Whole of the exchange of information between nodes. A transaction is uniquely identified by a transaction identifier.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|---------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| BC | Blockchain |
+| CA | Certificate Authority |
+| CDR | Call Detail Record |
+| DCH | Data Clearing Houses |
+| DDoS | Distributed Denial-of-Service |
+| DLT | Distributed Ledger Technology |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| HPMN | Home Public Mobile Network |
+| KYC | Know Your Customer |
+| MNO | Mobile Network Operator |
+| MNP | Mobile Number Portability |
+| MSISDN | Mobile Subscriber International ISDN Number |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NGNe | Next Generation Network Evolution |
+| NGNe-BC | NGNe-Blockchain |
+| OTT | Over The Top |
+| P2P | Peer to Peer |
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------|
+| PBFT | Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance |
+| PoS | Proof of Stake |
+| PoW | Proof of Work |
+| SIM | Subscriber Identification Module |
+| SMS | Short Message Service |
+| TAP | Transferred Account Procedures |
+| TEE | Trust Execution Environment |
+| VPMN | Visited Public Mobile Network |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+In the body of this document and its annexes, the words shall, shall not, should, and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted respectively as, is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 Introduction of NGNe-blockchain (NGNe-BC)
+
+## 6.1 Background and motivations
+
+Next generation network (NGN) [ITU-T Y.2012] is a packet-based network which is able to provide telecommunication services with decoupled service-related functions and underlying transport-related technologies. The NGN is naturally distributed both nationwide and worldwide. Equality and interconnection are the essential attributes between and even within the NGNs. However, due to the distrust between the NGN operators, centralized intermediary functions are deployed, such as the clearing houses for the international roaming mobile number portability database among the NGN operators and even the root domain name system (DNS) for interconnection and roaming. The centralized intermediary functions on one hand bring additional costs, and on the other hand lead to security issues for superimposing centralized functions over the distributed networks. In addition, the NGN has abundant network data resources which could be shared to improve and innovate the applications for the industry, however, it is hard to create the application ecosystem due to the distrust between the NGN operators and the application developers when making use of the network data.
+
+NGN evolution (NGNe) [ITU-T Y.2340] is a non-stop long-term project. The motivation for NGN evolution is to provide the enhanced capabilities to suit the new demands from industry based on the NGN infrastructure. It is a good opportunity for NGN to evolve towards a distributed and trusted network with equal rights among each NGN operators. The NGNe is expected to be enhanced in the following three aspects: 1) collaborative relationship among the NGNe;
+
+2) collaborative relationship between the NGNs and the industry participants; 3) collaborative relationship between the NGNe and the applications. Blockchain is considered as the candidate technology.
+
+The blockchain leverages the block-chain structure to store transactions and data in a decentralized way, and uses cryptography to ensure the security of the transmission and access. The blockchain could achieve consistent data records, anti-tampering/non-repudiation and failure-resistance. With the blockchain, applications can operate in a decentralized manner, without the need for a central authority and a trusted intermediary. Moreover, smart contract, a piece of self-executing program which resides on the blockchain, could provide distributed and automated workflows. The blockchain is not a specific technology, but a collection of technologies, such as cryptography, peer to peer (P2P), distributed system, distributed storage, consensus mechanisms, and so on.
+
+
+
+Figure 1 – Blockchain overview. The diagram illustrates the blockchain architecture. The top part shows a peer-to-peer network of five nodes: Peer 1, Peer 2, Peer 3, Peer M, and Peer M+1. These nodes are interconnected in a mesh topology. A 'Smart contract' is shown as a blue square on Peer 3. Below the network is the 'Ledger', represented by a circle. The bottom part shows a sequence of three blocks: Block N+1, Block N, and Block N-1. Each block contains a 'Prev\_Hash' field, a list of transactions (e.g., Transaction z, Transaction z+1 in Block N+1; Transaction y, Transaction y+1 in Block N; Transaction x, Transaction x+1 in Block N-1), and an ellipsis indicating more transactions. Arrows show the flow from Block N+1 to Block N to Block N-1, with an additional arrow pointing into Block N+1 from the left and out of Block N-1 to the right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Blockchain overview**
+
+As illustrated in Figure 1, the blockchain mainly comprises the blockchain ledger, the blockchain network and smart contract mechanism. The blockchain ledger is a chain of blocks which record the transactions (or data record entries). The block is the smallest storage unit, which is generated by the peer node after collecting and sequencing new transactions. To guarantee the immutability, usually the transactions are organized in the form of a Merkle hash tree and the root hash is included in each block head domain. Before adding a block to the blockchain ledger, a consensus process is needed among the peer nodes, such as proof of work (PoW), proof of stake (PoS) or practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT), etc. The blockchain network is a P2P network, which interconnects all peer nodes in a mesh network. The peer nodes broadcast and synchronize the transactions and blocks to achieve a consensus of the blockchain ledger. The smart contract mechanism provides the program to operate the data of the ledger and the execution environment for the program. The smart contracts can enable decentralized applications and services based on the data from the blockchain ledger.
+
+## 6.2 NGNe-BC overview
+
+NGNe-blockchain (NGNe-BC) is a specific blockchain which is utilized in NGNe, satisfying the specific requirements derived from the NGNe scenarios, such as reliability, privacy protection, supervision, etc. NGNe-BC supports the features of NGN/NGNe and has enhancements taking advantage of the blockchain concept and technologies. NGNe-BC comprises three types as follows:
+
+- **Public NGNe-BC:** a NGNe-BC which allows any participants to access the ledger for reading/writing the data records, operating the smart contract and carrying out the consensus.
+- **Consortium NGNe-BC:** a NGNe-BC which only allows the approved participants to access the ledger for reading/writing the data records, operating the smart contracts and carrying out the consensus.
+
+NOTE 1 – The consortium NGNe-BC protects the data privacy of the participants depending on the policies.
+
+NOTE 2 – The consortium NGNe-BC may restrict the privileges of the participants to read/write the ledger data, and operate the smart contracts.
+
+- **Private NGNe-BC:** a NGNe-BC which only allows the approved participants in the same NGNe to access the ledger for reading/writing the data records, operating the smart contracts and optionally carrying out the consensus.
+
+The NGNe-BC is complementary to NGNe by providing the decentralized application capability. Figure 2 shows the relationship between the NGN and the NGNe-BC. The applications and services based on NGNe-BC may have impacts on different function domains of NGN, as shown in Figure 2 the shading of the colour represents the degree of influence in general terms, e.g., the dark colour means deep influence. Appendix I provides typical use cases of NGNe-BC.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the NGN architecture and the influence of NGNe-BC on its components. The architecture is divided into two main sections: Management functions and Service/Transport stratum. The Management functions section includes IdM functions and End-user functions. The Service/Transport stratum section includes the Service stratum and Transport stratum. The diagram also shows Functions from other service providers and Functions from other network. The shading of the components indicates the degree of influence: Deep influence (dark orange), Medium influence (medium orange), and Slight influence (light orange).
+
+| Component | Influence Level |
+|----------------------------------------|------------------|
+| Management functions | Deep influence |
+| IdM functions | Medium influence |
+| End-user functions | Medium influence |
+| Service stratum | Deep influence |
+| Transport stratum | Slight influence |
+| Functions from other service providers | Medium influence |
+| Functions from other network | Medium influence |
+
+Legend:
+
+- Deep influence (Dark orange)
+- Medium influence (Medium orange)
+- Slight influence (Light orange)
+
+Y.2342(19)\_F02
+
+Diagram of NGN architecture showing the relationship between NGNe-BC and NGN components. The diagram is titled 'NGN architecture' and shows a grid of components. A legend at the bottom indicates three levels of influence: Deep influence (dark orange), Medium influence (medium orange), and Slight influence (light orange).
+
+Figure 2 – Relationship of NGNe-BC with the NGN
+
+# 7 Scenarios and requirements of NGNe-BC
+
+## 7.1 Scenario description
+
+The NGNe-BC could be adopted in coupled applications and services in NGNe. These applications and services could be assigned to different areas, thus it is necessary to categorize the scenarios to summarize the requirements. Considering the NGNe-BC feature of enabling trust in a trustless environment, the scenarios are divided into four categories, i.e., within the NGNe, between NGNs,
+
+between NGNe and customers and between NGNe and other networks, based on the relationship between the NGNe-BC participants.
+
+### **7.1.1 Within the NGNe**
+
+In this scenario, the applications and services based on the NGNe-BC are mainly used for self enhancement and optimization of NGNe. Hence, the participants of the NGNe-BC are the entities within the NGNe, e.g., network entities or administration entities. The NGNe-BC could be a consortium NGNe-BC or private NGNe-BC since the participants needed to be approved to access the ledger.
+
+Appendix I.4 is an example of this type of scenario. Appendix I.3 also could be an example of this type of scenario if the participants are all entities in the NGNe.
+
+### **7.1.2 Between NGNs**
+
+Currently there are interoperability requirements between multiple NGNs. Taking the roaming and interconnection as an example, usually it is time costly to negotiate and to archive an agreement between the NGNs, and financially costly to settle up through a clearing house. The NGNe-BC is promising to develop the decentralized applications and services between NGNs both nationwide and globally to enhance the current systems.
+
+Furthermore, the NGNs naturally have the alliance attribute. This is because combined NGNs could serve more customers, which would generate new innovative services leveraging the NGNe-BC.
+
+The NGNe-BC would be a consortium NGNe-BC in this scenario where all participants are equal and permissioned. For efficient coordination, there is optionally a management union coexisting with and independent of the consortium NGNe-BC.
+
+Appendices I.1 and I.2 are examples of this type of scenario.
+
+### **7.1.3 Between NGNe and customers**
+
+The NGNe-BC could serve as an application infrastructure between NGNe and customers for sharing data and resources. For example, the customers could share the storage, bandwidth and even computing resources, thus the NGNe could distribute the applications, such as the video content, to the edge of the network to reduce the burden on the backbone network and having to settle and clear in close to real-time. Moreover, the customers not only refer to the personal customers but also the enterprise customers. The enterprise customers could share data with NGNe, e.g., the status information of NB-IoT smart parking lot, on the NGNe-BC infrastructure to incubate new business.
+
+In this scenario, the NGNe-BC could be a consortium NGNe-BC or a public NGNe-BC since the number of the participants joined in the NGNe-BC may be large.
+
+### **7.1.4 Between NGNe and other networks**
+
+Usually there is a data sharing demand between an NGNe and other networks, e.g., regulator/government networks, service provider networks and enterprise networks, etc. However, the data sharing demand is hindered by the lack of trust between the NGNe and other networks.
+
+The data could be shared unidirectionally by the NGNe, such as the data for lawful interception to the regulator or the authentication data to the service provider as described in Appendix I.5. The data such as the security vulnerability information could also be shared between the NGNe and other networks.
+
+In addition, the NGNe-BC could be used for data and record traceability when the NGNe and the other networks do not trust each other.
+
+In this scenario, the NGNe-BC would be mainly a consortium NGNe-BC.
+
+## **7.2 General high-level requirements of NGNe-BC**
+
+The general high-level requirements of NGNe-BC are put forward to satisfy the basic service implementing, operation and maintenance.
+
+### **7.2.1 Account and membership management**
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to support the account and membership management. The account management is responsible for recording the active status of the participants, and if applicable the ownership status. The membership management provides the functions of the member identification, access control, authorization and authentication management, etc.
+
+The account and membership management requirement is not only applicable for the consortium and private NGNe-BC but also for the public NGNe-BC for the operation and maintenance.
+
+### **7.2.2 Scalability**
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to provide sufficient scalability.
+
+In NGNe-BC, the NGNe-BC node is an entity to execute all or part of the NGNe-BC function. However, the function granularity of the NGNe-BC node depends on the implementation. The NGNe-BC node can join in and quit the NGNe-BC without degrading the read-write throughput and impacting the other NGNe-BC nodes. Moreover, the consensus mechanism in the NGNe-BC is pluggable, and the NGNe-BC nodes can be separated into different clusters using different consensus mechanisms.
+
+### **7.2.3 Maintenance management**
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to provide maintenance management capabilities to guarantee long-term stable operation of the services running over the NGNe-BC.
+
+- NGNe-BC node management
+The NGNe-BC node management is required to have a global view of the NGNe-BC, such as the node number, node type, block generation status of the nodes, active status, node topology, etc.
+Optionally, the NGNe-BC node management could be a centralized system coexisting with the NGNe-BC in parallel.
+- Configuration management
+The configuration management is required to provide the initial default and updated configuration information and parameters to the NGNe-BC nodes, such as the software version, the ledger setting, consensus module selection, and so on.
+- Monitoring and alarm
+The NGNe-BC is required to provide monitoring and alarm capabilities. The NGNe-BC could keep monitoring the node status, the broadcasted messages status, the block generation status, the throughput performance and other parameters. When a predefined abnormal situation occurs, the NGNe-BC could receive the alarm information.
+- Block information query
+The NGNe-BC is required to have the capabilities to query the block and transaction information, and to generate statistical results which could be used for the system operation.
+
+### **7.2.4 Auditability**
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to support data auditability to fulfil the regulation requirements. The NGNe-BC could provide the data operation record and log access in the condition of meeting the regulatory compliance.
+
+### 7.2.5 Failure and disaster recovery
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to have a failure and disaster recovery mechanism.
+
+It is necessary for the NGNe-BC to provide the disaster recovery system to guarantee uninterrupted service, e.g., the automatic recovery of the smart contract and the redundant backup of the data stored locality.
+
+It is also necessary for the NGNe-BC to resist risk caused by fault configuration and operation. The NGNe-BC is required to discover the abnormal behaviour node and recover in a timely fashion.
+
+### 7.2.6 Data privacy
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to provide a data privacy protection mechanism. The protection methods may be various and in different dimensions, e.g., isolating the NGNe-BC nodes and establishing multiple message broadcast channels for different services, data encryption between the participants.
+
+### 7.2.7 NGNe-BC smart contract management
+
+The NGNe-BC is required to provide smart contract management. In NGNe-BC, the NGNe-BC smart contract is a piece of program code which is recorded on NGNe-BC and can be self-executing based on the data of NGNe-BC ledger. The NGNe-BC applications are able to trigger the execution of NGNe-BC smart contracts. In this case, the NGNe-BC smart contract is a data reading/writing interface between the NGNe-BC applications and the ledger.
+
+It is necessary for the NGNe-BC smart contract to be identified, which includes the owner, version, function, the updated history, etc. To recover the service quickly from a failure, the NGNe-BC could maintain a smart contract depository.
+
+## 7.3 General requirements of NGNe
+
+Since the applications and services based on the NGNe-BC are derived from NGNe scenarios, the NGNe is taken as part of applications.
+
+The NGNe is required to provide a capability to read/write the application related data entries from/to the NGNe-BC ledger.
+
+The NGNe is required to provide a capability to invoke/enable/update/disable the smart contracts according to the application function requirements.
+
+The NGNe is required to provide a capability to integrate the NGNe-BC smart contracts to the workflow existed for backward compatibility.
+
+The NGNe is required to provide normalized data format for the transactions recorded in the ledger.
+
+# 8 General framework and capability requirements of NGNe-BC
+
+## 8.1 General framework of NGNe-BC
+
+
+
+| | | |
+|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
+| NGNe-BC management capability | NGNe-BC application layer capability | NGNe-BC cross layer capability |
+| | NGNe-BC platform layer capability | |
+| | NGNe-BC network layer capability | |
+| | NGNe-BC infrastructure layer capability | |
+
+Diagram showing the framework of NGNe-BC. It consists of three main components: NGNe-BC management capability, NGNe-BC application layer capability, and NGNe-BC cross layer capability. The application layer capability is further divided into four sub-layers: platform layer, network layer, and infrastructure layer.
+
+Y.2342(19)\_F03
+
+**Figure 3 – Framework of NGNe-BC**
+
+The general framework of NGNe-BC includes six capability sets, which are the infrastructure layer capability, network layer capability, platform layer capability, application layer capability, NGNe-BC management capability and cross layer capability as shown in Figure 3.
+
+- NGNe-BC infrastructure layer capability: the NGNe-BC infrastructure layer capability provides the resource required to deploy the NGNe-BC nodes. The resource includes the computation, storage and network.
+- NGNe-BC network layer capability: the NGNe-BC network layer capability is responsible for the peer to peer communication which is used for ledger synchronization. In addition, the interaction between the NGNe-BC nodes, e.g., the ledger node and the smart contract execution node, relies on the network layer function.
+- NGNe-BC platform layer capability: the NGNe-BC platform layer capability provides the basic functions of blockchain including the ledger, consensus mechanism, membership and smart contract. Furthermore, the platform layer provides the uniform interface to the application layer by encapsulating the call of reading/writing the ledger and initializing/invoking the smart contract.
+- NGNe-BC application layer capability: the NGNe-BC application layer capability provides the applications and services derived from the NGNe.
+- NGNe-BC management capability: the NGNe-BC management capability includes the management capabilities to operate the NGNe-BC and the applications established on the NGNe-BC.
+- NGNe-BC cross layer capability: the NGNe-BC cross layer capability aims to implement the functions that need the cooperation of multiple layers.
+
+## **8.2 NGNe-BC application layer capability requirements**
+
+The NGNe-BC application layer capability provides specific services running over the NGNe-BC to the users, such as mobile number portability (MNP), the roaming settlement, etc. The services may make use of the NGNe-BC partially or adopt the NGNe-BC completely to establish the application architecture. The application layer is the source to read/write data from/to the NGNe-BC, and also the drive to carry out incentive if applicable. Generally, the application layer implements the service logic and completes the data processing.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for defining the data format stored in the NGNe-BC.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for coordinating the processing of the data stored in the NGNe-BC and other centralized database in the same service architecture.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for managing the secret key and encryption algorithm to guarantee the data privacy.
+
+It is required to provide the UI or wallet between the user and the NGNe-BC ledger, including account operation, authentication, asset operation and personal privacy data granted if applicable.
+
+## **8.3 NGNe-BC platform layer capability requirements**
+
+The NGNe-BC platform layer capability is the core in the NGNe-BC framework as it provides the basic service features and execution environment. There are multi-dimensional capabilities the platform layer provides such as the application programming interface (API) capability, membership capability, ledger capability, consensus capability and smart contract capability, etc.
+
+- API capability
+
+The API capability is the interface between the service and the NGNe-BC, which is the only method for the application layer accessing and managing the data in the ledger and the smart contracts.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for an encapsulated interface to the application layer for reading and writing the data from/to the ledger.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for an encapsulated interface to the application layer for deploying, initializing, invoking and updating the smart contracts.
+
+### - Membership capability
+
+The membership capability is responsible for the access control and authorization management of the NGNe-BC participants.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to grant and examine the authorization of the participant to read and write the ledger and query the account information.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to grant and examine the authorization of the participant to deploy, initialize, invoke and update the smart contracts.
+
+It is recommended to provide a capability to store the encryption/decryption key and execute an encryption/decryption algorithm to protect the data privacy.
+
+### - Ledger capability
+
+The ledger capability is mainly used for the data and transactions/records storage and validation.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to store the data and transactions/records in a blockchain structure to guarantee the integrity and time sequence.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to guarantee the data and transactions/records in a block are appropriately organized, e.g., the Merkle tree, to resist the tampering.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to validate the data stored in the ledger rapidly.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to query and locate a specific transaction/record from the ledger rapidly.
+
+### - Consensus capability
+
+The consensus capability implements the consensus mechanisms to guarantee the consistency of the ledger data stored in different NGNe-BC nodes.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which is energy efficient to reduce the energy consumption.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which could synchronize and validate the data or transactions/records and reach the consensus status rapidly in order to obtain a high performance.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which is scalable for adding or reducing the consensus nodes without decreasing the system performance.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which could maintain the system stability and correctness when the number of the malfunctioning or malicious nodes is less than a predefined proportion value.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which could resist Sybil and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which implements pluggable consensus algorithms.
+
+It is required to provide a consensus capability which could assign different consensus methods for different NGNe-BC network and NGNe-BC nodes.
+
+### - Smart contract capability
+
+The smart contract capability implements the smart contract execution environment and smart contract management.
+
+It is required to provide the execution environment which includes the computing resource, storage, I/O and network resource for the smart contracts. If applicable, the execution environment of the smart contracts is recommended to be the trust execution environment (TEE) to protect the sensitive data of the ledger.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage the deployment, termination and update of the smart contracts.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to check the execution status of the smart contracts.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to allow the smart contracts accessing to the ledger to obtain the data or update the data in the ledger according to the execution results of the smart contracts.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to deliver the event notification generated by the smart contracts to the application layer.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to suspend the smart contracts execution to resist resource occupation attacks.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to detect and find the vulnerabilities of the smart contracts.
+
+### - Interoperation capability
+
+The interoperation capability allows the NGNe-BC to obtain the necessary data from the source out of the ledger, e.g., leveraging the second layer protocols or oracle.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to interact with other blockchains and the off-chain data source.
+
+## **8.4 NGNe-BC network layer capability requirements**
+
+The NGNe-BC network layer capability implements the communications between the NGNe-BC nodes, mainly focusing on the network reachability and the message broadcast.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to build a P2P network for equal message dissemination among the NGNe-BC nodes.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to discover the NGNe-BC nodes automatically in a neighbourhood without the pre-configuration.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to maintain the system stability in case the NGNe-BC nodes are in and out frequently.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to evaluate the feasibility of providing a NGNe-BC node based on the consideration of not impacting other NGNe-BC nodes.
+
+## **8.5 NGNe-BC infrastructure layer capability requirements**
+
+The infrastructure layer capability is required to provide the computing/storage/networking resource for the NGNe-BC nodes. The computing/storage/networking resource could be physical or virtualized.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to recover from disaster and hardware/software malfunctions rapidly by triggering automated healing.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to be able to evaluate automated optimization results of the computing/storage/networking resource for the NGNe-BC nodes.
+
+It is recommended to provide specific capabilities which could accelerate the services deployment, such as database and encryption/decryption.
+
+## 8.6 NGNe-BC management capability requirements
+
+The management capability in the NGNe-BC framework includes multiple capabilities which help to maintain and monitor the operation of the NGNe-BC. The management capabilities could be deployed centralized or together with the NGNe-BC nodes. The management capabilities include the blockchain information inquiry capability, the topology view capability, the configuration management capability, the monitoring and alarm capability, the account management capability, the CA management capability, the IaaS resource management capability, which are important for the applications based on the NGNe-BC to guarantee the steady running and timely troubleshooting.
+
+### - Blockchain information inquiry capability
+
+The blockchain information inquiry capability is the interface for the operators of NGNe-BC services to view the status of the NGNe-BC.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to view all of the blocks and transaction information.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to search for and return the exact blocks and transactions based on keywords and the combination of the keywords.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to present or deliver the inquiry results to the operators.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to view all of the smart contract information.
+
+### - Topology view capability
+
+The topology view capability provides the NGNe-BC nodes topology and status view.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to collect the online/offline status of the NGNe-BC nodes and present the overall status view.
+
+It is recommended to provide a capability to generate a topology view of the NGNe-BC nodes based on the NGNe-BC node identities.
+
+### - Configuration management capability
+
+The configuration management capability provides the configuration function for the NGNe-BC node.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for manually configuring the NGNe-BC node, such as the network configuration, the consensus algorithm selection, the node identity and authorization and access configuration, etc.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for automatically configuring the NGNe-BC node, such as downloading and enabling the configuration profiles from a centralized node management entity.
+
+### - Monitoring and alarm capability
+
+The monitoring and alarm capability enables the operator and maintenance engineer of the NGNe-BC services to keep tracking the operating status of the system.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to monitor the NGNe-BC node operating status, such as the resource occupation status, the network connection status, etc.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to monitor the NGN-BC operating status, such as the generation rate of the block, the generation rate of the transaction, the message broadcasted status and so forth.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to monitor the service related operating status based on the NGN-BC, such as the reading/writing status from/to the ledger, the deployment status of the smart contract.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for an alarm based on monitoring depending on a predefined threshold.
+
+### - Account management capability
+
+The account management capability provides the account related management for the services based NGNe-BC. The account management module could be divided between the centralized part and the node accompanied part.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to create a new account and retrieve the account when the password/private key is lost for the participant.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage the account related parameters, such as the basic participant information, the access permission, the secret key for the data privacy protection and access permission, the smart contract updated record, the digital asset if applicable and so on.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to apply the Certificate Authority (CA) and update the access permission to inquire after some specific transaction data.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to allow deployment of the smart contract.
+
+### - CA management capability
+
+The CA management capability is responsible for the CA issue in the NGNe-BC. The CA management module could be logically deployed in a centralized way.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to issue the CA to the NGNe-BC nodes to access the NGNe-BC.
+
+### - IaaS resource management capability
+
+The IaaS resource management capability is required to provide a capability to allocate computing/storage/network resources according to demand to the NGNe-BC node.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to monitor the resource usage of the NGNe-BC node.
+
+## **8.7 NGNe-BC Cross layer capability requirements**
+
+The NGNe-BC cross layer capability is used to implement specific functions which need the cooperation of multiple layers in the NGNe-BC framework. The cross layer capability could include the privacy protection capability, the regulation capability, the policy capability and the big data/AI capability, etc.
+
+### - Privacy protection capability
+
+It is necessary to protect the privacy of the NGNe-BC participants to avoid exposing the sensitive data.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to allow the sensitive data to be read only by the participants authorized.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to broadcast the messages including the sensitive data among specific participants.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to leverage efficient security algorithms such as ring signature and zero knowledge proof to avoid the privacy data exposure.
+
+### - Regulation capability
+
+It is necessary to fulfil the audit requirements from the organizations and government.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to collect and deliver the operation logs, ledger data, smart contract logs and other information required according to the audit requirements.
+
+### - Policy capability
+
+The policy capability is utilized by the NGNe-BC to implement the intervention to the transaction and the smart contract execution.
+
+The policy module is required to provide a capability to mark the data storage in the NGNe-BC ledger for intervention according to the policies and regulations.
+
+- Big data/AI capability
+
+It is recommended to provide a capability to analyse the operation and maintenance data to optimize the performance of the NGNe-BC.
+
+# **9 Security consideration**
+
+This Recommendation is considered as an enhancement of NGNe, thus it supports the security features for NGN and follows the security considerations identified in [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2340]. In addition, since the NGNe-BC could be underlying technology for lot of applications, it is necessary for the NGNe-BC to meet the security requirements of the specific applications.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases of NGNe-BC
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+## I.1 NGNe-BC use case of international roaming
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | NGNe-BC use case of international mobile roaming |
+| Description | International mobile roaming is a service that allows mobile users to continue to use their mobile phone for voice, data and message services, while visiting another country. Traditionally, international mobile roaming needs to be negotiated by participating operators with an agreement to use data clearing houses (DCH) for accounting and billing purposes. There are some disadvantages of using DCH in practice:
- 1) Both home public mobile networks (HPMNs) and visited public mobile networks (VPMNs) have to pay hefty fees to DCH as the central authority to execute the contract for roaming services.
- 2) Roaming rated call detail records (CDRs) are exchanged in terms of transferred account procedures (TAP) files in offline mode which leads to delays in billing and hence revenue sharing among the roaming partners.
- 3) The dispute resolution processes are long because it is also executed offline by the DCH by validating the CDRs and contracts of both the partners.
However, the consortium NGNe-BC could be implemented between every pair of operators which have a roaming agreement. HPMN and VPMN could have an instantaneous settlement using blockchain-based smart contracts which take away the offline billing information exchange between roaming partners through DCH, resulting in great cost savings.
|
+| Chain's type | Consortium NGNe-BC, which includes operators' accounting and billing nodes. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | Participating operators' international mobile roaming CDR nodes have already joined the NGNe-BC. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | Image: Diagram illustrating the NGNe-BC use case of international roaming. It shows two Mobile Network Operators (MNO A and MNO B) interacting via NGNe-BC nodes. CDR generators feed into these nodes, which then interact with smart contracts. The diagram includes a legend: CDR generator (purple square), NGNe-BC node (pink circle), and Smart contract (blue triangle).
The diagram illustrates the NGNe-BC use case of international roaming. It shows two Mobile Network Operators (MNO A and MNO B) interacting via NGNe-BC nodes. CDR generators feed into these nodes, which then interact with smart contracts. The diagram includes a legend: CDR generator (purple square), NGNe-BC node (pink circle), and Smart contract (blue triangle).
Y.2342(19)_FI.Tab1
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Operational flows:
When the mobile subscriber roaming in a visited network uses the mobile services, it triggers the CDR Generator to generate CDR.
The CDR Generator broadcasts the CDR information as a transaction to the NGNe-BC node in its home realm, and triggers the execution of the smart contracts.
The smart contract verifies the CDR (e.g., the data format), and appends this CDR to the NGNe-BC ledger. Then the CDR is also synchronized to other NGNe-BC ledger nodes through the consensus procedure. The smart contract could have more functions such as real-time settlement and payment, and validation of usage in VPMN.
|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for NGNe:
It is required that the NGNe provides the capability to identify international mobile roaming events, and send the CDR to the NGNe-BC ledger node.
It is required that the NGNe provides normalized data format for the transactions recorded in the ledger.
Requirements for NGNe-BC:
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the smart contracts to implement the settlement.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the ledger to record the bills of the roaming.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent bill records.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
|
+
+### I.2 NGNe-BC use case of mobile number portability
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | NGNe-BC use case of mobile number portability |
+| Description | Mobile number portability (MNP) is an important service in NGNe, which enables users to keep their mobile telephone number when changing from one mobile network operator to another. It is necessary to build an intermediary database for the mobile operators to synchronize the status of mobile numbers provisioned by the MNP service to provide the correct service routing. The intermediary database has direct impact on the basic telecommunication services of the mobile operator:
- 1) The intermediary database has the risk of single point failure.
- 2) Serial verification procedure for leveraging intermediary database means there is a long period for provisioning the MNP service.
- 3) For the 3rd party service providers, such as the Internet APPs, real-time synchronization of the mobile number status is important, e.g., when using the short message service (SMS) verification code.
- 4) The intermediary database needs a new operation and maintenance entity independent of any of the mobile operators.
Therefore, the MNP needs a database which could be accessed by multiple participants and meet the real-time synchronization of the mobile number status.
|
+| Chain's type | Consortium NGNe-BC, which is built among multiple mobile operators supporting the MNP. The regulators and 3 rd party service providers could join the consortium NGNe-BC. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | - 1) The mobile network operators support the MNP service.
- 2) The regulator has the requirements to supervise the mobile number utilization.
- 3) The 3rd party service providers are sensitive to the reachability of the mobile subscribers via the mobile number.
|
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) | Image: Diagram of the NGNe-BC architecture for Mobile Number Portability (MNP). It shows four main entities in dashed circles: 'The third party service providers' (top left), 'Regulator' (top right), 'Mobile operator A' (bottom left), and 'Mobile operator B' (bottom right). 'The third party service providers' has an 'APP' connected to a red 'Ledger node'. 'Regulator' has a 'Supervision APP' connected to a blue 'Consensus/ledger node'. Both 'Mobile operator A' and 'Mobile operator B' have 'Service networks' connected to blue 'Consensus/ledger nodes', and two white 'MNP service provision nodes' each. All four central nodes (three blue, one red) are interconnected in a mesh. A legend defines: Blue circle = Consensus/ledger node; Red circle = Ledger node; White circle = MNP service provision node; Blue + White + Red circles = Blockchain network.
Y.2342(19)_FI.Tab2
Operational flows:
- 1) A subscriber of the mobile operator A applies to provision the MNP service to change mobile network operator A to mobile network operator B at the MNP service provision node.
- 2) The MNP service provision node provides necessary transaction parameters including the mobile number, the account status, source mobile operator ID, targeted mobile operator ID, etc., to the consensus/ledger node.
- 3) The consensus/ledger nodes verify the MNP service application, record the transaction, consent the block and add the block to the ledger.
- 4) The service networks of mobile network operator A/B make use of the records in the distributed ledgers to route the calls and messages correctly for the mobile numbers ported.
- 5) The regulator could supervise the transactions and ledger. For specific transactions, the regulator could participant in the consensus based on the policies previously defined.
- 6) The 3rd party service providers could access the ledger maintained locally and keep up with statuses of the mobile number porting in real time, as the distributed ledgers are updated nearly at the same time in a consortium NGNe-BC.
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for NGNe:
It is required that the NGNe provides the capability to record the MNP number and necessary transaction parameters to the NGNe-BC ledger.
Requirements for NGNe-BC:
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the ledger to record the MNP numbers.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent record.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the smart contracts to implement the MNP numbers reading/writing.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the access control and membership management.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides necessary privacy protection of the MNP data and regulation capability.
|
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+### I.3 NGNe-BC use case of data sharing
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | NGNe-BC use case of data sharing |
+| Description | There is plenty of high value data in the operator networks, such as the identity, location, bill, terminal and access status data, etc. On one hand the data could be used in network optimization and service experience improvement for both the operators and over the top (OTT) service providers; on the other hand, the data could be exchanged and monetized for supporting credit investigation, risk management, marketing, and innovative services of the 3rd party.
However, the data is scattered in different domains of the operator network, e.g., BSS, OSS, core network, access network, which leads to the data islands and makes it hard to aggregate the different dimensions data. The centralized data sharing platform is not only costly, but also has security risk on managing the costumer's data and tracing the data transactions. Most importantly, the data sharing should have tight control on the privacy and sensitive data, by avoiding to access to the raw data itself.
The NGNe-BC could be a potential solution to build the data sharing platform. The data sharing platform based NGNe-BC would be a decentralized, secure and multi-party participated data marketplace, where the data is aggregated, shared, exchanged and monetized in a distributed manner.
|
+| Chain's type | Consortium NGNe-BC, which includes the data providers, the data requesters and the regulators. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | 1) The data providers and the data requesters have got the certificates from the regulator, and access to the NGNe-BC.
2) The data provider registers the data for sharing on the NGNe-BC, which could include the data characteristic description, the data format, the data digest, and also smart contract address processing the data requests and the reference of the data stored off-chain optionally.
|
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+
+Figure and operational flows (optional)
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of a Data sharing platform. At the center is a purple-bordered box labeled "Data sharing platform". Inside this box, there are four nodes: two purple squares representing "Ledger nodes" and two red circles representing "Consensus nodes". The Ledger nodes are connected to the Consensus nodes, and the Consensus nodes are interconnected with each other. A dashed oval encircles the Consensus nodes, with labels "Ledger Contract Membership" and "Consensus Membership" pointing to it. Outside the platform box, there are four entities: "Data provider" (top left and top right), "Data requestor" (bottom left), and "Regulator" (bottom right). Each entity is connected to a corresponding Ledger node within the platform. The "Data provider" entities are associated with a "Data for sharing" box. The "Data requestor" is associated with an "Application" box. The "Regulator" is associated with a "Regulator" box. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: a purple square for "Ledger node", a red circle for "Consensus node", and a blue triangle for "Smart contract".
+
+Diagram of the Data sharing platform architecture and operational flows.
+
+Y.2342(19)\_FI.Tab3
+
+#### Operational flows:
+
+- 1) The data requestor inputs the keywords on the web client which connects to the ledger nodes to search the sharing data information, which could include the data characteristic description, the data format, the data digest, smart contract address, price, etc. The data requestor selects the data to purchase.
+- 2) The data requestor accesses the smart contract deployed by the data provider for processing the shared data and applies for the data.
+- 3) Depending on the data type, the smart contract may have different actions:
+ - i) For the static data without privacy and sensitive information, the smart contract may return the data reference directly;
+ - ii) For the static data with privacy and sensitive information, the smart contract only returns an analysis result but not the raw data, in this case, the data requestor need deploy a smart contract to execute the analysis;
+ - iii) For the dynamic data, the smart contract only returns an analysis result but not the raw data, in this case, the data requestor need deploy a smart contract to execute the analysis.
+- 4) The smart contract returns the data or the analysis result, and completes the payment. The transaction is recorded in the NGNe-BC for auditability and traceability. The data sharing process completes.
+- 5) For example, the finance company who provides loans online could be the potential data requestors. While the NGNe operators could be the data providers. The finance company raises the requests to the NGNe operators to evaluate the credit conditions of its customers based on the bills data of the subscribers leveraging specific analysis algorithms. The finance company pays for the data exchange to the NGNe operators.
+
+The data for sharing may be stored on-chain or off-chain depending on the data property and policies. The NGNe-BC provides the execution environment and computing resource for the smart contracts which could contain complex logic.
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for NGNe:
It is required that the NGNe provides the capability to collect the data for sharing and record the data to the NGNe-BC ledger.
Requirements for NGNe-BC:
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the ledger to record the data for exchange.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent record.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the smart contracts to implement the data entries reading/writing, and transaction billing if applicable.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the access control and membership management.
|
+|----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+
+### I.4 NGNe-BC use case of network elements management
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | NGNe-BC use case of network elements management |
+| Description | In NGNe there are thousands of items of network equipment supplied by hundreds of manufacturers and retailers. As an important asset, it is necessary for the operators to manage the network equipment effectively and clearly.
It is necessary to keep consistency between the operators and the manufacturers on the records of the purchased network equipment to avoid disputes, especially when the equipment needs repair and replacement. The record could include pictures, certification, serial numbers, manufacturer identity, and so on.
In addition, the network equipment, both on the network side and on the subscriber side, should be traced in their lifecycle from being deployed to when they are removed from the network.
Leveraging NGNe-BC, each item of network equipment both in physical and virtual manner has a specific management thread to record the equipment characteristic and status such as deploying, relocating, changing and removing. That makes the network elements management transparent, traceable and trustworthy.
|
+| Chain's type | Consortium NGNe-BC or private NGNe-BC, which includes the NGNe operators, the manufacturers and retailers. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | The NGNe operators, the manufacturers and retailers have access to the NGNe-BC. |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+
+| | |
+|------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure and operational flows (optional)
|
graph TD subgraph Nodes N1(( )) N2(( )) N3(( )) N4(( )) end N1 --- N2 N1 --- N3 N1 --- N4 N2 --- N3 N2 --- N4 N3 --- N4 Op1(( )) --> N1 Op2(( )) --> N1 Op3(( )) --> N2 Man(( )) --> N3 Ret(( )) --> N4 classDef nodeFill fill:#f9d5d5,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px; classDef clientFill fill:#a2b9d6,stroke:#333,stroke-width:1px; class N1,N2,N3,N4 nodeFill; class Op1,Op2,Op3,Man,Ret clientFill;
Y.2342(19)_FI.Tab4
Client NGNe-BC ledger node Smart contract
Operational flows:
- 1) The manufacturer and retailer record the purchased network equipment to the NGNe-BC through specific smart contracts leveraging the clients. The smart contract restricts the read privilege of the manufacturer and retailer. The information recorded includes the equipment characteristic such as serial number, manufacturer identity, certification, and so on.
- 2) The NGNe operator records the status of the network equipment deploying, relocating, changing and removing through smart contract leveraging the clients. The records would be shared between all the NGNe-BC ledger nodes.
- 3) The NGNe operator queries the network equipment by serial number or searches the network equipment by keywords using smart contract.
|
+| Derived requirements
| Requirements for NGNe:
It is required that the NGNe provides the capability to record network elements and necessary transaction parameters to the NGNe-BC ledger.
Requirements for NGNe-BC:
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the ledger to record the network elements.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent record.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the smart contracts to implement the data entries reading/writing.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the access control, membership management and authority management.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the scalability.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the account management.
|
+
+### I.5 NGNe-BC use case of MSISDN as a service
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Title | NGNe-BC use case of MSISDN as a service |
+| Description | Digital identity is increasingly important on the Internet. Firstly, for the service providers, it is difficult and costly to develop new customers, especially when the service needs the customer to register and has know your customer (KYC) processes to prove the identity and credential of the customers. Secondly, for the customers, it can be a lot of trouble to remember dozens of account names and passwords. Currently, the service providers allow customers to leverage their accounts of Google, Facebook and Wechat to login and use the APPs, however these accounts may not have KYC processes, which may incur the risk of identity theft, fraudulent purchases and data theft.
Mobile subscriber international ISDN number (MSISDN) could be used as a digital identity, as it is unique globally and the customer is verified when applying to use the MSISDN. Based on the NGNe-BC, the NGNe operators could provide the MSISDN-as-a-service, which includes the mobile authentication and account information, etc., to the service providers.
|
+| Chain's type | Consortium NGNe-BC, which includes the NGNe operators and service providers. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | - 1) The NGNe operator and the service providers have access to the NGNe-BC.
- 2) The NGNe operator has uploaded the raw data or the reference of data stored to the NGNe-BC. The data may include the subscriber identification module (SIM) authentication information and user data profile. Depending on the implementation, the reference of the data stored off-chain instead of the raw data could be uploaded. Multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) could share the same NGNe-BC.
|
+| Post-conditions (optional) | None. |
+| Figure and operational flows (optional) |
Operational flows:
- 1) The APP accesses to the service provider with the MSISDN as the account name. The access authentication could be SIM-based if the SIM profile and algorithm could be accessed leveraging the smart contract on the NGNe-BC.
- 2) The service provider could query the user profile of the MSISDN through a smart contract if necessary, such as initial verification or dispute.
|
+
+| | |
+|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | 3) The service provider could generate a temporary token which is used for next login in a period after a successful authentication.
Depending on the implementation, the access authentication for the APP also can use SMS code.
|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for NGNe:
It is required that the NGNe provides the capability to record n MSISDN related data to the NGNe-BC ledger.
Requirements for NGNe-BC:
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the ledger to record MSISDN related data.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent record.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the smart contracts to implement the data entries reading/writing.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the access control, membership management and authority management.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the privacy protection.
It is required that the NGNe-BC provides the scalability.
|
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.1255] Recommendation ITU-T X.1255 (2013), *Framework for discovery of identity management information*.
+- [b-ITU-T FG-DLT-D1.1] Technical Specification FG DLT D1.1 (2019), *Distributed ledger technology terms and definitions*.
+
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## ITU-T Y.2345 (05/2023)
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN
+
+---
+
+## **Scenarios and requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+### Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2345
+
+# Scenarios and requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2345 aims to provide the overview and general framework of the network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology and specifies scenarios and capability requirements which are derived from use cases.
+
+## History 1
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2345 | 2023-05-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15530 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Distributed ledger technology, network resource sharing, requirements, scenarios.
+
+---
+
+1 To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2023
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+# Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Overview of network resource sharing..... | 2 |
+| | 6.1 Background..... | 2 |
+| | 6.2 NRS-DLT ecosystem and roles ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | General framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology..... | 5 |
+| | 7.1 Network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.2 High-level requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology ..... | 6 |
+| 8 | Capability requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology..... | 7 |
+| | 8.1 Resource sharing application layer..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 DLT enabling layer..... | 7 |
+| | 8.3 Resource control layer ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.4 Infrastructure layer ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.5 Management-related capability requirements ..... | 9 |
+| | Appendix I – Scenarios and use cases of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology..... | 11 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 18 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2345
+
+# Scenarios and requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the scenarios and capability requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- 1) Overview of network resource sharing.
+- 2) General framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology.
+- 3) Capability requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology.
+- 4) Scenarios and use cases of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T X.1400] Recommendation ITU-T X.1400 (2020), *Terms and definitions for distributed ledger technology*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2340] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2340 (2016), *Next generation network evolution phase 1 – Overview*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2342] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2342 (2019), *Scenarios and capability requirements of blockchain in next generation network evolution*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 distributed ledger** [ITU-T X.1400]: A type of ledger that is shared, replicated, and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner.
+
+**3.1.2 smart contract** [ITU-T X.1400]: Program written on a distributed ledger system which encodes the rules for specific types of distributed ledger system transactions in a way that can be validated, and triggered by specific conditions.
+
+**3.1.3 transaction** [ITU-T X.1400]: Whole of the exchange of information between nodes. A transaction is uniquely identified by a transaction identifier.
+
+**3.1.4 entity** [b-ITU-T F.751.4]: Anything that has a separately identifiable existence (e.g., organization, person, group or device). An entity uses distributed ledger technology to solve the problem of its business or information systems.
+
+**3.1.5 participant** [b-ITU-T X.1405]: Entity who participates in the DLT system's decision making. For example, miners, validators, node owners, orders, voters, etc.
+
+**3.1.6 node** [ITU-T X.1400]: Device or process that participates in a distributed ledger network.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|---------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| CCPE | Computing Capabilities Provider at the Edge |
+| DLT | Distributed Ledger Technology |
+| HPC | High Performance Computing |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
+| IoT | Internet of Things |
+| NRB | Network Resource Broker |
+| NRC | Network Resource Customer |
+| NRNSM | Network Resource Node Service Maintainer |
+| NRNSP | Network Resource Node Service Provider |
+| NRP | Network Resource Provider |
+| NSP | Node Service Provider |
+| ProSe | Proximity-based Service |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# **6 Overview of network resource sharing**
+
+## **6.1 Background**
+
+Network resource sharing is the system that support the users of different networks to share the network resource among networks as business demands, including sharing computing, storage, connection and data resource.
+
+With the rapid evolution of 5G networks and IoT technology in recent years, an increasing number of devices are connected to the network, producing complex and enormous business demands, which need more flexible and efficient network resource support. Therefore, how to effectively promote network resource sharing to meet the demands of diversified services is a critical issue in the next generation network [ITU-T Y.2340].
+
+Distributed ledger is a type of ledger that is shared, replicated and synchronized in a distributed and decentralized manner [ITU-T X.1400].
+
+Distributed ledger technology (DLT) can record each transaction through distributed ledgers that are secured from tampering and revision. In a distributed ledger, the records, that are called blocks, are chained one by one using the cryptographic signature. To ensure the authenticity and integrity of the ledger, every record is provided a unique cryptographic signature and is time and date stamped. Only when the participants reach a consensus over the validity of a block, can the block be added in the distributed ledger. Beyond that, DLT has a unique token incentive model, which can increase the motivation of the participants on the chain, promote participants to jointly govern the network environment to achieve network resource sharing regularly, and further, enable users, contributors and regulators to achieve ecological balance.
+
+As one of the emerging technologies in recent years, DLT has core technical features such as smart contracts and distributed consensus, which can bring enhancement to network application scenarios in next generation networks as described in [ITU-T Y.2342].
+
+NRS-DLT is distributed network resource sharing which supports traditional network system interaction and provides DLT related capabilities among various network entities by utilizing DLT as a data carrier for resource status, for allocating computing, storage and network resources of infrastructure layer and network layer to applications.
+
+## **6.2 NRS-DLT ecosystem and roles**
+
+This clause describes a network environment, called a NRS-DLT ecosystem, with roles and sub-roles. It also defines necessary activities for roles sharing resource based on DLT, as well as relationships between roles.
+
+The NRS-DLT ecosystem includes the following roles:
+
+- network resource node service provider (NRNSP);
+- network resource node service maintainer (NRNSM);
+- network resource provider (NRP);
+- network resource broker (NRB);
+- network resource customer (NRC);
+- network operator (NO).
+
+The NRS-DLT ecosystem is shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-1: The ecosystem of NRS-DLT. This diagram illustrates the interactions between five main components: Network resource provider, Network resource nodes service provider, Network resource nodes service maintainer, Network resource broker, and Network resource customer. The Network resource provider (NRP) at the top includes 'Resource debugging', 'Sharing regular', and 'Open resource sharing API regularly'. It connects via a bidirectional arrow to the Network resource nodes service provider (NRNSP) in the center. The NRNSP includes 'Nodes admittance', 'Regular decision', 'Anomaly detection', 'Consensus algorithm', and 'Nodes status monitoring'. To the left, the Network operator (NO) includes 'Network status monitoring' and connects to the NRNSP. Below the NRNSP, the Network resource nodes service maintainer (NRNSM) includes 'Anomaly detection', 'Nodes resource allocation', and 'Network status monitoring', also connected by a bidirectional arrow. To the right, the Network resource broker (NRB) includes 'Manage resource catalogs/metadata', 'Manage resource requirements', 'Manage resource status', 'Match requirements', and 'Resource allocation'. It connects to the NRNSP and the Network resource customer (NRC) at the bottom. The NRC is a simple box representing the end user.
+
+Y.2345(23)
+
+**Figure 6-1 – The ecosystem of NRS-DLT**
+
+### 6.2.1 Network resource nodes service provider of NRS-DLT
+
+The NRNSP role provides the DLT infrastructure, which is the core of this ecosystem. The NRNSP could receive the resource API from the NRP and share to the NRC regularly, and record all the operations in the chain for tracing. The NRNSP's activities include:
+
+- DLT infrastructure construction, include consensus algorithm design, smart contract;
+- Nodes admittance and nodes classification, such as consensus nodes, common nodes;
+- Regular decision;
+- Anomaly detection;
+- Node status monitoring, such as computing resource status, node normal status, node activity.
+
+### 6.2.2 Network resource node service maintainer of NRS-DLT
+
+The network node service maintainer (NRNSM) role provides DLT network maintenance, which supports capabilities for breakdown maintenance, technical support, etc. The NRNSM's activities include:
+
+- Anomaly detection;
+- Network status monitoring, such as computing resource status, node normal status, node activity, etc.;
+- Node resource allocation: Through the result of node status monitoring feedback itself or by NRNSP, the NRNSM allocates and balances the resource among nodes.
+
+### 6.2.3 Network resource provider of NRS-DLT
+
+The NRP provides network resources, such as computing resources, storage resources, data resources and connection resources to the NRC. The NRP's activities include:
+
+- Resource debugging before sharing;
+- Making the sharing strategy include sharing conditions, sharing ways, sharing time, etc.;
+- Open resource sharing API, recorded by DLT, according to sharing strategy.
+
+### 6.2.4 Network resource customer of NRS-DLT
+
+The NRC is the end user or a system to use the results or services from the NRNSP to obtain the resource of the NRP.
+
+the NRC's activities include:
+
+- Requesting the network resource to the node service provider (NSP);
+- Obtaining the network resource API from the NSP and using it regularly.
+
+### 6.2.5 Network operator of NRS-DLT
+
+The network operator (NO) is usually the telecom operator, whose function is providing the normal operation of the network. The NO's activities include:
+
+- Monitoring network status.
+
+### 6.2.6 Network resource broker of NRS-DLT
+
+The network resource broker (NRB) serves to connect the NRC and network resource service provider. The NRB can act as an open network resource mart and aim to collect and manage resource information and requirements, to help achieve accurate resource matching between the NRP and NRC. The NRB could interact with the NRNSP and NRC, and its activities include:
+
+- Providing a meta-information registry to the NRNSP for publishing network resources;
+- Providing a service catalogue to the NRC for searching a usable network resource;
+- Supporting requirements management for NRC;
+- Interacting with the NRNSP to update network resource transaction and status information, such as the resource transaction amount, resource types involved in the transactions, etc.;
+- Supporting interactive information security and credibility.
+
+# 7 General framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+## 7.1 Network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+
+
+Y.2345(23)
+
+Figure 7-1: General framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology. The diagram shows three 'Network resource node' boxes at the top, interconnected by bidirectional arrows. Below them is a 'Management' block containing four layers: 'Resource sharing application layer', 'DLT enabling layer', 'Resource control layer', and 'Infrastructure layer'. At the bottom of the 'Management' block is an oval labeled 'Network resource entity'. Arrows indicate bidirectional communication between the nodes and the 'Resource sharing application layer'.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – General framework of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology**
+
+As shown in Figure 7-1, the framework of network resource sharing based on DLT involves multiple network resource nodes, which work together to promote network resource sharing. There are four layers in the framework of network resource sharing based on DLT:
+
+- The resource sharing application layer provides specific decentralized network resource sharing application, such as computing resource sharing resolution, data resource sharing, based on the smart contracts.
+- The DLT enabling layer provides core features to support network resource sharing application layer services, including providing decentralized ledger storage, consensus mechanism and smart contract execution environment.
+- The resource control layer provides asset control, network resource management, network resource breakage capability, etc., to support network resource allocation.
+- The infrastructure layer provides support for access of various network resource entities which belong to different physical nodes.
+
+It is recommended to consider these four layers in network resource sharing based on DLT. For each layer, specific relevant use cases need to be devised to derive requirements for different aspects.
+
+It is recommended that these requirements be classifiable into high level requirements and capability requirements.
+
+## **7.2 High-level requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology**
+
+### **7.2.1 Account management**
+
+It is required to provide valid account management mechanisms for NRS-DLT, including account generating, role assignment, identity authentication. Each participant, or user, of NRS-DLT will be provided an account with different authorities to act in different roles, e.g., resource provider, computing capability requester, system maintainer.
+
+### **7.2.2 Asset and resource control**
+
+It is required to provide asset and resource control mechanisms for NRS-DLT. Asset control enables each participant to manage and maintain their resources and transaction related activities directly, and resource control provides necessary resource registration, validation, reservation and dispatchment functions for resource capacity sharing. Asset and resource control should also ensure asset safety and data protection for each provider or requester and should be hot-pluggable.
+
+### **7.2.3 Scalability**
+
+It is required to support scalability, including:
+
+- Supporting the consensus mechanism of high scalability and efficiency;
+- Supporting availability management mechanisms for consensus nodes and network resource service nodes, such as heartbeat monitoring mechanisms;
+- Supporting system expansion, cross-system interaction and multisystem access.
+
+### **7.2.4 Intrusion prevention mechanism**
+
+It is required to provide intrusion prevention mechanisms such as network attack behaviour monitoring and malicious code detection, which should be set at key nodes (e.g., network resource service nodes and consensus nodes).
+
+It is required to upgrade and update intrusion prevention mechanisms regularly.
+
+### **7.2.5 Security mechanism**
+
+It is required to provide security protection for resource sharing, including data resource information protection, participants' identity information protection, sharing processes protection.
+
+It is required to provide failure detection mechanisms to automatically identify failed nodes to ensure DLT network security.
+
+### **7.2.6 Network management**
+
+It is required to provide network management mechanisms for NRS-DLT, including connection network management and blockchain network management, as follows:
+
+- Connection network management should monitor and record the connection performance and status of each participant to ensure effective resource sharing;
+- Blockchain network management should monitor the operation status of the consensus process and smart contract, provide timely feedback and deal with problems, and ensure the stable operation of the blockchain network.
+
+# **8 Capability requirements of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology**
+
+## **8.1 Resource sharing application layer**
+
+### **8.1.1 Computing resource related capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to record the attribute information of the computing resources on the distributed ledger.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to receive and record the resource requests from the NRC.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to record the computing resource sharing transaction on the distributed ledger.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage computing resource nodes and schedule computing resources between computing nodes. For example, the management capability will schedule more computing resources to consensus nodes to achieve an efficient consensus process.
+
+### **8.1.2 Billing related capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to open/close payment channels. It will open payment channels after matching resources successfully, and close payment channels before allocating a token to guarantee mutual interest.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to calculate the cost of the resource sharing based on the quality of service (QoS) of the resource service, service time, etc. This capability will trigger a smart contract to complete the resource sharing settlement, and record settlement transaction on the distributed ledger.
+
+## **8.2 DLT enabling layer**
+
+### **8.2.1 Consensus mechanism capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide the consensus mechanism for NRS-DLT. The consensus mechanism enables the guaranteeing of the consistent and authentic record of blockchain by consensus nodes.
+
+### **8.2.2 Smart contract capability requirements**
+
+It is required to support smart contracts for NRS-DLT to execute resource sharing transaction and settlement automatically. Smart contracts should keep status update records to meet security audit requirements.
+
+### **8.2.3 Incentive mechanism capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide an incentive mechanism for NRS-DLT. An incentive mechanism, unique to the DLT, could stimulate more participants to join the NRS-DLT ecosystem, to promote network resource sharing.
+
+### **8.2.4 Cross-chain interaction capability requirements**
+
+It is recommended to provide a cross-chain interaction capability for NRS-DLT, which could extend the ecosystem of NRS-DLT, not only limited to network resource sharing between nodes on this chain, but also extended to the heterogeneous chains.
+
+### **8.2.5 DLT service support and management capability requirements**
+
+It is recommended to provide a capability to support more service nodes and support heterogeneous network resources.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to monitor and alert node service performance.
+
+## **8.3 Resource control layer**
+
+### **8.3.1 Resource control capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to write/read data from NRS-DLT ledger rapidly and precisely to be used for resource registration and history traceability.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to validate the authenticity and availability of resources.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for invoke/query smart contracts for resource reserving, capability estimating, dispatching, plan generating, demand analysing etc.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to read/write data from/to other layers to receive and return data stably. Resources control layer and other layers should have full mutual access.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to the NRNSP for publishing network resources, including computing resources, edge resources, data resources, etc.
+
+### **8.3.2 Resource allocation capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to analyse the requests of the NRC.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to recommend or match appropriate resources to the NRC. It will recommend or match network resources based on the analysis results of the NRC's requests to meet the service needs of multiple NRCs to the greatest extent possible.
+
+## **8.4 Infrastructure layer**
+
+### **8.4.1 Asset control capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage users' resource related assets, including resource management and resources overview.
+
+NOTE – User resource related assets includes the resource providers' assets, such as the edge-computing resource or the storage resource, and the resource requesters' assets, such as the context data or the algorithm code.
+
+### **8.4.2 Network resource brokerage capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability to set the NRB in the edge of NRS-DLT for network resource scheduling.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage sharing resource information, including resource requirements, resource status and resource metadata.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for the NRB to match the requirements of NRC with registered resources.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to provide a network resource catalogue to the NRC.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to interact between ecosystem roles. For example, the NRB interact with the NRNSP for notifying the corresponding NRP to share a network resource to specific NRC, such as the edge-computing resource or data resource; the NRB forwards resource requests to the nearest NRNSP; interacts with the NRC to feedback resource status after the ensuring edge-computing resource; and interacts with the NRP to inform it to share a resource to the NRC after verifying user signatures.
+
+### 8.4.3 Network resource entity capability requirements
+
+It is required to provide a capability to network a resource entity for sharing computing, storage, connection, data and other resources.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to network a resource entity for invoking a smart contract to apply for computing, storage, connection, data and other resources.
+
+## 8.5 Management-related capability requirements
+
+In network resource sharing based on DLT, the system is required to provide management capabilities to ensure the normal operation of the sharing ecosystem, which includes node management, user identity management and sharing service management.
+
+According to the definition of ecosystem roles in clause 6, the NRNSP provides the DLT infrastructure and receives the resource API, which is required to provide node management, user management and sharing service management; and the NRNSM provides DLT network maintenance, supports capability for breakdown maintenance and technical support, which is required to provide node management and user management; and the NRB serves to connect between the NRC and NRP for resource sharing, which is required to provide sharing service management.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ NRNSP[Network resource nodes service provider] <--> NRNSM[Network resource nodes service maintainer]
+ NRNSP <--> NRB[Network resource broker]
+ NRNSM --> NRB
+ NRB --> NRNSP
+ NRB --> NM[Node management
+(Access, permission, situation, etc.)]
+ NRB --> UM[User management
+(Identity, data encryption, key management, etc.)]
+ NRB --> SSM[Sharing service management
+(Sharing API, etc.)]
+```
+
+Diagram illustrating the relationship between management requirements and roles. The diagram shows three main roles: Network resource nodes service provider, Network resource nodes service maintainer, and Network resource broker. The Network resource nodes service provider and Network resource nodes service maintainer are connected by a double-headed vertical arrow. The Network resource nodes service provider is connected to the Network resource broker by a double-headed horizontal arrow. The Network resource nodes service maintainer is connected to the Network resource broker by a single-headed arrow pointing right. The Network resource broker is connected to the Network resource nodes service provider by a single-headed arrow pointing left. The Network resource broker is also connected to three management requirements: Node management (Access, permission, situation, etc.), User management (Identity, data encryption, key management, etc.), and Sharing service management (Sharing API, etc.).
+
+Y.2345(23)
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Relationship between management requirements and roles**
+
+### 8.5.1 Node security management capability requirements
+
+It is required to provide the node security management strategy to achieve security management and control for nodes access to ensure the normal operation of their NRS-DLT while users register to and join the sharing ecosystem.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to respond to the node registration request and acquire the information to register, including: node identity, registered roles, credit rating information and node permission information, and record it on the distributed ledger by smart contract. Nodes' permission in NRS-DLT should be determined by roles in ecosystem and credit rating information. For example, registering the role of the NRC could be given the rights to query resource catalogue and obtain according to the strategy, which has no authority to participate in consensus. And if users apply to register the role of the NRNSP, the system will give different permission with different credit rating; low credit ratings do not authorize participation in the consensus.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for dynamic evaluation and updating nodes' credit rating information by online duration, activity levels and historical action, ensuring the dynamic adjustment of permissions, which could be monitored by the NRNSP. If the nodes' credit rating information changes, the nodes permission information that control the nodes permission in NRS-DLT should be updated and recorded on the distributed ledger. For different business, the weight of these indicators could be adjusted by the NRNSP or node consensus.
+
+It is required to provide a capability for repair faulty nodes to restore resource sharing services in a timely manner.
+
+### **8.5.2 User management capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability for identity authentication and data encryption to ensure users' identity security.
+
+It is required to provide a key management mechanism to ensure the security of key storage for completing the public and private key encryption and authentication during the sharing.
+
+It is required to provide a capability of user access management to give users access to computing, storage, connection and data resources.
+
+It is required to provide a capability of user information management to provide a basis for user identity authentication, transaction traceability, transaction settlement, etc.
+
+### **8.5.3 Sharing service management capability requirements**
+
+It is required to provide a capability of network resource sharing API managements to ensure normal sharing in NRS-DLT.
+
+It is required to provide a capability to manage the list of the sharing service resources to maintain and update NRP resource information in a timely manner.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Scenarios and use cases of network resource sharing based on distributed ledger technology
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+**Table I.1 – Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Description | With the development of 5G and edge computing, the need for computing capabilities of edge resources grows dramatically, as computing capabilities form the basis of ubiquitous computing. Hence, it is necessary to take good advantages of edge resources and share extra computing capabilities properly to help boost computing processes. However, centralized resource management systems fail to provide satisfying solutions:
- 1) Centralized management system may confront single point failure, which causes the computing resource sharing service to be unavailable.
- 2) The system operated by centralized mechanisms may have the risk of information leak.
- 3) Centralized architecture are insufficient for high performance computing (HPC) and distributed computing. A problem solver needs to use several centralized resource management systems to fulfil the computing capability requirements. This process can be error prone and costly – toward both money and energy.
In this case, NRS-DLT could be a potential solution for sharing the edge-computing resources. Based on distributed ledger technology, the NRS-DLT system is inherently suitable for HPC and distributed computing, and could manage, dispatch and share these computing resources at the edge automatically, instantly, uninterruptedly, safely and readily. Moreover, distributed architecture could easily build up trust between providers and users.
|
+| Roles | Computing capabilities provider at the edge (resource provider): The owner of the edge resources. Except for computing capabilities, the resource provider needs to provide necessary techniques such as device registration, device dispatch, device maintenance and so on.
Computing capabilities requester (resource requester): The purchaser of the computing capabilities at the edge.
NRS-DLT maintainer: The provider of NRS-DLT. The NRS-DLT maintainer should provide necessary capabilities, techniques, maintenances and functions of NRS-DLT under computing capabilities sharing of edge resources scenario.
|
+
+**Table I.1 – Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure and operational flows |
Figure I.1 – Edge-computing resources sharing based on NRS-DLT
- 1) The resource provider should register all the edge resources with computing capabilities to the NRS-DLT system, and key configurations, including exact computing capabilities, network capabilities, identity information, should be clarified and their availability verified via smart contract.
- 2) The resource requester publicizes the demand of computing capabilities to the NRS-DLT system. The request should give an estimate of resources usage, algorithm, throughput, etc.
- 3) NRS-DLT uses a smart contract to analyse the exact demand of edge resources according to the request. The exact demand, or plan, should in detail include the requirement and framework of the algorithm, network usage, storage, the need of computing capabilities, and so on. Meanwhile, the estimate cost of the plan should be provided to the requester.
- 4) The resource requester chooses a plan to purchase, returns the decision back to NRS-DLT, and waits for the resources ready to use.
- 5) After receiving the decision from the requester, the NRS-DLT system uses a smart contract to complete the following steps:
- 1) The NRS-DLT system analyses the decision and prepares the resources, i.e., divides tasks into sub-tasks and assigns them to different providers.
- 2) Resource providers receive tasks/sub-tasks, then reserve and dispatch corresponding edge resources with computing capabilities. The NRS-DLT system will generate configurations of network, safety and resource, install requester's algorithms on these edge resources and give a link to access the resources.
- 3) The NRS-DLT system will send the link back to the requester. The requester uses the link to connect to and access purchased computing capabilities at the edge.
|
+
+**Table I.1 – Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of edge-computing resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | It is necessary to clarify that step 5 described above is only an implementing option for sharing the edge-computing resource. Depending on the application features and computing provision methods, there are different implementing methods, e.g., transferring the context data to the execution environment base on the serverless service.
6) After computing is done, linkage between the requester and provider is cut off, and all the computing capabilities at the edge will be returned. The whole process is recorded in the distributed ledger for auditability and traceability.
|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for computing capabilities provider at the edge (CCPE):
It is required that the CCPE provide the capability to access resource control.
It is required that the CCPE provide the capability to register all the edge resources with computing capabilities and record the required parameter to the NRS-DLT ledger.
Requirements for the NRS-DLT:
It is required that NRS-DLT provide the ledger to record the resources.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide the consensus mechanism to guarantee the consistent record.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide sufficient reading/writing performance from/to the ledger.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide the smart contracts to implement data entries reading/writing.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide nodes management and access control.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide the scalability.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide necessary protection for user identity and data information by user management.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide asset control and resource control.
|
+
+**Table I.2 – Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|-------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Description | With the development of a series of emerging technologies and significant growth of business demand, an increasing number of devices are connected to the future network, which produces an enormous amount of data. How to effectively promote the interconnection and comprehensive sharing of network data resources to meet the demands of diversified services is a critical issue in the future development of computer network technology.
Centralized data resource sharing fails to provide satisfying solutions for the following reasons:
- 1) Centralized sharing solutions may confront single point failure which causes data resources to be unavailable.
- 2) Network data is stored on the centralized server side, which may have unauthorized behaviour, leading to problems of data security.
- 3) The centralized data management agency has a heavy responsibility, data rights are difficult to distinguish and meanwhile it also has the risk of information leak.
- 4) Data sharing in a centralized way has low efficiency, such as, "one situation, one discussion" and centralized approval, which will affect the sharing process.
It is necessary to provide a suitable interconnection solution with high performance for ever-richer access and various networks to maximize the data value through efficient
|
+
+**Table I.2 – Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | sharing. Distributed network data resource sharing based on DLT provides a suitable management model to address single points of failure and trust problem among networks. The network data resource is the data resource that is transmitted and released by network; further, the network data resource includes non-sensitive data (public data) and semi-sensitive data (conditional sharing data) classified by sensitivity. Sensitive data involves a confidentiality clause and data protection, which is not circulated by the network generally, so it is not included in the network data resources.
|
+| Roles | Network data resource provider: the owner of the network data resources.
Network data resource requester: the purchaser of the network data resources.
NRS-DLT maintainer: the provider of NRS-DLT. The NRS-DLT maintainer should provide necessary capabilities, techniques, maintenances and functions of NRS-DLT under a scenario of network data sharing resources.
|
+| Figure and operational flows | Image: Figure I.2: Cross-system network data resources sharing based on NRS-DLT. The diagram shows a central NRS-DLT system (dashed oval) containing consensus nodes (blue circles) and smart contracts (blue triangles). It is connected to a DLT maintainer (blue square) at the top, a data resource provider (database and front-end processor) on the left, and a data resource requester (front-end processor and database) on the right. Two additional front-end processors are at the bottom. A legend defines the symbols: Consensus node (blue circle), Smart contract (blue triangle), Front-end processor (blue square), and Database (cylinder icon). The identifier Y.2345(23) is in the bottom right.
Figure I.2 – Cross-system network data resources sharing based on NRS-DLT
- 1) The network data resource provider should divide their own network data into two categories: public data and conditional sharing data, and clarify their sharing conditions, such as: the business relevance, business support of data resources and using time.
- 2) The metadata of network data resource is recorded by smart contract, then sharing conditions and resource locations are also recorded.
- 3) The resource requester publicizes the demand of network data resources, then query metadata of existing resources on the NRS-DLT, where metadata is a description of data resource items.
- 4) Apply for the data resources in NRS-DLT by smart contract, and provide key contents of using, include: purpose, time, etc.
- 5) NRS-DLT estimates the relevant usage condition automatically by smart contract, if the condition meets the requirements, NRS-DLT provides the data sharing interface (API) to the requester.
- 6) Within the allotted time, the resource requester uses data according to the sharing strategy. After using or after the allotted time, the sharing interface fails. The whole process is recorded in the distributed ledger for auditability and traceability.
|
+
+**Table I.2 – Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of cross-system network data resource sharing based on NRS-DLT |
+|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Derived requirements | Requirements for network data resource provider:
It is required that the provider ensures that metadata is consistent with the data in the database, so the requester could obtain the data according to the metadata.
It is required that the provider have the capability to access resource control.
Requirements for NRS-DLT:
It is required that NRS-DLT provide computing nodes and adjust node computing resources, for example, to adjust more computing resources to consensus nodes or provider.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide an alert service when nodes are short of computing resource.
It is required that NRS-DLT automatically identify failed nodes by node management to ensure DLT network security.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide sharing service management to manage the resource API from the NRP for resource sharing.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide cross-system interaction for achieving resource sharing between different platform, which can be achieved by building cross-platform DLT network nodes.
|
+
+**Table I.3 – Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on DLT |
+|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Description | With the popularity of various intelligent terminals and 5G and 6G wireless connection access, network connection capacity is undergoing explosive growth, the original connection mode is facing challenges, and improving cellular frequency reuse has become a new solution. 3GPP proposes ProSe (proximity service), a new technology that allows LTE terminals to communicate directly from device to device (D2D) by sharing the network resources without infrastructure. In short, it is a new way of connection between two peer-to-peer user nodes under the network resource sharing mode. How to achieve secure and fair sharing of network resources between two untrusted nodes (under a weak trust environment) is an existing challenge.
It is necessary to provide a suitable interconnection solution with high performance for ever-richer access and various networks to maximize network value through efficient sharing. Distributed ProSe based on DLT provides a suitable solution to address the trust and security problem in network resources sharing, to improve cellular frequency reuse.
|
+| Roles | Service node (ProSe provider): Contributor of the network resources.
User node (ProSe requester): Demander of the network resources.
Operator node (network resource administrator): Administrator of the network resource.
NRS-DLT maintainer: The provider of NRS-DLT. The NRS-DLT maintainer should provide necessary capabilities, techniques, maintenances and functions of NRS-DLT under scenario of network sharing resources.
|
+
+**Table I.3 – Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on DLT |
+|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Figure and operational flows |
Figure I.3 – Proximity-based service (ProSe) based on NRS-DLT
Mobile users can register as a service node to share mobile network resources for other mobile terminals, so as to obtain the token. At the same time, it can also be used as a user node to obtain network services and pay for the token.
- 1) Node registration: Mobile phone users can apply for and register as hotspot service nodes, that is, network data resource providers, so as to directly share 5G network resources for other mobile terminals and provide near field network services.
- 2) Identity authentication: NRS-DLT records the registered nodes, and the smart contract transmits them to the operator for identity information comparison and authentication.
- 3) Resource preparation: The certified service nodes join the resource sharing pool through the app and open the hot spots.
- 4) Recommendation of smart contract: According to the current network quality, waiting time and historical evaluation, the smart contract recommends appropriate service nodes to network resource user nodes.
- 5) Waiting for connection: The user node makes its own choice according to the recommendation of the smart contract, and pays the token to the service node according to the rules of the smart contract to obtain the network service.
- 6) Process record: Until disconnection, the smart contract records the network resource sharing to the NRS-DLT, including: service node, user node, usage duration, network quality evaluation.
- 7) Gain revenue: For the completed services, according to the service duration and charging rules, the operator pays token to the service node to encourage more mobile users to participate in the ProSe, which can drive efficient and reliable frequency resource reuse, and improve the capacity of the 5G connection system.
|
+
+**Table I.3 – Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on NRS-DLT**
+
+| Title | Use case of proximity-based service (ProSe) based on DLT |
+|----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Derived requirements | - • Requirements for the ProSe provider:
It is required that the ProSe provider ensure its identity is credible and verifiable.
It is required that the ProSe provider provide stable services and not disconnect frequently. - • Requirements for the ProSe user:
It is required that the ProSe user provide enough tokens to pay for the service. - • Requirements for the operator:
It is required that the operator provide a database that contains identity information; in order to protect the data information, the database is stored locally and will be called by smart contract to comparison automatically.
It is required that the operator provide the ability to monitor network resources. - • Requirements for NRS-DLT:
It is required that NRS-DLT provide the smart contract with recording, settlement, recommending, query functions.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide identity protection for contributors.
It is required that NRS-DLT provide a token-based incentives mechanism to stimulate increased node participation in ProSe based on NRS-DLT.
|
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.751.4] Recommendation ITU-T F.751.4 (2022), *General framework for distributed ledger technology (DLT)-based invoices*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1405] Recommendation ITU-T X.1405 (2021), *Security threats and requirements for digital payment services based on distributed ledger technology*.
+- [3GPP WI #580059] 3GPP WI #580059[Rel 12], *Proximity-based service*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2501
+
+(09/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Computing power networks
+
+# --- **Computing power network – Framework and architecture**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2501
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+
+### **Computing power networks** **Y.2500–Y.2599**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------|---------------|
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2501
+
+# Computing power network – Framework and architecture
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2501 describes the framework and architecture of the computing power network (CPN). This is a new type of network that realizes optimized resource allocation, by distributing computing, storage, network and other resource information of service nodes through a network control plane. It combines network context and user requirements to provide the optimal distribution, association, transaction and scheduling of computing, storage and network resources.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2501 | 2021-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14768 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Architecture, computing power network, framework.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2021
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References ..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 | Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 | Terms defined in this Recommendation ..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Background and motivations ..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 | From the perspective of computing power resource consumers ..... | 2 |
+| 6.2 | From the perspective of computing power resource providers ..... | 3 |
+| 6.3 | From the perspective of network technology ..... | 3 |
+| 6.4 | From the perspective of a business model ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Scenarios ..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 | Scenarios of low latency ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 | Scenarios of high mobility ..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Requirements of computing power network ..... | 5 |
+| 9 | General framework of the computing power network ..... | 6 |
+| 10 | Functional architecture of computing power network ..... | 7 |
+| 10.1 | CPN resource layer ..... | 7 |
+| 10.2 | CPN control layer ..... | 8 |
+| 10.3 | CPN service layer ..... | 8 |
+| 10.4 | CPN orchestration and management layer ..... | 9 |
+| 11 | Security considerations ..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2501
+
+# Computing power network – Framework and architecture
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides the framework and architecture of the computing power network, specifies its functional entities and defines the functionalities of these functional entities, in addition this Recommendation also provides general scenarios, requirements and security considerations of the computing power network (CPN).
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+None.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+None.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| 5G | 5th-Generation |
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| CPN | Computing Power Network |
+| OAM | Operation Administration and Maintenance |
+| SDN | Software Defined Network |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| V2X | Vehicle to X |
+| vBRAS | virtual Broadband Remote Access Server |
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------|
+| vCPE | virtual Customer Premise Equipment |
+| VR | Virtual Reality |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended to" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+## 6 Background and motivations
+
+The computing power network (CPN) is a new type of network that realizes optimized resource allocation, by distributing computing, storage, network and other resource information of service nodes through a network control plane (such as a centralized controller, distributed routing protocol, etc.). CPN combines network context and user requirements to provide optimal distribution, association, transaction and scheduling of computing, storage and network resources.
+
+CPN provides technical opportunities within a certain business context.
+
+### 6.1 From the perspective of computing power resource consumers
+
+Demands for computing power are increasing day by day and ubiquitous computing power resources are needed.
+
+The market for computing-intensive services, such as the AI-based services is growing. The large-scale application of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms across various industries requires a great amount of computing power resources. In this the age of cloud computing, the tendency is to build centralized computing power resources pools to solve this problem. However, in some new scenarios, these centralized pools do not satisfy requirements as appropriate computing power nodes need to be selected according to the service characteristics, price, and network conditions. An access control system based on face recognition, shown in Figure 6-1, serves to explain why ubiquitous computing power resources are needed.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ User((User)) --> ACS[Access control system]
+ ACS -- "Face image" --> Cloud((Cloud computing centre))
+ Cloud -- "AI training" --> Cloud
+ Cloud -- "Module updating" --> Edge[Edge office]
+ Edge -- "Face recognition" --> Edge
+ Edge -- "Recognition result" --> ACS
+ Edge -- "Face image" --> ACS
+
+```
+
+The diagram shows a person interacting with an 'Access control system' (represented by a monitor and camera icon). A 'Face image' is sent from the system to a 'Cloud computing centre' (represented by a cloud icon). Inside the cloud, 'AI training' is performed. A 'Module updating' signal is sent from the cloud to an 'Edge office' (represented by a server rack icon). The 'Edge office' performs 'Face recognition'. A 'Recognition result' is sent back to the 'Access control system', and a 'Face image' is also sent from the 'Edge office' back to the 'Access control system'.
+
+Figure 6-1: Access control system based on face recognition. The diagram illustrates a workflow where a person's face is captured by an access control system, sent to a cloud computing center for AI training, and then used for face recognition at an edge office, with module updates being sent back to the cloud.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Access control system based on face recognition**
+
+In this example, an AI training part can be deployed in centralized computing power pools, such as a cloud computing centre, to perform complex computing processes offline. However, in the reasoning phase, such as for instance, when recognizing a face to open a door, the latency factor should be considered. If the image or video information is sent to a cloud computing centre for processing, the waiting time may be too long to be practical. Consequently, services need to consider not only computing power resources but also the time for processing, the time for transmitting and the cost. For fully-centralized computing power resource pools, they cannot satisfy all requirements, while distributed computing power resource pools, such as edge computing nodes, have obvious advantages in bandwidth and latency, thus meeting the development requirements of future services.
+
+### **6.2 From the perspective of computing power resource providers**
+
+The construction costs of computing power resources per unit are decreasing.
+
+In accordance with Moore's Law, the performance of chips is improving, while the costs of computing power resources per unit are decreasing. Compared with the provision of electricity, the provision of computing power is relatively easy. In theory, as long as there is space and electricity and due compliance with fire safety regulations, all units or even individuals can build a computing power resource pool to provide computing resources for various services. However, the existing computing resources pools, self-built by enterprises, are geographically scattered, and their utilization is quite low. If all these resources could be used, it would generate more value and create more wealth for users and society. It is also noted that super-computing centres own a large amount of computing power resources, while users do not have a way to apply for these resources. Consequently, there is a need to find a new solution and technology system to realize computing power resources sharing.
+
+### **6.3 From the perspective of network technology**
+
+Network development has laid the foundation for the flexible provision of multi-party computing resources.
+
+For sharing of computing power resources, the accessibility of computing power resources needs to be considered first. With the development of network technologies such as 5G and software defined networks (SDNs) the network is now no longer a cause of bottlenecks. Users and computing power resources can be efficiently connected through networks.
+
+The isolated computing power pool is difficult to transform into a measurable and saleable commodity that can promote a sustainable development of the industry chain. With the development of new network technologies such as 5G, computing power resources can be connected in a simple, efficient, and low-cost way, and can be sold and used through a new business model.
+
+### **6.4 From the perspective of a business model**
+
+A new business model is necessary.
+
+How to integrate the resources of all parties, so that users can flexibly choose appropriate computing resources according to service requirements is problematic. Cloud computing providers need to employ a lot of people to negotiate with owners of computing power resources, sign and then execute service contracts in order to integrate the discrete computing power resources. In addition, operation and maintenance operations also require a great number of staff. This goes against their principles of minimalist operation and maintenance. Consequently, cloud service providers prefer to cooperate with enterprises with large amounts of resources rather than small companies or even individuals.
+
+It is hard for the owners of small and mid-sized computing resources pools to compete with large-scale cloud computing service providers. First of all, due to the limitations of their technical capabilities, the products and services that can be provided are quite limited. Secondly, limited by the size of their enterprises, their marketing efforts are limited, and it is therefore difficult to inform potential users of their resource information.
+
+With the support of new technologies, computing power resources information can be distributed through networks. A computing power transaction platform for resource providers and resource consumers could be provided. Through this computing power transaction platform, computing power providers and consumers do not need to be concerned about the transaction partners. The transaction platform shields the difference between the providers and the consumers. Providers and consumers do not perceive each other, and they can pay according to unified rules, forming a new resource transaction model.
+
+## **7 Scenarios**
+
+Computing power networks mainly work in two types of scenarios: the first type are low-latency scenarios represented by edge computing. In this kind of scenario, the computing power network needs to provide coordination between computing resources; the second type are high-mobility scenarios represented by live broadcast and vehicle to X (V2X). In this kind of scenario, the computing power network needs to provide flexible scheduling for services.
+
+### **7.1 Scenarios of low latency**
+
+The low latency requirement of edge computing needs the interworking of computing and network capabilities. Low latency is one of the most critical characteristics of edge computing, and it is also the key factor that distinguishes edge computing from cloud computing. In the edge computing scenario, clients have an urgent need for low latency, high computing capabilities and networking routing capabilities, which is already beyond the capabilities of traditional cloud service providers, and network capabilities have become a part of the cloud computing capabilities. Therefore, in addition to deploying computing nodes at the edge of the network, it also needs a 'computing-network interworking' reconstruction of the substrate network architecture. This reconstruction evolves the traditional network architecture mainly carrying north-south traffic to the new network architecture which can schedule flexibly taking into account latency and carry east-west traffic as well.
+
+The new application of edge computing needs 'cloud-network interworking' network architecture. For a typical AI application for example, AI reasoning needs low latency, therefore it should be deployed in edge computing nodes. While AI training can be deployed in a centralized cloud computing platform at low cost as it needs high computing capabilities but has no requirements on latency. However, the current edge computing solution generally follows the network construction scheme of traditional data centres. This network construction solution consists of two layers of switches (aggregation + access or Spine-Leaf architecture) and one layer of egress routers [ITU-T Y.2011] and [ITU-T Y.2012]. This kind of networking architecture increases the number of routes and devices of the edge computing nodes. It also increases the latency, and the latency is uncontrollable which is quite different from the expected indicators.
+
+Therefore, for AI applications, computing power network technology is needed to collect the resources and network information about each resource node, then, according to the service requirement, the AI training task with the heaviest computing needs can be deployed on the central cloud. The computing tasks such as feature extraction, template matching, and object recognition are dynamically offloaded to appropriate edge nodes. The terminal only needs to be responsible for target tracking and screen rendering and display to reduce the end-to-end latency.
+
+### 7.2 Scenarios of high mobility
+
+Services such as live broadcast for travel and V2X often have high mobility. In an example scenario of live broadcast, anchor X is conducting a travel live broadcast. During the live broadcast, the anchor needs to go to city B from city A and share the scenery along the way between city A and city B. Live broadcast services need to be able to provide scenery features, real-time interaction with the audience (such as barrage communication, voice and video connections, live streaming commerce, etc.). In the future, VR live broadcast will require stronger image rendering, greater computing power and lower latency. As the location of the anchor continues to change, using the same computing resources the change will increase as will the physical distance between the service and the computing resources, leading to increased latency. Therefore, the computing power network may select matching resources for users in real-time based on the location and resource conditions, so as to provide the accompanying resources and improve the user experience. As shown in Figure 7-1, when anchor X is in city A, resource pool N1 provides services, when anchor X is in city B, resource pool N2 provides services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a live broadcast scenario involving a central computing power network and three resource pools. The computing power network consists of six routers labeled R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and R6, interconnected in a mesh topology. R2 is centrally located and connected to R1, R3, R4, and R5. R1 is connected to R2 and R3. R3 is connected to R1, R2, and R5. R4 is connected to R2 and R6. R5 is connected to R3 and R6. R6 is connected to R4 and R5. Three resource pools are represented by clouds containing server and storage icons: Resource pool N1 is connected to R1; Resource pool N2 is connected to R4; Resource pool N3 is connected to R5. Two anchors are shown: 'Anchor X' in 'City A' is connected to R2; 'Anchor X' in 'City B' is connected to R6. The diagram shows how the network can route traffic from different resource pools to the anchor as they move between cities.
+
+Y.2501(21)
+
+Figure 7-1 – Live broadcast scenario diagram showing a computing power network connecting resource pools to anchors in different cities.
+
+Figure 7-1 – Live broadcast scenario
+
+# 8 Requirements of computing power network
+
+Computing power networks are required to have the ability to allocate the computing power resources according to user requirements and adjust the allocation strategy with the change of requirements in a timely manner. Thus, the following requirements must be satisfied:
+
+- CPN is required to support computing power measurement for the quantification of computing power resources. In other words, CPN is required to provide unified description for computing power resources.
+- CPN is required to have the capability to collect resources information.
+- CPN is required to make resource allocation strategies for users according to user requirements.
+- CPN is required to establish network connection between resource users and resource providers according to the resource allocation strategies.
+- CPN is required to support resource transaction between resource users and resource providers.
+
+- CPN is required to support resource monitoring to update resource information in a timely manner.
+
+NOTE – The unified description refers to a set of measurement rules, according to which we can compare computing resources under certain conditions. It does not mean we need to give only one unit for all computing power resources.
+
+# 9 General framework of the computing power network
+
+A computing power network framework includes a computing power network consumer, a computing power network provider, a computing power network transaction platform, a computing power network control plane, a network operator, etc. An AI empowered platform can be linked according to services development requirements. The computing power network framework is shown in Figure 9-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-1: Computing power network framework diagram. The diagram illustrates the architecture of a computing power network. At the top, an 'AI empowered platform' (represented by a server rack icon) connects via a downward arrow to the 'Computing power network transaction platform' (represented by a circular network icon). This transaction platform is also connected by horizontal arrows to the 'Computing power network consumer' (represented by a person icon) on the left and the 'Computing power network provider' (represented by a building icon) on the right. A dashed red line separates the upper management layer from the lower network layer. Below the dashed line, the 'Computing power network control plane' (represented by a server rack icon with up/down arrows) connects via a downward arrow to the 'Network operator' (represented by a complex network of nodes and links). The network operator layer includes various cloud computing nodes and server racks. The identifier 'Y.2501(21)' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Computing power network framework**
+
+- Computing power network consumer: Units or individuals who consume computing power resources and network resources. They make various requirements in terms of cost, performance and security according to their services.
+- Computing power network provider: Refers to the units or individuals that can provide computing power resources. The computing resource pool can be a small-scale edge computing node, a large or medium-sized cloud computing node, a metropolitan computing node or a super-computing centre, etc. Therefore, the provider can be a telecommunication operator, a large cloud service provider, a small or medium-sized enterprise, a supercomputing centre, or even an individual.
+- Computing power network transaction platform: A platform that allows computing power network providers and computing power network consumers to make transactions. It can be
+
+a public transaction, that is, the computing power network consumers know exactly who provides the computing power resources. It can also be an anonymous transaction meaning that the computing power network consumers do not need to know who the computing power network providers are, and the computing power network transaction platform is responsible for transaction reliability and computing security. In addition, on this transaction platform, not only computing resource transactions, but network resource transactions need to be completed at the same time according to location and service requirements.
+
+- Computing power network control plane: It collects computing power information, network information, etc., and sends this information to the computing power network transaction platform for computing power network consumers to select appropriate computing power resources and network resources, and then provides the computing power network consumers with the optimal computing power resource allocation and network connection solution.
+- Network operator: An operator that provides connection services which connect users and computing power resources, and can provide different levels of connection services according to user requirements.
+- AI empowered platform: As an additional module in the computing power network framework, it can provide computing power applications for computing power network consumers as well as AI-based auxiliary operations for computing power network providers.
+
+## 10 Functional architecture of computing power network
+
+The functional architecture of the computing power network is depicted in Figure 10-1. It consists of four layers which provide the aforementioned functionalities by interacting with each other.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph Main_Layers [Main Layers]
+ direction TB
+ S[CPN service layer] <--> C[CPN control layer]
+ C <--> R[CPN resource layer]
+ end
+
+ subgraph Management [CPN orchestration and management layer]
+ direction TB
+ O[CPN orchestrator]
+ SSec[CPN security]
+ CPM[Computing power modelling]
+ CPOAM[Computing power OAM]
+ end
+
+ S <--> Management
+ C <--> Management
+ R <--> Management
+
+ subgraph S_Box [CPN service layer]
+ RIP[Resource information processing]
+ B[Billing]
+ TPE[Transaction process execution]
+ end
+
+ subgraph C_Box [CPN control layer]
+ RIC[Resource information collection]
+ RA[Resource allocation]
+ NCS[Network connection scheduling]
+ end
+
+ subgraph R_Box [CPN resource layer]
+ CR[Computing resource]
+ NR[Network resource]
+ SR[Storage resource]
+ SRV[Service resource]
+ end
+
+```
+
+Y.2501(21)
+
+Figure 10-1: Computing power network functional architecture diagram. The diagram shows three main layers on the left: CPN service layer, CPN control layer, and CPN resource layer, connected vertically by double-headed arrows. To the right is the CPN orchestration and management layer, connected to each of the three main layers by double-headed arrows. The CPN service layer contains Resource information processing, Billing, and Transaction process execution. The CPN control layer contains Resource information collection, Resource allocation, and Network connection scheduling. The CPN resource layer contains Computing resource, Network resource, Storage resource, and Service resource. The CPN orchestration and management layer contains CPN orchestrator, CPN security, Computing power modelling, and Computing power OAM. A small reference code Y.2501(21) is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Computing power network functional architecture**
+
+### 10.1 CPN resource layer
+
+CPN resource layer is where the resources reside that are provided by computing power network providers and network operators. This includes resources typically used in resource nodes (cloud
+
+computing node, edge computing node, etc.) such as computing resources (servers, etc.), network resources (switches, routers, etc.), storage resources (storage devices), and also the deployed services that run on the servers. In this layer, the resources are various, heterogeneous, and belong to many providers. Using unified identification can realize the unified authentication and resource scheduling of different vendors and heterogeneous computing power resources.
+
+### 10.2 CPN control layer
+
+The CPN control layer (realized by the CPN control plane) collects the information from the CPN resource layer, and sends it to a service layer for further processing. After receiving the processing results from the CPN service layer, the CPN control layer will pre-occupy the resources and establish a network connection.
+
+The computing power network control layer has three basic functions: resource information collection function, resource allocation function, and network connection scheduling function:
+
+- **Resource information collection function:** The computing power network control layer collects a variety of resource information, including but not limited to computing power resource information, network resource information, storage resource information, algorithm resource information, etc. and generates a resource information table.
+- **Resource allocation function:** According to the CPN consumers requirement or processing results from the CPN service layer, the computing power network control layer checks the resource information table, then makes a resource allocation strategy and sends it to the CPN providers. A resource allocation strategy could be notifying the computing power network providers when and how many computing resources will be occupied, and refreshing their resource information.
+- **Network connection scheduling function:** Network connection requirements are obtained according to the resource allocation strategy. Network connection requirements could include among which points the network connection should be established, the bandwidth of each network connection, and the quality of service needed to be provided. According to these network connection requirements, the corresponding network resources are scheduled, and the network connections are established.
+
+NOTE – The network connection here indicates not just traditional communication pipeline, it may also require the deployment of corresponding network elements, such as 5G user plane function (UPF), virtual broadband remote access server (vBRAS), virtual customer premise equipment (vCPE) and other access control network elements, according to network connection requirements.
+
+### 10.3 CPN service layer
+
+The CPN service layer can realize the functions of the CPN transaction platform mentioned in clause 9. The service layer supports the following functionalities:
+
+- **Resource information processing:** CPN service layer obtains various computing power resource information and network resource information from the computing power network control layer. According to user requirements and resource information, it provides optional resources and reasonable pricing based on the construction cost, maintenance cost, scarcity, and their competition relationships.
+- **Billing:** Includes two kinds of bills. One is paying bills for computing power consumers according to the occupation statistics of computing power resources and network resources. The other is income bills for computing power providers and network operators according to the supplement of computing power resources and network resources.
+- **Transaction process execution:** The transaction process is as follows:
+ - First, computing power network consumers input resource requirements or service requirements, such as resource location, latency, bandwidth, resource quantity.
+
+- Second, the computing power network transaction platform generates a resource view according to the user requirements and resource information received from the CPN control layer. In the resource view, it contains the optional resources as well as their price.
+- Third, users choose the most suitable resources according to the resource view, and then make a transaction contract with providers.
+- Then, the computing power network transaction platform sends the transaction information to the computing power network control layer, and updates the corresponding resource information.
+- Finally, the computing power network transaction platform will monitor the resource usage until the end of the transaction contract. The computing power network transaction platform will then terminate the service and release the associated resources.
+
+Emerging technologies such as blockchain are recommended to be used in the service layer to realize new functions such as distributed ledgers and anonymous transactions.
+
+### **10.4 CPN orchestration and management layer**
+
+The CPN orchestration and management layer can realize orchestration, security, modelling, and operation administration and maintenance (OAM) functions for CPN:
+
+- The CPN orchestrator is in charge of the orchestration and management of CPN resources and services.
+- CPN security module is responsible for applying security related controls to mitigate the security threats in CPN environments.
+- Computing power modelling module is used to computing power modelling according to various services.
+- Computing power OAM realizes the operation, administration and maintenance.
+
+# **11 Security considerations**
+
+The following are the security considerations for CPN:
+
+- 1) CPN is required to provide mechanisms to support trusted transactions.
+- 2) CPN is required to provide mechanisms to ensure the security of applications published by third-parties.
+- 3) CPN is required to provide security mechanisms to authorize and authenticate computing power providers.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2613
+
+(03/2010)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Future networks
+
+# --- **General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613**
+
+# **General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613 specifies the technical architecture of a public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) which can meet all the requirements described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2601, including the format of the data link frame and network packet, as well as the OAM and interworking methods with other packet bearer networks.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2613 | 2010-03-16 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+FPBN, interworking, link layer, network layer, OAM, PTDN, routing.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2010
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions and terms..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations..... | 2 |
+| 5 Reference model ..... | 3 |
+| 5.1 Connection-oriented mode ..... | 4 |
+| 5.2 Connectionless mode..... | 5 |
+| 6 Link layer..... | 5 |
+| 6.1 Data framing..... | 5 |
+| 6.2 Point-to-point multiplex ..... | 6 |
+| 6.3 Frame format and field definitions ..... | 6 |
+| 6.4 Control and management..... | 11 |
+| 7 Network layer ..... | 12 |
+| 7.1 Network address ..... | 12 |
+| 7.2 Packet format and field definitions..... | 12 |
+| 7.3 Control and management..... | 17 |
+| 8 Access and interworking ..... | 17 |
+| 8.1 Interworking ..... | 17 |
+| 8.2 General functions..... | 18 |
+| 8.3 Components..... | 19 |
+| 9 OAM..... | 19 |
+| 9.1 Connectionless mode..... | 19 |
+| 9.2 Connection-oriented mode ..... | 20 |
+| Bibliography..... | 22 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613
+
+# General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+Public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) is a packet data network designed for the NGN transport stratum, which should be secure, trustworthy, controllable, and manageable. It can meet all the requirements described in [ITU-T Y.2601]. This Recommendation defines the technical architecture of PTDN, including the format of the data link frame and network packet, as well as the OAM and interworking methods with other packet bearer networks.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T I.432] Recommendation ITU-T I.432 (1993), *B-ISDN user-network interface – Physical layer specification*.
+- [ITU-T Q.921] Recommendation ITU-T Q.921 (1997), *ISDN user-network interface – Data link layer specification*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2601] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2601 (2006), *Fundamental characteristics and requirements of future packet based networks*.
+- [IEEE 802.3] IEEE 802.3 (in force), *Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access method and Physical Layer Specifications*.
+
+# 3 Definitions and terms
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+- 3.1.1 address** [ITU-T Y.2601]: An address is the identifier for a specific termination point and is used for routing to this termination point.
+- 3.1.2 control plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+- 3.1.3 data plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+- 3.1.4 identifier** [ITU-T Y.2601]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects).
+
+NOTE – Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization. They can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private identifiers are normally not disclosed to third parties).
+
+**3.1.5 management plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to manage entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this management.
+
+**3.1.6 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2611]: A name is the identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element) that may be resolved/translated into an address.
+
+**3.1.7 user plane** [ITU-T Y.2601]: A classification for objects whose principal function is to provide transfer of end-user information: user information may be user-to-user content, or private user-to-user data.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)**: A packet data network designed for the NGN transport stratum, which should be secure, trustworthy, controllable, and manageable, can meet all the requirements described in [ITU-T Y.2601]. PTDN is a hierarchical network, which can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------------------|
+| BECN | Backward Explicit Congestion Notification |
+| DLCI | Data Link Connection Identifier |
+| FDI | Forward Defect Indication |
+| FECN | Forward Explicit Congestion Notification |
+| GFP | Generic Framing Procedure |
+| HDLC | High-level Data Link Control |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IWF | InterWorking Function |
+| LCN | Logical Channel Number |
+| LC-ID | Logical Channel ID |
+| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance |
+| PDN | Public packet Data Network |
+| PTDN | Public packet Telecommunication Data Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| TE | Terminal Equipment |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| VC | Virtual Circuit/Virtual Connection |
+
+# 5 Reference model
+
+The reference model of PTDN is shown in Figure 5-1.
+
+
+
+Y.2613(2010)\_F5-1
+
+Figure 5-1: Reference model of PTDN. The diagram illustrates a hierarchical network structure. At the top is the 'Core network' containing two SR (Service Router) nodes connected by a dashed line. Below it is the 'Aggregation network' with two SR nodes connected by a dashed line. At the bottom is the 'Access network' with two SR nodes connected by a dashed line. A central 'ADT' (Adaptation and Distribution Terminal) node is connected to the Access network SR nodes. 'ME' (Management Element) is connected to the Core network SR nodes via interface 'M'. 'ED' (Edge Device) is connected to the Access network SR nodes via interface 'R'. 'ED' is also connected to 'Other networks' and 'End system' via interface 'E'. The entire structure is labeled 'PTDN'. The diagram also shows 'Other networks' and 'End system' connected to the 'ED' nodes via interface 'E'.
+
+**Figure 5-1 – Reference model of PTDN**
+
+PTDN is a hierarchical network, which consists of access network, aggregation network, and core network. Moreover, access network, aggregation network and core network are hierarchical networks too, which can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+SRs (PTDN nodes) connect each other by Interface R.
+
+MEs (management elements) connect to the SRs by Interface M.
+
+EDs (edge devices) are located on the boundary of PTDN. Through Interface E, an ED can serve as an adapter between the end systems or other networks (e.g., IP network, ATM network) and PTDN network. Thus above the EDs, there are the trustable network domains. EDs can also support the mobility of end systems or other networks.
+
+ADTs (address translators) are responsible for the mapping or translation of IP addresses (or other network addresses) to PTDN addresses. ADTs cooperate with EDs to achieve the activities of address mapping/translation by Interface T.
+
+PTDN supports connection-oriented mode and connectionless mode.
+
+## 5.1 Connection-oriented mode
+
+### 5.1.1 Control flow in connection-oriented mode
+
+In connection-oriented mode, the control flow can set up or tear down the virtual circuit for the data plane, as shown in Figure 5-2.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ subgraph Node1
+ N1[Network layer]
+ L1[Link layer]
+ P1[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node2
+ N2[Network layer]
+ L2[Link layer]
+ P2[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node3
+ N3[Network layer]
+ L3[Link layer]
+ P3[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node4
+ N4[Network layer]
+ L4[Link layer]
+ P4[Physical layer]
+ end
+ N1 <--> N2
+ N2 <--> N3
+ N3 <--> N4
+ L1 <--> L2
+ L2 <--> L3
+ L3 <--> L4
+ P1 <--> P2
+ P2 <--> P3
+ P3 <--> P4
+```
+
+Diagram of control flow transportation in connection-oriented mode. It shows four nodes, each with three layers: Network layer, Link layer, and Physical layer. Control flow is indicated by double-headed arrows between corresponding layers of adjacent nodes: Network layer to Network layer, Link layer to Link layer, and Physical layer to Physical layer.
+
+Where: $\longleftrightarrow$ control flow
+
+**Figure 5-2 – Control flow transportation in connection-oriented mode**
+
+### 5.1.2 Data flow in connection-oriented mode
+
+In connection-oriented mode, the data flows are forwarded in a logic channel in the link layer, as shown in Figure 5-3.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ subgraph Node1
+ N1[Network layer]
+ L1[Link layer]
+ P1[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node2
+ L2[Link layer]
+ P2[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node3
+ L3[Link layer]
+ P3[Physical layer]
+ end
+ subgraph Node4
+ N4[Network layer]
+ L4[Link layer]
+ P4[Physical layer]
+ end
+ N1 <--> N4
+ L1 <--> L2
+ L2 <--> L3
+ L3 <--> L4
+ P1 <--> P2
+ P2 <--> P3
+ P3 <--> P4
+```
+
+Diagram of data flow transportation in connection-oriented mode. It shows four nodes, each with three layers: Network layer, Link layer, and Physical layer. Data flow is indicated by a long double-headed arrow between the Network layers of the first and last nodes, and by double-headed arrows between corresponding layers of adjacent nodes: Link layer to Link layer and Physical layer to Physical layer.
+
+Where: $\longleftrightarrow$ data flow
+
+**Figure 5-3 – Data flow transportation in connection-oriented mode**
+
+## 5.2 Connectionless mode
+
+### 5.2.1 Control flows in connectionless mode
+
+In connectionless mode, the control flows are forwarded per-hop in the control plane of the network layer according to the source address and destination address, as shown in Figure 5-4.
+
+
+
+The diagram shows four vertical rectangles representing nodes. Each node is divided into three horizontal sections: 'Network layer' at the top, 'Link layer' in the middle, and 'Physical layer' at the bottom. Between the 'Network layer' sections of adjacent nodes, there are double-headed horizontal arrows. Within each node, there are single-headed horizontal arrows pointing from the 'Link layer' to the 'Physical layer' and from the 'Physical layer' back to the 'Link layer'.
+
+Diagram illustrating control flow transportation in connectionless mode. It shows four nodes, each with three layers: Network layer, Link layer, and Physical layer. Control flow is indicated by double-headed arrows between the Network layers of adjacent nodes, and single-headed arrows between the Link and Physical layers of each node.
+
+Where: $\longleftrightarrow$ control flow
+
+**Figure 5-4 – Control flow transportation in connectionless mode**
+
+### 5.2.2 Data flow in connectionless mode
+
+In connectionless mode, data flows are forwarded per-hop in the data plane of the network layer according to the source address and destination address, as shown in Figure 5-5.
+
+
+
+The diagram is identical in structure to Figure 5-4, showing four nodes with 'Network layer', 'Link layer', and 'Physical layer' sections. However, the legend below indicates that the double-headed arrows between 'Network layer' sections represent 'data flow'.
+
+Diagram illustrating data flow transportation in connectionless mode. It shows four nodes, each with three layers: Network layer, Link layer, and Physical layer. Data flow is indicated by double-headed arrows between the Network layers of adjacent nodes, and single-headed arrows between the Link and Physical layers of each node.
+
+Where: $\longleftrightarrow$ data flow
+
+**Figure 5-5 – Data flow transportation in connectionless mode**
+
+# 6 Link layer
+
+The link layer is used to provide point-to-point multiplexing and/or packet encapsulation. In connection-oriented mode, data packets are encapsulated and multiplexed based on LC-ID. In connectionless mode, link layer only implements data packets encapsulation.
+
+## 6.1 Data framing
+
+The packets are encapsulated into a frame before forwarding. There are three methods of encapsulation:
+
+- 1) The flag sequence delimiter encapsulation: HDLC adopts this technology, the flag is 01111110. The data packet and upper control signalling will be carried between two flags.
+- 2) Header error control, length delimiter encapsulation: GFP and ATM adopt this technology. Usage of this technology is described in clause 4.3 of [ITU-T I.432].
+- 3) Preamble and start frame delimiter encapsulation: The packets of Ethernet network will be encapsulated by this technology. Usage of this technology is described in [IEEE 802.3].
+
+Any kind of the encapsulation methods can be adopted in PTDN.
+
+## 6.2 Point-to-point multiplex
+
+The link layer uses the logical channel for each pair to support point-to-point multiplexing. The logical channel should be identified by the logical channel number, i.e., logical channel ID (LC-ID). LC-ID is locally valid and used in the connection-oriented mode.
+
+## 6.3 Frame format and field definitions
+
+To help understand the structure of the link layer frame format, the flag sequence delimiter encapsulation is used as an example here. According to this method of encapsulation, the link layer frame of PTDN contains four parts: flag sequence, frame header, information section, and cyclic redundancy check (CRC). The link layer frame format is shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the structure of a link layer frame. At the top, a horizontal bar is divided into five segments labeled 'Flag sequence', 'Frame header', 'Information section', 'CRC', and 'Flag sequence'. Below the 'Frame header' segment, a larger box provides a detailed view of its internal structure, showing a 'Control field (8 bits)' on the left and an 'Information field' on the right. Lines connect the 'Flag sequence' and 'Frame header' segments of the top bar to the corresponding parts of the detailed frame structure below.
+
+Diagram of the Link layer frame format. The top part shows a sequence of five fields: Flag sequence, Frame header, Information section, CRC, and Flag sequence. Below this, a detailed view of the Frame header shows it contains a Control field (8 bits) and an Information field.
+
+Figure 6-1 – Link layer frame format
+
+### 6.3.1 Flag sequence
+
+All frames start and end with the flag sequence consisting of one 0 bit followed by six contiguous 1 bits and one 0 bit. The flag preceding the frame header is defined as the opening flag. The flag following the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field is defined as the closing flag. The closing flag may also serve as the opening flag of the next frame, in some applications. However, all receivers must be able to accommodate receipt of one or more consecutive flags.
+
+### 6.3.2 Frame header
+
+The frame header contains the control field. The control field identifies the type of frame which will be either a command or response. Three types of control field formats will be specified: information transfer format (I format), supervisory functions format (S format), and control functions format (C format). The control field formats are as shown in Figure 6-2:
+
+| Frame type | Command | Response | 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
+|---------------------------------|---------|----------|---|---|---|-----|---|---|---|---|
+| Information transfer (I format) | I | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
+| | UI | | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
+| Supervisory (S format) | RR | RR | 0 | 0 | 0 | P/F | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
+| Link control (C format) | SABME | | 0 | 1 | 1 | P | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+| | | DM | 0 | 0 | 0 | F | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+| | DISC | | 0 | 1 | 0 | P | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
+| | | UA | 0 | 1 | 1 | F | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
+| | | FRMR | 1 | 0 | 0 | F | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
+
+Figure 6-2 – Control field format
+
+**Poll/Final (P/F) bit:** The P/F bit serves a function in both command frames and response frames. In command frames, the P/F bit is referred to as the P bit. In response frames, it is referred to as the F bit. The P bit set to 1 is used by a data link layer entity to solicit (poll) a response frame from the peer data link layer entity. The F bit set to 1 is used by a data link layer entity to indicate the response frame transmitted as a result of a soliciting (poll) command.
+
+For the procedure for the use of the P/F bit, refer to clause 5 of [ITU-T Q.921].
+
+#### **6.3.2.1 I format**
+
+The information transfer (I) format is used to perform the connection-oriented or connectionless information transfer between layer 3 entities. The connection-oriented information is carried by connection-oriented information transfer frame, and the connectionless information is carried by the connectionless information transfer frame. The connection-oriented and connectionless information transfer frame are identified by control field, e.g., if the information from other networks (e.g., IP network) is confirmed to be transferred by connection-oriented mode based on the access control table, the value of control field is set to '00000000'; if the information from other networks (e.g., IP network) is confirmed to be transferred by connectionless mode based on the access control table, the value of control field is set to '00000011'.
+
+#### **6.3.2.2 S format**
+
+The supervisory (S) format is used to perform data link supervisory control functions such as: indicating whether the link is ready or not. A timer is used to determine whether to send an S frame, the S frame is sent if the timer expires. If the value of this timer is set to 0, then the S frame does not have to be sent. The timer represents the maximum time allowed without frames being exchanged. The default value of the timer is 10 seconds.
+
+#### **6.3.2.3 C format**
+
+The control (C) format is used to provide additional data link control functions. The related commands and responses contain the SABME, DM, DISC, UA and FRMR. The detailed information is described in clause 6.4.3.
+
+#### **6.3.3 Information section**
+
+Information section of a frame, when present, follows the control field (see clause 6.3.2) and precedes cyclic redundancy check (see clause 6.3.4 below). The contents of the information section consist of an integer number of octets. Depending upon the transmission mode, the information section structure is also different. The structure of the connection-oriented information field is specified in clause 6.3.3.1, and the structure of the connectionless information field is specified in clause 6.3.3.2.
+
+#### **6.3.3.1 Connection-oriented information section**
+
+There are two types of frames in connection-oriented information section: data frame and control frame. Both types of frames are encapsulated as I format frame, and the value of the control field should be set to 00000000B.
+
+The connection-oriented frame structure is specified in Figure 6-3. The value of control field should be set 00000000B, and the connection-oriented information section contains the address field and the information subfield.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the structure of a connection-oriented frame. It is organized into three hierarchical levels:
+
+- Top Level (Frame Structure):** A horizontal bar divided into five segments: '01111110', 'Frame head', 'Information section', 'CRC', and '01111110'.
+- Second Level (Detailed Frame Fields):** A horizontal bar below the top level, connected by lines. It is divided into three segments: 'Control field 00000000' (connected to the first '01111110'), 'Address field (24 bits)' (connected to 'Frame head'), and 'Information subfield' (connected to 'Information section').
+- Third Level (Address Field Sub-fields):** A horizontal bar below the second level, connected by lines. It is divided into five segments: 'LC-ID (20 bits)', 'Reserved (1 bit)', 'OAM (1 bit)', 'FECN (1 bit)', and 'BECN (1 bit)'. These are all connected to the 'Address field (24 bits)' of the level above.
+
+Diagram of the connection-oriented frame structure showing the hierarchy of fields from the frame level down to the address field level.
+
+Y.2613(2010)\_F6-3
+
+**Figure 6-3 – The connection-oriented frame structure**
+
+##### 6.3.3.1.1 Address field
+
+The address field contains the logical channel ID (LC-ID), Reserved, OAM indication, forward and backward explicit congestion notifications (FECN and BECN). The length of the address field is 24 bits.
+
+###### 6.3.3.1.1.1 Logical channel ID (LC-ID) field
+
+LC-ID identifies a logic channel in virtual circuit. LC-ID specifies a data link layer entity to/from which information is delivered/received and which is to be carried in frames by data link layer entities. The value of LC-ID is locally valid. The value of LC-ID is distributed by upper layer control signalling (e.g., [b-ITU-T Q.931]). The length of LC-ID field is 20 bits.
+
+###### 6.3.3.1.1.2 Reserved field
+
+The reserved field is set to 0.
+
+###### 6.3.3.1.1.3 OAM field
+
+The OAM field is used to indicate the OAM frame, this field is set to 1 to indicate the frame is an OAM frame; this field is set to 0 to indicate the frame is a user frame. The length of the OAM field is 1 bit.
+
+###### 6.3.3.1.1.4 Forward explicit congestion notification field (FECN)
+
+This field is set by a congested network to notify the user that congestion avoidance procedures should be initiated, where applicable, for traffic in the direction of the frame carrying the FECN indication. This field is set to 1 to indicate to the receiving end-system that the frames it receives have encountered congested resources. This field may be used by destination controlled transmitter rate adjustment. The length of FECN field is 1 bit.
+
+###### 6.3.3.1.1.5 Backward explicit congestion notification field (BECN)
+
+This field is set by a congested network to notify the user that congestion avoidance procedures should be initiated, where applicable, for traffic in the opposite direction of the frame carrying the BECN indicator. This field is set to 1 to indicate to the receiving end-system that the frames it transmits may encounter congested resources. This field may be used by source controlled transmitter rate adjustment. The length of BECN field is 1 bit.
+
+##### 6.3.3.1.2 Data frame structure
+
+If the value of LC-ID field is not equal to 0, the connection-oriented information frame is the data frame. The connection-oriented data frame structure is specified in Figure 6-4.
+
+
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet | |
+|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------|---------|----------|----------|-------|-----------------|
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | 1 | |
+| Control field(8) | | | | | | | | 2 | |
+| Upper LC-ID(8) | | | | | | | | 3 | } Address Field |
+| Middle LC-ID(8) | | | | | | | | 4 | |
+| Lower LC-ID(4) | | | | Rsvd(1) | OAM (1) | FECN (1) | BECN (1) | 5 | |
+| Information subfield | | | | | | | | 6 | |
+| | | | | | | | | N-3 | |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 1st octet | | | | | | | | N-2 | |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 2nd octet | | | | | | | | N-1 | |
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | N | |
+
+**Figure 6-4 – Connection-oriented data frame structure**
+
+##### 6.3.3.1.3 Control frame structure
+
+If the LC-ID field is equal to 0, the connection-oriented information frame is the control frame.
+
+The OAM, FECN and BECN fields are meaningless in the control frame. They should be set to 0 for transmission, ignored on reception. The connection-oriented control frame structure is specified in Figure 6-5.
+
+
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet | |
+|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|---------|---|---|---|-------|-----------------|
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | 1 | |
+| 00000000B (Control field) | | | | | | | | 2 | |
+| 00000000B (Upper LC-ID) | | | | | | | | 3 | } Address Field |
+| 00000000B (Middle LC-ID) | | | | | | | | 4 | |
+| 0000B (Lower LC-ID) | | | | Rsvd(1) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | |
+| Information subfield | | | | | | | | 6 | |
+| | | | | | | | | N-3 | |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 1st octet | | | | | | | | N-2 | |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 2nd octet | | | | | | | | N-1 | |
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | N | |
+
+**Figure 6-5 – Connection-oriented control frame structure**
+
+##### 6.3.3.1.4 Information subfield
+
+The information subfield consists of integer numbers of octets.
+
+#### 6.3.3.2 Connectionless information field
+
+The frames working in connectionless mode are encapsulated as UI frames whose control field value is equal to "00000011B". As an example using HDLC, the frame format in connectionless mode can be described as in Figure 6-6, where the flag field value should be equal to "01111110B":
+
+
+
+| | | | | |
+|----------|------------|-------------------|-----|----------|
+| 01111110 | Frame head | Information field | CRC | 01111110 |
+|----------|------------|-------------------|-----|----------|
+
+
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+| Control field
(C) 8 bits | Control and data packet in
connectionless mode |
+|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | | | |
+|--------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet |
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | 1 |
+| Control(8) | | | | | | | | 2 |
+| Reserved(8) | | | | | | | | 3 |
+| Information subfield | | | | | | | | 4 |
+| | | | | | | | | |
+| | | | | | | | | N-3 |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 1st octet | | | | | | | | N-2 |
+| Frame check sequence (FCS) 2nd octet | | | | | | | | N-1 |
+| Flag(8) | | | | | | | | N |
+
+Diagram of Figure 6-6 showing frame format in connectionless mode. It includes a top-level sequence of fields, an expanded view of the frame head and information field, and a detailed octet-by-octet table.
+
+**Figure 6-6 – Frame format in connectionless mode**
+
+Connectionless information field contains reserved field and information subfield.
+
+##### 6.3.3.2.1 Reserved field
+
+The reserved field will be defined and used in the future. Now its value should be set to 0.
+
+##### 6.3.3.2.2 Information subfield
+
+The information subfield consists of integer numbers of octets. The content of information subfield is network packet, including packet header and payload.
+
+### 6.3.4 Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) field
+
+The CRC field will be a 16-bit sequence. It will be the ones complement of the sum (modulo 2) of:
+
+- a) the remainder of $x^k$ ( $x^{15} + x^{14} + x^{13} + x^{12} + x^{11} + x^{10} + x^9 + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ ) divided (modulo 2) by the generator polynomial $x^{16} + x^{12} + x^5 + 1$ , where $k$ is the number of bits in the frame existing between, but not including, the final bit of the opening flag and the first bit of the CRC, excluding bits inserted for transparency; and
+- b) the remainder of the division (modulo 2) by the generator polynomial $x^{16} + x^{12} + x^5 + 1$ , of the product of $x^{16}$ by the content of the frame existing between, but not including, the final bit of the opening flag and the first bit of the CRC, excluding bits inserted for transparency.
+
+As a typical implementation at the transmitter, the initial content of the register of the device computing the remainder of the division is preset to all 1s and is then modified by division by the generator polynomial (as described above) on the address, control and information fields; the ones complement of the resulting remainder is transmitted as the 16-bit CRC.
+
+As a typical implementation at the receiver, the initial content of the register of the device computing the remainder is preset to all 1s. The final remainder, after multiplication by $x^{16}$ and then division (modulo 2) by the generator polynomial $x^{16} + x^{12} + x^5 + 1$ of the serial incoming protected bits and the CRC, will be 0001110100001111 ( $x^{15}$ through $x^0$ , respectively) in the absence of transmission errors.
+
+## **6.4 Control and management**
+
+According to Figure 6-2, the control field identifies the type of frame which is either a command or a response. Control and management command/response includes information transfer command, link supervisory command/response, and link control command/response. The details are as shown below.
+
+### **6.4.1 Information transfer command**
+
+The information transfer command is to transport data packet. In connection-oriented mode, the function of the transfer command is to encapsulate and multiplex data packets. In connectionless mode, the function of transfer command is to encapsulate data packets.
+
+### **6.4.2 Link supervisory command and response**
+
+The link supervisory command and response is used to perform data link supervisory control functions.
+
+### **6.4.3 Link control command and response**
+
+#### **6.4.3.1 Set asynchronous balanced mode extended (SABME) command**
+
+The SABME unnumbered command is used to start multiple frame acknowledged operation.
+
+A data link layer entity confirms acceptance of an SABME command by the transmission at the first opportunity of a UA response. The transmission of an SABME command indicates the clearance of all exception conditions.
+
+#### **6.4.3.2 Disconnect (DISC) command**
+
+The DISC unnumbered command is used to terminate the multiple frame operation.
+
+No information field is permitted with the DISC command. The data link layer entity receiving the DISC command confirms the acceptance of a DISC command by the transmission of a UA response. The data link layer entity sending the DISC command terminates the multiple frame operation when it receives the acknowledging UA or DM response.
+
+#### **6.4.3.3 Disconnected mode (DM) response**
+
+The DM unnumbered response is used by a data link layer entity to report to its peer that the data link layer is in a state such that multiple frame operation cannot be performed. No information field is permitted with the DM response.
+
+#### **6.4.3.4 Unnumbered acknowledgement (UA) response**
+
+The UA unnumbered response is used by a data link layer entity to acknowledge the receipt and acceptance commands (SABME or DISC). Received commands are not processed until the UA response is transmitted. No information field is permitted with the UA response.
+
+#### **6.4.3.5 Frame reject (FRMR) response**
+
+The FRMR unnumbered response may be received by a data link layer entity as a report of an error condition not recoverable by retransmission of the identical frame.
+
+- The receipt of a command or response that is undefined;
+- The receipt of a frame with an information field which exceeds the maximum established length.
+
+# 7 Network layer
+
+The network layer is used to provide end-to-end communications. It is necessary to provide routing mechanisms to set up the end-to-end forwarding path. There are two types of modes supported in PTDN, the connectionless mode and the connection-oriented mode.
+
+In connectionless mode, a network node forwards packets according to the destination address based on the routing table.
+
+In the connection-oriented mode, a network node forwards data packets according to the virtual circuit. Control packet is forwarded according to the destination address.
+
+## 7.1 Network address
+
+In PTDN, network address is a kind of global public address, which can be used to implement the end-to-end data packets delivery.
+
+In the connection-oriented mode, network address can only be used in the control plane to establish a virtual circuit between the source and the destination, or to disconnect the existing virtual circuit.
+
+In connectionless mode, network address can be used in the control, management and data planes. In the control plane, network address is used to deliver control commands and responses. In the management plane, network address is used to deliver management commands and responses. Then in the data plane, data packets can be forwarded based on network address and the established routing table.
+
+In PTDN, network address structure is hierarchical, which at least includes Country ID, Region ID, Network Provider ID, and some extensive IDs. The length of PTDN address is variable.
+
+## 7.2 Packet format and field definitions
+
+### 7.2.1 Connectionless mode
+
+#### 7.2.1.1 Common fields
+
+The common fields should be included by all the PTDN packets, which contain version field, packet type field, address length field, source address field, and destination address field. The packet format is described in Figure 7-1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the packet format for connectionless mode. It shows a sequence of fields with their corresponding bit positions and octet counts. The bit positions are labeled 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 from left to right. The fields are: Version (1 octet), Packet type (1 octet), Address length (1 octet), Source address (N\*1+1 octets), and Destination address (N\*1+1+1 octets). The total length of the packet is N\*1+1+1+1+1 octets.
+
+| Field | Bit Position | Octet Count |
+|---------------------|--------------|-------------|
+| Version | 8 | 1 |
+| Packet type | 7 | 1 |
+| Address length | 6 | 1 |
+| Source address | 5 | N*1+1 |
+| Destination address | 4 | N*1+1+1 |
+
+Diagram of packet format in connectionless mode showing fields: Version, Packet type, Address length, Source address, and Destination address with bit positions and octet counts.
+
+Figure 7-1 – Packet format in the connectionless mode
+
+NOTE 1 – The position of source address field and destination address field in the data packet, control packet and management packet are different.
+
+NOTE 2 – The length of source address field and destination address field is defined by the address length field.
+
+##### 7.2.1.1.1 Version field
+
+The version field is used to identify the version of the PTDN packet. Now the Version field is set to 1. The length of the field is 4 bits.
+
+##### 7.2.1.1.2 Packet type field
+
+The packet type field is used to distinguish the control packet, management packet and data packet. The length of the field is 2 bits. The value of the packet type field is as follows:
+
+- 00 reserved
+- 01 control packet
+- 10 management packet
+- 11 data packet
+
+##### 7.2.1.1.3 Address length field
+
+The address length field is used to indicate the length of PTDN address. The address length field is 2 bits; the value of the address length is as follows:
+
+- 00 reserved
+- 01 the length of address is 64 bits
+- 10 the length of address is 96 bits
+- 11 the length of address is 128 bits
+
+##### 7.2.1.1.4 Source address field
+
+The source address field is the source address of the PTDN network. The length of the source address is indicated by the address length field.
+
+##### 7.2.1.1.5 Destination address field
+
+The destination address field is the destination address of the PTDN network. The length of the destination address is indicated by the address length field.
+
+When the packet is the multicast data packet, the destination address field is a multicast address.
+
+#### 7.2.1.2 Data packet
+
+The data packet structure is described in Figure 7-2.
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|---------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|---|---------------------|---|-------------------|---|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
+| Version(4) | | | | Packet type(2) | | Address length(2) | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| VPN identifier (1) | Multicast identifier (1) | Class service stream(2) | | Reserved(4) | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Upper Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Lower Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| TTL(6) | | | | | | Protection(2) | | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Extension header identifier (1) | Reserved(3) | | | Upper VPN number(4) | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Middle VPN number(8) | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Lower VPN number(8) | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Source address | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Payload | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Data packet structure**
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.1 VPN identifier field
+
+The VPN identifier field indicates the VPN packet. The VPN identifier field length is 1 bit. If the field is set to 1, the data packet is a VPN data packet. If it is set to 0, the data packet is not a VPN data packet.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.2 Multicast identifier field
+
+The multicast identifier field indicates multicast packet. The length of multicast identifier field is 1 bit. If it is set to 1, the user packet is a multicast packet. If it is set to 0, the user packet is not a multicast packet.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.3 Class service stream field
+
+The class service stream field is used to distinguish the different class service streams. The length of the field is 2 bits. There are four classes of service stream.
+
+- 00 highest class service (full resource guaranteed)
+- 01 second high level class service (partial resource guaranteed)
+- 10 third high level class service (partial resource guaranteed)
+- 11 "best effort" service (no resource guaranteed)
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.4 Payload length field
+
+The payload length field is used to indicate payload length in octets. The length of the field is 16 bits.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.5 TTL field
+
+The TTL field indicates the maximum time the user packet is allowed to remain in PTDN. If the value of the field is zero, the user packet must be discarded. The field is decremented by each network node when the packet passes through. The length of the TTL field is 6 bits.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.6 Protection field
+
+The protection field is used to indicate classes of routes. The length of the protection field is 2 bits. There are four route classes:
+
+- 00 the main route
+- 11 the first standby route
+- 01 the second standby route
+- 10 the dynamic route
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.7 Extension header identifier field
+
+The extension header identifier field indicates whether there is an extension packet header. If the value of the field is set to 0, there is no extension header. If the value of the field is set to 1, it indicates there is an extension header. The length of the extension header identifier field is 1 bit.
+
+###### 7.2.1.2.7.1 Extension packet format
+
+The extension packet format is described in Figure 7-3.
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet | | | | | | | |
+|----------------|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
+| Next
Ext(1) | Type(7) | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | |
+| Length(8) | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | |
+| Value | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | |
+
+Figure 7-3 – Extension packet structure
+
+Next extension identifier (1 bit):
+
+=0 last extension packet;
+
+=1 more extension packet.
+
+Type(7 bits): The extension packet type.
+
+Length(8 bits): The length of the extension packet.
+
+Value: The maximum length is 256 bytes.
+
+###### 7.2.1.2.7.2 Fragment extension packet
+
+The fragment extension packet format is described in Figure 7-4.
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | | | |
+|--------------------|---------|-------|--------------------|---|---|---|---|-------|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet |
+| Ext(1) | Type(7) | | | | | | | 1 |
+| Length(8) | | | | | | | | 2 |
+| Resv(2) | | MF(1) | Fragment offset(5) | | | | | 3 |
+| Fragment offset(8) | | | | | | | | 4 |
+
+**Figure 7-4 – Fragment extension packet format**
+
+When the value of the type is equal to "0000100", it indicates that the extension packet is the fragment extension packet.
+
+Fragment offset (13 bits): A byte count from the start of the packet, the data packet is split only by the edge device. The middle transport device does not process the fragment packet.
+
+###### 7.2.1.2.7.3 OAM extension packet
+
+The OAM extension packet format is described in Figure 7-5.
+
+
+
+| | | | | | | | | |
+|--------------|---------|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octet |
+| Ext(1) | Type(7) | | | | | | | 1 |
+| Length(8) | | | | | | | | 2 |
+| OAM messages | | | | | | | | .... |
+
+**Figure 7-5 – OAM extension packet format**
+
+When the value of the type is equal to "0000101", it indicates that the extension packet is the OAM extension packet.
+
+Length(8 bits): The length of OAM extension packet.
+
+OAM message: There are several types of OAM messages: Event indications, Loopback indication, and Performance indication. See clause 9.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.8 Reserved field
+
+The field is reserved for future use, now its value is set to 0.
+
+##### 7.2.1.2.9 VPN number field
+
+VPN number field is used to identify a VPN. The VPN number is unique in PTDN. The length of the VPN number field is 20 bits.
+
+#### 7.2.1.3 Control packet
+
+The control packet structure is described in Figure 7-6:
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------------|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | | | |
+| Version
(4 bits) | | | | Packet type
(2 bits) | | Address length
(2 bits) | | | | | |
+| Message type (8 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Message length (16 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Source address (64, 96 or 128 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address (64, 96 or 128 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Message content (variable) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+**Figure 7-6 – Control packet structure**
+
+A control packet is identified by setting the packet type field to "01".
+
+##### 7.2.1.3.1 Message type field
+
+The message type field is used to distinguish different types of messages that accomplish different control functions.
+
+##### 7.2.1.3.2 Message length field
+
+The message length field is used to describe the length of message content.
+
+##### 7.2.1.3.3 Message content field
+
+The message content field adopts the TLV format.
+
+#### 7.2.1.4 Management packet
+
+The management packet structure is described in Figure 7-7:
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|------------------------------------------|---|---|---|-------------------------|---|----------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | | | | |
+| Version
(4 bits) | | | | Packet type
(2 bits) | | Address length
(2 bits) | | | | | |
+| Message type (8 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Message length (16 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Source address (64, 96 or 128 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address (64, 96 or 128 bits) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Message content (variable) | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+**Figure 7-7 – Management packet structure**
+
+A management packet is identified by setting the packet type field to "10".
+
+##### 7.2.1.4.1 Message type field
+
+The message type field is used to distinguish different types of messages that accomplish different management functions.
+
+##### 7.2.1.4.2 Message length field
+
+The message length field in the header of management packet is used to describe the length of message content.
+
+##### 7.2.1.4.3 Message content field
+
+The message content field adopts the TLV format.
+
+### **7.2.2 Connection-oriented mode**
+
+#### **7.2.2.1 Data packet**
+
+In connection-oriented mode, data packets are transferred through the virtual circuits. See clause 6.3.3.1.
+
+#### **7.2.2.2 Control packet**
+
+Control packets in control plane are carried on the specific packet with LC-ID = 0, see clause 6.3.3.1.3.
+
+Control packets adopt TLV format.
+
+#### **7.2.2.3 Management packet**
+
+Management packets in management plane are carried on the specific virtual circuit.
+
+Management packets adopt TLV format.
+
+## **7.3 Control and management**
+
+In connection-oriented mode, middle PTDN nodes have only control plane and management plane in network layer. In connectionless mode, there are three planes in the network layer: data plane, control plane and management plane.
+
+The control plane of the network layer provides VPN and multicast control functions, such as establishment and removal. The management plane of the network layer provides device configuration, performance management, security, and so on.
+
+Detailed message definition will be defined by other Recommendations.
+
+## **8 Access and interworking**
+
+## **8.1 Interworking**
+
+The purpose of interworking between PTDN and PDN is to allow one or both of:
+
+- a) Transportation of PDN traffic over a PTDN network; and
+- b) Customers on either type of network to communicate with one another.
+
+The need to transport PDN traffic over a PTDN network arises when network operators use a core PTDN infrastructure to provide multiple services. There is also a need for PTDN and PDN terminals to be able to communicate directly.
+
+Two interworking types between PTDN and PDN networks are defined; service interworking and network interworking. Service interworking applies when a PTDN terminal equipment (TE) interacts with an PDN terminal equipment (TE); the PTDN TE does not perform any PDN functions and the PDN TE does not perform any PTDN functions. All interworking is performed by an interworking function (IWF).
+
+In the case of network interworking, the PTDN will provide the transparent transport service for the other packet data network, as described in Figure 8-1, and the packet data network on the other side should be of the same type.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Network interworking diagram. A central oval labeled 'PTDN' is connected by solid lines to two ovals on either side, 'PDN A' and 'PDN B'. Vertical dashed lines separate the PTDN from the PDNs. Below 'PDN A' is a rectangle labeled 'TE A', and below 'PDN B' is a rectangle labeled 'TE B'. Solid lines connect each PDN to its respective TE.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Network interworking**
+
+In the case of service interworking, the service provided by PTDN will interwork with the service provided by the other packet data network, as described in Figure 8-2. The establishment and release of interworking connections in the involved networks is carried out by the control plane (C-plane). Once a connection through the interworking function (IWF) has been established, either by the management plane (M-plane) or by the C-plane, the user data is then subject to the interworking rules of the data plane (D-plane).
+
+
+
+Figure 8-2: Service interworking diagram. A central rectangle is divided into two horizontal sections: 'C Plane' (top) and 'D Plane' (bottom). Above this rectangle is the label 'IWF'. To the left of the rectangle is an oval labeled 'PTDN', and to the right is an oval labeled 'PDN'. Below 'PTDN' is a rectangle labeled 'PTDN Terminal A', and below 'PDN' is a rectangle labeled 'PDN Terminal B'. Solid lines connect each oval to its terminal and to both the C and D planes of the IWF. Dashed lines connect the C Plane of the IWF to the PTDN and PDN ovals.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Service interworking**
+
+## 8.2 General functions
+
+In the data plane, the main function is to encapsulate and decapsulate the packets according to the packet formats of the PTDN network or PDN network; then it can appropriately implement the mapping between the PTDN network address and PDN network address with the marking of the characteristic information fields in the packet header. For the network interworking, a nesting PTDN packet header should be encapsulated into the original PDN network packet header as defined in Figure 8-1. For the service interworking, however, the PDN packet headers should be appropriately mapped into the PTDN packet headers as defined in Figure 8-2. It requires that the traffic contracts and QoS commitments between the PDN network and the PTDN network should be taken into consideration in the forwarding process. If the traffic from PDN network to PTDN network exceeds what is required in traffic contracts, the IWF will become congested, and data will be discarded.
+
+The IWF should generate and monitor the OAM message. Any failure in the PTDN network must be detected by the IWF and may be mapped to the forward defect indication (FDI) syntax of the PDN network.
+
+In the control plane, the main function is to correctly generate and maintain the mapping address table between PDN network and PTDN network.
+
+## **8.3 Components**
+
+The IWF should include the control and management components and forwarding components.
+
+### **8.3.1 Control and management components**
+
+Control and management components should correctly generate and maintain the address mapping table, deal with the requests from edge devices locating the boundary between the PDN network and PTDN network at the same administrator domain, and then respond with the matching address mapping item.
+
+There may be two ways to generate the address mapping table. One way is that IWF learns the address mapping item by the active register. The other one is that IWF learns about it from other IWFs.
+
+A refresh mechanism is recommended to validate the item in the address mapping table.
+
+An aggregation mechanism is recommended to reduce the size of the address mapping table on the control entity.
+
+### **8.3.2 Forwarding components**
+
+Forwarding components should appropriately implement the mapping between the PDN network address and PTDN network address according to the address mapping table. Forwarding components can obtain the matching address mapping item by sending the requests to the control components at the same administrator domain.
+
+Caching mechanism is recommended to reduce the latency of searching the matching address mapping item.
+
+# **9 OAM**
+
+The OAM functions in PTDN include event indication, loopback and performance monitoring.
+
+The following clauses introduce different OAM procedures respectively in both the connection-oriented mode and the connectionless mode.
+
+## **9.1 Connectionless mode**
+
+### **9.1.1 OAM functions**
+
+The fixed routing in PTDN ensures OAM messages are delivered through the same path in both communication directions at the network layer. It allows any connection point between the two end-points to check and locate errors in both directions, and get performance parameters.
+
+#### **9.1.1.1 Event indications**
+
+When a network node notices that there is congestion or quality drop on a link, it should send an OAM event report to the routing system. After the routing system monitors the indication message, it may take related action according to the configuration, such as to initiate a process of a link switching. An event indication message is composed of an event type and the event occurrence location, etc.
+
+#### **9.1.1.2 Loopback indication**
+
+The network layer loopback is achieved by inserting a message that includes loopback information at a point and returned (or loopback) at another point along a fixed path. The loopback message loops at a certain point according to the system commands or the information in the loop message.
+
+The information carried in the loopback message includes flag fields, message fields related to the sender and receiver, the loop indication fields that indicate either loopback message or not, the loop location fields, etc.
+
+#### **9.1.1.3 Performance indication**
+
+Within the network layer, the end-to-end continuity check function is provided by sending continuity check packets periodically.
+
+The continuity check packets are not processed but transmitted at the middle network nodes.
+
+The performance monitoring at the end-to-end or at some segment monitors the performance, e.g., packet transmission delay is provided by inserting monitoring packets at the related end points or the end point of this segment.
+
+### **9.1.2 Carrier modes**
+
+The OAM messages are transmitted at the data plane or the control plane in the connectionless mode.
+
+### **9.1.3 OAM messages**
+
+OAM messages adopt the TLV format. There are several types of OAM messages: event indications, loopback indication, and performance indication. A different OAM function has a different OAM message format. The detailed message formats will be defined in future Recommendations.
+
+## **9.2 Connection-oriented mode**
+
+### **9.2.1 Functions**
+
+OAM messages are delivered through the virtual circuit (VC) in both communication directions. They allow any connection point between the two end-points to check and locate errors in both directions, and get performance parameters.
+
+#### **9.2.1.1 Event indications**
+
+When a network node notices that a packet transmission interface has failed or is congested, the network node will confirm the source address of the packet according to the failure information table and then send a failure report to the source end or routing system monitor. After the routing system monitor gets the indication message, it may take related action according to the configuration, such as to initiate a process of a link switch. The indication message should contain event type and the event occurrence location (node address and interface number).
+
+#### **9.2.1.2 Loopback indication**
+
+The data link layer loopback is achieved by inserting a message that includes loopback information at a point and returned (or loopback) at another point along a virtual circuit. The loopback message loops at a certain point according to the system commands or the information in the loop message.
+
+The information carried in the loopback message includes flag fields, message fields related to the sender and receiver, the loop indication fields that indicate either loopback message or not, the loop location fields, etc.
+
+#### **9.2.1.3 Performance indication**
+
+Within the data link layer, the logical channel status check function is provided by sending the status enquiry command periodically. The purpose of the logical channel status check is to indicate the status of existing logical channel at the interface.
+
+The performance monitoring at the logical channel or at some segment monitors the performance, e.g., frame transmission delay is provided by inserting monitoring frames at the related end points or the end point of this segment.
+
+### **9.2.2 Carrier modes**
+
+The OAM message is transmitted through a virtual circuit in the connection-oriented mode; it may be transmitted in a user data channel with a logical channel number (LC-ID) which is the same as that of the user frame; alternatively, it may be transmitted in a control channel.
+
+### **9.2.3 OAM messages**
+
+OAM messages adopt the TLV format. There are several types of OAM messages: event indications, loopback indication, and performance indication. A different OAM function has a different OAM message format. The detailed message formats will be defined in future Recommendations.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+The following documents contain information that may be valuable to the reader of this Recommendation. They provide additional information about topics covered within this Recommendation, but are not essential for an understanding of this Recommendation.
+
+- [b-ITU-T G.7041] Recommendation ITU-T G.7041/Y.1303 (2008), *Generic framing procedure (GFP)*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.8010] Recommendation ITU-T G.8010/Y.1306 (2004), *Architecture of Ethernet layer networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.8031] Recommendation ITU-T G.8031/Y.1342 (2009), *Ethernet linear protection switching*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.322] Recommendation ITU-T I.322 (1999), *Generic protocol reference model for telecommunication networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.326] Recommendation ITU-T I.326 (2003), *Functional architecture of transport networks based on ATM*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.330] Recommendation ITU-T I.330 (1988), *ISDN numbering and addressing principles*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.365.1] Recommendation ITU-T I.365.1 (1993), *B-ISDN ATM adaptation layer sublayers: Frame relaying service specific convergence sublayer (FR-SSCS)*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.365.2] Recommendation ITU-T I.365.2 (1995), *B-ISDN ATM adaptation layer sublayers: Service-specific coordination function to provide the connection-oriented network service*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.365.3] Recommendation ITU-T I.365.3 (1995), *B-ISDN ATM adaptation layer sublayers: Service-specific coordination function to provide the connection-oriented transport service*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.365.4] Recommendation ITU-T I.365.4 (1996), *B-ISDN ATM adaptation layer sublayers: Service-specific convergence sublayer for HDLC applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.630] Recommendation ITU-T I.630 (1999), *ATM protection switching*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.922] Recommendation ITU-T Q.922 (1992), *ISDN data link layer specification for frame mode bearer services*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.931] Recommendation ITU-T Q.931 (1998), *ISDN user-network interface layer 3 specification for basic call control*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.933] Recommendation ITU-T Q.933 (2003), *Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 1 (DSS1) – Signalling specifications for frame mode switched and permanent virtual connection control and status monitoring*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.25] Recommendation ITU-T X.25 (1996), *Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) for terminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public data networks by dedicated circuit*.
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.36] Recommendation ITU-T X.36 (2003), *Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-Terminating Equipment (DCE) for public data networks providing frame relay data transmission service by dedicated circuit.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.37] Recommendation ITU-T X.37 (1995), *Encapsulation in X.25 packets of various protocols including frame relay.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.45] Recommendation ITU-T X.45 (1996), *Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) for terminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public data networks, designed for efficiency at higher speeds.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.121] Recommendation ITU-T X.121 (2000), *International numbering plan for public data networks.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.124] Recommendation ITU-T X.124 (1999), *Arrangements for the interworking of the E.164 and X.121 numbering plans for frame relay and ATM networks.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.125] Recommendation ITU-T X.125 (1998), *Procedure for the notification of the assignment of international network identification codes for public frame relay data networks and ATM networks numbered under the E.164 numbering plan.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.136] Recommendation ITU-T X.136 (1997), *Accuracy and dependability performance values for public data networks when providing international packet-switched services.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.137] Recommendation ITU-T X.137 (1997), *Availability performance values for public data networks when providing international packet-switched services.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.200] Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994) | ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.212] Recommendation ITU-T X.212 (1995) | ISO/IEC 8886:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Data Link service definition.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.213] Recommendation ITU-T X.213 (2001) | ISO/IEC 8348:2002, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Network service definition.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.323] Recommendation ITU-T X.323 (1988), *General arrangements for interworking between Packet-Switched Public Data Networks (PSPDNs).*
+- [b-ITU-T X.371] Recommendation ITU-T X.371/Y.1402 (2001), *General arrangements for interworking between Public Data Networks and the Internet.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1001 (2000), *IP framework – A framework for convergence of telecommunications network and IP network technologies.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1231] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1231 (2000), *IP Access Network Architecture.*
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1251] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1251 (2002), *General architectural model for interworking*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2611] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2611 (2006), *High-level architecture of future packet-based networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2612] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2612 (2009), *Generic requirements and framework of addressing, routing and forwarding in future, packet-based networks*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 8802-3] ISO/IEC 8802-3:2000, *Information technology – Telecommunications and information exchange between systems – Local and metropolitan area networks – Specific requirements – Part 3: Carrier sense multiple access with collision detection (CSMA/CD) access method and physical layer specifications*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2614
+
+(08/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Smart ubiquitous networks
+
+# --- **Network reliability in public telecommunication data networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2614
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, followed by "International Telecommunication Union" in a smaller font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2614**
+
+# **Network reliability in public telecommunication data networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2614 identifies the objectives, architecture and mechanisms for network reliability in public packet telecommunication data networks (PTDNs), including a description of link protection, trail protection, network failure detection, protection switching trigger and protection coordination mechanisms.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2614 | 2011-08-06 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+FPBN, link protection, PTDN, reliability, trail protection.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|--------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Terms and definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Network reliability objectives..... | 3 |
+| | 5.1 Switching time..... | 3 |
+| | 5.2 Hold-off time ..... | 3 |
+| | 5.3 Protection types ..... | 3 |
+| | 5.4 Switching types ..... | 3 |
+| | 5.5 Operation types..... | 3 |
+| | 5.6 Manual protection..... | 4 |
+| | 5.7 Switch initiation criteria ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Network reliability architecture ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.1 Link protection ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.2 Trail protection ..... | 4 |
+| | 6.3 Switch types..... | 5 |
+| | 6.4 Operation types..... | 5 |
+| | 6.5 Network failure detection mechanism..... | 6 |
+| | 6.6 Protection switching trigger mechanism ..... | 6 |
+| 7 | Link protection ..... | 6 |
+| 8 | Trail protection ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.1 Dual path routing model..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 Shortest path routing model..... | 8 |
+| | 8.3 Alternative routing model..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Protection coordination mechanism ..... | 8 |
+| 10 | Security considerations..... | 9 |
+| | Appendix I – Ear decomposition ..... | 10 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+# Introduction
+
+Network reliability in public telecommunication data networks (PTDN) shall be provided using link protection and trail protection mechanisms. In both protection mechanisms, two of protection types, 1:1 and 1:n protection are considered. In the trail protection mechanism, three routing models can be implemented.
+
+Furthermore, three routing models, dual path routing model, shortest path routing model and alternative routing model, can be used to implement the trail protection in PTDN.
+
+- The dual path routing model pre-calculates two disjoint paths based on ear decomposition, to provide 1:1 protection, from the source node to the destination node based on the network topology and resource information. These are the working path and the protection path.
+- The shortest path routing model and the alternative routing model work together to provide 1:n protection.
+- The alternative routing model can provide 1:n protection by itself. It can calculate several paths. One of them works as the working path, while the remaining paths will be protection paths.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2614
+
+# Network reliability in public telecommunication data networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation identifies the objectives, architecture and mechanisms for network reliability in public packet telecommunication data networks (PTDNs), including a description of link protection, trail protection, network failure detection, protection switching trigger and protection coordination mechanisms.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2601] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2601 (2006), *Fundamental characteristics and requirements of future packet based networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2611] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2611 (2006), *High-level architecture of future packet-based networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2612] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2612 (2009), *Generic requirements and framework of addressing, routing and forwarding in future, packet-based networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2613] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613 (2010), *General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network*.
+
+## 3 Terms and definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 bidirectional protection switching** [b-ITU-T I.630]: A protection switching architecture in which, for a unidirectional failure, both directions (of the "trail", "subnetwork connection", etc.), including the affected direction and the unaffected direction, are switched to protection.
+
+**3.1.2 hold-off time** [b-ITU-T G.870]: The time between declaration of signal degrade or signal fail, and the initialization of the protection switching algorithm.
+
+**3.1.3 manual protection** [b-ITU-T M.2102]: Recovery is initiated by forced or manual switching to the alternative trail; return to original configuration is done by forced or manual switching to normal.
+
+**3.1.4 non-revertive (protection) operation** [b-ITU-T G.870]: A protection switching operation, where the transport and selection of the normal traffic signal does not return to the working transport entity if the switch requests are terminated.
+
+**3.1.5 protection switching** [b-ITU-T I.630]: A network survivability technique with dedicated protection resource allocation policy.
+
+**3.1.6 public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)** [ITU-T Y.2613]: A packet data network designed for the NGN transport stratum, which should be secure, trustworthy, controllable, and manageable, can meet all the requirements described in [ITU-T Y.2601]. PTDN is a hierarchical network, which can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+**3.1.7 revertive (protection) operation** [b-ITU-T G.870]: A protection switching operation, where the transport and selection of the normal traffic signal (service) always returns to (or remains on) the working transport entity if the switch requests are terminated; i.e., when the working transport entity has recovered from the defect or the external request is cleared.
+
+**3.1.8 switching time** [b-ITU-T G.870]: Time between the initialization of the protection switching algorithm and the moment the traffic is selected from the standby transport entity.
+
+**3.1.9 trail protection** [b-ITU-T G.780]: Normal traffic is carried over/selected from a protection trail instead of a working trail if the working trail fails, or if its performance falls below a required level.
+
+**3.1.10 unidirectional protection switching** [b-ITU-T I.630]: A protection switching architecture in which, for a unidirectional failure (i.e., a failure affecting only one direction of transmission), only the affected direction (of the "trail", "subnetwork connection", etc.) is switched to protection.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 1:1 protection:** A protection mechanism in which the traffic is sent only on the working path or on the protection path.
+
+**3.2.2 alternative routing model:** A routing model providing multiple paths between a source public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) node and a destination PTDN node.
+
+NOTE – These paths are not required to be deterministic and unique. In this model, the sending path and the receiving path are not necessarily composed of the same nodes and links.
+
+**3.2.3 dual path routing model:** A routing model providing two totally disjoint paths between a source public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) node and a destination PTDN node.
+
+NOTE – The two paths may not be the shortest paths.
+
+**3.2.4 link protection:** A point-to-point protection mechanism.
+
+NOTE – Protection switching and re-routing should not be initiated at the network layer unless link protection has failed.
+
+**3.2.5 shortest path routing model:** A routing model providing a deterministic and unique path, which is the shortest path from a source public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) node to a destination PTDN node.
+
+NOTE – In this model, the path from the source node to the destination node results in the same as the path from the destination node to the source node.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|----------------------------------------------|
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| OAM | Operations, Administration and Maintenance |
+| PTDN | Public packet Telecommunication Data Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SDH | Synchronous Digital Hierarchy |
+
+## **5 Network reliability objectives**
+
+This clause describes the network reliability objectives for a PTDN.
+
+### **5.1 Switching time**
+
+According to routing models supported in PTDN, service traffic can be switched from the working path to a protection path when a link or node fails. The switching time consists of two parts: one is the time that the node has received the notification message of network failure sent by the node nearest to the point of failure; the other is the time that protection switch has been completed from working path to protection path.
+
+In PTDN, switching time should be no more than 50 ms.
+
+### **5.2 Hold-off time**
+
+The PTDN is a layer network. A protection scheme is provided by each layer. So, the protection coordination between layers must be considered, in order to avoid back and forth protection switching. Hold-off time is useful for inter working of protection schemes. A hold-off timer is started when a defect condition is declared and its duration of the timer can be configured. When the hold-off timer expires, protection switching is initiated if a defect condition is still present at this point. Note that a defect condition does not have to be present for the entire duration of the hold-off period; only the state at the expiry of the hold-off timer is relevant.
+
+In a PTDN, the hold-off time should be larger than the switch time of the lower network layer.
+
+### **5.3 Protection types**
+
+The protection types can be either 1:1 protection type or 1:n protection type. Service traffic is transmitted either on the working path or on the protection path. In the 1:1 protection type, there are two disjoint paths between the source node and the destination node. One of them is the working path, the other one is the protection path. In the 1:n protection type, there are 1+ n paths between the source node and the destination node, one of them is the working path, the other n paths are protection paths.
+
+In PTDN, 1:1 protection type and 1:n protection type of trail protection are recommended.
+
+### **5.4 Switching types**
+
+There are two switching types, unidirectional switching and bidirectional switching. In unidirectional switching, the traffic sending path and the receiving path are different, so only the affected path is switched. In bidirectional switching, the traffic sending path and the receiving path usually are the same, so both paths can be switched.
+
+In PTDN, unidirectional protection switching and bidirectional protection switching are recommended to be provided.
+
+### **5.5 Operation types**
+
+There are two protection operation types, non-revertive operation type and revertive operation type. In non-revertive types, the service will not switch back to the working path when the working path is recovered. The service will be switched back to the working path only if the current protection path fails. In revertive types, the service will always switch back to the working path if the working path is recovered.
+
+In PTDN, revertive and non-revertive operation types should be provided.
+
+### 5.6 Manual protection
+
+In PTDN, automatic protection switching and manual protection switching are supported. The operator can make manual protection switching, with manual protection switching usually having a higher priority than automatic protection switching.
+
+### 5.7 Switch initiation criteria
+
+In PTDN, the following protection switching initiation criteria are supported:
+
+- externally initiated commands (e.g., in case of manual control);
+- link or node on the working path fails, the protection path is ready and the hold-off timer has expired;
+- the working path is recovered, in the revertive operation type.
+
+## 6 Network reliability architecture
+
+In PTDN, link protection and trail protection are required as follows:
+
+- 1:1 protection and 1:n trail protection shall be provided;
+- unidirectional and bidirectional switching types shall be supported; and
+- revertive and non-revertive operation shall be supported.
+
+### 6.1 Link protection
+
+A protection scheme is provided by each layer in PTDN which includes many layers. Link protection works on the link layer. Link protection is a point-to-point protection mechanism. Protection switching and rerouting should not be initiated at the network layer unless link protection has failed.
+
+The architecture for link protection is as shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the link protection architecture. It shows two rectangular blocks representing 'node' at the ends of a horizontal line. This line is composed of multiple parallel lines, representing physical links. In the center of this line is an oval shape, which is labeled 'Aggregated link' with an arrow pointing to it. Below the diagram, the text 'Y.2614(11)\_F6-1' is visible.
+
+Diagram of Link protection architecture showing two nodes connected by an aggregated link.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Link protection architecture**
+
+In PTDN, there are two mechanisms for service traffic distribution on the aggregated links:
+
+- 1) Traffic is distributed on all the aggregated physical links, but part of every link capability should be reserved, summing up to the capability of one or more links, for protection when one or more links break down.
+- 2) One or more of the aggregated links do not transfer traffic unless one or more of the aggregated links break down.
+
+The end nodes of the aggregated links can detect the failure of certain physical link(s) and distribute the traffic on the failed link(s) to other physical links.
+
+### 6.2 Trail protection
+
+Trail protection is an end-to-end protection mechanism. At least two paths from the source node to the same destination node should be pre-calculated based on the network topology and resource information in PTDN. One is the working path, the other(s) are the protection path(s).
+
+Consecutive probe packets are used to detect defects of the working path or the protection path. When a network failure notification message has been received, service traffic should switch from the working path to the protection path when the hold-off timer has expired.
+
+The architecture for trail protection is shown in Figure 6-2.
+
+
+
+Figure 6-2 – Trail protection architecture diagram. The diagram shows a dual-path network topology. On the left, a source node (hatched rectangle) connects to a 'Working path' and a 'Protection path'. Both paths consist of a series of 'Transfer nodes' (white squares). The paths converge at a destination node (hatched rectangle) on the right. A 'Protection switching function' (black rectangle) is located at the destination. A bracket below the paths indicates the 'Protection domain'. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: hatched rectangle for 'End node', white square for 'Transfer node', and black rectangle for 'Protection switching function'. The reference 'Y.2614(11)\_F6-2' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – Trail protection architecture**
+
+In PTDN, 1:1 protection type and 1:n protection type of trail protection should be provided.
+
+In the 1:1 protection type, the dual path routing model is applied, which will pre-calculate two disjoint paths based on ear decomposition.
+
+In 1:n protection type, there are two ways to implement:
+
+- 1) The shortest path routing model and the alternative routing model are applied together. The shortest path routing model will provide one working path and the alternative routing model will provide n protection paths.
+- 2) The alternative routing model is applied to calculate several paths; one of them serves as the working path, the remaining paths will be protection paths.
+
+Consecutive probe packets are used to detect defects of a working or protection path. They are inserted at the source of the protection trail and detected and extracted at the sink of the protection trail.
+
+### 6.3 Switch types
+
+The protection switch types can be unidirectional switch types or bidirectional switch types.
+
+In PTDN, the sending path and receiving path are usually the same, if the route is calculated based on the shortest path routing model or the dual path routing model. In both of these cases, a bidirectional switch is applied. However, the sending path and receiving path may be different if the route is calculated based on an alternative routing model. In this case, a unidirectional switch is applied.
+
+### 6.4 Operation types
+
+The protection operation types can be a non-revertive operation type or a revertive operation type.
+
+In non-revertive operation types, after the protection switches from the working path to the protection path, the service traffic will not switch back to the working path when the working path is recovered. The service will be switched back to the working path only if the current protection path fails and the working path is recovered.
+
+In the revertive operation type, the service will always switch back to the working path if the working path is recovered. In PTDN, the revertive operation type is recommended.
+
+### **6.5 Network failure detection mechanism**
+
+There are two network failure detection mechanisms in PTDN. One is the link failure detection mechanism. It works at the link layer and detects in real time the status of a link by periodically transmitting link maintenance frames. The other is the trail failure detection mechanism. It works at the network layer and detects in real time the end-to-end connectivity by periodically transmitting OAM packets.
+
+### **6.6 Protection switching trigger mechanism**
+
+Protection switching action should be conducted when:
+
+- 1) initiated by operator control (e.g., manual switch, forced switch) without a higher priority switch request being in effect;
+- 2) signal failure is declared on the working path, but not on the protection path, and the hold-off timer has expired; or
+- 3) the wait-to-restore timer expires (revertive mode) and signal failure is not declared on the working path.
+
+# **7 Link protection**
+
+In PTDN, a pair of nodes can be connected by multiple physical links to enhance the bandwidths and reliability between them. Multiple physical links should be aggregated as one logical link when calculating the route, and service traffic should be balanced among the multiple physical links according to the link bandwidth. When one or many of the aggregation links fail, service traffic carried by failed link(s) should be transferred to other available links, not switched from working path to protection path unless link protection fails.
+
+In PTDN, link protection fails when:
+
+- 1) all aggregated physical links break down;
+- 2) the capability of the remaining links cannot meet the requirements of traffic when one or several aggregated links break down.
+
+When link protection fails, a trail protection mechanism will be applied.
+
+# **8 Trail protection**
+
+To implement trail protection in PTDN, three routing models are used. These are dual path routing model, shortest path routing model and alternative routing model.
+
+In connectionless mode, a PTDN node determines the routing model based on the protection field's value, which consists of two bits in the packet header [ITU-T Y.2613]. When a network failure (link or node) occurs or the working paths recover, the value of the protection field is required to be modified.
+
+If the value of the protection field is "00", it means the shortest path routing model is applied. In this case, service traffic may be interrupted when a network failure (link or node) occurs, unless the alternative routing model is applied, in which case, the value of the protection field is required to be modified from "00" to "10". In the alternative routing model, network reachability can be guaranteed but QoS cannot be guaranteed.
+
+If the value of the protection field is "11" or "01", it means the dual path routing model is applied. In this case, service traffic will be switched from the working path to the protection path when network failure (link or node) occurs; or from the protection path to the working path when the working path is recovered in revertive operation type. Correspondingly, the value is required to be
+
+modified from "11" to "01" or from "01" to "11". It must be noted that QoS can be guaranteed only if the network resources of the working path and the protection path are exactly the same.
+
+### 8.1 Dual path routing model
+
+The dual path routing model pre-calculates two disjoint paths from the source node to the destination node based on the network topology and resource information. These are the working path and the protection path. Except for the source node and the destination node, there are other links or nodes common to the working path and the protection path.
+
+Two conditions should be met for network topology in the dual path routing model:
+
+- 1) every node in PTDN is connected to at least two other nodes;
+- 2) every link in PTDN is a bidirectional link.
+
+Two completely disjoint directed diagrams (see Figure 8-1) can be achieved by ear decomposition.
+
+For more information about ear decomposition refer to Appendix I.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the ear decomposition of a network topology into two disjoint paths. The top part shows a network graph with 10 nodes (0-9) and their connections. A large blue arrow points down to two separate directed graphs, each representing a path between nodes 1 and 7.
+
+The left graph (red) shows a working path: 1 → 3 → 7. The right graph (purple) shows a protection path: 1 → 0 → 2 → 4 → 7. Both paths are disjoint except for the source and destination nodes.
+
+Y.2614(11)\_F8-1
+
+Figure 8-1: Ear decomposition in dual path routing model. The diagram shows a network topology with 10 nodes (0-9) and two disjoint paths (working and protection) between nodes 1 and 7.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Ear decomposition in dual path routing model**
+
+As shown in Figure 8-1, there are two disjoint paths between any two nodes. For example, there are two disjoint paths from node 1 to node 7. One is a working path along nodes 1, 3 and 7. The other is a protection path along nodes 1, 0, 2, 4 and 7.
+
+When the working path fails, the nearest node of this point of failure will send a network failure notification message to the source node. On receipt of the notification message, the source node will switch the traffic from the working path to the protection path. The value of the protection field in the packet header is required to be reset from "11" to "01".
+
+In revertive operation type, if the working path is recovered, service traffic will switch back to the working path; the value of the protection field in the packet header is required to be modified from "01" to "11".
+
+In non-revertive operation type, even if the working path is recovered, service traffic will not switch back to the working path unless the protection path fails.
+
+In the dual path routing model, QoS can be guaranteed when switched from the working path to the protection path or from the protection path to the working path if the network resources on the two paths are the same.
+
+### **8.2 Shortest path routing model**
+
+The shortest path routing model provides a deterministic and unique path, which is the shortest path from the source PTDN node to the destination PTDN node. In this model, the sending path and receiving path must be the same. When there are multiple connections between PTDN domains on the boundary of the domain, only one connection with the highest priority is active.
+
+The value of protection field in the packet header should be set "00" when a packet is transmitted using the shortest path routing model.
+
+The alternative routing model will be applied to provide network reachability in case the shortest path routing model fails. In this case, the value of the protection field in the packet header should be modified to "10" from "00".
+
+### **8.3 Alternative routing model**
+
+In the alternative routing model, many paths are pre-calculated and kept in a routing table; one of them is the working path. If the working path fails, the second route in the routing table will be active. These paths may not be the shortest, and the sending and receiving paths are not required to include the same nodes and links. The alternative routing model can be applied in two cases:
+
+- 1) The working path is the shortest path; the alternative routing model provides the protection path(s).
+
+The failure of a node or link, or topology changes may result in the failure of the working path. In this situation, the alternative path routing model will provide the protection path(s). In this case, the value of the protection field in the packet header is required to be modified to "00" from "01".
+
+- 2) Both the working path and the protection path(s) are provided by the alternative routing model.
+
+In the alternative routing model, the value of the protection field in the packet header should be set to "01". Many paths from the source node to the destination node will be pre-calculated and stored in the routing table, one of which is used as working path. When the working path fails, the protection path will be chosen from other paths in the routing table. In this case, the value of the protection field in the packet header should not be changed.
+
+In the alternative routing model, network reachability can be guaranteed, but QoS cannot be guaranteed.
+
+## **9 Protection coordination mechanism**
+
+If nodes are connected by multiple aggregated links, when one or many of the aggregated links fail, link protection should be applied first, and if link protection fails, trail protection should be initiated.
+
+Moreover, hold-off time should be provided between the layer protections to avoid back and forth protection switching. For example, if a PTDN is based on the transport network (e.g., SDH, WDM), PTDN protection switching should not be initiated unless the hold-off timer has expired and a defect condition (e.g., link or node failure in the transport layer network) is still present at this point.
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation defines the mechanisms to produce one or several protection paths to protect the working path. The mechanisms are helpful to improve security of a PTDN. The reliability mechanisms described in this Recommendation assume that both working and protection paths are set up at the same time and in the same manner. Given that the setting of either path is performed by the normal PTDN procedures, no additional security risks specific to the reliability mechanisms described in this Recommendation are identified.
+
+In terms of instability when protection applies, a hold-off time and a protection coordination mechanism have already been considered in this Recommendation.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Ear decomposition
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+An ear decomposition $D=\{P_0;P_1;\dots;P_{r-1}\}$ of an undirected Graph $G=(V,E)$ is a partition of $E$ into an ordered collection of edge-disjoint simple paths $P_0;P_1;\dots;P_{r-1}$ , called ears, such that:
+
+- $P_0$ is a simple cycle.
+- $P_i$ ( $i>0$ ) is a simple path with the end-points belonging to lower-numbered ears, and with no internal vertices belonging to lower-numbered ears.
+- $P_i$ ( $i>0$ ) may also be a simple cycle. If it is a cycle consisting of only one edge, it is called a trivial ear.
+
+An ear decomposition is called open if and only if there is no cycle for $P_i$ ( $i>0$ ).
+
+In Figure I.1, the network topology on the left is decomposed into four ears, as shown on the right of Figure I.1. Among them, $P_0$ is a simple cycle composed of nodes 0, 1, 3 and 6; $P_1$ is composed of nodes 2, 4 and 7, with end-points 3 and 0 belonging to ear $P_0$ , which is a lower-numbered ear compared to $P_1$ ; $P_2$ is composed of nodes 5 and 8, with end-points 2 and 6 belonging to ears $P_1$ and $P_0$ respectively, which are lower-numbered ears compared to $P_2$ ; $P_3$ is composed of node 9, with end-points 7 and 8 belonging to ears $P_1$ and $P_2$ respectively, which are lower-numbered ears compared to $P_3$ .
+
+
+
+Before ear decomposition
+
+After ear decomposition
+
+Y.2614(11)\_Fl.1
+
+Figure I.1: Ear decomposition of a graph. The left diagram, labeled 'Before ear decomposition', shows a graph with 10 nodes (0-9) and several edges. The right diagram, labeled 'After ear decomposition', shows the same graph with four ears highlighted: P0 (a cycle of nodes 0, 1, 3, 6), P1 (a path of nodes 2, 4, 7), P2 (a path of nodes 5, 8), and P3 (a single node 9).
+
+**Figure I.1 – Ear decomposition**
+
+Ear decomposition exists if and only if the graph is 2-edge connected. In the PTDN, a 2-edge connected graph can provide protection for link failure and nodal failures.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T G.780] Recommendation ITU-T G.780/Y.1351 (2010), *Terms and definitions for synchronous digital hierarchy (SDH) networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.870] Recommendation ITU-T G.870/Y.1352 (2010), *Terms and definitions for optical transport networks (OTN)*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.8131] Recommendation ITU-T G.8131/Y.1382 (2007), *Linear protection switching for transport MPLS (T-MPLS) networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.322] Recommendation ITU-T I.322 (1999), *Generic protocol reference model for telecommunication networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T I.630] Recommendation ITU-T I.630 (1999), *ATM protection switching*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.2102] Recommendation ITU-T M.2102 (2000), *Maintenance thresholds and procedures for recovery mechanisms (protection and restoration) of international SDH VC trails (paths) and multiplex sections*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.25] Recommendation ITU-T X.25 (1996), *Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) for terminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public data networks by dedicated circuit*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.121] Recommendation ITU-T X.121 (2000), *International numbering plan for public data networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.136] Recommendation ITU-T X.136 (1997), *Accuracy and dependability performance values for public data networks when providing international packet-switched services*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.137] Recommendation ITU-T X.137 (1997), *Availability performance values for public data networks when providing international packet-switched services*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.200] Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994) | ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.212] Recommendation ITU-T X.212 (1995) | ISO/IEC 8886:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Data Link service definition*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.323] Recommendation ITU-T X.323 (1988), *General arrangements for interworking between Packet-Switched Public Data Networks (PSPDNs)*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.371] Recommendation ITU-T X.371 (2001), *General arrangements for interworking between Public Data Networks and the Internet*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1001 (2000), *IP framework – A framework for convergence of telecommunications network and IP network technologies*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1251] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1251 (2002), *General architectural model for interworking*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1720 (2006), *Protection switching for MPLS networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2619
+
+(05/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Next Generation Networks – Packet-based Networks
+
+---
+
+**Operation, administration and maintenance
+functions and mechanisms for the public packet
+telecommunication data network (PTDN)**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2619
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## FUTURE NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3999 |
+|-----------------|---------------|
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2619
+
+# Operation, administration and maintenance functions and mechanisms for the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)
+
+## Summary
+
+As one type of hierarchical packet data networks to meet requirements of future packet-based networks, the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) should provide operation, administration, and maintenance (OAM) functions as specified in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2619 specifies maintenance entities (MTEs), OAM functions, and common OAM mechanisms in PTDN. Recommendation ITU-T Y.2619 also defines OAM mechanisms, functions, and encapsulation specific to connectionless mode and connection-oriented mode. Some examples of encapsulation for OAM messages in different planes are given in an annex.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2619 | 2018-05-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13608 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Event indication, loopback, OAM, public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN), trace.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2018
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Background..... | 2 |
+| 7 OAM functions ..... | 3 |
+| 7.1 Continuity check..... | 3 |
+| 7.2 Connectivity verification ..... | 3 |
+| 7.3 Event indication..... | 3 |
+| 7.4 Performance measurement ..... | 3 |
+| 8 OAM mechanisms ..... | 4 |
+| 8.1 Loopback mechanism..... | 4 |
+| 8.2 Trace mechanism..... | 4 |
+| 8.3 Event indication..... | 5 |
+| 9 OAM in connection-oriented mode ..... | 5 |
+| 10 OAM in connectionless mode ..... | 5 |
+| 10.1 OAM message encapsulation ..... | 5 |
+| 10.2 Multicast OAM..... | 6 |
+| 11 Security considerations ..... | 6 |
+| Annex A – Examples of encapsulation of OAM packets in connectionless mode..... | 7 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2619
+
+## Operation, administration and maintenance functions and mechanisms for the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies maintenance entities (MTEs), operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) functions, and common OAM mechanisms in the public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN). It also describes OAM mechanisms specific to connectionless mode and connection-oriented mode (specified in [ITU-T Y.2613]).
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2613] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2613 (2010), *General technical architecture for public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2616] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2616 (2014), *Interworking mechanisms in public packet telecom data networks*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 defect** [b-ITU-T I.113]: Limited interruption of the ability of an item to perform a required function. It may or may not lead to maintenance actions depending on the results of additional analysis.
+
+**3.1.2 failure** [b-ITU-T G.806]: The fault cause persisted long enough to consider the ability of an item to perform a required function to be terminated. The item may be considered as failed; a fault has now been detected.
+
+**3.1.3 public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN)** [ITU-T Y.2613]: A packet data network designed for the NGN transport stratum, which should be secure, trustworthy, controllable, and manageable, can meet all the requirements described in [b-ITU-T Y.2601]. PTDN is a hierarchical network, which can be subdivided into several network layers.
+
+**3.1.4 link** [b-ITU-T G.805]: A "topological component" which describes a fixed relationship between a "subnetwork" or "access group" and another "subnetwork" or "access group".
+
+**3.1.5 maintenance entity** [b-ITU-T G.8001]: The entity between two of the flow/connection points in a maintenance entity group.
+
+**3.1.6 connection oriented** [b-ITU-T E.417]: Connection-oriented refers to the transfer of information between two entities by first establishing a path (or connection) for the information transfer. The communication proceeds through three well-defined phases: connection establishment, information transfer, and connection release. The most common example of connection-oriented
+
+information transfer is a telephone call over a circuit-switched network. other examples of connection-oriented information exchange are networks based on [b-ITU-T X.25], frame relay (FR), transmission control protocol (TCP) and asynchronous transfer mode (ATM).
+
+**3.1.7 connectionless** [b-ITU-T E.417]: Connectionless refers to the transfer of information between two entities without first establishing a path (or connection) for the information transfer. Examples of connectionless transport include the Internet protocol (IP) and user datagram protocol (UDP).
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 maintenance end point (MTEP)**: End point of a public packet telecommunication data network (PTDN) operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) exercise that is capable of initiating and terminating OAM messages for fault management and performance monitoring.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode |
+| FR | Frame Relay |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| MTE | Maintenance Entity |
+| MTEP | Maintenance End Point |
+| NNI | Network-Network Interface |
+| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance |
+| OAM-c | Operation, Administration and Maintenance-common |
+| PTDN | Public packet Telecommunication Data Network |
+| RTD | Round Trip Delay |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| TLV | Type–Length–Value |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UNI | User-Network Interface |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## **6 Background**
+
+The PTDN can provide connection-oriented and connectionless transmission services [ITU-T Y.2613]. The MTEs can be links and connections in general. In the PTDN, MTEs are virtual circuits in connection-oriented mode, paths in connectionless mode, and links in both modes.
+
+The PTDN may contain multiple administrative domains. One end-to-end MTE can be segmented into access link MTE(s), intradomain MTE(s) and interdomain MTE(s). Figure 1 illustrates one end-to-end MTE that passes through two PTDN domains. PTDN OAM MTEs are the various MTEs involved between two user-network interfaces (UNIs), i.e., an access link MTE is not included in PTDN OAM MTEs. Usually OAM messages should be confined to an administrative domain. Therefore, a gateway function is needed to terminate and regenerate the OAM message when interworking with other administrative domains or networks [ITU-T Y.2616].
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Illustration of various maintenance entities. The diagram shows a network path from User 1 to User 2. User 1 is connected to PTDN 1 via a UNI (User-Network Interface). PTDN 1 is connected to PTDN 2 via an NNI (Network-Network Interface). PTDN 2 is connected to User 2 via a UNI. The path is segmented into several MTEs (Maintenance Termination Entities): Access link MTE (between User 1 and PTDN 1), Intra domain MTE (within PTDN 1), Inter domain MTE (between PTDN 1 and PTDN 2), Intra domain MTE (within PTDN 2), and Access link MTE (between PTDN 2 and User 2). A UNI-to-UNI MTE spans from the first UNI to the second UNI. An End-to-end MTE spans the entire path from User 1 to User 2. The diagram is labeled Y.2619(18)\_F01.
+
+**Figure 1 – Illustration of various maintenance entities**
+
+When intermediate nodes do not support PTDN OAM functions, they only forward the OAM messages like other packets or frames in the same paths or virtual circuits. If end nodes do not support PTDN OAM functions, they will drop these PTDN OAM messages.
+
+## 7 OAM functions
+
+The PTDN OAM functions include a continuity check, connectivity verification, event indication and some performance measurement functions. These functions are used to monitor and verify network availability and performance, and to help in the detection, notification, handling and diagnosis of defects and failures.
+
+### 7.1 Continuity check
+
+A continuity check provides continuous monitoring of the liveness of links, connections or paths. This function is used for fault management, performance monitoring, and link switching when some defects occur.
+
+### 7.2 Connectivity verification
+
+A connectivity verification provides on-demand or proactive connectivity verification among end points of an MTE. This can be achieved by using loopback and trace mechanisms.
+
+### 7.3 Event indication
+
+When a defect, failure or monitored event occurs, the detecting node sends indication OAM messages to other related nodes. When receiving these indication messages, the nodes do not send the same indication messages to the sending node. They take necessary actions, such as activating a backup path or link, to overcome the effect of the defect, failure or event.
+
+### 7.4 Performance measurement
+
+Based on a loopback mechanism, PTDN OAM functions provide simple performance measurements, such as frame/packet loss rate, latency and jitter.
+
+# **8 OAM mechanisms**
+
+This clause describes some common OAM mechanisms used in both connection-oriented and connectionless modes. These mechanisms are loopback, trace and event indication.
+
+### **8.1 Loopback mechanism**
+
+The loopback mechanism provides several capabilities, such as continuity check, connectivity verification, fault localization, round trip delay (RTD) measurement and delay variation measurements.
+
+The loopback mechanism uses loopback OAM messages. These messages can be initiated and inserted at an MTEP, transferred through an MTE and returned (or looped back) to the sending MTEP without taking the MTE out of service.
+
+For unidirectional paths in the PTDN, i.e., multicast paths, an extra return path is required to transfer looped back OAM messages (see clause 10.2).
+
+A loopback OAM message includes the following fields:
+
+- OAM message type, which indicates this is a loopback OAM message;
+- sender's handle information, which is used by the sender to process the response OAM message, e.g., the sequence number used to correlate a loopback response against request;
+- loopback indication, which indicates whether this message is looped back;
+- loopback location information, which indicates which node should loopback this OAM message;
+- return information, which is used to tell the sender about return result and return node information;
+- additional type-length-value combinations (TLVs), which are used to provide more capabilities – the most often used TLV is timestamp TLV, which is used to calculate RTD by subtracting sending timestamp from receiving timestamp.
+
+### **8.2 Trace mechanism**
+
+The trace mechanism is used to identify and retrieve information about MTEPs on a path and to locate a fault when the path is unavailable.
+
+In the PTDN, the trace mechanism is similar to the loopback mechanism by sending trace OAM message with loopback location information specifying the destination MTEP. However, each intermediate node adds its node information to the OAM message, then forwards this OAM message. The destination MTEP adds its node information and sets a loopback indication field, then returns this OAM message to the source MTEP. When this OAM message returns to the source MTEP, it contains information about all nodes it has passed.
+
+For unidirectional paths in the PTDN i.e., multicast paths, extra return paths are required to return trace messages (see clause 10.2).
+
+A trace OAM message includes the following fields:
+
+- OAM message type, which indicates this is a trace OAM message;
+- the sender's handle information;
+- a loopback indication, which indicates whether this packet/frame is looped back;
+- loopback location information, which indicates which node should loopback these OAM packets/frames;
+- return information, which is used to tell the sender about the return result and return node information;
+
+- node information TLVs, which contain node information, such as identifier (ID) or address.
+
+### 8.3 Event indication
+
+The PTDN nodes use event indication to notify the peer MTEP(s) that some events have happened at the sender. For bidirectional paths or virtual circuits, event indication can be transmitted in the forward or backward direction. For unidirectional paths in the PTDN i.e., multicast paths, when an MTEP detects a defect and plans to notify an upstream MTEP, an extra return path is required (see clause 10.2).
+
+An event indication OAM message includes:
+
+- OAM message type, which indicates it is an event indication OAM message;
+- an event field, which indicates the information of the defect or event;
+- a location field, which indicates its occurrence location.
+
+## 9 OAM in connection-oriented mode
+
+In the connection-oriented mode, PTDN OAM is used to test and diagnose virtual circuits, and to measure their performance on an end-to-end or segment basis. These virtual circuits may be control/manage circuits or user data circuits. The PTDN OAM in connection-oriented mode includes functions, defined in clause 7, and uses mechanisms defined in clause 8.
+
+The encapsulation of PTDN OAM messages shall follow the link layer frame definitions, specified in clause 6 of [ITU-T Y.2613]. An OAM message is encapsulated in the frame payload, with the result that MTEPs in OAM messages, i.e., source MTEP and destination MTEP, are specified in the frame payload.
+
+As an OAM frame is inserted and transmitted in the same virtual circuit with other frames, so a field is needed to distinguish it from others. In this case, the OAM field in the frame header, specified in clause 6.3.3.1.1.3 of [ITU-T Y.2613], shall be set to 1 by the OAM frame initiator for identification of OAM frames.
+
+## 10 OAM in connectionless mode
+
+In connectionless mode, OAM is used to test and diagnose paths in a virtual private network (VPN) or multicast, and to measure their performance. OAM for VPN paths provides the same functions, defined in clause 7, and uses the same mechanisms defined in clause 8. However, paths in multicast are unidirectional, different mechanisms, specified in clause 10.2, will be used.
+
+### 10.1 OAM message encapsulation
+
+The encapsulation of PTDN OAM messages in connectionless mode shall be as specified in clauses 7.2 and 7.3 of [ITU-T Y.2613].
+
+Similarly, OAM messages can be encapsulated in the packet payload with the result that the MTEP information is in the packet payload. In connectionless mode, when the source MTEP and destination MTEP are the same as the source and destination of the packet, respectively, then source and destination information contained in the packet header can be used as MTEP information instead.
+
+In the control or management plane, the specific value of the message type field in the packet header has to be specified to distinguish OAM messages from other control or management messages. Examples are given in Annex A.
+
+In the data plane, there shall be a 1-bit field in the packet header to distinguish OAM messages from user data packets. This 1-bit field is recommended to occupy 1 bit of reserved fields in the PTDN packet header specified in clause 7.2 of [ITU-T Y.2613]. An example is given in Figure A.3.
+
+### 10.2 Multicast OAM
+
+The PTDN multicast service is provided only in connectionless mode with point-to-multiple-points unidirectional paths. Multicast OAM is used to test and diagnose those paths, and to measure their performance one-by-one or on a tree basis. A multicast MTE, whose MTEPs are specified by a multicast address, has the following two differences from other MTEs:
+
+- it has more than one destination MTEP for loopback and trace;
+- multicast paths are unidirectional; therefore, the extra reverse direction paths are needed to transfer the returned loopback and trace OAM messages, and to transfer event indication OAM messages to notify upstream MTEPs.
+
+These reverse direction paths, referred to as OAM common (OAM-c) paths, are not a part of multicast MTE. The control plane or a specific VPN, more practically, can be used to serve these reverse direction paths and to transmit these OAM messages, referred as OAM-c packets. Along OAM-c paths, intermediate nodes do not intercept and process, but only forward these OAM-c packets.
+
+#### 10.2.1 Loopback
+
+To verify connectivity of a multicast MTE, the source MTEP sends a loopback OAM message to all destination MTEPs specified by a multicast address. When a destination MTEP receives the loopback OAM message, it processes and sends this OAM message as an OAM-c packet on an OAM-c path. The source MTEP may receive more than one response, i.e., returned OAM messages, through OAM-c paths. Based on the received OAM-c packets, the source MTEP can obtain information about the multicast MTE.
+
+To maintain one of the paths in a PTDN multicast, the source MTEP can send a loopback OAM message to a specific destination MTEP by using the destination MTEP node address as destination and loopback MTEP.
+
+#### 10.2.2 Trace
+
+The trace mechanism is similar to the loopback mechanism specified in clause 10.2.1 except that:
+
+- along the MTE paths, each intermediate node adds its node information, such as node ID and address, into the OAM message, then forwards the OAM message;
+- the destination nodes add their node information to the OAM messages, then encapsulate the messages into OAM-c packets, and transmit the messages along the OAM-c paths;
+- the returned OAM-c packets contain information about nodes lying in the forwarding direction of the paths only.
+
+#### 10.2.3 Event indication
+
+The event indication mechanism is similar to the mechanism specified in clause 8.3, except that the backward indication OAM messages are encapsulated as OAM-c packets and transmitted along OAM-c paths.
+
+## 11 Security considerations
+
+OAM functions can enhance the security of the PTDN. For example, connectivity verification function or path detection function can detect misconfigured connections or wrongly delivered flows, therefore prevent user traffic from being exposed to unintended recipients.
+
+OAM functions of service providers or network operators do not allow messages originated from one network to get transmitted to other networks without going through the gateway function. Gateway function may contain additional security functions.
+
+## Annex A
+
+### Examples of encapsulation of OAM packets in connectionless mode
+
+(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure A.1 illustrates encapsulation of an OAM message in the management plane. In this example, the management message with type value 0x8F is an OAM message.
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octets | | | | |
+|------------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|-------------------|---|--------|--|--|--|--|
+| Version(4) | | | | Packet type(2)
1 0 | | Address length(2) | | 1 | | | | |
+| Message Type(8)
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | |
+| Upper Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | |
+| Lower Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | |
+| Source address* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Payload (OAM message) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+\*Note: address has variable length.
+
+**Figure A.1 – An example of encapsulation for an OAM message in the management plane**
+
+Figure A.2 illustrates encapsulation of an OAM message in the control plane. In this example, the control message with type value 0xCF is an OAM message.
+
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octets | | | | |
+|------------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------------------|---|-------------------|---|--------|--|--|--|--|
+| Version(4) | | | | Packet type(2)
0 1 | | Address length(2) | | 1 | | | | |
+| Message Type(8)
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 | | | | | | | | 2 | | | | |
+| Upper Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | |
+| Lower Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | |
+| Source address* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address* | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Payload (OAM message) | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+\*Note: address has variable length.
+
+**Figure A.2 – An example of encapsulation for an OAM message in the control plane**
+
+Figure A.3 illustrates encapsulation of an OAM messages in the user data plane. In this example, the first bit of Reserve(3) (specified in Figure 7.2 of [ITU-T Y.2613]) has been used as an OAM Flag and is set to 1.
+
+| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+|---------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|---|-------------------|---|---|--------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
+| 8 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | Octets | | | | | | | | |
+| Version(4) | | | Packet type(2) | | Address length(2) | | | 1 | | | | | | | | |
+| VPN identifier (1) | Multicast identifier (1) | Class service stream (2) | Reserve(4) | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | |
+| Upper Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | |
+| Lower Payload length(8) | | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | | | |
+| TTL(6) | | | | | Protection(2) | | | 5 | | | | | | | | |
+| Extension header identifier (1) | OAM Flag (1) | Reserve (2) | Upper VPN number (4) | | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | |
+| Middle VPN number (8) | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | |
+| Lower VPN number (8) | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | | | | |
+| Source address* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Destination address* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+| Payload (OAM message) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
+
+\*Note: address has variable length.
+
+**Figure A.3 – An example of encapsulation of an OAM message in the data plane**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.417] Recommendation ITU-T E.417 (2005), *Framework for the network management of IP-based networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.805] Recommendation ITU-T G.805 (2000), *Generic functional architecture of transport networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.806] Recommendation ITU-T G.806 (2012), *Characteristics of transport equipment – Description methodology and generic functionality*.
+- [b-ITU-T G.8001] Recommendation ITU-T G.8001/Y.1354 (2016), *Terms and definitions for Ethernet frames over transport*
+- [b-ITU-T I.113] Recommendation ITU-T I.113 (1997), *Vocabulary of terms for broadband aspects of ISDN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2601] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2601 (2006), *Fundamental characteristics and requirements of future packet based networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.25] Recommendation ITU-T X.25 (1996), *Interface between Data Terminal Equipment (DTE) and Data Circuit-terminating Equipment (DCE) for terminals operating in the packet mode and connected to public data networks by dedicated circuit*.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,1995 @@
+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2702
+
+(09/2008)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702**
+
+# **Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 specifies authentication and authorization requirements for next generation networks (NGNs).
+
+### **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 was approved on 12 September 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure.
+
+### **Keywords**
+
+Attributes, Authentication, Authorization, Identifiers, Identity Management (IdM), Next Generation Network (NGN), Privileges and Security.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2009
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Definitions from [ITU-T X.800] ..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Definitions from [ITU-T X.810] ..... | 2 |
+| 3.3 Definitions from [ITU-T X.811] ..... | 2 |
+| 3.4 Definitions from [ITU-T Y.2701] ..... | 3 |
+| 3.5 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 Reference models..... | 5 |
+| 5.1 ITU-T X.811 authentication framework..... | 5 |
+| 5.2 Authentication threats..... | 9 |
+| 5.3 Authentication assurance..... | 11 |
+| 5.4 Authorization and privilege management ..... | 13 |
+| 5.5 End-to-end reference architectural model ..... | 13 |
+| 5.6 Relationship with NGN architecture specified in [ITU-T Y.2012]..... | 14 |
+| 6 General Requirements ..... | 16 |
+| 7 Authentication and authorization of user for network access..... | 16 |
+| 7.1 Description ..... | 16 |
+| 7.2 General reference model..... | 17 |
+| 7.3 Requirements..... | 20 |
+| 8 Service NGN provider authentication and authorization of user for access to
service/application ..... | 23 |
+| 8.1 Description ..... | 23 |
+| 8.2 Requirements..... | 24 |
+| 9 User authentication and authorization of NGN providers ..... | 27 |
+| 9.1 Description ..... | 27 |
+| 9.2 Objectives and requirements ..... | 27 |
+| 10 NGN provider supported user peer-to-peer authentication and authorization..... | 28 |
+| 11 Mutual network authentication and authorization ..... | 28 |
+| 11.1 Description ..... | 28 |
+| 11.2 Mutual network authentication requirements ..... | 29 |
+| 12 NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party service/application
provider..... | 30 |
+| 12.1 Description ..... | 30 |
+| 12.2 Requirements..... | 30 |
+| 13 Use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service ..... | 31 |
+| 13.1 Description ..... | 31 |
+
+| | Page |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 13.2 Requirements ..... | 31 |
+| 14 Authentication and authorization of objects ..... | 31 |
+| 14.1 Description ..... | 31 |
+| 14.2 Requirements ..... | 32 |
+| Appendix I – SAML use case ..... | 33 |
+| I.1 Use of [b-ITU-T X.1141], Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0) ..... | 33 |
+| I.2 Service/application authentication procedures ..... | 33 |
+| I.3 Service/application authentication – Call flow examples ..... | 33 |
+| I.4 Security of service/application authentication procedures and mechanisms ..... | 34 |
+| Appendix II – ETS authentication and authorization ..... | 35 |
+| II.1 Overview ..... | 35 |
+| II.2 ETS user authentication and authorization ..... | 35 |
+| II.3 NGN provider authentication and authorization for ETS ..... | 36 |
+| II.4 ETS authentication and authorization use case examples ..... | 36 |
+| Appendix III – 3GPP Generic bootstrapping architecture ..... | 41 |
+| Appendix IV – Identity management (IdM) call flow examples ..... | 43 |
+| IV.1 Overview ..... | 43 |
+| IV.2 Call flow examples ..... | 43 |
+| Bibliography ..... | 54 |
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702**
+
+# **Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1**
+
+## **1 Scope**
+
+This Recommendation provides authentication and authorization requirements for next generation networks (NGN) based on [ITU-T Y.2012]. This includes requirements for authentication and authorization across the user-to-network interface (UNI), the network-to-network interface (NNI) and the application-to-network interface (ANI) as well as any entities internally with a network that may require authentication and authorization. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- 1) Authentication and authorization of user for network access (e.g., authentication and authorization of an end user device, a home network gateway, or an enterprise gateway to obtain access or attachment to the network)
+- 2) Service provider authentication and authorization of user for access to service/application (e.g., authentication and authorization of a user, a device or a combined user/device where the authentication and authorization apply to NGN service/application access)
+- 3) User authentication and authorization of Network (e.g., user authenticating the identity of the connected NGN network or of the service provider)
+- 4) User peer-to-peer authentication and authorization (e.g., authentication and authorization of the called user (or terminating entity), authentication and authorization of the originating entity, or data origin authentication as network functions)
+- 5) Mutual network authentication and authorization (e.g., authentication and authorization across NNI interface at the transport level, or service/application level)
+- 6) Authentication and authorization of service/application provider
+- 7) Use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service
+- 8) Authentication of objects (e.g., application process, message content and data content identifiers).
+
+The items above include authentication of flows of the signalling, bearer and management traffic as applicable.
+
+In addition, this Recommendation also provides reference models for NGN authentication and authorization.
+
+NOTE 1 – NGN authentication and authorization is viewed as part of the broader topic of NGN identity management (IdM). Specifically, the authentication and authorization functions and capabilities described in this Recommendation should be used to support identity assurance capabilities for NGN IdM.
+
+NOTE 2 – In this Recommendation, the use of the term "user" is not intended to be restricted to a person. A user could be a person, groups, companies, or juridical entities.
+
+NOTE 3 – Authentication of an entity is not intended to indicate positive validation of a person.
+
+## **2 References**
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+| | |
+|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T X.800] | Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnections for CCITT applications. |
+| [ITU-T X.805] | Recommendation ITU-T X.805 (2003), Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications. |
+| [ITU-T X.810] | Recommendation ITU-T X.810 (1995) ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996, Information technology – Open System Interconnection – Security framework for open systems: Overview. |
+| [ITU-T X.811] | Recommendation ITU-T X.811 (1995) ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, Information technology – Open System Interconnection – Security frameworks for open system: Authentication framework. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), NGN release 1 requirements. |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1. |
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Definitions from [ITU-T X.800]
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the following terms defined in [ITU-T X.800]:
+
+**3.1.1 authentication information:** Information used to establish the validity of a claimed identity.
+
+**3.1.2 authorization:** The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights.
+
+**3.1.3 credential:** Data that is transferred to establish the claimed identity of an entity.
+
+**3.1.4 data origin authentication:** The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
+
+**3.1.5 peer-entity authentication:** The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the one claimed.
+
+### 3.2 Definitions from [ITU-T X.810]
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the following terms defined in [ITU-T X.810]:
+
+**3.2.1 trust:** Entity X is said to trust entity Y for a set of activities if and only if entity X relies upon entity Y behaving in a particular way with respect to the activities.
+
+**3.2.2 trusted third party:** A security authority or its agent that is trusted with respect to some security-relevant activities (in the context of a security policy).
+
+### 3.3 Definitions from [ITU-T X.811]
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the following terms defined in [ITU-T X.811]:
+
+**3.3.1 asymmetric authentication method:** A method of authentication, in which not all authentication information is shared by both entities.
+
+**3.3.2 authenticated identity:** A distinguishing identifier of a principal that has been assured through authentication.
+
+**3.3.3 authentication:** The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.
+
+**3.3.4 authentication certificate:** A security certificate that is guaranteed by an authentication authority and that may be used to assure the identity of an entity.
+
+**3.3.5 authentication exchange:** A sequence of one or more transfers of exchange authentication information (AI) for the purposes of performing an authentication.
+
+**3.3.6 authentication information (AI):** Information used for authentication purposes.
+
+**3.3.7 authentication initiator:** The entity that starts an authentication exchange.
+
+**3.3.8 claimant:** An entity which is or represents a principal for the purposes of authentication. A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges on behalf of a principal.
+
+**3.3.9 claim authentication information (claim AI):** Information used by a claimant to generate exchange AI needed to authenticate a principal.
+
+**3.3.10 exchange authentication information (exchange AI):** Information exchanged between a claimant and a verifier during the process of authenticating a principal.
+
+**3.3.11 principal:** An entity whose identity can be authenticated.
+
+**3.3.12 symmetric authentication method:** A method of authentication in which both entities share common authentication information.
+
+**3.3.13 verification authentication information (verification AI):** Information used by a verifier to verify an identity claimed through exchange AI.
+
+**3.3.14 verifier:** An entity which is or represents the entity requiring an authenticated identity. A verifier includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges.
+
+### **3.4 Definitions from [ITU-T Y.2701]**
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the following terms defined in [ITU-T Y.2701]:
+
+**3.4.1 border element:** Network element providing functions connecting different security and administrative domains.
+
+**3.4.2 corporate network:** A private network that supports multiple users and may be in multiple locations (e.g., an enterprise, a campus).
+
+**3.4.3 security domain:** A set of elements, a security policy, a security authority and a set of security-relevant activities in which the elements are managed in accordance with the security policy. The policy will be administered by the security authority. A given security domain may span multiple security zones.
+
+**3.4.4 terminal equipment border element:** Border element providing security functions between customer premises equipment and service provider network.
+
+### **3.5 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.5.1 service level agreement (SLA):** Formal agreement between two or more parties that is reached after a negotiating activity with the scope to define service characteristics, responsibilities and priorities of every part. A SLA may include statements about security, performance, tariffing and billing, service delivery and compensations.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+ACL Access Control List
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Authentication Information |
+| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface |
+| AS | Application Server |
+| BE | Border Element |
+| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function |
+| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier |
+| CSCF | Call Session Control Function |
+| DSL | Digital Subscriber Loop |
+| ENI | ETS National Implementation |
+| ETS | Emergency Telecommunications Service |
+| FE | Functional Entities |
+| GAA | Generic Authentication Architecture |
+| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture |
+| GUSS | GBA User Security Settings |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber System |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| HTTPS | HTTP Security |
+| IAD | Integrated Access Device |
+| I-CSCF | Interrogating Call Session Control Function |
+| ID-FF | Identity Federation Framework |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IdP | Identity Provider |
+| ID-WSF | Identity Web Services Framework |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Service |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| IWF | InterWorking Function |
+| LUAD | Liberty enabled User Agent or Device |
+| MAC | Media Access Control |
+| MS | Media Server |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NAF | Network Application Function |
+| NAP | Network Access Point |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
+| OAM&P | Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning |
+| OSI | Open System Interconnection |
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------|
+| P-CSCF | Proxy Call Session Control Function |
+| PES | PSTN/ISDN Emulation Service |
+| PIN | Personal Identification Number |
+| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure |
+| PII | Personally Identifiable Information |
+| PSK | Pre-shared Keys |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| RBAC | Role-Based Access Control |
+| RP | Relying Party |
+| RPH | Resource-Priority Header |
+| RSVP | Resource Reservation Protocol |
+| SAML | Security Assertion Markup Language |
+| SASL | Simple Authentication and Security Layer |
+| SBC | Session Border Controller |
+| S-CSCF | Serving Call Session Control Function |
+| SDP | Session Description Protocol |
+| SIM | Subscriber Identification Module |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SLF | Subscriber Locator Function |
+| SOAP | Simple Object Access Protocol |
+| SP | Service Provider |
+| SSOS | Single-Sign-On Service |
+| TDR | Telecommunication for Disaster Relief |
+| TE | Terminal Equipment |
+| TE-BE | Terminal Equipment – Border Element |
+| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
+| UAI | User Authentication Interface |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| WS | Web Server |
+| XML | eXtensible Markup Language |
+
+## **5 Reference models**
+
+### **5.1 ITU-T X.811 authentication framework**
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the basic concepts of authentication described in [ITU-T X.811] as summarized below.
+
+#### 5.1.1 Basic concepts of authentication
+
+Authentication provides assurance of the claimed identity of an entity. Authentication is meaningful only in the context of a relationship between a principal and a verifier. Two important cases are:
+
+- the principal is represented by a claimant which has a specific communications relationship with the verifier (entity authentication); and
+- the principal is the source of a data item available to the verifier (data origin authentication).
+
+Entity authentication provides corroboration of the identity of a principal, within the context of a communication relationship. The principal's authenticated identity is assured only when an authentication service is invoked.
+
+NOTE 1 – When using data origin authentication, it is also necessary to have adequate assurance that the data has not been modified. This may be accomplished by using an integrity service, for example:
+
+- by using environments in which data cannot be altered;
+- by verifying that the data received matches a digital fingerprint of the data sent;
+- by using a digital signature mechanism; or
+- by using a symmetric cryptographic algorithm.
+
+NOTE 2 – The term "communications relationship" used in defining entity authentication may be interpreted in a broad way and could refer, for example, to an OSI connection, inter-process communication, or interaction between a user and a terminal.
+
+#### 5.1.2 Identifiers
+
+A principal is an entity whose identity can be authenticated. A principal has one or more distinguishing identifiers associated with it. Authentication services are used by an entity to verify purported identities of principals. A principal's identity which has been so verified is called an authenticated identity. Similarly, a principal whose identity has been verified is called an authenticated entity.
+
+Examples of principals that can be identified and hence authenticated are, but are not limited to:
+
+- human users;
+- NGN providers;
+- processes;
+- real open systems;
+- OSI layer entities;
+- enterprises, and
+- flows in the bearer, signalling and management traffic.
+
+Distinguishing identifiers are used to unambiguously claim an identity within a given security domain. Distinguishing identifiers distinguish a principal from others in the same domain, in one of two ways:
+
+- 1) by virtue of membership in a group of entities considered equivalent for purposes of authentication (in this case the entire group is considered to be one principal and has one distinguishing identifier); or
+- 2) by identifying one and only one entity.
+
+When authentication takes place between different security domains, a distinguishing identifier may not be sufficient to unambiguously identify an entity, as different security domain authorities may use the same distinguishing identifiers. In this case, distinguishing identifiers have to be used in conjunction with a security domain identifier in order to provide an unambiguous identifier for the entity.
+
+
+
+NOTE – Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport stratum or End-user functions
+
+Y.2702(08)\_F01
+
+Figure 1: Example NGN identifiers. This diagram illustrates the NGN architecture across three strata: Applications, Service, and Transport. The Applications stratum includes Applications. The Service stratum includes Application support functions and service support functions, S. user profile functions, Other NGN service components, Service control functions, PSTN/ISDN emulation service component, and IP multimedia service component. The Transport stratum includes T. user profile functions, Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF), Access network functions, Edge functions, and Core transport functions. External components include Legacy terminals, Legacy networks, Customer networks, NGN terminals, End-user functions, and Other networks. Red lines and circles highlight various identity-related components and their interconnections, with labels such as 'User identity data', 'Identities in NACF', 'User and terminal identities', 'Identities in common components for applications', 'Identities in common components for applications and service support', 'Identities in IMS and PES', 'Identity interoperability', and 'Identities in RACF'. A note at the bottom states: 'NOTE – Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport stratum or End-user functions'. The reference 'Y.2702(08)\_F01' is also present.
+
+**Figure 1 – Example NGN identifiers**
+
+Identifiers used to identify a principal or entity might be used by the components and functional elements in the different stratum and layers of the NGN. Figure 1 shows example identifiers for NGN based on Figure 8 (NGN Components) of [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+Examples of typical distinguishing identifiers are:
+
+- directory names;
+- network addresses;
+- AP-titles and AE-titles;
+- object identifiers;
+- names of persons (unambiguous within the context of the domain);
+- quintuples that contain:
+ - source IP address;
+ - destination IP address;
+ - source port number;
+ - destination port number; and
+ - protocol number.
+
+#### 5.1.3 Authentication entities
+
+The term "claimant" is used to describe the entity which is or represents a principal for the purposes of authentication. A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in an authentication exchange on behalf of a principal.
+
+The term "verifier" is used to describe the entity which is or represents the entity requiring an authenticated identity. A verifier includes the functions necessary for engaging in an authentication exchange to request verification of a claimed identity.
+
+An entity involved in mutual authentication will assume both claimant and verifier roles.
+
+The term "trusted third party" is used to describe a security authority or its agent, trusted by other entities with respect to security-related activities. In the context of this Recommendation, a trusted third party is trusted by a claimant and/or a verifier for the purposes of authentication.
+
+NOTE – A claimant or verifier may span multiple functional components, possibly residing in different open systems.
+
+#### 5.1.4 Authentication information
+
+The types of authentication information described in this standard are:
+
+- exchange authentication information (exchange AI);
+- claim authentication information (claim AI);
+- verification authentication information (verification AI).
+
+The term "authentication exchange" is used to describe a sequence of one or more transfers of exchange AI for the purposes of performing an authentication.
+
+Figure 2 illustrates the relationship among a claimant, a verifier, and a trusted third party. Figure 2 also illustrates the three types of authentication information that may make up an authentication exchange
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the relationships between three entities: Claimant, Verifier, and Trusted 3rd party (S). The Claimant and Verifier are represented by light blue boxes, while the Trusted 3rd party (S) is represented by a purple box. Inside the Claimant box is a rounded rectangle labeled 'Claim AI'. Inside the Verifier box is a rounded rectangle labeled 'Verification AI'. Above the Claimant and Verifier boxes is a rounded rectangle labeled 'Exchange AI'. Dashed arrows show the flow of information: one from 'Exchange AI' to 'Claim AI', one from 'Exchange AI' to 'Verification AI', one from 'Claim AI' to 'Exchange AI', and one from 'Verification AI' to 'Exchange AI'. Below the Claimant and Verifier boxes is the Trusted 3rd party (S) box, which contains two rounded rectangles: 'Claim AI' and 'Verification AI'. Dashed arrows show the flow of information: one from 'Exchange AI' to the 'Claim AI' inside the Trusted 3rd party (S) box, and one from the 'Verification AI' inside the Trusted 3rd party (S) box to 'Exchange AI'. The text 'Y.2702(08)F\_02' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Diagram illustrating the relationship between a Claimant, a Verifier, and a Trusted 3rd party (S) in an authentication exchange.
+
+**Figure 2 – Relationship between claimant, verifier and trusted third party**
+
+In some cases, in order to generate exchange AI, a claimant may need to interact with a trusted third party. Similarly, in order to verify exchange AI, a verifier may need to interact with a trusted third party. In these cases the trusted third party may hold verification AI related to a principal.
+
+It is also possible that a trusted third party is used in the transfer of exchange AI. Depending on the exchange, the third party may take on the role of a claimant relative to the verifier.
+
+The entities may also need to hold authentication information to be used in authenticating the trusted third party.
+
+#### 5.1.5 Multi-factor authentication
+
+Multi-factor authentication involves validating the authenticity of the identity of a principal by verifying multiple identifiers and attributes associated with the principal. Generally, multifactor authentication can be organized based on the following grouping of authentication attributes:
+
+- 1) something you are (e.g., physical or behavioural characteristics of an end user or customer's characteristic or attribute that is being compared such as typing patterns, voice recognition);
+
+- 2) something you have (e.g., a driver's licence, or a security token);
+- 3) something you know (e.g., a password, pin number, security image).
+
+The most common example of a single-factor authentication key is a password (something you know). Sometimes passwords, by themselves, do not provide sufficient confidence in the identity of an entity, and stronger forms of authentication, involving other authentication keys, would be required for access to certain NGN resources, applications and services. This would depend on the risks associated with the likelihood of unauthorized entities obtain access to the NGN resources, applications and services.
+
+The authentication factors and keys should be selected based on the risks to be addressed. Specifically the impacts of unauthorized entities obtaining access to NGN resources, applications and services would have to be accessed to determine the required authentication. Example electronic authentication keys are:
+
+- passwords,
+- hardware tokens,
+- software tokens,
+- one-time password device tokens.
+
+The use of passwords for authentication is widely established. The "password" is a secret that a claimant memorizes and uses to authenticate his or her identity. Passwords are typically character strings or images that the subscriber memorizes and must identify when presented along with other similar images. However, password systems are susceptible to many attacks. Additional protections for the communication channel can be used to protect the password, but this still does not prevent all attacks.
+
+Hardware tokens are specialized hardware devices that protect secrets (normally cryptographic keys) and perform cryptographic operations. Authentication is accomplished by proving possession of the device and control of the key. The cryptographic operations support authentication of both parties and the protection of the communication channel used for the authentication exchange.
+
+Software tokens are essentially software implementations of hardware tokens and share many of the advantages of hardware tokens (e.g., a cryptographic key that is typically stored on disk or some other media). The soft token key can be encrypted under a key derived from some activation data. Typically, the activation data is a password known only to the user, so a password is required to activate the token. Authentication is accomplished by proving possession and control of the key. As with hardware tokens, software tokens support authentication of both parties and protection of the communication channel used for the authentication exchange.
+
+One-time password device token is a personal hardware device that generates "one time" passwords for use in authentication. One-time password systems rely on a series of passwords generated using special algorithms. Each password of the series is called a one-time password as it is distinct from the others generated and can only be used once. A wide variety of one-time password systems exist that provide varying protection against attacks.
+
+### **5.2 Authentication threats**
+
+Authentication factors and keys can be attacked as follows:
+
+- 1) "Something you are" – replicating the customer's characteristic or attribute that is being compared (for example, fingerprints, typing patterns).
+- 2) "Something you have" – obtaining or copying what the customer has.
+- 3) "Something you know" – discovering what the customer knows.
+
+In general, authentication threats can be divided into threats that involve attacks against the authentication protocol, and other attacks that may reveal either token values, or compromise confidential information.
+
+Using multiple authentication factors improves security because multiple methods must be subverted. Using a hardware device (something you have) that is not easily copied also reduces the scope of an attack, as it is expected that the owner will notice the loss of the device. Authentication keys based on software or hardware tokens may be combined with activation data (e.g., a password) to implement two-factor authentication so that the authentication is not reliant on possession of the token alone.
+
+A customer may subvert the authentication system by deliberately divulging their one-factor authentication key to an accomplice and then denying it later, with the aim of repudiating subsequent successful authentications. The use of multiple authentication factors makes such a denial less credible and may deter such attacks.
+
+#### 5.2.1 Authentication protocol threats
+
+Example authentication protocol threats include:
+
+- 1) Eavesdroppers:
+ - eavesdroppers observing authentication protocol message exchanges for later analysis;
+ - eavesdroppers generally attempt to obtain tokens to pose as claimants.
+- 2) Impostors:
+ - impostor claimants posing as subscribers to the verifiers to test guessed tokens or obtain other information about a specific subscriber;
+ - impostor verifiers posing as verifiers to legitimate subscriber claimants to obtain tokens that can then be used to impersonate subscribers to legitimate verifiers;
+ - impostor relying parties posing as the relying party system to verifiers to obtain sensitive user information.
+- 3) Hijackers:
+ - hijackers who take over an authenticated session and pose as subscribers to relying parties to obtain sensitive information or input invalid information;
+ - hijackers who take over an authenticated session and pose as relying parties to verifiers to obtain sensitive information or output invalid information.
+
+These attacks may be mitigated in the following ways:
+
+- Requiring an element of freshness for each authentication to counters replay attacks.
+- Eavesdropper and session hijacking attacks may be countered by using cryptography to protect the signalling channel (channel encryption) used for the authentication exchange (for example, TLS in anonymous mode).
+- Man-in-the-middle and verifier impersonation attacks can be resisted, in a limited way, by using similar protections as with eavesdropper and session hijacking attacks. Combining the encryption with additional cryptographic techniques improves protection against these attacks (for example, using a mutual handshake exchange based around cryptography – such as TLS in authenticated mode – with cryptographic keys being held by the customer and the verifier achieves 'strong' mutual authentication).
+- Encryption provides only limited resistance to man-in-the-middle and verifier impersonation attacks, as security of the exchange can be compromised without breaking the encryption. For example, a customer may be deceived into accepting an authentication exchange as being from the verifier when it is not. Cryptographic-based mutual authentication techniques can be used between the customer and the verifier.
+
+#### 5.2.2 Authentication token threats
+
+If an attacker can gain control of a token, they will be able to masquerade as the token's owner. Threats to tokens can be categorized into attacks on authentication keys as follows:
+
+- Something you have may be stolen from the owner or cloned by the attacker. For example, an attacker who gains access to the owner's computer might copy a software token. A hardware token might be stolen or duplicated.
+- Something you know may be disclosed to an attacker. The attacker might guess a password or PIN. Where the token is a shared secret, the attacker could gain access to the verifier and obtain the secret value. An attacker may install malicious software (e.g., a keyboard logger) to capture this information. In addition, an attacker may determine the secret through off-line attacks on network traffic from an authentication attempt.
+- Something you are may be replicated. An attacker may obtain a copy of the token owner's identification and construct a replica.
+
+There are several strategies to mitigate these threats:
+
+- Multiple factors raise the threshold for attacks. If an attacker needs to steal a cryptographic token and guess a password, the work factor may be too high.
+- Physical security mechanisms may be employed to protect a stolen token from duplication. Physical security mechanisms can provide tamper evidence, detection, and response.
+- Complex passwords may reduce the likelihood of a successful guessing attack. By requiring use of long passwords that do not appear in common dictionaries, attackers may be forced to try every possible password.
+- System and network security controls may be employed to prevent an attacker from gaining access to a system or installing malicious software.
+
+#### 5.2.3 Other authentication threats
+
+Attacks are not limited to the authentication protocol itself. Other attacks include:
+
+- malicious code attacks that may compromise authentication tokens;
+- intrusion attacks that obtain credentials or tokens by penetrating the subscriber/claimant, certification authority or verifier system;
+- insider threats that may compromise authentication tokens;
+- out-of-band attacks that obtain tokens in some other manner, such as social engineering to get a subscriber to reveal his password to the attacker, or "shoulder-surfing";
+- attacks that fool claimants into using an insecure protocol, when they think that they are using a secure protocol, or trick them into overriding security controls (for example, by accepting server certificates that cannot be validated);
+- intentional repudiation by subscribers who deliberately compromise their tokens.
+
+Education and advice for the customer are methods to combat malicious code and social engineering attacks. Auditing and anomaly detection are commonly used to counter customer fraud attacks. Using multiple authentication keys can deter customer fraud attacks. Insider attacks may be countered through personnel vetting, auditing, and (where appropriate) using separation of duties and dual control.
+
+### 5.3 Authentication assurance
+
+To protect NGN resources, applications and services, NGN providers must determine the required level of assurance in the authentication used for network access and application/service transactions.
+
+Each NGN provider should establish and implement a process for authentication assurance. The authentication assurance process will involve a method to categorize confidence (i.e., confidence in the identity information electronically presented to a service provider) in the authentication mechanisms and the information provided for authentication.
+
+The authentication assurance process will establish and use relative and discrete levels of assurance to quantify confidence in the authentication process. For example, "n" levels of authentication assurance could be used. Level 0 could represent the lowest assurance level and level "n" the highest. The "n" levels will be used to define the level of assurance in terms of the likely consequence (e.g., the nature of the potential impacts) of an authentication error based on the assumption that all identifiers used in authentication are not equal or necessarily have the same authentication value.
+
+The following is an example authentication assurance method:
+
+**Example authentication method**
+
+| Assurance level | Relative confidence |
+|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Level 0 | No confidence in the asserted identity validity (e.g., use of access list controls) |
+| Level 1 | Some confidence in the asserted identity validity |
+| Level 2 | High confidence in the asserted identity validity |
+| – | – |
+| Level n | Highest degree of confidence in the asserted identity validity |
+
+The NGN provider must assess the potential risks associated with the consequences of authentication errors or to determine the appropriate level of assurance in an entity (e.g., end user's) identity. Authentication errors with potentially worse consequences will require higher levels of assurance.
+
+The risk from an authentication error is a function of two factors:
+
+- a) potential harm or impact;
+- b) the likelihood of such harm or impact.
+
+Categories of harm and impact, not limiting, include:
+
+- Inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation
+- Financial loss
+- NGN provider or customer liability
+- Harm to NGN provider infrastructure, resource, applications, services or public interests
+- Harm to public and government interest (e.g., critical communications such as ETS and TDR)
+- Unauthorized release of sensitive information
+- Harm to personal safety services
+- Civil or criminal violations
+
+### 5.4 Authorization and privilege management
+
+Authentication on its own is not sufficient in determining what the authenticated entity is authorized to do once access is granted. Authentication must be combined with authorization and privilege management mechanisms and approaches to provide access control to NGN services and resources. For example, assignment of roles and privileges to end-users/subscribers to control access to services and applications and to management interfaces to manage their subscription and profiles. Another example is role-based access control (RBAC) for control of OAM&P access.
+
+Authorization or privilege can be viewed as an attribute of an entity identity. Depending on the security policy, the authorization privileges on an entity can be validated through authentication.
+
+### 5.5 End-to-end reference architectural model
+
+This clause describes the end-to-end reference model used to organize and group the authentication requirements in this Recommendation. The reference model depicts:
+
+- 1) Authentication and authorization of user for network access (e.g., authentication and authorization of an end user device, a home network gateway, or an enterprise gateway to obtain access or attachment to the network).
+- 2) Service provider authentication and authorization of user for access to service/application (e.g., authentication and authorization of a user, a device or a combined user/device where the authentication and authorization apply to NGN service/application access).
+- 3) Service provider authentication and authorization of user for access to specific service/application (e.g., ETS and TDR specific authentication and authorization1).
+- 4) User authentication and authorization of network (e.g., user authenticating the identity of the connected NGN network or of the service provider).
+- 5) User peer-to-peer authentication and authorization (e.g., authentication and authorization of the called user (or terminating entity), authentication and authorization of the originating entity, or data origin authentication as network functions).
+- 6) Mutual network authentication and authorization (e.g., authentication and authorization across NNI interface at the transport level, or service/application level).
+- 7) Authentication and authorization of service/application provider.
+- 8) Use of 3rd party authentication service.
+
+Figure 3 illustrates the authentication reference points outlined above.
+
+In this Recommendation, the use of the term "user" is not restricted to a person. A user could be a person, groups, companies, or juridical entities.
+
+---
+
+1 ETS authentication may involve additional requirements beyond the basic requirements.
+
+
+
+Figure 3 – End-to-end reference architectural model. This diagram illustrates the end-to-end reference architectural model for a service-based network. At the top, a 'Service/application provider' cloud is connected via dashed lines to two 'Service Provider' blocks, 'Service Provider A' and 'Service Provider B'. Each service provider block contains a 'Service Stratum' cloud with 'Application Servers', 'Softswitch', and 'CSCF' components, and a 'Transport' cloud with three nodes. A 'Transit' cloud connects the two transport clouds. On the left, a 'User' and 'Device' are connected to 'Service Provider A' through an 'Access' cloud. On the right, a 'Device' and 'User' are connected to 'Service Provider B' through an 'Access' cloud. Numbered arrows indicate various interactions: (1) from Device to Service Provider A; (2) from Service Provider A to Device; (3) from Service Provider A to Service/application provider; (4) from Service/application provider to Service Provider B; (5) from Service Provider B to Device; (6) from Device to Service Provider B; (7) from Service/application provider to Service Provider A; (8) from Service/application provider to Service Provider B. The diagram is labeled 'Y.2702(08)\_F03' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 3 – End-to-end reference architectural model**
+
+As shown in Figure 3, authentication and authorization occurs both at the transport level and the service application level. In addition, there may be a binding or bundling of authentication that may occur. An example is when the service provider may bind/bundle the authentication of the user and the user's device in order to provide higher level of authentication assurance. For the most part horizontal authentication is achieved on a hop by hop basis. The main exception to this is user to user authentication, which is end to end. With exception of the user authenticating and authorizing the network, the relationships require mutual authentication.
+
+### 5.6 Relationship with NGN architecture specified in [ITU-T Y.2012]
+
+This clause describes relationship between the reference model described in this Recommendation and the functional architectural model described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. Specifically, highlighting:
+
+- The peer authentication relationship in Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2012], "NGN architecture overview".
+- The functional elements in Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2012] intended to perform authentication functions.
+- The functional elements in Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2012] intended to perform identity management, correlations and binding.
+- The functional elements in Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2012] intended to enforce access control based on authentication denial.
+
+Figure 4 uses Figure 1 of [ITU-T Y.2012] to illustrate the peering authentication relationships identified in clause 5.5. The peering authentication relationships are shown with the black double-headed arrows. Not shown is (5), user peer-to-peer authentication and authorization. Note that even when the applications to the user are provided by the NGN provider (i.e., no ANI), there is still an authentication relationship between the end-user and application, and the service stratum and the application.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a network, showing the relationships between various strata and their interfaces. The architecture is organized into three main strata:
+
+- Service stratum (green box):** Contains 'Application support functions & service support functions' and 'Service control functions' (which includes 'Service user profiles').
+- Transport stratum (yellow box):** Contains 'Network attachment control functions' (including 'Transport user profiles') and 'Resource and admission control functions'. Below these is the 'Transport functions' layer.
+- Management functions (purple vertical bar on the left):** A vertical bar representing management functions.
+- End-user function (white box on the left):** A box representing the end-user function.
+- Other networks (white box on the right):** A box representing other networks.
+
+Interfaces and connections are indicated by different line styles:
+
+- ANI (Application Network Interface):** A red solid line with a double-headed arrow connecting 'Applications' to the 'Service stratum'.
+- UNI (User Network Interface):** A red solid line with a double-headed arrow connecting the 'End-user function' to the 'Service stratum'.
+- NNI (Network Network Interface):** A red solid line with a double-headed arrow connecting the 'Transport stratum' to 'Other networks'.
+- Control:** Dashed black lines with double-headed arrows showing control plane interactions between the 'End-user function', 'Service stratum', 'Transport stratum', and 'Other networks'.
+- Media:** Blue hatched lines with double-headed arrows showing media plane interactions between the 'End-user function' and 'Transport stratum', and between the 'Transport stratum' and 'Other networks'.
+- Management:** Green dashed lines with double-headed arrows showing management plane interactions between the 'Management functions' bar and the 'End-user function', 'Service stratum', and 'Transport stratum'.
+
+Black double-headed arrows indicate peering authentication relationships between 'Applications' and the 'Service stratum', between the 'Service stratum' and the 'Transport stratum', and between the 'Transport stratum' and 'Other networks'. There are also black double-headed arrows between the 'End-user function' and the 'Service stratum', and between the 'End-user function' and the 'Transport stratum'.
+
+Legend:
+
+- Control
+- Media
+- Management
+
+Y.2702(08)\_F04
+
+Figure 4: Authentication peering references. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a network, showing the relationships between various strata and their interfaces.
+
+**Figure 4 – Authentication peering references**
+
+Figure 5 highlights the functional entities (FE) from the [ITU-T Y.2012] reference model that provide or may provide authentication and authorization functions.
+
+![Figure 5: Authentication and authorization functional entities of [ITU-T Y.2012]. This block diagram illustrates the functional architecture of an NGN (Next Generation Network) for authentication and authorization. The architecture is organized into several layers: Applications, Service control, NACF (Network Access Control Function), RACF (Resource Access Control Function), Core transport, and Core packet transport functions. Key functional entities (FEs) are represented as boxes, color-coded by their role: orange for FEs providing authentication and authorization functions, and blue for FEs that may provide these functions. The diagram shows the flow of signaling and data between these entities, including connections to external networks like IP Multimedia Networks and PSTN/ISDN. A yellow arrow at the bottom indicates the 'Scope of NGN'. A legend at the bottom left clarifies the color coding for the FEs.](e69b9188aa2c14ec6b21c83f711fef65_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 5 illustrates the functional entities for authentication and authorization in an NGN (Next Generation Network) architecture, as defined in ITU-T Y.2012. The diagram shows the interaction between various functional entities (FEs) across different layers of the network.
+
+**Legend:**
+
+- Orange box: FE which provides authentication and authorization functions
+- Blue box: FE which may provide authentication and authorization functions
+
+**Key Functional Entities (FEs) and their roles:**
+
+- Applications:** Application support functions & service support functions (may include own authentication, authorization and accounting).
+- Service control:**
+ - S-1: Serving call session control FE
+ - S-2: Proxy call session control FE
+ - S-3: Interrogating call session control FE
+ - S-4: Subscription locator FE
+ - S-5: S. user profile FE
+ - S-6: S. authentication & authorization FE
+ - S-7: Interconnection border gateway control FE
+ - S-8: access GW control FE
+ - S-9: Media GW control FE
+ - S-10: Breakout gateway control FE
+ - S-11: User signalling interworking FE
+ - S-12: Network signalling interworking FE
+ - S-13: Media resource control FE
+ - S-14: Media resource broker FE
+ - S-15: General services control FE
+- NACF (Network Access Control Function):**
+ - T-10: Network access configuration FE
+ - T-11: T. authentication & authorization FE
+ - T-12: T. user profile FE
+ - T-13: T. location management FE
+ - T-14: Access management FE
+ - T-15: Home gateway Configuration FE
+- RACF (Resource Access Control Function):**
+ - T-16: Policy decision FE
+ - T-17: Transport Resource control FE
+- Core transport:**
+ - T-5: Access border gateway FE
+ - T-6: Inter-connection border gateway FE
+ - T-7: Trunking media gateway FE
+ - T-8: Media resource processing FE
+ - T-9: Signalling gateway FE
+- Core packet transport functions:**
+- Access transport:**
+ - T-1: Access media gateway FE
+ - T-2: Access node FE
+ - T-3: Edge node FE
+ - T-4: Access relay FE
+- End-user Function:**
+ - Legacy terminal
+ - RGW (Residual Gateway)
+ - Customer network
+ - NGN terminal
+ - Legacy terminal
+- Other NGN:**
+- IP Multimedia Networks:**
+- PSTN/ISDN:**
+
+The diagram also shows the **Scope of NGN** and the **Y.2702(08)\_F05** reference.
+
+Figure 5: Authentication and authorization functional entities of [ITU-T Y.2012]. This block diagram illustrates the functional architecture of an NGN (Next Generation Network) for authentication and authorization. The architecture is organized into several layers: Applications, Service control, NACF (Network Access Control Function), RACF (Resource Access Control Function), Core transport, and Core packet transport functions. Key functional entities (FEs) are represented as boxes, color-coded by their role: orange for FEs providing authentication and authorization functions, and blue for FEs that may provide these functions. The diagram shows the flow of signaling and data between these entities, including connections to external networks like IP Multimedia Networks and PSTN/ISDN. A yellow arrow at the bottom indicates the 'Scope of NGN'. A legend at the bottom left clarifies the color coding for the FEs.
+
+**Figure 5 – Authentication and authorization functional entities of [ITU-T Y.2012]**
+
+## 6 General Requirements
+
+Support of the general identification, authentication and authorization requirements defined in [ITU-T Y.2701] and [ITU-T Y.2201] is required by this Recommendation as follows:
+
+- (R-1) – The requirements defined in clause 7.3.2 (Authentication) of [ITU-T Y.2701] shall be supported.
+- (R-2) – The requirements defined in clause 6.12 (Identification, Authentication and Authorization) of [ITU-T Y.2201] shall be supported.
+
+## 7 Authentication and authorization of user for network access
+
+### 7.1 Description
+
+Network access authentication and authorization services and capabilities are needed to mitigate threats associated with unauthorized access. Network access authentication and authorization services are needed to verify the identities and to determine whether access should be granted to end user equipment (i.e., terminal equipment (TE) and terminal equipment – border element (TE-BE)) requesting network connectivity to the NGN.
+
+#### General assumptions
+
+- a) An end user is not restricted to a person. End users could be a person, groups, companies, or juridical entities.
+
+- b) According to [ITU-T Y.2012], no assumptions are made about the diverse end-user interfaces and end-user networks that may be connected to the NGN access network. All categories of end-user equipment are supported in the NGN, from single-line legacy telephones to complex corporate networks. End-user equipment may be either mobile or fixed.
+- c) Determination of the network elements that implement the access and authorization services is not in the scope of this Recommendation.
+- d) Network access and authorization functions may be provided as part of the general network attachment control function (NACF) defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+### 7.2 General reference model
+
+Figure 6 shows the reference model for network access/attachment authentication and authorization consisting of the following security domains:
+
+- 1) Customer domain – Un-trusted domain containing user equipment owned and operated by the customer, for example:
+ - a) Legacy TE and TE-BE:
+ - Legacy TE represents legacy user devices connecting over narrow-band access (e.g., analogue and ISDN lines). These TEs obtain access to the IP network via an NGN provider gateway (e.g., access or media gateway).
+ - Legacy TE-BE represents user equipment serving as aggregate end points (e.g., enterprise and home network gateways) connecting over narrow-band access (e.g., analogue and ISDN lines). These TE-BEs obtain access to the IP network via an NGN provider gateway (e.g., access or media gateway).
+ - b) Legacy TE and TE-BE with integrated access device (IAD)
+ - Legacy TE with IAD represents legacy user devices connecting over broadband access (e.g., xDSL or cable). These TEs obtain access to the IP network via the IAD in the customer domain.
+ - Legacy TE-BE represents user equipment serving as aggregate end points (e.g., enterprise and home network gateways) connecting over broadband access (e.g., xDSL and Cable). This user equipment obtains access to the IP network via the IAD in the customer domain.
+ - c) NGN TE and TE-BE:
+ - NGN TE represents user devices in the customer domain with IP capabilities to support direct connectivity to the IP network (e.g., using xDSLs and cable broadband access).
+ - NGN TE-BE represents user equipment serving as aggregate end points (e.g., enterprise and home network gateways) with IP capabilities to support direct connectivity to the IP network.
+- 2) Access NGN provider domain: Access network hosted by an NGN provider (e.g., narrow-band, xDSL and cable). The access NGN provider may or may not be the same as the service NGN provider. Trust relationships between the NGN providers are governed by service level agreements (SLAs).
+- 3) Service NGN provider domain: The service NGN provider offers NGN application services to its subscribers. Trust relationships between NGN providers are governed by SLAs.
+
+
+
+Y.2702(08)\_F06
+
+Figure 6: Reference model for network access/attachment authentication and authorization. The diagram shows three domains: Customer domain, Access NGN provider, and Service NGN provider. The Customer domain contains Legacy TEs and TE-BEs, Legacy TEs and TE-BEs with IAD, and NGN TEs and TE-BEs. The Access NGN provider contains a Network access authentication function and a Gateway. The Service NGN provider contains a Service control authentication function. An IP network connects the Access NGN provider and the Service NGN provider. Six numbered arrows indicate information flows: (1) Legacy TEs and TE-BEs to Gateway; (2) Legacy TEs and TE-BEs with IAD to Gateway; (3) NGN TEs and TE-BEs to Gateway; (4) Gateway to Service control authentication function; (5) Legacy TEs and TE-BEs with IAD to Service control authentication function; (6) NGN TEs and TE-BEs to Service control authentication function. A bracket groups arrows (1), (2), and (3) as 'NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization'. Another bracket groups arrows (4), (5), and (6) as 'Bundled NGN access/attachment and service/application authentication and authorization'.
+
+**Figure 6 – Reference model for network access/attachment authentication and authorization**
+
+Figure 6 shows relationships for network access/attachment identification, authentication and authorization:
+
+- a) Device NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization – Services and capability to identify, authenticate and authorize user devices access or attachment to the access IP network.
+ - 1) This information flow represent services and capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorized legacy TE and TE-BE for access/attachment to the access IP network. The information flow is between the gateway (claimant) in the access NGN domain terminating the legacy TE and TE-BE in the customer domain and a network element (e.g., network access point) in the access NGN domain providing the NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization functions. The NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization functions (verifier) may be part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. However, where this function is implemented is implementation dependent.
+ - 2) This information flow represents services and capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain for access/attachment to the access IP network. The information flow is between the IAD (claimant) in the customer domain and a network element (e.g., network access point) in the access NGN domain providing the NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization. The NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization function (verifier) may be part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. However, where this function is implemented is implementation dependent.
+ - 3) This information flow represents services and capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorize NGN TE and TE-BE with IP capabilities in the customer domain for access/attachment to the IP network. The information flow is between the NGN TE or TE-BE (claimant) in the customer domain and a network element (e.g., network access point) in the access NGN domain providing the NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization. The NGN access/attachment authentication and authorization
+
+function (verifier) may be part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. However, where this function is implemented is implementation dependent.
+
+- b) Bundled device NGN access/attachment and service/application authentication and authorization – services and capabilities to bundle the access NGN provider authentication of the user device with the service NGN provider authentication and authorization of the user:
+- 4) This information flow represents services and capabilities for the service NGN provider to implicitly identify and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE. The information flow is between a gateway (claimant) in the access network domain and the NGN provider domain (verifier).
+ - 5) This information flow represents services and capabilities for the service NGN provider to implicitly identify and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD. The information flow is between the IAD (claimant) in the customer domain and the service NGN provider domain (verifier).
+ - 6) This information flow represents services and capabilities for the service NGN provider to directly identify, authenticate and authorize NGN TE and TE-BE in the customer domain. The information flow is between the NGN TE and TE-BE (claimant) in the customer domain and the service NGN provider domain (verifier).
+
+#### **Reference model for nomadicity**
+
+Figure 7 shows the reference model for nomadicity. This reference model is similar to the general reference model, except that in this scenario there is a visited NGN and home NGN to take into consideration.
+
+- 1) Visited NGN domain: NGN hosted by a visited NGN provider. Provides visited network functions for other NGN providers (i.e., home network provider). Trust relationships are governed by SLAs. The visited network may offer NGN services and may have its own subscribers.
+- 2) Home NGN domain: NGN hosted by the home NGN provider. The home NGN provider offers NGN services to its subscribers. Trust relationships are governed by SLAs.
+
+
+
+Figure 7: Reference model for nomadicity. The diagram illustrates the information flows between four domains: Customer domain, Access NGN, Visited NGN, and Home NGN. The Customer domain contains Legacy TEs and TE-BEs, Legacy TEs and TE-BEs connected via IAD, and NGN TEs and TE-BEs. The Access NGN contains a Network access authentication function and a Gateway. The Visited NGN contains a Service control authentication function. The Home NGN contains a Service control authentication function. All domains are connected via IP networks. Information flows are numbered (1) through (7). Flows (1), (2), and (3) are solid arrows between the Customer domain and the Access NGN. Flows (4), (5), and (6) are dashed arrows between the Access NGN and the Home NGN. Flow (7) is a dashed arrow between the Visited NGN and the Home NGN. A bracket on the right side groups flows (4), (5), and (6) as 'Bundled NGN access/attachment and service/application authentication and authorization for mobility'. The reference Y.2702(08)\_F07 is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7 – Reference model for nomadicity**
+
+The reference model shows information flows between the different domains for bundling the user device authentication and authorization and authentication and authorization of the user for nomadicity. The information flows represent services and capabilities to bundle the visited NGN provider authentication and authorization of the user device with the home NGN provider authentication and authorization of the user for nomadicity:
+
+- (1) – (6) – These information flows are the same flows as described for the single service provider scenario in Figure 6.
+- (7) – This information flow represents services and capabilities for a visited NGN provider and a home NGN provider to exchange identification, authentication and authorization information in support of nomadicity.
+
+### 7.3 Requirements
+
+#### 7.3.1 General requirements
+
+The following are general requirements for device network access/attachment identification, authentication and authorization:
+
+- (R-3) – It is required that the NGN be able to uniquely identify end user/subscriber devices (e.g., TE and TE-BE) based on NGN provider policy.
+- (R-4) – It is required that the NGN be capable of identifying, authenticating, and authorizing attachment of the TE and TE-BE at network access points (NAPs).
+- (R-5) – It is required that network access will only be granted to authorized TE and TE-BE.
+- (R-6) – For multi-network arrangements, each administrative domain (e.g., access NGN provider, visited NGN provider, and home NGN provider) is required to enforce policies (e.g., trust relationships) for identification, authentication, and authorization of TE and TE-BE network access/attachment (e.g., using SLAs).
+
+- (R-7) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to protect authentication and authorization information (e.g., user profile, subscription information, identity patterns) against unauthorized access, manipulation and corruption.
+- (R-8) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to provide confidentiality and integrity of protection of messages and information exchanges used for authentication and authorization.
+- (R-9) – The NGN is required to support capabilities for protection against attacks (e.g., message replay and denial of service attacks) on authentication and authorization functions and capabilities.
+- (R-10) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging unauthorized access attempts (e.g., a system configurable threshold may be set for the number of unauthorized access attempts beyond which an alarm will be generated, logged, and reported to a management system).
+
+#### **7.3.2 Legacy TE and TE-BE**
+
+NAPs supporting network access for legacy TE and TE-BE need to support capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorize such access.
+
+- (R-11) – Network access points (NAPs) supporting legacy TE and TE-BE are required to support capabilities to uniquely identify the fixed line for the attachment or connectivity to the NGN. A layer 2 address may be used to identify a fixed line (e.g., MAC or link layer address). This function may be provided as part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- (R-12) – NAPs supporting legacy TE and TE-BE are required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize the fixed line for attachment or connectivity to the NGN. Access control lists (ACLs) and transport stratum subscription/user profile information may be used to authorize fixed line access to the NGN. These functions may be provided as part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- (R-13) – NAPs supporting legacy TE and TE-BE are required to support capability to link and bind the identity of a fixed line with the IP address used for NGN access connectivity. This function may be provided as part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### **7.3.3 Legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD**
+
+NAPs supporting network access for legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain need to support capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorize such access.
+
+- (R-14) – NAPs supporting legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain are required to support capabilities to uniquely identify the fixed line and the IAD for the attachment or connectivity to the NGN. A layer 2 address may be used to identify a fixed line (e.g., MAC or link layer address) and an IP address for the IAD. This function may be provided as part of the general network NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- (R-15) – NAPs supporting legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain are required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize the IAD for attachment or connectivity to the NGN. Only authorized IADs are allowed to obtain attachment or network connectivity to the NGN. Access control lists (ACLs) and transport stratum subscription/user profile information may be used to authorize IAD and fixed line access to the NGN. These functions may be provided as part of the general network NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- (R-16) – NAPs supporting legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain are required to support capability to link and bind the identity of a fixed line with the identity of the
+
+IAD. This function may be provided as part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### **7.3.4 NGN TE and TE-BE**
+
+NAPs supporting network access for NGN TE and TE-BE need to support capabilities to identify, authenticate and authorize such access to the NGN.
+
+- (R-17) – NAPs supporting NGN TE and TE-BE (i.e., direct IP connectivity) are required to support capabilities to uniquely identify user devices within its domain for NGN attachment and connectivity. NGN TE and TE-BE may be uniquely identified by device identities and network addresses (e.g., equipment identities, SIM cards, security token, IP addresses, etc.).
+- (R-18) – NAPs supporting NGN TE and TE-BE (i.e., direct IP connectivity) are required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize user devices within its domain for NGN attachment and connectivity. The authentication and authorization may be based on transport stratum subscription/user profile information. Only authorized NGN TE and TE-BE are allowed to obtain attachment or network connectivity to the NGN. These functions may be provided as part of the general NACF defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### **7.3.5 Bundled user and user device authentication and authorization**
+
+Based on risk assessment, authentication and authorization of the user and the user's device combination may be needed to provide a higher level of identity assurance. NGN may support capabilities to bundle authentication functions for NGN access/attachment and access to services/applications based on transport stratum (e.g., user device and network access information) and service stratum (e.g., subscription/user profile) information.
+
+- (R-19) – It is required that capabilities to uniquely identify and bind user and user device combination be supported based on NGN provider policy.
+- (R-20) – It is required that capabilities to authenticate and authorize user and user device combination be supported based on NGN provider policy. Only authorized users and user devices are allowed to obtain attachment/network and access to services/applications.
+
+#### **7.3.6 Bundled user and user device authentication and authorization for nomadicity**
+
+Authentication and authorization of the user and the user's device combination may be supported to provide higher level of identity assurance for nomadicity. Capabilities for exchanging and sharing identification, authentication and authorization information (e.g., user profiles information) among the different administrative domains (i.e., access NGN provider, visited NGN provider, and home NGN provider) for IdM may be supported (see clause 8.2.2).
+
+- (R-21) – It is required that capabilities to uniquely identify user and user device combination for nomadicity be supported based on NGN provider policy.
+- (R-22) – It is required that capabilities to authenticate and authorize user and user device combination for nomadicity be supported based on NGN provider policy. In cases where the service is independent of the user device, authentication of access information such as fixed line, location or access address may be combined with authentication of the user to provide higher assurance level.
+
+## 8 Service NGN provider authentication and authorization of user for access to service/application
+
+### 8.1 Description
+
+Capabilities are needed to mitigate threats associated with unauthorized access to the services and features provided by a NGN provider. Authentication and authorization services and capabilities are needed to determine whether a user is authorized to receive service or authorized to perform an action based on its privileges. Service/application authentication and authorization is viewed as a NGN provider authentication of a user and authorization of the user to receive NGN services or to perform an action based on its privileges. Service/application authentication and authorization may involve verifying the identities and authorization of the privileges of the following:
+
+- user
+- user device
+- user and device combination
+
+Based on the NGN architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], service/application authentication and authorization functions will be supported in the service stratum using subscription and user profile information.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph "Customer domain"
+ User
+ TEs["NGN TEs and TE-BEs"]
+ end
+ subgraph "Access NGN provider"
+ NAAF["Network access authentication function"]
+ IP1["IP network"]
+ end
+ subgraph "Service NGN provider"
+ SCAF["Service control authentication function"]
+ IP2["IP network"]
+ end
+ TEs -- IP --- IP1
+ IP1 --- IP2
+ SCAF -. "(1) User device authentication" .-> NAAF
+ SCAF -- "(2) User device authentication" --> TEs
+ SCAF -- "(3) User device authentication" --> User
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the reference model for service/application authentication and authorization across three domains: Customer domain, Access NGN provider, and Service NGN provider. The Customer domain includes a User and NGN TEs and TE-BEs. The Access NGN provider includes a Network access authentication function and an IP network. The Service NGN provider includes a Service control authentication function and an IP network. Three authentication flows are shown: (1) User device authentication from the Service NGN provider to the Access NGN provider, (2) User device authentication from the Service NGN provider to the User device (TEs), and (3) User authentication from the Service NGN provider to the User.
+
+Figure 8: Reference model for service/application authentication and authorization. The diagram shows three domains: Customer domain, Access NGN provider, and Service NGN provider. The Customer domain contains a User and NGN TEs and TE-BEs. The Access NGN provider contains a Network access authentication function and an IP network. The Service NGN provider contains a Service control authentication function and an IP network. Arrows indicate three types of authentication flows: (1) User device authentication from the Service NGN provider to the Access NGN provider, (2) User device authentication from the Service NGN provider to the User, and (3) User device authentication from the Service NGN provider to the User via a dashed line.
+
+**Figure 8 – Reference model for service/application authentication and authorization**
+
+Figure 8 shows example relationships for service/application authorization and authentication in a multi-network provider scenario:
+
+- (1) This information flow represents the service NGN provider relying on the access NGN provider for authentication of a user device through trust relationships.
+- (2) This information flow represents the service NGN provider authentication and authorization of a user device. This case would require the user device to have special identification capabilities (e.g., SIM).
+- (3) This information flow represents the service NGN provider authentication of the user (e.g., user login and provide password or PIN).
+
+### **8.2 Requirements**
+
+#### **8.2.1 General requirements**
+
+The following are general requirements regarding the NGN provider authentication and authorization of the user:
+
+- (R-23) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to identify a user, a user device and a user and device combination based on subscription and user profile information.
+- (R-24) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize a user, a user device, or a user and user device combination based on subscription and user profile information.
+- (R-25) – It is required that NGN services only be granted to authorized user, device, or user and device combination.
+- (R-26) – It is required that the NGN support capabilities to verify and authorize the privileges of a user (e.g., allowing the user to perform certain actions only if its role or privilege is authorized).
+- (R-27) – For multi-network arrangements, each administrative domain (e.g., access NGN provider, visited NGN provider, and home NGN provider) is required to enforce policies (e.g., SLAs) for identification, authentication, and authorization of a user, a user device, and a user and device combination.
+- (R-28) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to provide confidentiality and integrity protection of messages and information exchanges used for authentication and authorization of user, user device, and user and device combination.
+- (R-29) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to protect against unauthorized access, manipulation and corruption of service authentication and authorization information (e.g., user profile and subscription information).
+- (R-30) – The NGN is required to support capabilities for protection against attacks (e.g., message replay and denial of service attacks) on service authentication and authorization functions and capabilities.
+- (R-31) – Capabilities to bundle access network technology specific authentication of user device with the authentication of the user are required to be supported based on NGN provider policy.
+- (R-32) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging unauthorized access attempts to NGN services or resources (e.g., a system configurable threshold may be set for the number of unauthorized access attempts beyond which an alarm will be generated, logged, and reported to a management system).
+- (R-33) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging access attempts that are unauthorized (e.g., unauthorized user actions).
+
+#### **8.2.2 Authentication result sharing for IdM**
+
+The NGN provider may need to exchange authentication results among different services and/or applications within its network and externally to other NGN providers to support identity management (IdM) services. This may include assertions and other information relevant to IdM such as (not limiting):
+
+- a) trust policy;
+- b) authentication method and information used for the authentication (e.g., authentication keys);
+- c) assurance levels;
+- d) privilege management information (e.g., privileges assigned or validated).
+
+Capabilities for secure exchange of authentication result information (e.g., assertions) and other related information as described above will allow NGN providers to design service/application platforms with efficient and user friendly authentication and authorization features. For example, authentication result information can be shared among systems (e.g., application servers) supporting different services and/or applications to allow a NGN provider to support "single sign on" features and capabilities for user's convenience. The following requirements are applicable to exchange and sharing of authentication results within an NGN provider's network:
+
+- (R-34) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to allow the systems and network elements (e.g., application servers) supporting different services and/or applications to exchange and share authentication result information (e.g., assertions, privilege management information, trust policy, and assurance levels) securely based on the NGN provider's service/application platform specific designs and security policy.
+- (R-35) – It is required that the communication between different systems or network elements (e.g., application servers) to exchange or share authentication result information be protected against unauthorized access, observation, manipulation or corruption (e.g., confidentiality and integrity protected). This includes protection of any stored information.
+
+In a multi-network environment, NGN providers may need to exchange and share authentication results securely with each other based on SLAs. The following requirements are applicable to the exchange and sharing of authentication results between different NGN providers:
+
+- (R-36) – It is required to support capabilities to allow NGN providers to exchange and share authentication results securely (i.e., across NNI and ANI) based on trust relationships, policies and SLAs between the NGN providers.
+- (R-37) – It is required that communication between NGN providers to exchange and share authentication result information (i.e., across NNIs and ANIs) be protected against unauthorized access, observation, manipulation or corruption (e.g., confidentiality and integrity protected). This includes protection of any stored information. The specific security mechanisms and security practices will be based on trust relationships, policies and SLAs between the NGN providers.
+- (R-38) – It is required to support capabilities to prove authentication method and communicate information about the method(s) that were used to authenticate entities to relying parties such as:
+ - method of user's identity verification;
+ - authentication method (use of digital certificates, signatures, security token, biometric data, SIM, etc.);
+ - trust policy;
+ - authentication assurance levels.
+
+Sharing of authentication information and results are subjected to the compliance with the relevant policies, such as national and regional regulations and legislations for protection of Personally Identifiable Information (PII).
+
+- (R-39) – It is required that the NGN Provider ensures the compliance with the relevant policies, such as national and regional regulations and legislations for protection of personally identifiable information (PII). This includes policies formed on the following basic data protection principles:
+ - binding of data to a specific purpose;
+ - no data sharing between applications for different purposes;
+ - limitation of data to the minimum needed for a specific purpose;
+
+- right of persons to have control over their PII.
+
+#### 8.2.3 Service NGN provider authentication and authorization of user for access to specific service/application
+
+NGN providers will have to manage user's privileges for access (including user roles and privileges to perform actions) to specific service/applications such as:
+
+- Voice services
+- Streaming services
+- Data and messaging services
+- Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) and telecommunication for disaster relief (TDR)
+
+Each service may have its own assurance level requirement to validate the identity and privileges of a user, user device or user and device combination based on the risks associated with the likelihood of unauthorized entities obtaining access to the service resource. The necessary assurance level for the authentication and validation of the privileges of a user, user device or user and device combination must be established and implemented for specific service based on the NGN security policy. This would involve support and use of various authentication methods ranging from basic authentication methods using passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs) and more stringent methods using authentication keys such as:
+
+- a) digital certificates (e.g., X.509 PKI)
+- b) security tokens (hardware and software tokens) and smart cards
+- c) behavioural characteristic data (e.g., keystroke analysis)
+- d) biometric identification data (e.g., voice recognition, fingerprint, iris, or retina identification)
+
+NOTE – Authentication of an entity is not intended to indicate positive validation of a person.
+
+The ease of use by the user should also be taken into account for authentication and authorization. This is especially true for certain types of services such as ETS and TDR. It is desirable that the authentication process should be user friendly. Refer to Appendix II for information on ETS authentication and authorization examples.
+
+When considering service specific authentication and authorization, the following requirements in addition to those in clauses 8.2.1 and 8.2.2 are applicable:
+
+- (R-40) – Authentication methods for credentials are required to be supported based on NGN provider policy. Multi-factor authentication methods are required to be supported and used as appropriate based on NGN provider policy for identity and privilege assurance.
+- (R-41) – It is required that it be possible to uniquely identify all users associated with a subscription to an application service, subject to NGN provider policy. This includes the identification of aggregate end users whose user identities may not be provided to the NGN provider.2
+- (R-42) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible to bind a number of individual users to the same subscription.
+- (R-43) – Each user/subscriber associated with an application service subscription is required to be uniquely addressable for communication purposes.
+
+---
+
+2 An aggregate end point will have two or more aggregate users associated with it. The identity of these users may only be known to the aggregate end point and not the NGN provider.
+
+- (R-44) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible for the end-user to access a service simultaneously multiple times and/or from multiple devices.
+- (R-45) – It is required that it be possible to support multiple subscription profiles for an individual end-user. These multiple subscription profiles are required to be uniquely identifiable.
+
+Subject to NGN provider policy, periodic authentication of a user may be necessary for high assurance and security.
+
+- (R-46) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible to periodically re-authenticate the user (e.g., an end user, network element or object) for the duration of an established communication session or transaction.
+
+## **9 User authentication and authorization of NGN providers**
+
+This clause provides requirements related to user authentication and authorization of the network (e.g., user authenticating the identity of the connected NGN network or of the service provider).
+
+### **9.1 Description**
+
+The NGN architecture allows end users to obtain services from multiple NGN providers. In addition, the transport NGN provider (e.g., access NGN provider) can be different from the service NGN provider. As a result, end users may need to verify the identities of NGN providers (e.g., access, transport and service providers). Specifically, the following may need to be supported:
+
+- Capabilities to allow an end user to identify, authenticate and authorize the access NGN provider for network connectivity (e.g., network access).
+- Capabilities to allow an end user to identify, authenticate and authorize a service NGN provider
+
+### **9.2 Objectives and requirements**
+
+#### **9.2.1 User authentication of NGN provider for network attachment**
+
+Network access points supporting network access for NGN TE and TE-BE should support capabilities to allow the user to identify, authenticate and authorize the network attachment.
+
+- (R-47) – Network access points (NAPs) supporting NGN TE and TE-BE (i.e., direct IP connectivity) shall support capabilities to allow the end user to uniquely identify the NGN provider for attachment and connectivity if required by security policy.
+- (R-48) – Network access points (NAPs) supporting NGN TE and TE-BE (i.e., direct IP connectivity) shall support capabilities to allow the user to authenticate and authorize the NGN provider for attachment and connectivity if required by security policy. These functions may be provided as part of the general network attachment control function (NACF) defined in [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- (R-49) – For multi-network arrangements, each administrative domain (i.e., network access provider, visited NGN provider, and home NGN provider) is required to enforce policies (e.g., trust relationships) regarding the identification, authentication, and authorization of the network attachment (e.g., using SLAs).
+
+#### **9.2.2 User authentication of NGN provider for obtaining service**
+
+Capabilities to allow an end user to authenticate and authorize an NGN provider to obtain NGN services may be provided.
+
+- (R-50) – The NGN shall support capabilities to allow an end user to uniquely identify the NGN provider providing a service or set of services if required by security policy.
+
+- (R-51) – The NGN shall support capabilities to allow an end user to authenticate and authorize the NGN provider providing service or set of services if required by security policy.
+
+## **10 NGN provider supported user peer-to-peer authentication and authorization**
+
+This clause is provided for completeness and is informational.
+
+It is transparent to the NGN provider that peer-to-peer communications are occurring, as the traffic transverses the NGN provider network only at the transport layer. It should be noted that an NGN provider may provide the role as an IdP providing IdM services (e.g., capabilities for peer-to-peer authentication) for these communication scenarios.
+
+## **11 Mutual network authentication and authorization**
+
+### **11.1 Description**
+
+Mutual network authentication and authorization are needed to mitigate threats of unauthorized access. Network access authentication and authorization services are needed to verify the identities and to determine whether network transport access, and/or services and capabilities access should be granted. Network access may occur at either the NNI or ANI.
+
+Figure 9 shows the reference model for mutual network authentication and authorization consisting of the following security domains:
+
+- 1) Access network domain: Access network hosted by an access network provider (e.g., narrow-band, xDSL and cable). The access network provider may or may not be the same as the NGN provider. Trust relationships between access network provider and NGN provider are governed by service level agreements (SLAs).
+- 2) Visited NGN domain: NGN hosted by a visited network provider. Provides visited network functions for other NGN network providers (i.e., home network provider). Trust relationships are governed by service level agreements (SLAs). The visited network may offer NGN services and may have its own subscribers. In addition, the visited network may have agreements with 3rd party application service provider. In addition, the visited network may interface with the home network via a transit network, and the trust relationship is governed by SLAs.
+- 3) Home network domain: NGN hosted by a home network provider. The home network offers NGN services to its subscribers. In addition, the home network may have agreements with 3rd party application service providers via an ANI. Trust relationships between visited and home network providers, including any 3rd party provider are governed by service level agreements (SLAs). In addition, the home network may interface with a visited or other network via a transit network, where the trust relationships are governed by SLAs.
+- 4) Transit network domain: NGN providing only transport. Trust relationships between the transport network and the adjacent networks, including any 3rd party provider are governed by service level agreements (SLAs).
+- 5) Other network domain: Either an NGN or non-NGN provider. Trust relationships are governed by service level agreements (SLAs).
+
+
+
+Figure 9: Mutual network authentication diagram. The diagram shows five network boxes: Access network, Visited network, Home network, Transit network, and Other network. Each box contains a 'Network access' circle and an 'IP network' cloud. The 'Visited', 'Home', and 'Other' networks also contain a 'Service control access' circle. Solid horizontal arrows connect the 'Network access' circles of adjacent networks (Access to Visited, Visited to Home, Home to Transit, Transit to Other). Dashed horizontal arrows connect the 'Service control access' circles of the Visited, Home, and Other networks. Vertical lines connect 'Service control access' to 'Network access' within each of the Visited, Home, and Other networks. A label 'Y.2702(08)\_F09' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 9 – Mutual network authentication**
+
+#### 11.1.1 Transport level authentication
+
+As shown in Figure 9, transport level authentication is on a hop-by-hop basis, whereby the authentication is always with the adjacent network at the transport. This means that the home network does not necessarily need to have an SLA agreement with the other network shown in the figure, but rather the transport level relationship is between the home network and the transit network and then between the transit network and the other network.
+
+#### 11.1.2 Service/application level authentication
+
+As shown in Figure 9, service/application level authentication is directly between the service control stratum of the visited, home, and other network, at a peer-to-peer service/application level. This peer-to-peer relationship is logical and not physical. The physical path is vertical from the service control to network access in one network, then transported directly or via a transit network, and then vertically from the network to service control access in the peer service/application network.
+
+### 11.2 Mutual network authentication requirements
+
+- (R-52) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to uniquely identify adjacent networks at the transport stratum.
+- (R-53) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize access from adjacent networks at the transport stratum.
+- (R-54) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to uniquely identify adjacent networks at the service stratum.
+- (R-55) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize access from adjacent networks at the service stratum.
+- (R-56) – Each NGN provider is required to enforce policies for mutual network identification, authentication, and authorization (e.g., using SLAs and trust relationships).
+- (R-57) – For inter-network communication it is required that it be possible to uniquely identify network elements involved by correlating network element identifiers with identifiers associated with the interconnected NGN provider.
+- (R-58) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to protect against unauthorized access, manipulation and corruption of mutual network authentication and authorization information.
+
+- (R-59) – The NGN is required to support capabilities for protection against attacks (e.g., message replay and denial of service attacks) on mutual network authentication and authorization functions and capabilities.
+- (R-60) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging unauthorized access attempts from other networks (e.g., a system configurable threshold may be set for the number of unauthorized access attempts beyond which an alarm will be generated, logged, and reported to a management system).
+
+Subject to NGN provider policy, periodic authentication of an adjacent NGN provider may be necessary for high assurance and security.
+
+- (R-61) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible to periodically re-authenticate the interconnecting NGN provider for the duration of the established communication session or transaction.
+
+## 12 NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party service/application provider
+
+### 12.1 Description
+
+There may be certain scenarios where the provider of an application or service is different from the NGN provider (i.e., a 3rd party service/application provider). In such scenarios, the NGN provider would need to authenticate and authorize the 3rd party service/application provider as shown in Figure 10.
+
+
+
+Figure 10: 3rd party service/application provider authentication and authorization. The diagram shows three domains: Customer domain, NGN provider network, and 3rd party service/application provider. In the Customer domain, a User is connected to NGN TEs and TE-BEs. In the NGN provider network, there is a Service control authentication function connected to an IP network. In the 3rd party service/application provider, there is also a Service control authentication function connected to an IP network. A double-headed arrow labeled '(1) NGN provider authentication of the NGN service/application provider' connects the two IP networks. A reference code 'Y.2702(08)\_F10' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10 – 3rd party service/application provider authentication and authorization**
+
+It should be noted that the user and network authentications described in the previous clauses occur and are not shown in Figure 10 and the text below.
+
+### 12.2 Requirements
+
+- (R-62) – A 3rd party service/application provider is required to support capabilities to identify itself to an NGN service provider.
+- (R-63) – A 3rd party service/application provider is required to support capabilities to identify itself to a user.
+- (R-64) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to uniquely identify 3rd party service/application providers.
+
+- (R-65) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize 3rd party service/application providers.
+- (R-66) – NGN provider and 3rd party service/application providers are required to enforce policies for identification, authentication, and authorization (e.g., using SLAs and trust relationships).
+- (R-67) – The NGN and 3rd party service/application providers are required to support capabilities to protect against unauthorized access, manipulation and corruption of authentication and authorization information.
+- (R-68) – The NGN and 3rd party service/application providers are required to support capabilities to protect against attacks (e.g., message replay and denial of service attacks) on authentication and authorization functions and capabilities.
+- (R-69) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging unauthorized access attempts from 3rd party service/application providers (e.g., a system configurable threshold may be set for the number of unauthorized access attempts beyond which an alarm will be generated, logged, and reported to a management system).
+
+Subject to NGN provider policy, periodic authentication of a 3rd party service/application provider may be necessary for high assurance and security.
+
+- (R-70) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible to periodically re-authenticate the 3rd party service/application provider for the duration of an established communication session or transaction.
+
+## **13 Use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service**
+
+### **13.1 Description**
+
+Third party authentication and authorization service providers may provide:
+
+- authentication of the user to a service provider;
+- authentication of a service provider to the user;
+- authentication between service providers; and
+- authentication of a service/application provider by either a user or service provider.
+
+In this regard, there will be at least three entities involved when a 3rd party authentication service provider is used. In addition to the 3rd party authentication service provider performing its authentication service function(s) upon request, it is required to authenticate itself to both the requestor and requestee.
+
+### **13.2 Requirements**
+
+The requirements in clause 12.2 are applicable.
+
+## **14 Authentication and authorization of objects**
+
+### **14.1 Description**
+
+In addition to authentication and authorization of users, user devices and service providers, there is a need to authenticate objects in general. This includes physical objects such as network elements or systems as well as virtual objects such as:
+
+- applications;
+- application process;
+- software programs;
+
+- signalling, management and bearer messages and data content.
+
+### **14.2 Requirements**
+
+- (R-71) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to uniquely identify objects, subject to NGN provider policy.
+- (R-72) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to authenticate and authorize objects, subject to NGN provider policy.
+- (R-73) – It is required that the NGN support capabilities to verify and authorize the privileges of an object (e.g., allowing the object to perform an action or engage in a process only if its role or privilege is authorized).
+- (R-74) – The NGN provider is required to enforce policies for identification, authentication, and authorization of objects.
+- (R-75) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to provide confidentiality and integrity protection of messages and information exchanges used for authentication and authorization of objects.
+- (R-76) – The NGN is required to support capabilities to protect against unauthorized access, manipulation and corruption of object authentication and authorization information.
+- (R-77) – The NGN is required to support capabilities for protection against attacks (e.g., message replay and denial of service attacks) on object authentication and authorization functions and capabilities.
+- (R-78) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging unauthorized access attempts from objects (e.g., a system configurable threshold may be set for the number of unauthorized access attempts beyond which an alarm will be generated, logged, and reported to a management system).
+- (R-79) – It is required that the NGN be capable of detecting and logging privilege attempts that are unauthorized (e.g., unauthorized user actions).
+
+Subject to NGN provider policy, periodic authentication of an adjacent NGN provider may be necessary for high assurance and security.
+
+- (R-80) – Subject to NGN provider policy, it is required that it be possible to periodically re-authenticate the associated object for the duration of the related established communication session or transaction.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## SAML use case
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### I.1 Use of [b-ITU-T X.1141], Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)
+
+This appendix provides example use cases for conveying authentication results while supporting privacy use of SAML for service/application authentication.
+
+### I.2 Service/application authentication procedures
+
+When the authentication resultants need to be exchanged among the trusted services and/or applications which can be 3rd party providers, security assertion markup language (SAML 2.0) may be used. SAML 2.0 is an open specification standardized by the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS). SAML can be used specifically for the following cases:
+
+- Single sign on: when different services and applications allow their users single sign on for users' convenience without exchanging all user information among them.
+- Account federation: when different services and applications link their accounts for the same user.
+
+### I.3 Service/application authentication – Call flow examples
+
+Figure I.1 shows a typical example of single sign on with federation using SAML 2.0.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the SSO call flow example using SAML 2.0. It shows the interaction between a user, a Service Provider (SP), and an Identity Provider (IdP).
+
+**Participants:**
+
+- A user:** Represented by a person icon and a computer icon.
+- SP (Service Provider):** Represented by a green box.
+- IdP (Identity Provider):** Represented by a yellow box.
+
+**Flow Steps:**
+
+- 1. Service request:** The user sends a service request to the SP.
+- 2. Request for authenticationa:** The SP sends a request for authentication to the IdP.
+- 3. Log on to IdP:** The user logs on to the IdP.
+- 4. Send the assertion including authentication information by IdPa, b:** The IdP sends an assertion back to the SP.
+- 5. Verify the assertion:** The SP verifies the assertion received from the IdP.
+- 6. Provide service:** The SP provides the service to the user.
+- 7. Service request to use another servicec:** The user sends a service request to another SP.
+
+**Callouts:**
+
+- A callout box from the SP to the user states: *SP trusts authentication resultant information from IdP to provide its service for a user*.
+
+**Footnotes:**
+
+- a) 2 and 4 are done communication (e.g., HTTP-redirect) via a user agent (e.g., Web browser).
+- b) The assertion can contain attribute information and authorization decision when necessary.
+- c) The same flow as from 1. through 6., excluding logging into IdP. (In other words, a user only needs to log on to IdP once to be authenticated.)
+
+**Reference:** Y.2702(08)\_Fl.1
+
+Figure I.1: SSO call flow example using SAML 2.0. The diagram illustrates the sequence of events between a user, a Service Provider (SP), and an Identity Provider (IdP).
+
+Figure I.1 – SSO call flow example using SAML 2.0
+
+[b-ITU-T X.1141] defines the terms shown on Figure I.1 as follows:
+
+- Identity provider (IdP)
+A kind of service provider that creates, maintains, and manages identity information for principals and provides principal authentication to other service providers within a federation, such as with web browser profiles.
+- Service provider
+A role donned by a system entity where the system entity provides services to principals or other system entities.
+- Assertion.
+A piece of data produced by a SAML authority regarding either an act of authentication performed on a subject, attribute information about the subject, or authorization data applying to the subject with respect to a specified resource.
+
+### **I.4 Security of service/application authentication procedures and mechanisms**
+
+SAML 2.0 itself has features such as anonymous federation and pseudonyms to protect security as well as privacy. Anonymous federation provides a transient nameID for service provider. Pseudonyms allow users to be identified to a service provider during single sign on using pair-wise pseudonyms that preserve privacy while enabling a persistent relationship to be maintained with the user. SAML 2.0 also permits attribute statements, name identifiers, or entire assertions to be encrypted. This feature ensures that end-to-end confidentiality of these elements may be supported as needed.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+## ETS authentication and authorization
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### II.1 Overview
+
+Countries have, or are developing, emergency telecommunications service (ETS). Implementation of ETS by definition is a national matter. However, disasters/emergencies can transcend geographic boundaries, and thus there is a potential that countries/administrations may enter into bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to link their respective ETS systems. [b-ITU-T E.107] provides guidance that will enable telecommunications between one ETS national implementation (ENI) and other ENI(s).
+
+NGN providers are required to allow access only to authorized ETS users. The unauthorized access, such as by intruders masquerading as authorized users must be prevented. Therefore, mechanisms and capabilities to authenticate and authorize access of the ETS user, device or user and device combination as applicable based on policy3 and the assurance level for specific service (e.g., voice, data, video) is important for ETS security.
+
+In the interconnection between ETS national implementations, NGN providers will have to rely on each other for authentication and authorization of ETS users through service level agreements. There are multiple approaches for ETS authentication and authorization. This appendix provides information on example approaches for ETS authentication and authorization including some call flow examples.
+
+### II.2 ETS user authentication and authorization
+
+How ETS users are authenticated and authorized is a national matter. Generally, a NGN provider authenticates and authorizes a user's ETS call/session request based on the enrolment/registration method and how the service is invoked. Authentication may be on a per-call/session basis, on a one-time (time-limited) authentication basis applicable to the ETS user's current access, or on a subscription basis. NGN providers should expedite the authentication of authorized emergency telecommunications users early in the call/session set up process. Specific mechanisms and methods shall be used for authentication and authorization based on the applicable policy (e.g., use of personal identification number (PIN), and user and subscription profiles). Once the user, user device or user and device combination is authenticated and authorized based on the applicable policy, the ETS call/session is marked and indicated in the forward direction to subsequent networks, and optionally the ETS user's priority level. In addition, once authenticated and authorized, priority is given to all aspects of the ETS call/session, the signalling/control, the bearer traffic, and any applicable management.
+
+Example approaches for ETS authentication and authorization includes:
+
+- a) Use of personal identification number (PIN): This approach uses a PIN to authenticate and authorize the user. In this approach we identify the user and not the user device. Therefore, it is normally used in cases where the user is allowed to invoke the ETS service from any device.
+- b) Use of subscription/service profile: In this approach, the user terminal service profile is provisioned to indicate ETS subscription. The user terminal is authenticated and the user's service profile is identified as part of the NGN provider's (i.e., ETS provider) normal
+
+---
+
+3 NOTE – Policy in this context includes all applicable policies such as NGN provider, regulatory and governmental rules and regulations.
+
+registration procedure. When the user initiates a request, check against the user's service profile determines whether the user is authorized for ETS. The ETS request is granted if the ETS subscription is validated for the user terminal.
+
+- c) Use of PIN and service profile combination: Approaches combining the PIN and service profile methods may also be used to authenticate both the user and the user device to provide higher levels of assurance.
+- d) Use of special security tokens and biometrics: In addition to the approaches described above, more sophisticated approaches using special security tokens and biometric capabilities to authenticate and authorize ETS users may be used to provide higher level of identity assurances.
+
+### **II.3 NGN provider authentication and authorization for ETS**
+
+Authentication and authorization consideration must also be given to the handing off and receiving of ETS traffic between NGN providers, taking into account a multi-provider environment and separation of service control and transport. Authentication and authorization of NGN providers for handing off and receiving ETS calls/session and traffic based on SLAs and applicable policy is also important for ETS security.
+
+### **II.4 ETS authentication and authorization use case examples**
+
+#### **II.4.1 Basic PIN-based authentication and authorization use case example**
+
+Figure II.1 illustrates a basic ETS authentication and authorization example involving the use of a personal identification number (PIN).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of events for PIN authentication and authorization. The participants are NGN terminal, P-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE, ETS AS, and MS. The process begins with the NGN terminal sending an INVITE (R-URI, RPH) to the ETS AS (Step 1). The ETS AS then sends an INVITE (VXML R-URI, RPH) to the MS (Step 2). The MS responds with a 200 OK [INVITE] (Step 3), followed by an Ack (RPH) to the ETS AS. The MS then sends an HTTP GET to the ETS AS, which responds with an HTTP 200 OK (Step 4). The MS sends a 200 OK [INVITE] to the ETS AS, which then sends an Ack to the NGN terminal (Step 5). The MS sends an HTTP POST to the ETS AS, which responds with an HTTP 200 OK (Step 6). The MS then sends a BYE (RPH) to the ETS AS, which responds with a 200 OK (Step 7). The MS sends a 200 OK to the ETS AS, which then sends a reINVITE (SDP for Hold, RRH) to the NGN terminal (Step 8/9). The MS sends a 200 OK to the ETS AS, which then sends an Ack (RPH) to the NGN terminal (Step 10). The MS sends an INVITE (R-URI=destination #, RPH) to the ETS AS (Step 11). The MS sends a 180 Ringing to the ETS AS, which responds with a 200 OK. The MS sends a reINVITE (SDP-DN, RRH) to the ETS AS, which responds with a 200 OK. The MS sends an Ack (RPH) to the ETS AS, which then sends a 200 OK to the NGN terminal (Step 12). The MS then plays tones and announcements to the calling user to collect PIN and destination number, and responds to the AS with the user's input. The diagram also shows a dotted line from the MS to the 'Toward destination number' label.
+
+Sequence diagram for PIN authentication and authorization involving NGN terminal, P-CSC-FE, S-CSC-FE, ETS AS, and MS.
+
+**Figure II.1 – PIN authentication and authorization**
+
+This example assumes that ETS user requests/invokes the ETS call/session by making a call/session request to an ETS number. In addition, all SIP requests include resource-priority header (RPH) [b-IETF RFC 4412] to indicate that priority treatment is required.
+
+- 1) The call/session is routed to an ETS application server (AS) where user authentication processing is initiated.
+- 2) The ETS AS sends an INVITE message to the selected media server (MS), with an SDP offer associated with the caller. The INVITE message contains the URL of a VoiceXML script, stored at the ETS AS. The script describes how the MS should interact with the caller (what announcement to play, how to collect digits, how many digits to collect, interdigit timers, etc.).
+- 3) Upon receipt of the INVITE message the MS:
+ - May send a 100 Trying to the ETS AS;
+ - Retrieves the VoiceXML script directly from the ETS AS using HTTP and the URL in the INVITE message. (MS sends a HTTP GET to the AS and VoiceXML script is returned from the ETS AS in an HTTP 200 OK);
+ - Validates the script;
+ - Formulates and sends a 200 OK message containing its own SDP to the ETS AS.
+
+- 4) The ETS AS sends a 200 OK towards the calling party (NGN terminal), including in it the session information it received from the MS.
+- 5) At this point the media connection is available between the MS and the calling party.
+- 6) Upon receipt of the ACK and VXML script in the HTTP 200 OK, the MS executes the VoiceXML script. It plays a tone and collects digits (PIN) entered by the calling party.
+- 7) The MS then sends the collected digits directly to the ETS AS using an HTTP POST message.
+- 8) Upon receipt of the collected digits, the ETS AS verifies whether the received digits (PIN) are valid.
+ - If the digits received are invalid (number of digits received or the wrong number), the ETS AS determines that further interaction with the caller is required. The ETS AS returns an HTTP 200 OK message to the MS with a new VoiceXML script. The ETS AS will instruct for final handling treatment.
+ - If the received digits are valid, the ETS AS will instruct the MS to play the announcement to collect the digits (Destination Number).
+- 9) The ETS AS determines that the calling party entered destination digits are valid.
+- 10) The ETS AS releases the MS from the call/session with a SIP BYE, and sends a reINVITE toward the calling party, with a SDP to place the media on hold.
+- 11) The ETS AS sends an INVITE toward the destination party. Upon receiving 200 OK (answer), the ETS AS sends a reINVITE with the SDP associated with the destination toward the calling party.
+- 12) Media path is established between the calling party and destination number, with the authentication ETS AS in the call control path.
+
+#### II.4.2 Subscription/service profile authentication and authorization use case example
+
+Figure II.2 illustrates use case example where the subscription/service profile is used for ETS authentication and authorization.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant P_I_CSCF as P/I-CSCF
+ participant HSS
+ participant S_CSCF as S-CSCF
+
+ Note over User: (1) REGISTER
+ User->>P_I_CSCF: REGISTER
+ Note over P_I_CSCF: (2)
+ P_I_CSCF-->>HSS: (3)
+ HSS-->>P_I_CSCF: (4)
+ Note over P_I_CSCF: (4) REGISTER
+ P_I_CSCF->>S_CSCF: REGISTER
+ Note over S_CSCF: (5)
+ S_CSCF-->>HSS: (6)
+ HSS-->>S_CSCF: (7)
+ Note over S_CSCF: (7) 200 OK
+ S_CSCF->>P_I_CSCF: 200 OK
+ Note over P_I_CSCF: (8)
+ P_I_CSCF->>User: 200 OK
+ Note over User: (8) INVITE
+ User->>P_I_CSCF: INVITE
+ Note over P_I_CSCF: INVITE
+ P_I_CSCF->>S_CSCF: INVITE
+ Note over S_CSCF: (9)
+
+```
+
+NOTE – All message exchanges are not shown for simplicity
+
+Y.2702(08)\_F11.2
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the subscription-based authentication and authorization process between User, P/I-CSCF, HSS, and S-CSCF.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Subscription-based example**
+
+This example relies on the subscription/service profile associated with the user device. Normal registration and authentication process for the user device is performed by the network. When the
+
+user invokes an ETS call/session, the service/subscription profile is checked to determine whether the user device is authorized for the ETS call/session. The call flows are as follows:
+
+- 1) Registration initiation
+- 2) P/I-CSCF queries HSS
+- 3) HSS verifies user subscription and provides identity of S-CSCF
+- 4) P/I-CSCF sends register message to S-CSCF
+- 5) S-CSCF queries HSS
+- 6) HSS provides user service profile information (may involve interaction with AS)
+- 7) S-CSCF sends 200 OK
+- 8) User initiates ETS session
+- 9) S-CSCF checks service profile to determine whether ETS session is authorized.
+
+#### II.4.3 User and device combination authentication and authorization example
+
+Figure II.3 shows an example involving the user's device with a SIM card that attaches to the network with standard 3GPP generic bootstrapping authentication (GBA).
+
+In this example, the device has a user authentication interface (UAI) that allows the user to provide authentication information via the device to the application layer in the service provider's network. The UAI can be as simple as a key pad or as complicated as biometrics.
+
+It is assumed that there is secure communications for the signalling and media.
+
+
+
+For the purpose of unlocking the device
+
+IP device
+
+https
+
+OR
+
+https
+
+Web server
+
+Application servers
+
+Device
+
+SIM
+
+UAI
+
+Device may be wired or wireless
+
+BE
+
+Other network
+
+NGN service provider
+
+Y.2702(08)\_F11.3
+
+SIM Subscriber Identification Module
+
+UAI User Authentication Interface
+
+Figure II.3: ETS user authentication and authorization diagram. The diagram shows an IP device (laptop) and a Device (containing SIM and UAI) connected to a Web server and Application servers via https. The Device is also connected to a BE (Base Element) and an Other network, which are connected to the NGN service provider. The diagram includes a legend: SIM - Subscriber Identification Module, UAI - User Authentication Interface.
+
+**Figure II.3 – ETS user authentication and authorization**
+
+##### Call/session flow:
+
+- 1) The user's device is turned on.
+- 2) The device securely attaches to the network using 3GPP GBA.
+- 3) ETS-user initiates local authentication with the SIM on the device using the UAI. The UAI could be a key pad, where a PIN is entered, or some type of biometric.
+ - a) SIM authenticates the ETS user, and provides success indicator. SIM informs ETS application server that the ETS user has been authenticated.
+ - b) Conversely, the information could be relayed securely to the application layer in the service provider's network.
+- 4) At this time the "normal" user and device are authenticated with the network. The user in role as an ETS user has been authenticated by the ETS AS.
+
+If the user fails local authentication after $x$ tries, then the user should be locked out of the device. An example approach to unlock the device is for the user to access a GUI via AS/WS interface, and enter a PIN for validation. If the identity of the user is validated, the AS/WS would send a message to the device, instructing the device to unlock.
+
+#### **II.4.4 Enterprise location use case example**
+
+ETS calls may originate or terminate at government enterprise locations. For typically deployments:
+
+- There are dedicated facilities from the government location and the service provider.
+- The user registers with the enterprise location, and not with the service provider.
+- The enterprise location registers with a wild card or an IWF (e.g., SBC) at the edge of the service provider's network performs a surrogate registration on behalf of the enterprise.
+
+So if authentication beyond pin-based authentication is desired, then additional functions will need to be performed. These include but are not limited to:
+
+- The enterprise publishing the presence of the user to the service provider. This piece of data will add in authentication assurance.
+- Relaying of a secure token from the enterprise to the service provider to identify this as a potential ETS call/session at layer 2/3 (e.g., secure token extension in RSVP).
+
+Authentication assurance with data from multiple sources is required depending on the user.
+
+## Appendix III
+
+## 3GPP Generic bootstrapping architecture
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+The generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) specifies access-independent bootstrapping procedure. It provides a framework for mutual authentication of the end users and network application function (NAF).
+
+The GBA is an authentication system that includes three parties:
+
+- An end user who is trying to obtain network services using user equipment (UE)
+- An application server (called network application function or NAF)
+- A trusted entity (called bootstrapping server function or BSF), which is involved in authentication and key exchange between two other entities.
+
+The basics of the GBA authentication process are illustrated by the reference model and described below.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the simple network model for bootstrapping. It shows five main components: HSS (Home Subscriber System), SLF (Subscription Locator Function), BSF (Bootstrapping Server Function), NAF (Network Application Function), and UE (User Equipment). HSS is connected to BSF via a solid line labeled Zh. SLF is connected to BSF via a dashed line labeled Dz. BSF is connected to NAF via a solid line labeled Zn. BSF is connected to UE via a solid line labeled Ub. NAF is connected to UE via a solid line labeled Ua. The diagram is labeled Y.2702(08)\_FIII.1 in the bottom right corner.
+
+Simple network model for bootstrapping diagram
+
+**Figure III.1 – Simple network model for bootstrapping from [b-ETSI TS 133 220]**
+
+These are the basic steps of the GBA procedure:
+
+- 1) NAF requests authentication and negotiates the use of GBA over Ua reference point.
+- 2) The BSF client that runs on the UE initiates bootstrapping procedure over the reference point Ub. The BSF fetches authentication information and the GBA user security settings from the HSS over Zh. The UE and the BSF mutually authenticate using HTTP Digest AKA. The procedure results in the UE receiving bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) from the BSF and establishing a shared key (Ks) between the UE and the BSF.
+- 3) UE derives Ks\_NAF from Ks and sends B-TID (along with the application-specific data) to the NAF.
+- 4) The NAF sends B-TID to the BSF over Zn reference point.
+- 5) The BSF based on B-TID determines the Ks that should be used, derives Ks\_NAF from it and sends Ks\_NAF to the NAF.
+- 6) Finally, UE and NAF can authenticate each other using the shared key Ks\_NAF. The exact authentication procedure depends on the protocol between the UE and NAF. For instance, GBA specifies that HTTP-based applications can use either HTTP Digest authentication [b-IETF RFC 2617] or TLS pre-shared key ciphersuites [b-IETF RFC 4279].
+
+NOTE – The BSF queries the SLF over the Dz reference point to obtain the name of the HSS containing the subscriber-specific data. The SLF is not needed when the BSF is configured to use a pre-defined HSS.
+
+Mapping of the GBA entities to the NGN entities specified in [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- NAF – corresponds to *Applications* entity in Figure 3 of [ITU-T Y.2012].
+- BSF – can be included in T-11 authentication & authorization FE. That is T-11 can be augmented and enabled with the capabilities of the BSF server.
+- HSS corresponds to S-5 service user profile FE.
+- SLF corresponds to S-4 subscription locator FE.
+- UE corresponds to the end-user function.
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+## Identity management (IdM) call flow examples
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### IV.1 Overview
+
+The example flows in this appendix are from [b-TR 33.980].
+
+The flows provide the details of possible interworking methods between the Security Assertion Markup Language v2.0, SAML v2.0 (or alternatively the Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework, ID-FF), the Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF), the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) and a component of GAA called the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA). This appendix is informative and only applies if ID-WSF and GBA or SAML v2.0 and GBA are used in combination.
+
+### IV.2 Call flow examples
+
+These flows only apply if Liberty Alliance and GBA or SAML v2.0 and GBA are used in combination.
+
+#### IV.2.1 SSO scenario: ID-FF with transfer
+
+##### IV.2.1.1 HTTPS with conventional TLS
+
+In this scenario the UE is not LAP aware. All protocol elements are taken from within ID Federation Framework [b-ID-FF] and complemented by the GAA-specific details from [b-TS 33.222]. First the steps are outlined that are needed when utilizing HTTPS deploying conventional TLS [b-IETF RFC 2246] according to [b-TS 33.222], clause 5.3:
+
+- 1) The UE contacts the SP to gain access to a service provided by the SP by sending an HTTP Request. This request will contain the GBA-based authentication support indication (see step 3), as this is required for the redirection of the request according to step 3.
+- 2) On receipt of the HTTP request from UE, the SP obtains the identity provider and sends a redirect HTTP Response with to UE. The means by which the identity provider address is obtained is implementation-dependent and up to the service provider.
+- 3) The UE in turn contacts the IdP under the URL given in the Location header field and the UE must access the NAF/IdP URL with an HTTP Request with information [b-ID-FF bindings].
+
+The UE will indicate to the NAF/IdP that GBA-based authentication is supported by adding a constant string to the "User-Agent" HTTP header as a product token as specified in [b-IETF RFC 2616]. This constant string will be set according to step 2 of clause 5.3 of [b-TS 33.222].
+
+If a bootstrapped security association between UE and IdP exists, then UE and IdP/NAF share the keys to protect reference point Ua and the UE possesses all necessary data to perform HTTP Digest Authentication from previous messages. In this case step 3 is combined with the request in step 5, and step 4 is omitted.
+
+- 4) As the IdP is collocated with the NAF, the HTTP Digest authentication is conducted in accordance with [b-TS 33.222] and a HTTP response with Unauthorized status and WWW-Authenticate header field is sent to the UE. The method and details of this authentication are defined by [b-TS 33.222] and not in [b-ID-FF].
+
+If the UE does not contain a valid bootstrapping session or the freshness of the key material is not sufficient for the IdP, then the UE will execute a new bootstrapping procedure with the BSF. This is transparent to the SP.
+
+- 5) The UE returns the Authorization data, using the B-TID as a username and the Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF as password to the IdP. The UE may include further LAP related user data.
+If the IdP is collocated with the NAF, then this happens as outlined in [b-TS 33.222]. The USS might contain Liberty specific information.
+- 6) The is processed. The IdP responds with an in the HTTP Response redirect URL [b-ID-FF bindings]. The IdP may include further LAP-related data.
+- 7) The UE contacts the SP again using this URL and HTTP Request with .
+- 8) The SP answers with a HTTP Response.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ UE->>Service provider: 1. HTTP request
+ Service provider-->>UE: 2. http response with
+ UE->>IdP: 3. HTTP request with
+ IdP-->>UE: 4. HTTP unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ Note over UE, IdP: Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available
+ UE->>IdP: 5. HTTP GET authorization B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ IdP-->>UE: 6. HTTP response with
+ Note over IdP, BSF: Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF
+ UE->>Service provider: 7. HTTP request with
+ Service provider-->>UE: 8. HTTP response
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.1
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with and conventional TLS with GBA. The diagram involves four entities: UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF. The flow includes: 1. HTTP request from UE to Service provider. 2. HTTP response with from Service provider to UE. 3. HTTP request with from UE to IdP. 4. HTTP unauthorized WWW-Authenticate from IdP to UE. A grey box spanning UE, Service provider, and IdP indicates 'Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available'. 5. HTTP GET authorization B-TID/Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF authentication from UE to IdP. 6. HTTP response with from IdP to UE. A grey box between IdP and BSF indicates 'Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF'. 7. HTTP request with from UE to Service provider. 8. HTTP response from Service provider to UE.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – Message flow for SSO with and conventional TLS with GBA**
+
+**NOTE 1** – As the IdP is collocated with the NAF, *i.e.*, *Ua* is chosen for authentication as outlined in TS [b-TS 33.222], then each request over *Ua* is authenticated by itself, as each request carries the full Authorization Header. There is no difference between first request and follow-up requests.
+
+**NOTE 2** – LAP ID-FF specification [b-ID-FF] defines also a POST-based communication between UE and IdP besides a GET-based request with a query string. This is in conformance with [b-TS 33.222], as there is only a HTTP request specified without any explicit method stated.
+
+**NOTE 3** – The SP may use the GBA-based authentication support indication received in step 1 to select an appropriate identity provider address.
+
+##### IV.2.1.2 HTTPS with PSK TLS
+
+When HTTPS with Pre-shared Keys (PSK) TLS according to [b-TS 33.222], clause 5.4, is utilized, then the steps are the following:
+
+- 1) The UE contacts the SP to gain access to a service provided by the SP by sending an HTTP Request. This request will contain the GBA-based authentication support indication (see step 3 of clause IV.2.1.1), as the UE may be forced by the IdP/NAF to use conventional TLS, even if the UE offers the usage of PSK TLS.
+- 2) On receipt of the HTTP request from UE, the SP obtains the identity provider and sends a redirect HTTP Response with in the URL to the UE. The means by which the identity provider address is obtained is implementation-dependent and up to the service provider.
+- 3) The UE starts to set up a PSK TLS tunnel to the IdP/NAF as specified in clause 5.4 of [b-TS 33.222]. This is in preparation of sending the redirected request to the IdP/NAF (see step 4). During TLS tunnel setup, the UE indicates the possibility to use PSK TLS, and the IdP/NAF may select to use PSK TLS with GBA.
+
+The UE recognizes from the TLS ciphersuite selected by IdP/NAF if the IdP/NAF will use PSK TLS.
+
+If a bootstrapped security association between the UE and IdP/NAF exists, then the UE and IdP/NAF share the keys to protect reference point Ua. Thus, the UE possesses all necessary data to set up the PSK TLS tunnel according to [b-TS 33.222] and the next step can be approached immediately without executing a bootstrapping procedure.
+
+If no bootstrapped security association between the UE and IdP/NAF exists, but the UE does contain a valid bootstrapping key Ks, then the UE establishes a PSK TLS tunnel with the IdP/NAF based on the related Ks\_(ext)\_NAF.
+
+If the UE does not contain a valid bootstrapping session or the freshness of the key material is not sufficient for the IdP/NAF, then the UE will execute a new bootstrapping procedure with the BSF. This is transparent to the SP.
+
+- 4) The UE accesses the IdP/NAF URL with the HTTP GET Request with information [b-ID-FF bindings] within the established PSK TLS tunnel.
+- 5) The IdP extracts the , processes it, uses the UE authentication done during the PSK TLS tunnel establishment, and sends a redirect HTTP Response to the UE, which redirects the UE back to the SP. The URL may contain a SAML artefact or a .
+- 6) The SP extracts the SAML artefact or the , processes it and answers with a HTTP Response.
+- 7) The SP answers with a HTTP Response.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant SP as Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ UE->>SP: 1. HTTP request
+ SP-->>UE: 2. http response with
+ Note over UE, SP, BSF: 3. Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available
+ Note over UE, SP, BSF: 3. Establishment of PSK TLS tunnel
+ UE->>IdP: 4. HTTP GET request with
+ IdP-->>UE: 5. HTTP response with
+ UE->>SP: 5. Redirect to SP
+ Note over SP: 6. SP processes artifact or
+ SP-->>UE: 7. HTTP response
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with and usage of PSK TLS with GBA. The participants are UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF. The flow includes: 1. HTTP request from UE to Service provider; 2. http response with from Service provider to UE; 3. Bootstrapping procedure (if no valid credentials available) and Establishment of PSK TLS tunnel (both spanning UE, Service provider, and BSF); 4. HTTP GET request with from UE to IdP; 5. HTTP response with from IdP to UE; 5. Redirect to SP from UE to Service provider; 6. SP processes artifact or (Service provider action); 7. HTTP response from Service provider to UE.
+
+**Figure IV.2 – Message flow for SSO with and usage of PSK TLS with GBA**
+
+NOTE – The notes given in clause IV.2.1.1 are also applicable for usage of PSK TLS as defined in this subclause.
+
+#### IV.2.2 SSO scenario: ID-FF with artefact transfer
+
+This scenario is similar to the scenario given in clause IV.2.1, with the extension that the service provider is able to contact the IdP directly.
+
+NOTE – As the basic message flow is the same for artefact and for usage, the same differences between usage of conventional TLS and PSK TLS as in clause IV.2.1 apply to this clause also. Message flows given in this clause refer to conventional TLS, analogous usage of PSK TLS is also possible.
+
+The IdP must support an additional interface to SP, to allow the SP retrieval of the authentication assertion. This interface is not completely separated from GBA, as this authentication information may include GBA related information, e.g., user identity, pseudonym and further information from GUSS, restrictions based on GBA, etc.
+
+- 1) The UE contacts the SP to gain access to a service provided by the SP by sending an HTTP Request. This request will contain the GBA-based authentication support indication (see step 3), as this is required for the redirection of the request according to step 3.
+- 2) On receipt of the HTTP request from the UE, the SP obtains the identity provider and sends a redirect HTTP Response with to the UE. The means by which the identity provider address is obtained is implementation-dependent and up to the service provider.
+- 3) The UE in turn contacts the IdP under the URL given in the Location header field and the UE must access the NAF/IdP URL with an HTTP Request with information [b-ID-FF bindings].
+
+The UE will indicate to the NAF/IdP that GBA-based authentication is supported by adding a constant string to the "User-Agent" HTTP header as a product token as specified in [b-IETF RFC 2616]. This constant string will be set according to step 2 of clause 5.3 of [b-TS 33.222].
+
+If a bootstrapped security association between the UE and IdP/NAF exists, then the UE and IdP/NAF share the keys to protect reference point Ua and the UE possesses all necessary data to perform HTTP Digest Authentication from previous messages. In this case step 3 is combined with the request in step 5, and step 4 is omitted.
+
+- 4) If the UE is not yet authenticated with the IdP, then the authentication has to take place here, as defined in [b-TS 33.222]. The method and details of this authentication are not defined by Liberty Alliance in [b-ID-FF]. The IdP sends a HTTP response with Unauthorized status to the UE as defined in [b-TS 33.222].
+
+If there is no valid NAF specific key material in the NAF, or the freshness of the key material is not to the satisfaction of the NAF or IdP, then the bootstrapping procedure has to be performed as defined in [b-TS 33.220]. This is transparent to the SP.
+
+- 5) The UE answers with a HTTP GET request with Authorization header field containing as a username the B-TID and as a password the Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF. The UE may include further LAP related user data.
+
+The IdP/NAF can request the credentials and related material, if it does not have it stored already. The received USS may contain further Liberty specific information.
+
+- 6) The IdP responds with a SAML artefact in the HTTP Response redirect URL [b-ID-FF bindings]. The IdP may include further LAP related data.
+- 7) The UE contacts the SP again using this URL and HTTP Request with the SAML artefact.
+- 8) The SP sends an HTTP Request with the SAML artefact to the IdP. The request contains a SOAP Request message to the identity provider's SOAP endpoint, requesting the assertion by providing the SAML assertion artefact in the element as specified in [b-ID-FF bindings].
+- 9) The IdP can now construct or find the requested assertion and responds with a SOAP Response message with the requested or a status code as defined in [b-OASIS]. The IdP sends the authentication assertion that corresponds to the artefact.
+- 10) The SP processes the SOAP message with the returned in the , verifies the signature on the and processes the message as defined in [b-ID-FF bindings] and then answers with a HTTP Response.
+
+The SAML authentication assertion should have a lifetime equal to or less than the B-TID.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ UE->>Service provider: 1. HTTP request
+ Service provider-->>UE: 2. http Response with
+ UE->>IdP: 3. HTTP Request with
+ IdP-->>UE: 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ Note over UE, BSF: Bootstrapping, if no valid credentials available
+ UE->>IdP: 5. HTTP GET Authorization using B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ Note over IdP, BSF: Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF
+ IdP-->>UE: 6. HTTP Response with Artifact()
+ UE->>Service provider: 7. HTTP Request with Artifact()
+ Service provider->>IdP: 8. HTTP Request with Artifact() in SOAP request message
+ IdP-->>Service provider: 9. HTTP Response with Assertion in SOAP Response message
+ Service provider-->>UE: 10. HTTP Response
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.3
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with artefact transfer and usage of GBA between UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF.
+
+**Figure IV.3 – Message flow for SSO with artefact transfer and usage of GBA**
+
+#### IV.2.3 SSO scenario: ID-WSF authentication service
+
+In this scenario the UE is LAP enabled, i.e., a LUAD (Liberty enabled user agent or device as defined in Liberty ID-WSF Profiles for Liberty enabled user agents and devices specification [b-ID-WSF profiles]). The protocol elements used are taken from ID-WSF Authentication Service [b-ID-WSF service], and the interaction of UE with IdP comprises two consecutive protocol runs. The active LUAD client contacts the NAF/IdP first before accessing the service provided by the SP.
+
+- 1) The UE authenticates with the Authentication Service (AS) of the IdP and retrieves a security token, which entitles the UE to invoke some services.
+- 2) The UE invokes the Single-Sign-On Service (SSOS) of the IdP using the security token. In this step the UE receives the authentication assertion (authentication and authorization information) to be used at the SP.
+- 3) The UE presents the authentication assertion to the SP acting as a WSP for web service access.
+
+In case the WSP providing the web service to the user is part of the domain of the IdP operator, the LUAD client may also contact the WSP directly with the security token. In this case the SSOS contact may be left out.
+
+Mapping of the three steps to GBA is done in the following way:
+
+- The first step is mapped to the communication between user (LUAD) and AS as specified within LAP [b-ID-WSF service]. The authentication protocol is embedded in the SASL protocol. The Ub run must be executed by the UE if necessary. This is not based on LAP protocols [b-ID-WSF security], [b-ID-FF] or [b-ID-WSF service], but only on GBA protocols [b-TS 33.220].
+- The second and third steps are completely as defined in LAP (no connection to GBA). The only dependency on GBA is in the content of the SAML authentication assertion depending partly on GBA results (protocol parameters, e.g., execution time, and user-specific parameters, e.g., taken from USS).
+
+The following gives a message flow for the SSO scenario of the ID-WSF authentication service with response transfer. This can also apply when the SSOS also offers an ID-WSF authentication service, in which case the SSOS is collocated with the AS.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant SP
+ participant AS
+ participant SSOS
+ participant BSF
+ participant HSS
+
+ UE->>SP: 1. HTTP Request
+ SP-->>UE: 2. HTTP Response with
+ UE->>AS: 3. HTTP Request with in SOAP Request message
+ AS-->>UE: 4. HTTP Response with in in SOAP Response message
+ rect rgb(255, 255, 255)
+ Note over UE,HSS: 5. Bootstrapping, if no valid credentials available
+ end
+ UE->>AS: 6. HTTP Request with in in SOAP Request message using B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ AS->>BSF: 7. Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in AS/NAF
+ AS-->>UE: 8. HTTP Response with in SOAP Response message
+ UE->>SSOS: 9. HTTP Request with in SOAP Request message
+ SSOS-->>UE: 10. HTTP Response with in SOAP Response message
+ UE->>SP: 11. HTTP Request with
+ SP-->>UE: 12. HTTP Response
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.4
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for ID-WSF AS and SSO with response transfer and usage of GBA. The diagram involves six entities: UE, SP, AS, SSOS, BSF, and HSS. The flow consists of 12 numbered steps: 1. HTTP Request from UE to SP; 2. HTTP Response from SP to UE with ; 3. HTTP Request from UE to AS with in SOAP Request message; 4. HTTP Response from AS to UE with in in SOAP Response message; 5. Bootstrapping from UE to BSF and HSS if no valid credentials are available; 6. HTTP Request from UE to AS with in in SOAP Request message using B-TID/Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF authentication; 7. Request of credentials and related material from AS to BSF using Zn interface, if not already in AS/NAF; 8. HTTP Response from AS to UE with in SOAP Response message; 9. HTTP Request from UE to SSOS with in SOAP Request message; 10. HTTP Response from SSOS to UE with in SOAP Response message; 11. HTTP Request from UE to SP with ; 12. HTTP Response from SP to UE.
+
+**Figure IV.4 – Message flow for ID-WSF AS and SSO with response transfer and usage of GBA**
+
+- 1) The UE contacts the SP to gain access to a service provided by the SP by sending an HTTP request.
+- 2) On receipt of the HTTP request from the UE, the SP obtains the AS address and sends a redirect HTTP response to the UE. The HTTP response may or may not contain an
+
+ header according to the application or deployment model. The means by which the AS's address is obtained is implementation-dependent.
+
+- 3) The UE (LUAD-WSC) sends an HTTP request to the AS. The request contains a soap-bound header, where the "mechanism" parameter is filled with a list of one-or-more client-supported SASL mechanism names.
+
+The UE will indicate to the NAF/AS that GBA-based authentication is supported by adding a constant string to the "User-Agent" HTTP header as a product token as specified in [b-IETF RFC 2616]. This constant string will be set according to step 2 of clause 5.3 of [b-TS 33.222].
+
+If a bootstrapped security association between the UE and NAF/AS exists, then the UE and NAF/AS share the keys to protect reference point Ua and the UE may perform a subsequent authentication procedure if the SASL profile allows. In this case step 3 is combined with the request in step 6, and steps 4 and 5 are omitted.
+
+- 4) The AS sends a HTTP response to the UE. The response contains a soap-bound header, where the "serverMechanism" parameter is filled with a selected SASL mechanism name (i.e., DIGEST authentication) from the client-supported SASL mechanism list and in this case the header also contains a parameter. The method and details of this parameter are compliant with [b-IETF RFC 2831].
+- 5) If the UE does not contain a valid bootstrapping session or the freshness of the key material is not sufficient for the AS, then the UE will execute a new bootstrapping procedure with the BSF and obtain a shared key Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF. This is transparent to the SP.
+- 6) The UE re-sends a HTTP request to the AS. The request contains a soap-bound header, where the "mechanism" parameter is filled with the returned SASL mechanism in step 4 and in this case the header also contains a parameter, where the authorization data is computed using the B-TID as a username and the Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF as the password. The method and details of this parameter are compliant with [b-IETF RFC 2831]. The UE may include further LAP related user data.
+- 7) As the AS is collocated with the NAF, the AS requests Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF and other materials from the BSF using the Zn interface if they are not available yet.
+- 8) The AS processes the parameter in the header. Then the AS responds with a soap-bound header in the HTTP Response. The header contains an ID-WSF EPR (EndpointReference) parameter which refers to the SSOS instance and the Service type URI is set according to [b-ID-WSF service] to identify the ID-WSF SSOS. The header also contains some necessary credentials for the UE to invoke the SSOS. The AS may include further LAP-related data.
+- 9) The UE sends a HTTP request to the SSOS. The request contains a soap-bound header, where the ProtocolBinding attribute is set according to [b-ID-WSF service] to identify the SAML protocol binding to be used. The request also contains a header which includes the returned credentials in step 8. The UE may have to construct the header by itself if it does not receive such a header in step 2 according to the application or deployment model.
+- 10) The is processed. The SSOS responds with an header in the HTTP Response redirect URL [b-ID-FF bindings]. The header contains a parameter. The SSOS may include further LAP-related data.
+
+- 11) The UE contacts the SP again using this URL and HTTP Request with .
+- 12) The SP answers with a HTTP Response.
+
+NOTE – If the IdP is co-hosted with the BSF, then the first step could be mapped to Ub reference point of GBA [b-TS 24.109]. The second step could be mapped to Ua interface of GBA.
+
+Despite having this formal analogy of executing two consecutive protocol runs required by both protocol worlds, it seems that a simple mapping is not possible. The syntax and semantic of the information elements transferred between GBA and LAP protocols differ substantially.
+
+#### IV.2.4 SSO scenario: SAML v2.0 with transfer
+
+##### IV.2.4.1 HTTPS with TLS
+
+This scenario is a version of the scenario in clause IV.2.1.1 with the difference that all protocol elements are taken from within [b-SAML v2.0] implementing the web browser SSO profile from [b-OASIS]. Hence all the steps described there apply here as well, after replacing with and with . The steps are not repeated here, only an adapted version of Figure IV.1 is included.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant SP as Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ Note over UE, SP: 1. HTTP request
+ UE->>SP: 1. HTTP request
+ Note over SP, UE: 2. HTTP Response with
+ SP-->>UE: 2. HTTP Response with
+ Note over UE, IdP: 3. HTTP Request with
+ UE->>IdP: 3. HTTP Request with
+ Note over IdP, UE: 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ IdP-->>UE: 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ Note over UE, BSF: Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available
+ Note over UE, IdP: 5. HTTP GET Authorization B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ UE->>IdP: 5. HTTP GET Authorization B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ Note over IdP, BSF: Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF
+ IdP->>BSF:
+ BSF-->>IdP:
+ Note over IdP, UE: 6. HTTP Response with
+ IdP-->>UE: 6. HTTP Response with
+ Note over UE, SP: 7. HTTP Request with
+ UE->>SP: 7. HTTP Request with
+ Note over SP, UE: 8. HTTP Response
+ SP-->>UE: 8. HTTP Response
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.5
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with and TLS with GBA. The diagram involves four entities: UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF. The flow consists of 8 steps: 1. HTTP request from UE to Service provider; 2. HTTP Response with from Service provider to UE; 3. HTTP Request with from UE to IdP; 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate from IdP to UE; 5. HTTP GET Authorization B-TID/Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF authentication from UE to IdP; 6. HTTP Response with from IdP to UE; 7. HTTP Request with from UE to Service provider; 8. HTTP Response from Service provider to UE. A shaded box labeled 'Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available' spans from step 4 to step 5. Another shaded box labeled 'Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF' is located between step 5 and step 6, involving the BSF entity.
+
+**Figure IV.5 – Message flow for SSO with and TLS with GBA**
+
+##### IV.2.4.2 HTTPS with PSK TLS
+
+This scenario is a version of the scenario in clause IV.2.1.2 with the difference that all protocol elements are taken from within [b-SAML v2.0] implementing the web browser SSO profile from [b-OASIS]. Hence all the steps described there apply here as well, after replacing with and with . The steps are not repeated here, only an adapted version of Figure IV.2 is included.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ UE->>Service provider: 1. HTTP request
+ Service provider-->>UE: 2. HTTP Response with
+ Note over UE, Service provider, IdP, BSF: 3. Bootstrapping procedure, if no valid credentials available
+ Note over UE, IdP: 3. Establishment of PSK TLS tunnel
+ UE->>IdP: 4. HTTP GET Request with
+ IdP-->>UE: 5. HTTP Response with
+ UE->>Service provider: 5. Redirect to SP
+ Service provider-->>UE: 7. HTTP response
+ Note over Service provider, IdP: 6. SP processes artifact or
+
+```
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.6
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with and usage of PSK TLS with GBA. The diagram involves four entities: UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF. The flow includes an HTTP request, an HTTP response with , a bootstrapping procedure, establishment of a PSK TLS tunnel, an HTTP GET request with , an HTTP response with , a redirect to the SP, and a final HTTP response.
+
+**Figure IV.6 – Message flow for SSO with and usage of PSK TLS with GBA**
+
+#### IV.2.5 SSO scenario: SAML v2.0 with artefact transfer (resolution)
+
+This scenario is a version of the scenario in clause IV.2.2 with the difference that all protocol elements are taken from within [b-SAML v2.0] implementing the web browser SSO profile from [b-OASIS]. Hence all the steps described there apply here as well, after replacing with . The steps are not repeated here, only the adapted version of Figure IV.3 is included.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant Service provider
+ participant IdP
+ participant BSF
+
+ UE->>Service provider: 1. HTTP request
+ Service provider->>UE: 2. HTTP Response with
+ UE->>Service provider: 3. HTTP Request with
+ Service provider->>IdP: 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ IdP->>UE: 4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate
+ Note over UE, BSF: Bootstrapping, if no valid credentials available
+ UE->>IdP: 5. HTTP GET Authorization using B-TID/Ks_(ext/int)_NAF authentication
+ Note over IdP, BSF: Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF
+ IdP->>UE: 6. HTTP Response with Artifact()
+ UE->>Service provider: 7. HTTP Request with Artifact()
+ Service provider->>IdP: 8. HTTP Request with Artifact() in SOAP Request message
+ IdP->>Service provider: 9. HTTP response with Assertion in SOAP Response message
+ Service provider->>UE: 10. HTTP Response
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the message flow for SSO with artefact resolution (SAML v2.0) and usage of GBA. The participants involved are UE (User Equipment), Service provider, IdP (Identity Provider), and BSF (Back-End Security Function). The flow consists of the following steps:
+
+1. HTTP request from UE to Service provider.
+2. HTTP Response with from Service provider to UE.
+3. HTTP Request with from UE to Service provider.
+4. HTTP Unauthorized WWW-Authenticate from Service provider to IdP and IdP to UE.
+- Bootstrapping, if no valid credentials available (involving UE and BSF).
+5. HTTP GET Authorization using B-TID/Ks\_(ext/int)\_NAF authentication from UE to IdP.
+- Request of credentials and related material using Zn interface, if not already in NAF (involving IdP and BSF).
+6. HTTP Response with Artifact() from IdP to UE.
+7. HTTP Request with Artifact() from UE to Service provider.
+8. HTTP Request with Artifact() in SOAP Request message from Service provider to IdP.
+9. HTTP response with Assertion in SOAP Response message from IdP to Service provider.
+10. HTTP Response from Service provider to UE.
+
+Y.2702(08)\_FIV.7
+
+Sequence diagram showing the message flow for SSO with artefact resolution (SAML v2.0) and usage of GBA between UE, Service provider, IdP, and BSF.
+
+**Figure IV.7 – Message flow for SSO with artefact resolution (SAML v2.0) and usage of GBA**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.107] Recommendation ITU-T E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1141] Recommendation ITU-T X.1141 (2006), *Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)*.
+- [b-Alliance] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-SIS: *Liberty Alliance ID-SIS 1.0 Specifications*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/specifications\\_1](http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/specifications_1)>
+- [b-ID-FF] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-FF v1.2: *Liberty ID-FF Architecture Overview*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_ff\\_1\\_2\\_specifications](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_ff_1_2_specifications)>
+- [b-ID-FF bindings] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-FF v1.2: *Liberty ID-FF Bindings and Profiles Specification*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_ff\\_1\\_2\\_specifications](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_ff_1_2_specifications)>
+- [b-ID-FF protocols] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-FF v1.2: *Liberty ID-FF Protocols and Schema Specification*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_ff\\_1\\_2\\_specifications](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_ff_1_2_specifications)>
+- [b-ID-WSF binding] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF v2.0: *Liberty ID-WSF SOAP Binding Specification*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_wsf\\_2\\_0\\_specifications\\_including\\_errata\\_v1\\_0\\_updates](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_wsf_2_0_specifications_including_errata_v1_0_updates)>
+- [b-ID-WSF discovery] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF v2.0: *Liberty ID-WSF Discovery Service Specification*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_wsf\\_2\\_0\\_specifications\\_including\\_errata\\_v1\\_0\\_updates](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_wsf_2_0_specifications_including_errata_v1_0_updates)>
+- [b-ID-WSF profiles] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF: *Profiles for Liberty enabled User Agents and Devices*.
+<>
+- [b-ID-WSF security] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF v2.0: *Liberty ID-WSF Security Mechanisms*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_wsf\\_2\\_0\\_specifications\\_including\\_errata\\_v1\\_0\\_updates](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_wsf_2_0_specifications_including_errata_v1_0_updates)>
+- [b-ID-WSF service] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF v2.0: *Liberty ID-WSF Authentication Service Specification and Single Sign-On Service*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_wsf\\_2\\_0\\_specifications\\_including\\_errata\\_v1\\_0\\_updates](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_wsf_2_0_specifications_including_errata_v1_0_updates)>
+- [b-ID-WSF v1.2] Liberty Alliance Project, ID-WSF v1.2: *Security Mechanisms*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_id\\_wsf\\_1\\_1\\_specifications](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_id_wsf_1_1_specifications)>
+
+- [b-LAP] Liberty Alliance Project Support Documents: *Authentication Context Specification v2.0*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_specifications\\_support\\_documents\\_and\\_utility\\_schema\\_files](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_specifications_support_documents_and_utility_schema_files)>
+- [b-M-04-04] M-04-04: *E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies*.
+<>
+- [b-NIST 800-63] NIST Special Publication 800-63 (2006), *Electronic Authentication Guidelines*.
+<[http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1\\_0\\_2.pdf](http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf)>
+- [b-OASIS] OASIS, *Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0*.
+<>
+- [b-OASIS auth] OASIS, *Authentication Contexts for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*.
+<>
+- [b-Reverse] Liberty Alliance Project Support Documents: *Liberty Reverse HTTP Binding for SOAP Specification v1.1*.
+<[http://www.projectliberty.org/resource\\_center/specifications/liberty\\_alliance\\_specifications\\_support\\_documents\\_and\\_utility\\_schema\\_files](http://www.projectliberty.org/resource_center/specifications/liberty_alliance_specifications_support_documents_and_utility_schema_files)>
+- [b-SAML assertions] OASIS, SAML v2 Core, *Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*.
+<>
+- [b-SAML v2.0] OASIS, SAML v2 Core, *Conformance Requirements for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*.
+<>
+- [b-TR 21.905] 3GPP TR 21.905 (in force), *Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications*.
+<>
+- [b-TR 33.980] 3GPP TR 33.980 (in force), *Liberty Alliance and 3GPP security interworking; Interworking of Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) (Release 7)*.
+<>
+- [b-TS 24.109] 3GPP TS 24.109 (in force), *Bootstrapping interface (Ub) and network application function interface (Ua); Protocol details*.
+<>
+- [b-TS 29.109] 3GPP TS 29.109 (in force), *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Zh and Zn Interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Stage 3*.
+<>
+- [b-TS 33.220] 3GPP TS 33.220 (in force), *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture*.
+<>
+- [b-TS 33.221] 3GPP TS 33.221 (in force), *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Support for subscriber certificates*.
+<>
+- [b-TS 33.222] 3GPP TS 33.222 (in force), *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Access to network application functions using Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS)*.
+<>
+
+- [b-IETF RFC 2222] IETF RFC 2222 (1997), *Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2246] IETF RFC 2246 (1999), *The TLS Protocol Version 1.0*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2616] IETF RFC 2616 (1999), *Hypertext Transfer Protocol-HTTP/1.1*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2617] IETF RFC 2617 (1999), *HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 2831] IETF RFC 2831 (2000), *Using Digest Authentication as a SASL Mechanism*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 3546] IETF RFC 3546 (2003), *Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4279] IETF RFC 4279 (2005), *Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*.
+<>
+- [b-IETF RFC 4412] IETF RFC 4412 (2006), *Communication Resource Priority for the Session Initiation Protocol*.
+<>
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.2703**
+
+(01/2009)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **The application of AAA service in NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703**
+
+# **The application of AAA service in NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703 provides an application of authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for NGN release 1.
+
+###### **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703 was approved on 23 January 2009 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2009-2012) under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2009
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | General concepts for the AAA service ..... | 2 |
+| | 6.1 Overview ..... | 2 |
+| | 6.2 The AAA process ..... | 2 |
+| | 6.3 AAA procedure ..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Application model for authentication and authorization in NGN ..... | 3 |
+| 8 | AAA architecture in NGN ..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 User to network access ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.2 User to network service attachment ..... | 7 |
+| | 8.3 Authentication and authorization of user for access to 3rd party service..... | 7 |
+| 9 | Enrolment ..... | 8 |
+| 10 | Authentication ..... | 8 |
+| | 10.1 Authentication entities..... | 8 |
+| | 10.2 Procedure for authentication..... | 8 |
+| 11 | Authorization ..... | 10 |
+| | 11.1 Authorization aspects for NGN ..... | 10 |
+| | 11.2 Authorization entities ..... | 10 |
+| | 11.3 Procedure for authorization ..... | 10 |
+| 12 | Accounting..... | 11 |
+| | 12.1 Security accounting ..... | 11 |
+| | 12.2 Functions for security accounting ..... | 11 |
+| | Appendix I – Authentication protocol for AAA in NGN ..... | 13 |
+| | I.1 EAP protocol for AAA service in NGN..... | 13 |
+| | I.2 AAA protocols..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix II – X.509 digital certificates as credentials..... | 15 |
+| | Appendix III – Authentication and authorization use-case..... | 16 |
+| | III.1 Authentication and authorization of user for network access ..... | 16 |
+| | III.2 NGN service provider authentication and authorization of user for access
to service/application..... | 18 |
+| | III.3 User authentication and authorization of NGN providers..... | 20 |
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| III.4 NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party
service/application provider ..... | 21 |
+| III.5 Use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service ..... | 22 |
+| Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703
+
+# The application of AAA service in NGN
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes an application for authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for next generation networks (NGNs) based on [b-ITU-T Y.2201]: NGN release 1 requirements, [b-ITU-T Y.2012]: Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1 (FRA), [b-ITU-T Y.2701]: Security requirements for NGN release 1, and [b-ITU-T Y.2702]: NGN authentication. This Recommendation applies to the authentication, authorization and accounting process in accessing an NGN using the AAA client and AAA server. In particular, this Recommendation addresses the accounting function only from the standpoint of its contribution to security accounting.
+
+The scope of this Recommendation is:
+
+- 1) The enrolment process.
+- 2) Authentication functions and procedures.
+- 3) Authorization functions and procedures.
+- 4) Security-accounting functions and procedures.
+
+## 2 References
+
+None.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation makes use of the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 authentication** [b-ITU-T X.811]: The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.
+
+**3.1.2 authentication certificate** [b-ITU-T X.811]: A security certificate that is guaranteed by an authentication authority and that may be used to assure the identity of an entity.
+
+**3.1.3 authentication information** [b-ITU-T X.811]: Information used for authentication purposes.
+
+**3.1.4 authorization** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights.
+
+**3.1.5 claimant** [b-ITU-T X.811]: An entity which is or represents a principal for the purposes of authentication. A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges on behalf of a principal.
+
+**3.1.6 security audit trail** [b-ITU-T X.800]: Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 security accounting**: The role that tracks security-related actions or events that can be included as resources in the security audit function.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations:
+
+| | |
+|--------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting |
+| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity |
+| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface |
+| EAP | Extensible Authentication Protocol |
+| ID | Identity – as defined by the network, service, or entity being accessed |
+| NAS | Network Access Server |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
+| NP | Network Provider |
+| OAMP | Operations, Administration, Maintenance, and Provision |
+| RACF | Resource Access Control Function |
+| SCTP | Stream Control Transport Protocol |
+| SR | Service Resource |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TE | Terminal Equipment |
+| TUP-FE | Transport User Profile Functional Entity |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## **6 General concepts for the AAA service**
+
+This clause deals with the basic concepts of AAA.
+
+### **6.1 Overview**
+
+The authentication, authorization and accounting service provides the functions by which a user's identity is verified (authentication), is given access to the services (authorization) and a means by which consumption of resources is measured (accounting).
+
+### **6.2 The AAA process**
+
+The individual processes within the AAA framework are as follows:
+
+Authentication validates the end user's identity prior to permitting network access. The end user presents a set of credentials such as a username/password combination, a security key, a certificate or biometric data (for example, fingerprints). These credentials are normally agreed during the enrolment process. Verification of the credentials leads to the authorization process.
+
+Authorization defines the privileges and services the end user is allowed once network access is granted. This might include providing an IP address or invoking a filter to determine which applications or protocols are supported. Authentication and authorization are performed together in an AAA-managed environment.
+
+Accounting provides the methodology for collecting information about the end user's resource consumption which can then be processed for billing, auditing, and capacity-planning purposes. Certain accounting data is relevant to the development of a security audit trail.
+
+These three processes are centralized into a set of functions which together provide access control.
+
+### **6.3 AAA procedure**
+
+The AAA service system is composed of an AAA server and an AAA client.
+
+The AAA server has access to a database of user profiles and configuration data. It communicates with AAA clients residing on network components such as NAS (network access server) and routers, to provide distributed AAA services.
+
+The AAA service scenarios are summarized in the following steps:
+
+- The end user connects to the point-of entry device and requests access to the network.
+- The AAA client forwards the end user's identity/authentication credentials to the AAA server.
+- The AAA server authenticates the user based on the credentials. If authentication is successful, the server then determines which service(s) are authorized and returns an accept or reject response and other relevant data to the AAA client.
+- The AAA client notifies the end user that access to specified resources has been granted or denied.
+
+The AAA client sends an accounting message to the AAA server during connection set-up and termination for record collection and storage.
+
+## **7 Application model for authentication and authorization in NGN**
+
+This Recommendation is based on security requirements for NGN in [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and the NGN authentication reference model in [b-ITU-T Y.2702]. The NGN authentication reference model (Figure 7-1) depicts eight authentication reference points; three of which are considered/taken into account by this Recommendation:
+
+They are:
+
+- (1) access of user to network;
+- (2) access of user to network provided service;
+- (4) access of service provider to receiving user.
+
+Reference points (1) and (4) refer to transport of user traffic and may be viewed as depending on "horizontal" access control at the transport control level, whereas reference points (2) and (8) may be viewed as depending on control data between the transport and service control layers and therefore as being "vertical." This relationship is displayed in Figure 7-2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the end-to-end reference architectural model for NGN authentication, showing the interaction between two service providers (A and B) and a third-party provider.
+
+**Architecture Components:**
+
+- Service Provider A:** Contains Application Servers, Service Stratum, Softswitch, CSCF, and Transport.
+- Service Provider B:** Contains Application Servers, Service Stratum, Softswitch, CSCF, and Transport.
+- 3rd party provider:** A cloud entity connected to both Service Providers A and B.
+- Transit:** A central cloud entity connecting the Transport layers of both Service Providers.
+- Access:** Cloud entities connecting the Transport layers of each Service Provider to the User/Device.
+- User/Device:** Represented by icons of a person and a mobile phone at the edge of each network.
+
+**Numbered Steps (1) through (8):**
+
+- (1):** A blue arrow from the Device to the User.
+- (2):** A green arrow from the User to the Device.
+- (3):** A green dashed arrow from the Device to the Application Servers of Service Provider A.
+- (4):** A brown arrow from the User of Service Provider B to the Application Servers of Service Provider B.
+- (5):** A red arrow from the User of Service Provider A to the Application Servers of Service Provider B.
+- (6):** A red arrow from the Device of Service Provider A to the Application Servers of Service Provider B.
+- (7):** A purple arrow from the 3rd party provider to the Application Servers of Service Provider A.
+- (8):** A pink dashed arrow from the Application Servers of Service Provider A to the Device.
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F7-1
+
+End-to-end reference architectural model (Y.2702 NGN authentication) diagram showing Service Provider A and B, a 3rd party provider, and various network components like Application Servers, Softswitch, CSCF, and Transport. It includes numbered steps (1) through (8) indicating the flow of authentication and signaling.
+
+Figure 7-1 – End-to-end reference architectural model (Y.2702 NGN authentication)
+
+
+
+Legend:
+
+- Control: Dashed line
+- Media: Hatched line
+- Management: Dotted line
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F7-2
+
+Figure 7-2: NGN architecture and AAA related domains. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is 'Applications' connected to 'ANI'. Below is the 'Service stratum' (green) containing 'Application support functions and service support functions' and 'Service control functions' (with 'Service user profiles'). Below that is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow) containing 'Network attachment control functions' (with 'Transport user profiles') and 'Resource and admission control functions', both under 'Transport control functions'. At the bottom is 'Transport functions'. On the left is 'Management functions' (pink bar) and 'End-user functions'. On the right is 'Other networks'. Interfaces are marked: UNI (User Network Interface) between End-user functions and Transport stratum; NNI (Network Network Interface) between Transport stratum and Other networks. Arrows indicate control (dashed), media (hatched), and management (dotted) flows. Numbered arrows (1, 2, 4, 8) highlight specific paths related to AAA.
+
+Figure 7-2 – NGN architecture and AAA related domains (Y.2702 NGN authentication)
+
+## 8 AAA architecture in NGN
+
+This clause describes the relationship between the AAA reference model and the functional architectural model described in [b-ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+### 8.1 User to network access
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1 illustrates the architecture for user authentication and authorization. The system is organized into three main strata: the Service stratum (green), the Transport stratum (yellow), and the Transport functions layer (white). The Service stratum contains application and service support functions, along with service control functions that manage service user profiles. The Transport stratum handles network attachment control (including AAA client and server functions), resource and admission control, and transport control. The Transport functions layer manages the physical transport. The architecture is accessed via ANI (Application Network Interface) at the top, UNI (User Network Interface) on the left, and NNI (Network Network Interface) on the right. Management functions are shown on the far left, and other networks are on the far right. Control, media, and management paths are indicated by different line styles.
+
+Figure 8-1: Authentication and authorization of a user for network access. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is 'Applications' connected to 'ANI'. Below is the 'Service stratum' (green) containing 'Application support functions and service support functions' and 'Service control functions' (which includes 'Service user profiles'). Below that is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow) containing 'Network attachment control functions' (with 'AAA client function' and 'AAA server function' connected by a double-headed arrow), 'Resource and admission control functions', and 'Transport control functions'. At the bottom is 'Transport functions'. On the left is a vertical bar for 'Management functions' (pink) with 'End-user functions' and 'Network access' (red text). On the right is a vertical bar for 'Other networks'. Connections are shown: dashed lines for control, blue hatched lines for media, and green dotted lines for management. The interface between the network and the user is labeled 'UNI', and the interface with other networks is labeled 'NNI'. A red arrow labeled 'Authentication request/response' points from the AAA client function to the AAA server function.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Authentication and authorization of a user for network access**
+
+Figure 8-1 shows the application of AAA for user to network access (i.e., an application of type-1 in Figure 7-1 above).
+
+Once an entity in the transport control functions (typically, T-14 AM-FE) detects the connection request from a user terminal, it starts acting as an AAA client. It requests the entities in the transport control functions which play the role of AAA server (such as T-11 TAA-FE, and T-12 TUP-FE), for authentication of the user and authorization for the use of NGN resources. The protocols such as RADIUS or Diameter can be used for this request and response procedure. Based on the request from an AAA client, an AAA server authenticates the user by explicit (e.g., EAP) or implicit (e.g., access-line authentication) procedures. After successful authorization of a user depending upon the user profile (usually managed by TUP-FE), the AAA server requests RACF for reservation and allocation of NGN resources for that user. Once it is granted, the AAA server notifies the AAA client of permission to connect that user equipment.
+
+### 8.2 User to network service attachment
+
+
+
+Figure 8-2: Authentication and authorization of user for service access. This diagram illustrates the architecture for user authentication and authorization. At the top, 'Applications' connect to the 'ANI' (Application Network Interface). The core architecture is divided into three main strata: 'Service stratum' (green), 'Transport stratum' (yellow), and 'Transport functions' (white). The 'Service stratum' contains 'Application support functions and service support functions' and 'Service control functions'. Within the 'Service control functions', there are 'AAA client function' and 'AAA server function' connected by a red arrow labeled 'Authentication request/response'. The 'Transport stratum' contains 'Network attachment control functions' (which include 'Transport user profiles') and 'Resource and admission control functions'. The 'Transport functions' layer is at the bottom. On the left, 'Management functions' (pink) and 'End-user functions' (white) are connected to the 'UNI' (User Network Interface). On the right, 'Other networks' (white) are connected to the 'NNI' (Network Network Interface). A legend at the bottom indicates: dashed lines for Control, hatched lines for Media, and dotted lines for Management. The reference 'Y.2703(09)\_F8-2' is in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Authentication and authorization of user for service access**
+
+Figure 8-2 shows the application of AAA for user to service access (i.e., an application of type-2 in Figure 7-1 above).
+
+Similarly to the previous case shown by Figure 8-1, an AAA client in service control functions (typically, S-1 S-CES-FE) detects the connection request from a user terminal. It requests an AAA server (such as S-5 SUP-FE, or S-6 SAA-FE), for authentication and authorization for the requested service. A service based on the service request is either provided or rejected depending upon the result of authentication and authorization.
+
+Once the user is connected to the network or the service, each AAA client notifies its AAA server of the information on NGN resources consumed by the user to help an AAA server collect accounting information associated with the user.
+
+### 8.3 Authentication and authorization of user for access to 3rd party service
+
+Third-party services accessed through the ANI are not addressed in NGN release 1. Therefore, the authentication and authorization of user for access to third-party services is out of scope of this Recommendation. This Recommendation does not depict the reference model for third-party services. However, a use-case illustrating authentication and authorization of a 3rd party service is described in Appendix III.
+
+## **9 Enrolment**
+
+A prerequisite for AAA is identification of the entity to be authenticated, e.g., the user or device. The credentials that identify the entity are established through an enrolment process which establishes the unique identity of a user/device. The credentials are used in the authentication process whenever access to service(s) is sought. The enrolment process may include acceptance of terms and conditions as well as financial arrangements. Although the initial verification of identity and credentials is referred to as enrolment, subsequent access to services and credential checks are known as registration. Precise arrangements for enrolment will depend on provider policies, nature of services, etc.
+
+## **10 Authentication**
+
+This Recommendation uses the basic concepts of authentication described in [b-ITU-T X.811]. Network and service access authentication services and capabilities are needed to mitigate threats associated with attempts to gain unauthorized access. Additional information on digital certificate is in Appendix II.
+
+### **10.1 Authentication entities**
+
+The term "claimant" is used to describe an entity which requests authentication. A claimant includes the functions necessary for engaging in authentication exchanges.
+
+The AAA client provides a specialized function that is part of the access path between the claimant and the verifying entity on each access request and enforces the decision made by the verifier.
+
+In the AAA managed environment, the AAA server is the verifying entity and issues an authentication certificate to the claimant upon successful authentication.
+
+### **10.2 Procedure for authentication**
+
+In a AAA managed environment, the AAA server provides the authentication service for the user. It identifies the entity requesting access sufficiently to determine which services can be authorized for access and charged for. An authentication certificate may be issued by the AAA server.
+
+#### **10.2.1 Successful authentications**
+
+The following steps and Figure 10-1 provide an example of the message flow for a successful authentication.
+
+- Step 1. An entity requests the AAA client for access.
+- Step 2. The AAA client requests the AAA server for authentication of the entity.
+- Step 3. The AAA server requests the AAA client for the credentials of the entity to start the authentication.
+- Step 4. The AAA client requests the entity for the credential(s) required for authentication.
+- Step 5. The entity, now a claimant, sends the requested credential(s) to the AAA client.
+- Step 6. The AAA client forwards the required credential(s) to the AAA server for authentication.
+- Step 7. The AAA server verifies the received credential(s) against the claimant's user profile.
+- Step 8. If the credentials could be verified, the AAA server proceeds to the authorization process without notifying the AAA client or claimant.
+- Step 9. After the authorization process, the AAA server sends an allow access message to the AAA client.
+- Step 10. The AAA client forwards the allow access message to the claimant.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Claimant
+ participant AAA Client
+ participant AAA Server
+
+ Note over Claimant, AAA Client: 1. Access request
+ Claimant-->>AAA Client: 1. Access request
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: 2. Authentication request
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 2. Authentication request
+ Note over AAA Server: Authentication process
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: 3. Request for credentials
+ Note over AAA Client, Claimant: 4. Request for credentials
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 4. Request for credentials
+ Note over Claimant, AAA Client: 5. Send credentials
+ Claimant->>AAA Client: 5. Send credentials
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: 6. Forward the credentials
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 6. Forward the credentials
+ Note over AAA Server: 7. Successfully verify the credentials
+ Note over AAA Server: 8. Authorization process as shown in Figure 11-1
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: 9. Return allow success
+ Note over AAA Client, Claimant: 10. Access allowed
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 10. Access allowed
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F10-1
+
+Sequence diagram for successful authentication flow between Claimant, AAA Client, and AAA Server.
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Message flows for successful authentication**
+
+#### 10.2.2 Unsuccessful authentications
+
+The following steps and Figure 10-2 provide an example of the message flow for an unsuccessful authentication.
+
+- Step 1. An entity requests the AAA client for access.
+- Step 2. The AAA client requests the AAA server for authentication of the entity.
+- Step 3. The AAA server requests the AAA client for the credentials of the entity to start the authentication.
+- Step 4. The AAA client requests the entity for credential(s) required for authentication.
+- Step 5. The entity, now a claimant, sends the requested credential(s) to the AAA client.
+- Step 6. The AAA client forwards the required credential(s) to the AAA server for authentication.
+- Step 7. The AAA server verifies the received credential(s) against the claimant's user profile.
+- Step 8. If the credentials could not be verified, the AAA server sends a deny access message to the AAA client.
+- Step 9. The AAA client forwards the deny access message to the claimant.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Claimant
+ participant AAA Client
+ participant AAA Server
+
+ Note over Claimant, AAA Client: 1. Access request
+ Claimant-->>AAA Client: 1. Access request
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: 2. Authentication request
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 2. Authentication request
+ Note over AAA Server: Authentication process
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: 3. Request for credentials
+ Note over AAA Client, Claimant: 4. Request for credentials
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 4. Request for credentials
+ Note over Claimant, AAA Client: 5. Send credentials
+ Claimant->>AAA Client: 5. Send credentials
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: 6. Forward the credentials
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 6. Forward the credentials
+ Note over AAA Server: 7. Unsuccessfully verify the credentials
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: 8. Deny access message
+ Note over AAA Client, Claimant: 9. Deny access message
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 9. Deny access message
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F10-2
+
+Sequence diagram for unsuccessful authentication flow between Claimant, AAA Client, and AAA Server.
+
+**Figure 10-2 – Message flows for unsuccessful authentication**
+
+## **11 Authorization**
+
+Authorization is defined as the act of determining whether a particular privilege can be granted to the presenter of a particular credential. The privilege can be the right of access to service resource (SR) and may include reading, writing or modifying resources depending on the policy. The authorization process follows authentication and approves or denies access to NGN service depending on the results of the previous authentication steps and policy.
+
+### **11.1 Authorization aspects for NGN**
+
+The purpose of authorization is to provide and control access to authorized services for the authenticated user. In NGN, the AAA server communicates with network elements containing enrolled entities access privileges.
+
+This Recommendation treats authentication and authorization as associated processes, normally conducted sequentially for enrolled entities each time access is requested. However, a provider's policy may permit an entity to request immediate access/usage rights without re-authentication or enrolment. This case is not addressed.
+
+Authorization of the user for service is accomplished by the AAA server communicating and receiving authorization information from the appropriate network elements. On completion of the authorization process by the AAA server, acknowledgement information is forwarded to the user requesting the service.
+
+Receipt of the acknowledgement information constitutes the successful completion of the authentication and authorization set of processes, and the accessing entity is considered to be connected to the network or authorized SR.
+
+### **11.2 Authorization entities**
+
+The authorization process is performed automatically by the AAA server following authentication without involvement of the accessing entity. The AAA server provides a specialized function that makes the authorization decisions by applying access control policy rules.
+
+### **11.3 Procedure for authorization**
+
+The procedure for the authorization process is as depicted in Figure 11-1:
+
+- Step A. Upon the successful authentication of the entity, the AAA server identifies the services and resources available to and accessible for the claimant.
+- Step B. Once Step A is completed, the AAA server advises the transport and service control functions to assign/allocate authorized services and resources to the claimant's use.
+- Step C. The AAA server sends an allow access message to the AAA client.
+- Step D. The AAA client forwards the allow access message to the claimant.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Claimant
+ participant AAA Client
+ participant AAA Server
+ participant TSCF as Transport and service control functions
+
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: Authentication process
+ Claimant->>AAA Client: 1. Access request
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 2. Authentication request
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: 3. Request for credentials
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 4. Request for credentials
+ Claimant->>AAA Client: 5. Send credentials
+ AAA Client->>AAA Server: 6. Forward the credentials
+ AAA Server->>AAA Server: 7. Verify credentials
+ AAA Server-->>AAA Client: 8. Deny access message
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: 9. Deny access message
+ Note over AAA Server: Verified?
+ Note over AAA Server: No
+ Note over AAA Server: Yes
+
+ Note over AAA Server, TSCF: Authorization process
+ AAA Server->>TSCF: A. Identity privileges
+ Note over TSCF: B1. Advise to assign authorized SR
+ TSCF->>AAA Server: B2. Response
+
+ Note over AAA Client, AAA Server: Successful authentication response
+ AAA Server->>AAA Client: C. Allow access
+ AAA Client->>Claimant: D. Forward allow access message
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F11-1
+
+Sequence diagram showing message flows for the authorization process between Claimant, AAA Client, AAA Server, and Transport and service control functions.
+
+**Figure 11-1 – Message flows for the authorization process**
+
+## 12 Accounting
+
+The final "A" in "AAA" stands for accounting. Accounting in the AAA context includes a security element which can be used in association with other security event data to support an accounting function.
+
+### 12.1 Security accounting
+
+Accounting of security events uses that subset of the accounting function which provides accounting data that is then used in developing a security audit trail for use by the security auditing function. The extent of the security audit trail depends on the security auditing needs and policy identified by the NGN provider for that particular context, e.g., start and end times of successful and unsuccessful network or service access, the service accessed, and identity information of the accessing entity (for successful authentications). The actual audit function is outside the scope of this Recommendation. The procedure of security accounting is as in Figure 12-1.
+
+### 12.2 Functions for security accounting
+
+The security accounting is a service area that performs functions such as:
+
+- 1) Capture: is responsible for acquiring detectable data from an event and providing information as relevant to the security context. Data to be captured may include:
+ - the results of authentication;
+ - information related to revocation of authentication and/or certificate;
+ - information on authentication assurance;
+ - other information relating to the process of authentication.
+
+- 2) Storage: keeps the representations that the capture function produces.
+- 3) Review: seeks to accurately describe the event by: verifying the accuracy of what was captured, discerning facts by examining what was captured.
+- 4) Report: takes information from the review function and delivers it to an audit function.
+- 5) Audit: verifies the correctness of a security accounting report or the conformance to usage policy and security guidelines. The audit function may require the ability to alert immediately.
+
+It should be noted that only capture is an AAA function with storage, review, report and audit being management functions. These are out of scope for this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph AAA_involvement [AAA involved process]
+ Capture[Capture]
+ end
+ subgraph OAMP_audit [OAMP and audit related processes]
+ Store[Store]
+ Review[Review]
+ Report[Report]
+ Audit[Audit]
+ end
+ Capture --> Store
+ Store --> Review
+ Review --> Report
+ Report --> Audit
+ Audit -.->|Feedback Loop| Capture
+ Audit -.->|Feedback Loop| Store
+ Audit -.->|Feedback Loop| Review
+ Audit -.->|Feedback Loop| Report
+
+```
+
+• Captures data from network elements including AAA client(s) and server(s)
+• The only process which involves AAA
+
+*AAA involved process*
+
+*OAMP and audit related processes*
+
+• Collected data to be stored and kept at secured place such as OAMP
+
+• Results and findings from audit to be appropriately reflected by each process for improvement
+
+Y.2703(09)\_F12-1
+
+Flowchart of the Security Accounting Process Example (Figure 12-1). The process consists of five sequential steps: Capture, Store, Review, Report, and Audit. A dashed line separates the 'AAA involved process' (Capture) from 'OAMP and audit related processes' (Store, Review, Report, Audit). A feedback loop on the left indicates that results and findings from the Audit step are reflected back into the Capture, Store, Review, and Report steps for improvement. The Audit step is labeled with the identifier Y.2703(09)\_F12-1.
+
+**Figure 12-1 – Security accounting process example**
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Authentication protocol for AAA in NGN
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix deals with the EAP protocol that is transported over data link layers, and AAA protocols which provide AAA framework at the various applications.
+
+### I.1 EAP protocol for AAA service in NGN
+
+The EAP protocol defines an authentication framework which supports various authentication methods. The EAP runs on the peer and authentication server via the authenticator. The EAP is directly transported over data link layers such as IEEE 802 and PPP (point-to-point protocol).
+
+However, due to the feature of link dependency, the EAP protocol requires the lower layer such as EAPoL, IEEE 802.1X, and IEEE 802.11i. Figure I.1 describes the EAP multiplexing model. The EAP method layer includes the authentication algorithm. The EAP peer and authenticator have a respective functionality as an authentication client and authenticator. The EAP layer performs the delivery of the EAP messages. The lower layer transmits or receives the EAP frames between the peer and the authenticator. Since the link layer consists of various link protocols, the EAP requires various lower layers for each link protocol.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the EAP forwarding model across three entities: Peer, Authenticator, and Authentication server. Each entity has a protocol stack represented by a column of boxes. The Peer stack consists of EAP method, EAP peer, EAP layer, and Lower layer. The Authenticator stack consists of two columns: the left column has EAP auth., EAP layer, and Lower layer; the right column has EAP auth., EAP layer, and AAA/IP. The Authentication server stack consists of EAP method, EAP auth., EAP layer, and AAA/IP. Red arrows indicate the flow of EAP messages: one arrow goes from the Peer's EAP peer layer up to its EAP method layer, and another goes from the Authentication server's EAP auth. layer up to its EAP method layer. A red line connects the Peer's Lower layer to the Authenticator's Lower layer, and another red line connects the Authenticator's AAA/IP layer to the Authentication server's AAA/IP layer, representing the transport of EAP frames.
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FI-1
+
+Figure I.1 – EAP forwarding model diagram showing the protocol stack for Peer, Authenticator, and Authentication server.
+
+**Figure I.1 – EAP forwarding model**
+
+The EAP requires lower layer for reliable message delivery, error detection, and ordering messages as follows:
+
+- Since the EAP does not know that the peer receives the message from the authenticator, the EAP requires the reliable channel between the peer and the authenticator.
+- The EAP does not assure that the EAP messages are delivered to the destination without error. The EAP needs an error detection function from the lower layer.
+- The EAP messages might be changed in order or duplicated by any reason. Thus, the EAP requires duplication detection and ordering for guaranteeing correct operations.
+- The lower layer does not know whether the upper layer includes authentication protocol or not. The EAP requires an indication of the authentication protocol.
+
+### I.2 AAA protocols
+
+AAA protocols such as RADIUS were initially deployed to provide dial-up PPP and terminal server access. Diameter protocol was developed with the growth of the Internet and the introduction of new access technologies. Table I.1 shows the comparison of AAA protocols.
+
+**Table I.1 – Comparison of AAA protocols**
+
+| | RADIUS | DIAMETER |
+|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------|
+| Network size | Small | Large |
+| Transport | UDP | SCTP/TCP |
+| Encryption | Password only | Entire packet |
+| Authentication/Authorization | Combination | Combination |
+| Standard | IETF | IETF |
+| Protocol architecture | C/S | P2P |
+| Scalability | Low | High |
+
+In case of RADIUS protocol, managing dispersed serial line and modem pools for large numbers of users can create the need for significant administrative support. Since modem pools are by definition a link to the outside world, they require careful attention to security, authorization and accounting. This can be best achieved by managing a single "database" of users, which allows for authentication (verifying user name and password) as well as configuration information detailing the type of service to deliver to the user.
+
+The base Diameter protocol may be used by itself for accounting applications, but for use in authentication and authorization, it is always extended for a particular application.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### X.509 digital certificates as credentials
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+A common method for providing authentication assurance is the use of digital certificates as described in [b-ITU-T X.509] and [b-ITU-T X.811]. The certificate defined by [b-ITU-T X.509], which is widely used, contains the following data types.
+
+- **version** is the version of the encoded certificate. If the extensions component is present in the certificate, version shall be v3. If the issuerUniqueIdentifier or subjectUniqueIdentifier component is present, version shall be v2 or v3.
+- **serialNumber** is an integer assigned by the CA to each certificate. The value of serialNumber shall be unique for each certificate issued by a given CA (i.e., the issuer name and serial number identify a unique certificate).
+- **signature** contains the algorithm identifier for the algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate (e.g., md5WithRSAEncryption, sha-1WithRSAEncryption, id-dsa-with-sha1, etc.).
+- **issuer** identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate.
+- **validity** is the time interval during which the CA warrants that it will maintain information about the status of the certificate.
+- **subject** identifies the entity associated with the public-key found in the subject public key field.
+- **subjectPublicKeyInfo** is used to carry the public key being certified and to identify the algorithm which this public key is an instance of (e.g., rsaEncryption, dhpPublicNumber, id-dsa, etc.).
+- **issuerUniqueIdentifier** is used to uniquely identify an issuer in case of name reuse.
+- **subjectUniqueIdentifier** is used to uniquely identify a subject in case of name reuse.
+- **extensions field** allows addition of new fields to the structure.
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Authentication and authorization use-case
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+The use-case using the AAA service in this appendix is based on the reference model provided in [b-ITU-T Y.2702].
+
+### III.1 Authentication and authorization of user for network access
+
+Network access authentication and authorization services are needed to verify the identities and to determine whether access should be granted to the end user equipment.
+
+#### III.1.1 Device access/attachment to NGN authentication and authorization
+
+In this case, there are 3 types of NGN device access/attachment, authentication and authorization. These services and capabilities identify, authenticate and authorize user devices access or attachment to the access IP network:
+
+- identify, authenticate and authorized legacy TE and TE-BE for access/attachment to the access IP network ((1) of Figure III.1);
+- identify, authenticate and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD in the customer domain for access/attachment to the access IP network ((2) of Figure III.1);
+- identify, authenticate and authorize NGN TE and TE-BE with IP capabilities in the customer domain for access/attachment to the IP network ((3) of Figure III.1).
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the device and network provider: it automatically allows the device to access the network provider, as necessary.
+
+The procedure of identification depicted in (1) of Figure III.1 is as follows:
+
+Step 1: The gateway (claimant) requests network access/attachment from the AAA client
+
+Step 2: The AAA client requests the identification of the gateway from AAA server (verifier) which identifies the gateway
+
+Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of identification to the AAA client
+
+Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the gateway, where the AAA client stores the access list of the gateway
+
+In case of (2) and (3), IAD and NGN TE is claimant respectively. The remaining process is identical to the procedure of (1).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the identification procedure for a device to access an NGN network. It involves the following entities: NGN TE, IAD, Gateway, NGN access provider (AAA client and AAA server), and NGN service provider (AAA client and AAA server). The procedure is shown for three scenarios: (1) Legacy TE, (2) Legacy TE using IAD, and (3) NGN TE. The steps are as follows:
+
+- Scenario (1) Legacy TE:**
+ - 1) Use request: Gateway to AAA client.
+ - 2-1) Identification request: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 2-2) Identification decision: AAA server to AAA client.
+ - 3) Result forward: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-1) Store list of gateway: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-2) Result forward: AAA client to Gateway.
+- Scenario (2) Legacy TE using IAD:**
+ - 1) Use request: Gateway to AAA client.
+ - 2-1) Identification request: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 2-2) Identification decision: AAA server to AAA client.
+ - 3) Result forward: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-1) Store list of IAD: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-2) Result forward: AAA client to IAD.
+- Scenario (3) NGN TE:**
+ - 1) Use request: NGN TE to AAA client.
+ - 2-1) Identification request: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 2-2) Identification decision: AAA server to AAA client.
+ - 3) Result forward: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-1) Store list of TE: AAA client to AAA server.
+ - 4-2) Result forward: AAA client to NGN TE.
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.1
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of identification for a device to access NGN network. The diagram involves NGN TE, IAD, Gateway, NGN access provider (AAA client and AAA server), and NGN service provider (AAA client and AAA server). Three scenarios are shown: (1) Legacy TE, (2) Legacy TE using IAD, and (3) NGN TE. Each scenario follows a similar flow: 1) Use request, 2-1) Identification request, 2-2) Identification decision, 3) Result forward, and 4-1) Store list of gateway/IAD/TE, followed by 4-2) Result forward.
+
+**Figure III.1 – Procedure of identification for a device to access NGN network**
+
+#### III.1.2 Bundled device access/attachment to NGN and service/application authentication and authorization
+
+In this case, there are 3 types of NGN access/attachment, authentication and authorization. These services and capabilities bundle the NGN access provider authentication of the user device with that of the NGN service provider as follows:
+
+- services and capabilities for the NGN service provider to implicitly identify and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE ((1) of Figure III.2);
+- services and capabilities for the NGN service provider to implicitly identify and authorize legacy TE and TE-BE with IAD ((2) of Figure III.2);
+- services and capabilities for the NGN service provider to directly identify, authenticate and authorize NGN TE and TE-BE in the customer domain ((3) of Figure III.2).
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the device and service/application provider: it automatically allows the device to access the service/application provider, as necessary.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (1) of Figure III.2 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The gateway (claimant) requests the use of service/application from the AAA client
+- Step 2: The AAA client requests the identification of the gateway from the AAA server (verifier) in the access network domain, where the AAA server identifies the gateway
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of the identification to the AAA client and the AAA server in the NGN service provider domain simultaneously
+- Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the gateway, where the AAA client stores the access list of the gateway
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (2) of Figure III.2 is as follows:
+
+Step 1: The IAD (claimant) requests the use of service/application from the AAA client.
+
+Step 2: The AAA client requests the identification of the IAD from the AAA client in the NGN service provider domain, where the AAA server (verifier) in the NGN service provider domain identifies the IAD.
+
+Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of the identification to the AAA client.
+
+Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to IAD, where the AAA client stores the access list of IAD.
+
+In case of (3), NGN TE is claimant. The remaining process is identical to the procedure of (2).
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant NGN_TE as NGN TE
+ participant IAD as IAD
+ participant Gateway as Gateway
+ box "NGN access provider"
+ participant AC1 as AAA client
+ participant AS1 as AAA server
+ end
+ box "NGN service provider"
+ participant AC2 as AAA client
+ participant AS2 as AAA server
+ end
+
+ Note over NGN_TE, AS2: (1) Legacy TE
+ Gateway->>AC1: 1) Use request
+ AC1->>AS1: 2) Identification request
+ AS1->>AC2: 3-1) Identification decision
+ AC2-->>AS1: 3-2) Result forward
+ AS1-->>AC1: 3-2) Result forward
+ Note right of AC1: 4-1) Store list of gateway
+ AC1-->>Gateway: 4-2) Result forward
+
+ Note over NGN_TE, AS2: (2) Legacy TE using IAD
+ IAD->>AC1: 1) Use request
+ AC1->>AC2: 2-1) Request msg forward
+ AC2->>AS2: 2-2) Identification request
+ AS2-->>AC2: 3-1) Identification decision
+ AC2-->>AC1: 3-2) Result forward
+ Note right of AC1: 4-1) Store list of IAD
+ AC1-->>IAD: 4-2) Result forward
+
+ Note over NGN_TE, AS2: (3) NGN TE
+ NGN_TE->>AC1: 1) Use request
+ AC1->>AS1: 2) Identification request
+ AS1->>AC2: 3-1) Identification decision
+ AC2-->>AS1: 3-2) Result forward
+ AS1-->>AC1: 3-2) Result forward
+ Note right of AC1: 4-1) Store list of TE
+ AC1-->>NGN_TE: 4-2) Result forward
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of identification for a device to use service/application provider. The diagram involves NGN TE, IAD, Gateway, NGN access provider (AAA client, AAA server), and NGN service provider (AAA client, AAA server). It details three scenarios: (1) Legacy TE, (2) Legacy TE using IAD, and (3) NGN TE.
+
+**Figure III.2 – Procedure of identification for a device to use service/application provider**
+
+### III.2 NGN service provider authentication and authorization of user for access to service/application
+
+In this case, there are 3 types in service/application authentication and authorization in a multi-network provider:
+
+- NGN service provider indirect authentication of a user device through trust relations with the NGN access provider ((1) of Figure III.3);
+- NGN service provider direct authentication and authorization of a user device. ((2) of Figure III.3);
+- NGN service provider direct authentication of the user ((3) of Figure III.3).
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the user and service/application provider: it automatically allows the user to access the service/application provider, as necessary.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (1) of Figure III.3 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The TE (claimant) requests the use of service/application from the AAA client.
+- Step 2: The AAA client requests the identification of the device from the AAA server (verifier) in the access network domain, where the AAA server identifies the device.
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of the identification to the AAA client and the AAA server in the NGN service provider domain simultaneously.
+- Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the gateway, where the AAA client stores the access list of the device.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (2) of Figure III.3 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The TE (claimant) requests the use of service/application from the AAA client in the NGN service provider domain.
+- Step 2: The AAA client requests the identification of the device from the AAA server (verifier) in the NGN service provider domain, where the AAA server identifies the device.
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of the identification to the AAA client.
+- Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the device, where the AAA client stores the access list of the device.
+
+The procedure of the authentication depicted in (3) of Figure III.3 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The user (claimant) requests the use of service/application from the AAA client in the NGN service provider domain.
+- Step 2: The AAA client requests the authentication of the user from the AAA server (verifier) in the NGN service provider domain that authenticates the user.
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of the authentication to the AAA client.
+- Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the user, where the AAA client stores the access list of the user.
+
+
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of NGN service provider authentication and authorization of user. The diagram involves four main entities: User, NGN TE, NGN service provider (containing AAA client and AAA server), and 3rd party provider (containing AAA client and AAA server). The process is divided into three main sections: (1) User device authentication (indirect), (2) User device authentication (direct), and (3) User authentication (direct). In section (1), the NGN TE sends a '1) Use request' to the NGN service provider AAA client, which sends a '2-2) Identification request' to the AAA server. The AAA server sends a '3-1) Identification decision' to the AAA client, which then sends a '3-2) Result forward' to the 3rd party provider AAA client. The 3rd party provider AAA client sends a '4-1) Store list of device' to the AAA server, which then sends a '4-2) Result forward' to the NGN TE. In section (2), the NGN TE sends a '1) Use request' to the 3rd party provider AAA client, which sends a '2-1) Identification request' to the AAA server. The AAA server sends a '3) Result forward' to the AAA client, which then sends a '4-1) Store list of device' to the AAA server. The AAA server sends a '4-2) Result forward' to the NGN TE. In section (3), the NGN TE sends a '1) Access request' to the 3rd party provider AAA client, which sends a '2-1) Authentication request' to the AAA server. The AAA server sends a '3) Result forward' to the AAA client, which then sends a '4-1) Store access list of user' to the AAA server. The AAA server sends a '4-2) Result forward' to the NGN TE. The diagram is labeled Y.2703(09)\_FIII.3 in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure III.3 – Procedure of NGN service provider authentication and authorization of user**
+
+### III.3 User authentication and authorization of NGN providers
+
+In this case, there are 2 types in user authentication and authorization of the network:
+
+- User authentication of NGN provider for network attachment ((1) of Figure III.4).
+- User authentication of NGN provider for obtaining the service ((2) of Figure III.4).
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the user authentication and authorization of the network: it automatically allows the user to access the network provider, as necessary.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (1) of Figure III.4 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The user (claimant) requests authentication of the NAP (network access points) from the 3rd party verifier.
+- Step 2: The 3rd party verifier forwards AI (authentication information) to the NAP.
+- Step 3: Exchange AI between 3rd party verifier and the NAP.
+- Step 4: The 3rd party verifier forwards the results to the user, where the 3rd party verifier verifies.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in (2) of Figure III.4 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The user (claimant) requests authentication of network from the 3rd party verifier.
+- Step 2: The 3rd party verifier forwards the request of the user to the AAA client, where the AAA client requests AI from the AAA server.
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends AI to the AAA client and exchanges AI between the 3rd party verifier and the AAA client.
+- Step 4: The 3rd party verifier forwards the results to the user, where the 3rd party verifier verifies.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant T3PV as Trusted 3rd party verifier
+ participant NAP
+ participant NGNAP as NGN access provider
+ participant AAAclient as AAA client
+ participant AAAserver as AAA server
+
+ Note over User, T3PV: (1) NAP authentication
+ User-->>T3PV: 1) NAP authentication request
+ T3PV-->>NAP: 2) AI forward
+ NAP-->>T3PV: 3) Exchange AI
+ T3PV-->>User: 4-2) Result forward
+ Note over T3PV: } 4-1) Verify AI
+
+ Note over User, T3PV: (2) Network authentication
+ User-->>T3PV: 1) Network authentication request
+ T3PV-->>AAAclient: 2-1) Request forward
+ AAAclient-->>AAAserver: 2-2) Request AI
+ AAAserver-->>AAAclient: 3-1) AI forward
+ AAAclient-->>T3PV: 3-2) Exchange AI
+ T3PV-->>User: 4-2) Result forward
+ Note over T3PV: } 4-1) Verify AI
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.4
+
+Sequence diagram showing the procedure of user authentication and authorization of NGN providers. The diagram involves four main entities: User, Trusted 3rd party verifier, NAP, and NGN access provider (containing AAA client and AAA server). The process is divided into two main parts: (1) NAP authentication and (2) Network authentication. In the NAP authentication part, the User sends a request to the Trusted 3rd party verifier, which forwards it to the NAP. The NAP exchanges AI with the Trusted 3rd party verifier and then forwards the result back to the User. In the Network authentication part, the User sends a request to the Trusted 3rd party verifier, which forwards it to the AAA client. The AAA client exchanges AI with the AAA server and then forwards the result back to the User. The diagram is labeled Y.2703(09)\_FIII.4.
+
+**Figure III.4 – Procedure of user authentication and authorization of NGN providers**
+
+### III.4 NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party service/application provider
+
+There may be certain scenarios where the provider of an application or service is different from the NGN provider (i.e., a 3rd party service/application provider). The NGN provider would need to authenticate and authorize the 3rd party service/application provider.
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the NGN provider authentication and authorization of the 3rd party service/application provider.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in Figure III.5 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The AAA client (claimant) in the NGN provider requests an authentication from the 3rd party service/application provider to the 3rd party verifier.
+- Step 2: The 3rd party verifier forwards the request of the user to the AAA client in the 3rd party service/application provider and the AAA client requests AI from the AAA server.
+- Step 3: The AAA server forwards AI to the AAA client and exchanges AI between the 3rd party verifier and the AAA client.
+- Step 4: The 3rd party verifier forwards the results to the AAA client in the NGN provider, where the 3rd party verifier verifies and the AAA server stores the result.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant NGN_provider as NGN provider
+ participant Trusted_3rd_party_verifier as Trusted 3rd party verifier
+ participant 3rd_party_service_application_provider as 3rd party service/application provider
+
+ Note over NGN_provider: AAA server, AAA client
+ Note over 3rd_party_service_application_provider: AAA client, AAA server
+
+ User->>AAA_client[AAA client]: 1) 3rd party authentication request
+ AAA_client->>AAA_client: 2-1) Request forward
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server[AAA server]: 2-2) Request AI
+ AAA_server->>AAA_client: 3-1) AI forward
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 3-2) Exchange AI
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 4-1) Verify AI
+ AAA_client->>AAA_client: 4-2) Forward AI
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 4-3) Result forward
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 4-4) Store result
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.5
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the procedure of NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party service/application provider. The diagram shows interactions between a User, an NGN provider (containing AAA server and AAA client), a Trusted 3rd party verifier, and a 3rd party service/application provider (containing AAA client and AAA server).
+
+**Figure III.5 – Procedure of NGN provider authentication and authorization of 3rd party service/application provider**
+
+### III.5 Use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service
+
+Service providers may provide third party authentication and authorization. In this case, there are 2 types in use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service:
+
+- Authentication of the user to a service provider ((1) of Figure III.6).
+- Authentication of a service provider to the user ((2) of Figure III.6).
+
+#### III.5.1 Authentication of the user to a service provider
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for the user authentication and authorization to a service provider: it automatically allows the user to access a 3rd party service/application provider, as necessary.
+
+The procedure of the identification depicted in Figure III.6 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The user (claimant) requests network access from the AAA client.
+- Step 2: The AAA client requests qualification from the user to the AAA server in the 3rd party service/application provider, where the AAA server (verifier) authenticates the user.
+- Step 3: The AAA server sends the results of authentication to the AAA client.
+- Step 4: The AAA client forwards the results to the user, where the AAA client stores the access list of the user.
+- Step 5: If granted, the user can access the specified resource of the network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant Provider as 3rd party service/application provider
+ participant AAA_client as AAA client
+ participant AAA_server as AAA server
+
+ User-->>AAA_client: 1) Access request
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 2-1) Authentication request
+ AAA_server-->>AAA_client: 2-2) Authentication decision
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 3) Result forward
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 4-1) Store access list of user
+ AAA_client-->>User: 4-2) Result forward
+ User->>AAA_server: 5) Access to resource of network/service
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.6
+
+Sequence diagram for Figure III.6 showing the procedure of use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service. The diagram involves a User, a 3rd party service/application provider (containing an AAA client and an AAA server), and an AAA server. The steps are: 1) Access request from User to AAA client; 2-1) Authentication request from AAA client to AAA server; 2-2) Authentication decision from AAA server to AAA client; 3) Result forward from AAA client to AAA server; 4-1) Store access list of user from AAA client to AAA server; 4-2) Result forward from AAA client to User; 5) Access to resource of network/service from User to AAA server. A bracket groups steps 2-1 and 2-2 as 'Authentication decision'. A bracket groups steps 4-1 and 4-2 as 'Result forward'.
+
+**Figure III.6 – Procedure of use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service**
+
+#### III.5.2 Authentication of a service provider to the user
+
+The AAA client provides the authentication service for authentication of a service provider to the user. The procedure of the identification depicted in Figure III.7 is as follows:
+
+- Step 1: The user (claimant) in custom domain requests authentication from the 3rd party service/application provider to the 3rd party verifier
+- Step 2: The 3rd party verifier forwards the request of the user to the AAA client in the 3rd party service/application provider, and the AAA client requests AI from the AAA server
+- Step 3: The AAA server forwards the AI to the AAA client and exchanges AI between the 3rd party verifier and the AAA client
+- Step 4: The 3rd party verifier forwards the results to the AAA client in the NGN provider, where the 3rd party verifier verifies and stores the result
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant User
+ participant Verifier as Trusted 3rd party verifier
+ participant Provider as 3rd party service/application provider
+ participant AAA_client as AAA client
+ participant AAA_server as AAA server
+
+ User-->>Verifier: 1) 3rd party authentication request
+ Verifier->>AAA_client: 2-1) Request forward
+ AAA_client->>AAA_server: 2-2) Request AI
+ AAA_server-->>AAA_client: 3-1) AI forward
+ AAA_client-->>Verifier: 3-2) Exchange AI
+ AAA_client-->>Verifier: 4-1) Verify AI
+ Verifier-->>User: 4-2) Result forward
+
+```
+
+Y.2703(09)\_FIII.7
+
+Sequence diagram for Figure III.7 showing the procedure of use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service. The diagram involves a User, a Trusted 3rd party verifier, a 3rd party service/application provider (containing an AAA client and an AAA server), and an AAA server. The steps are: 1) 3rd party authentication request from User to Trusted 3rd party verifier; 2-1) Request forward from Trusted 3rd party verifier to AAA client; 2-2) Request AI from AAA client to AAA server; 3-1) AI forward from AAA server to AAA client; 3-2) Exchange AI between AAA client and Trusted 3rd party verifier; 4-1) Verify AI from AAA client to Trusted 3rd party verifier; 4-2) Result forward from Trusted 3rd party verifier to User. A bracket groups steps 3-1 and 3-2 as 'Exchange AI'. A bracket groups steps 4-1 and 4-2 as 'Verify AI'.
+
+**Figure III.7 – Procedure of use of 3rd party authentication and authorization service**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T M.3410] Recommendation ITU-T M.3410 (2008), *Guidelines and requirements for security management systems to support telecommunications management.*
+- [b-ITU-T Q.3201] Recommendation ITU-T Q.3201 (2007), *EAP-based security signalling protocol architecture for network attachment.*
+- [b-ITU-T Q.3202.1] Recommendation ITU-T Q.3202.1 (2008), *Authentication protocols based on EAP-AKA for interworking among 3GPP, WiMax, and WLAN in NGN.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2005) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2005, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.805] Recommendation ITU-T X.805 (2003), *Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.810] Recommendation ITU-T X.810 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Overview.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.811] Recommendation ITU-T X.811 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-2:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Authentication framework.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.812] Recommendation ITU-T X.812 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-3:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Access control framework.*
+- [b-ITU-T X.816] Recommendation ITU-T X.816 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-7:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Security audit and alarms framework.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for next generation networks.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), *NGN release 1 requirements.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2233] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2008), *Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1.*
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1.*
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2704
+
+(01/2010)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704
+
+# Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701, *Security requirements for NGN release 1*, provides security requirements for next generation networks (NGNs) and its interfaces (e.g., UNIs, NNIs and ANIs). Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 describes some security mechanisms that can be used to fulfil the requirements described in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 and specifies the suite of options for each selected mechanism. Specifically, this Recommendation describes identification, authentication and authorization mechanisms; then it discusses transport security for signalling and OAMP, and media security. It then describes audit-trail-related mechanisms and finally describes the provisioning. The security mechanisms described in this Recommendation are based on use of the trust model defined in Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701.
+
+The list of security mechanisms described in this Recommendation is not exhaustive. NGN providers are encouraged to support additional security tools, capabilities and operational measures as needed beyond the mechanisms specified in this Recommendation for NGN security protection.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2704 | 2010-01-29 | 13 |
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2010
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 1.1 Assumptions ..... | 1 |
+| 1.2 Overview ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 2 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 3 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 3 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 4 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 4 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 7 |
+| 6 Security risks and threats ..... | 7 |
+| 7 Security trust model..... | 7 |
+| 7.1 Single network trust model..... | 7 |
+| 7.2 Peering network trust model..... | 9 |
+| 8 Identification, authentication and authorization ..... | 10 |
+| 8.1 Subscribers ..... | 10 |
+| 8.2 Network element ..... | 10 |
+| 8.3 Credential usage in the NGN security ..... | 10 |
+| 8.4 Identification and authentication of subscribers..... | 14 |
+| 8.5 Identification and authentication of end-users ..... | 18 |
+| 8.6 Identification and authentication by TE-BE..... | 20 |
+| 8.7 Authenticator-SAA/TAA-FEs interface ..... | 20 |
+| 8.8 Identification and authentication of bearer traffic ..... | 21 |
+| 9 Transport security for signalling and OAMP ..... | 23 |
+| 9.1 TLS ..... | 23 |
+| 9.2 IPsec in trusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zones ..... | 27 |
+| 9.3 Key agreement protocol between untrusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zone..... | 31 |
+| 9.4 IPsec between untrusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zone ..... | 31 |
+| 10 Media security ..... | 31 |
+| 10.1 SRTP..... | 33 |
+| 11 OAMP..... | 34 |
+| 11.1 Network element interface to logging systems ..... | 35 |
+| 11.2 Network element use of SNMP ..... | 35 |
+| 11.3 Security patch management..... | 35 |
+| 11.4 Version management ..... | 35 |
+| 11.5 Audit trail, trapping, and logging at TE-BE ..... | 36 |
+| 12 Provisioning of equipment in untrusted zone ..... | 36 |
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| Appendix I – Examples of source-address assurance and its application to the mechanism of subscriber identification and authentication..... | 37 |
+| I.1 Subscriber identification and authentication linked to access-line authentication ..... | 37 |
+| I.2 Subscriber identification and authentication linked to explicit access authentication at IP connectivity establishment ..... | 39 |
+| Appendix II – Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) interconnection security ..... | 42 |
+| II.1 Background..... | 42 |
+| II.2 Scope/purpose..... | 42 |
+| II.3 Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of ETS ..... | 42 |
+| II.4 Authentication and authorization ..... | 42 |
+| II.5 Transport security for signalling and OAMP ..... | 43 |
+| II.6 Media traffic ..... | 43 |
+| II.7 Support of calling number ID and calling name ID restriction features ..... | 43 |
+| II.8 Non-traceability ..... | 43 |
+| II.9 End-to-end peer-to-peer encryption ..... | 43 |
+| Appendix III – Security best practices ..... | 44 |
+| III.1 Introduction ..... | 44 |
+| III.2 Firewalls ..... | 44 |
+| III.3 Operating system hardening ..... | 45 |
+| III.4 Vulnerability assessment ..... | 45 |
+| III.5 Intrusion detection systems ..... | 46 |
+| Bibliography..... | 47 |
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704
+
+# Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+[ITU-T Y.2701], *Security requirements for NGN release 1*, provides security requirements for next generation networks (NGNs) and its interfaces (e.g., UNIs, NNIs and ANIs), including a trust model. The security mechanisms selected to implement these requirements will contain options, and mismatched options are undesirable because they tend to introduce security vulnerabilities and make it more difficult to achieve interoperability.
+
+This Recommendation therefore highlights some important security mechanisms that can be used to realize the requirements in [ITU-T Y.2701] and specifies the suite of options to be used for each selected mechanism to reduce interoperability and mismatch problems. The list of mechanisms described in this Recommendation is not exhaustive. NGN providers are encouraged to support additional security tools, capabilities and operational measures as needed beyond the mechanisms specified in this Recommendation for NGN security protection.
+
+This Recommendation is intended to be used with [ITU-T Y.2701] to provide a base for NGN security. It should be used with other security-related Recommendations and other specifications as appropriate for specific security areas.
+
+NOTE – The mechanisms described in this Recommendation for identification and authentication are part of the broader topic generally known as IdM ("identity management").
+
+## 1.1 Assumptions
+
+This Recommendation is based on the following assumptions:
+
+- 1) The bundling of functional entities, as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], to a given network element will vary, depending on the vendor.
+- 2) Each NGN provider has specific responsibilities within its domain for security. For example, implementing applicable security services and practices a) to protect itself, b) to assure end-to-end security is not compromised within its network, and c) to assure high availability and integrity of NGN communications.
+- 3) Each network domain will establish and enforce policies for service level agreements (SLAs) to assure the security of its domain and the security of the network interconnections. It is assumed that the SLAs would specify security services, mechanisms and practices to be implemented to protect the interconnected networks and the communications (signalling/control traffic, bearer traffic and management traffic) across UNIs, ANIs and NNIs.
+- 4) This Recommendation addresses network-based security, which is a layered architecture, consisting of perimeter security to trusted domains, physical security of provider equipment, and potentially the use of encryption.
+
+## 1.2 Overview
+
+This Recommendation is organized as follows:
+
+- Clause 2 (References) – This clause provides normative references.
+- Clause 3 (Definitions) – This clause provides definitions used in this Recommendation.
+- Clause 4 (Abbreviations and acronyms) – This clause provides the list of abbreviations and acronyms used in this Recommendation.
+- Clause 5 (Conventions) – This clause is intentionally left blank.
+
+- Clause 6 (Security risks and threats) – This clause provides reference to security risks and threats applicable to NGN.
+- Clause 7 (Security trust model) – This clause provides a summary of the trust model defined in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+- Clause 8 (Identification, authentication and authorization) – This clause provides mechanisms and security measures for identification, authentication and authorization.
+- Clause 9 (Transport security for signalling and OAMP) – This clause provides mechanisms for signalling and OAMP encryption and integrity protection.
+- Clause 10 (Media security) – This clause provides mechanisms for media (i.e., bearer traffic) protection.
+- Clause 11 (OAMP) – This clause provides information and references for audit trail, trapping and logging of security events.
+- Clause 12 (Provisioning of equipment in untrusted zone) – This clause provides information regarding provisioning of subscriber equipment in the untrusted zone.
+- Appendix I – Examples of source-address assurance and its application to the mechanism of subscriber identification and authentication
+- Appendix II – Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) interconnection security
+- Appendix III – Security best practices
+- Bibliography
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T Y.2012] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2702] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1 . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2703] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2703 (2009), The application of AAA service in NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2720] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), NGN identity management framework . |
+| [ITU-T X.509] | Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2008) ISO/IEC 9594-8:2008, Information technology – Open systems interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks . |
+| [ITU-T X.660] | Recommendation ITU-T X.660 (2008) ISO/IEC 9834-1:2008, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Procedures for the operation of OSI Registration Authorities: General procedures and top arcs of the International Object Identifier tree . |
+
+- [ITU-T X.1035] Recommendation ITU-T X.1035 (2007), *Password-authenticated key exchange (PAK) protocol*.
+- [IETF RFC 4302] IETF RFC 4302 (2005), *IP Authentication Header*.
+- [IETF RFC 4303] IETF RFC 4303 (2005), *IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*.
+- [IETF RFC 5246] IETF RFC 5246 (2008), *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+- 3.1.1 asset** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Anything that has value to the organization, its business, its operations and its continuity.
+- 3.1.2 border element** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Network element providing functions connecting different security and administrative domains.
+- 3.1.3 corporate network** [ITU-T Y.2701]: A private network that supports multiple users and may be in multiple locations (e.g., an enterprise, a campus).
+- 3.1.4 domain border element** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Border element under sole control of the provider, providing security functions with other network domains.
+- 3.1.5 emergency telecommunications service (ETS)** [b-ITU-T E.107]: A national service providing priority telecommunications to the ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies.
+- 3.1.6 network border element** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Border element under sole control of the provider, providing security functions with terminal equipment.
+- 3.1.7 security domain** [ITU-T Y.2701]: A set of elements, a security policy, a security authority and a set of security-relevant activities in which the elements are managed in accordance with the security policy. The policy will be administered by the security authority. A given security domain may span multiple security zones.
+- 3.1.8 security token** [b-ITU-T X.810]: A set of data protected by one or more security services, together with security information used in the provision of those security services, that is transferred between communicating entities.
+- 3.1.9 security zone** [ITU-T Y.2701]: [ITU-T Y.2701] defines 3 security zones, (1) trusted, (2) trusted but vulnerable, and (3) un-trusted. A security zone is defined by operational control, location, and connectivity to other device/network elements.
+- 3.1.10 terminal equipment border element** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Border element providing security functions between customer premises equipment and service provider network.
+- 3.1.11 trust** [ITU-T Y.2701]: Entity X is said to trust entity Y for a set of activities if and only if entity X relies upon entity Y behaving in a particular way with respect to the activities.
+
+**3.1.12 trusted but vulnerable zone** [ITU-T Y.2701]: From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a security zone where the network elements/devices are operated (provisioned and maintained) by the NGN provider. The equipment may be under the control by either the customer/subscriber or the NGN provider. In addition, the equipment may be located within or outside the NGN provider's domain. They communicate with elements both in the trusted zone and with elements in the un-trusted zone, which is why they are "vulnerable". Their major security function is to protect the NEs in the trusted zone from the security attacks originated in the un-trusted zone in a fail-safe manner.
+
+**3.1.13 trusted zone** [ITU-T Y.2701]: From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a security domain where NGN provider's network elements and systems reside and never communicate directly with customer equipment. The common characteristics of NGN network elements in this domain are that they are under the full control of the related NGN provider, are located in the NGN provider premises (which provides physical security), and they communicate only with elements in the "trusted" domain and with elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" domain.
+
+**3.1.14 un-trusted zone** [ITU-T Y.2701]: From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a zone that includes all network elements of customer networks or possibly peer networks or other NGN provider zones outside of the original domain, which are connected to the NGN provider's border elements.
+
+**3.1.15 user** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A user includes end user, person, subscriber, system, equipment, terminal (e.g., FAX, PC), (functional) entity, process, application, provider, or corporate network.
+
+**3.1.16 user network** [ITU-T Y.2701]: A private network consisting of terminal equipment that may have multiple users.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 authenticator**: An Authenticator is a network element that facilitates identification and authentication of subscribers, devices or end-users. For example, border elements with back-to-back user agent (B2BUA) functionality or proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE) can be Authenticators of subscribers for SIP-based services.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|----------------------------------|
+| 3G | 3rd Generation |
+| AGW | Access Gateway |
+| AH | Authentication Header |
+| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement |
+| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface |
+| AS/WS | Application Server/Web Server |
+| AuC | Authentication Centre |
+| B2BUA | Back-to-Back User Agent |
+| BE | Border Element |
+| BSR | Base Station Router |
+| CA | Certification Authority |
+| COPS | Common Open Policy Service |
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------------------|
+| CRL | Certificate Revocation List |
+| CSC-FE | Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| DBE | Domain Border Element |
+| DNS | Domain Name System |
+| DoS | Denial of Service |
+| DTMF | Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency |
+| ECC | Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
+| ESP | Encapsulating Security Protocol |
+| ETS | Emergency Telecommunications Service |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture |
+| GW | Gateway |
+| HMAC | Hash Message Authentication Code |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| I-CSC-FE | Interrogating Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| ID | Identity |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IDPS | Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems |
+| IDS | Intrusion Detection Systems |
+| IKE | Internet Key Exchange |
+| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network |
+| LAN | Local Area Network |
+| MD5 | Message Digest 5 |
+| MIB | Management Information Base |
+| MPLS | MultiProtocol Label Switching |
+| MRP-FE | Media Resource Processing Functional Entity |
+| MS | Mobile Station |
+| NAC-FE | Network Access Control Functional Entity |
+| NAPT | Network Address and Port Translation |
+| NAT | Network Address Translation |
+| NBE | Network Border Element |
+| NE | Network Element |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface |
+| OAMP | Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning |
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
+| OID | Object Identifier |
+| ONU | Optical Network Units |
+| PAK | Password Authenticated Key |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| POTS | Plain Old Telephone Service |
+| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RAC-FE | Resource and Admission Control Functional Entity |
+| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial In User Service |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| RTSP | Real Time Streaming Protocol |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| SASL | Simple Authentication and Security Layer |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| SDP | Session Description Protocol |
+| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SLA | Service Level Agreement |
+| SL-FE | Subscription Locator Functional Entity |
+| SNMP | Simple Network Management Protocol |
+| SRTP | Secure Real Time Protocol |
+| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| TE | Terminal Equipment |
+| TE-BE | Terminal Equipment Border Element |
+| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
+| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network |
+| TRIP | Telephony Routing over IP |
+| UA | User Agent |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card |
+| UMTS | Universal Mobile Telecommunications System |
+| UNI | User-to-Network Interface |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+| USIM | Universal Subscriber Identity Module |
+| VLAN | Virtual LAN |
+
+| | |
+|------|---------------------------|
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| WLAN | Wireless LAN |
+| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Line |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Security risks and threats
+
+See clause 4 in [ITU-T Y.2701] for security risks and threats assumed for the NGN environment.
+
+## 7 Security trust model
+
+The choice by an NGN provider of security mechanisms depends on the applicable trust model. This Recommendation assumes the use of the trust model defined in [ITU-T Y.2701]. This clause provides a summary of the NGN security trust model defined in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+The NGN functional reference architecture defines functional entities (FEs). However, since network security aspects depend heavily on the way that FEs are physically bundled together, the NGN security architecture is based on physical network elements (NEs), i.e., tangible boxes that contain one or more FEs. The way these FEs are bundled into NEs will vary, depending on the vendor and on the NGN provider.
+
+## 7.1 Single network trust model
+
+This clause defines three security zones:
+
+- 1) trusted;
+- 2) trusted but vulnerable;
+- 3) un-trusted,
+
+that are dependent on operational control, location, and connectivity to other device/network elements. These three zones are illustrated in the security trust model shown in Figure 1.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the security trust model for NGN, divided into three zones based on control and trust levels. A horizontal line at the top indicates that elements to the left are 'Network elements not always controlled by the NGN provider', while elements to the right are 'Network elements controlled by the NGN provider'.
+
+- Untrusted zone (Red hatched background):** Contains several 'TE' (Terminal Equipment) and 'TE-BE' (Terminal Equipment - Border Element) blocks. These are connected to the 'Provider-controlled equipment' block.
+- Trusted but vulnerable zone (Yellow hatched background):** Contains the 'Provider-controlled equipment' block and the 'Network border elements (NBE)' block. The 'Provider-controlled equipment' block is connected to the 'NBE' block.
+- Trusted zone (Green hatched background):** Contains the 'NGN network elements' block. The 'NBE' block is connected to the 'NGN network elements' block.
+
+Arrows indicate the flow of data and control between these elements across the zone boundaries.
+
+Y2704(09)\_F01
+
+Figure 1: Security trust model diagram showing three zones: Untrusted zone, Trusted but vulnerable zone, and Trusted zone. The Untrusted zone contains TE and TE-BE elements. The Trusted but vulnerable zone contains Provider-controlled equipment and Network border elements (NBE). The Trusted zone contains NGN network elements. Arrows indicate connectivity between elements across zones. A horizontal line at the top separates elements not always controlled by the NGN provider (left) from those controlled by the NGN provider (right).
+
+Figure 1 – Security trust model/[ITU-T Y.2701]
+
+A "trusted network security zone", or "trusted zone" in short, is a zone where NGN provider's network elements and systems reside and never communicate directly with customer equipment or other domains. The common characteristics of NGN network elements in this zone are that:
+
+- 1) they are under the full control (for provisioning, maintenance, and operational control) of the NGN provider;
+- 2) they are located in the NGN provider domain; and
+- 3) they communicate only with other elements in the "trusted" zone and with elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone.
+
+It should not be assumed that because a network element is in a trusted zone, it is necessarily secure.
+
+The network elements in the "trusted zone" will be protected by a combination of various methods. Some examples are physical security of the NGN network elements, general hardening of the systems, use of secure signalling, security for management messages, and the use of a separate VPN within the (MPLS/)IP network. The same combination of methods is expected to be applied to secure communication within the "trusted" zone and between NGN network elements in the "trusted" zone and the "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone.
+
+A "trusted but vulnerable network security zone", or "trusted but vulnerable zone" in short, is a zone where the network elements/devices communicate with elements in the "un-trusted" zone, which is why they are "vulnerable". In addition, they communicate with elements in the "trusted" zone. Like network elements in the "trusted" zone, the equipment is under the control of the NGN provider, though the equipment may be located within or outside the NGN provider's premises. Their major security function is to protect the NEs in the trusted zone from the security attacks originated in the un-trusted zone. The combination of methods applied to secure communication between NGN network elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone and the "untrusted" zone may differ from those used to secure communication in the "trusted" zone.
+
+Elements that are located on the NGN provider's domain with connectivity to elements outside the trusted zone are referred to as network border elements (NBEs). Examples of these are the:
+
+- "Network border elements (NBEs)" at the UNI that provide the interface to the service control or transport elements of the NGN provider in the trusted zone in order to provide the user/subscriber access to the NGN provider's network for services and/or transport.
+- "Domain border elements (DBEs)" that are similar to the network border elements except that they reside on the border between two domains.
+- "Device configuration and bootstrap NBEs (DCB-NBEs)" that interface with the NGN provider's device configuration system in the trusted zone in order to configure the user's/subscriber's device and NGN provider's equipment in the outside plant.
+- "OAMP-NBEs" that interface with the NGN provider's OAMP systems in the trusted zone in order to provision and maintain the user's/subscriber's device and certain NGN provider's equipment in the outside plant.
+- "Application server/web server NBEs (AS/WS-NBEs)" that interface with the NGN provider's AS/WS-NBE in the trusted zone in order to provide the user/subscriber access to web-based services.
+
+Figure 1 shows the relationships among the NBEs and NEs that need to be protected.
+
+Examples of devices/elements that are operated by an NGN provider but are not located on the NGN provider's premises, and that may or may not be under the control of the NGN provider, are:
+
+- outside plant equipment in the access network/technology;
+- a base station router (BSR), a network element that integrates the base station, radio network controller and router functionalities for wireless access;
+- an optical network unit (ONU) within a user/subscriber's residence.
+
+The "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone, comprised of NBEs, will be protected by a combination of various methods. Some examples are physical security of the NGN network elements, general hardening of the systems, use of secure signalling for all signalling messages sent to NGN network elements in the "trusted" zone, security for OAMP messages and packet filters and firewalls. An "un-trusted" zone that includes all network elements of customer networks or possibly peer networks or other NGN provider domains which are connected to the NGN provider's network border elements. In the "un-trusted" zone, comprised of terminal equipment, equipment is not under the control of the NGN provider and it may be impossible to enforce the NGN provider's security policy on the user. It is still desirable to try to apply some security measures, and to that end, it is recommended that signalling, media, and OAMP be secured and the TE-BE located in the "un-trusted" zone be hardened. However, due to communication with network elements in the "un-trusted" zone, security is less than in the "trusted" zone.
+
+## 7.2 Peering network trust model
+
+When an NGN is connected to another network, the presence or absence of trust depends on:
+
+- the physical interconnection, where the interconnection can range from a direct connection in a secure building to a connection between separate (possibly not secured) buildings via shared facilities;
+- the peering model, where the traffic can be exchanged directly between the two NGN service providers, or via one or more NGN transport providers;
+- the business relationships among networks, where there may be penalty clauses in the SLA, and/or a trust in the other NGN provider's security policies; in general, NGN providers should view other providers as un-trusted.
+
+Figure 2 shows an example when a connected network is judged un-trusted.
+
+
+
+Y2704(09)\_F02
+
+Diagram illustrating the Peering trust model from Provider A's perspective. Provider A's network is divided into three zones: a 'Trusted zone' (green diagonal stripes) containing 'NGN network elements', a 'Trusted but vulnerable zone' (yellow horizontal stripes) containing 'Domain border elements (DBE)', and an 'Untrusted zone' (red vertical stripes). Provider B's network, viewed from Provider A's perspective, is entirely within the 'Untrusted zone' and contains 'Domain border elements (DBE)' and 'NGN network elements'. A connection line links the DBE of Provider A to the DBE of Provider B.
+
+**Figure 2 – Peering trust model/[ITU-T Y.2701]**
+
+# **8 Identification, authentication and authorization**
+
+Refer to [ITU-T Y.2701], [ITU-T Y.2702], [ITU-T Y.2703] and [ITU-T Y.2720] for information related to identification, authentication, authorization and identity management (IdM).
+
+This clause describes identification, authentication and authorization mechanisms, in particular, those concerning SIP-based services. The mechanisms concerning other services are for further study.
+
+## **8.1 Subscribers**
+
+A request for an NGN service is associated with a subscriber. This association is determined through identification of the request with the subscriber. Further identification (and associated authentication) of the end-user may be necessary depending on the SLA between the NGN provider and the subscriber.
+
+This process can be achieved by using a functional element that facilitates identification and authentication of subscribers, devices or end-users (called an Authenticator). For example, network border elements (NBE) with back-to-back user agent (B2BUA) functionality or P-CSC-FEs can be Authenticators of subscribers for SIP-based services. Identification and authentication is achieved by exchanging and validating credentials between the Authenticator and the TE.
+
+## **8.2 Network element**
+
+[ITU-T Y.2701] recommends that network elements be identified and authenticated for communications.
+
+If the border element received the request from a NGN network element in the trusted zone, the identification contained in the request may be considered accurate and not checked further subject to NGN provider security policy.
+
+If the border element receives requests from network elements in the un-trusted and the trusted but vulnerable zone, the network elements are recommended to be identified and authenticated and the communication privileges verified. Identification and authentication is achieved by exchanging and validating credentials between the Authenticator and the NE.
+
+## **8.3 Credential usage in the NGN security**
+
+Credentials are used in the NGN security to identify and authenticate a device, a subscriber, and/or an end-user. The credentials to identify and authenticate a device, a subscriber, and/or an end-user are described in clause 8.3.1. These credentials may take one of two different forms, either a X.509 public key certificate (described in clause 8.3.2) or a shared key (described in clause 8.3.3). An X.509 public key certificate may be used to establish a secure transport between the TE and the Authenticator (described in clause 8.3.1) based on the NGN provider policy. The shared key may be used either to establish a secure transport, or in generating/verifying the response to an Authenticator-initiated challenge (described in clause 8.3.1) based on the NGN provider policy.
+
+### **8.3.1 Device, subscriber, and end-user credentials**
+
+Three distinct types of credentials are used in the NGN:
+
+- 1) device credentials;
+- 2) subscriber credentials, and
+- 3) end-user credentials.
+
+Device credentials may be supplied by the manufacturer with the device. For example, during the manufacture of the device, the device may have the credentials "burned in" from the manufacturer, which includes such information as the device serial number or the manufacturer. Device credentials identify the device. An NGN provider may associate device credentials with a particular
+
+subscriber's service to alleviate the need for subscriber credentials. In such cases, requests from the device may be associated with a particular account based on the NGN provider policy.
+
+Subscriber credentials are used for association of the originator of an NGN request with a particular account. Subscriber credentials are entered (e.g., via download, SIM, etc.) in the devices capable of accepting such credentials. Subscriber credentials, installed on a device, associate the subscriber with that device. All calls made from the device will be associated with the subscriber whose credentials are installed on the device. Multiple sets of credentials may be installed on a single device, in which case the device provides the means to distinguish between requests associated with each subscriber.
+
+NOTE – An NGN customer may have one or more NGN subscriptions associated with zero or more devices. In addition, the NGN subscription may be associated with one or more end users (i.e., the end user is not necessarily the subscriber) that may be using different devices or sharing the same device based on NGN provider policy.
+
+End-user credentials are used to identify and authenticate specific end users to the network. For example, a SIM card can identify the end-user for a service; when the end-user places its SIM card into the phone, it becomes associated with (and all calls are identified as being from) that end-user. Another example is a security token, a hardware token (a physical device) or a software token (a program installed on a general-purpose device such as a personal computer). It is provided to an authorized user to augment the authentication process. A security token may store cryptographic keys, such as a digital signature, or biometric data, such as a fingerprint. A request originating from a NGN device will be identified and authenticated as being from the end-user associated with that security token. In certain scenarios (e.g., in the case of the SIM card above), it may be possible for multiple end-users to use the service associated with a single subscriber (i.e., subscriber account), and calls originated by the end-user are charged to the subscriber account. The subscriber and end-user may be the same, or there may be many end-users for a single subscriber. End users can identify and authenticate themselves with the network to take advantage of personal services. Individual transport layer security associations may be established, using end user credentials, between the TE and NGN network (Authenticators). The NGN provider associates the end user credentials with a particular subscriber service for billing purposes.
+
+### **8.3.2 X.509 public key certificates as credentials**
+
+An X.509 public key certificate is a digital document that includes an entity's identifier, its attributes, a public key that belongs to the entity, and other authentication information (e.g., information on the issuer of the certificate, certificate revocation list (CRL), starting and ending dates and times of the certificate's validity, etc.). The description of some of the basic fields and some extension fields of an X.509 public key certificate is provided in Table 1. Refer to [ITU-T X.509] for detailed descriptions of the fields of X.509 public key certificates. A public key certificate is digitally signed by a trusted third party, which is normally referred to as the certification authority (CA) for the public key certificate. The CA computes a hash (e.g., using SHA-1) of all the fields except the *Signature Value field*, encrypts it with its own private key, and then adds the signature together with the signature algorithm applied to the certificate (in the *Signature Value field*).
+
+**Table 1 – Some basic and extension fields of an X.509 public key certificate**
+
+| Name of a field | Description |
+|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Subject | Identifies the entity associated with the public-key certificate (the directory distinguished name of certificate subject) |
+| Serial number | A unique identifier of the certificate |
+| Issuer | Identifies the entity that has signed and issued the certificate (the directory distinguished name of the CA) |
+| Valid From | Starting date and time of the certificate validity |
+| Valid To | Ending date and time of the certificate validity |
+| Public Key | The public key of the certificate holder |
+| Version | Version of the encoded X.509 public key certificate |
+| Subject Alternative Name | Another identifier of the certificate holder |
+| CRL Distribution Points | Name or address of the CRL distribution point |
+| Authority Information Access | Name or address for access to information about the CA |
+| Enhanced Key Usage | Description of the purposes that the certificate can be used for (list of the ITU-T ISO/IEC-defined object identifiers (OIDs)) [ITU-T X.660] |
+| Application policies | The applications and services that can use the certificate (specified by the OIDs) |
+| Certificate Policies | Policies and mechanisms used by the CA for receiving a request for, handling, authorizing, issuing, and managing certificates |
+| Signature Algorithm | The algorithm identifier for the algorithm and hash function used by the CA in signing the certificate (e.g., SHA-1 with RSA) |
+| Signature Value | The actual signature of the certificate |
+
+Public key certificates specified in [ITU-T X.509] may be used by NGN network elements in establishing security associations with other network elements, and provide the basis for mutual identification and authentication. They can also be used between TE and the Authenticator for the same purposes.
+
+For a subscriber or end-user certificate, the (see clause 8.4.2), an identifier to fetch subscriber account information, is used by the Authenticator to obtain further information about the credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. For a device certificate, the Device Manufacturer and Device Serial Number are used by the Authenticator to determine the associated (valid only if the device has been associated with a subscriber), and then the is used to obtain further information about the credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs.
+
+End-user, Service and Device certificates may be used in creating TLS connections between the device and the Authenticator (clause 9.1.2), or may be used in creating IPsec connections through IKE Authentication (clause 9.2.4.3).
+
+### 8.3.3 Shared keys as credentials
+
+Shared key can be used to enhance the security of NGN access. In that case, a copy of the shared key is given to the subscriber or end-user, and a copy is stored in the appropriate functional entities such as the service user profile functional entities (SUP-FEs) or transport user profile functional entities (TUP-FEs). Every key is required to have a unique name, and the name is used by the Authenticator to obtain further information about the credentials.
+
+When using pre-shared keys, the strength of the system is dependent upon the strength of the shared secret. The goal is to keep the shared secret from being the weak link in the chain of security. This implies that the shared secret needs to contain as much entropy (randomness) as the cipher being used. In other words, the shared secret is recommended to have at least 128-160 bits of entropy.
+
+It should be noted that the symmetric key approach has certain differences compared to the asymmetric key approach described in clause 8.3.2 and the following should be considered:
+
+- an entity needs to have a separate set of symmetric keys with each communications partner;
+- the keys have to be provisioned, established and stored in a secure way;
+- an entity must rely on its partner to keep the shared key secret.
+
+### 8.3.4 Information provisioned in SUP/TUP-FEs for each set of credentials
+
+The SUP/TUP-FEs are the repositories for all device, subscriber, and end-user credentials to be used to access in the NGN infrastructure. They are typically implemented as an integral part of the Authenticator in order to optimize the handling of authentication requests. However, to support mobility, the Authenticator may need to consult a remote SAA/TAA-FEs server to obtain information about credentials. The Subscriber Account Identifier, or the Key Name, is used to fetch this information through the SAA/TAA-FEs.
+
+The following security-related information associated with each set of credentials is required to be provisioned in the FEs such as SUP/TUP-FEs storing the credentials:
+
+- 1) the Subscriber Account Identifier or the Key Name;
+- 2) whether end-user identification and authentication is required for this subscriber;
+- 3) whether these credentials describe a subscriber or an end-user; and
+- 4) allowable values of the "From" header in requests.
+
+Following are several examples of the information stored in the credential repositories such as SUP/TUP-FEs.
+
+For a TE NGN device certificate that handles four POTS lines, with numbers 212-555-1111-1113 and 1151:
+
+| | |
+|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Subscriber Account: | 123-456789 |
+| From headers: | sip:212-555-111[1-3]@NGN .ngn.com
sip:212-555-1151@NGN .ngn.com |
+| Identity string: | sip:212-555-1111@NGN .ngn.com |
+| Type of credentials: | subscriber |
+| End-User ID required: | no |
+
+For a subscriber certificate assigned to the John Doe family:
+
+Subscriber Account: Doe-family
+From headers: sip:\*Doe@NGN .ngn.com
+Identity string: sip:Doe@NGN .ngn.com
+Type of credentials: subscriber
+End-User ID required: no
+
+For a pre-shared key assigned to the John Doe family:
+
+Key name: JohnDoe
+Key: dfe56131d1958046689d83306477ecc
+From headers: sip:\*Doe@NGN .ngn.com
+Identity string: sip: Doe@NGN .ngn.com
+Type of credentials: subscriber
+End-User ID required: no
+
+For a TE-BE serving the Acme Widget Company:
+
+Subscriber Account: Acme Widget Company
+From headers: sip:\*@acme.com
+Identity string: sip:acme.com
+Type of credentials: subscriber
+End-User ID required: no
+
+For an end-user at the Acme Widget Company:
+
+Subscriber Account: Acme Widget Company
+From headers: sip:bob@acme.com
+Identity string: sip:bob@acme.com
+Type of credentials: end-user
+
+## **8.4 Identification and authentication of subscribers**
+
+### **8.4.1 General strategy**
+
+The originator's identity in SIP is generally contained in the "From" header. However, identification of the subscriber through the use of the "From" header in a SIP request is susceptible to spoofing attacks and is therefore not used where higher level of assurance of the subscriber's identity is required. Instead, the value of the "From" header is compared against the subscriber identity obtained by other means.
+
+In order to minimize the effect on call setup delay, the identification and authentication of the subscriber is derived from the Network Source Address (source address in the IP packet header) or the transport security association (association established by e.g., IPsec or TLS between the originating device and the Authenticator) whenever possible. When these techniques do not produce an identification consistent with the "From" header in the SIP request, then a challenge is issued to the originator; if the response contains proper credentials then the request will proceed. Further details of these procedures are described in the following clauses.
+
+The procedures in clause 8.4.2 describe how the Authenticator determines, based on the Network Source Address, that either
+
+- 1) the Subscriber cannot be determined by this method;
+- 2) a Subscriber is determined and it matches the "From" header in the request; or
+- 3) a Subscriber is determined but it is different from the "From" header in the request.
+
+The procedures in clause 8.4.3 describe how the Authenticator determines, based on the Transport Security association, that either:
+
+- 1) the Subscriber cannot be determined by this method;
+- 2) the Subscriber is determined and it matches the "From" header in the request; or
+- 3) the Subscriber is determined but it is different from the "From" header in the request.
+
+The actions then taken by the Authenticator are given in Table 2.
+
+**Table 2 – Authenticator's actions for each authentication result**
+
+| Source address determination of subscriber | Transport security determination of subscriber | Authenticator actions |
+|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| N/A | N/A | Use Challenge/Response |
+| N/A | Match | OK |
+| N/A | Different | Use Challenge/Response |
+| Match | N/A | OK |
+| Match | Match | OK |
+| Match | Different | Use Subscriber identity from Network Source Address |
+| Different | N/A | Use Challenge/Response |
+| Different | Match | Use Subscriber identity from Transport Security Association |
+| Different | Different | Use Challenge/Response |
+| N/A: Not applicable. | | |
+
+If the resulting action is to use a challenge/response, the procedures of clause 8.4.4 are followed.
+
+Besides the strategy described in clauses 8.4.2 through 8.4.4, the generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) can also be used for identification and authentication of subscribers. It is described in clause 8.4.5.
+
+The authentication strategies described in this Recommendation are typical examples, and each NGN provider may select which of these other strategies to use (e.g., using just one procedure described in the following clauses).
+
+### **8.4.2 Identification of the subscriber through network source address**
+
+This is the simplest form of subscriber identification, based solely on the source address provided with the IP packets. The Authenticator consults a pre-provisioned mapping of IP address ranges to , and if the source address of the request is within one of these ranges, the Authenticator considers the request to be originated from that subscriber. The is then used to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs and check for consistency with the value of the "From" header.
+
+If the value of the "From" header is consistent with the subscriber, then it is considered a "Match"; if the value of the "From" header is not consistent with the subscriber, then it is considered "Different"; if the source IP address is not contained in any of the pre-provisioned address ranges, then it is considered "N/A".
+
+The strength of this method of subscriber identification depends on providing Source-Address Assurance. The Source-Address Assurance means that the IP address can be used only by the legitimate subscriber to whom the address is assigned. To achieve this, the following two mechanisms are necessary for transport-processing or transport-control FEs, and they must be properly coordinated: 1) strict management of a mapping between a subscriber and his/her assigned address, and 2) prevention of address spoofing based on this managed information. See Appendix I for examples of the above mechanisms and their coordination.
+
+### **8.4.3 Identification of the subscriber through TLS/IPsec security association**
+
+If a secure TLS transport was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE-BE certificate (see clause 8.3.2), the Authenticator checks that the "From" header is consistent with the allowed values for the subscriber identified in the .
+
+If a secure transport (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE NGN device certificate (see clauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2), then the Authenticator utilizes the Device Manufacturer and Device Serial Number to determine the associated (valid only if the device has been associated with a subscriber). The is used to obtain the subscriber credentials and those credentials are checked for consistency with the value in the "From" header.
+
+If a secure transport (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE NGN subscriber certificate (see clauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2), then the Authenticator utilizes the to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. The Authenticator then checks for consistency between the subscriber credentials and the value in the "From" header.
+
+If a secure transport (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE NGN end-user certificate (see clauses 8.3.1 and 8.3.2), then the Authenticator utilizes the to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. The Authenticator then checks for consistency between the subscriber credentials and the value in the "From" header.
+
+If a secure transport (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a pre-shared key (see clause 9.2.4.3.1), the Authenticator utilizes the Key Name to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. The Authenticator then checks for consistency between the subscriber credentials and the value in the "From" header.
+
+If a secure transport was not used between the originating device and the Authenticator, or an "anonymous client" TLS connection was used, then this method is "N/A".
+
+### 8.4.4 Identification of the subscriber through challenge/response
+
+Challenge/response is a more secure version of the old style userid/password scheme (i.e., sending of a user identification and password as part of a request for service, and the problem being that it was easily replayed to obtain fraudulent service later). In a challenge/response scheme, the server sends a challenge to the client, asking the client to perform some encryption task using a shared key. The result of that calculation is included in the response, which is then verified by the server. If the exchange were intercepted by others, it cannot be replayed as long as the server never reuses an old challenge.
+
+There is one important type of the challenge-response methods that combines convenience of the password-based authentication methods and security of the methods that are based on the challenge-response scheme. The password authenticated key (PAK) exchange protocol presents this type. The PAK protocol ensures mutual authentication of both parties in the act of establishing a symmetric cryptographic key via Diffie-Hellman exchange. The use of Diffie-Hellman exchange ensures the *Perfect Forward Secrecy* – a property of a key establishment protocol that guarantees that compromise of a session key or long-term private key after a given session does not cause the compromise of any earlier session. In addition, the PAK authentication method protects the exchange from *man-in-the-middle* attacks. The authentication relies on a pre-shared secret, which is protected (i.e., remains unrevealed) to an eavesdropper preventing an off-line dictionary attack. Thus, the protocol can be used in a wide variety of applications where pre-shared secrets based on the possibly weak password exist. The PAK protocol is specified in [ITU-T X.1035] and [b-TIA 683-D].
+
+A challenge/response involves an additional message exchange between the Authenticator and the originating endpoint, and a calculation done by the originating endpoint. It therefore may have an impact on the delay perceived by the user. It is the goal of the NGN Security to use a challenge/response only when absolutely necessary to achieve the necessary level of identification and authentication.
+
+If a secure transport connection (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and a previous request within a configurable time period with the same "From" header contents was successfully authenticated by the Authenticator, then the authentication is considered successful and the request is accepted. In the case of call setup signalling, since the typical first request over a new connection is a "Register", this challenge/response will be done at a time that will not affect call setup delay.
+
+Since authentication requests are computationally-intensive, it is essential that the Authenticator limit the frequency of queries to the SAA/TAA-FEs. The limits defined in this paragraph may be followed whether the SAA/TAA-FEs is an integral part of the Authenticator or if it is a separate element. A simple denial-of-service attack is for an endpoint to simply flood the Authenticator with incorrect requests – if each requires a cryptographic calculation in the SAA/TAA-FEs, then service is essentially delayed or halted for all (valid and invalid) requests. To counter such attacks, the Authenticator may locally reject a request if there is a pending authorization request from the same endpoint. A slightly more complex variant of this is for the Authenticator to locally reject a request if there have been at least XXX total requests within the past YYY seconds (both XXX and YYY values to be configurable in the Authenticator). In addition, the Authenticator may deliberately wait a configurable period of time before responding to a failed authorization request. This also prevents various kinds of "password cracking" attacks.
+
+#### 8.4.4.1 Challenge/response with SIP signalling from originating device
+
+If the originating device is using the SIP signalling protocol, then the Proxy-Authenticate mechanisms defined in [b-IETF RFC 3261] can optionally be used to implement a challenge/response. See section 22.2 of [b-IETF RFC 3261], section 3 of [b-IETF RFC 2617], and section 3 of [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+
+The Authenticator responds to the SIP request with a 407 (Proxy-Authentication-Required) response. In this response it includes a Proxy-Authenticate header with: Authentication Scheme of "Digest", Realm of "NGN .ngn.net", qop of "auth", Nonce of a cryptographically random 16-octet value (in hex), optionally a value of the "Opaque" parameter, and Algorithm of "MD5" or "AKAv1-MD5" depending on service agreement with the Customer.
+
+An example of a Proxy-Authenticate header in a 407 response is:
+
+```
+Proxy-Authenticate: Digest realm="NGN .ngn.com", qop="auth",
+nonce="ea9c8e88df84f1cec4341ae6cbe5a359", opaque="", stale=FALSE, algorithm=MD5
+```
+
+The originating device responds to the 407 with a regenerated request, containing a Proxy-Authentication header. This header is verified to contain the following information: Authentication scheme of "Digest", Realm identical to that in the 407 response, Nonce identical to that in the 407 response, and Opaque identical to that in the 407 response. In addition, the Proxy-Authentication header includes a "Username" parameter giving the key name, a "Uri" parameter matching the Request-URI of the request, and a "Response" parameter being the hash as specified in [b-IETF RFC 2617] or [b-IETF RFC 3310].
+
+An example of a Proxy-Authorization header in a re-issued request is:
+
+```
+Proxy-Authorization: Digest username="bob", realm="NGN .ngn.com",
+nonce="ea9c8e88df84f1cec4341ae6cbe5a359", opaque="", uri="sip:5551212@ngn.com",
+response="dfe56131d1958046689d83306477ecc"
+```
+
+The "User-to-User Authentication" mechanisms defined in [b-IETF RFC 3261] may also be used to implement a challenge/response. See section 22.2 of [b-IETF RFC 3261], section 3 of [b-IETF RFC 2617], and section 3 of [b-IETF RFC 3310] for details.
+
+If a request is forked, various NGN NEs (e.g., MGC-FE) and/or TEs may wish to challenge the originating device. The forking NE (e.g., S-CSC-FE) aggregates these challenges and places them into a single response that is sent by the forking NE to the originating device. When receiving the response that contains multiple challenges, the originating device supplies multiple credentials in a request and resubmits it.
+
+#### **8.4.4.2 Challenge/response with signalling other than SIP from originating device**
+
+If the originating device is expected to use SIP, but issues its request using a signalling protocol other than SIP, then the challenge/response is considered to have failed. The request is rejected.
+
+#### **8.4.5 Generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA)**
+
+The generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) specifies an access-independent bootstrapping procedure. It provides a framework for mutual authentication of end-users and network application function (NAF) that can be used for identification and authentication of subscribers in the NGN. Refer to [b-ETSI TS 133 220] for information on GBA.
+
+## **8.5 Identification and authentication of end-users**
+
+### **8.5.1 General strategy**
+
+While identification of the subscriber is absolutely required for the NGN infrastructure, identification of the end-user is an optional service that may be requested by the subscriber or required by the service. Typically this would be to provide additional services, e.g., personal mobility and presence, where the identity of the requesting user is required to enable the service. If a subscriber desires this additional level of identification, it is necessary that all the relevant endpoint devices support the ability to enter additional end-user credentials or to use an end-user instead of a subscriber certificate.
+
+Two methods exist for the Authenticator to identify and authenticate the end-user. The first is through the transport level security association used for the signalling exchange. If that security association was established with an end-user certificate (or a pre-shared key associated with a single end-user), then the end-user identification is complete. The second method is through a challenge/response, where the key name given in the response is associated with a single end-user. These two methods are described further in the following clauses.
+
+Advanced NGN devices may have multiple identities, e.g., a subscriber certificate and also one or more end-user certificates for the person(s) currently using the device. Such a device would create multiple TLS connections to the Authenticator, one separate connection for each certificate. The device would then send requests to the Authenticator over the appropriate signalling connection based on the desired identity for the call.
+
+There is a concern about credentials for a single user being valid long after the user has "left". If the transport security association was based on an end-user certificate, the subscriber may require continuous activity to maintain the validity of the authentication. Without such activity, the Authenticator closes the secure transport connection, and requires the originating device to re-establish it with the current end-user certificate (or subscriber certificate or device certificate if no end-user certificate is available). The detailed requirements for this behaviour of Authenticator are given in clauses 9.1.2 and 9.2.4.3.1, and are based on two timers: one that limits the absolute amount of time for which end-user credentials can be valid for a security association, and the second that limits the idle time between successive requests. Timeout values may be provisioned per subscriber or per end-user, but have to be limited by the maximum values set by the NGN provider.
+
+### **8.5.2 Identification of the end-user through TLS/IPsec security association**
+
+If a secure TLS transport was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE-BE certificate (see clause 8.6), the Authenticator verifies that the "From" header is consistent with the allowed values for the subscriber identified in the contained in the certificate.
+
+If a secure transport (either IPsec or TLS) was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator, and that secure transport was authenticated with a X.509 TE NGN End-User certificate (see clause 8.6), then the Authenticator utilizes the to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. The Authenticator then checks for consistency between the subscriber credentials and the value in the "From" header. If a secure IPsec transport was established for the signalling traffic between the originating device and the Authenticator (clause 8.4.4) and that secure transport was authenticated with a pre-shared key (see clause 9.2.4.3.1), the Authenticator utilizes the Key Name to obtain the subscriber credentials through the SAA/TAA-FEs. The Authenticator then checks for consistency between the subscriber credentials and the value in the "From" header.
+
+### **8.5.3 Identification of the end-user through challenge/response**
+
+The challenge/response procedures for identification of an end-user are identical to those used to identify the subscriber, as given in clause 8.4.4.
+
+The only extension is that the Authenticator checks the information retrieved through the SAA/TAA-FEs for the key name for an indication that the key is associated with an end-user. If so, then the end-user identification is successful.
+
+If the Authenticator had already done a challenge/response to identify the subscriber, and the named key returned in the response did not identify an end-user, then the end-user identification fails. If a challenge/response was not needed to identify the subscriber, a challenge is now issued.
+
+### **8.6 Identification and authentication by TE-BE**
+
+The identification and authentication procedures performed by a TE-BE are identical to those performed by an Authenticator with two differences:
+
+- 1) The TE-BE may be provisioned with all the credentials needed to identify and authenticate the subscriber(s) and end-users that it serves, since it has no access to the distributed SAA/TAA-FEs function available to an Authenticator.
+- 2) The request re-issued in response to a challenge from the Authenticator, containing the "Proxy-Authorization" header, is passed to the Authenticator rather than processed at the TE-BE.
+
+### **8.6.1 Use of X.509 certificates**
+
+There is a security association between every TE-BE and at least one NBE, established with the X.509 certificate issued to the TE-BE. Requests received at the NBE follow the identification and authentication procedures given in clause 8.4.3, which result in minimal verification of the identification performed by the TE-BE. When a challenge/response is needed (e.g., for a "roaming" user), the exchange will be between the originating endpoint and the NBE, and transparently passed through the TE-BE.
+
+A secure transport between the end-point and the TE-BE is optional. It is anticipated that the network source address will adequately identify most requests.
+
+End-points register to the NBE via TE-BE.
+
+### **8.7 Authenticator-SAA/TAA-FEs interface**
+
+### **8.7.1 Use of RADIUS and its extensions**
+
+The SAA/TAA-FEs contain the decision point and the SUP/TUP-FEs are the repositories for all end-user and device credentials in the NGN infrastructure. Some SAA/TAA-FEs functions, like authentication, may be distributed in order to optimize authentication request performance.
+
+Two competing choices are commonly used for the protocol for Authenticator to SAA/TAA-FEs communication: RADIUS [b-IETF RFC 2865] (well-known and well-supported) and Diameter [b-IETF RFC 3588] (defined to fix several deficiencies of RADIUS). It is the eventual goal of the NGN infrastructure to migrate to Diameter; however, it is recognized that current implementations of servers are based on RADIUS, and that numerous ad hoc extensions of the basic RADIUS protocol have been developed to meet the needs of this authentication function. While this release of this Recommendation is based on RADIUS with the extension described in [b-IETF RFC 5090], a future release of this Recommendation will likely change this interface to be based on Diameter with the extension described in [b-IETF RFC 4740].
+
+The Authenticator becomes a RADIUS client, and the SAA/TAA-FEs server becomes a RADIUS server, as defined in [b-IETF RFC 2865]. Both may implement the extensions for SIP Digest Authentication, as given in [b-IETF RFC 5090]. The connection between the Authenticator and SAA/TAA-FEs server may be secured with IPsec with mutual authentication.
+
+With the [b-IETF RFC 4590] extensions, the Authenticator makes a RADIUS request with the parameters from the Proxy-Authentication header; the RADIUS server calculates the expected response and returns it to the Authenticator. The Authenticator then validates the request by comparing the actual response from the endpoint to the expected response.
+
+An example of the message sent from the Authenticator to the SAA/TAA-FEs server is:
+
+```
+Code = 1 (Access-Request)
+ Identifier = 1
+ Length = 164
+ Authenticator = 56 7b e6 9a 8e 43 cf b6 fb a6 c0 f0 9a 92 6f 0e
+ Attributes:
+ NAS-IP-Address = d5 89 45 26 (213.137.69.38)
+ NAS-Port-Type = 5 (Virtual)
+ User-Name = "bob"
+ Digest-Response (206) = "2ae133421cda65d67dc50d13ba0eb9bc"
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [Realm (1) = "NGN .ngn.com"]
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [Nonce (2) = " ea9c8e88df84f1cec4341ae6cbe5a359
+"]
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [Method (3) = "INVITE"]
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [URI (4) = " sip:5551212@ngn.com "]
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [Algorithm (5) = "md5"]
+ Digest-Attributes (207) = [User-Name (10) = "bob"]
+```
+
+An example of the response sent from the SAA/TAA-FEs server to the Authenticator is:
+
+```
+Code = 2 (Access-Accept)
+ Identifier = 1
+ Length = 20
+ Authenticator = 6d 76 53 ce aa 07 9a f7 ac b4 b0 e2 96 2f c4 0d
+ Attributes:
+ Digest-Response (206) = "dfe56131d1958046689d83306477ecc"
+```
+
+### 8.7.2 Transport signalling security association
+
+When an X.509 certificate is used in the establishment of the transport signalling security association, the SUP/TUP-FEs store (indexed by the ) the set of acceptable "From" headers that may appear in requests from that source, which will be matched against the "From" header provided in the request.
+
+If a pre-shared key is used in the establishment of the transport signalling security association (e.g., peering service provider), then the SUP/TUP-FEs store (indexed by the Key name) the set of acceptable "From" headers that may appear in requests from that source, which will be matched against the "From" header provided in the request.
+
+## 8.8 Identification and authentication of bearer traffic
+
+There are times when it is desirable to identify individual bearer traffic flow for security enhancement, for example, to counter fraudulent attacks such as spoofing or RTP injection. In the NGN, the bearer traffic can be identified by a quintuple that contains:
+
+- source IP address;
+- destination IP address;
+- source port;
+- destination port; and
+- protocol number.
+
+The identification mechanism described in this clause uses this identifier for authentication of every packet. The mechanism is based on a shared secret and the use of the cryptographic hash function, keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC). See [b-NIST FIPS 198-1] for information.
+
+The entities involved in the process of authentication – the end-user function and the access node FE – are described in [ITU-T Y.2701] and are depicted in Figure 3 using the UNI as an example.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the User Network Interface (UNI) between two entities. On the left is a box labeled 'End-user function'. On the right is a box labeled 'T-2: Access node functional entity (FE)'. A horizontal line connects the two boxes, and a vertical line extends upwards from the connection point to the text 'UNI (User network interface)'. Below the right box, the reference 'Y.2704(09)\_F03' is noted.
+
+Diagram showing the UNI (User network interface) between an End-user function and T-2: Access node functional entity (FE).
+
+**Figure 3 – NGN entities involved in authentication procedure – UNI example**
+
+The description of the mechanism uses the following conventions:
+
+- $F$ is an identifier (quintuple) of bearer traffic.
+- $K$ is a shared secret that both the end-user function and the access node FE possess.
+- $P$ is a packet that the end-user function intends to send to the access node FE.
+- $i$ is a sequence number of a packet that is being incremented by both communicating parties. It is a 64-bit value.
+- $t$ is a time stamp – a 64-bit value that indicates time in seconds. Alternatively, it could be a nonce.
+- $(P', Q)$ is a packet that the access node FE has received.
+
+When the end-user function intends to send a packet $P$ to the access node FE, it first computes a quantity $H(F, t+i, K)$ , which is a hash function of a concatenation of $F$ , $t+i$ , and $K$ , and then attaches this quantity to the packet $P$ . Therefore, the full packet sent from the end-user function to the access node FE is $[P, H(F, t+i, K)]$ . When the access node FE receives a packet $(P', Q)$ , it computes the quantity $H(F, t+i, K)$ . If a time stamp is used, the access node FE computes the hashes for all values of $t$ that are in the agreed upon range for the difference between the times on the end-user function and the access node FE (this needs to be done only once at the beginning of a session). In this case, the access node FE looks for a match between $Q$ and any one of the computed values of hashes. If a match is found, then the packet is authenticated. The corresponding value of $t$ will be used for the packets of the flow.
+
+If a nonce is used, then the access node FE simply checks whether the computed value of the hash is equal to $Q$ . If it is, the packet is authenticated.
+
+In an environment where packet loss may occur, simply incrementing $i$ from packet to packet may not suffice. In this case, the access node FE may search from $i$ through $i+d$ (where $d$ is a small number) to resynchronize $i$ .
+
+The use of this authentication mechanism helps to counter fraudulent attacks such as spoofing or RTP injections.
+
+The mechanism also allows for authentication of the user-generated traffic without revealing the user's identity.
+
+In order for this implementation, it is suggested for the end-user function and the access node FE to agree on the format of identifier $F$ , shared secret $K$ , hash function $H$ , exact synchronized time to start time stamp $t$ , where the hashed quantity can be added to the packet $P$ and how, the value of $d$ , and what starts to resynchronize $i$ .
+
+The use of this mechanism is a subject of a network operator's security policy. There are other mechanisms that can be used for authenticating the flows, e.g., IPsec. The advantage of this mechanism in comparison to IPsec is that while IPsec requires encryption of the entire IP packet (in the tunnel mode), or the payload (in the transport mode), this mechanism requires computation only of the hash $H(F, t+i, K)$ , which can be done faster and using less computing resources.
+
+## 9 Transport security for signalling and OAMP
+
+Transport security is used in the NGN infrastructure to provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees of the signalling data and the OAMP messages. This clause specifies the profile of TLS and IPsec to be used by the NGN infrastructure network elements as two important security mechanisms. The lists of mechanisms are not exhaustive and other implementations may be adopted depending on the NGN provider policies.
+
+Within the trusted zone and trusted-but-vulnerable zone, VPN tunnel (e.g., IPsec or TLS) is required for securing the OAMP messages. Clause 9.1 gives the profile for TLS use cases, and clause 9.2 gives the corresponding profile for IPsec use cases. Between the TE-BE and OAMP-NBE (i.e., between the untrusted zone and trusted-but-vulnerable zone), IPsec is used for creating a VPN tunnel. Clause 9.3 gives the applicable profile of IPsec.
+
+While media security is not required within the NGN infrastructure, some border elements implement media security for service to specific endpoints. For these elements, clause 10 contains a profile of media security protocols.
+
+## 9.1 TLS
+
+In the NGN infrastructure, TLS is often used to secure various types of signalling traffic (e.g., SIP, COPS, TRIP, HTTP) between network elements within the trusted zone. It is also supported in border elements that might receive encrypted signalling from customer endpoints, and by the TE-BE for communicating to a NBE. Specific requirements for each type of network element are given in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+The TLS protocol is defined in [b-IETF RFC 5246]. It provides privacy and data integrity over a reliable transport layer protocol such as TCP or SCTP.
+
+Unless specified otherwise in this clause, it is desirable that NGN infrastructure network elements requiring TLS be compliant with the TLS specification [b-IETF RFC 5246] and any requirements specified in [b-IETF RFC 3261] relating to its usage in SIP. While TLS supports the negotiation and use of compression methods, compression may not be used within the NGN infrastructure, due to performance degradation.
+
+### 9.1.1 Cipher suites
+
+The cipher suite includes the authenticated key agreement method used in the TLS handshake, as well as encryption and authentication ciphers used to secure the record layer. Cipher suites are negotiated with the TLS client presenting a list of supported cipher suites in the Client Hello message, and the server responding with the selected cipher suite in the Server Hello message.
+
+There are many factors influencing the choice of encryption algorithm. The following are examples of common factors influencing the choice of encryption algorithm:
+
+- 1) Required security
+ - Value of the data (to either the organization and/or other entities – the more valuable the data, the stronger the required encryption).
+ - Time value of data (if data is valuable but for only a short time period (e.g., days as opposed to years), then a weaker encryption algorithm could be used).
+ - Threat to data (the higher the threat level, the stronger the required encryption).
+ - Other protective measures that are in place and that may reduce the need for stronger encryption – for example, using protected methods of communications, such as dedicated circuits as opposed to the public Internet.
+- 2) Required performance (higher performance requirements may require procurement of additional system resources, such as a hardware cryptographic accelerator, or may necessitate weaker encryption).
+
+- 3) System resources (fewer resources (e.g., process, memory) may necessitate weaker encryption).
+- 4) Import, export, or usage restrictions.
+- 5) Encryption schemes supported by network elements.
+- 6) Encryption schemes supported by user devices.
+
+Table 3 shows a list of candidate cipher suites suitable for NGN, though the table is not exhaustive.
+
+**Table 3 – Candidate cipher suites for NGN**
+
+| Cipher suite name | Reference | Key exchange | Cipher | Hash |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------|
+| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | RSA | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 2246] | RSA | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | b-IETF RFC 4132] | RSA | Camellia-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | Camellia-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+
+The cipher suites in Table 4 depicted from [b-IETF RFC 5246], [b-IETF RFC 4132] and [b-IETF RFC 4492] can also be optionally used by any NEs.
+
+**Table 4 – Candidate cipher suites (optional) for NGN**
+
+| Cipher suite name | Reference | Key exchange | Cipher | Hash |
+|----------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
+| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman with DSS signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with DSS signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+
+**Table 4 – Candidate cipher suites (optional) for NGN**
+
+| Cipher suite name | Reference | Key exchange | Cipher | Hash |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
+| TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | RSA | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman with DSS signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 5246] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with DSS signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman with DSS signature | Camellia-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | Camellia-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with DSS signature | Camellia-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | RSA | Camellia-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman with DSS signature | Camellia-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | Camellia-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with DSS signature | Camellia-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+
+**Table 4 – Candidate cipher suites (optional) for NGN**
+
+| Cipher suite name | Reference | Key exchange | Cipher | Hash |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|
+| TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4132] | Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signatures | Camellia-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with ECDSA signature | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with ECDSA signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with ECDSA signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with ECDSA signature | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with ECDSA signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with ECDSA signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman with RSA signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signature | 3DES in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signature | AES-128 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+
+**Table 4 – Candidate cipher suites (optional) for NGN**
+
+| Cipher suite name | Reference | Key exchange | Cipher | Hash |
+|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------|-------|
+| TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA | [b-IETF RFC 4492] | EC-Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral mode with RSA signature | AES-256 in CBC mode | SHA-1 |
+
+NOTE 1 – RC-4 is a popular and well used cipher. However, it is not included in the above list because it is not an open standard.
+
+NOTE 2 – Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptosystem that may be desirable for certain applications in NGN. Specifically, ECC would be appealing for certain applications because of efficiency benefits. Compared to other prevalent cryptosystems such as RSA, ECC offers equivalent security with significantly smaller key sizes. In addition, ECC offers computational efficiency and advantages over certain other public key techniques to achieve the same level of protection.
+
+### **9.1.2 TLS use of certificates**
+
+TLS is a client-server based protocol with optional client authentication. However, within the trusted zone of the NGN infrastructure, and between the trusted zone and the trusted-but-vulnerable zone, mutual authentication may be accomplished using TLS. In that case, the TLS server sends a Certificate Request to the Client. If a client in the trusted zone or trusted-but-vulnerable zone does not provide a client certificate, then the connection request may be rejected by the server. Both the TLS client and server certificates should conform to the NGN infrastructure certification specifications given in clause 8.3. Certificates may be verified as specified in clause 8.3. Before continuing with a TLS connection, the TLS server or client may validate the remote system that matches its certificate.
+
+Between the trusted-but-vulnerable zone and the untrusted zone, the TLS server may send a Certificate Request to the Client. If the client has no certificate, it responds with an empty Client Certificate message, and the session proceeds as an anonymous client.
+
+When a NBE accepts an authenticated connection with an endpoint based on a NGN end-user certificate (see clause 8.5.2), then the NBE may implement two timers on the connection. The first timer, T1, is started when the connection is established. The second timer, T2, is started when the connection is established and is reset to zero every time a request is received at the NBE over the connection. Whenever either timer reaches its limit value (which may depend on values contained in the certificate), the connection is reset by the NBE and will be re-established by the endpoint to refresh the NGN end-user certificate.
+
+### **9.1.3 Session key management**
+
+TLS sessions between NGN infrastructure network elements are expected to be long-lasting. It is therefore important that the session keys be changed periodically. Session keys for TLS sessions may be changed after a configurable period of time.
+
+## **9.2 IPsec in trusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zones**
+
+In the NGN infrastructure, IPsec may be used to secure various types of traffic (e.g., SNMP, RADIUS) between network elements within the trusted zone. Specific requirements for each type of network element are given in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+As described generally in [b-IETF RFC 4301], IPsec is composed of a number of different pieces. These can be used to provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection. Some of these can be configured manually, but in general a key management component is used. Additionally, the decision on the use of IPsec is typically controlled by a policy database. This clause describes the mandatory-to-implement subset of the components of IPsec.
+
+In network elements that use IPsec, it is recommended to ensure that TLS-secured connections are not run over IPsec.
+
+NOTE – Network elements that use IPsec should ensure that media streams secured with SRTP or RC-4 are not run over IPsec. This is to ensure that no double-encryption is done, which would be wasteful of NGN resources. It should also be noted that tunnelling of encryption may occur from the end user.
+
+### **9.2.1 AH and ESP**
+
+The authentication header (AH), described in [IETF RFC 4302], and [b-IETF RFC 4835], and the encapsulating security protocol (ESP), described in [IETF RFC 4303], are the two choices of over-the-wire security protocols. Both optionally provide replay protection. ESP typically is used to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of traffic. ESP also can provide integrity and authentication without confidentiality. ESP can also be used to provide confidentiality alone. AH protects portions of the preceding IP header, including the source and destination address. AH can also protect those IP options that need to be seen by intermediate routers, but is required to be intact and authentic when delivered to the receiving system, though use of such IP options is extremely rare.
+
+NGN infrastructure network elements may support the encapsulating security protocol (ESP), as defined in [IETF RFC 4303]. ESP\_DES (both 40 and 56 bits), ESP\_3DES, ESP\_AES [b-IETF RFC 3602], and ESP\_CAMELLIA [b-IETF RFC 4312] may be supported in cipher block chaining (CBC) mode. Network elements that support ESP\_NULL may NOT use ESP\_NULL when communicating with another NGN infrastructure network element. The actual encryption algorithm used within ESP is negotiated during key management.
+
+All implementations of ESP are required by [b-IETF RFC 4301] to support the concept of security associations (SAs), and [b-IETF RFC 4301] provides a general model for processing IP traffic relative to SAs. Although particular IPsec implementations need not follow the details of this general model, the external behaviour of any IPsec implementation may match the external behaviour of the general model. This ensures that components do not accept traffic from unknown addresses and do not send or accept traffic without security (when security is required). NGN infrastructure network elements that implement IPsec may provide behaviour that matches the general model described in [b-IETF RFC 4301].
+
+### **9.2.2 Transport and tunnel mode**
+
+Both AH and ESP can be used in either transport mode or tunnel mode. In tunnel mode, the IPsec header is followed by an inner IP header. This is the normal usage for virtual private networks (VPNs), and is generally required when either end of the IPsec-protected path is not the ultimate destination, e.g., when IPsec is implemented in a firewall, or router. Transport mode is preferred for point-to-point communications.
+
+NGN infrastructure network elements may support IPsec in transport mode.
+
+### 9.2.3 Replay protection
+
+NGN infrastructure network elements may use the IPsec optional replay-protection service (anti-replay service). Within NGN infrastructure network elements, the IPsec anti-replay service may be turned on at all times. An IPsec sequence number outside of the current anti-replay window is flagged as a replay and the packet is rejected. When the anti-replay service is turned on, an IPsec sequence number cannot overflow and roll over to 0. Before that happens, a new Security Association should be created as specified in [IETF RFC 4303].
+
+### 9.2.4 Key management
+
+All cryptographic systems require key management. While IPsec provides for both manual and automatic key management schemes, manual schemes do not scale as well as automatic schemes and do not offer replay protection. All key management schemes provide authentication. NGN infrastructure network elements should implement one of the automated key exchange mechanisms described in this clause.
+
+When IKE is not used for key management, an alternative key management protocol needs an interface to the IPsec layer in order to create/update/delete IPsec Security Associations. IPsec Security Associations may be automatically established or re-established as required. This implies that the IPsec layer also needs a way to signal a key management application when a new Security Association needs to be set up (e.g., the old SA is about to expire or there is no SA on a particular interface). In addition, some border elements may be required to run multiple key management protocols (e.g., IKE for securing connections for OAMP, and PKINIT for securing connections). In these cases, the PF\_KEY [b-IETF RFC 2367] interface is recommended to be used.
+
+#### 9.2.4.1 Transform identifiers
+
+The IPsec transform identifier is used by the key management procedures to negotiate an encryption algorithm that is used by ESP in IPsec. The transform identifier is also used by IKE to secure its phase-1 and phase-2 messages. A list of available IPsec transform identifiers is given in [b-IETF RFC 5282]. Within the NGN infrastructure, the transform IDs ESP\_3DES (value 0x03, with key size of 192 bits, CBC mode) and ESP\_CAMELLIA (value 0x16, with 128 bits key, CBC mode) [b-IETF RFC 4312] may be supported. The Transform ID ESP\_AES (value 0x0C, with 128-bit key, CBC mode) is recommended to be supported. IKE allows negotiation of the encryption key size, so if, in the future, it is desired to increase the key size for one of the above algorithms, IKE will use this built-in function.
+
+For all of these transforms, the CBC initialization vector (IV) is carried in the clear inside each ESP packet payload [b-IETF RFC 2451]. AES-128, defined in [b-NIST FIPS 197], and [b-IETF RFC 3602] may be used in CBC mode with a 128-bit block size and a randomly generated initialization vector. AES-128 requires 10 rounds of cryptographic operations [b-IETF RFC 3602]. Camellia-128, defined in [b-IETF RFC 3713] and [b-IETF RFC 4312] may be used in CBC mode with a 128-bit block size and a randomly generated initialization vector. It requires 18 rounds of cryptographic operations [b-IETF RFC 3713].
+
+#### 9.2.4.2 Authentication algorithms
+
+The IPsec authentication algorithm is used by the key management procedures to negotiate a packet-authentication algorithm that is used. A list of available IPsec authentication algorithms is given in [b-IETF RFC 5282]. Within the NGN infrastructure, the authentication algorithms HMAC-MD5-96 (value 0x01, key size of 128 bits, defined in [b-IETF RFC 2403]) and HMAC-SHA-1-96 (value 0x02, key size 160 bits, defined in [b-IETF RFC 4835]) may be supported.
+
+#### 9.2.4.3 Internet key exchange (IKE)
+
+One automated key exchange mechanism is described in [b-IETF RFC 2409], and is known as IKE. IKE key management is completely asynchronous to data messages and does not contribute to any delays during communications setup. The only exception would be some unexpected error, where the Security Association is unexpectedly lost by one of the endpoints.
+
+IKE is a peer-to-peer key management protocol. It consists of two phases. In the first phase, a shared secret is negotiated via a Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It is then used to authenticate the second IKE phase. The second phase negotiates another secret, used to derive keys for the IPsec ESP protocol.
+
+###### 9.2.4.3.1 First IKE phase
+
+Three different modes are defined for authentication during the first IKE phase. IKE authentication with Public-Key Encryption SHALL NOT be used in the NGN infrastructure, as this requires the initiator to already know the responder's public key. IKE Authentication with Signatures and IKE Authentication with Pre-Shared Keys may be supported.
+
+IKE defines specific sets of Diffie-Hellman parameters (i.e., prime and generator) that may be used for the phase 1 IKE exchange. The first group may be supported in NGN infrastructure network elements, and the remaining groups are recommended to be supported.
+
+If IKE Authentication with signatures is used, both client and server may exchange X.509 certificates (see clause 8.3.2). Certificates may be verified as specified in clause 8.3.
+
+When a network border element accepts an authenticated connection with an endpoint based on a NGN end-user certificate, then the NBE may implement two timers on the connection. The first timer, T1, is started when the connection is established. The second timer, T2, is started when the connection is established and is reset to zero every time a request is received at the NBE over the connection. Whenever either timer reaches its limit value (which may depend on values contained in the certificate), the connection is reset by the NBE and will be re-established by the endpoint to refresh the NGN end-user certificate.
+
+If IKE Authentication with Pre-Shared keys is used, a key derived by some out-of-band (e.g., manual) mechanism is used to authenticate the exchange. Implementations may allow a pre-shared key of at least 128 octets. Verification of the requirements for the pre-shared keys is not required in the network elements. Implementations may support Aggressive Mode, defined in clause 5.4 of [b-IETF RFC 2409], and use the key name as the identity of the initiator/responder. The aggressive mode of IKE v1 [b-IETF RFC 2409] in combination with pre-shared-key is known to be insecure. With this mode, a hash of the secret is transmitted in clear over the network; if the IP traffic is intercepted by an attacker, then the key can be retrieved with an off-line brute-force attempt. It is recommended that at least 128-bit long PSK shall be used to prevent the brute-force calculation of the PSK based on its hash.
+
+When using pre-shared keys, the strength of the system is dependent upon the strength of the shared secret. The goal is to keep the shared secret from being the weak link in the chain of security. This implies that the shared secret needs to contain as much entropy (randomness) as the cipher being used. In other words, the shared secret is recommended to have at least 128-160 bits of entropy.
+
+##### 9.2.4.3.2 Second IKE phase
+
+In the second IKE phase, an IPsec ESP Security Association is established, including the ESP keys and ciphersuites. First, a shared second-phase secret is established, and then all the IPsec keying material is derived from it using the one-way function specified in [b-IETF RFC 2409]. The second-phase secret is built from encrypted nonces that are exchanged by the two parties. Another Diffie-Hellman exchange is allowed by [b-IETF RFC 2409] in addition to the encrypted nonces, but
+
+may not be used in NGN infrastructure network elements. This is to avoid the associated performance penalties.
+
+## **9.3 Key agreement protocol between untrusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zone**
+
+The key agreement (AKA) protocol specified for IMS networks may also be used as applicable. The universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol supports mutual authentication of the mobile station (MS) and the network. The UMTS AKA is a challenge-response protocol, which uses a long-term key, $K$ , shared between universal subscriber identity module (USIM) and authentication Centre (AuC). These entities reside on the universal integrated circuit card (UICC) of the MS and in the mobile station's home network respectively. The AKA protocol is specified in [b-3GPP TS 33.102], Security Architecture.
+
+Although the AKA mechanism is typically used for authentication of the wireless devices that are equipped with the smart cards (e.g., UICC), there is nothing in the AKA specifications that would prevent the use of the mechanism for authentication of the fixed devices that are capable of running the USIM application.
+
+## **9.4 IPsec between untrusted and trusted-but-vulnerable zone**
+
+The TE-BE is a NGN network element that resides in the untrusted zone. However, it is still managed by the NGN carrier and needs access to the OAMP systems located within the trusted zone. Therefore, there is an OAMP-SE that resides in the trusted-but-vulnerable zone that acts as a relay point for the OAMP messages.
+
+The TE-BE may ensure that TLS-secured connections are not run over the IPsec VPN Tunnel. The TE-BE may ensure that media streams that are secured with SRTP media Security are not run over the IPsec VPN Tunnel.
+
+The IPsec VPN Tunnel may use IPsec ESP [IETF RFC 4303] in Tunnel mode [b-IETF RFC 4301].
+
+The IPsec anti-replay service may be enabled at all times.
+
+The IPsec VPN Tunnel may support Transform Identifiers ESP\_3DES (with key size of 192 bits, in CBC mode) and ESP\_CAMELLIA (with 128-bit key and CBC mode) [b-IETF RFC 4312]. The IPsec VPN Tunnel is recommended to support Transform Identifier ESP\_AES (with 128-bit key and CBC mode).
+
+The IPsec VPN Tunnel may support Authentication Algorithms HMAC-MD5-96 (key size of 128 bits), and HMAC-SHA-1-96 (key size 160 bits).
+
+Key generation and management for the IPsec VPN Tunnel may be done with IKE [b-IETF RFC 2409], using IKE authentication with digital signatures, or IKE authentication with a pre-shared key. If IKE authentication with digital signatures is used, both client and server may exchange X.509 certificates, and certificates may be verified.
+
+# **10 Media security**
+
+Media encryption is not required within the NGN infrastructure, but it may be required to be supported for customers that desire its use. Such support may include the support of media encryption protocols, SRTP [b-IETF RFC 3711]. In the rest of this clause, network border elements (i.e., the edge of the network provider's domain) are assumed to implement encryption/decryption although it is possible to do the same in a separate platform shared among NBEs. In either case, the encryption and decryption is required to be collocated with other media processing capabilities such as dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF) detection and transcoding.
+
+With the requirement to connect subscribers desiring media encryption on their access link with those that do not (or do not support it), there are five separate cases that need to be considered as shown in Figure 4.
+
+The first and simplest case is where neither endpoint desires encryption. The media will flow from source to destination, through the border elements, without any encryption on any of the links. Neither network border element (NBE) #1 (serving the originator) nor network border element (NBE) #2 (serving the destination) does any encryption or decryption.
+
+The second case occurs if the originator desires an encrypted media stream but the destination does not, NBE #1 acts as an encryption/decryption relay point. NBE #1 receives the encrypted stream from the originator, decrypts it and passes it through the NGN infrastructure to NBE #2, who passes it (still unencrypted) to the destination. In the reverse direction, NBE #1 receives unencrypted media through the NGN infrastructure and encrypts it before sending it to the originator. Thus the media over leg #1 (from the originator to NBE #1) is encrypted, leg #2 (between NBE #1 and NBE #2) is not, and leg #3 (between NBE #2 and the destination) is not.
+
+The third case occurs if the destination desires an encrypted media stream but the originator does not. NBE #2 acts as an encryption/decryption relay point. NBE #1 receives unencrypted media from the originator and passes it (still unencrypted) through the NGN infrastructure to NBE #2. NBE #2 encrypts it and passes it to the destination. In the reverse direction, NBE #2 receives the encrypted media stream from the destination endpoint and decrypts it before forwarding through the NGN infrastructure. NBE #1 passes the unencrypted media to the originator. Thus the media over legs #1 and #2 are unencrypted, and the media over leg #3 is encrypted.
+
+The fourth case occurs if the originator and destination both desire encrypted media, but either they do not support compatible encryption schemes or there is some enhanced service being provided by the NGN infrastructure (such as dual-tone multi-frequency (DTMF) detection for calling card applications). Both NBE #1 and NBE #2 act as encryption/decryption relay points. NBE #1 receives the encrypted stream from the originator, decrypts it and passes it through the NGN infrastructure to NBE #2. NBE #2 encrypts it and passes it to the destination. In the reverse direction, NBE #2 receives encrypted media from the destination endpoint and decrypts it before forwarding through the NGN infrastructure. NBE #1 receives unencrypted media and encrypts it before sending it to the originator. Thus the media over legs #1 and #3 are encrypted, and the media through the NGN infrastructure (leg #2) is not.
+
+The fifth case occurs if the originator and destination both desire encrypted media, support compatible encryption schemes, and there is no enhanced service being provided by the NGN infrastructure. NBE #1 receives encrypted media from the originator and passes it unchanged through the NGN infrastructure to NBE #2, who passes it unchanged to the destination. In the reverse direction, NBE #2 receives encrypted media from the destination and passes it unchanged through the NGN infrastructure to NBE #1 who passes it unchanged to the originator. Thus the media over all three legs is encrypted. The signalling needed to achieve this case is beyond the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+Media encryption described in this clause provide authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity.
+
+
+
+Case 1: Neither originator nor destination desires media encryption
+
+Case 2: Originator desires media encryption, but destination does not
+
+Case 3: Destination desires media encryption, but originator does not
+
+Case 4: Originator and destination desire media encryption, but no common capabilities
+
+Case 5: Originator and destination desire media encryption, with common capabilities
+
+Leg 1 Leg 2 Leg 3
+
+— Encrypted — Not encrypted
+
+Y.2704(09)\_F04
+
+Figure 4: Relationship of media encryption, BE's capabilities, and originator/destination's desire. The diagram shows five cases of media encryption across two Network Elements (NBE#1 and NBE#2) between an Originator and a Destination. Case 1: Neither desires encryption. Case 2: Originator desires encryption. Case 3: Destination desires encryption. Case 4: Both desire encryption but no common capabilities. Case 5: Both desire encryption with common capabilities. Encryption is indicated by red lines (Leg 1, Leg 2, Leg 3) and not encryption by black lines.
+
+**Figure 4 – Relationship of media encryption, BE's capabilities, and originator/destination's desire**
+
+## 10.1 SRTP
+
+Secure RTP is described in [b-IETF RFC 3711], and is defined as a profile of RTP [b-IETF RFC 3550]. It is intended to be implemented between the RTP application and the transport layer in the protocol stack – intercepting an RTP packet and forwarding an equivalent SRTP packet on the transmit side, and intercepting an SRTP packet and passing an equivalent RTP packet up the stack on the receiving side. It basically encrypts the payload of the RTP packet and adds an authentication tag to the end of the packet on the transmit side, and verifies the authentication tag and decrypts the payload on the receive side.
+
+### 10.1.1 Encryption and authentication algorithms
+
+An NBE supporting SRTP may support AES in Counter Mode [b-IETF RFC 3711]. Also see [b-NIST FIPS SP 800-38a] for more information. The NBE may support HMAC-SHA1 for message integrity check generation, with a tag length of 80 bits.
+
+### 10.1.2 Cipher suite negotiation and key generation
+
+Key generation for SRTP can be done in several ways:
+
+- 1) via provisioning (via TE Provisioning Element);
+- 2) by using key material generated by the endpoint device and included in the session description protocol (SDP) [b-IETF RFC 4566] in the INVITE requests;
+- 3) key material is exchanged using separate key management protocol and piggybacked with SDP.
+
+For each subscriber, the NBE may obtain from the SAA/TAA-FEs the SRTP master key, and from this derive preliminary encryption and authentication session keys. An SRTP master key of length 128 may be supported. The key derivation algorithm described in [b-IETF RFC 3711] may be supported. The preliminary encryption key length may be 128 bits, the preliminary session salt key length may be 112 bits, and the preliminary authentication key may be 160 bits. When a new SRTP master key is issued to a subscriber, the NBE may be able to use it immediately.
+
+If the SDP contained in the INVITE request has "RTP/SAVP" as the media protocol value in the "m=" line, and no key value in a "k=" line, and no "a=crypto" attribute, then the NBE may use the preliminary keys generated from the provisioning system as the actual keys for the session. The cipher suite is not negotiable in this case.
+
+If the SDP contained in the INVITE request has "RTP/SAVP" as the media protocol value in the "m=" line, and no "a=crypto" attribute, and a key value in a "k=" line, then the NBE may use the key contained in the "k=" line as the SRTP master key and generate the session and authentication keys from it. The cipher suite is not negotiable in this case.
+
+If the SDP contained in the INVITE request has "RTP/SAVP" as the media protocol value in the "m=" line, and a "a=crypto" attribute, then the NBE may follow the requirements of [b-IETF RFC 4568] to generate the session and authentication keys. For example, the SDP entry "a=crypto:1AES\_CM\_128\_HMAC\_SHA1\_80 inline:PS1uQCVeeCFCanVmcjpkPywjNWhcYD0mXXtxaVBR|220|1:4" indicates the cipher suite is AES\_CM\_128\_HMAC\_SHA1\_80, and the key\_param is defined by the text starting with "inline:". Within the key\_param, the first field is the master key appended with the master salt, concatenated and then base64 encoded. The list of valid cipher suites is given in section 5.2 of [b-IETF RFC 4568], from which one is chosen as part of the SDP offer/answer exchange.
+
+If the SDP contained in the INVITE request has "RTP/SAVP" as the media protocol value in the "m=" line, and a "a=key-mgmt" attribute, then NBE may follow the requirements of [b-IETF RFC 4567] to generate keys and security parameters. For example, "a=key-mgmt:mikey AQAfGm0XflABAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA..." indicates that the key management protocol is mikey [b-IETF RFC 3830], and the remainder text is the key management data which is base64 [b-IETF RFC 4648] encoded.
+
+### 10.1.3 Authentication interface between NGN network element and secure token server
+
+NGN network elements may implement SASL [b-IETF RFC 4422] protecting their OAMP functions. The SASL layer may include an authentication check based on secure token, as defined in [b-IETF RFC 2808]. This is identified with the SASL key "secure token". The user desiring OAMP access provides:
+
+- 1) an authorization identity (which allows system administrators to log in with a different user identity; if empty, it defaults to the authentication identity);
+- 2) an authentication identity (an identity whose passcode will be used);
+- 3) the pin value of the user and 6-digit passcode on the secure token.
+
+The NGN network element may implement an SAA/TAA-FE compliant client as part of the SASL handling of secure token. The NGN network element collects the presented user credentials and then sends them to the secure token server. Collected fields include the username, pin code, and currently-displayed secure token value. The network element receives back an Accept/Deny/Retry status message. If successful, the SASL enables the user to access the OAMP functions, based on the level of access associated with that username.
+
+# 11 OAMP
+
+An audit trail should be taken for all OAMP access attempts (whether successful or not), all OAMP changes made, and all OAMP signoffs. In addition, events considered significant by the NGN provider's policy are logged.
+
+In this clause, some mechanisms on important features are described. They are not exhaustive and other implementations may be adopted depending on the NGN provider policies.
+
+NOTE – Security of event logging is necessary. For additional information refer to [ITU-T Y.2701] and [b-ITU-T M.3016.0].
+
+## **11.1 Network element interface to logging systems**
+
+The network elements are recommended to send their logging information to a remote log host. Such elements that utilize the Syslog protocol [b-IETF RFC 5424] to achieve this function may follow the requirements of this clause.
+
+Network elements that utilize the Syslog protocol may include a timestamp, with the time based on the value received via SNTP/NTP from a trusted time source, and may give the timestamp in UTC. Elements may include their Hostname (if one has been provisioned) or their IP address in the syslog message header.
+
+## **11.2 Network element use of SNMP**
+
+It is essential that the NGN network elements be able to be managed from a remote platform. SNMP is the industry standard mechanism to do this. While SNMPv3 [b-IETF RFC 3413], [b-IETF RFC 3414], and [b-IETF RFC 3415] solves many of the security faults present in SNMPv2, it is becoming increasingly widely available.
+
+The network elements are recommended to send their logging information to a remote log host. Such elements may utilize the SNMP protocol to achieve this function, noting the caveats elsewhere in this Recommendation relating to SNMPv3.
+
+SNMP is defined by an overall architecture [b-IETF RFC 3411], the mechanism for naming objects and events (MIBs) [b-IETF RFC 1155], [b-IETF RFC 1212], [b-IETF RFC 1215], [b-IETF RFC 2578], [b-IETF RFC 2579], and [b-IETF RFC 2580], and protocol operations [b-IETF RFC 3416], and [b-IETF RFC 3417]. For a more detailed overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard Management Framework, see section 7 of [b-IETF RFC 3410].
+
+Each NGN network element may implement an SNMP client. If SNMPv1 or v2 is used, and if required by security policy of the NGN provider, it is required to use UDP over IPsec as the transport. Each instance of a message may be encoded using the Basic Encoding Rules of ASN.1 [b-ITU-T X.690] into a single UDP datagram. The client may listen on port 161 for Command Responder Applications, and may listen on port 162 for Notification Receiver Applications.
+
+NGN network elements are required to implement all necessary MIBs for reporting security events and audit trails.
+
+## **11.3 Security patch management**
+
+Regular installation of maintenance and security patches on NGN network elements and servers minimize their vulnerabilities to attacks and unintentional failures. A comprehensive patch management strategy is required to be deployed including installation and verification processes and platforms.
+
+## **11.4 Version management**
+
+Network element configurations and changes are required to be backed up. The primary goal of system backup is to allow system recovery in the event of hardware or software troubles that result in corruption of a software load and/or the associated system data. The following types of information may be included in a system backup load:
+
+- Customer data and logic.
+- Network traffic connectivity such as facilities and trunks.
+- The NGN carrier and vendor-provided application software.
+- Operating system.
+- Hardware configuration.
+
+An ongoing record of provisioning work is required to be maintained so that any network element (NE) can be brought up to date with provisioning actions that have occurred since a backup image was taken.
+
+The provisioning platform may provide the following capabilities:
+
+- A journal of provisioning activities for each of the network elements (NEs) that directly provisions.
+- At least one week's worth of provisioning activities for each NE.
+
+The provisioning platform may allow users to manually review the stored provisioning activities for each NE. The activity description provided to the user is required to summarize the size, number, and types of transactions for a given time interval.
+
+The provisioning platform may provide a utility to allow re-provisioning of a designated NE by re-entering data into a specified NE. This utility should allow selection of begin and end dates/times for the data to be re-provisioned. Based on the specified begin and end dates/times, the provisioning platform should automatically re-enter all of the intervening data into the specified NE.
+
+## **11.5 Audit trail, trapping, and logging at TE-BE**
+
+All of the audit trail, trapping, and logging requirements for NGN network elements apply to the TE-BE.
+
+The TE-BE is connected to the OAMP systems through a VPN tunnel. It therefore sends its logging messages, receives SNMP requests and sends SNMP responses through this VPN. The TE-BE is not recommended to accept any OAMP requests on any other interface.
+
+The requirements for the VPN tunnel are given in clause 9.4.
+
+## **12 Provisioning of equipment in untrusted zone**
+
+All customer premises equipments are configured by the TE provisioning element. The TE provisioning element resides in the trusted zone and may only communicate with the TEs via the network border element (NBE) as shown in Figure 2. A TE or TE-BE may authenticate and establish a security association with the NBE before it can obtain the configuration file from the TE provisioning element. NBE may support both TLS and IPsec for establishing SA with the TEs (including TE-BE). Refer to clauses 9.1 and 9.2 for more detail.
+
+Provider controlled equipment can be treated as a part of NBE in this context.
+
+The TE provisioning element includes the address of a NBE in the configuration data downloaded to the authenticated device. The TE provisioning element may also include a certificate that is used to authenticate the subscriber with the NBE, as described in clause 8.4.
+
+A TE device will request provisioning from an NGN service provider. The NBE will receive this request and authenticate the TE with the SAA/TAA-FEs. When the device is authenticated, the border element will forward the provisioning request to the TE provisioning element. The TE provisioning element then downloads the configuration and/or firmware to the TE. If the TE cannot be authenticated, the failure is logged.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+## Examples of source-address assurance and its application to the mechanism of subscriber identification and authentication
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix provides concrete examples of the source-address assurance mechanisms and its application to the subscriber identification and authentication through network source address described in clause 8.4.2.
+
+### I.1 Subscriber identification and authentication linked to access-line authentication
+
+This clause provides an example of the subscriber identification and authentication, in which an IP address is assigned as the result of access-line authentication. In this example, each subscriber is statically associated with his/her access line. Hence, the mechanism described in this example is applicable only to non-nomadic (i.e., fixed) services.
+
+![Sequence diagram showing high-level message flows for subscriber identification and authentication. The diagram involves four main entities: UE (User equipment), Access/core transport network, Transport control (RACF and NACF), and SCF (Service control function). The process starts with provisioning of subscriber data (0), followed by access-line identification/authentication (1), IP address request (2), identification of subscriber based on access line and allocation of IP address (3), notification of subscriber access (4), opening the gate with SAF [access line <-> IP address] (5), response with network configuration (6), service request (7), retrieval of mappings between subscriber ID and IP address (8), identification of the subscriber based on mappings and consistency-checking (9), and finally service response (10).](030c758fd425016b03290c8f11bef69d_img.jpg)
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE as UE (User equipment)
+ participant AN as Access/core transport network
+ participant TC as Transport control
+ participant SCF as SCF (Service control function)
+ participant RACF as RACF
+ participant NACF as NACF
+
+ Note over AN, TC: 0. Provisioning of Subscriber Data
+ Note over TC: 1. Access-Line identification/Authentication
+ Note over TC: 2. IP address Request
+ Note over TC: 3. Identification of subscriber based on the access line, and allocation of an IP address to the subscriber
+ Note over TC: 4. Notification of subscriber access
+ Note over AN, TC: 5. Opening the gate with SAF [access line <-> IP address]
+ Note over TC: 6. Response with network configuration
+ Note over TC: 7. Service Request
+ Note over SCF: 8. Retrieval of mappings between subscriber ID and IP address *) Notes 1, 2
+ Note over SCF: 9. Identification of the subscriber based on the mappings, and consistency-checking between the Service Request and the profile of the subscriber
+ Note over SCF: 10. Service Response
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing high-level message flows for subscriber identification and authentication. The diagram involves four main entities: UE (User equipment), Access/core transport network, Transport control (RACF and NACF), and SCF (Service control function). The process starts with provisioning of subscriber data (0), followed by access-line identification/authentication (1), IP address request (2), identification of subscriber based on access line and allocation of IP address (3), notification of subscriber access (4), opening the gate with SAF [access line <-> IP address] (5), response with network configuration (6), service request (7), retrieval of mappings between subscriber ID and IP address (8), identification of the subscriber based on mappings and consistency-checking (9), and finally service response (10).
+
+NOTE 1 – The mapping information between the IP address and the Subscriber ID may be provided from the NACF to the SCF at the time of address allocation by the NACF.
+
+NOTE 2 – The NACF may provide the mapping between the IP address and the location information (e.g., Line Identifier) instead of the mapping between the IP address and the subscriber ID. In that case, the SCF is required to maintain the mappings between subscriber IDs and locations and derive the subscriber ID from the location information sent from the NACF.
+
+Figure I.1 – High-level message flows of example 1
+
+#### Descriptions
+
+0. The subscriber profiles are preconfigured to the corresponding FEs (e.g., TUP-FE, SUP-FE) in the NACF or the SCF.
+
+The most important setting issues in this scenario are:
+
+- 1) The NACF (typically TUP-FE) maintains the mappings between subscriber IDs (Subscriber Account Identifiers) and logical/physical access-line IDs (e.g., VLAN ID or access port).
+- 2) The SCF (typically SUP-FE) maintains the mappings between subscriber IDs and the attributes or profiles of the corresponding subscribers (e.g., values of "From" header in case of SIP-based services). In cases where the name space of subscriber IDs in the SCF is different from that in the NACF, the SCF is recommended also to maintain the mappings between these IDs.
+
+Alternatively, the NACF does not have to maintain the mappings between subscriber IDs and access-line IDs. In such scenarios, the SCF is recommended to maintain the mappings between subscriber IDs and access-line IDs, so the SCF can retrieve a corresponding subscriber ID from an access-line ID.
+
+On the gateways in the access/core transport, all gates for subscriber's access lines are initially configured to be closed so that any incoming IP packets, except for the packets necessary for UE to attach the network (e.g., sending address requests or authentication requests), are dropped.
+
+1. A UE attaches to the access network through its access line to get IP connectivity to the NGN. This example assumes that access authentication by the NACF is implicit and is executed at step 3. However, the NACF may alternatively employ an explicit access authentication method (e.g., IEEE 802.1X). In that case, network access authentication is executed in this phase, i.e., before IP address assignment.
+2. The UE requests allocation of an IP address. This is typically performed by sending DHCP Discover and Request, and these messages are relayed to the NACF by the gateways.
+3. In this example, the access network authenticates the access line and provides the authenticated access-line ID (e.g., VLAN ID or access port) to the NACF. Hence, the NACF can identify the subscriber ID of the UE based on the access-line ID, through which the IP address request is sent. Then, the NACF allocates an IP address to the requesting UE and stores the mapping between the subscriber ID and the allocated IP address.
+This mapping information may be pushed from the NACF to the SCF and be stored (cached) in the SCF. In that case, the 8th step below can be skipped.
+4. The NACF notifies the RACF that the subscriber has been connected. This notification includes the subscriber ID, the access-line ID (physical/logical), the allocated IP address, and QoS profiles.
+5. The RACF makes a policy decision on network resource allocation to the subscriber and orders the gateways to open the gate for the access line with packet-filtering rules, which are defined to accept and forward incoming IP packets whose source address is the IP address assigned to the subscriber, and to drop other incoming packets.
+The enforcement of source IP address filtering coordinated with access-line authentication by the NACF, which is described above, ensures that an IP address can be used only by the subscriber to whom the address is assigned.
+6. The NACF returns the allocated IP address to the UE with other network configuration parameters (e.g., the addresses of DNS servers and P-CSC-FE). This is typically done by sending DHCP Offer and Response messages.
+
+7. After getting IP-connectivity, the UE sends a Service Request (e.g., REGISTER signal in case of SIP-based services) to the SCF. The Service Request is passed by the gateways (firewalls with source-address filtering) to the SCF only if the source address of the Request is one assigned by the NACF.
+8. The SCF retrieves the mapping information (i.e., the subscriber ID and its assigned IP address) corresponding to the source address of the Service Request, from the NACF.
+9. The SCF considers the Service Request to be originated from the subscriber who assigned the subscriber ID contained in the retrieved mapping information. In cases where the name space of subscriber IDs in the SCF is different from that in the NACF, the retrieved subscriber ID is required to be translated into the subscriber ID in the name space used by the SCF based on the mappings between these IDs.
+
+The SCF extracts the value of attributes regarding the subscriber's identity (e.g., the value of the "From" header in case of SIP-based services) from the Service Request and checks consistency between those values and the corresponding subscriber's profile.
+10. If the authentication and the authorization succeed, the SCF returns the normal reply to offer the requested service (e.g., "200 OK" in case of SIP-based services).
+
+### **I.2 Subscriber identification and authentication linked to explicit access authentication at IP connectivity establishment**
+
+This clause provides an example of the subscriber identification and authentication, in which an IP address is assigned as the result of explicit access authentication at the establishment of IP connectivity. In this example, each subscriber is dynamically associated to a L2 session, which is established at the time of access authentication. Hence, the mechanism described in this example is applicable to both nomadic and non-nomadic services.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE as UE (User equipment)
+ participant AN as Access/core transport network
+ participant RACF as RACF
+ participant NACF as NACF
+ participant SCF as SCF (Service control function)
+
+ Note over RACF, NACF: 0. Provisioning of Subscriber Data
+
+ UE->>AN: 1a. Access Authentication
+ AN->>RACF: 1b. Storing the mapping between the L2 session identifier and the subscriber ID
+ RACF->>AN: 1c. Accepting the access
+ AN->>UE: 1d. Sharing the session key and establishing the protected L2 session
+ UE->>RACF: 2. IP address Request
+ RACF->>NACF: 3. Identification of subscriber based on the L2 session ID, and allocation of an IP address to the subscriber
+ NACF->>AN: 4. Notification of subscriber access
+ AN->>UE: 5. Opening the gate with SAF [L2 session ID <-> IP address]
+ UE->>RACF: 6. Response with network configuration
+ RACF->>SCF: 7. Service Request
+ SCF->>NACF: 8. Retrieval of mappings between subscriber ID and IP address
+ Note over SCF: *) Note
+ SCF->>NACF: 9. Identification of the subscriber based on the mappings, and consistency-checking between the Service Request and the profile of the subscriber
+ NACF->>UE: 10. Service Response
+
+```
+
+Y.2704(09)\_F1.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing high-level message flows of example 2 between UE, Access/core transport network, Transport control (RACF, NACF), and SCF (Service control function).
+
+NOTE – The mapping information between the IP address and the Subscriber ID may be provided from the NACF to the SCF at the time of address allocation by the NACF.
+
+**Figure I.2 – High-level message flows of example 2**
+
+#### Descriptions
+
+0. The subscriber profiles are preconfigured to the corresponding FEs (e.g., TUP-FE, SUP-FE) in the NACF or the SCF. In contrast with the previous example, the NACF does not need to maintain the mappings between subscriber IDs and access-line IDs.
+On the gateways in the access/core transport, all gates for L2 access sessions with UEs are initially configured to be closed so that any incoming IP packets, except for the packets necessary for UE to attach the network (e.g., sending address requests or authentication requests), are dropped.
+- 1a. When a UE requests connectivity to the NGN, the access network dynamically creates an L2 session with the UE, and an access authentication procedure is performed between the UE and the NACF based on the subscriber's credential (typically with an explicit authentication method such as IEEE 802.1X and RADIUS/Diameter). The signalling messages for authentication are forwarded by the gateways.
+- 1b. During the authentication procedure, the identifier of the L2 session (e.g., VLAN-ID, L2 address of the UE, etc.) assigned to the UE is sent to the NACF. When the authentication succeeds, the NACF stores this L2 session identifier with the authenticated subscriber ID.
+- 1c. The NACF notifies the access network that the UE has been successfully authenticated and the access to the network has been authorized (e.g., an ACCESS ACCEPT message in case of RADIUS protocol).
+
+- 1d. Upon receiving the notification of successful authentication of the subscriber from the NACF, the access network establishes a security association (SA) with the UE to protect the integrity and confidentiality of the L2 session. Typically, these are achieved by the session-keys derivation mechanisms defined in IEEE 802.1X and the protection procedure defined for each L2 technology (e.g., TKIP/CCMP defined in IEEE 802.11i for 802.11 Wireless-LAN).
+
+The security mechanisms described above protect the L2 session from being used by other subscribers and provide necessary grounds for the prevention of IP-address spoofing.
+
+2. The UE requests allocation of an IP address. This is typically performed by sending DHCP Discover and Request, and these messages are relayed to the NACF by the gateways.
+3. The NACF identifies the subscriber ID of the UE based on the identifier of the L2 session, which the request is sent through. Then, the NACF allocates an IP address to the requesting UE and stores the mapping between the subscriber ID and the allocated IP address.
+
+This mapping information may be pushed from the NACF to the SCF and stored (cached) in the SCF. In that case, the 8th step below can be skipped.
+
+4. The NACF notifies the RACF that the subscriber has been connected. This notification includes the subscriber ID, the L2 session ID (physical/logical), the allocated IP address, and QoS profiles.
+5. The RACF makes a policy decision on network resource allocation to the subscriber and orders the gateways to open the gate for the L2 session with packet-filtering rules, which are defined to accept and forward incoming IP packets whose source address is the IP address assigned to the subscriber, and to drop other incoming packets.
+
+The enforcement of source IP address filtering coordinated with access authentication by the NACF, which is described above, ensures that an IP address can be used only by the subscriber to whom the address is assigned.
+
+Steps 6-10 are identical to those explained in the previous example described in clause I.1.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+## **Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) interconnection security**
+
+*(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)*
+
+### **II.1 Background**
+
+Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) is a national service, providing priority services to authorized ETS users in times of disaster and emergencies. ETS implementation is a national matter. However, disasters/emergencies can transcend geographic boundaries, and thus there is a potential that countries/administrations may enter into bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to link their respective ETS systems. This would allow priority telecommunications services (e.g., voice, messaging, video and data) under the umbrella of ETS to be supported between different national networks with bilateral and/or multilateral agreements in times of disaster and emergencies. Assurance and availability of ETS communications will depend on the security capabilities and measures enforced in each national network involved in an end-to-end communication.
+
+### **II.2 Scope/purpose**
+
+This appendix provides guidance to allow support of network-provided security for ETS communications across different national network (i.e., countries/administrations) implementations of ETS.
+
+The end-user peer-to-peer security function using special end-user equipment security functions is not included in the scope of this appendix. The scope of this appendix is limited to network-provided security for ETS communications across multiple networks on a hop-by-hop basis. However, the NGN is recommended to be capable of transparently supporting such peer-to-peer functions.
+
+This appendix is not intended to impose conditions on national implementations of ETS. Its primary purpose is to allow network-provided security for ETS communications (i.e., priority voice, video, data, and messaging communications) across different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations).
+
+### **II.3 Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of ETS**
+
+Refer to Appendix I of [ITU-T Y.2701] for information on security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of ETS.
+
+### **II.4 Authentication and authorization**
+
+It is recommended that national networks support and implement mechanisms and capabilities to authenticate and authorize the ETS user, device, or user and device combination based on the assurance level needed for access to specific service (e.g., voice, data, video) and applicable policy.
+
+It is recommended that the security mechanisms described in the body on this Recommendation for identification and authentication of users and user devices be utilized as appropriate to support ETS implementations in national networks:
+
+- IPsec/TLS associations.
+- SIP Challenge/Response and X.509 certificates.
+- Generic bootstrapping architecture.
+
+In addition, it is recommended that security measures monitoring access to ETS resources be implemented to detect and prevent denial of services type of attacks.
+
+Also, refer to Appendix I of [ITU-T Y.2702] for information on example ETS authentication and authorization approaches.
+
+### **II.5 Transport security for signalling and OAMP**
+
+It is recommended that the security mechanisms, IPsec and TLS, as described in the body of this Recommendation, be utilized as appropriate to protect ETS signalling and OAMP traffic in national networks.
+
+### **II.6 Media traffic**
+
+It is recommended that the security mechanisms to identify and protect media traffic, as described in the body of this Recommendation, be utilized as appropriate to protect ETS media traffic in national networks.
+
+### **II.7 Support of calling number ID and calling name ID restriction features**
+
+Calling Number ID and Calling Name ID are two legacy PSTN features that permit users to know who is calling. ETS calls may serve different national communities of users with different sensitivities to the disclosure of such information to the called party. Therefore, it is recommended that appropriate mechanisms be supported to enforce the policy regarding the display or the disclosure of ETS user information.
+
+### **II.8 Non-traceability**
+
+For certain ETS communications, it is important that location information associated with the calling party and called party be unavailable to all parties to the maximum extent feasible. In particular, any location-related information is recommended to be suppressed or, if necessary, have un-meaningful information substituted as appropriate based on applicable policy. Location-related information includes, but may not be limited to:
+
+- 1) Calling and called party NPA-NXX or URI.
+- 2) Calling and called party geographic address.
+- 3) Calling and called party x-y coordinates.
+- 4) Calling and called party cell information of possible use in narrowing location down to a cell.
+- 5) Calling and called party IP address.
+- 6) Calling and called party end office or other facility information enabling geographic proximity of the calling party to be determined.
+
+### **II.9 End-to-end peer-to-peer encryption**
+
+Selected users may require User Equipment (UE) encrypted ETS calls/sessions. For these calls/sessions, normal ETS call/session establishment procedures would apply and the end-to-end encryption process is provided by the UE for the bearer information (e.g., voice) to the terminating UE. This encryption process is transparent to the NGN. However, the NGN is recommended to be capable of transparently supporting such peer-to-peer functions.
+
+## **Appendix III**
+
+## **Security best practices**
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+### **III.1 Introduction**
+
+To meet the requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.2701], additional security mechanisms beyond those specified in this Recommendation may be needed. Best practice security mechanisms such as the use of firewalls, operating system hardening, vulnerability scanning, and intrusion detection systems (IDS) may be employed to secure the NGN infrastructure. Refer to [b-NIST SP 800-94] for guidance on intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) and [b-NIST SP 800-83] for guidance on malware incident prevention and handling.
+
+This appendix provides a summary of some example best practice security mechanisms that should be employed.
+
+### **III.2 Firewalls**
+
+Firewalls are fundamental security building blocks that provide network isolation at boundaries between network segments or between different networks. Firewalls perform isolation based on specific traffic filtering rules configured onto the firewalls. Firewalls may be used in conjunction with other security mechanisms to provide an additional layer of security. The addition of firewalls helps provide "defense in depth" security whereby multiple security mechanisms are overlaid to achieve stronger security.
+
+A firewall examines both inbound and outbound traffic, and should be configured to deny all traffic unless specifically allowed by the firewall rules. A firewall may also provide logging of traffic and trigger alarms when unauthorized packets are detected. Firewalls can physically be provided as separate appliances or may be provided as software on the host machines themselves. Types of firewalls include static packet filtering, application layer, and state-aware packet filtering firewalls, and the choice will depend on particular customer needs and preferences.
+
+Static packet filtering firewalls examine incoming and outgoing packets and apply a set of rules to determine whether packets will be allowed to transit the firewall or be dropped. This determination is typically based on the packet source and destination IP addresses, the protocol type, and the TCP source and destination ports. Depending on the packet and the criteria, the firewall will drop or forward the packet, and possibly create a log entry and/or raise an alarm. Some static packet filtering firewalls may also provide deeper inspection of packets, possibly up to the application layer.
+
+Application layer firewalls run applications on behalf of the machines in the network they are protecting, and are often called "proxy" firewalls. When performing the applications, application layer firewalls will detect any anomalous activity and, if any is found, will not pass the data on to the machines they are protecting. Application layer firewalls must be enabled with all necessary application and must run these applications on behalf of all protected machines. Because of this, application layer firewalls have a high impact on network performance.
+
+State-aware firewalls perform packet filtering functions similar to static packet filtering firewalls, and, in addition, maintain information about the state of traffic connections. The state information allows the firewall to make better decisions about whether to allow or deny particular traffic. For example, a state-aware firewall may be configured to only allow traffic from machines on one side of the network to initiate communications. This is particularly useful where private networks are connected to public networks.
+
+When using firewalls as an additional signalling and control plane security the firewalls should be configured to allow only desired signalling and control communication between a set of machines. Any other traffic on the network other than the desired communications should be denied, thereby providing a layer of protection for these machines.
+
+Note that providing firewalls may have system engineering and product impacts, and some applications may have to be made firewall aware. Also note that firewalls will not protect against all security attacks such as an attacker spoofing legitimate signalling packet information.
+
+### **III.3 Operating system hardening**
+
+Servers and network elements used for signalling and control plane functions are vulnerable to any number of attacks, including the following:
+
+- Backdoor programs.
+- Sniffing programs.
+- Password grabber and cracking tools.
+- Exploitation of defects in operating system services.
+- Denial of service (DoS).
+
+Some of these attacks are based on well-publicized techniques, with scripts and other tools available to make it possible for less knowledgeable crackers to apply exploits against systems. Once a system has been compromised, an intruder can do a number of things, among which are:
+
+- Modify or destroy information.
+- Disclose sensitive information.
+- Install malicious code to gather information.
+- Use the compromised server to attack other systems.
+
+Operating system hardening procedures may be used to improve the resistance of operating systems to attacks. Operating system hardening procedures are essentially sound practices that are followed during the installation and configuration of an operating system. While no system is absolutely secure, following operating system hardening procedures will result in systems that are harder for crackers to compromise.
+
+Operating system hardening essentially involves the restriction of services, ports, and access to applications and files. Operating system hardening also involves only running applications from a restricted access privilege account and with only absolutely necessary ports and services running only. Operating system manufacturers should be consulted to obtain the latest OS hardening procedures and security patches.
+
+### **III.4 Vulnerability assessment**
+
+The goal of performing a vulnerability assessment on network elements is to discover security vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and areas of risk. Vulnerability testing is designed to try and make systems fail by interrupting services, circumventing devised security controls, capturing confidential data, obtaining unauthorized access to the system, or stealing or denying service. Vulnerability assessment may be included for NGN elements in order to ensure even stronger security.
+
+Vulnerability assessment for network elements may be conducted at the product verification stage, and then ongoing as part of network maintenance. Including security vulnerability testing at the product verification stage is advantageous since there is already a pre-established procedure to record and submit requests for changes. Ongoing routine vulnerability assessments are useful to identify new threats and vulnerabilities and initiate action to mitigate the issues identified.
+
+### **III.5 Intrusion detection systems**
+
+Intrusion detection systems can be used to provide protection against intrusions and unauthorized actions. For example, intrusion detection systems can be used to warn network administrators of the possibility of a security incident such as a SIP server compromise or denial-of-service attack.
+
+Intrusion detection systems (IDS) can be broadly categorized according to the following criteria:
+
+- **Real-time or off-line incident detection:** A real-time IDS network traffic logs as events take place. An off-line IDS system analyses intrusions in batch mode after incidents have occurred.
+- **Network-based or host-based installation:** A network-based IDS typically involves multiple monitors installed at choke points on the network where all traffic between two points can be monitored. A host-based IDS requires that software be installed directly on the servers to be protected, and monitors the network connections and user activity on those servers.
+- **Reactive of passive:** A reactive IDS actively intervenes to head off attacks by modifying firewall rules or router filters or other measures. A passive IDS system only notifies administrators or other network systems of the problem.
+
+Most commercial IDS products provide a combination of network- and host-based monitoring capabilities, with a central management device to receive the reports from the various monitors and alert the network administrators.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.107] Recommendation ITU-T E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*.
+- [b-ITU-T M.3016.0] Recommendation ITU-T M.3016.0 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Overview*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.690] Recommendation ITU-T X.690 (2008) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2008, *Information technology – ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.810] Recommendation ITU-T X.810 (1995) | ISO/IEC 10181-1:1996, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Security frameworks for open systems: Overview*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 33.102] 3GPP TS 33.102 V7.1.0 (2007), *3G Security: Security Architecture*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 33.328] 3GPP TS 33.328, *IP Multimedia System (IMS) media plane security*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 133 220] ETSI TS 133 220 V9.2.0 (2010), *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 1155] IETF RFC 1155 (1990), *Structure and Identification of Management Information for TCP/IP-based Internets*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 1212] IETF RFC 1212 (1991), *Concise MIB definitions*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 1215] IETF RFC 1215 (1991), *A Convention for Defining Traps for use with the SNMP*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2246] IETF RFC 2246 (1999), *The TLS Protocol Version 1.0*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2367] IETF RFC 2367 (1998), *PF\_KEY Key Management API, Version 2*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2403] IETF RFC 2403 (1998), *The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2409] IETF RFC 2409 (1998), *The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2451] IETF RFC 2451 (1998), *The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2578] IETF RFC 2578 (1999), *Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2579] IETF RFC 2579 (1999), *Textual Conventions for SMIv2*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2580] IETF RFC 2580 (1999), *Conformance Statements for SMIv2*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2617] IETF RFC 2617 (1999), *HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2808] IETF RFC 2808 (2000), *The SecurID® SASL Mechanism*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2865] IETF RFC 2865 (2000), *Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3261] IETF RFC 3261 (2002), *SIP: Session Initiation Protocol*.
+
+| | |
+|-------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [b-IETF RFC 3310] | IETF RFC 3310 (2002), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3410] | IETF RFC 3410 (2002), Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet Standard Management Framework . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3411] | IETF RFC 3411 (2002), An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3413] | IETF RFC 3413 (2002), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3414] | IETF RFC 3414 (2002), User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3415] | IETF RFC 3415 (2002), View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3416] | IETF RFC 3416 (2002), Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3417] | IETF RFC 3417 (2002), Transport Mappings for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3550] | IETF RFC 3550 (2003), RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3588] | IETF RFC 3588 (2003), Diameter Base Protocol . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3602] | IETF RFC 3602 (2003), The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3711] | IETF RFC 3711 (2004), The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3713] | IETF RFC 3713 (2004), A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 3830] | IETF RFC 3830 (2004), MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4132] | IETF RFC 4132 (2005), Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4279] | IETF RFC 4279 (2005), Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4301] | IETF RFC 4301 (2005), Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4306] | IETF RFC 4306 (2005), Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4312] | IETF RFC 4312 (2005), The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4422] | IETF RFC 4422 (2006), Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4492] | IETF RFC 4492 (2006), Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4566] | IETF RFC 4566 (2006), SDP: Session Description Protocol . |
+| [b-IETF RFC 4567] | IETF RFC 4567 (2006), Key Management Extensions for Session Description Protocol (SDP) and Real Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) . |
+
+- [b-IETF RFC 4568] IETF RFC 4568 (2006), *Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4590] IETF RFC 4590 (2006), *RADIUS Extension for Digest Authentication*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4648] IETF RFC 4648 (2006), *The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4740] IETF RFC 4740 (2006), *Diameter Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Application*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 4835] IETF RFC 4835 (2007), *Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5077] IETF RFC 5077 (2008), *Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5090] IETF RFC 5090 (2008), *Radius Extension for Digest Authentication*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5246] IETF RFC 5246 (2008), *The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5282] IETF RFC 5282 (2008), *Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5424] IETF RFC 5424 (2009), *The Syslog Protocol*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15946-1] ISO/IEC 15946-1:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15946-2] ISO/IEC 15946-2:2002, *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15946-3] ISO/IEC 15946-3:2002, *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15946-4] ISO/IEC 15946-4:2004, *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 4: Digital signatures giving message recovery*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 15946-5] ISO/IEC 15946-5:2008, *Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 5: Elliptic curve generation*.
+- [b-ISO/IEC 18033-3] ISO/IEC 18033-3:2005, *Information technology – Security techniques – Encryption algorithms – Part 3: Block ciphers*.
+- [b-NIST FIPS 197] NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 197 (2001): *Advanced Encryption Standard*.
+- [b-NIST FIPS 198-1] NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 198-1 (2008), *The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)*.
+- [b-NIST FIPS SP 800-38a] NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS), *Special Publication 800-38: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operations. Methods and Techniques, December 2001*.
+
+- [b-NIST SP 800-44 v2] NIST Special Publication 800-44 Version 2, *Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers*.
+- [b-NIST SP 800-57] NIST Special Publication 800-57, *Recommendation on Key Management – Part 1: General (Revised)*.
+- [b-NIST SP 800-83] NIST Special Publication 800-83 (2005), *Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling*.
+- [b-NIST SP 800-94] NIST Special Publication 800-94, *Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)*.
+- [b-TIA 683-D] TIA Standard TIA-683-D (2006), *Over the Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations in Spread Spectrum Systems*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2724
+
+(11/2013)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Security
+
+# --- **Framework for supporting OAuth and OpenID in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2724
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS**
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2724**
+
+# **Framework for supporting OAuth and OpenID in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2724 describes a framework for the support and use of the IETF open authorization protocol (OAuth) and the OpenID protocol in the context of next generation networks (NGNs). Both protocols have been defined for general use on the worldwide web.
+
+The heightened security and identity management requirements of NGNs require careful restriction of the above protocols. This Recommendation explains the applicability of these protocols to NGNs and provides high-level guidelines for their use.
+
+The companion Recommendation ITU-T Y.2723, "Support for OAuth in next generation networks" provides a detailed set of NGN profiles.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2724 | 2013-11-15 | 13 |
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2013
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Framework for supporting OAuth and OpenID in NGN..... | 3 |
+| 6.1 Reference model..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 OAuth and OpenID flows..... | 4 |
+| Appendix I – Selected use cases ..... | 9 |
+| I.1 Use case: web server ..... | 9 |
+| I.2 Use case: client credentials..... | 10 |
+| I.3 Use case: assertion..... | 11 |
+| Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2724
+
+# Framework for supporting OAuth and OpenID in next generation networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes a framework for the support and use of OAuth and OpenID by next generation networks (NGNs). The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- functional framework for NGN support of OAuth and OpenID
+- requirements for NGN support of OAuth and OpenID
+- OAuth and OpenID use cases (documented in Appendix I).
+
+NOTE – Implementers and operators of the described technology shall comply with all applicable national and regional laws, regulations and policies.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2720] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2720 (2009), *NGN identity management framework*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2722] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2722 (2011), *NGN identity management mechanisms*.
+- [IETF RFC 6749] IETF RFC 6749 (2012), *The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework*.
+<>
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 access token** [IETF RFC 6749]: Access tokens are credentials used to access protected resources. An access token is a string representing an authorization issued to the client. The string is usually opaque to the client. Tokens represent specific scopes and durations of access, granted by the resource owner, and enforced by the resource server and authorization server.
+
+**3.1.2 (entity) authentication** [b-ITU-T X.1252]: A process used to achieve sufficient confidence in the binding between the entity and the presented identity.
+
+NOTE – Use of the term authentication in an identity management (IdM) context is taken to mean entity authentication.
+
+**3.1.3 authorization** [b-ITU-T X.800]: The granting of rights, which includes the granting of access based on access rights
+
+**3.1.4 authorization server** [IETF RFC 6749]: The server issuing access tokens to the client after successfully authenticating the resource owner and obtaining authorization.
+
+**3.1.5 client** [IETF RFC 6749]: An application making protected resource requests on behalf of the resource owner and with its authorization. The term "client" does not imply any particular implementation characteristics (e.g., whether the application executes on a server, a desktop, or other devices).
+
+**3.1.6 entity** [b-ITU-T X.1252]: Something that has a separate and distinct existence and that can be identified in context.
+
+NOTE – An entity can be a physical person, an animal, a juridical person, an organization, an active or passive thing, a device, a software application, a service, etc., or a group of these entities. In the context of telecommunications, examples of entities include access points, subscribers, users, network elements, networks, software applications, services and devices, interfaces, etc.
+
+**3.1.7 identifier** [b-ITU-T X.1252]: One or more attributes used to identify an entity within a context.
+
+NOTE – In the context of NGN as defined in [b-ITU-T Y.2091], an identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects).
+
+**3.1.8 identity provider (IdP)** [b-ITU-T X.1252]: See identity service provider (IdSP)
+
+**3.1.9 identity service provider (IdSP)** [b-ITU-T X.1252]: An entity that verifies, maintains, manages, and may create and assign identity information of other entities.
+
+**3.1.10 refresh token** [IETF RFC 6749]: Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current access token becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain additional access tokens with identical or narrower scope (access tokens may have a shorter lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource owner). Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of the authorization server. If the authorization server issues a refresh token, it is included when issuing an access token.
+
+**3.1.11 resource owner** [IETF RFC 6749]: An entity capable of granting access to a protected resource. When the resource owner is a person, they are referred to as an end-user.
+
+**3.1.12 resource server** [IETF RFC 6749]: The server hosting the protected resources, capable of accepting and responding to protected resource requests using access tokens.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------|
+| AKA | Authentication and Key Agreement |
+| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture |
+| IdM | Identity Management |
+| IdP | Identity Provider |
+| IdSP | Identity Service Provider |
+| IMPI | IP Multimedia Private Identity |
+
+| | |
+|------|------------------------------------------|
+| IMSI | International Mobile Subscriber Identity |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| SAML | Security Assertion Markup Language |
+| SNI | Service Network Interface |
+| UNI | User Network Interface |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+In the body of this Recommendation and its annexes, the words shall, shall not, should and may sometimes appear, in which case they are to be interpreted respectively as, is required to, is prohibited from, is recommended, and can optionally. The appearance of such phrases or keywords in an appendix or in material explicitly marked as informative are to be interpreted as having no normative intent.
+
+# 6 Framework for supporting OAuth and OpenID in NGN
+
+As described in [ITU-T Y.2720], the NGN network consists of multiple functional elements that use identifiers of entities to perform their functions in order to support and facilitate open authentication services to other providers. Such arrangements could be supported using OpenID and OAuth as shown in Figure 1. The use of OpenID and OAuth in NGNs is depicted in Figure 1.
+
+According to the OpenID specification [b-OpenID v.2], the OpenID IdP server participates in the whole authentication workflow, and the OAuth allows the relying party to send the authentication message directly to the NGN-IdP through the OAuth protocol.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: The OpenID and OAuth flows for NGN. This diagram illustrates the interaction between various components in a Next-Generation Network (NGN). At the top, an 'Application (Relying party)' is connected to 'NGN Provider A' and 'NGN Provider B' via 'ANY' interfaces. A '3rd party provider' (acting as an IdP) is also connected to both NGN providers. The NGN providers are shown as large blue blocks containing 'Service stratum' (with 'Service control functions') and 'Transport stratum' (with routers). A central 'Transit' block connects the two NGN providers. At the bottom, 'Users' and 'Devices' are connected to the NGN providers via 'Access' and 'UNI' interfaces. The diagram shows two types of flows: 'OpenID workflow' (indicated by orange dashed arrows) and 'OAuth workflow' (indicated by blue dashed arrows). The OpenID workflow involves the Application, the 3rd party provider, and the NGN providers. The OAuth workflow involves the Application, the NGN providers, and the Users/Devices. A legend at the bottom left identifies the flow types: OpenID workflow (orange dashed arrow) and OAuth workflow (blue dashed arrow).
+
+**Figure 1 – The OpenID and OAuth flows for NGN**
+
+### 6.1 Reference model
+
+Figure 1 provides a general overview of OAuth and OpenID frameworks.
+
+Figure 2 depicts a reference model for NGN to provide OAuth authorization and OpenID authentication services. NGN providers may use OpenID and OAuth to offer IdSP services and partner with content and application providers and/or other service providers.
+
+![Figure 2: Reference model. This diagram shows the reference model for NGN. At the top, a box contains 'OpenID IdP' and 'Web services and application providers'. Below this, a box labeled 'NGN (IdSP) [OAuth authorization and OpenID authentication services]' is connected to the top box via an 'ANI' interface. To the left, 'End users' (represented by a phone, laptop, and tablet) are connected to the NGN (IdSP) box via a 'UNI' interface. To the right, the NGN (IdSP) box is connected to 'Other NGS and IdSPs' (represented by a cloud) via an 'NNI and SNI' interface. A legend at the bottom left identifies the flow types: OpenID workflow (orange dashed arrow) and OAuth workflow (blue dashed arrow).](b8661c6c54f72ecc7ff6cb05e47b2891_img.jpg)
+
+Figure 2: Reference model. This diagram shows the reference model for NGN. At the top, a box contains 'OpenID IdP' and 'Web services and application providers'. Below this, a box labeled 'NGN (IdSP) [OAuth authorization and OpenID authentication services]' is connected to the top box via an 'ANI' interface. To the left, 'End users' (represented by a phone, laptop, and tablet) are connected to the NGN (IdSP) box via a 'UNI' interface. To the right, the NGN (IdSP) box is connected to 'Other NGS and IdSPs' (represented by a cloud) via an 'NNI and SNI' interface. A legend at the bottom left identifies the flow types: OpenID workflow (orange dashed arrow) and OAuth workflow (blue dashed arrow).
+
+**Figure 2 – Reference model**
+
+### 6.2 OAuth and OpenID flows
+
+This clause provides the general description of the message flows for OAuth and OpenID in NGN.
+
+#### 6.2.1 Entities involved in information flows
+
+This clause identifies the entities (including the functional entities of [ITU-T Y.2012]) that participate in the OAuth and OpenID information flows.
+
+#### 6.2.2 Entities that are common to the OAuth and OpenID flows
+
+The entities involved in both the OAuth and OpenID flows are as follows:
+
+- end-user function with the capability of a web client (e.g., browser);
+- A-2: application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE) [ITU-T Y.2012]. This functional entity should be capable of supporting OAuth and/or OpenID protocols.
+
+As defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], the "APL-GW-FE is the interworking entity between various functions of NGN and all external application servers and service enablers". That makes A-2 a logical choice for providing support for OpenID and OAuth. Additionally, because of its connection with S-5 – service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) [ITU-T Y.2012], A-2 is capable of supporting AKA-based authentication, including generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA), of the user devices. A method of OpenID authentication based on GBA is specified in [b-3GPP TS 33.220]. Another method for OpenID authentication based on AKA, similar to GBA in some aspects, is described in clause 6.2.8 of [ITU-T Y.2722]. If the OAuth authorization server and OpenID IdP [ITU-T Y.2722] are both implemented on A-2, they can use AKA-based authentication, through the interaction with S-5.
+
+#### 6.2.3 Entities that are specific to the OAuth flow
+
+The OAuth-specific entities are the following:
+
+- A web application server that performs a service for a user – an OAuth client. A client may, but not have to, run on an NGN entity.
+- An authorization server implemented as part of A-2.
+
+An authorization server first performs user authentication and then performs authorization of the client request. If both procedures succeed, the OAuth exchange results in the issuing of an access token to the client by the authorization server. In order to support AKA-based authentication, the authorization server shall be able to interact with S-5.
+
+- Resource server
+
+The resource server serves the client's request when it is accompanied by a valid access token. Two types of procedures for getting access to a resource with the use of access tokens are specified; bearer tokens are specified in [b-IETF RFC 6750] and IETF is currently working on the specification for MAC tokens. The resource server may or may not be collocated with the authorization server in A-2.
+
+The high level of OAuth information flows for a web-server use case (described in Appendix I) are depicted by Figure 3 below, with a description underneath.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant RO as Resource owner
+ participant UA as User agent
+ participant CS as Client (Web server)
+ participant AS as A-2 (Authorization server)
+ participant RS as Resource server
+
+ Note over RO, UA: End-user function
+ RO->>UA: 1. Enter URL, request service
+ UA->>CS: 2. Request service
+ CS->>UA: 3. Request authentication and authorization, redirect user agent to authorization server
+ UA->>AS: 4. Follow redirection
+ AS->>UA: 5. Present authentication and authorization interface
+ UA->>RO: 6. Present authentication and authorization interface
+ RO->>UA: 7. Present credentials and authorize (or deny)
+ UA->>AS: 8. Submit user credentials and authorization decision
+ AS->>UA: 9. Redirect user agent with authorization code back to client
+ UA->>CS: 10. Follow redirection and deliver authorization code
+ CS->>AS: 11. Present authorization code
+ AS->>CS: 12. Receive access token and optional refresh tokens
+ CS->>RS: 13. Request resource with access token
+ CS->>RS: 14. Get resource
+
+```
+
+Y.2724(13)\_F03
+
+Sequence diagram showing the OAuth flow for a web-server use case. The diagram involves five participants: Resource owner, User agent, Client (Web server), A-2 (Authorization server), and Resource server. The flow consists of 14 numbered steps: 1. Enter URL, request service; 2. Request service; 3. Request authentication and authorization, redirect user agent to authorization server; 4. Follow redirection; 5. Present authentication and authorization interface; 6. Present authentication and authorization interface; 7. Present credentials and authorize (or deny); 8. Submit user credentials and authorization decision; 9. Redirect user agent with authorization code back to client; 10. Follow redirection and deliver authorization code; 11. Present authorization code; 12. Receive access token and optional refresh tokens; 13. Request resource with access token; 14. Get resource.
+
+**Figure 3 – OAuth flow for a web-server use case**
+
+1. The user directs the user agent (e.g., browser) to request a service from the client.
+2. The user agent submits a request to the client.
+3. The client forms a response and redirects the user agent to the authorization server for user authentication and authorization of the client's request.
+4. The user agent follows the redirection.
+5. The authorization server responds by providing the authentication and authorization interface to the user agent.
+6. The user agent displays the authentication and authorization interface to the user (resource owner).
+7. The user provides authentication credentials and indicates the authorization decision through the user agent.
+8. The user agent sends the user-provided data to the authorization server.
+9. The authorization server, after authenticating the user and ensuring that the user has authorized the client's request, redirects the user agent back to the client. The response includes the authorization code.
+10. The user agent, following the redirection, delivers the authorization code to the client.
+11. The client sends the authorization code to the authorization server.
+12. The authorization server responds with an access token with the optional refresh tokens.
+
+13. The client sends a request to the resource server and presents an access token.
+14. The resource server provides the requested resource.
+
+#### 6.2.4 Entities that are specific to the OpenID flow
+
+The OpenID-specific entities are the following:
+
+- An application server that relies on authentication performed by the OpenID IdP.
+- An OpenID IdP implemented as a part of A-2. In order to support AKA-based authentication, this entity shall be able to interact with S-5.
+- An S-5 which is involved in OpenID authentication if the NGN performs the AKA-based authentication of the end-user function as specified in [ITU-T Y.2722].
+
+The OpenID information flows are depicted by Figure 4 and described underneath. The text and figure describe the OpenID procedure for the case when the IdP and the application server have established a shared secret. The secret is used for signing a message with the authentication result by the IdP and for verifying it by the application server.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant End-user as End-user function
+ participant A2 as A-2 (OpenID IdP)
+ participant AppServer as Application server (Relying party)
+ participant S5 as S-5
+
+ End-user->>AppServer: 1. Request service, provide OpenID identifier
+ AppServer->>End-user: 2. Redirect user's browser to IdP for authentication
+ End-user->>A2: 3. Follow the redirection
+ A2->>End-user: 4. Authenticate user
+ A2-->>S5: Get authentication vector and user profile (for example based on IMSI or IMPI)
+ S5-->>A2:
+ A2->>End-user: 5. Return signed authentication result and redirect user agent to application server
+ End-user->>AppServer: 6. Follow the redirection and deliver the signed authentication result
+ AppServer->>AppServer: Signature verification with the use of shared secret
+ AppServer->>End-user: 7. Respond to the user with the authentication result
+
+```
+
+Y.2724(13)\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram of the OpenID flow showing interactions between End-user function, A-2 (OpenID IdP), Application server (Relying party), and S-5.
+
+**Figure 4 – OpenID flow**
+
+1. The user's browser sends a request for a service to an application server; the request contains the user OpenID identifier.
+2. Based on the OpenID identifier, the application server discovers the user's OpenID IdP. Then the application server redirects the user browser for authentication to the OpenID IdP.
+3. The browser follows the redirection request.
+4. The OpenID IdP authenticates the user by exchanging information via the user browser.
+5. If the OpenID IdP performs an AKA-based authentication (e.g., as described in [ITU-T Y.2722]), it needs to interact with S-5. Such interactions are denoted by a dashed arrow.
+6. The OpenID IdP redirects the user browser back to the application server with a response containing a signed message with the authentication result.
+7. The browser follows the redirection request and delivers the signed message to the application server.
+
+8. The application server, after validating the signature and checking the authentication result, notifies the user whether the authentication was successful. The signing and validation procedures are specified in [b-OpenID v.2].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Selected use cases
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Use case: web server
+
+##### Description
+
+Alice accesses an application running on a web server at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) and instructs it to print her photographs that are stored on a server [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example). Alice has a subscription with her NGN service provider that runs an OAuth authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example). The application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) receives Alice's authorization for accessing her photographs without learning her authentication credentials with [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example) or [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+
+##### Pre-conditions
+
+- Alice has registered with [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) to enable authentication.
+- The application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) has established the authentication credentials with the OAuth authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+- The application at [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example) is capable of validating the access token issued by the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+
+##### Post-conditions
+
+A successful procedure results in the application [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) receiving an authorization code from [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example). The code is bound to the application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) and to the callback URL supplied by the application. The application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) uses the authorization code for obtaining an access token from [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example). The application at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) issues an access token after authenticating the application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) and validating the authorization code that it has submitted. The application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) uses the access token for getting access to Alice's photographs at [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example).
+
+NOTE – When an access token expires, the service at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) needs to repeat the OAuth procedure for getting Alice's authorization to access her photographs at [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example). Alternatively, if Alice wants to grant the application a long-lasting access to her resources at [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example), the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) may issue the long-living tokens. Those tokens can be exchanged for short-living access tokens required to access [www.X-storephotos.example](http://www.X-storephotos.example).
+
+##### Requirements
+
+- The server [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example), which hosts an OAuth client, must be capable of issuing the HTTP redirect requests to Alice's user agent – a browser.
+- The authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) must be able to authenticate Alice. The authentication method is not in the OAuth's scope.
+- The application at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) must obtain Alice's authorization for the access to her photos by [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example).
+- Application at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) may identify to Alice the scope of access that [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) has requested when asking for Alice's authorization.
+
+- The authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) must be able to authenticate the application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) and validate the authorization code before issuing an access token. The application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) must provide a callback URL to the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) (NOTE – URL should be pre-registered with [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example)).
+- The authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) is required to maintain a record that associates the authorization code with the application at [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example) and the callback URL provided by the application.
+- The access tokens are the bearer's tokens (they are not associated with a specific application, such as [www.X-printphotos.example](http://www.X-printphotos.example)) and should have a short lifespan.
+- The authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) must invalidate the authorization code after its first use.
+- Alice's manual involvement in the OAuth authorization procedure (e.g., entering a URL or a password) should not be required. (Alice's authentication to [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) is not in the OAuth's scope).
+
+### **I.2 Use case: client credentials**
+
+#### **Description**
+
+The company Good-X-Pay prepares the employee payrolls for the company Good-X-Work. In order to do this, the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) gets authenticated access to the employees' attendance data stored at [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example). Authentication is performed by the authorization server, which is a part of an NGN with the URL [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+
+#### **Pre-conditions**
+
+- The application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) has established through registration an identifier and a shared secret with the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+- The scope of the access by the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) to the data stored at [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example) has been defined.
+
+#### **Post-conditions**
+
+A successful procedure results in the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) receiving an access token after authenticating to the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example). The application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) then uses the access token to get access to the attendance data at [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example).
+
+#### **Requirements**
+
+- Authentication of the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) to the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) is required.
+- The authentication method must be based on an identifier and a shared secret, which the application running at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) submits to the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) in the initial HTTP request.
+- Because the procedure results in access to Good-X-Work's sensitive data, Good-X-Work shall establish trust with Good-X-Pay and the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+
+### I.3 Use case: assertion
+
+#### Description
+
+Company Good-X-Pay prepares the employee payrolls for the company Good-X-Work. In order to do that, the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) gets authenticated access to the employees' attendance data stored at [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example). The server [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example) grants access to the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) upon receiving an access token issued by the authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example). The authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) authenticates the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) through validating an assertion that [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) has presented.
+
+This use case describes an alternative solution to the one described by the use case "client credentials".
+
+#### Pre-conditions
+
+- The application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) has obtained an authentication assertion from a party that is trusted by the authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+- The scope of the access by the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) to the data stored at [www.Good-X-Work.example](http://www.Good-X-Work.example) has been defined.
+- The authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) has established a trust relationship with the asserting party and is capable of validating its assertions.
+
+#### Post-conditions
+
+A successful procedure results in the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) receiving an access token after authenticating to the authorization server at [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) by presenting an assertion (e.g., SAML assertion). It gets access to the employees' attendance data using the access token
+
+#### Requirements
+
+- Authentication of the application at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example) to the authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) is required.
+- The authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example) must be capable of validating assertions issued by the asserting party and presented by the application running at [www.Good-X-Pay.example](http://www.Good-X-Pay.example).
+- Good-X-Work shall establish trust with Good-X-Pay and the authorization server [www.X-carrier.example](http://www.X-carrier.example).
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252 (2010), *Baseline identity management terms and definitions*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 6750] IETF RFC 6750, *The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage*.
+- [b-OpenID v.2] OpenID Authentication 2.0
+< [http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2\\_0.html](http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html) >
+- [b-3GPP TS 33.220] 3GPP TS 33.220 (2013) *Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture, Release 12*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2807
+
+(01/2009)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Generalized mobility
+
+# --- **MPLS-based mobility capabilities in NGN**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2807
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, followed by "International Telecommunication Union" in a smaller font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2807**
+
+# **MPLS-based mobility capabilities in NGN**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2807 describes MPLS-based mobility capabilities in an NGN environment where the MPLS technology is deployed in the NGN core IP network. The MPLS-based mobility capabilities seek to provide QoS-enabled mobility support in NGN.
+
+This Recommendation identifies service requirements, functional requirements, functional architecture and mobility scenarios for support of QoS-enabled terminal mobility in NGN using MPLS-based capabilities.
+
+## **Source**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2807 was approved on 23 January 2009 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2009-2012) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedures.
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Handover, MMCF, MPLS, NGN, QoS, terminal mobility.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2009
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## CONTENTS
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Requirements for MPLS-based mobility capabilities..... | 4 |
+| 6.1 Service requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 6.2 Functional requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Functional architecture for support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Network environment..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Functional architecture ..... | 7 |
+| 8 Mobility scenarios using MPLS-based mobility capabilities ..... | 9 |
+| 8.1 Case of intra-AN mobility ..... | 9 |
+| 8.2 Case of inter-AN mobility ..... | 10 |
+| 8.3 Case of inter-CN mobility ..... | 10 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 10 |
+| Appendix I – Functional procedures using MPLS-based mobility capabilities..... | 11 |
+| I.1 Location registration..... | 11 |
+| I.2 Service registration..... | 11 |
+| I.3 Handover ..... | 12 |
+| Appendix II – Information flows using MPLS-based mobility capabilities..... | 15 |
+| II.1 Location registration..... | 15 |
+| II.2 Location update ..... | 17 |
+| II.3 Location query/response for user data transmission ..... | 20 |
+| Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+In NGN, it is expected that a variety of the existing and new wired/wireless access network technologies are supported, such as WLAN, xDSL and 2G/3G mobile technologies, etc. Various services ranging from real-time multimedia services to data transfer services to a fixed or a mobile user are expected to be supported by the NGN, and such services may be provided with different QoS commitment levels, i.e., from best-effort up to more stringent QoS levels. Multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) is a key transport technology in NGN. Deployment of the MPLS technology in the NGN core IP network can provide significant assurance in the delivery of the desired QoS for a variety of services and applications.
+
+Given the objective of fixed-mobile convergence in NGN, this Recommendation describes the MPLS-based capabilities required to provide QoS-enabled terminal mobility in NGN. This includes the support of terminal mobility across different fixed and mobile networks as well as in different mobility scenarios including intra-access network, inter-access network and inter-core network scenarios.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2807
+
+# MPLS-based mobility capabilities in NGN
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+The objective of this Recommendation is to describe the MPLS-based capabilities required to provide QoS-enabled terminal mobility in NGN.
+
+More specifically, this Recommendation identifies service requirements, functional requirements, functional architecture and mobility scenarios for support of QoS-enabled terminal mobility in NGN using MPLS-based capabilities.
+
+This Recommendation builds on general mobility management functionalities described in [ITU-T Q.1707] for support of the NGN mobility related requirements described in [b-ITU-T Y.2201].
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Q.1706] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), *Mobility management requirements for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1707] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1707/Y.2804 (2008), *Generic framework of mobility management for next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.1541] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1541 (2006), *Network performance objectives for IP-based services*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 access network** [ITU-T Q.1707]: A network that is characterized by a specific wired/wireless access technology.
+
+**3.1.2 core network** [ITU-T Q.1707]: An architectural term related to the part of an NGN network, which is independent of a specific access technology.
+
+**3.1.3 handover** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability to provide services with some impact on their service level agreements to a moving object during and after movement.
+
+**3.1.4 mobility** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment.
+
+**3.1.5 mobility management** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The set of functions used to provide mobility. These functions include authentication, authorization, location updating, paging, download of user information and more.
+
+**3.1.6 session** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A temporary telecommunications relationship among a group of objects in the service stratum that are assigned to collectively fulfil a task for a period of time. A session has a state that may change during its lifetime. Session-based telecommunications may, but need not be, assisted by intermediaries. Session-based telecommunications can be one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-one, or many-to-many.
+
+**3.1.7 terminal mobility** [ITU-T Q.1706]: This is the mobility for those scenarios where the same terminal equipment is moving or is used at different locations. The ability of a terminal to access telecommunication services from different locations and while in motion, and the capability of the network to identify and locate that terminal.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 end user** : The actual user of the products or services.
+
+NOTE – The end user consumes the product or service. Further, an end user may or may not be responsible for concluding contracts for the services subscribed to and for paying for these services (i.e., an end user may or may not be a subscriber).
+
+**3.2.2 roaming**: This is the ability of the users to access services according their user profile while moving outside of their subscribed home network, i.e., by using an access point of a visited network. This requires the ability of the user to get access in the visited network, the existence of an interface between home network and visited network, as well as a roaming agreement between the respective network operators.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------------|
+| 2G | 2nd Generation |
+| 3G | 3rd Generation |
+| A-HCF | Access Handover Control Function |
+| A-LMF | Access Location Management Function |
+| A-MMCF | Access Mobility Management Control Function |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| A-RACF | Access Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| C-HCF | Central Handover Control Function |
+| C-LMF | Central Location Management Function |
+| C-MMCF | Central Mobility Management Control Function |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| C-RACF | Core Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| CUE | Correspondent User Equipment |
+| FTTH | Fibre-To-The Home |
+| GMA | Global Mobility Agent |
+
+| | |
+|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------|
+| HCF | Handover Control Function |
+| HDSF | Handover Decision Sub-Function |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IS | Information Server |
+| L2 | Layer 2 |
+| LER | Label Edge Router |
+| LID | Location Identifier |
+| LMA | Local Mobility Agent |
+| LMF | Location Management Function |
+| LSP | Label Switched Path |
+| LSR | Label Switching Router |
+| MM | Mobility Management |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management Control Function |
+| MPLS | Multiprotocol Label Switching |
+| MSCS | Mobile Service Control System |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function |
+| NGN | Next Generation Networks |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| PoA | Point of Attachment |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| TCF | Transport Control Function |
+| TF | Transport Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UID | User Identifier |
+| WLAN | Wireless Local Area Network |
+| W-LAN/MAN | Wireless Local Area Network/Metropolitan Area Network |
+| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Line |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+The terms "terminal" and "UE" are used interchangeably in this Recommendation.
+
+# **6 Requirements for MPLS-based mobility capabilities**
+
+### **6.1 Service requirements**
+
+This clause identifies the service requirements for the MPLS-based mobility capabilities in NGN. The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are required to:
+
+- Support terminal mobility [ITU-T Q.1706] in order to allow the UE to maintain its ongoing services while moving around.
+
+NOTE 1 – Mobility in NGN may impact the QoS delivered to the UE by NGN provisioning, since the various access networks connected to an NGN core may differ with respect to the QoS level they can provide to the UE. Therefore, NGN may be required to support QoS adaptation mechanisms.
+
+- Support the IP QoS classes and associated performance requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.1541].
+
+NOTE 2 – [ITU-T Y.1541] recommends the selection of the specific QoS classes based on the application requirements.
+
+- Provide the UE with pertinent network-related information, inclusive of, but not limited to, available access networks, related cost and related QoS level, that may enable the selection and utilization of access networks.
+
+NOTE 3 – It is recommended to achieve this via a request by the UE of information on accessible access networks so that one of the detected networks can be selected as appropriate, e.g., according to UE selection criteria or because of its movement into another access network.
+
+- Monitor the temporal properties (e.g., available bandwidth, current packet loss rate) of the traffic stream against the agreed upon QoS level.
+
+The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to:
+
+- Provide support of network policies and user preferences for ongoing services.
+- In case of QoS level degradation of the UE traffic stream and where possible, trigger UE handover to another access network in order to satisfy as much as possible the agreed upon QoS level.
+
+### **6.2 Functional requirements**
+
+This clause identifies the functional requirements for the MPLS-based mobility capabilities in NGN.
+
+- Interaction with location management
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are required to recognize the UE movement and its location by interacting with the location management functions [ITU-T Q.1707].
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to enable efficient resource allocation by activation of hierarchical location management [ITU-T Q.1707].
+
+- Interaction with handover control
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are required to interact with the handover control functions in order to minimize the impacts on ongoing services while the UE is moving into other access networks [ITU-T Q.1707].
+- Interaction with service control
+ - The session information related to required bandwidth, delay constraint and allowed packet loss rate of ongoing services is required to be delivered to the mobility management control functions in order to trigger the establishment of label switched paths (LSPs) as appropriate for handover support.
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities can optionally cooperate with the NGN service control functions (e.g., P-CSC-FE and S-CSC-FE [ITU-T Y.2012]) to receive the session information of ongoing services.
+ - The provision of the collected network-related information (see the requirements for network resource control) to the service control functions is recommended to enable downgrading of the QoS level of ongoing services in case of lack of resources.
+- Network resource control
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to mediate resource allocation between SCF and RACF [ITU-T Y.2111].
+ - In order to support as much as possible the agreed upon QoS level of ongoing services, as well as network providers' policies and user preferences, the MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to collect and maintain the network-related information (network topology and QoS information (e.g., available bandwidth, packet loss rate)) from access networks via RACF.
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to support network resource pre-provisioning in order to allow fast and reliable handovers.
+ - The MPLS-based mobility capabilities are recommended to support network resource pre-provisioned in order to allow reliable and fast delivery of mobility signalling.
+
+# **7 Functional architecture for support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities**
+
+### **7.1 Network environment**
+
+Figure 7-1 shows an instantiation of network environment with support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a hierarchical network architecture for MPLS-based mobility. At the top is a 'Mobile Service Control System' connected via control lines to two 'GMA' (Global Mobility Agent) blocks. Below these are five 'LMA' (Local Mobility Agent) blocks. An 'IS' (Information Server) is also present at this level. These components interact with an 'NGN core network based on MPLS' which contains a mesh of 'LSR' (Label Switch Router) and 'LER' (Label Edge Router) nodes. 'RACF' (Resource and Admission Control Function) instances are associated with the LERs. At the bottom, the network connects to various access networks: '2G RAN', '3G RAN', 'W-LAN/MAN', and 'xDSL/FTTH AN'. Legend: Blue dotted line = Control; Green solid line = Media; Black solid line = LSP.
+
+Figure 7-1 – Network environment with support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Network environment with support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities**
+
+As indicated in the above figure, various types of access networks such as 2G RAN, 3G RAN, W-LAN/MAN and xDSL/FTTH based access networks may be connected to the MPLS-based NGN core network. The MPLS-based mobility capabilities in the NGN core network are responsible for UE mobility (e.g., the UE moving from a W-LAN/MAN access network to a 3G radio access network). The MPLS-based NGN core network has the control plane separated from the transport plane by using dedicated control LSPs. In the control plane, each global mobility agent (GMA) is connected to various local mobility a gents (LMAs), and each LMA is connected to a RACF instance (note that Figure 7-1 shows the case of distributed RACF) allowing the LMA to exchange information related to resource and admission control.
+
+LMAs are located at the edge of the NGN core network and each LMA manages mobility within a given AN. In order to support mobility [ITU-T Q.1707], each LMA includes location management function (LMF) and handover control function (HCF), and maintains UE information (e.g., user ID, location ID, etc.). When moving to a new AN, in order to inform the LMA in that AN about its arrival and register its information, the UE performs registration to the LMA. Then the LMA interacts with the relevant GMA within the NGN core network in order to update UE location information. During the LMA registration to GMA, the LMA can exchange information with RACF for resource and admission control.
+
+GMAs are located in the NGN core network and each GMA supports mobility between pairs of access networks (pairs of LMAs) connected to that NGN core network. In order to support mobility, each GMA includes LMF and HCF. During location management and handover control process, GMA interacts with the connected LMAs within the NGN core network. In case of mobility between different NGN core networks, the UE information (e.g., user ID, location ID, etc.) is exchanged with GMAs located in different NGN core networks.
+
+RACF can be centralized [b-ITU-T Y.2175] or distributed [b-ITU-T Y.2174]. RACF manages resource and admission control.
+
+Information servers (ISs) may store access network-related information of the various wired or wireless channels. When choosing to connect to one of the access networks or moving into another access network, a user may use this network-related information stored in ISs to make an appropriate selection.
+
+Mobile service control systems (MSCSs) can be deployed in centralized or distributed form. MSCSs provide the service control functions described in clause 7.2.
+
+6 **Rec. ITU-T Y.2807 (01/2009)**
+
+### 7.2 Functional architecture
+
+Figure 7-2 shows an overview of the functional architecture for support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities, which includes service control functions (SCF), mobility management control functions (MMCF), transport control functions (TCF) and transport functions (TF).
+
+
+
+Figure 7-2: Functional architecture for support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities. The diagram shows a layered architecture. On the left, 'End User Functions' connect to the 'NGN UNI' interface. On the right, 'Other Networks' connect to the 'NGN NNI' interface. The core architecture consists of four main layers: 1. 'Service Control Functions' (SCF) at the top, containing 'Service User Profiles'. 2. 'Mobility Management Control Functions (MMCF)' in the middle, which is divided into 'A-MMCF' and 'C-MMCF'. 'A-MMCF' contains 'A-LMF' and 'A-HCF' (which includes 'HDSF'). 'C-MMCF' contains 'C-LMF' and 'C-HCF' (which includes 'HDSF'). 3. 'Transport Control Functions' (TCF) below MMCF, containing 'Network Attachment Control Functions' (with 'Transport User Profiles') and 'Resource and Admission Control Functions'. 4. 'Transport Functions' (TF) at the bottom. Dashed lines indicate interactions between 'End User Functions' and 'A-MMCF', and between 'Other Networks' and 'C-MMCF'.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Functional architecture for support of MPLS-based mobility capabilities**
+
+This functional architecture is aligned with the general mobility management functional architecture defined in [ITU-T Q.1707] and builds upon the NGN functional architecture [ITU-T Y.2012] with the addition of a new set of functions called MMCF for mediation between SCF and TCF. SCFs and TCFs interact with MMCF.
+
+MMCF interacts with the UE as well as with other MMCFs (in other NGNs). MMCF includes a handover decision sub-function (HDSF), which is responsible for handover decisions.
+
+For QoS management related to mobility, HDSF interacts with SCF to get information on the QoS level required by ongoing services. HDSF also interacts with RACF to get resource-related information and to compare post-handover QoS level with pre-handover QoS level. As described in clause I.3, the handover cases are classified into three: (1) case of having enough resources to provide the service continuously; (2) case of downgrading the QoS level, and; (3) case of no resources for handover. HDSF may also provide network-related information to the UE. The various functional groups shown in Figure 7-2 are described later in this clause.
+
+NOTE – As far as the resource control mechanisms are concerned, these are specified in [b-ITU-T Y.2174] and [b-ITU-T Y.2175].
+
+#### 7.2.1 Service control function (SCF)
+
+SCF includes resource control, registration, authentication and authorization functions at the service level for services as described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. It can also include functions for controlling media resources, specialized resources and gateways at the service signalling level. For authentication, mutual authentication between the end user and the service is performed. SCF accommodates service user profiles representing the combination of user information and other control data into a single user profile function [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+#### 7.2.2 Mobility management control function (MMCF)
+
+MMCF provides mobility management and control functions in order to support mobility in NGN as described in [ITU-T Q.1707]. MMCF includes LMF and HCF for, respectively, location management and handover control. These two functions include several functional entities as described in [ITU-T Q.1707]. Basically, MMCF in the functional architecture consists of access
+
+mobility management control functions (A-MMCFs) and central mobility management control functions (C-MMCFs). According to their functional role, C-MMCF can be classified into central LMF (C-LMF) and central HCF (C-HCF). Similarly, A-MMCF can be divided into access LMF (A-LMF) and access HCF (A-HCF).
+
+A-MMCF is used to support intra-AN mobility (see clause 8.1). A-MMCF is used to support inter-AN mobility (see clause 8.2) through interaction with C-MMCF. C-MMCF is used to manage inter-CN mobility (see clause 8.3).
+
+#### **7.2.3 Transport control function (TCF)**
+
+TCF includes NACF and RACF. NACF provides registration at the access level and initialization of end user functions for accessing NGN services as described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. These functions provide transport stratum-level identification/authentication, manage the IP address space of the access network, and authenticate access sessions. NACF provides the following functionalities:
+
+- Dynamic provisioning of IP addresses and other user equipment configuration parameters.
+- By endorsement of user, auto-discovery of user equipment capabilities and other parameters.
+- Authentication of end user and network at the IP layer (and possibly other layers); for authentication, mutual authentication between the end user and the network attachment is performed.
+- Authorization of network access, based on user profiles.
+- Access network configuration, based on user profiles.
+- Location management at the IP layer.
+
+NACF includes the transport user profile representing the combination of a user's information and other control data into a single "user profile" function in the transport stratum.
+
+RACF provides the resource and admission control functions for QoS-related transport resource control within access and core networks as described in [ITU-T Y.2111]. RACF can make use of information such as transport subscription information, network policy rules, service priority and transport resource status and utilization information.
+
+RACF interacts with SCF and TFs for services requiring NGN transport resource control. RACF performs policy-based transport resource control at the request of SCF, determines the transport resource availability and admission, and applies controls to TFs to enforce the policy decision. RACF interacts with TFs for the purpose of controlling functions such as bandwidth reservation and allocation, traffic classification and policing in the transport layer. RACF takes into account the capabilities of transport networks and associated transport subscription information for subscribers in support of transport resource control.
+
+#### **7.2.4 Transport function (TF)**
+
+TFs provide the connectivity for all components and physically separated functions within NGN as described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. These functions are responsible for the transfer of media information, as well as control and management information.
+
+#### **7.2.5 End user functions**
+
+These functions request access network-related information allowing the UE to make the appropriate selection among the detected access networks. These functions allow dynamic change of QoS level upon UE request.
+
+# 8 Mobility scenarios using MPLS-based mobility capabilities
+
+In NGN, various types of access networks (ANs) may be connected to a core IP/MPLS network through ingress label edge routers (LERs). These access networks may use MPLS or IP-based technologies to transport traffic from/to the UE.
+
+Three types of mobility are considered: intra-AN mobility, inter-AN mobility, and inter-CN mobility. As shown in the example configuration in Figure 8-1, TF1 and TF2 exist in AN1, and TF3 in AN2. AN1 and AN2 are controlled by A-RACF1 and A-RACF2, respectively, and are connected to the same core network 1 (CN1). C-RACF may be centralized in the NGN core network (as in Figure 8-1) or distributed. C-RACF monitors the resource status of the core network and triggers the establishment of new LSPs or resizing of existing LSPs by interacting with TFs.
+
+The following clauses provide a functional overview of the mobility scenarios related to the above mentioned three types of mobility. Appendix II describes information flows to support these mobility scenarios using MPLS-based mobility capabilities.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture for mobility scenarios across access networks connected to MPLS-based NGN core networks. It shows three access networks (AN1, AN2, AN3) and two core networks (CN1, CN2). AN1 and AN2 are connected to CN1, while AN3 is connected to CN2. Each AN contains one or more Traffic Flows (TF1, TF2, TF3). The core networks contain Centralized Mobility Control Functions (C-MMCF1, C-MMCF2) and Centralized Resource Allocation Functions (C-RACF1, C-RACF2). Access networks have their own Access MMCFs (A-MMCF1, A-MMCF2, A-MMCF3) and Access RACFs (A-RACF1, A-RACF2, A-RACF3). LERs (Label Edge Routers) connect the ANs to the core networks. LSRs (Label Switched Routers) are within the core networks. A sequence of UEs at the bottom shows Intra-AN, Inter-AN, and Inter-CN mobility scenarios.
+
+Figure 8-1: Mobility scenarios across access networks connected to MPLS-based NGN core networks. The diagram illustrates three access networks (AN1, AN2, AN3) connected to two core networks (CN1, CN2). AN1 and AN2 are connected to CN1, while AN3 is connected to CN2. Each AN contains one or more Traffic Flows (TF1, TF2, TF3). The core networks contain Centralized Mobility Control Functions (C-MMCF1, C-MMCF2) and Centralized Resource Allocation Functions (C-RACF1, C-RACF2). Access networks have their own Access MMCFs (A-MMCF1, A-MMCF2, A-MMCF3) and Access RACFs (A-RACF1, A-RACF2, A-RACF3). LERs (Label Edge Routers) connect the ANs to the core networks. LSRs (Label Switched Routers) are within the core networks. A sequence of UEs at the bottom shows Intra-AN, Inter-AN, and Inter-CN mobility scenarios.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Mobility scenarios across access networks connected to MPLS-based NGN core networks**
+
+### 8.1 Case of intra-AN mobility
+
+This case is the mobility scenario associated with UE movement within a single AN. In this scenario, the UE can continue to use its ongoing services. No location update to C-MMCF is needed because the UE movement is within the same AN.
+
+SCF provides application level signalling for session handling. It also provides information to MMCF to allow identification of media sessions and their required QoS characteristics.
+
+MMCF requests transport resources to RACF1 and receives notifications from RACF1 when these resources are reserved or released. A-MMCF is used to manage the intra-AN mobility and may be located within the LER interconnecting that AN with the NGN core network.
+
+In this scenario, the UE moves under control of the same RACF. Depending on the UE movement, RACF1 supports the establishment of a new connection on TF2 and releases the resources allocated on TF1.
+
+### **8.2 Case of inter-AN mobility**
+
+In this case, the UE moves to another AN (AN2) connected to the same NGN core network. This scenario requires handover control and LSP re-direction since the UE moves between ANs. According to its movement, the UE executes a location update to C-MMCF. Afterwards, traffic to/from the UE can be sent through AN2. In this process, HDSF makes use of the network-related information provided by RACFs, and subsequently verifies resource availability in AN2.
+
+Moving between ANs, the UE may change its location ID (LID) and its corresponding A-MMCF. The UE executes a location update to the new A-MMCF (A-MMCF2). A-MMCF1 and A-MMCF2 interact with C-MMCF to support the inter-AN handover.
+
+By interacting with MMCFs, C-RACF requests the establishment of a new LSP or resizing of an existing LSP in the NGN core network, and A-RACF2 performs the establishment of a new connection on TF3 in AN2. The existing connection in AN1 is then released by A-RACF1. At the AN2-related ingress LER of the NGN core network, the session in AN2 is mapped into the relevant LSP in the core network. For scalability purposes, the session-to-LSP mapping may be controlled by C-RACF.
+
+### **8.3 Case of inter-CN mobility**
+
+In this case, the UE moves to an access network connected only to a different NGN core network. The UE performs roaming signalling via the C-MMCFs located in the old and new NGN core networks through an LSP established between the old and new NGN core networks.
+
+C-MMCF is used to manage UE roaming. According to the UE movement, C-MMCF requests C-RACF to establish a new LSP or resize an existing LSP to transport traffic from/to the UE through the two NGN core networks.
+
+C-RACF collects the network-related information in the new NGN core network and verifies availability of its resources.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+In the MPLS-based NGN core network (and in those access networks where the MPLS technology is deployed), it is recommended to maintain secure LSPs (this being particularly important during the handover process).
+
+The following are requirements related to the establishment of security associations in scenarios related to the three types of the mobility described in clause 8:
+
+- Intra-AN mobility:
+UE movement does not require the establishment of any new security association.
+- Inter-AN mobility:
+UE movement is controlled by the same GMA. The UE requires re-registration to GMA with information related to the new LMA. A new security association between the UE and the new LMA needs to be established.
+- Inter-CN mobility:
+When moving from the old NGN core network to the new NGN core network, the UE requires new security associations with the relevant LMA and GMA in the new NGN core network.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Functional procedures using MPLS-based mobility capabilities
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes functional procedures using MPLS-based mobility capabilities related to location registration, service registration and handover.
+
+### I.1 Location registration
+
+This clause describes the location registration procedures for the UE.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ SCF[SCF] --- MMCF[MMCF]
+ MMCF --- TCF[TCF]
+ UE[UE] --- TCF
+ UE -- "(1)" --> MMCF
+ MMCF -- "(2)" --> UE
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the location registration procedure. It shows four entities: SCF, MMCF, TCF, and UE. SCF is connected to MMCF. MMCF is connected to TCF. UE is connected to TCF. The procedure involves two flows: (1) from UE to MMCF, and (2) from MMCF to UE.
+
+Figure I.1 – Location registration procedure diagram
+
+**Figure I.1 – Location registration procedure**
+
+- (1) The UE performs location registration to MMCF. After receiving the request via flow (1), the MMCF creates an association between the address of the UE and the address of its point of attachment (PoA) and stores the association in its local lookup table.
+- (2) A location registration confirmation is sent from MMCF to the UE.
+
+### I.2 Service registration
+
+This clause describes registration procedures for the UE to use a service.
+
+
+
+```
+graph TD
+ SCF[SCF] -- "(3)" --> MMCF
+ MMCF -- "(4)" --> SCF
+ MMCF -- "(5)" --> TCF
+ TCF -- "(2)" --> MMCF
+ UE[UE] -- "(1)" --> TCF
+ TCF -- "(6)" --> UE
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the service registration procedure. It shows four entities: SCF, MMCF, TCF, and UE. SCF is connected to MMCF. MMCF is connected to TCF. UE is connected to TCF. The procedure involves six flows: (1) from UE to TCF, (2) from TCF to MMCF, (3) from MMCF to SCF, (4) from SCF to MMCF, (5) from MMCF to TCF, and (6) from TCF to UE.
+
+Figure I.2 – Service registration procedure diagram
+
+**Figure I.2 – Service registration procedure**
+
+- (1) The UE performs service registration to the TCF. This service registration request contains QoS information for the service.
+- (2) Upon receipt of the service registration request, the TCF sends this message to MMCF together with information on the resource usage status.
+
+- (3) The MMCF stores the information on the resource usage status and requests service registration to SCF.
+- (4) After receiving the information on the requested QoS level for the service from the SCF via the service registration response, the MMCF decides whether the QoS parameters (e.g., bandwidth, delay, jitter, loss, etc.) of the requested QoS level are accepted or not.
+- (5) If the requested QoS level is accepted, the MMCF informs the TCF that the requested QoS parameters are accepted.
+- (6) The TCF replies to the UE, i.e., the requested registration with the QoS parameters is accepted.
+
+### 1.3 Handover
+
+Handover cases are classified into three: (1) case of having enough resources to provide the service continuously; (2) case of downgrading the QoS level, and; (3) case of no resources for handover.
+
+- Case of having enough resources to provide the service continuously
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ SCF
+ sub MMCF
+ LMF
+ HCF
+ HDSF
+ end
+ NACF
+ RACF
+ sub TF1 [Transport Functions 1]
+ end
+ sub TF2 [Transport Functions 2]
+ end
+ UE1[UE]
+ UE2[UE]
+
+ UE1-->>TF2: (1)
+ UE2->>TF2: (2)
+ TF2-->>TF1: (3)
+ TF2->>RACF: (4)
+ RACF->>HDSF: (5)
+ RACF->>SCF: (6)
+ SCF-->>RACF: (7)
+ RACF-->>HDSF: (8)
+ RACF-->>TF2: (9)
+ RACF-->>TF1: (10)
+
+```
+
+Figure I.3 – Handover functional procedure in the case of having enough resources. The diagram shows a network architecture with SCF, MMCF (containing LMF and HCF/HDSF), NACF, RACF, Transport Functions 1 and 2, and two UE instances. Numbered arrows (1) through (10) indicate the sequence of operations: (1) UE moves to TF2; (2) UE re-enters network; (3) TF2 to TF1 context retrieval; (4) TF2 to RACF handover request; (5) RACF to HDSF request; (6) RACF to SCF registration; (7) SCF to RACF response; (8) RACF to HDSF response; (9) RACF to TF2 response; (10) RACF to TF1 response.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Handover functional procedure in the case of having enough resources**
+
+- (1) The UE moves to TF2.
+- (2) The UE executes the network re-entry procedure. This step includes the interactions with NACF to perform authentication, authorization, etc.
+- (3) Optionally, TF2 performs a context retrieval procedure to get some information from the previous TF1 (for example, in WLAN, the inter-access point protocol (IAPP) and other proprietary methods are used to support roaming between different access points; the details of this step are not covered by the scope of this Recommendation).
+- (4) TF2 sends a handover request to RACF with information on the current resource usage status.
+- (5) RACF requests for handover from HDSF and sends information on the resource usage status.
+
+- (6) HDSF stores information on the resource usage status and asks SCF for information on the QoS level required by the service. At this time, the SCF can decide if the service level should change or not with the current resource usage status because it knows which service level is allowed for the service.
+- (7) After receiving information on the QoS level required by the service from SCF, the HDSF decides whether the UE should execute handover or not based on service level information received from the SCF.
+- (8) If it decides handover execution because of enough resources, the HDSF informs RACF that the current resource usage status satisfies the QoS level required by the service.
+- (9) RACF performs the resource reservation procedure and applies policy decisions to TF2.
+- (10) RACF notifies TF1 of the handover status and requests for the release of the previously allocated resources on TF1. After receiving the release indication from RACF, TF1 releases the correlated resources and subsequently gives a response to RACF.
+- Case of downgrading the QoS level
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SCF
+ participant MMCF
+ participant LMF
+ participant HDSF
+ participant RACF
+ participant NACF
+ participant TF1 as Transport Functions 1
+ participant TF2 as Transport Functions 2
+ participant UE1 as UE
+ participant UE2 as UE
+
+ Note over UE1: (1)
+ UE1 -->> UE2
+ Note over UE2: (2)
+ UE2 -->> TF2
+ Note over TF1,TF2: (3)
+ TF1 -.->> TF2
+ Note over TF2: (4)
+ TF2 -->> RACF
+ Note over RACF: (5)
+ RACF -->> MMCF
+ Note over MMCF: (6)
+ MMCF -->> SCF
+ Note over SCF: (7)
+ SCF -->> MMCF
+ Note over MMCF: (8)
+ MMCF -->> RACF
+ Note over RACF: (9)
+ RACF -->> TF2
+ Note over RACF: (10)
+ RACF -->> TF1
+ Note over TF1: (10)
+ TF1 -->> RACF
+
+```
+
+Figure I.4 – Handover functional procedure in the case of downgraded service. The diagram shows the interaction between SCF, MMCF (containing LMF and HDSF), RACF, NACF, Transport Functions 1 and 2, and two UE instances. Step (1) shows a UE moving from a dashed box to a solid box. Step (2) shows a signal from the new UE to Transport Functions 2. Step (3) shows a dashed signal from Transport Functions 1 to Transport Functions 2. Step (4) shows a signal from Transport Functions 2 to RACF. Step (5) shows a signal from RACF to MMCF. Step (6) shows a signal from MMCF to SCF. Step (7) shows a signal from SCF to MMCF. Step (8) shows a signal from MMCF to RACF. Step (9) shows a signal from RACF to Transport Functions 2. Step (10) shows a signal from RACF to Transport Functions 1. NACF is connected to RACF.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Handover functional procedure in the case of downgraded service**
+
+Steps (1) ~ (7) are similar to the procedure described above.
+
+- (8) In case it decides that keeping the service is possible by downgrading the QoS level even as it confirms that TF does not have enough resources to provide the service, HDSF adjusts the QoS level of the service and informs SCF and RACF of the revised QoS level.
+- (9) RACF performs the resource reservation procedure and applies the policy decisions to TF2 according to the revised QoS level of the service.
+- (10) RACF notifies TF1 of the handover status and requests for the release of the previously allocated resources on TF1. After receiving the release indication from RACF, TF1 releases the correlated resource and subsequently gives a response to RACF.
+
+- Case of no resources for handover
+
+
+
+Figure I.5 – Handover functional procedure in the case of no resources. The diagram shows a network architecture with SCF at the top, MMCF (containing LMF and HCF) below it, and RACF below MMCF. NACF is connected to RACF. Transport Functions 1 and 2 are below RACF, and two UE blocks are at the bottom. Numbered arrows indicate the flow of the procedure: (1) UE to UE, (2) TF2 to UE, (3) TF1 to TF2, (4) RACF to TF2, (5) RACF to MMCF, (6) SCF to MMCF, (7) MMCF to SCF, (8) SCF to MMCF, (9) MMCF to SCF, (10) MMCF to RACF, (11) RACF to TF2, and (12) TF2 to UE. A dashed line connects UE to TF1, and a dashed arrow connects TF1 to TF2.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Handover functional procedure in the case of no resources**
+
+Steps (1) ~ (7) are similar to the procedure described above.
+
+- (8) In case it decides that keeping the service is impossible because of lack of resources, the HDSF informs the SCF that the resources in TF2 are not enough to support the service.
+- (9) The SCF decides that providing the service continuously is impossible. HDSF is then informed by SCF that it cannot provide the service because of lack of resources.
+- (10) HDSF informs RACF that SCF cannot provide the service because of lack of resources.
+- (11) RACF informs TF2 that SCF cannot provide the service because of lack of resources.
+- (12) TF2 informs the UE that SCF cannot provide the service because of lack of resources.
+- (13) RACF notifies TF1 of the handover status and requests for the release of previously allocated resources on TF1. After receiving the release indication from RACF, TF1 releases the correlated resource and subsequently gives a response to RACF.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Information flows using MPLS-based mobility capabilities
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation)
+
+This appendix describes information flows using MPLS-based mobility capabilities for the mobility scenarios described in clause 8.
+
+NOTE – In this appendix, H\_GMA is the GMA located in the home network of the UE [ITU-T Q.1707].
+
+### II.1 Location registration
+
+This clause describes information flows for the location registration in two cases: (1) initial location registration of the UE, and (2) location registration of the UE in the new GMA.
+
+- Initial location registration
+
+Figure II.1 shows the information flow for the initial location registration.
+
+- When the UE enters a new PoA\_1 area, an L2 association is made between the UE and the PoA\_1. During the L2 association, PoA\_1 gets UE L2 ID (e.g., MAC address).
+- PoA\_1 sends to LMA\_1 a Link\_Up\_Notification message together with UE L2 ID. Upon receiving this message, LMA\_1 allocates the temporal IP address for the UE and creates a record for the UE in its local address table.
+- LMA\_1 sends to H\_GMA a Location\_Registration message together with UE L2 ID and temporal IP address and LMA\_1 IP address through the previously established LSP between LMA\_1 and H\_GMA.
+- Upon receiving this Location\_Registration message, H\_GMA, which does not have UE L2 ID, sends the GMA\_Information\_Request message to the UE to confirm whether the UE has information on any other GMA related to the UE.
+- The UE sends the GMA\_Information\_Response message to H\_GMA to let H\_GMA know that the UE has no information on other GMAs related to itself. Upon receiving this message, H\_GMA stores information on UE L2 ID, UE temporal IP address, and LMA\_1 IP address and subsequently sends the Location\_Registration\_Response message to LMA\_1.
+- After receiving the Location\_Registration\_Response message from H\_GMA, LMA\_1 sends to the UE the Address\_Inform message including the UE temporal IP address, LMA\_1 IP address, and H\_GMA IP address and receives the Address\_Inform\_Response message as a response.
+- In the initial location registration, the UE temporal IP address is considered a persistent IP address.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant PoA_1
+ participant LMA_1
+ participant H_GMA
+
+ UE->>PoA_1: L2 Association
+ PoA_1->>LMA_1: Link_Up_Notification
+ LMA_1->>PoA_1: Link_Up_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_1->>H_GMA: Location_Registration
+ H_GMA->>LMA_1: Location_Registration_Response
+ LMA_1->>UE: GMA_Inform_Request
+ UE->>LMA_1: GMA_Inform_Response
+ LMA_1->>UE: < Option >
+ LMA_1->>UE: Address_Inform
+ UE->>LMA_1: Address_Inform_Response
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the initial location registration process. It involves four entities: UE (User Equipment), PoA\_1 (Point of Attachment), LMA\_1 (Local Mobility Anchor), and H\_GMA (Home Gateway). The process begins with an L2 Association between the UE and PoA\_1. PoA\_1 then sends a Link\_Up\_Notification to LMA\_1, which responds with a Link\_Up\_Notification\_Response (Option). LMA\_1 then sends a Location\_Registration message to H\_GMA, which responds with a Location\_Registration\_Response. LMA\_1 then sends a GMA\_Inform\_Request to the UE, which responds with a GMA\_Inform\_Response. LMA\_1 then sends an optional < Option > message to the UE. Finally, LMA\_1 sends an Address\_Inform message to the UE, which responds with an Address\_Inform\_Response.
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for initial location registration between UE, PoA\_1, LMA\_1, and H\_GMA.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Information flow for initial location registration**
+
+- Location registration in the new GMA
+
+Figure II.2 shows the information flow for location registration in the new GMA.
+
+- When the UE enters a new PoA\_1 area, an L2 association is made between the UE and the PoA\_1. During the L2 association, PoA\_1 gets UE L2 ID (i.e., MAC address).
+- PoA\_1 sends to LMA\_1 a Link\_Up\_Notification message together with UE L2 ID. Upon receiving this message, LMA\_1 allocates the temporal IP address for the UE and creates a record for the UE in its local address table.
+- LMA\_1 sends to GMA\_1 a Location\_Registration message together with UE L2 ID and temporal IP address for UE and LMA\_1 IP address through the previously established LSP between LMA\_1 and GMA\_1.
+- Upon receiving this Location\_Registration message, GMA\_1 sends the GMA\_Information\_Request message to the UE to confirm whether the UE has information on any other GMA related to the UE.
+- The UE sends the GMA\_Information\_Response message to GMA\_1 to let GMA\_1 know that the UE has information on H\_GMA related to itself. This message includes the UE persistent IP address as well as the information of H\_GMA. Upon receiving this GMA\_Information\_Response message, GMA\_1 stores information on UE L2 ID, UE temporal IP address and persistent IP address, and LMA\_1 IP address.
+- GMA\_1 sends the Location\_Registration message to H\_GMA to register UE location information including LMA\_1 IP address and GMA\_1 IP address as well as UE L2 ID, persistent IP address, and temporal IP address.
+- H\_GMA updates UE location information together with UE temporal IP address and LMA\_1 IP address and subsequently sends the Location\_Registration\_Response message to GMA\_1.
+- After receiving the Location\_Registration\_Response message from GMA\_1, LMA\_1 sends to the UE the Address\_Inform message including UE temporal IP and LMA\_1 IP address UE and receives the Address\_Inform\_Response message as a response.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant PoA_1
+ participant LMA_1
+ participant GMA_1
+ participant H_GMA
+
+ UE->>PoA_1: L2 Association
+ PoA_1->>LMA_1: Link_Up_Notification
+ LMA_1-->>PoA_1: Link_Up_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_1->>GMA_1: Location_Registration
+ GMA_1->>PoA_1: GMA_Inform_Request
+ PoA_1->>GMA_1: GMA_Inform_Response
+ PoA_1->>H_GMA: Location_Registration
+ H_GMA-->>PoA_1: Location_Registration_Response
+ LMA_1-->>PoA_1: Location_Registration_Response
+ PoA_1->>LMA_1: Address_Inform
+ LMA_1-->>PoA_1: Address_Inform_Response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location registration in a new GMA. The diagram involves five entities: UE, PoA\_1, LMA\_1, GMA\_1, and H\_GMA. The process starts with L2 Association between UE and PoA\_1. PoA\_1 sends Link\_Up\_Notification to LMA\_1, which responds with Link\_Up\_Notification\_Response (Option). LMA\_1 sends Location\_Registration to GMA\_1. GMA\_1 sends GMA\_Inform\_Request to PoA\_1, which responds with GMA\_Inform\_Response. PoA\_1 then sends Location\_Registration to H\_GMA, which responds with Location\_Registration\_Response. LMA\_1 also sends Location\_Registration\_Response to PoA\_1. Finally, PoA\_1 sends Address\_Inform to LMA\_1, which responds with Address\_Inform\_Response. An optional step is indicated by a dashed box around the Address\_Inform and Address\_Inform\_Response messages.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Information flow for location registration in new GMA**
+
+### II.2 Location update
+
+This clause describes the information flow for location update in three cases: (1) the UE moves between different LMAs within the home core network; (2) the UE moves into a foreign core network, and correspondent UE (CUE) is located in the home core network; and (3) the UE moves into a foreign core network, and CUE is located in another foreign core network.
+
+- In case the UE moves between different LMAs within the home core network
+
+Figure II.3 shows the information flow for fast handover when the UE moves to the new PoA area in the home core network.
+
+- When the UE enters a new PoA\_2 area, an L2 association is made between the UE and the PoA\_2. During the L2 association, PoA gets UE L2 ID.
+- PoA\_2 sends to LMA\_2 a Link\_Up\_Notification message together with UE L2 ID. Upon receiving this message, LMA\_2 allocates the temporal IP address for the UE and creates a record for the UE in its local address table.
+- LMA\_2 sends to H\_GMA a Location\_Registration message together with UE L2 ID and temporal IP address and LMA\_2 IP address through the previously established LSP between LMA\_2 and H\_GMA.
+- Upon receiving this Location\_Registration message, H\_GMA, which has UE L2 ID, updates the information in the global address table and sends a Location\_Registration\_Response message to LMA\_2.
+- H\_GMA sends to LMA\_CUE a Binding\_Update\_Notification message together with the UE persistent IP address and temporal IP address and LMA\_2 IP address. If LMA\_1, where UE was connected before handover or LMA\_2 where UE is currently connected, is able to know the location information of CUE, LMA\_1 or LMA\_2 can optionally send the Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_CUE.
+- After receiving the Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response message from H\_GMA, LMA\_2 sends to the UE the Address\_Inform message including UE temporal IP and LMA\_2 IP address and receives the Address\_Inform\_Response message as a response.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant PoA_2
+ participant LMA_2
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant LMA_CUE
+ participant CUE
+
+ UE->>PoA_2:L2 Association
+ PoA_2->>LMA_2:Link_Up_Notification
+ LMA_2-->>PoA_2:Link_Up_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_2->>H_GMA:Location_Registration
+ H_GMA-->>LMA_2:Location_Registration_Response
+ LMA_2->>UE:Address_Inform
+ UE-->>LMA_2:Address_Inform_Response
+ H_GMA->>LMA_CUE:Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_CUE-->>H_GMA:Binding_Update_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_CUE->>LMA_2:Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_2-->>LMA_CUE:Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location update in case UE moves between different LMAs within the home core network. The diagram involves six entities: UE, PoA\_2, LMA\_2, H\_GMA, LMA\_CUE, and CUE. The process starts with L2 Association between UE and PoA\_2. PoA\_2 sends Link\_Up\_Notification to LMA\_2, which responds with Link\_Up\_Notification\_Response (Option). LMA\_2 sends Location\_Registration to H\_GMA, which responds with Location\_Registration\_Response. LMA\_2 then sends Address\_Inform to UE, which responds with Address\_Inform\_Response. H\_GMA sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_CUE, which responds with Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response (Option). Finally, LMA\_CUE sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_2, which responds with Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response. Dashed boxes indicate optional steps.
+
+**Figure II.3 – Information flow for location update in case UE moves between different LMAs within the home core network**
+
+- In case the UE moves into a foreign core network (CUE exists within the home core network)
+
+Figure II.4 shows the information flow for fast handover when the UE moves to the area of the new PoA located in the foreign core network.
+
+- When the UE moves from the area of the old PoA to the new PoA area, the L2 association is performed between the UE and the new PoA. During the L2 association process, the new PoA gets UE L2 ID.
+- PoA sends to LMA\_UE a Link\_Up\_Notification message together with UE L2 ID.
+- LMA\_UE sends to GMA\_UE a Location\_Registration message together with UE L2 ID and temporal IP address via the previously established LSP between LMA\_UE and GMA\_UE.
+- Upon receiving this Location\_Registration message, GMA\_UE searches for UE L2 ID in its global address table.
+- If its global address table does not have UE L2 ID, GMA\_UE requests for the other GMA information from the UE.
+- The UE responds to GMA\_UE with the UE the persistent IP address as well as the information of H\_GMA.
+- GMA\_UE registers the location information of the UE based on the received GMA\_Information\_Response message to H\_GMA.
+- By using the registration message of GMA\_UE, H\_GMA updates its global address table related to the location information of the UE and sends the Location\_Registration\_Response message to GMA\_UE. In addition, GMA\_UE sends the Location\_Registration\_Response message to LMA\_UE.
+- H\_GMA sends to LMA\_CUE a Binding\_Update\_Notification message together with UE temporal IP address, UE persistent IP address, and LMA\_UE IP address. If LMA, where the UE was connected before handover or LMA\_UE where UE is currently connected, is able to know the location information of CUE, the LMA or LMA\_UE can optionally send the Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_CUE.
+
+- LMA\_UE informs the UE of LMA IP address and UE temporary IP address; the UE sends the Address\_Inform\_Response message to LMA\_UE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant PoA
+ participant LMA_UE
+ participant GMA_UE
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant LMA_CUE
+ participant CUE
+
+ UE->>PoA: L2 Association
+ PoA->>LMA_UE: Link_Up_Notification
+ LMA_UE-->>PoA: Link_Up_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_UE->>GMA_UE: Location_Registration
+ GMA_UE->>UE: GMA_Inform_Request
+ UE-->>GMA_UE: GMA_Inform_Response
+ GMA_UE->>H_GMA: Location_Registration
+ H_GMA-->>GMA_UE: Location_Registration_Response
+ H_GMA->>LMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_CUE-->>H_GMA: Binding_Update_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_CUE->>CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ CUE-->>LMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response (Option)
+
+ Note over UE, LMA_UE: < Option >
+ LMA_UE->>UE: Address_Inform
+ UE-->>LMA_UE: Address_Inform_Response
+
+ Note over LMA_UE, LMA_CUE: < Option >
+ LMA_UE->>LMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_CUE-->>LMA_UE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location update in a foreign core network. The diagram involves seven entities: UE, PoA, LMA\_UE, GMA\_UE, H\_GMA, LMA\_CUE, and CUE. The process starts with L2 Association between UE and PoA. PoA sends Link\_Up\_Notification to LMA\_UE, which responds with Link\_Up\_Notification\_Response (Option). LMA\_UE sends Location\_Registration to GMA\_UE. GMA\_UE sends GMA\_Inform\_Request to UE, which responds with GMA\_Inform\_Response. GMA\_UE sends Location\_Registration to H\_GMA, which responds with Location\_Registration\_Response. H\_GMA sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_CUE, which responds with Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response (Option). LMA\_CUE sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to CUE, which responds with Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response (Option). The diagram also shows optional steps for Address\_Inform and Binding\_Update\_Notification between UE and LMA\_UE, and between LMA\_UE and LMA\_CUE.
+
+**Figure II.4 – Information flow for location update in case UE is located in a foreign core network, and CUE in the home core network**
+
+- In case the UE moves into the foreign core network (CUE exists within the home core network)
+
+Figure II.5 shows the information flow for fast handover when the UE and CUE move to the areas of the new PoAs located in different foreign core networks.
+
+- When the UE enters a new PoA area, an L2 association is made between the UE and the PoA. During the L2 association, PoA gets UE L2 ID.
+- PoA sends to LMA\_UE a Link\_Up\_Notification message together with UE L2 ID. Upon receiving this message, LMA\_UE allocates the temporal IP address for the UE and creates a record for the UE in its local address table.
+- LMA\_UE sends to GMA\_UE a Location\_Registration message together with UE L2 ID and temporal IP address for UE and LMA\_UE IP address through the previously established LSP between LMA\_UE and GMA\_UE.
+- Upon receiving this Location\_Registration message, GMA\_UE sends the GMA\_Information\_Request message to the UE to confirm whether the UE has information on any other GMA related to the UE.
+- The UE sends the GMA\_Information\_Response message to GMA\_UE to let GMA\_UE know that the UE has the information on H\_GMA related to itself. This message includes UE persistent IP address as well as the information of H\_GMA. Upon receiving this message, GMA\_1 stores information on UE L2 ID, UE temporal IP address and persistent IP address, and LMA\_1 IP address.
+- GMA\_UE sends the Location\_Registration message to H\_GMA to register UE location information including LMA\_UE IP address and GMA\_UE IP address as well as UE L2 ID, persistent IP address, and temporal IP address.
+
+- H\_GMA updates UE location information and then sends the Location\_Registration\_Response message to GMA\_UE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant PoA
+ participant LMA_UE
+ participant GMA_UE
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant GMA_CUE
+ participant LMA_CUE
+ participant CUE
+
+ UE->>PoA: L2 Association
+ PoA->>LMA_UE: Link_Up_Notification
+ LMA_UE-->>PoA: Link_Up_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_UE->>GMA_UE: Location_Registration
+ GMA_UE->>PoA: GMA_Inform_Request
+ PoA->>GMA_UE: GMA_Inform_Response
+ GMA_UE->>H_GMA: Location_Registration
+ H_GMA-->>GMA_UE: Location_Registration_Response
+ H_GMA->>GMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ GMA_CUE-->>H_GMA: Binding_Update_Notification_Response (Option)
+ H_GMA->>LMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_CUE-->>H_GMA: Binding_Update_Notification_Response (Option)
+ LMA_UE->>UE: Address_Inform
+ UE-->>LMA_UE: Address_Inform_Response
+ LMA_UE->>GMA_UE: Location_Registration_Response
+ LMA_UE->>LMA_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_CUE-->>LMA_UE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location update in a foreign core network. The diagram involves eight entities: UE, PoA, LMA\_UE, GMA\_UE, H\_GMA, GMA\_CUE, LMA\_CUE, and CUE. The process starts with L2 Association between UE and PoA. PoA sends Link\_Up\_Notification to LMA\_UE, which then sends Link\_Up\_Notification\_Response (Option) back to PoA. LMA\_UE sends Location\_Registration to GMA\_UE, which sends GMA\_Inform\_Request to PoA. PoA sends GMA\_Inform\_Response to GMA\_UE. GMA\_UE sends Location\_Registration to H\_GMA, which sends Location\_Registration\_Response back to GMA\_UE. H\_GMA sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to GMA\_CUE, which sends Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response (Option) back to H\_GMA. H\_GMA also sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_CUE, which sends Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response (Option) back to H\_GMA. LMA\_UE sends Address\_Inform to UE, which sends Address\_Inform\_Response back to LMA\_UE. LMA\_UE also sends Location\_Registration\_Response to GMA\_UE. Finally, LMA\_UE sends Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_CUE, which sends Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response back to LMA\_UE.
+
+**Figure II.5 – Information flow for location update in case UE and CUE are located in a foreign core network**
+
+- H\_GMA sends to GMA\_CUE and LMA\_CUE a Binding\_Update\_Notification message together with UE persistent IP address and temporal IP address and LMA\_2 IP address. If LMA, where the UE was connected before handover or LMA\_UE where the UE is currently connected, is able to know the location information of CUE, the LMA\_UE or LMA can optionally send the Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_CUE.
+- After receiving the Location\_Registration\_Response message from GMA\_CUE, LMA\_UE sends to the UE the Address\_Inform message including UE temporal IP and LMA\_UE IP address and receives the Address\_Inform\_Response message as a response.
+
+### II.3 Location query/response for user data transmission
+
+This clause describes the information flows for the location query/response for user data transmission in three cases: (1) both the UE and the CUE are located within the home core network; (2) the UE is located in a foreign core network, and the CUE in the home core network; and (3) both the UE and the CUE are located within different foreign core networks.
+
+- In case the UE and the CUE are located within the home core network
+
+Figure II.6 shows the information flow for data packet transmission between the UE and the CUE when H\_GMA has UE temporal IP address.
+
+- When the CUE sends data packets, the UE persistent IP address is used for the destination IP address; the CUE persistent IP address is used for the source IP address.
+- Upon receiving the first packet toward the UE, LER\_2 searches for UE temporal IP address in its local address table. If it does not have UE temporal IP address, LER\_2 sends a Packet\_Arrival\_Event to LMA\_2.
+
+- When receiving this message, the LMA\_2 sends a Location\_Query message to H\_GMA to determine UE temporal IP address.
+- Upon receiving this message, H\_GMA searches for UE temporal IP address in its global address table. If it has UE temporal IP address in its global address table, H\_GMA sends a Location\_Query\_Response message to LMA\_2.
+- On the other hand, upon receiving a Location\_Query message from the LMA\_2, H\_GMA sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_1 to set up another endpoint of LSP tunnel. This message contains the CUE temporal IP address (i.e., LSP endpoint controlled by LMA\_2).
+- Tunnel\_Request/Response messages are exchanged between LMA\_1 and LER\_1 and between LMA\_2 and LER\_2 to set up LSP for user data transmission.
+- During this process, the received packets from CUE may be buffered in LER\_2.
+- Finally, data packets from the CUE to UE can be transmitted through the LSP tunnel established between LER\_2 and LER\_1.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant LMA-1
+ participant LER-1
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant LMA-2
+ participant LER-2
+ participant CUE
+
+ CUE->>LER-2: Data Packet
+ LER-2->>LMA-2: Packet_Arrival_Event
+ LMA-2->>H_GMA: Location_Query
+ H_GMA->>LMA-2: Location_Query_Response
+ H_GMA->>LMA-1: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA-1->>H_GMA: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+ LMA-1->>LER-1: Tunnel_Request
+ LER-1->>LMA-1: Tunnel_Reponse
+ LMA-2->>LER-2: Tunnel_Request
+ LER-2->>LMA-2: Tunnel_Reponse
+ Note over LER-1, LER-2: LSP Tunnel
+ CUE->>LER-2: Data Packet
+ LER-2->>LER-1: Data Packet
+ LER-1->>UE: Data Packet
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow for location query/response and data packet transmission. The participants involved are UE, LMA-1, LER-1, H\_GMA, LMA-2, LER-2, and CUE. The process begins with a Data Packet being received by LER-2 from CUE. LER-2 sends a Packet\_Arrival\_Event to LMA-2. LMA-2 then sends a Location\_Query message to H\_GMA, which responds with a Location\_Query\_Response. H\_GMA sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA-1, which responds with a Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response. LMA-1 then sends a Tunnel\_Request to LER-1, which responds with a Tunnel\_Reponse. LMA-2 sends a Tunnel\_Request to LER-2, which responds with a Tunnel\_Reponse. Finally, an LSP Tunnel is established between LER-1 and LER-2. Data packets are then transmitted from CUE to LER-2, and from LER-2 to LER-1, and finally to the UE.
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location query/response between UE, LMA-1, LER-1, H\_GMA, LMA-2, LER-2, and CUE. The diagram illustrates the setup of an LSP tunnel and the subsequent data packet transmission.
+
+**Figure II.6 – Information flow for location query/response in case UE and CUE are located within the home core network**
+
+- In case the UE is located in the foreign core network (CUE exists within the home core network)
+
+Figure II.7 shows the information flow for data packet transmission between the UE and the CUE in case the UE moves into the foreign core network and the CUE is located within the home core network.
+
+- Upon receiving the first packet toward the UE, H\_LER searches for UE temporal IP address in its local address table. If it does not have UE temporal IP address, H\_LER sends a Packet\_Arrival\_Event to H\_LMA.
+- When receiving this message, the H\_LMA sends a Location\_Query message to H\_GMA to determine UE temporal IP address.
+- Upon receiving this message, H\_GMA searches for UE temporal IP address in its global address table. If it has UE temporal IP address, GMA sends a Location\_Query\_Response message to H\_LMA.
+
+- On the other hand, upon receiving a Location\_Query message from the H\_LMA, H\_GMA sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_UE to set up another endpoint of LSP tunnel. This message contains the CUE temporal IP address (i.e., LSP endpoint controlled by H\_LMA).
+- Tunnel\_Request/Response messages are exchanged between LMA\_UE and LER\_UE and between H\_LMA and H\_LER to set up LSP for user data transmission.
+- During this process, the received packets from the CUE may be buffered in H\_LER.
+- Finally, data packets from the CUE to the UE can be transmitted through the LSP tunnel established between H\_LER and LER\_UE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant LMA_UE
+ participant LER_UE
+ participant GMA_UE
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant H_LMA
+ participant H_LER
+ participant CUE
+
+ CUE->>H_LER: Packet_Arrival_Event
+ H_LER->>H_LMA: Location_Query
+ H_LMA-->>H_GMA: Location_Query_Response
+ H_GMA->>LMA_UE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_UE-->>GMA_UE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+ LMA_UE->>LER_UE: Tunnel_Request
+ LER_UE-->>LMA_UE: Tunnel_Response
+ H_LMA->>H_LER: Tunnel_Request
+ H_LER-->>H_LMA: Tunnel_Response
+ Note over LER_UE, H_LER: LSP Tunnel
+ CUE->>LER_UE: Data Packet
+ LER_UE->>UE: Data Packet
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location query/response when UE is in a foreign core network. The diagram involves eight entities: UE, LMA\_UE, LER\_UE, GMA\_UE, H\_GMA, H\_LMA, H\_LER, and CUE. The process starts with a Data Packet arriving at CUE. CUE sends a Packet\_Arrival\_Event to H\_LER. H\_LER sends a Location\_Query to H\_LMA. H\_LMA sends a Location\_Query\_Response to H\_GMA. H\_GMA sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification to LMA\_UE. LMA\_UE sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response to GMA\_UE. LMA\_UE sends a Tunnel\_Request to LER\_UE, which responds with a Tunnel\_Response. H\_LMA sends a Tunnel\_Request to H\_LER, which responds with a Tunnel\_Response. A blue bar labeled 'LSP Tunnel' spans from LER\_UE to H\_LER. Finally, a Data Packet is sent from CUE through the LSP Tunnel to LER\_UE, and then to UE.
+
+**Figure II.7 – Information flow for location query/response in case UE is located in a foreign core network (CUE exists within the home core network)**
+
+- In case the UE and CUE are located within different foreign core networks
+
+Figure II.8 shows the information flow for data packet transmission between the UE and CUE when GMA\_CUE does not have UE temporal IP address.
+
+- Upon receiving the first packet toward the UE, LER\_CUE searches for UE temporal IP address in its local address table. If it does not have UE temporal IP address, LER\_CUE sends a Packet\_Arrival\_Event to LMA\_CUE.
+- When receiving this message, the LMA\_CUE sends a Location\_Query message to GMA\_CUE to determine UE temporal IP address.
+- Upon receiving a Location\_Query message from LMA\_CUE, GMA\_CUE searches for UE temporal IP address in its global address table. If GMA\_CUE does not have UE temporal IP address, it sends a Location\_Query message to H\_GMA.
+- When H\_GMA responds with UE temporal address, GMA\_CUE updates its global address table and sends a Location\_Query\_Response message to LMA\_CUE via GMA\_CUE.
+- On the other hand, upon receiving a Location\_Query message from the GMA\_CUE, H\_GMA sends a Binding\_Update\_Notification message to LMA\_UE to set up another endpoint of LSP tunnel. This message contains the CUE temporal IP address (i.e., LSP endpoint controlled by LMA\_CUE).
+- Tunnel\_Request/Response messages are exchanged between LMA\_UE and LER\_UE and between LMA\_CUE and LER\_CUE to set up LSP for user data transmission.
+- During this process, the received packets from CUE may be buffered in LER\_CUE.
+
+- Finally, data packets from the CUE to UE can be transmitted through the LSP tunnel established between LER\_CUE and LER\_UE.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant LMA_UE
+ participant LER_UE
+ participant GMA_UE
+ participant H_GMA
+ participant GMA_CUE
+ participant LMA_CUE
+ participant LER_CUE
+ participant CUE
+
+ LER_UE->>LMA_UE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LMA_UE->>LER_UE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+ LER_UE->>LMA_UE: Tunnel_Request
+ LMA_UE->>LER_UE: Tunnel_Reponse
+ LER_UE->>LER_CUE: Binding_Update_Notification
+ LER_CUE->>LER_UE: Binding_Update_Notification_Response
+ LER_CUE->>LER_UE: Tunnel_Request
+ LER_UE->>LER_CUE: Tunnel_Reponse
+ LER_CUE->>GMA_CUE: Location_Query
+ GMA_CUE->>LER_CUE: Location_Query_Response
+ LER_CUE->>GMA_UE: Location_Query
+ GMA_UE->>LER_CUE: Location_Query_Response
+ LER_CUE->>LER_UE: Packet_Arrival_Event
+ LER_UE->>UE: Data Packet
+ CUE->>LER_CUE: Data Packet
+ LER_CUE->>LER_UE: Data Packet
+ LER_UE->>UE: Data Packet
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the information flow for a location query and response when the UE and CUE are in different foreign core networks. The sequence of events is as follows:
+
+- Binding Update:** LER\_UE sends a *Binding\_Update\_Notification* to LMA\_UE, which responds with *Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response*. LER\_UE then sends a *Tunnel\_Request* to LMA\_UE, which responds with *Tunnel\_Reponse*. LER\_CUE sends a *Binding\_Update\_Notification* to LER\_UE, which responds with *Binding\_Update\_Notification\_Response*. LER\_CUE then sends a *Tunnel\_Request* to LER\_UE, which responds with *Tunnel\_Reponse*.
+- Location Query:** LER\_CUE sends a *Location\_Query* to GMA\_CUE, which responds with *Location\_Query\_Response*. LER\_CUE then sends a *Location\_Query* to GMA\_UE, which responds with *Location\_Query\_Response*.
+- Data Packet Flow:** LER\_CUE sends a *Packet\_Arrival\_Event* to LER\_UE. LER\_UE then sends a *Data Packet* to the UE. Simultaneously, the CUE sends a *Data Packet* to LER\_CUE, which then forwards it to LER\_UE, and finally to the UE.
+
+The LSP Tunnel is established between LER\_CUE and LER\_UE, as indicated by the blue bars at the bottom of the diagram.
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow for location query/response between UE and CUE across different core networks.
+
+**Figure II.8 – Information flow for location query/response in case UE and CUE are located within different foreign core networks**
+
+## Bibliography
+
+The following references are useful to understand this Recommendation:
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.1281] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1281 (2003), *Mobile IP services over MPLS*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), *General overview of NGN*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2007), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2174] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2174 (2008), *Distributed RACF architecture for MPLS networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2175] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2175 (2008), *Centralized RACF architecture for MPLS core networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2007), *NGN Release 1 requirements*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.1] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2006), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on NGN Release 1 scope*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.21] IEEE 802.21 (2008), *Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks: Media Independent Handover*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 2475] IETF RFC 2475 (1998), *An Architecture for Differentiated Services*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3031] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3036] IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3209] IETF RFC 3209 (2001), *RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP Tunnels*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3212] IETF RFC 3212 (2002), *Constraint-Based LSP Setup using LDP*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3344] IETF RFC 3344 (2002), *IP Mobility Support for IPv4*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3775] IETF RFC 3775 (2004), *Mobility Support in IPv6*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.2809
+
+(11/2011)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Generalized mobility
+
+# --- **Framework of mobility management in the service stratum for next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2809
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font.
+
+ITU logo: a globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2809**
+
+# **Framework of mobility management in the service stratum for next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2809 describes the framework of mobility management (MM) in the service stratum for next generation networks (NGNs). This Recommendation identifies the functional architecture of MM in the NGN service stratum, and specifies the procedural information flows for location management and handover control based on the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS).
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2809 | 2011-11-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Framework, mobility management, NGN, service stratum.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2012
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Design considerations ..... | 2 |
+| 7 | Functional architecture for MM in the service stratum ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Generic architectural model ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 MM functional entities in the service control function ..... | 5 |
+| | 7.3 Mappings between IMS functions and MM control functions..... | 6 |
+| 8 | Information flows for IMS-based location management..... | 7 |
+| | 8.1 Location registration and location re-registration ..... | 7 |
+| | 8.2 Location query..... | 8 |
+| 9 | Information flows for IMS-based handover control..... | 10 |
+| | 9.1 Handover by interaction between P-CSCF and S-CSCF ..... | 10 |
+| | 9.2 Handover control by interaction between two neighbouring proxy call
session control functional entities (P-CSC-FEs) ..... | 12 |
+| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix I – Use cases of IMS-based MM with IEEE 802.21 ..... | 14 |
+| | Appendix II – Examples of IMS handover using network agents ..... | 21 |
+| | II.1 RACF applicability in the IMS handover..... | 21 |
+| | II.2 GGSN applicability in the IMS handover ..... | 22 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 24 |
+
+## **Introduction**
+
+This Recommendation describes the framework of mobility management (MM) in the service stratum for NGNs. This work has been motivated by the observation that MM is an essential functionality to provide seamless mobility for NGN users and services. This Recommendation is a part of the MM framework for NGNs. Based on the generic framework of [ITU-T Q.1707], the two Recommendations [ITU-T Q.1708] and [ITU-T Q.1709] have addressed the MM schemes in the NGN transport stratum, whereas this Recommendation deals with the MM schemes in the NGN service stratum.
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2809
+
+# Framework of mobility management in the service stratum for next generation networks
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the framework of mobility management (MM) in the service stratum for next generation networks (NGNs). This Recommendation addresses the issues on terminal mobility based on the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS). This Recommendation first identifies the functional architecture of MM in the NGN service stratum, and then specifies the procedural information flows for location management and handover control based on the identified functional architecture.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Q.1707] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1707/Y.2804 (2008), *Generic framework of mobility management for next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1708] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1708/Y.2805 (2008), *Framework of location management for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Q.1709] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1709/Y.2806 (2008), *Framework of handover control for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2007), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+This Recommendation uses the terms and definitions given in [ITU-T Y.2012], [ITU-T Y.2091], [ITU-T Q.1707], [ITU-T Q.1708], and [ITU-T Q.1709].
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+- ABG-FE Access Border Gateway Functional Entity
+- A-MMCF Access Mobility Management Control Function
+- BGF Border Gateway Function
+- CN Correspondent Node
+
+| | |
+|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| CSC-FE | Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| EN-FE | Edge Node Functional Entity |
+| FE | Functional Entity |
+| GGSN | GPRS Gateway Supporting Node |
+| HC | Handover Control |
+| HC-FE | Handover Control Functional Entity |
+| HSS | Home Subscriber Subsystem |
+| IBG-FE | Interconnection Border Gateway Functional Entity |
+| I-CSC-FE | Interrogating Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| IMS | Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LM | Location Management |
+| MIH | Media Independent Handover |
+| MM | Mobility Management |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management Control Function |
+| MN | Mobile Node |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| RACF | Resource Admission Control Function |
+| SAA-FE | Service Authentication Authorization Functional Entity |
+| SCF | Service Control Function |
+| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity |
+| SDP | Session Description Protocol |
+| S-HC-FE | Handover Control Functional Entity in the Service Stratum |
+| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol |
+| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## **6 Design considerations**
+
+This Recommendation considers mobility management (MM) in the service stratum of NGNs. In the network, a user or a user equipment (UE) may change its IP address by movement and thus the user may experience service disruption and session discontinuity. This Recommendation deals with the MM schemes or protocols that can be used to provide seamless services and session continuity against the movement of users. To provide seamless mobility, the link-layer information on the concerned access links might be used in the MM schemes, as shown in the IEEE 802.21 media independent handover (MIH). In this fashion, the so-called cross-layer optimization tasks may need
+
+to be taken to provide seamless mobility. However, the details of a specific link-layer technology are outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+It is noted that the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) platform can typically be used to support a variety of multimedia services. [b-ITU-T F.700] gives a generic model of multimedia service architecture. Multimedia services are built up by combining 'communication tasks' and organizing their interaction. A communication task is considered as a functional entity of a multimedia service, which performs its communication features. Each communication task handles a set of media components in a synchronized way, in order to convey and control information types such as audio or video. Media components are individual (mono-media) components, which handle functions related to each independent medium such as capture, coding and presentation. With regard to communication tasks, [b-ITU-T F.700] mentions 'conversing', 'conferencing', 'distributing', 'sending', 'receiving' and 'collecting'. It shall be noted that this list of communication tasks can be extended by new tasks or by the refinement of given tasks. Audio, video, text, graphics and data are identified on the level of media components.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Reference model of generic multimedia services. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is a rectangle labeled 'Generic multimedia service'. It connects via solid lines to two rounded rectangles below it: 'Communication Task A' on the left and 'Communication Task B' on the right. 'Communication Task B' is enclosed in a dashed border. Below 'Communication Task A', two solid lines connect to two ovals: 'Media component 1' and 'Media component 2'. Below 'Communication Task B', two dashed lines connect to two ovals: 'Media component 3' and 'Media component 4'. A legend at the bottom left indicates that solid lines represent 'Mandatory' relationships and dashed lines represent 'Optional' relationships. The text 'Y.2809(11)\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 1 – Reference model of generic multimedia services [b-ITU-T F.700]**
+
+Figure 1 shows the relationship among multimedia services, communication tasks and media components. Communication tasks and media components will form the basic set of a specific multimedia service. For example, by the used media components, the multimedia conversational services can be further divided into:
+
+- videophone service, with audio and moving pictures and optionally various types of data;
+- voice and data services, with audio and various types of data;
+- text telephony, with real time text, optionally combined with audio;
+- total conversation service, with moving pictures, real time text and audio.
+
+In general, the MM schemes for mobility support in NGNs can be classified into the network layer MM (in the transport stratum) and the application layer MM (in the service stratum). The MM issues in the network layer or in the transport stratum are addressed in [ITU-T Q.1708] and [ITU-T Q.1709]. This Recommendation focuses on the MM issues in the application layer or in the service stratum. In the application layer, the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS) platform will be considered and enhanced to provide seamless mobility.
+
+This Recommendation describes the framework of MM in the NGN service stratum. For this purpose, the MM functional architecture based on the IMS platform is discussed, and the service control function (SCF) of the IMS will be investigated and further enhanced to support seamless mobility. Based on the functional architecture, the procedural information flows will be described for location management and handover control.
+
+## 7 Functional architecture for MM in the service stratum
+
+### 7.1 Generic architectural model
+
+The generic architectural model for MM in the service stratum is described in Figure 2, in which the MM functionality is provided via collaborative interactions between the functional entities (FEs) in the SCF and transport function (TF).
+
+
+
+Figure 2: Generic architecture of mobility management (MM) in the service stratum. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top is a large oval containing SAA-FE, SUP-FE, SL-FE, and P/S-CSC-FE. Below this is a box labeled 'Service control function' containing three S-HC-FE entities. At the bottom is a box labeled 'Transport function' containing two groups of FE entities: 'Visited network' and 'Home network'. The 'Visited network' group contains three FE entities, and the 'Home network' group contains four FE entities. A Mobile Network (MN) is shown at the bottom left, connected to the 'Visited network' FE entities. A Core Network (CN) is shown at the bottom right, connected to the 'Home network' FE entities. Solid lines connect P/S-CSC-FE to the three S-HC-FE entities. Solid lines also connect each S-HC-FE entity to the FE entities in both the 'Visited network' and 'Home network' groups. Dashed lines connect the MN to the FE entities in the 'Visited network' group and to the FE entities in the 'Home network' group. A dashed line also connects the MN to the P/S-CSC-FE entity. The label 'Y.2809(11)\_F02' is at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 2 – Generic architecture of mobility management (MM) in the service stratum**
+
+The SCF may comprise the following components, which are described in the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012]:
+
+- call session control functional entity (CSC-FE);
+- service authentication authorization functional entity (SAA-FE);
+- service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE);
+- subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE).
+
+In addition, the handover control FE in the service stratum (S-HC-FE) is defined to support the handover of users in the service stratum. Such S-HC-FEs in the service stratum may be differently defined and implemented from the HC-FEs in the transport control function, which were described in [ITU-T Q.1708] and [ITU-T Q.1709].
+
+In the service stratum, the MM functions are divided into the location management (LM) functionality and the handover control (HC) functionality. The CSC-FEs are used to provide the LM functionality (e.g., for location registration and/or update and location query from the UE or the
+
+network agent on behalf of the UE). On the other hand, the HC-FEs are defined and used to provide the seamless mobility for NGN users. For handover control, the HC-FEs may exchange the control messages with the FEs in the transport stratum, which may be used for management of handover tunnels or for optimization of data paths during handover.
+
+In the transport stratum, some of the FEs may need to provide the handover enforcement at the network entities. Typical operations for handover control include the encapsulation, de-capsulation and forwarding of data packets based on the bearer path under the control of HC-FEs. It is noted that such HC-FEs may be instantiated by some of the NGN transport FEs, such as the edge node FE (EN-FE), access border gateway FE (ABG-FE) and interconnection border gateway FE (IBG-FE), which are described in the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2012].
+
+In the MM model, a user moves from the home network to a visited network, which may belong to a different NGN provider (administration domain). The detailed MM scenarios will be described in the following clauses.
+
+### 7.2 MM functional entities in the service control function
+
+The FEs in the service control function in the IMS-based NGN can be used for MM, as described in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: MM functional entities in an IMS-based NGN. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure of functional entities. At the top is a box labeled 'Application support functions and service support functions' containing A-S1 through A-S6. Below this is the 'Service control' block, which contains several sub-blocks: S-14 (Media resource broker FE), S-15 (General services control FE), S-6 (Service authentication and authorization FE), S-5 (Service user profile FE), S-4 (Subscription locator FE), S-11 (User signalling interworking FE), S-2 (Proxy call session control FE), S-1 (Serving call session control FE), S-3 (Interrogating call session control FE), S-12 (Network signalling interworking FE), S-7 (Interconnection border gateway control FE), S-13 (Media resource control FE), S-8 (Access gateway control FE), S-10 (Breakout gateway control FE), and S-9 (Media gateway control FE). On the left, S-U1 and S-U2 are connected to S-11. On the right, S-ON1, S-ON2, and S-ON3 are connected to S-12, S-7, and S-10 respectively. At the bottom, a row of boxes labeled S-TC1 through S-T5 represents transport stratum entities, with various lines connecting them to the service control entities above. A reference 'Y.2809(11)\_F03' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 3 – MM functional entities in an IMS-based NGN [Y.2012]**
+
+The FEs in Figure 3, which are associated with MM, are described below.
+
+#### 7.2.1 S-CSC-FE (S-1)
+
+The serving call session control FE (S-CSC-FE) handles the functionality related to session control, such as registration, session set-up/modification/teardown, and routing of session messages. In particular, the S-CSC-FE performs the registration functions for location management.
+
+It can determine that a particular user and/or terminal identifier is currently in service and can interact with the SUP-FE (possibly via the SL-FE) to obtain the relevant service profile and address information which will act as an input to the service triggering and routing functions of the S-CSC-FE.
+
+#### **7.2.2 P-CSC-FE (S-2)**
+
+The proxy call session control FE (P-CSC-FE) acts as the contact point to a user for session-based services. Its IP address is discovered by the user's terminal using an address configuration mechanism such as static provisioning or dynamic address configuration in the NACF.
+
+P-CSC-FE shall have the capability to forward the registration request from a user to an appropriate I-CSC-FE. The P-CSC-FE shall have the capability to forward the registration request messages received from the terminal to the S-CSC-FE.
+
+#### **7.2.3 I-CSC-FE (S-3)**
+
+The interrogating call session control FE (I-CSC-FE) is the contact point within an operator's network for all service connections destined to a user of that network operator. In the LM perspective, the I-CSC-FE performs the registration process by assigning an S-CSC-FE to a user.
+
+#### **7.2.4 Subscription locator FE (S-4)**
+
+The subscription locator FE (SL-FE) may be queried by the S-CSC-FE, I-CSC-FE, or application support FE, to obtain the address of the SUP-FE for the required subscriber. The SL-FE is used to find the address of the physical entity that keeps the subscriber's information for a given user identifier.
+
+#### **7.2.5 Service user profile FE (S-5)**
+
+The service user profile FE (SUP-FE) is responsible for storing user profiles, subscriber-related location information, and presence information, in the service stratum.
+
+#### **7.2.6 Service AA-FE (S-6)**
+
+The service authentication and authorization FE (SAA-FE) provides the authentication and authorization in the service stratum. The SAA-FE will perform the first step for the MM process via authentication, authorization, and accounting of users/terminals.
+
+### **7.3 Mappings between IMS functions and MM control functions**
+
+It is noted that some of the IMS FEs could be used only for the LM functionality in the service stratum, without supporting the handover control. Some of the example usage or mapping scenarios between IMS functions and MM control functions (MMCF), defined in [ITU-T Q.1707] (MM framework), are described as follows:
+
+- Use of P-CSCF as A-MMCF (or A-LMF) in the service stratum:
+P-CSCF is the first contact point in the IMS, so it could be used for A-MMCF in the service stratum which is defined in [ITU-T Q.1707]. Note that A-MMCF should support MM2 (Inter-AN MM) and MM3 (Intra-AN MM), but the conventional P-CSCF supports only the call-forwarding function. Therefore, in this case, a new function to support mobility management including MM2 and MM3 should be added to the conventional P-CSCF.
+- Use of S-CSCF/HSS as C-MMCF in the service stratum:
+S-CSCF is likely to be located in the core network, which is responsible for accepting the registration request. Also, it makes the registration information available through the location server (i.e., HSS). Therefore S-CSCF could be mapped into C-MMCF in the service stratum along with HSS, which provides location information. Even though S-CSCF provides basic functions for mobility management, it may not be sufficient to support the full functions of C-MMCF in terms of MM types: MM1 (inter-CN MM), MM2, and MM3, described in [ITU-T Q.1707]. Therefore, in this case, some functions to support mobility management including MM2 and MM3 should be added to conventional P-CSCF, or should cooperate with other functions (or functional entities) in the transport/service stratum.
+
+- Use of I-CSCF:
+I-CSCF is used only for the assignment of S-CSCF in IMS and does not maintain any information related to registration. Therefore, it does not seem to have a direct relationship with MMCF in the service stratum. However, the I-CSCF may be used for MM1 using its interworking supporting function.
+
+## 8 Information flows for IMS-based location management
+
+### 8.1 Location registration and location re-registration
+
+The IMS-based location registration and update (re-registration) procedures are described in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant P_CSC_FE as P-CSC-FE
+ participant I_CSC_FE as I-CSC-FE
+ participant SUP_FE as SUP-FE
+ participant S_CSC_FE as S-CSC-FE
+
+ Note over Visited network
+ Note over Home network
+
+ UE->>P_CSC_FE: 1. Register
+ P_CSC_FE->>I_CSC_FE: 2. Register
+ I_CSC_FE->>SUP_FE: 3. Cx-Query/Cx-Select-Pull
+ SUP_FE-->>I_CSC_FE: 4. Cx-Query Resp/Cx-Select-Pull Resp
+ I_CSC_FE->>S_CSC_FE: 5. Register
+ I_CSC_FE->>SUP_FE: 6. Cx-Put/Cx-Pull
+ SUP_FE-->>I_CSC_FE: 7. Cx-Put Resp/Cx-Pull Resp
+ I_CSC_FE->>S_CSC_FE: 8. Service control
+ S_CSC_FE-->>I_CSC_FE: 9. 200 OK
+ I_CSC_FE-->>P_CSC_FE: 10. 200 OK
+ P_CSC_FE-->>UE: 11. 200 OK
+
+```
+
+Y.2809(11)\_F04
+
+Sequence diagram for IMS-based location registration and re-registration. The diagram shows the interaction between a Visited network (UE, P-CSC-FE) and a Home network (I-CSC-FE, SUP-FE, S-CSC-FE). The steps are: 1. Register (UE to P-CSC-FE), 2. Register (P-CSC-FE to I-CSC-FE), 3. Cx-Query/Cx-Select-Pull (I-CSC-FE to SUP-FE), 4. Cx-Query Resp/Cx-Select-Pull Resp (SUP-FE to I-CSC-FE), 5. Register (I-CSC-FE to S-CSC-FE), 6. Cx-Put/Cx-Pull (I-CSC-FE to SUP-FE), 7. Cx-Put Resp/Cx-Pull Resp (SUP-FE to I-CSC-FE), 8. Service control (I-CSC-FE to S-CSC-FE), 9. 200 OK (S-CSC-FE to I-CSC-FE), 10. 200 OK (I-CSC-FE to P-CSC-FE), 11. 200 OK (P-CSC-FE to UE).
+
+**Figure 4 – Location registration and location re-registration**
+
+- 1) After the UE has obtained its IP connectivity, it can perform the IMS registration. To do so, the UE sends the register information to the P-CSC-FE.
+- 2) Upon receipt of this register information, the P-CSC-FE shall examine the "home domain name" to discover the entry point to the home network (i.e., I-CSC-FE). The proxy shall send to the I-CSC-FE the register information, which includes the P-CSC-FE address/name, the public user identity, the private user identity, the P-CSC-FE network identifier and the UE IP address. A name-address resolution mechanism is utilized in order to determine the address of the home network from the home domain name. Note that the P-CSC-FE network identifier is a string that identifies the network where the P-CSC-FE is located (e.g., the P-CSC-FE network identifier may be the domain name of the P-CSC-FE network).
+- 3) The I-CSC-FE shall send the Cx-Query/Cx-Select-Pull information to the SUP-FE, which may include the public user identity, the private user identity, and the P-CSC-FE network identifier. The SUP-FE shall then check whether the user is already registered. The SUP-FE shall indicate whether the user is allowed to register in that P-CSC-FE network (identified by the P-CSC-FE network identifier) according to the user subscription and operator limitations/restrictions, if any.
+- 4) The Cx-Query Resp/Cx-Select-Pull Resp information is sent from the SUP-FE to the I-CSC-FE. It shall contain the S-CSC-FE name. When capabilities are returned, the I-CSC-FE may perform the new S-CSC-FE selection function. If the checking in SUP-FE was not successful, the Cx-Query Resp shall reject the registration attempt.
+
+- 5) The I-CSC-FE, using the name of the S-CSC-FE, shall determine the address of the S-CSC-FE through a name-address resolution mechanism. The I-CSC-FE also determines the name of a suitable home network, possibly based on information received from the SUP-FE. The I-CSC-FE shall then send the register information (e.g., P-CSC-FE address/name, public user identity, private user identity, P-CSC-FE network identifier, and UE IP address to the selected S-CSC-FE). Then, the S-CSC-FE shall store the P-CSC-FE address/name, as supplied by the visited network. This represents the address/name that the home network forwards to the subsequent terminating session signalling to the UE. The S-CSC-FE shall store the P-CSC-FE network ID information.
+- 6) The S-CSC-FE shall send Cx-Put/Cx-Pull (public user identity, private user identity, and S-CSC-FE name) to the SUP-FE.
+- 7) The SUP-FE shall store the S-CSC-FE name for the user, and return the Cx-Put Resp/Cx-Pull Resp information to the S-CSC-FE. The information that was passed from the SUP-FE to the S-CSC-FE shall include one or more names/addresses, which can be used to access the platform(s) used for service control while the user is registered at this S-CSC-FE. The S-CSC-FE shall store the information for the indicated user.
+- 8) Based on an appropriate filtering criterion, the S-CSC-FE shall send the register information to the service control platform and perform the service control procedures.
+- 9) The S-CSC-FE shall return the 200 OK information (e.g., home-network contact information, and GRUU set) to the I-CSC-FE.
+- 10) The I-CSC-FE shall send the 200 OK (home-network contact information, and GRUU set) information to the P-CSC-FE. Then, the I-CSC-FE shall release all registration information.
+- 11) The P-CSC-FE shall store the home-network contact information, and shall send the 200 OK information to the UE.
+
+### **8.2 Location query**
+
+The IMS-based location query procedures with the call set-up signalling operations are described in Figure 5.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the signalling sequence for a location query with session set-up. It involves four main entities: Originating network, Originating home network (containing S-CSC-FE#1), Terminating home network (containing I-CSC-FE#2, SUP-FE, and S-CSC-FE#2), and Terminating network.
+
+The sequence of messages is as follows:
+
+1. Invite (initial SDP Offer) from Originating network to S-CSC-FE#1.
+2. Service control (local to S-CSC-FE#1).
+3. Invite (initial SDP Offer) from S-CSC-FE#1 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+4. Location query from I-CSC-FE#2 to SUP-FE.
+5. Response from SUP-FE to I-CSC-FE#2.
+6. Invite (initial SDP Offer) from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#2.
+7. Service control (local to S-CSC-FE#2).
+8. Invite (initial SDP Offer) from S-CSC-FE#2 to Terminating network.
+9. Offer Response from Terminating network to S-CSC-FE#2.
+10. Offer Response from S-CSC-FE#2 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+11. Offer Response from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#1.
+12. Offer Response from S-CSC-FE#1 to Originating network.
+13. Response Conf (Opt SDP) from Originating network to S-CSC-FE#1.
+14. Response Conf (Opt SDP) from S-CSC-FE#1 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+15. Response Conf (Opt SDP) from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#2.
+16. Response Conf (Opt SDP) from S-CSC-FE#2 to Terminating network.
+17. Conf Ack (Opt SDP) from Terminating network to S-CSC-FE#2.
+18. Conf Ack (Opt SDP) from S-CSC-FE#2 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+19. Conf Ack (Opt SDP) from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#1.
+20. Conf Ack (Opt SDP) from S-CSC-FE#1 to Originating network.
+21. Reservation Conf from Originating network to S-CSC-FE#1.
+22. Reservation Conf from S-CSC-FE#1 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+23. Reservation Conf from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#2.
+24. Reservation Conf from S-CSC-FE#2 to Terminating network.
+25. Reservation Conf from Terminating network to S-CSC-FE#2.
+26. Reservation Conf from S-CSC-FE#2 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+27. Reservation Conf from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#1.
+28. Reservation Conf from S-CSC-FE#1 to Originating network.
+29. Ringing (dashed line) from Terminating network to S-CSC-FE#2.
+30. Ringing (dashed line) from S-CSC-FE#2 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+31. Ringing (dashed line) from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#1.
+32. Ringing (dashed line) from S-CSC-FE#1 to Originating network.
+33. 200 OK from Terminating network to S-CSC-FE#2.
+34. 200 OK from S-CSC-FE#2 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+35. 200 OK from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#1.
+36. 200 OK from S-CSC-FE#1 to Originating network.
+37. ACK from Originating network to S-CSC-FE#1.
+38. ACK from S-CSC-FE#1 to I-CSC-FE#2.
+39. ACK from I-CSC-FE#2 to S-CSC-FE#2.
+40. ACK from S-CSC-FE#2 to Terminating network.
+
+Y.2809(11)\_F05
+
+Sequence diagram showing location query with session set-up signalling between Originating network, Originating home network, and Terminating home network.
+
+**Figure 5 – Location query with session set-up signalling**
+
+- 1) The IMS INVITE request is sent from the UE to S-CSC-FE#1. This message should contain the initial media description in the session description protocol (SDP) offer.
+- 2) S-CSC-FE#1 invokes the service logic that is appropriate for this session set-up attempt.
+- 3) S-CSC-FE#1 performs an analysis of the destination address, and determines the network operator to whom the subscriber belongs. Since it is local, the request is passed to a local I-CSC-FE.
+- 4) I-CSC-FE shall query the SUP-FE for current location information.
+- 5) SUP-FE responds with the address of the current S-CSC-FE for the terminating user.
+- 6) I-CSC-FE forwards the INVITE request to the S-CSC-FE (S-CSC-FE#2) that will handle the session termination.
+- 7) S-CSC-FE#2 invokes the service logic that is appropriate for this session set-up attempt.
+- 8) The sequence continues with the message flows determined by the termination procedure.
+
+- 9-12) The terminating end point responds with an answer to the offered SDP and this message is passed along the established session path.
+- 13-16) The originator decides on the offered set of media streams, confirms receipt of the Offer Response with a Response Confirmation, and forwards this information to S-CSC-FE#1 by the origination procedures. This message is forwarded via the established session path to the terminating end point. The Response Confirmation may also contain SDP. This may be the same SDP as in the Offer Response received in Step 12 or a subset.
+- 17-20) Terminating end point responds to the offered SDP and the response, if forwarded to the originating end point via the established session path.
+- 21-24) Originating end point sends successful resource reservation information towards the terminating end point via the established session path.
+- 25-28) Terminating end point sends successful resource reservation acknowledgement towards the originating end point via the established session path.
+- 29-32) Terminating end point sends a ringing message toward the originating end point via the established session path.
+- 33-36) The SIP final response, 200-OK, is sent by the terminating endpoint over the signalling path. This is typically generated when the user has accepted the incoming session set-up attempt. The message is sent to S-CSC-FE#2 per the termination procedure.
+- 37-40) The originating endpoint sends the final acknowledgement to S-CSC-FE#1 by the origination procedures, and it is then sent over the signalling path to the terminating end point.
+
+## **9 Information flows for IMS-based handover control**
+
+### **9.1 Handover by interaction between P-CSCF and S-CSCF**
+
+As shown in Figure 6, in this handover control scheme, the UE is originating a voice call with the correspondent UE in the home network. When the UE is attached to the new visited network, it performs the location re-registration with the S-CSC-FE through a new P-CSC-FE in the visited network. The new P-CSC-FE and the S-CSC-FE will notify the new border gateway function (BGF) in the visited network and the BGF in the home network to install the new tunnel entry points through the new HC-FE in the visited network and the C-HC-FE, respectively. After that, the S-CSC-FE will interact with the old P-CSC-FE to notify the old BGF to release the tunnel resource through the A-HC-FE in the visited network and the C-HC-FE in the home network.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the IMS-based handover process across three phases: Before handover, During handover, and After handover. The entities involved are MN, Previous visited network (BGF1, AHC-FE1, P-CSC-FE1), New visited network (BGF2, AHC-FE2, P-CSC-FE2), Home network (S-CSC-FE, CHC-FE, BGF), and CN.
+
+**Before handover:** Data packets from the CN are intercepted by the BGF in the home network and tunneled to the BGF in the previous visited network.
+
+**During handover:**
+
+1. Service join request (MN to P-CSC-FE2)
+2. Service join request (P-CSC-FE2 to S-CSC-FE)
+3. HC\_Ind\_Req (S-CSC-FE to AHC-FE2)
+4. TEP install\_Req (AHC-FE2 to BGF2)
+5. HC\_Ind\_Rsp (AHC-FE2 to S-CSC-FE)
+6. Service join response (S-CSC-FE to P-CSC-FE2)
+7. Service join response (P-CSC-FE2 to MN)
+8. Service leave request (P-CSC-FE1 to S-CSC-FE)
+9. HC\_Ind\_Req (S-CSC-FE to CHC-FE)
+10. TEP\_Uninstall\_Req/PR\_RSReq (CHC-FE to BGF)
+11. HC\_Ind\_Rsp (CHC-FE to S-CSC-FE)
+12. Service leave (S-CSC-FE to P-CSC-FE1)
+
+**After handover:** Data packets from the CN are intercepted by the BGF in the home network and tunneled to the BGF in the new visited network.
+
+Y.2809(11)\_F06
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating IMS-based handover using P-CSC-FE and S-CSC-FE. The diagram shows the interaction between MN, Previous visited network (BGF1, AHC-FE1, P-CSC-FE1), New visited network (BGF2, AHC-FE2, P-CSC-FE2), Home network (S-CSC-FE, CHC-FE, BGF), and CN. The process is divided into three phases: Before handover, During handover, and After handover. Data packets are shown being intercepted by BGF in the home network and tunneled to BGF in the previous visited network before handover, and by BGF in the home network and tunneled to BGF in the new visited network after handover. During handover, steps 1-12 describe the signaling flow for service join and leave requests and responses.
+
+**Figure 6 – IMS-based handover using P-CSC-FE and S-CSC-FE**
+
+The detailed signalling flows are described as follows:
+
+- Before handover**
+Before handover, the data packets from the correspondent node (CN) will be intercepted by the BGF in the home network and then encapsulated and tunneled to the BGF in the previous visited network.
+- During handover**
+When the mobile node (MN) moves to the new visited network, it acquires a new address prior to receiving the data packet from the CN and performs the location re-registration (i.e., join service) with the S-CSC-FE in the home network via the P-CSC-FE in the new visited network (steps 1 and 2). Upon the request to join service from the MN, the proxy registrar and the home registrar will send a handover indication request so as to trigger the AHC-FE in the new visited network and the CHC-FE in the home network to perform the tunnel entry point installation on the BGF in the new visited network (steps 3 to 7). When a new tunnel is set up between the new BGF in the visited network and the BGF in the home network, the S-CSC-FE will interact with the old P-CSC-FE to make the old AHC-FE and the CHC-FE release the tunnel resource in the old BGF and in the BGF in the home network (steps 8 to 12).
+- After handover**
+After handover, the data packet from the CN will be intercepted by the BGF in the home network and then encapsulated and tunneled to the BGF in the new visited network.
+
+### 9.2 Handover control by interaction between two neighbouring proxy call session control functional entities (P-CSC-FEs)
+
+In this handover control scheme, the UE is originating a voice call with the correspondent UE in the home network when the UE is attached to the new visited network, and performs the location re-registration with the S-CSC-FE through the P-CSC-FE in the new visited network. The S-CSC-FE will notify the new P-CSC-FE about the location of the old P-CSC-FE. Here, it is assumed that the two adjacent P-CSC-FEs in the visited network are allowed to communicate with each other. Then, the new P-CSCF will interact with the old P-CSC-FE to make the AHC-FE install a tunnel entry point between the old BGF and the new BGF in the two adjacent visited networks. When a voice-call session is terminated, the S-CSC-FE will request all the P-CSC-FEs along the path, from the first visited network to the last visited network, to release the tunnel resources.
+
+Figure 7 describes the information flows of handover control by interaction between neighbouring P-CSCFs. The detailed signalling flows are described as follows:
+
+- a) Before handover
+Before handover, the data packets from the CN will be intercepted by the BGF in the home network and then tunnelled to the BGF in the previous visited network.
+- b) During handover
+When the MN moves to the new visited network, it acquires a new address prior to receiving a data packet from the CN and performs the location re-registration (i.e., joining service) with the S-CSC-FE in the home network via the P-CSC-FE in the visited network (steps 1 and 2). Upon receiving the service request from the MN, the S-CSC-FE will notify the new P-CSC-FE about the location of the old P-CSC-FE by sending the service response message (step 3). Then, the new P-CSC-FE will interact with the old P-CSC-FE to make the new AHC-FE and the old AHC-FE install a tunnel entry point between the old BGF and the new BGF in the visited network (steps 4 to 9).
+- c) After handover
+After handover, the data packet from the CN will first be intercepted by the BGF in the home network and tunnelled to the BGF in the previous network. When the BGF in the previous visited network receives the datagram, it will forward the data packet to the UE through the BGF in the new visited network.
+
+
+
+Y.2809(11)\_F07
+
+Sequence diagram for IMS-based handover using two neighbouring P-CSC-FEs. The diagram shows the interaction between MN, Previous visited network (BGF1, AHC-FE1, P-CSC-FE1), New visited network (BGF2, AHC-FE2, P-CSC-FE2), Home network (S-CSC-FE, CHC-FE, BGF), and CN. The process is divided into three phases: Before handover, During handover, and After handover. In the 'Before handover' phase, data packets flow from CN to MN. In the 'During handover' phase, the MN sends a '1. Service join request' to P-CSC-FE2, which sends a '2. Service join request' to S-CSC-FE. S-CSC-FE sends a '3. Service response' to P-CSC-FE2. P-CSC-FE2 sends a '4. Handover request' to P-CSC-FE1. P-CSC-FE1 sends a '5. HC\_Ind\_Re' to AHC-FE1. AHC-FE1 sends a '6. TEP install\_Req/RS' to BGF1. BGF1 sends a '7. HC\_Ind\_Rsp' to AHC-FE1. AHC-FE1 sends an '8. Handover response' to P-CSC-FE2. P-CSC-FE2 sends a '9. Service' to MN. In the 'After handover' phase, data packets flow from CN to MN, and from MN to P-CSC-FE1.
+
+**Figure 7 – IMS-based handover using two neighbouring P-CSC-FEs**
+
+## 10 Security considerations
+
+This Recommendation does not require any specific security considerations and aligns with the security requirements in [ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Use cases of IMS-based MM with IEEE 802.21
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix provides some scenarios of IMS-based MM schemes using [b-IEEE 802.21] (MIH). Figure I.1 depicts a simplified IMS network, while Figure I.2 shows the migration of 802.21 as an application server (AS) in the context of IMS.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates a simplified IMS network architecture. On the left, a UE (IMS enabled multi-RAT device) is shown connected to two access networks: 'Access network 1 e.g., cellular' (via Node B) and 'Access network n and n+1; e.g., WLAN' (via an Access point). These access networks connect to the Internet. The Internet connects to the IMS core network, which is enclosed in a blue oval. Inside the core network, the following components are shown: P-CSCF, S-CSCF, I-CSCF, AS (Application Server), HSS (Home Subscriber System), and SLF (Subscription Location Function). The components are interconnected with lines representing network connections. A small label 'Y.2809(11)\_F1.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Figure I.1 – Simplified IMS network diagram
+
+**Figure I.1 – Simplified IMS network**
+
+The IMS network relies on high-level security, reliable QoS, and a standardized framework for easy application server (AS) service deployment.
+
+The migration of 802.21 to an IMS platform requires that the 801.21 MIH be an IMS client application in the UE (IMS-enabled multi-RAT device) and the inclusion of 802.21 as an IMS-application server. This solution also brings the advantages of having minimal HO interruption time, and there is no user involvement in the HO process, thus providing an enhanced user experience.
+
+
+
+Figure I.2: Migration of IEEE 802.21 to an IMS Platform. This diagram shows a UE (IMS enabled multi-RAT device) connected to multiple access networks (e.g., cellular via Node B, WLAN via Access point) which connect to the Internet. The Internet connects to an IMS core network containing P-CSCF, I-CSCF, S-CSCF, SLF, HSS, and AS. An inset shows the IMS applications stack: VoIP application and MIH at the top, followed by SIP, and then WLAN I/F and Cellular I/F at the bottom. A label '802.21 AS an IMS application server' points to the AS in the core network. Reference: Y.2809(11)\_Fl.2
+
+**Figure I.2 – Migration of IEEE 802.21 to an IMS Platform**
+
+
+
+Figure I.3: High-level description of IEEE 802.21 for IMS Model. This diagram shows a UE connected to access networks and the Internet. The Internet connects to an IMS core network and an 802.21 Application server. The 802.21 Application server contains an 802.21 Application layer with Mobility Policy, VoIP application, and MIHF, connected to SIP and then to WLAN/Cellular I/F. The 802.21 application server also contains 802.21 functionality (MIHF and Mobility controller) connected to an Interworking function and then to SIP. The Internet connects to the 802.21 Application server. Reference: Y.2809(11)\_Fl.3
+
+**Figure I.3 – High-level description of IEEE 802.21 for IMS Model**
+
+Figure I.3 shows a high-level description of the IEEE 802.21-IMS model. The left box describes the related components within the terminal, while the right box shows the 802.21 AS functionality. The bi-directional flow arrows through the IMS core platform and the IP network illustrate the message exchange, as described below.
+
+In the IEEE 802.21-IMS model, the UE (IMS-enabled multi-RAT device) triggers the SIP functionality. The SIP messages are used to set up an 802.21 session, as shown in the lowest flow between the terminal, the IMS core network, and the 802.21 AS's SIP function. Directly after session set-up, 802.21 messages are exchanged over IP between the terminal's MIH function (MIHF) and the 802.21 AS's functionality, as shown in the upper flow. The 802.21 functionality in the AS will trigger the SIP module to send the requests during the HO process.
+
+In Figure I.3, the home subscriber system (HSS) in the IMS core network provides the 802.21 AS with the user preferences and subscription information to perform intersystem handover optimized decisions.
+
+Figures I.4, I.5 and I.6 describe these interactions in more detail, showing the detailed message flows for IMS registration, session set-up in the control/signalling plane, MIH registration, VoIP session set-up, VoIP session data exchange, handover initiation, inter-system handover and standardized 802.21 commands to control links, handover execution, and handover completion to resume the ongoing VoIP session.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the VoIP session setup process with an IEEE 802.21 application server. It is divided into three main phases:
+
+- IMS Registration:**
+ - P-CSCF discovery completed.
+ - IMS Register.
+ - IMS Registration procedure (indicated by a large green arrow).
+ - IMS Registration complete.
+- Session Establishment:**
+ - Start session with 802.21 AS.
+ - Obtains the URI of the 802.21 AS.
+ - Triggers: (1) Request URI, (2) the strings "Mobility Services" and "Unique Identifier" that should be included in the message body (MIHF ID should be used as the identifier).
+ - Send INVITE.
+ - Proxy the INVITE.
+ - Creates a user record.
+ - Forward client's IP address and MIHF ID.
+ - Incoming request.
+ - User record created.
+ - 200 OK.
+ - Proxy the 200 OK.
+ - ACK.
+ - Client now knows the IP address of the 802.21 AS.
+- MIH Registration:**
+ - MIH register request.
+ - Send MIH\_REGISTER.request.
+ - MIH register request.
+ - Sh-Pull (user data).
+ - Sh-Pull response (user data allowed, network IDs).
+ - MIH register confirm.
+ - Send MIH\_REGISTER.confirm.
+ - MIH register confirm.
+ - Updates user record.
+
+The diagram also shows the network architecture components: UE (IMS device enabled with 802.21), Cellular access network (Node B), WLAN access network (Access point), S-CSCF, IMS network, 802.21 AS, Correspondent host, and HSS. The SIP, Mobility policy, and MIHF components are highlighted in the sequence diagram.
+
+Y.2809(11)\_Fl.4
+
+Sequence diagram showing VoIP session setup with IEEE 802.21 application server. The diagram is divided into three main phases: IMS Registration, Session Establishment, and MIH Registration. The network architecture includes a UE (IMS device), Cellular access network (Node B), WLAN access network (Access point), S-CSCF, IMS network, 802.21 AS, Correspondent host, and HSS. The sequence of events involves SIP, Mobility policy, and MIHF components, with messages like INVITE, 200 OK, ACK, MIH\_REGISTER.request, and MIH\_REGISTER.confirm. Key actions include P-CSCF discovery, user record creation, and data allowed/network ID retrieval.
+
+**Figure I.4 – VoIP session set-up with IEEE 802.21 application server**
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the handover process for a VoIP session initiated by an IEEE 802.21 application server. It shows the interaction between a UE (IMS device enabled with 802.21), the Cellular access network (Node B), the WLAN access network (Access point), the S-CSCF, the IMS network (802.21 AS), and a Correspondent host.
+
+**Sequence of Events:**
+
+- User initiates a VoIP session:** The UE sends an INVITE message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF proxies the INVITE to the Correspondent host. The Correspondent host sends a 200 OK response back to the S-CSCF, which then proxies it to the UE. The UE sends an ACK message to the S-CSCF.
+- Cellular signal strength degrades:** The UE sends a Link parameters report to the S-CSCF.
+- WLAN powered on and WLAN link is detected:** The S-CSCF sends a MIH\_Link\_Parameters\_Report.indication to the 802.21 AS. The 802.21 AS sends a MIH\_Scan.request (WLAN) to the UE. The UE performs a scan (WLAN) and sends a Scan confirm (WLAN) to the 802.21 AS. The 802.21 AS sends a MIH\_Scan.confirm (WLAN) to the S-CSCF.
+- Handover to WLAN completed and a new IP address is obtained; e.g., using DHCP:** The S-CSCF sends a MIH\_Switch.request (handover from cellular to WLAN) to the 802.21 AS. The 802.21 AS sends a Switch to WLAN message to the UE. The UE sends a Switch confirm message to the 802.21 AS. The 802.21 AS sends a MIH\_Switch.confirm (handover from cellular to WLAN) to the S-CSCF.
+
+**Network Architecture:**
+
+- UE (IMS device enabled with 802.21):** Contains SIP, Mobility policy, and MIHF components.
+- Cellular access network:** Includes Node B and Access point.
+- WLAN access network:** Includes Access point.
+- S-CSCF:** The Serving Call Session Control Function.
+- IMS network (802.21 AS):** Includes MIHF, Mobility controller, and SIP components.
+- Correspondent host:** The destination of the VoIP session.
+
+**VoIP Session:** Indicated by a yellow circle and a double-headed arrow.
+
+Sequence diagram showing VoIP session initiation and handover from cellular to WLAN network.
+
+Y.2809(11)\_F1.5
+
+Figure I.5 – Handover initiation by IEEE 802.21 application server
+
+
+
+Figure I.6: Handover completion: IEEE 802.21 triggers SIP messaging. The diagram shows a network architecture and a sequence of SIP messages. The architecture includes a UE (IMS device enabled with 802.21), Cellular access network (Node B), WLAN access network (Access point), S-CSCF, IMS network (802.21 AS), Correspondent host, and HSS. The UE has SIP, Mobility policy, and MIHF components. The S-CSCF has MIHF, Mobility controller, and SIP components. The 802.21 AS has MIHF, Mobility controller, and SIP components. The Correspondent host has SIP and HSS components. The sequence of events is: 1. Update ongoing sessions with 802.21 AS and peer. 2. Send a REFER request (inserts the new IP address). Indicates that 802.21 AS should send INVITE requests to the listed peer. 3. Update record. 4. Sh-Update. 5. Sh-Update response. 6. Record updated. 7. 200 OK. 8. Sessions is updated. 9. INVITE. 10. 200 OK. 11. ACK. A callout box indicates: 'Includes the new IP address of the client and the call ID of the ongoing session'. A VoIP session is shown as a continuous line with a yellow circle in the middle. The IMS Registration procedure is shown as a green arrow pointing right, with 'Registration complete' at the end. The diagram is labeled Y.2809(11)\_F1.6.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Handover completion: IEEE 802.21 triggers SIP messaging**
+
+The mobility controller, depicted in the flow diagrams, decides whether to switch the subscriber to WLAN, or any other radio access technology (RAT). It requires the user subscription profile and user preferences stored in the HSS. The IMS $S_h$ interface is used to transfer information between the 802.21 AS, using the mobility controller, and the HSS.
+
+In Figure I.4, after receiving the MIH\_Register Request message from the IMS-device-enabled UE, the mobility controller starts the standardized Sh-Pull procedure with the HSS. It sends the user identity and requests data related to the specific user. The HSS answers to the mobility controller with the Sh-Pull Response message containing user data; including networks IDs – with which the home network has agreements, and/or to which the user has subscribed, and therefore roaming is allowed. The network IDs may provide the 802.21 AS user with preferences to decide upon handover execution based on current characteristics, such as network connection costs or network speed.
+
+Figure I.5 shows the VoIP session set-up procedure with related messages. The VoIP media exchanges are continued until the UE detects the radio signal degradation and decides to prepare a notification to the network for an inter-system handover.
+
+In Figure I.6, the UE sends the REFER request to the 802.21 AS to trigger the SIP functionality. In turn, the mobility controller starts the Sh-Update procedure to which the HSS responds with a Sh-Update Response message. The 802.21 AS thus informs the HSS about the IP address change, and the VoIP session resumes.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+### Examples of IMS handover using network agents
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix gives the two examples of IMS handover using network agents, the resource admission control function (RACF) and the GPRS gateway supporting node (GGSN), as possible examples of IMS-based handover.
+
+### II.1 RACF applicability in the IMS handover
+
+The handover control scheme can be performed with the support of agents in the network. The following figure shows the overview of the handover control scheme in the session or application layer. Within this handover control scheme, the P-CSCF and the C-CSCF play the role of location management and handover control. The RACF acts as arbitrator between the IMS component (e.g., CSCF) and the transport function (e.g., BGF).
+
+
+
+Y.2809(11)\_FII.1
+
+Legend:
+
+- Red double-headed arrow: SIP mobility signalling
+- Black double-headed arrow: Resource control signalling
+- Solid black arrow: Media stream for soft handover
+- Dashed black arrow: Media stream for hard handover
+
+Figure II.1: Application-layer handover control with mobile agent support. The diagram illustrates the handover process between three networks: Previous visited network, Home network, and New visited network, all connected to a central Core network area. Mobile Nodes (MN) and Core Networks (CN) are shown moving between these networks. Key components include P-CSCF, C-CSCF, RACF, BGF, and Transport function. Signaling paths are shown for SIP mobility (red arrows), Resource control (black arrows), and Media streams (solid black for soft handover, dashed black for hard handover).
+
+**Figure II.1 – Application-layer handover control with mobile agent support**
+
+On the service join request from the mobile host, the proxy registrar (i.e., P-CSCF) will send a service request to trigger RACF to perform resource admission control on the corresponding transport functions in the visited network. Also, the BGFs in the visited network and home network interact with the proxy registrar and home registrar to establish a relationship between BGFs. Thereby, the datagram from the corresponding host could be redirected to the BGF in the current visited network from the BGF in the previous visited network, or from the BGF in the home network. In this way, continuity of mobility, and transport independent from handover control, can be achieved. The only difficult part is the detection ability that is required at the application layer to
+
+identify when the IP address has changed. The ability to notify application subscribers of such changes would be preferable.
+
+### II.2 GGSN applicability in the IMS handover
+
+The existing IMS handover scheme operates at the application layer, and thus the overall handover latency can be significantly increased during handover, depending on the network conditions such as movement detection, IP address configuration, and new signalling of INVITE messages. The IMS handover latency could be reduced by using the fast handover with the support of the link-layer triggers and the network agents such as GGSN nodes.
+
+The following figure shows the overall procedures of the IMS fast handover with the support of the network agent, in which the 3GPP network system is considered as an example.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant GGSN_OL as GGSNOL
+ participant P-CSCF_OL as P-CSCFOL
+ participant GGSN_NEW as GGSNNEW
+ participant P-CSCF_NEW as P-CSCFNEW
+ participant CN
+
+ UE->>GGSN_OL: INVITE
+ GGSN_OL-->>UE: 200 OK
+ UE->>GGSN_OL: ACK
+ GGSN_OL->>UE: DATA
+ Note over UE: ES: Link Detected
+IS: MIH Info. Req.
+ES: Link Going Down
+ UE->>P-CSCF_OL: HO.Req (context transfer)
+ P-CSCF_OL->>GGSN_NEW: HI
+ Note over GGSN_NEW: L3: Assigning new IP via DHCP or autoconf.
+ GGSN_NEW->>P-CSCF_NEW: HAcK
+ P-CSCF_NEW->>GGSN_NEW: HO.Ack (New IP, router IP, proxy IP)
+ P-CSCF_OL->>GGSN_NEW: Pre-INVITE
+ GGSN_NEW->>P-CSCF_NEW: 200 OK
+ P-CSCF_NEW->>GGSN_NEW: ACK
+ GGSN_NEW->>P-CSCF_NEW: DATA
+ Note over GGSN_NEW: L3: Buffering ...
+ GGSN_NEW->>P-CSCF_OL: HO.Complete
+ P-CSCF_OL->>GGSN_NEW: HC
+ GGSN_NEW->>P-CSCF_OL: Deliver buffered packets
+ P-CSCF_OL->>UE: DATA
+ UE->>GGSN_NEW: DATA
+ Note over UE: ES: Link Down
+CS: LinkConnect
+ES: Link Up
+
+```
+
+Y.2809(11)\_Fil.2
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the IMS fast handover with network agent support. The diagram shows the interaction between UE, GGSN\_OL, P-CSCF\_OL, GGSN\_NEW, P-CSCF\_NEW, and CN. The process starts with the UE sending an INVITE to GGSN\_OL, which then sends a 200 OK to the UE. The UE then sends an ACK to GGSN\_OL. GGSN\_OL then sends DATA to the UE. The UE then sends HO.Req (context transfer) to P-CSCF\_OL. P-CSCF\_OL then sends HI to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends L3: Assigning new IP via DHCP or autoconf. to P-CSCF\_NEW. P-CSCF\_NEW then sends HAcK to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends HO.Ack (New IP, router IP, proxy IP) to P-CSCF\_OL. P-CSCF\_OL then sends Pre-INVITE to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends 200 OK to P-CSCF\_NEW. P-CSCF\_NEW then sends ACK to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends DATA to P-CSCF\_NEW. P-CSCF\_NEW then sends L3: Buffering ... to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends HO.Complete to P-CSCF\_OL. P-CSCF\_OL then sends HC to GGSN\_NEW. GGSN\_NEW then sends Deliver buffered packets to P-CSCF\_OL. P-CSCF\_OL then sends DATA to the UE. The UE then sends DATA to GGSN\_NEW. The diagram also includes event boxes for ES: Link Detected, ES: MIH Info. Req., ES: Link Going Down, ES: Link Down, CS: LinkConnect, and ES: Link Up.
+
+**Figure II.2 – IMS fast handover with network agent support**
+
+The overall handover steps can be classified into four steps: (1) detecting a new network and preparing required information using MIH, (2) triggering the handover procedure and acquiring a new IP address, (3) making a new session and buffering application data, and (4) completing the procedure and receiving the buffered data.
+
+In the figure, the UE has connected to the old network and communicates with the CN. When it receives Link Detected event from the MIH layer, it can retrieve information about available neighbouring networks using the MIH information service. Although the MIH specification defines many elements in this neighbour information, the minimum functionalities, like an IP address of the candidate next router (GGSNNEW), are used. The information server and the detailed procedures for an information query are not presented in the figure.
+
+When the signal strength of the old link gets weaker than the predefined threshold, the UE detects a Link Going Down event from the MIH layer and triggers the handover procedure by sending HO.Req message to the old SIP proxy server (P-CSCFOLD). The context information of the UE must be included in HO.Req such as the identifier, MAC address, IP address of GGSNNEW, or security information like a session key.
+
+After receiving HO.Req, P-CSCFOLD sends HI message to the GGSNNEW with the received context information. Then GGSNNEW, instead of the UE, configures the new IP address for the UE by DHCP or the auto-configuration mechanism. It is assumed that P-CSCFOLD can configure the UE's address. It is also assumed that GGSNNEW knows the IP address of the next SIP proxy server (P-CSCFNEW). The configured IP address and IP address of P-CSCFNEW are delivered to the UE through HAck and HO.Ack message.
+
+When the UE gets its new address and P-CSCFNEW address, it attaches the new address into its network interface. It is noted that most operating systems allow attaching multiple IP addresses to one network interface card. After successful address attachment, the UE can switch the underlying network. At the same time, GGSNNEW makes a new session for the UE using Pre-INVITE message. If the UE requested handover with the data buffering option, GGSNNEW should keep application data from the CN until it receives the HC message from P-CSCFNEW.
+
+Now, the UE can associate to the new network link by using the MIH LinkConnect command when it detects a Link Down event. As soon as possible after the UE detects Link Up event, it has to send HO.Complete message to P-CSCFNEW. Finally, it can receive all the buffered data and new application data from the CN through the new network.
+
+The protocol messages required for IMS fast handover are for further study.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+The following documents are useful to understand this Recommendation:
+
+- [b-ITU-T F.700] Recommendation ITU-T F.700 (2000), *Framework Recommendation for multimedia services*.
+- [b-ITU-T F.702] Recommendation ITU-T F.702 (1996), *Multimedia conference services*.
+- [b-ITU-T F.703] Recommendation ITU-T F.703 (2000), *Multimedia conversational services*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.21 ] IEEE 802.21-2008, *IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks – Part 21: Media Independent Handover Services*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 3261] IETF RFC 3261 (2002), *Session Initiation Protocol*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.2811
+
+(07/2012)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Next Generation Networks – Generalized mobility
+
+# --- **Framework of the mobile virtual private network service in next generation networks**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2811
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, followed by "International Telecommunication Union" in a smaller font.
+
+ITU logo
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2811**
+
+# **Framework of the mobile virtual private network service in next generation networks**
+
+## **Summary**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.2811 describes the functional architecture of the mobile virtual private network (VPN) service based on the host-based mobility framework in next generation networks (NGNs), and defines the corresponding reference points. This Recommendation focuses on remote access VPNs and community-based VPNs where mobile user equipment (MUE) is directly involved. The high-level mobile VPN service procedures on the functional architecture are also described.
+
+## **History**
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2811 | 2012-07-29 | 13 |
+
+## **Keywords**
+
+Mobile VPN, NGN.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2013
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 7 | Mobile VPN architecture..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 High level functions ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Functional architecture ..... | 7 |
+| | 7.3 Reference points ..... | 10 |
+| 8 | High-level mobile VPN procedures..... | 12 |
+| | 8.1 VPN service registration/de-registration ..... | 12 |
+| | 8.2 QoS provisioning and enforcement for VPN tunnel ..... | 12 |
+| | 8.3 Initial network attachment..... | 12 |
+| | 8.4 Handover ..... | 14 |
+| 9 | Security considerations..... | 15 |
+| | Appendix I – Use case of mobile VPN based on the IP-based mobility protocol ..... | 16 |
+| | I.1 Secure tunnel set up ..... | 16 |
+| | I.2 Mobility ..... | 18 |
+| | Appendix II – Use case of mobile VPN based on MOBIKE..... | 20 |
+| | II.1 VPN service registration/de-registration procedure ..... | 20 |
+| | II.2 VPN tunnel QoS provisioning..... | 20 |
+| | II.3 Initial attachment procedure ..... | 21 |
+| | II.4 Handover procedure ..... | 21 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 22 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2811
+
+# Framework of the mobile virtual private network service in next generation networks
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+There are several types of virtual private network (VPN) services such as remote access VPN (or client-to-server VPN), site-to-site VPN, community-based VPN, etc. This Recommendation focuses on the mobile VPN framework in NGN based on the host-based mobility framework in which mobile UEs are directly involved in the VPN. The mobile VPN framework is based on the mobility-related ITU-T Recommendations [ITU-T Q.1706], [ITU-T Q.1707], [ITU-T Q.1708], [ITU-T Q.1709] and [ITU-T Y.2018], as well as on the VPN requirements described in [ITU-T Y.2215]. This Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- requirements of mobile VPN;
+- mobile VPN architecture in terms of high-level functions, functional architecture and reference points;
+- high-level mobile VPN procedures based on host-based mobility.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T G.1000] | Recommendation ITU-T G.1000 (2001), Communications Quality of Service: A framework and definitions . |
+| [ITU-T M.1400] | Recommendation ITU-T M.1400 (2006), Designations for interconnections among operators' networks . |
+| [ITU-T Q.1706] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), Mobility management requirements for NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Q.1707] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1707/Y.2804 (2008), Generic framework of mobility management for next generation networks . |
+| [ITU-T Q.1708] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1708/Y.2805 (2008), Framework of location management for NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Q.1709] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1709/Y.2806 (2008), Framework of handover control for NGN . |
+| [ITU-T X.1035] | Recommendation ITU-T X.1035 (2007), Password-authenticated key exchange (PAK) protocol . |
+| [ITU-T Y.101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN . |
+| [ITU-T Y.2011] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks . |
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2014] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2008), *Network attachment control functions in next generation networks.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2018] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2018 (2009), *Mobility management and control framework and architecture within the NGN transport stratum.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2007), *Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next generation Networks.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2215] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2215 (2009), *Requirements and framework for the support of VPN services in NGN, including the mobile environment.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1.*
+- [ITU-T Y.2702] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), *Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1.*
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 application** [ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services.
+
+**3.1.2 functional architecture** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A set of functional entities and the reference points between them used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions.
+
+NOTE – The functional entities can be used to describe a set of reference configurations. These reference configurations identify which reference points are visible at the boundaries of equipment implementations and between administrative domains.
+
+**3.1.3 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations.
+
+**3.1.4 host-based mobility management** [ITU-T Q.1707]: A mobility management scheme in which the MM signalling is performed based on (or controlled by) the user equipment (UE).
+
+**3.1.5 mobility** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment.
+
+**3.1.6 next generation network (NGN)** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users.
+
+**3.1.7 quality of service (QoS)** [ITU-T G.1000]: The collective effect of service performances, which determine the degree of satisfaction of a user of the service.
+
+**3.1.8 service stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer service-related data and the functions that control and manage service resources and network services to enable user services and applications (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]).
+
+**3.1.9 service** [ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider.
+
+**3.1.10 service provider** [ITU-T M.1400]: A general reference to an operator that provides telecommunication services to customers and other users either on a tariff or contract basis. A service provider may or may not operate a network. A service provider may or may not be a customer of another service provider.
+
+**3.1.11 transport stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]).
+
+**3.1.12 virtual private network (VPN)** [ITU-T Y.2215]: A VPN is a communication network, built over public and/or private network resources, used to support controlled and secure communications within a group of users as if they were on a private network.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------------|
+| BID | Binding Identification |
+| e-MCF | enterprise Mobility Control Function |
+| e-NAF | enterprise Network Attachment Function |
+| e-RACF | enterprise Resource Admission and Control Function |
+| GW | Gateway |
+| HBM | Host-Based Mobility |
+| IKE | Internet Key Exchange |
+| IPsec | Internet Protocol security |
+| MLM-FE | Mobility Location Management Functional Entity |
+| MM | Mobility Management |
+| MMCF | Mobility Management and Control Functions |
+| MOBIKE | Mobile IKE |
+| MP-t-MP | Multipoint-to-Multipoint |
+| MUE | Mobile User Equipment |
+| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions |
+| NGN | Next Generation Network |
+| PAK | Password-Authenticated Key exchange |
+| PD-FE | Policy Decision Functional Entity |
+| P-t-P | Point-to-Point |
+| PW | Password |
+
+| | |
+|---------|------------------------------------------|
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RACF | Resource Admission and Control Functions |
+| SCF | Service Control Functions |
+| TID | Tunnel Identification |
+| VPN SCF | VPN Service Control Functions |
+| VPN | Virtual Private Network |
+| VTF | VPN Transport Functions |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Requirements**
+
+The basic requirements of mobile VPN follow the NGN VPN requirements listed in [ITU-T Y.2215]. This clause identifies and focuses on the mobile VPN service and mobility requirements.
+
+The VPN in the NGN mobile environment is required to support the following service requirements:
+
+- the mobility protocol and related security association mechanisms are required to establish secure mobile VPN tunnels;
+- the secure mobile VPN tunnels should be released and set up seamlessly as an MUE moves;
+- a point-to-point/multipoint-to-multipoint (P-t-P/MP-t-MP) VPN tunnel should be created among peers in a community group;
+- the VPN service control function is required to provide VPN service by extending the NGN service control function;
+- allow mobile users to access the VPN resources in and out of their networks while supporting seamless mobility;
+- resource provisioning and re-provisioning for mobile VPN tunnels in the initial attachment and handover cases should be considered.
+
+# **7 Mobile VPN architecture**
+
+### **7.1 High level functions**
+
+The NGN architecture is a general service- and technology-independent architecture that can be later instantiated in customized architectures that can respond to specific contexts in terms of the services offered and the technologies used, according to [ITU-T Y.2012]. To provide mobile VPN services, several functions in both the service stratum and the transport stratum would be required to extend their functionalities and/or define new ones, as illustrated in Figure 7-1.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1 – High-level mobile VPN architecture diagram. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is 'Applications' connected to 'ANI'. Below is the 'Service stratum' (green background) containing 'Application Support Functions & Service Support Functions', 'VPN Service Control Function' (with 'VPN Service User Profiles'), and 'VPN Service User Profiles'. Below that is the 'Transport stratum' (yellow background) containing 'Network Attachment Control Functions' (with 'Transport User Profiles'), 'Mobility Management Control Functions', 'Resource and Admission Control Functions', and 'NGN Transport Functions'. To the left is a vertical pink bar for 'Management Functions' connected to 'End-User Functions'. To the right is a vertical white bar for 'Other Networks'. Connections are shown: red solid lines for Media (UNI, NNI), black dotted lines for Control, and green dotted lines for Management. A legend at the bottom indicates: black dotted line for Control, red hatched line for Media, and green dotted line for Management.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – High-level mobile VPN architecture**
+
+#### 7.1.1 VPN control functions in NGN
+
+##### 7.1.1.1 VPN transport control functions
+
+The transport stratum provides mobile VPN connectivity services to NGN users under the control of transport control functions, including the network attachment control functions (NACF), the resource and admission control functions (RACF) and the mobility management and control functions (MMCF).
+
+The NACF provides the registration function to allow registration of NGN users at the access level and also provides the initialization of the end-user functions so that the users can access NGN services including the mobile VPN service. The function provides network-level identification/authentication for NGN users. The function could also deliver user profiles to RACF so as to configure basic policies for the users in the related network elements. More detailed information on NACF in NGN can be found in [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+The RACF manages NGN resources to support resource reservation for traffic flows. The function provides admission control and gate control for traffic flows based on user profiles, SLA, operator specific policy rules, service priority and resource availability within access and core transport networks. More detailed information about RACF in NGN can be found in [ITU-T Y.2111].
+
+The MMCF provides mobility for traffic flows. The mobility mechanism for mobile VPN service in this Recommendation is based on the host-based mobility architecture which is defined in [ITU-T Y.2018]. More detailed information about MMCF can be found in [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+According to [ITU-T Y.2012], NGN transport control functions are able to support different types of NGN services in a common way. Mobile VPN service is expected to be supported by those functions as well.
+
+##### **7.1.1.2 VPN service control function**
+
+The delivery of mobile VPN services to the end-user is provided by utilizing the application support functions and service support functions, and related service control functions. The VPN service control function (VPN SCF) is a subset of the service control function in the NGN service stratum to support mobile VPN services. It provides the following functions:
+
+- management of VPN membership including authentication and authorization for the VPN service;
+- request of resource and admission control to RACF for VPN service requests from VPN users;
+- management of VPN identification and VPN path information, and fault management of VPN path.
+
+#### **7.1.2 VPN control functions in enterprise networks**
+
+An enterprise network could have its own VPN control functions which would be used for a remote access mobile VPN service which is not managed by NGN.
+
+##### **7.1.2.1 VPN transport control functions**
+
+An enterprise network could have corresponding transport control functions with the network attachment control functions (NACF), the resource and admission control functions (RACF) and the mobility management and control functions (MMCF); enterprise network attachment functions (e-NAF), enterprise resource and admission control functions (e-RACF) and enterprise mobility control functions (e-MCF).
+
+The e-NAF is responsible for allocation of IP addresses to the MUEs cooperating with the NACF in the NGN.
+
+The e-RACF provides resource management to support resource reservation for traffic flows within an enterprise network. The function provides admission control and gate control for traffic flows based on user profiles, enterprise network specific policy rules, service priority and resource availability within the enterprise networks. The e-RACF may interact with the RACF in NGN.
+
+The e-MCF provides mobility management for traffic flows. The mobility mechanism in this Recommendation is based on the host-based mobility architecture.
+
+##### **7.1.2.2 VPN service control function**
+
+An enterprise network could have its own VPN service control functions which would be used for the remote access mobile VPN service which is not managed by NGN. The VPN service control functions inherit service control function in the NGN service stratum to support mobile VPN services and provide the following functions:
+
+- management of VPN membership including authentication and authorization for VPN service;
+- request of resource and admission control to e-RACF for VPN service requests from VPN users;
+- management of VPN identification and VPN path information, fault management of VPN path, etc.
+
+#### **7.1.3 VPN transport functions**
+
+The VPN transport functions (VTF) is a subset of the transport functions in the NGN transport stratum that support mobile VPN services, which provides the following functions:
+
+- VPN tunnel encapsulation and decapsulation;
+- VPN traffic engineering mechanisms such as service priority control, packet filtering, traffic classification, rate limiting, resource reservation and admission control at the transport stratum;
+- handover execution.
+
+#### **7.1.4 VPN end-user functions**
+
+The VPN end-user functions provide the following functions:
+
+- Host-based mobility protocol supporting security association for data packets;
+- VPN registration/deregistration functions.
+
+### **7.2 Functional architecture**
+
+#### **7.2.1 Remote access mobile VPN**
+
+The remote access mobile VPN model is a VPN service model for the MUEs which connect remotely from outside an enterprise network to the resources inside an enterprise network or to the other corresponding MUEs outside the enterprise network. For example, an MUE may try to connect to the enterprise resources which are located in the head office site while moving around outside the network.
+
+There are two types of remote access mobile VPNs depending on whether the VPN service control and mobility control are performed by a public NGN service provider or an enterprise network: the remote access mobile VPN with public service control and the remote access mobile VPN with enterprise network control.
+
+##### **7.2.1.1 Remote access mobile VPN with public service control**
+
+This is a mobile VPN service type in which a public NGN service provider offers mobile VPN service. The NGN service provider controls the VTF and performs VPN service management and mobility control as well as access and service authentication for the remote mobile VPN users. The remote mobile VPN users, however, may need to go through an additional authentication procedure internal to the enterprise.
+
+As defined in [ITU-T Y.2018] and related ITU-T Recommendations, an MUE may require two IP addresses: the persistent IP address and the temporary IP address. The persistent IP address is allocated either statically or dynamically, and the temporary IP address is allocated by the current NGN access network at network attachment time.
+
+The VPN SCF will manage VPN identification and VPN path information, and will provide fault management for the paths. The resource control for the VPN should be processed by RACF after receiving a request from VPN SCF, and once after RACF provisions quality of service (QoS) for the VPN paths, VPN SCF should manage the status of the paths.
+
+
+
+Functional architecture of remote access mobile VPN with public service control. The diagram is split into two main sections: Enterprise Network (left) and NGN (right). A vertical line separates them. A legend at the top left indicates that dashed boxes represent functions not used for mobile VPN, and solid boxes represent functions used for mobile VPN. The Enterprise Network contains an MUE box connected to a 'Transport processing functions' box which includes a VTF oval. Above this are three dashed boxes: e-NAF, e-MCF, and e-RACF. The NGN section contains a 'Transport processing functions' box connected to an MUE box. Above this are three solid boxes: NACF, MMCF, and RACF. At the top of the NGN section is a 'VPN Service Control Function' box. Horizontal dashed lines separate the layers into 'Service stratum' (top) and 'Transport stratum' (bottom). Arrows at the bottom indicate the scope of the Enterprise Network and NGN.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Functional architecture of remote access mobile VPN with public service control**
+
+##### 7.2.1.2 Remote access mobile VPN with enterprise service control
+
+This is a mobile VPN service type in which an NGN enterprise network itself provides VPN service. The NGN enterprise network controls the VTF and performs VPN service management and mobility control. However, the access authentication for the remote user is provided by a public NGN service provider, while VPN service authentication is performed through VPN SCF in the NGN enterprise network.
+
+The MUE may require two IP addresses: a persistent IP address and a temporary IP address, as defined in [ITU-T Y.2018] and related ITU-T Recommendations. The persistent IP address is allocated from the enterprise network either statically or dynamically, and the temporary IP address is allocated from the current NGN access network.
+
+The VPN service provisioning between MUE and VTF is performed by VPN SCF in the NGN enterprise network, and the resource control for the VPN service in VTF is performed by the e-RACF in the NGN enterprise network. If the resource control in the transport functions in public NGN is needed for the VPN service, the VPN SCF function in the NGN enterprise network may need to interact with the corresponding function in the public NGN. The detailed interfaces between the control functions in the enterprise network and the ones in NGN are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-3: Functional architecture of remote access mobile VPN with enterprise service control. The diagram is split into two sections: Enterprise Network (left) and NGN (right). A vertical line separates them. On the left, the Enterprise Network contains a VPN Service Control Function (solid box) at the top, connected to e-NAF, e-MCF, and e-RACF (solid boxes). Below these is a box for Transport processing functions containing a VTF (solid oval). An MUE (solid box) is connected to the left side of the Transport processing functions. On the right, the NGN contains a dashed box for Transport processing functions. Above it are NACF, MMCF, and RACF (dashed boxes). A VTF (dashed oval) is inside the Transport processing functions box. An MUE (solid box) is connected to the right side of the Transport processing functions. Horizontal dashed lines separate the Service stratum (top) from the Transport stratum (bottom). A legend at the top right indicates that solid boxes are functions used for mobile VPN and dashed boxes are functions not used for mobile VPN. Arrows at the bottom indicate the Enterprise Network and NGN domains.
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Functional architecture of remote access mobile VPN with enterprise service control**
+
+#### 7.2.2 Community-based mobile VPN
+
+This is a mobile VPN service type for the MUEs that want to share information securely with each other. The MUEs themselves are secure tunnel end points. This service, however, may still need VTF in the public NGN for initial data transfer before the direct communication among the multiple MUEs.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-4: Community-based mobile VPN functional architecture. The diagram shows a single NGN domain. At the top is the VPN Service Control Function (solid box). Below it are NACF, MMCF, and RACF (solid boxes). Below these is a box for Transport processing functions containing a VTF (solid oval). Two MUEs (solid boxes) are connected to the left and right sides of the Transport processing functions box. Horizontal dashed lines separate the Service stratum (top) from the Transport stratum (bottom). Arrows at the bottom indicate the NGN domain.
+
+**Figure 7-4 – Community-based mobile VPN functional architecture**
+
+An MUE creates a secure tunnel, with other MUEs directly and through the VTF as well, which is not associated with a specific enterprise network but open to public for MUEs having common interests to create their own VPN networks, for the secure data communication among them. The MUE will have a persistent IP address which may be allocated at the VPN registration procedure from the network attachment function, and a temporary IP address which is allocated from the current NGN access network. The MUE will interact with MMCF to support the host-based mobility protocol.
+
+### 7.3 Reference points
+
+
+
+Figure 7-5: Reference points of the mobile NGN functional architecture. The diagram shows two main sections: Enterprise Network on the left and NGN on the right, separated by a vertical line. The Enterprise Network contains a MUE (Mobile User Equipment) connected to a block containing 'Transport processing functions' and 'VTF' (Virtual Transport Function). Above this block are three boxes: e-NAF, e-MCF, and e-RACF. The NGN contains a similar block with 'Transport processing functions' and is connected to three boxes: NACF, MMCF, and RACF. Above these are two 'VPN Service Control Function' boxes. Reference points are indicated by dashed lines with labels: VT-5' and VT-6' connect the VPN Service Control Functions; VT-1' connects e-NAF to the Enterprise Network transport block; VT-2' connects e-MCF to the Enterprise Network transport block; VT-4' connects e-RACF to the Enterprise Network transport block; VT-3' connects the Enterprise Network transport block to the NGN transport block; VT-1 connects the NGN transport block to NACF; VT-2 connects the NGN transport block to MMCF; VT-4 connects the NGN transport block to RACF; VT-5 connects the VPN Service Control Function to NACF; and VT-6 connects the VPN Service Control Function to RACF. The top layer is labeled 'Service stratum' and the middle layer is labeled 'Transport stratum'.
+
+**Figure 7-5 – Reference points of the mobile NGN functional architecture**
+
+#### 7.3.1 VT-1 reference point
+
+The VT-1 reference point is defined between MUE and NACF. The NACF provides IP addresses (IPv4 or IPv6 addresses) and some configuration information for the MUE in an NGN access network (typically through DHCP) through this reference point. This reference point is also defined for MUE authentication and authorization, and mobile VPN security association including security key exchange. This reference point is mapped to a combination of TU-1 and TC-1, which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+#### 7.3.2 VT-1' reference point
+
+The VT-1' reference point is defined between MUE and e-NAF. The e-NAF is a function in an enterprise network which can be matched to NACF in NGN and has the corresponding functionalities as the NACF in NGN. Therefore, the reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-1.
+
+#### 7.3.3 VT-2 reference point
+
+The VT-2 reference point is defined between MUE and MMCF. The MMCF provides a host-based mobility protocol for MUEs in an NGN access network through this reference point. This reference point is mapped to a combination of M3, M4, and M5, which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+#### 7.3.4 VT-2' reference point
+
+The VT-2' reference point is defined between MUE and e-MCF. The e-MCF is a function in an enterprise network which can be matched to MMCF in NGN and has the corresponding functionalities to the MMCF in NGN. Therefore, the reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-2.
+
+#### 7.3.5 VT-3 reference point
+
+The VT-3 reference point is defined between transport functions in NGN and RACF. Note that VTF could be controlled via this interface in remote access mobile VPN with managed service from NGN even though it is located in enterprise network. The RACF provides real-time application-driven and policy-based transport resource management in support of end-to-end QoS, gate control, network address translation, and traversal of remote network address translators through this
+
+interface. This reference point is mapped to a combination of $R_w$ and $R_c$ , which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2011].
+
+#### **7.3.6 VT-3' reference point**
+
+The VT-3' reference point is defined between transport functions and e-RACF. The e-RACF is a function in an enterprise network which can be matched to RACF in NGN and has the corresponding functionalities to the RACF in NGN. Therefore, the reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-3.
+
+#### **7.3.7 VT-4 reference point**
+
+The VT-4 reference point is defined between transport functions and MMCF. This reference point is used to activate handover at the related layer 2 and 3 transport functions. This reference point is mapped to a combination of $M_6$ and $M_7$ , which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2018].
+
+#### **7.3.8 VT-4' reference point**
+
+The VT-4' reference point is defined between transport functions and e-MMCF. The e-MMCF is a function in an enterprise network which can be matched to MMCF in NGN and has the corresponding functionalities to the MMCF in NGN. Therefore, the reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-4.
+
+#### **7.3.9 VT-5 reference point**
+
+The VT-5 reference point is defined between a service control function and NACF. This reference point is used for the service control function to query geographical location information to NACF. This reference point is mapped to S-TC1, which is defined in [ITU-T Y.2014].
+
+#### **7.3.10 VT-5' reference point**
+
+The VT-5' reference point is defined between transport functions and e-NAF. The reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-5.
+
+#### **7.3.11 VT-6 reference point**
+
+The VT-6 reference point is defined between a service control function and RACF. This reference point is used to authorize and reserve QoS resource for VPN service sessions. This reference point is mapped to $R_s$ , which is defined in [ITU-T Y.2011].
+
+#### **7.3.12 VT-6' reference point**
+
+The VT-6' reference point is defined between a service control function and e-RACF. The reference point may be defined similarly to the matching NGN reference point, VT-6.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE1 as MUE
+ participant VTF
+ participant NACF as NACF (e-NAF)
+ participant MMCF as MMCF (e-MCF)
+ participant RACF as RACF (e-RACF)
+ participant VPN_SCF as VPN SCF
+ participant MUE2 as MUE
+
+ MUE1->>NACF: Network attachment
+(IP address allocation,
+Authentication, etc)
+ MUE1->>VPN_SCF:
+ VTF->>RACF: QoS Enforcement
+ VTF->>MMCF: Security association and binding
+update
+ VTF->>MMCF: Tunnel creation
+ MUE1-->>VTF: VPN Tunnel
+ VTF-->>MUE2: VPN Tunnel
+ VTF->>MUE2: Tunnel creation
+ VTF->>MUE2: Direct VPN Tunnel
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the service registration and initial attachment procedure for mobile VPN service based on host-based mobility protocol. The diagram involves seven entities: MUE, VTF, NACF (e-NAF), MMCF (e-MCF), RACF (e-RACF), VPN SCF, and another MUE. The process includes network attachment, QoS enforcement, security association and binding update, tunnel creation, and the establishment of VPN and Direct VPN tunnels.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Service registration and initial attachment procedure for mobile VPN service based on host-based mobility protocol**
+
+### 8.1 VPN service registration/de-registration
+
+An MUE should register itself to VPN SCF if it wants to be a member of a VPN. The registered addresses or identifiers of the MUEs should be available to the other nodes (other MUEs and VTF) to create secure VPN tunnels. The MUE could de-register itself from the VPN SCF when it does not want to be a member of the VPN anymore.
+
+### 8.2 QoS provisioning and enforcement for VPN tunnel
+
+The VPN SCF will trigger RACF (or e-RACF) to provision QoS for the VPN tunnels as the MUE registers itself to the VPN SCF. Then the RACF (or e-RACF) enforces QoS for VPN tunnels into VTF and related network elements. The VPN SCF will also trigger RACF (or e-RACF) to release QoS for the VPN tunnel as the MUE deregisters itself from the VPN through the VPN SCF.
+
+### 8.3 Initial network attachment
+
+When an MUE is powered on, it will perform the initial attachment process defined in [ITU-T Y.2014]. Then the host-based mobility (HBM) protocol is used to establish a mobile VPN tunnel between an MUE and a VTF as well as between two different MUEs.
+
+#### **8.3.1 Security association establishment and binding registration**
+
+The MUE may support the various key exchange protocols such as IKEv2 [b-IETF RFC 5996] and password authenticated key exchange (PAK) [ITU-T X.1035] for negotiating the security association which will be used for securing mobility control signalling and data packets. The security associations for control packets and data packets are performed independently. The MMCF (or e-MCF) needs to take care of the security association only for control packets in general mobility cases but the MMCF (or e-MCF) for mobile VPN service should take care of the security association for data packets as well. During this security association procedure, the MUE may request the allocation of a persistent IP address or prefix if it is not pre-configured manually or in the service registration procedure.
+
+#### **8.3.2 VPN tunnel creation**
+
+After establishing the security association and obtaining the persistent IP address, the MUE should exchange mobility location binding update messages in order to register its persistent IP address and temporary IP address at the mobility location management functional entity (MLM-FE) of MMCF (or e-MCF), if it detects the change of its location. In order to support IP version independent mobility in access networks, the MUE may have multiple persistent IP addresses of different IP versions as well as multiple temporary IP addresses of different IP versions.
+
+When the MMCF (or e-MCF) receives the location binding update from an MUE, it will first set up a secure VPN tunnel to VTF and then send the location binding acknowledgement back to the MUE. If the location binding acknowledgement indicates that the location binding update request is accepted, the MUE should create and manage a binding entry for the persistent IP address and the temporary IP address. After this, a mobile VPN tunnel is established between the MUE and VTF.
+
+#### **8.3.3 Direct VPN tunnel creation**
+
+If both communication entities are MUEs, these can create a direct mobile VPN tunnel which does not necessarily go through VTF. The two MUEs should set up a security association between them to establish a direct VPN tunnel which will provide an optimized and secure communication path between the MUEs.
+
+### 8.4 Handover
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE1 as MUE
+ participant VTF
+ participant NACF as NACF (e-NAF)
+ participant MMCF as MMCF (e-MCF)
+ participant RACF as RACF (e-RACF)
+ participant VPN_SCF as VPN SCF
+ participant MUE2 as MUE
+
+ Note over MUE1: VPN Tunnel
+ Note over MUE1, VTF: VPN Tunnel
+ Note over MUE1, VTF, NACF, MMCF, RACF, VPN_SCF, MUE2: Direct VPN Tunnel
+ Note over MUE1, VTF, NACF: Network attachment (IP address allocation, Authentication, etc)
+ Note over MUE1, VTF, MMCF: Binding update
+ Note over MMCF, RACF: QoS Modification Request
+ Note over RACF, VPN_SCF: QoS Update Notification
+ Note over VTF, MMCF, RACF: QoS Enforcement
+ Note over VTF, MMCF: Tunnel Creation
+ Note over MUE1: New VPN Tunnel
+ Note over MUE1, VTF, NACF, MMCF, RACF, VPN_SCF, MUE2: Direct Tunnel Creation
+ Note over MUE1, VTF, NACF, MMCF, RACF, VPN_SCF, MUE2: New Direct VPN Tunnel
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the handover procedure for host-based mobility protocol based mobile VPN. The diagram shows interactions between MUE, VTF, NACF (e-NAF), MMCF (e-MCF), RACF (e-RACF), VPN SCF, and MUE. Key steps include: Network attachment (IP address allocation, Authentication, etc.), Binding update, QoS Modification Request, QoS Update Notification, QoS Enforcement, Tunnel Creation, New VPN Tunnel, Direct Tunnel Creation, and New Direct VPN Tunnel.
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Handover procedure for host-based mobility protocol based mobile VPN**
+
+The handover procedure is performed by the MUE according to the HBM protocol to update its temporary IP address to the MMCF (or e-MCF) after detecting a movement between two different access networks, which implies a change of the temporary IP address. When this procedure takes place, the MUE already has a valid registration at the MMCF (or e-MCF), which implies that the MMCF (or e-MCF) has a binding entry for that MUE and a security association to secure HBM protocol signalling is in place between the MUE and the MMCF (e-MCF).
+
+The procedure involves performing the movement detection and exchanging of location binding update and location binding acknowledgement between the MUE and the MMCF (or e-MCF). For the handover procedure, it is assumed that the MUE has already set up a security association with the MMCF (or e-MCF) in the initial attachment procedure described in the previous clause and the security association remains valid even after handover to the other access network.
+
+When the MMCF (or e-MCF) receives the location binding update from the MUE, the MMCF (or e-MCF) will interact with RACF (or e-RACF) to re-provision QoS for the new location and create a new tunnel to VTF. The QoS update information may be notified to VPN SCF to update its QoS provisioning information for the VPN tunnel.
+
+After a new mobile VPN tunnel is created between the MUE and VTF, the MUE will create a new direct tunnel to the corresponding MUE after creating security association between them for an optimized communication path.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+Basic considerations on security architecture for NGN are addressed in [ITU-T Y.2001], and the security requirements of the NGN are described in [ITU-T Y.2701]. Concerning the specifics of mobile VPN, the various kinds of terminals, devices and contents that can be involved will have to conform to the security requirements of the network to which they are willing to attach. When attaching to the NGN, corresponding authentication and authorization requirements in [ITU-T Y.2702] should be applied.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use case of mobile VPN based on the IP-based mobility protocol
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Secure tunnel set up
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of operations for setting up a secure tunnel between two Mobile User Equipment (MUE) devices and a Virtual Private Network Gateway (VPN GW). The process is divided into two main phases: initial setup and subsequent communication.
+
+**Initial Setup Phase:**
+
+- MUE 1** initiates the process by sending an **mPAK** (modified Pseudo Password Acknowledgment) to **VPN GW**.
+- MUE 1** sends a **Setup secure tunnel** message to **VPN GW**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **Setup secure tunnel** message to **MUE 2**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **KH[TR/TA]** (Keyed Hash of Tunnel Request and Tunnel Acknowledgment) message to **MUE 1**.
+- MUE 1** sends a **Control Msg** (Control Message) to **VPN GW**.
+- MUE 1** sends a **PPQ(Pseudo Password Query)** (Pseudo Password Query) to **VPN GW**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **PPA(Pseudo Password Ack)** (Pseudo Password Acknowledgment) to **MUE 1**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **PPA(Pseudo Password Ack)** to **MUE 2**.
+- VPN GW** sends an **mPAK** to **MUE 2**.
+
+**Subsequent Communication Phase:**
+
+- MUE 1** sends a **Setup secure tunnel** message to **VPN GW**.
+- MUE 2** sends a **Setup secure tunnel** message to **VPN GW**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **Control Msg** to **MUE 1**.
+- VPN GW** sends a **Data** message to **MUE 1**.
+
+The diagram is labeled **Y.2811(12)\_Fl.1** at the bottom right.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the modified PAK-based secure tunnel creation process between two MUEs and a VPN GW.
+
+**Figure I.1 – Modified PAK-based secure tunnel creation**
+
+Figure I.1 shows how the secure tunnel between the MUEs can be set up using modified PAK. The PAK is a protocol to establish a shared secret with a party whose identity has been assured by the password. In this scenario, the original PAK is extended to exchange security policy configuration information between two nodes. Every MUE is assumed to have an ID and password in order to use modified PAK (mPAK). Every MUE should exchange key information with the VPN service control function through the mPAK.
+
+Using the key information and keyed-hash (KH) mechanism, the MUE will set up a tunnel by exchanging tunnel request (TR) and tunnel acknowledgement (TA) messages with the VPN transport function which is normally located in VPN gateway. Through the tunnel, the MUEs and VPN gateway can exchange secure control messages.
+
+Then, MUEs will request a pseudo ID and password using "pseudo password query" and then the VPN service control function will generate a pseudo ID and password for the MUEs. The newly generated pseudo ID and password will be delivered to all the VPN members through the secure tunnels between the VPN transport function (also known as VPN gateway) and MUEs that were already set up.
+
+Then, the MUEs could exchange key information with the other MUEs using their pseudo IDs and passwords through the mPAK.
+
+#### I.1.1 Key exchange between MUE and VPN gateway
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Local as Local node
+ participant Remote as Remote node
+
+ Note over Local: $x \in {}_R Z_p$
+
+ $X = g^x \cdot H_1[LA || RA || ID || PW]$
+ Local->>Remote: ID, X
+ Note over Remote: $y \in {}_R Z_p$
+
+ $\rho = \left( \frac{X}{H_1[LA || RA || ID || PW]} \right)^y = g^{xy}$
+
+ $K_{seed} = H_3[LA || RA || ID || PW || g^x || g^y || \rho]$
+
+ $K_A = PRF[K_{seed} || \rho || ID || PW || 0]$
+
+ $Y = g^y \cdot H_2[LA || RA || ID || PW]$
+
+ $MSG_R = [Alg List]$
+
+ $AUTH_R = KH[ID || Y || MSG_R]_{K_A}$
+ Remote-->>Local: ID, Y, MSG_R, AUTH_R
+ Note over Local: $\rho = \left( \frac{Y}{H[LA || RA || ID || PW]} \right)^x = g^{xy}$
+
+ $K_{seed} = H_3[LA || RA || ID || PW || g^x || g^y || \rho]$
+
+ $K_A = PRF[K_{seed} || \rho || ID || PW || 0]$
+
+ Verify AUTH_R
+
+ $MSG_L = [Alg List, SP List]$
+
+ $AUTH_L = KH[ID || MSG_L]_{K_A}$
+ Local->>Remote: ID, MSG_L, AUTH_L
+ Note over Remote: Verify AUTH_L
+
+ $MSG_N = [SP List]$
+
+ $AUTH_N = KH[ID || MSG_N]_{K_A}$
+ Remote-->>Local: ID, MSG_N, AUTH_N
+ Note over Local: Verify AUTH_N
+
+```
+
+Y.2811(12)\_F1.2
+
+Sequence diagram of the Modified PAK algorithm between a Local node and a Remote node.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Modified PAK algorithm**
+
+First, a random number is generated ( $g^x$ ) from a number set ( ${}_R Z_p$ ) and the value is multiplied by the hash value of the concatenation of local address (LA), remote node address (RA), MUE's identifier (ID) and password (PW) using a hash function $H_1$ , to finally obtain a value X. This way only the nodes that know the password can calculate the key. Then the local node sends the message including ID and X to the remote node.
+
+If a remote node (VPN gateway or corresponding MUE) receives the message from a local node, it generates a random number ( $g^y$ ) from a number set ( ${}_R Z_p$ ). Then, a hash value ( $K_{seed}$ ) of the concatenation of LA, RA, ID, PW, $g^x$ , $g^y$ and $g^{xy}$ is calculated using a hash function $H_3$ . $K_A$ is obtained by generating a pseudo random number from the concatenation of $K_{seed}$ , ID and PW. The $g^y$ value is multiplied by the hash value of the concatenation of LA, RA, ID and PW using a hash function $H_2$ to finally obtain a value Y. Finally, a keyed-hash value ( $AUTH_R$ ) is generated using $K_A$ from the concatenation of ID, Y and a security algorithm list ( $MSG_R$ ) that the remote node can provide. Then, the node sends back the message including ID, Y, $MSG_R$ and $AUTH_R$ to the local node.
+
+The local node again calculates $K_{seed}$ and $K_A$ from the information that it received from the remote node and its password (PW), and verifies the $AUTH_R$ . Then, it sends a keyed-hash value ( $AUTH_L$ ) which is generated using $K_A$ from the concatenation of ID and security algorithm and policy list ( $MSG_L$ ) that the node can support. The node sends back the message including ID, $MSG_L$ and $AUTH_L$ to the remote node.
+
+The remote node sends a keyed-hash value ( $AUTH_N$ ) which is generated using $K_A$ from the concatenation of ID and security policy list ( $MSG_N$ ) which is decided to be used. Then, the remote node sends the message including ID, $MSG_N$ and $AUTH_N$ to the local node. Finally, the key exchange procedure ends by verifying the $AUTH_N$ .
+
+Through this procedure, a local node (MUE) and its remote node (VPN gateway or corresponding MUE) share the key information. The procedure follows the basic procedure in [ITU-T X.1035] and uses the keyed-hash mechanism to protect messages. The following are keys to be used for tunnel set up and control messages after the above procedure.
+
+$$K_{\text{tun}} = H[K_{\text{seed}} \parallel K_A \parallel g^{xy} \parallel \text{ID} \parallel \text{PW} \parallel 1]$$
+
+$$K_{\text{ctrl}} = H[K_{\text{seed}} \parallel K_{\text{tun}} \parallel g^{xy} \parallel \text{ID} \parallel \text{PW} \parallel 2]$$
+
+$K_{\text{tun}}$ is used as the key to protect tunnel request (TR) and tunnel acknowledge (TA) messages, and $K_{\text{ctrl}}$ is used as the key to protect control messages.
+
+#### **I.1.2 Key exchange between MUEs**
+
+Once a secure tunnel between MUE and VPN gateway is created, the separate key should be exchanged to set up a direct secure tunnel between two MUEs. Since it is not appropriate to distribute an MUE's password to the others, a temporary ID and password are created for each MUE, which is only temporarily valid for the direct communication between MUEs.
+
+The temporary ID and password are dynamically created for each MUE directly after setting up a tunnel between MUE and VPN gateway. MUEs will request a pseudo ID and password using "pseudo password query" and then VPN service control function will generate a pseudo ID and a password for each MUE. The newly generated pseudo ID and password will be delivered to the entire VPN member MUEs through the secure VPN tunnels between MUEs and VPN gateway functions which were already set up.
+
+Then, the MUEs could exchange key information with the other MUEs using their pseudo IDs and passwords through the mPAK which is described in clause I.1.1.
+
+### **I.2 Mobility**
+
+#### **I.2.1 Mobility for the tunnel between MUE and VPN gateway**
+
+In order to support seamless mobility using the IP-based mobility mechanism, multiple interfaces are assumed to support make-before-break handover. One of the interfaces is used for active VPN tunnels and others are used for standby VPN tunnels.
+
+Figure I.3 shows an example with two interfaces. The first interface is chosen to be a primary interface, which is determined the local node's policy or the network's policy. First, a tunnel is created between MUE and VPN gateway. A tunnel ID (TID) value is allocated for the tunnel and the TID value is used when an actual binding is performed. A tunnel is registered as an active tunnel through performing binding registration for the tunnel while setting the BID (binding ID) value to the TID value. As shown in the figure, a tunnel with a TID value of X is used as a primary tunnel for the VPN traffic and a tunnel with a TID value of Y is used as secondary tunnel.
+
+If a handover is needed because of various reasons of the primary tunnel such as signal strength degradation, MUE will switch the secondary tunnel to the primary tunnel by setting BID to the TID of the secondary tunnel.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE
+ participant VPN_gateway as VPN gateway
+
+ Note over MUE, VPN_gateway: Primary control tunnel
+ MUE->>VPN_gateway: Tunnel creation request and response (TID = X)
+ MUE->>VPN_gateway: Binding registration and response (BID = X)
+ Note over MUE, VPN_gateway: Primary control tunnel (established)
+
+ Note over MUE, VPN_gateway: Secondary control tunnel
+ MUE->>VPN_gateway: Tunnel creation request and response (TID = Y)
+ Note over MUE, VPN_gateway: Secondary control tunnel (established)
+
+ Note over MUE, VPN_gateway: Control tunnel handover
+ MUE->>VPN_gateway: Binding registration and response (BID = Y)
+ MUE->>VPN_gateway: Tunnel removal request and response for previous primary tunnel
+
+```
+
+Y.2811(12)\_Fl.3
+
+Sequence diagram showing signalling flow for mobility between MUE and VPN gateway. The diagram is divided into three sections: Primary control tunnel, Secondary control tunnel, and Control tunnel handover. In the Primary control tunnel section, MUE sends a Tunnel creation request and response (TID = X) to VPN gateway, followed by a Binding registration and response (BID = X). In the Secondary control tunnel section, MUE sends a Tunnel creation request and response (TID = Y) to VPN gateway, followed by a Binding registration and response (BID = Y). In the Control tunnel handover section, MUE sends a Tunnel removal request and response for previous primary tunnel to VPN gateway. The diagram is labeled Y.2811(12)\_Fl.3 at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Signalling flow for mobility between MUE and VPN gateway**
+
+#### I.2.2 Mobility for the tunnels between MUEs
+
+If multiple MUEs want to communicate through secure VPN tunnels, the MUEs create direct VPN tunnels between them. Before creating the direct VPN tunnel, the primary and secondary control tunnels are created between MUEs and VPN gateway. Once the control tunnels are created, the MUEs can create the direct VPN tunnels with other MUEs that they want to communicate with. If a handover is needed because of various reasons of the primary interface such as signal strength degradation, MUE will hand over the control tunnel as in clause I.2.1. Once the control tunnel is handed over the new interface, the data traffic also passes through the tunnel instead of the through the direct tunnel. And the traffic is again forwarded through the direct tunnel after deleting the old direct tunnel and creating the new direct tunnel through the new primary interface.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE1 as MUE
+ participant VPN_gateway as VPN gateway
+ participant MUE2 as MUE
+
+ Note over MUE1, VPN_gateway: Control tunnel
+ MUE1->>VPN_gateway: Primary control tunnel
+ MUE1->>VPN_gateway: Secondary control tunnel
+ Note over VPN_gateway, MUE2: Primary control tunnel
+ Note over VPN_gateway, MUE2: Secondary control tunnel
+
+ Note over MUE1, MUE2: Direct tunnel
+ MUE1->>MUE2: Direct tunnel creation request and response
+ MUE1->>MUE2: Direct tunnel
+
+ Note over MUE1, VPN_gateway: Control tunnel handover
+ MUE1->>VPN_gateway: Control tunnel handover
+
+ Note over MUE1, MUE2: Direct tunnel handover
+ MUE1->>MUE2: Direct tunnel delete request and response for old direct tunnel
+ MUE1->>MUE2: Direct tunnel create request and response for new primary interface
+
+```
+
+Y.2811(12)\_Fl.4
+
+Sequence diagram showing signalling flow for mobility between MUEs. The diagram involves three participants: MUE, VPN gateway, and MUE. It is divided into four sections: Control tunnel, Direct tunnel, Control tunnel handover, and Direct tunnel handover. In the Control tunnel section, MUE creates a Primary control tunnel and a Secondary control tunnel with the VPN gateway. In the Direct tunnel section, MUE sends a Direct tunnel creation request and response to the other MUE, followed by a Direct tunnel. In the Control tunnel handover section, MUE sends a Control tunnel handover message to the VPN gateway. In the Direct tunnel handover section, MUE sends a Direct tunnel delete request and response for old direct tunnel to the other MUE, followed by a Direct tunnel create request and response for new primary interface to the other MUE. The diagram is labeled Y.2811(12)\_Fl.4 at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure I.4 – Signalling flow for mobility between MUEs**
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## Use case of mobile VPN based on MOBIKE
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The MOBIKE-based mobile VPN provides only the case where an MUE accesses the enterprise resources, but does not provide the case of communication between MUEs.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the service registration and initial attachment procedure for MOBIKE-based mobile VPN. It features six participants: MUE, VTF, NACF (e-NAF), MMCF (e-MCF), RACF (e-RACF), and VPN SCF. The sequence of operations is as follows:
+
+- Network attachment (IP address allocation, Authentication, etc):** A message from VTF to MUE.
+- VPN Service Registration:** A message from MUE to VPN SCF.
+- QoS Provisioning:** A message from VPN SCF to RACF.
+- QoS Enforcement:** A message from RACF to VTF.
+- MOBIKE Security Association:** A message from VTF to MUE.
+- SA download:** A message from MUE to NACF.
+- VPN Tunnel (IPsec):** A message from MUE to NACF.
+
+A blue oval at the bottom of the MUE lifeline indicates the end of the procedure.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the service registration and initial attachment procedure for MOBIKE based mobile VPN.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Service registration and initial attachment procedure for MOBIKE based mobile VPN**
+
+### II.1 VPN service registration/de-registration procedure
+
+The VPN service registration/de-registration procedure is basically the same as in mobile VPN service based on host-based mobility protocol.
+
+### II.2 VPN tunnel QoS provisioning
+
+When the MUE registers itself to the VPN service control function (VPN SCF), the VPN SCF will trigger PD-FE in RACF to provision QoS for the VPN tunnel. Likewise, when the MUE deregisters itself from the VPN SCF, the VPN SCF will also trigger PD-FE in RACF to release QoS for the VPN tunnel.
+
+### II.3 Initial attachment procedure
+
+The MOBIKE initial attachment is performed by the MUE to establish an IPsec tunnel with the tunnelling end-points as described in [b-IETF RFC 4555]. The MOBIKE client and server perform the IKE security association initialization procedure (IKE\_SA\_INIT) and the IKE authentication procedure (IKE\_AUTH) to set up an IPsec tunnel. Once the IPsec tunnel has been established between the MOBIKE client and the VTF, the MUE may start sending and receiving data to/from its enterprise network.
+
+### II.4 Handover procedure
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant MUE
+ participant VTF
+ participant NACF as NACF (e-NAF)
+ participant MMCF as MMCF (e-MCF)
+ participant RACF as RACF (e-RACF)
+ participant VPN_SCF as VPN SCF
+
+ MUE->>VTF: Network attachment
+(IP address allocation,
+Authentication, etc)
+ VTF->>NACF: IP address update
+ NACF->>MMCF: QoS Modification Request
+ MMCF->>RACF: QoS Update Notification
+ RACF->>VPN_SCF: QoS Update Notification
+ RACF->>MUE: QoS Enforcement
+ MUE->>VTF: New VPN Tunnel (IPsec)
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the handover procedure for MOBIKE based mobile VPN. It shows the interactions between the MUE (Mobile User Equipment), VTF (Virtual Tunnel Function), NACF (Network Access Control Function, e-NAF), MMCF (Mobility Management Control Function, e-MCF), RACF (Resource Access Control Function, e-RACF), and VPN SCF (VPN Service Control Function). The procedure starts with the MUE sending a 'Network attachment (IP address allocation, Authentication, etc)' message to the VTF. The VTF then sends an 'IP address update' message to the NACF. The NACF sends a 'QoS Modification Request' message to the MMCF. The MMCF sends a 'QoS Update Notification' message to the RACF. The RACF sends a 'QoS Update Notification' message to the VPN SCF. The RACF then sends a 'QoS Enforcement' message to the MUE. Finally, the MUE sends a 'New VPN Tunnel (IPsec)' message to the VTF.
+
+Sequence diagram of the handover procedure for MOBIKE based mobile VPN.
+
+**Figure II.2 – Handover procedure for MOBIKE based mobile VPN**
+
+While MUE is connected to an access network, if any of the handover conditions is met, such as signal strength degradation, the MUE may hand over to another wireless network. Once the handover decision is made, the MOBIKE client sends an INFORMATIONAL message to VTF to inform that its IP address has been changed. After the INFORMATIONAL message is exchanged, MUE's data traffic is sent and received through the target access network.
+
+As in the initial attachment phase, when the NACF receives a security association request from an MUE, the NACF will interact with PD-FE in RACF to re-provision QoS. Optionally, the QoS update information may be notified to VPN SCF.
+
+# **Bibliography**
+
+- [b-IETF RFC 4555] IETF RFC 4555, *IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol (MOBIKE)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 5996] IETF RFC 5996, *Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)*.
+
+
+
+# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3013
+
+(08/2014)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Socio-economic assessment of future networks by tussle analysis**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3013
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+### INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3013
+
+# Socio-economic assessment of future networks by tussle analysis
+
+## Summary
+
+The need for a socio-economic assessment of future networks (FNs) is documented in the "Social and economic awareness" objective and in the "Economic incentives" design goal of Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3013 introduces tussle analysis as a meta-method for such a socio-economic assessment of FN technology. Different methods are proposed to implement the three steps that comprise tussle analysis. The benefits of integrating tussle analysis into the standardization phase of FN technology are highlighted.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3013 | 2014-08-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12283 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Economic incentives, social and economic awareness, socio-economic assessment, tussle analysis.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2014
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation ..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Introduction..... | 2 |
+| 7 Design for tussle ..... | 3 |
+| 8 Tussle analysis ..... | 3 |
+| 8.1 Stakeholder identification methods ..... | 5 |
+| 8.2 Tussle identification methods..... | 5 |
+| 8.3 Tussle impact and tussle evolution methods ..... | 6 |
+| 9 Tussle analysis in FN technology standardization..... | 7 |
+| Appendix I – Tussle notions ..... | 8 |
+| I.1 General example ..... | 8 |
+| I.2 Specific example ..... | 9 |
+| Appendix II – Methods overview ..... | 11 |
+| Appendix III – Stakeholder overview ..... | 13 |
+| Bibliography..... | 15 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3013
+
+# Socio-economic assessment of future networks by tussle analysis
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes tussle analysis and recommends it to complement FN design and standardization using socio-economic assessment. The scope of this Recommendation covers the following aspects:
+
+- The importance of social and economic awareness of FNs, as identified by [ITU-T Y.3001];
+- FN design for tussle principles, which ensure social and economic awareness;
+- Tussle analysis as a meta-method to assess a FN technology's compliance with these principles;
+- Recommended methods to implement the three steps of the tussle analysis meta-method;
+- Benefits of the integration of tussle analysis into FN standardization.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 future network (FN)** [ITU-T Y.3001]: A network able to provide services, capabilities, and facilities difficult to provide using existing network technologies. A future network is either:
+
+- a) A new component network or an enhanced version of an existing one, or
+- b) A heterogeneous collection of new component networks or of new and existing component networks that is operated as a single network.
+
+NOTE (added by this Recommendation) – The plural form "future networks" (FNs) is used to show that there may be more than one network that fits the definition of a future network.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 spillover:** A special case of a tussle evolution, which is characterized by triggering a tussle in a functionality space that the original tussle was not about.
+
+**3.2.2 tussle:** The entire set of stakeholders with conflicting interests over the usage and deployment of a technology and the resulting attempts to enforce these interests through technological, economic, or judicial means.
+
+**3.2.3 tussle evolution:** An iterative interaction of stakeholders through technological, economic, or judicial means, to influence the outcome of the respective tussle.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ASP | Application Service Provider |
+| DPI | Deep Packet Inspection |
+| FN | Future Network |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| ISP | Internet Service Provider |
+| MACTOR | Matrix of Alliances and Conflicts: Tactics, Objectives and Recommendations |
+| SWOT | Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| VoIP | Voice over IP |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+## **6 Introduction**
+
+Social and economic awareness is one out of four objectives for future networks (FNs) outlined in [ITU-T Y.3001]. This objective is motivated by the desire to reduce entry barriers for the various actors involved in the network ecosystem, and can be achieved by reducing life cycle costs and thereby allowing appropriate competition and an appropriate return for all actors.
+
+Traditional engineering goals are focused on technical properties, such as effectiveness, efficiency and modularity. Contrary to other technologies, FNs are a means for socio-economic interactions between a wide group of participants with possibly conflicting interests. Therefore, designing FNs according to purely technically-driven engineering goals can lead to technologies that do not match the market and policy makers' needs, or that fail to satisfy other socio-economic demands, thus negatively affecting the technologies' adoption and long-term success.
+
+Therefore, [ITU-T Y.3001] identifies the design goal of economic incentives for FNs. This design goal postulates that FNs are to be designed to provide a sustainable competition environment for solving tussles among the range of participants in the information and communication technology (ICT)/telecommunication ecosystem.
+
+In the light of the objective of social and economic awareness and the related design goal of economic incentives, as determined in [ITU-T Y.3001], this Recommendation recommends that technically-driven FN design and standardization is to be complemented by a socio-economic assessment of FN technology. To this end, tussle analysis is proposed as a meta-method (see Note) to assess if a technology for FNs is designed in a socio-economic aware and incentive-compatible manner. In addition useful methods to implement the three steps of tussle analysis are recommended.
+
+NOTE – A meta-method describes steps that need to be implemented by specific methods.
+
+## 7 Design for tussle
+
+Ideally, the introduction of a new FN technology should lead to a satisfying outcome for all involved stakeholders and it should not lead to spillovers to other functionalities. In cases where unsatisfied stakeholders or spillovers have to be expected, the technology designer should examine whether implementation changes could avoid these undesirable outcomes.
+
+Internet technologies should be designed to allow for variations rather than imposing a particular outcome [b-Clark05]. Accordingly, the stated "Design for tussle" goal is based on the perception that the Internet is a rather unpredictable system and it is very difficult to assess whether a particular outcome will remain desirable in the future.
+
+The tussle analysis methodology helps in designing FN technology that is designed for tussle. A technology such as an Internet communication protocol is designed for tussle if it complies with the "Design for choice" and the "Modularize the design along the tussle boundaries" principles, whereby the technology should:
+
+- lead to a stable outcome by allowing all involved stakeholders to express their interests and affect the outcome ("Design for choice" principle);
+- avoid spillovers to other functionalities ("Modularize the design along the tussle boundaries" principle).
+
+The "Design for choice" principle provides guidance in designing technology that allows for variation in outcome. Useful properties of this principle include:
+
+- "Exposure of list of choices" suggesting that the stakeholders involved must be given the opportunity to express multiple alternative choices and which the other party should also consider;
+- "Exchange of valuation" suggesting that the stakeholders involved should communicate their preferences in regard to the available set of choices (for instance by ranking them in descending order);
+- "Exposure of choice's impact" suggesting that the stakeholders involved should appreciate what the effects of their choices are on others;
+- "Visibility of choices made" suggesting that both the agent and the principal of an action must allow the inference of which of the available choices that has been selected.
+
+The "Modularize the design along tussle boundaries" principle helps in identifying whether tussle spillovers can appear. A technology designer can check for the following two conditions:
+
+- "Stakeholder separation", or whether the choices of one stakeholder group have significant side effects on stakeholders of another functionality (another tussle space), for example, create economic externalities between stakeholders of different tussle spaces;
+- "Functional separation", or whether different stakeholders use some functionality of the given technology in an unforeseen way to achieve a different goal in some other tussle space, i.e., the functionality of technology A interferes with (and possibly cancels) the functionality of technology B.
+
+## 8 Tussle analysis
+
+FN technology should undergo a systematic socio-economic assessment during technology design and technology standardization phases in order to anticipate the extent to which the FN technology is designed for tussle. Tussle analysis [b-TussleAnalysis] determines the recommended meta-method for conducting such a socio-economic assessment.
+
+When applying tussle analysis to FN technology, the following steps, for which concrete methods are given in clauses 8.1 to 8.3, have to be performed:
+
+- Step 1. Identify all primary stakeholders and their characteristics for the functionality under investigation (see clause 8.1).
+- Step 2. Identify tussles among identified stakeholders (see clause 8.2).
+- Step 3. For each tussle (see clause 8.3):
+- Assess the impact to each stakeholder (short-term, mid-term or long-term depending on the context);
+ - Identify potential ways for stakeholders to circumvent negative impacts (or gain unwarranted advantages) and the resulting tussle evolution (the term tussle evolution is related to other notions described in Appendix I);
+ - For each such manipulation technique, apply tussle analysis again.
+
+Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the steps to be performed in tussle analysis. Each step is shown as a horizontal rectangle with arrows denoting transitions. All steps need to be applied in the context of one or more functionalities (rounded vertical rectangles).
+
+
+
+Figure 1: High-level view of tussle analysis methodology. The diagram shows two yellow rounded rectangles at the top labeled 'Functionality I' and 'Functionality II'. Below them is a light blue rectangle for 'Step 1: Identify all primary stakeholders and their characteristics for the functionality under investigation'. Arrows point from Step 1 to two yellow rectangles below, with a purple arrow labeled 'New iteration' pointing back to Step 1. Below these is a blue rectangle for 'Step 2: Identify tussles among identified stakeholders'. Arrows point from Step 2 to a purple rectangle for 'Step 3: For each tussle assess the impact to each stakeholder and potential spillovers'. Inside the Step 3 rectangle, there are labels 'Tussle' and 'Spillover' with arrows pointing to the yellow rectangles. A red arrow labeled 'Spillover' points from the Step 3 rectangle to the 'Functionality II' rectangle. The text 'Y.3013(14)\_F01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – High-level view of tussle analysis methodology**
+
+In the ideal scenario the tussle outcome is an equilibrium point where the following two conditions hold:
+
+- Condition 1 All stakeholders in this functionality derive a payoff that is considered fair, therefore they will not take means to change the outcome and thus the tussle will not evolve further, and;
+- Condition 2 No stakeholder in another functionality, who was receiving a fair payoff before, gets an unfair payoff after this tussle equilibrium has been reached, i.e., the tussle does not spillover.
+
+If both conditions hold then the analysis of this particular tussle is completed and the focus should be shifted to the remaining tussles identified in Step 2. In the case where Condition 1 is not met, a new iteration of the methodology must be performed by making assumptions on the most probable policies adopted by unhappy stakeholders, i.e., the future evolution of the tussle must be investigated. Similarly, a new iteration must be performed for each spillover to other functionalities when Condition 2 is not met.
+
+Ideally, a new technology should lead to a stable outcome without spillovers to other functionalities. In the case where no such stable outcome can be expected, the technology designer should examine whether a change in the implementation details would lead to a better outcome.
+
+### 8.1 Stakeholder identification methods
+
+In order to implement Step 1 of tussle analysis, a method should be chosen that achieves a high level of completeness and relevance with respect to stakeholder identification.
+
+The identification of as complete a set of stakeholders as possible is crucial, since all further steps in tussle analysis depend on the range of identified stakeholders. If a stakeholder is missing, potential tussles involving that stakeholder cannot be captured in the analysis (Step 2), rendering the analysis as a whole incomplete and/or leading to incorrect analysis results (e.g., a stable outcome might be anticipated in Step 3).
+
+The following types of methods (see Appendix II for a methods overview) are recommended for identifying a set of stakeholders that satisfies the goals of completeness and relevance:
+
+- Personal observation
+- Interviews
+- Role-playing simulations (partly recommended)
+
+Any person familiar with the characteristics of the technology to be analysed is able to determine an *a priori* complete set of stakeholders according to personal observation. Personal observation covers not only own experience and knowledge, but also literature study. Personal observation and interview methods are especially beneficial when applied in combination. While personal observation is recommended to determine an *a priori* candidate stakeholder list, which in turn may support the basis for identifying suited interview partners, interviews are recommended in order to validate a stakeholder's involvement (relevance) and to identify other relevant stakeholders that were not covered in the *a priori* stakeholder list (completeness). Role-playing simulation methods (e.g., Delphi method, focus groups) show benefits over the additional effort as long as participants are representatively selected.
+
+Appendix III provides a collection of stakeholders specific to Internet technology, which should be used to verify and extend the list that was compiled with those methodologies listed above.
+
+### 8.2 Tussle identification methods
+
+In order to implement Step 2 of tussle analysis, a method should be chosen that achieves a high level of completeness and relevance with respect to stakeholder incentives, conflicts and available choices (see "Design for choice" principle in clause 7).
+
+Identifying an as complete set of tussles as possible is an important goal to ensure an all embracing tussle analysis. Since the relevance of tussles to a considered functionality varies, tussles have to be ranked accordingly during Step 2 so that Step 3 can be performed only for tussles which are classified as relevant. Therefore, it is crucial to completely characterize stakeholders by their incentives and the range of choices they have available. This is not always easy to obtain since this information might be considered as business confidential, or there might be a hidden agenda.
+
+The following types of methods (see Appendix II for a methods overview) are recommended for identifying a set of tussles that satisfies the goals of completeness and relevance:
+
+- Role-playing simulation
+- Personal observation
+- Risk management
+- MACTOR method
+- SWOT analysis (partly recommended)
+- Interviews (partly recommended)
+
+Assuming that participants were selected carefully, role-playing simulations (e.g., Delphi method, focus groups) constitute the most highly recommended methods, because they endorse a group-based
+
+approach rather than an individual approach. Bringing several motivated and knowledgeable experts into a group with each expert adopting a dedicated stakeholder role considerably increases the likelihood of relevant tussles being identified (see [b-TussleCookbook] for information on how to guide these role-playing simulations). This is supported mainly by the confrontational, debate-oriented and direct (but moderated) interaction among participants in for example a focus group. If effects of group dynamics should be avoided, the Delphi method may be prioritized over the discussion-oriented focus group method.
+
+Individual approaches, such as personal observation, risk management and the MACTOR method determine recommended methods as well, especially when personal observation is combined with risk management or with the MACTOR method. Even though not based on the thoughts, ideas and opinions of several experts, risk management's focus on identifying candidate factors with a negative and quantitatively or qualitatively evaluated effect on a system is highly beneficial in identifying tussles. Equally, the MACTOR method is suited for the identification of tussles due to its focus on giving an overview of possible alliances and conflicts in a business ecosystem.
+
+SWOT analysis might be selected as an alternative instrument to the MACTOR method and interviews might determine a valid instrument to complement personal observation (validation of identified tussles in interviews with stakeholders).
+
+### **8.3 Tussle impact and tussle evolution methods**
+
+In order to implement Step 3 of tussle analysis, a method should be chosen that achieves a high level of plausibility.
+
+Since tussle analysis is about anticipating a candidate technology's impact in consideration of tussles emerging among stakeholders, Step 3 has to ensure that such anticipation is based on reasonable and traceable grounds. Therefore, the more formal a method is (reproducible results), the more risk-oriented it is (dealing with aspects uncertainty and probability) and the more dynamics-oriented it is (complex system modelling covering feedback cycles), the better it is suited.
+
+The following types of methods (see Appendix II for a methods overview) are recommended for assessing tussle impact and tussle evolution, satisfying the goal of plausibility:
+
+- Game theory
+- Risk management
+- System dynamics
+- Role-playing simulations
+- Interviews (partly recommended)
+- MACTOR method (partly recommended)
+- SWOT analysis (partly recommended)
+
+Game theory is the recommended method when a single tussle round with well-known incentive structures can be modelled and played out in a formal and quantified manner. Risk management leads to comparable result quality as it allows for a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of previously identified factors and the resulting effects, considering risk dimensions and probability. Game theory and risk management are both less suited for assessing evolution over time, even though it is technically possible to model multi-round games. If evolution, dynamics and causal loops are prioritized, system dynamics is the recommended method. System dynamics is the method best suited to cope with simulations of various outcomes when multiple stakeholders interact over a longer modelling horizon. Due to the focus on actions and counter-actions in an interactive, complex modelled system, system dynamics is the primary recommended method for Step 3 in tussle analysis. However the trade-off is the significant effort expended in modelling.
+
+If a not fully formal, not quantified method is acceptable, role-playing simulations, in particular focus groups, are recommended. Focus groups profit from their unique ability to understand the dynamics of the major tussles by observing stakeholder behaviour.
+
+Interviews, the MACTOR method and SWOT analysis may determine valid complementary instruments for validation purposes of results originating from the use of the other recommended methods.
+
+## **9 Tussle analysis in FN technology standardization**
+
+The integration of a socio-economic assessment by means of tussle analysis into the standardization process of FN technology will improve the quality of according standards by increasing their level of social and economic awareness in terms of, e.g., incentive compatibility, adoption potential, marketability and compliance with regulatory requirements. In particular, a tussle analysis during the standardization phase identifies if a standard needs improvement to avoid unstable outcomes or spillovers upon release. Such improvement is achieved by further research on the technology or by design and implementation changes. If improvement is not possible by such means, the prior knowledge of instabilities, allows for timely information for administrations about the need for regulations to stabilize such unstable outcomes. Therefore, a tussle analysis during the standardization phase allows publishing of standards without destabilising effects or, at least mitigation of destabilizing effects by timely regulative provisions.
+
+In addition, the publication of the results of the performed tussle analysis increases the standard's value to and acceptance by different stakeholders. If the results indicate a high-adoption potential and a highly stable outcome, this provides for a strong support and investment signal for manufactures and operators, which will also increase the overall adoption of the standard. Furthermore, promising research fields will be revealed to academia, e.g., investigating disruptive technologies, which also generates feedback to be integrated into subsequent standards. For administrations a tussle analysis provides reference points to identify needs for regulations and develop these more efficiently.
+
+Therefore, a tussle analysis performed during the standardization phase allows the standard to be improved not only by accounting for socio-economic considerations but also by recording and publishing these considerations in a formal and comprehensive manner, thereby making published Recommendations more appealing. Thus, it is advantageous to integrate tussle analysis into the standardization process of FN technology and to publish this socio-economic assessment alongside the respective standards.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Tussle notions
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The long-term goals of each stakeholder with respect to a specific Internet functionality define the stakeholder's strategy that is, finally, implemented by policies. These policies take into account the technological, economic and judicial restrictions and other stakeholders' socio-economic aspects. However, a tussle involves not only the interests of stakeholders, but also how these conflicting interests are expressed through the available technological, economic, or judicial means, e.g., which technology is chosen for a specific functionality and how the technology's resources and parameters are configured. Since this expression may change in reaction to other stakeholders' moves, a tussle will usually lead to an iterative process of stakeholder interactions, which is termed tussle evolution. By this process the tussle may evolve into new tussles or trigger tussles for different functionalities, where the latter effect is termed spillover.
+
+A tussle outcome is characterized by the benefit or satisfaction that each involved stakeholder gets at a distinct point of the tussle evolution. The level of benefit can vary substantially among stakeholders. If the outcome is not considered fair by all stakeholders, these will try to change the outcome, which results in a tussle evolution. In particular, if the tussle outcome is considered "unfair" by a subset of stakeholders, it can evolve into a new tussle based on:
+
+- Socio-economic decisions alone, e.g., stop using that functionality, stop doing business
+- Out-of-band actions, e.g., asking a regulator to intervene, making coalitions for taking coordinated technology decisions, or
+- New socio-techno-economic decisions following the basic socio-economic technology cycle, e.g., introduce a radically different technology or use a technology option in an unforeseen way
+
+All these reactions characterize an unstable tussle outcome. It is likely that unstable outcomes will lead to tussle evolution and possibly destabilize other functionality spaces as well (spillover). However, a stable tussle outcome can also create spillovers in the case where some users of the established functionality find some new, not previously anticipated, uses of it, which interfere with other functions of the ecosystem. These are cases of negative externalities (i.e., adverse effects) between different functionality spaces. Positive externalities may also appear, for example more resources become available to functionality due to the introduction of a more efficient technology to another related functionality.
+
+### I.1 General example
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates how tussles can evolve inside a single functionality space or affect another functionality. Assuming a discrete-time model and that initially only functionality B is observed to be in a stable state. At a given time T1, both tussles A1 and C1 (for functionalities A and C respectively) reach equilibrium, but tussle A1 has a spillover effect and triggers a new tussle B1 in functionality B. At a later given time T2, both tussles A2 and B1 have reached equilibrium. Even though functionality A has now reached a new and stable outcome, it has a spillover to functionality C and makes the previously stable outcome of C1 unstable. Thus, the tussles of functionalities B and C evolve further in time (not shown).
+
+
+
+Y.3013(14)\_FI.1
+
+Figure I.1 – Tussle evolution due to instability and externalities. The diagram shows three rows representing Functionality A (blue), Functionality B (pink), and Functionality C (orange) across three time points: T0 (Initial tussle outcomes), T1, and T2. At T0, each functionality has an initial state (dashed blue circle). At T1, Functionality A evolves to an unstable outcome (solid blue circle) via Tussle A1. Functionality B and C have stable outcomes (solid green circles). At T2, Functionality A evolves to a stable outcome (solid green circle) via Tussle A2. Functionality B evolves to an unstable outcome (solid blue circle) via Tussle B1, which then evolves to a stable outcome (solid green circle) via Tussle B2. Functionality C evolves to an unstable outcome (solid blue circle) via Tussle C1, which then evolves to a stable outcome (solid green circle) via Tussle C2. Red dashed arrows indicate that the stable outcome of Functionality A at T2 affects the stable outcome of Functionality B at T2 and the stable outcome of Functionality C at T2. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols: Functionality (rectangle), Initial state (dashed circle), Stable outcome (solid green circle), Unstable outcome (solid blue circle), Evolves (solid arrow), Affects (red dashed arrow), Time A (TA), and Transfers (blue arrow).
+
+**Figure I.1 – Tussle evolution due to instability and externalities**
+
+### I.2 Specific example
+
+A detailed example of the tussle evolution related to sharing bandwidth on a common link with the transmission control protocol (TCP) is given in this clause and illustrated by Figure I.2, which shows the tussle evolution that occurs due to instability and externalities. Stakeholders appear on the left of each rectangle, while the positioning of an outcome denotes whether it is considered fair or not.
+
+When TCP was proposed in the early 1980s, it was assumed that hosts would initiate a single connection for each session. The algorithm suggested for controlling how instantaneous bandwidth is being shared can be considered fair in the sense that if $k$ connections are instantaneously active in a bottleneck link, then each of them would take $1/k$ of the bandwidth.
+
+But due to the introduction of peer-to-peer applications for file sharing, this outcome can no longer be considered stable. Users of such applications can open multiple TCP connections for the same file and get disproportionate bandwidth share in relation to traditional users (called interactive).
+
+This new outcome cannot be considered stable either, since the ability of an Internet service provider (ISP) to offer other services was threatened by the great increase in peer-to-peer traffic. ISPs responded by introducing middle boxes for inspecting data packets. These dedicated machines use advanced technology, such as deep packet inspection (DPI) techniques, in order to identify and throttle peer-to-peer traffic.
+
+
+
+**Stakeholders' strategies/policies**
+
+- Peer-to-peer (p2p) users
+- ISP (neutral entity)
+- Interactive users (e.g., web browser)
+- ISPs
+- Regulator
+- ASPs (e.g., VoIP)
+
+**bandwidth sharing**
+
+p2p users configure applications to open multiple TCP connections for the same session
+
+ISPs throttle bandwidth of p2p applications by using DPI technology
+
+p2p applications configured to perform traffic obfuscation
+
+What if ISPs deploy congestion exposure technologies and congestion pricing schemes?
+
+Functionality: bandwidth sharing
+
+Tussle outcome: p2p users get disproportionate bandwidth share, Fair bandwidth sharing, Interactive users get disproportionate bandwidth share
+
+**VoIP service delivery**
+
+ISPs use DPI technology to degrade quality of rival VoIP services
+
+Regulator announces fines due to VoIP providers' complaints
+
+Functionality: VoIP service delivery
+
+Tussle outcome: ISP's telephony services get preferential treatment, No discrimination, ASP's VoIP service get preferential treatment
+
+Y.3013(14)\_FI.2
+
+Figure I.2 – Tussle evolution due to instability and externalities for the bandwidth sharing case study. The diagram is divided into two horizontal sections: 'bandwidth sharing' (top, blue background) and 'VoIP service delivery' (bottom, orange background). The top section shows a flow from p2p users configuring multiple TCP connections, through ISPs throttling bandwidth using DPI, to p2p applications performing traffic obfuscation. A question mark points to a potential outcome of 'Fair bandwidth sharing'. The bottom section shows ISPs using DPI to degrade VoIP services, leading to a regulator announcing fines, which results in 'No discrimination'. A red dashed arrow connects the obfuscation step to the ISP's DPI use. Vertical axes on the right indicate 'Tussle outcome' for each section.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Tussle evolution due to instability and externalities for the bandwidth sharing case study**
+
+Even though this new bandwidth allocation outcome can be considered fair, it is not stable either. Peer-to-peer applications started performing traffic obfuscation, e.g., by encryption, in order to decrease downloading time.
+
+At the same time, DPI technology, which was installed to throttle peer-to-peer traffic, allowed ISPs to identify traffic that directly competes with the complementary services they offer. A famous example was an ISP's attempt to degrade the quality of third-party voice over IP (VoIP) services offered by application service providers (ASPs) that threatened traditional telephony services often offered by an affiliate of the ISP. This is an example of a spillover to another functionality, which was solved by affected users asking the regulator to intervene (judicial means) for discouraging anti-competitive tactics. In the interests of graphic simplicity the "VoIP service delivery" functionality in Figure I.2 is assumed to reach a stable outcome.
+
+In order to anticipate such socio-economic interactions through technological, economic, and judicial means, research projects already apply tussle analysis to enrich their technology development via socio-economic considerations and also publish these in their deliverables [b-ETICS], [b-ICN], [b-SmartenIT] and [b-FLAMINGO].
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Methods overview
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Each of the steps described in clauses 8.1 to 8.3 can be performed using several different techniques, or methods, while some of these methods can be used for more than one step. Table II.1 provides an overview of such popular methods (rows) and their suitability to carry out a particular step (columns).
+
+**Table II.1 – Overview of methods for implementing tussle analysis steps**
+
+| Methods | Stakeholder identification | Tussle identification | Tussle impact and tussle evolution |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|
+| Interviews | Highly relevant | Relevant | Relevant |
+| Personal observation | Highly relevant | Highly relevant | Less relevant |
+| Role-playing simulation | Relevant | Highly relevant | Highly relevant |
+| MACTOR method | Prerequisite | Highly relevant | Relevant |
+| SWOT analysis | Prerequisite | Relevant | Relevant |
+| Game theory | Prerequisite | Prerequisite | Highly relevant |
+| Risk management | Prerequisite | Highly relevant | Highly relevant |
+| System dynamics | Prerequisite | Prerequisite | Highly relevant |
+| NOTE 1 – See [b-MACTOR] and [b-MACTOR2]
NOTE 2 – See [B-SWOT], p. 2-6.
NOTE 3 – See [b-GameTheory], p. 460-482.
NOTE 4 – See [b-Risk], p. 18.
NOTE 5 – See [b-Dynamic]. | | | |
+
+**Interviews** are the most widespread method for gaining information about a situation from the stakeholders involved or other experts. Starting from an initial set of candidate stakeholders, interviews can help validate their own involvement and identify new stakeholders. Furthermore, depending on the set of questions, this method can be used for learning what possible strategies are to be followed by each stakeholder at each particular phase of the technology cycle. Finally this method can be used for evaluating candidate outcomes from the perspectives of separate stakeholders as fair, biased for, or biased against that stakeholder.
+
+**Personal observation** is another method used to understand how stakeholders react to certain circumstances. Own experience or related literature can be used as well when it is difficult to study the value network and candidate reactions to events. However, as not all outcomes may occur or be realized during the observation period, this method is less suitable for characterizing the attractiveness of different outcomes to each stakeholder.
+
+**Role-playing simulation** involves the interaction of multiple participants in a hypothetical environment. Examples include group-based discussions such as the Delphi method and focus groups. Such methods can help identify major stakeholders if the sample of participants is carefully selected, but the major advantage of role-playing simulation methods is their ability to identify and understand the dynamics of the major tussles by observing stakeholders' behaviour.
+
+**SWOT analysis** is a framework for understanding the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats facing a particular stakeholder at a given situation. It assumes knowledge of the major stakeholders and tries to identify tussles by predicting how they could harm a particular stakeholder, as well as the opportunities for the stakeholder. Thus SWOT analysis tries to evaluate the attractiveness of potential outcomes, but rarely studies interactions (reactions and spillovers).
+
+The **MACTOR method** (matrix of alliances and conflicts: tactics, objectives and recommendations) attempts to give an overview of possible alliances and conflicts in a business ecosystem. Having identified the set of stakeholders, this approach tries to document candidate tactics (strategies) that could lead to other outcomes and then evaluate the attractiveness of each outcome to participants. Like SWOT, the tactics do not focus on reactions.
+
+**Game theory** is a branch of mathematics that aims at finding and evaluating the possible equilibrium outcomes for a specific scenario in a system with rational participants. Not only major stakeholders should have been identified, but candidate strategies must be known as well, in order to predict the outcomes of multi-party interactions. Multiple rounds of actions can be considered, but at the trade-off of increased complexity.
+
+**Risk management** is a method for identifying candidate factors that can have a negative effect on a system and for quantitatively or qualitatively evaluating those effects in order to take precautions. When performing risk analysis, although the actors are considered to be known, the factors that can have negative impact, including the level of their impact, must be identified. Because the main focus is not the evolution over time, further reactions by other stakeholders are usually not considered.
+
+**System dynamics** is another method for simulating the possible outcomes (e.g., a technology reaching the critical mass adoption level) when multiple stakeholders interact. These actors, as well as their interactions, are identified using out-of-band means and encoded into system variables and statistically driven events, respectively. The main focus is the assessment of outcomes and their evolution over time, since possible reactions can be modelled.
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Stakeholder overview
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+The following list shows a collection of stakeholders specific to Internet technology. The list is helpful when performing Step 1 of tussle analysis (see clause 8.1) and has been compiled from an analysis of 16 European research projects for designing and implementing future Internet technology. First-level entries determine generic roles, meaning that a generic role represents a group of stakeholders. Instantiations of these groups are listed as second- and third-level entries. This stakeholder list is not claimed to be conclusive, especially with respect to second- and third-level entries.
+
+Internet stakeholders:
+
+- Technology makers
+ - Industry standardization consortiums
+ - Consumer electronics manufacturers
+ - Network element vendors
+ - Application developers
+ - Software development kit (SDK) publishers
+ - Research projects
+- Connectivity providers
+ - Edge ISP
+ - Transit ISP
+- Information providers
+ - Content distribution networks
+ - Directory service providers
+ - Application service providers
+ - Brokers (market place providers)
+ - Communication providers
+ - Gaming providers
+ - Financial service providers
+ - Internet retailers
+- Infrastructure providers
+ - Network component providers
+ - Network exchange points
+ - Last mile providers
+ - Dark fiber providers
+ - Gateway providers
+ - Sensor operators
+ - Venue owners
+ - Cloud operators
+
+- Users
+ - Customers
+ - Residential
+ - Business
+ - Roamers
+ - End-users.
+- Policy makers
+ - Regulators
+ - Legislators
+ - Administration authorities
+ - Researchers
+ - Security agencies
+- Content owners
+ - Professionals
+ - Amateurs
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-Clark05] Clark, D.D., Wroclawski, J., Sollins, K.R. and Braden, R. (2005), *Tussle in cyberspace: defining tomorrow's Internet*. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking Vol. 13, No. 3, June, pp. 462-475.
+- [b-Dynamic] Forrester, J. (1971), *Counterintuitive behavior of social systems*, *Technology Review*, Vol. 73. No. 3, pp. 52-68.
+- [b-ETICS] Kalogiros, C., Courcoubetis, C., Stamoulis, G.D., Dramitinos, M. and Dugeon, O. (2012), *Socioeconomic Tussles Analysis of the ETICS Approach for Providing QoS-enabled Inter-domain Services*. In Future Network and Mobile Summit 2012, Paul Cunningham and Miriam Cunningham (Eds.). IIMC International Information Management Corporation, July, pp. 1-8.
+- [b-FLAMINGO] Radhika, G. (Ed.) (2013), *Basics, Requirements, Scenarios, and Architecture*. FLAMINGO Deliverable D7.1.
+
+- [b-GameTheory] Aumann, R.J. (1987), *Game Theory, The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics*, 2nd Edition.
+- [b-ICN] Kostopoulos, A., Papafili, I., Kalogiros, C., Levä, T., Zhang, N. and Trossen, D. (2012), *A Tussle Analysis for Information-Centric Networking Architectures*. In The Future Internet, Federico Álvarez et al. (Eds.). Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 6-17.
+- [b-MACTOR] Godet, M. (1991), *Actors' Moves and Strategies: The MACTOR Method, Futures*, pp. 605-622.
+- [b-MACTOR2] Godet, M. (1994), *From Anticipation to Action. A Handbook of Strategic Prospective*, Unesco Publishing, Paris, France.
+
+- [b-Risk] Crockford, N. (1986), *An Introduction to Risk Management*, Woodhead-Faulkner, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, U.K.
+- [b-SmartenIT] Papafili, I., Stamoulis, G.D. (Eds.) (2012), *Report on Stakeholders Characterization and Traffic Characteristics*, SmartenIT Deliverable D1.1.
+- [b-SWOT] Pahl, N., Richter A. (2007), *SWOT Analysis – Idea, Methodology and a Practical Approach*, Grin Verlag, Nordestedt, Germany.
+- [b-TussleAnalysis] Kalogiros, C., Courcoubetis, C., Stamoulis, G.D., Boniface, M., Meyer, E.T., Waldburger, M., Field, D. and Stiller, B. (2011), *An Approach to Investigating Socio-economic Tussles Arising from Building the Future Internet*. In The Future Internet, John Domingue et al. (Eds.). Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, Vol. 6656, May, pp. 145-159.
+[http://nes.aueb.gr/publications/FIA\\_BOOK2011-FI\\_Socio-economic\\_Tussles.pdf](http://nes.aueb.gr/publications/FIA_BOOK2011-FI_Socio-economic_Tussles.pdf)
+- [b-TussleCookbook] Kalogiros, C., Pickering, B., Waldburger, M., Poullie, P. and Stiller, B. (2012), *The Tussle Analysis Cookbook*.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | General tariff principles |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a965e0f6a6b71fb04559fc7ce12fd9dddc6748b1
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@@ -0,0 +1,669 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+# **ITU-T Y.3023 (09/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+## **Framework of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3023
+
+# Framework of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems
+
+## Summary
+
+Energy storage systems aim to store electricity when the demand is low and provide stored electricity when the demand is high. For efficient grid operations and satisfying increasing customers' demands, while these systems should be distributed, it is essential that virtualized storages are dynamically allocated and operated for individual customers. Thus, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3023 provides the framework of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems. After identifying key characteristics and core technologies of energy storage systems, this Recommendation specifies roles of stakeholders associated to the energy value chain. It also provides an architectural overview specifying related interfaces and functional blocks. Finally, mechanisms for virtualization of energy storage systems are described.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3023 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16126 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Demand response, energy storage, grid, virtualized energy storage.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, and information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2024
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 Introduction to energy storage system..... | 2 |
+| 6.1 Virtual energy storage ..... | 3 |
+| 6.2 General service scenario with distributed and virtualized energy storage
systems ..... | 4 |
+| 7 Roles of stakeholders associated to distributed and virtualized energy storage
systems..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Stakeholders associated to virtual energy storage systems ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Roles of each stakeholder for virtual energy storage systems..... | 5 |
+| 8 Architecture overview of energy storage systems ..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 Generic architectural model of distributed platforms for virtualized energy
storage systems..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Functional architecture for distributed and virtualized energy storage
systems ..... | 8 |
+| 9 Mechanisms for virtualization of energy storage systems..... | 10 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 12 |
+| Appendix I Use cases and service scenarios..... | 13 |
+| I.1 VESS based energy management system in power system..... | 13 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3023
+
+# Framework of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+Energy storage systems aim to store electricity when the demand is low and provide stored electricity when the demand is high. For efficient grid operations and satisfying increasing customers' demands, these systems should be distributed. Further, it is essential that virtualized storages are dynamically allocated and operated for individual customers. Therefore, this Recommendation provides the framework of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems and specifies roles of stakeholders, an architectural overview and detailed mechanisms.
+
+This Recommendation covers the following:
+
+- Key characteristics and core technologies of distributed and virtualized energy storage systems;
+- Roles of stakeholders associated to the energy value chain;
+- Architectural overview specifying related interfaces and functional blocks;
+- Mechanisms for virtualization of energy storage systems.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T X.1111] Recommendation ITU-T X.1111 (2007), *Framework of security technologies for home network*.
+
+[ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 energy storage** [b-ITU-T Y.2071]: Energy storage provides storage functions of electricity using various types of batteries.
+
+NOTE – One example usage of energy storage is used to respond effectively to a dynamic price mechanism from a utility network. The electric energy is stored in the storage during a relatively lower price period, while the stored electric energy may replace the higher price of electric power from the utility network.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-----------------------------------------------|
+| AMI | Advanced Metering Infrastructure |
+| BEMS | Building Energy Management System |
+| CAES | Compressed Air Energy Storage |
+| DERMS | Distributed Energy Resource Management System |
+| DR | Demand Response |
+| DRMS | Demand Response Management System |
+| ESS | Energy Storage System |
+| FEMS | Factory Energy Management System |
+| HEMS | Home Energy Management System |
+| IBDR | Incentive Based Demand Response |
+| ICT | Information and Communications Technology |
+| IT | Information Technology |
+| MDMS | Meter Data Management System |
+| PBDR | Price Based Demand Response |
+| RTU | Remote Terminal Unit |
+| SOC | State of Charge |
+| VES | Virtual Energy Storage |
+| VESS | Virtual Energy Storage System |
+| VPP | Virtual Power Plant |
+
+# **5 Conventions**
+
+None.
+
+# **6 Introduction to energy storage system**
+
+Energy storage is the capture of energy produced at one time for use at a later time with storage functions of electricity. Energy storage systems (ESS) aim to store electricity when the demand is low and provide stored electricity when the demand is high. Such systems are becoming more economically important as they can reduce costs. Furthermore, energy storage systems have quite a significant role in energy trading through stabilized market prices for electricity.
+
+In particular, energy storage systems have great potential to improve the efficiency and reliability of the delivery of electricity. These systems can balance peak loads, control the increasing costs of grid infrastructure equipment and mitigate the intermittent nature of various types of renewable energy sources.
+
+The goals of energy storage systems [b-IEEE-Safak], [b-IEC-WP] can be summarized as follows:
+
+- To reduce electricity costs by storing electricity obtained at off-peak times;
+- To improve power grid optimization for bulk power production;
+- To balance the power system operations with renewable generation options;
+- To help to defer capital-intensive upgrades in the transmission and distribution grids;
+
+- To provide ancillary services to grid operations.
+
+With the help of energy storage systems, various types of applications (such as for supplying electricity during peak hours, improving power quality) can be provided.
+
+Distributed energy storage systems can improve the overall efficiency of grid operations while minimizing operational costs through the integration of these systems. Furthermore, with the help of virtualization technologies, the storage can be used to modify load shapes dynamically based on customers' demands. Multiple virtual energy storages from a single storage are allocated and operated for customers.
+
+Figure 1 illustrates the concept of virtual energy storage systems. All four energy storage systems with 10 kW output, 50 kWh charge/discharge capacity (i.e., ESS-1, ESS-2, ESS-3 and ESS-4) are virtualized as the integrated virtual energy storage with 200 kWh capacity. The virtualized energy storage with different outputs and capacity (i.e., VES-1, VES-2, VES-3 and VES-4) is dynamically allocated to individual customers. Each VES has its own electricity measuring process for customized operations and adjustment.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the concept of virtual energy storage systems in three stages:
+
+- Top Stage:** Four individual Energy Storage Systems (ESS-1, ESS-2, ESS-3, ESS-4) are shown, each with a capacity of 10 kW and 50 kWh.
+- Middle Stage:** An arrow labeled "Virtualization of energy storage systems" points to a single, larger box representing the "Integrated virtual energy storage" with a total capacity of 40 kW and 200 kWh.
+- Bottom Stage:** An arrow labeled "Logical allocation/mapping/control" points to four Virtual Energy Storage (VES) units:
+ - VES-1:** Contains ESS-1 (6 kW, 30 kWh) and ESS-2 (2 kW, 10 kWh).
+ - VES-2:** Contains ESS-1 (4 kW, 20 kWh) and ESS-2 (2 kW, 10 kWh).
+ - VES-3:** Contains ESS-2 (8 kW, 40 kWh), ESS-3 (10 kW, 50 kWh), and ESS-4 (6 kW, 30 kWh).
+ - VES-4:** Contains ESS-4 (4 kW, 20 kWh).
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+Diagram illustrating the concept of virtual energy storage systems. It shows four ESS units (ESS-1 to ESS-4) with 10 kW and 50 kWh capacity being virtualized into an integrated virtual energy storage system with 40 kW and 200 kWh capacity. This integrated system is then logically allocated into four VES units (VES-1 to VES-4) with varying capacities and outputs.
+
+ESS – Energy storage system, VES – Virtual energy storage
+
+**Figure 1 – The concept of virtual energy storage systems**
+
+## 6.1 Virtual energy storage
+
+Virtual energy storage can be integrated with user applications through a home energy management system (HEMS), building energy management system (BEMS) and factory energy management system (FEMS) to reduce power bills and be used in a variety of smart grid consumer domains (e.g. in homes, buildings and factories). In addition, it can contribute to the stabilization of power grid supply and demand by linking with applications of a demand response management system (DRMS), distributed energy resource management system (DERMS) and a virtual power plant (VPP).
+
+Virtual energy storage (VES) provides on-demand energy storage capacity to energy consumers who cannot afford the direct investment of distributed generation resources (e.g., energy storage devices and solar power generation) due to high initial investment costs.
+
+Energy prosumers can use virtual energy storage-based applications to distribute power generation capacity and energy storage capacity according to the buyer's desired size.
+
+A variety of applications for energy consumers and prosumers need a standardized platform for ESS integrated management and virtualization to take advantage of virtual energy storage. The virtual energy storage system (VESS) integrates and manages physical ESSs, and provides virtual energy storage capacity requested by the above mentioned user applications.
+
+To this end, it is necessary to:
+
+- periodically manage and control the status of various ESSs that are managed in an integrated manner (ESS interface);
+- provide a standardized interface (metering interface) to meter the amount of power charged and discharged on each physical or logical ESS;
+- provide a standard interface for various applications to monitor and control the VES.
+
+Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the VESS and user applications, ESSs, and metering devices.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: VESS and related interfaces. The diagram shows a hierarchy of components. At the top, multiple applications (Application 1, Application 2, Application 3, ..., Application n) are connected to a central 'Virtual energy storage system (VESS)' block via 'Application interface' lines. The VESS block is connected to 'MDMS' (Meter data management system) and 'AMI meter' (Advanced metering infrastructure) via a 'Metering interface'. The VESS block is also connected to multiple 'ESS' (Energy Storage System) units (ESS A, ESS N) via an 'ESS interface'. Each ESS unit contains multiple 'VES' (Virtual Energy Storage) units (VES A-1, VES A-2, ..., VES A-n for ESS A; and VES N-1, VES N-2, ..., VES N-n' for ESS N).
+
+MDMS - Meter data management system, VESS - Virtual energy storage system,
+VES - Virtual energy storage, AMI - Advanced metering infrastructure
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+**Figure 2 – VESS and related interfaces**
+
+## 6.2 General service scenario with distributed and virtualized energy storage systems
+
+This subsection describes a general service scenario with distributed and virtualized energy storage systems as follows.
+
+Stage 1: Virtual energy storage mapping and allocation
+
+Energy storage virtualization allows a large number of energy storage devices to be divided into logical energy storage capacity divisions without any physical separation. This stage allocates the space of the energy storage device and conducts the mapping of virtual energy storage and the allocated storage space.
+
+Stage 2: Virtual energy storage operation setup
+
+This stage configures virtual energy storage operations such as maximum demand power reduction operation, participation in demand resource trading market, participation in small-scale distributed resource trading market, participation in REC market, etc. with respect to the divided virtual energy storage.
+
+Stage 3: Virtual energy storage charge/discharge control
+
+This stage controls the charging and discharging of the energy storage device according to the configured virtual energy storage operation mode.
+
+### Stage 4: Metering and settlement
+
+This stage conducts the settlement of virtual energy storage service revenue based on power generation and consumption measurement information collected from individual logical energy storages.
+
+# **7 Roles of stakeholders associated to distributed and virtualized energy storage systems**
+
+This clause describes several types of stakeholders associated with VESS and presents roles of each stakeholder.
+
+## **7.1 Stakeholders associated to virtual energy storage systems**
+
+### **VES user**
+
+- Energy consumers who lease virtual energy storage for the purpose of reducing electricity charges and reducing peak load.
+- Energy producers who want to maximize power sales revenue by charging and discharging electricity generated by solar power and wind power generation facilities.
+
+### **VESS operator**
+
+- Operators who support real-time monitoring of the operation status of energy storage systems and related facilities, as well as administrating VESS to supply VES users with customized power and energy capacity meeting the requirements of VES users.
+
+#### **ESS owner**
+
+- Holders of ESS equipment entrusted to VESS operator to operate ESS.
+
+## **7.2 Roles of each stakeholder for virtual energy storage systems**
+
+A VES user has the following roles:
+
+- to create and lease a VES with customized energy storage capacity;
+- to register and update VES charge and discharge schedules;
+- to monitor VES operations and notify their faults in real-time;
+- to provide information on energy generation and consumption of VES;
+- to manage VES account based on the amount of energy produced and consumed by VES-mapped ESSs and energy price information;
+
+A VESS operator has the following roles:
+
+- to logically allocate partial or full energy storage capacity of ESS to VES;
+- to discover available energy storage capacities and assign them to VES;
+- to schedule ESS operations according to VES charge and discharge schedules;
+- to monitor VES-mapped ESS operations and their faults in real-time;
+- to provide a standardized communication interface for interworking with various types of ESSs;
+- to provide a function to optimize ESS charge and discharge schedules in consideration of ESS characteristics and predicted energy demand.
+
+An ESS owner has the following roles:
+
+- to monitor ESS operation status (e.g., state of charge (SOC), charge/discharge schedule, etc.) in real-time.
+- to notify information on ESS operation performance and fault in real-time.
+
+# 8 Architecture overview of energy storage systems
+
+## 8.1 Generic architectural model of distributed platforms for virtualized energy storage systems
+
+Energy storage virtualization enables logical integration and separation of one or more ESSs. For this, VESS needs to support open service interfaces for the interactions with both, various types of ESSs and smart grid applications. Figure 3 shows the reference architecture of VESS to describe the relations between VESS and the external systems such as ESSs, metering systems, and EMSs.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: Reference architecture and reference points of VESS. The diagram shows the VESS (Virtual energy storage system) as a central component. It is divided into two main parts: VES (Virtual energy storage manager) and ESS controllers. The VES part is connected to external applications (Application 1, Application 2, ..., Application N) via reference point V-A. The ESS controllers are connected to various ESS types (Li-ion battery ESS, Flow battery ESS, ..., CAES ESS) via reference point V-E. The VES part is also connected to the ESS controllers via reference point V-C. The VES part is connected to the Metering systems via reference point V-M. The ESS controllers are connected to the Power grid via Smart meters. The Metering systems are connected to the Power grid via Smart meters. The diagram is labeled Y.3023(24) in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 3 – Reference architecture and reference points**
+
+- **VESS**
+ - The VESS has key functions as a common service platform for delivering VES to a variety of smart grid applications through the interoperation with various types of ESSs.
+ - The VESS allows smart grid applications to monitor and control the allocated VES according to the VES operating policies and schedules set by its users.
+ - Optionally, a VESS provides data analytics and prediction services (e.g., user behaviour analysis and electric power demand forecasting for VES operating policy decisions).
+ - For the interoperation with ESSs, some of the VESS functions (e.g., ESS monitoring and control) are implemented on ESS controllers (e.g., ESS inverters and remote terminal units (RTUs)) remotely. For this reason, the VESS is logically separated into two modules, VES manager and ESS controller.
+ - The VES Manager provides the following functions as a VES management server platform:
+ - VES account management: User registration and access control, VES contract management, VES meter data management, and user account management;
+
+- VES lifecycle management: VES creation, allocation, and destruction;
+- VES operation management: VES configuration, status monitoring, and operation control.
+- The ESS controller provides the following functions as a VES management agent platform:
+ - ESS configuration management;
+ - ESS status monitoring;
+ - ESS charge and discharge control.
+
+The VESS-related applications and the external systems are described as follows:
+
+- **Application**
+ - VESS enables smart grid applications to lease or buy VES with the desired storage capacity and to monitor and control VES. It also manages the access rights of VES users and applications, and provides VES lease contract and user account management services.
+ - The following smart grid applications can use VES in order to minimize electricity costs and maximize electricity sales revenue through peak load curtailment and surplus energy trading:
+ - Customer energy management systems: Electricity usage reduction and peak load curtailment of customer domains (e.g., residential, commercial and industrial buildings) by utilizing VES;
+ - Demand response management system: Contribution to stabilization of electric power grids at peak load time by joining incentivized demand response (DR) programs with VES;
+ - Electricity brokerage system: Aggregating small-scale energy generated by customer VESs into a large-scale energy product in order to sell it to an electric power wholesale market.
+- **ESS**
+ - ESSs interworking with a VESS needs to provide the VESS with their status information (e.g., battery charge status) in real-time.
+NOTE – Various ESSs include Li-ion, flow battery, compressed air energy storage (CAES), etc.
+ - A VESS provides ESSs with common data models and communication interfaces in order to support vendor-specific data models and communication protocols.
+ - A suitable ESS should be selected in order to create and allocate a VES to meet customer requirements considering battery characteristics, and so on.
+- **Metering System**
+ - The metering systems collect the meter data from smart meters installed on utility grids and delivers the data to the VESS.
+ - Meter data can be directly collected from the ESS controller without the help of the utility provider's metering system. In that case, the data is mainly used for ESS status monitoring rather than user account management.
+ - The VESS utilizes the meter data for more accurate account management between stakeholders.
+
+The following reference points indicate the relations between the VESS functional components and external systems.
+
+- **V-A reference point**
+ - The V-A reference point allows energy service applications to utilize VESs through an online lease contract with VESS in order to maximize the benefit of application users and to minimize the cost of energy consumption.
+ - Through this reference point, a variety of energy service applications can access the VES lease contract, VES operation, and VES information service provided by the VES manager.
+- **V-C reference point**
+ - The V-C reference point is an interface between VESS internal functional components (e.g., VES manager and ESS controller).
+ - Through this interface, the VES manager collects ESS status information from the ESS controller in real time and transmits ESS control messages to the ESS controller according to the operation schedule set by VES users.
+- **V-E reference point**
+ - The V-E reference point provides communication paths between the ESS controller and various types of ESSs.
+ - Through the communication paths, the ESS controller keeps monitoring the status of the managed ESSs and control the ESSs according to the ESS operation schedules sent from the VES manager. It also can receive various types of event messages such as fault notification from the ESSs.
+- **V-M reference point**
+ - The V-M reference point is an interface for collecting the electric power meter data of the managed ESSs from a metering system.
+ - Through this interface, the meter data for user account management are securely collected from metering systems and smart meters that are installed by utility providers.
+
+## 8.2 Functional architecture for distributed and virtualized energy storage systems
+
+A VESS helps VES users to optimize electric power demand profiles or to reduce electricity bills by saving energy when energy prices are low and releasing stored energy when energy prices are high. Instead of buying ESSs, VES users can lease customized electric power and energy capacity through VES application services. VESS controls energy storage devices to maximize the utilization of ESSs considering VES operation schedules set by VES users. The VES management functions of a VES manager enable available energy storage capacity of ESSs to be dynamically allocated based on VES operation schedules. The ESS operation functions of an ESS controller perform the configuration, control and monitoring of ESSs associated with VESSs. Based on Figure 4, the following describes VESS key functions from the perspective of VES application service, VES management and ESS operation.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the key functions of VESS, organized into two main layers: VES manager and ESS controller. The VES manager layer is divided into two sub-sections: Application service functions and VES management functions. The ESS controller layer is divided into one sub-section: ESS operation functions. Each sub-section contains three specific functions.
+
+| Layer | Sub-section | Function |
+|----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|
+| VES manager | Application service functions | VES account service |
+| | | VES market service |
+| | | VES operation service |
+| | VES management functions | Energy storage allocation |
+| | | VES operation scheduling |
+| | | VES monitoring |
+| ESS controller | ESS operation functions | ESS configuration |
+| | | ESS control |
+| | | ESS monitoring |
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+Figure 4 – Key functions of VESS. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure of functions for VES Manager and ESS Controller. The VES Manager layer includes Application service functions (VES account service, VES market service, VES operation service) and VES management functions (Energy storage allocation, VES operation scheduling, VES monitoring). The ESS Controller layer includes ESS operation functions (ESS configuration, ESS control, ESS monitoring).
+
+**Figure 4 – Key functions of VESS**
+
+#### 8.2.1 Application service functions
+
+- **VES account service**
+ - VES user authentication, authorization and accounting management.
+ - VES user account management based on VES metering data and electricity prices.
+ - Value prediction based on VES operation schedules and forecasted electricity prices.
+- **VES market service**
+ - VES service advertisement (e.g., VES power generation capabilities, available storage capacity range and VES lease price).
+ - VES service recommendation based the forecasted electricity demand of VES users.
+ - VES purchase and lease service contract management.
+- **VES operation service**
+ - VES charge and discharge schedule management.
+ - VES operation status and fault event messages reporting.
+
+#### 8.2.2 VES Management Functions
+
+- **Energy storage allocation**
+ - Discovery of the available ESSs to meet VES user requirements such as VES capability, storage capacity and lease period.
+ - Dynamic energy storage allocation considering ESS characteristics, status and operation schedules.
+ - VES-to-ESS mapping information management.
+- **VES operation scheduling**
+ - VES charge and discharge schedule optimization.
+ - VES operation policy configuration.
+- **VES monitoring**
+ - ESS meter data management and VES metering.
+ - VES status monitoring and operation fault handling.
+ - VES performance analysis and fault diagnosis.
+
+#### 8.2.3 ESS Operation Functions
+
+- **ESS Configuration**
+ - Energy storage facility information registration.
+ - ESS communication interface configuration.
+ - ESS operation policy configuration.
+- **ESS Control**
+ - ESS operation schedule optimization.
+ - ESS charge and discharge control.
+- **ESS Monitoring**
+ - ESS status monitoring (e.g., state of charge, ESS operation state, meter data, operation faults).
+ - ESS performance analysis and fault diagnosis.
+
+# 9 Mechanisms for virtualization of energy storage systems
+
+A method of controlling an energy storage and an energy storage controlling system are described. The method includes dividing an energy storage of large capacity into virtual energy storages corresponding to respective users based on a required energy amount and a period of use of an energy storage of each of the users, and integrally controlling, for each time, the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users based on a management schedule of the energy storage of each of the users.
+
+In Figure 5, an energy storage controlling system includes a user device, an energy storage controlling system and an energy storage of large capacity. The user device may communicate with the energy storage controlling system.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR;
+ UD[User device] <--> ESCS[Energy storage controlling system];
+ ESCS <--> ES[Energy storage];
+ subgraph ES_Box [Energy storage]
+ VES1[Virtual energy storage 1]
+ VES2[Virtual energy storage 2]
+ VESn[Virtual energy storage n]
+ VES1 --- VES2 --- VESn
+ end
+```
+
+Figure 5: System configuration for controlling energy storage. The diagram shows a 'User device' box connected by a double-headed arrow to an 'Energy storage controlling system' box. This system box is further connected by a double-headed arrow to a large box labeled 'Energy storage'. Inside the 'Energy storage' box, there are three smaller boxes: 'Virtual energy storage 1', 'Virtual energy storage 2', and 'Virtual energy storage n', with a vertical ellipsis between the second and third boxes.
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+**Figure 5 – System configuration for controlling energy storage**
+
+- The user device is used by each user.
+ - It transmits a user response signal to the energy storage based on the response of each user.
+ - It displays control information on the energy storage of large capacity transmitted from the energy storage controlling system.
+ - It is an interface connecting each of the users and the energy storage controlling system.
+- The **energy storage controlling system** controls the **energy storage** of large capacity based on the user response signal transmitted from the user device of each of the users.
+ - It integrally controls, for each time, a charge and a discharge of the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users based on the management schedule of the energy storage of each of the users.
+
+- It rents and integrally controls the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users to allow a user who has not built an energy storage yet to reduce initial investment costs of installing the energy storage, to provide an energy storage that is used more effectively, to reduce the cost of managing the energy storage, to reduce an effort required to manage the energy storage, to reduce a maximum power requirement due to an energy storage rent, and to enable participation in a demand resource trading market.
+- It allows a businessman who builds an energy storage to obtain initial investment costs for installing the energy storage and minimizes the risk to business promotion.
+- The energy storage of large capacity includes a plurality of virtual energy storages. The energy storage of large capacity may be implemented as a single physical energy storage or a plurality of physical energy storages.
+
+NOTE – The energy storage (or energy) of small capacity may be required by various structures such as homes, buildings and factories. A consumer may require an energy storage (or energy) during at least one of a predetermined period or a predetermined season.
+
+Figure 6 illustrates the main components of an energy storage controlling system. This system includes an interface, a processor and a memory.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ Interface[Interface] <--> Processor
+ subgraph Processor
+ Divider[Divider] <--> Register[Register]
+ Register <--> Calculator[Calculator]
+ Calculator <--> Controller[Controller]
+ end
+ Processor <--> Memory[Memory]
+
+```
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+Block diagram of an energy storage controlling system. An 'Interface' block is connected to a 'Processor' block, which contains 'Divider', 'Register', 'Calculator', and 'Controller' sub-blocks. The 'Processor' block is connected to a 'Memory' block. Bidirectional arrows indicate data flow between the Interface and Processor, and between the Processor and Memory. The sub-blocks within the Processor are also connected with bidirectional arrows.
+
+**Figure 6 – Components of an energy storage controlling system**
+
+- (1) **Interface:** The interface receives a user response signal transmitted from the user device of each user. It transmits control information on the energy storage of large capacity to the user device.
+- (2) **Processor:** The processor controls an overall operation of the energy storage controlling system. It divides the energy storage of large capacity into virtual energy storages corresponding to respective users based on a required energy amount (or required energy storage space) and a period of use (or rental period) of an energy storage of each of the users. In addition, it integrally controls the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users based on a management schedule of the energy storage of each of the users.
+
+The processor includes a divider, a register, a calculator and a controller.
+
+- **Divider:** The divider divides the energy storage of large capacity into multiple virtual energy storages.
+ - It divides the energy storage of large capacity into a plurality of virtual logical energy storages.
+ - It allocates energy storage areas corresponding to the respective users of the virtual logical energy storages based on the required amount of energy (or required energy storage space) and the period of use (or rental period) of the energy storage of each of the users.
+ - It generates the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users based on the invariably allocated energy storage area or the variably allocated energy storage area.
+- **Register:** The register registers the management schedule of the energy storage of each of the users.
+- **Calculator:** The calculator calculates an integrated management schedule of the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users based on the management schedule of the energy storage of each of the users.
+
+- It may calculate a time-based first management schedule of the virtual invariable energy storage corresponding to the long-term renter based on the management schedule of the energy storage of the long-term renter.
+ - Subsequently, it may calculate a time-based second management schedule of the virtual variable energy storage corresponding to the short-term renter based on the management schedule of the energy storage of the short-term renter.
+ - It may calculate the integrated management schedule for each time based on the first management schedule and the second management schedule.
+ - It may calculate the management schedule based on a discharge loss rate of a physical energy storage linked to the virtual energy storages.
+ - In response to a discharge of the virtual energy storages, it may calculate the management schedule based on the discharge loss rate of the physical energy storage linked to the virtual energy storages such that the virtual energy storages discharge 90% of total generation capacity.
+- **Controller:** The controller integrally controls the virtual energy storages corresponding to the respective users for each time based on the integrated management schedule. It transmits information on the energy storage of large capacity to the user device via the interface.
+- (3) **Memory:** The memory stores information on the energy storage of large capacity and the user response signal.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+The security considerations in a VESS should be in accordance with the security requirements in [ITU-T X.1111] and [ITU-T Y.2701]. The general security requirements and technologies are described in [ITU-T X.1111]. This Recommendation applies the technologies in [ITU-T X.1111] to the key system components and functions of VESSs.
+
+A VESS should consider various security aspects in terms of physical security, system security and operation security as follows:
+
+- Verifying the identity of an entity (e.g., user, process or device) for accessing resources in a virtual energy storage system;
+- Determining the adequacy of security requirements and ensuring compliance with the established security policy and procedures for a virtual energy storage system;
+- Authorization to use various services in a virtual energy storage system;
+- Supporting cryptography and validation mechanisms for data integrity in a virtual energy storage system;
+- Providing the privacy considerations with respect to a virtual energy storage system.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases and service scenarios
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix provides various use cases and service scenarios considering distributed and virtualized energy storage systems.
+
+### I.1 VESS based energy management system in power system
+
+#### I.1.1 Overview
+
+Depending on the development of information technology (IT), it is expected that overall power systems will evolve as data- based infrastructure. This change will be arisen due to the development of technology in power transaction and data accumulation processes depending on sensors in power usage environments. This kind of development of ICT infrastructure in power systems have brought more data movement which make it possible to implement various services for power consumers. For example, the emergence of smart meters makes possible to impose charges according to power usage at time horizons and seasonal periods. In addition, the emergence of ancillary services enables the operation of the power market through control of the amount of electricity used, rather than the existing power system which manages the system depending on various kinds of generators (Figure I.1).
+
+
+
+**Previous power system**
+
+- Stabilize demand and power supply of the system based on total power generation control
+- Using simple power charging tariff
+
+**Future power system**
+
+- Stabilize demand and power supply of the system based on simultaneous operation of demand resources and generators based on charging rate
+- Using complex power charging tariff
+
+Y.3023(24)
+
+Figure I.1: Changes of power systems and the necessity of VESS. The diagram compares a 'Previous power system' with a 'Future power system'. The previous system shows a central fossil fuel source feeding into a fossil generator, which connects to a system operator, then to distributed generators and system operators, and finally to power consumers. The future system shows a mix of renewable and traditional generators connected to a system operator, which then connects to distributed system operators, power consumers, and a Virtual ESS (Virtual Energy Storage System).
+
+**Figure I.1 – Changes of power systems and the necessity of VESS**
+
+One of the factors should be considered in the power system is the charging tariff policy for participants. Since power data are collected from heterogeneous environments, it is hard to decide a proper charging tariff to control overall power systems. VESS now becomes an essential element for system operators to manage and plan the power generation schedule by considering the relationship between power charging tariff and power management.
+
+#### I.1.2 Types and characteristics of a general demand response market
+
+The DR market considered in one of the use cases of a VPP could be classified according to the operating method and the incentive system as follows:
+
+- Price based demand response (PBDR)
+ - Based on the pricing factors, the system operator analyses the supply and demand of the overall power system according to time and environment, and it imposes a proper charge at each time. According to the electricity charging rate, power consumers adjust their power usage voluntarily
+ - This method analyses overall power usage of all power consumers on an annual basis; therefore, the system operator determines and announces proper power charges by taking into consideration the weight of power usage (e.g. seasonal, peak time, etc.).
+- Incentive based demand response (IBDR)
+ - In a specific situation (e.g. unbalanced power supply, peak power load, frequency instability), the system operator sends signals to the demand response market participants to manage the power usage to solve the problem. At this time, incentives/penalties are provided/imposed to participants based on the contract. In this way, the system operator forces consumers to manage their power usage based on the contract. Table I.1 lists various demand response programs.
+
+**Table. I.1 – Types and characteristics of demand response programs**
+
+| Program | Explanation | Purpose | Participants | Type |
+|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------|
+| Utility program | | | | |
+| Time of use | Differential rates according to time period | Minimize peak power | Whole of participants | PBDR |
+| Curtailable load programs | Charging discount according to load control | Emergency
Reliability of system | Type of energy usage | IBDR |
+| Emergency DR | Incentive for load control | Emergency
Reliability of system | Large scale power user | IBDR |
+| Aggregator programs | Contract between aggregator and system operator | Minimize peak power
Emergency | Aggregator | IBDR |
+| Peak time rebates | Give incentive according to estimated peak baseline | Minimize peak power | Small scale power user | IBDR |
+| Direct load control | Control customers' electricity | Minimize peak power | Small scale power user | IBDR |
+| Critical peak pricing | Based on ToU, high rates are applied under certain conditions | Power system stability | Whole of power consumer
Industry | PBDR |
+| Real time pricing | Price changes based on wholesale prices | Minimize peak power
Power system stability | Type of energy usage | PBDR |
+
+- As Table I.1 mentioned, most IBDR programs consider an urgent situation in the system. In other words, if the pre-contracted power operation of the IBDR participant is not achieved, the system operator has to activate an alternative plan, which will incur additional costs. This is the reason that the penalty is imposed if the DR market participant fails to achieve the actual pre-engaged contract. Further, it indicates that the VESS system is needed for the practical power environment.
+
+#### **I.1.3 The use of VESS from the perspective of power consumers and its direction**
+
+The main issue from the perspective of power consumers is the minimization of electricity tariffs through participating in the demand response market. As mentioned in Table I.1, consumers in the electricity market are classified according to the amount or type of electricity they use. This classification also affects the decision of the demand response market. Therefore, it is possible that VESS can be applied to the DR market proposed in the table based on the integrated operation of various algorithms such as HEMS, BEMS and FEMS. In other words, the application of VESS not only enables more small-scale power consumers to participate in the DR market but also has the advantage of enabling more efficient power system operation by configuring more controllable demand power resources from the system operator point of view.
+
+#### **I.1.4 The use of VESS from the perspective of system operator to maintain power system**
+
+The VESS system encourages more power consumers to participate in the demand resource market and makes that various power consumers can stabilize their power consumption rates. In addition, from the system operator's perspective, the VESS enables that the system operator operates the power system more efficiently based on the diversification of controllable power resources. The widespread use of renewable energy and electric vehicles cause many uncertain factors in the system. To minimize the risk of the system, the operator needs to reserve more baseline power supply or schedule rapid generators to maintain the system. However, the broadening of the DR market with the VESS enables system operators to minimize the financial loss and maintain system reliability more efficiently in an environment where there is an increase of undetermined power resources.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2071] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2071 (2015), *Framework of a micro energy grid*.
+- [b-IEC-WP] IEC white paper, *Electrical energy storage*, 2011.
+- [b-IEEE-Safak] Safak Bayram, *et. al.*, *A survey on energy trading in smart grid*, IEEE GlobalSIP Conference, 2014.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3047 (11/2024)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+## --- **Requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3047
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3047 specifies requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing. The scope of this Recommendation includes the following aspects of network awareness based on cloud computing: basic model, functional requirements, performance requirements, interface requirements and capabilities, etc.
+
+## History\*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3047 | 2024-11-22 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16097 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Capability, cloud computing, network awareness, requirement.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, and information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2025
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 | Introduction of network awareness based on cloud computing..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Basic model of NACC ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Basic model for NACC ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Functional components of cloud-based network awareness system ..... | 6 |
+| 8 | Functional requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing ..... | 8 |
+| | 8.1 Overview of functional requirements..... | 8 |
+| | 8.2 Functional requirements for functional entity of network awareness ..... | 9 |
+| | 8.3 Functional requirements of service provisioning from network awareness... | 10 |
+| 9 | Performance requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing ..... | 10 |
+| | 9.1 Overall performance requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing ..... | 10 |
+| | 9.2 Performance requirements of functional components..... | 11 |
+| | 9.3 Performance requirements of service provisioning ..... | 11 |
+| 10 | Interface requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing ..... | 12 |
+| | 10.1 Overview of the interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing..... | 12 |
+| | 10.2 Internal interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing..... | 13 |
+| | 10.3 External interfaces for NACC ..... | 13 |
+| 11 | Capability of network awareness based on cloud computing..... | 14 |
+| | 11.1 Overview of the capability for network awareness based on cloud computing..... | 14 |
+| | 11.2 Network application/service awareness capability..... | 14 |
+| | 11.3 Network status awareness capability..... | 14 |
+| | 11.4 Network requirements awareness capability ..... | 15 |
+| | 11.5 Other aspects of network awareness capability..... | 15 |
+| | 11.6 Service providing awareness capability ..... | 15 |
+| 12 | Security considerations..... | 15 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3047
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Basic model of network awareness based on cloud computing;
+- Functional requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing;
+- Performance requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing;
+- Interface requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing;
+- Capability of network awareness based on cloud computing;
+- Security considerations.
+
+NOTE – Cloud computing technologies are out of scope of this Recommendation, and the functional architecture described in [ITU-T Y.3515] is referred to by this Recommendation.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T F.747.10] Recommendation ITU-T F.747.10 (2022), *Requirements of distributed ledger systems for secure human factor services*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2704] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2770] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2770 (2012), *Requirements for deep packet inspection in next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.2771] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2771 (2014), *Framework for deep packet inspection*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3515] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3515 (2014), *Cloud computing – Functional architecture of Network as a Service*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cloud computing** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable physical or virtual resources with self-service provisioning and administration on-demand.
+
+NOTE – Examples of resources include servers, operating systems, networks, software, applications, and storage equipment.
+
+**3.1.2 network as a service (NaaS)** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Cloud service category (see 3.2.10 of [ITU-T Y.3500]) in which the capability provided to the cloud service customer is transport connectivity and related network capabilities.
+
+NOTE – NaaS can provide any of the three cloud capabilities types.
+
+**3.1.3 software as a service (SaaS)** [ITU-T Y.3500]: Cloud service category (see 3.2.10 of [ITU-T Y.3500]) in which the cloud capabilities type (see 3.2.4 of [ITU-T Y.3500]) provided to the cloud service customer (see 3.2.11 of [ITU-T Y.3500]) is an application capabilities type (see 3.2.1 of [ITU-T Y.3500]).
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 network awareness:** A class of technologies and methods that can make the network operator, network owner, network service provider, etc. be aware of the distribution of traffic in the network, the network service carried in the network, the network resource and its utility, the current network status, the real-time requirements of the network and other aspects related to runtime information of the network.
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|--------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| DFI | Deep Flow Inspection |
+| DL | Deep Learning |
+| DPI | Deep Packet Inspection |
+| IaaS | Infrastructure as a Service |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| NA | Network Awareness |
+| NaaS | Network as a Service |
+| NACC | Network Awareness based on Cloud Computing |
+| NFV | Network Function Virtualization |
+| NSA | Network Status Awareness |
+| PaaS | Platform as a Service |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+
+| | |
+|------|--------------------------------|
+| QUIC | Quick UDP Internet Connections |
+| SaaS | Software as a Service |
+| SDN | Software-Defined Networking |
+| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+# 6 Introduction of network awareness based on cloud computing
+
+Network awareness is a class of technologies and methods that can make the network operator, network owner, network service provider, etc. be aware of the distribution of traffic in the network, network services carried in the network, a network resource and its utility, current network status, real-time requirements of the network and other aspects related to runtime information of the network. It is essential for network operators to operate, administrate and manage the network.
+
+On the one hand, based on network awareness, operators can improve the quality of service (QoS) and quality of experience (QoE) of the network, they can also make efficient use of network resources, and reduce costs, and capital investment. On the other hand, network awareness can make the network better and provide strong support for other methods and technologies such as network analysis, network planning and network optimization.
+
+However, there is a problem with how to implement and deploy network awareness functions efficiently and economically. Usually, the network owner and network service provider set up and deploy independent network awareness functional entities to different application scenarios when they need network awareness capabilities. In other words, the network awareness functions are exclusive to the network in which the network awareness functions are deployed. In reality, the aforementioned deployment is neither efficient nor economic.
+
+When network awareness functional entities are deployed to certain network scenarios, restricted by the resources of the network, the network awareness functions are not implemented powerfully. But network requirements and new technologies demand that the network awareness function should be powerful.
+
+For example, artificial intelligence related technologies such as machine learning have been, and will continue to be rapidly developed and will also promote other technologies. It is certain that network awareness related technologies or methods can achieve great progress through the help of artificial intelligence. In the meantime, because complicated machine learning algorithms are needed, artificial intelligence and machine learning enhanced network awareness functions must continue to occupy more network resources. If the aforementioned network scenario cannot meet the resource requirements of the network awareness function, then the network awareness function cannot work efficiently.
+
+On the other hand, when network awareness functions are exclusive to a certain network, the network awareness functions cannot be used by other networks even if the network deployed with network awareness functions do not use the functions all the time. Therefore, this deployment mode is not very economic.
+
+Because traditional implementation and deployment modes of network awareness functions have these shortcomings as described above, it is useful to find novel implementations and deployment modes of network awareness functions.
+
+Cloud computing-based implementation and deployment mode is one such candidate mode, and network awareness services can be provided based on cloud computing.
+
+When network awareness functions are implemented based on cloud computing, the following advantages can be achieved:
+
+- More powerful functions and performance: When network awareness functions are deployed in a certain network or a certain partition of a network, they are limited by the resources of the network or the network partition, many functions cannot possibly be implemented or cannot work with high performance. Cloud-based implementation is totally different, there are huge amounts of resources in the cloud that can be scheduled to implement functions and those functions can work more efficiently with the support of enough resources.
+- Lower implementation costs: By deploying network awareness functions based on cloud infrastructure and sharing network awareness functions among various network scenarios, it is then not necessary to deploy a complete suite of network awareness functions to a specific network application scenario. Therefore, overall costs can be greatly reduced.
+- High extensibility and flexibility: Network awareness requirements may change with time. If network awareness entities are deployed to a certain network or a certain network partition, it would be very difficult to change the deployment when new network awareness requirements arrive. However, this is not a problem when deploying network awareness functions in the cloud-based environment because it is easy to schedule and orchestrate necessary resources to meet the new requirements.
+- High data security: Data security is also critical to network awareness functions. Certainly data is in some ways secure when it is restricted to a specific network if the network awareness function is deployed in the network or in a network partition. However, security assurance in a specific network cannot be better than in a cloud environment. Cloud infrastructure is now so mature that various security measures have been adopted to guarantee data security. These security measures may not always be supported by a unique network partition.
+- High recovery capability in disaster: When network awareness functions are deployed in the cloud environment, all information can be recovered from the network even if local information is damaged by a specific disaster.
+
+Network awareness based on cloud computing (NACC) is therefore very beneficial and appropriate for the deployment of network awareness functions. [ITU-T Y.3515] illustrates the use of network as a service (NaaS) services based on user layer, access layer, service layer and resources layer, see clause 6.2 of [ITU-T Y.3515]. NACC deploys network awareness resources in the resources layer and implements the network awareness functions through the service layer.
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and capabilities of network awareness based on cloud computing. In order to facilitate description, in the following sections, the use of the single word 'cloud' has the same meaning as 'cloud computing'.
+
+# **7 Basic model of NACC**
+
+### **7.1 Basic model for NACC**
+
+The use of multi-layer functional components of NaaS services in cloud computing including integration, security systems, operational support systems, business support systems, development support, etc., is described in clause 6.2 of [ITU-T Y.3515], and the following functional components are described in clause 8 of [ITU-T Y.3515]:
+
+- Business support system functional components for NaaS products;
+- Service layer functional components for NaaS;
+- Operational support system functional components;
+- Functional components for NaaS development support.
+
+In addition to the above functional components, NACC also comprises multi-layer functions, and it is the basis of many other functions such as for example, network management and control.
+
+Figure 7-1 depicts the basic model of NACC.
+
+
+
+Figure 7-1: General model of network awareness based on cloud computing. The diagram is divided into three horizontal layers by dashed lines. The top layer, 'Network awareness cloud layer', contains a 'Network awareness cloud' with several server icons, each with a globe, and labels for 'Network awareness node' and 'Network awareness entity'. The middle layer, 'Network awareness agent layer', contains an 'Agent for network awareness' group of servers, an 'Agent node' (server with a small device), and a 'Network awareness controller' (multiple servers). The bottom layer, 'Local network layer', shows a 'Local network awareness system' (server with a monitor), two 'Network device embedded with awareness functions' (routers), and an 'Independent network awareness device' (server with a monitor). Arrows indicate data flow: from the cloud layer to the agent layer, and from the agent layer to the local network layer. Specific labels include 'Data input' and 'Data output' pointing to the local network devices. A reference 'Y.3047(24)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – General model of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+The model includes the following three layers:
+
+- Network awareness cloud layer: This layer is responsible for implementing and deploying network awareness functions based on cloud computing. This layer corresponds to the resource layer and service layer described in [ITU-T Y.3515]. According to [ITU-T Y.3515], this layer can also be designed as a resource layer and service layer logically. However, this Recommendation aims at implementation of network awareness functions, so, in order to
+
+facilitate description of the implementation, it is appropriate to abstract the two layers to a single layer.
+
+- Network awareness agent layer: This layer is responsible for connecting and coordinating the network awareness functions deployed in the network awareness cloud layer and local network awareness functions. This layer corresponds to the access layer described in [ITU-T Y.3515].
+- Local network layer: This layer is responsible for implementing and deploying network awareness functions in the network itself. This layer corresponds to the user layer described in [ITU-T Y.3515].
+
+All these three layers coordinate to compose a network awareness system that is called the cloud-based network awareness system.
+
+### **7.2 Functional components of cloud-based network awareness system**
+
+NACC is mainly used to design and deploy network awareness functions in cloud computing scenarios in order to make full use of the resources of the cloud. According to Figure 7-1, the following functional components or functional entities related to the cloud-based network awareness system include:
+
+- Cloud network awareness node: A physical network awareness device deployed in a cloud computing context (resource layer of cloud computing).
+- Cloud network awareness functional entity: A functional entity deployed in cloud computing and providing network awareness services.
+- Network awareness cloud: Cloud computing that is deployed with network awareness resources and that can provide network awareness services. It composes the network awareness cloud layer which is equivalent to the resource layer and service layer of cloud computing
+- Network awareness agent: A functional entity which connects local networks and the network awareness cloud. It composes the network awareness agent layer that is equivalent to the access layer of cloud computing.
+- Network awareness controller: A functional entity that controls the other network awareness related functional entities.
+- Local network awareness node: A physical network awareness device deployed in a local network.
+- Local network awareness functional entity: A functional entity deployed in a local network and that can realize local network awareness functions.
+- Local network: The network which needs to use network awareness functions. It composes the local network layer which is equivalent to the user layer in cloud computing.
+
+Because there are several aspects of network awareness such as network application/service awareness, network status awareness, network requirements awareness, and so on, there are also several kinds of cloud-based network awareness systems.
+
+#### **7.2.1 Functional components of cloud-based network application/service awareness system**
+
+The basic and representative network application/service technology is deep packet inspection (DPI), see [ITU-T Y.2770], [ITU-T Y.2771], etc. A cloud-based DPI system can be thought of as a representative cloud-based network application/service awareness system. Other implementations of cloud-based network application/service implementation such as deep flow inspection (DFI) and network traffic awareness based on machine learning, see [ITU-T Y.3180], are similar to the cloud-based DPI system.
+
+A cloud-based DPI system has three kinds of main functional components/entities:
+
+- End DPI
+- DPI cloud agent and control
+- Cloud DPI
+
+End DPI, DPI cloud agent and control, and cloud DPI are network application/service awareness subsystems that are deployed in the local network layer, network awareness agent layer and network awareness cloud layer respectively. The aforementioned subsystems are independent parts of the cloud-based network awareness system.
+
+End DPI is responsible for the following tasks: receiving data packets from the network, performing feasible DPI operations that are dependent on resources in the end DPI, and acquiring processing results of the end DPI, sending data packets that need to be processed by cloud DPI through a DPI cloud agent and controlling, acquiring and executing DPI action instructions based on the processing results of end DPI and cloud DPI.
+
+DPI cloud agent and control is used to configure DPI rules and other information to end DPI and cloud DPI. It connects with end DPI and cloud DPI respectively and implements the function to transfer information between end DPI and cloud DPI. DPI cloud agent and control is also responsible for sending configuration commands to the end DPI.
+
+Cloud DPI is used to receive data packets from end DPI through DPI cloud agents and control, performing DPI operations that are not able to be realized by end DPI by using the resources in the end DPI system, and acquiring processing results of the cloud DPI, and sending the processing results to the end DPI through DPI cloud agent and control.
+
+#### **7.2.2 Functional components of cloud-based network status awareness system**
+
+Generally, a cloud-based network status awareness system has four main functional components/entities:
+
+- Local network status awareness
+- Network status awareness cloud agent
+- Cloud network status awareness
+- Control/management
+
+Local network status awareness, network status awareness cloud agent, cloud network status awareness, and control/management are network status awareness subsystems that are deployed in the local network layer, network awareness agent layer and network awareness cloud layer respectively.
+
+Local network status awareness is used to collect network status data from the network, process the collected data depending on its resource, send the collected data to cloud network status awareness through the network status awareness cloud agent and send the processing result to the control/management subsystem.
+
+Network status awareness cloud agent is used to transfer necessary information between the local network status awareness and cloud network status awareness subsystems or between cloud network status awareness and control/management subsystems.
+
+Cloud network status awareness is used to receive network status data from network status awareness cloud agent, process the collected data, and send the processing result to the control/management subsystem.
+
+Control/management is used to receive the processing result from local network status awareness and cloud network status awareness and decide on the further operations based on the processing results.
+
+#### **7.2.3 Functional components of cloud-based network requirements awareness system**
+
+A cloud-based network requirements awareness system also has four kinds of main functional components/entities:
+
+- Local network requirements awareness
+- Network requirements awareness cloud agent
+- Cloud network requirements awareness
+- Control and evaluation
+
+Local network requirements awareness, network requirements awareness cloud agent, cloud network requirements awareness, and control and evaluation are network requirements awareness subsystems that are deployed in the local network layer, network awareness agent layer and network awareness cloud layer respectively.
+
+Local network requirements awareness is used to collect necessary data, process the collected data depending on its resources, send the collected data to cloud network requirements awareness through the network requirements awareness cloud agent and send mined requirements to the control and evaluation subsystem.
+
+Network requirement awareness cloud agent is used to transfer necessary information between the local network requirements awareness and cloud network requirements awareness subsystems or between the cloud network requirements awareness and control and evaluation subsystems.
+
+Cloud network requirements awareness is used to receive data from network requirements awareness cloud agent, process the collected data, and send mined requirements to the control and evaluation subsystem.
+
+The control and evaluation subsystem is used to receive mined requirements from the local network requirements awareness and cloud network requirements awareness subsystems, evaluate the mined requirements and set up the requirements if it is feasible and reasonable.
+
+# **8 Functional requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+### **8.1 Overview of functional requirements**
+
+When network awareness functions are deployed in the cloud computing context, those functions are not realized by a certain determined physical or logical entity or a specific group of determined physical or logical entities. Rather, some resources from the cloud are coordinated together to realize the network awareness functions.
+
+In other words, in comparison to the traditional deployment mode of the network awareness function, deployment based on cloud computing relies on a group of virtual entities to implement a concrete task of network awareness, and the virtual entities may vary with the task. However, the traditional deployment mode relies on one or more determined physical or logical entities to implement the network awareness functions, and the physical or logical entities do not usually change with the network awareness tasks.
+
+Figure 8-1 illustrates the difference between the ordinary deployment mode and the cloud computing-based deployment mode.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Two kinds of deployment for network awareness functions. The diagram compares 'Ordinary deployment mode' and 'Cloud based deployment mode'. In the ordinary mode, an 'Awareness functional entity' (represented by three server icons) is connected to an 'Infrastructure network' (represented by a mesh of five network switch icons). In the cloud-based mode, an 'Awareness agent' (represented by two server icons) is connected to the same 'Infrastructure network'. The 'Awareness agent' is also connected to an 'Awareness cloud' (represented by a cloud icon containing several server icons). The label 'Y.3047(24)' is located at the bottom right of the cloud-based mode diagram.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Two kinds of deployment for network awareness functions**
+
+When network awareness functions are deployed based on cloud computing, the functional architecture, subject to realization of the network awareness functions, etc., are different compared to the traditional deployment mode. Consequently, the functional requirements should also be different.
+
+## 8.2 Functional requirements for functional entity of network awareness
+
+When network awareness functions are deployed based on cloud computing, the following functional requirements related to functional entities should be met:
+
+- The network awareness agent is required to have the capability to store the network awareness requests submitted by the infrastructure network or other network entities.
+- The network awareness agent is required to have the capability to transform the network awareness requests into a formation that the network awareness cloud can understand.
+- The network awareness agent is recommended to have the capability to encrypt the information about the network awareness tasks.
+- The network awareness agent is required to have the capability to store the network awareness results provided by the awareness cloud.
+- The network awareness agent is required to have the capability to transform the network awareness results into a formation that the corresponding entities can understand.
+- The network awareness agent is recommended to have the capability to encrypt the network awareness results.
+- The network awareness cloud is required to have the capability to accept and store the network awareness tasks from the network awareness agent.
+- The network awareness cloud is required to have the capability to evaluate whether network awareness tasks can be realized by itself and send the evaluated result to the network awareness agent.
+
+- The network awareness cloud is recommended to have the capability to exchange keys with the network awareness agent.
+- The network awareness cloud is required to have the capability to coordinate resources in itself and finish the network awareness tasks from the network awareness agent.
+
+### **8.3 Functional requirements of service provisioning from network awareness**
+
+The target of implementation of the network awareness functions is to provide the network awareness service to a network owner, network operator and network end user, etc., whether the network awareness functions are deployed based on cloud computing or ordinary mode.
+
+The following functional requirements related to service provisioning should be met:
+
+- The network awareness result is required to be formatted according to service agreement between the network awareness service provider and the network awareness service consumer.
+- The network awareness result is recommended to be encrypted when it is sent from the network awareness service provider to the network awareness service consumer.
+- The network awareness result is required to be stored in the network awareness service provider in case the network awareness service consumer needs to use it in the future.
+- The network awareness result is required to be provided during the period specified in the service agreement between the network awareness service provider and the network awareness service consumer.
+- The network awareness service provider is required to execute actions specified in the service agreement between the network awareness service provider and the network awareness service consumer based on the network awareness result.
+- The network awareness result is recommended to be independent of the other services that the network awareness service consumer needs.
+
+NOTE – That is to say, network aware functions should not do harm to the other network services that the network awareness service consumer needs.
+
+- The network awareness services is required to be guaranteed regardless whether the resources in the cloud have changed.
+
+# **9 Performance requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+## **9.1 Overall performance requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+Figure 8-1 describes an example model for network awareness functions to be deployed based on cloud computing. Compared with the ordinary deploying mode of network awareness functions, the deploying mode of network awareness functions in the cloud computing context is substantially different. One of the basic differences between the ordinary deploying mode and the cloud computing based deploying mode is that network awareness functions are deployed adjoint to the network infrastructure for ordinary deploying mode while network awareness functions are not deployed locally for the cloud computing based deploying mode.
+
+However, even if network awareness functions are realized based on cloud computing, performance requirements should not be reduced.
+
+The following performance requirements should be met by the network awareness system:
+
+- Deploying time for the network awareness functions for cloud computing mode is required to be less than twice the deploying time for the ordinary deploying mode.
+- The time from setting the configuration to the configuration taking effect is required not to exceed the time for ordinary deploying mode.
+
+- The volume of awareness policy rules for cloud computing mode is required not to be less than the volume of awareness policy rules of the ordinary deploying mode.
+- The length of a single network awareness policy rule for cloud computing mode is required to be not less than the length of a network awareness policy rule of the ordinary deploying mode.
+- The time for network awareness functions to be finished in cloud computing mode is required to be not greater than the time for ordinary mode.
+- The time to add, remove or modify a single awareness policy rule is required to be not greater than 50 ms.
+
+### **9.2 Performance requirements of functional components**
+
+There are several kinds of functional components to be deployed while realizing the network awareness functions based on cloud computing. Those function components include the awareness entity, awareness control entity and awareness agent, etc.
+
+Regarding the awareness entity, the following performance requirements should be met:
+
+- The process capability of an awareness entity or a group of awareness entities in the awareness cloud should match the network traffic between the awareness agent and the awareness cloud in order to avoid congestion.
+- The process capability of a group of awareness entities in the awareness cloud should be matchable so that coordination among those awareness entities is efficient.
+- The buffer capacity of the awareness entity in the awareness cloud is required to be big enough so that no data loss happens even if the process capability of the awareness entity is less than the network traffic between the awareness agent and the awareness cloud.
+
+Regarding the awareness control entity, the following performance requirements should be met:
+
+- The time for the control instruction from the control entity to the awareness entity for the cloud computing based mode is required not to exceed the time for the ordinary deploying mode.
+- The response time for a control entity to process a requirement from the awareness entity for the cloud computing based mode is required not to be greater than the time for ordinary mode.
+- The control capacity of a control entity for the cloud computing based mode is required not to be less than the control capacity for ordinary mode.
+
+Regarding the awareness agent, the following performance requirements should be met:
+
+- The bandwidth between the awareness agent and network for the cloud computing-based mode is required not to be less than the bandwidth between the awareness functional entity and the network for ordinary mode.
+- The bandwidth between the awareness agent and the awareness cloud for the cloud computing-based mode is required to be not less than the bandwidth between the awareness functional entity and the network for ordinary mode.
+- The process capability of the awareness agent is required to match the network traffic between the awareness agent and the network in order to avoid congestion.
+
+### **9.3 Performance requirements of service provisioning**
+
+No matter how the network functions are deployed, the core target is to provide service to network users or customers. Regarding service provisioning, the following performance requirements should be met:
+
+- Service provisioning time for the cloud computing-based mode is required not to be greater than the service provision time for ordinary deploying mode when the user service is changed.
+- Service QoS/QoE index for the cloud computing-based mode is required not to be worse than service QoS/QoE index for the ordinary deploying mode.
+- Service capability set for the cloud computing-based mode is required not to be less than service capability set for the ordinary deploying mode.
+- Average continuous service provisioning time for the cloud computing-based mode should not be less than the average continuous service provision time for the ordinary deploying mode.
+- Average service interrupt time for the cloud computing-based mode should not exceed the average service interrupt time for the ordinary deploying mode.
+
+Service recovery time for cloud computing-based mode is required not to be greater than 50 ms.
+
+# 10 Interface requirements of network awareness based on cloud computing
+
+## 10.1 Overview of the interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing
+
+An infrastructure network, awareness agent and awareness cloud are necessary functional components for network awareness based on cloud computing. An interface between two of the three aforementioned components is called an internal interface. An interface between one of the three aforementioned components and the other component is called an external component. Figure 10-1 describes these interfaces.
+
+
+
+Figure 10-1: Interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing. The diagram shows two identical functional blocks side-by-side. Each block contains three components: an 'Awareness cloud' (cloud icon), an 'Awareness agent' (server icon), and an 'Infrastructure network' (network diagram with a central router and four switches). Internal interfaces within each block are labeled: 'Iac' between the cloud and agent, and 'Ian' between the agent and the network. External interfaces between the two blocks are labeled: 'Ecc' between the two clouds, 'Eaa' between the two agents, and 'Enn' between the two infrastructure networks. A reference code 'Y.3047(24)' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 10-1 – Interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+It can be seen from Figure 10-1 that there are the following two internal interfaces:
+
+- Iac: an interface between the awareness agent and the awareness cloud.
+- Ian: an interface between the awareness agent and the infrastructure network.
+
+There are also the following three external interfaces:
+
+- Ecc: an interface between the awareness cloud and the peer awareness cloud.
+- Eaa: an interface between the awareness agent and the peer awareness agent.
+- Enn an interface between the infrastructure network and the infrastructure network.
+
+## **10.2 Internal interfaces for network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+Regarding interface Iac, the following requirements need to be supported:
+
+- Awareness agent is required to have the capability to provide necessary information to the awareness cloud through the Iac interface.
+- Awareness cloud and awareness agent are recommended to have the capability to negotiate the feature (for example data category, data sending speed and data structure, etc.) of the data provided through the Iac interface.
+- Iac interface is required to have the capability to guarantee the data transport on it is reliable.
+- Iac interface is required to have the capability to guarantee the data transport on it is secure.
+- Iac interface is required to support at least one of the security transport protocols such as quick UDP Internet connections (QUIC), transport layer security (TLS), and so on.
+
+Regarding interface Ian, the following requirements need to be supported:
+
+- Awareness agent and infrastructure network are recommended to have the capability to negotiate the data transport feature (for example data category, data sending speed and data structure, etc.) of the data provided through the Ian interface.
+- Ian interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is reliable.
+- Ian interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is secure.
+
+## **10.3 External interfaces for NACC**
+
+Regarding the interface Ecc, the following requirements need to be supported:
+
+- Two peers of interface Ecc are recommended to have the capability to negotiate the data transport feature (for example data category, data sending speed and data structure, etc.) of the data provided through the interface.
+- Ecc interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is reliable.
+- Ecc interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is secure.
+- Ecc interface is required to support at least one of the security transport protocols such as QUIC, TLS and so on.
+
+Regarding interface Eaa, the following requirements need to be supported:
+
+- Eaa interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is reliable.
+- Eaa interface is required to have the capability to guarantee that the data transported on it is secure.
+- Eaa interface is recommended to use QUIC transport protocol.
+
+Regarding interface Enn, the following requirements need to be supported:
+
+There are no special requirements related to interface Enn.
+
+## **11 Capability of network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+## **11.1 Overview of the capability for network awareness based on cloud computing**
+
+Generally, NACC can support the following capabilities:
+
+- Network application/service awareness capability.
+- Network status awareness capability.
+- Network requirements awareness capability.
+- Capability of other aspects for network awareness.
+- Service providing awareness capability.
+
+Capability of NACC is based on the service provider information, network application/service information, network status information, network requirements information, and so on.
+
+The service provider information includes information about the service nodes deployed in the network, service node deployment location, the number of service connections, service node deployment mode (physical, virtual), etc.
+
+The network application/service information includes real-time information of application or services that are carried on the network. The network status information includes network topology, bandwidth, network device running status, etc. The network requirements information includes real-time requirements from the network users, etc.
+
+## **11.2 Network application/service awareness capability**
+
+NACC should support the following network application/service awareness capabilities:
+
+- The capability to be aware of the common-used applications/services.
+- The capability to be aware of the malice applications/services.
+- The capability to be aware of network service crossing multiple domains.
+- The capability to be aware of emerging application/services.
+
+## **11.3 Network status awareness capability**
+
+The capability of network status awareness mainly includes the network service node status, network performance status (bandwidth utilization, processing delay and link delay, jitter, packet loss rate, etc.), network functional component (CPU, forwarding engine, storage, etc.). NACC should support the following capabilities related network status awareness:
+
+- Network node status awareness: being aware of the runtime status of the service node.
+- Network node performance awareness: being aware of the runtime performance of the service node.
+- Network status awareness methods support: to support some awareness methods such as in-band operations, administration and maintenance (OAM) detection, etc.
+- Network status awareness policy table generation and update: based on the information on the network, the network status awareness policy table is calculated and generated.
+- Network status awareness policy is generated according to the change of requirements.
+- Network status fault detection and repair in case of failure.
+- Scalable capability of network status awareness methods and capability of function extensibility.
+
+### **11.4 Network requirements awareness capability**
+
+NACC should support the following network requirements awareness capabilities:
+
+- The capability to be aware of the critical requirements of the network user.
+- The capability to be aware of real-time change of the network requirements.
+- The capability to be aware of common features of the network requirements from a group of network users.
+
+## **11.5 Other aspects of network awareness capability**
+
+NACC should support the following network awareness capabilities:
+
+- The capability to be aware of network resource utilities.
+- The capability to be aware of network environment parameters.
+- The capability to be aware of real-time changes in the network environment.
+
+### **11.6 Service providing awareness capability**
+
+The target of the network awareness functions is beneficial for the network to provide better service, NACC should support the following service-providing capabilities.
+
+- Service capability information collection: for example, NACC support to collect real-time service providing information.
+- Capability for network real-time QoS awareness: being aware of how QoS changes with time.
+
+# **12 Security considerations**
+
+The mechanisms specified in [ITU-T Y.2704] address the security requirements of this Recommendation. In addition, entities and the information pertaining to the mechanisms specified in this Recommendation should be under protection against threats described in [ITU-T Y.2704] and [ITU-T F.747.10].
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3054
+
+(05/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- Framework for trust-based media services
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS**
+
+**Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054
+
+# Framework for trust-based media services
+
+## Summary
+
+Content is produced, shared, exchanged and consumed through various media services. However, media services are associated with many inherent risks. In order to minimize unexpected risks and to maximize the survivability of media services, trust can be used to evaluate and verify that entities involved in media services are working in expected ways. Trust-based media services aim to restrain untrustworthy users from behaving maliciously, as well as being robust to unexpected executions and failures with a certain level of predictability and reliability.
+
+Thus, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054 provides a framework for trust-based media services. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054 identifies inherent risks in existing media services and describes the necessity for trust-based media services. After identifying functional requirements, the Recommendation describes components and a functional architecture for trust-based media services. Finally, trust-based content consumption and sharing services are introduced along with a trust analysis mechanism for trust-based media services.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3054 | 2018-05-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13609 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Functional architecture, media service, requirements, trust.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+### INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2018
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Overview of trust-based media services ..... | 2 |
+| | 6.1 Risks in media services ..... | 2 |
+| | 6.2 Necessity for trust-based media services..... | 3 |
+| 7 | Requirements for trust-based media services ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements for trust data collection..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements for trust analysis ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements for applying trust to trust-based media services..... | 4 |
+| | 7.4 Requirements for operating and managing trust-based media services ..... | 4 |
+| 8 | Architectures for trust-based media services..... | 5 |
+| | 8.1 Trust agent..... | 6 |
+| | 8.2 Trust information and management system ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.3 Trust service enabler..... | 7 |
+| 9 | Trust analysis and service provisioning for trust-based media services..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Trust analysis mechanism for trust-based media services..... | 8 |
+| | 9.2 Service provisioning for trust-based media services..... | 8 |
+| 10 | Security considerations..... | 9 |
+| | Appendix I – Use cases of trust-based media services ..... | 10 |
+| | I.1 Trust-based content consumption services..... | 10 |
+| | I.2 Trust-based content-sharing services ..... | 13 |
+| | Appendix II – Calculating a trust index for trust-based content consumption services ..... | 16 |
+| | II.1 The concept of a trust index for trust-based media services ..... | 16 |
+| | II.2 Calculation of trust index ..... | 17 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 19 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054
+
+## Framework for trust-based media services
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+In order to minimize unexpected risks and to maximize the survivability of media services, trust can be used to evaluate and verify that entities involved in media services are working in expected ways. Trust-based media services aim to restrain untrustworthy users from behaving maliciously, as well as being robust to unexpected executions and failures with a certain level of predictability and reliability. Thus, this Recommendation provides a framework for trust-based media services. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- identifying risks of media services and the necessity of trust-based media services;
+- functional requirements for trust-based media services;
+- components and a functional architecture for trust-based media services;
+- trust analysis mechanism, trust-based content consumption and sharing services.
+
+Detailed use cases for trust-based media services are described in Appendix I and calculating trust index is described in Appendix II.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3052] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3052 (2017), *Overview of trust provisioning for information and communication technology infrastructures and services*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 trust** [ITU-T Y.3052]: The measureable belief and/or confidence which represents accumulated value from history and the expecting value for the future.
+
+NOTE – Trust is quantitatively and/or qualitatively calculated and measured. Trust is used to evaluate values of entities, value-chains among multiple stakeholders and human behaviours, including decision making.
+
+**3.1.2 content** [b-ITU-T H.780]: A combination of audio, still image, graphic, video, or data.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 media service**: A service providing the electronic communication tools that are used to store, aggregate, share, discuss and deliver various types of content.
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-------------------------------------------|
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| idM | identification Manager |
+| OAM | Operations, Administration and Management |
+| PID | Pseudo-Identity |
+| SNS | Social Networking Service |
+| TA | Trust Agent |
+| TIMS | Trust Information Management System |
+| TSE | Trust Service Enabler |
+| UI | User Interface |
+| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
+
+## **5 Conventions**
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# **6 Overview of trust-based media services**
+
+### **6.1 Risks in media services**
+
+Media services store, aggregate, share, discuss and deliver various types of content. Recently, the volume of content has been enormously increasing and users participate in multiple media services (e.g., mail, contents delivery services or social networking services (SNSs)). Basically, the media service environment consists of four major entities (i.e., the media service itself, content, sender and receiver) as shown in Figure 6-1.
+
+When a sender and a receiver have content use interactions on the media service, there are various inherent risks associated with each entity.
+
+- Risks of media service: malicious attack, device infection, etc.
+- Risks of content: leakage of sensitive content, unidentified content, infected content, manipulated content address, etc.
+- Risks of users (i.e., sender and receiver): privacy leakage, unintended redistribution, reproduction of content, malicious comments on contents, other malicious behaviour by the user, etc.
+
+
+
+| Major concern | Is it risky to send or post it? | Is it risky to receive or access it? |
+|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Risk | - – Forwarding email to the wrong person by mistake
- – Unintended redistribution and reproduction of content
- – Leakage of sensitive content
| - – Unidentified or infected content
- – Manipulated URL
- – Device infection
- – Malicious attack
- – Leakage of personal information
|
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F6-1
+
+Figure 6-1: Inherent risks in media services. The diagram shows a flow from Sender A to a Media service (Content) to Receiver B. Below this, two columns list major concerns and risks. The left column addresses 'Is it risky to send or post it?' with risks like forwarding to the wrong person, unintended redistribution, and leakage of sensitive content. The right column addresses 'Is it risky to receive or access it?' with risks like unidentified or infected content, manipulated URLs, device infection, malicious attacks, and leakage of personal information.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – Inherent risks in media services**
+
+Since these inherent risks cause various problems, mitigating them is one of the most urgent and significant challenges in the media services environment. However, it is hard to mitigate risks of a sender and a receiver when they have content interactions (e.g., using text, images, short clips, movies and advertisements) on the media service because they do not have enough information about each other.
+
+Although those risks significantly threaten the media service environment, conventional media service providers have not addressed these problems adequately. While several feasible solutions can mitigate the risks, current approaches are limited. A new approach is to apply the concept of trust defined in [ITU-T Y.3052] to minimize risks to media services.
+
+### 6.2 Necessity for trust-based media services
+
+Although it is critical for media service providers to build a reliable and secure content usage environment, to date they rely on limited capabilities providing rating information and comments on content. However, these capabilities are insufficient to identify potential risks due to inadequate measurements and analysis.
+
+To overcome those limitations, this Recommendation describes trust-based media services that evaluate and utilize trust by modelling, collecting and analysing user data from multiple services. Figure 6-2 presents a conceptual approach to trust-based media services.
+
+
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F6-2
+
+Figure 6-2: A conceptual approach to trust-based media services. The diagram illustrates a trust analysis process. At the top, a 'Trust analysis' box (with a magnifying glass icon) contains two steps: (A) Measuring trust of sender and receiver by analyzing various data from multiple services, and (B) data from multiple services. Below this, a central 'Media service' box (with a play button icon) shows 'Content' being sent from 'Sender A' to 'Receiver B'. 'Sender A' and 'Receiver B' are represented by circles, and they are connected to 'Other services used by sender' and 'Other services used by receiver' respectively, which are shown as dashed boxes containing grey squares. Arrows indicate data flow: dashed arrows from the 'Other services' boxes to the 'Trust analysis' box represent 'Data collection for trust analysis'; a solid arrow from the 'Trust analysis' box to the 'Media service' box represents 'Trust analysis result application'; and double-headed arrows between 'Sender A' and 'Media service', and between 'Media service' and 'Receiver B', represent 'Media service interactions'. A legend at the bottom clarifies the symbols: a dashed arrow for data collection, a solid arrow for result application, a double-headed arrow for interactions, a circle for media service users, and a grey square for other services used by users.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – A conceptual approach to trust-based media services**
+
+# **7 Requirements for trust-based media services**
+
+This clause identifies functional requirements for trust-related capabilities in order to support trust-based media services.
+
+### **7.1 Requirements for trust data collection**
+
+- Collecting data in multiple services: Collection of internal data (e.g., media usage) from the media service as well as external data (e.g., social activities) from various services (i.e., SNS, etc.) is required.
+- Pre-processing of collected data: It is recommended that the collected data be refined and filtered for pre-processing.
+- Transferring collected data: Transfer of collected data into components for analysing trust in secured ways is required.
+
+### **7.2 Requirements for trust analysis**
+
+- Trust evaluation: Evaluation of trust by analysing data by various methods is required.
+- Quantization of trust: For trust-based media services, calculation of a specific value from various trust information sources (i.e., a real number) is required.
+- Analysis of heterogeneous data: Processing and analysis of heterogeneous data, because the data collected varies in properties, is required.
+- Data repository: It is recommended that trust information be stored in a repository to keep track of trust over time.
+- Interface for trust information: Provision of an interface (i.e., an application programming interface (API), etc.) between service or application and trust information analysis entities to exchange trust information is required.
+- Maintenance of trust-relevant information: Monitoring and modification of trust information seamlessly, because trust information is valid only for a specific time period and can change as time goes on, is required.
+
+### **7.3 Requirements for applying trust to trust-based media services**
+
+- Applying analysed trust to content: The granting by a media service provider to users of appropriate rights of access, downloading and reacting to content in accordance with trust is required.
+- Dynamic authentication: A media service provider is required to apply dynamic authentication based on evaluated trust, which varies with time.
+- Initiating media usage right: It is recommended that initial trust be granted for media content usage rights to a new user by a media service provider.
+
+### **7.4 Requirements for operating and managing trust-based media services**
+
+- Identifier (ID) management: Trust-based media services are required to issue and manage unique IDs to identify users and respond to requests for trust.
+- Operations, administration and management (OAM) of trust information: A service provider is required to operate and maintain entities and related information involved in trust-based media services.
+- User-friendly user interface (UI): Support of a user-friendly UI efficiently to handle complicated interactions between users and services can be optionally needed.
+
+## 8 Architectures for trust-based media services
+
+In order to provide trust-based media services, a legacy media service provider needs to be connected to a trust information management platform consisting of: 1) a trust information management system (TIMS); 2) a trust agent (TA); and 3) a trust service enabler (TSE). Trust-relevant functionalities can be added to traditional media services by connecting the media service to a trust information management platform. Figure 8-1 illustrates the components of trust-based media services.
+
+
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F6-2
+
+Figure 8-1: Components of trust-based media services. The diagram shows a central 'Content Media service' box with a play button icon. It is connected to a 'Sender' (A) and a 'Receiver' (B). The Sender and Receiver are represented by circles. The Sender is connected to a dashed box labeled 'Other services used by sender' which contains three gray squares. The Receiver is connected to a dashed box labeled 'Other services used by receiver' which contains three gray squares. Above the Sender and Receiver are two 'Trust agent' boxes. Dashed arrows labeled 'Data from other services' point from the Sender's services box to its Trust agent, and from the Receiver's services box to its Trust agent. Dashed arrows labeled 'Media service specific data' point from the Sender and Receiver to their respective Trust agents. A solid double-headed arrow labeled 'Trust information' connects the two Trust agents. A solid double-headed arrow labeled 'Dynamic authentication' connects the Trust agents to a 'Trust service enabler' box. A solid double-headed arrow connects the Trust service enabler to the 'Trust information management system' (TIMS) box at the top. A solid double-headed arrow connects the TIMS to the Trust agents. A solid double-headed arrow connects the Sender and Receiver to the 'Content Media service' box. A legend at the bottom explains the symbols: dashed arrows for data collection, solid arrows for trust analysis result application, double-headed arrows for media service interactions, circles for media service users, gray squares for other services used by users, and gray rectangles for components for trust-based media service. The text 'Y.3054(18)\_F6-2' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 8-1 – Components of trust-based media services**
+
+- A **TIMS** is responsible for modelling and evaluating trust by collecting data from TAs. Based on analysis of heterogeneous data from TAs, a TIMS measures trust and represents it as an explicit value.
+NOTE – A TIMS can utilize multiple trust analysis methodologies, e.g., calculation, machine learning and natural language processing. A media service provider can select the most appropriate analysis method for its purpose.
+- **TAs** collect various internal and external data from the media service itself and other services. Because users use multiple services, it is beneficial to gain abundant data to analyse user trust accurately. For efficient trust analysis, TAs conduct pre-treatment processing of data, and then deliver the data into a TIMS in a secure way.
+- A **TSE** provides trust-adapting capabilities to media servers. A TSE also provides various APIs for TAs and TIMS to call functions. In this manner, legacy media service providers request a TIMS to analyse trust through a TSE.
+
+A functional architecture for trust-based media services is presented in Figure 8-2. Each component of a TA, TIMS and TSE provides functional modules aligning with specified requirements. This architecture is developed by referring to [b-CG-Trust-TR].
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of trust-based media services. It shows the following components and their interactions:
+
+- User** and **Other service 1**, **Other service 2**, ..., **Other service n** provide **Trust-relevant data collection** to the **Trust agent**.
+- Media service** interacts with the **Trust agent** and the **Trust service enabler**.
+- Trust agent** contains:
+ - Trust-relevant media data collector
+ - Trust-relevant external data collector
+ - Trust data filter and preprocessor
+ - Trust data adapters
+- Trust service enabler** contains:
+ - Trust linking
+ - Trust-based content access controller
+ - Trust-based content assistant
+ - Trust APIs
+- Trust information management system (TIMS)** contains:
+ - Trust indicator evaluation**:
+ - Trust attributes evaluator
+ - Trust metric extractor
+ - Trust indicators identification
+ - Trust index computation**:
+ - Trust model
+ - Trust index analysis engine
+ - Trust reasoner
+ - Trust data store**:
+ - Trust idM
+ - Trust data gathering interfaces
+ - Trust data repository
+ - Trust privacy handler
+ - Trust information OAM**:
+ - Operation, administration, and management
+ - Trust information visualization
+
+Arrows indicate data flow: from User and Other services to Trust agent; from Trust agent to Trust service enabler; from Trust service enabler to Media service (labeled 'Apply trust index'); and bidirectional communication between Trust agent and TIMS.
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F8-2
+
+Figure 8-2 – Functional architecture of trust-based media services. The diagram shows the interaction between a User, Other services, Media service, Trust agent, Trust service enabler, and Trust information management system (TIMS).
+
+**Figure 8-2 – Functional architecture of trust-based media services**
+
+### 8.1 Trust agent
+
+A TA is responsible for collecting trust-related data from multiple services by the following modules.
+
+- **Trust-relevant media data collector:** This is responsible for gathering media specific data required for measuring trust attributes from the media service.
+- **Trust-relevant external data collector:** This is responsible for gathering external data from other services for measuring trust attributes.
+- **Trust data filtering and pre-processor:** This is used to refine trust data sets without including other data that can be repetitive, irrelevant or even sensitive for trust evaluation.
+- **Trust data adapter:** This is responsible for linking collected data to a TIMS, as an internal interface. It conducts a data synchronization process to establish consistency among data flowing from a TA toward a TIMS.
+
+NOTE – Because raw data from various services have different data characteristics, a trust data adapter adjusts collected data for a TIMS.
+
+### 8.2 Trust information and management system
+
+A TIMS consists of four components of trust indicator evaluation, trust data store, trust index computation and trust information OAM. Each component consists of different modules to satisfy functional requirements.
+
+#### 1) Trust indicator evaluation
+
+- **Trust attributes evaluator:** This is used to evaluate trust attributes defined in a trust model.
+
+NOTE 1 – Trust attributes are used as gradients to generate trust indicators, such as ability, benevolence and integrity (Refer to [ITU-T Y.3052]).
+
+- **Trust metric extractor:** It recognizes trust characteristics, accounts for factors influencing trust and determines proper trust metrics for the trust modelling and reasoning by analysing the metadata or semantic ontologies.
+
+- **Trust indicators identification:** This is used for identifying trust indicators by referring to trust metric extractor.
+
+#### 2) Trust data store
+
+- **Trust identification manager (idM):** This is used to protect and identify users. It generates a pseudo-identity (PID) for each user and identifies the PID when identification is required to collect and analyse trust data by collaborating with a trust privacy handler.
+- **Trust data gathering interface:** This is used to interact with a trust data adapter by transforming data collected from a trust data adapter into a trust data repository.
+- **Trust data repository:** This is responsible for storing raw data and analysed trust value.
+- **Trust privacy handler:** This is used to encrypt and decrypt user data to protect private data stored in a trust data repository at the request of an idM.
+
+NOTE 2 – To evaluate trust, the necessary data is loaded from this repository and is transferred to a trust indicator evaluation module.
+
+#### 3) Trust index computation
+
+- **Trust model:** This is used to specify, annotate and build trust relationships between users for the purpose of calculating trust data.
+- **Trust index analysis engine:** This is used to calculate a trust index and set rules based on a trust model. It cooperates and communicates with the trust data repository.
+- **Trust reasoner:** This is used to infer a level of trust by means of a trust index based on a trust model.
+
+NOTE 3 – Because a trust index can change with time and circumstantial context, a trust reasoning method must be able to handle such dynamics of trust. Trust computation happens when the state of a user is changed or an interaction occurs between users.
+
+#### 4) Trust information OAM
+
+- **Operations, administration and management:** This is used to operate, administer and manage TIMS for both media service providers and trust information providers.
+- **Trust information visualization:** This is used to visualize trust information on a UI to correspond to various requests from media services.
+
+### 8.3 Trust service enabler
+
+A TSE is responsible for granting a user appropriate rights to content depending on the trust evaluated. A TSE directly controls a user's rights to accessing, sharing, protecting and reacting rights on specific content.
+
+- **Trust linking:** This is a module capable of identifying an encrypted ID in collaboration with a trust idM.
+- **Trust-based content access controller:** This is used to grant a user appropriate rights to content in accordance with a combination of information about the content creator's rules, the service provider's trust policies and an evaluated trust index.
+- **Trust-based content assistant:** This is used to attach a trustworthy tag to content and to display trust information about content.
+- **Trust APIs:** This is used to respond to various requests from media service providers and users. APIs allow service operators to utilize trust information for specific purposes.
+
+## 9 Trust analysis and service provisioning for trust-based media services
+
+### 9.1 Trust analysis mechanism for trust-based media services
+
+While trustworthiness and trust have been treated as subjective concepts, trust-based media services utilize objectified trust, which is determined by a set of trust indicators computed by collected data, as described in [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+Figure 9-1 shows the objectified trust evaluation and utilization process. When users make a decision (e.g., user A – sending content; user B – clicking a uniform resource locator (URL)) about content in a media service, a trust-based media service grants a user (trustee) appropriate rights (access, distribution, reaction and tagging) to content with a trustee's objectified trust (user A). Simultaneously, a trustor can refer to the objectified trust to make a decision.
+
+
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F9-1
+
+Figure 9-1: Objectified trust evaluation and utilization process. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Trust evaluation' and 'Results of evaluated trust'. In the 'Trust evaluation' section, 'User A (Trustee)' provides 'Internal data from the media service' and 'External data from other services'. These are processed through 'Extracting data' to identify 'Trust indicators' (Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, and Other factors). These indicators are then used in 'Evaluating trust' to produce 'Objectified trust'. In the 'Results of evaluated trust' section, 'Objectified trust' is used by the 'Media service' to 'Granting appropriate right on content' and by 'User B (trustor)' to 'Referring to trust for decision'. A reference code 'Y.3054(18)\_F9-1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Objectified trust evaluation and utilization process**
+
+NOTE – A detailed explanation of the trust computation process is given in Appendix II.
+
+### 9.2 Service provisioning for trust-based media services
+
+In general, there are two types of media services – closed and open.
+
+- Closed media service: a content creator (sender) specifies receivers (e.g., email). After receiving permission to enter a closed media service, there are relatively low restrictions on content usage rights. Thus, potential risks exist in a closed media service.
+- Open media service: content is open to anyone in an open media service (e.g., a blog). Because content in an open media service is not restricted, content involves some level of risk.
+
+#### 9.2.1 Trust-based content consumption service
+
+The service covers a closed media service. For a content sender (trustor), the rights of a receiver (trustee) to content can be adjusted by trust as follows.
+
+- **Access right:** Even though a content creator (trustor) sends content to multiple users (trustees), only trustworthy receivers can access the content. If the content is forwarded to another user (trustee) regardless of the sender's intention, only trustworthy users can access the content based on the trust of the original sender (trustor) towards the forwarded user.
+
+For a content receiver (trustor), the right of a sender (trustee) to content can be adjusted by trust as follows.
+
+- **Trustworthy tag:** The service automatically provides trust information by attaching a "trustworthy" tag to the content representing the level of trust in the sender (trustee). Before accessing content, a receiver can refer to trust information.
+- **Distribution right:** The content distribution right of an untrustworthy sender is restricted when an untrustworthy sender distributes content continuously.
+
+#### 9.2.2 Trust-based content-sharing service
+
+The service covers an open media service. For a content creator (trustor), the rights of a content consumer (trustee) to content can be adjusted by trust as follows:
+
+- **Reaction right:** Content reaction rights depend on evaluated trust. An untrustworthy consumer (trustee) can neither add and reply to comments nor redistribute the content. However, trust does not influence the access right to the content. Even untrustworthy consumers can access the content on an open media service.
+
+For a content consumer (trustor), the rights of a content creator (trustee) to content can be adjusted by trust as follows:
+
+- **Trustworthy tag:** The service automatically provides trust information by attaching a "trustworthy" tag to content representing the level of trust in the sender (trustee). By referring to this information, users can access content selectively.
+- **Distribution right:** The content distribution right of an untrustworthy content creator is restricted when that creator tries to share content continuously.
+
+NOTE – Detailed use cases of services are described in Appendix I.
+
+## 10 Security considerations
+
+Trust-based media services aim to restrain untrustworthy users from behaving maliciously, as well as being robust to unexpected executions and failures with a certain level of predictability and reliability. To satisfy trust for media services, the media service provider should deliver security for building, managing and operating trust-based media services. Detailed security requirements and mechanisms can be based on [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and [b-ITU-T X.509]. In addition, privacy protection for user data should be guaranteed because trust-based media services collect and utilize privacy-sensitive data to analyse trust.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Use cases of trust-based media services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### I.1 Trust-based content consumption services
+
+#### I.1.1 Motivation
+
+As content sharing has emerged as a popular application; users can easily share content with others. However, the increasing number of untrustworthy users reduces the credibility of shared content. Also, malicious users can distribute original content (e.g., private photos, videos or documents) without the permission of creators, and it sometimes causes problems. Utilizing trusted information is an effective solution to problems, by protecting content from being recklessly distributed and abused.
+
+#### I.1.2 Overview
+
+Figure I.1 is an overview of trust-based content consumption services. As a TIMS is a cloud computing service, it can be easily applied to various existing media services.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the flow of content consumption in a trust-based system. A Sender (represented by a blue stick figure) sends content (represented by a document icon) to a Media service (E-mail), depicted as a server icon. This service then distributes the content to Receiver #1 (blue stick figure) and an unknown receiver (black stick figure with a question mark). Receiver #1 can further share the content with another Media service (E-mail), which then distributes it to Receiver #2 (blue stick figure) and another unknown receiver. A Trust information management system (TIMS), shown as a cloud icon, is connected to the Media services and the unknown receivers via dashed lines, indicating its role in analyzing trust.
+
+Figure I.1: Overview of trust-based content consumption services. The diagram illustrates a flow where a Sender sends content to a Media service (E-mail). This service then distributes the content to Receiver #1 and an unknown receiver. Receiver #1 can further share the content with another Media service (E-mail), which then distributes it to Receiver #2 and another unknown receiver. A Trust information management system (TIMS) is shown at the bottom, connected to the Media services and the unknown receivers via dashed lines, indicating its role in analyzing trust.
+
+Y.3054(18)\_FI.1
+
+**Figure I.1 – Overview of trust-based content consumption services**
+
+In closed media service, a sender can send an e-mail with various content types (e.g., text, image, video clip or URL) to any designated receiver. All receivers can open the e-mail and share the content it contains. If one receiver forwards the e-mail to others with attached content, then they are also able to share and redistribute content created by the original sender without the original sender's permission.
+
+From the sender's perspective, trust in a receiver can be analysed by a TIMS from e-mail, SNSs and other services. Then, trust is utilized to determine whether to grant permission to access content. Except for the e-mail service described in the previous paragraph, various applications related to open media service (e.g., chatting or messenger services and peer-to-peer file sharing) are described in clause I.2 as trust-based content-sharing services.
+
+#### I.1.3 Information flow
+
+Figure I.2 depicts information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for a sender using an e-mail application as an example. Specifically, a trust-based content consumption service analyses trust in the receiver by the sender. Because receivers can forward content to other users regardless of the sender's intention, the service grants access rights to content to receivers based on their trust, which is analysed by a TIMS.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Sender as Sender
+(creator/owner of content)
+ participant Media as Media service
+(E-mail)
+ participant TMS as Trust information and
+management system
+ participant R1 as Receiver #1
+ participant R2 as Receiver #2
+
+ Sender->>Media: Send e-mail to Receiver #1
+with media content
+ Note over Media: Store content
+ Media->>R1: Notification of e-mail
+ R1->>Media: Request for content
+ Media->>TMS: Query trust information
+ Note over TMS: Analyse sender's trust to Receiver #1
+ TMS->>Media: Response trust information
+ Media->>R1: Allow Receiver #1 to
+access content
+ R1->>R2: Forward e-mail to friend
+(Receiver #2)
+ Media->>R2: Notification of e-mail
+ R2->>Media: Request for content
+ Media->>TMS: Query trust information
+ Note over TMS: Analyse sender's trust to Receiver #2
+ TMS->>Media: Response trust information
+ Media->>R2: NOT allow Receiver #2
+to access content
+
+```
+
+Y.3054(18)\_F1.2
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for senders. The diagram involves five participants: Sender (creator/owner of content), Media service (E-mail), Trust information and management system, Receiver #1, and Receiver #2. The process starts with the Sender sending an e-mail with media content to the Media service. The Media service stores the content and notifies Receiver #1. Receiver #1 requests the content, and the Media service queries the Trust information and management system for trust information about Receiver #1. The system responds, and the Media service allows Receiver #1 to access the content. Receiver #1 then forwards the e-mail to Receiver #2. The Media service notifies Receiver #2, who requests the content. The Media service queries the Trust information and management system for trust information about Receiver #2. The system responds, and the Media service does not allow Receiver #2 to access the content.
+
+**Figure I.2 – Information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for senders**
+
+The interaction shown in Figure I.2 can be described as follows:
+
+- 1) a sender sends content to receiver #1 (No. 1);
+- 2) a media service (e-mail service) stores the attached content and informs receiver #1 about the receipt of the e-mail;
+- 3) receiver #1 requests to download content, and the media service requests trust information about receiver #1 (i.e., sender's trust toward receiver #1) to a TIMS;
+- 4) the TIMS responds to the request for media service by providing trust information that is analysed by data and information collected from various data sources (i.e., e-mail, SNSs, etc.);
+- 5) if measured trust in receiver #1 is greater than the criterion level, the media service allows receiver #1 to access content based on the response from the TIMS;
+- 6) receiver #1 forwards content to receiver #2 to share the contained content, and the media service informs receiver #2 about the receipt of the content;
+- 7) on receiving the e-mail, receiver #2 requests content, and the media service requests trust information about receiver #2 (i.e., trust of the sender in receiver #2) to the TIMS;
+- 8) a TIMS analyses the trust information about receiver #2 and responds to the media service request;
+
+- 9) if measured trust in receiver #2 is greater than the criterion level, the media service allows receiver #2 to access the content – if not, media service is denied.
+
+On the other hand, from the receiver's perspective, it is risky to access content from a suspicious or unknown sender. Figure I.3 depicts an information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for the receiver using an e-mail application as an example. Specifically, a trust-based content consumption service analyses trust in a sender by a receiver. Based on the analysis of trust in the sender, the content is tagged by "trustworthy". Even though trust in the sender is less than the criterion level, receivers can still access content. As such, the media service intends to minimize intervention in content flow because the service provides users with an option to access received content from an untrustworthy sender.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Sender as Sender (creator of content)
+ participant Media as Media service (E-mail)
+ participant TIMS as Trust information and management system
+ participant Receiver as Receiver #1
+
+ Sender->>Media: Send e-mail to Receiver #1 with media content
+ Note over Media: Store content
+ Media->>Receiver: Notification of e-mail
+ Receiver->>Media: Request for content
+ Media->>TIMS: Query trust information
+ Note over TIMS: Analyse sender's trust to Receiver #1
+ TIMS->>Media: Response trust information
+ Note over Media: Put trustworthy tag on the content
+ Media->>Receiver: Allow Receiver #1 to access content with the tag
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between four entities: Sender (creator of content), Media service (E-mail), Trust information and management system, and Receiver #1. The process begins with the Sender sending an e-mail to Receiver #1 via the Media service. The Media service then stores the content and notifies Receiver #1. Upon receiving the notification, Receiver #1 requests the content from the Media service. The Media service then queries the Trust information and management system for trust information about the sender. The system analyzes the sender's trust to Receiver #1 and responds with the measured trust information. The Media service then puts a trustworthy tag on the content and allows Receiver #1 to access the content with the tag.
+
+Y.3054(18)\_FI.3
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for receivers.
+
+**Figure I.3 – Information flow in a trust-based content consumption service for receivers**
+
+The interaction shown in Figure I.3 can be described as follows:
+
+- 1) a sender sends content;
+- 2) the media service requests information about trust in the sender in response to a receiver request;
+- 3) a TIMS gathers data required to analyse trust from various services and analyses trust information;
+- 4) the TIMS responds to a request from the media service by providing measured trust information about the sender;
+- 5) based on the trust information, the media service attaches a trustworthy tag to the content;
+- 6) a receiver can access the content with the tag.
+
+### I.2 Trust-based content-sharing services
+
+#### I.2.1 Motivation
+
+In trust-based content-sharing services, anyone can access content as long as a content creator does not impose restrictions. Even though content is open to anyone, the concept of trust is still required because content contains a certain level of risk.
+
+Accordingly, it is critical not to impose unnecessary restrictions on open media services because they are developed to share content with anyone. In this context, a trust-based content-sharing media service aims to minimize intervention determined by trust.
+
+From the perspective of a receiver (content consumer), contaminated, manipulated or illegal contents are major concerns. From the perspective of a sender (content producer), reputation attack, rating distortion and malicious threads are major concerns.
+
+#### I.2.2 Overview
+
+Figure I.4 is an overview of trust-based content-sharing services. From the content consumer perspective, content with a trustworthy tag can be useful. While any user can upload or post content in an open media service, it is beneficial to consumers if they can refer to trust information to avoid accessing infected, contaminated, manipulated or illegal contents. For this purpose, trust-based content-sharing services provide content producer trust information so that the media service can add a trustworthy tag to content. Based on trust indicated by the tag, consumers can access trustworthy content and avoid inherent risks in content consumption. If consumers want to see only trustworthy content, trust information about content producers is analysed and presented by interaction between the media service and a TIMS.
+
+From the content producer perspective, this media service prevents untrustworthy users from reacting to the content, since their major concerns are reputation attack, rating distortion and malicious threads. Reacting includes replying, rating and re-distributing. The media service prevents untrustworthy consumers reacting to the content. However, even untrustworthy consumers are still able to access the content (i.e., to watch or read it).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the flow of content and trust information in a trust-based content-sharing service. It shows the following components and interactions:
+
+- Sender (Producer):** A person icon who uploads or posts content to the Media service.
+- Media service:** A server icon that receives content from the Sender and provides content to the Receiver. It also interacts with the TIMS.
+- Trust information management system (TIMS):** A cloud icon that manages trust information, interacting with the Media service.
+- Receiver (consumer):** A person icon who consumes content from the Media service.
+
+Key actions and outcomes shown in the diagram:
+
+- The Sender (Producer) performs an "Upload/post" action, sending content to the Media service.
+- The Media service can "Put 'Trustworthy' tag on the content" (indicated by a blue play button icon) or "Put 'Untrustworthy' tag on content" (indicated by an orange play button icon).
+- The Media service and TIMS have a bidirectional dashed arrow connection, indicating interaction.
+- The Receiver (consumer) performs a "Consume" action, receiving content from the Media service.
+- Based on the trust tag, the Receiver can be "Able to react the content" (indicated by a black arrow) or "Unable to react the content" (indicated by a grey arrow).
+
+Y.3054(18)\_FI.4
+
+Figure I.4: Overview of trust-based content-sharing services. The diagram illustrates the flow of content and trust information between a Sender (Producer), a Media service, a Trust information management system (TIMS), and a Receiver (consumer).
+
+**Figure I.4 – Overview of trust-based content-sharing services**
+
+#### I.2.3 Information flow
+
+Figure I.5 depicts information flow in a trust-based content-sharing service for content consumers, while Figure I.6 illustrates such flow for content producers.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Sender as Sender (Producer)
+ participant MediaServer as Media server
+ participant TMS as Trust information and management system
+ participant Receiver as Receiver (consumer)
+
+ Sender->>MediaServer: Upload multimedia contents
+ activate MediaServer
+ MediaServer->>TMS: Request sender's trust
+ activate TMS
+ TMS->>MediaServer: Analyse sender's trust
+ TMS-->>MediaServer: Response trust information
+ deactivate TMS
+ MediaServer->>MediaServer: Put trust information tag on the content
+ deactivate MediaServer
+ MediaServer->>Receiver: Consume the contents with regard to trust information
+ deactivate MediaServer
+
+```
+
+Y.3054(18)\_FI.5
+
+Sequence diagram showing information flow in a trust-based content-sharing service. The participants are Sender (Producer), Media server, Trust information and management system, and Receiver (consumer). The process starts with the Sender uploading multimedia content to the Media server. The Media server then requests the sender's trust information from the Trust information and management system. The TMS analyzes the trust information and responds with trust information. The Media server then puts this trust information as a tag on the content. Finally, the Receiver consumes the content with regard to the trust information.
+
+**Figure I.5 – Information flow in a trust-based content-sharing service for content consumers**
+
+The interaction shown in Figure I.5 can be described as follows:
+
+- 1) the producer uploads content to a media service, and the media service stores content;
+- 2) the media server requests trust information about the producer trust from a TMS;
+- 3) the TMS gathers relevant data from various services (e.g., media services or SNSs) and analyses trust information;
+- 4) the TMS responds to the request from the media service by providing measured trust information about the content producer;
+- 5) based on the trust information, the media service attaches a trustworthy tag to the content;
+- 6) consumers can refer to the tagged trust information when they consume content.
+
+NOTE – The media service has multiple options to utilize trust information. For example, the media service can prohibit untrustworthy producers for uploading content if the media service applies a strict regulation.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant Consumer
+ participant Media server
+ participant TIMS as Trust information and management system
+
+ Consumer->>Media server: Access multimedia contents
+ activate Media server
+ Media server->>Media server: Consume the content
+ Media server->>TIMS: Request consumer's trust
+ activate TIMS
+ TIMS->>TIMS: Analyse consumer's trust
+ TIMS-->>Media server: Response trust information
+ deactivate TIMS
+ Media server->>Media server: Grant the right of reaction to the content
+ Media server-->>Consumer: Untrustworthy consumer cannot react the content
+ deactivate Media server
+
+```
+
+Y.3054(18)\_Fl.6
+
+Sequence diagram showing the information flow in a trust-based content-sharing service. The diagram involves three participants: Consumer, Media server, and Trust information and management system (TIMS). The process starts with the Consumer accessing multimedia contents from the Media server. The Media server then consumes the content and requests the consumer's trust information from the TIMS. The TIMS analyzes the consumer's trust and responds with trust information. Based on this, the Media server grants the right of reaction to the content. Finally, the Media server informs the Consumer that untrustworthy consumers cannot react to the content.
+
+**Figure I.6 – Information flow in a trust-based content-sharing service for content producers**
+
+The interaction shown in Figure I.6 can be described as follows:
+
+- 1) a content consumer accesses the content;
+- 2) the media service requests consumer trust information when the consumer wants to react to the content;
+- 3) the TIMS gathers the data required to analyse trust from various services and analyses trust information;
+- 4) the TIMS responds to the request from the media service by providing measured trust information about the content consumer;
+- 5) based on the trust information, the media service grants the consumer right of reaction to the content;
+- 6) only consumers to whom the reaction right has been granted can react to content.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+## Calculating a trust index for trust-based content consumption services
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### II.1 The concept of a trust index for trust-based media services
+
+This appendix introduces an example of applying a trust index to closed media services. Although various methods of measuring trust exist, this appendix introduces a computational trust analysis method. Assuming that a trustor, user $i$ , want to determine whether it is safe to send an important e-mail to a trustee, user $j$ . In this situation, user $i$ can request a TMS to analyse trust in user $j$ .
+
+In a trust-based media consumption service, *Trust index* ( $i, j, t$ ) indicates the trust of user $i$ in user $j$ at time $t$ . *Trust index* ( $i, j, t$ ) is calculated by 1) *trustworthiness* ( $j$ ), and 2) *relationship* ( $j \rightarrow i$ ) between $j$ and $i$ . It should be noted that the relationship ( $j \rightarrow i$ ) is considered because the reverse relationship ( $i \rightarrow j$ ) is already identified by user $i$ . *Trustworthiness* can be evaluated by four trust indicators: *Ability*, *Integrity*, *Benevolence* and *Sincerity*. Table II.1 shows definition and measurements for each trust indicator.
+
+**Table II.1 – Definition and measurement for each trust indicators**
+
+| Trust indicator | Definition | Example of trust attributes and data source |
+|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Ability | The potential of a group of skills, competencies and characteristics that enable a party to have influence in media services [b-Mayer] [b-Colquitt] | - – Number of received content a day
- – Number of friends on an SNS
- – Number of likes a day on an SNS
|
+| Benevolence | The degree to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an egocentric profit motive in media services [b-Mayer] [b-Colquitt] | - – Number of postings of malicious URLs on the medium itself
- – Number of postings of malicious URLs on an SNS
|
+| Integrity | The degree to which the trustee adheres to a set of principles prescribed by media services [b-Mayer] [b-Colquitt] | - – Reported number of disagreed behaviour incidents on the medium itself
- – Reported number of disagreed behaviour incidents on an SNS
|
+
+For trust-based media consumption services, *relationship* ( $j \rightarrow i$ ) is measured by three factors: *similarity*, *relationship period* and *closeness*. Similarity is an indicator measuring how much trustor and trustee share the same network in a given network. The more they share the same users in the network, the more user $j$ trusts user $i$ . In a similar vein, the longer their relationship period is, the more user $j$ trusts in user $i$ . If user $j$ comparably sends more e-mails to user $i$ , it is clear that $j$ has a close relationship with user $i$ . Figure II.1 represents a computational trust reasoning method for trust-based media services.
+
+
+
+Figure II.1 – Method of evaluating trust for trust-based content consumption services. The diagram shows a hierarchical flowchart. At the top, 'Prior trust index (i → j)' points to 'Trust index (i → j)'. Below 'Trust index (i → j)', there are two main branches: 'Trustworthiness (j)' and 'Relationship (j → i)'. 'Trustworthiness (j)' is composed of 'Ability', 'Integrity', 'Benevolence', and 'Sincerity'. 'Ability' includes 'Number of received mails', 'Number of friends', and 'Number of get "like"'. 'Integrity' includes 'The reported number of disagreed behaviours in email' and 'That in other media service'. 'Benevolence' includes 'Number of sending suspicious mails' and 'That in other media service'. 'Sincerity' includes 'Standard deviation of the number of sent mails'. 'Relationship (j → i)' is composed of 'Similarity', 'Relationship period', and 'Closeness'. 'Similarity' includes 'Ratio of common receivers' and 'Ratio of common senders'. 'Relationship period' includes 'Relation periods in mail service' and 'Relation period in SNS'. 'Closeness' includes 'Ratio of sent and received mails'. Arrows indicate the flow from the bottom-level indicators up to the 'Trust index (i → j)'.
+
+Y.3054(18)\_FII.1
+
+**Figure II.1 – Method of evaluating trust for trust-based content consumption services**
+
+### II.2 Calculation of trust index
+
+Equation II-1 represents the method of measuring the trust index $T(i, j, t)$ .
+
+$$T(i, j, t) = \alpha \cdot \text{Trustworthiness}(j, t) + \beta \cdot \text{Relationship}(j, i, t) \quad (\text{II-1})$$
+
+$$\text{Trustworthiness}(j, t) = \sigma \cdot \text{Ability}(j, t) + \tau \cdot \text{Integrity}(j, t) + \varphi \cdot \text{Benevolence}(j, t) + \Phi \cdot \text{Sincerity}(j, t) \quad (\text{II-2})$$
+
+$$\text{Relationship}(j, i, t) = \gamma \cdot \text{Similarity}(j, i, t) + \delta \cdot \text{Relationship period}(j, i, t) + \varepsilon \cdot \text{Closeness}(j, i, t) \quad (\text{II-3})$$
+
+In Equations II-1 to II-3, $\alpha, \beta, \sigma, \tau, \varphi, \Phi, \gamma, \delta, \varepsilon$ indicate weights for each factor.
+
+To evaluate *trustworthiness* ( $j, t$ ), three indicators of *Ability*, *Integrity* and *Sincerity* should be calculated by Equations II-4 to II-6. *Ability* ( $j, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-4:
+
+$$\text{Ability}(j, t) = \frac{\text{Number of received mail}_j}{\text{Number of received mail}_j + 1} + \frac{\text{Number of friends}_j}{\text{Number of frinds}_j + 1} + \frac{\text{Number of get "like"}_j}{\text{Number of get "like"}_j + 1} \quad (\text{II-4})$$
+
+If $j$ has a strong ability, others may send e-mails for requests.
+
+*Integrity* ( $j, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-5, as [b-Lee] suggests:
+
+$$\text{Integrity}(j, t) = M - \frac{1}{h} \sum_{k=1}^h n_k \quad (\text{II-5})$$
+
+In Equation II-5, $M$ indicates initial value, $n_k$ denotes the reported number of disagreed behaviours. For example, $n_1$ is the number of reported incidences of to swearing on the media service and $n_2$ is the number of violated behaviour incidents on an SNS. A large value of $j$ indicates a high incidence of violating pre-described rules, while a low value of $j$ means trustworthy.
+
+*Benevolence* ( $j, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-6:
+
+$$\text{Benevolence}(j, t) = N - \frac{1}{h} \sum_{o=1}^h n_o \quad (\text{II-6})$$
+
+In Equation II-6, $N$ indicates initial value, $n_o$ denotes the number of incidences of sending and posting malicious content in media service $n_o$ . The more $j$ conducts doubtful behaviours, the less $j$ means trustworthy.
+
+*Sincerity* ( $j, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-7, as [b-Song] suggests:
+
+$$Sincerity(j, t) = \left(1 - \frac{1}{\bar{n}_t}\right) \cdot \frac{1}{STD^M} \quad (II-7)$$
+
+In Equation II-7, $\bar{n}_t$ indicates the average number of sent mails, and $STD^M$ refers to the standard deviation of the number of sent mails. Sincerity measures user $j$ 's consistent usage in media services.
+
+To measure *relationship* ( $j \rightarrow i$ ), three factors of *Similarity*, *Relationship period* and *Closeness* are considered, as represented by Equations II-8 and II-9.
+
+*Similarity* ( $j, i, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-8:
+
+$$Similarity(j, i, t) = \left( \frac{send\ mail(i) \cap send\ mail(j)}{send\ mail(i) \cup send\ mail(j)} + \frac{receive\ mail(i) \cap receive\ mail(j)}{receive\ mail(i) \cup receive\ mail(j)} \right) \quad (II-8)$$
+
+Both $i$ and $j$ send mails to the same other user, $send\ mail(i) \cap send\ mail(j)$ will increase. In addition, both $i$ and $j$ receive e-mail from the same user, again the value of this intersection will increase.
+
+*Relationship period* ( $j, i, t$ ) can be measured by Equation II-9:
+
+$$Relationship\ period(j, i, t) = \left( \frac{First\ mail(j, i)}{stat\ mail(j)} \right) \quad (II-9)$$
+
+In Equation II-9, *start mail* ( $j$ ) denotes the date when $j$ starts to use e-mail, and *First mail* ( $j, i$ ) indicates the first date on which $j$ sent an e-mail to $i$ .
+
+*Closeness* ( $j, i, t$ ) is measured by Equation II-10:
+
+$$Closeness(j, i, t) = \left( \frac{send(j \rightarrow i)}{send(j \rightarrow i) + send(i \rightarrow j)} \right) \quad (II-10)$$
+
+The measured value of *Closeness* ( $j, i, t$ ) increases when $j$ sends more e-mails to $i$ than user $i$ does to user $j$ .
+
+Based on data gathered from media services, a trust-based media service provides trust information (i.e., a trust index) so that users can refer to the analysed trust index or the e-mail service via a TSE and can make a decision about whether to allow content download. For example, it is possible to build and operate a policy that someone whose trust index is less than 0.3 is not allowed to download attached content.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T H.780] Recommendation ITU-T H.780 (2012), *Digital signage: Service requirements and IPTV-based architecture*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.509] Recommendation ITU-T X.509 (2016) | ISO/IEC 9594-8:2017, *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks*.
+- [b-CG-Trust-TR] ITU-T Technical Report (2016), *Trust provisioning for future ICT infrastructures and services*.
+- [b-Colquitt] Colquitt, A., Brent A. Scott, B.A, LePine, J.A, (2007), *Trust, Trustworthiness, and Trust Propensity: A Meta-Analytic Test of Their Unique Relationships With Risk Taking and Job Performance*, Journal of Applied Psychology, **92**, No. 4, pp. 909~927.
+- [b-Lee] Lee, C.H., Jang, Y.M., Jung, J.W., Won, D.H. (2013). *Dynamic user reliability evaluation scheme for social network service*. Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security and Cryptology, **23**(2), pp. 157-168.
+- [b-Mayer] Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D. (1995). *An integrative model of organizational trust*. Academy of Management Review, **20**, pp. 709-734.
+- [b-Song] Song, H.S. (2013). *Prediction method for implicit interpersonal trust between Facebook users* [in Korean]. Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management, **20**(2), pp. 177-191.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3058 (09/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+## --- **Functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+### Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3058
+
+## Functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning
+
+## Summary
+
+A trust enabled service is a reliable service which satisfies service and trust requirements by applying additional functions for trust provisioning capabilities to conventional information and communication technology (ICT) service entities (including resources, stakeholders and users), and that is able to develop a better quality of services and experience. In order to provide trust enabled features to existing ICT services, relevant architectures with key components are required. Therefore, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3058 provides a functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning. It describes the concept and requirements and specifies related functional blocks, reference points and trust enabled service provisioning procedures between related functional blocks to support trust provisioning processes.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3058 | 2023-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15637 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Functional architecture, trust, trust enabled service provisioning, trust provisioning.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+### NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2023
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 1 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Overview ..... | 2 |
+| 7 | Requirements for trust enabled service provisioning ..... | 4 |
+| | 7.1 Requirements of trust-related data collection for trust enabled service provisioning..... | 4 |
+| | 7.2 Requirements of trust analysis for trust enabled service provisioning..... | 4 |
+| | 7.3 Requirements of trust provisioning for trust enabled service provisioning ... | 5 |
+| | 7.4 Security and resilience requirements for trust enabled service provisioning..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Functional architecture ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.1 Trust agent (TA)..... | 6 |
+| | 8.2 Trust analysis and management functions (TAMFs) ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.3 Trust enablement functions (TEFs)..... | 7 |
+| 9 | Reference point..... | 8 |
+| | 9.1 Reference point Ta ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.2 Reference point Tp ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.3 Reference point Tma ..... | 8 |
+| | 9.4 Reference point Tpm ..... | 9 |
+| | 9.5 Reference point Tpa ..... | 9 |
+| 10 | Procedures ..... | 9 |
+| | 10.1 Trust enabled entity registration procedure..... | 9 |
+| | 10.2 Trust enabled entity request and monitoring procedure..... | 10 |
+| | 10.3 Trust enabled entity discovery procedure..... | 11 |
+| | 10.4 Trust enabled entity recommendation procedure ..... | 12 |
+| 11 | Security considerations..... | 12 |
+| | Appendix I – Comparison of trust provisioning relative functions ..... | 13 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 15 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3058
+
+## Functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation provides a functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning to specify detailed functions and their relationships. The scope of this Recommendation includes:
+
+- Concept of trust enabled service provisioning;
+- General and functional requirements for trust enabled service provisioning;
+- Functional architecture that specifies the associated functional blocks and interfaces;
+- Trust enabled service provisioning procedures that specifies the flows between related functional blocks.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ITU-T Y.3052] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3052 (2017), *Overview of trust provisioning for information and communication technology infrastructures and services*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 trust** [ITU-T Y.3052]: The measurable belief and/or confidence which represents accumulated value from history and the expecting value for the future.
+
+NOTE – Trust is quantitatively and/or qualitatively calculated and measured. Trust is used to evaluate values of entities, value-chains among multiple stakeholders, and human behaviours, including decision making.
+
+## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 trust enabled service**: A reliable service which satisfies service and trust requirements by applying additional functions for trust provisioning capabilities to conventional ICT service entities (including resources, stakeholders and users) and that is able to develop better quality of services and experience.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------|
+| AC-FE | Admission Control Functional Entity |
+| API | Application Programming Interface |
+
+| | |
+|---------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
+| DPF | Discovery and Provisioning Function |
+| ICT | Information and Communication Technology |
+| PII | Personal Identifiable Information |
+| TA | Trust Agent |
+| TAI-FE | Trust Agent Interface Functional Entity |
+| TAMF | Trust Analysis and Management Function |
+| TDC-FE | Trust Data Collection Functional Entity |
+| TDFP-FE | Trust Data Filtering and Pre-processing Functional Entity |
+| TDGI-FE | Trust Data Gathering Interface Functional Entity |
+| TDR-FE | Trust Data Repository Functional Entity |
+| TECM-FE | Trust Enabled Contract Management Functional Entity |
+| TER-FE | Trust Enabled Recommendation Functional Entity |
+| TLA | Trust Level Agreement |
+| TMEF | Trust Modelling and Evaluation Function |
+| TME-FE | Trust Metric Extraction Functional Entity |
+| TM-FE | Trust Model Functional Entity |
+| TRE-FE | Trust Reasoning and Evaluation Functional Entity |
+| TRGF | Trust Repository and Gathering Function |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+The concept of trust implies belief and confidence that the functional entities in information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures and services will behave in expected ways. As ICT-based applications and services underpin other industrial domains and involve multiple stakeholders, trust evaluation of the corresponding value chains of business as well as of the system and component levels in a holistic manner can enable users to have confidence in their services and applications. Therefore, trust provisioning is one of the most important functional capabilities in ICT infrastructures and services [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+Trust provisioning in ICT infrastructures and services consists of a set of processes that include gathering data from entities and the producing trust information by evaluating all aspects of trust to support the decision-making of entities in establishing trust relationships with other entities [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+The ultimate goal for trust provisioning in ICT infrastructure is to develop a trust infrastructure that cooperates with ICT applications and services to assess and compute all aspects of trust among any entities in future ICT environments; in order to support these applications and services for better quality of services and experience. Therefore, the existing ICT applications and services need a way to provide trust provisioning processes to provide trustworthy ICT services.
+
+A trust enabled service is a reliable service which satisfies service and trust requirements, by applying additional functions for trust provisioning capabilities to conventional ICT service entities (including resources, stakeholders and users), and that is able to develop better quality of services and experience. A trust enabled service is bidirectional and bilateral. This means that a trust relationship in telecommunications applications and environments works in both directions. For example, when an end device attempts to connect to a network for telecommunications services, the network can make an assessment of how much it trusts the end device and the end device can make an assessment of how much it trusts the network to which it is connecting. The end device, and the network, can assume the roles of both trustors and trustees [ITU-T Y.3052].
+
+The trust provisioning process consists of data collection, data management, trust information analysis, trust information dissemination and trust information lifecycle management. Furthermore, in order to provide the trust service, trust components and platform architecture are described in clause 7.3 of [b-CG-Trust-TR]. Therefore, this Recommendation specifies functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning, which includes related functional blocks, reference points and procedures to support trust provisioning processes.
+
+Figure 1 shows the concept of trust enabled services, that includes trust enabled service provisioning flow based on relative functions by comparing with conventional services. The conventional services do not consider the trust information. An additional process is required to consider trust, a new value for ICT infrastructure and services.
+
+A trust enabled service consists of trust-related data collection, trust analysis, trust provisioning and service provisioning phases through the trust provisioning functions that are developed based on the trust components in [b-CG-Trust-TR]. The trust provisioning functions consist of trust agent, trust analysis and management and trust enablement.
+
+Trust Agents collect trust-related information needed for trust provisioning from each service domain. The collected information is sent to the trust analysis and management and applied to the trust model for trust analysis of the target. The trust model is bidirectional, adaptive to changes in the network or application and accounts for flexible trust and reputation calculations. It is possible for different services or applications to have different trust models. For example, the trust model for adding an IoT device to a broader network may be very different from the trust model that supports access to a specific platform (e.g., a video sharing service).
+
+Trust enablement provides trust requirement analysis and trust attribute extraction, and requests trust information needed by trust analysis and management to satisfy the trust requirements of target service providers.
+
+The requested trust analysis and management derives the target's trust index according to the trust requirements. The trust enablement provides the results of the trust consideration (i.e., trustworthy search or recommendation results) to the service provider. The service provider that acquires the target's trust index can provide service through trust-based decision-making.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: The concept of trust enabled service provisioning. The diagram shows a system architecture for trust-enabled services. At the top, a dashed box labeled 'Trust enabled services' contains three main components: 'Trust agent', 'Trust analysis and management', and 'Trust enablement'. 'Trust agent' and 'Trust analysis and management' are connected by a bidirectional arrow. 'Trust analysis and management' and 'Trust enablement' are also connected by a bidirectional arrow. Below 'Trust agent' is a 'Service domain' containing 'User' and 'User\_n'. A vertical arrow labeled 'Trust related data collection' points from the 'Service domain' to the 'Trust agent'. To the right of the 'Service domain' is a 'Service provider'. A horizontal arrow labeled 'Service provisioning' points from the 'Service provider' to the 'Service domain'. A vertical arrow labeled 'Trust provisioning' points from the 'Trust enablement' to the 'Service provider'. At the bottom, a box labeled 'Conventional services' is shown. The entire diagram is labeled 'Y.3058(23)' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure 1 – The concept of trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+# **7 Requirements for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+The requirements for trust enabled service provisioning are specified in clauses 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. Data collection for trust enabled service provisioning shall be subject to local, regional and national regulation that governs the security, privacy and confidentiality of data collected. Since the regulatory environment for data collection is not harmonized globally, there can be no global standard for data collection regarding trust enabled service provisioning.
+
+In order to perform trust analysis and management, the trust enabled service requires a base of data on which to carry out trust evaluations. In the case of end devices connecting to networks, this base of data potentially combines information from a variety of sources – possibly greater in scope than traditional telecommunication metadata collected by conventional ICT services.
+
+## **7.1 Requirements of trust-related data collection for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+- It is required to collect trust-related data about resources and stakeholders from the target service domain as well as other service domains in which the resources and stakeholders are used and work.
+- It is required to collect profile and status data of resources and stakeholders to manage resource availability.
+- It is required that PII information is not requested and not stored.
+- It is required to provide data filtering and/or pre-processing for refining trust data sets.
+- It is required to provide transformation of heterogeneous data collected from different service domains.
+
+## **7.2 Requirements of trust analysis for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+- It is recommended to provide bidirectional relationship, meaning that any stakeholder may be in the role of trustor and/or trustee.
+- It is required to process trust-related data representing different service domains, resources and stakeholders including their relationships. It is understood that it is possible to use multiple trust models depending on the service domain, application or stakeholder.
+
+- It is required to process trust information taking into account different characteristics of trust attributes (e.g., subjectivity, dynamicity)
+NOTE – [b-CG-Trust-TR] and [ITU-T Y.3052] describe different characteristics of trust.
+- It is recommended to reflect the changes of the network or application characteristics between service domains.
+- It is required to follow various conformance of service domains to gain access for trust analysis and management.
+- It is recommended to consider usage data of resources and stakeholders for trust analysis.
+- It is recommended to provide scalability to include additional information required for trust analysis.
+- It is required to provide trust evaluation by analysing data with different methods.
+- It is recommended to provide trust quantization to calculate various trust information into a specific value (i.e., a real number).
+- It is required to store trust calculations and intermediate trust processing information, for the use of future trust calculations.
+
+## **7.3 Requirements of trust provisioning for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+- It is required to accumulate trust value usage feedback from trustors and trustees to improve the trust value calculation in the future.
+- It is required to provide trust requirement analysis and trust attribute extraction.
+- It is required to provide a resource and service discovery based on trust requirement.
+- It is recommended to provide a recommendation based on trust requirements for selecting a suitable resource and service.
+- It is required to provide trust-based decision-making for selecting resources or stakeholders according to the result of trust-based discovery or recommendation.
+- It is required to provide a contract management between trustor and trustee which updates contract terms and usage information.
+- It is required to provide a usage control of target resources according to contract terms between trustors and trustees.
+- It is required to provide permission control and admission control of target resources according to trust decision between trustors and trustees.
+
+## **7.4 Security and resilience requirements for trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+- It is required to suspend the provision of resources to the user when the trust value of the service does not meet the users' requirements.
+- It is recommended to create a list containing several services that meet the historical requirements and sort them according to the trust value.
+- It is required to change another service for the user if the current service does not meet the trust requirement.
+- It is recommended to evaluate each user's trust index if multiple users need to obtain a specific trust-based service resource at the same time.
+- It is recommended to ask users whether or not they can wait if no suitable service can be provided at the current time.
+
+# 8 Functional architecture
+
+Based on the concept of ICT trust provisioning and the architectural framework and requirements of existing documents [b-CG-Trust-TR], [ITU-T Y.3052], [b-ITU-T Y.3054], a functional architecture for trust enabled service provisioning is presented in Figure 2.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of trust enabled service provisioning, organized into three main functional blocks: Trust analysis management functions (TAMFs), Trust agent (TA), and Trust enablement functions (TEFs), all interacting with a General ICT service entity (represented by a dashed box at the bottom).
+
+- Trust analysis management functions (TAMFs)** (top left):
+ - Trust modeling and evaluation function (TMEF) containing Trust model functional entity (TM-FE), Trust reasoning and evaluation functional entity (TRE-FE), and Trust metric extraction functional entity (TME-FE).
+ - Trust repository and gathering function (TRGF) containing Trust data gathering interface functional entity (TDGI-FE) and Trust data repository functional entity (TDR-FE).
+- Trust agent (TA)** (bottom left):
+ - Trust data collection functional entity (TDC-FE)
+ - Trust data filtering and pre-processing functional entity (TDFP-FE)
+ - Trust agent interface functional entity (TAI-FE)
+- Trust enablement functions (TEFs)** (top right):
+ - Discovery and provisioning function (DPF) containing Trust requirement analysis and provisioning functional entity (TRAP-FE), Trust enablement contract management functional entity (TECM-FE), and Usage and admission control functional entity (UAC-FE).
+ - Trust enablement data management function (TEDMF) containing Trust enablement repository functional entity (TER-FE), Trust enablement monitoring functional entity (TEM-FE), and Trust enablement interface functional entity (TEI-FE).
+
+Interactions and interfaces are indicated by lines with labels:
+
+- Tma**: Interface between TAMFs and TA.
+- Tpa**: Interface between TA and TEFs.
+- Tpm**: Interface between TAMFs and TEFs.
+- Ta**: Interface between TA and the General ICT service entity.
+- TP**: Interface between TEFs and the General ICT service entity.
+
+Y.3058(23)
+
+Figure 2 – Functional architecture of trust enabled service provisioning. The diagram shows a functional architecture with three main components: Trust analysis management functions (TAMFs), Trust agent (TA), and Trust enablement functions (TEFs), all interacting with a General ICT service entity.
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional architecture of trust enabled service provisioning**
+
+## 8.1 Trust agent (TA)
+
+TA is used to collect trust-related data from the general ICT service entity with trust agent interface, trust data collection, and trust data filtering and pre-processing.
+
+- The trust agent interface functional entity (TAI-FE) provides connectivity to various types of objects to collect trust-related data. It also needs to connect to existing platforms and devices to extract the required data.
+- The trust data collection functional entity (TDC-FE) is responsible for gathering the data required to evaluate a trust level of an object. It is also responsible for gathering the general and domain-specific data for evaluating a trust level of an object in a domain-specific perspective.
+- The trust data filtering and pre-processing functional entity (TDFP-FE) is used to refine trust data sets without including other data that can be repetitive, irrelevant or even sensitive for trust evaluation.
+
+## 8.2 Trust analysis and management functions (TAMFs)
+
+TAMFs is used to model, reason and manage trust data collected from TAs to verify that objects meet certain trust criteria and to identify the required trust metrics for the object. TAMFs consists of trust modelling and evaluation function (TMEF) and trust repository and gathering function (TRGF).
+
+- TMEF: This function provides trust analysis of the target entity, managing the trust-related data as a trust model, and extracts appropriate trust metrics for trust evaluation and reasoning. This function includes three functional entities as follows:
+ - The trust model functional entity (TM-FE) is used to specify, annotate and build trust relationships between objects for the purpose of reasoning trust data. Trust modelling is social-cyber-physical and service domain-specific, and there are social, cyber and physical trust models to define a trust model for each domain in the ICT infrastructure.
+ - The trust reasoning and evaluation functional entity (TRE-FE) is used to analyse and assess trust levels based on the trust model. There are various types of reasoning methods, depending on the service domains, and an appropriate reasoning method for the specific object.
+ - The trust metric extraction functional entity (TME-FE) recognizes trust characteristics, considers for factors that influence trust and determines appropriate trust metrics for the trust modelling and reasoning.
+- TRGF: This function manages the collected data as a repository. This function includes two functional entities as follows:
+ - The trust data gathering interface functional entity (TDGI-FE) provides a connection with appropriate trust agents and trust enablement functions which is located in target service domains for gathering trust-related data regarding on an object's trust aspects.
+ - The trust data repository functional entity (TDR-FE) manages the trust data including the operations of objects and the history of interactions among objects.
+
+## 8.3 Trust enablement functions (TEFs)
+
+TEFs are used for discovery and provisioning of trust resources and trust enabled service. TEFs also manage the repository for contract, usage and satisfaction data of trust enabled service and provide a brokering service to share and disseminate domain-specific trust knowledge across service domains. TEFs consist of a discovery and provisioning function (DPF) and a trust enablement data management function (TEDMF).
+
+- DPF: This function provides a suitable trusted resource according to trust requirements. The DPF includes a trust requirement analysis and provisioning functional entity (TRAP-FE), a trust enablement contract management functional entity (TECM-FE) and a usage and admission control functional entity (UAC-FE).
+ - The trust requirement analysis and provisioning functional entity (TRAP-FE) provides trust requirement analysis, trust-based discovery and recommendation. TRAP-FE analyses trust requirements from the service environment (e.g., user and service provider) and extract appropriate trust attributes for trust analysis. For trust-based discovery, TRAP-FE provides available lists of suitable resources or services which have the required level of trust. TRAP-FE provides a recommendation for selecting a suitable object that is similar to level of trust previously used.
+ - The trust enablement contract management functional entity (TECM-FE) manages contracts between trust enabled service participants. The contract information is stored by the TEDMF.
+ - The usage and admission control functional entity (UAC-FE) provides usage and admission control. Admission control manages trust enabled service users and existing service providers who access through the trust enablement interface functional entity (TEI-FE). Usage control grants permission to use an entity according to the TLA. The TLA defines the permitted operation, usage scope and usage time of a particular resource for an authorized user.
+
+- TEDMF: This function stores and manages the trust contract, usage and satisfaction information through the trust enablement repository functional entity (TER-FE), the trust enablement monitoring functional entity (TEM-FE) and the trust enablement interface functional entity (TEI-FE).
+ - The trust enablement repository functional entity (TER-FE) stores trust enablement data such as trust enablement contract information, usage information and satisfaction information. The trust enablement contract information contains the participant information and the target service information trust level agreement (TLA) that uses every target service resource. Usage information includes historical information such as creation time, access time and modification time, transaction type and a user who used the resource. The satisfaction information is a feedback data from trustors and trustees about service experience.
+ - The trust enablement monitoring functional entity (TEM-FE) collects trust enablement contract, usage and satisfaction information and stores it at the trust enablement repository functional entity (TER-FE).
+ - The trust enablement interface functional entity (TEI-FE) provides an application programming interface (API) between TEFs and general ICT service entities to operate TEFs. TEI-FE provides trust enablement information to TAMFs for subsequent trust evaluation of participants and trust enabled service. It also creates a trust link between authorized trust enabled service participants (trustor and trustee).
+
+# **9 Reference point**
+
+## **9.1 Reference point Ta**
+
+The reference point Ta is located between the TA and the general ICT service entity. It allows the TA to collect general and trust-related data of trust enabled service entities (i.e., trustor and trustee) from the general ICT service entity.
+
+The TA collects trust-related data and status data from the reference point Ta to monitor the status of entities.
+
+The TA collects general and trust-related data from the reference point Ta to register a new entity.
+
+## **9.2 Reference point Tp**
+
+The reference point Tp allows the communication between TEFs and the general ICT service entity. It allows the TEFs to receive the trust enabled service request from the user. Also, the TEFs can notify the result which includes the trust enabled service list and trust contract information.
+
+The trust enabled service user sends the service request through the reference point Tp to TEFs for discovering the trust enabled service entity which satisfies certain trust criteria.
+
+The TEFs can provide the response to the trust enabled service user by the reference point Tp. This response includes the trust enabled service list, trust contract information and usage information.
+
+The trust enabled service user can notify the selecting result of the service list to TEFs by the reference point Tp to announce the beginning of the task.
+
+The trust enabled service user can report the completion of the task with satisfaction data about the selected service or resource to TEFs through the reference point Tp to update usage and trust information.
+
+## **9.3 Reference point Tma**
+
+The reference point Tma allows the TAMFs to receive data collected by the TA.
+
+The TA constantly monitors the status of the trust enabled service entity and sends the collected information to the TAMFs to update the trust model and evaluate the trust of the target entity.
+
+When a trust evaluation result of a particular target entity is required, the TA can obtain the evaluation result from the TAMFs through the reference point Tma.
+
+## 9.4 Reference point Tpm
+
+Tpm is a reference point which enables the communication between TAMFs and TEFs.
+
+TEFs send trust-related data to TAMFs through reference point Tpm to create trust model (i.e., specify, annotate and establish trust relationship) and evaluate the trust level of newly registered entity.
+
+TEFs can receive the trust evaluation result from TAMFs by reference point Tpm for entity discovery and recommendation.
+
+According to the status of the entity, TEFs send renewed trust-related data to TAMFs through reference point Tpm which includes usage information for updating the trust model.
+
+## 9.5 Reference point Tpa
+
+Tpa is a reference point which enables the communication between TA and TEFs.
+
+TEFs receives trust-related and profile data from TA through reference point Tpa to register a new entity.
+
+TECM-FE of TEFs creates a trust contract and usage model for the newly registered entity.
+
+# 10 Procedures
+
+This clause provides procedures for trust enabled service provisioning between functional blocks. It includes registration, request, monitoring, discovery and recommendation of the trust enable entity.
+
+## 10.1 Trust enabled entity registration procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant E as Entities
+resources/user
+ participant TA as TA
+ participant TAMFs as TAMFs
+ participant TEFs as TEFs
+
+ Note over TEFs: DPF / TECM-FE
+ Note over TEFs: TEDMF / TER-FE
+
+ E->>TA: Entity information
+ activate TA
+ Note right of TA: Entity monitoring
+ TA->>TAMFs: Entity registration request
+ deactivate TA
+ activate TAMFs
+ TAMFs->>TEFs: Trust information
+ activate TEFs
+ Note right of TEFs: Trust-enabled contract creation
+ TEFs->>TEFs: Trust contract and usage information
+ Note right of TEFs: Trust contract and usage model update
+ deactivate TEFs
+ Note left of TAMFs: Trust evaluation and model update
+ TAMFs->>TA: Registration response
+ deactivate TAMFs
+
+```
+
+Y.3058(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the trust enabled entity registration procedure. Participants include Entities (resources/user), TA, TAMFs, and TEFs (which contains DPF/TECM-FE and TEDMF/TER-FE). The flow starts with 'Entity information' from Entities to TA. TA performs 'Entity monitoring'. TA sends 'Entity registration request' to TAMFs. TAMFs send 'Trust information' to TEFs (DPF/TECM-FE). TEFs perform 'Trust-enabled contract creation' and send 'Trust contract and usage information' to TEDMF/TER-FE. TEDMF/TER-FE performs 'Trust contract and usage model update'. TAMFs perform 'Trust evaluation and model update' and send a 'Registration response' back to TA.
+
+**Figure 3 – Trust enabled entity registration procedure**
+
+All entities must first be registered for trust enabled service provisioning. As shown in Figure 3, the trust enabled entity registration procedures are described below:
+
+- 1) When the TA discovers new entity through the entity monitoring, the TA sends the entity registration request to the TECM-FE of the TEFs. This request contains general and trust-related data about a new entity which is aggregated by TA.
+- 2) TECM-FE creates a trust contract which describes a scope of authority such as ownership, permitted operation, permitted time, usage history and permitted target.
+- 3) TECM-FE sends trust-related data to TAMFs for trust model update and trust evaluation about the newly registered entity.
+- 4) TECM-FE sends usage data to TER-FE for trust contract and usage model update for the newly registered entity.
+- 5) When the registration is completed, the TECM-FE sends the registration response to notify the registration result to TA.
+
+## 10.2 Trust enabled entity request and monitoring procedure
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ER1 as Entity resources 1
+ participant EUA as Entity user A
+ participant TA as TA
+ participant TAMFs as TAMFs
+ participant TEFs as TEFs
+ Note over TEFs: DPF / UAC-FE | TEDMF / TER-FE
+
+ EUA->>TEFs: Resource 1 request
+ Note right of TEFs: Admission and usage check
+ TEFs->>EUA: Resource and contract information
+ rect rgb(240, 240, 240)
+ Note over TA: Entity monitoring
+ end
+ EUA->>ER1: Using resource 1 by user A
+ ER1-->>TA: (Monitoring flow)
+ EUA->>TAMFs: Trust status update
+ TAMFs->>TEFs: Usage information
+ TEFs->>EUA: Usage model update
+ EUA->>TA: Task finish
+ TA->>TAMFs: Trust status update
+ TAMFs->>TEFs: Usage information
+ TEFs->>EUA: Usage model update
+
+```
+
+The diagram illustrates the interaction between five main components: Entity resources 1, Entity user A, TA (Trust Authority), TAMFs (Trust Assessment and Monitoring Functions), and TEFs (Trust Enabled Functions). The TEFs are further divided into DPF (Data Protection Function) with UAC-FE (Usage Access Control Functional Entity) and TEDMF (Trust Evaluation and Data Management Function) with TER-FE (Trust Evaluation and Repository Functional Entity). The process begins with Entity user A requesting Resource 1 from the UAC-FE. After an admission and usage check, resource and contract information is returned to the user. While the user uses the resource, the TA performs entity monitoring. Periodic trust status updates are sent to TAMFs, which then provide usage information to the TEDMF/TER-FE, resulting in usage model updates sent back to the user. This cycle repeats after the task is finished.
+
+Sequence diagram of Figure 4 showing the Trust enabled entity request and monitoring procedure between Entity resources 1, Entity user A, TA, TAMFs, and TEFs (comprising DPF/UAC-FE and TEDMF/TER-FE).
+
+Y.3058(23)
+
+**Figure 4 – Trust enabled entity request and monitoring procedure**
+
+In order to use a particular entity, the status and trust level of the target must be updated when the status of the entity is changed. As shown in Figure 4, the trust enabled entity request and monitoring procedures are as follows:
+
+- 1) To provide entity monitoring, TA constantly monitors the status of entities in its scope.
+- 2) User A sends a request message to UAC-FE of TEFs to use specific entity (Resource 1).
+- 3) UAC-FE of TEFs checks the permission and usage of the requested entity.
+
+- 4) If User A is allowed, UAC-FE sends the resource and contract information to User A. It includes the access point and usage profile of the requested resource. User A then starts a task with Resource 1.
+- 5) UAC-FE sends usage information about Resource A to the TER-FE to update the usage model.
+- 6) If the state of an entity (Resource 1) has changed, the TA sends the trust status update message to the TAMFs for trust evaluation and trust model update.
+- 7) When the task is completed, User A notifies the completion of the task with satisfaction data about the entity (Resource 1) to UAC-FE. And the UAC-FE updates the usage model again.
+- 8) The UAC-FE sends the satisfaction data to the TAMFs for trust evaluation and trust model update about this task.
+
+## 10.3 Trust enabled entity discovery procedure
+
+![Sequence diagram illustrating the Trust enabled entity discovery procedure. The diagram shows interactions between Entity resources 1, Entity user A, TA, TAMFs, and TEFs (DPF/TRAP-FE and TEDMF/TER-FE). The process starts with a Resource request from Entity user A to TEFs. TEFs send Trust evaluation result to TAMFs. TAMFs send Resource list and contract information to Entity user A. Entity user A performs Select resource. A vertical bar labeled Entity monitoring spans the TA and TAMFs. A horizontal bar at the bottom represents the Trust enabled entity request procedure [Resource 1].](2cde062fd82833415971a8bd1a2cafab_img.jpg)
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant ER1 as Entity resources 1
+ participant EA as Entity user A
+ participant TA
+ participant TAMFs
+ participant TEFs as TEFs
+ participant DPF as DPF
+TRAP-FE
+ participant TEDMF as TEDMF
+TER-FE
+ participant TRD as Trust-enabled resource delivery
+
+ EA->>TEFs: Resource request
+ TEFs->>TAMFs: Trust evaluation result
+ TAMFs->>EA: Resource list and contract information
+ EA->>ER1: Select resource
+ TA-->>TAMFs: Entity monitoring
+ TEFs-->>TRD: Contract and usage information
+ TAMFs-->>TRD: Trust evaluation result
+ TRD-->>TEFs: Contract and usage information
+ Note over ER1,EA,TA,TAMFs,TEFs: Trust enabled entity request procedure [Resource 1]
+
+```
+
+Y.3058(23)
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Trust enabled entity discovery procedure. The diagram shows interactions between Entity resources 1, Entity user A, TA, TAMFs, and TEFs (DPF/TRAP-FE and TEDMF/TER-FE). The process starts with a Resource request from Entity user A to TEFs. TEFs send Trust evaluation result to TAMFs. TAMFs send Resource list and contract information to Entity user A. Entity user A performs Select resource. A vertical bar labeled Entity monitoring spans the TA and TAMFs. A horizontal bar at the bottom represents the Trust enabled entity request procedure [Resource 1].
+
+**Figure 5 – Trust enabled entity discovery procedure**
+
+Users can request a search to use entities that meet their target trust profile. As shown in Figure 5, the trust enabled entity discovery procedures are as follows:
+
+- 1) User A sends a request message to TRAP-FE of TEFs to search for entities that satisfy their target trust profile. The trust profile describes requirements such as entity type, trust level and scope of use.
+- 2) TRAP-FE aggregates trust evaluation information from TAMFs and trust contract and usage information from TER-FE about relevant entities. Based on the aggregated trust-related information, TRAP-FE sends a list of entities which meet the required trust profile.
+- 3) User A selects an entity from the list and the trust enabled entity request procedure which is described in clause 10.2 is performed.
+
+
+
+# Appendix I
+
+### Comparison of trust provisioning relative functions
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+This appendix provides a comparison table (Table I.1) of trust provisioning relative functions which are defined in relevant Recommendations and draft Recommendations. The functions located in the same row are classified as the same category.
+
+**Table I.1 – Comparison of trust provisioning related functions**
+
+| TR, trust provisioning | | ITU-T Y.3053
(Trustworthy networking) [b-ITU-T Y.3053] | ITU-T Y.3054
(Trust-based media service) [b-ITU-T Y.3054] | ITU-T Y.3055
(Trust-based personal data management) [b-ITU-T Y.3055] | Trust-arch | |
+|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
+| TA
(trust agent) | TA interface | | Trust data adapters | | TA
(arust agent) | TA interface |
+| | Trust data collection | Trust verification support FE | Trust relevant media data collector, trust relevant external data collector | | | Trust data collection |
+| | Trust data filtering and pre-processing | | Trust data filter and preprocessor | | | Trust data filtering and pre-processing |
+| TAMP
(Trust Analysis and Management Platform) | Trust models | | Trust models | Trust modelling function | TAMFs
(Trust analysis and management functions) | Trust models |
+| | Trust reasoner and evaluator | Trust level validation FE | Trust reasoner, trust attributers' evaluator | Trust information analysis function | | Trust reasoning and evaluation |
+| | Data analytics | | | | | |
+| | Cloud computing | | | | | |
+| | Trust metric extractor | | Trust metric extractor, Trust index analysis engine, trust indicators identification | | | Trust metric extraction |
+| | Trust knowledge gathering Interface | | Trust data gathering interface | Trust attributes monitoring function | | Trust data gathering interface |
+| | Trust data repository | | Trust data repository | | | Trust data repository |
+| | | Trust information lifecycle management FE | Trust information OAM | Trust information lifecycle management function | TEFs
(Trust enablement functions) | Usage and admission control |
+| TSE
(Trust service enabler) | Trust linker | | Trust linking | | | |
+| | Trust idM | ID-locator mapping support FE | Trust idM | | | |
+| | Trust-based recommendation | | | | | |
+
+**Table I.1 – Comparison of trust provisioning related functions**
+
+| TR, trust provisioning | | ITU-T Y.3053
(Trustworthy networking) [b-ITU-T Y.3053] | ITU-T Y.3054
(Trust-based media service) [b-ITU-T Y.3054] | ITU-T Y.3055
(Trust-based personal data management) [b-ITU-T Y.3055] | Trust-arch | | |
+|------------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------|--|
+| | | | Trust APIs | | | Trust enablement interface | |
+| TSB (Trust service broker) | | | | | | Trust requirement analysis and provisioning | |
+| | | | | | | Trust enablement contract management | |
+| | | | | | | Trust enablement repository | |
+| | | | | | | Trust enablement monitoring | |
+| Domain-specific optional functions | | Domain membership management FE, domain policy management FE, accessing / peering control support FE, data transport and processing FE, ID-based routing support FE | Trust-based content access controller, trust-based content assistant, Trust privacy handler | Privacy compliance management functions, personal data evaluation functions, personal data transaction management functions | | | |
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3053] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3053 (2018), *Framework of trustworthy networking with trust-centric network domains*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3054] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3054 (2018), *Framework for trust-based media services*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3055] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3055 (2020), *Framework for trust-based personal data management*.
+- [b-CG-Trust-TR] Technical Report CG-Trust (2016), *Trust provisioning for future ICT infrastructures and services*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+## Y.3075
+
+(09/2020)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Requirements and capabilities of information- centric networking routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation in IMT-2020**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS**
+
+**Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING
+
+Y.3500–Y.3599
+
+### BIG DATA
+
+Y.3600–Y.3799
+
+### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
+
+Y.3800–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of information-centric networking routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation in IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075 specifies service requirements and functional requirements of information-centric networking (ICN) routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation (CUPS) in IMT-2020. In addition, the capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding in control plane and data plane are described with consideration of various scenarios. Finally, the security consideration is discussed.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3075 | 2020-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14394 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Control and user plane separation, control plane, data plan, ICN routing and forwarding, IMT-2020.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2020
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of ICN routing and forwarding..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 Service requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Functional requirements ..... | 5 |
+| 8 Capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 Capabilities in the control plane ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Capabilities in the data plane..... | 6 |
+| 9 Security consideration ..... | 7 |
+| Bibliography..... | 9 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3075
+
+# Requirements and capabilities of information-centric networking routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation in IMT-2020
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the service requirements and functional requirements of information-centric networking (ICN) routing and forwarding based on control and user plane separation (CUPS) in IMT-2020, and also explains the capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding in consideration of various scenarios, including mobility, multi-homing, multicast and caching.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3032] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3032 (2014), *Configuration of node identifiers and their mapping with locators in future networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3071] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071 (2017), *Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3072] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3072 (2019), *Requirements and capabilities of name mapping and resolution for information-centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.2 data plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+
+**3.1.3 identifier (ID)** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities.
+
+**3.1.4 information-centric networking (ICN)** [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.48]: A new approach to networking where named objects (not only devices) are the principal components for the network. Named data objects can be stored in network nodes (with caching capability) distributed throughout the network. Data objects are transmitted by using names to requesting consumers from any network node that can provide requested data. Locations of the nodes that store data objects in their caches are irrelevant to consumers because they send their requests for data objects by using names (not the data object locations).
+
+**3.1.5 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in Recommendation [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.6 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: The identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element, physical or logical objects) that may be resolved/translated into an address.
+
+**3.1.7 named data object (NDO)** [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.35]: A data object that is identifiable by a name.
+
+**3.1.8 user plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: A synonym for data plane.
+
+**3.1.9 name mapping** [ITU-T Y.3072]: A service that builds one-to-one or one-to-many relationships between an identifier of an object and addresses of the object, where the addresses can be IP addresses.
+
+**3.1.10 name resolution** [ITU-T Y.3072]: A service that provides the translation between an identifier and address(es) of the object based on the relationship built by name mapping.
+
+### **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 named object (NO)**: An object that is identifiable by a name. The object can be a data object, a device, a service, etc.
+
+**3.2.2 name-based ICN**: A type of information-centric networking (ICN) wherein a named data object (NDO) is routed and forwarded based on its name.
+
+**3.2.3 ID/IP integrated ICN**: A type of information centric networking (ICN) wherein a named data object (NDO) is routed and forwarded based on joint ID and IP address.
+
+**3.2.4 name mapping and resolution system**: A system that supports name mapping and resolution services, and in which a registration process is also included. It contains naming, mapping, registering, resolving and managing functionalities.
+
+**3.2.5 identifier protocol (IDP)**: A set of rules and regulations that specifies how the locator(s) of a data packet is/are manipulated based on ID in the network layer under the ID/locator separation of information-centric networking (ICN).
+
+## **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------|
+| AN | Access Network |
+| ARP | Address Resolution Protocol |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| CP | Control Plane |
+| CUPS | Control and User Plane Separation |
+| DAN | Data Aware Networking |
+| DDoS | Distributed Denial-of-Service |
+| GNMRS | Global Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| HDD | Hard Disk Drive |
+
+| | |
+|----------|----------------------------------------------|
+| ICN | Information-Centric Networking |
+| ID | Identifier |
+| IDP | Identifier Protocol |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications 2020 |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LNMRs | Local Name Mapping and Resolution System |
+| NDO | Named Data Object |
+| NDP | Neighbour Discovery Protocol |
+| NO | Named Object |
+| RF | Radio Frequency |
+| SDN | Software Defined Networking |
+| SSD | Solid State Disk |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UP | User Plane |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is prohibited from" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "is not recommended" indicate a requirement which is not recommended but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this specification can still be claimed even if this requirement is present.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+## 6 Introduction
+
+Information-centric networking (ICN) has been considered as an emerging technology for the IMT-2020 network to achieve its performance goals. [ITU-T Y.3071] gives a functional view of data aware networking (DAN) which is also called ICN, capabilities with separated control capability and data capability. Control and user plane separation (CUPS) has been set as a key feature of the core network (CN) for the IMT-2020 network, which allows enabling of software defined networking (SDN) to deliver the user plane data more flexibly. As fundamental functions of ICN, the ICN routing and forwarding should follow the same mechanism of CUPS in IMT-2020. In ICN, unique ID is used to label data/devices, and the ID-locator pairs are usually maintained. Currently, the Internet has a locator-based infrastructure, such as IP. When using ICN technology to
+
+build IMT-2020 network, it is required to give consideration on how to inter-operate with the existing locator-based network infrastructure. Under the mechanism of ID/locator separation, using IP as a locator is a reasonable option for ICN in IMT-2020. Considering the IMT-2020 scenarios and the previous studies of DAN in [ITU-T Y.3071], this Recommendation intends to specify the requirements and capabilities for ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020.
+
+Capabilities in the control plane and data plane for ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020 are separated. The routing controlling and forwarding information maintaining are responsibilities of the control plane. The packet classification, packet reconstruction and name-based/IP-based forwarding are all processed in the data plane, and the locator(s) or address(es) of a data packet can be manipulated based on its ID, which are instructed by the controlling information sent by the control plane. Meanwhile, some actions or process logics are also executed in the node of the data plane, such as local computing and local storage. In addition, both control plane and data plane have the interface to interact with the global name mapping and resolution system (GNMRS), and local name mapping and resolution system (LNMRS) [ITU-T Y.3032], [ITU-T Y.3071], [ITU-T Y.3072], in which the ID-locator mappings are maintained globally and locally separately. GNMRS and LNMRS can help name-based forwarding to retrieve its corresponding IP address based on its ID. Usually, GNMRS maintains global ID-locator pairs, and LNMRS maintains local ID-locator pairs.
+
+NOTE – The terms "data plane" and "user plane" are synonyms in this Recommendation. In the context of routing and forwarding, the data plane is commonly used instead of user plane.
+
+## **7 Requirements of ICN routing and forwarding**
+
+Requirements of ICN routing and forwarding are described in this clause.
+
+### **7.1 Service requirements**
+
+- 1 It is required to implement the separation of control plane and data plane for ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020.
+- 2 It is required to have the capability to interact with the global or local name mapping and resolution system.
+ - It is required to have the capability for the control plane to interact with the GNMRS or LNMRS.
+ - It is required to have the capability for the data plane to interact with the GNMRS or LNMRS, and to obtain the ID and IP mapping information. Usually, LNMRS is located near the user, which may bring more efficient or onsite service for users.
+- 3 It is required to have the capability for the data plane to receive the flow table from the control plane, and the data plane creates, forwards, modifies or duplicates packets based on the received flow table.
+- 4 It is required to have the capability to configure or load the routing and forwarding strategies dynamically to meet service requirements elastically. Meanwhile:
+ - It is required to have the capability to configure the routing and forwarding algorithm manually.
+ - It is recommended to have the capability to update the routing and forwarding strategies in the run time.
+- 5 It is required to have the capability for the network layer to provide an ID based service interface for the transport layer.
+- 6 It is required to have the capability to support the hybrid networking schema of IP and ICN based on control and user plane separation in IMT-2020.
+
+### 7.2 Functional requirements
+
+- 1 It is required that the control plane has the capability to support different kinds of routing.
+ - It is required to have the capability to get the network topology and status information for routing.
+ - It is required to have the capability to route based on the joint of ID and IP address.
+ - It is required to have the capability to route based on name.
+ - It is required to have the capability to route based on IP address.
+- 2 It is required to have the capability to support the intermediate network node to store or cache data for highly efficient or nearby forwarding in the data plane. Meanwhile, it is required to have the capability to support the intermediate network node to store or cache the forwarded data.
+- 3 It is required to have the capability to maintain more information for elastic caching or storing in the data plane. For example, the information about intermediate network node and its nearby nodes are maintained, including load status, storage status, service status and input/output (IO) status, which can be used for collaborative caching and storing among different nodes.
+- 4 It is required to have the capability to support querying and measuring the network status in the data plane, including:
+ - It is required to support querying and measuring the network status in real-time, such as the load of ports and available bandwidth.
+ - It is recommended to support analysing and predicting the network status.
+- 5 It is required that the data plane has the capability to forward, create, modify and duplicate packets, including:
+ - It is required to have the capability to differentiate and forward different kinds of packets, including IP packets, ID/IP integrated ICN packets and other packets.
+ - It is required to have the capability for a node in data plane to construct a new packet according to the information from control plane or local function of the node. For example, construct specific packets for the name mapping and resolution purpose.
+ - It is required to have the capability to elastically select proper address(es) and modify the address field for a packet during the forwarding process. For example, in a multi-homing scenario, a user equipment (UE) may have a candidate address set which may contain more than one address. The proper address(es) should be selected from the candidate address set during the forwarding. The corresponding address field in the packet may be modified (e.g., added, deleted or changed) based on the selected address(es) accordingly.
+ - It is required to have the capability to change the destination address during the forwarding process. For example, in a mobility scenario, if a UE changes its location and so is its IP address. Therefore, the destination address in the packets which are forwarded to the UE should be modified to the new address during the forwarding process.
+- 6 It is recommended to have the capability of computing in the data plane, which can execute some actions or network protocols, such as network measuring and neighbour discovery protocol (NDP)/address resolution protocol (ARP).
+- 7 It is recommended to have the capability to acquire the network status information from the data plane by the control plane for routing.
+- 8 It is required to have the capability to calculate the forwarding path based on the hybrid routing schema of IP and ICN in the control plane.
+
+## 8 Capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding
+
+Capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020, as shown in Figure 8-1, are divided into the capabilities in the control plane and the data plane. Figure 8-1 also illustrates the functionalities that support the capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding. Capabilities in the two planes are depicted in clauses 8.1 and 8.2 respectively.
+
+
+
+Figure 8-1: Capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020. The diagram shows a central dashed box containing two main sections: 'Control plane capabilities' (shaded light purple) and 'Data plane capabilities' (shaded light green). The 'Control plane capabilities' section includes 'Interface for registration and resolution', 'Routing', and 'Forwarding information base'. The 'Data plane capabilities' section includes 'Local computing', 'Local storage', 'Flow classifier', 'Name-based forwarding', 'ID/IP integrated reconstruction' (which contains 'IDP process' and 'Packet reconstruction'), and 'IP forwarding'. To the right of the dashed box, there are two external components: 'Global name mapping and resolution system' (shaded light purple) connected to the control plane by a double-headed arrow, and 'Local name mapping and resolution system' (shaded light purple, represented as a stack of boxes) connected to the data plane by a double-headed arrow. The identifier 'Y.3075(20)\_F8-1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area.
+
+Figure 8-1 Capabilities of ICN routing and forwarding based on CUPS in IMT-2020
+
+### 8.1 Capabilities in the control plane
+
+Capabilities in the control plane have three major functionalities, including routing, forwarding information base and name mapping and resolution. The functionalities are described as follows:
+
+**Routing:** Collect and analyse the network topology and status information reported from the data plane; calculate the transmission path based on specific routing algorithms including algorithms for name-based routing, ID/IP integrated routing and IP routing. Routing can support different scenarios such as mobility, multi-homing and multicast.
+
+**Interface for name mapping and resolution:** Provide the interface to GNMRS and LNMRS. Usually, GNMRS maintains the global information. LNMRS contains the information that is related to the nearby users, and LNMRS is located at the edge of network. In general, it is more efficient for end users to look up in LNMRS than in GNMRS. The control plane and the data plane maintain the entrance of GNMRS or LNMRS, sending the mapping or resolution messages to GNMRS or LNMRS and receiving the address information from them.
+
+**Forwarding information base:** It is the storage to hold information to determine the direction of a packet to be forwarded to, and **forwarding information base** is to be used by the forwarding function. The forwarding information is derived from the routing function.
+
+### 8.2 Capabilities in the data plane
+
+Capabilities in the data plane have six major functionalities, which are described as follows:
+
+**Flow classifier:** Recognizes different kinds of packets including ID/IP integrated ICN packets, IP packets and other specified packets.
+
+**IP forwarding:** Forward IP packets according to the forwarding information base.
+
+**Name-based ICN forwarding:** Forwards the ICN packet by name according to the forwarding information base, which is totally different from IP forwarding.
+
+**ID/IP integrated ICN reconstruction:** Contains the IDP process module and packet reconstruction module. The IDP process module is responsible for asking GNMRS or LNMRS for address(es), maintaining the rules and regulations about how to process the address/es in the packet and modifying the address field in the packet based on the aforementioned rules or regulations, for example, deleting some addresses from the address field, or changing the destination address. In order to get the corresponding address(es) based on a unique ID, the IDP process module uses the interface to query GNMRS or LNMRS. Under the consideration of the elastic and onsite service, LNMRS is normally first queried. The address field of a packet may be modified based on the queried address/es through the IDP process module. After that, a new ID/IP integrated ICN packet will be reconstructed by the packet reconstruction module, which will finally be forwarded by the IP forwarding module.
+
+This process includes the following capabilities, which can correspond to various scenarios.
+
+- In a multicast scenario, a data packet can be duplicated and forwarded to more than one port. The destination IP addresses of the duplicated packets can be modified by the identifier protocol (IDP) process module accordingly.
+- In a multi-homing scenario, an ID may correspond to multiple IPs. Selection of the suitable address as the destination address is based on the network status information and the forwarding strategies. The address field in the packet may be modified by the IDP process module during the forwarding process.
+- In a mobility scenario, when a UE changes its position, its IP address may also be changed. It implies that the IP address in the packet should be modified by the IDP process module dynamically.
+- In a caching scenario, the same content may have multiple replicas cached at different intermediate network nodes. In order to achieve better data service, the address of the proper data replica may be selected as the destination address based on some strategies by the IDP process module.
+
+**Local computing:** Executes some actions or process logics in a node of the data plane, which may be valuable to provide elastic resources for some services, especially in the resource autonomous network. Some computing functions in the control plane can also be executed by this module, such as measuring network status and maintaining status information. It may improve the processing efficiency of the data plane to satisfy the requirements on high efficiency or onsite process for some time-sensitive services.
+
+**Local storage:** Provides storage medium in the node of the data plane, such as solid state disk (SSD) or hard disk drive (HDD). It can be used by the local computing function to read/write data.
+
+## 9 Security consideration
+
+To support the capabilities of radio frequency (RF), different kinds of security threats should be considered.
+
+The availability of RF is dependent on the interaction between RF and GNMRS or LNMRS. In order to avoid the potential risks caused by the interaction with outside systems, some security mechanisms should be considered to ensure the interacting process is safe enough, for example, authentication and authorization to avoid illegal users, and malicious information detection against unexpected messages.
+
+In RF, the data plane has the capability of storage, which implies some intermediate nodes are data providers and become the destination of user packets. Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack caused by node address leakage may be the risk in this stage. To alleviate this risk, address
+
+translation can be executed at the network boundary, and the real addresses of intermediate nodes are shielded for end users. In addition, some approaches for IP network devices defence can also be borrowed, such as a firewall.
+
+For SDN, many mechanisms are applied to secure the network, for example, encryption and authentication for data and users, examining programs thoroughly before their installation to networks, verifying the communication channel between the controller and network resources, and shaping secure data traffic, which can guarantee the security of RF with the aforementioned approaches simultaneously.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3033] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3033 (2014), *Framework of data aware networking for future networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.35] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 35 (2016), *Data aware networking – Scenarios and use cases*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup.48] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 48 (2018), *Proof-of-concept for data service using information centric networking in IMT-2020*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+**ITU-T**
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+**Y.3107**
+
+(08/2019)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3107
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3107
+
+# Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3107 aims to specify the functional architecture for quality of service (QoS) assurance management in the International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) 2020 network.
+
+This Recommendation first describes the functional architecture for QoS assurance management under the IMT-2020 network management and orchestration framework. It then specifies reference points between QoS functional entities and the IMT-2020 network management and orchestration plane.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3107 | 2019-08-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13986 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+IMT-2020 network, functional architecture, QoS assurance management
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2019
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 3 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 3 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 4 |
+| 6 | Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network.... | 5 |
+| | 6.1 Functional architecture for QoS assurance management ..... | 5 |
+| | 6.2 Functional entities for QoS assurance management..... | 7 |
+| 7 | Reference points ..... | 9 |
+| | 7.1 Reference point Si ..... | 9 |
+| | 7.2 Reference point Se..... | 11 |
+| | 7.3 Reference point Is..... | 13 |
+| | 7.4 Reference point Ic..... | 15 |
+| | 7.5 Reference point Id ..... | 17 |
+| 8 | QoS assurance management procedure ..... | 19 |
+| 9 | Security considerations..... | 21 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 22 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3107
+
+# Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies functional architecture for quality of service (QoS) assurance management in the IMT-2020 network. The scope of this Recommendation is as follows:
+
+- Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network;
+- Reference points between QoS assurance management functional entities and the IMT-2020 network management and orchestration plane;
+- QoS assurance management procedure.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T E.860] | Recommendation ITU-T E.860 (2002), Framework of a service level agreement . |
+| [ITU-T M.3010] | Recommendation ITU-T M.3010 (2000), Principles for a telecommunications management network . |
+| [ITU-T P.10] | Recommendation ITU-T P.10/G.100 (2017), Vocabulary for performance, quality of service and quality of experience . |
+| [ITU-T Q.1743] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1743 (2016), IMT-Advanced references to Release 11 of LTE-Advanced evolved packet core network . |
+| [ITU-T X.1211] | Recommendation ITU-T X.1211 (2014), Techniques for preventing web-based attacks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3100] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), Requirements of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3106] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3106 (2019), Quality of service functional requirements for the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3110] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3110 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration requirements . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3111] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3111 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration framework . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3170] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3170 (2018), Requirements for machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network . |
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3324] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3324 (2018), *Requirements and architectural framework for autonomic management and control of IMT-2020 networks*.
+- [ITU-R M.2083-0] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), *IMT Vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 anomaly** [ITU-T X.1211]: A pattern in the data that does not conform to the expected behaviour.
+
+**3.1.2 assurance** [b-ITU-T X.1500]: The degree of confidence that the process or deliverable meets defined characteristics or objectives.
+
+**3.1.3 control plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.4 data plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+
+**3.1.5 IMT-2020** [ITU-T Y.3100]: (Based on [ITU-R M.2083-0]) Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.6 network slice** [ITU-T Y.3100]: A logical network that provides specific network capabilities and network characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network slices enable the creation of customized networks to provide flexible solutions for different market scenarios which have diverse requirements, with respect to functionalities, performance and resource allocation.
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice may have the ability to expose its capabilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – The behavior of a network slice is realized via network slice instance(s).
+
+**3.1.7 network slice instance** [ITU-T Y.3100]: An instance of network slice, which is created based on a network slice blueprint.
+
+NOTE 1 – A network slice instance is composed of a set of managed run-time network functions, and physical/logical/virtual resources to run these network functions, forming a complete instantiated logical network to meet certain network characteristics required by the service instance(s).
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice instance may also be shared across multiple service instances provided by the network operator. A network slice instance may be composed of none, one or more sub-network slice instances which may be shared with another network slice instance.
+
+**3.1.8 orchestration** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, the processes aiming at the automated arrangement, coordination, instantiation and use of network functions and resources for both physical and virtual infrastructures by optimization criteria.
+
+**3.1.9 quality of experience** [ITU-T P.10]: The overall acceptability of an application or service, as perceived subjectively by the end-user.
+
+NOTE – Quality of experience includes the complete end-to-end system effects (client, terminal, network, services infrastructure, etc.).
+
+**3.1.10 quality of service** [ITU-T Q.1743]: The collective effect of service performances, which determine the degree of satisfaction of a user of a service. It is characterized by the combined aspects of performance factors applicable to all services, such as:
+
+- service operability performance;
+- service accessibility performance;
+- service retainability performance;
+- service integrity performance; and
+- other factors specific to each service.
+
+**3.1.11 service level agreement (SLA)** [ITU-T E.860]: A formal agreement between two or more entities reached after a negotiating activity with the scope to assess service characteristics, responsibilities and priorities of every part. A SLA may include statements about performance, billing, service delivery but also legal and economic issues.
+
+**3.1.12 third party (3rd party)** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, with respect to a given network operator and network end-users, an entity which consumes network capabilities and/or provides applications and/or services.
+
+NOTE 1 – An example of 3rd party, a virtual network operator (VNO) may use capabilities exposed by a network operator, e.g., to manage specific network slices. Another example of 3rd party, a service and/or application provider (e.g., an over the top (OTT) player) may provide applications and/or services to enhance the network capabilities.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network end-users are not regarded as 3rd parties.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+None.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| AN | Access Network |
+| ASPM | Application and Service Plane Management |
+| ASPM-S | Application and Service Plane Management Support |
+| ASP-S | Application and Service Plane Support |
+| BSS | Business Support System |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| CPM | Control Plane Management |
+| CPM-S | Control Plane Management Support |
+| CP-S | Control Plane Support |
+| DPM | Data Plane Management |
+| DPM-S | Data Plane Management Support |
+| DP-S | Data Plane Support |
+| DSCP | Differentiated Service Code Point |
+| E2E | End-to-End |
+| EMES | External Management Entity Support |
+| ERM | External Relationship Management |
+
+| | |
+|--------|------------------------------------------|
+| IASP | IMT-2020 Applications and Service Plane |
+| ICP | IMT-2020 Control Plane |
+| IDP | IMT-2020 Data Plane |
+| IMT | International Mobile Telecommunications |
+| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
+| MANO | Management and Orchestration |
+| OSS | Operational Support System |
+| OTT | Over The Top |
+| PQ | Priority Queuing |
+| QCI | QoS Class Indicator |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| SCM | Slice Charging Management |
+| SCPO | Slice Capacity Planning and Optimization |
+| SDN | Software-defined Networking |
+| SFM | Slice Fault Management |
+| SI | Slice Instance |
+| SLM | Slice Life-cycle Management |
+| SLMCCS | Slice Lifecycle Customer Care Support |
+| SP | Slice Provisioning |
+| SRMA | Slice Resource Monitoring and Analysis |
+| SRR | Slice Resource Repository |
+| SSM | Slice Security Management |
+| WRED | Weighted Random Early Detection |
+| WRR | Weighted Round-Robin |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+This Recommendation uses the following conventions:
+
+The term "is required to" indicates a requirement which must be strictly followed, and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification.
+
+# **6 Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in the IMT-2020 network**
+
+## **6.1 Functional architecture for QoS assurance management**
+
+The quality of service (QoS) functional requirements for the IMT-2020 network are specified in [ITU-T Y.3106]. Assurance is defined in [b-ITU-T X.1500] as the degree of confidence that the process or deliverable meets defined characteristics or objectives. The functional architectures for QoS assurance management in this Recommendation are based on the high-level architecture of IMT-2020 network slice management and orchestration provided in [ITU-T Y.3110], [ITU-T Y.3111] and [ITU-T Y.3324]. Figure 1 illustrates the functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice life cycle management. Figure 2 illustrates the functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice instance management.
+
+Network slicing enables the operator to create logically partitioned networks customized to provide optimized solutions for different market scenarios which demand diverse requirements in terms of service characteristics, required functionality, performance and isolation issues. The orchestration functionalities are specified in the functional elements: slice capacity planning and optimization (SCPO), slice provisioning (SP), and inter-slice orchestration. Management functionalities are specified in the functional elements: slice fault/security/charging management, slice resource monitoring and analytics and resource repository.
+
+The slice capacity planning and optimization functional element is responsible for the planning of necessary resources for the requested slice provisioning and optimizing usage of resources for creating and maintaining slices. During the slice capacity planning, the IMT-2020 QoS planning is involved. The IMT-2020 network QoS planning provides an estimate of the network coverage, capacity and resources requirements. This requires knowledge of real traffic estimates and network topology for each analysed area, utilisation of accurate models for signal and user data transmissions, and implementation of the actual network element characteristics, functionalities and parameters. During the slice optimization, the IMT-2020 QoS optimization is involved. The IMT-2020 network QoS optimisation can be seen as a process to improve the overall network quality, users' quality of experience (QoE) [ITU-T P.10] and to ensure that the network resources are efficiently utilised.
+
+The slice provisioning functional element is responsible for provisioning requested slices by the customers. During the slice provisioning, the IMT-2020 QoS provisioning is also involved. The IMT-2020 network QoS provisioning includes: translation of service-centric service level agreement (SLA) [ITU-T E.860] to resource-facing network slice descriptions, unified and end to end (E2E) QoS controlling, QoS interworking and mapping, efficient E2E QoS provisioning, etc.
+
+The slice resource monitoring and analytics functional element is responsible for collecting the status and events of the provisioned slice resources and analysing them for the purpose of fault, quality, and security management. During the slice resource monitoring and analytics, the IMT-2020 QoS monitoring and analytics is also involved. This includes IMT-2020 QoS monitoring [b-3GPP TS 22.261], measurements, analysis of measurement results, modelling and training [ITU-T Y.3170], anomaly [ITU-T X.1211] detection, anomaly prediction and updates of the network slice parameters.
+
+The QoS policy repository functional element provides capabilities to store the network-wide QoS policy information in a distributed manner.
+
+
+
+Figure 1: Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice life-cycle management. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. The outermost box is 'IMT-2020 slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane'. Inside it is 'IMT-2020 slice life-cycle management and orchestration'. This contains a 'Slice life-cycle management customer care support' block at the top, followed by two columns of functional blocks. The left column includes 'Slice capacity planning and optimization' (with 'QoS planning' and 'QoS optimization' sub-blocks), 'Inter-slice orchestration', 'Slice security management', 'Slice resource monitoring and analytics' (with 'QoS monitoring and analytics' sub-block), and 'External management entity support'. The right column includes 'Slice provisioning' (with 'QoS provisioning' sub-block), 'Slice fault management', 'Slice charging management', 'Slice resource repository' (with 'QoS policy repository' sub-block), and 'External management entity support'. A 'Su' label points to the top of the inner box, and 'Se' and 'Si' labels point to the bottom right of the inner box. The reference 'Y.3107(19)\_F01' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 1 – Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice life-cycle management**
+
+
+
+Figure 2: Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice instance management. The diagram shows two main planes. The left plane is 'IMT-2020 slice life-cycle management and orchestration' (containing 'External management entity support') and 'IMT-2020 applications and service plane' (containing 'Applications and service plane functions' and 'ASP QoS assurance support'). The right plane is 'IMT-2020 slice instance management plane' (containing 'Extern relationship management', 'Applications and service plane management', 'Control plane management', and 'Data plane management'). A vertical bar on the right is labeled 'Multi-plane management coordination'. Arrows labeled 'Si', 'Ie', 'Is', 'Ic', and 'Id' connect the two planes. The bottom of the left plane is labeled 'Resources'. The reference 'Y.3107(19)\_F02' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 2 – Functional architecture for QoS assurance management in IMT-2020 network slice instance management**
+
+## 6.2 Functional entities for QoS assurance management
+
+The QoS assurance management functional entities are illustrated in Figure 3. The IMT-2020 applications and service plane QoS assurance support functional entities include: SLA support, QoS policy and QoS capabilities exposure to third party [ITU-T Y.3100]. The control plane [ITU-T Y.2011] QoS assurance support functional entities include: QoS data analysis, QoS planning and optimization, QoS provisioning. The data plane [ITU-T Y.2011] QoS assurance support functional entities include: QoS policy enforcement, QoS data collection and QoS mapping.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the functional entities for QoS assurance management across three planes of the IMT-2020 network. Each plane is represented by a horizontal bar containing a green box for assurance support and blue boxes for specific functional entities.
+
+- IMT-2020 applications and service plane (ASP):** Contains 'ASP QoS assurance support' (green box), 'SLA support' (blue box), 'QoS policy' (blue box), and 'QoS capabilities exposure' (blue box).
+- IMT-2020 control plane (CP):** Contains 'CP QoS assurance support' (green box), 'QoS data analysis' (blue box), 'QoS planning and optimization' (blue box), and 'QoS provisioning' (blue box).
+- IMT-2020 data plane (DP):** Contains 'DP QoS assurance support' (green box), 'QoS policy enforcement' (blue box), 'QoS data collection' (blue box), and 'QoS mapping' (blue box).
+
+Y.3107(19)\_F03
+
+Figure 3 – QoS functional entities diagram showing three planes: ASP, CP, and DP.
+
+Figure 3 – QoS functional entities
+
+### 6.2.1 Applications and service plane QoS assurance support functional entity
+
+The applications and service plane QoS assurance support functional entity includes the following functions:
+
+##### 1) Service level agreement (SLA) support
+
+SLA is a formal agreement between two or more entities reached after a negotiating activity with the scope to assess service characteristics, responsibilities and priorities of every part. SLA may include statements about performance, billing, service delivery but also legal and economic issues [ITU-T E.860]. The SLA is from the user and service point of view. The QoS policy is from the network point of view. The SLA support receive the SLAs from the network users and translate them to QoS policies.
+
+##### 2) QoS policy support
+
+In general, SLAs are used to establish QoS parameters for QoS enforcement functions. Each SLA consists of a set of objectives that are used to derive network level policies, which are in turn translated into QoS primitives (e.g., forwarding rules, queue configurations, packet dropping rate, and traffic shaping policies). The QoS mapping policies for QoS interworking between access network (AN) and core network (CN) is also included in QoS policy functional entity.
+
+The QoS policy support distributes the translated QoS policies to the control plane and data plane for QoS enforcement.
+
+##### 3) QoS capabilities exposure
+
+IMT-2020 networks are expected to bring some new and enhanced capabilities. The opening of IMT-2020 network capabilities exposure will bring new business opportunities to operators, vendors and third parties e.g., enterprises or over the top (OTT) players. Except for the network slicing capabilities exposure, the IMT-2020 QoS capabilities exposure is also one of the network capabilities which can open the QoS capabilities for third parties.
+
+All QoS functions and capabilities can be accessed through service-oriented interfaces which include service registration, service discovery, service request and service deregistration.
+
+### **6.2.2 Control plane QoS assurance support functional entity**
+
+The control plane QoS assurance support functional entity includes the following functions:
+
+##### **1) QoS data analysis**
+
+The QoS data analysis receives QoS related information data and construct QoS model for QoS assurance. For example, it can construct correlations model between QoS information data and QoS anomalies and the correlations between QoS data and user QoE using machine learning methods [ITU-T Y.3170].
+
+QoS data analysis can detect QoS related anomalies and predict QoS anomaly when current QoS related information data is input into the model with high confidence.
+
+##### **2) QoS planning and optimization**
+
+The IMT-2020 network QoS planning receives the knowledge of real traffic estimates and network topology for each analysed area, utilisation of accurate models for signal and user data transmissions, and implementation of the actual network element characteristics, functionalities and parameters. Then, QoS planning provides an estimate of the network coverage, capacity and resources requirements.
+
+The IMT-2020 network QoS optimisation can update the QoS planning results to improve the overall network quality, user's QoE and to ensure that the network resources are efficiently utilized.
+
+The estimation and optimization results are embedded in the network slice planning and optimization.
+
+##### **3) QoS provisioning**
+
+The IMT-2020 QoS provisioning translates QoS policies to resource-facing network slice descriptions to enforce unified and E2E QoS controlling, QoS interworking and mapping, efficient E2E QoS provisioning.
+
+### **6.2.3 Data plane QoS assurance support functional entity**
+
+The data plane QoS assurance support functional entity includes the following functions:
+
+##### **1) QoS policy enforcement**
+
+The QoS enforcement is mainly focusing on queue management. An important goal of queue management is to minimize the steady-state queue size while not under-utilizing link as well as avoiding the lock-out phenomenon where a single connection or flow monopolizes the queue space. The detailed QoS enforcement functions include packet marking, congestion avoidance, queue shaping, and queue scheduling with a finer level of QoS granularities (per-UE, per-flow). Schemes for queue management differ mainly in the criteria for dropping packets and what packets should be dropped. The use of multiple queues introduces further variation in the schemes, for example, in the way packets are distributed among the queues. It can utilize weighted random early detection (WRED) queue management algorithm, priority queuing (PQ), and weighted round-robin (WRR) queue scheduling algorithms.
+
+##### **2) QoS monitoring and data collection**
+
+The IMT-2020 networks are very complicated and are composed of many different network domains such as front haul, backhaul, and core networks. IMT-2020 QoS analysis is data driven. QoS monitoring solution should cover the entire network environment. This complexity is typically solved by distributed domain QoS monitoring.
+
+The QoS monitoring and data collection function entity monitors and collects static information data of IMT-2020 physical or virtual resources, network slice, configuration, fault, performance, security and key performance indicators (KPIs). The QoS monitoring and data collection function entity also monitors and collects dynamic information data of IMT-2020 configuration, fault, performance and security events. The QoS monitoring and data collection functional entity sends these information to the QoS data analysis functional entity for further processing.
+
+##### **3) IMT-2020 QoS mapping**
+
+IMT-2020 QoS mapping is used to support proper QoS interworking between networks that packets traverse different network domains (e.g., mapping access network QoS class indicator (QCI) to core network differentiated service code point (DSCP)). QCI value is associated with three attributes: priority, packet delay budget and packet error loss. QCI values are used for selecting scheduling weights, queue thresholds, link-layer configuration which can be translated and mapped into other network domain.
+
+# **7 Reference points**
+
+Based on the reference points specified in [ITU-T Y.3111] and [ITU-T Y.3324], the reference points in this Recommendation are described in this clause.
+
+NOTE – [ITU-T M.3010] specifies management reference points among various management functional entities such as x, q, g, m, and f depending on the context that they are used. Two of them are applicable in this Recommendation: x and q. x is for an inter-operators system and q is for intra-operator system purposes. Although SG13 uses different naming conventions for reference points, Si and Se reference points may serve in the context of x or q and Is, Ic and Id reference points in the context of q.
+
+## **7.1 Reference point Si**
+
+The Si reference point is required to enable request/response information needed for IMT-2020 network slice instance life-cycle management to be exchanged between the external management entity support functional element (EMES) in the management and orchestration plane of the IMT-2020 network slice life-cycle management (SLM) and the external relationship management functional component (ERM) in the management plane of a network slice instance (SI).
+
+This reference point is extended to support QoS assurance management in the overall network slice life cycle. The extension is described in this clause.
+
+The Si reference point may operate as an intra-domain and/or inter-domain reference point.
+
+### **7.1.1 Functional requirements**
+
+#### **7.1.1.1 Slice instance life-cycle management functional requirements**
+
+The Si reference point provides the ability to make requests/responses between the EMES in the SLM and ERM in SI for:
+
+- network slice provisioning;
+- network slice instance monitoring;
+- network slice instance fault management;
+- network slice instance charging management;
+- network slice instance security management;
+- inter-network slice instance orchestration;
+- autonomic network slice life-cycle instance management;
+- QoS related network slice life-cycle instance management;
+
+- a status report of network slice provisioning, network slice instance performance, fault, charging and security events.
+
+#### 7.1.1.2 Slice instance life-cycle management session processing functional requirements
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of slice instance life-cycle management session operations across the Si reference point, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- **Overload control:** The Si reference point is required to support the capability on overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged between the EMES and ERM.
+- **Synchronization and audit:** The Si reference point is required to support the capability on synchronization and audit of the network slice instance life-cycle management session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+- **Session state maintenance:** The Si reference point is required to support the capability on maintaining the session state using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+#### 7.1.2 Information exchange requirements
+
+This clause provides brief descriptions of the information exchange requirements for the Si reference point:
+
+- **Request-response transactions:** The reference point is required to allow EMES to request a transaction to be performed by the ERM and get a response (that can be correlated with the request) in return and also vice versa.
+- **Notifications:** The reference point is required to support the notification of asynchronous events between two entities: EMES and ERM.
+- **Reliable delivery:** The reference point is required to provide reliable delivery of messages.
+- **Capabilities:** Each entity is required to be able to determine the capabilities of an appropriate corresponding instance when requesting network slice instance life-cycle management functions.
+- **Security:** The Si is required to support the authentication between two entities so that requests from unauthenticated sources will not be performed and each entity can verify the source of notifications sent.
+- **One-to-many/many-to-one:** Two modes are required to be supported: 1) one-to-many mode: an EMES is required to be able to communicate with multiple ERMs; 2) many-to-one mode: multiple ERM instances are required to be able to make requests to a given EMES.
+
+#### 7.1.3 Information components
+
+The information components exchanged across the Si reference point are categorized in Table 7-1 as follows:
+
+**Table 7-1 – Information components for reference point Si**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Connection ID | Identifies a transport connection or path. A unique value for Connection ID is set by ERM in SI. Two types supported are IPv4 & IPv6 transport connection IDs. |
+| Authentication Information | Authenticates the peers (i.e., EMES and ERM) |
+| Reason Code | Specifies the reason associated with a particular connection ID or service ID. |
+
+**Table 7-1 – Information components for reference point Si**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Identity Identification | Specifies unique identification. It adopts only International Alphabet No. 5 string format defined in the [ITU-T T.50]. Generally, it is a static IP address of EMES/ERM. When the ERCM/ERM adopts dynamic IP address, identity identification object can use domain name system (DNS) domain name. |
+| Keep-Alive Timer | Specifies the maximum time interval over which an Si protocol transport channel message is recommended in order to be sent or received. |
+| Data Consistency Information | Verifies the consistency of the Se protocol message. |
+| SLM Service ID | Identifies an SLM service and a unique value should be set for each service by ERCM. |
+| Service Profile | Describes a service profile generated by ERCM for a service request. |
+| Connection Profile | Describes a connection that can be set up or has already been set up by ERM. |
+| EventNotify | Allows ERM send notification to ERCM for event that may need ERCM take appropriate action. |
+| Service Attribute Object | Describes the attributes associated with the service profile. It is a sub-object of the Service Profile Object. |
+| Constraint Object | Describe the constraint imposed by a service. It is a sub-object of the Service Profile Object. |
+| Connection Attribute Object | Describes the attributes associated with the transport connection. It is a sub-object of the Connection Profile Object. |
+| Autonomic Management Profile | Describes overall network slice life-cycle autonomic management monitoring and provisioning policies. |
+| Autonomic Management Attribute Object | Describes the attributes associated with overall network slice life-cycle autonomic management monitoring and provisioning policies. |
+| QoS Assurance Management Profile | Describes overall network slice life-cycle QoS management monitoring and provisioning policies. |
+| QoS Assurance Management Attribute Object | Describes the attributes associated with overall network slice life-cycle QoS management monitoring and provisioning policies. |
+
+## 7.2 Reference point Se
+
+The Se reference point is required to enable request/response information needed for an IMT-2020 network slice instance communicating with external management entities to be exchanged between the external management entity support functional element (EMES) in the management and orchestration plane of the IMT-2020 network slice life-cycle management (SLM) and external management entities: management and orchestration (MANO), operation support system (OSS), business support system (BSS), etc.
+
+This reference point is extended to support QoS assurance management in the overall network slice life cycle in relationship with external management entities. The extension is described in this clause.
+
+The Se reference point may operate as an inter-domain reference point.
+
+### **7.2.1 Functional requirements**
+
+#### **7.2.1.1 Communication of a slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane with external management entities functional requirements**
+
+The Se reference point provides the ability to make requests/responses between the EMES in the SLM and external management entities for:
+
+- network slice management interworking and orchestration including autonomic management and QoS assurance management capabilities;
+- a status report of interworking and orchestration requests including autonomic management capabilities and QoS assurance management actions.
+
+#### **7.2.1.2 Communication of a slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane with external management entities session processing functional requirements**
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of communication of a slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane with external management entities session operations across Se reference point, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- **Overload control:** The Se reference point is required to support the capability on overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged between the EMES and external management entities.
+- **Synchronization and audit:** The Se reference point is required to support the capability on synchronization and audit of the communication of a slice instance with the external management entities session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+- **Session state maintenance:** The Se reference point is required to support the capability on maintaining the session state using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+### **7.2.2 Information exchange requirements**
+
+This clause provides a brief description of the information exchange requirements for the Se reference point.
+
+- **Request-response transactions:** The reference point is required to allow the EMES to request a transaction to be performed by the external management entity and get a response (that can be correlated with the request) in return and vice versa.
+- **Notifications:** The reference point is required to support the notification of asynchronous events between two entities: EMES and external management entities.
+- **Reliable delivery:** The reference point is required to provide reliable delivery of messages.
+- **Capabilities:** Each entity is required to be able to determine the capabilities of an appropriate corresponding instance when requesting communication of a slice instance with external management entities functions.
+- **Security:** The Se is required to support the authentication between two entities so that requests from unauthenticated sources will not be performed and each entity can verify the source of notifications sent.
+- **One-to-many/many-to-one:** Two modes are required to be supported: 1) one-to-many mode: an EMES is required to be able to communicate with multiple external management entities; 2) many-to-one mode: multiple EMES are required to be able to make requests to a given external management entity.
+
+### 7.2.3 Information components
+
+The information components exchanged across the Se reference point are categorized in Table 7-2 as follows:
+
+**Table 7-2 – Information components for reference point Se**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| User Identifier | A unique identifier for different instances of the IMT-2020 slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane within the same administrative domain of a single requester. |
+| Authentication Information | Authenticates the peers (i.e., IMT-2020 slice life-cycle management and orchestration plane and external management system). |
+| Management Interworking Profile Identifier | A unique management interworking profile identifier required for an exchange of management information between EMES and external management entity. |
+| Management Interworking Profile | Describes management interworking profile information required for an exchange of management information including autonomic management information between EMES and external management entity. |
+| EventNotify | Allows IMT-2020 management plane to send notification to the external management entities for an event that may need external management entities to take appropriate actions. |
+
+## 7.3 Reference point Is
+
+The Is reference point is required to enable request/response information needed for an IMT-2020 network slice application and service plane management to be exchanged between the application and service plane support (ASP-S) of the application and service plane management (ASPM) in the SI and application and service plane management support (ASPM-S) of the IMT-2020 applications and service plane (IASP) in the SI.
+
+This reference point is extended to support QoS assurance management of the network slice instance application and service plane. The extension is described in this clause.
+
+The Is reference point may operate as an intra-domain and/or inter-domain reference point.
+
+### 7.3.1 Functional requirements
+
+#### 7.3.1.1 Network slice application and service plane management functional requirements
+
+The Is reference point provides the ability to make requests/responses between the ASP-S in the ASPM and the ASPM-S in the IASP for:
+
+- network slice application and service plane management including autonomic management capabilities and QoS assurance management capabilities;
+- a status report of slice application and service plane management actions including autonomic management and QoS assurance management actions.
+
+#### 7.3.1.2 Network slice application and service plane management session processing functional requirements
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of network slice application and service plane management session operations across the Is reference point, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- **Overload control:** The Is reference point is required to support the capability on overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged between the ASP-S in the ASPM and the ASPM-S in the IASP.
+- **Synchronization and audit:** The Is reference point is required to support the on synchronization and audit of the network slice application and service plane management session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+- **Session state maintenance:** The Is reference point is required to support the capability on maintaining the session state using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+### 7.3.2 Information exchange requirements
+
+This clause provides a brief description of the information exchange requirements for the Is reference point.
+
+- **Request-response transactions:** The reference point is required to allow the ASP-S in the ASPM to request a transaction to be performed by the ASPM-S in the IASP and get a response (that can be correlated with the request) in return and vice versa.
+- **Notifications:** The reference point is required to support the notification of asynchronous events between two entities: ASP-S and ASPM-S.
+- **Reliable delivery:** The reference point is required to provide reliable delivery of messages.
+- **Capabilities:** Each entity is required to be able to determine the capabilities of the appropriate corresponding instance when requesting network slice application and service plane management functions.
+- **Security:** The Is is required to support the authentication between two entities so that requests from unauthenticated sources will not be performed and each entity can verify the source of notifications sent.
+- **One-to-many/many-to-one:** Two modes are required to be supported: 1) one-to-many mode: an ASP-S is required to be able to communicate with multiple ASPM-S; 2) many-to-one mode: multiple ASP-S are required to be able to make requests to a given ASPM-S in the IASP.
+
+### 7.3.3 Information components
+
+The information components exchanged across the Is reference point are categorized in Table 7-3 as follows:
+
+**Table 7-3 – Information components for reference point Is**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| User Identifier | A unique identifier for different instances of the application and service plane management (ASPM) within the same administrative domain of a single requester. |
+| Management Operation Request Session Identifier | An identifier for the session for which the management operation requests are sent to the application and service plane. The identifier has to be unique within the same application and service plane instance. |
+| Globally Unique IP Address Information (Optional) | A set of IP address information used for locating the network in which the ASP-S is requesting the management operations. |
+| Unique IP address | The IP address for identifying ASP-S. |
+| Address Realm | The addressing domain of the IP address (e.g., Subnet prefix or VPN ID). |
+
+**Table 7-3 – Information components for reference point Is**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Management Operation Requester Identifier | An identifier for the requester (i.e., the owner of ASP-S in ASPM) of application and service plane management service. It is unique over the requesters sending requests for the ASPM. |
+| Management Operation Request Priority (Optional) | The indication of the importance of a management operation request. It can be used for processing simultaneous requests by application and service plane management based on the priority level. |
+| ASP Autonomic Management Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance application and service plane. |
+| ASP Autonomic Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance application and service plane. |
+| ASP QoS Assurance Management Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance application and service plane. |
+| ASP QoS Assurance Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance application and service plane. |
+| Management Operation Request Result | Indication of the result for a management operation request (includes both synchronous and scheduled request result). |
+| EventNotify | Allows application and service plane to send notifications to ASP-S for events that may need to take appropriate action for requested management operations. |
+
+## **7.4 Reference point Ic**
+
+The Ic reference point is required to enable request/response information needed for an IMT-2020 network slice control plane management to be exchanged between the control plane support (CP-S) of control plane management (CPM) in the SI and control plane management support (CPM-S) of the IMT-2020 control plane (ICP) in the SI.
+
+This reference point is extended to support QoS assurance management of the network slice instance control plane. The extension is described in this clause.
+
+The Ic reference point may operate as an intra-domain and/or inter-domain reference point.
+
+### **7.4.1 Functional requirements**
+
+#### **7.4.1.1 Network slice control plane management functional requirements**
+
+The Ic reference point provides the ability to make requests/responses between the CP-S in the CPM and the control plane management support (CPM-S) in the ICP for:
+
+- network slice control plane management including autonomic management and QoS assurance management capabilities;
+- a status report of slice control plane management actions including autonomic management and QoS assurance management actions.
+
+#### 7.4.1.2 Network slice control plane management session processing functional requirements
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of network slice control plane management session operations across the Ic reference point, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- **Overload control:** The Ic reference point is required to support the on overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged between the CP-S and the CPM-S in the ICP.
+- **Synchronization and audit:** The Is reference point is required to support the capability on synchronization and audit of the network slice control plane management session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+- **Session state maintenance:** The Ic reference point is required to support the capability on maintaining the session state using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+#### 7.4.2 Information exchange requirements
+
+This clause provides a brief description of the information exchange requirements for the Ic reference point.
+
+- **Request-response transactions:** The reference point is required to allow the CP-S to request a transaction to be performed by the CPM-S in the ICP and get a response (that can be correlated with the request) in return and vice versa.
+- **Notifications:** The reference point is required to support the notification of asynchronous events between two entities: CP-S and CPM-S.
+- **Reliable delivery:** The reference point is required to provide reliable delivery of messages.
+- **Capabilities:** Each entity is required to be able to determine the capabilities of an appropriate corresponding instance when requesting network slice control plane management functions.
+- **Security:** The Ic is required to support the authentication between two entities so that requests from unauthenticated sources will not be performed and each entity can verify the source of notifications sent.
+- **One-to-many/many-to-one:** Two modes are required to be supported: 1) one-to-many mode: a CP-S is required to be able to communicate with multiple CPM-S in the ICP; 2) many-to-one mode: multiple CP-S are required to be able to make requests to a given CPM-S in the ICP.
+
+#### 7.4.3 Information components
+
+The information components exchanged across the Ic reference point are categorized in Table 7-4 as follows:
+
+**Table 7-4 – Information components for reference point Ic**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| User Identifier | A unique identifier for different instances of the control plane management (CPM) within the same administrative domain of a single requester. |
+| Management Operation Request Session Identifier | An identifier for the session for which the management operation requests are sent to the control plane. The identifier has to be unique within the same control plane instance. |
+
+**Table 7-4 – Information components for reference point Ic**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Globally Unique IP Address Information (Optional) | A set of IP address information used for locating the network in which the CP-S is requesting the management operations. |
+| Unique IP address | The IP address for identifying CP-S. |
+| Address Realm | The addressing domain of the IP address (e.g., Subnet prefix or VPN ID) |
+| Management Operation Requester Identifier | An identifier for the requester (i.e., the owner of CP-S in CPM) of control plane management service. It is unique over the requesters sending requests for the CPM. |
+| Management Operation Request Priority (Optional) | The indication of the importance of a management operation request. It can be used for processing simultaneous requests by control plane management based on the priority level. |
+| CP Autonomic Management Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance control plane. |
+| CP Autonomic Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance control plane. |
+| CP QoS assurance Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance control plane. |
+| CP QoS assurance Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance control plane. |
+| Management Operation Request Result | Indication of the result for a management operation request (includes both synchronous and scheduled request result) |
+| EventNotify | Allows control plane to send notifications to the CP-S for events that may need to take appropriate action for requested management operations. |
+
+## 7.5 Reference point Id
+
+The Id reference point is required to enable request/response information needed for an IMT-2020 network slice physical and virtual data plane management to be exchanged between the data plane support (DP-S) of the data plane management (DPM) in the SI and data plane management support (DPM-S) of the IMT-2020 data plane (IDP) in the SI.
+
+This reference point is extended to support QoS assurance management of the network slice instance physical and virtual data planes. The extension is described in this clause.
+
+The Id reference point may operate as an intra-domain and/or inter-domain reference point.
+
+### 7.5.1 Functional requirements
+
+#### 7.5.1.1 Network slice data plane management functional requirements
+
+The Id reference point provides the ability to make requests/responses between the DP-S in the DPM and the DPM-S for a status report of slice data plane management actions including autonomic management actions.
+
+#### 7.5.1.2 Network slice data plane management session processing functional requirements
+
+To assure the reliability and performance of network slice data plane management session operations across the Id reference point, the following capabilities are required:
+
+- **Overload control:** The Id reference point is required to support the capability on overload control for preventing the overflow of information messages exchanged between the DP-S and DPM-S of the IDP in the SI.
+- **Synchronization and audit:** The Id reference point is required to support the capability on synchronization and audit of the network slice data plane management session status in support of recovery and operational information statistics and auditing.
+- **Session state maintenance:** The Id reference point is required to support the capability on maintaining the session state using either soft-state or hard-state approaches.
+
+#### 7.5.2 Information exchange requirements
+
+This clause provides a brief description of the information exchange requirements for the Id reference point.
+
+- **Request-response transactions:** The reference point is required to allow the DP-S to request a transaction to be performed by the DPM-S in the IDP and get a response (that can be correlated with the request) in return and also vice versa.
+- **Notifications:** The reference point is required to support the notification of asynchronous events between two entities: DP-S and DPM-S.
+- **Reliable delivery:** The reference point is required to provide reliable delivery of messages.
+- **Capabilities:** Each entity is required to be able to determine the capabilities of an appropriate corresponding instance when requesting network slice data plane management functions.
+- **Security:** The Id is required to support the authentication between two entities so that requests from unauthenticated sources will not be performed and each entity can verify the source of notifications sent.
+- **One-to-many/many-to-one:** Two modes are required to be supported: 1) one-to-many mode: a DP-S is required to be able to communicate with multiple DPM-S in the IDP; 2) many-to-one mode: multiple DP-S are required to be able to make requests to a given DPM-S in the IDP.
+
+#### 7.5.3 Information components
+
+The information components exchanged across the Id reference point are categorized in Table 7-5 as follows:
+
+**Table 7-5 – Information components for reference point Id**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| User Identifier | A unique identifier for different instances of the data plane management (DPM) within the same administrative domain of a single requester. |
+| Management Operation Request Session Identifier | An identifier for the session for which the management operation requests are sent to the data plane. The identifier has to be unique within the same data plane instance. |
+| Globally Unique IP Address Information (Optional) | A set of IP address information used for locating the network in which the DP-S is requesting the management operations. |
+
+**Table 7-5 – Information components for reference point Id**
+
+| Information component | Description |
+|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Unique IP address | The IP address for identifying DP-S. |
+| Address Realm | The addressing domain of the IP address (e.g., Subnet prefix or VPN ID) |
+| Management Operation Requester Identifier | An identifier for the requester (i.e., the owner of DP-S in DPM) of data plane management service. It is unique over the requesters sending requests for the DPM. |
+| Management Operation Request Priority (Optional) | The indication of the importance of a management operation request. It can be used for processing simultaneous requests by data plane management based on the priority level. |
+| DP Autonomic Management Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance data plane. |
+| DP Autonomic Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the autonomic management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance data plane. |
+| Management Operation Request Result | Indication of the result for a management operation request (includes both synchronous and scheduled request result) |
+| DP QoS assurance Management Operation Profile | Describes the policies related to QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of network slice instance data plane. |
+| DP QoS assurance Management Operation Attribute Object | Describes attributes associated with the policies of the QoS assurance management monitoring and provisioning of the network slice instance data plane. |
+| EventNotify | Allows data plane to send notifications to DP-S for events that may need to take appropriate action for requested management operations. |
+
+# **8 QoS assurance management procedure**
+
+During the lifecycle of services and associated network slice instances [ITU-T Y.3111], the QoS lifecycle management is also involved. This clause describes a QoS assurance management lifecycle procedure in IMT-2020 network which is illustrated in Figure 4.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant SC as Slice customer
+ participant SLMCCS as SLMCCS
+SLA support
+QoS capabilities exposure
+ participant SCPO as SCPO
+QoS planning and optimization
+ participant SP as SP
+QoS provisioning
+QoS policy enforcement
+QoS mapping
+ participant SRMA as SRMA
+QoS data collection
+QoS data analysis
+ participant SRR as SRR
+QoS policy
+ participant SF as SF/S/CM
+
+ SC->>SLMCCS: 1 Request a slice
+ SLMCCS->>SCPO: 2 Request a slice
+ SCPO->>SP: 3 Provision request
+ SP-->>SC: 4 Provision reply
+ SP->>SRMA: 5 Provision status
+ SP->>SRR: 6 Resource status
+ SRMA->>SRR: 7 Resource status update
+ SRR->>SF: 8 Resource status update
+ SF->>SCPO: 9 Provision update request
+ SCPO->>SP: 10 Provision update request
+ SP->>SRMA: 11 Provision status
+ SRMA->>SRR: 12 Resource status update
+ SRR->>SCPO: 13 Resource status update
+ SCPO->>SC: 14 Provision status update
+ SC->>SLMCCS: 15 Provision status update
+
+```
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the Procedure for QoS assurance management. The diagram shows interactions between seven entities: Slice customer, SLMCCS, SCPO, SP, SRMA, SRR, and SF/S/CM. The process starts with a 'Request a slice' (1) from the customer to SLMCCS, followed by a 'Request a slice' (2) from SLMCCS to SCPO. SCPO sends a 'Provision request' (3) to SP. SP sends a 'Provision reply' (4) back to the customer. SP then sends 'Provision status' (5) to SRMA and 'Resource status' (6) to SRR. SRMA sends 'Resource status update' (7) to SRR. SRR sends 'Resource status update' (8) to SF/S/CM. SF/S/CM sends 'Provision update request' (9) to SCPO. SCPO sends 'Provision update request' (10) to SP. SP sends 'Provision status' (11) to SRMA. SRMA sends 'Resource status update' (12) to SRR. SRR sends 'Resource status update' (13) to SCPO. SCPO sends 'Provision status update' (14) to the customer. Finally, the customer sends 'Provision status update' (15) to SLMCCS.
+
+Y.3107(19)\_F04
+
+**Figure 4 – Procedure for QoS assurance management**
+
+- 1) The IMT-2020 customer requests a slice to be provisioned with its specified service requirements from slice lifecycle management – customer care support (SLMCCS). The QoS capabilities exposure can open the QoS capabilities for third parties. The QoS SLA support provide QoS information for the template of slice provision which include: statements about performance, billing, service delivery.
+- 2) IMT-2020 SLMCCS functional element receives the customer's request and carries it to the slice capacity planning and optimization (SCPO) functional element.
+- 3) After decision of QoS planning and optimization, SCPO then determines an optimal slice plan based on the available resources which matches the customer's request. Once the provisioning policy is determined, SCPO requests provisioning to slice provisioning (SP) functional element.
+- 4) SP then performs the requested slice provisioning task. It involves various sub-tasks including QoS related aspects: QoS provisioning, QoS policy enforcement and QoS mapping, etc. If the provisioning functionality including QoS provisioning functionality is fully supported by the SLM functional component, all the tasks are performed internally. If not, SP then interacts with external slice provisioning related functional entities such as MANO orchestrator, software-defined networking (SDN) controller, etc. When SP interacts with external management entities, it uses external management entity support (EMES) functional element. Upon completion of the provisioning process, SP sends a provision reply message to the customer via SLMCCS.
+- 5) At the same time, it sends a provision status slice resource monitoring and analytics functional element to initiate the collection and monitoring of the provisioned resources.
+- 6) It also sends the status update to slice resource repository (SRR) to store the provisioned resource information.
+
+- 7) Slice resource monitoring and analysis (SRMA) performs collection, monitoring, and analysis tasks of the provisioned slice resources. The QoS related data is also collected. Data and information collected and analysed are then stored in SRR for further processing by other functional elements.
+- 8) The QoS policy information is also stored in SRR. When SRR receives any resource status updates, it stores them in the repository and, at the same time, it emits notification to all functional elements that are listening to the status updates. In this case, it sends its update notification to slice fault management (SFM), slice security management (SSM), slice charging management (SCM), and 9) SCPO.
+- 10) When SCPO receives the notification, it updates available resource status and determines if re-optimization is needed upon status updates. 11) Also SF/S/C/PM receive the notification, they perform fault, security and charging management of the provisioned slices and their resources and determine if any control or re-provisioning actions are required. If so, they send a request to SP for provisioning update processes.
+- 12) SP, upon receiving the provisioning update requests, performs re-provisioning tasks for the provisioned slices. When re-provisioning tasks are done, SP generates provision status to SRR and SRR further conveys the notification to 13) SF/S/CM, SCPO and 14) IMT-2020 slice customer for resource status updates.
+- 15) SCPO sends provision status update to the customer.
+
+# **9 Security considerations**
+
+The QoS functional entities for the IMT-2020 network are subject to security and privacy measures. Sensitive QoS information should be protected in high priority in order to avoid leaking and unauthorized access. Security and privacy concerns should be aligned with the requirements specified in [b-ITU-T Q.1762], [ITU-T Y.3101] and [b-ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1762] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1762/Y.2802 (2007), *Fixed-mobile convergence general requirements*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1500] Recommendation ITU-T X.1500 (2011), *Overview of cybersecurity information exchange*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 22.261] 3GPP TS 22.261(2018), 3rd Generation Partnership Project, *Service requirements for the 5G system, Stage 1, (Release 16)*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,531 @@
+
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3112
+
+(12/2018)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Framework for the support of network slicing in the IMT-2020 network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3112
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+
+## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+
+## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS
+
+| | |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+
+## **FUTURE NETWORKS** **Y.3000–Y.3499**
+
+### CLOUD COMPUTING Y.3500–Y.3999
+
+### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
+
+| | |
+|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------|
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3112
+
+# Framework for the support of network slicing in the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3112 describes the concept of network slicing and use cases of when a single user equipment (UE) simultaneously attaches to multiple network slices in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+The use cases introduce the slice service type to indicate a specific network slice and the slice user group for precisely representing the network slice in terms of performance aspects and business aspects.
+
+This Recommendation also specifies high-level requirements and framework for the support of network slicing in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3112 | 2018-05-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13611 |
+| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.3112 | 2018-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13810 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+IMT-2020, network function, network slice, network slice instance, network slicing.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at .
+
+© ITU 2019
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere ..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation ..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview..... | 3 |
+| 7 Framework of network slicing..... | 5 |
+| 7.1 Functional aspects of network slicing ..... | 5 |
+| 7.2 Use cases of network slicing ..... | 7 |
+| 7.3 Network slice indication and selection ..... | 8 |
+| 8 High-level requirements of network slicing ..... | 9 |
+| Appendix I - Descriptions of core network functions relevant to network slicing ..... | 10 |
+| I.1 Network access control function (NACF) ..... | 10 |
+| I.2 Session management function (SMF) ..... | 10 |
+| I.3 Network function registry function (NFR)..... | 11 |
+| I.4 Network slice selection function (NSSF) ..... | 11 |
+| I.5 Registration management (RM) ..... | 11 |
+| Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3112
+
+# Framework for the support of network slicing in the IMT-2020 network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation describes the concept of network slicing and use cases of when a single UE simultaneously attaches to multiple network slices in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+The Recommendation specifies high-level requirements from the perspective of the service and the network, and provides a high-level framework in terms of network functions. Furthermore, this Recommendation introduces a slice service type and a slice user group for precisely indicating and representing a specific network slice in terms of performance aspects and business aspects.
+
+This revision of the Recommendation provides more explanation about network slice selection, and slightly modifies the structure of the text.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of IMT-2020 network*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3102] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), *Framework of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3111 (2017), *IMT-2020 network management and orchestration framework*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3150] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3150 (2018), *High level technical characteristics of network softwarization for IMT-2020*.
+- [ITU-R M.2083] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083-0 (2015), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+- [ITU-R M.2410] Report ITU-R M.2410-0 (2017), *Minimum requirements related to technical performance for IMT-2020 radio interface(s)*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 IMT-2020** [ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.2 network function** [ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, a processing function in a network.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network functions include but are not limited to network node functionalities, e.g., session management, mobility management and transport functions, whose functional behaviour and interfaces are defined.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network functions can be implemented on a dedicated hardware or as virtualized software functions.
+
+NOTE 3 – Network functions are not regarded as resources, but rather any network functions can be instantiated using the resources.
+
+**3.1.3 network slice** [ITU-T Y.3100]: A logical network that provides specific network capabilities and network characteristics.
+
+NOTE 1 – Network slices enable the creation of customized networks to provide flexible solutions for different market scenarios which have diverse requirements, with respect to functionalities, performance and resource allocation.
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice may have the ability to expose its capabilities.
+
+NOTE 3 – The behaviour of a network slice is realized via network slice instance(s).
+
+**3.1.4 network slice blueprint** [ITU-T Y.3100]: A complete description of the structure, configuration and work flows on how to create and control a network slice instance during its life cycle.
+
+NOTE – A network slice template can be used synonymously with a network slice blueprint.
+
+**3.1.5 network slice instance** [ITU-T Y.3100]: An instance of network slice, which is created based on network slice blueprint.
+
+NOTE 1 – A network slice instance is composed of a set of managed run-time network functions, and physical/logical/virtual resources to run these network functions, forming a complete instantiated logical network to meet certain network characteristics required by the service instance(s).
+
+NOTE 2 – A network slice instance may also be shared across multiple service instances provided by the network operator. A network slice instance may be composed of none, one or more sub-network slice instances which may be shared with another network slice instance.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation does not define any terms.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------------|
+| 3G | Third Generation |
+| 4G | Fourth Generation |
+| AR | Augmented Reality |
+| eMBB | enhanced Mobile Broadband |
+| E2E | End-to-End |
+| HD | High Definition |
+| IMT | International Mobile Telecommunications |
+| KPI | Key Performance Indicator |
+| mMTC | massive Machine Type Communications |
+| MANO | Management and Orchestration |
+| MVNO | Mobile Virtual Network Operator |
+
+| | |
+|-------|-------------------------------------------|
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NF | Network Function |
+| NS | Network Slice |
+| NSI | Network Slice Instance |
+| NSSF | Network Slice Selection Function |
+| NSTI | Network Slice Type Indicator |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| SST | Slice Service Type |
+| SUG | Slice User Group |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UHD | Ultra-High Definition |
+| URLLC | Ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communications |
+| V2X | Vehicle to Everything |
+| VR | Virtual Reality |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator and/or service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+The IMT-2020 network is expected to be able to support a variety of services and applications beyond the current IMT [ITU-R M.2083]. In the IMT-2020 network, the services and the applications can have a variety of different requirements on functionality (e.g., priority, charging, policy control, security, and mobility), differences in performance requirements (e.g., latency, mobility, availability, reliability and data rates), or differences in serving users (e.g., public safety users, corporate customers, roamers, or hosted MVNO) [b-3GPP TS 22.261]. Network slicing is recognized as a key enabler for the support of different types of services as it can provide services over corresponding logically isolated network slices by slicing a single physical network into multiple, end-to-end (E2E) networks [ITU-T Y.3101] [b-NGMN].
+
+Furthermore, a broad variety of capabilities can be tightly coupled with these intended different usage scenarios for IMT-2020 [ITU-R M.2083] [b-3GPP TS 22.261]. The usage scenarios for IMT-2020 include:
+
+- Enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB): This usage scenario pertains to high data rates, high user density, high user mobility, highly variable data rates, deployment and coverage. The enhanced mobile broadband will come with new application areas and requirements in
+
+addition to existing mobile broadband applications for improved performance and an increasingly seamless user experience.
+
+- Massive machine type communications (mMTC): This usage scenario is characterized by a very large number of connected devices typically transmitting a relatively low volume of non-delay-sensitive data. Devices are required to be low cost, and to have a very long battery life.
+- Ultra-reliable and low latency communications (URLLC): This usage scenario has stringent requirements for capabilities such as throughput, latency and reliability. Some examples include wireless control of industrial manufacturing or production processes, remote medical surgery, distribution automation in a smart grid, transportation safety, etc.
+
+Network slicing enables an IMT-2020 network operator to provide customized networks by slicing a network into multiple virtual, and end-to-end networks, referred to as network slices. Each network slice can be defined according to different requirements on functionality, performance and specific users.
+
+Figure 6-1 illustrates the concept of network slicing. A network slice is composed of a collection of the necessary network functions (e.g., virtualized and/or physical, shared or slice specific [ITU-T Y.3101]) that support the service requirements of particular usage scenario(s). It is required to be possible to associate devices to their proper slices in order to meet the respective requirements, based on device or service type. For example, a mobile phone requesting high definition (HD) streaming service is associated to an eMBB slice. While the mMTC slice and the URLLC slice are respectively allocated to a sensor measuring the temperature for an agricultural application and an automobile using V2X communication service.
+
+Network slicing allows the IMT-2020 network operator to provide dedicated logical networks (i.e., network slices) with customer specific functionalities. A network slice, spanning all the network segments including radio access network, transport network and core network, can be dedicated to specific types of service [ITU-T Y.3101]. When a UE is only associated to a single dedicated network slice, the IMT-2020 network can identify the association of the UE with the network slice based on user subscription, context, service provider's policy, etc. Otherwise, if a UE accesses multiple network slice instances simultaneously, it is recommended that the UE provide information to the network to assist the network slice selection process.
+
+
+
+Y.3112(12-18)\_F6-1
+
+Diagram illustrating the concept of network slicing in an IMT-2020 network. The network is represented as a cloud containing three stacked slices: eMBB slice (blue), mMTC slice (yellow), and URLLC slice (green). On the left, three devices are shown: a smartphone connected to the eMBB slice, a temperature sensor connected to the mMTC slice, and a car connected to the URLLC slice. On the right, three service scenarios are listed in colored boxes: 'Voice, Internet (e.g., AR/VR)' in blue, 'Logistics, agriculture' in yellow, and 'Automobile factory' in green. Lines connect the devices to their respective slices and the slices to their corresponding service scenarios. The entire cloud is labeled 'IMT-2020 network' at the bottom.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – The concept of network slicing**
+
+For each network slice, dedicated resources (e.g., virtualized network functions, network bandwidth, QoS) are allocated and an error or fault that occurs in one slice does not cause any effect in other slices.
+
+So far, mobile networks (e.g., 3G, 4G), mainly serving mobile phones, have been optimized for voice and Internet services in a centralized deployment. However, in the IMT-2020 network, they have to serve a variety of devices with different requirements and different needs. The above-mentioned
+
+usage scenarios require different requirements on performance [b-Netmanias]. For instance, the mMTC usage scenario that connects stationary sensors measuring temperature, humidity, precipitation, etc. to mobile networks does not require features like handover or location update, which have been critical in serving mobile phones. For the eMBB usage scenario, high data rates are driven by the increasing use of data for services such as streaming (e.g., 4K/8K UHD) and interactive services (e.g., augmented reality (AR)). These services come with stringent requirements for user experienced data rates as well as associated latency requirements to meet service requirements [ITU-R M.2410]. On the other hand, the URLLC usage scenario (e.g., autonomous driving, remote controlled robots) requires, unlike mobile broadband services, a substantially lower latency as well as higher reliability. Table 6-1 provides examples of services and expected performance requirements corresponding to each usage scenario.
+
+**Table 6-1 – Examples of services corresponding to each usage scenario**
+
+| Usage scenario | Typical characteristics | Examples of services |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| eMBB | High bit rate (e.g., 20 Gbit/s downlink peak data rate) | 4K/8K UHD, hologram, AR/VR |
+| mMTC | Massive connections | Sensor-network services(metering, agriculture, building, logistics, city, home, etc.) |
+| URLLC | Low latency (e.g., 1 ms), high reliability, high positioning accuracy | Motion control, autonomous driving, automated factory, smart-grid service, AR/VR |
+| NOTE – These requirements are not intended to restrict the full range of capabilities or performance. | | |
+
+Based on the concept of network slicing, some use cases for multiple network slicing are described in clause 7. Clause 8 specifies how to indicate a specific network slice and select the indicated network slice. Clause 9 and clause 10 respectively provide the high-level requirements and the framework.
+
+# **7 Framework of network slicing**
+
+## **7.1 Functional aspects of network slicing**
+
+When a UE accesses multiple slice instances simultaneously, it should provide the IMT-2020 network with the information to assist the network slice selection process. If a UE is only associated with a single dedicated network slice, the IMT-2020 network can identify the network slice of the UE based on user subscription, context, service provider's policy, etc.
+
+From the network slicing perspective, the network functions can be further divided into two types: UE level functions and service level functions. The UE level functions are functions that support user access to the IMT-2020 network. Network access control function (NACF) is a UE level function and it should be available in every registration area (RA). The NACF is responsible for providing registration management and mobility management [ITU-T Y.3102]. An instance of NACF, which has the proper capabilities to support registration and mobility management of every service session by a UE, should be selected. With the proper NACF instance selection, NACF instance relocation may happen rarely. In addition, the NACF instance logically resides in multiple network slice instances serving the UE, and interacts with other network function instances in the network slice instances.
+
+On the other hand, other network functions such as the session management function (SMF) belong to the service level functions. They can exist within different network slice instances providing the relevant KPIs. The SMF is responsible for providing session management and data path control in the IMT-2020 networks [ITU-T Y.3102]. When the UE requests a single service session with a specific capability, a proper instance of SMF should be selected supporting such capability.
+
+From the UE perspective, a number of different service sessions can be initiated at the same time, and each service session should be served by the appropriate network slice instances. In addition, each network slice instance should include the specific network function instances that satisfy the related service requirements. Therefore, the NACF instance should be selected to be able to meet the highest demand of performance requirements among the multiple NACF instances. On the other hand, the SMF instance should be selected in each corresponding network slice instance.
+
+From the network perspective, different network slices should be enough isolated from each other in order to minimize their interference. This means that communications between different service level network functions (e.g., SMF) within a network slice can be possible. In addition, as the network slice instance is the realization of a network slice, which is created based on network slice blueprint [ITU-T Y.3100], multiple network slice instances can be instantiated according to a corresponding usage scenario (e.g., eMBB).
+
+On the other hand, communications between an NACF instance and an SMF instance should be possible under the condition that a network slice instance is differently isolated.
+
+Therefore, the service sessions from the UE side can be established through the single UE level network function and the multiple service level network functions in the IMT-2020 network as shown in Figure 7-1
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the network architecture from the UE perspective. A UE (User Equipment) is shown on the left, connected to a central yellow box labeled 'UE level network functions'. This yellow box is situated within a larger container labeled 'IMT-2020 network'. From the 'UE level network functions' box, two lines extend to two separate, stacked boxes: 'eMBB slice instance' (top) and 'URLLC slice instance' (bottom). Each of these slice instance boxes contains a sub-box labeled 'Service level network functions'. The entire structure is enclosed in a large rectangle representing the IMT-2020 network.
+
+Figure 7-1: Network functions from the UE perspective. The diagram shows a UE connected to a yellow box labeled 'UE level network functions' within the 'IMT-2020 network'. This yellow box is connected to two separate boxes: 'eMBB slice instance' and 'URLLC slice instance'. Each slice instance contains a box for 'Service level network functions'.
+
+**Figure 7-1 – Network functions from the UE perspective**
+
+From the network deployment perspective, network functions can be classified into two types based on whether they are sensitive to key performance indicators (KPIs) or not. A KPI-sensitive network function can be located close to the user but other types of network functions do not depend on UE location in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+The KPI-insensitive network functions such as the network slice selection function (NSSF) and the user data management function, would be deployed in a centralized manner so that they can provide their capability support to the other network functions in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+On the other hand, KPI-sensitive network functions may be deployed in a distributed manner. Therefore, KPI-sensitive network functions such as mobility management, session management and data path control, can be deployed close to a UE (e.g., specific area such as a set of tracking areas (TAs) and registration area (RA) in the IMT-2020 networks.
+
+NOTE – A tracking area is a logical grouping of cells in an IMT-2020 network, and a registration area is the set of tracking areas. A registration area is an area in which the UE may roam without a need to perform location registration.
+
+## 7.2 Use cases of network slicing
+
+In general, a UE can access one network slice instance or multiple network slice instances simultaneously depending on the requesting service types and performance requirements.
+
+As an example, this clause illustrates the use case of an autonomous driving car where a UE simultaneously accesses different network slice instances.
+
+An autonomous driving car attaches to the network via the V2X communication service. A user, sitting in the car, initiates an HD video streaming service through the infotainment system available in the car. In this use case, the V2X communication service requires low latency but not necessarily high bit rate, whereas the HD video streaming service requires high bit rate but is tolerant to latency.
+
+Therefore, the V2X communication service and the HD video streaming service are attached to different network slice instances satisfying their corresponding performance requirements; for example, a URLLC slice and an eMBB slice, respectively, as shown in figure 7-2.
+
+
+
+Y.3112(12-18)\_F7-2
+
+Figure 7-2: Use case for network slicing – Autonomous driving car. The diagram shows a cloud labeled 'IMT-2020 network' containing three stacked slices: 'eMBB slice' (blue), 'mMTC slice' (yellow), and 'URLLC slice' (green). On the left, a smartphone, a key fob, and a car with a navigation screen are shown with lines connecting them to the slices. On the right, three boxes represent services: 'Voice, Internet (e.g., AR/VR)' connected to the eMBB slice, 'Logistics, agriculture' connected to the mMTC slice, and 'Automobile factory' connected to the URLLC slice. The label 'Y.3112(12-18)\_F7-2' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-2 – Use case for network slicing – Autonomous driving car**
+
+From the business deployment perspective, a network slice may indicate the vehicles designed with a specific motor, and it can be used to efficiently manage and update configuration changes if the vehicles are of the same brand. Figure 7-3 shows a use case of network slice for autonomous driving cars using different motors.
+
+
+
+Y.3112(12-18)\_F7-3
+
+Figure 7-3: Use case for network slicing – Autonomous driving cars using different motors. The diagram shows a cloud labeled 'IMT-2020 network' containing three stacked slices: 'eMBB slice' (blue), 'uRLLC\_A motors slice' (yellow), and 'uRLLC\_B motors slice' (green). On the left, a smartphone, a car with a navigation screen, and another car with a navigation screen are shown with lines connecting them to the slices. On the right, three boxes represent services: 'Voice, Internet (e.g., AR/VR)' connected to the eMBB slice, 'Automobile A motors' connected to the uRLLC\_A slice, and 'Automobile B motors' connected to the uRLLC\_B slice. The label 'Y.3112(12-18)\_F7-3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 7-3 – Use case for network slicing – Autonomous driving cars using different motors**
+
+According to [b-3GPP TS 22.261], the IMT-2020 network is assumed to support motion-to-photon latency in the range of 7 ms -15 ms while maintaining the required user data rate of 250 Mb/s for virtual reality (VR). A particular service like VR likely requires both high data rate and low latency, and both eMBB and URLLC usage scenarios [ITU-R M.2083] would be associated for this. It means that the UE is recommended to provide an appropriate network slice indication information to the network in order to access the network slice that the UE needs.
+
+## 7.3 Network slice indication and selection
+
+This clause specifies how to indicate network slice and select network slice.
+
+### 7.3.1 Indication of network slice
+
+In the IMT-2020 network, network slices can explicitly be associated to the kinds of service and user groups. For example, the type of network slices may be identified in terms of different requirements of functionality (e.g., charging, policy control, security and mobility), of differences in performance (e.g., latency, mobility and data rates) and specific users (e.g., corporate customers, roamers, or hosted MVNO) [ITU-T Y.3101], [b-3GPP TS 22.261]. The type of a network slice needs to be identified with a particular indicator called a network slice type indicator (NSTI).
+
+From the above usage scenarios, the NSTI can be defined taking into consideration three aspects: 1) key functionality, 2) performance and 3) users.
+
+The NSTI can be comprised of two kinds of information.
+
+- SST (Slice Service Type): represents the kinds of different services that require different key functionality and different performance of network functions. Basic SSTs are eMBB, URLLC and mMTC. Additional SSTs can be defined according to the need of finer segmentation of the performance requirements and/or operator's policy (e.g., eMBB+URLLC).
+- SUG (Slice User Group): optional information that complements the SST and enables further differentiation of user groups (e.g. the user group with detailed performance requirements, the user group in a particular area).
+
+The NSTI information is required to include all slice service types that a UE is willing to request to the IMT-2020 network when the UE is initially registered or re-registered. When receiving the NSTI information from the UE, the network verifies the NSTI information to see whether the corresponding network slice is available, based on the operator's policy and the IMT-2020 network status. The UE can provide a single NSTI when requesting a particular service session establishment to the IMT-2020 network.
+
+### 7.3.2 Selection of network slice
+
+An NSTI is required to include one SST when a UE requests a specific service to the IMT-2020 network. The SST may indicate either a usage scenario (e.g., eMBB, mMTC and URLLC) or their combination (e.g., eMBB+URLLC, etc.). Furthermore, the NSTI can optionally include an SSG as well as the SST to precisely indicate a specific network slice, where the SUG can include detailed performance requirements of different user groups in a particular area. Examples are "URLLC with a latency of 100 ms", "URLLC with a latency of 5 ms", "eMBB with 100 Mbps for users in a urban area", and "eMBB with 10 Mbps for users in a rural area".
+
+The network determines and selects a network slice instance (NSI) based on the NSTI provided by the UE, the availability of NSI in the IMT-2020 network, operator's policy and subscription information. The NSTI can be defined more based on the operator's policy, and configured/provided to the UE. If the NSTI from UE can be applicable to the network-provided NSIs or the network-provided NSIs are a superset of the NSTI from UE, the network can select one of the NSIs to serve the UE. Otherwise, the network can reject the UE's request.
+
+The NSI can be instantiated in a static or a dynamic way depending on whether the NSI is created at configuration time or at run time.
+
+An NSI comprises the relevant network functions (NFs) required for providing a certain service. An NSI can also include multiple NF instances with the same features. Among the multiple NF instances, one of them can be selected considering load balancing.
+
+In static network slicing, the NSIs are instantiated and provisioned at configuration time, and the NSI already includes the proper network function (NF). Therefore, in static network slicing, the NACF instance first chooses a proper NSI among the available NSIs and then selects the necessary SMF instance in the mobile core network. It is not allowed to pick up the NF instances within the other NSIs. The NACF instance can get the related NSI information from the NSSF.
+
+In dynamic network slicing, the NACF instance first initiates the selection process of the proper NF instances through coordinated activities with other functions in the IMT-2020 network, and then creates an NSI comprising the NF instances according to a network slice template, in run time.
+
+NOTE – One of the possible dynamic methods is that the NACF is assisted by a NSSF in the creation of the NSI, where the NSSF is associated with management and orchestration (MANO) [ITU-T Y.3111].
+
+NF instances can also be added dynamically to an existing NSI if the system allows it (for example, for the purpose of saving resources when an existing slice is not operating at full load at the moment of the request from the UE). A subsequent request, from a different UE requesting the same services, will not trigger the instantiation of the needed NF in the same NSI. This method may make the time to satisfy the first UE request longer, but can sensibly enhance the resource efficiency.
+
+# **8 High-level requirements of network slicing**
+
+This clause specifies the high-level requirements from the service aspect as well as from the network slicing aspect.
+
+- UE level network functions, e.g., registration management and mobility management, etc., are required to be shared among the multiple network slices.
+NOTE 1 – Some of the shared functions can be global and be used for all network slices, whereas some of them can be shared among the specific slices serving the same users.
+- The service level network functions, e.g., session management and data path control, etc., are required to allow to be used as NFs in each network slice.
+- The IMT-2020 network is required to instantiate at least one network slice instance (e.g., eMBB) inherited from the characteristics of the SST (e.g., eMBB).
+- A UE is recommended to provide all NSTI that it wishes to access to the IMT-2020 network when the UE registers to the network.
+- A UE is required to provide a single NSTI indicating a specific network slice when the UE requests the IMT-2020 network to establish a service session.
+- The IMT-2020 network is recommended to create a network slice instance based on the NSTI provided by the UE or default network slice instance if the NSTI is not available.
+NOTE 2 – The availability of default network slice instances depends on the IMT-2020 network operator's policy.
+- The IMT-2020 network is required to select a network slice instance based on the NSTI provided by the UE, or a default network slice instance if the NSTI is not available.
+- The IMT-2020 network is recommended to allocate a default NSTI when a UE subscribes to the network.
+- The IMT-2020 network is recommended to add and/or remove the network functions in order to change the configuration of a network slice instance.
+- The IMT-2020 network is required to minimize the impact, in changing the configuration of a network slice, on services being provided by itself and other network slices.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## Descriptions of core network functions relevant to network slicing
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Following paragraphs, which are relevant to core network functions in IMT-2020 networks, are cited from [ITU-T Y.3102] for supporting consideration of the role of NACF.
+
+### I.1 Network access control function (NACF)
+
+The NACF functionalities include registration management, connection management and session management function (SMF) selection.
+
+#### – Registration management
+
+When a UE accesses the network, NACF provides functionalities to register and de-register the UE with the network and it establishes the user context in the network. In the registration procedure, NACF performs, but is not limited to, network slice instance selection, UE authentication, authorization of network access and network services, network access policy control.
+
+#### – Connection management
+
+When a registered UE requests network services to the network, NACF provides functionalities to establish and release signalling connections between UE and core network. This includes mobility management functionalities.
+
+#### – SMF selection
+
+When a session establishment request message is received from UE, NACF performs discovery and selection of the SMF that is the most appropriate to manage the session.
+
+When network slicing is used and a NACF instance, which has received a registration request through a signalling message, cannot serve an appropriate network slice for the UE's request, NACF instance re-allocation is required. Rerouting of the signalling message to the target NACF instance is required during the registration procedure to re-allocate the serving NACF instance including the transfer of the UE context.
+
+Depending on the deployment scenarios, the NACF functionalities in a network slice may be performed in distributed multiple NACF instances in order to minimize the signalling delays. In this case, local NACF instances distributed at the network edge can perform the mobility management functionalities for the (intra-RAT and inter-RAT) handovers. The serving NACF instance notifies UE location to SMF. If user plane function (UPF) re-allocation is required to support mobility, SMF selects a new UPF and performs inter-UPF mobility management. NACF re-allocation between local NACF instances can be performed if necessary.
+
+### I.2 Session management function (SMF)
+
+This function provides functionalities to set up the IP or non-IP protocol data unit (PDU) connectivity (i.e., PDU session) for a UE as well as to control the user plane for that connectivity (e.g., selection/re-selection of user plane network functions and user path, enforcement of policies including QoS policy and charging policy). SMF gets policy information related to session establishment from the policy control function (PCF).
+
+SMF also provides IP address management functionalities for allocation and release of the UE's IP address.
+
+### **I.3 Network function registry function (NFR)**
+
+This function provides functionalities to assist the discovery and selection of required network functions. Each network function instance registers itself when instantiated and updates its status (i.e., activation/de-activation) so that NFR can maintain information of the available network function instances.
+
+Multiple instances may be discovered by NFR per discovery request from network functions (for example, NACF uses NFR to select appropriate SMF, ASF and PCF). In such cases, NFR responds to the requesting network function with a list of discovered network functions, network function capabilities and optionally additional selection rules. The requesting network function selects an instance from the list and updates NFR to reflect its selection.
+
+When the discovery of network function instances in different network slices is required, NFR instances in different network slices interact with each other. A typical example is the case of discovery of network functions (e.g., user plane function) in visited public land mobile network (VPLMN) when a UE roams.
+
+In general, each network slice instance has its own NFR, at least logically. In certain cases, e.g., if the network slice instances are in the same administrative domain, a single NFR instance can be shared by multiple network slice instances as shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 of [ITU-T Y.3102].
+
+### **I.4 Network slice selection function (NSSF)**
+
+This function provides functionalities to select appropriate network slice instances for a UE. When a UE requests registration with the network, NACF sends a network slice selection request to NSSF with preferred network slice selection information. The NSSF responds with a message including the list of appropriate network slice instances for the UE.
+
+### **I.5 Registration management (RM)**
+
+A single UE can be served simultaneously by multiple network slice instances and a single NACF instance may be shared by the different network slice instances.
+
+The selection of a set of network slice instances for the UE is triggered by the first NACF instance but this may lead to NACF instance relocation. For example, when a NACF instance is not proper to serve the UE's requirements related to a network slice, the NACF instance reroutes the UE registration request message to the appropriate NACF instance.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-3GPP TS 22.261] 3GPP TS 22.261 (2017), *Service requirements for the 5G system*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.501] 3GPP TS 23.501 (2017), *System Architecture for the 5G System*.
+- [b-NGMN] NGMN Alliance (2016), *Perspectives on Vertical Industries and Implications for 5G*.
+- [b-Netmanias] Korea Communication Review (2015), *E2E Network Slicing - Key 5G technology*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3113
+
+(02/2021)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+# --- **Requirements and framework for latency guarantee in large-scale networks including the IMT-2020 network**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3113
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3113
+
+# Requirements and framework for latency guarantee in large-scale networks including the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3113 specifies requirements and a framework for effective and efficient solutions for latency guarantee and cooperation among heterogeneous quality of service (QoS) domains.
+
+For a latency guarantee in multi-domain large-scale networks, it is necessary to clarify how the numerous data-plane functional entities should be arranged and operate in conjunction with each other. In order for the solution to be both effective and efficient, selecting an appropriate traffic granularity for network treatment is essential. The variety of granularity of flow aggregates (FAs), between flow and class, should be taken into consideration.
+
+On the Internet or the IMT-2020 network, there are inevitably multiple domains with possibly different QoS architectures. Even with multiple heterogeneous domains, there should be an underlying unified resource reservation and admission control functions, while the data plane functions should be based on FAs and appropriate regulations in the middle of an end-to-end path.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3113 | 2021-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14595 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Flow aggregate, IMT-2020, latency guarantee, large-scale network, quality of service.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2021
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 8 Framework..... | 5 |
+| 9 Security considerations..... | 6 |
+| Appendix I – Analysis of existing solutions and the proposed framework ..... | 7 |
+| Appendix II – Implementation practice of the framework ..... | 8 |
+| Appendix III – Latency bounds comparison of IntServ, TSN ATS, and the proposed
framework in example networks ..... | 9 |
+| Appendix IV – Gap analysis of the requirements and framework for the IMT-2020
network ..... | 16 |
+| IV.1 Overview of the IMT-2020 network architecture and its QoS framework .... | 16 |
+| IV.2 Gap analysis of the requirements for the IMT-2020 network ..... | 18 |
+| IV.3 Gap analysis of the framework for the IMT-2020 network ..... | 20 |
+| Bibliography..... | 21 |
+
+
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3113
+
+# Requirements and framework for latency guarantee in large-scale networks including the IMT-2020 network
+
+## 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies requirements and a framework for latency guarantee in large-scale networks, including the IMT-2020 network, as follows:
+
+- the requirements for achieving latency guarantee in large-scale networks including the IMT-2020 network;
+- overall framework and functional entities, and their interworking to achieve latency guarantee, effectively and efficiently.
+
+Routing and upper layer functions lie outside the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+## 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2011), *Resource and admission control functions in next generation networks*.
+- [ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [ITU-R M.2083] Recommendation ITU-R M.2083 (2015), *IMT vision – Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT for 2020 and beyond*.
+
+## 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 customer premises equipment** [b-ITU-T E.800]: Telecommunications equipment located at the customer installation on the customer side of the network interface.
+
+**3.1.2 service provider** [b-ITU-T E.800]: An organization that provides services to users and customers.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 aggregation domain**: A set of relay nodes in the path, for a flow, between the aggregation and segregation points.
+
+**3.2.2 domain**: A set of relay nodes and end-hosts under a single administrative control or within a closed group of administrative control; these include campus wide networks, private wide area networks, and IMT-2020 networks.
+
+NOTE – This definition references the description in the Introduction to [b-IETF RFC 8655].
+
+**3.2.3 IMT-2020:** Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE 1 – [ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+NOTE 2 – Based on [ITU-R M.2083].
+
+**3.2.4 large-scale network:** A network or a set of networks, whose longest end-to-end path includes 16 or more relay nodes.
+
+**3.2.5 relay node:** A node supporting relay functionality that acts as an intermediary node, through which other nodes can pass their traffic (e.g., router, switch or gateway).
+
+## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|----------|--------------------------------------|
+| 5G | fifth Generation |
+| 5QI | 5G QoS Identifier |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| ATS | Asynchronous Traffic Shaping |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment |
+| DiffServ | Differentiated Services |
+| DL | Downlink |
+| DN | Data Network |
+| DRR | Deficit Round Robin |
+| e2e | end to end |
+| FA | Flow Aggregate |
+| FIFO | First In, First Out |
+| GBR | Guaranteed Bit Rate |
+| GFBR | Guaranteed Flow Bit Rate |
+| IntServ | Integrated Services |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| IPv4 | Internet Protocol version 4 |
+| IPv6 | Internet Protocol version 6 |
+| IR | Interleaved Regulator |
+| MDBV | Maximum Data Burst Value |
+| MFBR | Maximum Flow Bit Rate |
+| NGBR | Non-GBR |
+| NG-RAN | Next Generation-Radio Access Network |
+| PDB | Packet Delay Budget |
+| PDU | Protocol Data Unit |
+
+| | |
+|-------|------------------------------------------|
+| PGPS | Packetized Generalized Processor Sharing |
+| QFI | QoS Flow Identifier |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RAN | Radio Access Network |
+| RSpec | Request Specification |
+| SDF | Service Data Flow |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| TDM | Time Division Multiplexing |
+| TSpec | Traffic Specification |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| UL | Uplink |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| uRLLC | ultra-Reliable Low Latency Communication |
+
+## 5 Conventions
+
+None.
+
+## 6 Introduction
+
+The IMT-2020 network is expected to be able to support a variety of different services and applications. Among them, the ultra-reliable and low-latency communication (uRLLC) service requires an end-to-end (e2e) network latency bound [ITU-R M.2083]. A network latency guarantee is also one of the most important requirements for the 6G network [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.66]. For example, it is required to have a 5 ms latency upper bound for the tactile Internet. Remote industrial management control and remote robotic surgery are example applications of the tactile internet. On the Internet, when measured in 1998, 90% of hosts were within fewer than 18 hops from the University of California at Los Angeles [b-Fei]. The Internet in 2030 should not be smaller than this measurement. As such, a large-scale network is defined to include 16 or more e2e hops in this Recommendation.
+
+Different networks on the Internet including the IMT-2020 network, which is further divided into access network (AN), core network (CN) and data network (DN), have different quality of service (QoS) models and components. A QoS model includes the mechanisms, functions, description of QoS parameters information, and how that information should be treated and interpreted on the network. An integrated approach is necessary, which makes the various domains in the Internet work together as a whole.
+
+Legacy technologies, based on either microscopic flows or simple classes, are too complex to be implemented on a large-scale network, or ineffective in an arbitrary network topology. Time-synchronized approaches, which are similar to time division multiplexing (TDM), taken in IEEE Time Sensitive Network (TSN) task group (TG) are not scalable to IMT-2020 networks or the current Internet.
+
+In order for the solution to be both effective and efficient, selecting appropriate traffic granularity for network treatment is essential. The various granularity levels of flow aggregates (FAs), between flow and class, should be taken into consideration, and used as a basis for QoS control.
+
+Therefore, this Recommendation specifies requirements and a framework for a latency guarantee in large-scale networks.
+
+## 7 Requirements
+
+Req\_1. It is required to be able to specify, by the customer premises equipment (CPE) or on behalf of the CPEs with insufficient signalling capabilities, the CPE flow destination and characteristics (e.g., average data rate and maximum burst size).
+
+Req\_2. It is recommended to be able to specify, by the CPE or on behalf of the CPEs with insufficient signalling capabilities, the CPE desirable e2e latency upper bound.
+
+NOTE 1 – For detailed information about the QoS negotiation process, see [ITU-T Y.2111].
+
+Req\_3. It is required that a network be able to determine the latency upper bound within the network, of a traversing flow, with the flow destination and the characteristics specified.
+
+Req\_4. It is recommended that the means to provide the latency upper bound be: 1) implementable in CNs where there are millions of active flows at an output port; 2) applicable to an arbitrary network topology; 3) of minimal effect on the average latency and the throughput; and 4) scalable to a large-scale network.
+
+Req\_5. It is recommended that the latency upper bound be susceptible to negotiation, for a flow, between the CPE and the service provider.
+
+NOTE 2 – The latency upper bound negotiation can be a two-way handshake, or a more complex process. The simplest negotiation is that of the integrated services (IntServ). A CPE with signalling capability specifies its flow request specification (RSpec) and traffic specification (TSpec). Based on these specifications, the service provider decides whether the CPE-requested upper bound can be met. If not, the provider is required to deny the admission. The latency bound negotiation can be more complex, in which a renegotiation process is included. If a first negotiation fails, the flow may restart with a new TSpec. For another example, the QoS provisioning is based on the network allowance. This means that an individual flow does not specify its latency bound requirement (RSpec in IntServ). Rather, as a flow determines its TSpec (e.g., its burst size and input rate), then based on the best e2e path among those can be provided, the feasible latency bound is calculated and notified to the flow. The flow decides whether to accept it.
+
+Req\_6. It is recommended that the dynamic latency upper bound be susceptible to negotiation.
+
+NOTE 3 – Dynamic negotiation refers a process in which already accepted flows and their upper bounds are reconsidered as new flows that are coming into the networks. It is necessary because as a network state changes, the guaranteed latency bound of already accepted flows can be also changed.
+
+Req\_7. It is required that networks be able to handle FAs as control elements.
+
+Req\_8. It is required that networks be able to aggregate and segregate flows at any desired points in a network or equivalently within an aggregation domain.
+
+Req\_9. It is required that within an aggregation domain, flows be aggregated according to an aggregation domain-specific rule (e.g., a rule that flows with the same input and output ports of the domain are aggregated into a single FA).
+
+Req\_10. It is recommended that aggregation domains be susceptible to merger and division on demand.
+
+Req\_11. It is required that flow aggregation rules be susceptible to negotiation among the aggregation domains.
+
+Req\_12. It is recommended that the TSpec include: a maximum burst size; an average input rate; a peak rate; and a maximum packet size.
+
+Req\_13. It is recommended that best-effort service traffic not affect the latency bound of high-priority flows.
+
+Req\_14. It is required that a traffic regulation capability be provided at the boundary of aggregation domains.
+
+## 8 Framework
+
+This Recommendation specifies a framework to overcome the current limitations that are analysed in Appendix I. In the proposed framework, flows are aggregated according to their {input, output port} pair in an aggregation domain, and minimal interleaved regulators (IRs) per FA are implemented at the boundary of the aggregation domain. The minimal IRs at aggregation domain boundaries suppress the burst accumulations with latency upper bounds intact [b-Le Boudec]. The conditions under which a minimal IR does not increase the upper latency bound can be summarized as follows.
+
+- 1) Every flow into the aggregation domain conforms to an arrival curve with parameters {average arrival rate, maximum burst size}.
+- 2) The aggregation domain outputs all the packets first in, first out (FIFO).
+- 3) The IR regulates every flow to reproduce the arrival characteristics at the ingress of the aggregation domain.
+- 4) (Minimal IR) An IR transmits immediately when a packet at the head of queue meets the output condition. Such an IR is called a minimal IR.
+- 5) An IR provides zero latency, including transmission latency, for packets satisfying the output condition. For example, if a packet comes in when the queue is empty, it can be cut-through if it is eligible to leave.
+
+The following e2e latency guarantee framework is specified based on the conditions described in the foregoing.
+
+- Flows are divided into high priority and low priority.
+- Low priority flows are put in a single FIFO queue at the output port of all nodes and processed in strict priority mode with preemption.
+- High-priority flows are handled as follows.
+ - A. Select an appropriately sized aggregation domain.
+ - B. The flows with the same {input, output port} in the aggregation domain are aggregated into a single FA.
+ - C. In a node, a fair queuing-based scheduling is performed per FA with a queue for each FA. This operation lets the aggregation domain for an FA become a FIFO system in condition 2).
+ - D. Install minimal IRs per FA at the boundaries of aggregation domains. See Figure 1.
+ - E. Only the flows conforming to the initial arrival characteristics or the flows from the IR are accepted into an aggregation domain.
+ - F. The aggregation domains with IRs are interconnected to form an entire network. See Appendix II for implementation practice.
+
+
+
+Y.3113(21)\_F01
+
+Figure 1: Framework for latency guarantee. The diagram shows a sequence of aggregation domains. On the left, 'Regulated flows' (represented by four arrows) enter an 'Aggregation domain' (cloud shape). An arrow points from this domain to a central vertical stack of three boxes, each labeled 'Minimal IR per FA', with three dots between the top and bottom boxes. An arrow points from this stack to another 'Aggregation domain' (cloud shape), which then has an arrow pointing to the right. The label 'Y.3113(21)\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+**Figure 1 – Framework for latency guarantee**
+
+## **9 Security considerations**
+
+The QoS management of IMT-2020 network includes user equipment (UE), ANs, and CN that are subject to security and privacy measures. Sensitive information should be protected as a high priority in order to avoid leakage and unauthorized access. Security and privacy concerns should be aligned with the requirements specified in [b-ITU-T Y.2701] and [b-ITU-T Y.3101].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Analysis of existing solutions and the proposed framework
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Flow-based approaches such as the IntServ framework are known to provide a latency bound guarantee when the following three conditions are met.
+
+- 1) Every flow conforms to its predefined characteristics {the average input rate, maximum burst size}.
+- 2) The sum of average input rates of flows in every output port does not exceed the link capacity of the port.
+- 3) Every flow is guaranteed to receive a service rate not less than the input rate.
+
+Conditions 1) and 2) make resource reservation and admission control mandatory. Condition 3) requires a scheduler appropriate to the flows. IntServ scheduling complexity is proportional to the number of flows, which grows to millions in CNs. This scheduling complexity prohibits the IntServ from being implemented in real networks.
+
+Therefore, the differentiated services (DiffServ) framework has been proposed, which provides relative performance differentiation with 8 or 32 queues for each priority class. Flows belonging to a class are put into a queue. The queues are served with strict priority. Because of such a simplification, DiffServ has been adopted in the current Internet. However, the maximum burst of a flow increases proportionally to the sum of all maximum bursts of flows within a queue. When there is a cycle in a network, such as a mesh network, the maximum burst grows to infinity, as does the latency bound. The DiffServ framework does not provide a latency bound in a general topology network.
+
+IEEE 802.1 TSN [b-IEEE TSN] aims to guarantee a latency upper bound in a single domain network, therefore a small scale network only. The major part of the effort in TSN depends on the time synchronization function across the network, and the synchronized behaviour of the nodes. The asynchronous traffic shaping (ATS) [b-IEEE 802.1Qcr] technique presented in TSN employs a node with an output port with IRs for each input port, and a strict priority class-based FIFO system side by side [b-Specht]. An IR is a single queue system that examines the packet at the head of the queue and lets it leave as soon as it is qualified according to the regulation rule of the flow to which the packet belongs. The remainder of the packets in the queue may be delayed, even when they are already qualified. However, it is proven that a minimal IR does not increase the latency upper bound of the associated FIFO system, such as the class-based FIFO system employed in ATS [b-Le Boudec]. However, the ATS framework requires an IR for each input port at every output port of every node. Frequent regulation significantly affects statistical performance, such as average latency. It also implies increased implementation cost.
+
+IntServ, DiffServ, TSN synchronous approaches and TSN ATS have their own shortcomings when employed in large scale multi-domain networks. A new framework is required, which is less complex than IntServ and has better statistical performance than ATS. The framework has to provide latency bounds in arbitrary topology networks. It also has to be scalable to a large-scale network.
+
+The framework proposed in this Recommendation satisfies all the requirements mentioned in the foregoing. It has a lower scheduling complexity compared to flow-based frameworks, since the number of FAs in a scheduler is certainly less than the number of flows. Compared to the ATS, the reduced number of regulators of the suggested framework contributes to reduced cost, as well as improved average latency. A performance analysis with a simple exemplary network is provided in Appendix III. For further details, see [b-Joung]. It is shown that the proposed framework gives a better latency bound than the IntServ and the ATS.
+
+## Appendix II
+
+### Implementation practice of the framework
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+Figure II.1 depicts a practical implementation of the proposed framework. It contains an aggregation domain (called a "domain" in this appendix) and an ingress edge node of the adjacent domain. Only high-priority traffic is depicted. Every node fairly schedules the FAs, which are aggregated according to the input-output port of the domain. An FA in the domain is fed to the next domain, at whose ingress edge node the minimal IRs are implemented and the FA is regulated. If minimal IRs were located in the egress edge node, then the scheduled packets according to a fair scheduler should be redistributed into different IRs. The eligible times and corresponding transmission times of packets from different IRs would overlap, which causes violation of the non-zero latency condition. Exactly as in the ATS framework, it is assumed that zero latency may be provided with a switch module in a node, e.g., with an infinitely large bandwidth of the switch module.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the architecture of nodes in a latency guarantee framework. It shows an aggregation domain and an adjacent domain's ingress edge node.
+
+**Aggregation Domain:**
+
+- Ingress edge node:** Contains two input ports. Each input port feeds into a set of "Minimal IRs per FA". These IRs feed into "Queues per FA". A "Switch module" is shown with a double-headed arrow connecting the "Minimal IRs per FA" and "Queues per FA".
+- Core node:** Contains "Queues per FA". It receives traffic from the ingress edge node.
+- Egress edge node:** Contains "Queues per FA". It receives traffic from the core node.
+
+**Adjacent Domain:**
+
+- Ingress edge node:** Contains two input ports. Each input port feeds into a set of "Minimal IRs per FA". These IRs feed into "Queues per FA".
+
+Arrows indicate the flow of traffic from the ingress edge node of the aggregation domain through the core node and egress edge node to the ingress edge node of the adjacent domain.
+
+Y.3113(21)\_FII.1
+
+Figure II.1: Example architecture of the nodes in the proposed latency guarantee framework. The diagram shows an aggregation domain with an ingress edge node, core nodes, and an egress edge node, followed by an adjacent domain's ingress edge node.
+
+**Figure II.1 – Example architecture of the nodes in the proposed latency guarantee framework**
+
+## Appendix III
+
+### Latency bounds comparison of IntServ, TSN ATS, and the proposed framework in example networks
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+An example network for the description of the proposed framework is depicted in Figure III.1, in which minimal IRs are implemented between aggregation domains (called "domains" in this appendix). Assume the internetwork in Figure III.1 is perfectly symmetrical. A flow travels $d$ domains, with identically $h$ hops in a domain, making the total number of hops the flow travels $E=hd$ . The critical design choice in this architecture would be the value of $h$ (and thus $d$ ), given $E$ .
+
+
+
+Y.3113(21)\_FIII.1
+
+Figure III.1: An example network architecture of the proposed framework. The diagram shows a central cloud representing an internetwork. Four aggregation domains, each represented by a cloud, are connected to the central cloud via 'Minimal IR' (Inter-Router) blocks. A flow enters from the bottom-left aggregation domain, passes through a Minimal IR, and enters the central cloud. It then exits the central cloud, passes through another Minimal IR, and enters the bottom-right aggregation domain. The flow continues through the domain and exits to the right. Labels indicate that 'h hops in an aggregation domain (also called a "domain")' and 'd domains in the entire path of a flow E = hd hops in the entire path of a flow'.
+
+**Figure III.1 – An example network architecture of the proposed framework**
+
+The numerical performance analysis of the proposed framework is presented. The symbols for the parameters frequently used in the analysis are given in Table III.1.
+
+**Table III.1 – Mathematical Symbols used in the analysis**
+
+| Symbol | Quantity |
+|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
+| $L_i$ | Maximum packet length of flow $i$ |
+| $L_{\max}$ | Maximum packet length of all the flows in a scheduler |
+| $r$ | Link capacity |
+| $\rho_i$ | Arrival rate of flow $i$ |
+| $\sigma_i$ | Maximum burst size of flow $i$ |
+| $\varphi_i$ | Quantum value assigned for flow $i$ |
+| $\theta_i^S$ | Latency of flow $i$ at scheduler $S$ |
+| $h$ | Number of hops in a network |
+| $n$ | Number of flows in a flow aggregate |
+| $p$ | Number of ports in a node |
+| $d$ | Number of networks in a flow path |
+
+If a flow $i$ traverses only the latency rate (LR) schedulers $S_j$ in its path (with a total of $k$ LR schedulers), then the e2e latency experienced by the packets in the flow is bounded by Inequality III.1 [b-Stiliadis].
+
+$$D_i \leq \frac{\sigma_i - L_i}{\rho_i} + \sum_{j=1}^k \theta_j^{S_j} \quad (\text{III.1})$$
+
+The *latency* (written in italic) defined in the LR server context differs from the term used elsewhere in this Recommendation. Latency in non-italic is synonymous with delay. The *latency* of a scheduler in an LR server can be interpreted to be a maximum time a flow may have to wait, from the start of a busy period, to be served with its allocated service rate. The packetized generalized processor sharing (PGPS) is an ideal but complex LR scheduler. PGPS *latency* is given by Expression III.2 [b-Stiliadis].
+
+$$\theta_i^{\text{PGPS}} = \frac{L_i}{\rho_i} + \frac{L_{\max}}{r} \quad (\text{III.2})$$
+
+The deficit round robin (DRR) is the representative round-robin LR scheduler with reduced complexity. The *latency* of a DRR scheduler, if quantum values are smaller than the maximum packet length, is given by Expression III.3 [b-Lenzini].
+
+$$\theta_i^{\text{DRR}} = \frac{1}{r} \left[ (F - \varphi_i) \left( 1 + \frac{L_i}{\varphi_i} \right) + \sum_{n=1}^N L_n \right] \quad (\text{III.3})$$
+
+where $F$ is the sum of all quantum values ( $\varphi_i$ ) of active flows in the scheduler, and $N$ is the number of active flows. Quantum refers to the amount of data serviced at one time, which is determined in proportion to the service rate allocated to each flow [b-Shreedhar].
+
+A FIFO scheduler is also an LR scheduler with the *latency* given by Expression III.4.
+
+$$\theta_i^{\text{FIFO}} = \frac{1}{r} \left[ \sum_{n=1}^N \sigma_n \right] \quad (\text{III.4})$$
+
+where $N$ is the number of active flows.
+
+Consider an aggregation domain in which all the flows have the same characteristics and have to pass the same number of hops $h$ to depart, as shown in Figure III.2. Every node has $p$ inputs and $p$ output ports. A total of $np^h$ flows are input into an ingress port, and among them $np^{h-1}$ flows are output from the same port used for egress. On the second node, $np^{h-2}$ of these flows are output from the same egress port, and on the last node, $np^{h-h} = n$ of the flows exit from the same egress port. Therefore, there are $n$ flows having the same pair of {input and output ports} in the domain. Suppose this input/output (I/O) pattern occurs on all nodes.
+
+
+
+$p$ ports per node,
+ $np^h$ flows enter per port,
+among them $np^{h-1}$ flows exit the node
+at the same output port
+
+$np^{h-2}$ flows exit
+at the same
+output port
+
+$np$ flows enter
+from an input port
+
+$n$ flows exit
+at the same
+output port
+
+$n$ flows are combined
+into a single FA
+
+Y.3113(21)\_FIII.2
+
+Figure III.2: Flow aggregation architecture within an aggregation domain of the example network. The diagram shows a sequence of nodes in a network. The first node has multiple input ports (indicated by vertical dots) and multiple output ports. A blue line represents a flow path entering a node and exiting at the same output port. A red curved arrow indicates a flow path between two nodes. The second node has a label 'np^{h-2} flows exit at the same output port'. The third node has a label 'np flows enter from an input port' and 'n flows exit at the same output port'. A label 'n flows are combined into a single FA' points to the output of the third node. The diagram illustrates how flows are aggregated as they pass through nodes in the network.
+
+**Figure III.2 – Flow aggregation architecture within an aggregation domain of the example network**
+
+From Expressions III.1 and III.2, the domain latency of the flow-based framework with the PGPS schedulers is given by
+
+$$D_i^{F\_PGPS} \leq \sum_{j=1}^k \theta_j^{F\_PGPS} = \frac{h(np^h+1)}{r/L}. \quad (\text{III.5})$$
+
+Assume for simplicity that $\sigma_i = L_i = L_{\max} = L$ and $\rho_i = r/np^h$ , for all $i$ . Similarly, for an FA-based framework with the PGPS, there are $p^h$ FAs in an output port, and the maximum burst of an FA is $nL$ , therefore
+
+$$D_i^{\text{FA\_PGPS}} \leq \frac{nL-L}{\rho_i} + \sum_{j=1}^k \theta_j^{\text{FA\_PGPS}} = \frac{(h+n-1)p^h+h}{r/L}. \quad (\text{III.6})$$
+
+Consider a case where the domain in Figure III.2 employs the ATS framework, i.e., FIFO and minimal IRs at every node. In this case Expression III.1 is applied to a single node, since the minimal IR is not an LR scheduler. Assume for simplicity that $\sigma_i = L_i = L_{\max} = L$ again. We have $np^h$ flows in an output port, whose burst sizes are all $L$ . The burst size of the aggregated flows at the FIFO scheduler is therefore $np^h L$ . Using Expressions III.1 and III.4) gives
+
+$$D_i^{\text{FIFO}} \leq \frac{np^h L - L}{\rho_i} + \sum_{j=1}^k \theta_j^{\text{FIFO}} = \frac{2np^h - 1}{r/L}$$
+
+since we assume $\rho_i = r$ for the highest priority FIFO scheduler. We have $h$ such nodes in a domain, therefore the latency bound of the ATS domain is given by
+
+$$D_i^{\text{ATS}} \leq \frac{h(2np^h-1)}{r/L}. \quad (\text{III.7})$$
+
+To elaborate the internetwork in Figure III.1, the number of flows entering a port is denoted, $F$ , and represented by $np^h$ , as in Figure III.2. The internetwork can now be depicted as in Figure III.3.
+
+
+
+Figure III.3: The example network diagram. It shows a central cloud connected to four 'Minimal IR' boxes. Each box is connected to an external cloud. Labels include: 'Total F = np^h flows per port', 'n flows in the FA', 'p ports per node', 'h hops in a network', 'd domains in the entire path of a flow', and 'E = hd hops in the entire path of a flow'. A reference code 'Y.3113(21)\_FIII.3' is at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure III.3 – The example network, with parameters for the latency bound calculation of the flow under observation**
+
+Now consider the e2e latency bound of the internetwork, with fixed values of $E$ and $F$ . Now determine the latency bound while $h$ (and thus $n$ and $d$ ) varies. A larger value of $h$ means smaller values of $d$ and $n$ , and a lower number of minimal IRs. If $h = E$ , then there is no minimal IR. If $n = 1$ , then there is no flow aggregation, which is similar to IntServ framework. A smaller value of $h$ means a smaller domain size and more minimal IRs. If $h = 1$ , then IR resides at every node, which is similar to the ATS framework.
+
+Consider the e2e latency bounds of the IntServ, ATS, and the proposed framework. From the relationships between the variables $p$ , $F$ , $E$ , namely $np^h = F$ , $hd = E$ , can be obtained $d = E/h$ , $n = F/p^h$ . First, for IntServ, since it has the "pay burst only once" property, from Expression III.5,
+
+$$T_i^{\text{F\_PGPS}} \leq \frac{h(np^h + 1)}{r/dL}. \quad (\text{III.8})$$
+
+Second, for the proposed framework, from Expression III.6,
+
+$$T_i^{\text{FA\_PGPS}} \leq \frac{(h+n-1)p^h + h}{r/dL}. \quad (\text{III.9})$$
+
+Similarly, from Expression III.7,
+
+$$T_i^{\text{ATS}} \leq \frac{h(2np^h - 1)}{r/dL} \quad (\text{III.10})$$
+
+Now consider a case where $p = 2$ , $E = 16$ , $F = 65\,536 = 2^{16}$ , $r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ Kbit. The right hand side (RHS) of Expression (III.9) gives the red curve in Figure III.4. The blue line represents the value of the RHS of Expression (III.8), IntServ, which is 10.486. The value of the RHS of Expression (III.10), ATS (not shown), is 20.97.
+
+
+
+| h | Latency Bound (s) |
+|----|-------------------|
+| 1 | 10.486 |
+| 8 | 1.347 |
+| 10 | ~1.2 |
+| 16 | 10.486 |
+
+Figure III.4: Latency bound of the proposed framework – Plot 1. A line graph showing a red U-shaped curve on a grid. The x-axis ranges from 0 to 16 with major ticks every 2 units. The y-axis ranges from 0 to 12 with major ticks every 2 units. A horizontal blue line is drawn at y = 10.486. The red curve intersects this line at x = 1 and x = 16. The curve reaches its minimum at x = 8, y = 1.347. A point on the curve at x = 10 is also marked.
+
+**Figure III.4 – Latency bound of the proposed framework – Plot 1**
+
+The red curve is plotted with $p = 2$ , $E = 16$ , $F = 2^{16} = 65\,536$ , $r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ Kbit, with varying $h$ . When $h = 8$ , the latency bound is 1.347 s. When $h = 1$ and $h = 16$ , it is 10.486 s, which is identical to the latency bound given with IntServ. The latency bound of the ATS framework is 20.97 s. The red curve reaches a minimum near $h = 10$
+
+Note that all the possible choices of $h$ and $d$ give lower than or equal latency bounds compared to those of IntServ. They are always smaller than those of ATS. The optimal choice in this case is $\{h = 8, d = 2\}$ , which gives 1.347 s of latency bound, which is almost eight times better than IntServ, and 16 times better than ATS.
+
+This result is remarkable. By only dividing a path into two parts, putting a minimum IR in the path, and aggregating flows accordingly, the latency bound can be reduced by as much as to 1/8, compared to that of IntServ. The scheduler complexity is reduced by the order of $2^8$ .
+
+Next, consider a network with $p = 8$ , $E = 4$ , $F = 8^4 = 4\,096$ , $r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ kbit/s. This set of parameters represents a smaller sized network with nodes with more ports. The RHS of Expression III.8 gives the red curve in Figure III.5. The blue line represents the value of the RHS of Expression III.9, IntServ, which is 0.164. The value of the RHS of Expression III.10, the latency bound of ATS (not shown), is 0.328.
+
+
+
+Figure III.5 – Latency bound of the proposed framework – Plot 2. A line graph showing the latency bound (Y-axis, 0 to 0.5) versus h (X-axis, 0 to 4). A red curve starts at (0, 0.5), decreases to a minimum at (2, 0.083), and then increases to (4, 0.164). A horizontal blue line is at Y ≈ 0.164. Points are marked at (1, 0.164), (2, 0.083), (2, 819, 0.067), and (4, 0.164).
+
+**Figure III.5 – Latency bound of the proposed framework – Plot 2**
+
+The red curve is plotted with $p = 8$ , $E = 4$ , $F = 8^4 = 4\,096$ , $r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ Kbit/s, with varying $h$ . When $h = 2$ , the latency bound is 0.083 s. When $h = 1$ and $h = 4$ , it is 0.164 s, which is identical to the latency bound given with IntServ. The latency bound of the ATS framework is 0.328 s. The red curve reaches the minimum with $h = 2.819$
+
+The possible sets of parameters in this case are $\{h = 1, d = 4, n = 512 = 8^3\}$ , $\{h = 2, d = 2, n = 64\}$ , and $\{h = 4, d = 1, n = 1\}$ . The optimum choice for the value of $h$ is 2. It means that even in a small network with an e2e hop count of 4, dividing the path into two, aggregating flows accordingly, and inserting a minimal IR per FA would produce a latency bound that is only half that of IntServ. The scheduler complexity is also reduced by the order of $8^2$ . Table III.2 summarizes the latency bounds of three frameworks, with two network scenarios.
+
+**Table III.2 – Latency bounds comparison of the IntServ, the ATS, and the proposed framework**
+
+| Frameworks | Network parameters | |
+|--------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| | Core network scenario
( $p = 2$ , $E = 16$ , $F = 2^{16} = 65\,536$ ,
$r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ Kbit/s) | Local network scenario
( $p = 8$ , $E = 4$ , $F = 8^4 = 4\,096$ ,
$r = 1$ Gbit/s, $L = 10$ Kbit/s) |
+| IntServ | 10.486 s | 0.164 s |
+| ATS | 20.97 s | 0.328 s |
+| Proposed framework | 1.347 s with $h = 8$ | 0.083 s with $h = 2$ |
+
+The proposed framework with minimal IRs and FA scheduling can be seen as a generalized framework that embraces the IntServ and the TSN ATS framework at its extreme implementation cases, as Table III.3 suggests. At one extreme the domain for flow aggregation encompasses only a single node, then IRs are in between every node, which is similar to the TSN ATS framework except that ATS uses a class-based FIFO scheduler. At the other extreme, the domain for flow aggregation encompasses the whole internetwork that does not need any IR, which is similar to the IntServ framework. The difference in this case is that the proposed framework aggregates flows according to the input and output ports of a domain.
+
+**Table III.3 – Categorization of three frameworks based on the IR locations and the scheduler used**
+
+| IR locations | Scheduler | | |
+|--------------------|------------|---------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| | Flow-based | Based on FA with
{input, output port} of
a domain | FIFO |
+| Zero IR | IntServ | Proposed framework | |
+| IR between domains | | | |
+| IR at every node | | | ATS |
+
+The major complexity of the three frameworks comes from the scheduler. In this regard, ATS has the advantage. The proposed framework shows smaller or equal complexity to that of IntServ. The IR also contributes to the complexity, but it is negligible since it maintains a single queue. The IR still
+
+has to maintain and update every flow state. The drawback of the IR resides in the average latency. It is conjectured that more IRs produce larger average latency. This is for further study by analysis or simulation. The number of IRs required for the ATS framework is proportional to the square of the port numbers of all nodes in a network. The number of IRs required for the proposed framework is proportional to the square of the number of ports of all the edge nodes, which is always less than that in ATS. Therefore, the proposed framework is expected to enjoy less complexity than IntServ and a smaller average latency than the ATS, with a smaller latency bound than both.
+
+## Appendix IV
+
+### Gap analysis of the requirements and framework for the IMT-2020 network
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### IV.1 Overview of the IMT-2020 network architecture and its QoS framework
+
+The IMT-2020 network is a complex internetwork of different architectures and purposes. IMT-2020 network components are divided into UE, AN, CN, and DN. In Figure IV.1, functional entities other than UE, AN, and DN are included in the CN. The IMT-2020 network emphasizes three features: control and user plane separation (distributed softwarization); AN and CN independence; and network slicing. The CN has multiple user plane functions (UPFs), as data plane components, physically separated and distributed, with other control plane functions virtually distributed with the network slicing.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the IMT-2020 network framework. It is divided into three main sections: UE (User Equipment), Access network (AN), and Core network (CN). The CN is further divided into a Control plane and a User plane. The Control plane includes the following functions: Capability exposure function, Network function registry, Policy control function, Unified subscription management function, and Application function. The User plane includes the following functions: Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, and Session management function. The Session management function is connected to a stack of User plane functions (UPFs). The UE and AN are connected to the CN via UE-CN signalling and AN-CN signalling. The UE and AN are also connected to the CN via UE-AN data transport and AN-CN data transport. The CN is connected to Data networks via the UPFs. The diagram is labeled Y.3113(21)\_FIV.1.
+
+Figure IV.1: Framework of the IMT-2020 network. The diagram shows the interaction between the UE, Access network (AN), and Core network (CN). The CN is divided into a Control plane and a User plane. The Control plane includes functions like Capability exposure, Network function registry, Policy control, Unified subscription management, and Application. The User plane includes Network access control, Network slice selection, Auth. server, and Session management. Data transport occurs between UE-AN, AN-CN, and CN-Data networks. A stack of User plane functions (UPFs) is shown connected to the Data networks.
+
+**Figure IV.1 – Framework of the IMT-2020 network [b-ITU-T Y.3102]**
+
+In this Recommendation, it is assumed that a single UPF governs an aggregation domain that is a part of a network slice and also a part of a CN, with a physically identifiable boundary. The UPF performs per-flow QoS handling, including transport level packet marking for uplink (UL) and downlink (DL), rate limiting and reflective QoS (DiffServ code point) marking on the DL [b-ETSI TS 123 501]. A domain may encompass multiple routers or switches. By default, within a UPF domain relay, nodes keep the same scheduling, queueing and regulation policy.
+
+Note that a session management function (SMF) belongs to a single network slice, and a UPF belongs to a single SMF, therefore a UPF belongs to a single network slice [b-ETSI TS 128 530].
+
+Figure IV.2 depicts the QoS flow classification principle in the IMT-2020 network. QoS flow is the finest granularity for QoS management in the IMT-2020 core network. A QoS flow can either guarantee the bit rate or not, i.e., guaranteed bit rate (GBR) QoS flow or non-GBR (NGBR) QoS flow. With the QoS flow concept, granularity for QoS treatment (per flow) becomes different from tunnelling (per protocol data unit (PDU) session, basically), and it enables more flexible QoS control.
+
+The terms and concepts defined in the 3GPP 5G system are mapped to the terms used in this Recommendation in Table IV.1.
+
+
+
+Figure IV.2: The principle for classification and User plane marking for QoS flows. The diagram shows the flow of data packets from the Application/Service layer through the UE, AN, and UPF. Key components include QoS rules for mapping UL packets to QoS flows and applying QoS flow marking, QoS flows (all packets marked with the same QFI), Mapping QoS flows to AN resources, AN resources, PDU session, PDRs (Classify packets for QoS flow marking and other actions), and UE/AN/UPF blocks. The diagram is labeled Y.3113(21)\_FIV.2.
+
+**Figure IV.2 – The principle for classification and User plane marking for QoS flows [b-ETSI TS 123 501]**
+
+**Table IV.1 – Mapping of 3GPP 5G terms and concepts to terms used in this Recommendation**
+
+| Terms used in this Recommendation | Terms defined in 3GPP 5G System TS | Definitions in [b-ETSI TS 123 501] and [b-ETSI TS 124 501] |
+|----------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Flow | 5G QoS flow | All traffic mapped to the same 5G QoS flow receive the same forwarding treatment (e.g., scheduling policy, queue management policy, rate shaping policy and radio link control configuration). QoS rules are used for identification of a QoS flow. QoS rules are basically a set of packet filters that are constructed with Ethernet, Internet protocol (IP), user datagram protocol/transmission control protocol header fields. |
+| – | PDU session | Association between the UE and a DN that provides a PDU connectivity service, which is a service that provides exchange of PDUs between a UE and a DN. Generally a PDU session can be mapped to one or more QoS flows (see Note). |
+| Flow latency bound requirement (RSpec) | 5G QoS identifier (5QI) | A scalar that is used as a reference to a specific QoS forwarding behaviour (e.g., packet loss rate, packet delay budget (PDB)) to be provided to a 5G QoS flow. |
+| High and low priority flow | GBR and NGBR QoS flow | GBR flow is a QoS flow using the GBR resource type or the delay-critical GBR resource type and requiring guaranteed flow bit rate. NGBR flow is a QoS flow using the NGBR resource type and not requiring guaranteed flow bit rate. |
+| | Priority | 5QI is also associated with priority. |
+| Latency upper bound | PDB | The PDB determines an upper bound for the time that a packet may be delayed between the UE and the UPF that terminates the interface between the DN and the UPF (N6). |
+
+**Table IV.1 – Mapping of 3GPP 5G terms and concepts to terms used in this Recommendation**
+
+| Terms used in this Recommendation | Terms defined in 3GPP 5G System TS | Definitions in [b-ETSI TS 123 501] and [b-ETSI TS 124 501] |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Average input rate | Guaranteed flow bit rate (GFBR) and maximum flow bit rate (MFBR) | The GFBR denotes the bit rate that is guaranteed to be provided by the network to the QoS flow over the averaging time window. The MFBR limits the bit rate to the highest bit rate that is expected by the QoS flow (e.g., excess traffic may get discarded or delayed by a rate shaping or policing function at the UE, radio access network (RAN), UPF). Bit rates above the GFBR value and up to the MFBR value, may be provided with relative priority determined by the priority level of the QoS flows. |
+| Maximum burst size | Maximum data burst value (MDBV) | MDBV denotes the largest amount of data that the 5G-AN is required to serve within a period of 5G-AN PDB (i.e., the 5G AN part of the PDB). |
+| NOTE – In a PDU session of Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), IPv4v6 and Ethernet PDU session type, the non-access stratum protocol enables different forwarding treatments of UL user data packets in one or more QoS flows based on signalled QoS rules, derived QoS rules or any combination of them. In an unstructured PDU session type, all UL user data packets are associated with the same QoS flow (clause 6.2.5.1.1 of [b-ETSI TS 124 501]). | | |
+
+### IV.2 Gap analysis of the requirements for the IMT-2020 network
+
+The 5G QoS model is based on QoS flows (clause 5.7.1.1 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]). The 5G QoS model supports both GBR QoS flows and NGBR QoS flows. The QoS flow is the finest granularity of QoS differentiation in the PDU session. A QoS flow identifier (QFI) is used to identify a QoS flow in the 5G system. User plane traffic with the same QFI within a PDU session receives the same traffic forwarding treatment (e.g., scheduling, admission threshold). The QFI is carried in an encapsulation header on the interface between the RAN and the initial UPF (N3) (and the interface between the intermediate UPF and the UPF session anchor (N9)) i.e., without any changes to the e2e packet header. A QFI shall be used for all PDU session types. The QFI shall be unique within a PDU session. The QFI may be dynamically assigned or may be equal to the 5QI, which is a static number assigned to a flow based on its characteristics. For example, the value 80 is assigned as the standardized 5QI to low latency eMBB applications augmented reality applications with the specified 10 ms PDB.
+
+For GBR QoS flows only, the following additional QoS parameters exist (clause 5.7.2.5 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]):
+
+- GFBR – UL and DL;
+- MFBR – UL and DL.
+
+The GFBR denotes the bit rate that is guaranteed to be provided by the network to the QoS flow over the averaging time window. The MFBR limits the bit rate to the highest bit rate that is expected by the QoS flow (e.g., excess traffic may get discarded or delayed by a rate shaping or policing function at the UE, RAN, UPF).
+
+Each GBR QoS flow with a delay-critical resource type shall be associated with an MDBV (clause 5.7.3.7 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]). MDBV denotes the largest amount of data that the 5G-AN is required to serve within a 5G-AN PDB period. Every standardized 5QI (of delay-critical GBR resource type) is associated with a default value for the MDBV (specified in the QoS characteristics of Table 5.7.4-1 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]). The MDBV may also be signalled together with a standardized 5QI to the (R)AN, and if it is received, it shall be used instead of the default value. The
+
+MDBV may also be signalled together with a pre-configured 5QI to the (R)AN, and if it is received, it shall be used instead of the pre-configured value.
+
+With these QoS parameters, the SMF binds service data flows (SDFs) to QoS flows based on the QoS and service requirements (clause 5.7.1.5 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]). The SMF assigns the QFI for a new QoS flow and derives its QoS profile, corresponding UPF instructions and QoS rule(s) from the PCC rules and other information provided by the PCF. A mapping from IP flow to SDF and further down to 5G QoS flow may not be one-to-one, however.
+
+The following list of requirements is specified in clause 7, as well as the gap analysis of each requirement for the IMT-2020 network.
+
+Req\_1. It is required to be able to specify, by the CPE or on behalf of the CPEs with insufficient signalling capabilities, the CPE flow destination and characteristics (e.g., average data rate and maximum burst size).
+
+Analysis: The SMF binds SDF to QoS flows with MFBR and MDBV, which correspond to the average data rate and the maximum burst size in requirement 1. Therefore, a standard IMT-2020 network meets requirement 1 as it is.
+
+Req\_2. It is recommended to be able to specify, by the CPE or on behalf of the CPEs with insufficient signalling capabilities, the CPE desirable e2e latency upper bound.
+
+Analysis: UE or an application in a piece of UE in IMT-2020 is able to specify its PDB if the flow is GBR QoS flow. Requirement 2 is met in the current standard IMT-2020 network.
+
+Req\_3. It is required that a network be able to determine the latency upper bound within the network, of a traversing flow, with the flow destination and the characteristics specified.
+
+Analysis: A network, regardless of the AN or CN of the IMT-2020 system, or independent DN system, is required to be able to provide and announce the latency upper bound (or PDB) in a network. It is required to add a new latency bound decision function to IMT-2020 networks.
+
+Req\_4. It is recommended that the means to provide the latency upper bound be: 1) implementable in CNs where there are millions of active flows at an output port; 2) applicable to an arbitrary network topology; 3) of minimal effect on the average latency and the throughput; and 4) scalable to a large-scale network.
+
+Analysis: This requirement is the key for the successful deployment of latency critical GBR applications in a 5G system. This requirement can be met with the framework proposed in this Recommendation. It is required that IMT-2020 networks to follow the framework proposed in this Recommendation.
+
+Req\_5. It is recommended that the latency upper bound be susceptible to negotiation, for a flow, between the CPE and the service provider.
+
+Req\_6. It is recommended that the dynamic latency upper bound be susceptible to negotiation.
+
+Analysis of Req\_5 and Req\_6: The basic approach in an IMT-2020 network to the admission decision is based on the pre-defined QoS profile of a flow and resource availability. As such, the negotiation is as simple as determining a QoS profile. On the other hand, the QoS parameter notification control in an IMT-2020 network indicates whether notifications are requested from the next generation-radio access network (NG-RAN) when the GBR can no longer (or can again) be guaranteed for a QoS flow during its lifetime. Notification control may be used for a GBR QoS flow if the application traffic is able to adapt to the change in the QoS (clause 5.7.2.4.1 of [b-ETSI TS 123 501]). A similar admission control procedure is also specified. However, notification control focuses on re-admission control according to dynamic network environment changes. The means to determine whether to admit is not clearly specified in [b-ETSI TS 123 501] or [b-ETSI TS 123 503], but use of the performance measurements is suggested. It is recommended to add a new negotiation functionality to IMT-2020 networks.
+
+- Req\_7. It is required that networks be able to handle FAs as control elements.
+- Req\_8. It is required that networks be able to aggregate and segregate flows at any desired points in a network or equivalently within an aggregation domain.
+- Req\_9. It is required that within an aggregation domain, flows be aggregated according to an aggregation domain-specific rule (e.g., a rule that flows with the same input and output ports of the domain are aggregated into a single FA).
+- Req\_10. It is recommended that aggregation domains be susceptible to merger and division on demand.
+- Req\_11. It is required that flow aggregation rules be susceptible to negotiation among the aggregation domains.
+
+Analysis of Req\_7 and Req\_11: Requirements 7 to 11 are about flow aggregation. Currently the bearer service in IMT-2020 can be thought as a flow aggregation. A more flexible aggregation function in the IMT-2020 network is required.
+
+- Req\_12. It is recommended that the TSpec include: a maximum burst size; an average input rate; a peak rate; and a maximum packet size.
+
+Analysis: The current IMT-2020 standard specifies the MFBR and the MDBV to be QoS parameters, which correspond to the input rate and the maximum burst size. The maximum packet size is rather a network-specific parameter not specified for QoS control in a IMT-2020 network. It is recommended that the maximum packet size be a part of the TSpec in IMT-2020.
+
+- Req\_13. It is recommended that best-effort service traffic does not affect the latency bound of high-priority flows.
+- Req\_14. It is required that a traffic regulation capability be provided at the boundary of aggregation domains.
+
+Analysis: It is recommended that a pre-emption capability on NGBR or low-priority traffic be implemented in IMT-2020 networks. It is also required that a regulation function (e.g., minimal IR per FA) be implemented in IMT-2020 networks.
+
+### **IV.3 Gap analysis of the framework for the IMT-2020 network**
+
+The framework in this Recommendation depends on three essential elements: flow aggregation; aggregation domain; and minimal IR. The flow in this Recommendation can be specified to be a set of packets sharing network start and end points, as well as traffic characteristics such as the latency bound. A QoS flow in the IMT-2020 network, identified by a QFI, may be an aggregation of SDFs. An SDF may also be an aggregation of IP flows. A proper mapping from IP flow to QoS flow can satisfy the specification of the flow in this Recommendation. QoS flows can use the bearer service in an IMT-2020 network. A bearer in this regard can be seen as an FA. Again a careful initiation and a termination of a bearer can be seen as flow aggregation and also segregation. However, the initiation and termination points of a bearer service are rather fixed according to the network type, i.e., whether it is access or core network. It is recommended that an aggregation domain be arbitrarily set to include multiple networks or multiple UDFs. Implementation of the minimal IRs per FA at the boundaries of aggregation domains is also required.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.800] Recommendation ITU-T E.800 (2008), *Definitions of terms related to quality of service*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3102] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), *Framework of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.66] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 66, (2020), *ITU-T Y.3000-series Network 2030 services: Capabilities, performance and design of new communication services for the Network 2030 applications*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 123 501] Technical Specification ETSI TS 123 501 V16.6.0 (2020), *5G; System architecture for the 5G System (5GS) (3GPP TS 23.501 version 16.6.0 Release 16)*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 123 503] Technical Specification ETSI TS 123 503 V16.5.0 (2020), *5G; Policy and charging control framework for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.503 version 16.5.0 Release 16)*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 124 501] Technical Specification ETSI TS 124 501 V16.5.1 (2020), *5G; Non-access-stratum (NAS) protocol for 5G system (5GS); Stage 3 (3GPP TS 24.501 version 16.5.1 Release 16)*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 128 530] Technical Specification ETSI TS 128 530 V16.2.0 (2020), *5G; Management and orchestration; Concepts, use cases and requirements (3GPP TS 28.530 version 16.2.0 Release 16)*.
+- [b-IEEE 802.1Qcr] IEEE 802.1Qcr-2020, *IEEE Standard for local and metropolitan area networks – Bridges and bridged networks – Amendment 34: Asynchronous traffic shaping*.
+- [b-IEEE TSN] IEEE 802.1 Working Group (2017). *Time-Sensitive Networking Task Group*. Available [viewed 2021-03-18] at:
+- [b-IETF RFC 8655] IETF RFC 8655 (2019), *Deterministic networking architecture*.
+- [b-Fei] Fei A., Pei G., Liu R., Zhang L. (1998). Measurements on delay and hop-count of the Internet. In: *IEEE GLOBECOM*. Available [viewed 2021-03-18] at: .
+- [b-Joung] Joung, J. (2020). Framework for delay guarantee in multi-domain networks based on interleaved regulators. *Electronics*, **9**, 436, 11 pp. Available [viewed 2021-03-18] from: .
+- [b-Le Boudec] Le Boudec, J. (2018). A theory of traffic regulators for deterministic networks with application to interleaved regulators. In: *IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking*, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 2721-2733. doi: 10.1109/TNET.2018.2875191.
+- [b-Lenzini] Lenzini, L., Mingozi, E., Stea, G. (2004). Tradeoffs between low complexity, low latency, and fairness with deficit round-robin schedulers. In: *IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking*, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 681-693. doi: 10.1109/TNET.2004.833131.
+
+- [b-Shreedhar] Shreedhar, M., Varghese, G. (1996). Efficient fair queueing using deficit round-robin. In: *IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking*, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 375-385 doi: 10.1109/90.502236.
+- [b-Specht] Specht, J., Samii, S. (2016). Urgency-based scheduler for time-sensitive switched Ethernet networks. In: *Proc. 28th Euromicro Conference on Real-Time Systems (ECRTS)*, Toulouse, pp. 75-85. doi: 10.1109/ECRTS.2016.27.
+- [b-Stiliadis] Stiliadis, D., Varma A. (1998). Latency-rate servers: A general model for analysis of traffic scheduling algorithms. In: *IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking*, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 611-624. doi: 10.1109/90.731196.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3125 (09/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Quality of service assurance requirements and framework for cloud gaming supported by the IMT-2020 network**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3125
+
+## Quality of service assurance requirements and framework for cloud gaming supported by the IMT-2020 network
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3125 specifies quality of service assurance aspects for cloud gaming (CG) supported by the International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 (IMT-2020) network.
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3125 first provides an overview of CG supported by the IMT-2020 network and then specifies high-level requirements, functional requirements, and framework for CG with that support.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3125 | 2023-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15641 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Cloud gaming, cloud-gaming centre, cloud-gaming edge, IMT-2020, QoS assurance.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2023
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 Scope ..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Overview ..... | 3 |
+| 7 High level requirements..... | 4 |
+| 8 Functional requirements ..... | 4 |
+| 8.1 CG centre..... | 4 |
+| 8.2 CG edge..... | 5 |
+| 8.3 CG client..... | 5 |
+| 8.4 Collaboration between CG centre and CG edge..... | 5 |
+| 9 Framework..... | 5 |
+| 10 Security considerations..... | 7 |
+| Appendix I – General quality of service considerations for cloud gaming ..... | 8 |
+| Appendix II – General deployment use case ..... | 10 |
+| Bibliography..... | 11 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3125
+
+## Quality of service assurance requirements and framework for cloud gaming supported by the IMT-2020 network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies quality of service (QoS) assurance requirements and a framework for cloud gaming (CG) supported by the International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 network (IMT-2020). This Recommendation provides:
+
+- an overview;
+- high-level requirements;
+- functional requirements;
+- a framework;
+- security considerations.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- [ITU-T G.1032] Recommendation ITU-T G.1032 (2017), *Influence factors on gaming quality of experience*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3076] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3076 (2020), *Architecture of ICN-enabled edge network in IMT-2020*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), *Requirements of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3106] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3106 (2019), *Quality of service functional requirements for the IMT-2020 network*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 cloud gaming** [ITU-T G.1032]: Cloud gaming is characterized by game content delivered from a server to a client as a video stream with game controls sent from the client to the server. The execution of the game logic, rendering of the virtual scene, and video encoding are performed at the server, while the client is responsible for video decoding and capturing of client input.
+
+**3.1.2 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related aspects that support to provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network.
+
+**3.1.3 multi-access edge computing (MEC)** [b-ETSI GR MEC 001]: System which provides an IT service environment and cloud-computing capabilities at the edge of an access network which contains one or more type of access technology, and in close proximity to its users.
+
+**3.1.4 quality of experience (QoE)** [b-ITU-T P.10]: The degree of delight or annoyance of the user of an application or service.
+
+NOTE – Recognizing on-going research on this topic, this is a working definition which is expected to evolve for some time. (This note is not part of the definition.).
+
+**3.1.5 quality of service (QoS)** [b-ITU-T P.10]: The totality of characteristics of a telecommunications service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated and implied needs of the user of the service (see [b-ITU-T E.800]).
+
+**3.1.6 quality of service assurance** [b-ITU-T Y.3109]: Functionalities or mechanisms that enable service providers to make statements with a degree of confidence that the service meets the quality characteristics or objectives specified elsewhere.
+
+## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation**
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 cloud-gaming centre; CG centre:** A part of a cloud-gaming (CG) server located in the data network connected to IMT-2020 network to support global management functions of CG.
+
+**3.2.2 cloud-gaming edge; CG edge:** A part of a cloud-gaming (CG) server located at the edge of IMT-2020 network for supporting computation-intensive and delay-sensitive functions of CG.
+
+# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms**
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|------------|----------------------------------------------|
+| AF | Application Function |
+| AN | Access Network |
+| CG | Cloud Gaming |
+| CG-IMT2020 | Cloud Gaming supported by IMT-2020 network |
+| CN | Core Network |
+| E2E | End to End |
+| IMT-2020 | International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 |
+| MEC | Multi-Access Edge Computing |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NFR | Network Function Repository |
+| NSSF | Network Slice Selection Function |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| RTT | Round-Trip Time |
+| QoE | Quality of Experience |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RP | Reference Point |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+
+| | |
+|-----|---------------------------------|
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The phrase "is required" indicates a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The phrase "is recommended" indicates a requirement that is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The phrase "can optionally" indicates an optional requirement that is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator or service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Overview
+
+CG is characterized by game content delivered from a server to a client as a video stream with game controls sent from the client to the server. The execution of the game logic, rendering of the virtual scene and video encoding is performed on the server, while the client is responsible for video decoding and capturing of client input [ITU-T G.1032]. CG shifts the computationally intensive graphics rendering and processing from the player client devices to network servers, which means that players do not need high-performance hardware, but only basic capacities for video decoding, video display and network connection. Figure 6-1 shows a generic framework for CG.
+
+CG begins by collecting game controls or user interaction from the client. Then the user interaction and other relevant information is uploaded to the CG server via a network. The CG server contains powerful hardware to quickly perform the necessary computing and graphic rendering needed to create the video frames corresponding to control inputs by players. The rendered video frames are then sent to the player devices and decoded by them.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph Client
+ UIC[User interaction capturing]
+ VD[Video decoding]
+ end
+ subgraph Cloud_gaming_service [Cloud gaming service]
+ CI[Client interaction]
+ GL[Game logic]
+ GR[Game rendering]
+ VE[Video encoding]
+ VS[Video streaming]
+ end
+ UIC -- "User commands" --> CI
+ CI --> GL
+ GL --> GR
+ GR --> VE
+ VE --> VS
+ VS -- "Video stream" --> VD
+
+```
+
+Y.3125(23)
+
+Figure 6-1: General concept of cloud gaming. The diagram shows a Client and a Cloud gaming service. The Client contains 'User interaction capturing' and 'Video decoding'. The Cloud gaming service contains 'Client interaction', 'Game logic', 'Game rendering', 'Video encoding', and 'Video streaming'. Arrows show 'User commands' from Client to Cloud, and 'Video stream' from Cloud to Client. Internal flows in the Cloud service are: Client interaction to Game logic, Game logic to Game rendering, Game rendering to Video encoding, and Video encoding to Video streaming.
+
+**Figure 6-1 – General concept of cloud gaming**
+
+[ITU-T G.1032] presents a list of factors that may influence the QoE of CG. The influence factors are grouped according to origin: human; system; and context. Network transmission is one important
+
+aspect of the system influence factor. Due to the highly interactive nature of CG, network distortion can negatively influence user experience. CG mostly suffers from latency, jitter, packet loss and insufficient bandwidth.
+
+With the development of the IMT-2020 network and related technologies, such as network slicing and MEC, the network gains a high performance with low latency, high bandwidth, high reliability and high isolation, such performance meets the requirements of CG. CG is expected to take advantage of the low latency enabled by an IMT-2020 network and MEC to reduce the end-to-end (E2E) application level delay. When deploying a CG service, part of the functions can be deployed on the edge data network [ITU-T Y.3076] of the IMT-2020 network that contracts the distance between the user client and the gaming server, reduces the network latency and improves the CG experience.
+
+Figure 6-2 shows a general framework for CG supported by an IMT-2020 network (CG-IMT2020), which consists of the CG client, CG edge and CG centre.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph LR
+ subgraph UE_Box [UE]
+ CG_client[CG client]
+ end
+ AN[AN]
+ UPF[UPF]
+ subgraph CN_Box [CN]
+ Global_management[Global management]
+ end
+ CG_centre((CG centre))
+ subgraph CG_edge_Box [CG edge]
+ Game_rendering[Game rendering]
+ Video_encoding[Video encoding]
+ end
+
+ CG_client --- AN
+ AN --- UPF
+ UPF --- CN_Box
+ CN_Box --- CG_centre
+ UPF --- CG_edge_Box
+
+```
+
+Y.3125(23)
+
+Figure 6-2: General framework for cloud gaming supported by an IMT-2020 network. The diagram shows a flow from a UE (User Equipment) containing a CG client, through an AN (Access Network), a UPF (User Plane Function), and a CN (Core Network) to a CG centre (represented by a cloud shape containing 'Global management'). Below the CN, a CG edge (represented by a cloud shape containing 'Game rendering' and 'Video encoding') is connected to the UPF. The reference Y.3125(23) is noted at the bottom right.
+
+**Figure 6-2 – General framework for cloud gaming supported by an IMT-2020 network**
+
+# 7 High level requirements
+
+Since CG-IMT2020 is a vertical application of an IMT-2020 network, its QoS assurance is supported by the requirements and control mechanisms specified in [ITU-T Y.3101][ITU-T Y.3106]. Besides the common requirements, the CG-IMT2020-specific high level and functional ones for QoS assurance are specified in clause 7 and clause 8.
+
+- CG-IMT2020 is required to assure the delay, bandwidth, jitter, and packet loss for CG.
+- CG-IMT2020 is required to assure CG service scalability and reliability based on the collaboration between a CG centre and CG edge.
+- CG-IMT2020 is required to assure mobility management of the CG edge.
+
+# 8 Functional requirements
+
+## 8.1 CG centre
+
+- The CG centre is required to act as an IMT-2020 application function (AF) and to interact with the IMT-2020 policy control function (PCF) to exchange QoS subscription information. The subscription information may contain bandwidth, delay, jitter loss rate, etc.
+- The CG centre is recommended to collect QoS data and report to the IMT-2020 PCF.
+- The CG centre is required to perform global management functions (e.g., resource management).
+- The CG centre is required to interact with CG-IMT2020 to customize the local shunting policies.
+
+## **8.2 CG edge**
+
+- The CG edge is required to act as an IMT-2020 AF and to interact with IMT-2020 PCF to exchange QoS subscription information. The subscription information may contain bandwidth, delay, jitter loss rate, etc.
+- The CG edge is recommended to collect QoS data and report to the IMT-2020 PCF.
+- The CG edge is required to perform computation-intensive and delay-crucial functions (e.g., video encoding and game rendering).
+- The CG edge is required to support video encoding and compression mechanisms to lower the network bandwidth requirement.
+- Deployment of the CG edge is required at the edge of the IMT-2020 network close to the CG client.
+- The CG edge is required to adjust video frame rate dynamically based on QoS monitoring data.
+
+## **8.3 CG client**
+
+- The CG client is recommended to collect QoS data and report to the IMT-2020 PCF.
+- The CG client is required to support local decoding and rendering to meet QoS assurance objectives.
+
+## **8.4 Collaboration between CG centre and CG edge**
+
+- The CG centre is required to monitor the status of the CG edge.
+- The CG centre is required to support dynamic scheduling and orchestration for the CG edge.
+
+NOTE – Dynamic scheduling depends on the location of CG clients and the status of the CG edge.
+
+# **9 Framework**
+
+Figure 9-1 shows the framework for CG supported by an IMT-2020 network. It consists of CG client (user equipment (UE)), CG edge and CG centre. A description of each part follows.
+
+
+
+Figure 9-1: Framework for cloud gaming supported by IMT-2020. The diagram illustrates the network architecture and QoS flow across different components. Key elements include: UE (User Equipment) with a CG client (User interaction capturing, Video decoding, QoS monitoring); AN (Access Network) with RP-tn and RP-an interfaces; CN (Core Network) with USM, NFR, ASF, CEF, AF, NACF, NSSF, PCF, SMF, and QoS assurance functions (planning, provisioning, monitoring, optimisation); Data network with Resource management, Access management, QoS monitoring, and CG centre; Edge data network with Game rendering, Video encoding, QoS monitoring, and CG edge; and UPF (User Plane Function) in the CN. QoS flows are indicated by solid arrows, and QoS assurance functions are highlighted in blue. Interfaces shown include UE-AN, RP-an, RP-au, RP-su, RP-ud, and RP-tn. A legend at the bottom right defines the symbols for QoS flow and QoS assurance functions.
+
+Y.3125(23)
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Framework for cloud gaming supported by IMT-2020**
+
+- The IMT-2020 network exposes the QoS assurance-related network capabilities to the CG centre and the CG edge for QoS customization [b-ITU-T Y.3108] and supports E2E QoS control. The CG centre and CG edge act as an AF and may interact with the PCF in an IMT-2020 network for QoS customization in two ways:
+ - i) with the PCF directly by acting as a trusted AF;
+ - ii) with the PCF via the capability exposure function.
+ When the PCF receives QoS-related requests, it starts a new QoS flow or updates the existing QoS flow and the QoS policies are applied to the flow that spans the UE, access network (AN) and user plane function (UPF). The CG traffic is routed to the CG edge as local traffic and any other types of traffic is routed to the CG centre [b-ITU-T Y.3158].
+- The CG client is thin, i.e., with basic hardware capacities. The CG client is responsible for:
+ - i) decoding and displaying the video stream to CG players;
+ - ii) capturing player interaction (input) and dispatch to the CG edge.
+ The CG client can also monitor and collect related QoS data and report to IMT-2020 PCF to optimize CG QoS. CG requires "playing everywhere", the CG client may move around and switch between different ANs or core networks (CNs).
+- The CG centre is located in the data network and is responsible for global management functions, such as access and resources management; The CG centre acts as an AF in the IMT-2020 network and may interact with the PCF for QoS customization. The CG centre is also responsible for generating the traffic-steering policy applied on the UPF and selecting an appropriate CG edge. The CG centre can also collect QoS data and report to the IMT-2020 PCF to optimize CG QoS.
+- CG edge is located at the edge near the CG client to reduce the round-trip time over the IMT-2020 network. It is managed by the CG centre and is responsible for game logic, video encoding and rendering, etc. The CG edge also collects CG QoS data and reports to the IMT-2020 PCF for QoS optimization.
+
+- The CG centre and CG edge collaborates to support QoS assurance in mobility, scalability and reliability. When the CG client moves, based on the CG client location and the coverage of the CG edge, the CG centre schedules the serving CG edge on demand. The CG centre also interacts with the CG edge to acquire its status. It schedules or orchestrates the CG edge: more CG edge instances are created when the resource of the serving instances is insufficient. The serving instance is destroyed when it serves no CG client.
+
+# **10 Security considerations**
+
+This Recommendation describes QoS assurance requirements and a framework for CG supported by the IMT-2020 network and general network security requirements and mechanisms in networks based on the Internet protocol and the IMT-2020 network should be applied [b-ITU-T Y.2701], [ITU-T Y.3101]. Security mechanisms, such as authentication, authority, accounting and encryption, should be adopted to ensure system security.
+
+# Appendix I
+
+## General quality of service considerations for cloud gaming
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+CG places substantial demands on a network in terms of delay, bandwidth, jitter, packet loss and mobility, for which QoS considerations are described as follows.
+
+- **Delay:** This is time lag between the user command actions and the video refresh responses on the screen. Figure I.1 shows E2E delay in CG. The network requirements for CG depend largely on the desired quality of the video and gameplay experience. Since user input is sent from the client to the game server, this means that uplink delay must be as low and consistent as downlink delay. Smoothness of gameplay for the user depends on the number of video frames per second (fps) and delay. For example, while a 30 fps game requires a frame interval of 33.3 ms, a 60 fps game requires one of 16.67 ms. More frames per second demand lower delays. The E2E delay including command collection, uplink user interaction, processing and rendering, downlink streaming and display needs to be less than or equal to the time duration of each video frame. Removing client and game server internal processing delays such as command collection, processing, rendering and display, the round-trip time (RTT) delay over an IMT-2020 system should be less than 5 ms for 60 fps [b-3GPP TR 22.842]. Furthermore, the RTT delay is more relaxed for 30 fps. The uplink will likely be a shorter process than downlink because less data needs to be sent from the device compared to the stream data sent on the downlink.
+
+
+
+```
+graph LR
+ User[User] -- 1 --> Client
+ subgraph Client
+ UIC[User interaction capturing]
+ VD[Video decoding]
+ end
+ subgraph Cloud_gaming_service [Cloud gaming service]
+ CI[Client interaction]
+ GL[Game logic]
+ GR[Game rendering]
+ VE[Video encoding]
+ VS[Video streaming]
+ CI --> GL
+ GL --> GR
+ GR --> VE
+ VE --> VS
+ end
+ Client -- 2: User commands --> Cloud_gaming_service
+ Cloud_gaming_service -- 4: Video stream --> Client
+ Client -- 6 --> VD
+ VD -- 7 --> Video_display[Video display]
+```
+
+Figure I.1 – End-to-end delay in cloud gaming. The diagram illustrates the flow of data and processing steps between a User, a Client, and a Cloud gaming service. The Client contains 'User interaction capturing' and 'Video decoding'. The Cloud gaming service contains 'Client interaction', 'Game logic', 'Game rendering', 'Video encoding', and 'Video streaming'. The flow is: 1. User sends command to Client (1). 2. Client sends 'User commands' to Cloud (2). 3. Cloud processes (3). 4. Cloud sends 'Video stream' to Client (4). 5. Client decodes (5). 6. Client sends to Video display (6). 7. Video display shows to User (7).
+
+Y.3125(23)
+
+**Figure I.1 – End-to-end delay in cloud gaming**
+
+List of components of E2E delay:
+
+1. command data collection delay;
+2. uplink transmission delay of user interaction;
+3. delay in receiving, processing and rendering the picture;
+4. graphic preparation delay;
+5. downlink transmission delay of the video steam;
+6. client decoding delay;
+7. delay in displaying to the user.
+
+- **Bandwidth:** Resolution in CG has a significant impact on the requirement for bandwidth and higher resolution usually offers a better user experience. When bandwidth is insufficient, packet loss or timeout retransmission of video streams can occur, which causes screen dullness and operation hysteresis. CG usually supports resolution such as 720 p and 1 080 p, higher resolutions 2K and 4K are also getting more popular since the IMT-2020 network provides high bandwidth. It is evaluated that 10 Mbit/s is required for 720 p, 30 Mbit/s is required for 1 080 p, 45 Mbit/s is required for 4K during the active part of CG ([b-Bell]). Besides resolution, many other factors can also affect requirements for network bandwidth, such as frame rate, compression algorithm and group of pictures. Often CG servers adjust video frame rate dynamically based on bandwidth and network round trip time.
+- **Jitter:** E2E delay can vary from packet to packet, and the variation is referred to as delay jitter. Jitter determines the consistency of connection between the source and the destination. It has a perceivable influence on the CG experience because the client must receive, decode and display frames at a constant rate, and any late frames resulting from delay jitter can produce stuttering in game playback. While additional buffering can eliminate jitter in general streaming applications, but CG with high interactions and associated low E2E delay requires lower jitter.
+- **Packet loss:** In CG, the effect of packet loss on the downlink is fragmentation of the video as well as keystroke loss on the uplink. A packet loss of 1% can very well compromise more than 20% of the picture in the video stream.
+- **Mobility:** The user can enjoy CG services in high-speed mobile scenarios, such as in a high-speed train. As the user client connects to different ANs gradually, the delay with the original CG edge will increase. The client needs access to the appropriate CG edge based on user location in the IMT-2020 network.
+
+# Appendix II
+
+## General deployment use case
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+A general deployment of CG supported by IMT-2020 network is shown in Figure II.1. To meet the QoS requirement, CG service from a provider is divided into CG centre and CG edge. The CG edge is deployed in the MEC system provided by the network operator and the CG centre is deployed in the cloud from the service provider ([b-ITU-T Y.3500]). The UPF is deployed at the edge of the IMT-2020 network for better network performance; the CG traffic is routed as local traffic to the CG edge and any other types of traffic to the CG centre according to the local shunting policy, which is generated by the CG centre and sent to the IMT-2020 network.
+
+
+
+Figure II.1: General deployment of CG centre and CG edge. The diagram illustrates the network architecture for CG (Cloud Gaming) service. On the left, a 'User client' (represented by a game controller and a smartphone) connects to an 'AN' (Access Network) tower. The AN connects to a 'MEC system' cloud. Inside the MEC system, there is a 'CG edge' block containing 'Rendering' and a 'UPF' (User Plane Function) block. The CG edge is connected to the AN. The MEC system is connected to a 'CN' (Core Network) block, which contains another 'UPF' block. The CN is connected to a 'Cloud' cloud, which contains a 'CG centre' block with 'Management' and 'CG centre' components. A dashed line labeled 'Collaboration' connects the CG edge and the CG centre. The Cloud is connected to a 'DN' (Data Network). The diagram is labeled 'Y.3125(23)' in the bottom right corner.
+
+**Figure II.1 – General deployment of CG centre and CG edge**
+
+Some essential collaboration issues between CG centre and CG edge for QoS assurance follow.
+
+- The CG centre needs to collaborate with the CG edge for scheduling and orchestration of CG edge. For example, the game starts when the UE (players) sends a game access request to the CG centre. After receiving the request from the UE, the CG centre schedules the UE to an existing or new CG edge based on the location of UE and the status of MEC resources. When the UE is moving (e.g., on a high-speed train) and leaves the coverage of the MEC host or if the resources of the MEC host (e.g., network resource or computing resource) run out, the CG centre should shift the player to an appropriate CG edge to meet the QoS requirements. Also, as the number of players increases, the CG centre should be able to adjust or expand the availability of CG edge resources.
+
+# Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T E.800] Recommendation ITU-T E.800 (2008), *Definitions of terms related to quality of service*.
+- [b-ITU-T P.10] Recommendation ITU-T P.10/G.100 (2017), *Vocabulary for performance, quality of service and quality of experience*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3108] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3108 (2019), *Capability exposure function in IMT-2020 networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3109] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3109 (2021), *Quality of service assurance-related requirements and framework for virtual reality delivery using mobile edge computing supported by IMT-2020*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3158] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3158 (2022), *Local shunting for multi-access edge computing in IMT-2020 networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-ETSI GR MEC 001] Group Report ETSI GR MEC 001 V3.1.1 (2022), *Multi-access edge computing (MEC); Terminology*.
+- [b-3GPP TR 22.842] Technical Report 3GPP TR 22.842 V17.2.0 (2019), *3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Study on network controlled interactive services (Release 17)*.
+- [b-Bell] Bell Labs Consulting (2020). *Cloud gaming and 5G*, white paper. Espoo: Nokia. Available [viewed 2023-10-31] at: [https://d1p0gxncu0lvz.cloudfront.net/documents/Nokia\\_Cloud\\_gaming\\_and\\_5G\\_-\\_Realizing\\_the\\_opportunity\\_White\\_Paper\\_EN.pdf](https://d1p0gxncu0lvz.cloudfront.net/documents/Nokia_Cloud_gaming_and_5G_-_Realizing_the_opportunity_White_Paper_EN.pdf)
+
+
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3127 (12/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Future networks including IMT-2020 –
+Requirements and framework for self-
+organizing core network**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3127
+
+# Future networks including IMT-2020 – Requirements and framework for self-organizing core network
+
+## Summary
+
+The self-organizing core network (SOCN) is a core network constituted by a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on available network capabilities and resources. It may reduce the capital expenditure and operating expense of core networks by efficiently utilizing available network capabilities and resources. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3127 provides an overview, and specifies requirements, framework and general procedures of a self-organizing core network, in the context of future networks including IMT-2020.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3127 | 2023-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15738 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+Core network, framework, future networks, IMT-2020, requirements, self-organizing.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2024
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | Page |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 References..... | 1 |
+| 3 Definitions ..... | 2 |
+| 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 2 |
+| 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 2 |
+| 4 Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 Conventions ..... | 3 |
+| 6 Introduction of self-organizing core network ..... | 3 |
+| 7 Requirements of self-organizing core network..... | 4 |
+| 7.1 General requirements of self-organizing core networks ..... | 4 |
+| 7.2 Service requirements of self-organizing core networks ..... | 5 |
+| 7.3 Network capability requirements of self-organizing core network..... | 5 |
+| 7.4 Network resource requirements of self-organizing core networks..... | 6 |
+| 8 Framework of self-organizing core network ..... | 6 |
+| 8.1 High-level framework of self-organizing core network ..... | 6 |
+| 8.2 Functional entities of self-organizing core network ..... | 7 |
+| 8.3 Functions external to self-organizing core network ..... | 7 |
+| 8.4 Reference points of self-organizing core network..... | 8 |
+| 8.5 Enabling technologies of self-organizing core network ..... | 9 |
+| 9 General procedures of self-organizing core network..... | 10 |
+| 9.1 Network connection procedure..... | 10 |
+| 9.2 Network organization procedure ..... | 11 |
+| 9.3 Network operation procedure ..... | 11 |
+| 9.4 Network management procedure..... | 12 |
+| 10 Security considerations ..... | 13 |
+| Appendix I – Use cases of self-organizing core network ..... | 14 |
+| Bibliography..... | 16 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3127
+
+# Future networks including IMT-2020 – Requirements and framework for self-organizing core network
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies the requirements and framework for a self-organizing core network (SOCN), in the context of future networks including IMT-2020.
+
+The self-organizing core network is a core network constituted by a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on available network capabilities and resources. This Recommendation addresses the following aspects of self-organizing core network in future networks including IMT-2020:
+
+- Overview;
+- Requirements;
+- Framework;
+- General procedures.
+
+Some relevant use cases are provided in Appendix I.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+- | | |
+|----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| [ITU-T X.1313] | Recommendation ITU-T X.1313 (2012), Security requirements for wireless sensor network routing . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3101 (2018), Requirements of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3102] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), Framework of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3104] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3104 (2018), Architecture of the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3105] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3105 (2018), Requirements of capability exposure in the IMT-2020 network . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3108] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3108 (2019), Capability exposure function in IMT-2020 networks . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3110] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3110 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration requirements . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3111] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3111 (2017), IMT-2020 network management and orchestration framework . |
+| [ITU-T Y.3114] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3114 (2022), Future networks including IMT-2020: requirements and functional architecture of lightweight core for dedicated networks . |
+
+- [ITU-T Y.3172] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), *Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300 (2014), *Framework of software-defined networking*.
+- [ITU-T Y.3324] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3324 (2018), *Requirements and architectural framework for autonomic management and control of IMT 2020 networks*.
+- [ITU-T Y.4417] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4417 (2018), *Framework of self-organization networking in Internet of things environments*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere:
+
+**3.1.1 control plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control.
+
+**3.1.2 data plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration.
+
+**3.1.3 dedicated network** [ITU-T Y.3114]: A network designed for application domains with common requirements.
+
+**3.1.4 IMT-2020** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related technologies that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645].
+
+**3.1.5 machine learning (ML)** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed.
+
+**3.1.6 network function** [b-ITU-T Y.3100]: In the context of IMT-2020, a processing function in a network.
+
+**3.1.7 software-defined networking** [ITU-T Y.3300]: A set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner.
+
+**3.1.8 user plane** [b-ITU-T Y.2011]: A synonym for data plane.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following term:
+
+**3.2.1 self-organizing core network (SOCN)**: A core network constituted by a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on the available network capabilities and resources.
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|-------|---------------------------------------------------------|
+| AI | Artificial Intelligence |
+| AMC | Autonomic Management and Control |
+| AN | Autonomous Network |
+| FCAPS | Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security |
+| FMC | Fixed Mobile Convergence |
+
+| | |
+|------|-----------------------------------------|
+| FMSC | Fixed, Mobile and Satellite Convergence |
+| GBR | Guaranteed Bit Rate |
+| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol |
+| IP | Internet Protocol |
+| LEO | Low Earth Orbit |
+| ML | Machine Learning |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| QoS | Quality of Service |
+| RP | Reference Point |
+| SDN | Software-Defined Networking |
+| SOCN | Self-Organizing Core Network |
+| SON | Self-Organized Network |
+| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol |
+| UAV | Unmanned Aerial Vehicle |
+| UDP | User Datagram Protocol |
+| UE | User Equipment |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Introduction of self-organizing core network
+
+The self-organizing core network (SONC) is a core network constituted by a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on available network capabilities and resources, in the context of future networks including IMT-2020. There is a single head entity and multiple member entities in a self-organizing core network. A group of network entities in a specific region, which constitute a self-organizing core network, automatically elect the head entity based on different factors, e.g., capabilities, resources, reliability, robustness, and mobility. The head entity takes the role of organizing the core network, while a member entity takes the role of constituting the core network under the control of the head entity. The head entity distributes the IMT-2020 core network functions to itself and each member entity. In the case that the head entity loses network connection, the member entities re-elect the head entity, and the
+
+newly-elected head entity reorganizes the core network. In the case that a member entity loses network connection, the head entity reorganizes the core network. In summary, a self-organizing core network is a kind of autonomous network (AN) [b-ITU-T Y.3061], addressing the organization and operation of a core network in the function level.
+
+With the introduction of innovative technologies including self-organization networking [ITU-T Y.4417], clustering networking [ITU-T X.1313], software-defined networking (SDN) [ITU-T Y.3300], and artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning (ML) [ITU-T Y.3172], it is technically feasible to deploy the self-organizing core network in the context of future networks including IMT-2020. The self-organizing core network may reduce the capital expenditure and operating expense of core networks by efficiently utilizing available network capabilities and resources.
+
+The use of a self-organizing core network is suited for, but not limited to, the following use cases:
+
+- The use case of a network with high mobility, such as a vehicular network, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) network, and a satellite network, in which the core network is required to adapt to the dynamic network topology;
+- The use case of a network deployed to meet dynamic service requirements, such as emergency communications, event communications, and disaster recovery, in which the core network is required to be deployed in a timely manner;
+- The use case of a network requiring extensive customization on functionalities, interfaces, protocols, and procedures, which may not fully conform to the requirements and design principles of the IMT-2020 core network [ITU-T Y.3104];
+- The use case of a network requiring secure isolation from other networks, which may not be required to be supported in the IMT-2020 core network [ITU-T Y.3104];
+- The use case of a network requiring AI/ML related capabilities, which may not be required as basic capabilities of the IMT-2020 core network [ITU-T Y.3104].
+
+Specifically, the use cases of satellite-based wireless core networks and wireless core networks for emergency communications are provided in Appendix I.
+
+# **7 Requirements of self-organizing core network**
+
+## **7.1 General requirements of self-organizing core networks**
+
+The general requirements of the self-organizing core network are as follows:
+
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the use cases identified in this Recommendation.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the services and applications supported by the IMT-2020 network, as specified in [ITU-T Y.3101].
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to be compatible with user equipment (UE) and access networks supported by the IMT-2020 network.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support interworking with IMT-2020 networks.
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support interworking with different access networks, including fixed access, mobile access and satellite access.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to automatically organize and manage the IMT-2020 core network functions, as specified in [ITU-T Y.3102] and [ITU-T Y.3104].
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support the following enabling technologies: self-organization networking [ITU-T Y.4417], clustering networking [ITU-T X.1313], SDN [ITU-T Y.3300], and AI/ML [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to discover and use services of the service plane.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to have the ability to implement energy-efficient operations.
+NOTE 1 – The self-organizing core network may be deployed on nodes which have limitations on energy supply, such as vehicles, UAV and satellites.
+- It is required for a self-organizing core network to exploit the mobility of its nodes.
+NOTE 2 – The mobile nodes may include, but are not limited to, vehicles, UAV and satellites. The mobility of nodes may affect the network connection, network organization and network management of the self-organizing core network, as specified in clause 9.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the management and orchestration capability, as specified in [ITU-T Y.3110] and [ITU-T Y.3111].
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to use stateless and intent-driven protocols [b-ITU-T Y.2344].
+
+## **7.2 Service requirements of self-organizing core networks**
+
+The service requirements supported by self-organizing core networks are as follows:
+
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the service requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3101] and [ITU-T Y.3114].
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support best-effort quality of service (QoS).
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support guaranteed bit rate (GBR) QoS.
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support service continuity among different access networks.
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support traffic routing across different access networks.
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to have the ability to deploy services in a distributed manner using networking, computing and storage resources of the core networks, access networks and UEs.
+
+## **7.3 Network capability requirements of self-organizing core network**
+
+The network capability requirements of self-organizing core networks are as follows:
+
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the network capability requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3102] and [ITU-T Y.3104].
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the capability exposure requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3105] and [ITU-T Y.3108].
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the customization of network functions based on the requirements of services and applications, including with respect to networking, computing and storage resources.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to support the self-organizing capabilities [ITU-T Y.4417].
+- It is recommended for self-organizing core networks to support fixed mobile convergence (FMC) [b-ITU-T Y.3131], and fixed, mobile and satellite convergence (FMSC) [b-ITU-T Y.3201].
+- It is required for self-organizing core network to enable the use of AI/ML functionalities.
+
+NOTE – The enabled AI/ML functionalities are internal to the self-organizing core network. These functionalities may be provided via an ML overlay [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+### 7.4 Network resource requirements of self-organizing core networks
+
+The network resource requirements of self-organizing core networks are as follows:
+
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to manage the available resources.
+NOTE 1 – The resources include networking (e.g., access networks, core networks), computing and storage resources.
+- It is required for self-organizing core networks to discover and use new resources.
+- It is required for a self-organizing core networks to be able to cope with unreliable and constrained resources.
+
+NOTE 2 – The self-organizing core network may be deployed on nodes which have limitation on networking, computing and storage resources; also these resources may be deployed by unreliable sources.
+
+- It is required to have the ability to implement self-organizing core networks using virtual resources [ITU-T Y.3300].
+- It is recommended to have the ability to implement self-organizing core networks using terrestrial and satellite related resources [b-ITU-T Y.3201].
+
+# 8 Framework of self-organizing core network
+
+### 8.1 High-level framework of self-organizing core network
+
+Figure 8-1 depicts the high-level framework of the self-organizing core network, in the context of future networks including IMT-2020.
+
+
+
+```
+
+graph TD
+ subgraph SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork [Self-organizing core network]
+ HE[Head entity]
+ ME1[Member entity]
+ ME2[Member entity]
+ AIMLEntity[AI/ML entity]
+ ME1 -.->|RP-cn1| HE
+ ME2 -.->|RP-cn2| HE
+ HE -- RP-cn3 --> AIMLEntity
+ ME1 -.->|RP-cn4| AIMLEntity
+ end
+
+ SP[Service plane] --- RP-ex6 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+ MP[Management plane] --- RP-ex5 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+ DN[Data network] --- RP-ex4 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+ UE[User equipment (UE)] --- RP-ex1 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+ AN[Access network] --- RP-ex2 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+ IMT2020[IMT-2020 core network] --- RP-ex3 --- SelfOrganizingCoreNetwork
+
+```
+
+Figure 8-1: High-level framework of self-organizing core network. The diagram shows a central 'Self-organizing core network' box containing a 'Head entity', two 'Member entity' boxes, and an 'AI/ML entity'. The 'Head entity' is connected to both 'Member entity' boxes via 'RP-cn1' and 'RP-cn2' interfaces. The 'Head entity' is also connected to the 'AI/ML entity' via 'RP-cn3'. The 'Member entity' on the left is connected to the 'AI/ML entity' via 'RP-cn4'. The 'Self-organizing core network' is connected to external components: 'Service plane' (top) via 'RP-ex6', 'Management plane' (left) via 'RP-ex5', 'Data network' (left) via 'RP-ex4', 'User equipment (UE)' (bottom) via 'RP-ex1', 'Access network' (bottom) via 'RP-ex2', and 'IMT-2020 core network' (right) via 'RP-ex3'.
+
+Y.3127(23)
+
+**Figure 8-1 – High-level framework of self-organizing core network**
+
+In the high-level framework, the self-organizing core network interoperates with UE, access network, data network, management plane, and service plane, and may interoperate with other IMT-2020 core network(s). The self-organizing core network consists of a single head entity, multiple member entities, and an optional single entity supporting AI/ML functionalities (AI/ML entity), working in a self-organized and dynamic fashion. The interface between the head entity and a member entity, and the interface between the head entity and the AI/ML entity are required; while
+
+the interface between member entities, and the interface between a member entity and the AI/ML entity are optional.
+
+The self-organizing core network entities, i.e., the head entity, member entities and the AI/ML entity, operate in terms of control plane and user plane of the core network.
+
+The self-organizing core network performs the organization and operation of a core network with the general procedures of network connection, network organization, network operation and network management, as specified in clause 9.
+
+### **8.2 Functional entities of self-organizing core network**
+
+#### **8.2.1 Head entity**
+
+The head entity is a required functional entity. It takes the role of organizing the core network in the function level. The role of core network organization includes, but is not limited to, distributing the core network functions to itself and each member entity; determining the service procedures between itself and each member entity; determining the service procedures between member entities; and reorganizing the core network in case that a member entity loses network connection. The head entity is automatically determined in the process of network organization; it is elected based on different factors, e.g., capabilities, resources, reliability, robustness, and mobility. The head entity consists of control related functionalities, user related functionalities and data related functionalities; and supports the processes of network organization, network operation and network management.
+
+NOTE – The function level corresponds to the network functions of the IMT-2020 core network [ITU-T Y.3102] and [ITU-T Y.3104].
+
+#### **8.2.2 Member entity**
+
+A member entity is a required functional entity. It takes the role of constituting the core network in the function level, under the control of the head entity. A member entity is automatically determined in the process of network organization; it re-elects the head entity in case that the head entity loses network connection. A member entity consists of control related functionalities, user related functionalities and data related functionalities; and supports the processes of network organization, network operation and network management.
+
+#### **8.2.3 AI/ML entity**
+
+The AI/ML entity is an optional functional entity. It interacts with the head entity and the member entities to assist in the processes of self-organized network organization, network operation and network management. The AI/ML entity takes the role of AI/ML overlay [ITU-T Y.3172] internal to the self-organizing core network. The AI/ML entity may also use AI/ML related functionalities provided externally to the self-organizing core network as an AI/ML overlay. The AI/ML entity may adopt the high-level architectural framework specified in [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+### **8.3 Functions external to self-organizing core network**
+
+#### **8.3.1 User equipment**
+
+The user equipment (UE) includes, but is not limited to, handset terminals, wearable terminals, customer premise equipment, satellite terminals and multi-access terminals.
+
+#### **8.3.2 Access network**
+
+The access network includes a fixed access network, mobile access network and satellite access network.
+
+#### 8.3.3 IMT-2020 core network
+
+The IMT-2020 core network external to the self-organizing core network includes the core networks specified in [ITU-T Y.3102], [ITU-T Y.3104] and [ITU-T Y.3114].
+
+#### 8.3.4 Data network
+
+The data network plays the same role as the data network specified in [ITU-T Y.3104].
+
+#### 8.3.5 Management plane
+
+The management plane provides the functionalities for the management of the self-organizing core network according to the management functional areas listed in [b-ITU-T M.3010], i.e., performance management, fault management, configuration management, accounting management and security management, also known as fault, configuration, accounting, performance, security (FCAPS) functional areas.
+
+These functionalities are expected to include the management of the functional entities of the self-organizing core network.
+
+NOTE 1 – The detailed operations involving the management plane are out of scope of this Recommendation.
+
+NOTE 2 – [b-SMN] provides an example for self-managed network, in which the management plane functionalities are addressed.
+
+#### 8.3.6 Service plane
+
+The service plane supports communications services and third party applications.
+
+Communications services may use the service invoking interfaces of the self-organizing core network, while third party applications may use the capability exposure interfaces of the self-organizing core network.
+
+### 8.4 Reference points of self-organizing core network
+
+Some of the reference points of the self-organizing core network are the same as the reference points of an IMT-2020 network; while others reflect the specific requirements of the three types of involved functional entities, i.e., head entity, member entity and AI/ML entity. As shown in Figure 8-1, the self-organizing core network has 4 internal reference points (RPs) and 6 external reference points as follows:
+
+- RP-cn1: The reference point exists between the head entity and a member entity. This reference point is recommended to adopt the protocol stack based on hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) [b-IETF RFC 7540] / Transmission control protocol (TCP) / Internet protocol (IP) for control plane [b-ITU-T Y.2011]; and the protocol stack based on HTTP / user datagram protocol (UDP) / IP for user plane [b-ITU-T Y.2011].
+- RP-cn2: The reference point exists between member entities. This reference point is recommended to adopt the protocol stack based on HTTP [b-IETF RFC 7540] / TCP / IP for control plane [b-ITU-T Y.2011]; and the protocol stack based on HTTP / UDP / IP for user plane [b-ITU-T Y.2011].
+- RP-cn3: The reference point exists between the head entity and the AI/ML entity. This reference point is recommended to adopt the protocol stack based on HTTP [b-IETF RFC 7540] / UDP / IP.
+- RP-cn4: The reference point exists between a member entity and the AI/ML entity. This reference point is recommended to adopt the protocol stack based on HTTP [b-IETF RFC 7540] / UDP / IP.
+
+- RP-ex1: The reference point exists between the UE and the self-organizing core network. RP-ex1 corresponds to the reference point RP-tn as defined in [ITU-T Y.3104]. The details of this reference point are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+- RP-ex2: The reference point exists between the access network and the self-organizing core network. RP-ex2 corresponds to the reference point RP-an as defined in [ITU-T Y.3104]. The details of this reference point are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+- RP-ex3: The reference point exists between the self-organizing core network and the IMT-2020 core network. RP-ex3 corresponds to the interoperability interfaces as defined in [3GPP TS 23.501]. The details of this reference point are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+- RP-ex4: The reference point exists between the self-organizing core network and the data network. RP-ex4 corresponds to the reference point RP-ud as defined in [ITU-T Y.3104]. The details of this reference point are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+- RP-ex5: The reference point exists between the self-organizing core network and the management plane, including, but not limited to, network function management interfaces, network connection management interfaces, resource management interfaces, capability management interfaces, and user management interfaces. The details of this reference point, including the operations carried out via this reference point, are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+- RP-ex6: The reference point exists between the self-organizing core network and the service plane, including service invoking interfaces and capability exposure interfaces. The details of this reference point are out of the scope of this Recommendation.
+
+### 8.5 Enabling technologies of self-organizing core network
+
+In support of the network connection, network organization, network operation and network management of the self-organizing core network, the enabling technologies of the self-organizing core network include the following:
+
+- Self-organization networking
+
+Self-organization networking refers to networking established by individual devices where the devices interact with their peers and perform self-control. The self-organizing core network uses self-organization networking technologies for dynamic and flexible network connection and network organization of functional entities. The self-organization networking functionalities are specified in [ITU-T Y.4417].
+
+- Clustering networking
+
+Clustering networking is a networking method in which neighbouring nodes advertise their existence to each other to form a cluster, where a clustering head has more computing resources for information processing. The self-organizing core network uses clustering networking technologies for efficient network connection and network organization of functional entities. The clustering networking functionalities are specified in [ITU-T X.1313].
+
+- SDN
+
+SDN is a set of techniques that enables to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of network services in a dynamic and scalable manner. The self-organizing core network uses SDN technologies for dynamic and flexible network connection, network organization and network management of functional entities. The basic SDN functionalities are specified in [ITU-T Y.3300].
+
+- AI/ML
+
+The self-organizing core network uses AI/ML technologies for automatic network organization, network operation and network management of functional entities.
+
+NOTE – The basic ML functionalities are specified in [ITU-T Y.3172].
+
+## 9 General procedures of self-organizing core network
+
+This clause specifies the general procedures of self-organizing core networks, including network connection procedure, network organization procedure, network operation procedure, and network management procedure. The network operation procedure and network management procedure are provided in the form of examples. These general procedures do not impact the detailed procedures of the IMT-2020 network specified in [ITU-T Y.3104], which include registration management procedures, connection management procedures, session management procedures, and handover procedures.
+
+### 9.1 Network connection procedure
+
+Figure 9-1 depicts the network connection procedure of a self-organizing core network.
+
+
+
+```
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN as Access network
+ participant NE1 as Network entity 1
+ participant Dots as .....
+ participant NEN as Network entity N
+ participant DN as Data network
+ participant MP as Management plane
+ participant SP as Service plane
+
+ Note over NE1, NEN: 1. Network entities establish connections among them
+ Note over NE1, NEN: 2. Network entities negotiate the roles for external network connections
+ Note over AN, NE1: 3. Network entities establish network connections to access network
+ Note over NEN, DN: 4. Network entities establish network connections to data network
+ Note over NEN, MP: 5. Network entities establish network connections to management plane
+ Note over NEN, SP: 6. Network entities establish network connections to service plane
+ Note over UE, AN, NE1, Dots, NEN, DN, MP, SP: 7. End-to-end network connections have been established
+```
+
+Sequence diagram showing the network connection procedure of a self-organizing core network. The diagram involves seven entities: UE, Access network, Network entity 1, ..., Network entity N, Data network, Management plane, and Service plane. The steps are: 1. Network entities establish connections among them. 2. Network entities negotiate the roles for external network connections. 3. Network entities establish network connections to access network. 4. Network entities establish network connections to data network. 5. Network entities establish network connections to management plane. 6. Network entities establish network connections to service plane. 7. End-to-end network connections have been established.
+
+Y.3127(23)
+
+**Figure 9-1 – Network connection procedure of self-organizing core network**
+
+The steps shown in Figure 9-1 are as follows:
+
+- 1) A group of network entities in a specific region establish network connections among them in a self-organized manner.
+- 2) The group of network entities negotiate their roles for external network connections in a self-organized manner, in which the roles include connecting to the access network, connecting to the data network, connecting to the management plane, and connecting to the service plane.
+- 3) Based on the role for external network connections, some of the network entities establish network connections to the access network.
+- 4) Based on the role for external network connections, some of the network entities establish network connections to the data network.
+- 5) Based on the role for external network connections, some of the network entities establish network connections to the management plane.
+- 6) Based on the role for external network connections, some of the network entities establish network connections to the service plane.
+
+- 7) The end-to-end network connections, which include the network connections among UE, access network, network entities, data network, management plane and service plane, have been established.
+
+### 9.2 Network organization procedure
+
+Figure 9-2 depicts the network organization procedure of a self-organizing core network.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the network organization procedure of a self-organizing core network. It features five lifelines: Network entity 1, Network entity 2, Network entity 3, an ellipsis (.....), and Network entity N. The process follows these steps:
+
+1. Network entities automatically elect head entity: A wide horizontal bar spans all lifelines.
+2. Network entity 1 is elected as head entity: A box on the lifeline of Network entity 1.
+3. Network entity assigns network entity 2 as AI/ML entity: An arrow points from Network entity 1 to Network entity 2.
+4. Head entity assigns network entities 3 - N as member entities: An arrow points from Network entity 1 to Network entity N.
+5. Core network has been organized: A wide horizontal bar spans all lifelines.
+
+Y.3127(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the network organization procedure of a self-organizing core network.
+
+**Figure 9-2 – Network organization procedure of self-organizing core network**
+
+The steps shown in Figure 9-2 are as follows:
+
+- 1) A group of network entities automatically elect the head entity in a self-organized manner, based on different factors, e.g., capabilities, resources, reliability, robustness, and mobility.
+- 2) The network entity 1 is elected as the head entity, it takes the role of organizing the core network in the function level. The head entity distributes some of IMT-2020 core network functions to itself.
+- 3) The head entity (network entity 1) considers the AI/ML related functionalities of other network entities, and assigns network entity 2 as the AI/ML entity. The head entity distributes some of IMT-2020 core network functions to the AI/ML entity.
+- 4) The head entity (network entity 1) assigns network entities 3-N as member entities. The head entity distributes some of IMT-2020 core network functions to member entities.
+- 5) The core network has been organized under the control of the head entity.
+
+### 9.3 Network operation procedure
+
+Figure 9-3 depicts an example of network operation procedure of a self-organizing core network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant UE
+ participant AN as Access network
+ participant HE as Head entity
+ participant AIML as AI/ML entity
+ participant ME as Member entity
+ participant DN as Data network
+ participant MP as Management plane
+ participant SP as Service plane
+
+ Note over UE, AN, ME: 1. UE communicates with member entity
+ Note over ME, HE: 2. Member entity requests head entity for appropriate information
+ Note over HE, AIML: 3. Head entity requests AI/ML entity for AI/ML support
+ Note over HE, ME: 4. Head entity produces appropriate information and sends to member entity
+ Note over ME, DN: 5. Member entity communicates with data network
+ Note over ME, MP: 6. Member entity communicates with management plane
+ Note over ME, SP: 7. Member entity communicates with service plane
+
+```
+
+Y.3127(23)
+
+Sequence diagram showing the network operation procedure of a self-organizing core network. The diagram involves eight entities: UE, Access network, Head entity, AI/ML entity, Member entity, Data network, Management plane, and Service plane. The steps are: 1. UE communicates with member entity (via Access network). 2. Member entity requests head entity for appropriate information. 3. Head entity requests AI/ML entity for AI/ML support. 4. Head entity produces appropriate information and sends to member entity. 5. Member entity communicates with data network. 6. Member entity communicates with management plane. 7. Member entity communicates with service plane.
+
+**Figure 9-3 – An example of network operation procedure of self-organizing core network**
+
+The steps shown in Figure 9-3 are as follows:
+
+- 1) The UE communicates with a member entity through the access network. In this example, the member entity contains the network access control function (NACF) [ITU-T Y.3102].
+- 2) The member entity requests the head entity for appropriate information for the UE. In this example, the head entity contains the policy control function (PCF) and unified subscription management (USM) [ITU-T Y.3102]; the appropriate information is the available services and corresponding QoS.
+- 3) The head entity requests the AI/ML entity for AI/ML support, i.e., to use AI/ML related functionalities of AI/ML entity. In this example, the head entity requests the AI/ML entity for the expected connection data rate for the UE, which is useful for determining which services and corresponding QoS can be provided to the UE.
+- 4) The head entity produces appropriate information with AI/ML support, and sends appropriate information to the member entity.
+- 5) The member entity communicates with the data network.
+- 6) The member entity communicates with the management plane.
+- 7) The member entity communicates with the service plane.
+
+### 9.4 Network management procedure
+
+Figure 9-4 depicts an example of network management procedure of a self-organizing core network.
+
+
+
+```
+
+sequenceDiagram
+ participant HE as Head entity
+ participant AIML as AI/ML entity
+ participant ME1 as Member entity 1
+ participant ME2 as Member entity N
+ participant MP as Management plane
+
+ Note over HE, AIML, ME1, ME2: 1. Head entity, AI/ML entity and member entities operate core network functions
+ Note over HE: 2. Head entity loses network connection
+ Note over ME1, ME2: 3. Member entities re-elect head entity
+ Note over ME1: 4. Member entity 1 is re-elected as head entity
+ Note over HE, AIML, ME1, ME2: 5. New head entity reorganizes core network
+ Note over HE, MP: 6. New head entity reports to management plane
+
+```
+
+Y.3127(23)
+
+Sequence diagram illustrating the network management procedure of a self-organizing core network. The diagram shows the interaction between a Head entity, AI/ML entity, Member entities (1 to N), and a Management plane. The steps are: 1. All entities operate core network functions. 2. Head entity loses network connection. 3. Member entities re-elect head entity. 4. Member entity 1 is re-elected as head entity. 5. New head entity reorganizes core network. 6. New head entity reports to management plane.
+
+**Figure 9-4 – An example of network management procedure of self-organizing core network**
+
+The steps shown in Figure 9-4 are as follows:
+
+- 1) The head entity, AI/ML entity and member entities operate core network functions, under the management of the management plane.
+- 2) The head entity loses network connection.
+- 3) The member entities re-elect the head entity in a self-organized manner.
+- 4) The member entity 1 is re-elected as the head entity.
+- 5) The new head entity (original member entity 1) reorganizes the core network, including the assignment of AI/ML entity and member entities.
+- 6) The new head entity (original member entity 1) reports to the management plane about the reorganization of core network.
+
+# 10 Security considerations
+
+The security and privacy considerations of a self-organizing core network include the following aspects:
+
+- Functional entity security, which includes the security considerations on the head entity, member entities, and AI/ML entity. The secure operations of control related functionalities, user related functionalities, data related functionalities, and AI/ML related functionalities are to be addressed.
+- Interoperation security, which refers to the secure interoperation between functional entities of the self-organizing core network and external functions (including UE, access network, IMT-2020 core network, data network, management plane, and service plane). The mechanisms for secure interoperation are to be addressed.
+- User and service privacy, which include the privacy considerations on the processes of the self-organized network connection, network organization, network operation and network management, in which the privacy sensitive user data and service data are stored, cached and processed.
+
+In addition, the security and privacy considerations of self-organizing core network should be aligned with the requirements specified in [ITU-T Y.3101] and [b-ITU-T Y.2701].
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Use cases of self-organizing core network
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+### Use case 1: Satellite-based wireless core network
+
+With the development of satellite communications technologies, especially low earth orbit (LEO) satellite communications technologies, the technical capabilities of satellite communications are enhanced to the level of 4G/IMT-Advanced or 5G/IMT-2020, and the use cases and services of satellite communications are enriched. In geographic areas such as oceans, seas, deserts, deep mountain, deep forest, and polar regions, and in the scenarios of international roaming and global communications, there exists the need to introduce satellite-based core networks, which could complement and interact with land-based core networks.
+
+However, LEO satellite has high mobility with respect to the ground and with respect to LEO satellites of different orbits. In addition, the communications capabilities and capacity of LEO satellites are relatively limited, typically similar to a land-based base stations; it is practically impossible to deploy all the network functions of IMT-2020 core network in one LEO satellite. Therefore, it is required for satellite-based wireless core networks to support distributed deployment in dynamic network topology, and to dynamically load network functions on different LEO satellites on demand. Traditional IMT-2020 core network does not possess these capabilities.
+
+NOTE – Even in the same LEO constellation, the LEO satellites are distributed in different orbits.
+
+Consisting of a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on the available network capabilities and resources, the self-organizing core network possesses the capabilities to be deployed in dynamic network topology and to dynamically load network functions. Therefore, the self-organizing core network is a potential and technically possible solution for satellite-based core networks.
+
+Experiments on self-organizing core networks based on LEO satellites have been already conducted, proving it is a technically possible solution. Some of the LEO constellations have already deployed core network functions on the satellites, and self-organizing core networks may be introduced. Considering that a LEO constellation has the capabilities to provide communications services to multiple regions and multiple operators, interoperable self-organizing core networks are needed.
+
+### Use case 2: Wireless core network for emergency communications
+
+In emergency scenarios, such as earthquakes, floods, tsunamis and typhoons, land-based communications infrastructure and networks may be damaged or destroyed. However, the communications requirements increase dramatically in the geographic areas in an emergency, and it is of great importance to satisfy these communications requirements for their economic and social benefits. However, traditional IMT-2020 core network requires a relatively long time for deployment, typically a couple of days or a couple of weeks, which could not satisfy the sudden spikes in communications requirements.
+
+Consisting of a group of self-organized network entities cooperating to provide core network functions based on the available network capabilities and resources, the self-organizing core network requires much less time for deployment than traditional networks, typically a couple of hours. Therefore, the self-organizing core network is a potential and technically possible solution for wireless core network for emergency communications.
+
+The self-organizing core network has already been deployed in the form of a "5G customized core network", which aims to meet the requirements of emergency communications. Considering that emergencies may occur over a vast area, covering multiple regions and multiple operators, interoperable self-organizing core networks are needed.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T M.3010] Recommendation ITU-T M.3010 (2000), *Principles for a telecommunications management network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), *General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2344] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2344 (2024), *Scenarios and requirements of intent-based network for network evolution*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.2701] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), *Security requirements for NGN release 1*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3061] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3061 (2023), *Autonomous networks - Architecture framework*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3131] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3131 (2019), *Functional architecture for supporting fixed mobile convergence in IMT-2020 networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3201] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3201 (2023), *Fixed, mobile and satellite convergence – Framework for IMT-2020 networks and beyond*.
+- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*.
+- [b-3GPP TS 23.501] Recommendation 3GPP TS 23.501 (2022), *System architecture for the 5G System (5GS), Stage 2 (Release 17)*.
+- [b-IETF RFC 7540] IETF RFC 7540 (2020), *Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)*.
+- [b-SMN] M. Toy, *Self-Managed Networks with Fault Management Hierarchy*, in *Procedia Computer Science*, vol. 36, pp. 373-380, 2014.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+
+
+# Recommendation
+
+## **ITU-T Y.3128 (12/2023)**
+
+SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Requirements for network function
+communication between public networks and
+public network integrated non-public networks
+in IMT-2020**
+
+## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 |
+| General | Y.100-Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700-Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 |
+| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 |
+| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 |
+
+For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3128
+
+# Requirements for network function communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020
+
+## Summary
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3128 specifies requirements for network function communication between public networks (PNs) and public network integrated non-public networks (NPNs) in IMT-2020. These requirements build on the analysis of relevant use cases and related network problems.
+
+There are two types of NPN: public network integrated non-public networks (PNI-NPN); and stand-alone non-public networks (SNPN). The requirements specified in this Recommendation concern the first type.
+
+## History \*
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3128 | 2023-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15739 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+IMT-2020, network function communication, non-public network, NPN, public network, PN, public network integrated non-public network, PNI-NPN, requirements.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID.
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at .
+
+© ITU 2024
+
+All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU.
+
+## Table of Contents
+
+| | | Page |
+|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------|
+| 1 | Scope..... | 1 |
+| 2 | References..... | 1 |
+| 3 | Definitions ..... | 1 |
+| | 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere..... | 1 |
+| | 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation..... | 1 |
+| 4 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 2 |
+| 5 | Conventions ..... | 2 |
+| 6 | Overview of public network integrated non-public network..... | 2 |
+| 7 | Network function communication problems between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020 ..... | 5 |
+| 8 | Requirements for network function communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020 ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.1 PN requirements ..... | 6 |
+| | 8.2 NPN requirements ..... | 7 |
+| | Appendix I – Use cases of communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020..... | 8 |
+| | I.1 UPF deployed in a customer's DC..... | 8 |
+| | I.2 NACF, SMF, PCF, UPF deployed in a customer's DC..... | 8 |
+| | I.3 SMF, PCF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC..... | 9 |
+| | I.4 ASF, USM function, NACF, SMF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC... | 10 |
+| | Bibliography..... | 12 |
+
+
+
+# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3128
+
+## Requirements for network function communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020
+
+# 1 Scope
+
+This Recommendation specifies requirements for network function (NF) communication between public networks (PNs) and public network integrated non-public networks (NPNs) in IMT-2020.
+
+There are two types of NPN: public network integrated non-public network (PNI-NPN); and stand-alone non-public network (SNPN). The requirements specified in this Recommendation concern the PNI-NPN type.
+
+Relevant use cases are provided in Appendix I.
+
+# 2 References
+
+The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation.
+
+[ETSI TS 123 501] Technical Specification ETSI TS 123 501 V17.10.0 (2023-09), *System architecture for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2*.
+
+# 3 Definitions
+
+### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere
+
+None.
+
+### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation
+
+This Recommendation defines the following terms:
+
+**3.2.1 direct communication:** Communication between network functions or network function services without using a service communication proxy.
+
+NOTE – Based on [ETSI TS 123 501].
+
+**3.2.2 indirect communication:** Communication between network functions or network function services via a service communication proxy.
+
+NOTE – Based on [ETSI TS 123 501].
+
+**3.2.3 non-public network:** A network that is intended for non-public use.
+
+NOTE – Based on [b-ITU-T X.1813].
+
+**3.2.4 public network integrated non-public network:** A non-public network deployed with the support of a public land mobile network.
+
+NOTE – Based on [ETSI TS 123 501].
+
+**3.2.5 stand-alone non-public network:** A non-public network not relying on network functions provided by a public land mobile network.
+
+NOTE – Based on [ETSI TS 123 501].
+
+# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms
+
+This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms:
+
+| | |
+|---------|----------------------------------------------|
+| ASF | Authentication Server Function |
+| DC | Data Centre |
+| IE | Information Element |
+| NACF | Network Access Control Function |
+| NF | Network Function |
+| NPN | Non-Public Network |
+| PCF | Policy Control Function |
+| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network |
+| PN | Public Network |
+| PNI-NPN | Public Network Integrated Non-Public Network |
+| SCP | Service Communication Proxy |
+| SMF | Session Management Function |
+| SNPN | Stand-alone Non-Public Network |
+| UPF | User Plane Function |
+| USM | Unified Subscription Management |
+
+# 5 Conventions
+
+In this Recommendation:
+
+The phrase "is required" indicates a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted, if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed.
+
+The phrase "is recommended" indicates a requirement that is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance.
+
+The phrase "can optionally" indicates an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator or service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with this Recommendation.
+
+# 6 Overview of public network integrated non-public network
+
+With the IMT-2020 enablement of vertical industries, more and more customers are interested in using a non-public network (NPN) [b-ITU-T X.1813] to provide their private data network services.
+
+Two types of NPNs can be distinguished: Stand-alone non-public network (SNPN); and public network integrated non-public network (PNI-NPN) [ETSI TS 123 501]. An SNPN is operated by an NPN operator and does not rely on network functions (NFs) provided by a public land mobile network (PLMN) [b-ITU-T Q.1741.7]. A PNI-NPN is supported by PLMNs, e.g., by means of dedicated data network names [b-ETSI TS 123 003] or by one (or more) network slice instances [b-ITU-T Y.3100] allocated for the NPN.
+
+This Recommendation addresses in particular the PNI-NPN type, which is an easy and rapid way for operators to provide private data network services.
+
+Figure 1 illustrates the PNI-NPN type where all NFs are deployed in the operator's data centre (DC).
+
+NOTE 1 – The example NFs shown in Figure 1 (as well as in Figures 2 and 3) include NFs specified in [b-ITU-T Y.3102] and, as far as the service communication proxy (SCP) is concerned, in [ETSI TS 123 501].
+
+
+
+Core network (CN)
+
+Operator's DC
+
+Public network's network function
+
+PNI-NPN's network function
+
+Public data networks
+
+Private data network 1
+
+Private data network 2
+
+Private data network 3
+
+Private data network 4
+
+Customer 1's DC
+
+Customer 2's DC
+
+Customer 3's DC
+
+Customer 4's DC
+
+Network function registry
+
+Policy control function
+
+Unified subscription management function
+
+Service communication proxy
+
+Network access control function
+
+Network slice selection function
+
+Auth. server function
+
+Session management function
+
+User plane function
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+Figure 1: The PNI-NPN type with all NFs deployed in the operator's DC. The diagram shows a Core network (CN) containing the Operator's DC. Inside the Operator's DC, there are two rows of Network Functions (NFs). The top row contains four NFs: Network function registry, Policy control function, Unified subscription management function, and Service communication proxy. The bottom row contains five NFs: Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Session management function, and User plane function. Arrows indicate connections between these NFs. Below the Core network, there are four Customer DCs (Customer 1's DC, Customer 2's DC, Customer 3's DC, and Customer 4's DC). Each Customer DC is connected to a Private data network (Private data network 1, 2, 3, and 4). The User plane function in the Operator's DC is connected to Public data networks. A legend on the right indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network function and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network function.
+
+**Figure 1 – The PNI-NPN type with all NFs deployed in the operator's DC**
+
+As shown in Figure 1, the operator provides private and public data network services to end users via access network and core NFs. All NFs of the core network are deployed in the operator's DC and none in those of customers. There are four customers, which use the NFs of the operator's DC and have no control over them. Each customer holds their own private data network.
+
+NOTE 2 – The two-colour boxes in the two upper rows of Figure 1 illustrate NFs deployed in the operator's DC serving both a PN and PNI-NPN.
+
+In Figure 2, in order to meet the individual needs of private data network services, some NFs may be deployed as dedicated NFs in customers' DCs, located then in an untrusted domain out of control of the operator.
+
+
+
+Figure 2: The PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in the customers' DCs. The diagram shows a hierarchical network structure. At the top is the 'Core network (CN)' containing the 'Operator's DC' with functions: Network function registry, Policy control function, Network slice selection function, Network access control function, Unified subscription management function, Auth. server function, Session management function, and User plane function. Below this are four 'Customer's DC' blocks: Customer 1's DC, Customer 2's DC, Customer 3's DC, and Customer 4's DC. Each customer DC contains various network functions (NFs) and connects to the core network via specific interfaces (I1, I2, I3, I4). Customer 1's DC has a User plane function connected via I1. Customer 2's DC has Network access control function, Policy control function, Session management function, and User plane function, connected via I2 and I3. Customer 3's DC has Policy control function, Session management function, and User plane function, connected via I3. Customer 4's DC has Network access control function, Unified subscription management function, Auth. server function, Session management function, and User plane function, connected via I2, I4, and I3. Public data networks are connected to the User plane function in the Operator's DC. Private data networks are connected to the User plane functions in the customer DCs. A legend indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network function and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network function.
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+**Figure 2 – The PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in the customers' DCs**
+
+Public data network services are provided by NFs deployed in the operator's DC, while those that are private are provided jointly by NFs deployed in both the operator's and customers' DCs.
+
+NOTE 3 – In the operator's DC of Figure 2, similarly to Figure 1, the two-colour boxes in the two upper rows represent NFs serving both the public network (PN) and PNI-NPN, and the user plane function (UPF) deployed in the operator's DC only serves the PN. The NFs, including UPF, deployed in customers' DCs only serve PNI-NPNs.
+
+There are four main deployment options of the PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in the customers' DCs, as described in Appendix I. The options differ in the set of NFs deployed in the customers' DCs, e.g., that for customer 2's DC includes a network access control function (NACF), session management function (SMF), policy control function (PCF) and UPF. These different sets provide various network capabilities and communicate with NFs of the PN with different types of interface. The interfaces of each customer's DC to connect to the operator's DC are shown in Figure 2 as I1 for UPF, I2 for NACF, I3 for SMF and I4 for unified subscription management (USM) function. For example, in customer 1's DC, the UPF communicates with the PN through interface I1, and in customer 2's DC, the NACF and SMF communicate with the PN respectively through interface I2 and I3. Moreover, in one customer's DC, there may be multiple types of interface to communicate with the PN, as shown for customer 2's DC.
+
+In addition, as specified in [ETSI TS 123 501], two types of communication mode are possible for the PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in the customers' DCs: direct, which supports the communication between NFs directly as shown in Figure 2; and indirect, which supports the communication between NFs via a SCP as shown in Figure 3.
+
+
+
+Figure 3: The PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in customers' DCs and usage of the indirect communication mode. The diagram shows a Core network (CN) containing an Operator's DC and three Customer DCs. The Operator's DC contains Network function registry, Policy control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Network access control function, Unified subscription management function, Service communication proxy, Session management function, and User plane function. The three Customer DCs (Customer 2's DC, Customer 3's DC, and Customer 4's DC) contain various network functions like Service communication proxy, Session management function, User plane function, Network access control function, and Unified subscription management function. Connections are shown between the Operator's DC and the Customer DCs via interfaces I5 and I4, and between the Customer DCs and Private data networks (Private data network 2, Private data network 3, Private data network 4) via interfaces I5 and I4. A Public data network is also connected to the Operator's DC. A legend indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network function and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network function.
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+**Figure 3 – The PNI-NPN type with some NFs deployed in customers' DCs and usage of the indirect communication mode**
+
+The SCPs deployed in customers' DCs communicate with the PN through the interfaces I5.
+
+NOTE 4 – The two-colour boxes in the two upper rows of SCP deployed in the operator's DC serve both PN and PNI-NPN, while the single colour boxes of SCP deployed in the customers' DCs only serve PNI-NPN.
+
+The same communication mode is used between the NFs within a given customer's DC (direct communication mode in Figure 2 and indirect in Figure 3) and between the NFs in the operator's DC (direct communication mode in Figure 2 and indirect in Figure 3). However, different communication modes may be used between one (or more) NF in a given customer's DC and one (or more) NF in the operator's DC.
+
+# 7 Network function communication problems between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020
+
+According to the use cases provided in Appendix I, some NFs of NPNs are located in customers' DCs, with some NPNs having only one NF, while others have multiple NFs.
+
+Different NPNs may connect to the PN through various types of interface. NPNs may also connect to the PN through one or multiple types of interface (e.g., in Figure 2, in customer 1's DC or customer 3's DC, there is one type of interface to communicate with the PN, while in customer 2's DC or customer 4's DC there are multiple types).
+
+The support of the described use cases causes the following problems from a network perspective.
+
+- Complex topology: As the number of NPNs continues to increase, and the number of point-to-point connections between the NFs of NPNs and the NFs of the PN rises, IMT-2020 network topology becomes more and more complex. For example, in the use case described in clause I.2, NACF, SMF, PCF and UPF are all deployed in a single NPN, communicating
+
+with an authentication server function (ASF) and USM function in the PN through different interfaces. Complexity of network topology particularly affects the direct communication mode.
+
+- Complex interworking: As NFs can be provided from different vendors, the interface between those of NPNs and the PN require interoperability testing. The more interfaces and more vendors there are, the more interoperability testing is required. The message information elements (IEs) on one interface are divided into three categories: mandatory; conditional; and optional. The optional IEs make interoperability testing between NPNs and the PN more complex as different vendors may implement message information elements differently, e.g., some vendors include them and others not.
+
+On the other hand, several IMT-2020 core network implementations based on 3GPP 5G core network specifications can be deployed, and the related 3GPP specifications continue to evolve in terms of version updates. There are compatibility issues when different versions for NPNs and PN work together. The version applied in a given NPN depends on customer demand and the time of network deployment. After network set up, the version in the NPN may not be updated at the same time as the PN upgrade. For example, various customers can deploy NPNs based on different versions of 3GPP specifications. In order to adapt to different versions of NPNs, the NFs of the PN may need to support multiple versions at the same time.
+
+- PN instability: Every time an NPN is deployed, data configuration, including configuration updates, must be performed on the NFs in the PN. Each data configuration and related modifications can cause a risk to the PN, as well as in terms of interworking with NPNs.
+- Failure due to different communication modes: When an NF in the PN tries to communicate by using the indirect (direct) communication mode with an NPN that adopts one that is direct (indirect), the communication fails.
+
+# **8 Requirements for network function communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020**
+
+In order to address the problems identified in clause 7, while deploying NPNs for customers on the basis of their specific requirements, and simultaneously reducing the impact of these deployments on the PN, the requirements in clauses 8.1 and 8.2 for NF communication between the PN and NPNs apply.
+
+## **8.1 PN requirements**
+
+- The PN is required to support signalling aggregation in order to reduce the number of point-to-point connections between the NFs of NPNs and the NFs of the PN.
+- The PN is required to synchronize NPN user data with the NPN unidirectionally (i.e., from the PN to the NPN), in order to avoid modifications of the user data in the PN by customers.
+
+NOTE 1 – This applies when a dedicated USM function is deployed in a given customer's NPN.
+
+- The PN is required to distinguish different NPN user data and synchronize with each NPN respectively.
+
+NOTE 2 – This applies when a dedicated USM function is deployed in a given customer's NPN.
+
+- The PN is required to support the identification of the communication modes of NPNs, such as by their pre-configuration or their identification through communication requests from NPNs, so that the PN can adapt as needed.
+- The PN is required to support adaptation between different communication modes.
+
+NOTE 3 – Adaptation applies when a given NPN adopts a communication mode different from that of the PN.
+
+NOTE 4 – Adaptation can include, but is not limited to, modification of the parameters in the HTTP header.
+
+- The PN is required to identify and process abnormal traffic from NPNs according to the operator's policy.
+
+NOTE 5 – Examples of abnormal traffic in a given operator's policy include unknown users and traffic carrying sensitive information.
+
+NOTE 6 – A firewall may be used by the PN to identify and process abnormal traffic from NPNs. The types and processing policies of abnormal traffic may be configured on the firewall.
+
+- Traffic from high-priority NPNs is recommended for processing first by the PN.
+
+NOTE 7 – This is particularly beneficial in the case of a signalling storm or large amounts of traffic from NPNs.
+
+NOTE 8 – The priority of NPNs may be configured in the PN, e.g., NPNs of high-value customers may receive preference.
+
+- The PN is recommended to avoid modifying NF configuration data frequently during the deployment of new NPNs or the modification of existing NPNs.
+
+### **8.2 NPN requirements**
+
+- An NPN is required to support signalling aggregation in order to reduce the number of point-to-point connections between the NFs of NPN and those of the PN.
+- An NPN is required to receive the synchronization of NPN user data from the PN in order to avoid modifying them in the PN by customers.
+
+NOTE 1 – This applies when a dedicated USM function is deployed in a given customer's NPN.
+
+- An NPN is recommended to support high network reliability.
+
+NOTE 2 – Network reliability for NPN indicates that it works properly also when its connection with a PN fails.
+
+NOTE 3 – If a connection fails between NFs of the NPN and those of the PN, such as operator's DC server shut down, accidental cable breakage or NF version update in the PN, private data network services offered to NPN users, such as important production lines, will not be interrupted, minimizing the impact of the connection failure.
+
+NOTE 4 – An NPN may deploy a dedicated NACF, SMF, ASF, USM function and UPF to support network reliability.
+
+## Appendix I
+
+### Use cases of communication between public networks and public network integrated non-public networks in IMT-2020
+
+(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.)
+
+In order to meet the individual needs of private data network services, e.g., in terms of low latency, high reliability and controllability, some NFs may be deployed as dedicated in customers' DCs. Clauses I.1 to I.4 present some possible application scenarios.
+
+### I.1 UPF deployed in a customer's DC
+
+Figure I.1 illustrates user plane function (UPF) deployed in a customer's DC.
+
+
+
+Core network (CN)
+
+Operator's DC
+
+Customer's DC
+
+Public data networks
+
+Private data networks
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+Figure I.1: UPF deployed in a customer's DC. The diagram shows a Core network (CN) containing an Operator's DC and a Customer's DC. The Operator's DC includes Network function registry, Policy control function, Unified subscription management function, Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Session management function, and User plane function. The Customer's DC includes a User plane function. The User plane function in the Customer's DC communicates with the Session management function in the Operator's DC. The Operator's DC User plane function connects to Public data networks, and the Customer's DC User plane function connects to Private data networks. A legend indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network function and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network function.
+
+**Figure I.1 – UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+In order to meet the industry's requirements for low latency and to keep the user plane [b-ITU-T Y.3100] traffic in the customer's domain, the UPF may be deployed in the customer's DC. The UPF in the customer's DC communicates with the SMF deployed in the operator's DC.
+
+### I.2 NACF, SMF, PCF, UPF deployed in a customer's DC
+
+Figure I.2 illustrates NACF, SMF, PCF, UPF deployed in a customer's DC.
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the Core network (CN) architecture, divided into two Data Centers (DC): the Operator's DC and the Customer's DC. A legend on the right identifies white boxes as 'Public network's network function' and orange boxes as 'PNI-NPN's network function'.
+
+**Operator's DC (Orange border):**
+
+- Top row (Public network functions):** Network function registry, Policy control function, Session management function.
+- Bottom row (PNI-NPN functions):** Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Unified subscription management function, and User plane function.
+
+**Customer's DC (Orange border):**
+
+- Top row (PNI-NPN functions):** Policy control function, Network access control function, Session management function.
+- Bottom row (PNI-NPN function):** User plane function.
+
+**External Connections:**
+
+- The **User plane function** in the Operator's DC is connected to **Public data networks** (cloud icon).
+- The **User plane function** in the Customer's DC is connected to **Private data networks** (cloud icon).
+
+Reference: Y.3128(23)
+
+Figure I.2: Core network (CN) architecture showing Operator's DC and Customer's DC components. The Operator's DC includes Network function registry, Policy control function, Session management function, Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Unified subscription management function, and User plane function. The Customer's DC includes Policy control function, Network access control function, Session management function, and User plane function. Public data networks and Private data networks are connected to the User plane functions. A legend indicates Public network's network function (white) and PNI-NPN's network function (orange).
+
+**Figure I.2 – NACF, SMF, PCF, UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+In addition to the low latency requirement, some customers also want to apply some policies for customized access control and session management to their users, so NACF, SMF, PCF and UPF may be deployed in the customer's DC.
+
+In this case, there are different types of interface used for communication between the operator's and the customer's DCs.
+
+The interfaces between the NACF and SMF in the customer's DC and the USM function in the operator's DC are used to retrieve and subscribe to user data from the USM function.
+
+The interface between the NACF in the customer's DC and the ASF in the operator's DC is used for user authentication.
+
+The interface between the NACF in the customer's DC and the NACF in the operator's DC is used for the NACF re-allocation procedure. If the user equipment of an industry customer initially registers with the NPN without the single network slice selection assistance information [ETSI TS 123 501], the access network selects the NACF in the operator's DC by default. The NACF in the operator's DC then initiates the re-allocation procedure for the NACF in the customer's DC.
+
+### **I.3 SMF, PCF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+Figure I.3 illustrates an SMF, PCF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC.
+
+
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+Figure I.3: Network architecture diagram showing SMF, PCF, and UPF deployment in a customer's DC. The Core network (CN) is divided into the Operator's DC and the Customer's DC. The Operator's DC contains the Network function registry, Policy control function, Session management function, Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Unified subscription management function, and User plane function. The Customer's DC contains the Policy control function, Session management function, and User plane function. Public data networks connect to the User plane function in the Operator's DC, and Private data networks connect to the User plane function in the Customer's DC. A legend indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network functions and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network functions.
+
+**Figure I.3 – SMF, PCF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+Some vertical industry customers are mainly concerned with session management policy control, low latency and keeping the user plane traffic in the customer's domain, so only SMF, PCF and UPF may be deployed in a customer's DC.
+
+The SMF in the customer's DC retrieves user data from the USM function in the operator's DC and communicates with the NACF in the operator's DC while establishing protocol data unit (PDU) sessions.
+
+### **I.4 ASF, USM function, NACF, SMF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+Figure I.4 illustrates an ASF, USM function, NACF, SMF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC.
+
+
+
+Y.3128(23)
+
+Figure I.4: Network architecture diagram showing ASF, USM function, NACF, SMF, and UPF deployment in a customer's DC. The Core network (CN) is divided into the Operator's DC and the Customer's DC. The Operator's DC contains the Network function registry, Policy control function, Session management function, Network access control function, Network slice selection function, Auth. server function, Unified subscription management function, and User plane function. The Customer's DC contains the Auth. server function, Network access control function, Unified subscription management function, Session management function, and User plane function. Public data networks connect to the User plane function in the Operator's DC, and Private data networks connect to the User plane function in the Customer's DC. A legend indicates that white boxes represent Public network's network functions and orange boxes represent PNI-NPN's network functions.
+
+**Figure I.4 – ASF, USM function, NACF, SMF and UPF deployed in a customer's DC**
+
+To maintain normal running if the connection between the DCs of the operator and customer breaks down, the ASF, USM function, NACF and SMF are deployed in the NPN.
+
+In this case, the NACF and SMF in the customer's DC communicate with the USM function and ASF in the operator's DC when the connection between the NPN and PN works. When the connection between the NPN and the PN breaks down, NACF and SMF in the customer's DC still communicate with the USM function and ASF in the customer's DC keeping the NPN ongoing: not
+
+only the registered devices and the established PDU session can operate, but also a new device can access the NPN. The data between the USM function and ASF in the operator's DC and the USM function and ASF in the customer's DC are synchronized unidirectionally, i.e., only the synchronization of the USM function and ASF in the operator's DC with the USM function and ASF in the customer's DC is allowed. Meanwhile, for security purposes, the user data of the ASF and USM function in the customer's DC cannot be modified by the customer.
+
+The NACF re-allocation procedure is the same as that described in clause I.2.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+- [b-ITU-T Q.1741.7] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1741.7 (2011), *IMT-2000 references to Release 9 of GSM-evolved UMTS core network*.
+- [b-ITU-T X.1813] Recommendation ITU-T X.1813 (2022), *Security and monitoring requirements for operation of vertical services supporting ultra-reliability and low-latency communication (URLLC) in IMT-2020 private networks*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ITU-T Y.3102] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3102 (2018), *Framework of the IMT-2020 network*.
+- [b-ETSI TS 123 003] Technical Specification ETSI TS 123 003 V17.10.0 (2023-07), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Numbering, addressing and identification*.
+
+
+
+## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+| | |
+|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T |
+| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues |
+| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors |
+| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services |
+| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks |
+| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems |
+| Series I | Integrated services digital network |
+| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals |
+| Series K | Protection against interference |
+| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant |
+| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance |
+| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits |
+| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment |
+| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks |
+| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests |
+| Series R | Telegraph transmission |
+| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment |
+| Series T | Terminals for telematic services |
+| Series U | Telegraph switching |
+| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network |
+| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security |
+| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities |
+| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems |
\ No newline at end of file
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+
+
+I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n
+
+# ITU-T
+
+TELECOMMUNICATION
+STANDARDIZATION SECTOR
+OF ITU
+
+# Y.3139
+
+(09/2022)
+
+SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION
+INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS,
+NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF
+THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+Future networks
+
+---
+
+**Fixed mobile convergence enhancements to
+support IMT-2020 based software-defined
+wide-area networking service**
+
+Recommendation ITU-T Y.3139
+
+ITU-T
+
+
+
+The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), featuring a blue globe with a network of lines and the letters 'ITU' in the center.
+
+ITU logo
+
+# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS
+
+# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES
+
+| | |
+|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
+| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | |
+| General | Y.100–Y.199 |
+| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 |
+| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 |
+| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 |
+| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 |
+| Security | Y.700–Y.799 |
+| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 |
+| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | |
+| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 |
+| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 |
+| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 |
+| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 |
+| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 |
+| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 |
+| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 |
+| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 |
+| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 |
+| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 |
+| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | |
+| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 |
+| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 |
+| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 |
+| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 |
+| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 |
+| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 |
+| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 |
+| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 |
+| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 |
+| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 |
+| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 |
+| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 |
+| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3599 |
+| BIG DATA | Y.3600–Y.3799 |
+| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800–Y.3999 |
+| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | |
+| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 |
+| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 |
+| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 |
+| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 |
+| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 |
+| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 |
+| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 |
+| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 |
+| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 |
+
+*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.*
+
+## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3139
+
+# Fixed mobile convergence enhancements to support IMT-2020 based software-defined wide-area networking service
+
+## Summary
+
+IMT-2020 based fixed mobile convergence (FMC) is one of the main trends in the future development of telecommunications. The main purpose of FMC is to combine all access technologies, including fixed and mobile access method, to access the network without network constraints. When adopting IMT-2020 technologies, software-defined wide-area networking (SD-WAN) service is required to support IMT-2020 access as one of the multiple connection types. With the enhancements of FMC, an IMT-2020 based SD-WAN service could gain features such as end-to-end isolated connections and dual link transmission. Recommendation ITU-T Y.3139 provides specifications for FMC enhancements to support an IMT-2020 based SD-WAN service.
+
+## History
+
+| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* |
+|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3139 | 2022-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15056 |
+
+## Keywords
+
+FMC, IMT-2020, SDN.
+
+---
+
+\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL in the address field of your web browser, followed by the Recommendation's unique ID. For example, .
+
+## FOREWORD
+
+The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis.
+
+The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics.
+
+The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1.
+
+In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC.
+
+## NOTE
+
+In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency.
+
+Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party.
+
+## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
+
+ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process.
+
+As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents/software copyrights, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the appropriate ITU-T databases available via the ITU-T website at