ISDN BRI/PRI
T1/E1 CAS
Cellular Mobile
VSAT
Cable TV | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | Analogue Loop
ISDN BRI/PRI
T1/E1 CAS
Cellular Mobile
VSAT
Cable TV | Voice Band and/or 3.1 kHz Audio | +| 64 kbit/s Digital | N-ISDN | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | N-ISDN | 64 kbit/s Digital | +| $N \times 64$ kbit/s Digital | ISDN-PRI | B-ISDN/SDH/
SONET/ATM | B-ISDN/SDH/
SONET/ATM | ISDN-PRI | $N \times 64$ kbit/s Digital | +| Leased line | T1/E1 | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | T1/E1 | Leased line | +| X.25 | Various | X.25 | X.25 | Various | X.25 | +| Frame Relay | Various | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | DS3/SDH/
SONET/ATM | Various | Frame Relay | + +With the introduction of IP services and the use of IP transport capabilities (which may provide capabilities which are "pure" IP, or which are enhanced by the IP transport capability making use of the underlying layer capabilities) as backbone technology this end-to-end alignment is radically reduced. + +Table 1b illustrates the support for Telecom Services by IP Networks, and Table 1c shows the support of IP services by telecom networks. In practice, elements of Table 1 and elements of Table 2 may apply, in different parts of an end-to-end path for a given communication. Consequently, the need for the development of interworking functions (IWFs) between various combinations of technology is greatly increased. IWFs may need to be applied at the network or user service level, or both, depending on the case under consideration. + +**Table 1b/Y.1001 – Traditional telecom services supported by IP networks** + +| End User Service | Access Technology | Backbone Technology Domain 1 | Backbone Technology Domain 2 | Access Technology | End User Service | +|------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| 3.1 kHz Audio | Analogue Loop
ISDN BRI/PRI
T1/E1 CAS
Cellular Mobile
VSAT
Cable TV
IP (Note) | IP (Note) | IP (Note) | Analogue Loop
ISDN BRI/PRI
T1/E1 CAS
Cellular Mobile
VSAT
Cable TV
IP (Note) | 3.1 kHz Audio | +| X.25 | Various | X.25
IP (Note) | X.25
IP (Note) | Various | X.25 | + +NOTE – It is understood that IP will run over a telecommunications network as shown in Table 1c. + +**Table 1c/Y.1001 – Telecom architectures supporting IP networks/services** + +| End User Service | Access Technology | Backbone Technology Domain 1 (Note) | Backbone Technology Domain 2 (Note) | Access Technology | End User Service | +|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| IP Best Effort | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, Cable, Satellite, etc. | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | IP (Best Effort, Controlled Load, Guaranteed Load, etc.) | +| IP Controlled Load | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, Cable, Satellite, etc. | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | IP (Best Effort, Controlled Load, Guaranteed Load, etc.) | +| IP Guaranteed Load | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, MPLS, Cable, Satellite, etc. | ATM, FR, DS3, SONET/SDH, Gigabit Ethernet, 100BaseT, FDDI, MPLS, Cable, Satellite, etc. | Analogue Loop, Analogue Cellular, GSM, Coax, ISDN, SONET/SDH, ATM, FR, Gigabit Ethernet, Cable, Satellite, etc. | IP (Best Effort, Controlled Load, Guaranteed Load, etc.) | + +NOTE – IP may or may not take advantage of the underlying features and facilities of the underlying technologies (e.g. ATM, Frame Relay, SDH/SONET, etc.). + +## 6.4 Technology model for IP network architecture + +The technology model for IP network architecture should consist of a series of technical standards or recommendations, describing configuration, interrelation and interaction of various components in an IP network as shown abstractly in Figure 5. The technology model comprises a diversified set of referenced standards or recommendations, for services, interfaces, equipment and interrelationships. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Technology Model for IP Network Architecture. A vertical bar on the left is labeled "Technology Model for IP Network Architecture". To its right, under the heading "Referenced Standards", are six horizontal boxes representing different layers of the model. Each box is connected to a list of examples on the right: + +- Terminal System**: Host, phone, facsimile, video conference, WWW ..... +- Quality of Service**: Time delay, error, naturalness ..... +- Networking**: Router, sub-network, switching ..... +- Transmission**: Fiber, wired, wireless, satellite, access network ..... +- Information Modelling**: Voice, data, image, message ..... +- Interworking**: Network, service, management ..... +- Security**: Terminals, network, transmission, modelling, architectures, supporting services ..... + +T1317320-00 + +Diagram of the Technology Model for IP Network Architecture showing six layers: Terminal System, Quality of Service, Networking, Transmission, Information Modelling, Interworking, and Security, each with associated examples. + +**Figure 5/Y.1001 – Technology and Standards Model** + +# 7 Basic architectural principles + +Figure 6 shows the two most fundamental architectural relationships that can exist between one service (and its protocol) and another service (and its protocol). These relationships will occur, to a lesser or greater extent, in the IP/telecommunications convergence architectures which are described in this Recommendation. In some of the convergence architectures these principles will occur simultaneously and multiple times. + + + +Diagram illustrating basic architectural principles. It shows four protocol blocks: Pa, Pb, Pq, and Pr. Pa and Pb are connected by a thick vertical double-headed arrow labeled 'Service Mapping & Encapsulation'. Pa and Pq are connected by a thick horizontal double-headed arrow labeled 'Service Mapping & Protocol Conversion'. Pb is below Pa, and Pq is to the right of Pa. Pr is above Pq. A dashed box encloses Pa, Pb, and Pq. Arrows point from labels to these relationships: 'Principle 1' points to the vertical arrow, 'Principle 2' points to the horizontal arrow, 'Peering Relationship' points to the horizontal arrow, and 'Layering Relationship' points to the vertical arrow. The text 'T1317330-00' is in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 6/Y.1001 – Basic architectural principles** + +## 7.1 Principle 1 – vertical relationship + +Principle 1, P1, shows the vertical relationship between protocols Pa and Pb. P1 is a layering relationship. + +With respect to P1, Pa is encapsulated within Pb, and uses the service offered by Pb. No fixed relationship between the actual protocols in the role of Pa and Pb can be assumed. A given protocol may be used in either a Pa or Pb role according to a specific context. For example, we may run X.25 protocol over the IP, or the IP over the X.25, according to particular requirements. + +## 7.2 Principle 2 – horizontal relationship + +P2 shows the horizontal relationship between Pa and Pq. P2 is a peering relationship. + +With respect to P2, where an end-to-end service is being provided by performing a concatenation/conversion between Pa and Pq, via some form of Interworking Unit (IWF) interposed within the path between Pa and Pq, the IWF terminates each of the protocols (Pa and Pq) and provides a mapping/matching between the service implementation provided by Pa to that provided by Pq. In the case of disparities between service implementations, some loss of features/capabilities will occur, to one or other or both of the end users. + +In the case where Pa and Pq are already end-to-end in nature and, thus, both terminate within end systems, the IWF in an end system may only be required to co-ordinate the events related to Pa and Pq for the purposes of achieving synchronization and synergy between services. + +NOTE – The notion of an "end" may also vary dependent on the viewpoint of the observer. + +## 7.3 Recursion + +Principles 1 and 2 may be repeated recursively, either within, or mutually between P1 and P2 structures. Some examples of this are shown in Figure 7. + + + +Figure 7/Y.1001: Example of recursive application of principles 1 and 2. The diagram shows four hierarchical levels of recursive structure. Level 1: A single box containing two smaller boxes connected by a horizontal double-headed arrow. Level 2: A box containing two Level 1 structures connected by a horizontal double-headed arrow. Level 3: A box containing two Level 2 structures connected by a horizontal double-headed arrow. Level 4: A box containing two Level 3 structures connected by a horizontal double-headed arrow. The structures become increasingly complex with nested boxes and internal connections as the level increases. A reference code 'T1317340-00' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area. + +**Figure 7/Y.1001 – Example of recursive application of principles 1 and 2** + +# 8 Basic reference models + +## 8.1 Layered protocol model + +Generally, the process of utilizing the telecommunication bearers is hidden from the IP service users. However, standardized mappings are required for using the IP over each and every telecommunication protocol to be deployed. + +Figure 8 illustrates the layered protocol model for the provision of IP service. The area between the IP protocols and the actual telecommunication protocols (i.e. boxed area containing (a), (b), (c), etc.) represents the adaptation functions, mapping for QoS, and convergence/adaptation protocols (if necessary). + +This model only depicts the IP layer and below. Layers above the IP layer would be concerned with application requirements such as those required to select/negotiate and instantiate a specific voice encoding scheme for a voice service. + +In Figure 8, the following specific cases are shown: + +- Combination (a) IP Network scenario over FR (access) +- Combination (b) IP Network scenario over FR (access) over ATM (backbone) +- Combination (c) IP Network scenario over ATM (access) + +Combination (e) IP Network scenario over SDH/PhDH (existing mapping) + +Combination (g) IP Network scenario over Optical/WDM Transport Network or other physical layer technology, including cable TV. + +NOTE – Further mappings for combinations (d) and (f) may be required and are left for further study. + +The layered protocol architecture shown in Figure 8 is a straightforward example of the application of principle 1. + + + +``` + + graph TD + IP["IP Present and Future"] + FR["Frame Relay"] + ATM["ATM (including existing AALs)"] + SDH["SDH/PDH"] + OTN["OTN or other Physical Layer Technologies (Wireless, Satellite, Cable TV, etc.)"] + Adapt["Additional adaptation functions for IP where required"] + + IP -- "(a)" --> FR + IP -- "(b)" --> ATM + IP -- "(c)" --> SDH + IP -- "(d) (Note)" --> Adapt + FR --> ATM + FR --> SDH + ATM --> SDH + Adapt -- "(e)" --> SDH + Adapt -- "(f) (Note)" --> OTN + IP -- "(g)" --> OTN + SDH --> OTN + +``` + +NOTE – Further mapping methods may be required. + +T1317350-00 + +**Figure 8/Y.1001 – Layered protocol model for IP network** + +Figure 8/Y.1001 – Layered protocol model for IP network + +### 8.2 General protocol reference model – potential U-, C- and M-plane relationships + +In addition to the hierarchical relationship shown in Figure 8, each protocol layer can be considered to have its user (U), control (C) and management (M) planes. + +An IP network operates via the IP layer protocol and its associated protocols (e.g. ICMP) with the telecommunication infrastructure as underlying supporting layers. IP was designed without a distinct concept of Control, User transport and Management planes, although it and its associated protocols do provide these functions. In some cases, these functions are implicitly included in the IP protocol. In cases where separate protocols for control and management of an IP network have been defined, these may be conveyed over IP. They may or may not be conveyed over the same logical and physical path as the customer's user data. This is an operational decision. + +Some components within the totality of equipment constituting an IP network will usually include control and management protocols not operating over, or directly associated with IP. This would apply, for example, to the equipment supporting the transport of IP. + +**ITU-T Y.1001 (11/2000)** 13 + +In any event, where the two technologies converge there is a need to ensure appropriate mappings between the respective user (U), control (C) and management (M) planes. Mappings are required both between adjacent layers and between peer layers (in the case of service interworking). From this point of view, there is always a need to establish a protocol reference model (PRM) of an IP network to specify the relationship between an IP network and the telecommunication network U, C and M planes in order to adequately and comprehensively specify the overall service provision, control and management aspects. Figure 9 shows a PRM as applied to an IP network. + + + +Figure 9/Y.1001 – Protocol reference model for an IP network. The diagram shows a 3D block diagram of a protocol reference model. It consists of several layers represented as rectangular blocks. At the top is a single block labeled 'Upper Layer – M'. Below it are two blocks side-by-side: 'Upper Layer – C' on the left and 'Upper Layer – U' on the right. These two blocks are connected by a dashed line, with a vertical line labeled 'C' on the left and a vertical line labeled 'U' on the right. Below these is a single, wider block labeled 'Layer 3 (IP)'. Below that is another block labeled 'Lower Layer/Sublayer – M'. At the bottom are two blocks side-by-side: 'Lower Layer/Sublayer – C' on the left and 'Lower Layer/Sublayer – U' on the right. Vertical lines connect the 'C' and 'U' blocks across the layers. A small label 'M' is on the right side of the 'Upper Layer – M' block, and 'T1317360-00' is at the bottom right corner of the diagram. + +**Figure 9/Y.1001 – Protocol reference model for an IP network** + +# 9 IP network overlay architecture + +In this case IP is conveyed end-to-end, i.e. from IP host to IP host4, as shown in Figure 10. IP is overlaid on any underlying telecommunication protocol such as X.25, Frame Relay, ATM, ISDN, etc. Different telecommunication protocols may be used in different parts of the IP-based network itself, i.e. between routers, using the concepts of 8.1 and 8.2 for each inter-router link. + +4 The term "IP host" is used as defined in RFC 1122 and 1123. According to the context, an IP host may be a computer, a terminal, or some type of specialized information appliance (e.g. phone, TV) or other equipment with network access for control/monitoring (e.g. heating and/or refrigeration equipment, household appliances, etc.). + + + +a) + +b) + +IP + +IP Host + +IP Network + +IP Host + +IP Host + +TN Tx + +Router + +TN Ty + +Router + +IWU + +Circuit Switched Network (CSN) + +IP Host + +IP + +T1317370-00 + +| | | +|-------|----------------------------------------------| +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| ISP | Internet Service Provider | +| IWU | Interworking Unit | +| POP | Point of Presence | +| TN Tx | Telecommunications Network technology type x | +| TN Ty | Telecommunications Network technology type y | + +Figure 10/Y.1001 – IP Network overlay architecture. The diagram shows two parts: a) and b). Part a) shows an IP Host connected to an IP Network, which is then connected to another IP Host. Part b) shows an IP Host connected to a TN Tx, which is connected to a Router, then to a TN Ty, then to a Router, then to an IWU, then to a Circuit Switched Network (CSN), and finally to an IP Host. The entire sequence in b) is enclosed in an oval labeled 'IP'. + +**Figure 10/Y.1001 – IP Network overlay architecture** + +NOTE – The use of a CSN to access an IP POP is a special case, due to the dynamic/transient nature of the access arrangements and the use of IP and PSTN/ISDN addressing schemes. However, once the customer is connected to the POP the CSN case is the same as the other cases. This case is elaborated further in 10.2.1. + +# 10 Use of specific telecommunication bearers + +This clause outlines the use of specific telecommunication bearers. Two subcases may be identified: + +- a) use of a telecommunication bearer service between IP routers; and +- b) use of a telecommunication bearer service to access an IP network. + +Typically, the Internet does not draw a hard distinction between user-network and network-network and intra-network in its use and choice of transmission bearer services. Thus, there may be little if any difference between the use of a leased line within an IP network and for the access to an IP network. Mostly, the difference lies in the policy (e.g. security, QoS) applied to routing and admission control. For example, although most people think of PSTN/ISDN dial-up as a method for accessing an IP network, there are cases in which PSTN/ISDN dial-up is used within an IP network to interconnect two routers. + +## **10.1 Use of a telecommunication bearer service between IP routers** + +### **10.1.1 IP on ATM** + +Currently, carriers utilize point-to-point ATM PVCs for interconnecting their IP routers using RFC 2684 ("Multiprotocol Encapsulation over ATM Adaptation Level 5") or RFC 2225 ("Classical IP and ARP over ATM AAL5") using either LLC/SNAP or direct encapsulation. ATM PVCs are used to provide interconnectivity and traffic engineering in the network. In the future, the integrated use of IP and ATM using MPLS is expected, enabling MPLS-enabled ATM switches to switch ATM cells on the basis of IP routing information. + +### **10.1.2 IP on SDH** + +In current practice, carriers support IP over SONET or SDH using RFC 2615 ("PPP over SONET/SDH"). + +### **10.1.3 IP on frame relay** + +RFC 2427 ("Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay") is used to carry IP over Frame Relay between routers. + +### **10.1.4 IP on leased lines** + +Carriers use IP over TDM-based leased lines using RFC 1661 ("The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)") and RFC 1662 ("PPP in HDLC-like Framing"). + +### **10.1.5 IP on WDM** + +This area is for further study. + +### **10.1.6 IP on satellite (VSAT or TV data channels)** + +This area is for further study. + +## **10.2 Use of a telecommunication bearer service to access an IP network** + +### **10.2.1 Use of circuit switched network** + +Figure 10 b) shows the extension of IP over a dial-in or dial-out Circuit Switched Network (CSN) connection used to gain access to an IP point-of-presence, as is currently provided by many Internet Service Providers (ISPs) today. A discrete three-stage process is required, firstly to establish the telecommunication bearer between the ISP POP and the end user, secondly to authenticate and authorize the dial-in (or dial-out) user and finally to route the IP packets. + +For voice support over such a dial-in service, the voice service is digitally encoded and conveyed as a payload of the IP network transparently to the CSN. This may be contrasted with the service interworking approach elaborated in clause 12. + +#### **10.2.1.1 Dial-in to the ISP POP** + +This case is relatively simple, being identical to existing dial-in access, i.e. set up the PSTN/ISDN connection to ISP, using a PSTN/ISDN number to access the interworking unit. Once the PSTN/ISDN connection is established the Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) is invoked for the carriage of the IP containing the encoded voice information. + +#### **10.2.1.2 Dial-out from the ISP POP** + +Dial-out is supported in different ways by current ISPs. The user on the PSTN/ISDN is generally reachable from the user on the IP network using a standard IP address as the destination address for the PSTN/ISDN user. The user on the IP network may only be required to know the host name of the user on the PSTN/ISDN, thus letting DNS determine the correct IP address to use. In either case, the IWU has to determine the PSTN/ISDN address required for dial-out, from the IP address assigned to the PSTN/ISDN user (or the host name), through address translation/mapping mechanisms. For example, a static configuration could be used in the IWU to map the IP address to a PSTN/ISDN address, or a more dynamic method may be used (e.g. DNS, RADIUS, etc.). Standard mechanisms for performing this function have not been defined. + +Other cases may be possible, perhaps, by directly conveying the destination E.164 address across the IP network. + +Other requirements include locating a specific IWU optimally located for a given PSTN/ISDN destination. + +### **10.2.2 Use of PSDN/frame relay** + +Users access the Internet via frame relay by utilizing RFC 2427 ("Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay"). + +### **10.2.3 Use of ATM/B-ISDN** + +Users typically access the Internet using ATM by utilizing RFC 2684, RFC 2364 or RFC 2225. Other methods are for further study. + +### **10.2.4 Use of xDSL bitstreams** + +Different DSL technologies may be used for accessing the Internet. + +In the case of ADSL and VDSL, users accessing the Internet use the same methods as listed for the use of ATM/B-ISDN. + +In the case of IDSL, HDSL, or SDSL, users accessing the Internet use RFC 1661 and RFC 1662. + +### **10.2.5 Use of leased lines** + +Uses accessing the Internet via leased lines use RFC 1661 ("Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)") and RFC 1662 ("PPP in HDLC-like Framing"). + +### **10.2.6 Use of satellite (VSAT or TV data channels)** + +For further study. + +### **10.2.7 Other access mechanisms** + +Other access mechanisms are in use or under investigation for access to the Internet. These include mobile wireless, fixed wireless, cable, Gigabit Ethernet (over fibre), cable TV or Satellite TV, etc. Some of these are not normally considered a telecommunication bearer services. + +# 11 Interworking within the underlying telecommunication infrastructure + +It is conceivable that interworking may be required/possible between two dissimilar telecommunication technologies without the presence of an intervening IP router, as shown in Figure 11. + +In the case where two different telecommunication network technologies are interworked, the interworking function may need to be aware of the adaptation/convergence protocols, and be prepared to provide appropriate interworking functions, if necessary, at the adaptation layer. + +Figure 11 shows the use of two different transport technologies, Tx and Ty, with corresponding adaptation functions AFx and AFy encapsulated within Tx and Ty. Two cases may be distinguished. + +In case 1, the adaptation protocol AFx is identical to AFy. In this case the interworking unit can transparently pass the adaptation protocol. In this case the adaptation protocol can simply be un-encapsulated from one side and re-encapsulated on the other side without change. + +Case 2 is required when AFx is not identical to AFy. In this case, the interworking unit must terminate both AFx and AFy and provide the necessary mapping functions. In this case, the adaptation protocol must be un-encapsulated and terminated on one side, and translated to a different adaptation protocol for subsequent encapsulation on the other. + +NOTE – ITU-T I.555 and ITU-T X.46 are examples of specifications for the interworking of two dissimilar telecommunication technologies, i.e. ATM and Frame Relay. + + + +T1317380-00 + +Diagram illustrating interworking within the underlying telecommunication infrastructure. The diagram shows an IP layer at the top, connected to two sides. On the left, a dashed box contains AFx and Tx. On the right, a dashed box contains AFy and Ty. In the center, a dashed box labeled 'Additional Interworking Functions' (marked with a circled 2) contains Tx and Ty. Dashed arrows indicate data flow between AFx and the central functions, and between AFy and the central functions. A solid line labeled with a circled 1 connects the IP layer to the central functions. The diagram is labeled T1317380-00 in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 11/Y.1001 – Interworking within the underlying telecommunication infrastructure** + +Case 1 is an example of the application of principle 1. Case 2 is an example of both principle 2 and principle 1. Principle 2 applies to the interworking between the adaptation functions AFx and AFy, and principle 1 applies to the carriage of AFx over Tx and AFy over Ty. + +# 12 Telephony service interworking + +## 12.1 General considerations + +In this case interworking is achieved at the service level via an intermediate gateway or Interworking Unit (IWU) for the provision of an end-to-end voice service. All protocols terminate on the respective side of the Interworking Function (IWF). There is no end-to-end protocol in this case. The IP stack is terminated at the IWF. This is shown in Figure 12. + + + +Figure 12/Y.1001 – Telephony service – basic interworking architecture. This diagram illustrates the basic interworking architecture for telephony service between an IP Network and a CSN (Circuit Switched Network). The IP Network is represented by a large oval containing two 'IP Host' boxes and an 'IP' label. The CSN is represented by a large oval containing two 'Phone' icons. An 'IWF' (Interworking Function) box connects the two networks. Four call scenarios are shown: (a) from an IP Host to a Phone; (b) from a Phone to an IP Host; (c) from an IP Host to another IP Host; and (d) from a Phone to another Phone. Arrows indicate the call direction. A legend at the bottom left states '→ = Call Direction'. The reference number 'T1317390-00' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 12/Y.1001 – Telephony service – basic interworking architecture** + +The connection patterns are classified into four scenarios (a) – (d), according to the point of origin and destination of the call, as follows: + +- (a) from audio capable IP Host on an IP network to a phone on the CSN (PSTN or ISDN); +- (b) from a phone on a CSN to an audio capable IP Host on an IP network; +- (c) from audio capable IP Host on an IP network to another audio capable IP Host on an IP network, via an intervening CSN; +- (d) from a phone on a CSN to another a phone on a CSN, via an intervening IP network. + +The following figure outlines the mappings that are required in general for service interworking cases. + + + +Figure 13/Y.1001 – Mappings for service interworking. This 3D block diagram shows the mapping between two service domains. The top layer consists of two 'IP-based applications' blocks. Below them are two 'Management Plane' blocks, which are connected to the applications by vertical double-headed arrows. Under the Management Planes are two 'Control Plane' and 'User Plane' blocks. The Control Planes are connected to the Management Planes by vertical double-headed arrows, and the User Planes are connected to the Management Planes by vertical double-headed arrows. Horizontal double-headed arrows connect the Management Planes, the Control Planes, and the User Planes. All these planes sit on top of a 'Physical Infrastructure' base. A legend at the bottom right states 'T1317400-00'. + +**Figure 13/Y.1001 – Mappings for service interworking** + +The horizontal arrows represent the application of principle 2. The vertical arrows represent the application of principle 1. + +## **12.2 Interworking functions** + +### **12.2.1 C-plane aspects** + +#### **12.2.1.1 Conversion of call connection procedure** + +In scenario (a), the functions are required for converting from the call connection procedure for the IP network section to that for the CSN section, to establish the end-to-end connection between the IP host and phone. The functions may be implemented in a gateway at the border between the IP network and the CSN. + +In scenario (b), the functions are required for converting from the call connection procedure for PSTN/ISDN CSN section to that for the IP network section to establish the end-to-end connection between phone and the IP host. The functions may be implemented at the border between the IP based network and the CSN. + +In scenarios (a), (b) and (c), the functions dealing with the call connection procedure for the IP network section may be required. The functions may be implemented at adapters attached to the IP host and/or in the gateway at the border between the IP network and the CSN. + +In scenarios (c) and (d), the functions for converting from the call connection procedure for the IP network section to that for CSN section, and vice versa, may be required or not, since in this case the call connection protocol may be transmitted transparently across the PSTN/ISDN/CSN or the IP network. + +#### **12.2.1.2 Numbering and addressing** + +In scenario (a), the address resolution functions are required to convert from the address used on the IP network section to that required for the CSN section for the designation of the called terminal. + +In scenario (b), the address resolution functions are required to convert from the address used on the CSN section to that required for the IP network section for the designation of the called terminal. + +In scenarios (a) and (c), PSTN directory functions may be required to designate the called terminals. + +### **12.2.2 U-plane aspects** + +#### **12.2.2.1 Conversion of voice coding methods** + +In each scenario, the functions are required for converting the voice encoding methods used for voice services over an IP network to those used for analogue voice over the PSTN or to those used for voice encoding over ISDN and digital trunk sections of PSTN, and vice versa. + +NOTE – The presence of different voice encoding systems is not peculiar to the IP network, and many existing ITU-T standards are applicable to this issue. + +#### **12.2.2.2 QoS for IP services** + +Specifications for various classes of IP service, characterized by different qualities of service will be required in order to select IP services suitable for specific types of application. Voice and other real-time sensitive applications are examples of applications which have specific QoS requirements. The specifications for these classes of IP service will include values for transmission delay and packet loss and other relevant QoS parameters. + +#### **12.2.2.3 Security** + +Specification for the provision of security in the IP network section will be required. + +### 12.2.3 M-plane aspects + +#### 12.2.3.1 Accounting + +IP networks do not include the concept of calls, and therefore have not included the concept of call-based accounting. Accounting capabilities that can support any and all scenarios in Figure 9 will need to be determined to support accounting principles and requirements defined by the appropriate ITU Study Group. Special attention may need to be given to permanent connection to PUSH services. + +## 12.3 Interworking gateway architecture + +Figure 14 shows a hypothetical and generic functional architecture of an interworking unit or gateway. + +Four functional components are shown: + +- a) Media Gateway (MG); +- b) Media Gateway Controller (MGC); +- c) Signalling Gateway (SG); and +- d) Intelligent Databases (ID). + +The MG will handle the real-time operations associated with interworking, voice encoding conversion, etc. An MG terminates the circuit switched network (CSN) facilities (trunks, loops), packetizes the media stream, if it is not already packetized, and delivers packetized traffic to the IP network. It performs these functions in the reverse order for media streams flowing from the IP network to the CSN. The MG will interface with the CSN as per PSTN/ISDN requirements and specifications. The MG will interface with the IP network, using IP packets as the payload bearer, using Real-Time Protocol for voice transmission. + +The MGC will handle call control aspects associated with interworking. The MGC controls the operation of the Media Gateway function. Where these functions are packaged in separate devices, a protocol is needed between them. It is envisaged that the interconnection between the MGC and the MG will be over an IP network. The MGC interfaces to the IP network for the purposes of conveying call control information to peer entities on the IP network using either the IETF's Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) family of protocols, or the ITU-T's H.323 family of protocols (H.225, H.245, etc.). An MGC-MG control protocol is required and one candidate for this is H.248 (or its IETF equivalent). + +The SG will handle any necessary interactions between the interworking functions and the SS7 network. The SG is a signalling agent that receives/sends CSN native signalling at the border between the IP network and telecommunication network. In particular the SG function may relay, translate or terminate SS7 signalling in an SS7-Internet Gateway. + +The ID will be used to acquire any necessary information required, e.g. for credit card usage, 800 services, directory services, etc. + +Although all the illustrated functions may be packaged into one physical box, it is likely that the relative scale of operation of each of the component functions and the nature of multi-vendor equipment provision will result in the realization of separate physical units with the interconnection interfaces shown in Figure 14. + +The interworking functions between the IP network and the CSN require the application of principle 2. The other interfaces are various cases of the application of principle 1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the telephony gateway architecture, showing the interworking between the IP Network, Interworking Functions, and the CSN (Core Service Network). + +**IP Network:** Represented by a dashed line at the top left. + +**Interworking Functions:** A central block containing three main components: + + +- Intelligent Databases:** Connected to the IP Network via a dashed line. +- Signalling Gateway:** Connected to the Intelligent Databases via a solid line labeled **ID/SG** and **INAP**. +- Media Gateway Controller:** Connected to the Signalling Gateway via a solid line labeled **SG/MGC**. + +**CSN:** Represented by a dashed line at the top right. + +**Connections and Interfaces:** + +- ID/MGC:** A solid line connection between the Intelligent Databases and the Media Gateway Controller. +- MGC/MGC:** A dashed line connection between the Media Gateway Controller and the Media Gateway. +- SS7 ISUP:** A solid line connection between the Signalling Gateway and the CSN. +- RTP:** A solid line connection between the Media Gateway and the IP Network. +- CSN Trunks:** A solid line connection between the Media Gateway and the CSN. + +**Media Gateway:** The bottom component, which handles the actual media flow between the IP Network and the CSN. + +**Legend:** + +- Solid lines with black dots represent control or signaling connections. +- Dashed lines represent data or media connections. + +**Reference:** T1317410-00 + +Figure 14/Y.1001 – Telephony gateway architecture diagram showing the interworking between IP Network, Interworking Functions, and CSN. + +**Figure 14/Y.1001 – Telephony gateway architecture** + +# 13 Native IP services interworking with services defined in ITU-T Recommendations + +In this case both the IP network and the telecommunication networks are used to provide services, via their inherent applications, in a complementary and synergistic fashion. For example, IP data services may be used in parallel with telecommunication voice and/or facsimile (fax) services. In this architecture, however, the establishment of the telecommunications-based services is triggered and controlled by a server on the IP network. Figure 15 depicts such an arrangement, where the actual services are deemed to exist in parallel universes but with coordinated or integrated control mechanisms. + + + +The diagram illustrates a parallel service architecture between a Client(s) and a Server. The Client(s) side contains an IP App, Integration Functions, and a TN App. The Server side contains an IP App, Integration & Control Functions, and a TN App. The IP App on the client connects to the IP App on the server via an IP AP. The IP App on the client also connects to the Integration Functions, which in turn connect to the TN App. The Integration Functions on the client connect to the Integration & Control Functions on the server via an IP Network. The Integration & Control Functions on the server connect to the TN App on the server via a Non-IP Telecom Network. The TN App on the client connects to the TN App on the server via a TN AP. A legend at the bottom left defines IP App as IP Application and TN App as Telecommunication Network Application. The reference T1317420-00 is at the bottom right. + +Figure 15/Y.1001 – Parallel service architecture diagram + +**Figure 15/Y.1001 – Parallel service architecture** + +Figure 16 shows a specific example of such an arrangement. The synergy between the two networks is achieved by the link between the server, in this case an IP Host (for example a Web server) of the IP network and the IN Service Node (SN) or Service Control Point (SCP) of the telecommunication network. It is possible that the IP host and the SCP or SN will be co-resident on the IP network providing services to IP hosts and to the telecommunication network. + +The **PSTN/Internet Interworking (PINT)** activity developed jointly by IETF and ITU-T is an example of such an architecture. Other architectures are possible. + + + +The diagram shows a PINT architecture. On the left, two IP Terminals connect to an IP Network. Inside the IP Network is a Web Server. The Web Server connects to three points: A (to an SN), B (to an SCP), and E (to an SMS). The SCP connects to an SS7 network, which in turn connects to an SSP. The SMS connects to an SN, which also connects to an SSP. The SS7 network connects to the SSP. The SSP connects to two Phone/Fax devices. A legend at the bottom left defines the components: Gateway function (shaded box), IN (Intelligent Network), SCP (Service Control Point), SMS (Service Management System), SN (Service Node), SS7 (Signalling System No. 7), and SSP (Service Switching Point). The reference T1317440-00 is at the bottom right. + +Figure 16/Y.1001 – PINT – An example of parallel service architecture diagram + +**Figure 16/Y.1001 – PINT – An example of parallel service architecture** + +The interfaces A, B and E correspond to those defined in RFC 2458 "Toward the PSTN/Internet Inter-networking". + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification | +| Series C | General telecommunication statistics | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data 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b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1261-200212-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,706 @@ + + + + +ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe. + +INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION + +**ITU-T** + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +**Y.1261** + +(12/2002) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE +AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +Internet protocol aspects – Architecture, access, network +capabilities and resource management + +# --- **Service requirements and architecture for voice services over Multi-Protocol Label Switching** + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1261 + +--- + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# **ITU-T Recommendation Y.1261** + +# **Service requirements and architecture for voice services over Multi-Protocol Label Switching** + +## **Summary** + +This Recommendation describes service requirements and architecture for transport of Voice Services over MPLS networks. + +Voice Services over MPLS networks include a family of protocols that may be supported over MPLS, including Voice over IP (as specified by IETF), Voice over MPLS (as specified by MPLS Forum) and I.366.2 Voice Trunking Format (based on ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 adapted for MPLS). + +Possible approaches for transporting Voice Services over MPLS are provided in Appendix II. + +Detailed protocol specifications are subject of other Recommendations. + +###### **Source** + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1261 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 14 December 2002. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +## NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database. + +© ITU 2003 + +All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of ITU. + +## CONTENTS + +| | | Page | +|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------| +| 1 | Scope ..... | 1 | +| 2 | References..... | 1 | +| | 2.1 Normative references..... | 1 | +| | 2.2 Informative references..... | 2 | +| 3 | Definitions ..... | 2 | +| 4 | Abbreviations..... | 3 | +| 5 | Architecture ..... | 3 | +| | 5.1 Voice Services over MPLS logical service reference model ..... | 4 | +| | 5.2 Voice services over MPLS Reference Architecture..... | 5 | +| 6 | Requirements for Voice Services over MPLS..... | 5 | +| | 6.1 General service requirements ..... | 5 | +| | 6.2 User plane requirements ..... | 6 | +| | 6.3 User plane requirements for combined audio and video service..... | 6 | +| | 6.4 Control plane requirements ..... | 7 | +| | 6.5 Management plane requirements..... | 7 | +| 7 | Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements ..... | 7 | +| | 7.1 Voice Services over MPLS Interworking requirements with Voice over IP..... | 7 | +| | 7.2 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with Voice over ATM ..... | 7 | +| | 7.3 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with Voice over Frame Relay..... | 7 | +| | 7.4 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with PSTN/ISDN.... | 7 | +| | 7.5 Voice Services over MPLS Interworking requirements with mobile access networks ..... | 8 | +| | Appendix I – Voice over Packet Protocol architectures ..... | 8 | +| | I.1 Voice over Frame Relay ..... | 8 | +| | I.1.1 FR reference model and service description ..... | 8 | +| | I.1.2 Multiplexing ..... | 9 | +| | I.1.3 Voice over Frame Relay user plane protocol stack..... | 10 | +| | I.2 Voice over ATM as described in AAL type 2 Service Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9]..... | 10 | +| | I.2.1 User plane protocol stack for Voice over ATM as described in AAL type 2 Service-Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9]..... | 11 | +| | I.3 Voice over IP ..... | 11 | + +| | Page | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Appendix II – Alternate solutions for Voice Services over MPLS..... | 12 | +| II.1 Voice over ATM..... | 12 | +| II.2 Voice over IP..... | 13 | +| II.3 I.366.2 Voice Trunking format over MPLS ..... | 13 | +| II.4 Voice over MPLS ..... | 13 | +| II.5 Summary of different solutions for Voice Services over MPLS..... | 14 | +| Appendix III – BICC architecture..... | 14 | +| Appendix IV – Examples of Voice Services over MPLS deployment scenarios ..... | 15 | + +# ITU-T Recommendation Y.1261 + +# Service requirements and architecture for voice services over Multi-Protocol Label Switching + +# 1 Scope + +The scope of this Recommendation is to describe services requirements and architecture for transport of Voice Services over MPLS networks. + +Voice Services over MPLS networks include a family of protocols that may be supported over MPLS, including Voice over IP (as specified by IETF), Voice over MPLS (as specified by MPLS Forum) and I.366.2 Voice Trunking Format (based on ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 adapted for MPLS). + +An overview of several possible approaches that have been proposed as the basis for the family of protocols for transporting Voice services over MPLS is provided in Appendix II. Nothing in this Recommendation precludes the progression of all these protocols for the transport of Voice Services over MPLS. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +## 2.1 Normative references + +- [1] ITU-T Recommendation G.711 (1988), *Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies*. +- [2] ITU-T Recommendation G.723.1 (1996), *Speech coders: Dual rate speech coder for multimedia communications transmitting at 5.3 and 6.3 kbit/s*. +- [3] ITU-T Recommendation G.726 (1990), *40, 32, 24, 16 kbit/s Adaptive Differential Pulse Code Modulation (ADPCM)*. +- [4] ITU-T Recommendation G.729 (1996), *Coding of speech at 8 kbit/s using conjugate-structure-algebraic-code-excited linear prediction (CS-ACELP)*. +- [5] ITU-T Recommendation I.361 (1999), *B-ISDN ATM layer specification*. +- [6] ITU-T Recommendation I.363.1 (1996), *B-ISDN Adaptation Layer specification: Type 1 AAL*. +- [7] ITU-T Recommendation I.363.2 (2000), *B-ISDN Adaptation Layer specification: Type 2 AAL*. +- [8] ITU-T Recommendation I.363.5 (1996), *B-ISDN Adaptation Layer specification: Type 5 AAL*. +- [9] ITU-T Recommendation I.366.2 (2000), *AAL type 2 service specific convergence sublayer for narrow-band services*. +- [10] ITU-T Recommendation I.610 (1999), *B-ISDN operation and maintenance principles and functions*. + +- [11] ITU-T Recommendation Q.922 (1992), *ISDN data link layer specification for frame mode bearer services*. +- [12] ETSI TS 126 071 V3.0.1 (2000-02), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); AMR Speech Codec; General description*. +- [13] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture*. +- [14] IETF RFC 3032 (2001), *MPLS Label Stack encoding*. +- [15] IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*. +- [16] IETF RFC 3270 (2002) *Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS). Support of Differentiated Services*. + +## 2.2 Informative references + +- [17] ITU-T Recommendation Q.1950 (2002), *Bearer independent call bearer control protocol*. +- [18] IETF RFC (1996), *RTP: A Transport Protocol For Real-Time applications*. +- [19] IETF RFC 1890 (1996), *RTP Profile for Audio and Video Conferences with Minimal Control*. +- [20] FRF.11.1 (1999), *Voice over Frame Relay Implementation Agreement*. +- [21] MPLS Forum 1.0 (2001), *Voice over MPLS – Bearer Transport Implementation Agreement*. + +# 3 Definitions + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.1 voice services over MPLS:** The term encompasses the set of technical approaches used to transport encoded voice over MPLS. This terminology is independent of the method by which MPLS frames are transported. + +**3.2 active voice:** A sampled audio interval that has been determined to contain speech as opposed to silence. The classification is made by a Voice Activity Detection algorithm. It enables discontinuous transmission, whereby the bit rate of the signal is reduced during silent intervals. + +**3.3 audio:** In the context of this Recommendation, audio is used as a general term for signals of the audible medium, including voice and voiceband data. + +**3.4 channel-associated signalling:** Bits dedicated for connection control across a 1544 kbit/s or 2048 kbit/s interface that carries 64 kbit/s channels. Procedures are based on the state of up to four signalling bits (A, B, C, D) that are allocated per channel per multiframe. + +**3.5 circuit mode data:** A continuous stream of digital information at 64 kbit/s or $2 \times 64$ kbit/s having an 8 kHz structure. + +**3.6 dialled digits:** Multifrequency audio tones typically used for inter-register signalling of addresses during call set-up or for end-to-end device control during an established call. Depending on the system, codes are defined for the digits 0-9 of a telephone keypad and other auxiliary signals. + +**3.7 facsimile demodulation/remodulation:** The process of detecting facsimile traffic, extracting digital information from the incoming analogue modulated signal, transporting this across a trunk in packet formats, and reproducing the facsimile control and image information by remodulation at the other end. + +**3.8 silence insertion descriptor:** A compressed representation of the audio background noise that can be sent during silent intervals. SIDs may not be continuous and may only be sent when + +there is a change in noise characteristics. Playing out received SIDs is known as Comfort Noise Generation. + +# **4 Abbreviations** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations: + +| | | +|------|---------------------------------------| +| AAL | ATM Adaptation Layer | +| AMR | Adaptive Multi-Rate | +| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode | +| BICC | Bearer Independent Call Control | +| CAS | Channel-Associated Signalling | +| CPCS | Common Part Convergence Sublayer | +| DTMF | Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency | +| GW | Gateway | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network | +| LER | Label Edge Router | +| LSP | Label Switched Path | +| LSR | Label Switching Router | +| MG | Media Gateway | +| MGC | Media Gateway Controller | +| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switching | +| MSC | Mobile Switching Center | +| MTU | Maximum Transmission Unit | +| NT | Network Termination | +| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network | +| RAN | Radio Access Network | +| RTP | Real-Time Transport Protocol | +| SSCS | Service-Specific Convergence Sublayer | +| TDM | Time Division Multiplexing | +| UDP | User Datagram Protocol | + +# **5 Architecture** + +MPLS is being introduced into IP networks to support Traffic Engineering and various applications. One of the motivations for Voice Services over MPLS is to take advantage of the MPLS network capabilities to improve voice services by: + +- using label-switched-paths as a bearer capability for encoded voice thereby providing appropriate QoS capability; +- providing efficient transport mechanism. + +## 5.1 Voice Services over MPLS logical service reference model + +A logical service reference model for Voice Services over MPLS consists of two main components: + +- 1) a high-capacity MPLS core network consisting of MPLS nodes (LSR) with support of MPLS control protocols; +- 2) Gateway Devices used at the edge of the MPLS network to perform interworking between a variety of technologies such as ATM, frame relay, TDM, IP, PSTN, ISDN, etc. and the MPLS network. + +Figure 1 shows the Voice Services over MPLS logical service reference model including control plane, transport plane, and management plane. + + + +GW Gateway device + +----- Link + +○ Label Edge Router + +— Label Switched Path + +● Label Switching Router + +Y.1261\_F01 + +Figure 1: Voice Services over MPLS logical service reference model. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Logical view' (top) and 'Physical network' (bottom), separated by a dashed line. In the 'Logical view', three planes are shown: 'Management plane', 'User plane', and 'Control plane'. Each plane is connected to a 'GW' (Gateway device) on the left and a 'GW' on the right. These GWs are connected to three corresponding networks: 'Management network', 'Transport network', and 'Signalling network'. In the 'Physical network' section, the left and right GWs are connected to physical networks labeled 'e.g. PSTN, ISDN, ATM'. The central 'MPLS network' is shown as a core network with 'Label Edge Router' (LER) nodes at the edges and 'Label Switching Router' (LSR) nodes in the center. A 'Label Switched Path' (LSP) is highlighted with a red line connecting the LERs through the LSRs. A legend at the bottom left defines the symbols: GW (Gateway device), Link (dashed line), LER (Label Edge Router, represented by a circle), LSP (Label Switched Path, represented by a red line), and LSR (Label Switching Router, represented by a blue dot). The identifier 'Y.1261\_F01' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area. + +**Figure 1/Y.1261 – Voice Services over MPLS logical service reference model** + +## 5.2 Voice services over MPLS Reference Architecture + +Figure 2 identifies the Reference Architecture for Voice Services over MPLS. The MPLS network contains a number of Gateway devices (GW), Label Switching Routers (LSR), and Label Switched Paths (LSP) [13], [14], [15]. An example LSP is shown as a solid line in the figure. Gateways may be directly connected to each other or indirectly connected through a number of LSRs. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Reference Architecture for Voice Services over MPLS. It shows a central MPLS network (cloud shape) connected to two external networks (cloud shapes) labeled "PSTN, ISDN, ATM". The MPLS network contains three Gateway devices (GW) and four Label Switching Routers (LSR). The GWs are labeled "GW IWF" and are connected to the LSRs. A "Voice terminal" is connected to the top GW. A "Label Switched Path" (LSP) is shown as a solid green line connecting the left GW to the right GW through the LSRs. Physical links are shown as dashed lines. A legend at the bottom left defines the symbols: GW (Gateway device), IWF (Interworking Function), LSP (Label Switched Path), Physical link (dashed line), and LSR (Label Switching Router). The text "Y.1261\_F02" is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Figure 2/Y.1261 – Voice services over MPLS Reference Architecture diagram + +**Figure 2/Y.1261 – Voice services over MPLS Reference Architecture** + +Gateway devices include LER functionality as well as the interworking functions. + +This architecture should be capable of supporting different LSP configurations (e.g., E-LSP, L-LSP [16], hierarchical LSP, etc.) to convey voice payloads in an MPLS environment. + +NOTE – Voice Services over MPLS can be deployed in both core and access networks. Network architecture functions and definitions for the usage of Voice Services over MPLS in access networks are for further study. + +# 6 Requirements for Voice Services over MPLS + +The following subclauses provide a list of requirements for Voice Services over MPLS. The relative priority of these requirements is Service Provider specific. + +## 6.1 General service requirements + +The following provides a list of general service requirements: + +- 1) The architecture should be capable of supporting carrier-grade networks (e.g., support of a large number of voice calls as well as a rapid rate of voice call requests, etc.) in accordance with existing Recommendations for voice networks. +- 2) If a solution makes use of mechanisms which apply only in restricted environments, a clear statement about the restricted applicability must be included. +- 3) Multiple applications may be supported (e.g., facsimile, video, etc.) + +Table 1 below summarises the categories and the corresponding delivered services which have been identified in the "Voice Services over MPLS" family. + +**Table 1/Y.1261 – Categories for Voice Services over MPLS** + +| Category | Services delivered | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| Audio | Digitized Voice | +| | Alarm | +| | Silence information descriptor | +| | Dialled digits | +| | Channel-associated signalling | +| | Facsimile – voiceband data | +| | Facsimile remodulation/demodulation | +| | Circuit mode data for 64 kbit/s or $2 \times 64$ kbit/s | +| Multirate | Circuit mode data for $N \times 64$ kbit/s, $2 < N \leq 31$ | +| | Alarm | +| Video | Video | +| | Alarm | +| NOTE – Either one category or any combination of categories may be supported. | | + +## 6.2 User plane requirements + +The following provides a list of requirements for the user plane: + +- 1) Multiplexing encoded voice samples from different calls into a single MPLS frame should be supported. +- 2) The bandwidth should not be used by the voice application when it is not needed – when the talk is silent or when the call is completed. +- 3) The user plane protocol should be efficient in terms of bandwidth. +- 4) The capability to implement echo cancellation functionality to reduce echo should be supported. +- 5) QoS/SLA (jitter, loss, bandwidth, delay) commitments for the voice service must be supported. +- 6) Uncompressed (i.e., G.711 64 kbit/s, both A-law and $\mu$ -law) and compressed voice (G.726 16/24/32/40 kbit/s, G.729 8 kbit/s, G.723.1 5.3/6.3 kbit/s) should be supported ([1], [2], [3], [4]). +- 7) Standard encoding schemes should be supported. +- 8) Specific families of related encoding algorithms (e.g., AMR [12]) should experience minimum disruption in audio when the algorithm rate is changed during the call. +- 9) Silence suppression, i.e., non-transfer of MPLS subframes during silent intervals should be supported. Generic Silence Insertion Descriptor for voice encodings that do not contain this capability should be supported. +- 10) DTMF transport should be supported. +- 11) Voiceband data through modem detection should be supported. +- 12) Transport of Channel-Associated Signalling bits should be supported. + +## 6.3 User plane requirements for combined audio and video service + +The following provides a list of user plane requirements for the combined audio and video service: + +- 1) Multimedia applications may be supported. + +- 2) If multimedia applications are supported, standard video schemes should be supported (e.g., CelB, JPEG, H261, MPV, MP2T, and H263). +- 3) One video call may be mapped to one LSP. Mapping more than one video call to single LSP is for further study. +- 4) Higher resolution timer (e.g., 90 kHz for IP video) and indication of end of frame should be supported. +- 5) Variable length and large payloads up to MTU size minus the MPLS overhead of the underlying link layer for MPLS should be supported. + +## **6.4 Control plane requirements** + +The following provides a list of requirements for the control plane: + +- 1) LSPs that are used for Voice Services over MPLS may be either established on demand or via management procedures. +- 2) Voice call channel parameters (e.g., bandwidth, QoS, etc.) applicable to both single and multiplexed channels in an LSP may be either statically or dynamically provisioned. + +## **6.5 Management plane requirements** + +The management plane should provide the following functions: + +- a) Resource management (e.g., bandwidth, label, addresses, etc.) +- b) Parameter management (e.g., priority of traffic, sampling and framing period of voice) +- c) Monitoring and maintenance: + - connection identification; + - connection state monitoring; + - fault detection and notification; + - alarm capabilities. + +# **7 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements** + +## **7.1 Voice Services over MPLS Interworking requirements with Voice over IP** + +- 1) ITU-T Rec. G.711 must be supported without negotiation. +- 2) Video and combined audio and video services may be supported. +- 3) Tones and DTMF digits should be supported. + +## **7.2 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with Voice over ATM** + +- 1) Narrowband services defined in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 should be supported. +- 2) Interworking of operation and maintenance capabilities defined in ITU-T Rec. I.610 [10] should be supported. +- 3) Mapping of ATM traffic and QoS parameters to MPLS LSPs should be supported. + +## **7.3 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with Voice over Frame Relay** + +Support is for further study. + +## **7.4 Voice Services over MPLS interworking requirements with PSTN/ISDN** + +- 1) Interworking with PSTN/ISDN should be supported. + +## **7.5 Voice Services over MPLS Interworking requirements with mobile access networks** + +Support is for further study. + +# **Appendix I** + +## **Voice over Packet Protocol architectures** + +In recent years, voice over packet protocols were developed for different packet networks. They include: Voice over Frame Relay, Voice over ATM using AAL type2 as described in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2 [9] and Voice over Internet Protocol. Each of these packet voice schemes developed a transport protocol for providing end-to-end network transport for voice applications. + +These Voice over Packet protocols provide functionalities similar to Voice Services over MPLS in the User plane protocol. + +### **I.1 Voice over Frame Relay** + +The Frame Relay Forum developed the Voice over Frame Relay implementation agreement [20]. Transport of uncompressed and compressed voice is provided with a generalized frame format that supports multiplexing of subchannels on a single frame relay connection. Support for the unique needs of the different voice compression algorithms is accommodated with algorithm-specific "transfer syntax" definitions. These definitions establish algorithm specific frame formats and procedures. + +Transport of supporting information for voice communication, such as signalling indications (e.g., ABCD bits), dialled digits, and facsimile data, is also provided through the use of transfer syntax definitions specific to the information being sent. + +#### **I.1.1 FR reference model and service description** + +In the FR reference model (Figure I.1), a Voice Frame Relay Access Device can exchange voice information over a FR connection with another Voice Frame Relay Access Device. It could also use the Voice over Frame Relay protocol stack on a connection to a transparent channel bank into a private network (middle right) or to a PBX (bottom right). + +A block diagram for the Voice over Frame Relay service is provided in Figure I.2 and identifies the information provided to users of the Voice over Frame Relay service. + + + +Y.1261\_Fl.1 + +Figure I.1/Y.1261 – Voice over Frame Relay network reference model. This diagram shows a central cloud labeled 'Frame Relay' connected to six nodes. Each node represents a different network element: 1. Application (e.g., Fax) with a VoFR stack. 2. Transparent (e.g., Channel bank) with a Voice interface and a VoFR stack. 3. Switching (e.g., PBX) with a Voice interface and a VoFR stack. 4. Application (e.g., Fax) with a VoFR stack. 5. Transparent (e.g., Channel bank) with a VoFR stack and a Voice interface. 6. Switching (e.g., PBX) with a VoFR stack and a Voice interface. The connections show the flow of data through the Frame Relay network. + +**Figure I.1/Y.1261 – Voice over Frame Relay network reference model** + + + +Y.1261\_Fl.2 + +Figure I.2/Y.1261 – Voice over Frame Relay service block diagram. This block diagram illustrates the service flow. At the top is the 'Voice over Frame Relay service user'. Below it is the 'Voice over Frame Relay service' block, which contains two sub-blocks: 'Primary payloads' and 'Signalled payloads'. Between the user and the service block, there are eight vertical double-headed arrows representing data flows: 'Voice', 'Delay', 'Encoded Fax', 'Fault indication', 'Dialled digits', 'Encoded Fax', 'Signalling bits (CAS)', and 'Silence information'. At the bottom is the 'Frame Relay service' block. A single vertical double-headed arrow labeled 'Service Data Units' connects the 'Voice over Frame Relay service' block to the 'Frame Relay service' block. + +**Figure I.2/Y.1261 – Voice over Frame Relay service block diagram** + +#### I.1.2 Multiplexing + +The Voice over Frame Relay service supports multiple voice and data channels on a single frame relay data link connection. The Voice over Frame Relay service delivers frames on each sub-channel in the order they were sent. + +Voice and data payloads are multiplexed within a voice over frame relay data link connection by encapsulation within the FR frame. Each payload is packaged as a sub-frame within a frame's information field. Sub-frames may be combined within a single frame to increase processing and + +transport efficiencies. Each sub-frame contains a header and payload. The sub-frame header identifies the voice/data sub-channel and, when required, payload type and length. + +#### I.1.3 Voice over Frame Relay user plane protocol stack + +In the case of Voice over Frame Relay, the user plane protocol stack consists of: *Physical layer/Q.922 Annex A/Voice over Frame Relay* as shown in Figure I.3 [11]. The higher layer (i.e., Voice over Frame Relay) is providing the voice protocol. The Voice over Frame Relay protocol is the User plane protocol in this case and provides peer-to-peer layer communications in a Frame Relay network. + + + +| | +|------------------------| +| Voice | +| Voice over Frame relay | +| Q.922 Annex A | +| Physical layer | + +**Figure I.3/Y.1261 – Voice over Frame Relay protocol stack** + +### I.2 Voice over ATM as described in AAL type 2 Service Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9] + +Figure I.4 shows an example of narrow-band trunking supported in AAL type 2 Service Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9]. + +The Service-Specific Convergence Sublayer (SSCS) carries the information content of one narrow-band call over each AAL type 2 connection – with the appropriate bearer capability. Secondary messaging, such as frame mode data, dialled digits, channel-associated signalling bits, and alarms may be interleaved on the same AAL type 2 connection. + + + +The diagram illustrates a narrow-band trunking deployment. On the left, two PBX (Private Branch Exchange) boxes are connected to a central 'Trunk interface' box. A vertical dashed line separates the 'TDM' side from the 'ATM' side. The 'Trunk interface' box is connected to a central oval labeled 'B-ISDN'. On the right, the 'B-ISDN' oval is connected to another 'Trunk interface' box, which is then connected to two more PBX boxes. A vertical dashed line separates the 'ATM' side from the 'TDM' side. The label 'Y.1261\_FI.4' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram illustrating the deployment example of narrow-band trunking. It shows two PBXs connected to a central B-ISDN network via Trunk interfaces. The left side shows a TDM/ATM interface, and the right side shows an ATM/TDM interface. The B-ISDN network is represented by a central oval with two lines connecting to the Trunk interfaces on both sides. + +**Figure I.4/Y.1261 – Deployment example of narrow-band trunking** + +At each end of a trunk, the User coordinates the operations of the SSCS. The services offered by the SSCS are delivered through Service Access Points (SAPs). + +The audio, circuit mode data, and facsimile demodulation/remodulation services represent primary information streams of the audio service. Only one of these streams can be transported on an AAL type 2 connection at a given time. + +The dialled digits service is a secondary information stream. It could be transported simultaneously with one of the primary streams, but it is anticipated that the primary stream will be made idle during the transport of dialled digits. The frame mode data, channel-associated signalling, and + +alarms services are secondary information streams that can be transported simultaneously with one of the primary information streams. + +#### **I.2.1 User plane protocol stack for Voice over ATM as described in AAL type 2 Service-Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9]** + +For voice over ATM using AAL Type 2 as described in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2, the user plane protocol stack consists of: *physical layer/ATM layer/ (AAL 2 common part + AAL 2 service specific part)/Voice*. + +The service-specific part of AAL sublayer performs different functions depending on the service. I.366.2 defines how to transport audio service information between trunking interfaces. + +| | +|------------------------------------------| +| Voice | +| AAL 2 Service-Specific Part
(I.366.2) | +| AAL 2 Common Part
(I.366.2) | +| ATM | +| Physical Layer | + +**Figure I.5/Y.1261 – User plane protocol stack for Voice over ATM as described in AAL type 2 Service-Specific Convergence Sublayer for trunking [9]** + +### **I.3 Voice over IP** + +The user plane protocol for a Voice over IP stack is shown in Figure I.6. + +| | +|----------------| +| Voice | +| RTP | +| UDP | +| IP | +| Link Layer | +| Physical Layer | + +**Figure I.6/Y.1261 – Voice over IP protocol stack** + +The RTP protocol provides end-to-end network transport functions suitable for audio application. Those functions include payload type identification, sequence numbering, and time stamping. + +RTP provides the information required by a particular application and will often be integrated into the application processing rather than being implemented as a separate layer. RTP along with application profiles for audio provides the transport services for voice application. The profile specifications define a set of payload type codes and their mapping to payload formats. + +The RTP header contains timing information and a sequence number that allows the receiver to reconstruct the sample produced by the source. + +# Appendix II + +## Alternate solutions for Voice Services over MPLS + +MPLS provides a link layer independent transport framework and uses existing IP mechanisms for addressing and routing of traffic. There are several possibilities to provide Voice Services over MPLS. + +It is important to realize that MPLS networks will evolve from existing networks; existing services and capabilities will have to be supported and interwork with the MPLS networks. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture for voice services over MPLS. It features a central 'Transport Network' (MPLS) flanked by two external networks, each labeled 'e.g., PSTN, ISDN, ATM (existing services and capabilities)'. The MPLS network is shown as a vertical bar with a dashed line indicating its internal structure. The external networks are represented by large ovals. The MPLS network supports several voice services, which are listed in the center: 'Voice Services over MPLS solutions' (including 'Voice over MPLS', 'MPLS Forum IA 1.0', and 'AAL 1, AAL 2, AAL 5'), 'I.366.2 Trunking format', 'Voice over IP (RTP/UDP/IP)', and 'Voice over ATM (AAL 1, AAL 2, AAL 5)'. The MPLS network is also labeled 'MPLS' at the bottom. The entire diagram is labeled 'Y1261\_FII.1' in the bottom right corner. + +Diagram illustrating alternate solutions for Voice Services over MPLS. The diagram shows a central MPLS network (Transport Network) connected to two external networks (e.g., PSTN, ISDN, ATM). The MPLS network supports various voice services: Voice Services over MPLS solutions (Voice over MPLS, MPLS Forum IA 1.0, AAL 1, AAL 2, AAL 5), I.366.2 Trunking format, Voice over IP (RTP/UDP/IP), and Voice over ATM (AAL 1, AAL 2, AAL 5). + +**Figure II.1/Y.1261 – Alternate solutions for Voice Services over MPLS** + +### II.1 Voice over ATM + +The coded voice over an ATM connection [5] can be transported using: + +- a) Voice over AAL 1; +- b) Voice over AAL 2; +- c) Voice over AAL 5. + +This approach uses respectively ATM AAL type 1 [6], AAL type 2 [7] [9], or AAL type 5 [8]. + +Using this approach over an MPLS network, ATM/MPLS network interworking or AAL/MPLS network interworking can be used. ATM cells or AAL frames are received at the ATM/MPLS network gateway. + +NOTE – ATM/MPLS and AAL/MPLS interworking specifications are currently under development. + +| | +|-------------------------| +| Voice | +| AAL 1 or AAL 2 or AAL 5 | +| ATM | +| MPLS | +| Link layer | +| Physical layer | + +**Figure II.2/Y.1261 – Voice over ATM protocol stack** + +### **II.2 Voice over IP** + +MPLS will be used to transport IP frames. Voice over IP is transparent to MPLS. RFC 1889 [18], and RFC 1890 [15] are used by this approach. + +| | +|----------------| +| Voice | +| RTP | +| UDP | +| IP | +| MPLS | +| Link layer | +| Physical layer | + +**Figure II.3/Y.1261 – Voice over IP protocol stack** + +### **II.3 I.366.2 Voice Trunking format over MPLS** + +This approach describes a mechanism using the same format of AAL type 2 CPCS packet encapsulated within MPLS frames. It uses variable length packets with are formatted as described in ITU-T Rec. I.366.2, but carried by MPLS frames and not ATM cells. + +In this approach, the segmentation and reassembly (SAR) functionality as well as the start field are not required. Similarly, the AAL-CU timer and related functionality are not required. + +| | +|-----------------------------------| +| Voice | +| I.366.2 Trunking format over MPLS | +| MPLS | +| Link layer | +| Physical layer | + +**Figure II.4/Y.1261 – I.366.2 Voice Trunking format over MPLS protocol stack** + +### **II.4 Voice over MPLS** + +This approach is based on the MPLS Forum Implementation Agreement 1.0 [21]. In this case, the protocol stack consists of voice samples directly encapsulated in the MPLS frame. + +| | +|--------------------------------------| +| Voice | +| Voice over MPLS
MPLS Forum IA 1.0 | +| MPLS | +| Link layer | +| Physical layer | + +**Figure II.5/Y.1261 – Voice over MPLS protocol stack** + +### **II.5 Summary of different solutions for Voice Services over MPLS** + +Figure II.6 summarizes a number of protocol stacks to support Voice Services over MPLS (those described in Appendix II). + +| | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------|-----------------------------|--|--| +| Voice | | | | | | | +| | | RTP | | | | | +| | | UDP | AAL 1
(I.363.1) | AAL 2
(I.363.2, I.366.2) | | | +| Voice over MPLS
MPLS Forum IA 1.0 | I.366.2 Voice trunking
format over MPLS | IP | ATM | | | | +| MPLS layer | | | | | | | +| Link layer | | | | | | | +| Physical layer | | | | | | | + +**Figure II.6/Y.1261 – Various protocol stacks for support of Voice Services over MPLS** + +# **Appendix III** + +## **BICC architecture** + +An instance of the Bearer Independent Call Control (BICC) architecture is shown in Figure III.1 [17]. It consists of ATM or IP backbone networks and Media gateways (MG) connected to network edge nodes. The role of a MG is to map TDM time slots to ATM cells or IP packets and vice versa. MGs can be either line (local loop) or trunk MGs. Media gateway controllers (MGC) perform call control functions and interact with one or more MGs under their control. + + + +Y.1261\_FIII.1 + +CPE Customer Premises Equipment + EO End Office + TO Trunk Office + +Diagram of BICC architecture showing two symmetrical paths. Each path starts with a CPE connected to an EO (End Office), which connects to a TO (Trunk Office). The TO connects to an MG (Media Gateway), which then connects to an MGC (Media Gateway Controller). The MGCs are connected via a Signalling network. The MGs connect to Network edge nodes, which interface with an ATM or IP network. The Network edge nodes connect to another MG, which then connects to another TO, EO, and CPE. A legend defines CPE as Customer Premises Equipment, EO as End Office, and TO as Trunk Office. The reference Y.1261\_FIII.1 is noted at the bottom right. + +**Figure III.1/Y.1261 – An instance of BICC architecture** + +When MGs are connected to an ATM network, AAL type 1 or AAL type 2 may be used to transport voice services. When MGs are connected to an IP network, RTP over UDP and IP is used. MGs interface to the PSTN with TDM 64 kbit/s channels. + +So far BICC supports ATM networks with AAL type 1 and type 2 and IP networks with RTP/UDP/IP for voice transport. + +Current BICC capabilities will remain for some time when the network evolves to the multi-service MPLS network. + +Detailed BICC architecture and its evolution for MPLS network control is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +# Appendix IV + +## Examples of Voice Services over MPLS deployment scenarios + +LSPs that are used for Voice Services over MPLS could be either established on demand or via management procedures. Depending on the specific application, the mapping of voice call information streams (e.g., time slots on a primary rate interface) to multiplexed streams could be either static or dynamic. Voice calls could even be switched at an external interface to one of several outgoing LSPs, based on an analysis of the destination address. + +These are possible applications of Voice Services over MPLS and are provided just as deployment examples. + + + +Y.1261\_FIV.1 + +Figure IV.1/Y.1261: Deployment example of Voice Services over MPLS for trunking. The diagram shows a TDM network on the left connected to a 'Trunk interface' box. This box is connected to an 'MPLS' cloud. The 'MPLS' cloud is connected to two 'Trunk interface' boxes on the right, which are then connected to two separate 'TDM' networks. + +**Figure IV.1/Y.1261 – Deployment example of Voice Services over MPLS for trunking** + + + +Y.1261\_FIV.2 + +Figure IV.2/Y.1261: Deployment example of Voice Services over MPLS for trunking, for mobile access, and for fixed line access. The diagram shows a TDM network on the left connected to a 'Local exchange' box. This box is connected to an 'MPLS' cloud. The 'MPLS' cloud is connected to three components on the right: an 'MSC' box, an 'NT' box, and a 'Trunk interface' box. The 'MSC' box is connected to a 'RAN' network, and the 'Trunk interface' box is connected to a 'TDM' network. + +**Figure IV.2/Y.1261 – Deployment example of Voice Services over MPLS for trunking, for mobile access, and for fixed line access** + + + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification | +| Series C | General telecommunication statistics | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks and open system communications | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | + + + +A standard 1D barcode is located at the bottom right of the page. Below the vertical bars, the numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 are printed, flanked by asterisks on both sides: \* 2 3 4 5 7 \*. + +Barcode with numbers 2 3 4 5 7 and asterisks \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1271-201407-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1271-201407-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5acdd5fdb0a2931ce1fff8488984574416bd1737 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1271-201407-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,666 @@ + + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +## Y.1271 + +(07/2014) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION +INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS +AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS + +Internet protocol aspects – Architecture, access, network +capabilities and resource management + +--- + +**Framework(s) on network requirements and +capabilities to support emergency +telecommunications over evolving circuit- +switched and packet-switched networks** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1271 + +# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | + +## FUTURE NETWORKS + +| | | +|-----------------|---------------| +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 | +|-----------------|---------------| + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.1271 + +# **Framework(s) on network requirements and capabilities to support emergency telecommunications over evolving circuit-switched and packet-switched networks** + +## **Summary** + +Many challenges and considerations need to be addressed in defining and establishing the functional capabilities to support emergency telecommunications in evolving circuit- and packet-switched telecommunications networks. This Recommendation presents an overview of the basic requirements, features, and concepts for emergency telecommunications that evolving networks are capable of providing. + +## **History** + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.1271 | 2004-10-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/7047 | +| 2.0 | ITU-T Y.1271 | 2014-07-18 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12177 | + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
- – Ideal, although providing per flow delivery guarantees introduces scaling challenges
- – A common approach, which does not provide per flow delivery guarantees, is to use over-provisioning and class-based priority queuing (to manage any-to-any bursty traffic and congestion)
Example: An Ethernet server layer supporting an IP client layer
|- – Providing per flow delivery guarantees introduces scaling challenges
- – A common approach, which does not provide per flow delivery guarantees, is to use over-provisioning and class-based priority queuing
- – VPN client layer must be able to recover from out-of-sequence traffic units (due to the possibility of server layer packet re-ordering)
Example: An IP server layer supporting an ATM client layer
|- – Providing per flow delivery guarantees introduces scaling challenges
- – A common approach, which does not provide per flow delivery guarantees, is to use over-provisioning and class-based priority queuing
- – Recovering clock timing is technically challenging
- – VPN client layer must be able to recover from out-of-sequence traffic units
Example: An IP server layer supporting a TDM client layer
| +| CO-PS VPN server layer |- – Cost associated with maintaining connection state for on-demand VPNs with short hold times, i.e., SPVCs
Example: An ATM server layer supporting an IP client layer
|- – Ideal
Example: A P2P MPLS server layer supporting an ATM client layer
|- – Recovering clock timing is technically challenging
Example: An ATM server layer supporting a TDM client layer
| +| CO-CS VPN server layer |- – No statistical multiplexing between aggregates
- – Bandwidth assigned permanently in course increments resulting in poor network utilization
- – Slow connection set up response times for on-demand VPNs with short hold times
Example: An SDH server layer supporting an Ethernet client layer
|- – No statistical multiplexing between aggregates
- – Bandwidth assigned permanently in course increments resulting in poor network utilization
- – Slow connection set up response times for on-demand VPNs with short hold times
Example: An ATM server layer supporting a TDM client layer
|- – Ideal
Example: An optical server layer (e.g., a DWDM channel) supporting a SDH/SONET client layer
| + +## 5.2 VPN client layer transparency + +In a client/server VPN, the functional components (such as routing, signalling, OAM, management, etc.) belonging to the VPN client layer network should be completely independent of the functional components belonging to the VPN server layer network. + +Although it is possible to design client/server VPN solutions where the VPN server layer network's functional components interact with the VPN client layer network's functional components, this approach leads to a number of undesirable consequences, for example: + +- 1) The VPN service may break if the customer changes any of the VPN client layer functional components. +- 2) The VPN service provider needs to track developments in the customer's VPN client layer technology and implement upgrades in its network accordingly. +- 3) Under fault conditions it becomes difficult to establish if the fault is in the VPN client layer network or the VPN server layer network. + +By requiring that the VPN client and server layer networks are able to be run independently of one another, it naturally follows that the VPN server layer should transparently transfer the VPN client layer. For example, if the VPN client layer network is ATM, the VPN client layer network may implement a proprietary feature (e.g., AAL, non-PNNI routing and signalling, OAM) which, if not carried transparently, would break the VPN service. + +Client layer transparency is not only a technical requirement, but it also has commercial implications because a VPN service provider is likely to consider the details of its network to be commercially sensitive and will therefore wish to hide those details from any VPN client layer networks. For example, it would not be desirable for the VPN server layer network to peer with the routing and signalling of the VPN client layer in the above example. + +# 6 Peer level VPNs + +In clause 5 the VPN topologies described were based on a client/server relationship between a VPN client layer and a VPN server layer. In the client/server VPN model, the VPN server layer adaptation source function adapts the CI of the VPN client layer into AI in the VPN server layer, and the VPN server layer adaptation sink function adapts VPN server layer AI to VPN client layer CI. In basic terms, this adaptation refers to the encapsulation of the client layer frame/signal in a VPN server layer frame/signal. + +However, not all VPN topologies are based on the client/server model. VPNs can also be provided using CL-PS network technologies based on a model in which VPN reachability isolation within a shared domain is achieved via some means other than client/server encapsulation. This Recommendation refers to this type of VPN as a peer level VPN. The term "peer level" refers to the fact that the provider transports the customers VPN packets across its shared infrastructure at the same network layer at which it receives the packets from the customer. It does not refer to customer/provider control plane peering, the customer and provider may peer with each other in the control plane regardless of the type of VPN. Only the CL-PS network mode supports this type of VPN because, in the CO-PS and CO-CS cases, the connection-orientated nature of the technology enforces reachability isolation, i.e., NEs can only communicate with NEs that belong to the same P2P or P2MP connection. + +In order to support VPNs across a shared domain, the network technology used must have some means of providing VPN isolation, i.e., NEs must only be able to communicate with other NEs belonging to the same VPN or be able to decrypt packets from NEs belonging to the same VPN. + +## 6.1 Packet/route filtering + +One way of implementing VPN isolation across a shared domain is to use packet filters along with PEs that are shared between multiple customers. In this approach, all the nodes in the service provider's network know all the customers' routes. This includes the provider edge (PE) nodes that face the customers' sites, and the provider (P) nodes in the core. In this architecture, the PE nodes are shared by different customers. The service provider allocates a portion of its address space to a customer and manages the packet filters on the PE routers to ensure full reachability between sites of a single customer, and isolation between customers. + +To overcome the need to maintain consistent routing tables and packet filters on a per customer per site basis, an alternative is to implement a solution based on route filtering rather than packet filtering along with dedicated PEs, i.e., one PE per VPN. In this architecture, the P nodes contain all customers' routes but the PE nodes only contain routes for a single customer. Isolation of customer routes is achieved by route filtering. PE nodes are configured with route filters that only allow customers to learn about routes that belong to them. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an example of a protocol commonly used for this purpose inside the provider backbone due to its versatile route filtering tools. An alternative to route filtering would be to use a different routing protocol instance for each VPN. However, using this approach, the shared network would only be able to support a small number of VPNs due to P nodes only being able to support a finite number of routing protocol instances, and due to the operational complexity of managing multiple protocol instances. + +To overcome the need to use a different PE node for each VPN, an alternative approach is to use virtual routers (VRs). In this approach, one physical node is effectively compartmentalized into a number of virtual routers. One (or several) virtual routers can be assigned to a particular customer. In this way, one node can provide compartmentalized routing instances for several customers. Individual virtual routers behave just like separate PE nodes dedicated to a particular VPN. As with the route filtering approach, P nodes contain all customers' routes and therefore route filtering is required at PEs.1 + +## 6.2 Encryption + +An alternative to route/packet filtering is to provide full reachability between all customers connected to a shared infrastructure in conjunction with packet encryption. Packet encryption ensures that if customers receive packets from a VPN to which they do not belong, they cannot obtain the information contained inside the packet. The customer may encrypt VPN packets before the traffic goes out over the shared network and therefore the customer is responsible for managing the VPN. In this approach, traffic within the service provider network is routed the same as any other IP traffic, and the service provider has no visibility into the tunnel. Nor does the service provider network need to be configured in any special manner. Alternatively, VPN packets may be encrypted using equipment managed by the provider (i.e., PEs or provider managed CEs) at the edge of the provider's shared network. In this approach, the provider is responsible for managing the VPN. + +--- + +1 A natural evolution of this approach is to use MPLS or other tunnelling approaches so that VPN-specific routes do not have to be maintained on backbone routers. However, this creates a client/server VPN topology and therefore this approach is applicable to clause 5 rather than this clause. + +An example of an architecture that supports encryption is RFC 2401 – Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol (IPsec). IPsec defines cryptographic algorithms, authentication and key2 management routines for creating secure IP traffic tunnels between IPsec gateways/clients. IPsec guarantees the privacy, integrity and data origin authentication in a VPN as the information traverses a shared infrastructure. IPsec is particularly useful for providing VPNs across public networks such as the Internet for site-to-site and remote access VPNs. IPsec functionality may be provided by a PE, CE, or end user device (e.g., a laptop running an IPsec client). + +Secure Socket Layer (SSL) VPNs are another type of VPN that use encryption to provide per VPN isolation. A typical use of SSL VPNs is to allow users to access applications and files securely over the Internet. The advantage of this approach is that it does not require any configuration changes to end users' systems, only standard applications need to be supported (e.g., Web browsers, email clients, etc.). Also, SSL VPNs are transparent to the VPN peer layer (as encryption is performed at the application layer) and therefore configuration of routing/switching nodes is not necessary in order to support SSL VPNs. + +## **6.3 Ethernet VLANs** + +The IEEE 802.1Q standard defines the operation of Virtual LAN (VLAN) Bridges that permit the definition, operation and administration of Virtual LAN topologies within a Bridged LAN infrastructure. VLANs allow end-stations on multiple physical LAN segments to communicate as if they were connected to the same LAN segment. End users and hubs/switches can be moved to different VLANs by changing the VLAN configuration on the port/interface on the 802.1Q-compliant switching device that the end station or hub/switch connects to. Broadcast and multicast frames are constrained by VLAN boundaries so end-stations will only receive broadcast/multicast frames for the VLAN that they belong to. This, in conjunction with how MAC address learning works, ensures that only end-stations belonging to the same VLAN may communicate with each other, and can therefore be considered to be members of the same VPN. + +Traffic separation for frames belonging to different VLANs across a shared infrastructure is achieved by inserting a tag with a VLAN identifier (VID) into each frame. A VID must be assigned for each VLAN (1 to 4 096) and must be globally unique within the same physical infrastructure. One of the drawbacks to this approach is that customers also use VLANs within their own network, which introduces VID allocation and limitation issues. To solve this problem a second IEEE 802.1Q-tag can be appended to customer IEEE 802.1Q tagged packets that enter the providers' network (Q-in-Q as defined in IEEE 802.1ad). This separates the providers VLAN space from the customers' VLAN space and allows customers to use whatever VIDs they want3. + +--- + +2 A key is a piece of information that controls the operation of the encryption/decryption algorithm. + +3 Another option is to use a MAC-in-MAC approach (as defined in IEEE 802.1ah) in which a provider appends a second Ethernet header to the customers packet. However, this option creates a client/server VPN rather than a peer level VPN because the customers' frame is encapsulated inside a provider frame. + +# 7 Functional architecture of VPNs + +The VPN reference model from ITU-T Rec. Y.1311 is shown in Figure 7-1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the VPN reference model architecture, organized into three concentric layers: the Core layer (innermost), the Edge layer (middle), and the CE layer (outermost). The Core layer contains four Provider (P) nodes arranged in a square topology. The Edge layer contains four Provider Edge (PE) nodes, each connected to a corresponding P node in the Core layer. The CE layer contains four Customer Edge (CE) nodes, each connected to a corresponding PE node in the Edge layer. The diagram uses dashed lines to delineate the layers and solid lines for connections. A legend at the bottom left defines the components: CE for Customer edge, PE for Provider edge, and P for Provider. The identifier Y.1314\_F7.1 is located at the bottom right of the diagram area. + +Figure 7-1/Y.1314 – ITU-T Rec. Y.1311 VPN reference model diagram + +**Figure 7-1/Y.1314 – ITU-T Rec. Y.1311 VPN reference model** + +Although this model shows the physical topology and the different network components, it does not show the different VPN server and client layer topologies or the location of inter-layer adaptation functions. + +An alternative method of representing a client/server VPN network is to use functional modelling. The functional architecture of connection-orientated (CO-PS/CO-CS) and connectionless (CL-PS) layer networks can be described using ITU-T Rec. G.805, the "generic functional architecture of transport networks" and ITU-T Rec. G.809, the "functional architecture of connectionless layer networks" respectively. + +ITU-T Recs G.805 and G.809 provide useful generic methods for modelling networks from a functional and structural architecture perspective. The terminology defined is technology-independent and can be used to describe the physical and logical components for any given network. This is particularly useful for network inventory and management as the complete network view can be modelled, from the optical fibres in the duct up to the VPN services running over them. + +A VPN network can be decomposed into a number of independent layer networks with a client/server relationship between adjacent layer networks. As noted in ITU-T Rec. G.805, layer networks defined using functional modelling should not be confused with the layers of the Open System Interconnection (OSI) Model (ITU-T Rec. X.200). Each layer in the OSI model offers a specific service and the protocols defined at each layer perform a specific function corresponding to that layer, e.g., the transport layer (Layer 4) accepts data from the session layer, and passes it onto the network layer providing an end-to-end delivery service. On the contrary, each layer network in a functional model based on ITU-T Recs G.805 or G.809 offers the same service, i.e., the transport of bits/frames between inputs and outputs. Abstraction is commonly used to hide detail and to focus on the network layers/components of interest, but networks can be modelled right down to the network elements, e.g., Ethernet switches, copper pairs, SDH cross connects, etc. + +## 7.1 Connection-orientated VPN layer networks + +VPN client and server layer networks each have their own set of connectivity inputs and outputs known as access points (APs). These may be associated with each other to transfer information transparently across the layer network from input to output. Valid topology constructs of association between APs for CO layer networks are point-to-point (P2P) and point-to-multipoint (P2MP). + +VPN server layer APs mark the functional boundary between the VPN server and client layer networks. From the VPN server layers perspective, a VPN server layer AP represents a routing destination that may support a trail. From the VPN client layer's perspective, a VPN server layer AP represents a point at which it is possible to procure link capacity. The functional components and reference points in a CO network layer are illustrated in Figure 7-2. + + + +The diagram illustrates the functional components and reference points in a CO network layer. It shows a Source AP connected to a Sink AP via a Trail. The Trail is composed of Link connections and Subnetwork connections. The Link connections connect Termination functions (TCPs) and Connection Points (CPs). The Subnetwork connections connect CPs within a Subnetwork. The diagram also shows a Termination function connected to a TCP, and a TCP connected to a CP. The diagram is labeled Y.1314\_F7.2. + +Figure 7-2/Y.1314 – CO functional components and reference points. The diagram illustrates the functional components and reference points in a CO network layer. It shows a Source AP connected to a Sink AP via a Trail. The Trail is composed of Link connections and Subnetwork connections. The Link connections connect Termination functions (TCPs) and Connection Points (CPs). The Subnetwork connections connect CPs within a Subnetwork. The diagram also shows a Termination function connected to a TCP, and a TCP connected to a CP. The diagram is labeled Y.1314\_F7.2. + +**Figure 7-2/Y.1314 – CO functional components and reference points** + +Connections are transport entities in CO layer networks that consist of an associated pair of unidirectional connections capable of simultaneously transferring information in opposite directions between their respective inputs and outputs. A network connection is a transport entity in a CO layer network formed by a series of contiguous link connections and/or subnetwork connections between termination connection points (TCPs). + +A subnetwork is a topological component in a CO layer network used to effect routing of specific characteristic information, and contains a set of points associated with a management function within a single CO network layer. A subnetwork connection transfers information across a subnetwork, and is formed by the association of ports (output of a trail termination source/input of a trail termination sink) on the boundary of the subnetwork. + +Link connections interconnect topologically adjacent subnetworks that have a common subset of points. The point at which the input of a link connection is bound to the output of another link connection is a connection point (CP). The point at which a trail termination source output in a CO layer network is bound to the input of the network connection is a source TCP, and the point at which a trail termination sink input is bound to a network connection output is sink TCP. CPs and TCPs have a managed object associated with them and, it is therefore possible to group together TCPs and CPs belonging to the same VPN for management purposes. + +## 7.2 Connectionless VPN layer networks + +Unlike CO layer networks, CL layer networks support multipoint-to-multipoint (MP2MP) or any-to-any topologies. CL layer networks use flows rather than connections which are an aggregation of one or more traffic units with an element of common routing. Flows can be unidirectional or bidirectional, with bidirectional flows consisting of two contra-directional unidirectional flows. A network flow is a transport entity in a CL layer network formed by a series of contiguous flows between termination flow points (TFPs). The functional components and reference points in a CL network layer are illustrated in Figure 7-3. + + + +The diagram shows a linear representation of a connectionless trail between a Source and a Sink. At the Source end, there is an Access Point (AP) connected to a Termination function (represented by a downward-pointing triangle). Below this is a Termination Flow Point (TFP). A Link flow connects this TFP to a Flow Point (FP). Another Link flow connects this FP to a second TFP. This second TFP is part of a larger oval labeled 'Flow domain'. Within the flow domain, a 'Flow domain flow' connects the TFP to another FP. Finally, at the Sink end, there is another Termination function connected to an AP. The entire top-level path is labeled 'Connectionless trail'. The diagram includes labels for Source, Sink, AP, Termination function, TFP, FP, Link flow, Flow domain flow, and Flow domain. The reference number Y.1314\_F7.3 is in the bottom right. + +Figure 7-3/Y.1314 – CL functional components and reference points + +**Figure 7-3/Y.1314 – CL functional components and reference points** + +A flow domain is a topological component in a CL layer network used to effect routing of specific characteristic information. A flow domain flow is a transport entity that transfers information across a flow domain, and is formed by the association of ports on the boundary of the flow domain. A flow domain contains a set of points associated with a management function within a single CL network layer. + +Link flows interconnect topologically adjacent flow domains that have a common subset of points. The point at which the input of a link flow is bound to the output of another link flow is a flow point (FP). The point at which a connectionless trail termination source output in a CL layer network is bound to the input of the network flow is a source TFP, and the point at which a connectionless trail termination sink input is bound to a network flow output is a sink TFP. As with CPs and TCPs in the CO case, in the CL case FPs and TFPs have a managed object associated with them and it is, therefore, possible to group together TFPs and FPs belonging to the same VPN for management purposes. + +## 7.3 VPN client/server relationships + +In functional terms, a VPN client layer network is a topological component in a client/server VPN that represents the set of access points of the same type associated for the purpose of transferring VPN client layer characteristic information, which are supported by a VPN server layer trail or a connectionless trail. The source/sink TCPs/TFPs for VPN client layer connections/flows may be located in CE nodes, or in nodes/end-systems elsewhere in the customer's network. For example, TCPs in an ATM VPN client layer are likely to be located in CE nodes, whilst TFPs in an Ethernet VPN client layer are likely to be located in end user computers or servers. The location of the VPN client flow/connection TFPs/TCPs is important from a customer perspective, as this is the point in the customer's network where adaptation between the VPN client layer and the layer above must take place. It is also important from an OAM perspective, as this is where the source and sink APs for the trail/connectionless trail associated with a VPN client layer flow/connection are located. Examples of client/server VPNs where the TFPs/TCPs are located in different places are provided in Appendix I. + +A VPN server layer network is a topological component in a client/server VPN that represents the set of access points of the same type associated for the purpose of transferring adapted client layer information for one or multiple VPN client layer flows or connections. The VPN server layer contains source/sink adaptation functions that adapt the characteristic information in the VPN client layer into/from adapted information in the VPN server layer. The VPN client and server layers may belong to the same mode (i.e., when the client and server layers are both CO or the client and server layer are both CL), but combinations of the two are also possible, i.e., CO VPN server layers can support CL client layers, and likewise CL server layers can also support CO client layers. Figure 7-4 shows an example of a CL VPN server layer supporting a CL VPN client layer from a functional perspective based on the physical topology of the network model from ITU-T Rec. Y.1311 shown in Figure 7-1. The bottom layer shown in the model is the VPN server layer and the top layer is the VPN client layer. Only the VPN client/server layers are illustrated for simplicity, the customer client layer above the VPN client layer, and the server layer below the VPN server layer are not shown. In this example the VPN server layer is CO (e.g., ATM) whilst the VPN client layer is CL (e.g., Ethernet), although any combination of CO or CL pairs is possible. + + + +Y.1314\_F7.4 + +Figure 7-4/Y.1314 – Functional model of client/server VPN. The diagram illustrates a two-layer functional model. The top layer is the 'VPN client layer' (blue plane) containing CE nodes (CE1, CE2, CE3) with TFP (Traffic Flow Point) icons. The bottom layer is the 'VPN server layer' (blue plane) containing PE nodes (PE1, PE2, PE3) with FP (Flow Point) and AP (Adaptation Point) icons, and P nodes (P1, P2, P3, P4) with CP (Connection Point) icons. Dashed lines represent connections between TFPs and FPs/APs. A legend at the bottom left defines the line styles: dashed for Connection, dotted for Trail, and dash-dot for Flow. Labels indicate 'Source VPN client/server adaptation function' and 'Sink VPN client/server adaptation function'. + +**Figure 7-4/Y.1314 – Functional model of client/server VPN** + +Figure 7-4 shows how the functional model relates to the network diagram in Figure 7-1 by highlighting which functions and network reference points exist in which network element (i.e., CE, PE, or P node). The CE and P nodes belong to the VPN client and server layers respectively, whilst the PE nodes belong to both layers. The TFPs in the VPN client layer identify where (which CE node in this case) the P2P VPN client layer flow starts (its source) and ends (its sink), and the FPs identify which PE nodes the P2P flow passes through. Likewise, the TFPs in the VPN server layer identify the source and sink for the VPN server layer connection, and the FPs identify which P nodes the flow passes through. The APs in the VPN server layer identify the source/sink for the VPN server layer trail. + +The following subclauses present each of the four possible client/server VPN combinations using functional models and describe the role of the client/server VPN adaptation functions. + +### 7.3.1 CO VPN client layer supported by a CO VPN server layer + +An example of a CO VPN client layer network that is supported by a CO VPN server layer network is illustrated in Figure 7-5. + + + +The diagram illustrates a CO VPN client layer network supported by a CO VPN server layer network. It is divided into two main horizontal sections: the top section for the VPN client layer and the bottom section for the VPN server layer. + +**VPN client layer (top):** + +- Source:** Contains an AP (Application Process) and a TCP (Transport Control Protocol) component. A "Termination function" is indicated on the left. +- Sink:** Contains an AP and a CP (Control Plane) component. A "Termination function" is indicated on the right. +- Trail:** A dashed line labeled "VPN client layer trail" connects the Source AP to the Sink AP. +- Connections:** "Link connection" dashed lines connect the Source TCP to the Source CP, and the Sink CP to the Sink TCP. A "Subnetwork connection" dashed line connects the Source CP to the Sink CP. +- Adaptation:** A trapezoidal "VPN client-to-server adaptation function" block is between the Source CP and the Source AP. A similar "VPN server-to-client adaptation function" block is between the Sink AP and the Sink CP. + +**VPN server layer (bottom):** + +- Trail:** A dashed line labeled "VPN server layer trail" connects the Source AP to the Sink AP. +- Network connection:** A dashed line connects the Source TCP to the Sink TCP. +- Termination functions:** Indicated on both the left and right sides of the server layer. + +The diagram shows how the client layer's trail and connections are mapped to the server layer's trail and network connection through adaptation functions. + +Y.1314\_F7.5 + +Figure 7-5/Y.1314 – CO VPN server layer with a CO VPN client + +**Figure 7-5/Y.1314 – CO VPN server layer with a CO VPN client** + +In this example, the CO VPN client layer connection is supported by a CO VPN server layer trail. The CO VPN server layer adaptation source function adapts the characteristic information (CI) of the CO VPN client layer into adapted information (AI) in the CO VPN server layer. The CO VPN server layer adaptation sink function adapts CO VPN server layer AI to CO VPN client layer CI. + +### 7.3.2 CL VPN client layer supported by a CL VPN server layer + +An example of a CL VPN client layer network that is supported by a CL VPN server layer network is illustrated in Figure 7-6. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of a CL VPN client layer supported by a CL VPN server layer. It is divided into two main horizontal sections: the top section for the VPN client layer and the bottom section for the VPN server layer. + +**VPN client layer (top):** + +- Source:** Contains an AP (Access Point) and a TFP (Termination Function Point). +- Sink:** Contains an AP and a FP (Flow Point). +- Flow domain:** A dashed line connects the Source AP to the Sink AP, labeled "VPN client layer connectionless trail". +- Link flow:** A dashed line connects the Source TFP to the Sink FP, labeled "Link flow". +- Termination function:** Indicated by arrows pointing to the Source and Sink APs. +- Adaptation functions:** "VPN client-to-server adaptation function" is shown as a downward arrow from the Source TFP to the Source AP. "VPN server-to-client adaptation function" is shown as an upward arrow from the Sink AP to the Sink TFP. +- CP (Control Point):** Located in the center of the client layer, connected to both TFPs. + +**VPN server layer (bottom):** + +- Flow domain:** A dashed line connects the Source AP to the Sink AP, labeled "VPN server layer connectionless trail". +- Network flow:** A dashed line connects the Source TFP to the Sink TFP, labeled "Network flow". +- Termination function:** Indicated by arrows pointing to the Source and Sink APs. + +The diagram shows how the client layer's connectionless trail is supported by the server layer's connectionless trail through adaptation functions. + +Y.1314\_F7.6 + +Diagram illustrating the CL VPN client layer supported by a CL VPN server layer network. + +**Figure 7-6/Y.1314 – CL VPN server layer with a CL VPN client** + +In this example, the CL VPN client layer flow is supported by a CL VPN server layer connectionless trail. The CL VPN server layer adaptation source function adapts the characteristic information (CI) of the CL VPN client layer into adapted information (AI) in the CL VPN server layer. The CL VPN server layer adaptation sink function adapts CL VPN server layer AI to CL VPN client layer CI. + +### 7.3.3 CO VPN client layer supported by a CL VPN server layer + +An example of a CO VPN client layer network that is supported by a CL VPN server layer network is illustrated in Figure 7-7. + + + +The diagram illustrates a CO VPN client layer network supported by a CL VPN server layer network. It is divided into two main horizontal sections: the top section for the VPN client layer and the bottom section for the VPN server layer. + +**VPN client layer (top section):** + +- Source:** Contains an AP (Application Process) and a TCP (Transport Control Protocol) component. +- Sink:** Contains an AP and a CP (Control Plane) component. +- VPN client layer trail:** A dashed line connecting the Source AP to the Sink AP. +- Link connection:** Dashed lines connecting the Source TCP to the Source CP, and the Sink CP to the Sink TCP. +- Subnetwork connection:** A dashed line connecting the Source CP to the Sink CP. +- Subnetwork:** A dashed line connecting the Source TCP to the Sink TCP. +- Termination function:** Indicated by arrows pointing to the Source and Sink APs. +- Adaptation functions:** Two trapezoidal blocks labeled "VPN client-to-server adaptation function" and "VPN server-to-client adaptation function" are positioned between the client and server layers. + +**VPN server layer (bottom section):** + +- Source:** Contains an AP and a TFP (Transport Flow Protocol) component. +- Sink:** Contains an AP and a TFP component. +- VPN server layer connectionless trail:** A dashed line connecting the Source AP to the Sink AP. +- Network flow:** A dashed line connecting the Source TFP to the Sink TFP. +- Termination function:** Indicated by arrows pointing to the Source and Sink APs. + +The diagram shows how the CO VPN client layer is supported by the CL VPN server layer through adaptation functions and connectionless trails. + +Y.1314\_F7.7 + +Diagram illustrating a CO VPN client layer supported by a CL VPN server layer network. + +**Figure 7-7/Y.1314 – CL VPN server layer with a CO client** + +In this example, the CO VPN client layer connection is supported by a CL VPN server layer connectionless trail. The CL VPN server layer adaptation source function adapts the characteristic information (CI) of the CO VPN client layer into adapted information (AI) in the CL VPN server layer. The CL VPN server layer adaptation sink function adapts CL VPN server layer AI to CO VPN client layer CI. + +**7.3.4 CL VPN client layer supported by a CO VPN server layer** + +An example of a CL VPN client layer network that is supported by a CO VPN server layer network is illustrated in Figure 7-8. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architectural relationship between a Connectionless (CL) VPN client layer and a Connection-Oriented (CO) VPN server layer. At the top, a 'VPN client layer connectionless trail' connects a Source AP to a Sink AP. Below this, the 'VPN client layer' consists of Termination Functions (represented by triangles) and Adaptation Functions (represented by trapezoids). The client layer includes 'Link flow', 'Flow domain flow', and 'Flow domain' components, with TFP (Termination Flow Point) and FP (Flow Point) markers. The 'VPN client-to-server adaptation function' links the client layer to the 'VPN server layer trail' below. The 'VPN server layer' at the bottom shows a 'Network connection' between two TCP (Termination Connection Point) nodes, supported by its own Termination Functions and APs. The diagram is labeled with 'Y.1314\_F7.8' at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-8/Y.1314 – CO VPN server layer with a CL client** + +Figure 7-8/Y.1314 – CO VPN server layer with a CL client + +In this example, the CL VPN client layer flow is supported by a CO VPN server layer trail. The CO VPN server layer adaptation source function adapts the characteristic information (CI) of the CL VPN client layer into adapted information (AI) in the CO VPN server layer. The CO VPN server layer adaptation sink function adapts CO VPN server layer AI to CL VPN client layer CI. + +**7.4 Multiple VPN client layers** + +In the examples so far in this clause, a single VPN client layer has been used end-to-end. However, this may not always be the case, a customer may wish to use one VPN client layer type at one side of a VPN, and a different VPN client type at the other side of a VPN. For example, at one side the VPN client layer might be IP and at the other side it might be MPLS, or one side might be Frame Relay (FR) and the other side might be ATM. In such cases, the two different VPN client layer networks must be networked on a peer level basis. + +It should be noted that the term 'VPN client layer network' used here refers to a topological component in a client/server VPN that represents the set of access points of the same type associated for the purpose of transferring VPN client layer CI. It does not refer to network layering in the Layer 1, Layer 2, Layer 3 sense, i.e., the two network technologies being interworked at the VPN client layer may both be Layer 2 technologies (e.g., one may be ATM and one may be FR), but they are considered to be different layer networks as they contain different access points, which are also of a different type. + +ITU-T Rec. Y.1314 (10/2005) 19 + +The interworking function may take place either before the VPN server layer source adaptation function or after the VPN server layer sink adaptation function. Figure 7-9 shows the physical topology of client/server VPN network which uses different VPN client layers at each side of the VPN. + + + +Figure 7-9: VPN client peer level interworking physical topology. This diagram shows a network topology within a cloud. On the left, CE1 is connected to PE1, which is labeled 'VPN client layer X' with an orange double-headed arrow. PE1 connects to P1, which then connects to P2. P2 connects to PE2, which is labeled 'VPN client layer Y' with a green double-headed arrow. PE2 connects to CE2. P3 is also connected to the network. A blue line traces a path from CE1 through PE1, P1, P2, and PE2 to CE2. + +**Figure 7-9/Y.1314 – VPN client peer level interworking physical topology** + +Figure 7-10 presents a generic functional model for peer level VPN client interworking based on the physical topology in Figure 7-9, where the interworking function takes place prior to VPN server layer source adaptation function. + + + +Figure 7-10: VPN client peer level interworking (pre-VPN server source adaptation). This functional model diagram shows the flow of data between different layers. At the top, 'VPN client layer X' (orange) contains CE1 with AP and TCP components. A 'Link connection' leads to 'VPN client layer Y' (green), which contains PE1 with a CP component. This is followed by a 'VPN client trail' (green) with a 'Link connection' to PE2 with a CP component, and finally 'VPN client layer Y' (green) containing CE2 with AP and TCP components. An arrow labeled 'VPN client layer X to VPN client layer Y interworking function' points from the first CP to the second. Below this is the 'VPN server layer' (blue), which contains P1 and P3 with CP components, connected by a 'Subnetwork'. The 'VPN server trail' (blue) connects the CP of PE1 to the CP of PE2 via 'Link connection' points. AP components are also shown at the interfaces between the client and server layers. + +**Figure 7-10/Y.1314 – VPN client peer level interworking (pre-VPN server source adaptation)** + +The two heterogeneous VPN client layers in this model are VPN client layer X and VPN client layer Y. In this example, the PE performs the interworking function but it could also be performed using a separate device. The interworking function converts the VPN client layer X CI into VPN client layer Y CI. The VPN server layer source adaptation function adapts the VPN client layer Y CI into AI in the VPN server layer and the VPN server layer AI is transmitted across the VPN server layer trail. At the VPN server layer sink the adaptation function adapts VPN server layer AI to VPN client layer Y CI. As an example, if VPN client layer X was FR and VPN client + +layer Y was ATM, then the source PE would convert the FR traffic into ATM traffic (e.g., using FRF.8) and the VPN client layer traffic would be carried as ATM over the VPN server layer. + +Figure 7-11 presents a generic functional model for peer level VPN client interworking where the interworking function takes place after the VPN server layer sink adaptation function. + + + +Figure 7-11/Y.1314 – VPN client peer level interworking (post VPN server sink adaptation). The diagram illustrates a network architecture for VPN client interworking. It shows two VPN client trails (orange and green) and a VPN server trail (blue). The VPN client trail X (orange) connects CE1 (with AP and TCP) through PE1 (with CP) to PE2 (with CP). The VPN client trail Y (green) connects CE2 (with AP and TCP) through PE2 (with CP). The VPN server trail (blue) connects PE1 (with AP) through a subnetwork (P1, P3) to PE2 (with AP). Link connections are shown between CE1 and PE1, PE1 and PE2, and PE2 and CE2. A dashed arrow indicates the VPN client layer Y to VPN client layer X interworking function at PE2. The diagram is labeled Y.1314\_F7.11. + +**Figure 7-11/Y.1314 – VPN client peer level interworking (post VPN server sink adaptation)** + +The VPN server layer source adaptation function adapts the VPN client layer X CI into AI in the VPN server layer and the VPN server layer AI is transmitted across the VPN server layer trail. At the VPN server layer sink, the adaptation function adapts VPN server layer AI to VPN client layer X CI. The interworking function converts the VPN client layer X CI into VPN client layer Y CI. If VPN client layer X was FR and VPN client layer Y was ATM, then the VPN client layer traffic would be carried as FR over the VPN server layer and converted into ATM by the sink PE. + +## 7.5 Multiple VPN server layers + +In the previous examples, a single VPN server layer was used end-to-end across the provider network to support the VPN client layer. However, this may not always be the case; for example, a provider may not be able to provide end-to-end connectivity using a single VPN server layer due to lack of network coverage, or a VPN client layer may need to cross multiple provider networks. Under these circumstances, multiple VPN server layers are required. Depending on the specific network technologies and the interworking capabilities of the provider's equipment, separate VPN server layers may be interworked on a peer level basis, or interworked with the VPN client on a client/server basis. + +Although using multiple VPN server layers is possible, there are several factors that need to be taken into consideration when contemplating using multiple MPLS VPN server layers. The factors to be considered are dependent on the type of interworking required and the VPN server layer technologies to be employed. Examples of peer level and client/server interworking of multiple server layers along with some considerations for each are provided in Appendix II. + +It should be noted that using multiple server layers below the VPN server layer should not be confused with using multiple VPN server layers. For example, as illustrated in Figure 7-12 a service provider may use a single MPLS VPN server layer end-to-end, but use a MPLS server layer (using MPLS label stacking) below the VPN server layer in one part of the network, and use an IP server layer (e.g., using GRE encapsulation) in another part of the network. + + + +Figure 7-12/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN with MPLS and IP server layers. The diagram shows a network topology. On the left, CE1 is connected to PE1. PE1 and P1 are inside an orange cloud labeled 'MPLS server layer network'. P2 is also in this cloud. PE1 connects to P1, which connects to PE2. PE2, P3, and PE3 are inside a green cloud labeled 'IP server layer network'. PE2 connects to P3, which connects to PE3. PE3 connects to CE2 on the right. A blue line representing a VPN path starts at CE1, goes through PE1, P1, PE2, P3, PE3, and ends at CE2. Black lines represent physical links. A small label 'Y.1314\_F7.12' is in the bottom right corner. + +CE Customer edge node +PE Provider edge node +P Provider (core) node + Physical link + VPN + +**Figure 7-12/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN with MPLS and IP server layers** + +The PE and P routers must all support MPLS in the MPLS server layer network, however, only the PE routers in the IP server layer need to support MPLS, the P routers do not need to support MPLS. The functional model relating to the network illustrated in Figure 7-12 is described in Figure 7-13. + + + +Figure 7-13/Y.1314 – VPN server layer supported by multiple server layers. This functional model diagram shows three main horizontal layers. The top layer is the 'VPN client layer' (blue) showing a 'VPN client connectionless trail' (red dashed line) between CE1 and CE2, passing through PE1 and PE3. The middle layer is the 'MPLS VPN server layer' (blue) showing a 'VPN server layer connectionless trail' (red dashed line) between PE1 and PE3, passing through PE2. The bottom layer is split into two: the 'MPLS server layer' (orange) on the left and the 'IP server layer' (green) on the right. The MPLS server layer shows an 'MPLS server layer trail' (red dashed line) between PE1 and PE2, passing through P1. The IP server layer shows an 'IP server layer connectionless trail' (red dashed line) between PE2 and PE3, passing through P3. Various functional components like AP (Access Point), TFP (Termination Flow Point), FP (Flow Point), CP (Connection Point), and TCP (Termination Connection Point) are shown as symbols (ovals, triangles, circles) at the boundaries and within the layers. Dotted lines represent 'Link flow' or 'Link connection'. A small label 'Y.1314\_F7.13' is in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 7-13/Y.1314 – VPN server layer supported by multiple server layers** + +In this example the MPLS server layer source adaptation function adapts the MPLS VPN server layer CI (which is a client of the MPLS server layer) into AI in the MPLS server layer, and the MPLS server layer sink adaptation function adapts the MPLS server layer AI to MPLS VPN server layer CI. The IP server layer source adaptation function adapts the MPLS VPN server layer CI into + +AI in the IP server layer, and the IP server layer sink adaptation function adapts the IP server layer AI to MPLS VPN server layer CI. + +## 7.6 VPN modelling using partitioning + +The functional models provided in the previous clauses were developed using a layered approach. Decomposing networks into a number of independent layer networks allows the client/server relationship between adjacent layer networks to be modelled and the corresponding adaptation, termination and interworking functions to be described. + +An alternative modelling approach is partitioning, which is used to define the network structure within a layer network and administrative/routing boundaries between network domains, e.g., networks owned by different operators. Partitioning allows a subnetwork at one level to be decomposed into its containing subnetworks and the links between them. This partitioning can continue until the limit of recursion is reached, that is, a single subnetwork within a network element. This is known as a matrix, as described in ITU-T Rec. G.805. Partitioning is illustrated in Figure 7-14. + + + +Access group + +Layer network + +Transit subnetwork + +A subnetwork must always divide into at least two when partitioned + +Access point numbers are conserved at all levels of partitioning + +Y.1314\_F7.14 + +Figure 7-14/Y.1314 – Partitioning of subnetworks within a layer network. The diagram shows two levels of network partitioning. The top level shows a 'Layer network' containing three 'Access group' nodes (each with two blue dots) and a central 'Transit subnetwork' node (with four blue dots). The bottom level shows the same 'Layer network' partitioned into subnetworks. A label points to a subnetwork stating 'A subnetwork must always divide into at least two when partitioned'. Another label points to the access points, stating 'Access point numbers are conserved at all levels of partitioning'. The diagram is labeled Y.1314\_F7.14 in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 7-14/Y.1314 – Partitioning of subnetworks within a layer network** + +As part of the process of partitioning, the number of flow/connection points in the largest subnetwork remains the same under partitioning, whilst the connection points internal to it at the next level of partitioning are revealed. From the perspective of connectivity, the subnetwork (flow domain) represents a point of flexibility between its inputs and outputs (e.g., source/sink access points or flow/connection points). Generally, this allows any input to be connected to any output. + +This model is sufficient for public networks where the resources can all be assumed as being available for use. However it is not suitable for virtual private networks. The reason for this is that the connectivity between inputs and outputs on the subnetwork/flow domain is limited to those inputs and outputs belonging to the same VPN. To support the modelling of a VPN using the partitioning approach, Flow Domain Fragment (FDFr) constructs as described in ITU-T Rec. G.8010, and Subnetwork Connection (SNC) constructs are used. A FDFr/SNC is + +fragmented by means of dividing its inputs and outputs into different groups. Connectivity is limited to being between members of the same group. Such a group may be a VLAN on an Ethernet bridge (an Ethernet flow domain) or a VPN on a subnetwork or flow domain. Note that the fragment has no flow points; these are associated with the flow domain. A FDFr/SNC may be labelled by its associated layer network name and fragment number, or by the means of grouping flow points into a particular fragment, e.g., by VLAN identifier. An example of a network using VLANs to provide VPN isolation is shown in Figure 7-15. + + + +Figure 7-15/Y.1314 – Example of VPN partitioning functional model. The diagram shows a central large blue oval representing a 'Flow domain'. Inside this domain are three smaller light blue ovals representing 'Flow domain fragments', labeled 'VLAN 203', 'VLAN 55', and 'VLAN 309'. Outside the central domain are several other blue ovals, some of which also contain 'VLAN 309' fragments. Yellow pill-shaped icons representing 'FP / TFP' (Flow Points / Traffic Flow Points) are connected to the fragments. A legend at the bottom identifies the symbols: a yellow pill for 'FP / TFP', a blue oval for 'Flow domain', and a light blue oval for 'Flow domain fragment'. The identifier 'Y.1314\_F7.15' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area. + +**Figure 7-15/Y.1314 – Example of VPN partitioning functional model** + +An FDFr of one flow domain is associated with an FDFr in another flow domain by means of the interconnecting component link. Similarly, an SNC in one subnetwork is associated with an SNC in another subnetwork via the interconnecting link connection. This allows the construct to be partitioned or aggregated in line with the subnetwork model. As such, the model is very flexible and allows the VPN structure to be shown at any level of subnetwork partitioning. + +## 7.7 VPN peer layer + +Figure 7-16 shows the physical topology of a peer level VPN. In this example, the network cloud depicts the domain of the shared network and the grey line depicts a P2P VPN. VPN isolation could be achieved using any of the approaches defined in clause 6, e.g., an Ethernet VLAN, an IPsec tunnel, etc. + + + +Figure 7-16/Y.1314 – Peer level VPN physical topology example. The diagram shows a network topology. On the left, a box labeled 'CE1' is connected to a box labeled 'PE1'. 'PE1' is connected to a box labeled 'P1'. 'P1' is connected to a box labeled 'P2'. 'P2' is connected to a box labeled 'PE2'. 'PE2' is connected to a box labeled 'CE2'. A blue line connects 'PE1' to 'PE2' through 'P1' and 'P2', representing a P2P VPN. A cloud shape encloses the boxes 'P1', 'P2', 'P3', and 'PE2'. A box labeled 'P3' is also connected to 'P2'. The identifier 'Y.1314\_F7.16' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area. + +**Figure 7-16/Y.1314 – Peer level VPN physical topology example** + +Figure 7-17 describes the VPN topology in Figure 7-1 from a functional perspective showing the VPN layer and a single underlying server layer between PEs. In this example the server layer is CO, but it could equally be CL. + + + +A complex network architecture diagram showing two horizontal layers: a blue 'VPN layer' on top and an orange 'Server layer' below. The VPN layer spans nodes CE1, PE1, P1, P2, PE3, and CE2. It shows a 'VPN connectionless trail' as a blue dashed line across the top. Within the VPN layer, nodes have Access Points (AP), Termination Flow Points (TFP), and Flow Points (FP) connected by 'Link flows'. The Server layer is situated between PE1 and PE3, involving P1 and P2. It shows a 'Server layer trail' as a red dashed line. It includes Termination Connection Points (TCP) and Connection Points (CP) connected by 'Link connections' and a 'Subnetwork'. Adaptation functions (trapezoids) connect the VPN layer to the Server layer at PE1 and PE3. + +Figure 7-17/Y.1314 – Layer model of a single layer VPN + +**Figure 7-17/Y.1314 – Layer model of a single layer VPN** + +As Figure 7-17 shows, all the nodes in the network (including the P nodes) belong to the VPN layer and, therefore, they must be able to forward packets onto the correct destination using information in the VPN layer packet headers. Due to the single layer VPN architecture, the layering model does not provide as much information as it does when it is used in the client/server VPN case. In particular, the presentation format of Figure 7-17 does not provide any information about where the VPN starts and ends. One way to incorporate this information is to expand on the VPN/server layer adaptation functions. Figure 7-18 shows two different examples of VPN/server layer adaptation functions, one which uses IPsec and one which uses Ethernet VLAN tags. + + + +A diagram showing two alternative adaptation processes between a 'VPN layer' (top) and a 'Server layer' (bottom), separated by the word 'OR'. The left side shows a process for 'VPN layer specific process: Encrypt/decrypt VPN packet using IPsec'. The right side shows 'VPN layer specific process: Insert/remove 802.1Q VLAN tag (VID 123)'. Both sides use trapezoidal adaptation symbols with arrows indicating flow between layers and a side-path to the specific process box. + +Figure 7-18/Y.1314 – Expansion of VPN/server layer adaptation functions + +**Figure 7-18/Y.1314 – Expansion of VPN/server layer adaptation functions** + +ITU-T Rec. Y.1314 (10/2005) 25 + +Another way of describing a peer level VPN is to use the partitioning concept introduced in 7.6. An example of how partitioning may be used in this way is provided in Figure 7-19. + + + +Figure 7-19: Peer level VPN modelled using partitioning. The diagram shows a network topology with nodes CE1, PE1, P1, P2, P3, PE2, and CE2. Nodes are represented as yellow ovals with internal components (TFP, CP). They are connected in a chain: CE1-PE1-P1-P2-PE2-CE2. A large blue oval labeled 'Ethernet flow domain' encloses nodes P1, P2, and P3. Inside this domain, a light blue oval labeled 'Ethernet flow domain fragment (VLAN ID 123)' encloses nodes P1 and P2. Labels 'Ethernet flow domain' and 'Ethernet flow domain fragment (VLAN ID 123)' point to their respective areas. The identifier 'Y.1314\_F7.19' is in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 7-19/Y.1314 – Peer level VPN modelled using partitioning** + +Figure 7-19 describes the peer level VPN topology, and also shows the corresponding VLAN (123), but does not provide information about where the VPN starts and ends, i.e., where the IEEE 802.1Q VLAN tags are inserted/removed. It is easy to see from the model in Figure 7-19 that Nodes P1 and P2 are part of VLAN 123, but although PE1 and PE2 are the start/end points for the VPN, the model does not provide this information. However, incorporating the VPN/server layer adaptation functions into the partitioning model and expanding on the VPN layer-specific processing could provide this information (as shown in Figure 7-18). + +# 8 VPN topology support + +The term 'VPN topology' used within this Recommendation refers to the network topology from the perspective of the VPN customer, i.e., the topology between VPN sites which may be CE nodes or end systems. Connectivity between VPN sites can only be provided if VPN server layer or peer layer trails have been established between them. In general, the topology at layer $n$ is dependent on the topology provided by the server layer trails at layer $n-1$ . Once the VPN server or peer layer trails have been established, if the VPN client layer or peer layer technology is packet switched then it is possible to prune the VPN topology by restricting connectivity between certain sites within the VPN. One method of restricting connectivity between VPN members is to control route distribution at the VPN client layer (VPN sites cannot communicate if they do not have routes to reach each other). Another method that can be used to restrict connectivity is to use packet filtering (e.g., based on VPN client layer or peer layer source/destination addresses). The three basic VPN topologies are full mesh, partial mesh and hub and spoke, and are described in clauses 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. + +## 8.1 Full mesh VPN topologies + +In a full mesh VPN topology, every VPN site has a route/connection to every other VPN site as depicted in Figure 8-1. + + + +The diagram shows a full mesh VPN topology with six sites labeled CE1, CE2, CE3, CE4, CE5, and CE6. Each site is represented by a 3D box. They are arranged in a circular pattern within a green cloud-like boundary. Every site is connected to every other site by a straight line, forming a complete graph. There are 15 connections in total. The label 'Y.1314\_F8.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram of a full mesh VPN topology with 6 sites (CE1-CE6) connected to each other. + +**Figure 8-1/Y.1314 – An example of a full mesh VPN topology** + +A full mesh topology provides complete redundancy and can also provide efficient network utilization and performance as VPN sites can use the shortest/best paths/routes to reach each other. A disadvantage of the full mesh approach is that a full mesh can be expensive to implement, although this is dependent on the VPN network modes/technologies employed (e.g., a VPN network made up of a full mesh of ATM VCs is likely to be more expensive than an Ethernet VPN that supports any-to-any connectivity). Another disadvantage is that as the number of sites in the full mesh increases, the number of connections/routes and control plane adjacencies increases proportionately (the number of connections in a full mesh is $n(n-1)/2$ , where $n$ is the number of VPN sites). Supporting large numbers of connections/routes and control plane adjacencies introduces scaling issues due to an increase in the bandwidth and CPU resources required. + +## 8.2 Partial mesh VPN topologies + +In a partial mesh topology, VPN sites have routes/connections to some VPN sites but not all. An example of a partial mesh topology is provided in Figure 8-2. + + + +The diagram shows a partial mesh VPN topology with six sites labeled CE1, CE2, CE3, CE4, CE5, and CE6. They are arranged in a circular pattern within a green cloud-like boundary. The connections are as follows: CE1 is connected to CE2, CE3, and CE5; CE2 is connected to CE1, CE3, and CE5; CE3 is connected to CE1, CE2, and CE6; CE4 is connected to CE5; CE5 is connected to CE1, CE2, CE4, and CE6; CE6 is connected to CE3 and CE5. There are 10 connections in total. The label 'Y.1314\_F8.2' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram of a partial mesh VPN topology with 6 sites (CE1-CE6) connected in a partial mesh. + +**Figure 8-2/Y.1314 – An example of a partial mesh VPN topology** + +In some cases, VPN sites may be able to reach other VPN sites that do not have direct routes/connections to via transit VPN sites. However, in other cases, if VPN sites do not have direct routes/connections to reach each other then communication between them may not be possible. The ability for communication to take place between nodes that do not have direct routes or connections to reach each other is dependent on the existence of VPN server layer or peer layer trails and on any topology connectivity restrictions (e.g., routing policies or packet filters). Partial mesh topologies are more scalable than full mesh topologies because the bandwidth and CPU resources required are reduced, although this is at the expense of optimal routing and efficient network utilization (if some CEs are used as transit nodes). Network redundancy is also reduced, although partial mesh networks are usually designed so that redundant routes/connections are used where they are needed the most. For example, in Figure 8-2, CE nodes CE2 and CE5 could be core nodes and the other CE nodes could be edge nodes. In which case, in this topology, the edge nodes have redundant connections/routes to reach the core. Customers are often forced to use partial mesh topologies due to factors such as cost (i.e., full mesh networks are more expensive) and due to geographic restrictions. + +## 8.3 Hub and spoke VPN topologies + +In a hub and spoke (or star) topology, a VPN site can either be a spoke or a hub for a particular VPN (although if a VPN site belongs to multiple VPNs it may be a hub for some VPNs and a spoke for others). All the spokes in a hub and spoke topology have direct routes/connections to reach the hub, but do not have direct routes/connections to reach each other. Figure 8-3 shows an example of a hub and spoke topology in which CE2 is the hub and all the other CE nodes are spokes. + + + +``` + +graph TD + CE2 --- CE1 + CE2 --- CE3 + CE2 --- CE4 + CE2 --- CE5 + CE2 --- CE6 + +``` + +Y.1314\_F8.3 + +Diagram of a hub and spoke VPN topology. A central node CE2 is connected to five peripheral nodes CE1, CE3, CE4, CE5, and CE6. All nodes are enclosed in a green cloud-like shape. The connections are direct lines from CE2 to each of the other nodes. + +**Figure 8-3/Y.1314 – An example of a hub and spoke VPN topology** + +In some cases, the hub may be configured as a transit node so that spokes can communicate with each other via the hub. However, in other cases, connectivity between spoke nodes may not be permitted. A common use of a hub and spoke topology is for connecting offices (spokes) to a corporate headquarters (hub). Using a hub and spoke topology allows the use of centralized network resources (e.g., Internet access, firewalls, and email servers), which can lead to a reduction in costs compared with a distributed network resources approach. + +# 9 VPN QoS considerations + +There are a large number of sources of information about Quality of service (QoS), which contain different definitions of what QoS actually means. ITU-T Rec. E.800 defines QoS as being the collective effect of service performances, which determine the degree of satisfaction of a user of the service. ITU-T Rec. G.1000 provides a framework and definitions for communications quality of + +service, and ITU-T Rec. G.1010 defines a model for multimedia Quality of Service (QoS) categories from an end-user viewpoint. The functions required to meet the quality of service requirements defined in these Recommendations and elsewhere are dependent on the network mode of operation. Therefore, quality of service requirements may have an impact on a VPN service provider's choice of VPN server layer technology and the VPN client layer's technologies that can be supported. + +## **9.1 Circuit-switched layer networks** + +In connection-orientated circuit-switched layer networks, a path based on a physical link, optical wavelength, SDH/SONET VC, or TDM timeslot is established and dedicated to a single connection between APs in the network for the duration of the connection. When a new connection is requested, the network must decide whether or not to accept the connection; and if so, how to route it through the network and what resources to reserve for the connection. Connection Admission Control (CAC) mechanisms are used to accept a connection if bandwidth is available, or to reject it when the bandwidth of a requested connection exceeds the available bandwidth. + +Data is transmitted at a constant bit rate in exactly the same order in which it was sent. Connections can be set up manually using static provisioning, or dynamically using signalling mechanisms or automated provisioning tools. The ability to set up new connections is dependent on having spare capacity in the network. If a connection is established then delivery of data across the connection is guaranteed. + +In CO-CS networks such as a PSTN, delay is primarily a function of transmission distance. Switching delay in CO-CS network nodes is relatively small when compared to transmission (propagation) delay, especially when calls traverse long-distance trunks. + +## **9.2 Packet-switched layer networks** + +In packet-switched networks, packets are forwarded based on information in the packet header. Packet switching provides connectivity while making efficient use of network resources by sharing them with many users (based on the assumption that not all users need to use the resources all of the time). Packet forwarding behaviour for flows or connections can be described by a set of parameters called traffic descriptors. Examples of traffic descriptors include mean packet/bit rate, maximum burst length/packet size, and probability of packet arrival within a fixed interval. User quality requirements are often expressed in terms of acceptable packet loss, delay and jitter. + +Traffic shaping mechanisms may be used to regulate the amount of traffic admitted to the network, generally on a per queue/flow, per connection, or per interface basis. Congestion can occur in packet-based networks if traffic volume exceeds the forwarding capabilities of a network entity (NE) or available network capacity. When the network becomes congested, packets may be buffered which introduces a delay, or they may be dropped. + +In packet-switched networks, delay is dependent on the transmission distance associated with the underlying physical server layer, plus a number of other factors at the packet-switched layer. The factors that introduce delay at the packet-switched layer include packet size, link speeds, per hop forwarding delay (which can be broken down into packetization, compression/decompression, switching/routing, and buffering delay), and number of hops. Priority control is required in packet-based networks in order to guarantee a diverse range of quality levels. Generally, priority control is implemented using separate queues per connection, per flow, or per QoS class at each interface, and controlling the priority of each queue. Packet scheduling mechanisms are used to allocate packets to a particular queue according to specific policies. + +### **9.2.1 Connection-orientated packet-switched** + +In connection-orientated packet-switched layer networks, connections are established and maintained until connectivity is no longer required (regardless of whether data is being transmitted + +or not). Just as with connection-orientated circuit-switched layer networks, connections can be established via manual provisioning, a management system, or a signalling protocol. The current state of the network can be determined by monitoring the utilization of network resources and/or by characterizing the behaviour of connections already admitted. CAC mechanisms can be used to reserve the peak bandwidth of the connection required for constant bit rate (CBR) traffic sources. Alternatively, statistical multiplexing schemes may be used with CAC mechanisms to assign less than the peak bandwidth required in order to increase network efficiency. However, it can be difficult to characterize the bandwidth of a requested connection as the bandwidth required may vary significantly over time. + +In a CO-PS network (e.g., an ATM network), if CBR services are supported (no over-subscription) per hop-forwarding delay remains constant and, therefore, delay/jitter can be calculated/guaranteed. If, however, services are overbooked to increase network utilization (which they usually are), then delay/loss will be introduced at congested nodes due to buffering or dropping of out of contract traffic. Although per hop forwarding delays become variable, the other factors such as link speeds, distance/number of hops (and packet size in ATMs case) remain constant. + +### **9.2.2 Connectionless packet-switched** + +In connectionless packet-switched networks, once the data is sent, the connection is broken until further information is either sent or received (a packet can be thought of as a connection that exists for the time duration it takes the packet to be transmitted and received). There is no connection state stored and, therefore, successive packets do not necessarily follow the same path or arrive in the order in which they were sent. Traffic is sent at a variable bit rate and resources are normally assigned as needed on a first-come, first-served basis. + +In CL-PS networks (e.g., IP networks), factors that determine delay such as packet size, link speeds, number of hops, and per hop forwarding delay are variable, especially when techniques are used to provide load balancing. Rate limiting/traffic shaping can be implemented at the edge to limit the amount of traffic entering a network, but due to the any-to-any nature of CL-PS traffic (and the increase in peer-to-peer networking), it is difficult to predict per link bandwidth utilization across a CL-PS network. Traffic monitoring along with modelling techniques can be used to develop a traffic matrix, and IGP metrics can be tweaked to provide increased link utilization but, due to the bursty and unpredictable nature of CL-PS traffic, the simplest/safest way to ensure service guarantees can be met is to over-provision the network. + +However, even with over-provisioning, due to the non-deterministic nature of connectionless traffic, nodes/links in a CL-PS network can become congested, especially in the event of link/node failure or denial of service (DoS) attack. Also, the impact of link/node failure is not limited to traffic traversing the failed link/node, rerouting can cause congestion elsewhere in the network. A common approach to protecting premium traffic against network congestion is to use priority-based queuing (e.g., based on RFC 2475 Differentiated Services Architecture for IP) to control per class forwarding behaviour, i.e., higher priority traffic receives preferential treatment over lower priority traffic. This allows a provider to offer customers multiple levels of service (e.g., premium, real-time, best-effort) and to price services accordingly. The drawback to the Differentiated Services (Diffserv) approach is that bandwidth can only be reserved on a per aggregate basis and, therefore, delivery of individual flows within an aggregate cannot be guaranteed. + +An alternative (or complementary) approach is to use an Integrated Services Architecture (based on RFC 1633) in which Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP, RFC 2205) is used to reserve capacity along an end-to-end path by signalling a flow's requirements before sending any packets. Due to the fact that bandwidth can be reserved on a per flow basis, it is possible to provide guaranteed delivery for individual flows. This replicates the CAC model used in CO networks in which traffic is not sent until CAC has been performed to ensure there is sufficient capacity in the network. The major drawback to this approach is that it can place a significant (RSVP) processing load on core routers, which increases proportionately with the number of packet flows that require resource reservation. + +Another approach that supports the reservation of resources on a per flow basis is the use of flow based routers. Flow based routers maintain per flow state and only accept new flows if there is sufficient resource available. As with RSVP, the challenge with this approach is that processing loads increase as the number of flows increases. However, there are routers available today that do support per flow routing for large numbers of flows. + +# 10 Functions required for client/server VPN establishment + +In establishing a client/server VPN there is a strict ordering of events that must take place. VPN client layer flows/connections cannot be established until the VPN server layer flows/connections have been established. Likewise, the VPN server layer flows/connections cannot be established until the server layer connections/flows (for which the VPN server layer is a client) have been established. This ordering of flow/connection establishment is due to the fact that a client layer topology is determined by the topology of the underlying server layer, which is recursive right down to the duct. + +## 10.1 VPN server layer establishment + +Assuming that the underlying server layer topology has been established and the VPN server layer TCP/TFPs and CPs/FPs have been configured with addresses, there are three main steps involved in establishing VPN server layer connectivity between VPN client layer members: + +**Step 1:** Discover VPN members and store VPN membership information. + +**Step 2:** Calculate routes between VPN members at the VPN server layer. + +**Step 3:** Establish connections/tunnels/VLANs between VPN members at the VPN server layer. + +Each of the functions required to support VPN server layer establishment and maintenance along with the individual functional entities are described in further detail in Table 10-1. + +**Table 10-1/Y.1314 – VPN server layer functions** + +| Function | Functional entities | Network elements | VPN server layer mode | +|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------| +| VPN membership discovery | Discovery of VPN members (VPN client layer CPs/FPs belonging to the same VPN) | PE | All | +| | Distribution/collection of VPN membership information (including joins, leaves, availability) | PE | All | +| | VPN membership information maintenance | PE | All | +| | Mapping of VPN client layer CPs/FPs to VPN server layer APs | PE | All | +| VPN server layer routing | Distribution/collection of VPN server layer reachability/topology/resource information | PE, P | All | +| | Maintenance of VPN server layer reachability/topology/resource information | PE, P | All | +| | Calculation of the best route(s) between VPN server layer APs | PE, P | All | +| VPN server layer tunnel/connection establishment | Connection admission control (CAC) | PE, P | All | +| | Notification of success/failure of connection/tunnel request | PE, P | All | +| | Assignment and configuration of VPN server layer de-multiplexing fields | PE, P | All | +| | Distribution of connection/tunnel information, e.g., QoS, de-multiplexing fields, bandwidth, etc. | PE, P | All | + +### 10.1.1 VPN membership discovery + +In order to establish the VPN server layer topology between PEs, it is necessary to first of all determine which PEs are connected to CEs that are members of the particular client/server VPN. This function may be performed manually by a human operator based on the known network topology. Alternatively, this function may be performed dynamically via a centralized server/system or distributed protocol in order to automate/simplify the provisioning process. In order to support dynamic discovery, PEs must be configured with VPN identifiers to indicate that they are connected to one or more CEs that belong to a particular VPN. An example of a centralized server/system for discovery is the use of an authentication server (e.g., RADIUS) to distribute information about VPN members as part of the client authentication process. An example of a distributed protocol is the use of BGP for RFC 2547 VPNs, which uses route targets as VPN identifiers to ensure PEs only receive information about the VPNs of which they are members. + +### 10.1.2 VPN server layer routing + +If the underlying server layer (the layer below the VPN server layer) between the source/sink VPN server layer termination points is a single one-hop P2P connection/flow, then no routing needs to take place as there is only one route/path available. On the other hand, if there are alternative paths/routes across intermediate nodes to the same destination, or if the underlying server layer provides a P2MP4 topology, then routing must be performed at the VPN server layer in order to discover the topology and/or calculate the best route(s) to the destination. + +#### 10.1.2.1 The need for routing + +In the case of CO layer networks, signalling cannot take place until a route/path at the given layer has been calculated. In the CL layer network case, a packet cannot be forwarded until a route to the destination has been calculated/configured. This is not to say that every node in the network needs to have an explicit route to every other node in the network. Network address summarization is commonly used in conjunction with routing domain hierarchy in order to improve scalability. The ultimate form of address summarization is the use of default routes, which can be used as a 'catch all' mechanism to forward a packet regardless of its destination address. + +One exception to the rule that a CL packet cannot be forwarded until a route has been calculated (or default route configured) is when the CL technology supports broadcasting. Broadcasting refers to the replication and forwarding of packets with unknown destination addresses across all server layer trails in the topology (except the trail that the packet was received on). An example of technology that supports this functionality is Ethernet. Another exception to the rule is the way in which token ring networks operate. In token ring layer networks, when a node receives a packet it retransmits the packet sending it onto the next node in the ring until it circulates back to the source node where it is removed. The destination node retains a copy of the frame and indicates that it has received the frame by setting the response bits in the frame. Although there are technologies that do not require routing, it should be noted that these technologies are not ideal as VPN server layer technologies. For layer networks to scale to large numbers of nodes over a large geographical area, routing, along with hierarchical address structures, are fundamental requirements. Mechanisms such as broadcasting and token passing are inherently insecure from a VPN perspective and are highly inefficient for the transmission of unicast (P2P) traffic. + +--- + +4 The reference to P2MP here refers to the outbound server layer topology from the perspective of a single source PE. The actual overall layer network topology could be any-to-any based on a full/partial mesh of bidirectional connections/flows between PEs. + +#### 10.1.2.2 Example network topologies that require routing + +Figure 10-1 shows an example of a network where there are two alternative routes/paths (A and B) to the same destination. + + + +Figure 10-1 illustrates a network topology with two alternative routes (A and B) from a source CE1 to a destination CE2. The network is enclosed in a cloud shape. Route A (solid blue line) passes through PE1, P1, P2, P4, and PE2. Route B (dashed red line) passes through PE1, P1, P3, P4, and PE2. The legend indicates: Solid blue line = Alternative path/route A; Dashed red line = Alternative path/route B. + +Figure 10-1: Network topology showing two alternative routes (A and B) from CE1 to CE2. Route A (solid blue line) goes through PE1, P1, P2, P4, and PE2. Route B (dashed red line) goes through PE1, P1, P3, P4, and PE2. The network is enclosed in a cloud shape. + +Y.1314\_F10.1 + +**Figure 10-1/Y.1314 – Multiple routes/paths to the same destination** + +As Figure 10-1 shows, route A from CE1 to CE2 passes through PE1, P1, P2, P4 and PE2, whereas route B passes through PE1, P1, P3, P4 and PE2. This information is depicted using a functional model in Figure 10-2. + + + +Figure 10-2 illustrates a functional model for multiple paths/routes. The diagram shows two layers: VPN server layer and Server layer. The VPN server layer contains CE1, PE1, and PE2, each with a TFP (Traffic Flow Processor). The Server layer contains P1, P2, P3, and P4, each with a CP (Control Plane) and a TCP (Traffic Control Plane). The diagram shows two alternative server layer trails (A and B) that may be used by the VPN server layer. Trail A (dashed blue line) goes from PE1 to P1 to P4 to PE2. Trail B (dashed red line) goes from PE1 to P1 to P3 to P4 to PE2. The legend indicates: Dashed purple line with arrow = Connection; Dotted black line with arrow = Flow; Solid blue line with arrow = Path/route A; Solid red line with arrow = Path/route B; Dashed blue line with arrow = Trail A; Dashed red line with arrow = Trail B. + +Figure 10-2: Functional model for multiple paths/routes. The diagram shows two layers: VPN server layer and Server layer. The VPN server layer contains CE1, PE1, and PE2, each with a TFP (Traffic Flow Processor). The Server layer contains P1, P2, P3, and P4, each with a CP (Control Plane) and a TCP (Traffic Control Plane). The diagram shows two alternative server layer trails (A and B) that may be used by the VPN server layer. Trail A (dashed blue line) goes from PE1 to P1 to P4 to PE2. Trail B (dashed red line) goes from PE1 to P1 to P3 to P4 to PE2. The legend indicates: Dashed purple line with arrow = Connection; Dotted black line with arrow = Flow; Solid blue line with arrow = Path/route A; Solid red line with arrow = Path/route B; Dashed blue line with arrow = Trail A; Dashed red line with arrow = Trail B. + +Y.1314\_F10.2 + +**Figure 10-2/Y.1314 – Functional model for multiple paths/routes** + +Figure 10-2 shows two alternative server layer trails (A and B) that may be used by the VPN server layer. Based on the route calculated via the routing function at the VPN server layer, one of the server layer trails will be selected (or both if load balancing is required) in order to transmit the VPN server layer flow(s) between the VPN server layer source TFP located in CE1 and sink TFP located in CE2. + +Figure 10-3 shows a case where a server layer provides P2MP connectivity from CE1 (the source) to CE2, CE3, and CE4 (the branch sinks in the P2MP topology). + + + +The diagram shows a network cloud containing nodes P1, P2, and P3. Outside the cloud, PE1 is connected to the source CE1. PE1 connects to P1. P1 branches to P2 and P3. P2 connects to PE2, which serves sinks CE2 and CE3. P3 connects to PE3, which serves sink CE4. Three paths are defined: + +- Alternative path/route A (dashed blue line) +- Alternative path/route B (solid red line) +- Alternative path/route C (solid green line) + +Y.1314\_F10.3 + +Figure 10-3: P2MP server layer topology diagram showing a source CE1 connected to PE1, which then connects through a core network of P1, P2, and P3 to egress nodes PE2 and PE3, finally reaching sinks CE2, CE3, and CE4. Three alternative paths (A, B, C) are highlighted. + +Figure 10-3/Y.1314 – P2MP server layer topology + +The network in Figure 10-3 is shown as a functional model in Figure 10-4. + + + +The functional model depicts two horizontal planes: the VPN server layer (top) and the Server layer (bottom). It shows the internal architecture of nodes using standard functional blocks like Traffic Forwarding Points (TFP), Forwarding Points (FP), Access Points (AP), Termination Connection Points (TCP), and Connection Points (CP). Arrows represent flows, connections, paths, and trails between these functional components across the nodes CE1, PE1, P1, P2, P3, PE2, PE3, CE2, CE3, and CE4. + +Legend: + +- Connection (dashed purple arrow) +- Flow (dotted black arrow) +- Path/route A (solid blue arrow) +- Path/route B (solid red arrow) +- Path/route C (solid green arrow) +- Trail A (dashed blue arrow) +- Trail B (dashed red arrow) +- Trail C (dashed green arrow) + +Y.1314\_F10.4 + +Figure 10-4: Functional model of P2MP server layer topology. It details the internal functional blocks (TFP, FP, AP, TCP, CP) within the network elements CE1-4, PE1-3, and P1-3 across two layers: VPN server layer and Server layer. + +Figure 10-4/Y.1314 – Functional model of P2MP server layer topology + +If CE1 is the source and CE2 is the sink for a particular VPN server layer flow, then CE1 needs to know what the route is to reach CE2. However, the routes/paths at the VPN server layer shown in Figure 10-4 are provided by P2P trails in the underlying server layer, i.e., only one route from the source TFP to each branch sink TFP in the P2MP topology exists. This means that the routing function only needs to discover the topology; it does not need to perform route calculation (as only one route to each sink exists). Following topology discovery, flows from CE1 destined for CE2 will use route/path A, provided by server layer trail A. + +#### **10.1.2.3 Alternative routing approaches** + +When routing is required, a human operator may perform the routing function in which case the human operator calculates routes across the network based on the known network topology and on resource utilization information. One example where routing may be performed manually is when configuring dual homed CE nodes when the VPN client layer is IP based. In this example, it may make sense to use static routes (i.e., one primary and one floating default routes) as only two alternative routes exist. + +If a network management system (NMS) is used to perform the routing function, then the management system must discover the network topology by requesting or collecting reachability/topology/resource information, and then use this information to calculate routes and distribute the routing information to the network nodes. One example where routing is performed by a NMS is in establishing P2P connections across an SDH-based layer network. Before the connections can be established, the NMS must first calculate the best route(s) through the network. + +If a dynamic routing protocol is used to perform the routing function, then reachability/topology/resource information is distributed across the network via the routing protocol to each node and used to calculate the best route/path to reach each destination. One example of a dynamic routing protocol is the routing component of PNNI used for ATM layer networks (although it can also be used with other network technologies) to discover the network topology and calculate routes for dynamic connections. Another example is RPR, which uses topology messages to discover the ring topology. When a node receives a topology message, it appends its MAC address and passes it to the next node in the ring, eventually the packet returns to its source with a topology map (list of addresses) of the ring. + +An alternative to using a dynamic routing protocol in the control plane is to use address learning in the data plane, an example of a network technology that employs this mode of operation is Ethernet. Ethernet uses spanning tree (to avoid loops by pruning the network topology) and transparent bridging (based on source address learning) in the data plane to forward packets onto the correct destination without having to broadcast them to all nodes/end-stations. However, if address learning in the data plane is used then the network technology must also support broadcasting to forward packets with destination addresses that have not yet been learnt. Due to the fact that routes are not known until packets with the corresponding addresses have been received, address learning in the data plane cannot be used to perform the routing function for CO layer networks, it is only suitable for CL layer networks. + +### **10.1.3 VPN server layer signalling** + +For the purposes of this Recommendation, signalling refers to the exchange of information required to establish CL tunnels (e.g., L2TP tunnels) and CO connections (e.g., ATM VPI/VCI). The information required includes parameters such as multiplexing/de-multiplexing fields, QoS (e.g., delay, jitter), bandwidth, encryption keys, and resiliency (e.g., 1+1 protection). + +One of the key differences between tunnels and connections is that connections always require signalling (or manual provisioning) to establish the connections before any user data can be sent. Although some tunnelling techniques (e.g., L2TP tunnels, explicitly configured GRE tunnels) also require signalling of tunnel parameters before user data can be sent, others such as soft/dynamic GRE and IP-in-IP tunnels do not require any signalling. These tunnelling techniques simply encapsulate a VPN client layer packet inside a VPN server layer packet header based on local policy/routing information. Intermediate (P) nodes encountered between the tunnel source/sink termination points only look at the VPN server layer packet header to determine whether and how to forward the packet towards the VPN server layer sink (destination PE). The VPN client layer headers are only used once the packet reaches the destination PE where the VPN server layer sink is located. Note also that intermediate nodes would often not be able to make any sense (e.g., be able to route) in the internal VPN client layer headers. + +Connection admission control (CAC) is performed at connection set up time to determine whether sufficient bandwidth is available in the underlying server layer to maintain the QoS requirements of the client layer. Traffic descriptors (e.g., Peak Cell Rate (PCR) and Sustained Cell Rate (SCR) used in ATM) are used during client layer signalling to request the appropriate resource from the underlying server layer. The ability to determine how much bandwidth is available at the server layer, based on a request from a client layer, means that the CAC function must peer in the control plane with both the server and client layers. + +In the case of CO-CS server layers, CAC is based on the amount of physical bandwidth available at the network layer at which it is requested (e.g., spare TDM timeslots or WDM wavelengths). In the case of CO-PS server layers, CAC is based on the amount of spare bandwidth not being used by existing connections. This information is made available by maintaining information about the state (e.g., up/down, amount of resource used) of each connection at each node for that particular layer network. Unlike CO-CS layer networks where the available bandwidth is constrained by the physical bandwidth available, in CO-PS networks per connection policing must be performed (especially if statistical multiplexing is assumed) at each node in the network to ensure that each connection only transmits/receives the amount of traffic agreed during connection establishment. + +In the case of CL-PS server layer networks, CAC may be performed based on the bandwidth available at a physical/logical interface, or a queue/flow/class of service level. As with CO-PS layer networks, policing must be performed at each node in the network based on the bandwidth requested. However, unlike the CO-PS case where state is maintained for each connection, the equivalent (i.e., per flow) information is not normally maintained in CL layer networks5. This, combined with the non deterministic any-to-any nature of CL traffic means that CAC in CL layer networks relies on the use of extensive traffic monitoring and modelling to develop a traffic matrix, along with network over-provisioning to ensure that bandwidth is available, especially under failure conditions. If per VPN hard CAC and strong SLAs are required then a CO server layer network should be used rather than a CL server layer network. + +## **10.2 VPN client layer authentication/configuration** + +The functions required to establish connectivity between CE and PE nodes at the VPN client layer may be performed using static provisioning or by using dynamic protocols. Static provisioning may be performed via manual configuration or via automated network management systems. The functional entities involved in establishing VPN client layer connectivity are shown in Table 10-2. + +--- + +5 Exceptions include the use of RSVP RFC 2205 (end-to-end signalling based solution) and flow state routing (hop-by-hop solution), where the state of each flow is maintained and new flows are rejected if there is not enough bandwidth available. + +**Table 10-2/Y.1314 – VPN client layer authentication and configuration functions** + +| Function | Functional entities | Network elements | VPN client layer mode | +|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------| +| CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) | Authentication: Identification of the CE/user based on the authentication parameters, e.g., a valid username and password | CE, PE | All | +| | Authorization: Grant or deny access to the VPN client layer network resources/services | CE, PE | All | +| | Accounting: Measurement of resources/services used | CE, PE | All | +| VPN client layer network element configuration | Assignment and configuration of VPN client layer network addresses across VPN client layer CPs/FPs and TCPs/TFPs | CE, PE | All | +| | Assignment and configuration of VPN identifiers across VPN client layer CPs/FPs belonging to the same VPN | PE | All | +| | Configuration of per VPN profiles and policies | CE, PE | CO-PS, CL-PS | + +### 10.2.1 CE/user AAA + +The CE/user AAA function controls access to the VPN client layer, enforces policies, supports usage audits, and provides the information necessary to bill for VPN services. The AAA functions may be performed by the PE device that the CE connects to, a separate device, or a mixture of the two. + +In some cases a centralized authentication server is likely to be required for user/CE authentication, and in others only the CE and PE may be involved in the authentication process. An example of the former is when IEEE 802.1X is used for authentication of an Ethernet CE device. In this example the PE would be the authenticator, and a centralized authentication server would be used to carry out the authentication. An example of the latter is the authentication of control messages (e.g., BGP messages) from a CE to authenticate the message source and protect against spoofing. + +### 10.2.2 VPN client layer network element configuration + +During VPN client layer provisioning the network elements at the edge of the customer and provider network must be configured with the following parameters: VPN client layer network addresses, VPN client layer network de-multiplexing fields, VPN identifiers, and per VPN policies/profiles. The configuration could be performed during the authentication/authorization process or independently. An example of the former is following successful authentication, a CE could automatically be configured with a specific bandwidth allocation and packet marking profile based on information received from an authentication server. An example of the latter is the use of manual configuration or Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) to assign an IP address to a CE. + +VPN client layer addresses to be configured at PE CPs/FPs and CE TCPs/TFPs or CPs/FPs are the addresses belonging to the VPN client layer network (e.g., IP addresses for an IP VPN client or ITU-T Rec. E.164/NSAP addresses for an ATM VPN client). + +Client layer network de-multiplexing fields only need to be configured if multiple VPN clients are being carried across the same CE to PE link, or if the VPN client layer network technology employed always carries a de-multiplexing field. An example of the former is an Ethernet VPN client layer, which only needs to use VLAN tags if it needs to support multiple VPNs. An example of the latter is ATM, which always uses VPI/VCI values in traffic unit (cell) headers. In some cases, the de-multiplexing field configuration will be dependent on the physical configuration rather than configuring a value in a packet header (e.g., attaching a fibre to the correct ingress interface at a PE corresponding with the correct egress DWDM wavelength). + +Although a VPN identifier is a name used to identify a particular VPN and only needs to be assigned/configured if support for dynamic VPN membership discovery and signalling is required, it may also be useful from an operational perspective (e.g., to aid troubleshooting, billing). An example of a VPN identifier used for dynamic discovery and signalling is the Route Target attribute used for RFC 2547 VPNs. A VPN identifier may be configured on a PE statically via manual/OSS provisioning, or dynamically (e.g., as part of the authentication process using RADIUS). If the VPN identifier is to be used for discovery/signalling, then it should be unique at least within a single routing/signalling domain (and ideally globally unique if support for inter-AS/provider VPNs is required). + +Configuration of per VPN profiles and policies for packet-based VPN clients may be required in the CE device, in the PE device or in both. Examples of VPN profiles and policies that may need to be configured depending on the VPN service include: rate limiting/traffic shaping, packet marking/classification, and route/connection selection for multi-homed sites (i.e., one primary, one backup). + +## 10.3 VPN client layer routing and signalling + +As with the VPN server layer, VPN client layer routing is required where multiple routes/paths between source and sink TCPs/TFPs exist, or if the VPN server layer trails create a P2MP topology at the VPN client layer. If the VPN client layer is CO and dynamic provisioning at the VPN client layer is to be supported, then signalling is also required. + +An important point to note here is that the VPN server layer trails must be established before VPN client layer routing/signalling may take place. The VPN client layer data plane topology is based on the topology of the underlying VPN server layer trails, and therefore it is not possible to perform route calculation or signal connections/tunnels until the VPN server layer trails have been established. + +The VPN client layer routing and signalling functions along with the individual functional entities are described in Table 10-3. + +**Table 10-3/Y.1314 – VPN client layer routing and signalling functions** + +| Function | Functional entities | Network elements | VPN client layer mode | +|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------| +| VPN client layer routing | Distribution/collection of VPN client layer reachability/topology/resource information | CE, PE | All | +| | Maintenance of VPN client layer reachability/topology/resource information | CE, PE | All | +| | Calculation of the best route(s) between VPN client layer APs | CE, PE | All | +| VPN client layer tunnel/connection signalling | Connection admission control (CAC) | PE, P | CO-CS, CO-PS | +| | Notification of success/failure of connection/tunnel request | PE, P | All | +| | Assignment and configuration of VPN client layer de-multiplexing fields | PE, P | All | +| | Distribution of VPN client layer connection/tunnel information, e.g., QoS, de-multiplexing fields, bandwidth, etc. | PE, P | All | + +### 10.3.1 Any-to-any CL-PS VPN client layer connectivity + +If VPN server layer trails provide an any-to-any full/partial mesh topology for a CL-PS VPN client layer network with multiple sites, then nodes containing VPN client layer TFPs/FPs (i.e., PE/CE nodes but not P nodes) must make forwarding decisions regarding where to forward a packet based on VPN client layer address information. This means that CE and PE nodes must exchange VPN client layer routing information using dynamic routing protocols via the control plane, or static routes must be configured using manual or OSS provisioning. An alternative to using dynamic routing protocols or static routing is to use address learning in the data plane, as is the case with Ethernet which uses source-based address learning to unicast traffic to the correct destination. + +The routing information for each VPN must be isolated from the routing information from other VPNs. This is to provide VPN forwarding separation (i.e., to ensure packets are not routed to nodes belonging to a different VPN) and to allow overlapping VPN client layer address spaces to be used. This may be achieved using physically separate per VPN PEs, or common PEs with logically/virtually separate routing information databases. An alternative would be to use common PE devices and routing tables but allocate separate address spaces for each VPN client6. An example of a VPN solution that supports routing at the VPN client layer is RFC 2547. RFC 2547 uses dynamic or static CE to PE routing along with MP-BGP to distribute VPN client layer routing information between PEs and separate virtual routing tables to provide VPN client layer route isolation. + +### 10.3.2 On-demand VPN client layer dynamic connection set up/teardown + +In most cases, CO-CS and CO-PS VPN client layer connections will be statically configured via manual or OSS provisioning. However, if on-demand dynamic connection establishment is required, then peering in the control plane peering (routing and signalling) at the VPN client layer must take place between all CPs and TCPs (i.e., between PE and CE nodes). Also, CAC must be performed at connection set up time to determine whether sufficient bandwidth is available at the VPN server layer for the VPN client layer connection. This means that the CAC function must peer with both the VPN server layer network and VPN client layer network control planes. If the VPN server layer and client layer technologies are different, then peer level control plane interworking must take place between the VPN client and server layers. + +### 10.3.3 Customer-controlled on-demand connections + +Customer-controlled on-demand dynamic connections refers to the case where the customer has some (or total) control over the CE node which allows them to establish new VPN client layer connections. The advantage of this capability from a customer perspective is that it gives them the flexibility to dynamically set up VPNs as and when they are needed, and be charged for their use accordingly. For example, a customer may wish to establish an on-demand connection for a short period of time to download/upload a large file (e.g., an application or video file) or to set up a reliable connection for a videoconference. An example of the use of on-demand dynamic VPN client layer connection set up is the use of PNNI to set up/teardown SPVCs across VPN server layer trails provided using virtual paths. + +One important factor to be taken into consideration when considering adding support for on-demand dynamic VPN client layer connections is the distribution of address/topology information. A service provider is unlikely to want to disclose their network topology or internal + +--- + +6 There are several major disadvantages to this approach: it requires careful management of the address space by the service provider, agreement by the customer to use addresses allocated by the service provider (the customer may want to use their own addresses), and packet filtering to guarantee isolation between VPNs, which is a tedious and error prone task. + +network addressing to customers for security reasons. Therefore, it is desirable for the routing function at the PE to distribute reachability information to the CE only. Another important consideration is in deciding what action to take at connection set up time if bandwidth is not available. The ability to establish a new VPN client layer connection is dependent on the availability of server layer trails between the source and sink termination points. If trails do not exist or there is not enough spare bandwidth, then either the connection must be rejected, or a new VPN server layer connection/tunnel must be established (or the bandwidth increased for existing connections/tunnels). In order to establish new VPN server layer connections/tunnels or increase the bandwidth of existing connection/tunnels, CAC must be performed to ensure that bandwidth is available in the underlying server layer. + +If the server layer is CL then it is not possible to perform hard CAC and, therefore, the network must be over-provisioned to allow new VPN server layer tunnels to be established. The disadvantage with this approach is that it requires careful network planning and control/policing to ensure that existing VPN server layer tunnels are not affected in any way. If the underlying server layer is CO then hard CAC can be performed to ensure that bandwidth is available to establish new VPN server layer connections/tunnels. However, every connection request at layer $n$ has an impact on the bandwidth available at layer $n-1$ , and this is recursive down to the duct. As we get closer to the duct, the bandwidth granularity and provisioning/hold times for the connections increase. In general, if there is insufficient capacity in an underlying server layer to support a new connection then the connection should be rejected. Server layer capacity should be provided as a result of capacity planning activities including network modelling and usage analysis/forecasting. + +### **10.3.4 Service provider controlled on-demand connections** + +Service provider controlled on-demand dynamic connections refers to the scenario where the service provider manages the CE node and uses routing/signalling to dynamically establish new VPN client layer connections. The advantage of this capability from the service providers perspective is that it allows them to establish end-to-end VPN client layer connections dynamically rather than having to use static configuration (i.e., manual or OSS provisioning). An example scenario where VPN client layer dynamic connection set up may be useful is where two or more ATM access networks are interconnected via a MPLS core. In this example, PNNI could be used to set up/teardown SPVCs at the VPN client layer across MPLS VPN server layer trails. As the VPN client and server layer technologies are different, peer level interworking in the control plane must take place. + +In the service provider controlled on-demand dynamic connections case, even if the provider manages the CE node on behalf of the customer, distributing internal addressing and topology information to the CE has risks associated with it, e.g., the CE is located within the customer's premises rather than the provider's premises. One way to avoid these security risks would be to use static/manual provisioning between the CE device and the adjacent intermediate node in the provider's network, and to use dynamic routing/signalling from that node back to the PE. For example, if the VPN client layer is ATM then the VC could be manually provisioned between the CE and the provider's ATM switch that it connects to, and then PNNI used end-to-end between the ATM switches. Regarding the control of connection/tunnel set up at different layers in the layer network hierarchy, as the provider controls the on-demand connections, the provider has more control over what happens in the network. However, careful network planning and NMS monitoring of connections at each layer must still take place, particularly if the department in the company responsible for managing the VPN client layer is different from the department responsible for managing the VPN server layer (and the server layers below). + +# 11 Functions required for peer level VPN establishment + +Assuming that the underlying server layer topology has been established and the VPN peer layer TFPs and FPs have been configured with addresses, there are three main steps involved in establishing VPN peer layer connectivity between VPN members: + +**Step 1:** Discover and authenticate VPN members and store VPN membership information. + +**Step 2:** Calculate routes between VPN members at the VPN peer layer. + +**Step 3:** Configure VPN peer layer network elements to provide VPN isolation. + +Each of the functions required to support VPN peer layer establishment and maintenance along with the individual functional entities are described in further detail in Table 11-1. + +**Table 11-1/Y.1314 – VPN server layer functions** + +| Function | Functional entities | Network elements | +|-------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| VPN membership discovery | Discovery of VPN members | CE/PE | +| | Distribution/collection of VPN membership information (including joins, leaves, availability) | CE/PE | +| | VPN membership information maintenance | CE/PE | +| CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) | Authentication: Identification of the CE/user based on the authentication parameters, e.g., a valid username and password | CE, PE | +| | Authorization: Grant or deny access to the VPN client layer network resources/services | CE, PE | +| | Accounting: Measurement of resources/services used | CE, PE | +| VPN peer layer routing | Distribution/collection of VPN peer layer reachability/topology/resource information | CE, PE, P | +| | Maintenance of VPN peer layer reachability/topology/resource information | CE, PE, P | +| | Calculation of the best route(s) between VPN peer layer APs | CE, PE, P | +| VPN peer layer network element configuration | Configuration of per VPN packet filters | PE | +| | Configuration of per VPN route filters | PE | +| | Configuration and exchange of per VPN/CE encryption keys | ES, CE, PE | +| | Assignment and configuration of VLAN IDs | CE, PE, P | + +## 11.1 VPN membership discovery + +In customer provisioned peer level VPN scenarios where the VPN is transparent to the provider (e.g., an IPsec VPN over the Internet), before establishing the VPN it is necessary to first of all determine which CEs belong to the VPN. In provider provisioned VPN scenarios (e.g., Ethernet VLAN based VPNs), the provider needs to discover which PEs are connected to CEs that are members of the VPN. Discovery may be performed manually by a human operator based on the known network topology, or may be performed dynamically via a centralized server/system or distributed protocol. + +## **11.2 CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA)** + +A CE/user AAA function is used in provider provisioned VPN scenarios to control access to VPN peer layer resources. AAA is also used to enforce policies, support usage audits, and to provide information necessary to bill the customer for VPN services. The AAA function may be performed by a PE, a separate device, or using a mixture of the two. For example, if IEEE 802.1X is used to authenticate a CE for an Ethernet VLAN based VPN, the PE would be the authenticator and a centralized authentication server could be used to carry out the authentication. + +## **11.3 VPN peer layer routing** + +Where alternative paths/routes between VPN members exist, routing must be performed at the VPN peer layer in order to discover the topology and/or calculate the best route(s) between VPN members. As CE, PE, and P nodes all belong to the VPN peer layer, all three node types are involved in any route/path calculations. The routing function may be performed manually by a human operator, or may be performed dynamically via a centralized server/system or distributed routing protocol. For the purposes of this Recommendation, routing includes transparent bridging based on source address learning in the data plane. + +## **11.4 VPN peer layer network element configuration** + +There are a number of alternative functions for providing VPN isolation. One option is to configure per VPN packet filters on shared PE nodes to ensure full reachability between sites of a single customer, but isolation between customers. Another option is to use dedicated PE nodes and configure route filters so that although P nodes contain all customers' routes, PE nodes only contain routes for a single customer. Packet/route filtering is only applicable to provider provisioned VPN scenarios and therefore must be carried out by PE nodes. + +An alternative to using route/packet filtering where connectivity exists between customers (e.g., across the Internet) is to use packet encryption. Using packet encryption ensures that if customers receive packets from a VPN they do not belong to, they cannot obtain the data contained inside the packet. Packet encryption is performed by PE nodes for provider provisioned VPNs and by CE nodes or end systems for customer provisioned VPNs. + +Common types of cryptography used to support encryption/decryption include secret key and public key cryptography. Secret key cryptography is most suited to closed user groups where secret keys can be held and securely distributed by a single authority, e.g., in an enterprise VPN environment. The advantage of public-key cryptography is that it allows users to communicate securely without having prior access to a shared secret key. This approach uses two keys, a private key that is kept secret and a public key that needs to be distributed to all VPN members. Public and private keys are mathematically related and anyone that does not possess a specific private key cannot decrypt the information in the encrypted packet. A common use for public key cryptography is for the exchange of secret keys to be used for secret key cryptography. + +Where Ethernet is used as the VPN peer layer technology, VPN isolation can be achieved by assigning and configuring VLANs. VLANs are normally assigned and configured manually or via OSS, although dynamic protocols can also be used. To provide end-to-end connectivity between CEs, VLANs must be configured correctly on CE, PE and P nodes. + +# 12 VPN OAM functions + +OAM tools and functions are essential in maintaining operational efficiency in large-scale networks. Examples of important network connection/flow characteristics conveyed via OAM functions include quality, integrity and validity. If a layer network does not support OAM or has some missing OAM functionality, then that particular layer network is functionally deficient with regard to that OAM functionality. Higher/lower layer OAM functions/tools cannot be used as a replacement/substitute to provide the same functionality, particularly when it comes to fault localization. This is not to say that it is not possible to provide VPN services using network technologies that have OAM functions missing. However, missing OAM functionality is likely to significantly increase operating costs and operational complexity. + +Table 12-1 presents some of the key OAM functions and identifies which network elements should support the associated functions. + +**Table 12-1/Y.1314 – Client/server OAM functions** + +| Function | Functional entities | Network elements | +|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------|------------------| +| VPN client layer OAM | VPN client layer fault detection/management | CE and PE | +| | VPN client layer performance monitoring | CE and PE | +| | VPN client layer OAM activation and deactivation | CE and PE | +| VPN server layer OAM | VPN server layer fault detection/management | PE and P | +| | VPN server layer performance monitoring | PE and P | +| | VPN server layer OAM activation and deactivation | PE and P | +| VPN peer layer OAM | VPN peer layer fault detection/management | CE, PE, P (all) | +| | VPN peer layer performance monitoring | CE, PE, P (all) | +| | VPN peer layer OAM activation and deactivation | CE, PE, P (all) | + +## 12.1 Fault management + +Fault management includes fault detection, localization, correction and on-demand diagnostic testing. Defects must be detected and processed at the connection/flow sink termination point in the layer network that they occur. Failure to do this will lead to ambiguous fault indications, which significantly increase operational complexity and the time taken to resolve a fault. Upon detecting a failure, in addition to generating and sending alarms to the NMS, to prevent alarm storms in client layer networks an FDI (Forward Defect Indication) or AIS (Alarm Indication Signal) signal should be passed to client layer network(s) using the appropriate syntax of the OAM used by the particular client layer technology affected (if one exists). + +The most important fault detection mechanism is the use of Connectivity Verification (CV), which is a common requirement across all three networking modes. Put simply, it requires the source of a traffic flow to deterministically (in some manner) identify itself to the sink. How this is achieved is dependent on the networking mode and is explained in subsequent clauses. Fault localization is another key requirement across all three networking modes in order to determine the root cause of a failure. In addition to the initial failure information, on-demand diagnostic testing tools may be used to localize the fault. + +An example of a failure scenario in a VPN server layer is described from a functional perspective in Figure 12-1. + + + +Figure 12-1: Client/server FDI propagation diagram. The diagram shows a multi-layer network architecture. At the top is the 'VPN client layer' containing CE1, PE1, PE3, and CE2. Below this is the 'VPN server layer' containing PE2. At the bottom are 'Server layer A' (containing P1) and 'Server layer B' (containing P3). Connections are shown as trails: 'VPN client layer trail' (red dashed), 'VPN server layer trail' (red dashed), 'Server layer A trail' (red dashed), and 'Server layer B CL trail' (red dashed). Network connections (dotted lines) exist between CE1-PE1, PE1-PE2, PE2-PE3, and PE3-CE2. Link connections (solid lines) exist between PE1-PE2 and PE2-PE3. In Server layer A, a link connection between P1 and a node is marked with a red 'X' and labeled '1'. In Server layer B, a network flow is shown between TFP and FP nodes. A thick black arrow labeled '2' shows an FDI being propagated from Server layer A to the VPN server layer. Another thick black arrow labeled '3' shows the FDI being propagated from the VPN server layer to the VPN client layer. The diagram is labeled 'Y.1314\_F12.1' at the bottom right. + +1. Server layer A detects LOC based on non-receipt of CV packets +2. Server layer A forwards a FDI to the VPN server layer +3. The VPN server layer receives a FDI and propagates it up to the VPN client layer + +**Figure 12-1/Y.1314 – Client/server FDI propagation** + +In this example, detection of a link failure by the sink termination function in server layer A causes a FDI/AIS to be generated and to be passed onto the VPN server layer. The FDI is propagated to the VPN server layer sink termination function, which in turn sends an FDI to the client layer. This behaviour is recursive up to a layer network that does not support FDI. Therefore, although it is not shown here, on receipt of an FDI the VPN client layer may send an FDI to the layer above, depending on what technology the layer above is (e.g., ATM, Ethernet, IP, etc.). + +The only place an alarm should be raised is at the trail termination point in the layer network where the original fault is detected. In particular, there should be no alarms raised in any client layers affected (this is the key purpose in sending FDI to them). Further, if single-ended monitoring of both directions is required, then a BDI (Backward Defect Indicator) can be sent in the other direction. Further details on how defect indicators/alarms (including details of defect and unavailability entry and exit criteria and consequent actions) can be found in Recommendations that deal with OAM for specific layer network technologies, e.g., ITU-T Rec. Y.1711 for MPLS OAM. + +Fault Correction is responsible for the repair of a fault and for the control of procedures that use redundant resources to replace equipment or facilities that have failed. For example, in case of a fibre cut or node failure, protection switching or connection re-routing may be used to restore/maintain service. + +On-demand diagnostic testing tools are generally used for fault localization, but can also be used for verification of correct connectivity/configuration of a connection/tunnel prior to it being brought into service. Loopback is one example of a diagnostic test during which a loop on a network connection from the source back towards the source via a connection or terminating connection point thereby isolating that section of the connection. + +## 12.2 Performance management + +Performance Monitoring (PM) is the process of collection, analysis, and reporting of performance data. This data is used to assess and maintain the network as well as to document the quality of service to customers. If multiple levels of class of service are supported (e.g., based on the Diffserv architecture) then performance monitoring should be performed on a per class of service basis. Performance monitoring includes, amongst other things, the detection of signal degradation, latency/jitter monitoring, and the counting of lost packets. There are a number of different objectives for performance monitoring including SLA maintenance, support for traffic engineering, per customer accounting, and service restoration/protection switching (e.g., due to signal degradation). + +It is important to establish the relationship between defects, availability and PM. There is a particular ordering which can be summarized as follows: + +- 1) The network mode defines the defects that are of relevance (which are different for each mode) and the nature of the OAM required. +- 2) All defects should be defined in terms of standardized entry/exit criteria and consequent actions. +- 3) The unavailability state is entered when a defect or unacceptable performance degradation has persisted for a consecutive number of seconds. In SDH the unavailable state is entered following 10 consecutive Severely Errored Seconds7 (SES) and is exited following 10 consecutive non SES. To ensure harmonization, the unavailability period should be the same across all layer networks, i.e., 10 seconds. +- 4) PM for SLA purposes is only valid when in the available state and, therefore, PM for SLA purposes must be suspended when the unavailable state is entered. + +When in the available state, PM for SLA purposes is a unidirectional measurement. However, as most applications require both directions (upstream and downstream) to be working, if either direction fails then both directions are deemed to have failed from an application's perspective. This means that unavailability is an "OR" function of each direction and, therefore, if either direction enters the unavailable state, then PM for SLA purposes should be suspended in both directions. + +## 12.3 OAM activation/deactivation + +For the CO-CS and CO-PS modes, the basic defect detection/handling OAM mechanisms should be activated/deactivated in synchronization with trail set up and teardown, which could be via NMS/OSS provisioning or via signalling. For example, CV generation should be activated at the source before activating CV detection at the sink in order to avoid meaningless alarms. The provisioning or signalling method used to set up the trail should also be able to tell the trail sink point what source identifier (e.g., TTSI in ITU-T Rec. Y.1711) to expect in the data plane for a particular trail in order to determine which trail the OAM packets it receives belong to. + +--- + +7 A SES is a period of one second with a bit error ratio equal to or higher than 1E-3, or during which an LOS or an AIS is detected. + +## 12.4 Defects relevant to each network mode + +The potential transport defects that may occur in a VPN client or server layer network are dependent on the network mode that the layer network technology belongs to. A summary of mode dependent potential defects is given below: + +- **CL-PS:** Breaks only; +- **CO-PS:** Breaks, swaps, and merges; +- **CO-CS:** Breaks, swaps (but only between alike entities). + +In the following clauses, each of the network modes is described in further detail to describe what the key OAM requirements and considerations are for that particular mode. It should be noted that this is not intended to be an in-depth list of OAM requirements for each mode. Only fundamental functional differences are highlighted in order to show how the network mode that the VPN client and server layers belong to impacts the OAM functions/tools required. + +### 12.4.1 CL-PS layer networks + +Under an assumption of consistent and valid routing information (which actually applies to all modes), misconnectivity defects (i.e., swaps or merging) cannot occur in CL-PS layer networks. Each packet contains both a source address (this is the CV function) and a destination address that contains all the information required for the packet to be routed correctly at each network node. Therefore, the only defect possible in a CL-PS layer network is the case where there is a break (e.g., due to routing, link, or node failures). In CL-PS layer networks, the CV function is an integral part of the packet header as each packet contains a network unique source/destination address. In CL-PS networks, the control and user data usually share the same data path and, therefore, if there is a failure in the control plane (e.g., a routing adjacency goes down), then by implication it can be assumed that connectivity has been lost and user data cannot be sent either. This is generally how faults are detected and corrected in CL-PS layer networks, e.g., non-receipt of routing hellos in the control plane indicates that there is a fault in the data plane and, therefore, corrective action (e.g., selection of an alternative route) must be taken. One case where this is not true, however, is when load balancing is used in IP layer networks. In this case, multiple routes to the same destination exist, therefore, if one route becomes unavailable this may not be detected by the control plane as control traffic may simply use one of the other routes available. To detect failures where load balancing is employed, an OAM mechanism must be used that tests connectivity across all available routes. + +### 12.4.2 CO-PS layer networks + +In the CO-PS case, only the layer network access points are aware of the network unique addresses used by the routing function to calculate the best route/path through the network for the connection. Once the route/path has been calculated, signalling (or manual provisioning) is used to allocate and configure locally significant ingress/egress multiplexing/de-multiplexing fields (or link connection identifiers), which are used in the data plane for switching the packet to the correct destination. As multiplexing/de-multiplexing fields are only locally significant, the same values can be reused by upstream/downstream nodes for the same connection, or for different connections. The reuse of multiplexing/de-multiplexing fields combined with the lack of network unique addressing in the data plane means that in the CO-PS layer networks, in addition to breaks, we can experience swapping and merging defects. As CO-PS packets are transmitted asynchronously and do not contain unique source/destination network addresses, the CV function needs to be added in some deterministic fashion, normally by transmitting CV packets at a specific rate. The rate at which CV packets are sent needs careful consideration to ensure that unnecessary actions are not taken in the event of transient error bursts. + +### 12.4.3 CO-CS layer networks + +CO-CS layer networks do not suffer from merging as the multiplexing/de-multiplexing fields are based on physical time/space/frequency link-connection identifiers with a constant bit rate. Defects that may occur in a CO-CS layer network include breaks and swapped connections, however, swapped connection defects can only occur between exactly alike trails, e.g., swaps cannot occur between a VC12 and VC4 in SDH. In the case of the CO-CS layer networks, as with CO-PS layer networks, the CV function must be added in some deterministic fashion. As a CO-CS frame is transmitted at a constant bit rate (whether there is data to be sent or not), the CV information can be carried in each frame using the frame transmit rate as the CV transmit rate, for example, the J0 trace message in an SDH VC4 frame has a base 125 $\mu$ s insertion rate. In the CO-CS case, control traffic is always carried OOB and therefore OAM functions must be provided on a per connection basis for the user and control data planes. + +### 12.4.4 Control and user data plane separation + +The control data and user data in CO-PS networks can be transmitted using different data planes (often referred to as out of band (OOB) control); and, as noted in the previous paragraph, in the CO-CS mode this is forced behaviour in all cases. This separation of control and user data planes is advantageous for many reasons, and especially from a security and network stability perspective as it protects the control plane from user plane attacks and overloading/congestion problems caused by user plane traffic. When the user and control data planes are separated, it clearly cannot be assumed that a failure in the control plane indicates a failure in the user data plane (or indeed vice versa). Therefore, an OAM mechanism in CO-PS layer networks where OOB control is used must be used on a per data plane (i.e., per connection) basis. This is also the case where the control traffic may use the same data plane as some user traffic, but not all (e.g., in MPLS traffic engineering (TE) may be used to provide explicit routing for certain traffic types and, therefore, user data traffic need not follow the same path as the control packets used to set up the TE tunnels). + +Failure to use data plane based OAM mechanisms may lead to a scenario in which a connection carrying data packets may experience a fault, but as control traffic is being transmitted using a separate connection, control information continues to flow and, therefore, the fault is not detected by the control plane. Without a data plane OAM detection mechanism the connection source will continue to send user data creating a traffic black hole, or worse, compromising security of customer data by sending traffic to the wrong location. + +In order to unambiguously determine in which direction a fault has occurred, and to support correct fault handling for both P2P and P2MP connections, OAM should operate unidirectionally. Also, single-ended monitoring of faults in both directions should be supported if possible. This is particularly important where a customer or provider has control over one end of a connection/tunnel but not the other end, e.g., in an inter-provider VPN scenario where each end of a P2P VPN client layer connection is located in a different service provider's network. + +# 13 Functional convergence and service scenarios + +Mapping VPN service requirements to the functions described in this Recommendation allows network operators to select the most appropriate network technologies and mechanisms required to provide the VPN services they wish to offer. Selecting the best of breed mechanisms/protocols for each function allows individual functional components to evolve independently. This approach also supports the reuse of common mechanisms/protocols across different VPN network technologies (where appropriate) to reduce costs and complexity. + +## **13.1 Client/server VPN services scenarios** + +The functions (and therefore mechanisms/protocols) required to support client/server VPNs are dependent on the client/server network modes as well as the actual VPN service being offered. For example, some customers may want to be able to set up on-demand SVCs between multiple sites as and when they are needed, whilst other customers may just want permanent connections based on a known static topology. As another example, some customers may want to use per user/CE authentication to increase security whilst other customers may believe restricting physical access to network infrastructure is adequate. Tables III.1 and III.2 provide some examples of different service scenarios and identify some example mechanisms/protocols that can be used to provide the functions required. + +## **13.2 Peer level VPN scenarios** + +The functions required to support peer level VPNs are dependent on the peer layer network technology and the type of VPN service being offered. For example, authentication in the encryption based VPN case is mandatory in order to use the correct keys whereas in the Ethernet VLAN based VPN case authentication (e.g., using IEEE 802.1X) provides extra security but is not essential. Table III.3 provides some examples of different service scenarios and identifies some example mechanisms/protocols that can be used to provide the functions required. + +# **14 VPN security considerations** + +This Recommendation does not introduce any new security issues. However, security is a fundamental factor to consider when designing/developing VPN networks in order to select the network technologies and functional components that meet a customer's security requirements. There are inherent security risks associated with all VPN technologies due to the fact that a shared infrastructure is being used to transport traffic for multiple customers. + +Network security is a huge area in itself and is therefore not investigated in detail within this Recommendation. Looking at security from a high level, the physical VPN network infrastructure must be protected from unauthorized access or malicious attack (e.g., by restricting access to buildings containing network equipment). In addition, unauthorized remote access from outside the VPN network infrastructure must also be prevented (e.g., by using firewalls to protect against attacks sources from the Internet). + +As described in 5.1, in the client/server VPN case, a VPN server layer network must support multiplexing/de-multiplexing to provide data plane separation between multiple VPN client layers. This traffic separation must be combined with effective VPN access control at the edge of the network based on per customer VPN policies. + +In the peer level VPN case, as described in clause 6, in order to support VPNs across a shared domain, the network technology used must have some means of providing VPN isolation. CEs must only be able to communicate with other CEs belonging to the same VPN, or only be able to decrypt packets from CEs belonging to the same VPN. + +Security can be increased for both client/server and peer level VPNs by using encryption to encrypt user/control traffic units and authentication can be used to authenticate users and network nodes. Authentication for client/server and peer level VPNs is described in more detail in 10.2.1 and 11.2 respectively. Encryption is described in further detail in 6.2 and 11.4. + +# Appendix I + +## Location of VPN client layer TCPs/TFPs + +Figure I.1 gives an example of a client/server VPN network, it shows the physical topology of the network in which the black line represents the VPN server layer and the grey lines represent physical links between the nodes. + + + +Y.1314\_FI.1 + +Figure I.1: Client/server VPN physical topology. The diagram shows a network topology with nodes CE1, PE1, P1, P2, P3, PE2, and CE2. A thick blue line represents the VPN server layer, connecting CE1 to PE1, PE1 to P1, P1 to P2, P2 to PE2, and PE2 to CE2. Grey lines represent physical links between adjacent nodes. A legend indicates: Physical link (grey line), VPN (thick blue line), CE (Customer edge node), PE (Provider edge node), and P (Provider (core) node). + +**Figure I.1/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN physical topology – Example 1** + +Although Figure I.1 shows the physical topology and VPN server layer, it does not show the separate VPN client and server layer topologies or where the TCPs/TFPs are located. Figure I.2 shows a functional model based on the physical topology in Figure I.1 in which the TFPs are located in the CE nodes. In this example, the VPN server layer is CO (e.g., ATM) whilst the VPN client layer is CL (e.g., Ethernet), although any combination of CO or CL pairs are possible. + + + +Y.1314\_FI.2 + +Figure I.2: VPN client layer TFPs located in CE nodes. This functional model diagram shows two layers: the VPN client layer (top) and the VPN server layer (bottom). In the client layer, CE1 and CE2 contain TFPs (Traffic Flow Profiles), and PE1 and PE2 contain FPs (Flow Profiles). In the server layer, P1, P2, and P3 contain CPs (Connection Profiles), and PE1 and PE2 contain APs (Access Profiles) and TCPs (Traffic Control Profiles). Sources and Sinks are indicated for the TFPs. Connections (dashed purple arrows) and flows (dotted black arrows) are shown between the layers. A subnetwork (purple oval) encloses P1, P2, and P3. Trails (dash-dot blue arrows) are also shown. A legend defines the symbols: Connection (dashed purple arrow), Flow (dotted black arrow), Subnetwork (purple oval), and Trail (dash-dot blue arrow). + +**Figure I.2/Y.1314 – VPN client layer TFPs located in CE nodes** + +The CE and P nodes belong to the VPN client and server layers respectively, whilst the PE nodes belong to both layers. The TFPs in the VPN client layer identify where (which CE node in this case) the P2P VPN client layer flow starts (its source) and ends (its sink), and the FPs identify which PE nodes the P2P flow passes through. Likewise the TFPs in the VPN server layer identify the source and sink for the VPN server layer connection, and the FPs identify which P nodes the flow passes through. The APs in the VPN server layer identify the source/sink for the VPN server layer trail. + +In the previous example, the VPN client layer TFPs were situated in the CE nodes (CE1 and CE2), however, this is not the case for all VPN client/server relationships. For example, the VPN client layer may be an Ethernet or IP layer network where the TFPs are located in hosts/end-systems. + +Figure I.3 shows the physical topology of a client/server VPN network. If the VPN client layer was Ethernet then the C nodes would be Ethernet switches, and the end-systems/hosts would be computers/servers with Ethernet interfaces. + + + +— Physical link +**—** VPN + +| | | +|----|----------------------| +| C | Customer node | +| CE | Customer edge node | +| ES | Customer end system | +| P | Provider (core) node | +| PE | Provider edge node | + +Y.1314\_FI.3 + +Figure I.3/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN physical topology – Example 2. The diagram shows a network topology with two main paths. On the left, ES1 is connected to C1, which is connected to CE1. CE1 is connected to PE1. PE1 is connected to P1. P1 is connected to P2 and P3. P2 is connected to PE2. PE2 is connected to CE2. CE2 is connected to C2. C2 is connected to ES2. A thick blue line represents the VPN path, starting from ES1, passing through C1, CE1, PE1, P1, P2, PE2, CE2, and ending at C2. A legend indicates that a thin black line is a 'Physical link' and a thick blue line is the 'VPN'. A table below the legend defines the node types: C (Customer node), CE (Customer edge node), ES (Customer end system), P (Provider (core) node), and PE (Provider edge node). The identifier 'Y.1314\_FI.3' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area. + +**Figure I.3/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN physical topology – Example 2** + +A functional model based on the physical network depicted in Figure I.3 is presented in Figure I.4, where the VPN client layer's TFPs/TCPs are located in end-system/hosts rather than the CEs. + + + +The diagram illustrates a VPN architecture divided into two main layers: the VPN client layer (top) and the VPN server layer (bottom). The VPN client layer contains end-systems (ES1, ES2), customer edge nodes (C1, C2), and client edge nodes (CE1, CE2). The VPN server layer contains provider edge nodes (PE1, PE2), provider nodes (P1, P2, P3), and access points (AP1, AP2). Traffic flows from a source (ES1) through the client layer, then through the server layer, and finally to a sink (ES2). The diagram uses various line styles to represent connections, flows, subnetworks, and trails. A legend at the bottom clarifies these symbols: a dashed purple arrow for 'Connection', a dotted black arrow for 'Flow', a purple oval for 'Subnetwork', and a dash-dot blue arrow for 'Trail'. A specific trail is shown connecting the source TFP in the client layer, through the APs and PEs in the server layer, and ending at the sink TFP in the client layer. A subnetwork is also highlighted around the P1, P2, and P3 nodes in the server layer. + +Y.1314\_F1.4 + +Diagram of a VPN architecture showing client and server layers with various nodes and connections. + +**Figure I.4/Y.1314 – VPN client layer TFPs located in end-systems/hosts** + +The C and CE nodes along with the ESs belong to the VPN client layer. The PE nodes belong to the VPN server layer and the client layer whilst the P nodes only belong to the VPN server layer. The TFPs in the VPN client layer identify the source and sink (i.e., ES1 and ES2 respectively) for the VPN client layer flow, and the FPs identify which C, CE, and PE nodes the flow passes through. + +Although not illustrated in the previous examples, it is also possible that at one side of the VPN a source or sink TFP/TCP is located in the CE, whilst at the other end, the TFP is not located in the CE, i.e., a CP/FP is located in the CE and the TFP/TCP is located in a customer node or ES. + +# Appendix II + +## Client/server VPNs with multiple VPN server layers + +Figure II.1 shows the physical topology of a client/server VPN network that uses two different VPN server layers, X and Y. Nodes PE1, P1 and P2 belong to VPN server layer X whilst nodes P3 and PE3 belong to VPN server layer Y. Node PE2 belongs to both server layers and acts as a gateway between the two. + + + +Figure II.1: VPN server layer interworking physical topology. The diagram shows two overlapping cloud shapes representing VPN server layers. The left cloud, labeled 'VPN server layer X', is orange and contains nodes PE1, P1, and P2. The right cloud, labeled 'VPN server layer Y', is green and contains nodes P3 and PE3. Node PE2 is located at the intersection of the two clouds. External nodes CE1 and CE2 are connected to the clouds. CE1 connects to PE1, and CE2 connects to PE3. A blue line represents a connection path from CE1 through PE1, P1, PE2, P3, and PE3 to CE2. The label 'Y.1314\_FIL.1' is in the bottom right corner. + +Figure II.1/Y.1314 – VPN server layer interworking physical topology + +One method of interworking between VPN server layers X and Y would be to use client/server interworking as illustrated in Figure II.2. In this model, node PE2 belongs to the VPN server layer X and Y and all three PE nodes belong to the VPN client layer. + + + +Figure II.2: VPN server layer client/server interworking. This diagram illustrates the internal structure and data flow between the VPN client layer and two VPN server layers (X and Y). The top section, 'VPN client layer', shows a sequence of nodes: CE1, PE1, PE2, PE3, and CE2. Each node contains an 'AP' (Application Process) and a 'TFP' (Transport Function Process). 'Link flow' is indicated by dashed arrows between the TFPs of adjacent nodes. A 'VPN client connectionless trail' is shown as a red dashed line above the client layer. The bottom section shows two server layers: 'VPN server layer X' (orange) and 'VPN server layer Y' (green). Layer X contains nodes P1 and P2, while layer Y contains P3. Each server node has an 'AP' and a 'TCP' (Transport Control Process). 'Link connection' is shown as dashed arrows between the TFP of a client node and the TCP of a server node. A 'Subnetwork' is depicted between the two server layers, with 'Link connection' arrows between their TCPs. The label 'Y.1314\_FIL.2' is in the bottom right corner. + +Figure II.2/Y.1314 – VPN server layer client/server interworking + +The VPN server layer X source adaptation function adapts VPN client layer CI into AI in the VPN server layer X, and the sink adaptation function adapts VPN server layer X AI to VPN client layer CI. Similarly, the VPN server layer Y source adaptation function adapts the CI of the VPN client layer into AI in the VPN server layer Y, and the sink adaptation function adapts VPN server layer Y AI to VPN client layer CI. + +The network elements in which the client/server adaptation takes place contain FPs or CPs belonging to the VPN client layer, which must be identified using VPN client layer addresses. So, for example, if the VPN client layer was IP, PE1, PE2, and PE3 would require IP addresses belonging to the VPN client layer. + +Using multiple VPN server layers with client/server adaptation for CO VPN client layers means that a route/path must be dynamically/manually calculated across CPs and at least two link connections established end-to-end at the VPN client layer within the provider's network. Using multiple VPN server layers with client/server adaptation for CL VPN client layers means that a route/path must be dynamically/manually calculated across FPs, and that CL traffic units (i.e., packets) must be forwarded based on the address information at the VPN client layer. This is in contrast to the case where a single VPN server layer has been established end-to-end across the provider network between two CPs/FPs at the VPN client layer. In this case, only a single link connection/flow is required within the provider network between the VPN server layer trail source and sink and, therefore, a route/path does not need to be calculated across the provider network at the VPN client layer. + +The alternative method of interworking between VPN server layers X and Y in Figure II.2 would be to use peer level interworking as illustrated in Figure II.3. In this model, node PE2 belongs to VPN server layer X and Y but does not belong to the VPN client layer. PE1 and PE3 belong to VPN server layers X and Y respectively, and also belongs to the VPN client layer. + + + +Diagram illustrating VPN server layer peer level interworking. The diagram shows two main layers: the VPN client layer (top) and the VPN server layer (bottom). The VPN client layer includes CE1, PE1, PE3, and CE2, connected by a 'VPN client connectionless trail' (dashed red line). The VPN server layer is divided into two sections: VPN server layer X (orange) and VPN server layer Y (green). VPN server layer X contains PE1, P1, and PE2. VPN server layer Y contains PE3, P3, and PE2. PE2 is shown as a shared node between both server layers. The diagram illustrates 'Link flow' (dotted line) and 'Link connection' (solid line) between various components like AP, TFP, FP, CP, and TCP. A 'Subnetwork' is shown between P1 and P3. A 'VPN server layer X to VPN server layer Y interworking function' is indicated by a double-headed arrow between the two server layers. The diagram is labeled Y.1314\_FII.3. + +**Figure II.3/Y.1314 – VPN server layer peer level interworking** + +The VPN server layer X source adaptation function adapts VPN client layer CI into AI in the VPN server layer X. The VPN server layer X to VPN server layer Y interworking function adapts the VPN server layer X AI to VPN server layer Y AI. The VPN server layer Y sink adaptation function adapts VPN server layer Y AI to VPN client layer CI. + +The main factor to take into consideration when considering peer level interworking is that only certain network technologies can be interworked on a peer level basis, e.g., ATM and Frame Relay networks can be interworked on a peer level basis (using FRF.8), but IP and TDM networks can not. Peer level interworking requires interworking not only in the data plane but also in the control plane for functions such as routing, signalling, and OAM. + +# Appendix III + +## Examples of client/server and peer level VPN service scenarios + +The tables below provide some examples of different VPN service scenarios and identify some example mechanisms/protocols that can be used to provide the functions required. + +NOTE – Additional references related to the tables in this appendix are provided in the Bibliography. + +**Table III.1/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN service scenarios 1** + +| | Layer 2 frame relay service over MPLS | Layer 2 Ethernet VPWS service over IP/L2TPv3 | Layer 3 RFC 2547 IP VPN service | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------| +| VPN client layer | Frame Relay | Ethernet | IP | +| VPN server layer | MPLS PW | IP/L2TPv3 | MPLS | +| VPN membership discovery | RADIUS, BGP, Manual, NMS | RADIUS, BGP, LDP, RSVP-TE, Manual, NMS | BGP | +| VPN server layer routing | IGP, BGP, manual, NMS | IGP, BGP, manual, NMS | BGP | +| VPN server layer tunnel/connection establishment | LDP, BGP, Manual, NMS | L2TPv3 signalling | BGP | +| CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) | RADIUS, IEEE 802.1X, RMON, SNMP, NMS | RADIUS, IEEE 802.1X, RMON, SNMP, NMS | CE-PE routing protocol (e.g., EBGp with MD5), RMON, SNMP, NMS | +| VPN client layer network element configuration | NMS, manual | NMS, manual, E-LMI | DHCP, NMS, Manual | +| VPN client layer routing | NMS, manual | MAC address learning | EBGP, OSPF, manual/static | +| VPN client layer tunnel/connection signalling | NMS, manual | Non required as the client is CL-PS | Non required as the client is CL-PS | +| VPN client layer OAM | Frame Relay LMI | IEEE 802.1ag, E-LMI, IEEE 802.3ah, ITU-T Rec. Y.1731 | IP Ping/traceroute | +| VPN server layer OAM | ITU-T Rec. Y.1711, ITU-T Rec. Y.1713, MPLS, VCCV, BFD/LSP ping | IP ping/traceroute | ITU-T Rec. Y.1711, ITU-T Rec. Y.1713, LSP Ping/traceroute | + +**Table III.2/Y.1314 – Client/server VPN service scenarios 2** + +| | Layer 1 SDH VPNservice over OTN | Layer 1 TDM VPN
service over MPLS | Layer 2 ATM VPN
service over SDH | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------| +| VPN client layer | SDH (e.g., STM-16) | TDM (e.g., E1) | ATM | +| VPN server layer | Lightpath / Optical Channel (OCh) | MPLS PW | SDH (e.g., VC4) | +| VPN membership discovery | ITU-T Rec. G.7714.1/Y.1705.1, Manual, NMS | RADIUS, BGP, LDP, Manual, NMS | Manual, NMS | +| VPN server layer routing | GMPLS/ASON routing protocols, manual, NMS | IGP, BGP, manual, NMS | GMPLS/ASON routing protocols, manual, NMS | +| VPN server layer tunnel/connection establishment | GMPLS/ASON signalling protocols, manual, NMS | LDP, BGP, Manual, NMS | GMPLS/ASON signalling protocols, manual, NMS | +| CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) | GMPLS/ASON protocols, SNMP, NMS | RMON, SNMP, NMS | ATM, PNNI/UNI security, RMON, SNMP, NMS | +| VPN client layer network element configuration | NMS, Manual | NMS, Manual | ATM UNI, Manual, NMS | +| VPN client layer routing | GMPLS/ASON routing protocols, manual, NMS | Manual, NMS | Manual/static, NMS, PNNI | +| VPN client layer tunnel/connection signalling | GMPLS/ASON signalling protocols, manual, NMS, | Manual, NMS | Manual, NMS, PNNI | +| VPN client layer OAM | SDH overhead (e.g., J0/J1/J2 trace bytes, G1 path status byte) | ITU-T Rec. G.775, AIS/LOS | F4 and F5 fault management, loopback, and continuity check (CC) | +| VPN server layer OAM | OCh overhead (e.g., Trail Trace Identifier (TTI) used in path/section monitoring (PM/SM)) | ITU-T Rec. Y.1711, ITU-T Rec. Y.1713, MPLS, VCCV, BFD/LSP ping | SDH overhead (e.g., J0/J1/J2 trace bytes, G1 path status byte) | + +**Table III.3/Y.1314 – Peer level VPN service scenarios** + +| | IPsec VPN over the Internet | Ethernet VLAN VPN | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| VPN peer layer | IP | Ethernet | +| VPN membership discovery | Manual, NMS | Manual, NMS, RADIUS | +| CE/user authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) | IKE primary authentication (based on pre-shared keys or digital signatures), RMON, SNMP, NMS | IEEE 802.1x, RADIUS, RMON, SNMP, NMS | +| VPN peer layer routing | IGP routing protocols (e.g., ISIS, OSPF, RIP), BGP, manual, NMS | STP topology pruning and data plane address learning (transparent bridging) | +| VPN peer layer network element configuration | Configure the shared key, or request a certificate from the certification authority | Configure VLANs using manual configuration, NMS, or dynamic protocols | +| VPN peer layer OAM | IP ping, traceroute | IEEE 802.1ag, E-LMI, IEEE 802.3ah, ITU-T Rec. Y.1731 | + +# BIBLIOGRAPHY + +The indicated references are subject to revision. Users of this Recommendation are encouraged to search for the most recent edition/draft of these references. + +ATM UNI: ATM Forum UNI 4.1 (2002), "*ATM User Network Interface (UNI) Signalling Specification version 4.1*", af-sig-0061.001. + +ATM Forum PNNI 1.1 (2002), *Private Network-Network Interface Specification v.1.1*, af-pnni-0055.001. + +IEEE 802.1ad (2005, Draft 6.0), *Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks – Amendment 4: Provider Bridges*. + +IEEE 802.1ag (2005, Draft 4.1), *Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks – Amendment 5: Connectivity Fault Management*, status: PAR approved, Task Group ballot in progress. + +IEEE 802.1ah (Aug 2005, Draft 1.2), *Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks – Amendment 6: Provider Backbone Bridges*, status: PAR approved, Task Group ballot. + +IEEE 802.1Q (2005), *Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks*, status: published. + +IEEE 802.1X (2004), *Port-Based Network Access Control*, status: published. + +IEEE 802.17 (2004), *Specific requirements – Part 17: Resilient packet ring (RPR) access method and physical layer specifications*, status: published. + +IEEE 802.3ah (2004), *Specific requirements – Part 3: Carrier Sense Multiple Access With Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications Amendment: Media Access Control Parameters, Physical Layers, and Management Parameters for Subscriber Access Networks*, Ethernet in the First Mile amendment to IEEE Std 802.3. + +IETF RFC 1633 (1994), *Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an Overview*. + +IETF RFC 2205 (1997), *Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) – Version 1 Functional Specification*. + +IETF RFC 2401 (1998), *Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol*. + +IETF RFC 2409 (1998), *The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)*. + +IETF RFC 2475 (1998), *An Architecture for Differentiated Services*. + +IETF RFC 2547 (1999), *BGP/MPLS VPNs*. + +IETF RFC 3036 (2001), *LDP Specification*. + +IETF RFC 3209 (2001), *RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP Tunnels*. + +IETF draft-ietf-bfd-base-03.txt (2005), *Bidirectional Forwarding Detection*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-bfd-mpls-02.txt (2005), *BFD For MPLS LSPs*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-l2tpext-l2vpn-05.txt (2005), *L2VPN Extensions for L2TP*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-l2vpn-radius-pe-discovery-01.txt (2005), *Using RADIUS for PE-Based VPN Discovery*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-l3vpn-bgpvpn-auto-06.txt (2005), *Using BGP as an Auto-Discovery Mechanism for Network-based VPNs*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-l3vpn-rfc2547bis-03.txt (2004), *BGP/MPLS VPNs*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-mpls-lsp-ping-09.txt (2005), *Detecting MPLS Data Plane Failures*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-pwe3-control-protocol-17.txt (2005), *Pseudowire Setup and Maintenance using the Label Distribution Protocol*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-pwe3-frame-relay-05.txt (2005), *Encapsulation Methods for Transport of Frame Relay Over MPLS Networks*, work in progress. + +IETF draft-ietf-pwe3-vccv-06.txt (2005), *Pseudo Wire Virtual Circuit Connectivity Verification (VCCV)*, work in progress. + +ITU-T Recommendation E.164 (2005), *The international public telecommunication numbering plan*. + +ITU-T Recommendation E.800 (1994), *Terms and definitions related to quality of service and network performance including dependability*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.775 (1998), *Loss of Signal (LOS), Alarm Indication Signal (AIS) and Remote Defect Indication (RDI) defect detection and clearance criteria for PDH signals*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.826 (2002), *End-to-end error performance parameters and objectives for international, constant bit-rate digital paths and connections*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.827 (2003), *Availability performance parameters and objectives for end-to-end international constant bit-rate digital paths*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.1000 (2001), *Communications Quality of Service: A framework and definitions*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.1010 (2001), *End-user multimedia QoS categories*. + +ITU-T Recommendation G.7714.1/Y.1705.1 (2003), *Protocol for automatic discovery in SDH and OTN networks*. + +ITU-T Recommendation I.610 (1999), *B-ISDN operation and maintenance principles and functions*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Q.933 (2003), *ISDN Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 1 (DSS1) – Signalling specifications for frame mode switched and permanent virtual connection control and status monitoring*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Q.2931 (1995), *Digital Subscriber Signalling System No. 2 – User-Network Interface (UNI) layer 3 specification for basic call/connection control*. + +ITU-T Recommendation X.200 (1994), *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1413 (2004), *TDM-MPLS network interworking – User plane interworking*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1415 (2005), *Ethernet-MPLS network interworking – User plane interworking*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1711 (2004), *Operation & Maintenance mechanism for MPLS networks*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1713 (2004), *Misbranching detection for MPLS networks*. + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.1731 (2006), *OAM functions and mechanisms for Ethernet based networks*. + +MEF ETH OAM (2003), *Ethernet Services OAM*, Draft. + +Frame Relay Forum FRF.8 (1995), *Frame Relay/ATM PVC Service Interworking Implementation Agreement*. + + + + + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.140-200011-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.140-200011-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..49b7ee708d3aca3ff96dcc0082bd834cd8a63247 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.140-200011-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,994 @@ + + + + +ITU logo: a globe with the letters ITU inside, and a lightning bolt striking the globe. + +INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +# Y.140 + +(11/2000) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE +AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +Global information infrastructure – General + +# --- **Global Information Infrastructure (GII): Reference points for interconnection framework** + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.140 + +(Formerly CCITT Recommendation) + +--- + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE AND INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# **Global Information Infrastructure (GII): Reference points for interconnection framework** + +## **Summary** + +This Recommendation sets the scene for interconnection within the framework of the GII, a multi-operator, multi-provider and multi-vendor telecommunications environment. The significance of interconnection in particular scenarios is dealt with in Annexes A, B, C, D and E. These include PSTN/ISDN, PSTN/ISDN access network, gateway architectures, service provider access and management systems/TMN. The annexes, Appendix I and the bibliography list interconnection related Recommendations and also standards developed by other organizations cooperating with ITU. + +## **Source** + +ITU-T Recommendation Y.140 was prepared by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2001-2004) and approved under the WTSA Resolution 1 procedure on 24 November 2000. + +## **Keywords** + +Framework, global information infrastructure, interconnection, interconnection interfaces, reference points for interconnection. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications. The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +## NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementors are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database. + +© ITU 2001 + +All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and microfilm, without permission in writing from ITU. + +## CONTENTS + +| | | Page | +|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| 1 | Scope and purpose ..... | 1 | +| 2 | Terms and Definitions ..... | 1 | +| 3 | Abbreviations..... | 1 | +| 4 | References..... | 3 | +| 5 | The scene – background and relationship with the GII ..... | 3 | +| 6 | Interconnection related concepts inside and outside the ITU ..... | 6 | +| 7 | General concept of interfaces at reference points for interconnection
(interconnection interfaces) ..... | 8 | +| 8 | Classes of interface ..... | 9 | +| 9 | Organization of the annexes and the appendix ..... | 10 | +| | Annex A – PSTN/ISDN scenario..... | 10 | +| A.1 | Overview..... | 10 | +| A.2 | Applicable standards..... | 11 | +| A.3 | Reference list ..... | 11 | +| | Annex B – PSTN/ISDN Access Network scenario ..... | 12 | +| B.1 | Overview..... | 12 | +| B.2 | Applicable standards for PSTN/ISDN Access Network..... | 13 | +| B.3 | Referenced standards ..... | 13 | +| | Annex C – Service Provider Access ..... | 14 | +| C.1 | Overview..... | 14 | +| C.2 | IN-based service provider access..... | 15 | +| C.3 | Applicable standards for IN based service provider access..... | 16 | +| C.4 | Referenced standards ..... | 16 | +| | Annex D – Management systems/TMN..... | 17 | +| D.1 | Overview..... | 17 | +| D.2 | Applicable standards for management systems/TMN ..... | 18 | +| D.3 | Referenced standards ..... | 18 | +| | Annex E – General packet radio service interworking scenario ..... | 18 | +| E.1 | Overview..... | 18 | +| E.2 | Applicable standard for GPRS interworking ..... | 19 | + +| | Page | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Appendix I – Gateway architectures ..... | 19 | +| I.1 General..... | 19 | +| I.2 ETSI Gateway Architecture..... | 20 | +| I.2.1 Functional decomposition of the IP telephony application plane..... | 20 | +| I.2.2 Reference points used in scenario 1 ..... | 21 | +| I.2.3 Example implementations ..... | 22 | +| I.3 IETF Gateway Architecture (Figure I.4) ..... | 24 | +| I.4 ITU-T Architecture ..... | 25 | + +## **ITU-T Recommendation Y.140** + +# **Global Information Infrastructure (GII): reference points for interconnection framework** + +## **1 Scope and purpose** + +This Recommendation provides a pictorial overview of the role of key ITU-T Recommendations in the field of interconnection as part of the Global Information Infrastructure (GII). + +In the context of this Recommendation, the term "interconnection" is used only from the technical viewpoint to describe the technical relationship between the players in the enterprise model. It is recognized that the term interconnection also has regulatory implications and may in that context have a different scope (see e.g. [1] and [2]). + +This Recommendation is intended to be open-ended, in order to keep pace with the ongoing standards development process within the ITU. + +This Recommendation is intended to help those involved in developing the GII to discover which ITU-T Recommendations are applicable to practical cases and realistic business contexts. This Recommendation is particularly a tool to give guidance for the standardization of general network aspects and service requirements. This tool would be a basis to meet requirements for interconnection interfaces. + +It is envisaged that, among others, this Recommendation will be useful to: + +- a) equipment manufacturers; +- b) network operators; +- c) organizations involved in GII related work; +- d) regulatory authorities; +- e) service providers. + +## **2 Terms and Definitions** + +In this Recommendation, the following terms and definitions from ITU-T Y.110 are used: + +- broker; +- domain; +- player; +- role; +- segment. + +## **3 Abbreviations** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations: + +| | | +|-------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| AN | Access Network | +| ANSI | American National Standards Institute | +| BES | Back End Services | +| CAMEL | Customized Applications for Mobile (Network) Enhanced Logic | +| CCF | Call Control Function (IN) | + +| | | +|----------|-------------------------------------------------| +| CN | Customer Network | +| CORBA | Common Object Request Broker Architecture | +| DSS(1,2) | Digital Subscriber Signalling System (No. 1, 2) | +| ETSI | European Telecommunications Standards Institute | +| FAS | Frame Alignment Signal | +| GII | Global Information Infrastructure | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSM | Global System for Mobile Communications | +| IETF | Internet Engineering Task Force | +| IN | Intelligent Network | +| INAP | Intelligent Network Application Part (SS7) | +| INTI | Interconnection Interface | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network | +| ISUP | ISDN User Part (in SS7) | +| LDN | Long Distance Network | +| LN | Local Network | +| MAP | Mobile Application Part | +| MDTP | Multi-network Datagram Transmission Protocol | +| MEGACO | Media Gateway Control (IETF Working Group) | +| MG | Media Gateway | +| MGC | Media Gateway Controller | +| MGCP | Media Gateway Control Protocol | +| MT | Mobile Terminal | +| NFAS | Non-Frame Alignment Signal | +| NNI | Network-(Network) Node Interface | +| PCM | Pulse Code Modulation | +| PLMN | Public Land Mobile Network | +| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network | +| PTN(O) | Public Telecommunication Network (Operator) | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RAS | Registration, Admission and Status | +| RPI | Reference Point for Interconnection | +| RPI-N | Reference Point for Interconnection (Network) | +| RPI-S | Reference Point for Interconnection (Service) | +| RTP | Real-time Transport Protocol | +| SCF | Service Control Function (IN) | + +| | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------| +| SCGF | Service Control Gateway Function (IN) | +| SCN | Switched Circuit Network | +| SDF | Service Data Function (IN) | +| SDO | Standards Development Organization | +| SDP | Session Description Protocol | +| SG | Signalling Gateway | +| SIGTRAN | Signalling Transport (IETF Working Group) | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) | +| SP | Service Provider | +| SPA(I) | Service Provider Access (Interface) | +| SSF | Service Switching Function (IN) | +| SS7 | Signalling System No. 7 | +| TMN | Telecommunications Management Network | +| TUP | Telephone User Part (in SS7) | +| UNI | User-Network Interface | + +## 4 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. + +- ITU-T Y.101 (2000), *Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions*. +- ITU-T Y.110 (1998), *Global Information Infrastructure principles and framework architecture*. +- ITU-T Y.120 (1998), *Global Information Infrastructure scenario methodology*. + +References particularly relevant to Annexes A, B, C, D and E, and Appendix can be found in the annexes and the appendix themselves. + +## 5 The scene – background and relationship with the GII + +One of the statements of ITU-T Y.110, which is key to this Recommendation, says that the GII is based upon a seamless federation of interconnected, interoperable communication networks and information processing equipment, databases and terminals (i.e. interconnection plays an important role within the context of GII). + +It is essential that all parties who need interface standards can easily determine whether there is already one available to meet their needs. It is desirable that proprietary solutions are not invented simply because of lack of awareness of the existence of standards-based solutions. + +The GII is a wide ranging concept involving many players (network operators, service providers, manufacturers, etc.). Inevitably, components belonging to different organizations are required to be interconnected. This interconnection takes place at a *Reference Point for Interconnection* (RPI). *Reference Point* is a well-defined term in the ISDN context to separate functional groups + +(ITU-T I.411). To realize an interconnection at an RPI an *Interconnection Interface* is implemented. At one and the same RPI different types of interfaces may be possible. + +ITU-T Y.110 – GII principles and framework architecture – describes and formalizes many situations where such interfaces may arise. ITU-T Y.110 also describes the concepts of segments, roles, players, domains, etc. in terms of the telecommunications market place. + +With reference to ITU-T Y.110, Figure 1 gives an overview of the telecommunications market place that illustrates the diversity of players, roles and domains, in which *Reference Points for Interconnection* may occur. + + + +Figure 1/Y.140: Illustrative examples of Reference Points for Interconnection. The diagram is divided into two main sections by a vertical dashed line. The left section, titled 'Multiple Role, Single Player', shows a single network entity acting in multiple roles: a 'Long Distance Network' containing a 'Transit Node (Note 2)', a 'Local Network' containing a 'Local Node (Note 3)', and an 'Access Network'. The right section, titled 'Single Role, Multiple Players', shows three distinct network types: 'Other Long Distance Networks', 'Other Local Networks (Note 1)', and 'Other Access Networks (Note 1)', all connected to a 'Customer Network'. Various Conceptual Reference Points (cRPIs) are marked with circles and letters (a, b, c, d, e, q, x) at key interconnection points. Management systems like 'LDN Management', 'LN Management', 'AN Management', and 'CN Management' are shown connected to the networks via cRPI q. Service Providers (SP) and Brokers are shown connected to the networks via cRPIs a, b, c, and e. Icons of a computer, a telephone, and a mobile phone represent different service classes (SP Class 1, SP/Broker Class 2, SP/Broker Class 3). + +T1317130-00 + +— carry user plane and control plane information + +..... carry management plane information + +○ Conceptual Reference Point for Interconnection (cRPI) + +NOTE 1 – This could use, e.g. twisted pair, coaxial cable, wireless and support ATM, FR, IP, etc. + +NOTE 2 – Transit Switch and/or Router. + +NOTE 3 – Initial point of attachment (Service Node/Local Switch). + +cRPI a Point of connection of a customer to a public network + +cRPI b Initial point of connection to a switched network, i.e. to gain access to switched services + +cRPI c Point to connect an SN to other SNs or to services of the Transit Network + +cRPI d Point of interconnecting Transit Nodes + +cRPI e Point to connect an SP/broker class 2 to a (transport) network + +cRPI q Point to connect a network to its management system/TMN + +cRPI x Point to interconnect Management Systems/TMNs + +**Figure 1/Y.140 – Illustrative examples of Reference Points for Interconnection** + +RPIs can be categorized for a more detailed specification of interconnection requirements. The left hand side of Figure 1 illustrates a case where all parts of a telecommunication network are operated by a single player (single player, multiple role). In the right hand side of the figure, a telecommunication network service is provided by several operators (multiple players, single role). The application of ITU-T Recommendations in an open multi-operator multi-vendor fashion will result in the standardization of interfaces at these RPIs. + +Besides the more obvious case of network interconnection other types of "connecting to ..." or "providing access to ..." are relevant in the complex environment of the GII as well. One of these is the access of service providers (SPs) or brokers to networks or parts thereof. RPIs which may be used by SPs or brokers are also included in Figure 1. At least three classes of SPs or brokers could be distinguished. They are dealt with in Annex C in more detail together with the special case of an IN based SP access. + +In practice, some conceptual RPIs may not be provided by the player in question for interconnection to other players. The provision of actual interfaces will be determined by competitive practices and/or local regulations. + +## **6 Interconnection related concepts inside and outside the ITU** + +As specified in ITU-T Y.110, the GII is the evolutionary concept towards the infrastructure that enables people securely to use a set of communication services supporting open multitude of applications and embracing all modes of information. The GII is based upon a seamless federation of interconnected, interoperable communication networks and information processing equipment. This means that the GII should not be seen as a unique single network with one single reference configuration but as a federation of interworking networks with their own reference configurations. + +Standards and Recommendations for the GII are and will be prepared in many groups inside and outside ITU. The groups may adopt their own architectural models and interconnection interfaces. This Recommendation is intended to provide a framework model that incorporates all the individual models from the GII's point of view. It is a tool to investigate and ensure that the GII requirements are properly taken into account. The framework model is also a useful tool to study the converging aspects of evolution. + +Figure 2 describes an initial phase for the GII model. The GII platform incorporates the concepts currently under study in SDOs and standardization projects. Several current activities are based on the IP technology. The GII can be seen as a federation of classical telecommunications, broadcast and/or data networks enhanced by IP based capabilities providing additional possibilities to interconnect available communications resources. + +Standardization activities relevant to this Recommendation: + +- Voice over packet based networks; e.g. VoIP scenarios under preparation in ETSI [3]. +- Multimedia in packet based transport networks; e.g. models under preparation in ITU-T and in the IETF Transport Area. +- Interactive broadcasting (cable/terrestrial/satellite) networks, e.g. models under preparation in ITU-T and [4]. +- Cellular mobile networks (PLMNs) e.g. models for enhancements of the second generation mobile systems (e.g. GPRS) and IMT-2000. + +Available examples of reference points for interconnection: + +- Multimedia interworking gateway architectures from ETSI [3], IETF and ITU-T are contained in Appendix I. +- Architectures for interactive broadcasting and IP interworking (e.g. Multimedia Home Platform). +- Architectures for interworking between PLMNs supporting IP and IP based networks (Annex E). +- Architectures for accessing IN supported services from IP based networks. + + + +The diagram illustrates the initial model for a GII platform. At the top is an oval labeled "Applications". A vertical line connects it to a large green oval labeled "GII Platform". Inside the "GII Platform" oval are seven smaller white ovals: "IN capabilities", "Network Management", "VoIP (voice)", "Other concepts", "IMT- 2000 (mobile)", "H.323 (multimedia)", and "Set-top-box (broadcasting)". Below the "GII Platform" is a dashed oval labeled "Network interworking". Inside this dashed oval are five white ovals: "PSTN/ISDN Network", "Packet Network", "Digital Broadcasting Network", "Digital Mobile Network", and "Other Networks". Vertical lines connect the "GII Platform" to the "Network interworking" oval, with specific lines also connecting "VoIP (voice)" to "PSTN/ISDN Network", "H.323 (multimedia)" to "Packet Network", and "Set-top-box (broadcasting)" to "Digital Broadcasting Network". + +T1317140-00 + +Diagram of the initial model for a GII platform showing Applications, GII Platform (with IN capabilities, Network Management, VoIP, Other concepts, IMT-2000, H.323, Set-top-box), and Network interworking (PSTN/ISDN, Packet, Digital Broadcasting, Digital Mobile, Other Networks). + +**Figure 2/Y.140 – Initial model for a GII platform** + +## 7 General concept of interfaces at reference points for interconnection (interconnection interfaces) + +Many terms are applied to interfaces. ITU has generally and generically used the terms User-Network Interface (UNI) and Network-(Network) Node Interface (NNI) to differentiate between the interfaces at the boundary of the telecommunications domain on the one hand, and interfaces within the telecommunications domain on the other. However, with the larger scope of the GII, it is clear that the ultimate end-user may not be directly connected to a telecommunication UNI, but rather to another "local" network which is connected to the UNI. + +Another important consideration is the higher layer virtual interfaces that occur between non-adjacent network elements. In this case, it is not clear where the interface is exactly. The higher layer protocols may be observed at any number of intermediate lower layer interfaces which are normally used to carry them transparently. In this case the interface may be conceptually related to the two end points of such higher layer protocols. + +Figure 3 provides a general reference configuration for a multilayer RPI. The lower layers of an RPI shall be able to transfer transparently interconnection information of higher layers. Multi-Player independence in a multilayer service provision environment is required. + + + +The diagram illustrates a multilayer Reference Point Interface (RPI) configuration. It features two main sections: 'Higher Layers' and 'Lower Layers'. Each section contains two rectangular blocks representing the layers of a network element. The 'Higher Layers' section is connected to an oval labeled 'RPI-S component' via multiple dashed lines. The 'Lower Layers' section is connected to an oval labeled 'RPI-N component' via multiple solid lines. A vertical line connects the 'RPI-S component' to the 'RPI-N component'. Below the 'RPI-N component', a vertical line leads to the label 'INTI at an RPI'. A dashed oval encircles both the 'RPI-S component' and the 'RPI-N component'. The reference number 'T1317150-00' is located in the bottom right corner of the diagram area. + +Diagram of a multilayer RPI showing Higher Layers and Lower Layers connected to RPI-S and RPI-N components, which are then connected to an INTI at an RPI. + +**Figure 3/Y.140 – Lower and higher layers of the protocol stack associated with an INTI at an RPI** + +Figure 4 shows both adjacent and non-adjacent interfaces. These two types of interface are both called Interconnection Interfaces INTI but are differentiated as INTI at RPI-N (for Network) and INTI at RPI-S (for Service) respectively. + +A consequence of this approach is that a given interface may be considered as having two components, its own inherent RPI-N component and its RPI-S component which it carries transparently. + +In the case of an RPI-N having a real standardized interconnection interface associated with it, which carries higher layer interface protocol for an RPI-S, the provider of the interface associated with the RPI-N is not necessarily responsible for the corresponding interface associated with the RPI-S. + + + +Diagram illustrating interfaces at reference points for interconnection (interconnection interfaces). The diagram shows two User Domains (circles) connected to two Network Elements (squares). The left User Domain connects to the first Network Element via a UNI at RPI-N. The first Network Element connects to the second Network Element via an NNI at RPI-N. The second Network Element connects to the right User Domain via a UNI at RPI-N. Additionally, the second Network Element connects to a Service Provider Domain (circle) via a UNI/NNI at RPI-N. Dashed lines represent INTI at RPI-S interfaces, connecting the User Domains and the Service Provider Domain to the Network Elements. A reference point T1317160-00 is indicated at the bottom right. + +**Figure 4/Y.140 – Interfaces at reference points for interconnection +(interconnection interfaces)** + +## 8 Classes of interface + +To get access to the products and/or production and/or parts thereof, the realization of the value chain mentioned above requires providing each "production facility" with interfaces. + +From a technical point of view interconnection can take place vertically or horizontally. This has an impact on each of the market players, at least on the two on both sides of such an interface. + +Different classes of Reference Points for technical interconnection may exist, e.g.: + +- for the interconnection between two public network operators' networks; +- for the access and/or interconnection of a service provider to products of a public network operator; +- for the (access) interconnection of a private corporate network to a public network; +- for the (access) interconnection of an "end-customer" to a network and/or service. + +In order to implement these interfaces, which will form the basis of contractual arrangements, to identify the necessary products and to specify the interworking capability, a set of "essential requirements" is needed. + +Essential requirements may concern functionalities regarding: + +- integrity of networks; +- support of data transport for accounting, billing and charging; +- support of network and/or traffic management; +- service interoperability; +- reliability, etc. + +These essential requirements may be applied in different ways and depth depending on the class of interface. + +## 9 Organization of the annexes and the appendix + +The basic format of each Annex comprises a figure of the particular interconnection configuration, with identified and enumerated RPIs and/or their associated INTIs. Additionally, for each case there is a table which indicates the relevant Recommendation(s)/standards corresponding to the RPIs, and a reference list containing the full title of the indicated Recommendations/standards. + +In cases where many Recommendations and/or non-ITU-T standards apply at a particular RPI and/or INTI, only the relevant series of Recommendations and/or standards is listed. + +## ANNEX A PSTN/ISDN scenario + +### A.1 Overview + +See Figure A.1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the network architecture for PSTN and ISDN services. It shows two parallel paths for Local Networks (L1 and L2), Interexchange Networks (X1 and X2), and International Networks (I1 and I2). Each path starts with a PSTN TE and an ISDN TE connected to the Local Network via interfaces A and B. The Local Networks are interconnected via interface C. The Local Networks connect to the Interexchange Networks via interfaces D and E. The Interexchange Networks are interconnected via interface F. The Interexchange Networks connect to the International Networks via interfaces G and H. The International Networks are interconnected via interface J. The diagram is labeled T1317170-00 in the bottom right corner. + +Figure A.1/Y.140 – PSTN/ISDN scenario – Overview + +**Figure A.1/Y.140 – PSTN/ISDN scenario – Overview** + +This scenario shows: + +- a) terminal equipment for subscribers with PSTN service (PSTN TE) or ISDN service (ISDN TE) accessing the network via interfaces A and B, respectively; +- b) the local networks L1 and L2, the interexchange networks X1 and X2, and the international networks I1 and I2; +- c) the interconnection of local networks L1 and L2 via interface C; +- d) the interconnection of local network L1 with interexchange networks X1 and X2 via interfaces D and E, respectively; +- e) the interconnection of local network L2 with interexchange networks X1 and X2 via interfaces D and E, respectively; +- f) the interconnection of interexchange networks X1 and X2 via interface F; +- g) the interconnection of interexchange network X1 with international networks I1 and I2 via interfaces G and H, respectively; + +- h) the interconnection of interexchange network $X_2$ with international networks $I_1$ and $I_2$ via interfaces G and H, respectively; and +- i) the interconnection of international networks $I_1$ and $I_2$ via interface J. + +### A.2 Applicable standards + +| Interface | Applicable standard(s) | Comments | +|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------| +| | ITU-T Recommendations | | +| A | Not internationally standardized | Analogue access interface | +| B | User Plane: I.43x series of Recs
Control Plane: Q.920/Q.921
Q.930/Q.931
Q.29xx series of Recs | ISDN access interface | +| C – H, J | User Plane: G.70x series of Recs
Control Plane: Q.701-Q.704
Q.761-Q.764 | National interexchange interfaces | +| I | User Plane: G.70x series of Recs
I.5xx series of Recs (INIs)
Control Plane: Q.767
Q.701-Q.704
Q.761-Q.764 | International interexchange interface | + +### A.3 Reference list + +| | | +|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| G.703 (10/98) | Physical/electrical characteristics of hierarchical digital interfaces. | +| G.704 (10/98) | Synchronous frame structures used at 1 544, 6 312, 2 048, 8 448 and 44 736 kbit/s hierarchical levels. | +| G.706 (04/91) | Frame alignment and CRC procedures relating to basic frame structures defined in G.704. | +| G.707 (10/00) | Network node interface for the SDH. | +| G.708 (07/99) | Sub STM-0 network node interface for the SDH. | +| I.120 (03/93) | Integrated services digital networks. | +| I.121 (04/91) | Broadband aspects of ISDN. | +| I.300 series of Recs | ISDN – Overall network aspects and functions. | +| I.400 series of Recs | ISDN user-network interfaces. | +| I.500 series of Recs | Internetwork interfaces. | +| Q.600 series of Recs | Interworking of Signalling Systems. | +| Q.700 series of Recs | Specifications of Signalling System No. 7. | +| Q.920 series of Recs | Digital subscriber Signalling System No. 1 (Data link layer). | +| Q.930 series of Recs | Digital subscriber Signalling System No. 1 (Network layer). | + +Q.1200 series of Recs Intelligent network. + Q.2000 series of Recs B-ISDN signalling. + +## ANNEX B + +### PSTN/ISDN Access Network scenario + +### B.1 Overview + +See Figure B.1. + + + +Figure B.1/Y.140 – PSTN/ISDN Access Network scenario – Overview. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a PSTN/ISDN Access Network. On the left, two external entities, 'PSTN TE' and 'ISDN TE', are connected to the network at points A and B respectively. These connections are labeled 'UNI' (User Network Interface). The network itself is enclosed in a dashed box labeled 'Local Network'. Inside this box, the 'Access Network' is shown as a central functional entity. It connects to a 'Service Node' on the right. The interface between the Access Network and the Service Node is labeled 'INTI at RPI V' (Internal Network Interface at Reference Point V). Above the Access Network, a 'TMN (LN)' (Telecommunications Management Network / Local Network) is shown, containing an 'LN Operations System' connected to a 'Q3' interface. The Service Node is also connected to two external points, C and D. The reference 'T1317180-00' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure B.1/Y.140 – PSTN/ISDN Access Network scenario – Overview** + +In the scenario shown in Figure B.1, the Access Network is a functional entity that, in simple terms, allows the transfer of user and signalling information between a variety of analogue and digital subscriber line systems on the one hand and a service node (e.g. a local exchange), on the other, over a common standardized digital interface at the Reference Point V. Such an Access Network is described in ITU-T G.902 *Framework Recommendation on functional access networks (AN) – Architecture and functions, access types, management and service node aspects*. Important features characterizing an AN according to ITU-T G.902 are multiplexing and/or concentrating of bearer channels. + +For the sake of consistency with Figure 1, Figure B.1 also shows the network management system/TMN controlling the Local Network. In the case shown, it is assumed that the Local Network belongs to a single operator and therefore only one single management system is needed. If AN and SN belong to different operators and are managed separately, their respective management systems need to be interconnected via an X interface. This case is dealt with in Annex E. + +Well-known examples of interfaces at RPI V in accordance with ITU-T G.902 are V5.1 (ITU-T G.964) and V5.2 (ITU-T G.965). The main functions of the Access Network are: + +- to extract call control (signalling) information arriving from a terminal and embedding it in a standard V5 envelope for transmission to the Service Node; + +- to extract call control information arriving from the Service Node in a standard envelope and transferring it to the terminal using the applicable subscriber line protocol; +- to perform where applicable, i.e. in the case of communication with analogue terminals, analogue to digital or digital to analogue conversion of user information; and +- to provide certain system management functions to coordinate the provisioning, operation and maintenance of the user and service node access ports and to communicate with Telecommunication Management Network functions over a standard Q3 interface at Reference Point q. + +The Access Network is transparent to user and signalling information (including the transfer of tones and announcements between a user terminal and the service node) and does not encompass any call control functions. + +Further examples of Reference Points for such interfaces at RPI V are VB5.1 (ITU-T G.967.1) and VB5.2 (ITU-T G.967.2), designed for the support of ATM based broadband access networks. + +### B.2 Applicable standards for PSTN/ISDN Access Network + +| Interface | Applicable standard(s) | Comments | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | ITU-T Recommendations | | +| A | Not internationally standardized | Analogue access interface
Digital Transmission | +| B | User plane: I.43x series of Recs
Control Plane: Q.92x, Q.93x, Q.29xx series of Recs | ISDN access interface | +| C, D | User Plane: G.70x series of Recs
Control Plane: Q.701-Q.704
Q.761-Q.764 | National interexchange interfaces | +| V | G.964
G.965
G.967.1
G.967.2 | V5.1 interface
V5.2 interface
VB5.1 Reference Point
VB5.2 Reference Point | +| Q3 | M.3600 series of Recs (ISDN mgmt.), Q.800 series of Recs, X.700 series of Recs. | | + +### B.3 Referenced standards + +For the standards quoted against Interfaces B, C and D see Annex A. + +| | | +|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| G.902 (11/95) | Framework Recommendation on functional access networks (AN) – Architecture and functions, access types, management and service node aspects. | +| G.964 (07/94) | V-Interfaces at the digital local exchange (LE) – V5.1-interface (based on 2 048 kbit/s) for the support of access network (AN). | +| G.965 (03/95) | V-Interfaces at the digital local exchange (LE) – V5.2-interface (based on 2 048 kbit/s) for the support of access network (AN). | +| G.967.1 (06/98) | VB5.1 reference point specification. | +| G.967.2 (02/99) | VB5.2 reference point specification. | +| M.3000 series of Recs | TMN Recommendations. | + +| | | +|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M.3600 series of Recs | Principles for the management of ISDNs. | +| Q.800 series of Recs | Q3 and X interfaces. | +| Q.811 (06/97) | Lower layer protocol profiles for the Q3 and X interfaces. | +| Q.812 (06/97) | Upper layer protocol profiles for the Q3 and X interfaces. | +| X.700 series of Recs | Management framework for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) for CCITT applications. | + +## ANNEX C + +### Service Provider Access + +### C.1 Overview + +A variety of interfaces exist within public telecommunication networks (PTNs), between them and for accessing them. The specification of intra and inter-working interfaces and a service provider access interface (SPAI) is important to both PTN operators (PTNOs) and Service Providers (SPs), who desire a maximum flexibility in the deployment of new technology and introduction of new services. Intra-network interfaces are regularly under the control and operation of PTNOs and are an integral part of their network architecture. Inter-network interfaces are used nationally and internationally between the networks of different PTNOs. + +At present there are no standardized interfaces between SP and PTNO domains to enable SP access requirements to be satisfied. + +Service providers may need access to control plane functions and optionally also to user plane functions of the PTNs. Moreover, management plane functions may be needed. + +At least three classes of SPs or brokers could be distinguished: + +SP Class 1: An SP is connected to the network like a "normal" end-user, but offering a service to the public, e.g. video on demand. + +Function: The SP offers his service using only network transport functions like it is the case for normal telephone calls, fax, etc. The billing and service control functions will be handled directly by the terminal equipment after the call (transport route) has been established. + +SP/Broker Class 2: An SP uses a "special access" using some control functions of the network. + +Function: This could also be, for example, a video-on-demand service but the provider has access to some network functions, e.g. reservation of transport capacity, billing via the original network provider (facility provider). + +SP/Broker Class 3: An SP has access to some network internal functions, e.g. for third party billing, directory services, etc. + +Function: To interact with a customer this SP does not necessarily make use of the transport facilities but will offer a service, e.g. for third party billing or directory answers. For this function he may need to get access to internal network data or functions only without using the "normal" telecommunication transport facilities. + +### C.2 IN-based service provider access + +An example of particular importance is the case of an SP who wants to make use of network intelligence which is under the control of a PTNO. Such a scenario is shown in Figure C.1. The figure illustrates how a customer – connected to a network via a UNI – cannot only make use of IN functions located in the network he is connected to, but also of additional ones provided by an external SP. The interconnection of IN functions belonging to the SP and those belonging to the PTN is performed by means of an SPAI. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture for IN-based service provider access. At the top, the 'Service Provider Domain' contains 'IN functions'. Below this, three networks are shown: 'Network A', 'Transit Network', and 'Network B'. Each of these networks contains its own 'IN functions'. 'Network A' is connected to 'CPE A' via a 'UNI' (User Network Interface). 'Network B' is connected to 'CPE B' via a 'UNI'. The 'Service Provider Domain' is connected to each of the three networks (Network A, Transit Network, and Network B) through a 'SPAI' (Service Provider Access Interface). A legend at the bottom left defines the abbreviations: CPE (Customer Premises Equipment), IN (Intelligent Network), SPAI (Service Provider Access Interface), and UNI (User Network Interface). The reference 'T1317190-00' is located at the bottom right of the diagram area. + +CPE Customer Premises Equipment +IN Intelligent Network +SPAI Service Provider Access Interface +UNI User Network Interface + +T1317190-00 + +Diagram of IN-based service provider access architecture. + +**Figure C.1/Y.140 – IN-based service provider access** + +RPIs at which an SPAI can be implemented are depicted in Figure C.2. The figure shows IN functions in both the network operator's domain and the SP's domain which can be interconnected to provide IN services to customers. The design of a particular SPAI depends on the service capability requirements. Supporting protocols could be, e.g. enhanced versions of DSS1; TUP or ISUP over SS7; INAP, MAP, and CAMEL over SS7 or TCP/IP. + +The IN functions CCF, SSF, SCF, SDF are described in the ITU-T Q.1200 series of Recommendations. + +The service control gateway function (SCGF) performs, for example: + +- screening and filtering of messages and message parameters across the interface; +- mapping of messages and parameters; +- collection of usage information. + + + +Network Operator's domainService Provider's domain + +The diagram illustrates functional entities (circles) in both domains connected via reference points (small circles on a vertical line). In the Network Operator's domain, entities include SCGF, SCF, and SSF/CCF. In the Service Provider's domain, entities include SCF, SCGF, SDF, and SSF/CCF. Lines indicate logical connections between these entities across the domain boundary. + +○ Reference Point for Interconnection +Intelligent Network (IN) functions: +CCF Call Control Function +SCF Service Control Function +SCGF Service Control Gateway Function +SDF Service Data Function +SSF Service Switching Function + +T1317200-00 + +Diagram showing possible IN based service provider access configurations between Network Operator's domain and Service Provider's domain. A vertical line separates the two domains. Interconnection points are marked with small circles on this line. Various functional entities like SCGF, SCF, SSF/CCF, and SDF are connected across this boundary. + +**Figure C.2/Y.140 – Possible IN based service provider access configurations** + +### C.3 Applicable standards for IN based service provider access + +| Interface | Applicable standard(s) | Comments | +|-----------|----------------------------------------------|----------| +| | ITU-T Recommendations | | +| SPAI | Q.1200 series of Rec. ETSI EG 201 722 V1.2.1 | | + +### C.4 Referenced standards + +| | | +|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Q.1200 series of Recs | Intelligent Network (IN). | +| ETSI EG 201 722 V1.2.1 | IN; Service provider access requirements; Enhanced telephony services. | + +## ANNEX D + +### Management systems/TMN + +### D.1 Overview + +The scene for management systems/TMN is set by ITU-T M.3010 *Principles for a TMN* and M.3013 *Considerations for a TMN*. The latter includes management aspects of IP-based networks. + +The connection of a network/network element to its Operations System takes place at Reference Point q. A corresponding interface is Q3. + +For the interconnection of different management systems – or more specifically their respective Operations Systems – Reference Point x is defined. Due to the potential mutual impact of each of the interconnected networks/network elements involved security aspects are of particular importance when implementing X interfaces at RPI x, i.e. a powerful firewall functionality required. + +Management systems/TMNs can be interconnected on various levels ranging from element management via network management to service management. Even interconnection from one level of management of a first TMN to a different level of a second TMN is possible. + +Though many standards in the field of management systems exist and solutions based on [5] are being considered, it should be noted that fully standardized X interfaces are not available. + + + +The diagram illustrates two network elements, 'Network/ Network Element A' and 'Network/ Network Element B', connected to a single 'TMN' (Telecommunications Management Network). The TMN is represented by a dashed rectangular box containing an 'Operations System' box. Each network element is connected to the TMN via a 'Q3' interface, shown as a black circle with a horizontal line. A horizontal line connects the two network elements. The reference 'T1317210-00' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram of two network elements sharing a common TMN. + +**Figure D.1/Y.140 – Networks/network elements with a common management system** + + + +The diagram shows two separate management systems, 'TMN A' and 'TMN B', each enclosed in a dashed box. TMN A contains an 'Operations System A' box connected to a 'Q3' interface (black circle with a horizontal line), which is in turn connected to 'Network/ Network Element A'. TMN B contains an 'Operations System B' box connected to a 'Q3' interface, which is connected to 'Network/ Network Element B'. The two network elements are connected by a horizontal line. An 'X' interface, represented by a black circle with a vertical line, connects the 'Operations System A' box to the 'Operations System B' box. The reference 'T1317220-00' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram of two separate TMNs connected via an X interface. + +**Figure D.2/Y.140 – Networks/network elements with separate management systems** + +Figures D.1 and D.2 above cover two cases of practical significance: + +- a single common management system which controls more than one network/network element; and +- separate management systems for each of the networks/network elements under consideration. + +An example where "Network A" is an access network and "Network Element B" is a service node is dealt with in ITU-T G.902, the common management system which is used in Annex B. + +### D.2 Applicable standards for management systems/TMN + +| Interface | Applicable Standard(s) | Comments | +|-----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------| +| | ITU-T Recommendations | | +| Q3, X | M.3000 series of Recs | | +| Q3, X | X.700 series of Recs | | +| X | M.3320; Q.811, Q.812 | | +| Q3 | M.3600 series of Recs, Q.800 series of Recs, X.700 series of Recs | | + +### D.3 Referenced standards + +| | | +|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| M.3000 series of Recs | TMN Recommendations. | +| M.3320 (04/97) | Management requirements framework for the TMN X interface. | +| M.3600 series of Recs | Principles for the management of ISDNs. | +| Q.800 series of Recs | Q3 and X interfaces. | +| Q.811 (06/97) | Lower layer protocol profiles for the Q3 and X interfaces. | +| Q.812 (06/97) | Upper layer protocol profiles for the Q3 and X interfaces. | +| X.700 series of Recs | Management framework for Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) for CCITT applications. | + +## ANNEX E + +### General packet radio service interworking scenario + +### E.1 Overview + +Interworking for GSM General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) is specified in ETSI TS 101 348 V7.2.0. Interconnection to external IP networks takes place at Reference Point Gi and interworking between GSM GPRS networks takes place at Reference Point Gp. + +Gi is a Reference Point between gateway node GGSN (Gateway GPRS Support Node) and an external IP network. From the external IP network's point of view, the GGSN is seen as a normal IP router. + +Gp is a Reference Point between two GPRS Support Nodes in different PLMNs. Interworking through Gp provides a support of roaming GPRS subscribers. See Figure E.1. + + + +Figure E.1/Y.140 – GPRS access interfaces and reference points. The diagram shows a Mobile Station (dashed box) containing Terminal Equipment and a Mobile Terminal connected via reference point R. The Mobile Terminal connects to the Um interface of GSM GPRS Network 1. GSM GPRS Network 1 connects to GSM GPRS Network 2 via reference point Gp. GSM GPRS Network 1 also connects to IP or other Networks via reference point Gi. Reference T1317230-00 is noted at the bottom right. + +**Figure E.1/Y.140 – GPRS access interfaces and reference points** + +### E.2 Applicable standard for GPRS interworking + +ETSI TS 101 348 V7.2.0 Digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2+); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting GPRS and Packet Data Networks (PDN). + +## APPENDIX I + +### Gateway architectures + +### I.1 General + +Interworking between non-IP and IP-based telecommunications domains is performed by interworking functions. The corresponding interworking units contain gateways. Architectures of such gateways developed in ETSI [3], by the IETF and within ITU-T are described below. See Figure I.1. + + + +Figure I.1/Y.140 – Generic configuration for interworking between non-IP and IP-based telecommunications domains. The diagram shows three main components: Non-IP Telecommunications Domain, Interworking Unit, and IP-based Telecommunications Domain. Between Non-IP and Interworking Unit, and between Interworking Unit and IP-based, there are four horizontal layers: Management (dashed line), Control, User, and information. The Interworking Unit is a central box connecting these domains. + +T1317240-00 + +NOTE 1 – Two different cases may be identified. One, where service interworking is taking place, and the other where a single seamless service is being provided. + +NOTE 2 – The definition of reference points does not necessarily imply the provision of a physical interface. + +NOTE 3 – Where separate physical interfaces are involved, they do not necessarily imply the use of completely different protocols. A given protocol may be applicable to a number of cases. + +**Figure I.1/Y.140 – Generic configuration for interworking between non-IP and IP-based telecommunications domains** + +### I.2 ETSI Gateway Architecture + +According to ETSI Technical Report TR 101 300, four scenarios can be distinguished when connecting non-IP based to IP-based terminals/users. + +**Scenario 1:** communication between IP network based users and Switched Circuit Network (SCN) based users in which the call setup is originated by the IP network user. + +**Scenario 2:** communication between IP network based users and SCN based users in which the call setup is originated by the SCN based user. + +**Scenario 3:** communication between SCN based users using IP based networks for the connection/trunking between the users involved. + +**Scenario 4:** communication between IP network based users using SCNs for the connection/trunking between the users involved. + +In the Technical Specification ETSI TS 101 314 Reference Configurations and Reference Points for scenarios 1 to 4 are described. As an example, the configuration for scenario 1 is shown in Figure I.2. + +#### I.2.1 Functional decomposition of the IP telephony application plane + +The architecture for the IP telephony application plane consists of functional entities organized into functional layers. One functional layer builds upon functionality provided by another functional layer. Together they provide the telephony application. This grouping is useful for the *understanding* of the functionality involved but does not imply any physical implementation. There are information flows between the functional entities. Information flows may be: + +- between functional entities in the same functional layer; +- between a functional entity in one functional layer and a functional entity in the next functional layer upwards; and +- between a functional entity in one functional layer and a functional entity in the next functional layer downwards. + +A functional entity may have one or more of these types of information flow. + +There are information flows between functional entities in the IP Telephony Application plane and the other functional planes. + +Where it can be determined that there is a requirement for a physical interface between entities residing in separate pieces of physical equipment, a reference point will be defined. One reference point may encompass multiple distinctive information flows. + +A standardized protocol will be required to support information flows in cases where a reference point is defined. + +The TIPHON functional architecture has 5 functional layers: the service functional layer, the service control functional layer, the call control functional layer, the bearer control functional layer and the media functional layer. A detailed description of the various functional layers can be found in TS 101 314, section 8.1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the ETSI TIPHON Reference Configuration for scenario 1, organized into five functional groups (FG) and five service layers. + +- Functional Groups (FG):** + - Originating Terminal FG + - Originating Network FG + - Intermediate Network FG + - Terminating Network FG + - Terminating Gateway FG +- Service Layers:** + - Service:** Contains Service Profile, User Profile, and Route. + - Service Control:** Contains Registration and SC. + - Call Control:** Contains CC. + - Bearer Control:** Contains BC. + - Media Control:** Contains MC. +- Interactions:** + - S1:** Between Service Profile and Registration. + - S2:** Between User Profile and SC. + - S3:** Between Route and SC. + - SC1:** Between Registration and CC. + - SC2:** Between SC and CC. + - SC3:** Between SC and CC. + - C1, C2, C3:** Between CC and BC. + - N1, N2, N3:** Between BC and MC. + - M1, M2, M3:** Between MC and the IP Transport Plane. + - T1, T2, T3:** Between MC and the IP Transport Plane. +- IP Transport Plane:** A horizontal bar at the bottom representing the transport layer. + +ETSI TIPHON Reference Configuration for scenario 1 diagram showing functional groups and their interactions. + +T1318040-01 + +FG Functional Grouping + +**Figure I.2/Y.140 – ETSI TIPHON Reference Configuration for scenario 1** + +#### I.2.2 Reference points used in scenario 1 + +##### SC-Service reference points + +**S1:** Information flows at S1 provide the capability to store, retrieve and delete the registration ticket. + +**S2:** Information flows at S2 provide the capability to get and set properties in the User Profile. For the purposes of: User authentication, User authorization, Call routing, User preferences, Allowed services and service options. + +**S3:** Information flows at S3 provide the capability to get call routing information and address translation. + +##### SC-SC reference points (see Figure I.3) + +**R1:** Information flows at R1 provide the capability required for a user to register with the Serving IPTN. They provide the capability to convey users ID, terminal ID, terminal capabilities, etc. + +**R2:** Information flows at R2 provide the capability so that networks can exchange user registration and information related to user profile and subscription. + +##### CC-SC reference points + +**SC1:** Information flows at SC1 provide the capability to get a ticket on an existing registration session. + +**SC2:** Information flows at SC2 provide the capability to answer queries to the user profile. + +**SC3:** Information flows at SC3 provide the capability to answer access and routing requests for calls in the context of Network Functional Groupings. Input information may include called address/name, caller, calling domain. Output information may include next-hop address, preferences and constraints for the call parameters. + +##### **CC/BC-CC/BC reference points** + +**C1:** Information flows at C1 provide the capability to establish, modify and terminate both calls and bearers to and from the terminal. + +**C2:** Information flows at C2 provide the capability to establish, modify and terminate both calls and bearers between non-terminal functional groupings. + +**C3:** Information flows at C3 provide the capability to establish, modify and terminate calls and connections between non-terminal functional groupings using an SCN. + +##### **MC-BC reference points** + +**N1:** Information flows at N1 provide the capability to request, modify and delete media paths for the creation of a bearer in the context of Terminal Functional Grouping. + +**N2:** Information flows at N2 provide the capability to request, modify and delete media paths for the creation of a bearer and provides the capability to control an insertion of information (e.g. tones and announcements) into media flows in the context of Network Functional Grouping. + +**N3:** Information flows at N3 provide the capability to request, modify and delete media paths for the creation of a bearer in the context of Gateway Functional Grouping. + +##### **MC-MC reference points** + +**M1:** Information flows at M1 provide the capability to carry media flows between the terminal and the IPN. + +**M2:** Information flows at M2 provide the capability to carry media flows over the IPN. + +**M3:** Information flows at M3 provide the capability to carry media flows over the SCN. + +##### **TR-MC reference points** + +**T1:** Information flows at T1 provide the capability to permit, modify and inhibit transport capabilities for the terminal, including Quality of Service, for the creation of a media flow. + +**T2:** Information flows at T2 provide the capability to permit, modify and inhibit transport capabilities for the IPTN, including Quality of Service, for the creation of a media flow. + +**T3:** Information flows at T3 provide the capability to permit, modify and inhibit transport capabilities for the SCN, including Quality of Service, for the creation of a media flow. + +#### **I.2.3 Example implementations** + +Examples of implementations according to ITU-T H.323, IETF SIP, BICC and IN respectively are described in informative Annexes C to F of TS 101 314. + +To indicate the relationship with the Reference Points given in I.2.2 above, one of these examples, an H.323 implementation, is shown in Figure I.3. + + + +T1318050-01 + +Figure I.3/Y.140: Mapping of the ETSI TIPHON Reference Points to a H.323 based architecture. The diagram shows a network architecture with a User profile and Back end routing function at the top. Below them are two Gatekeeper entities connected by R2 and C2. A Terminal is connected to the left Gatekeeper via R1 and C1. The Terminal is also connected to a Media Gateway Control (MGC) and a Media Gateway (MG) via M1 and T2. The MGC is connected to the right Gatekeeper via C2 and to the MG via N3. The MG is connected to a Signalling Gateway (SGW) via M3. The SGW is connected to a Switched Circuit Network (SCN) via C3. The entire architecture is mapped to an IP transport plane at the bottom. Reference points T1, T2, T3, M1, M3, C1, C2, C3, R1, R2, S2, SC2, and N3 are labeled throughout the diagram. + +**Figure I.3/Y.140 – Mapping of the ETSI TIPHON Reference Points to a H.323 based architecture** + +#### Relevant standards + +| | | +|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TR 101 300 V2.1.1 (10/99) | Description of Technical Issues. | +| TR 101 306 V1.2.3 (02/98) | Requirements for Service Interoperability – Scenario 1. | +| TR 101 307 V2.2.2 (03/99) | Requirements for Service Interoperability – Phase 2. | +| TS 101 312 V1.3.2 (06/98) | Network architecture and reference configurations – Scenario 1. | +| TS 101 313 V0.4.2 (02/99) | Network architecture and reference configurations – Phase II: Scenarios 1 + 2. | +| TS 101 314 V1.1.1 (09/2000) | Network architecture and reference configurations – TIPHON Release 2. | +| TS 101 316 V1.1.1 (04/99) | Requirements for a protocol at reference point N; Media gateway controller to media gateway. | +| TS 101 315 V0.3.3 (Draft) | TIPHON Release 3; Information Flow and Reference Points Definition; For application of TIPHON functional architecture to inter-domain services. | +| TS 101 318 V1.1.1 (08/98) | Using GSM Speech Codecs within H.323. | +| TS 101 319 V1.6.4 (12/98) | Signalling for basic calls from an H.323 terminal to a terminal in a Switched-Circuit Network (SCN). | +| TS 101 321 V1.4.2 (12/98) | Inter-domain pricing, authorization and usage exchange. | + +| | | +|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TS 101 322 V1.0.0 (07/99) | Signalling for basic calls and inter-domain calls, between an H.323 terminal and a terminal in a Switched-Circuit Network (SCN) – Phase II: Scenarios 1 + 2. | +| TS 101 323 V1.2.3 (07/99) | Interoperable security profiles. | +| TS 101 324 V2.1.1 (11/99) | Numbering; Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 4. | +| TR 101 326 V1.1.1 (09/2000) | The procedure for determining IP addresses for routing packets on interconnected IP networks that support public telephony. | +| TS 101 327 V1.1.1 (11/99) | Guide to numbering options for public networks based on VoIP technology. | +| TR 101 329 V2.1.1 (06/99) | General aspects of Quality of Service (QoS). | +| TR 101 334 V3.1.1 (01/2000) | Verification, Demonstration and Interoperability (VDI) activities. | +| TR 101 338 (01/2000) | Analysis of existing roaming techniques applicable to TIPHON mobility services. | +| DTR, DTS/TIPHON-07 series | Mobile aspects. | +| DTR, DTS/TIPHON-08 series | Security aspects. | + +### I.3 IETF Gateway Architecture (Figure I.4) + +The IETF does not mandate the use of H.323. The IETF have other solutions defined for use over the Internet, such as Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP) for IP telephony. ITU-T and the IETF MEGACO Working Group have specified the Media Gateway Control Protocol (MEGACO, IETF RFC 2885) for the interface N3. ITU-T has approved ITU-T H.248, which is identical to IETF RFC 2885. The result of this successful joint ITU-T/IETF effort is referred to as MEGACO/H.248. The IETF has also developed a protocol set for transporting telephony-based signalling over an IP Network (by a working group known as SIGTRAN). + + + +``` + +graph TD + ISUP_SG[ISUP SG] --- SS7_ISUP[SS7 ISUP] --- CS[Circuit Switch] + CS --- Trunks --- MG[MG] + ISUP_SG --- SIGTRAN1["(SIGTRAN)"] --- MGC[MGC] + MGC --- MGC_P["MGC"] --- MG + MGC --- SIGTRAN2["(SIGTRAN), H.323, SIP"] --- IP_Net[ ] + MG --- MEGACO_H248["MEGACO/H.248"] --- MGC + MG --- RTP --- IP_Net + style IP_Net fill:none,stroke:none + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the IETF Gateway Architecture. It shows a Circuit Switch connected to an ISUP SG via SS7 ISUP. The Circuit Switch is also connected to a Media Gateway (MG) via Trunks. The ISUP SG is connected to a Media Gateway Control (MGC) via (SIGTRAN). The MGC is connected to the MG via MGC. The MGC is also connected to an external network via (SIGTRAN), H.323, SIP. The MG is connected to the external network via RTP. The MGC is also connected to the MG via MEGACO/H.248. + +Figure I.4/Y.140 – IETF Gateway Architecture diagram showing the connection between ISUP SG, Circuit Switch, MGC, MG, and various protocols like SS7 ISUP, (SIGTRAN), H.323, SIP, MGC, MEGACO/H.248, RTP, and Trunks. + +**Figure I.4/Y.140 – IETF Gateway Architecture** + +### Relevant standards + +| | | +|---------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| IETF RFC 2543 | (SIP): Session Initiation Protocol | +| IETF RFC 2327 | SDP: Session Description Protocol. | +| IETF RFC 0791 | Internet Protocol. | +| IETF RFC 1883 | Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) specification. | +| IETF RFC 1889 | RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications. | +| IETF RFC 2885 | Megaco Protocol 0.8. F. Cuervo, C. Huitema, A. Rayhan, B. Rosen, J. Segers. August 2000. | + +### I.4 ITU-T Architecture + +ITU-T has also developed a Gateway Reference Architecture along the same lines as the ETSI model. It is a functional architecture and has been added to H.323 Version 4. It is provided for information in Figure I.5. + + + +The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a decomposed gateway. It features several interconnected functional blocks represented by ovals: + +- RAS Signalling Termination**: Connected to the **High Layer Resource Control** block via an unlabeled line. +- H.245 Signalling Termination**: Connected to the **High Layer Resource Control** block via interface **B1**. It also has an external **X** interface on its left. +- H.225.0 Signalling Termination**: Connected to the **High Layer Resource Control** block via interface **B2**. It also has an external **X** interface on its left. +- High Layer Resource Control**: The central control block, connected to **Low Layer Resource Control** via interface **A**. It is also connected to **SCN Signalling Termination** via interface **C**. +- Low Layer Resource Control**: Connected to **Packet and Circuit Media Termination** via an unlabeled line. +- SCN Signalling Termination**: Connected to **SCN Signalling Transport Termination** via interface **D**. +- SCN Signalling Transport Termination**: Has an external **Z** interface on its right. +- Packet and Circuit Media Termination**: Has an external **Y** interface on its left and an external **Z** interface on its right. + +External interfaces are labeled **X**, **Y**, and **Z**. Internal interfaces between blocks are labeled **A**, **B1**, **B2**, **C**, and **D**. + +T1317270-00 + +Functional architecture of the decomposed gateway diagram + +**Figure I.5/Y.140 – Functional architecture of the decomposed gateway** + +NOTE – Figure I.5 does not represent a physical decomposition at this stage. The challenge for Gateway vendors is to group these components into physical devices and implement the associated interfaces in order to produce highly scalable, multi-vendor H.323 Gateways. The X interface is the external H.323 interface, the Y interface is the external packet media interface (i.e. RTP) and the Z interface is the external SCN interface. Refer to ITU-T H.323 for examples on how these components can be grouped into physical entities. + +### Relevant standards + +| | | +|--------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| H.200 and H.300 series of Recs | Infrastructure for audiovisual services. | +| G.711 (11/88) | Pulse code modulation (PCM) of voice frequencies. | +| G.720 series of Recs | Coding of analogue signals by methods other than PCM. | +| Y.1001 (11/2000) | IP framework – A framework for convergence of telecommunication network and IP network technologies. | +| Y.1401 (10/2000) | General requirements for interworking with IP based networks. | + +## Bibliography + +- [1] World Trade Organization's "Agreement on Basic Telecommunications" of 15 February 1997. +- [2] Directive 97/33/EC on "Interconnection in Telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through application of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP)" of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997. +- [3] ETSI Project TIPHON Telecommunications and Internet Protocol Harmonization over Networks. +- [4] DVB Digital Video Broadcasting Forum. +- [5] CORBA *Common Object Request Broker Architecture*, developed by the Object Management Group OMG. + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series B | Means of expression: definitions, symbols, classification | +| Series C | General telecommunication statistics | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | TMN and network maintenance: international transmission systems, telephone circuits, telegraphy, facsimile and leased circuits | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks and open system communications | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure and Internet protocol aspects | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a3dc41dc3df86ea68d266af2bf95cf5b_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a3dc41dc3df86ea68d266af2bf95cf5b_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0fa963bec6b0e522cab101eb8a1f28ac77620ad4 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a3dc41dc3df86ea68d266af2bf95cf5b_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:b5f9bb4f90651fcdee8273d661b94cfc4514fd6b63db75ca7dc6504e09a04ccf +size 4096 diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e0cb7b65d2e8ea2dc199a63d1274d2fc21e1f346 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/a5ee5c23b6dc52ec1d724b76d5a5f58f_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:bf7e82cfa2007b1892b54f58f030f47703d21a22c29c533a3040d1110670c204 +size 63035 diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..dfa76245c7b3de01141d167e4b2d3c3133d3f5ee --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1545-201305-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,456 @@ + + +I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n + +**ITU-T** + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +**Y.1545** + +(05/2013) + +SERIES Y: INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, +INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- +GENERATION NETWORKS + +Internet protocol aspects – Quality of service and network +performance + +# --- **Roadmap for the quality of service of interconnected networks that use the Internet protocol** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545 + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +## **Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545** + +# **Roadmap for the quality of service of interconnected networks that use the Internet Protocol** + +## **Summary** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1545 is intended as a guide to help regulators and network service providers meet QoS performance objectives. + +Traditional packet networks have been built under the principle that networks will operate on the basis of an unguaranteed best-effort packet delivery. The best effort paradigm has been spectacularly successful in supporting non-real-time data applications (e.g., email and file transfer); this principle assigns the responsibility for detecting and correcting transmission problems to the customer equipment and higher-level protocols that require better network support. + +However, the best-effort delivery principle does not provide a reliable quality of user experience in interactive voice telephony and other demanding real-time applications when network bandwidth limitations increase considerably delay, jitter and packet loss. These applications work best across networks that can deliver "better than best-effort" performance for various characteristics. + +## **History** + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.1545 | 2013-05-14 | 12 | + +## **Keywords** + +Network service provider, NSP, quality of service, QoS, QoS classes. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +## NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at
video teleconference (VTC) | $\leq 100$ ms | $\leq 50$ ms | $\leq 10^{-3}$ | PSTN-quality VoIP (or voice telephony)
Real-time, jitter sensitive, high interaction | +| Class 1 | Voice over IP (VoIP)
video teleconference (VTC) | $\leq 400$ ms | $\leq 50$ ms | $\leq 10^{-3}$ | Satellite-quality VoIP
Real-time, jitter sensitive, interactive | +| Class 2 | Transaction data | $\leq 100$ ms | U | $\leq 10^{-3}$ | Signalling
Highly interactive | +| Class 3 | Transaction data | $\leq 400$ ms | U | $\leq 10^{-3}$ | Business data (e.g., e-banking)
Interactive | + +**Table 1 – QoS classes of packet networks [ITU-T Y.1541]** + +| QoS Class | Applications | Network performance parameter | | | Comments | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|------|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| | | IPTD | IPDV | IPLR | | +| Class 4 | Video streaming | $\leq 1$ s | U | $\leq 10^{-3}$ | File transfer
Low loss only (short transactions) | +| Class 5 | Traditional applications of default IP networks | U | U | U | Best effort | +| NOTE – U means "unspecified" or "unbounded". For more information, see [ITU-T Y.1541]. | | | | | | + +## 7.3 Packet marking + +- A single NNI or UNI may carry traffic from several applications, intended for multiple packet network QoS classes. In order for the receiving network to apply the appropriate treatment to each packet in accordance with the desired packet network QoS class, the packets shall be marked in an appropriate way by the sender. Refer to Table I.1 for more information on packet marking. +- The QoS class agreements should be implemented by associating packet markings (e.g., type of service precedence bits or differentiated service code point) with a specific QoS class. + +## 7.4 Packet handling + +- When a packet is received for a supported packet network QoS class, the receiving network provider shall transport it according to the service level agreement it has established with the sender network provider. When multiple network sections are present in a UNI-to-UNI path, the transfer capacities available for each QoS class at the point of NNI should be considered and agreed upon between all network providers in the path. +- When a received packet is marked for a packet network QoS class that is not supported within the sender's service agreement with the receiving network service provider, then the receiving network provider should carry the received packet in another agreed class but with the sender's marking preserved. +- To avoid packet re-ordering, it is recommended that packets belonging to the same flow should be allocated to the same packet network QoS class and given the same treatment in network queues. + +## 7.5 Network performance + +A network service provider should state what the performance objectives of a packet service across their network are, using the metrics in clause 7.2, for each QoS class offered. + +## 7.6 Performance measurement + +The purpose of performance measurement of QoS parameters is to ensure that the performance objectives are achieved. + +#### **7.6.1 Performance measurement of traffic (or test traffic)** + +- When verifying performance of an end-user's service, measurement using probing packets is typically appropriate. +- Probing packets should be generated only for each packet network QoS class contracted to be carried for the end-user by the NSP. +- Traffic performance is verified by measuring the performance parameters of a population of packets as they cross one or more network sections. +- Probing packets for each packet network QoS class should be evenly distributed throughout the test packets of a population [IETF RFC 3432]. +- Probing packets should traverse the same path as the user's packets that have the same packet network QoS class. The same QoS treatment should be provided to test traffic as is provided to end-user traffic along the path. In particular, the packet marking of test traffic should be the same as for user traffic for the packet network QoS class to be measured. +- Any individual stream of probing packets should not be sent at a higher data rate than is committed for an individual stream of end-user traffic. +- Test traffic should be transmitted with uniform packet length. +- Test traffic may be transmitted with uniform inter-packet spacing, or the inter-packet spacing may have a random distribution. If a uniform inter-packet spacing is used then the test procedure should conform to [IETF RFC 3432]. +- The probe payload size should be set at up to 20 octets (for classes 0 and 1) and 256 octets of probe payload size (for classes 2, 3 and 4), [ITU-T Y. 1543]. +- The information field size and protocol used must be recorded. +- When the sum of the committed data rates for all contracted packet network QoS classes exceeds the maximum committed capacity of the service, then the service is overbooked. In such cases, the test data rate for each packet network QoS class with a lesser priority should be reduced in accordance with the service contract such that the service is not overbooked. +- The measurement time should be indicated when reporting the results using UTC. + +#### **7.6.2 Performance measurement duration (or test duration)** + +The test duration should be recorded with the corresponding measured metrics: + +- A measurement interval (roll-up period) of 5 minutes for all packet network QoS classes (0, 1, 2, 3 and 4), according to [ITU-T Y.1543]. +- Probe packet transmission period (continuous) of 100 ms for all packet network QoS classes (0, 1, 2, 3 and 4) [ITU-T Y.1543]. +- At the end of a test, measuring equipment (receiving the probing packets) should continue to listen for and count packets for at least 3 seconds after the traffic generator has ceased transmitting the test packet stream. + +### **7.7 Performance monitoring** + +- The purpose of performance monitoring is to confirm that ongoing delivery of the packet transport service is achieved within the performance objectives for the relevant packet network QoS classes. +- Monitoring is an intrinsic measurement method, intended to enable ongoing service assurance while the end-user's service is in line with the contracted service. +- When monitoring, the performance of a connection should be based on: + - ✓ observing the end-user's traffic; or + - ✓ introducing test traffic into the same physical path taken by the end-user's traffic. + +- Packet performance should be measured and recorded in each monitoring period over a population-of-interest of 1500 packets, spread uniformly throughout the monitoring period. +- It is the responsibility of each NSP to establish the duration and frequency of its monitoring period in accordance with its operational policies and procedures. +- Measurements should not have an impact on end-user traffic and should include a repetition of measurement intervals to assist ongoing monitoring. +- The time between measurement intervals should be every 15 minutes [IETF RFC 3432]. + +## 7.8 Reporting + +- The NSP should report the performance values periodically as may be required to the regulatory authority and performance values by the interconnected NSPs at least on a monthly basis. Moreover, the reporting should not exceed 10 working days from the end of each month. Each NSP should provide both a hard copy and a soft copy (word processor or spreadsheet) version of their reports. +- The NSP should retain quality of service data, including all measurements and related records, for a minimum of twelve (12) months after the end of the "reporting period" or as may be otherwise directed by the regulatory authority. + +NOTE – All measurements, such as packets captured, etc., should be defined (by means of a common measurement data format). Otherwise, different NSPs might use different tools and provide different measurement data, which would increase the difficulty in interoperability. + +- It is recommended that the following points be taken into consideration in the agreements (SLA signed between the two or more NSPs) to be signed by the NSPs, as a minimum: + - ✓ Content and format of such reports + - ✓ Agreed processes for the exchange of hard copies of the measurement results + - ✓ Methods for the electronic exchange of measurement reports + - ✓ The agreement should respect the time-frame of reporting given in this paper + - ✓ One or more agreed threshold value(s) for each parameter with indications of severity. +- When the performance measurement of a network section exceeds an agreed threshold value for a parameter, the NSP should report the incident to its interconnected NSP and to the regulatory authority. +- It is recommended that reports, when an agreed threshold value is exceeded, should contain the following information, as a minimum: + - ✓ Date + - ✓ Time in UTC (at the commencement of the measurement interval) + - ✓ Location of end points + - ✓ Measurement/report period + - ✓ Measurement type + - ✓ Measurement statistics + - ✓ Brief reason. + +## 7.9 Publication + +Regulatory authorities may, after analysis, mandate or request NSPs to make the necessary amendments or corrections to the measurements submitted by NSPs. Regulatory authorities should thereafter publish the measurements within one (1) month after the relevant end of the "*reporting period*" to which the measurements apply, with or without additional notes or comments. + +## Appendix I + +### Mapping between DiffServ, MPLS and Ethernet + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This appendix introduces the mapping between differentiated service, multi-protocol label switching and Ethernet, as shown in Table I.1. + +**Table I.1 – Mapping table of DiffServ, MPLS and Ethernet** +[ITU-T Y.1541], [b-ITU-T Y.1566], [b-ITU-T Y.2113], +[b-IETF RFC 4594], [b-IEEE 802.1p] and [IETF RFC 3270] + +| Packet network QoS class | Description | Layer 3 packet marking: DSCP (Diffserv Code Point) | Layer 2 packet marking | | Applications | +|--------------------------|------------------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------| +| | | | MPLS (class of service) | Ethernet (priority code point) | | +| Classes 0, 1 | Jitter sensitive | EF (Expedited forward) | 5 | 5 (default) or 6 | Telephony | +| Classes 2, 3, 4 | Low latency | AF (Assured forward) | 4, 3 or 2 | 4, 3 or 2 | Signalling, interactive Data | +| Class 5 | Best efforts | DF (Default forward) | 0 | 0 | Web browsing, Email | + +NOTE 1 – DiffServ is a service model which can offer several levels of service assuring differing QoS needs. DiffServ divides the traffic into a small number of classes and treats each class differently. In a DiffServ network, the edge router does admission control and ensures that only acceptable traffic is injected into the network. The remaining routers inside the DiffServ architecture network utilize the DSCP (DiffServ code point) in making scheduling behaviour known as a PHB (per hop behaviour) suitable for the particular class. A number of PHBs may be defined and enforced throughout a DiffServ network. For more information on DiffServ, refer to [b-IETF RFC 4594], [IETF RFC 2598] and [IETF RFC 2597]. + +NOTE 2 – MPLS is a connection-oriented technology which enables traffic engineering in packet-based networks. MPLS integrates the label swapping paradigm with network layer routing. Label swapping is accomplished by associating fixed-length labels with routes and using the label value to forward packets, including the procedure for determining the value of any replacement label. Label switching routers (LSRs) use link-level forwarding to provide a simple and fast packet-forwarding capability. For more information about MPLS, refer to [IETF RFC 3270] and [b-IETF RFC 3031]. + +NOTE 3 – [b-IEEE 802.1Q] defines an Ethernet frame format which allows inclusion of VLAN ID and priority. The IEEE Standard 802.1Q tagged frame defines a 3-bit field which accordingly specifies the QoS priority levels. For more information on the QoS priority levels in the Ethernet, refer to [b-IEEE 802.1D]. + +## Appendix II + +### Sharing of bearer QoS budgets + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +- 1) When a service passes through multiple interconnected networks, it is necessary for the end-to-end performance targets to be met so that the impairment budgets are shared between each of the networks in a fair way [b-ITU-T Y.1542]. +- 2) The end-to-end expectation for each of these parameters can then be calculated as follows: + - ✓ IPTD: Sum of the individual network mean values. + - ✓ IPLR: Multiplication of the probabilities of successful transmission. +$$\text{IPLR} = 1 - \{(1 - \text{IPLR}_{\text{NS1}}) \times (1 - \text{IPLR}_{\text{NS2}}) \times (1 - \text{IPLR}_{\text{NS3}}) \times (1 - \text{IPLR}_{\text{NS4}})\}$$ + - ✓ IPDV: No practical method for calculating expected IPDV is available. The best that can be done is an estimate of the probability that IPDV exceeds a target. +- 3) For a clear understanding of the "*partitioning of bearer QoS*" and how to calculate the *end-to-end IP network performance (expected end-to-end IPTD, IPLR and IPDV)*, please refer to Appendices II, III and IV of [b-ITU-T Y.1542]. + +NOTE – The method described in Appendix I of [b-ITU-T Y.1542] (static divisor approach) is not recommended here. + + + +## Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T I.353] Recommendation ITU-T I.353 (1996), *Reference events for defining ISDN and B-ISDN performance parameters.* +- [b-ITU-T Y.1542] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1542 (2010), *Framework for achieving end-to-end IP performance objectives.* +- [b-ITU-T Y.1566] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1566 (2012), *Quality of service mapping and interconnection between Ethernet, Internet protocol and multiprotocol label switching networks.* +- [b-ITU-T Y.2113] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2113 (2009), *Ethernet QoS control for next generation networks.* +- [b-IEEE 802.1D] IEEE Standards 802.1D (2004), *IEEE Standard for local and metropolitan area networks – Media Access Control (MAC) Bridges.* +- [b-IEEE 802.1Q] IEEE Standard 802.1Q (2011), *IEEE standard for local and metropolitan area networks – Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks.* +- [b-IETF RFC 3031] IETF RFC 3031 (2001), *Multi-Protocol Label Switching Architecture. Differentiated Services.* +- [b-IETF RFC 3270] IETF RFC 3270 (2002), *Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) Support of Differentiated Services.* +- [b-IETF RFC 4594] IETF RFC 4594 (2006), *Configuration Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes.* + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1910-200809-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1910-200809-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5cf526452c1a33cd1d1b6734ef96c684da0e6cff --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.1910-200809-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,3223 @@ + + +I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +# Y.1910 + +(09/2008) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION +INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS +AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS + +Internet protocol aspects – IPTV over NGN + +# --- **IPTV functional architecture** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 + + + +The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it. + +ITU logo + +# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS** + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | + +## | | | |----------------------|----------------------| | IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | |----------------------|----------------------| + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Future networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910** + +# **IPTV functional architecture** + +## **Summary** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 describes the IPTV functional architecture intended to support IPTV services based on the IPTV service requirements and definitions. Starting from a basic description of IPTV roles and services, a high level IPTV functional model is outlined. This model is then developed into a set of functional architectures which support NGN and non-NGN transport networks, as well as operation modes with or without IMS. + +### **Source** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 was approved on 12 September 2008 by ITU-T Study Group 13 (2005-2008) under Recommendation ITU-T A.8 procedures. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +### NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure e.g. interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at
architecture ..... | 16 | +| 10.2 Description of functions specific to NGN IPTV functional architectures ..... | 18 | +| 10.3 Description of functions common to the three architectural approaches ..... | 23 | +| 10.4 Interworking ..... | 32 | +| 11 Reference points ..... | 34 | +| 11.1 Reference points with characteristics common to all three IPTV
architectures..... | 38 | + +| | Page | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| 11.2 Reference points with characteristics specific to non-NGN IPTV architecture ..... | 41 | +| 11.3 Reference points with characteristics specific to NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture ..... | 42 | +| 11.4 Reference Points specific to NGN IMS IPTV Architecture..... | 43 | +| Annex A – Relationship between IPTV and NGN architectures..... | 46 | +| A.1 IPTV-related components in the NGN architecture ..... | 46 | +| A.2 Functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN architectures..... | 47 | +| A.3 Application support functions and service support functions ..... | 47 | +| Appendix I – Procedural flows relating to IPTV services ..... | 49 | +| I.1 High level flows ..... | 49 | +| I.2 Procedural flows for IPTV services based on NGN non-IMS IPTV architectures..... | 59 | +| I.3 Procedural flows for IPTV services based on NGN IMS IPTV architecture ..... | 69 | +| I.4 Procedural flows for IPTV interconnection between two NGN networks..... | 73 | +| Appendix II – Potential protocols that could be used on IPTV reference points..... | 77 | +| Appendix III – IPTV physical network hierarchy ..... | 81 | +| Appendix IV – Overlay networking function for IPTV services and multicast ..... | 83 | +| Appendix V – Adaptation of the IPTV architecture for HFC networks ..... | 84 | +| Appendix VI – Nomadism for IPTV services..... | 87 | +| VI.1 Interconnection with the visited network ..... | 87 | +| VI.2 Interconnection with third party service providers..... | 91 | +| Bibliography..... | 93 | + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 + +# IPTV functional architecture + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation describes the IPTV functional architecture intended to support IPTV services based on the IPTV service requirements and definitions [b-ITU-T IPTVFG]. Starting from a basic description of IPTV roles and services, a high level IPTV functional model is outlined. This model is then developed into a more detailed functional architecture. Specific cases are also described in more detail. + +The IPTV functional architecture is based on the use of existing network components and technologies, as well as on NGN architectures. This leads to three possible options for the architectural representations: + +- 1) IPTV functional architecture for non-NGN network components. +- 2) IPTV functional architecture based on the NGN functional architecture, but not based on IMS. +- 3) IPTV functional architecture based on NGN and its IMS components. + +The common elements between these alternatives, as well as the differences, are described in this Recommendation. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T M.1400] Recommendation ITU-T M.1400 (2006), *Designations for interconnections among operators' networks*. +- [ITU-T M.3050.1] Recommendation ITU-T M.3050.1 (2007), *Enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM) – The business process framework*. +- [ITU-T Q.1290] Recommendation ITU-T Q.1290 (1998), *Glossary of terms used in the definition of intelligent networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*. +- [ITU-T Y.2014] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2008), *Network attachment control functions in next generation networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.2021] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2021 (2006), *IMS for Next Generation Networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.2111] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*. + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 application** [b-ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services. + +**3.1.2 functional architecture** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A set of functional entities and the reference points between them used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions. + +NOTE 1 – The functional entities can be used to describe a set of reference configurations. These reference configurations identify which reference points are visible at the boundaries of equipment implementations and between administrative domains. + +NOTE 2 – This definition is taken from [ITU-T Y.2012] and therefore relates to NGN. However, it is also valid for other networks, e.g., networks supporting IPTV. + +**3.1.3 functional entity** [ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations. + +**3.1.4 reference point** [ITU-T Y.2012]: A conceptual point at the conjunction of two non-overlapping functional entities that can be used to identify the type of information passing between these functional entities. + +NOTE – A reference point corresponds to one or more physical interfaces between pieces of equipment. + +**3.1.5 service provider** [ITU-T M.1400]: A general reference to an operator that provides telecommunication services to customers and other users either on a tariff or contract basis. A service provider can optionally operate a network. A service provider can optionally be a customer of another service provider. + +NOTE – Typically, the service provider acquires or licenses content from content providers and packages this into a service that is consumed by the end-user. + +**3.1.6 subscriber** [ITU-T M.3050.1]: The subscriber is responsible for concluding contracts for the services subscribed to and for paying for these services. + +## 3.2 Terms defined within this Recommendation + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 content provider**: The entity that owns or is licensed to sell content or content assets. + +**3.2.2 delivery**: In the context of IPTV architecture, "delivery" is defined as sending contents to the end user. + +**3.2.3 distribution**: In the context of IPTV architecture, "distribution" is defined as sending the content to appropriate intermediate locations to enable subsequent delivery. + +**3.2.4 end user**: The actual user of the products or services. + +NOTE – The end-user consumes the product or service. An end-user can optionally be a subscriber (see definition of "subscriber"). + +**3.2.5 linear television (linear TV)**: A television service in which a continuous stream flows in real time from the service provider to the terminal device and where the user cannot control the temporal order in which contents are viewed. + +**3.2.6 network provider:** The organization that maintains and operates the network components required for IPTV functionality. + +NOTE 1 – A network provider can optionally also act as service provider. + +NOTE 2 – Although considered as two separate entities, the service provider and the network provider can optionally be one organizational entity. + +**3.2.7 video on demand (VoD):** A service in which the end user can, on demand, select and view video content and where the end user can control the temporal order in which the video content is viewed (e.g., the ability to start the viewing, pause, fast forward, rewind, etc.). + +NOTE – The viewing may occur some time after the selection of the video content. + +# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|--------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| AS-FE | Application Support Functional Entity | +| BGCF | Breakout Gateway Control Function | +| CD&LCF | Content Distribution and Location Control Function | +| CD&SF | Content Delivery and Storage Function | +| CDF | Content Delivery Function | +| CMTS | Cable Modem Termination System | +| CP | Content Protection | +| CPF | Content Provider Function | +| CSCF | Call Session Control Function | +| DNG | Delivery Network Gateway | +| DOCSIS | Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications | +| DRM | Digital Rights Management | +| DSG | DOCSIS Set-Top box Gateway | +| DVBSTP | Digital Video Broadcast Service discovery and selection Transport Protocol | +| EPG | Electronic Programme Guide | +| FB | Functional Block | +| FE | Functional Entity | +| FEC | Forward Error Correction | +| FFS | For Further Study | +| FLUTE | File Delivery over Unidirectional Transport | +| HFC | Hybrid Fibre Coax | +| IGMP | Internet Group Management Protocol | +| IMS | Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem | +| IPTV | Internet Protocol Television | +| ITF | Internet Protocol Television Terminal Functions | + +| | | +|-------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| IW | Interworking | +| McCPF | Multicast Control Point Functional block | +| McRf | Multicast Replication Functional block | +| MGCF | Media Gateway Control Function | +| MLD | Multicast Listener Discovery protocol | +| MRFC | Multimedia Resource Function Controller | +| NACF | Network Attachment Control Function | +| NGN | Next Generation Network | +| OAM&P | Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning | +| PIM | Protocol Independent Multicasting | +| PVR | Personal Video Recorder | +| QAM | Quadrature Amplitude Modulation | +| QoE | Quality of Experience | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Function | +| RF | Radio Frequency | +| RTSP | Real-Time Streaming Protocol | +| RTP | Real-time Transport Protocol | +| SADS | Service and Application Discovery and Selection | +| SC&DF | Service Control and Delivery Function | +| SCF | Service Control Function | +| SCP | Service and Content Protection | +| SHE | Super Head End | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SP | Service Protection | +| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol | +| UDP | User Datagram Protocol | +| URL | Universal Resource Locator | +| VCR | Video Cassette Recorder | +| VHO | Video Hub Office | +| VoD | Video on Demand | +| VSO | Video Serving Office | + +# 5 Conventions + +**Functions:** In the context of IPTV architecture, "functions" are defined as a collection of functionalities. It is represented by the following symbol: + + + +A diagram showing a rounded rectangle with the word "Functions" centered inside it. + +Symbol for Functions: a rounded rectangle. + +**Functional block:** In the context of IPTV architecture, a "functional block" is defined as a group of functionalities that has not been further subdivided at the level of detail described in this Recommendation. It is represented by the following symbol: + + + +A diagram showing a rectangle with the words "Functional block" centered inside it. + +Symbol for Functional block: a rectangle. + +NOTE – In the future, other groups or other Recommendations may possibly further subdivide these functional blocks. + +**Data source:** In the context of IPTV architecture, "data sources" are defined as particular sources of content, metadata and content protection information. They are represented by the following symbol: + + + +A diagram showing an oval with the words "Data source" centered inside it. + +Symbol for Data source: an oval. + +# 6 IPTV domains + +Figure 6-1 shows the main domains that are involved in the provision of an IPTV service. These domains do not define a business model. This decomposition does not preclude that one provider be involved in the support of any given IPTV service across more than one domain. + + + +The diagram illustrates the four IPTV domains in a horizontal sequence, each enclosed in a rounded rectangular box. + 1. **End user**: Contains an icon of a computer monitor and a set-top box. + 2. **Network provider**: Contains an icon of a router and a server rack. + 3. **Service provider**: Contains an icon of a server rack and a small globe with a play button. + 4. **Content provider**: Contains an icon of a globe and a film strip. + A blue line connects the components across the domains: from the set-top box to the router, from the router to the server rack, from the server rack to the globe with play button, and from the globe with play button to the globe. Below each box is its respective label: 'End user', 'Network provider', 'Service provider', and 'Content provider'. + +Figure 6-1 – IPTV domains diagram showing four domains: End user, Network provider, Service provider, and Content provider, connected in a sequence. + +Y.1910(08)\_F6-1 + +**Figure 6-1 – IPTV domains** + +NOTE – In Figure 6-1, the conventions defined in clause 5 are not used as this is not a functional architecture diagram. + +The four IPTV domains, the definitions of which are provided in clause 3, are: + +- content provider; +- service provider; +- network provider; +- end user. + +The functional elements constituting these above domains are described in more detail in clause 8. + +# **7 IPTV architectural approaches** + +## **7.1 Architectural approaches** + +This Recommendation identifies three IPTV architecture approaches that enable service providers to deliver IPTV services: + +- 1) "Non-NGN IPTV functional architecture" (non-NGN IPTV): The non-NGN IPTV architecture is based on existing network components and protocols/interfaces. The technology components, protocols and interfaces used in this IPTV architecture are already in use and hence this approach is a representation of typical existing networks providing IPTV services. This architectural approach can optionally be used as the basis for evolution towards the other IPTV architectures listed below. +- 2) "NGN-based non-IMS IPTV functional architecture" (NGN non-IMS IPTV): The NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture utilizes components of the NGN framework reference architecture as identified in [ITU-T Y.2012] to support the provision of IPTV services, in conjunction with other NGN services if required. +- 3) "NGN IMS-based IPTV functional architecture" (NGN-IMS IPTV): The NGN IMS-based IPTV architecture utilizes components of the NGN architecture including the IMS component to support the provision of IPTV services in conjunction with other IMS services if required. + +In the following clauses, this Recommendation identifies the commonalities of the three architectural approaches identified above. This Recommendation also describes the main specifics + +of each architectural approach. This allows to facilitate the interworking and to identify potential evolutionary paths between these architectural approaches. + +NOTE – The NGN strata used in this Recommendation refers to [ITU-T Y.2012]. + +## **7.2 Architectural differences** + +### **7.2.1 Differences between NGN-based and non-NGN-based IPTV architectures** + +The NGN-based IPTV architecture is based on the NGN architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] and uses the components and functions of the NGN. The non-NGN-based IPTV architecture does not necessarily require these components and functions and uses conventional and/or legacy network technologies for the delivery of IPTV services. The main differences are described below: + +- The NGN-based IPTV architecture uses network attachment control functions (NACF) defined in [ITU-T Y.2014] to provide functions such as authentication and IP configuration. +- The NGN-based IPTV architecture uses resource and admission control functions (RACF) defined in [ITU-T Y.2111] to provide resource and admission control functions. +- The NGN-based IPTV architecture uses service control functions defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] to provide service control functions. + +### **7.2.2 Differences between NGN non-IMS-based and NGN-IMS-based IPTV architectures** + +The NGN-IMS-based IPTV architecture uses core IMS functions and associated functions such as the service user profile functional block defined in [ITU-T Y.2021] to provide service control functions. The NGN non-IMS-based IPTV architecture uses service control functions other than core IMS functions to provide service control functions. + +# **8 IPTV functional architecture framework** + +The IPTV functional architecture framework shown in Figure 8-1 identifies the principal functional groups for IPTV. These functional groups provide a more detailed breakdown of the IPTV domains that are defined in clause 6. + +The domains of content provider and end-user remain the same. The domains of service provider and network provider are not used in the architecture as commercial and operational boundaries are not appropriate to an architectural decomposition. + +The functional groups in the architecture are derived by grouping related functions. How these functional groups are allocated across operational and organizational boundaries is out of the scope of this Recommendation. + +Although accounting functionalities are necessary, they are not currently described in this Recommendation. These functionalities are for further study. + + + +The diagram illustrates the IPTV functional architecture framework. It consists of several functional groups arranged in a layered structure: + +- End-User Functions** (pink box on the left): The top layer of the architecture. +- Application Functions** (blue box): The second layer, connected to End-User Functions. +- Service Control Functions** (yellow box) and **Content Delivery Functions** (orange box): The third layer, connected to Application Functions. +- Network Functions** (green box): The fourth layer, connected to both Service Control and Content Delivery Functions. +- Management Functions** (grey box) and **Content Provider Functions** (grey box): The rightmost layers, connected to the other functional groups. + +Connections are shown using solid lines and dashed lines with arrows, indicating the flow of data and control between the functional groups. + +Figure 8-1 – IPTV functional architecture framework. The diagram shows a layered architecture with four main functional groups: End-User Functions (pink), Application Functions (blue), Service Control Functions (yellow) and Content Delivery Functions (orange), and Network Functions (green). These are connected to Management Functions (grey) and Content Provider Functions (grey). + +**Figure 8-1 – IPTV functional architecture framework** + +The following clauses give a description of each functional group. The related functions in each functional group are further decomposed in clause 9. + +## **8.1 End-user functions** + +The end-user functions perform mediation between the end user and the IPTV infrastructure. + +## **8.2 Application functions** + +The application functions enable the end-user functions to select and purchase or rent a content item. + +## **8.3 Service control functions** + +The service control functions (SCF) provide the functions to request and release network and service resources required to support the IPTV services. + +The service control functions can request the content delivery functions to allocate resources and request the network functions to reserve required network bandwidth for the content stream. The service control functions can optionally obtain the end user's current location from the network functions. + +## **8.4 Content delivery functions** + +The content delivery functions (CDF) receive content from the application functions, store, process and deliver it to the end-user functions using the capabilities of the network functions, under control of the service control functions. + +## **8.5 Network functions** + +The network functions provide IP layer connectivity between the IPTV service components and the end-user functions. The network functions are shared across all services delivered by IP to an end user. + +The network functions contribute to the provision of the quality of service (QoS) required by the IPTV services. + +## **8.6 Management functions** + +The management functions perform overall system management (i.e., operations, administration, maintenance and provisioning (OAM&P)). The management functions do not include the functions that provision the behaviour within applications or the functions that gather accounting information within applications. + +As an example, the installation of a software upgrade to a video on demand application would be a management function. However, the provisioning of the multicast addresses of linear TV channels within a linear TV application would not be a management function. + +## **8.7 Content provider functions** + +The content provider functions are provided by the entity that owns or is licensed to provide (i.e., sell, rent or give free usage permission) content or content assets (i.e., owner of the content, metadata and usage rights). + +# **9 IPTV architectural overview** + +Figure 9-1 provides an overview of the IPTV functional architecture. Functions and functional blocks described in this clause are common to all architectural approaches as detailed in clause 7.1 except where stated differently. + +Key to figures: + +- The rectangular blocks represent functional blocks in the IPTV architecture, as indicated in clause 5. +- The rounded rectangular areas represent the particular grouping of functions, as indicated in clause 5. +- The solid lines represent direct relationships between either functions or functional blocks. +- The dotted lines represent logical associations between end-user functions and either functions or functional blocks located outside the end-user functions. +- Crossed lines do not imply connections, unless explicitly stated. + + + +The diagram illustrates the IPTV architectural overview, organized into four main functional areas and two supporting areas: + +- End-user functions (Red box):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions, SCP client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions, Control client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Blue box):** + - IPTV application functions:** Application profile functional block, SCP functions. + - Content preparation functions:** Content preparation functions. +- Service control functions (Yellow box):** + - Delivery protocols:** IPTV service control functional block, Service user profile functional block. +- Content delivery functions (Orange box):** + - Content distribution and location control functions:** Content distribution and location control functions. + - Content delivery and storage functions:** Content delivery and storage functions. + - Content and control:** Content and control. +- Network functions (Green box):** + - Authentication and IP allocation functional block:** Authentication and IP allocation functional block. + - Resource control functional block:** Resource control functional block. + - Transport functions:** Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions. +- Management functions (Grey box):** + - Application management functional block:** Application management functional block. + - Service control management functional block:** Service control management functional block. + - Content delivery management functional block:** Content delivery management functional block. + - End-user device management functional block:** End-user device management functional block. + - Transport management functional block:** Transport management functional block. +- Content provider functions (Dark Grey box):** + - Content and metadata sources:** Content and metadata sources. + +**Interactions and Data Flow:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to Application profile functional block. +- Metadata:** Connects Application profile functional block to Content preparation functions. +- Control:** Connects SCP functions to Content preparation functions. +- Content:** Connects Content preparation functions to Content distribution and location control functions. +- Multicast delivery control protocol:** Connects Content delivery client functions to IPTV service control functional block. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects Control client functional block to Authentication and IP allocation functional block. +- Content and metadata:** Connects Application management functional block to Content and metadata sources. + +IPTV architectural overview diagram showing four main functional areas: End-user functions, Application functions, Service control functions, and Network functions, along with Management and Content provider functions. + +Y.1910(08)\_F9-1 + +Figure 9-1 – IPTV architectural overview + +### **9.1 End-user functions** + +The end-user functions are comprised of IPTV terminal functions and home network functions. + +### **9.1.1 IPTV terminal functions** + +The IPTV terminal functions (ITF) are responsible for collecting control commands from the end user and interacting with the application functions to obtain service information (e.g., EPG), content licenses and keys for decryption. They interact with the service control and content delivery functions to receive the IPTV services and also provide the capability for content reception, decryption and decoding. + +#### **9.1.1.1 Application client functions** + +The application client functions exchange information with the IPTV application functions to support IPTV services and other interactive applications. + +#### **9.1.1.2 Service and content protection client functions** + +The service and content protection (SCP) client functions interact with SCP functions to provide service protection and content protection. + +The SCP client functions verify the usage rights and decrypt and optionally watermark the content. + +#### **9.1.1.3 Content delivery client functions** + +The content delivery client functions receive and control the delivery of the content from the content delivery and storage functions (CD&SF). After receiving the content, the content delivery client functions can optionally use the SCP client functions to decrypt and decode the content, and can also optionally support playback control. + +#### **9.1.1.4 Control client functional block** + +The control client functional block allows the ITF to initiate service requests to the IPTV service control functional block in order to prepare for the connection to the content delivery functions. + +NOTE – Clause 10 provides more information on IPTV terminal functions related to NGN IMS IPTV architecture. + +### **9.1.2 Home network functions** + +The home network functions provide the connectivity between the external network (i.e., external to the home network) and each IPTV terminal device. These functions include IP connectivity, IP address allocation and configuration from the network functions to the IPTV terminal devices. All data, content and control traffic must pass through the home network functions in order to enter or exit the end-user's IPTV terminal device. The home network functions serve as the gateway between the IPTV terminal functions and the network functions. + +The home network functions are comprised of the following functional block. + +#### **9.1.2.1 Delivery network gateway functional block** + +The delivery network gateway functional block provides IP connectivity between the external network (i.e., external to the home network) and the IPTV terminal device. + +The delivery network gateway functional block manages IP connectivity, obtains IP addresses and configurations for the home network functions and IPTV terminal devices. + +### **9.2 Application functions** + +### **9.2.1 IPTV application functions** + +The IPTV application functions enable the IPTV terminal functions to select and purchase, if necessary, content. + +When receiving requests from IPTV terminal functions, the IPTV application functions perform application authorization and execution of IPTV service logic based on user profile, content metadata and other information retrieved from relevant entities. The IPTV application functions also communicate with content delivery functions to prepare the delivery of media content to IPTV terminal functions through content delivery functions. + +### **9.2.2 Application profile functional block** + +The IPTV application profile can optionally include: + +- End-user settings which include information related to the capabilities of the end user's IPTV terminal devices. An IPTV end user may be associated with one or more IPTV terminals with different capabilities. +- Global settings (e.g., language preference). +- Linear TV settings. +- List of subscribed linear TV service packages. +- VoD settings (e.g., parental control level). +- Personal video recorder (PVR) settings (PVR network/local preferences, PVR user restrictions, PVR storage limit). +- IPTV service action data which encompass information related to the actions the user can optionally have taken while accessing services, e.g.: + - list of linear TV services (or programmes) that the user has paused and is hence likely to resume later, including the bookmark value associated with the pause; + - list of VoDs that the user has ordered, and associated status; + - list of PVR contents that the user has asked to be recorded. + +### **9.2.3 Content preparation functions** + +The content preparation functions control the preparation and aggregation of the contents such as VoD programme, TV channel streams, metadata and EPG data, as received from the content provider functions. The content preparation functions can optionally pre-process (e.g., transcode or edit) the content in advance of passing it to the content delivery, IPTV application and SCP functions. + +Content preparation may optionally include the insertion of a watermark for the purpose of content tracing. Additionally, it may create content tracing metadata to facilitate subsequent embedding, into the content, of a content-tracing watermark. The content-tracing metadata is appropriate when multiple copies of the protected content will be created and distributed to end users. + +### **9.2.4 Service and content protection (SCP) functions** + +The SCP functions control the protection of the services and content. Content protection includes control of access to contents and the protection of contents using methods such as encryption. Service protection includes authentication and authorization of access to services and optionally protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +## **9.3 Service control functions** + +### **9.3.1 IPTV service control functional block** + +The IPTV service control functional block provides the functions to handle service initiation, modification and termination requests, perform service access control, establish and maintain the network and system resources required to support the IPTV services requested by the IPTV terminal functions. + +The IPTV service control functional block can optionally: + +- provide registration, authentication and authorization functions for the end-user functions; +- process requests from IPTV application functions and forward them to the content delivery functions in order that the content delivery functions select the most appropriate content delivery and storage functions, for delivering content to the end-user functions; +- request the content delivery functions or application functions to collect charging information. + +### **9.3.2 Service user profile functional block** + +The service user profile functional block: + +- stores end-user service profile (i.e., IPTV services subscribed to); +- stores subscriber-related data (e.g., who pays the incurred charges); +- stores end-user location data; +- stores end-user presence status (e.g., online/offline); +- performs basic data management and maintenance functions: + - updating and storage of "user subscription data" or "network data" (e.g., the current network access point and network location); +- responses to queries for user profiles for: + - authentication; + - authorization; + - service subscription information; + - subscriber mobility; + - location; + - presence. + +## **9.4 Content delivery functions** + +The content delivery functions (CDF) perform cache and storage functionalities and deliver the content according to the request from the end-user functions. The content delivery functions can optionally process the content. + +Multiple instances of storage and delivery functionalities can optionally exist. The content delivery functions select the suitable one(s). To maintain the same content at the multiple instances, the content delivery functions control the distribution of content to multiple instances of storage and delivery functionalities. + +Content is distributed to the content delivery functions before or during the service offering process. + +Content delivery functions interact with end-user functions (e.g., trick mode play functionality). + +Content delivery functions support unicast, multicast or both mechanisms. + +The content delivery functions are comprised of the following functions: + +- content distribution and location control functions (CD&LCF) +- content delivery and storage functions (CD&SF). + +### **9.4.1 Content distribution and location control functions** + +The content distribution and location control functions include, but are not limited to: + +- Handling interactions with the IPTV service control functional block. +- Controlling the distribution of content from the content preparation functions to the content delivery and storage functions. +- Gathering the information regarding content delivery and storage functions, e.g., resource utilization, resource status (e.g., in-service and out-of-service), content distribution information and load status. +- Performing the selection of suitable content delivery and storage functions to serve end-user functions according to certain criteria, e.g., the gathered information and the terminal capability. + +NOTE – This selection request can optionally be triggered by the IPTV service control functions or the IPTV applications functions. + +### **9.4.2 Content delivery and storage functions** + +The content delivery and storage functions store and cache the content, process it under the control of content preparation functions and distribute it among instances of content delivery and storage functions based on the policy of content distribution and location control functions. + +The content delivery and storage functions are responsible for delivering content to the content delivery client functions using the network functions (e.g., unicast and/or multicast mechanisms). + +The content delivery and storage functions include, but are not limited to: + +- Handling interaction with the IPTV service control functional block. +- Handling content delivery to end-user functions. +- Caching and storing content and associated information. +- Insertion, watermarking, transcoding and encryption of the content. +- Distributing content within the content delivery and storage functions. +- Managing interaction with the content delivery client functions (e.g., trick mode commands). +- Reporting status (e.g., load status and availability) to content distribution and location control functions. +- Generating charging information. + +## **9.5 Network functions** + +The network functions are shared across all services delivered by IP to end-user functions. The network functions provide the IP layer connectivity to support IPTV services. + +NOTE – The conventions defined in clause 5 are not used in clause 9.5.3 in order to maintain alignment with the terminology used in the NGN framework. + +### **9.5.1 Authentication and IP allocation functional block** + +The authentication and IP allocation functional block provides the functionality to authenticate the delivery network gateway functional block which connects to the network functions, as well as + +allocation of IP addresses to the delivery network gateway functional block and optionally to the IPTV terminal functions. + +### **9.5.2 Resource control functional block** + +The resource control functional block provides control of the resources which have been allocated for the delivery of the IPTV services through the access network, edge and core transport functions. + +### **9.5.3 Transport functions** + +The transport functions provide IP layer connectivity between the content delivery functions and the end-user functions. The transport functions include access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions and gateway functions. + +#### **9.5.3.1 Access network functions** + +Access network functions are responsible for: 1) aggregating and forwarding the IPTV traffic sent by the end-user functions into the edge of the core network: and 2) forwarding the IPTV traffic from the edge of the core network towards the end-user functions. + +#### **9.5.3.2 Edge functions** + +Edge functions are responsible for forwarding the IPTV traffic aggregated by the access network functions (as defined in clause 9.5.3.1) towards the core network, and also to forward the IPTV traffic from the core network to the access network functions. + +#### **9.5.3.3 Core transport functions** + +Core transport functions are responsible for forwarding IPTV traffic throughout the core network. + +## **9.6 Management functions** + +The management functions handle overall system status monitoring and configuration. This set of functions can optionally be deployed in a centralized or a distributed manner. + +Management functions are comprised of the following functional blocks: + +- Application management functional block. +- Content delivery management functional block. +- Service control management functional block. +- End-user device management functional block. +- Transport management functional block. + +## **9.7 Content provider functions** + +Content provider functions provide the content and associated metadata to content preparation functions, which contain the following sources. + +### **9.7.1 Content and metadata sources** + +The content and metadata sources include content protection rights sources, content sources and metadata sources for the IPTV services. + +# **10 IPTV functional architectures** + +The functional architectures, shown in Figures 10-1 to 10-3, are based on Figure 9-1. These functional architectures are expected to provide functionality for IPTV services. Figure 9-1 provides a high level IPTV functional architecture overview, while Figures 10-1, 10-2 and 10-3, respectively, + +provide a non-NGN IPTV functional architecture, an NGN-based non-IMS IPTV functional architecture and an NGN IMS-based IPTV functional architecture. + +## **10.1 Description of functions specific to the non-NGN IPTV functional architecture** + +Clause 9 provides a description of the functions and functional blocks related to all three IPTV architectural approaches. This clause provides descriptive text for the functions and functional blocks which are specific to the non-NGN IPTV functional architecture. + +Figure 10-1 shows the non-NGN IPTV functional architecture. + +NOTE – This figure is identical to Figure 9-1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Non-NGN IPTV architecture, organized into six main functional areas with their internal components and interconnections: + +- End-user functions (Red box):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions, SCP client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions, Control client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Blue box):** + - IPTV application functions:** Application profile functional block, SCP functions. + - Content preparation functions:** Content preparation functions. +- Service control functions (Yellow box):** + - Delivery protocols:** IPTV service control functional block, Service user profile functional block. +- Content delivery functions (Orange box):** + - Content distribution and location control functions:** Content distribution and location control functions. + - Content delivery and storage functions:** Content delivery and storage functions. + - Content and control:** Content and control. +- Network functions (Green box):** + - Authentication and IP allocation functional block:** Authentication and IP allocation functional block. + - Resource control functional block:** Resource control functional block. + - Transport functions:** Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions. +- Management functions (Grey box):** + - Application management functional block:** Application management functional block. + - Service control management functional block:** Service control management functional block. + - Content delivery management functional block:** Content delivery management functional block. + - End-user device management functional block:** End-user device management functional block. + - Transport management functional block:** Transport management functional block. +- Content provider functions (Dark Grey box):** + - Content and metadata sources:** Content and metadata sources. + +**Interconnections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Metadata:** Connects Application profile functional block to Content preparation functions. +- Control:** Connects SCP functions to Content preparation functions. +- Content:** Connects Content preparation functions to Content distribution and location control functions. +- Multicast delivery control protocol:** Connects Content delivery client functions to IPTV service control functional block. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects Control client functional block to Authentication and IP allocation functional block. +- Content and metadata:** Connects Application management functional block to Content and metadata sources. + +Figure 10-1 – Non-NGN IPTV architecture diagram showing functional blocks and their interactions across four main categories: End-user functions, Application functions, Service control functions, Network functions, Management functions, and Content provider functions. + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-1 + +Figure 10-1 – Non-NGN IPTV architecture + +### **10.1.1 Control client functional block** + +See clause 9.1.1.4 for descriptive text. + +NOTE – This functional block is common with its counterpart in NGN non-IMS IPTV functional architecture. + +### **10.1.2 IPTV service control functional block** + +See clause 9.3.1 for descriptive text. + +NOTE – This functional block is common with its counterpart in NGN non-IMS IPTV functional architecture. + +### **10.1.3 Service user profile functional block** + +See clause 9.3.2 for descriptive text. + +### **10.1.4 Authentication and IP allocation functional block** + +See clause 9.5.1 for descriptive text. + +### **10.1.5 Resource control functional block** + +See clause 9.5.2 for descriptive text. + +## **10.2 Description of functions specific to NGN IPTV functional architectures** + +### **10.2.1 Description of functions specific to NGN non-IMS IPTV functional architecture** + +Clause 9 provides a description of the functions and functional blocks related to all three IPTV architectural approaches. This clause provides descriptive text for the functions and functional blocks which are specific to the NGN non-IMS IPTV functional architecture. Figure 10-2 shows the NGN non-IMS IPTV functional architecture. + + + +The diagram illustrates the NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture, organized into four main functional areas with their internal components and interconnections: + +- End-user functions (Red box):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions, SCP client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions, Control client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Blue box):** + - IPTV application functions:** Application profile functional block, SCP functions. + - Content preparation functions:** Content preparation functions. +- Management functions (Grey box):** + - Application management functional block:** Application management functional block. + - Service control management functional block:** Service control management functional block. + - Content delivery management functional block:** Content delivery management functional block. + - End-user device management functional block:** End-user device management functional block. + - Transport management functional block:** Transport management functional block. +- Content provider functions (Dark Grey box):** + - Content and metadata sources:** Content and metadata sources. +- Intermediate Functional Blocks (Yellow and Orange boxes):** + - Service support functions (Yellow dashed box):** NGN service stratum functions, Delivery protocols. + - Service control functions (Yellow solid box):** IPTV service control functional block, Service user profile functional block. + - Content delivery functions (Orange solid box):** Content distribution and location control functions, Content delivery and storage functions, Content and control. +- NGN transport stratum functions (Green box):** + - Transport control functions:** Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF). + - Transport functions:** Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions. + +**Interconnections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Metadata:** Connects Application profile functional block to Content preparation functions. +- Control:** Connects SCP functions to Service control functions. +- Content:** Connects Content preparation functions to Content delivery functions. +- Control protocol:** Connects Content delivery client functions to Service control functions. +- Multicast delivery control protocol:** Connects Control client functional block to Service control functions. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects Delivery network gateway functional block to Transport control functions. +- Content and metadata:** Connects Application management functional block to Content and metadata sources. + +Figure 10-2 – NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture diagram showing functional blocks and their interactions across four main categories: End-user functions, Application functions, Management functions, and Content provider functions. + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-2 + +Figure 10-2 – NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture + +#### **10.2.1.1 Control client functional block** + +See clause 9.1.1.4 for descriptive text. + +This functional block is common with its counterpart in non-NGN IPTV functional architecture. + +#### **10.2.1.2 IPTV service control functional block** + +See clause 9.3.1 for descriptive text. + +This functional block is common with its counterpart in non-NGN IPTV functional architecture. + +#### **10.2.1.3 Service user profile functional block** + +This functional block corresponds to the service user profile functional entity as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], see also clause 9.3.2. + +### **10.2.2 Description of functions specific to NGN IMS IPTV functional architecture** + +Clause 9 provides a description of the functions and functional blocks related to all three IPTV architectural approaches. This clause provides descriptive text for the functions and functional blocks which are specific to the NGN IMS IPTV functional architecture. Figure 10-3 shows the NGN IMS IPTV functional architecture. + + + +The diagram illustrates the NGN IMS IPTV architecture, organized into four main functional areas with their internal components and interconnections: + +- End-user functions (Red box):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions, SCP client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Session client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Blue box):** + - IPTV application functions:** Application profile functional block, SCP functions. + - Content preparation functions:** Content and metadata. + - Service support functions (Yellow dashed box):** NGN service stratum functions, Delivery protocols. + - Service control functions (Yellow solid box):** Core IMS functions, Service user profile functional block. + - Content delivery functions (Orange box):** Content distribution and location control functions, Content delivery and storage functions, Content and control. +- Management functions (Grey box):** + - Application management functional block:** Content and metadata. + - Service control management functional block:** Content. + - Content delivery management functional block:** Content. + - End-user device management functional block:** Content. + - Transport management functional block:** Content. +- Content provider functions (Dark Grey box):** + - Content and metadata sources:** Content and metadata. + +**Interconnections and Protocols:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Session protocol:** Connects Session client functional block to Core IMS functions. +- Multicast delivery control protocol:** Connects Session client functional block to Core IMS functions. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects Delivery network gateway functional block to Network attachment control functions (NACF). +- Metadata:** Connects Application profile functional block to Content preparation functions. +- Control:** Connects SCP functions to Service control functions. +- Content:** Connects Content preparation functions to Content delivery functions. + +Figure 10-3 – NGN IMS IPTV architecture diagram showing functional blocks and their interactions across four main categories: End-user functions, Application functions, Management functions, and Content provider functions. + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-3 + +Figure 10-3 – NGN IMS IPTV architecture + +#### 10.2.2.1 Session client functional block + +The session client functional block provides the functions to handle service requests, such as session initiation, modification and termination. + +This functional block communicates with IPTV application functions via core IMS functions to prepare for the connection to the content delivery functions. In the VoD case, the session client functional block initiates requests to the IPTV application functions to select suitable content delivery and storage functions which can provide the required content. For the linear TV case, the session client functional block initiates requests to the IPTV application functions for the relevant network parameters, (e.g., multicast address and port), to enable delivery of the required linear TV content. + +#### 10.2.2.2 Core IMS functions + +Functionalities related to and described for the IPTV service control functional block in clause 9.3.1 are supported by core IMS functions. Core IMS functions offer a session control mechanism, and provide functions for the authentication and authorization of IPTV terminal functions based on the user profile. Core IMS functions also provide functions for the interaction with RACF for resource reservation. + +Core IMS functions also provide interactions between IPTV terminal functions, IPTV application functions and content delivery functions. The core IMS functions can be used for service discovery. Functions such as charging and roaming can also be supported by IMS mechanisms. + +NOTE – IMS for NGN is described in [ITU-T Y.2021]. Core IMS functions are the call session control function (CSCF), media gateway control function (MGCF), multimedia resource function controller (MRFC) and breakout gateway control function (BGCF). + +#### 10.2.2.3 Service user profile functional block + +This functional block corresponds to the service user profile functional entity as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], see also 9.3.2. + +### 10.2.3 Functions specific but common to both NGN IMS and non-IMS IPTV architectures + +#### 10.2.3.1 NGN service stratum functions + +The NGN service stratum functions described in [ITU-T Y.2012] are comprised of "service control functions" and "application support functions and service support functions". In the NGN-based IPTV architectures, application functions correspond to the application support functions in NGN and the service stratum is comprised of: + +- **Service support functions** – These include gateway functions to the IPTV service control functions. However, these are not shown at this level of decomposition. +- **Service control functions** – These include the functions for the control of the network to ensure the delivery of the media content from the source to the IPTV terminal functions. + +#### 10.2.3.2 NGN transport stratum functions + +NGN transport stratum functions described in [ITU-T Y.2012] are comprised of "transport functions" and "transport control functions". This functional decomposition is also applicable to IPTV NGN-based architectures. + +##### **10.2.3.2.1 Transport control functions** + +The transport control functions include resource and admission control functions (RACF) described in [ITU-T Y.2111] as well as network attachment control functions (NACF) described in [ITU-T Y.2012] and [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +##### **10.2.3.2.2 Transport functions** + +The NGN transport functions provide connectivity for all components and physically separated functions within the NGN. These functions provide support for the transfer of content information, as well as the transfer of control and management information. + +The NGN transport functions include "access network functions", "edge functions", "core transport functions" and "gateway functions" all of which are described in [ITU-T Y.2012]. + +## **10.3 Description of functions common to the three architectural approaches** + +Functions and functional blocks described in this clause are common to the three architecture approaches described in this Recommendation. Figure 10-4 shows further decomposition of functions into their constituent functional blocks. + + + +The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of IPTV, organized into four main vertical sections: End-user functions, Application functions, Management functions, and Content provider functions. + +- End-user functions (Leftmost, pinkish-red background):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions (Service and application discovery and selection client functional block, Linear TV client functional block, On-demand client functional block, Other client functional block(s)). + - SCP client functions:** Content protection client functional block, Service protection client functional block. + - Content delivery client functions:** Error recovery client functional block, Unicast content delivery client functional block, Multicast content delivery client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Authentication and configuration protocol, Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Center, light blue background):** + - IPTV application functions:** Service and application discovery and selection functional block, Linear TV application functional block, On-demand application functional block, Other application functional block(s). + - SCP functions:** Content protection functional block, Service protection functional block. + - Content preparation functions:** Content processing control functional block, Content management functional block, Metadata processing functional block, Content pre-processing functional block. + - Service control functions:** IPTV service control functional block, Service user profile functional block, Unicast delivery control protocols, Error recovery control protocol. + - Content delivery functions:** Content distribution and location control functions (Location control functional block, Distribution control functional block), Content delivery and storage functions (Content delivery control functional block, Cache/storage functional block, Distribution functional block, Error recovery functional block, Content processing functional block, Unicast delivery functional block, Multicast delivery functional block). + - Network functions:** Authentication and IP allocation functional block, Resource control functional block, Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, Multicast transport functions (Multicast control point functional block, Multicast replication functional block), Unicast transport functions. +- Management functions (Right of Application functions, grey background):** + - Application management functional block. + - Service control management functional block. + - Content delivery management functional block. + - End-user device management functional block. + - Transport management functional block. +- Content provider functions (Far right, grey background):** + - DRM rights sources. + - Metadata sources. + - Content sources. + +Interconnections are shown via solid and dashed lines, representing data and control flows. Labels like 'Control protocol', 'Unicast path', and 'Multicast path' indicate specific data flows between components. + +Detailed IPTV functional architecture diagram showing four main functional areas: End-user functions, Application functions, Management functions, and Content provider functions. End-user functions include IPTV terminal, SCP client, Content delivery client, and Home network functions. Application functions include IPTV application, SCP, Content preparation, Service control, Content delivery, and Network functions. Management functions include Application, Service control, Content delivery, and Transport management blocks. Content provider functions include DRM rights, Metadata, and Content sources. + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-4 + +NOTE 1 – For NGN IPTV architectures, "authentication and IP allocation functional block" is replaced by "network attachment control functions (NACF)". + +NOTE 2 – For NGN IPTV architectures, "resource control functional block" is replaced by "resource and admission control functions (RACF)". + +NOTE 3 – For NGN IMS IPTV architecture, "IPTV service control functional block" is replaced by "core IMS functions". + +NOTE 4 – For NGN IMS IPTV architecture, "control client functional block" is replaced by "session client functional block". + +**Figure 10-4 – Detailed IPTV functional architecture** + +### **10.3.1 Application functions** + +#### **10.3.1.1 IPTV application functions** + +The IPTV application functions allow the IPTV terminal functions to select and purchase the content if desired. + +When receiving requests from IPTV terminal functions, the IPTV application functions perform application authorization and execution of IPTV service logic based on user profile, content metadata and other information retrieved from relevant entities. The IPTV application functions also communicate with content functions to prepare the delivery of media content to IPTV terminal functions. + +Application functions make use of a set of underlying support functions that provide common facilities, for example, content delivery functions and service control functions. These functions are built from functional blocks, for example, the unicast delivery functional block. + +An end-user can optionally have access to IPTV services from different service providers and depending on the services to which the end-user is subscribed, the end-user can optionally select applications from the same or a different service provider. + +##### **10.3.1.1.1 Service and application discovery and selection functional block** + +The service and application discovery and selection (SADS) functional block provides for the discovery and selection of IPTV services and applications. This can include the discovery and selection of services from multiple service providers. + +The ordering of service selection and application selection is out of the scope of this Recommendation. Clause I.1.5 provides an example of high level procedural flows for initialization of IPTV application access. + +The SADS functional block generates and provides the service discovery information to the SADS client functional block. The service discovery information consists of one or more entry points to service selection. The entry points can optionally be in the form of a URL. Service discovery can optionally be performed using the IPTV service control functions. + +The SADS functional block generates and provides the description information about the available applications, for example, linear TV and video on demand, to the SADS client functional block. The SADS client functional block presents this information to the end user for browsing and selection. The SADS functional block receives metadata information about services and applications from the metadata processing functional block. + +##### **10.3.1.1.2 On-demand application functional block** + +The on-demand application functional block performs session management, service authorization, presentation of the content metadata and execution of the service logic for on-demand applications. + +##### **10.3.1.1.3 Linear TV application functional block** + +The linear TV application functional block performs session management, service authorization, presentation of the content metadata and execution of the service logic for linear TV applications. + +##### **10.3.1.1.4 Other application functional blocks** + +These functional blocks provide for the delivery and presentation of additional IPTV services and their content, e.g., games, distant learning. + +All the IPTV application functions can optionally communicate with the application profile functional block to support the customization of IPTV services. + +#### **10.3.1.2 SCP functions** + +The service and content protection (SCP) functions control the protection of the services and content. Content protection includes control of accessing the content and the protection of content using methods such as encryption. Service protection includes authentication and authorization to access the services and optionally protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +##### **10.3.1.2.1 Content protection functional block** + +The content protection functional block controls the protection of the content and is responsible for the management of the content rights and the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the content. It acquires the content rights (or content license, originated from the content provider) indication from the content preparation functions, generates and distributes this security information (rights object or keys) to the SCP client functions. It can optionally provide keys for content encryption. + +For example, when it receives a request for security information from IPTV terminal functions, it interacts with the application profile functional block for user-related security subscription information (e.g., time limited, whether fast forward/fast rewind are allowed), generates the rights object and delivers it to the IPTV terminal functions. + +It also provides keys for service and content protection to IPTV application functions, which then deliver the keys to relevant functions, e.g., IPTV terminal functions and the content encryption function. + +##### **10.3.1.2.2 Service protection functional block** + +The service protection functional block controls the protection of services. Service protection includes authentication and authorization of access to services and the protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +#### **10.3.1.3 Application profile functional block** + +See clause 9.2.2 for the relevant information associated with the application profile functional block. + +#### **10.3.1.4 Application provisioning functional block** + +The application provisioning functional block manages the life-cycle of IPTV applications, e.g., adding or withdrawing them from service. + +#### **10.3.1.5 Content preparation functions** + +The content preparation functions are comprised of content management, metadata processing, content processing control and content pre-processing functional blocks. These functional blocks may be used to control the preparation and/or combination of the content, as delivered by the content owner(s), into the required delivery format. + +The content preparation functions may be subject to commercial agreements with content owners, note that not all contents are subject to the functions described below: + +- The metadata and rights information are delivered to the metadata processing functional block. Content can optionally be watermarked, transcoded and encrypted by the content pre-processing functional block before being delivered to content delivery functions. The programme related metadata is delivered to IPTV application functions. If the original content from the content owner is modified or transcoded in any way, it may be necessary to also edit the programme-related metadata. + +##### **10.3.1.5.1 Content management functional block** + +The content management functional block manages the life-cycle of the content in compliance with commercial agreements with the content owner. This management function can optionally be triggered by requests from the IPTV application functions. The content management functional block directs the other content preparation functions to prepare the content, e.g., to perform packaging, scheduling or transcoding. + +##### **10.3.1.5.2 Metadata processing functional block** + +The metadata processing functional block obtains, manages and processes the programme-related metadata from the metadata sources, via the content pre-processing functional block, and provides it to the IPTV application functions. The metadata can optionally include title, brief introduction and content-tracing information (such as watermark), etc., from the content provider, as well as price, time schedule, etc., from the service provider. + +##### **10.3.1.5.3 Content processing control functional block** + +The content processing control functional block controls transcoding and other functions such as tracing, packaging, advertising-insertion into streams, format conversion, resolution conversion, editing, etc. It controls the content pre-processing functions within content preparation and the content processing functions within content delivery functions. + +##### **10.3.1.5.4 Content pre-processing functional block** + +The content pre-processing functional block performs all or some of the following functions: + +- **Transcoding:** In order to achieve bandwidth efficiency, content encoded in one compression format is recommended to be encoded into a more efficient format, e.g., content encoding based on [b-ITU-T H.262] as opposed to content encoding based on [b-ITU-T H.264]. +- **Content packaging:** Content packaging is the selection and combination of multiple items of content into a single item of content for delivery (e.g., packaging a movie with different subtitles). +- **Content scheduling:** Content scheduling is the provision of timing information for advertising-insertion or for the scheduling of content delivery. +- **Content aggregation:** Aggregation of content and metadata delivered by the content provider functions. +- **Content encryption:** Encryption of the content under the control of the content protection functional block. +- **Content tracing:** Conditioning for content tracing watermark embedding and creation of content tracing metadata. +- Other functions such as advertising-insertion, format conversion, resolution conversion, editing, etc. + +### **10.3.2 Application client functions** + +#### **10.3.2.1 Service and application discovery and selection client functional block** + +The SADS client functional block provides for the end user's discovery and selection of IPTV services and applications. + +#### **10.3.2.2 On-demand client functional block** + +The on-demand client functional block interacts with the on-demand application functional block to perform session management, service authorization, presentation of the content metadata and execution of the service logic for the on-demand applications. + +#### **10.3.2.3 Linear TV client functional block** + +The linear TV client functional block interacts with the linear TV application functional block to perform session management, service authorization, presentation of the content metadata and execution of the service logic for the linear TV applications. + +#### **10.3.2.4 Other client functional blocks** + +These functional blocks interact with the other application functional blocks for the delivery and presentation of additional IPTV services and their content, e.g., games, distant learning. + +#### **10.3.2.5 Service and content protection client functions** + +##### **10.3.2.5.1 Content protection client functional block** + +The content protection client functional block performs integrity checking, usage rights verification, content decryption and content tracing. + +##### **10.3.2.5.2 Service protection client functional block** + +The service protection client functional block performs the authentication and authorization of access to services and, optionally, protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +### **10.3.3 Content delivery functions** + +The following clauses describe decomposition of the content delivery functions into their constituent functional blocks (see Figure 10-4). The detailed functional architecture of content delivery functions applies to all three architectural approaches, and extends the IPTV functional architecture to include the detailed functional blocks that relate to content delivery functions and their relationship to the network functions. The details for unicast delivery and multicast delivery are considered. + +#### **10.3.3.1 Content distribution and location control functions** + +The content distribution and location control functions (CD&LCF) control the content delivery and storage functions to optimize content distribution, selection and delivery of content to the IPTV terminal functions. If there are many instances of content distribution and location control functions, one instance must be chosen according to some criteria such as location, load status of content distribution and location control functions to process the request from content preparation functions or the IPTV service control functional block. + +The content distribution and location control functions (CD&LCF) are comprised of two functional blocks: distribution control functional block and location control functional block. + +##### **10.3.3.1.1 Distribution control functional block** + +The distribution control functional block coordinates the delivery and storage resources of content delivery and storage functions and establishes the optimal distribution policy for distributing content from content preparation functions to content delivery and storage functions. It also controls the distribution of content among the instances of content delivery and storage functions. + +The distribution policy for content distributed as files or streams can optionally be different. + +The distribution control functional block uses and maintains the distribution information about how the content is distributed among the instances of content delivery and storage functions. The distribution control functional block can optionally use the information obtained from the location control functional block to optimize the distribution policy. + +The distribution control functional block can optionally use information such as load status of content delivery and storage functions to optimize the distribution policy. + +##### **10.3.3.1.2 Location control functional block** + +The location control functional block is used to process requests from the IPTV service control functional block or IPTV application functions to select a suitable content delivery and storage functions which can provide the required content. Then the selected content delivery and storage functions can deliver the content to the content delivery client functions. The selection criteria include the distribution information and load status of content delivery and storage functions, the terminal information, e.g., terminal location and capability, and other possible criteria. The IPTV service control functional block or IPTV application functions then request the identified content delivery and storage functions to allocate resources for content delivery. + +The location control functional block resolves the application information, such as logical content identifier, into the content location information, such as the address of the content delivery and storage functions which can provide the requested content. + +In the case where multicast is used, the location control functional block can optionally: + +- manage and allocate multicast network parameters (e.g., multicast address); +- associate and maintain the mapping between logical channel identifiers and multicast network parameters; +- provide mapping, explained in the previous bullet, to IPTV application functions or IPTV service control functional block when requested. + +#### **10.3.3.2 Content delivery and storage functions** + +The content delivery and storage functions are described in clause 9.4.2. The detailed functional blocks contained in these functions are described below. + +##### **10.3.3.2.1 Content delivery control functional block** + +The content delivery control functional block handles control functions related to the content delivery and storage functions, such as control of the media resources, and handling of recoding commands, such as for video cassette recorders (VCRs). + +##### **10.3.3.2.2 Unicast delivery functional block** + +The unicast delivery functional block is responsible for streaming and delivering (e.g., via RTP over UDP) content streams to the content delivery client functions via the network functions based on the use of the unicast protocols and mechanisms. + +It reports status information to content distribution and location control functions (e.g., reporting on an established IPTV media session). + +It can optionally provide other functions, such as file downloading and uploading to and from the content delivery client functions and embedding of content tracing information. + +##### **10.3.3.2.3 Multicast delivery functional block** + +The multicast delivery functional block is responsible for streaming and delivering (e.g., via RTP over UDP) content streams to the content delivery client functions via the network functions based on the use of the multicast protocols and mechanisms. + +##### **10.3.3.2.4 Cache and storage functional block** + +The cache and storage functional block is responsible for caching the content, e.g., in order to support time-shifted linear TV. It is also responsible for storing the content, e.g., in order to support VoD or other IPTV services. + +##### **10.3.3.2.5 Distribution functional block** + +The distribution functional block receives the content from the content preparation functions. It distributes the content, which includes live streams or files, residing among the separate instances of content delivery and storage functions. + +##### **10.3.3.2.6 Content processing functional block** + +The content processing functional block processes the content under the control of the content processing control functional block. The main functionalities are: + +- transcoding; +- other functions, such as watermarking, advertising-insertion into streams, format conversion, resolution conversion, editing, etc.; +- encryption. + +##### **10.3.3.2.7 Error recovery functional block** + +The content delivery functions can optionally include an error recovery functional block. This functional block serves to improve reliability in the case where IPTV network functions cannot provide sufficient QoS. The error recovery functional block generates additional information for a content stream, either proactively or on request, such that the error recovery client functional block in the content delivery client functions can recover the content. + +The error recovery functional block relies on other content delivery functions to deliver the additionally generated information. + +The error recovery functional block relies on the availability of an error recovery client functional block in the content delivery client functions. The error recovery functional block can optionally be realized by forward error correction (FEC) or by retransmission. + +#### **10.3.3.3 Content delivery client functions** + +The content delivery client functions are responsible for the content reception in the IPTV terminal functions. + +##### **10.3.3.3.1 Multicast content delivery client functional block** + +The multicast content delivery client functional block receives the content from the multicast delivery functional block within the content delivery and storage functions. This functional block communicates with the multicast control point functional block for the selection of the multicast stream. + +##### **10.3.3.3.2 Unicast content delivery client functional block** + +The unicast content delivery client functional block receives the content from the unicast delivery functional block within the content delivery and storage functions. This functional block + +communicates with the content delivery control functional block within the content delivery and storage functions for the control of the unicast stream. + +##### **10.3.3.3.3 Error recovery client functional block** + +The content delivery client functions can optionally include an error recovery client functional block. This functional block performs error recovery on the content streams in conjunction with the error recovery functional block within the content delivery functions. + +### **10.3.4 Network functions** + +The network functions are described in clause 9.5. The detailed functional blocks contained in these functions are described below. Multicast control point functional blocks and multicast replication functional blocks can optionally exist in access network functions, edge function, or core transport functions. + +#### **10.3.4.1 Multicast transport functions** + +##### **10.3.4.1.1 Multicast control point functional block** + +The multicast control point functional block is responsible for the selection of the individual multicast streams to be delivered, over the access network, to the IPTV end-user functions. The request for a multicast stream can optionally be authorized before it is accepted. + +##### **10.3.4.1.2 Multicast replication functional block** + +The multicast replication functional block is responsible for replicating multicast streams from a multicast delivery functional block to all the instances of the multicast control point functional blocks. + +#### **10.3.4.2 Unicast transport functions** + +The unicast transport functions are responsible for the transport of unicast content streams from the unicast delivery functional block to the end-user functions. + +### **10.3.5 Content provider functions** + +The content provider functions provide a number of different types of source to the content preparation functions, e.g., content protection metadata sources, metadata sources and content sources. The physical interfaces and content formats can optionally be different depending on the type of the source. It can optionally include functions for access control based on the rating of the content. + +#### **10.3.5.1 Content protection metadata sources** + +Content protection metadata defines the usage rules and rights for protected IPTV content. + +#### **10.3.5.2 Metadata sources** + +A metadata source is an entity that provides content provider metadata associated with the IPTV content. + +#### **10.3.5.3 Content sources** + +A content source is an entity that provides IPTV content. + +## 10.4 Interworking + +### 10.4.1 Interworking between IPTV architectures + +IPTV services can optionally be supported by either non-NGN or by NGN-based architectures, using either non-IMS or IMS-oriented approaches. Interworking between these various architectures can be achieved by means of interworking functions or interworking gateways, as shown in Figure 10-5. + + + +The diagram shows two identical IPTV architectures, labeled 'IPTV architecture 1' and 'IPTV architecture 2', connected by a central 'Interworking gateway'. Each architecture is represented as a large rectangle containing several functional blocks. On the left of each architecture is a vertical pink block labeled 'End-user functions'. To its right are three stacked blocks: a light blue block at the top labeled 'Application functions', a yellow block in the middle labeled 'Service control functions', and an orange block on the right labeled 'Content delivery functions'. Below these three blocks is a light green block labeled 'Network functions'. Dashed lines with dots at the ends indicate internal connections within each architecture: a vertical line connects 'End-user functions' to 'Application functions'; a vertical line connects 'Application functions' to 'Service control functions'; a vertical line connects 'Service control functions' to 'Content delivery functions'; a vertical line connects 'Content delivery functions' to 'Network functions'; and a horizontal line connects 'End-user functions' to 'Network functions'. The 'Interworking gateway' is a white vertical rectangle positioned between the two architectures. It has two horizontal lines extending from its left and right sides, each connecting to the 'Service control functions' block of the respective architecture. Additionally, there are two horizontal dashed lines with dots at the ends, one connecting the 'Service control functions' block of IPTV architecture 1 to the 'Service control functions' block of IPTV architecture 2, and another connecting the 'Content delivery functions' block of IPTV architecture 1 to the 'Content delivery functions' block of IPTV architecture 2. + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-5 + +Diagram illustrating interworking between two IPTV architectures (IPTV architecture 1 and IPTV architecture 2) via an Interworking gateway. Each architecture consists of End-user functions, Application functions, Service control functions, Content delivery functions, and Network functions. The Interworking gateway connects the Service control functions and Content delivery functions of both architectures. + +**Figure 10-5 – Interworking between IPTV architectures** + +The detailed interworking functions required within the interworking gateway depend on whether the interworking is desired to be carried out at one or more layers, and the specifics of the service provided as well as the detailed protocols used by the non-IMS and IMS-based IPTV domains. Consequently, the details of these interworking (IW) functions are for further study. + +Here it is necessary to establish that the concept of IW functions/gateways can be used to enable interworking between the IPTV services provided by any of the three IPTV architectures described in this Recommendation. + +### 10.4.2 Third party application interworking + +The third party application gateway functional block is responsible for the support of third party application functions as shown in Figure 10-6. + + + +The diagram illustrates the functional blocks and their interactions in an IPTV architecture, specifically focusing on the third party application gateway. + +**End-user functions (Leftmost column, reddish-brown background):** + +- IPTV terminal functions:** Contains "Application client functions". +- Content delivery client functions:** A separate block below the terminal functions. +- Control client functional block:** A separate block below the client functions. +- Home network functions:** Contains "Delivery network gateway functional block". + +**Application functions (Top middle, light blue background):** + +- Application profile functional block:** Connects to "Application client functions" and "Third party application gateway functional block". +- IPTV application functions:** Connects to "Application client functions" and "Content preparation functions". +- Third party application gateway functional block:** Connects to "Application profile functional block", "Content preparation functions", and "Third party application functions". +- Content preparation functions:** Connects to "IPTV application functions" and "Third party application gateway functional block". + +**Service control functions (Middle left, yellow background):** + +- Delivery protocols:** A central block within the service control functions. +- IPTV service control functional block:** Connects to "Delivery protocols" and "Authentication and IP allocation functional block". +- Service user profile functional block:** Connects to "Delivery protocols" and "Authentication and IP allocation functional block". + +**Content delivery functions (Middle right, orange background):** + +- Content distribution and location control functions:** Connects to "Delivery protocols" and "Content delivery and storage functions". +- Content delivery and storage functions:** Connects to "Content distribution and location control functions" and "Content and control". +- Content and control:** A label for the content delivery functions area. + +**Network functions (Bottom middle, light green background):** + +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects to "Control client functional block" and "Authentication and IP allocation functional block". +- Authentication and IP allocation functional block:** Connects to "IPTV service control functional block", "Service user profile functional block", and "Access network functions". +- Resource control functional block:** Connects to "Content delivery and storage functions" and "Core transport functions". +- Transport functions (Bottom right, light green background):** Contains "Access network functions", "Edge functions", and "Core transport functions". + +**Third party application functions (Top right, grey background):** + +- Third party application functions:** Connects to "Third party application gateway functional block" and "Content and metadata sources". + +**Content provider functions (Far right, grey background):** + +- Content and metadata sources:** Connects to "Third party application functions" and "Content delivery and storage functions". + +Y.1910(08)\_F10-6 + +Figure 10-6: Third party application gateway functional block in IPTV architecture. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture with four main vertical sections: End-user functions, Application functions, Service control functions, and Content delivery functions, all interacting with a central Network functions block and a Content provider functions block. + +Figure 10-6 – Third party application gateway functional block in IPTV architecture + +Third party application functions invoke application interfaces to make use of IPTV functionality. The reference point between the third party application gateway functional block and third party application functions is intended to support the development of third party applications. + +#### **Third party application gateway functional block** + +The third party application gateway functional block provides a controlled interface to enable third party application functions to utilize the IPTV-related capabilities and resources. The functions of the third party application gateway functional block are: + +- Policy control. +- Access to user profiles. +- Access to IPTV presence and status information (e.g., the requested service status, channel currently accessed, content currently accessed). +- Content play control. +- Access to the status and position within a content stream. +- Translation of protocols between the IPTV service control functional block and third party applications in cases where the protocols adopted by the two sides are different. + +# **11 Reference points** + +Figures 11-1, 11-2 and 11-3, respectively, identify the IPTV reference points for the non-NGN, NGN non-IMS and NGN IMS architectures. + +Appendices I and II add informative complements to the reference point descriptions of this clause. + + + +**End-user functions** + +**IPTV terminal functions** + +**Application client functions** + +SADS client functional block + +IPTV application client functional block + +SCP client functions + +Control client functional block + +**Content delivery client functions** + +Error recovery client functional block + +Unicast content delivery client functional block + +Multicast content delivery client functional block + +**Home network functions** + +Delivery network gateway functional block + +**Application functions** + +**IPTV application functions** + +SADS functional block + +IPTV application functional block + +Application profile functional block + +Content preparation functions + +SCP functions + +**Service control functions** + +Service user profile functional block + +IPTV service control functional block + +**Content delivery functions** + +**Content distribution and location control functions** + +Location control functional block + +Distribution control functional block + +**Content delivery and storage functions** + +Content delivery control functional block + +Cache/storage functional block + +Distribution functional block + +Error recovery functional block + +Content processing functional block + +Unicast delivery functional block + +Multicast delivery functional block + +**Network functions** + +Authentication and IP allocation functional block + +Resource control functional block + +Access network functions + +Edge functions + +Core transport functions + +**Multicast transport functions** + +Multicast control point functional block + +Multicast replication functional block + +**Unicast transport functions** + +Reference points: E0, E1, E2, E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, M1, C1, C2, C3, D1, S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, T1, R1, Ud, Mc, Md, H1, H2, H3. + +Figure 11-1: Reference points of non-NGN IPTV architecture. The diagram shows four main functional areas: End-user functions (red), Application functions (blue), Service control functions (yellow), and Network functions (green). End-user functions include IPTV terminal functions (Application client functions: SADS client, IPTV application client; SCP client; Control client; Content delivery client functions: Error recovery, Unicast, Multicast), and Home network functions (Delivery network gateway). Application functions include IPTV application functions (SADS, IPTV application), Application profile, Content preparation, SCP functions, and Content delivery functions (Location control, Distribution control, Content delivery and storage). Service control functions include Service user profile and IPTV service control. Network functions include Authentication and IP allocation, Resource control, Access network, Edge functions, Core transport, Multicast transport (Multicast control point, Multicast replication), and Unicast transport. Reference points E0-E7 connect the End-user functions to the other areas. Reference points A1-A6, M1, C1-C3, D1, S1-S5, T1, R1, Ud, Mc, Md, H1-H3, and S3 connect the internal blocks within and between the other three areas. + +Y.1910(08)\_F11-1 + +NOTE – The IPTV application functional block at any instance can be any of the following: + +- on-demand application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.2; +- linear TV application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.3; or +- other application functional blocks as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.4. + +**Figure 11-1 – Reference points of non-NGN IPTV architecture** + + + +Figure 11-2: Reference points of NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture. The diagram shows four main functional layers: End-user functions, Application functions, NGN service stratum functions, and NGN transport stratum functions. End-user functions include IPTV terminal functions (Application client functions: SADS client, IPTV application client, SCP client, Control client; Content delivery client functions: Error recovery, Unicast, Multicast) and Home network functions (Delivery network gateway). Application functions include IPTV application functions (SADS, Application profile, Content preparation, SCP) and Content delivery functions (Distribution and location control, Content delivery and storage). NGN service stratum functions include Service support functions (S1, S5) and Service control functions (Service user profile, IPTV service control). NGN transport stratum functions include Control functions (NACF, RACF), Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, and Transport functions (Multicast and Unicast). Reference points E0-E7 connect the layers, and A1-A6, M1, C1-C3, D1, S3, Ud, Mc, Md, T1, R1 connect internal blocks. + +Y.1910(08)\_F11-2 + +NOTE – The IPTV application functional block at any instance can be any of the following: + +- on-demand application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.2; +- linear TV application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.3; or +- other application functional blocks as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.4. + +**Figure 11-2 – Reference points of NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture** + + + +Y.1910(08)\_F11-3 + +Figure 11-3: Reference points of NGN IMS IPTV architecture. The diagram shows four main functional layers: End-user functions (red), Application functions (blue), NGN service stratum functions (yellow), and NGN transport stratum functions (green). End-user functions include IPTV terminal functions (SADS client, IPTV application client, SCP client, Session client) and Content delivery client functions (Error recovery, Unicast, Multicast). Home network functions include a Delivery network gateway. Application functions include IPTV application functions (SADS, IPTV application functional block) and Content delivery functions (Location control, Distribution control, Content delivery and storage). NGN service stratum functions include Service support functions (S1, S5) and Service control functions (Service user profile, Core IMS). NGN transport stratum functions include Control functions (NACF, RACF), Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, Multicast transport functions (Multicast control point, Multicast replication), and Unicast transport functions. Reference points E0-E7 connect the layers, and A0-A6, M1, C1-C3, D1, S3, Ud, Mc, Md, T1, R1 connect internal blocks. + +NOTE – The IPTV application functional block at any instance can be any of the following: + +- on-demand application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.2; +- linear TV application functional block as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.3; or +- other application functional blocks as defined in clause 10.3.1.1.4. + +**Figure 11-3 – Reference points of NGN IMS IPTV architecture** + +## **11.1 Reference points with characteristics common to all three IPTV architectures** + +The reference points identified in Figures 11-1, 11-2 and 11-3, common to all three IPTV architectures, are discussed below. + +### **11.1.1 Reference point A2** + +The A2 reference point is between the IPTV applications functional block and content distribution and location control functions (CD&LCF). + +This reference point is used by the IPTV applications functional block to request service parameters from CD&LCF. + +For a linear TV application, the A2 reference point is used by the corresponding IPTV application functional block to request multicast network parameters, e.g., multicast address. For an on-demand application, the A2 reference point is used by the corresponding on-demand application functional block to request the CD&LCF to identify a suitable CD&SF for content delivery. + +### **11.1.2 Reference point A3** + +The A3 reference point is between the IPTV application functional block and content preparation functions. + +This reference point is used to transmit the metadata stored in content preparation functions to the IPTV application functional block. + +### **11.1.3 Reference point A4** + +The A4 reference point is between the SADS functional block and the application profile functional block. + +This reference point is used by the SADS functional block to retrieve application profiles. The application profile can optionally include end-user subscription information, e.g., when there is a need for the SADS functional block to obtain personalized profiles. + +### **11.1.4 Reference point A5** + +The A5 reference point is between the IPTV application functional block and the application profile functional block. + +This reference point is used by the IPTV application functional block to retrieve application profiles. The application profile can optionally include end-user subscription information, e.g., when there is a need for the IPTV application functional block to obtain personalized application profiles. + +### **11.1.5 Reference point A6** + +The A6 reference point is between the IPTV application functional block and SCP functions. + +This reference point is used for transferring keys related to service and content protection information from SCP functions to the IPTV application functional block. + +### **11.1.6 Reference point C1** + +The C1 reference point is between the content preparation functions and content distribution and location control functions (CD&LCF). + +This reference point is used to facilitate content preparation functions to configure policies such as content distribution rules, selection criteria, etc., in the CD&LCF. + +### **11.1.7 Reference point C2** + +The C2 reference point is between content preparation functions and content delivery and storage functions (CD&SF). + +This reference point is used to transfer content from content preparation functions to CD&SF. + +### **11.1.8 Reference point C3** + +The C3 reference point is between content preparation functions and SCP functions. + +This reference point is used by the SCP functions to acquire the content rights or licenses from the content preparation functions. SCP functions can optionally also provide generated keys to content preparation functions. + +### **11.1.9 Reference point E0** + +The E0 reference point is between the ITF SADS client functional block and the SADS functional block. + +This reference point is used by the ITF to discover and select IPTV services and applications. + +NOTE – In the NGN IMS-based IPTV architecture, use of the E0 reference point may be limited to service selection, since service discovery can optionally be performed via the IMS core using the E3 and A0 reference points. + +### **11.1.10 Reference point E1** + +The E1 reference point is between the ITF application client functional block and IPTV application functional block. + +This reference point is used by the ITF to support service and application configuration. + +### **11.1.11 Reference point E2** + +The E2 reference point is between SCP client functions and SCP functions. + +This reference point is used for delivering security information (e.g., rights object or keys) from SCP functions to SCP client functions. + +### **11.1.12 Reference point E4** + +The E4 reference point is between error recovery functional block and error recovery client functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange messages for requesting and delivering error recovery information, for example FEC repair data or retransmission data. + +### **11.1.13 Reference point E5** + +The E5 reference point is between the multicast content delivery client functional block and the multicast control point functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange messages for joining multicast channels, e.g., IGMP messages. + +### **11.1.14 Reference point E6** + +The E6 reference point is between the unicast content delivery client functional block and the content delivery control functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange content control messages, e.g., video recording commands. + +NOTE – The information exchanged between the unicast content delivery client functional block and the content delivery control functional block can optionally be transferred via the IPTV service control functions, e.g., in the case where the IPTV service control functions proxy all requests between the unicast content delivery client functional block and the content delivery control functional block. + +### **11.1.15 Reference point E7** + +The E7 reference point is between content delivery client functions and the delivery network gateway functional block. + +This reference point is used to deliver control messages and content streams. + +### **11.1.16 Reference point D1** + +The D1 reference point is between content distribution and location control function (CD&LCF) and content delivery and storage functions (CD&SF). + +This reference point is used by the CD&LCF to get status information from the CD&SF, such as load status, the contents catalogue on each CD&SF, etc. + +### **11.1.17 Reference point H2** + +The H2 reference point is between the multicast replication functional block and delivery network gateway functional block. + +This reference point provides multicast-based IP connectivity between the delivery network gateway functional block and access network functions in order to deliver control messages and content streams. + +### **11.1.18 Reference point H3** + +The H3 reference point is between unicast transport functions and delivery network gateway functional block. + +This reference point provides unicast-based IP connectivity between the delivery network gateway functional block and access network functions in order to deliver control messages and content streams. + +### **11.1.19 Reference point M1** + +The M1 reference point is between SCP functions and the application profile functional block. + +This reference point is used by SCP functions to get security-related information from the application profile functional block. + +### **11.1.20 Reference point Mc** + +The Mc reference point is between the multicast delivery functional block and multicast control point functional block. + +This reference point is used to pass information to allow for the dynamic computation, establishment and maintenance of multicast trees. + +### **11.1.21 Reference point Md** + +The Md reference point is between the multicast delivery functional block and the multicast replication functional block. + +This reference point is used by the CD&SF to deliver content streams in multicast mode. + +### **11.1.22 Reference point Ud** + +The Ud reference point is between the unicast delivery functional block and the unicast transport functions. + +This reference point is used by the CD&SF to deliver content streams in unicast mode. + +## **11.2 Reference points with characteristics specific to non-NGN IPTV architecture** + +The reference points below are specific to the non-NGN IPTV architecture which is depicted in Figure 11-1. + +### **11.2.1 Reference point A1** + +The A1 reference point is between the IPTV application functional block and the IPTV service control functional block. + +This reference point is used for: + +- forwarding service signalling information between the IPTV service control functional block and the IPTV application functional block; +- forwarding signalling information between the IPTV application functional block and other functions, such as the ITF, CD&LCF. + +Service requests from the ITF are forwarded to the appropriate IPTV application functional block, and service responses, including service parameters, are sent from the corresponding IPTV application functional block and forwarded to the ITF via the A1 reference point. + +### **11.2.2 Reference point E3** + +The E3 reference point is between the control client functional block and the IPTV service control functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange session signalling information, e.g., session establishment, modification and termination. It can optionally be used to exchange: + +- content control messages, such as content recording commands; +- service and application discovery information. + +### **11.2.3 Reference point H1** + +The H1 reference point is between the delivery network gateway functional block and the authentication and IP allocation functional block. + +This reference point is used to perform authentication, and obtain necessary network parameters, e.g., IP address, etc., when the ITF within end-user functions attaches to the network. + +### **11.2.4 Reference point R1** + +The R1 reference point is between the resource control functional block and the network transport functions (e.g., access network functions). + +This reference point is used by the resource control functional block to control network resources within the transport functions. + +### **11.2.5 Reference point S1** + +The S1 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and the CD&LCF. + +This reference point is used to forward the service signalling messages, e.g., service requests, content resource requests, between the ITF/IPTV application functions and the CD&LCF. + +### **11.2.6 Reference point S2** + +The S2 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and the service user profile functional block. + +This reference point is used by the IPTV service control functional block to access service user profiles. + +The service user profile includes end-user information, e.g., end-user identity, security information, etc., and can optionally include a service user profile specific to an IPTV application. + +### **11.2.7 Reference point S3** + +The S3 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and the resource control functional block. + +This reference point is used by the IPTV service control functional block for requesting control of network resources. + +### **11.2.8 Reference point S4** + +The S4 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and the authentication and IP allocation functional block. + +This reference point is used by the IPTV service control functional block to get information from the authentication and IP allocation functional block such as the ITF location. + +### **11.2.9 Reference point S5** + +The S5 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and the content delivery control functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange messages for session management, e.g., session establishment, modification, or termination. + +It can optionally be used to exchange content control messages, e.g., content recording commands. + +### **11.2.10 Reference point T1** + +The T1 reference point is between the authentication and IP allocation functional block and the access network functions. + +This reference point is used for management of network configuration parameters as well as authentication of data. + +## **11.3 Reference points with characteristics specific to NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture** + +The reference points below are specific to NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture which is depicted in Figure 11.2. + +### **11.3.1 Reference point A1** + +The A1 reference point is the same as the A1 reference point in the non-NGN architecture (see clause 11.2.1). + +### **11.3.2 Reference point E3** + +The E3 reference point is the same as the E3 reference point in the non-NGN architecture (see clause 11.2.2). + +### **11.3.3 Reference point H1** + +The H1 reference point is between the delivery network gateway functional block and NACF. + +This reference point is used to perform authentication, and get necessary network parameters, e.g., IP address, when the ITF within the end-user functions attaches to the network. + +### **11.3.4 Reference point R1** + +The R1 reference point is between RACF and the transport functions. The R1 reference point corresponds to the Rw reference point in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +### **11.3.5 Reference point S1** + +The S1 reference point is the same as the S1 reference point in the non-NGN architecture (see clause 11.2.5). + +### **11.3.6 Reference point S2** + +The S2 reference point is the same as the S2 reference point in the non-NGN architecture (see clause 11.2.6). + +### **11.3.7 Reference point S3** + +The S3 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and RACF. + +The S3 reference point corresponds to the Rs reference point in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +### **11.3.8 Reference point S4** + +The S4 reference point is between the IPTV service control functional block and NACF. + +The S4 reference point corresponds to the S-TC1 reference point in [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +### **11.3.9 Reference point S5** + +The S5 reference point is the same as the S5 reference point in the non-NGN architecture (see clause 11.2.9). + +### **11.3.10 Reference point T1** + +The T1 reference point is between NACF and the access network functions. + +The T1 reference point corresponds to the TC-T1 reference point in [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +## **11.4 Reference Points specific to NGN IMS IPTV Architecture** + +The reference points below are specific to NGN IMS IPTV architecture which is depicted in Figure 11-3. + +### **11.4.1 Reference point A0** + +The A0 reference point is between the SADS functional block and core IMS functions. + +This reference point can optionally be used for exchanging service and application discovery information towards the ITF. This exchange of information can be performed in push mode or pull mode. + +- Push mode: the SADS functional block actively sends the service and application discovery information to the ITF. +- Pull mode: the ITF actively requests the service and application discovery information from the SADS functional block. + +This reference point corresponds to the ISC reference point referred to in [ITU-T Y.2021]. + +### **11.4.2 Reference point A1** + +The A1 reference point is between the IPTV application functional block and the core IMS functions. + +This reference point is used for: + +- forwarding service signalling information between the core IMS and IPTV application functional block; +- forwarding signalling information between the IPTV application functional block and other functions, such as the ITF, CD&LCF. + +Service requests from the ITF are forwarded to the appropriate IPTV application and service responses, including service parameters, are sent from the IPTV application functions and forwarded to the ITF via this reference point. + +This reference point corresponds to the ISC reference point defined in [ITU-T Y.2021]. + +### **11.4.3 Reference point E3** + +The E3 reference point is between the session client functional block and the core IMS functions. + +This reference point is used by the session client functional block to initiate a service request to the IPTV application functions via the core IMS functions, to identify and prepare for the connection to the content delivery functions, e.g., request for suitable content delivery and storage functions in a VoD case, and request for network parameters in a linear TV case, etc. It can optionally be used for exchanging service and application discovery information. + +This reference point corresponds to the Gm reference point defined in [ITU-T Y.2021]. + +### **11.4.4 Reference point H1** + +The H1 reference point is the same as the H1 reference point in the NGN non-IMS architecture (see clause 11.3.3). + +### **11.4.5 Reference point R1** + +The R1 reference point is between the RACF and network transport functions. This reference point corresponds to the Rw reference point in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +NOTE – This reference point is the same as the R1 reference point in the NGN non-IMS architecture (see clause 11.3.4). + +### **11.4.6 Reference point S1** + +The S1 reference point is between the core IMS functions and CD&LCF. + +This reference point is used to forward the service signalling messages, e.g., service requests, content resource requests, between the ITF/IPTV application functions and CD&LCF. + +### **11.4.7 Reference point S2** + +The S2 reference point is between the core IMS functions and service user profile functional block. + +This reference point is used by core IMS functions to store and get service user profiles. The profile includes end-user information, e.g., end-user identity, security information, etc., as well as a service profile specific to an IPTV application. + +This reference point corresponds to the Cx reference point defined in [ITU-T Y.2021]. + +### **11.4.8 Reference point S3** + +The S3 reference point is between the core IMS functions and RACF. + +This reference point is used by the core IMS functions to request RACF for the control of transport resources. This reference point corresponds to the Rs reference point as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +### **11.4.9 Reference point S4** + +The S4 reference point is between core IMS functions and NACF. + +This reference point is used by core IMS functions to interact with NACF in order to retrieve information related to the IP connectivity access information (e.g., physical location of the ITF). + +This reference point corresponds to the S-TC1 reference point as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. + +### **11.4.10 Reference point S5** + +The S5 reference point is between the core IMS functions and the content delivery control functional block. + +This reference point is used to exchange messages for session management, e.g., session establishment, modification or termination. + +It can optionally be used to exchange content control messages, e.g., content recording commands. + +### **11.4.11 Reference point T1** + +The T1 reference point is between the NACF and access network functions. This reference point corresponds to the TC-T1 reference point as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. + +NOTE – This reference point is the same as the T1 reference point in NGN non-IMS architecture (see clause 11.3.10). + +# Annex A + +## Relationship between IPTV and NGN architectures + +(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation) + +## A.1 IPTV-related components in the NGN architecture + +It is useful to relate the IPTV architecture to the general NGN framework architecture and other networks to clarify the similarities and differences, as well as provide a reference for the more detailed description of IPTV-specific components. The "NGN-based" architecture indicates that the IPTV architecture is in accordance with NGN architecture as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. The NGN components described in [ITU-T Y.2012] are shown in Figure A.1. + +As the non-NGN IPTV functional architecture mentioned in the scope and detailed in the main body of this Recommendation does not necessarily require NGN components, and uses conventional and/or legacy technology networks for delivery of IPTV services, Figure A.1 should not be construed as the only basis for providing IPTV services. + + + +Y.1910(08)\_FA.1 + +Figure A.1: Transport and service configuration of the NGN. The diagram illustrates the architecture of the Next Generation Network (NGN) divided into two main strata: the Service stratum (top) and the Transport stratum (bottom). The Service stratum includes Applications, Application support functions and service support functions, S. user profile functions, Other NGN service components, IPTV service component, PSTN/ISDN emulation service component, IP multimedia service component, and Service control functions. The Transport stratum includes T. user profile functions, Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF), Access network functions, Edge functions, and Core transport functions. On the left, Legacy terminals, Customer networks, and NGN terminals are connected to the network via Gateways (GW). On the right, the network connects to Other networks. The diagram shows the flow of data and control signals between these components. + +**Figure A.1 – Transport and service configuration of the NGN** + +NOTE – In diagram A.1: service components are not purely service control but also comprise service delivery functions. For the purposes of adding support for IPTV, the diagram from [ITU-T Y.2012] is considered to have a service control function box that stops halfway into the underlying components, with another "service delivery functions" box covering the remaining space. + +## A.2 Functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN architectures + +The NGN-based IPTV architecture is defined in accordance with [ITU-T Y.2012] for providing IPTV services. Therefore, its functionalities have a corresponding relationship with the NGN architecture. + +Application functions in IPTV architecture can optionally be included in application support functions and service support functions of NGN shown in Figure A.1. Service control functions and content delivery functions can optionally be included in the IPTV service component of NGN of Figure A.1. Thus, application functions, service control functions and content delivery functions are included in the service stratum of the NGN architecture. + +NOTE – In Figure A.1 it is assumed that the IPTV service components contain both a service control and a service delivery part. + +Table A.1 provides the relationships between the functions of NGN-based IPTV and NGN architectures. + +**Table A.1 – Functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN functional architectures** + +| No. | IPTV functional architecture | NGN functional architecture | Remarks | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | Network functions | Transport stratum | These correspond to each other. | +| 2 | End-user functions | End-user functions | These correspond to each other. | +| 3 | Management functions | Management functions | These correspond to each other. | +| 4 | Service control functions | Service control functions (in service stratum) | IPTV service control functional block corresponds to NGN service control functions. However, NGN service control functions can optionally include other functionalities. | +| 5 | Content delivery functions | Allocation of content delivery functions to NGN is for further study | Content delivery functions can optionally reside outside the NGN in cases such as a third party service provider. | +| 6 | Application functions | Application support functions and service support functions (in service stratum) | Application functions can optionally reside outside the NGN in cases such as a third party service provider | +| NOTE – Content provider functions are out of scope and not included in this mapping table. | | | | + +## A.3 Application support functions and service support functions + +The application support functions and service support functions which are defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] include four functional entities: + +- application support functional entity (AS-FE); +- application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE); +- application service coordination manager functional entity (APL-SCM-FE) and; +- service switching functional entity (SS-FE). + +Among these functional entities, the AS-FE has the closest relationship with the application functions of the IPTV architecture. The guidelines for selecting functions as the AS-FE are as follows: + +- A function that is used in common in two or more applications is recommended to be included in the AS-FE. +- From the viewpoint of personal information and privacy protection, a function that handles the user profile managed within NGN is recommended to be included in the AS-FE. +- From the viewpoint of security, a function that handles the inside information of network, such as network control signalling, is recommended to be included in the AS-FE. +- A function that can be located in application support functions and service support functions to provide an efficient service is recommended to be included in the AS-FE to improve QoE. + +# Appendix I + +## Procedural flows relating to IPTV services + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +The functional architecture in clause 10 describes the functions and functional blocks of the IPTV functional architecture. The following clauses describe the interactions between the functions and functional blocks by illustrating the related procedural flows. + +NOTE – These procedural flows are intended as illustrative examples of interactions between functional blocks and functions, and should not be taken as mandatory when implementing the IPTV functional architectures defined in this Recommendation. + +### I.1 High level flows + +The high level procedural flows describe the high level interactions between the functions in the IPTV architecture. + +In this description, the content delivery functions and service control functions are combined, represented as a single group of functions called "content delivery and service control functions", so that the different interaction between the application functions and these functions can be illustrated. Detailed breakdown of the functions, and their associated procedural flows, are described later. + +In general, a transactional protocol is used between the ITF and the application functions, this protocol is used for the selection and, if required, purchase of content. A streaming control protocol is used between the ITF and the content delivery and service control functions to establish the delivery and control the content. A delivery protocol is used to carry the content from a delivery function to the ITF. + +There are two main approaches to timing of the allocation resources: + +**Tightly coupled:** The delivery and network resources are allocated at the request of the application during the transactional phase of the service. They are released by a request from the application after viewing has been completed. This requires a session to be maintained with the transaction protocol. This approach is called "tightly coupled" as the application layer is tightly coupled to the control and delivery layer. + +**Loosely coupled:** The delivery and network resources are allocated in response to the establishment of the streaming protocol session. They are released when this streaming protocol session is terminated. This approach is called "loosely coupled" as the application layer is only loosely coupled to the control and delivery layer. + +The principal differences between tight and loose coupling of the application with the service control functions are the timing of the allocation of delivery and network resources. Tight coupling can optionally be more appropriate for the immediate consumption of content as delivery can be guaranteed. Loose coupling can optionally be more appropriate for delayed consumption of content as resources are not allocated until actually needed. + +Although the event sequences for the tightly coupled content on-demand and loosely coupled content on-demand operations are different, the sequences of messages sent by the ITF are the same. The same is true for the two linear TV cases. This can optionally allow an ITF to interoperate with either style of application to service delivery and control operations. + +NOTE – In cases where there is no clear distinction between the application functions and the content delivery and service control functions, the following figures may not accurately represent the procedural flows. For specific IMS-based procedural flows, refer to clause I.3. + +#### I.1.1 High level procedural flows for loosely coupled content-on-demand + +The following procedural flows represent the high level sequence of flows for a content-on-demand application that uses the unicast content delivery functions where the application is loosely coupled to the service control functions. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning, network attachment and service selection have been completed. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV as IPTV TF + participant App as Application functions + participant CD as Content delivery and service control functions + participant Net as Network functions + + Note left of IPTV: Select + IPTV->>App: Connect + App-->>IPTV: OK + IPTV->>App: Browser and select + App->>CD: Establish authority + CD-->>App: OK + App->>IPTV: OK (Service URL) + + Note left of IPTV: Consume: Set-up + IPTV->>CD: Consume (Service URL) + CD->>Net: Get current ITF location (Note) + Net-->>CD: Location (Note) + rect rgb(255, 200, 150) + Note over CD: Allocate CD&SF capabilities + end + CD->>Net: Request network resources + rect rgb(255, 200, 150) + Note over Net: Allocate network resources + end + Net-->>CD: OK + CD->>IPTV: OK + + Note left of IPTV: Play + IPTV->>CD: Play + CD->>IPTV: OK + CD->>IPTV: Content flow (Red Arrow) + IPTV->>CD: Close + + Note left of IPTV: Consume: Close + rect rgb(255, 200, 150) + Note over CD: Release CD&SF capabilities + end + CD->>Net: Release network resources + rect rgb(255, 200, 150) + Note over Net: Release network resources + end + Net-->>CD: OK + CD->>IPTV: OK + App->>IPTV: Disconnect + IPTV-->>App: OK + + Note right of Net: Transaction protocol + Note right of Net: Stream control protocol + +``` + +Y.1910(08)\_Fl1 + +Sequence diagram showing high-level procedural flows for loosely coupled content-on-demand between IPTV TF, Application functions, Content delivery and service control functions, and Network functions. The diagram is divided into four phases: Select, Consume: Set-up, Play, and Consume: Close. It includes messages for connection, browsing, authority establishment, resource allocation, content delivery, and disconnection. A red arrow indicates a 'Content flow' from the Content delivery function to the IPTV TF. A green arrow on the right indicates the 'Stream control protocol' direction. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.1 – High level procedural flows for loosely coupled content-on-demand** + +- 1) IPTV terminal functions (ITF) connect to and interact with the application functions to select the content item that the end user wishes to receive. +- 2) The application functions connect to the content delivery and service control functions to establish the authority for the ITF to consume the content. +- 3) The application functions return the URL of the content delivery and service control functions and content item. +- 4) ITF connects to the content delivery and service control functions to request the delivery of the content item. +- 5) The content delivery and service control functions determine the location of the ITF, for example by querying the network control function. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 6) The content delivery and service control functions determine which delivery function has the requested content and can be connected to the ITF and allocate this delivery function. +- 7) The content delivery and service control functions request the allocation of the network resources needed to support the network path from the delivery function to the ITF. +- 8) The ITF issues a play request. +- 9) The content delivery and service control functions facilitate the content flow to the ITF. +- 10) At the end of the viewing session, the ITF closes the content flow. +- 11) The content delivery and service control functions release the delivery resources. +- 12) The content delivery and service control functions request the release of network resources. +- 13) The content delivery and service control functions confirm that the session is closed. + +#### **I.1.2 High level procedural flows for tightly coupled content-on-demand** + +The following procedural flows represent the high-level sequence of flows for a content-on-demand application that uses the unicast content delivery functional block, where the application is tightly coupled to the service control functions. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning, network attachment and service selection have been completed. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV_TF as IPTV TF + participant App as Application functions + participant CD_SF as Content delivery and service control functions + participant Net as Network functions + + Note over IPTV_TF, App: Select + IPTV_TF->>App: Connect + App-->>IPTV_TF: OK + IPTV_TF->>App: Browser and select + + Note over App, CD_SF: Consume: Set-up + App->>CD_SF: Establish authority and resource + CD_SF->>Net: Get current ITF location (Note) + Net-->>CD_SF: Location (Note) + CD_SF->>CD_SF: Allocate CD&SF capabilities + CD_SF->>Net: Request network resources + Net->>Net: Allocate network resources + Net-->>CD_SF: OK + CD_SF-->>App: OK + + Note over IPTV_TF, App: Play + App->>IPTV_TF: OK service (URL) + IPTV_TF->>CD_SF: Consume (service URL) + CD_SF-->>App: OK + App->>CD_SF: Play + CD_SF-->>App: OK + CD_SF->>IPTV_TF: Content flow + IPTV_TF->>CD_SF: Close + CD_SF-->>App: OK + + Note over IPTV_TF, App: Consume: Close + App->>CD_SF: Disconnect + App->>CD_SF: Release authority and resource + CD_SF->>CD_SF: Release CD&SF capabilities + CD_SF->>Net: Release network resources + Net->>Net: Release network resources + Net-->>CD_SF: OK + CD_SF-->>App: OK + App-->>IPTV_TF: OK + + Note over CD_SF: Can be triggered by abnormal termination or timeout of transaction session + +``` + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +Sequence diagram showing high-level procedural flows for tightly coupled content-on-demand. The diagram involves four main entities: IPTV TF, Application functions, Content delivery and service control functions, and Network functions. The process is divided into three phases: Select, Consume: Set-up, and Play, followed by a Consume: Close phase. The Select phase includes 'Connect' and 'Browser and select' messages. The Consume: Set-up phase includes 'Establish authority and resource', 'Get current ITF location (Note)', 'Location (Note)', 'Allocate CD&SF capabilities', 'Request network resources', and 'Allocate network resources'. The Play phase includes 'OK service (URL)', 'Consume (service URL)', 'OK', 'Play', 'OK', 'Content flow', 'Close', 'OK', and 'Disconnect'. The Consume: Close phase includes 'Release authority and resource', 'Release CD&SF capabilities', 'Release network resources', and 'OK'. A note indicates that the release process can be triggered by abnormal termination or timeout of the transaction session. The diagram also shows vertical arrows for 'Transaction protocol' (blue) and 'Stream control protocol' (green). + +**Figure I.2 – High level procedural flows for tightly coupled content-on-demand** + +- 1) The IPTV terminal function (ITF) interacts with the application functions to select the content item that the end user wishes to receive. +- 2) The application functions connect to the content delivery and service control functions to establish the authority for the ITF to consume the content and reserve the delivery and network resources. +- 3) The content delivery and service control functions determine the location of the ITF, for example by querying the network control functions. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. + +- 4) The content delivery and service control functions determine which content delivery function has the requested content and can optionally be connected to the ITF, and allocate this delivery function. +- 5) The content delivery and service control functions request the allocation of the network resources needed to support the network path from the content delivery functions to the ITF. +- 6) The application functions return the URL of the content delivery and service control functions and content item. +- 7) The ITF connects to the content delivery and service control functions to request the delivery of the content item. +- 8) The ITF issues a play request. +- 9) The content delivery and service control functions stream the content to the ITF. +- 10) At the end of the viewing session, the ITF closes the streaming session. +- 11) The ITF closes the transaction session with the application functions. +- 12) The application functions inform the content delivery and service control functions that the session has ended. +- 13) The content delivery and service control functions release the delivery resources. +- 14) The content delivery and service control functions request the release of network resources. + +#### **I.1.3 High level procedural flows for loosely coupled linear TV** + +The following procedural flows represent the high-level sequence of flows for a linear TV application that uses the multicast delivery functions where the application is loosely coupled to the service control functions. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning, network attachment and service selection have been completed. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV_TF as IPTV TF + participant App as Application functions + participant CDS as Content delivery and service control functions + participant Net as Network functions + + Note left of IPTV_TF: Select + IPTV_TF->>App: Connect + App-->>IPTV_TF: OK + IPTV_TF->>App: Browser and select + App->>CDS: Establish authority + CDS-->>App: OK + IPTV_TF->>App: OK (service URL) + + Note left of IPTV_TF: Consume: Set-up + IPTV_TF->>CDS: Consume (service URL) + CDS->>Net: Get current ITF location (Note) + Net-->>CDS: Location (Note) + CDS->>Net: Request network resources + Note right of Net: Allocate network resources + Net-->>CDS: OK + CDS-->>IPTV_TF: OK + + Note left of IPTV_TF: Play + IPTV_TF->>CDS: IGMP join + CDS->>IPTV_TF: Content flow + + Note left of IPTV_TF: Consume: Close + IPTV_TF->>CDS: Close + CDS->>Net: Release network resources + Note right of Net: Release network resources + Net-->>CDS: OK + CDS-->>IPTV_TF: OK + IPTV_TF->>App: Disconnect + App-->>IPTV_TF: OK + + Note right of Net: Transaction protocol + Note right of Net: Stream control protocol + +``` + +Y.1910(08)\_F13 + +Sequence diagram showing high-level procedural flows for loosely coupled linear TV. The diagram involves four main entities: IPTV TF, Application functions, Content delivery and service control functions, and Network functions. The process is divided into four phases: Select, Consume: Set-up, Play, and Consume: Close. In the Select phase, the IPTV TF connects to Application functions, which then establish authority with Content delivery and service control functions. In the Consume: Set-up phase, the IPTV TF consumes a service URL, and the Content delivery and service control functions request network resources from the Network functions. In the Play phase, the IPTV TF sends an IGMP join request to the Content delivery and service control functions, which then sends a content flow to the IPTV TF. In the Consume: Close phase, the IPTV TF closes the session, and the Content delivery and service control functions release network resources from the Network functions. A note indicates that the release of network resources can be triggered by abnormal termination or timeout of the streaming session. The diagram also includes vertical arrows on the left for phases and on the right for Transaction and Stream control protocols. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.3 – High level procedural flows for loosely coupled linear TV** + +- 1) The IPTV terminal function (ITF) connects to and interacts with the linear TV application to obtain the list of channels that the customer wishes to receive. +- 2) The application connects to the content delivery and service control functions to establish the authority for the ITF to consume the channels. +- 3) The application returns the URL of the content delivery and service control functions and the list of multicast addresses. +- 4) The ITF connects to the content delivery and service control functions to request the network resources for the reception of the channels. +- 5) The content delivery and service control functions determine the location of the ITF, for example by querying the network control function. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 6) The content delivery and service control functions request the allocation of the network resources needed to support the network path from the delivery function to the ITF. +- 7) The ITF issues a multicast group join request to receive the channel. +- 8) At the end of the viewing session, the ITF closes the streaming session. + +- 9) The content delivery and service control functions request the release of network resources. +- 10) The content delivery and service control functions confirm that the session is closed. + +#### I.1.4 High level procedural flows for tightly coupled linear TV + +The following procedural flows represent the high-level sequence of flows for a linear TV application that uses the multicast delivery functional block where the application is tightly coupled to the service control functions. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning, network attachment and service selection have been completed. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV as IPTV TF + participant App as Application functions + participant CDS as Content delivery and service control functions + participant Net as Network functions + + Note over IPTV: Select + IPTV->>App: Connect + App-->>IPTV: OK + Note over IPTV: Consume: Set-up + IPTV->>App: Browser and select + App->>CDS: Establish authority and resource + CDS->>Net: Get current ITF location (Note) + Net-->>CDS: Location (Note) + CDS->>Net: Request network resources + Note over Net: Allocate network resources + Net-->>CDS: OK + CDS-->>App: OK + App-->>IPTV: OK (service URL) + Note over IPTV: Play + IPTV->>App: IGMP join + App->>CDS: Content flow + Note over CDS: Content flow + Note over IPTV: Consume: Close + IPTV->>App: Disconnect + App->>CDS: Release authority and resource + CDS->>Net: Release network resources + Note over Net: Release network resources + Net-->>CDS: OK + CDS-->>App: OK + App-->>IPTV: OK + + Note over Net: Transaction protocol + Note over Net: Transaction protocol + +``` + +Sequence diagram showing high-level procedural flows for tightly coupled linear TV. The diagram involves four main entities: IPTV TF, Application functions, Content delivery and service control functions, and Network functions. The flow is divided into three phases: Select, Consume: Set-up, and Play, followed by a Consume: Close phase. Key messages include Connect, OK, Browser and select, Establish authority and resource, Get current ITF location (Note), Location (Note), Request network resources, Allocate network resources, OK, OK (service URL), IGMP join, Content flow, Disconnect, Release authority and resource, Release network resources, and OK. A note indicates that the release of network resources can be triggered by abnormal termination or timeout of the transaction session. The diagram also includes vertical arrows for 'Transaction protocol' and 'Transaction protocol' on the right side. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.4 – High level procedural flows for tightly coupled linear TV** + +- 1) The IPTV terminal function (ITF) connects to and interacts with the linear TV application to obtain the list of channels that the customer wishes to receive. +- 2) The application connects to the content delivery and service control functions to establish the authority for the ITF to consume the channels and reserve the network resources. +- 3) The content delivery and service control functions determine the location of the ITF, for example by querying the network control function. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. + +- 4) The content delivery and service control functions request the allocation of the network resources needed to support the network path from the content delivery function to the ITF. +- 5) The application returns the URL of the content delivery and service control functions and the list of multicast addresses. +- 6) The ITF issues a multicast group join request to receive the channel. +- 7) At the end of the viewing session, the ITF closes the application session. +- 8) The application informs the content delivery and service control functions that the session has ended. +- 9) The content delivery and service control functions request the release of network resources. + +#### **I.1.5 High level procedural flows for initialization of IPTV application access** + + + +The diagram illustrates the high-level procedural flow for the initialization of IPTV application access. It shows the interaction between various functional blocks across four main stages: + +- Top Level:** End User Functions, Network Functions, Service Control Functions, and Application Functions (enclosed in a dashed box). The Application Functions block contains two sub-blocks: Service and Application Discovery & Selection Functional Block, and IPTV Applications (LTV, VOD, etc.). +- Stage 1: Network Attachment** - A box spanning End User Functions and Network Functions. +- Stage 2: Service Discovery and Selection** - A yellow box spanning End User Functions, Network Functions, and Service Control Functions. +- Stage 3: Application Discovery and Selection** - A yellow box spanning End User Functions, Network Functions, and Service Control Functions. +- Stage 4: Application Offering and Consumption** - A wide box at the bottom spanning all four functional areas. + +Vertical lines connect the functional blocks to the stage boxes, indicating the flow of information and control between them. + +High level procedural flow for initialization of IPTV application access diagram + +**Figure I.5 – High level procedural flow for initialization of IPTV application access** + +- 1) The user first selects a network provider and a network access mode, and the end-user functions execute the network attachment operation with the network functions. +- 2) After the user accesses the network, the service control functions provide the user the initial information of the available IPTV service providers, and the user selects an IPTV service provider. The network functions can optionally be involved in this procedure. +- 3) The service and application discovery and selection functional block finds available applications (such as linear TV, VoD, etc.), and provides these to the user for selection. +- 4) The user accesses the selected application. + +#### I.1.6 High level procedural flows for content distribution + +##### I.1.6.1 Procedural flows for file-based content distribution + +File-based content distribution is mainly used in VoD services. + +The procedures above the dotted line of Figure I.6 refer to file-based content distribution from the content preparation functions to the content delivery and storage functions. + +The procedures below the dotted line of Figure I.6 refer to file-based content distribution from content delivery and storage functions which already have received the required file-based content, and hence can distribute it to other content delivery and storage functions. + +The procedures below the dotted line are intended for the case when efficiency can be enhanced for the content delivery. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that content metadata and content protection rights information have been delivered from the content provider functions to the content preparation functions. + + + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant CPF as Content Preparation Functions + participant CDLCF as CD&LCF + participant CDSF1 as CD&SF + participant CDSF2 as CD&SF + + Note over CPF: 1) file-based content preparation + CPF->>CDLCF: 2) Indicates file-based content is available for distribution + Note over CDLCF: 3) enforces distribution policy and allocates resources + CDLCF->>CDSF1: 4) Indicate file-based content is available for distribution + CDSF1->>CDLCF: 5) acknowledge file-based content distribution + CDLCF->>CPF: 6) acknowledge file-based content distribution + CPF->>CDSF1: 7) file-based media transfer, for (a) pull mode, (b) push mode + Note over CDSF1, CDSF2: 12) file-based content transfer among CD&SF Instances + CDSF1->>CDLCF: 8) periodically request status related information + CDLCF->>CDSF1: 9) reply status related information + Note over CDLCF: 10) schedules content to CD&SF according to distribution policy + CDLCF->>CDSF1: 11) enable file-based content distribution for (a) pull mode, (b) push mode +``` + +The diagram illustrates the procedural flows for file-based content distribution across four main components: Content Preparation Functions, CD&LCF, and two instances of CD&SF. The process is divided into two sections by a horizontal dashed line. Above the dashed line, the flow starts with '1) file-based content preparation' in the Content Preparation Functions. This leads to '2) Indicates file-based content is available for distribution' being sent to CD&LCF. CD&LCF then performs '3) enforces distribution policy and allocates resources' and sends '4) Indicate file-based content is available for distribution' to the first CD&SF instance. This instance responds with '5) acknowledge file-based content distribution' to CD&LCF, which then sends '6) acknowledge file-based content distribution' back to the Content Preparation Functions. A large arrow labeled '7) file-based media transfer, for (a) pull mode, (b) push mode' points from the Content Preparation Functions to the first CD&SF instance. Below the dashed line, the first CD&SF instance sends '8) periodically request status related information' to CD&LCF, which replies with '9) reply status related information'. CD&LCF then performs '10) schedules content to CD&SF according to distribution policy' and sends '11) enable file-based content distribution for (a) pull mode, (b) push mode' to the first CD&SF instance. Finally, a double-headed arrow labeled '12) file-based content transfer among CD&SF Instances' indicates communication between the two CD&SF instances. + +Sequence diagram showing procedural flows for file-based content distribution between Content Preparation Functions, CD&LCF, CD&SF, and CD&SF. + +Figure I.6 – Procedural flows for file-based content distribution + +- 1) File-based content preparation procedures include content aggregation, content management, metadata processing, content processing and content encryption, which can optionally be completed before file-based content is distributed. +- 2) Content preparation functions indicate file-based content is available for distribution to the CD&LCF. +- 3) CD&LCF enforces distribution policy and allocates resources (i.e., select suitable CD&SF to receive file-based content). +- 4) CD&LCF indicate to the CD&SF that file-based content is available for distribution. +- 5) CD&SF provides an acknowledgement to the CD&LCF that file-based content can be distributed. +- 6) CD&LCF provides an acknowledgement to the content preparation functions that file-based content can be distributed. +- 7) Content preparation functions proceed to transfer the file-based content to CD&SF. + - a) The file-based content transport method can be PULL mode, i.e., the CD&SF downloads the file-based content initially from the content preparation functions. + - b) The file-based content transport method can be PUSH mode, i.e., content preparation uploads the file-based content initiatively to CD&SF. +- 8) In order to maintain information such as file-based content distribution information, load status of CD&SF, the CD&LCF periodically send "status" request messages to the CD&SF. +- 9) The CD&SF returns status-related information back to the CD&LCF. +- 10) CD&LCF schedules content to CD&SF according to a distribution policy. +- 11) Enable file-based content distribution for (a) push mode, (b) pull mode. +- 12) File-based content is transferred among CD&SF instances. + +##### **I.1.6.2 Procedural flows for stream-based content distribution** + +Stream-based content distribution is mainly used in linear TV and time-shifted linear TV. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that content metadata and content protection rights information have been delivered from the content provider functions to the content preparation functions. + + + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant CPF as Content Preparation Functions + participant CDLCF as CD&LCF + participant CDSF as CD&SF + + Note over CPF: 1) stream-based content preparation + CPF->>CDLCF: 2) Indicates stream-based content +is available for distribution + Note over CDLCF: 3) enforces distribution policy and +allocates resources + CDLCF->>CDSF: 4) Indicates stream-based +content +is available for distribution + CDSF->>CDLCF: 5) acknowledges stream- +based +content distribution + CDLCF->>CPF: 6) acknowledges stream- +based +content distribution + Note over CPF,CDSF: 7) stream-based content transfer +``` + +Sequence diagram showing the stream-based content distribution flow between Content Preparation Functions, CD&LCF, and CD&SF. + +**Figure I.7 – Stream-based content distribution flow** + +- 1) Stream-based content preparation procedures include content aggregation, content management, metadata processing, content processing and content encryption, which can optionally be completed before stream-based content is distributed. +- 2) Content preparation functions indicate stream-based content is available for distribution to the CD&LCF. +- 3) CD&LCF enforces distribution policy and allocates resources (i.e., select suitable CD&SF to receive stream-based content). +- 4) The CD&LCF indicates to the CD&SF that stream-based content is available for distribution. +- 5) The CD&SF provides an acknowledgement to the CD&LCF that stream-based content can be distributed. +- 6) The CD&LCF provides an acknowledgement to the content preparation functions that stream-based content can be distributed. +- 7) Content preparation functions proceed to transfer the stream-based content to CD&SF. + +### **I.2 Procedural flows for IPTV services based on NGN non-IMS IPTV architectures** + +The following clauses provide detailed descriptions of the procedural flows in the case of the NGN non-IMS IPTV architecture. + +There are two ways in which the IPTV control and the content delivery functions interoperate: + +- **Proxy:** One approach is for IPTV service control functional block to proxy all requests between the ITF and the content functions. In this way, IPTV control can request the allocation of delivery and network resources, track the progress of the streaming session and request the release of resources at the end of the session. +- **Redirect:** The other approach is for the IPTV service control functional block to request the allocation of delivery and network resources and then redirect the ITF to communicate directly with the actual content storage and delivery functions that have been allocated. + +The proxy approach has the advantage that a single function, the IPTV service control functions, keeps track of the allocated resources. The redirect approach has the advantage that the ITF communicates directly with the content storage and delivery function, reducing latency and resource usage. + +The redirect approach requires that the streaming control protocol can be redirected during session establishment. This is supported by most protocols, and if supported means that a single ITF implementation can communicate with ITPV services using either the proxy or the redirect method. + +The following figures show the procedural flows for the four use-cases resulting from the combination of loose and tight coupling with proxy and redirect methods. In all cases, the content on-demand application is shown making use of the unicast content delivery functions. + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning, network attachment and service selection have been completed. + +#### **I.2.1 Procedural flows for content on-demand with loose coupling and redirect** + +The following procedural flows show the interaction between the ITF and the IPTV application functions, the IPTV service control functions and the content delivery functions. In these flows, the application functions and the IPTV service control functional block do not communicate with each other, and the IPTV service control functional block redirects the ITF to the allocated content storage and delivery functions. + + + +The diagram illustrates the on-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and redirect. The participants involved are IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. + +The process is divided into several phases indicated by vertical arrows on the left: + +- Select:** Includes 'Connect to application' and 'Browse and select'. +- Purchase:** Includes 'Purchase content'. +- Consume: Set-up:** Includes 'Consume (service URL)', 'Request CD&SF for content and location', 'Allocate CD&SF capabilities', 'Request network resources between endpoints', 'Allocate network resources', and 'Redirect (delivery URL)'. +- Consume: Play:** Includes 'Consume (delivery URL)', 'Content authorization', 'Play', 'Media flow', and 'Close (delivery URL)'. +- Consume: Close:** Includes 'Session end', 'Release network resources between endpoints', and 'Release network resources'. + +Key messages and actions include: + +- Service authorization:** From IPTV TF to Application profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- Personalize:** From IPTV application functions to Application profile functional block. +- Content authorization and record purchase:** From IPTV application functions to Application profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- Establish content authority:** From IPTV application functions to Service profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- OK (service URL):** From IPTV application functions to IPTV service control functional block. +- Consume (service URL):** From IPTV application functions to IPTV service control functional block. +- Content authorization:** From IPTV service control functional block to Service profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- Get current ITF location (Note):** From IPTV service control functional block to NACF. +- Location (Note):** From NACF to IPTV service control functional block. +- Request CD&SF for content and location:** From IPTV service control functional block to CD&SF. +- Allocate CD&SF capabilities:** Action performed by CD&SF. +- OK (delivery URL):** From CD&SF to IPTV service control functional block. +- Request network resources between endpoints:** From IPTV service control functional block to RACF. +- Allocate network resources:** Action performed by RACF. +- Redirect (delivery URL):** From RACF to IPTV application functions. +- Consume (delivery URL):** From IPTV application functions to IPTV service control functional block. +- Content authorization:** From IPTV service control functional block to Application profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- Play:** From Application profile functional block to CD&SF. +- Media flow:** From IPTV service control functional block to IPTV application functions (indicated by a red arrow). +- Close (delivery URL):** From IPTV application functions to Application profile functional block, with an 'OK' response. +- End:** From CD&SF to Application profile functional block. +- Release CD&SF capabilities:** Action performed by CD&SF. +- Session end:** From Application profile functional block to IPTV service control functional block. +- Release network resources between endpoints:** From IPTV service control functional block to RACF. +- Release network resources:** Action performed by RACF. +- OK:** From RACF to IPTV service control functional block. + +On the right side, vertical arrows indicate the scope of the protocols: + +- Transaction protocol:** Covers the Select, Purchase, and Consume: Set-up phases. +- Stream control protocol:** Covers the Consume: Play phase. +- Stream delivery:** Covers the Consume: Close phase. + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-8 + +Sequence diagram showing on-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and redirect between various functional blocks. The diagram is divided into four phases: Select, Purchase, Consume: Set-up, and Consume: Play, followed by a Consume: Close phase. It includes messages for service authorization, content authorization, resource allocation, and session termination. A red arrow indicates a media flow from the IPTV service control functional block to the IPTV application functions. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.8 – On-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and redirect** + +- 1) The ITF runs the on-demand client which connects, using a transactional protocol, to the on-demand application to obtain the URL of the IPTV service control functional block with a reference to the content item that the customer wishes to receive. During this interaction, the application will authorize the ITF's connection, it can optionally use the application profile to personalize the service and it can optionally record the transaction and any associated purchase in the application profile. The application will establish, within the service profile, the authority for the ITF to subsequently consume the content. +- 2) The ITF connects to the IPTV service control functional block, using a session control protocol, and passes to it the reference for the content item to be consumed. The IPTV service control functional block authorizes the ITF's connection request against the authority that has been established. +- 3) The IPTV service control functional block determines the location of the IPTV device, for example by querying the NACF. It passes this information and the content reference to the unicast delivery control functional block so that the allocation of delivery resources can be requested. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 4) The content delivery control function determines which unicast delivery functional block has the requested content and can optionally be connected to the IPTV device. It queries, or maintains, the state of the unicast delivery functional block to identify one that has available capacity and allocates this to the ITF. It returns the URL of the physical server containing the allocated content item to the IPTV service control functional block. +- 5) The IPTV service control functional block requests the network resources needed to support the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the IPTV device. The IPTV service control functional block returns the ITF a redirect command containing the URL of physical server and content item. +- 6) The ITF redirect its session control connection to the identified unicast delivery functional block to control and receive the content. +- 7) The unicast delivery functional block uses a delivery protocol to send the content to the ITF. +- 8) At the end of the viewing, the ITF terminates the streaming control session with the unicast delivery functional block. +- 9) The unicast delivery functional block informs the unicast delivery control function that the session has ended. +- 10) The unicast delivery control function releases the delivery resources and informs the IPTV control function that the session has ended. +- 11) The IPTV service control function requests the release of network resources that were allocated to the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the ITF. + +In the exception case where the ITF does not perform step 8, the unicast delivery functional block monitors the session and, if this fails, performs step 9. Steps 10 and 11 would also follow. + +#### **1.2.2 Procedural flows for content on-demand with loose coupling and proxy** + +The following procedural flows show the interaction between the ITF, the IPTV application functions, the IPTV service control functions and the content delivery functions. In these flows, the application functions and the IPTV service control functional block do not communicate with each other and the IPTV service control functional block proxies the communication between the ITF and the allocated content storage and delivery function. + + + +The diagram illustrates the on-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and proxy, involving the following components and phases: + +- Components:** IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, NACF. +- Phases:** Select, Purchase, Consume: Set-up, Consume: Play, Consume: Close. +- Transaction protocol (Blue arrows):** + - Select:** Connect to application, Validate connect, OK, Browse and select, Personalize. + - Purchase:** Purchase content, Validate and record purchase, OK, Establish authority, OK, OK (service URL), Consume (service URL). + - Consume: Set-up:** Validate, OK, Get current ITF location (Note), Location (Note), Request CD&SF for content and location, Allocate CD&SF capabilities, OK (delivery URL), Request network resources between endpoints, Allocate network resources, OK. + - Consume: Play:** Play, OK, Media flow, Close, OK. + - Consume: Close:** Request for releasing CD&SF capabilities, Release CD&SF capabilities, Release network resources between endpoints, Release network resources, OK. +- Stream control protocol (Green arrows):** + - Consume: Play:** Play, OK, Close, OK. + - Consume: Close:** OK. +- Stream delivery (Red arrow):** Media flow. + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-9 + +Sequence diagram showing on-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and proxy. The diagram involves nine lifelines: IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. The flows are categorized into four phases: Select, Purchase, Consume: Set-up, and Consume: Play, and Consume: Close. The Transaction protocol is represented by blue arrows, and the Stream control protocol is represented by green arrows. The Stream delivery is represented by a red arrow. The diagram shows the process of connecting to an application, browsing and selecting content, purchasing content, validating and recording the purchase, establishing authority, consuming the service URL, requesting CD&SF for content and location, allocating CD&SF capabilities, requesting network resources, allocating network resources, playing the media flow, and finally releasing CD&SF capabilities and network resources. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.9 – On-demand procedural flows with loose coupling and proxy** + +- 1) The ITF runs the on-demand client which connects, using a transactional protocol, to an on-demand application to obtain the URL of the IPTV service control functional block with a reference to the content item that the customer wishes to receive. During this interaction, that application will authorize the ITF's connection, it can optionally use the application profile to personalize the service, it can optionally record the transaction and any associated purchase in the application profile. The application will establish, within the service profile, the authority for the ITF to subsequently consume the content. +- 2) The ITF connects to the IPTV service control functional block, using a session control protocol, and passes to it the reference to the content item to be consumed. The IPTV service control functional block authorizes the ITF's connection request against the authority that has been established. +- 3) The IPTV service control functional block determines the location of the IPTV device, for example by querying the NACF. It passes this information and the content reference to the unicast delivery control function to request the allocation of delivery resources. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 4) The content delivery control function determines which unicast delivery functional block has the requested content and can optionally be connected to the IPTV device. It queries, or maintains, the state of the unicast delivery functional block to identify one that has free capacity and allocates this to the ITF. It returns the URL of the physical server containing the allocated content item to the IPTV service control functional block. +- 5) The IPTV service control functional block requests the network resources needed to support the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the IPTV device. +- 6) The IPTV service control functional block starts to proxy the ITF's session control connection to the identified unicast delivery functional block to control and receive the content. +- 7) The unicast delivery functional block uses a delivery protocol to send the content to the ITF. +- 8) At the end of the viewing, the ITF terminates the streaming control session which the IPTV service control functional block proxies to the unicast delivery functional block. +- 9) The IPTV service control functions inform the unicast delivery control function that the session has ended. +- 10) The unicast delivery control function releases the CD&SF capabilities. +- 11) The IPTV service control function requests the release of network resources that were allocated to the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the ITF. + +In the exception case where the ITF does not perform step 8, the IPTV service control functions monitor the session and, if this fails, terminate the connection to the unicast delivery functional block and perform step 9. Steps 10 and 11 would also follow. + +#### **1.2.3 Procedural flows for content on-demand with tight coupling and redirect** + +The procedural flows show the interactions between the ITF, the IPTV application functions, the IPTV service control functional block and the content delivery functions. In these flows, the application communicates with the IPTV service control functional block to pre-allocate resources. As the delivery resources have already been allocated, the ITF communicates directly to the allocated content storage and delivery functions. + + + +The diagram illustrates the procedural flows for content on-demand with tight coupling and redirect. The participants involved are IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. + +The flows are categorized into four main phases: + +- Select:** + - IPTV TF connects to application functions. + - IPTV application functions validate connect with the IPTV service control functional block. + - IPTV service control functional block returns OK. + - IPTV application functions browse and select. + - IPTV service control functional block personalizes the selection. +- Purchase:** + - IPTV TF purchases content. + - IPTV application functions validate and record purchase with the IPTV service control functional block. + - IPTV service control functional block returns OK. + - IPTV application functions establish authority with the Service profile functional block. + - IPTV service control functional block returns OK. + - IPTV application functions setup. + - IPTV service control functional block gets current ITF location (Note) from the Application profile functional block. + - IPTV service control functional block returns Location (Note). + - IPTV service control functional block requests CD&SF for content and location from the CD&LCF. + - CD&LCF allocates CD&SF. + - CD&LCF returns OK (delivery URL). + - IPTV service control functional block requests network resources between endpoints from the RACF. + - RACF allocates network resources. + - RACF returns OK. + - IPTV service control functional block returns OK (URL). +- Consume: Set-up:** + - IPTV TF returns OK (URL). + - IPTV application functions consume (URL). +- Consume: Play:** + - IPTV application functions validate with the CD&SF. + - CD&SF returns OK. + - IPTV application functions play. + - IPTV application functions return OK. + - IPTV application functions send media flow (red arrow) to the CD&SF. + - IPTV application functions close. + - CD&SF returns OK. + - IPTV application functions end. + - CD&SF releases CD&SF capabilities. +- Consume: Close:** + - IPTV service control functional block sends session end to the CD&LCF. + - IPTV service control functional block releases network resources between endpoints from the RACF. + - RACF releases network resources. + - RACF returns OK. + +On the right side, a blue arrow indicates the 'Transaction protocol' and a green arrow indicates the 'Stream control protocol'. A red arrow indicates 'Stream delivery'. + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-10 + +Sequence diagram showing procedural flows for content on-demand with tight coupling and redirect. The diagram involves nine functional blocks: IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. The flows are categorized into four main phases: Select, Purchase, Consume: Set-up, and Consume: Play, followed by Consume: Close. The diagram includes messages for connection, validation, browsing, purchase, setup, resource allocation, media flow, and session termination. A red arrow indicates 'Stream delivery' and a green arrow indicates 'Stream control protocol'. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.10 – Procedural flows for content on-demand with tight coupling and redirect** + +- 1) The ITF runs the on-demand client which connects, using a transactional protocol, to an on-demand application to obtain the URL of the IPTV service control functional block with a reference to the content item that the customer wishes to receive. During this interaction, that application will authorize the ITF's connection, it can optionally use the application profile to personalize the service, it can optionally record the transaction and any associated purchase in the application profile. The application will establish, within the service profile, the authority for the ITF to subsequently consume the content. +- 2) The application connects to the IPTV service control functional block passing it the reference to the content item to be consumed and the ITF. +- 3) The IPTV service control functional block determines the location of the ITF, for example by querying the NACF. It passes this information and the content reference to the unicast delivery control function to request the allocation of delivery resources. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 4) The content delivery control function determines which unicast delivery functional block has the requested content and can optionally be connected to the IPTV device. It queries, or maintains, the state of the unicast delivery functional block to identify one that has free capacity and allocates this to the ITF. It returns the URL of the physical server containing the allocated content item to the IPTV service control functional block. +- 5) The IPTV service control functional block requests the network resources needed to support the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the IPTV device. The IPTV service control functional block returns to the application the URL of the physical server and content item, which in turn passes this to the ITF. +- 6) The ITF establishes the session control connection to the identified unicast delivery functional block to control and receive the content. The unicast delivery functional block authorizes this request by checking with the service profile. +- 7) The unicast delivery functional block uses a delivery protocol to send the content to the ITF. +- 8) At the end of the viewing, the ITF terminates the streaming control session with the unicast delivery functional block. +- 9) The ITF then terminates that connection to the application, which in turn informs the IPTV service control functions that the session has ended. +- 10) The IPTV service control functional block informs the unicast delivery control function that the session has ended so that it can release the delivery resources. +- 11) The IPTV service control function requests the release of network resources that were allocated to the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the ITF. + +In the exception case where the ITF does not perform step 9, the IPTV application functions monitor the session and, if this fails, terminate the session and notify the IPTV control functional block. Steps 10 and 11 would also follow. + +#### **1.2.4 Procedural flows for content on-demand with tight coupling and proxy** + +The following flow shows the interaction between the ITF, the IPTV application functions, the IPTV service control functions and the content delivery functions elements. In these flows, the application calls the IPTV service control functions to pre-allocate resources. The IPTV service control functions act as a proxy for the communication between the ITF and the allocated content storage and delivery function. + + + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-11 + +Sequence diagram showing procedural flows for on-demand IPTV services with tight coupling and proxy. The diagram involves nine lifelines: IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. The flows are categorized into four phases: Select, Purchase, Consume: Set-up, and Consume: Play, and Consume: Close. The Select phase includes 'Connect to application' and 'Browse and select'. The Purchase phase includes 'Purchase content', 'Validate and record purchase', 'Establish authority', and 'Setup'. The Consume: Set-up phase includes 'Get current ITF location (Note)', 'Request CD&SF for content and location', 'Allocate CD&SF', 'Request network resources between endpoints', and 'Allocate network resources'. The Consume: Play phase includes 'Consume (URL)', 'Validate', 'Play', 'Media flow', and 'Close'. The Consume: Close phase includes 'Release CD&SF' and 'Release network resources'. The diagram also shows 'Stream delivery' (red arrow) and 'Stream control protocol' (green arrow) flows. A blue arrow on the right indicates the 'Transaction protocol'. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.11 – Procedural flows for on-demand procedural flows with tight coupling and proxy** + +- 1) The ITF runs the on-demand client which connects, using a transactional protocol, to an on-demand application to obtain the URL of the IPTV service control functional block with a reference to the content item that the customer wishes to receive. During this interaction, the application will authorize the ITF's connection, it can optionally use the application profile to personalize the service, it can optionally record the transaction and any associated purchase in the application profile. The application will establish, within the service profile, the authority for the ITF to subsequently consume the content. +- 2) The application connects to the IPTV service control functional block, passing it references to the content item to be consumed and the ITF. +- 3) The IPTV service control functional block determines the location of the IPTV device, for example by querying the NACF. It passes this information and the content reference to the unicast delivery control function to request the allocation of delivery resources. This procedure is not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 4) The content delivery control function determines which unicast delivery functional block has the requested content and can optionally be connected to the IPTV device. It queries, or maintains, the state of the unicast delivery functional block to identify one that has available capacity and allocates this to the ITF. It returns the URL of the physical server containing the allocated content item to the IPTV service control functional block. +- 5) The IPTV service control functional block requests the network resources needed to support the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the IPTV device. The IPTV service control functional block returns to the application the URL of the physical server and content item, which in turn passes this to the ITF. +- 6) The ITF starts the session control connection to the IPTV service control functional block which proxies the request to the selected unicast delivery functional block. +- 7) The unicast delivery functional block uses a delivery protocol to send the content to the ITF. +- 8) At the end of the viewing, the ITF terminates the streaming control session which the IPTV service control functions are still proxying to the unicast delivery functional block. +- 9) The ITF then terminates the connection to the application, which in turn informs the IPTV service control functions that the session has ended. +- 10) The IPTV service control functions request that the unicast delivery control function releases the session. +- 11) The IPTV control function requests the release of network resources that were allocated to the network path from the unicast delivery functional block to the ITF. + +In the exception case where the ITF does not perform step 9, the IPTV application functions monitor the session and, if this fails, terminate the session and notify the IPTV service control functional block. Steps 10 and 11 would also follow. + +#### **1.2.5 Procedural flows for local programme adaptation for NGN-based linear IPTV** + +The following diagram illustrates how location-specific content can be proposed to end-users after determining the location of the terminal. + +NOTE – Figure I.12 depicts optional behaviour when a programme is adapted to local constraints. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV_TF as IPTV TF + participant IPTV_app as IPTV application functions + participant IPTV_scf as IPTV service control functional block + participant SPFB as Service profile functional block + participant APFB as Application profile functional block + participant CD_LCF as CD&LCF + participant CD_SF as CD&SF + participant RACF as RACF + participant NACF as NACF + + Note over IPTV_TF, IPTV_app: Select + IPTV_TF->>IPTV_app: Connect to application + IPTV_app->>APFB: Validate connect + APFB-->>IPTV_app: OK + IPTV_app->>IPTV_TF: OK + IPTV_app->>IPTV_scf: Get current ITF location (Note) + IPTV_scf->>NACF: Get current ITF location + NACF-->>IPTV_scf: Location + IPTV_scf-->>IPTV_app: Location (Note) + + Note over IPTV_TF, IPTV_app: Purchase + IPTV_TF->>IPTV_app: Browse and select + IPTV_app->>APFB: Personalize + IPTV_TF->>IPTV_app: Purchase content + IPTV_app->>APFB: Validate and record purchase + APFB-->>IPTV_app: OK + IPTV_app->>SPFB: Establish authority + SPFB-->>IPTV_app: OK + + Note over IPTV_TF: OK (service URL) + IPTV_TF-->>IPTV_app: OK (service URL) + + Note right of NACF: Transaction protocol + Note left of IPTV_TF: NOTE – Optional procedure. + +``` + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-12 + +Sequence diagram showing procedural flows of local programme adaptation for NGN-based linear IPTV. The diagram involves nine lifelines: IPTV TF, IPTV application functions, IPTV service control functional block, Service profile functional block, Application profile functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. The process is divided into 'Select' and 'Purchase' phases. In the 'Select' phase, the IPTV TF connects to the application, validates the connection, and gets the current ITF location. In the 'Purchase' phase, the IPTV TF browses and selects content, purchases it, and establishes authority. The diagram also includes a 'Transaction protocol' label on the right and a 'NOTE – Optional procedure.' at the bottom. + +**Figure I.12 – Procedural flows of local programme adaptation for NGN-based linear IPTV** + +### I.3 Procedural flows for IPTV services based on NGN IMS IPTV architecture + +The following clauses provide detailed descriptions of the procedural flows in the case of NGN IMS IPTV architecture. + +#### I.3.1 Procedural flows for VoD service + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV_TF as IPTV TF + participant Core_IMS as Core IMS + participant On_demand_application as On-demand application + participant CD_LCF as CD&LCF + participant CD_SF as CD&SF + participant RACF as RACF + participant NACF as NACF + + Note over IPTV_TF: 1. ITF acquisition of service parameters, e.g., content identifier, logical URL of a content item, bandwidth, codec, etc. + IPTV_TF->>Core_IMS: 2. Service request + Core_IMS->>NACF: 3. Get current ITF location + NACF-->>Core_IMS: 4. Location + Core_IMS->>RACF: 5. Network resource request + RACF-->>Core_IMS: 6. Response + Note over RACF: Network resource reservation + Core_IMS->>On_demand_application: 7. Service request + Note over On_demand_application: Service authorization, etc. + On_demand_application->>Core_IMS: 8. CD&SF request + Core_IMS->>CD_LCF: 9. CD&SF request + Note over CD_LCF: Select CD&SF + CD_LCF-->>Core_IMS: 10. CD&SF response + Core_IMS->>On_demand_application: 11. CD&SF response + On_demand_application->>Core_IMS: 12. CD&SF capabilities request + Core_IMS->>CD_SF: 13. CD&SF capabilities request + Note over CD_SF: Allocate CD&SF capabilities + CD_SF-->>Core_IMS: 14. CD&SF capabilities response + Core_IMS->>On_demand_application: 15. CD&SF capabilities response + On_demand_application->>Core_IMS: 16. Service response + Core_IMS->>RACF: 17. Network resource request + RACF-->>Core_IMS: 18. Network resource response + Note over RACF: Network resource allocation + Core_IMS->>IPTV_TF: 19. Service response + Note over IPTV_TF: 20. Establishment of content control channel and/or content delivery channel. Delivery of media content + +``` + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-13 + +Sequence diagram showing the procedural flows for VoD service between IPTV TF, Core IMS, On-demand application, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. + +**Figure I.13 – Procedural flows for VoD service** + +Preconditions: It is assumed that provisioning and network attachment has been completed. + +- 1) The IPTV terminal functions obtain the content identifier, logical URL, bandwidth, and codec information for a content item that the end-user wishes to receive. This is achieved by interaction with the programme guide function or by other means. In this step, the IPTV + +terminal functions can optionally obtain content delivery parameters such as bandwidth, codec, etc., by using content control messages. + +- 2) The IPTV terminal functions initiate a service request to the core IMS functions. +- 3-4) The core IMS functions optionally determine the location of the IPTV terminal functions, for example by querying the NACF. +NOTE – Steps 3 and 4 are not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 5) The core IMS functions send a network resource request to the RACF in order to reserve network resources for content control and content delivery. +- 6) The RACF performs network resource reservation and sends the response to the core IMS functions. +- 7) The core IMS functions send the service request with content identifier and logical URL to the on-demand IPTV application functional block. +- 8) The on-demand application functional block performs service authorization. If the IPTV terminal functions are allowed to access the content, the on-demand IPTV application functional block sends the request to the CD&LCF via core IMS functions in order to select the CD&SF. +- 9) The core IMS functions forward the request to the CD&LCF. +- 10) The CD&LCF selects a suitable CD&SF based on some criteria, e.g., the state of the CD&SF (e.g., load state, etc.), the knowledge of distributed content among the CD&SF, etc. The CD&LCF resolves the logical URL of content into the physical URL of an allocated CD&SF, and responds with the URL of the selected CD&SF to the on-demand application functional block via the core IMS functions. +- 11) The core IMS functions forward the response to the on-demand application functional block. +- 12) The on-demand application functional block sends the content resource request to the selected CD&SF via the core IMS functions in order to allocate content resources. +- 13) The core IMS function forwards the content resource request to the selected CD&SF. +- 14) The CD&SF performs content resource allocation and sends the response to the core IMS functions. +- 15) The core IMS functions forward the response to the on-demand application functional block. +- 16) The on-demand application functional block sends the service response to the core IMS functions. +- 17) The core IMS functions send a network resource request to the RACF. +- 18) The RACF performs network resource allocation and sends the response to the core IMS functions. +- 19) The core IMS functions send the service response to the IPTV terminal functions. +- 20) The ITF connects to the identified CD&SF to receive the content. + +#### I.3.2 Linear TV service procedural flows in NGN IMS IPTV + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant IPTV_TF as IPTV TF + participant Core_IMS as Core IMS functions + participant LTV as Linear TV application functional block + participant CD_LCF as CD&LCF + participant CD_SF as CD&SF + participant RACF as RACF + participant NACF as NACF + + Note over IPTV_TF: 1) ITF acquisition of service parameters, e.g., logical channel identifiers + IPTV_TF->>Core_IMS: 2) Service request (logical ChID) + Core_IMS->>NACF: 3) Get current ITF location (Note) + NACF-->>Core_IMS: 4) Location (Note) + Core_IMS->>LTV: 5) Service request (logical ChID) + LTV->>CD_LCF: 6) Request for multicast network parameters + CD_LCF-->>LTV: 7) Response for multicast network parameters + LTV-->>Core_IMS: 8) Service response (multicast network parameters) + Core_IMS->>RACF: 9) Network resources reserve and/or commit + Core_IMS-->>IPTV_TF: 10) Service response (multicast network parameters) + Note over IPTV_TF: 11) Content control and content delivery + Note over IPTV_TF, LTV: McCPF/McRF + +``` + +Y.1910(08)\_FI-14 + +Sequence diagram showing Linear TV service procedural flows in NGN IMS IPTV. The diagram involves seven entities: IPTV TF, Core IMS functions, Linear TV application functional block, CD&LCF, CD&SF, RACF, and NACF. The flow consists of 11 steps: 1) ITF acquisition of service parameters (e.g., logical channel identifiers) by IPTV TF; 2) Service request (logical ChID) from IPTV TF to Core IMS functions; 3) Get current ITF location (Note) from Core IMS functions to NACF; 4) Location (Note) from NACF to Core IMS functions; 5) Service request (logical ChID) from Core IMS functions to Linear TV application functional block; 6) Request for multicast network parameters from Linear TV application functional block to CD&LCF 7) Response for multicast network parameters from CD&LCF to Linear TV application functional block; 8) Service response (multicast network parameters) from Linear TV application functional block to Core IMS functions; 9) Network resources reserve and/or commit from Core IMS functions to RACF; 10) Service response (multicast network parameters) from Core IMS functions to IPTV TF; 11) Content control and content delivery by IPTV TF, with a callout box for McCPF/McRF. + +NOTE – Optional procedure. + +**Figure I.14 – Linear TV service procedural flows in NGN IMS IPTV** + +Pre-conditions: It is assumed that provisioning and network attachment has been completed, and that the channel streams have been delivered to multicast replication functional block (McRF)/multicast control point functional block (McCPF). + +NOTE 1 – Only multicast mechanism is assumed in Figure I.14. + +- 1) The ITF acquires linear TV service parameters (such as a logical channel identifier or a list of logical channel identifiers), e.g., by a service selection procedure. +- 2) The ITF initiates a service request with logical channel identifier(s) to the core IMS. +- 3-4) The core IMS functions determine the location of the IPTV device, for example by querying the NACF. +NOTE 2 – Steps 3 and 4 are not necessary in the case of a fixed network because the location is already known. +- 5) The core IMS functions forward the request to the LTV application with ITF location and logical channel identifier(s). +- 6) The linear TV application passes the ITF location and the logical channel identifier(s) to the content delivery control function. + +- 7) The content delivery control function determines the multicast addresses and which content delivery and storage function uses to output the required channels and has multicast network paths to the IPTV terminal based on the association between logical channel identifiers and multicast addresses. It returns the corresponding multicast addresses to the linear TV application. +- 8) The linear TV application returns the multicast network parameters to the core IMS. +- 9) The core IMS functions request the network resources to support the network path from the content delivery and storage function to the IPTV device. +- 10) Core IMS functions forward response to ITF. +- 11) The ITF receives the one or a list of logical channels and their multicast addresses and maintains this mapping for the duration of the multicast session. After that, the ITF initiates channel control request by sending a multicast join request and receiving the multicast stream. When the user exits the linear TV application, i.e., they stop watching TV, the ITF will request the session be ended and will release any requested resources. + +### **I.4 Procedural flows for IPTV interconnection between two NGN networks** + +The following scenarios show how the network attachment process and service session establishment process can be coordinated in order to realize the roaming case in Figure VI.2, where the service control function in the visited network is not used. Some NGN-related interfaces (e.g., RACF-RACF interaction, NACF-NACF interaction) require further standardization work in the future. Figure I.15 illustrates a session set-up procedure specific for VoD in the NGN IMS-based IPTV in the case of a visited network without IMS control function (as in Figure VI.2). + +The network attachment procedure can optionally be independent from the service establishment procedure. + + + +Sequence diagram showing the basic set-up procedure for IMS-based IPTV. The diagram is divided into two main sections: 'Visited Network' (left, pink background) and 'Home Network' (right, yellow background). The 'Visited Network' contains 'Access Network Functions', 'RACF', and 'NACF'. The 'Home Network' contains 'RACF', 'NACF', 'Core IMS Functions', 'User Profile Functional Block', 'Content Delivery Functions', and 'Application Functions'. The procedure consists of 11 steps: 1) IPTV TF sends 'Connection Request' to Access Network Functions. 2) Access Network Functions sends 'Access User Authentication' to RACF, which then sends it to NACF. 3) Access Network Functions sends 'IP Address Assignment' to IPTV TF. 4) Access Network Functions sends 'Policy Rules' to RACF, which then sends it to NACF. 5) IPTV TF sends 'SIP Registration' to Core IMS Functions, which then sends 'User Profile' to User Profile Functional Block. 6) IPTV TF sends 'SIP INVITE' to Core IMS Functions, which then sends it to Application Functions. 7) Application Functions sends 'Resource Request' to Content Delivery Functions. 8) Content Delivery Functions sends 'Resource Allocation' to Core IMS Functions, which then sends it to NACF, which finally sends 'Gate Open and Resource Allocation' to RACF. 9) IPTV TF sends 'IPTV Media Request' to Content Delivery Functions. 10) Content Delivery Functions sends 'Media Request' to Application Functions. 11) IPTV TF receives 'IPTV Media' from Content Delivery Functions. + +**Figure I.15 – Basic set-up procedure for IMS-based IPTV in Figure VI.2** + +- 1) The IPTV terminal attaches to the access network and requests the user authentication and authorization in order to obtain the valid IP address and establish the link. +- 2) The access network sends the user authentication request to the home NACF through the visited NACF. +- 3) After the completion of the user authentication and authorization, the access network assigns the valid IP address to the IPTV terminal and establishes the link. +- 4) The access network obtains the user policy rules from the home RACF through the visited RACF and opens the gate for signalling messages (e.g., SIP port number) based on the provider's agreement. +- 5) The IPTV terminal executes the SIP registration mechanism with the core IMS functions, including the user profile. +- 6) The IPTV terminal sends a SIP INVITE message to the core IMS functions in order to request the IPTV application session. The core IMS functions then send it to the application functions. +- 7) The application functions request the resource allocation for the IPTV terminal to the content delivery functions. + +- 8) The content delivery functions request the resource allocation for the IPTV terminal to the core IMS. The core IMS functions then send the IPTV content information (e.g., IP address, port number, content type and bandwidth) to the home RACF so that the home RACF can request the visited RACF to open the gate on the access network for the IPTV content. Policy rules can optionally be allocated to the access network. +- 9) The IPTV terminal requests the application functions to send the content. +- 10) The application functions request the content delivery functions to start sending the content. +- 11) The IPTV terminal receives the IPTV content from the content delivery functions. + +Figure I.16 illustrates the basic VoD session set-up procedure for NGN non-IMS-based IPTV in the case of a visited network without IPTV service control functions (as in Figure VI.2). + +The network attachment procedure can optionally be independent from the service establishment procedure. + + + +The diagram illustrates the basic VoD session set-up procedure for NGN non-IMS-based IPTV. It shows the interaction between the Visited Network (Access Network Functions, RACF, NACF) and the Home Network (RACF, NACF, IPTV Service Control Functional Block, User Profile Functional Block, Content Delivery Functions, Application Functions). The procedure consists of 11 steps: + +- 1) Connection Request: IPTV TF sends a request to Access Network Functions. +- 2) Access User Authentication: Access Network Functions send a request to RACF, which then sends a request to NACF. +- 3) IP Address Assignment: Access Network Functions send a request to RACF. +- 4) Policy Rules: Access Network Functions send a request to RACF, which then sends a request to NACF. +- 5) IPTV Application Request: IPTV TF sends a request to RACF, which then sends a request to NACF. +- 6) User Profile: RACF sends a request to NACF. +- 7) Resource Request: RACF sends a request to NACF. +- 8) Gate Open and Resource Allocation: RACF sends a request to NACF. +- 9) IPTV Media Request: IPTV TF sends a request to RACF, which then sends a request to NACF. +- 10) Media Request: RACF sends a request to NACF. +- 11) IPTV Media: IPTV TF receives the media from RACF. + +Sequence diagram illustrating the basic VoD session set-up procedure for NGN non-IMS-based IPTV. The diagram shows the interaction between the Visited Network (Access Network Functions, RACF, NACF) and the Home Network (RACF, NACF, IPTV Service Control Functional Block, User Profile Functional Block, Content Delivery Functions, Application Functions). The procedure consists of 11 steps: 1) Connection Request, 2) Access User Authentication, 3) IP Address Assignment, 4) Policy Rules, 5) IPTV Application Request, 6) User Profile, 7) Resource Request, 8) Gate Open and Resource Allocation, 9) IPTV Media Request, 10) Media Request, and 11) IPTV Media. + +**Figure I.16 – Basic setup procedure for non-IMS-based IPTV in Figure VI.2** + +- 1) The IPTV terminal attaches to the access network and requests the user authentication and authorization in order to obtain the valid IP address and establish the link. +- 2) The access network sends the user authentication request to the home NACF through the visited NACF. + +- 3) After the completion of the user authentication and authorization, the access network assigns the valid IP address to the IPTV terminal and establishes the link. +- 4) The access network obtains the user policy rules from the home RACF through the visited RACF and opens the gate for signalling messages (e.g., IPTV control port number) based on the provider's agreement. +- 5) The IPTV terminal requests the IPTV content to the IPTV service control functions, including the user profile. +- 6) The IPTV service control functions request the IPTV application session to the application functions. +- 7) The application functions request the resource allocation for the IPTV terminal to the content delivery functions. +- 8) The content delivery functions request the resource allocation for the IPTV terminal to the IPTV service control functions. The IPTV service control functions then send the IPTV content information (e.g., IP address, port number, content type and bandwidth) to the home RACF so that the home RACF can request the visited RACF to open the gate on the access network for the IPTV content. Policy rules can optionally be allocated to the access network. +- 9) The IPTV terminal requests the application functions to send the content. +- 10) The application functions request the content delivery functions to start sending the content. +- 11) The IPTV terminal receives the IPTV content from the content delivery functions. + +# **Appendix II** + +## **Potential protocols that could be used on IPTV reference points** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +This appendix provides examples of the potential protocols that could be used on the IPTV reference points as defined in clause 11. + +Table II.1 describes the potential protocols that could be used on the reference points common to the three architectural approaches (non-NGN, NGN non-IMS and NGN IMS). + +Table II.2 describes the potential protocols that could be used on the reference points specific to the three architectural approaches (non-NGN, NGN non-IMS and NGN IMS). For the NGN architecture, the reference points already defined are indicated in brackets. + +**Table II.1 – Protocols on reference points common to all three IPTV architectures** + +| Ref. Point | Entity 1 | Entity 2 | Non-NGN | NGN non-MS | NGN IMS | +|-------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------| +| A2 | IPTV application FB | CD&LCF | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| A3 | IPTV application FB | Content preparation functions | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| A4 | SADS FB | Application profile FB | FFS | FFS (e.g., Diameter) | Diameter (Sh) | +| A5 | IPTV application FB | Application profile FB | FFS | FFS (e.g., Diameter) | Diameter (Sh) | +| A6 | IPTV application FB | SCP functions | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| C1 | Content preparation functions | CD&LCF | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| C2 | Content preparation functions | CD&SF | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| C3 | Content preparation functions | SCP Functions | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| D1 | CD&LCF | CD&SF | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| E0 | SADS client FB | SADS FB | HTTP or DVBSTP | HTTP or DVBSTP | HTTP or DVBSTP, or FLUTE | +| E1 | IPTV application client FB | IPTV application FB | HTTP | HTTP | HTTP | +| E2 | SCP client functions | SCP Functions | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| E4 | Error recovery client FB | Error recovery FB | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| E5 | Multicast content delivery client FB | Multicast control point FB | IGMP or MLD | IGMP or MLD | IGMP or MLD | +| E6 | Unicast content delivery client FB | Content delivery control FB | RTSP | RTSP | RTSP | +| E7 | IPTV terminal functions | Delivery network gateway FB | FFS | FFS | FFS | + +**Table II.1 – Protocols on reference points common to all three IPTV architectures** + +| Ref. Point | Entity 1 | Entity 2 | Non-NGN | NGN non-MS | NGN IMS | +|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| H2 | Delivery network gateway FB | Multicast replication FB | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | +| H3 | Delivery network gateway FB | Unicast transport functions | RTP over UDP or RTP over TCP | RTP over UDP or RTP over TCP | RTP over UDP or RTP over TCP | +| M1 | SCP functions | Application profile FB | FFS | FFS | FFS | +| Mc | Multicast delivery FB | Multicast control point FB | PIM | PIM | PIM | +| Md | Multicast delivery FB | Multicast replication FB | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | +| Ud | Unicast delivery FB | Unicast transport functions | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | RTP over UDP | + +**Table II.2 – Protocols on reference points specific to IPTV architectures** + +| Ref. Point | Non-NGN | | | NGN non-IMS | | | NGN IMS | | | +|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------| +| A0 | – | – | NA | – | – | NA | SADS FB | Core IMS functions | SIP (ISC) | +| A1 | IPTV application FB | IPTV service control FB | HTTP | IPTV application FB | IPTV service control FB | HTTP | IPTV application FB | Core IMS functions | SIP (ISC) | +| E3 | Control client FB | IPTV service control FB | RTSP | Control client FB | IPTV service control FB | RTSP | Session client FB | Core IMS functions | SIP (Gm) | +| H1 | Delivery network gateway FB | Authentication and IP allocation FB | FFS | Delivery network gateway FB | NACF | FFS (TC-U1) | Delivery network gateway FB | NACF | FFS (TC-U1) | +| R1 | Resource control FB | Network transport functions | FFS | RACF | Network transport functions | Diameter (Rw) | RACF | Network transport functions | Diameter (Rw) | +| S1 | IPTV service control FB | CD&LCF | FFS | IPTV Service Control FB | CD&LCF | ffs | Core IMS Functions | CD&LCF | SIP | +| S2 | IPTV service control FB | Service user profile FB | FFS | IPTV service control FB | Service user profile FB | Diameter (Cx) | Core IMS functions | Service profile FB | Diameter (Cx) | +| S3 | IPTV service control FB | Resource control FB | FFS | IPTV service control FB | RACF | Diameter (Rs) | Core IMS functions | RACF | Diameter (Rs) | +| S4 | IPTV service control FB | Authentication and IP allocation FB | FFS | IPTV service control FB | NACF | Diameter (S-TC1) | Core IMS functions | NACF | Diameter (S-TC1) | +| S5 | IPTV service control FB | Content delivery control FB | RTSP | IPTV service control FB | Content delivery control FB | RTSP | Core IMS functions | Content delivery control FB | SIP | +| T1 | Authentication and IP allocation FB | Access network functions | FFS | NACF | Access network functions | FFS (TC-T1) | NACF | Access network functions | FFS (TC-T1) | + +# Appendix III + +## IPTV physical network hierarchy + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +The IPTV architecture needs to allow for IPTV network, service and application components to exist at different physical and logical points in a network. This is common for many operators where the network and service components are hierarchically distributed. + +An example of mapping IPTV functional elements to a physical network hierarchy for linear TV is shown in Figure III.1. + +Figure III.1 shows an example of a network hierarchy as content and control flows from content provider to the end-user. This hierarchy is an example, with larger networks having more levels and smaller networks having fewer. The figure shows the components and flows for a linear TV service example. The access network functions must be located between the video serving office (VSO) and end-user, and the IP multicast replication functions can optionally be located in the VSO; however, they are not illustrated in the figure. + +**Super head end (SHE) network node(s) with the broadest content scope:** The SHE sources content to an entire IPTV network. Intended uses include primary storage for off-line content and transmission of region-independent off-air content (e.g., premium and specialty programming). + +**Video hub office (VHO) network node(s) with a local/regional content scope:** The VHO sources region-dependent off-air content (e.g., local programming) and houses local off-line storage of content. + +**Video serving office (VSO) network node(s) that connect end users (via access systems) to the IPTV network:** The VSO (typically a local exchange office) hosts or connects all access systems for interconnection to end users. In addition, the VSO contains aggregation equipment to enable efficient interconnection of access systems to the IPTV network. The option to locate content interconnection and/or content processing equipment is shown, though perhaps not typical. + +NOTE – SHEs may be referred to as central servers, VHOs may be referred to as regional or metro servers, and VSOs may be referred to as local servers. + + + +The diagram illustrates the network hierarchy for an IPTV network, organized into five main functional areas: HN (Home Network), VSO (Video Source), VHO (Video Headend), SHE (Service Home Environment), and Content. The components and their interactions are as follows: + +- HN (Home Network):** + - IPTV terminal device:** Contains **Application client functions**. + - Content delivery client functions:** Interacts with the VSO/VHO CD&SF blocks via the **Delivery protocol**. + - Control client functional block:** Interacts with the VSO/VHO CD&SF blocks via the **Control protocol**. + - DNG (Delivery Network Gateway):** Contains the **Delivery network gateway functional block**, which connects to the **Access network**. +- VSO (Video Source):** + - Content preparation functions:** Connects to the **Linear TV application functional block** in the SHE. + - CD&SF (Content Distribution and Selection Function):** Contains **Multicast delivery functional block** and **Multicast control point functional block**. + - Multicast replication functional block:** Receives data from the **Multicast control point functional block**. +- VHO (Video Headend):** + - Content preparation functions:** Connects to the **Linear TV application functional block** in the SHE. + - CD&SF (Content Distribution and Selection Function):** Contains **Multicast delivery functional block** and **Multicast control point functional block**. + - Multicast replication functional block:** Receives data from the **Multicast control point functional block**. +- SHE (Service Home Environment):** + - Linear TV application functional block:** The central point for content delivery, connected to **Content and metadata sources**. + - Content distribution and location control functions:** Manages the distribution of content. + - IPTV service control functional block:** Manages service control, connected to **Network attachment control functions (NACF)** and **Resource and admission control functions (RACF)**. +- Content:** + - Content and metadata sources:** The origin of the content being delivered. + +**Protocols and Connections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects the **Application client functions** in the HN to the **Linear TV application functional block** in the SHE. +- Delivery protocol:** Connects the **Content delivery client functions** in the HN to the **CD&SF** blocks in the VSO and VHO. +- Control protocol:** Connects the **Control client functional block** in the HN to the **CD&SF** blocks in the VSO and VHO. +- Access network:** Connects the **Delivery network gateway functional block** in the HN to the **Multicast replication functional blocks** in the VSO and VHO. + +Network hierarchy for an IPTV network (linear TV example) diagram showing functional blocks across HN, VSO, VHO, SHE, and Content domains. + +Y.1910(08)\_FIII-1 + +**Figure III.1 – Network hierarchy for an IPTV network (linear TV example)** + +# **Appendix IV** + +## **Overlay networking function for IPTV services and multicast** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +An optional way for an overlay networking function to support IPTV services and QoS-enabled multicast delivery can be performed using the content delivery control function capabilities. + +The following functions can optionally be present in the content delivery control function: + +- a) Control overlay networking configuration and topology management and overlay multicast tree management. The overlay network will be created virtually with the control of "content delivery control". +- b) Provide multi-homed "content delivery control function" through constructed overlay networks to meet efficient content delivery with high quality service requirements for IPTV services. +- c) Support overlay network configurations to ensure that clients are not connected/disconnected from the delivery function in case of failures. In addition, the "content delivery control function" provides control functions that support redundancy in case of multiple servers in order to reduce the impact of server delivery failures. + +# **Appendix V** + +## **Adaptation of the IPTV architecture for HFC networks** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +Figure V.1 shows the high-level functional architecture for IPTV where the network layer is provided by a hybrid fibre coax (HFC) cable network. Detailed decomposition of the diagram is shown in [b-ITU-T J.700]. + + + +The diagram illustrates the high-level functional architecture for cable-delivered IP, organized into four main functional areas and two supporting areas: + +- End-user functions (Red box):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions, SCP client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions. + - Control client functional block:** Control client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Residential gateway, Cable modem. +- Application functions (Blue box):** + - IPTV application functions:** Application profile functional block, SCP functions, Content preparation functions. +- Service control functions (Yellow box):** + - Delivery protocols:** Content distribution and location control functions, Content delivery and storage functions. + - IPTV service control functional block:** IPTV service control functional block, Service user profile functional block. +- Network functions (Green box):** + - Authentication and IP allocation functional block:** Authentication and IP allocation functional block. + - Resource control functional block:** Resource control functional block. + - Access and Core functions:** HFC access network functions, CMTS functions, Core transport functions. +- Management functions (Grey box):** + - Application management functional block:** Application management functional block. + - Service control management functional block:** Service control management functional block. + - Control delivery management functional block:** Control delivery management functional block. + - End-user device management functional block:** End-user device management functional block. + - Transport management functional block:** Transport management functional block. +- Content provider functions (Grey box):** + - Content and metadata sources:** Content and metadata sources. + +**Interconnections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to Application profile functional block. +- Content and metadata:** Connects Content preparation functions to Application management functional block. +- Control and delivery protocols:** Connects Content distribution and location control functions to Service control management functional block. +- Control and storage protocols:** Connects Content delivery and storage functions to Control delivery management functional block. +- Authentication and IP allocation:** Connects Authentication and IP allocation functional block to End-user device management functional block. +- Resource control:** Connects Resource control functional block to Transport management functional block. +- Access and Core functions:** Connects HFC access network functions, CMTS functions, and Core transport functions to Transport management functional block. + +High-level functional architecture for cable-delivered IP diagram showing four main functional areas: End-user functions, Application functions, Service control functions, and Network functions, along with Management and Content provider functions. + +Y.1910(08)\_FV-1 + +Figure V.1 – High-level functional architecture for cable-delivered IP + +The descriptions of the functional elements that are common to all IPTV architectures are presented in clause 10. The cable-specific functions are described below. It is noted that the nature of the interfaces to the common functional elements can optionally differ between cable-delivered IPTV and NGN- or non-NGN-delivered IPTV. + +### **HFC access network** + +The hybrid fibre coax (HFC) access network is defined as the network between the cable modem termination system (CMTS) and the cable modem. Attributes of the HFC access network include: + +- Supported or required data over cable service interface specifications (DOCSIS) versions. +- DOCSIS set top box gateway (DSG). +- Edge QAMs. +- Modular CMTS. +- Optical distribution network. +- Radio-frequency (RF) network. + +### **CMTS** + +The cable modem termination system (CMTS) provides support for IP-based data services, such as Internet or voice over IP. + +# **Appendix VI** + +## **Nomadism for IPTV services** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +This appendix describes examples of roaming between two NGN networks to offer IPTV services. These examples cover: + +- 1) roaming (nomadism); +- 2) access to third party service providers. + +All interconnection scenarios in this appendix assume VoD service and unicast delivery method. Linear TV transmission with multicast delivery is out of scope of this appendix. + +Roaming in this appendix means nomadism of the terminal device. + +In order to realize network interworking, various business arrangements are required among service provider, network provider and content provider, which are beyond the scope of this appendix. + +Note that in this appendix the use of the terms "home network" and "visited network" is based on the context of mobile (e.g., cellular) networks or networks supporting nomadism. These terms are not to be confused with the use of the term "home network" as used in the context of residential (home) networks. + +### **VI.1 Interconnection with the visited network** + +Figure VI.1 illustrates the case where IPTV terminal functions are connected to the visited network and are accessing the application functions in the home network. In this figure, either the core IMS functions or the IPTV service control functional block is used depending on the capabilities of the home network and the visited network, respectively. The service control functions of each network request network resources via its own RACF. Network functions in each network can optionally be interconnected to other networks and the RACF-to-RACF reference point can optionally be used to request resource and admission control. + +NOTE 1 – The detailed procedures and information related to RACF-to-RACF communication are for further study. + + + +The diagram illustrates the interconnection between a **Home network** and a **Visited network** for IPTV services. The architecture is organized into several layers and functional blocks: + +- End-user functions (Left):** Includes **IPTV terminal functions** (Application client functions) and **Home network functions** (Content delivery client functions, Control/session client functional block, Authentication and configuration protocol, Delivery network gateway functional block). +- Application functions (Top Right):** Includes **IPTV application functions** and **Content preparation functions**. +- NGN service stratum functions (Middle):** Divided into **Visited network** and **Home network**. Both contain **IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions** and a **Service user profile functional block**. +- Content delivery functions (Right):** Includes **Content distribution and location control functions** and **Content delivery and storage functions**. +- NGN transport stratum functions (Bottom):** Divided into **Visited network** and **Home network**. Both contain **Transport control functions** (Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF)) and **NGN transport functions** (Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, Border functional block). + +**Protocols and Interconnections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Delivery protocols:** Connects Content delivery client functions to Content distribution and location control functions. +- Control/session protocol:** Connects Control/session client functional block to IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions in the visited network. +- Resource control protocol:** Connects IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions in the visited network to the corresponding block in the home network. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects the delivery network gateway functional block to the NACF in the visited network. + +Y.1910(08)\_FVI-1 + +Figure VI.1 – Interconnection with the visited network. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture for IPTV service interconnection between a home network and a visited network. It shows the flow of data and control signals through various functional blocks and protocols. + +Figure VI.1 – Interconnection with the visited network + +Figure VI.2 illustrates the case where IPTV terminal functions are connected to a visited network and access the application functions in the home network without using service control functions in the visited network. In this figure, either the core IMS functions or the IPTV service control functional block is used, depending on the capabilities of the home network. The RACF of the home network requests the network resources from the visited network via the RACF-to-RACF reference point. + +If no service control functions are applicable due to the absence of compatible service control functions or mutual agreement between network providers, the RACF-to-RACF reference point is used to request network resources in the visited network. + +NOTE 2 – The detailed procedures and information related to RACF-to-RACF communication is for further study. + + + +The diagram illustrates the interconnection of functional blocks across three main domains: + +- End-user functions (Left, Red):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions. + - Control/session client functional block:** Control/session client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Authentication and configuration protocol, Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Top Right, Blue):** + - IPTV application functions:** Connected to Application client functions via Transaction protocol. + - Content preparation functions:** Connected to Content preparation functions. +- NGN service stratum functions (Middle Right, Yellow):** + - Service user profile functional block:** Connected to IPTV application functions. + - IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions:** Connected to Content delivery client functions via Delivery protocols and to Control/session client functional block via Control/session protocol. +- Content delivery functions (Middle Right, Orange):** + - Content distribution and location control functions:** Connected to Content preparation functions. + - Content delivery and storage functions:** Connected to Content distribution and location control functions. +- Visited network (Bottom Left, Green):** + - NGN transport stratum functions:** Transport control functions (Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF)). + - NGN transport functions:** Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, Border functional block. +- Home network (Bottom Right, Green):** + - NGN transport stratum functions:** Transport control functions (Resource and admission control functions (RACF), Network attachment control functions (NACF)). + - NGN transport functions:** Border functional block, Core transport functions, Edge functions, Access network functions. + +**Interconnections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Delivery protocols:** Connects Content delivery client functions to IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions. +- Control/session protocol:** Connects Control/session client functional block to IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions. +- Resource control protocol:** Connects IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions to RACF in both Visited and Home networks. +- Authentication and configuration protocol:** Connects Delivery network gateway functional block to NACF in the Visited network. + +Figure VI.2 – Interconnection with the visited network without service control functions. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture for IPTV service delivery across three main domains: End-user functions, Application functions, and Network functions (split into Visited and Home networks). + +Y.1910(08)\_FVI-2 + +Figure VI.2 – Interconnection with the visited network without service control functions + +### **VI.2 Interconnection with third party service providers** + +Figure VI.3 illustrates the interconnection with a third party service provider. In this figure, either core IMS functions or the IPTV service control functional block is used, depending on the architecture variants used in the home network and the third party service provider, respectively. The application functions and content delivery functions of the third party service provider are involved in providing IPTV services. The service control functions of each provider request the network resources from their respective RACF. + + + +The diagram illustrates the interconnection between a Home network and a Third party service provider for IPTV services. It is organized into several main functional areas: + +- End-user functions (Left, Red):** + - IPTV terminal functions:** Application client functions. + - Content delivery client functions:** Content delivery client functions. + - Control/session client functional block:** Control/session client functional block. + - Home network functions:** Authentication and configuration protocol, Delivery network gateway functional block. +- Application functions (Top Right, Blue):** + - IPTV application functions:** Connected to Application client functions via Transaction protocol. + - Content preparation functions:** Connected to Content preparation functions. +- NGN service stratum functions (Middle, Yellow):** + - Home network (Left):** Service user profile functional block, IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions. + - Third party service provider (Right):** IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions. +- Content delivery functions (Middle Right, Orange):** + - Content distribution and location control functions:** Connected to Content preparation functions. + - Content delivery and storage functions:** Connected to Content distribution and location control functions. +- NGN transport stratum functions (Bottom, Green):** + - Home network (Left):** + - Transport control functions:** Network attachment control functions (NACF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF). + - NGN transport functions:** Access network functions, Edge functions, Core transport functions, Border functional block. + - Third party service provider (Right):** + - Transport control functions:** Resource and admission control functions (RACF), Network attachment control functions (NACF). + - NGN transport functions:** Border functional block, Core transport functions, Edge functions, Access network functions. + +**Protocols and Connections:** + +- Transaction protocol:** Connects Application client functions to IPTV application functions. +- Delivery protocols:** Connects Content delivery client functions to Content distribution and location control functions. +- Control/session protocol:** Connects Control/session client functional block to IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions. +- Resource control protocol:** Connects IPTV service control functional block/core IMS functions to the Transport control functions in both networks. + +Diagram illustrating the interconnection between a Home network and a Third party service provider for IPTV services. The diagram shows functional blocks for End-user functions, Application functions, NGN service stratum functions, and NGN transport stratum functions, connected via various protocols. + +Y.1910(08)\_FVI-3 + +Figure VI.3 – Interconnection with the third party service provider + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T H.262] Recommendation ITU-T H.262 (in force) | ISO/IEC 13818-2:in force, *Information technology – Generic coding of moving pictures and associated audio information: Video*. +- [b-ITU-T H.264] Recommendation ITU-T H.264 (in force), *Advanced video coding for generic audiovisual services*. +- [b-ITU-T J.700] Recommendation ITU-T J.700 (2007), *IPTV service requirements and framework for secondary distribution*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.101] Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), *Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions*. +- [b-ITU-T IPTVFG] ITU-T IPTV Focus Group Proceedings (2008). +<
Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012..... | 61 | + +| | Page | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------| +| Annex B – Support of IPTV services ..... | 62 | +| B.1 Overall functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN architectures..... | 62 | +| B.2 IMS-based IPTV functional architecture..... | 63 | +| B.3 Non-IMS-based IPTV architecture..... | 65 | +| Appendix I – Examples of NGN network configurations..... | 68 | +| I.1 Configurations and topology of the NGN ..... | 68 | +| I.2 Relationship between the NGN and administrative domains..... | 70 | +| I.3 Relationship between the NGN and service domains ..... | 72 | +| I.4 Enterprise role model ..... | 73 | +| I.5 Functional roles ..... | 75 | +| Appendix II – Transport-stratum access network scenarios ..... | 77 | +| II.1 Introduction ..... | 77 | +| II.2 Scenario 1: Multi-layered transport stratum..... | 77 | +| II.3 Scenario 2: Access aggregation using layer-2..... | 78 | +| II.4 Scenario 3: Access aggregation using layer-3 ..... | 79 | +| II.5 Scenario 4: Multistage policy enforcement..... | 80 | +| II.6 Scenario 5: Partitioning into transport-layer traffic subdomains ..... | 81 | +| Appendix III – Instantiation of NGN reference points ..... | 82 | +| III.1 Introduction ..... | 82 | +| III.2 Scope ..... | 82 | +| III.3 Rationale to consider SNI..... | 82 | +| III.4 Instantiation of NGN reference points ..... | 82 | +| Appendix IV – Example illustrative deployment scenario for IdM in NGN..... | 85 | +| Bibliography..... | 87 | + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 + +# Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks + +# 1 Scope + +The objective of this Recommendation is to describe the functional requirements and architecture of the next generation network (NGN) [ITU-T Y.2001] taking into account the requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN as described in [ITU-T Y.2201]. This Recommendation defines functional entities (FEs) of the NGN and is a precursor to further identifying and designating reference points, and defining information flows across such reference points. + +The functional architecture provided in this Recommendation allows a clear distinction between the definition/specification aspects of services provided by the NGN and the actual specification of the network technologies used to support those services. In line with [ITU-T Y.2011] principles, an implementation-independent approach is adopted. This Recommendation describes the functional architecture of the NGN by using the generic definitions, symbols, and abbreviations that are defined in related ITU-T Recommendations. + +Although the scope of this Recommendation is targeted primarily at an NGN architecture, it is clear that the accommodation of legacy PSTN/ISDN terminals and/or interworking with the PSTN/ISDN is an important consideration with respect to NGN deployment. Thus, to provide a more comprehensive view, certain functional elements required to accommodate PSTN/ISDN terminals and interworking with the PSTN/ISDN are shown/described even though they are not strictly part of the NGN architecture itself. + +This Recommendation provides support for nomadism between different network termination points as well as transport level mobility. + +Administrations may require network operators and service providers to take into account national regulatory and national policy requirements in implementing this Recommendation. + +Note that Annex A provides a high-level description of the main additional features provided in this Recommendation as compared to the 2006 edition of this Recommendation. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- | | | +|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| [ITU-T G.722] | Recommendation ITU-T G.722 (1988), 7 kHz audio-coding within 64 kbit/s. | +| [ITU-T G.8010] | Recommendation ITU-T G.8010/Y.1306 (2004), Architecture of Ethernet layer networks. | +| [ITU-T M.1400] | Recommendation ITU-T M.1400 (2006), Designations for interconnections among operators' networks. | +| [ITU-T M.3060] | Recommendation ITU-T M.3060/Y.2401 (2006), Principles for the Management of the Next Generation Networks. | + +| | | +|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| [ITU-T Q.1706] | Recommendation ITU-T Q.1706/Y.2801 (2006), Mobility management requirements for NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.101] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.101 (2000), Global Information Infrastructure terminology: Terms and definitions. | +| [ITU-T Y.1291] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1291 (2004), An architectural framework for support of quality of service in packet networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.1453] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1453 (2006), TDM-IP interworking – user plane interworking. | +| [ITU-T Y.1901] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1901 (2009), Requirements for the support of IPTV services. | +| [ITU-T Y.1910] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.1910 (2008), IPTV functional architecture. | +| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.2011] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2011 (2004), General principles and general reference model for Next Generation Networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2014] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2014 (2010), Network attachment control functions in next generation networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2017] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2017 (2009), Multicast functions in next generation networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2018] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2018 (2009), Mobility management and control framework and architecture within the NGN transport stratum. | +| [ITU-T Y.2021] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2021 (2006), IMS for Next Generation Networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2031] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2031 (2006), PSTN/ISDN emulation architecture. | +| [ITU-T Y.2091] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2008), Terms and definitions for Next Generation Networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2111] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2111 (2008), Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2171] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2171 (2006), Admission control priority levels in Next Generation Networks. | +| [ITU-T Y.2173] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2173 (2008), Management of performance measurement for NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.2201] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2201 (2009), Requirements and capabilities for ITU-T NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.2233] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2233 (2008), Requirements and framework allowing accounting and charging capabilities in NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.2234] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2234 (2008), Open service environment capabilities for NGN. | +| [ITU-T Y.2701] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2701 (2007), Security requirements for NGN release 1. | +| [ITU-T Y.2702] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2702 (2008), Authentication and authorization requirements for NGN release 1. | + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 application** [ITU-T Y.101]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services. + +**3.1.2 content provider** [ITU-T Y.1910]: The entity that owns or is licensed to sell content or content assets. + +**3.1.3 control plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions that controls the operation of entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this control (see clause 8.1.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011] for some details). + +**3.1.4 data plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to transfer data in the stratum or layer under consideration. + +**3.1.5 identity management** [ITU-T Y.2720]: Set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administration, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for: + +- assurance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials, attributes), +- assurance of the identity of an entity (e.g., users/subscribers, groups, user devices, organizations, network and service providers, network elements and objects, and virtual objects), and +- enabling business and security applications. + +**3.1.6 IPTV** [ITU-T Y.1901]: Multimedia services such as television/video/audio/text/graphics/data delivered over IP-based networks managed to support the required level of QoS/QoE, security, interactivity and reliability. + +**3.1.7 management plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: The set of functions used to manage entities in the stratum or layer under consideration, plus the functions required to support this management (see clause 8.1.2 of [ITU-T Y.2011] for some details). + +**3.1.8 mobility** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for the user or other mobile entities to communicate and access services irrespective of changes of the location or technical environment. + +**3.1.9 network operator** [ITU-T M.1400]: An operator that manages a telecommunications network. A network operator may be a *Service Provider* and vice versa. A Network Operator may or may not provide particular telecommunications services. + +**3.1.10 NGN service stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer service-related data and the functions that control and manage service resources and network services to enable user services and applications (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]). + +**3.1.11 NGN transport stratum** [ITU-T Y.2011]: That part of the NGN which provides the user functions that transfer data and the functions that control and manage transport resources to carry such data between terminating entities (see also clause 7.1 of [ITU-T Y.2011]). + +**3.1.12 nomadism** [ITU-T Y.2201]: The ability of the user to change their network access point. When changing the network access point, the user's service session is completely stopped and then started again, i.e., there is no service continuity or hand-over used. It is assumed that normal usage pattern is that users shut down their service session before attaching to a different access point. + +**3.1.13 open service environment capabilities** [ITU-T Y.2234]: Capabilities provided by an open service environment to enable enhanced and flexible service creation and provisioning based on the use of standards interfaces. + +NOTE – Open service environment capabilities enable services reusability, portability across networks, and accessibility by application providers and user applications in NGN. + +**3.1.14 service** [ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider. + +**3.1.15 service continuity** [ITU-T Q.1706]: The ability for a moving object to maintain ongoing service over including current states, such as user's network environment and session for a service. + +**3.1.16 service provider** [ITU-T M.1400]: A general reference to an operator that provides telecommunication services to customers and other users either on a tariff or contract basis. A service provider may or may not operate a network. A service provider may or may not be a customer of another service provider. + +**3.1.17 user plane** [ITU-T Y.2011]: A synonym for data plane. + +## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation** + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 application network interface:** Interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between applications and NGN elements. The ANI offers capabilities and resources needed for realization of applications. + +**3.2.2 application provider:** A general reference to a provider that offers applications to the customers making use of the services capabilities provided by the NGN. + +**3.2.3 cardinality:** The numeric relationship between occurrences of the entities on either end of the relationship line. + +**3.2.4 functional architecture:** A set of functional entities and the reference points between them used to describe the structure of an NGN. These functional entities are separated by reference points, and thus, they define the distribution of functions. + +NOTE – The functional entities can be used to describe a set of reference configurations. These reference configurations identify which reference points are visible at the boundaries of equipment implementations and between administrative domains. + +**3.2.5 functional entity:** An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations. + +**3.2.6 media:** One or more of audio, video, or data. + +**3.2.7 media stream:** A media stream can consist of audio, video, or data, or a combination of any of them. Media stream data conveys user or application data (i.e., a payload) but not control data. + +**3.2.8 mediated services:** Services that are based on intermediate service stratum facilities provided by one or more service providers. + +**3.2.9 non-mediated services:** Services that are not based on intermediate service stratum facilities provided by any service provider. + +**3.2.10 reference point:** A conceptual point at the conjunction of two non-overlapping functional entities that can be used to identify the type of information passing between these functional entities. + +NOTE – A reference point may correspond to one or more physical interfaces between pieces of equipment. + +**3.2.11 stream:** A flow of real-time information of a specific media type (e.g., audio) and format (e.g., [ITU-T G.722]) from a single source to one or more destinations. + +**3.2.12 topology:** Information that indicates the structure of a network. It contains the network address and routing information. + +# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations: + +| | | +|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------| +| 2G | 2nd Generation | +| 3G | 3rd Generation | +| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project | +| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting | +| ABG-FE | Access Border Gateway Functional Entity | +| ABMF | Account Balance Management Function | +| AG-FE | Application Gateway Functional Entity | +| AGC-FE | Access Gateway Control Functional Entity | +| ALG | Application Level Gateway | +| AM-FE | Access Management Functional Entity | +| AMG-FE | Access Media Gateway Functional Entity | +| AMR | Adaptive Multi-Rate | +| AN-FE | Access Node Functional Entity | +| ANI | Application Network Interface | +| APL-GW-FE | Application GateWay Functional Entity | +| APL-SCM-FE | Application Service Coordination Manager Functional Entity | +| APP-FE | Application Provisioning Functional Entity | +| AR-FE | Access Relay Functional Entity | +| AS | Application Server | +| AS-FE | Application Support Functional Entity | +| ASCM-FE | Application Service Coordination Manager Functional Entity | +| ASF&SSF | Application Support functions and Service Support functions | +| ASUP-FE | Application Support User Profile Functional Entity | +| ATM | Asynchronous Transfer Mode | +| BGC-FE | Breakout Gateway Control Functional Entity | +| BRAS | Broadband Remote Access Server | +| CAF | Charging and Accounting Functions | +| CCF | Charging Collection Function | +| CD&LC-FE | Content Distribution & Location Control Functional Entity | +| CDC-FE | Content Delivery Control Functional Entity | +| CDF | Content Delivery Functions | +| CDP-FE | Content Delivery Processing Functional Entity | +| CGCM-FE | CPN Gateway Configuration and Management Functional Entity | + +| | | +|----------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| CGF | Charging Gateway Function | +| CGNA-FE | CPN Gateway Network Attachment Functional Entity | +| CGPD-FE | CPN Gateway Policy Decision Functional Entity | +| CGPE-FE | CPN Gateway Policy Enforcement Functional Entity | +| CGSC-FE | CPN Gateway Service Control Functional Entity | +| CIR | Charging Information Record | +| CPE | Customer Premises Equipment | +| CPN | Customer Premises Network | +| CPR-FE | Content Preparation Functional Entity | +| CTF | Charging Trigger Function | +| DHCP | Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol | +| DNS | Domain Name System | +| DSL | Digital Subscriber Line | +| DTMF | Dial Tone Multi Frequency | +| E-UTRAN | Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network | +| EAG | External Application Gateway | +| EC-FE | Elementary Control Functional Entity | +| EF-FE | Elementary Forwarding Functional Entity | +| EN-FE | Edge Node Functional Entity | +| EPG | Electronic Program Guide | +| FB | Functional Block | +| FE | Functional Entity | +| FMC | Fixed-Mobile Convergence | +| FP | Flow Point | +| FW | Firewall | +| GBA | Generic Bootstrapping Architecture | +| GGSN | Gateway GPRS Support Node | +| GPRS | General Packet Radio Service | +| GSC-FE | General Services Control Functional Entity | +| HDC-FE | Handover Decision and Control Functional Entity | +| HGW | Home GateWay | +| HGWC-FE | Home GateWay Configuration Functional Entity | +| HSS | Home Subscriber Server | +| I-CSC-FE | Interrogating Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| IBC-FE | Interconnection Border Gateway Control Functional Entity | +| IBG-FE | Interconnection Border Gateway Functional Entity | +| ICMP | Internet Control Message Protocol | + +| | | +|----------|------------------------------------------------| +| ID | Identifier | +| IdM | Identity Management | +| IdMCC-FE | IdM Coordination and Control Functional Entity | +| IdP | Identity Provider | +| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem | +| IN | Intelligent Network | +| INAP | Intelligent Network Application Protocol | +| INNI | Internal Network-Network Interface | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IP-CAN | IP Connectivity Access Network | +| IPCGF | Inter-Provider Charging Gateway Function | +| IPsec | Internet Protocol Security | +| IPTV | IP Television | +| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network | +| ISP | Internet Service Provider | +| IVR | Interactive Voice Response | +| L2HE-FE | Layer 2 Handover Execution Functional Entity | +| L2TP | Layer 2 Tunnelling Protocol | +| L3HCF | Layer 3 Handover Control Function | +| L3HEF | Layer 3 Handover Execution Function | +| LAC | L2TP Access Concentrator | +| LAN | Local Area Network | +| LNS | L2TP Network Server | +| LS | Location Server | +| MGC-FE | Media Gateway Control Functional Entity | +| MLM-FE | Mobile Location Management Functional Entity | +| MMCF | Mobility Management and Control Functions | +| MPLS | Multi Protocol Label Switching | +| MPM | Management of Performance Measurement | +| MRB-FE | Media Resource Broker Functional Entity | +| MRC-FE | Media Resource Control Functional Entity | +| MRF | Multicast Replication Function | +| MRP-FE | Media Resource Processing Functional Entity | +| NAC-FE | Network Access Configuration Functional Entity | +| NACF | Network Attachment Control Functions | +| NAPT | Network Address and Port Translation | +| NAT | Network Address Translation | + +| | | +|----------|------------------------------------------------------------| +| NE | Network Element | +| NID-FE | Network Information Distribution Functional Entity | +| NIR-FE | Network Information Repository Functional Entity | +| NGN | Next Generation Network | +| NNI | Network-Network Interface | +| NPF | NAPT Proxy Function | +| NSIW-FE | Network Signalling Interworking Functional Entity | +| OAMP | Operation, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning | +| OCF | Online Charging Function | +| OSA | Open Service Architecture | +| OSE | Open Service Environment | +| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| PD-FE | Policy Decision Functional Entity | +| PDG | Packet Data Gateway | +| PE-FE | Policy Enforcement Functional Entity | +| PII | Personally Identifiable Information | +| POTS | Plain Old Telephone Service | +| PPP | Point-to-Point Protocol | +| PPPoE | PPP over Ethernet | +| PS | Presence Server | +| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network | +| PVR | Personal Video Recorder | +| QoE | Quality of Experience | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions | +| RADIUS | Remote Authentication Dial In User Service | +| RAN | Radio Access Network | +| RF | Rating Function | +| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| SADS | Service and Application Discovery and Selection | +| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity | +| SC&CDF | Service Control and Content Delivery Functions | +| SCF | Service Control Functions | +| SCP | Service Control Point | +| SCP-FE | Service and Content Protection Functional Entity | +| SDH | Synchronous Digital Hierarchy | +| SG-FE | Signalling Gateway Functional Entity | + +| | | +|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------| +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SL-FE | Subscription Locator Functional Entity | +| SLA | Service Level Agreement | +| SNI | Service Network Interface | +| SPAI | Service Provider Access Interface | +| SS-FE | Service Switching Functional Entity | +| STP | Spanning Tree Protocol | +| SUP-FE | Service User Profile Functional Entity | +| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity | +| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol | +| TDM | Time Division Multiplex | +| TLM-FE | Transport Location Management Functional Entity | +| TMG-FE | Trunking Media Gateway Functional Entity | +| TRC-FE | Transport Resource Control Functional Entity | +| TRE-FE | Transport Resource Enforcement Functional Entity | +| TUP-FE | Transport User Profile Functional Entity | +| UDP | User Datagram Protocol | +| UE | User Equipment | +| UNG | User Network Gateway | +| UNI | User Network Interface | +| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier | +| USIW-FE | User Signalling Interworking Functional Entity | +| UT | User Terminal | +| VCR | Video Cassette Recorder | +| VLAN | Virtual LAN | +| VoD | Video on Demand | +| VoIP | Voice over IP | +| VPN | Virtual Private Network | +| VR | Virtual Router | +| W-CDMA | Wideband-Code Division Multiple Access | +| WAG | WLAN Access Gateway | +| WDM | Wavelength Division Multiplexing | +| WiMax | Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access | +| WLAN | Wireless LAN | +| WS | Web Server | +| WSG | Web Services Gateway | +| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Line | + +# 5 Conventions + +The following conventions apply: + +- 1) This Recommendation uses the following conventions which are specific to this Recommendation and are used to facilitate referencing different relationships: + +**A-Cn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in application support functions and service support functions, and functional entities in content delivery functions. + +**A-ONn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in application support functions and service support functions, and other networks. + +**A-Sn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in application support functions and service support functions, and functional entities in service control functions. + +**A-Tn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in application support functions and service support functions, and transport processing functional entities. + +**A-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in application support functions and service support functions, and end-user functions. + +**C-Tn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in content delivery functions and transport processing functional entities. + +**C-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in content delivery functions and end-user functions. + +**I-An**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and functional entities in application support functions, and service support functions. + +**I-Cn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and functional entities in content delivery functions. + +**I-Mn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and functional entities in management functions. + +**I-Sn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and functional entities in service control functions. + +**I-Tn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and transport processing functional entities. + +**I-TCn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and transport control functional entities. + +**I-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in identity management functions and end-user functions. + +**S-Cn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in service control functions and functional entities in content delivery functions. + +**S-ONn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in service control functions and other networks, including other NGNs. + +**S-Tn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in service control functions and transport processing functional entities. + +**S-TCn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in service control functions and transport control functional entities. + +**S-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between functional entities in service control functions and end-user functions. + +**T-ONn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between transport processing functional entities and other networks, including other NGNs. + +**T-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between transport processing functional entities and end-user functions. + +**TC-ONn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between transport control functional entities and other networks, including other NGNs. + +**TC-Tn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between transport control functional entities and transport processing functional entities. + +**TC-TCn**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between the entities of network attachment control function (NACF), resource and admission control functions (RACF) and mobility management and control functions (MMCF). NACF, RACF and MMCF constitute the transport control functions. + +**TC-Un**: This term is used to indicate the relationship between transport control functional entities and end-user functions. + +2) In this Recommendation: + +The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed. + +The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance. + +The keywords "can optionally" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification. + +3) In this Recommendation, the term "NGN operator" is used to refer to a network operator (as defined in clause 3.1.9) that manages one or more NGN(s). A NGN operator can also be a service provider (as defined in clause 3.1.16). Note also that the term "NGN provider", when used in this Recommendation, is equivalent to the term "NGN operator". + +# 6 General principles of the NGN functional architecture + +## 6.1 General characteristics + +The NGN functional architecture incorporates the following principles: + +- **Support for multiple access technologies:** The NGN functional architecture is required to offer the configuration flexibility needed to support multiple access technologies. +- **Distributed control:** This will enable adaptation to the distributed processing nature of packet-based networks and support location transparency for distributed computing. +- **Open control:** The network control environment is open to support service creation, service updating, and incorporation of service logic provision by third parties. +- **Independent service provisioning:** The service provisioning process is separated from transport network operation by using the above-mentioned distributed, open control mechanism. This is intended to promote a competitive environment for NGN development in order to speed up the provision of diversified NGN services. +- **Support for services in a converged network:** This is needed to generate flexible, easy-to-use multimedia services, by tapping the technical potential of the converged, fixed-mobile functional architecture of the NGN. + +- **Enhanced security and protection:** This is the basic principle of an open architecture. It is imperative to protect the network infrastructure by providing mechanisms for security and survivability in the relevant layers. +- **Functional entity characteristics:** Functional entities incorporate the following principles: + - Functional entities may not be distributed over multiple physical units but may have multiple instances. + - Functional entities have no direct relationship with the layered architecture [ITU-T Y.2011]. However, similar entities may be located in different logical layers. + +## 6.2 Connectivity to the NGN + +Figure 6-1 shows the different connectivity, direct or indirect (i.e., through another network), that a NGN may support. + + + +The diagram shows a central light blue rounded rectangle labeled "Next Generation Network". To its left, three red cloud-like shapes represent "Terminal Equipment", "User networks", and "Corporate networks". To its right, four red cloud-like shapes represent "Other Service Providers", "Other Service Providers", "Other NGNs", "Other IP-based Networks", and "PSTN/ISDN". Dashed lines connect the NGN to each of these external entities. A legend at the bottom left shows a dashed line for "Control" and a solid blue line for "Media". The interface on the left is labeled "UNI" and the interface on the right is labeled "NNI". Specific interface labels "ANI" and "SNI" are also present near the top right connections. + +Diagram illustrating connectivity to the Next Generation Network (NGN). The central NGN is connected to various external entities via two main interfaces: UNI (User-Network Interface) on the left and NNI (Network-Network Interface) on the right. The UNI connects to Terminal Equipment, User networks, and Corporate networks. The NNI connects to Other Service Providers (via ANI and SNI), Other NGNs, Other IP-based Networks, and PSTN/ISDN. A legend indicates that dashed lines represent Control and solid blue lines represent Media. + +**Figure 6-1 – Connectivity to the NGN** + +The UNI (user-network interface) is used to provide connectivity to: + +- terminal equipments; +- user networks; +- corporate networks. + +The UNI supports both a control level type of interaction and a media level type of interaction. + +The NNI (network-network interface) is used to provide connectivity to: + +- other NGNs (at the service stratum and/or transport stratum level); + +- other IP-based networks; +- PSTN/ISDN. + +The NNI supports both a control level type of interaction and a media level type of interaction. + +The ANI (application network interface) is an interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between a NGN and applications. The ANI offers capabilities and resources needed for realization of applications. The ANI supports only a control plane level type of interaction without involving media level (or data plane) interaction. The ANI is used to provide connectivity to other service providers, and their applications, also referred to as application providers in this Recommendation. It has to be noted that a NGN operator can also be an application provider as it may support "in-house" applications. + +The SNI (service network interface) is an interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between a NGN and other service providers (such as a content provider [ITU-T Y.1910]). The SNI supports both a control plane level type of interaction and a media level (or data plane) type of interaction. + +Appendix III provides additional information regarding the UNI, NNI, ANI and SNI reference points. + +# 7 Overview of the NGN architecture + +Along with a new architecture, the next generation network brings an additional level of complexity beyond that of legacy networks. In particular, support for multiple access technologies and mobility results in the need to support a wide variety of network configurations. The specific configurations used in the NGN are not the subject of this Recommendation. Some examples of configurations are provided in Appendices I and II. Such examples serve to provide a context for the functional architecture described in this clause. + +The NGN architecture provided in this Recommendation supports the delivery of services identified in the NGN [b-Y.2000-Sup.7], as well as the requirements and capabilities identified in [ITU-T Y.2201]. NGN services include multimedia services, such as conversational services, and content delivery services, such as IPTV services. + +An aim of NGN is to support PSTN/ISDN replacement. Therefore, the NGN provides support for PSTN/ISDN emulation as well as PSTN/ISDN simulation. + +Figure 7-1 shows an overview of the NGN functional architecture. + +The NGN functional architecture supports the UNI, NNI, ANI and SNI reference points as described in clause 6.2. + +The NGN functions are divided into service stratum functions and transport stratum functions according to [ITU-T Y.2011]. To provide these services, several functions in both the service stratum and the transport stratum are needed, as illustrated in Figure 7-1. + +The delivery of services/applications to the end-user is provided by utilizing the application support functions and service support functions, and related control functions. + +The transport stratum provides the IP connectivity services to the NGN users under the control of transport control functions, including the network attachment control functions (NACF), the resource and admission control functions (RACF) and mobility management and control functions (MMCF). + + + +Figure 7-1 – NGN architecture overview. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a Next-Generation Network (NGN). It is organized into four main layers: Applications, Service Stratum, Transport Stratum, and Management Functions. The Applications layer (light blue) connects to the Service Stratum via the ANI (Application Network Interface). The Service Stratum (green) contains Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions, and Service Control and Content Delivery Functions (which include Service User Profiles, Service Control Functions, and Content Delivery Functions). The Transport Stratum (yellow) contains Network Attachment and Control Functions (with Transport User Profiles), Mobility Management and Control Functions, and Resource and Admission control Functions, all under the umbrella of Transport Control Functions. The Management Functions (pink vertical bar) include IdM Functions and End-User Functions. The End-User Functions connect to the Transport Stratum via the UNI (User Network Interface). The Transport Stratum connects to other networks via the NNI (Network Network Interface). The Service Stratum connects to other service providers via the SNI (Service Network Interface). The diagram uses four types of lines to represent interactions: Control (dashed black), Media (solid blue), Management (dotted pink), and IdM (dashed orange). + +**Figure 7-1 – NGN architecture overview** + +NOTE 1 – The user network interface (UNI), the network network interface (NNI), the application network interface (ANI) and the service network interface (SNI) are to be understood as general NGN reference points that can be mapped to specific physical interfaces depending on the particular physical implementations. + +NOTE 2 – Boxes in Figure 7-1 identify high-level functional groups, for which overall descriptions are given later in this clause. + +NOTE 3 – The control links between the functional groups represent high-level logical interactions. + +NOTE 4 – Some functional groups, such as resource and admission control functions (RACF), network attachment control functions (NACF), mobility management and control functions (MMCF), content delivery functions (CDF) and service control functions (SCF), can be distributed and instantiated over different NGN provider domains (e.g., access network, core network). The functional groups in the service stratum and the transport stratum can also be distributed between a visited network and a home network (refer to the NGN terminology [ITU-T Y.2091]). Refer to Appendix I for the details. + +NOTE 5 – User profiles in both the service stratum and the transport stratum are shown as separate functional databases. Depending on the business model in place, these two functional databases can optionally be co-located. Note that other functional databases required for the support of NGN services (such as DNS) are not illustrated in Figure 7-1. + +NOTE 6 – Since Figure 7-1 is drawn from a high-level conceptual point of view, instantiation of the NGN reference points, namely UNI, NNI, ANI and SNI, is useful to clarify the specific role of these different + +reference points in terms of service offering and the physical implementation entailed. The instantiation of NGN reference points is given in Appendix III. + +NOTE 7 – The NGN-UNI line shows the functional aspect only and should not make any pre-decision about an ownership domain. + +NOTE 8 – More precise location and distinction of possible NGN UNIs are for further study. + +NOTE 9 – Although this Recommendation assumes that content delivery functions are provided by the NGN, these functions can optionally be provided outside of the NGN. + +NOTE 10 – It is possible for IdM functions to reside in different planes (e.g., user, control and management) and different strata of the distributed architecture (e.g., service stratum and transport stratum). Although IdM functions are shown in a standalone group of functions, this is not intended to impose any implementation design and restrictions for IdM. + +NOTE 11 – Although IdM functions are shown on the left side of Figure 7-1, this does not mean that IdM functions are located on the UNI side or part of the end-user functions. + +NOTE 12 – Although not shown in Figure 7-1, IdM functions can be connected to functions from other service providers using the SNI reference point. + +## **7.1 Transport stratum functions** + +The transport stratum functions include transport functions and transport control functions, per [ITU-T Y.2011]. + +### **7.1.1 Transport functions** + +The transport functions provide the connectivity for all components and physically separated functions within the NGN. These functions provide support for unicast and/or multicast transfer of media information, as well as the transfer of control and management information. + +Transport functions include access network functions, edge functions, core transport functions, and gateway functions. + +NOTE – No assumptions are made about either the technologies to be used or the internal structure, e.g., the core transport network and the access transport network. + +#### **7.1.1.1 Access network functions** + +The access network functions take care of end-users' access to the network as well as collecting and aggregating the traffic coming from these accesses towards the core network. These functions also perform QoS control mechanisms dealing directly with user traffic, including buffer management, queuing and scheduling, packet filtering, traffic classification, marking, policing, and shaping. In addition, the access network provides support for mobility. + +The access network includes access-technology dependent functions, e.g., for W-CDMA technology and xDSL access. Depending on the technology used for accessing NGN services, the access network includes functions related to: + +- 1) Cable access; +- 2) xDSL access; +- 3) Wireless access (e.g., [b-IEEE 802.11] and [b-IEEE 802.16] technologies, and 3G RAN access); +- 4) Optical access. + +#### **7.1.1.2 Edge functions** + +The edge functions are used for media and traffic processing when aggregated traffic coming from different access networks is merged into the core transport network; they include functions related to support for QoS and traffic control. + +The edge functions are also used between core transport networks. + +#### **7.1.1.3 Core transport functions** + +The core transport functions are responsible for ensuring information transport throughout the core network. They provide the means to differentiate the quality of transport in the core network. + +These functions provide QoS mechanisms dealing directly with user traffic, including buffer management, queuing and scheduling, packet filtering, traffic classification, marking, policing, shaping, gate control, and firewall capability. + +#### **7.1.1.4 Gateway functions** + +The gateway functions provide capabilities to interwork with end-user functions and/or other networks, including other types of NGN and many existing networks, such as the PSTN/ISDN, the public Internet, and so forth. + +Gateway functions can be controlled either directly from the service control functions (see clause 7.2.1) or through the transport control functions (see clause 7.1.2). + +#### **7.1.1.5 Media handling functions** + +The media handling functions provide specialized media resource processing for service provision, such as generation of tone signals and transcoding. These functions are specific to media resource handling in the transport stratum. + +### **7.1.2 Transport control functions** + +The transport control functions include resource and admission control functions, network attachment control functions as well as mobility management and control functions. + +#### **7.1.2.1 Resource and admission control functions (RACF)** + +Within the NGN architecture [ITU-T Y.2011], the resource and admission control functions (RACF) act as the arbitrator between service control functions and transport functions for QoS [ITU-T Y.1291]. The decision is based on transport subscription information, SLAs, network policy rules, service priority (e.g., defined by [ITU-T Y.2171]), and transport resource status and utilization information. + +The RACF provides an abstract view of transport network infrastructure to service control functions (SCF) and makes service stratum functions agnostic to the details of transport facilities, such as network topology, connectivity, resource utilization and QoS mechanisms/technology, etc. The RACF interacts with the SCF and transport functions for a variety of applications (e.g., SIP-based call, video streaming, etc.) that require the control of NGN transport resource, including QoS control, NAPT and firewall control and NAPT traversal. + +The RACF performs the policy-based transport resource control upon the request of the SCF, determines the transport resource availability and admission, and applies controls to the transport functions to enforce the policy decision, including resource reservation, admission control and gate control, NAPT and firewall control, and NAPT traversal. The RACF interacts with transport functions for the purpose of controlling one or more of the following functions in the transport layer: bandwidth reservation and allocation, packet filtering; traffic classification, marking, policing, and priority handling; network address and port translation; and firewall. + +The RACF takes into account the capabilities of transport networks and associated transport subscription information for subscribers in support of the transport resource control. Transport subscription information is the responsibility of the network attachment control functions (NACF). The RACF and the NACF interact to exchange relevant transport subscription information and information on the user terminal's point of attachment. + +For delivering of those services across multiple service providers and/or network operators, SCF, RACF and transport functions may interact with the corresponding functions in other NGNs. + +NOTE – The details and other aspects of the RACF are specified in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **7.1.2.2 Network attachment control functions (NACF)** + +The network attachment control functions (NACF) provide registration at the access level and initialization of end-user functions for accessing NGN services. These functions provide transport stratum level identification/authentication, manage the IP address space of the access network, and authenticate access sessions. They also announce the contact point of NGN functions in the service stratum to the end user. + +The NACF provides the following functionalities: + +- Dynamic provisioning of IP addresses and other user equipment configuration parameters. +- By endorsement of user, auto-discovery of user equipment capabilities and other parameters. +- Authentication of end user and network at the IP layer (and possibly other layers). Regarding the authentication, mutual authentication between the end user and the network attachment is performed. +- Authorization of network access, based on user profiles. +- Access network configuration, based on user profiles. +- Location management at the IP layer. + +The NACF includes the transport user profile which takes the form of a functional database representing the combination of a user's information and other control data into a single "user profile" function in the transport stratum. This functional database may be specified and implemented as a set of cooperating databases with functionalities residing in any part of the NGN. + +NOTE – The details and other aspects of the NACF are specified in [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **7.1.2.3 Mobility management and control functions (MMCF)** + +The mobility management and control functions (MMCF) provide functions for the support of IP-based mobility in the transport stratum. These functions allow the support of mobility of a single device. The MMCF provides mechanisms to achieve seamless mobility if network conditions permit, but does not provide any mechanism to deal with service adaptation if the post-handover quality of service is degraded from the quality of service before handover. + +The MMCF assumes that mobility is a service, explicitly specified by parameters in the user service profile. The MMCF is not dependent on specific access technologies, and supports handover across different technologies. + +NOTE – The details and other aspects of the MMCF are specified in [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +## **7.2 Service stratum functions** + +This abstract representation of the functional grouping in the service stratum includes: + +- the service control and content delivery functions including service user profile functions and, +- the application support functions and service support functions. + +### **7.2.1 Service control and content delivery functions (SC&CDF)** + +The service control and content delivery functions include service control functions and content delivery functions. + +#### **7.2.1.1 Service control functions (SCF)** + +The service control functions (SCF) include resource control, registration, and authentication and authorization functions at the service level for both mediated and non-mediated services. They can + +also include functions for controlling media resources, i.e., specialized resources and gateways at the service-signalling level. + +Regarding the authentication, mutual authentication between end user and the service is performed. + +The service control functions accommodate service user profiles which represent the combination of user information and other control data into a single user profile function in the service stratum, in the form of functional databases. These functional databases may be specified and implemented as a set of cooperating databases with functionalities residing in any part of the NGN. + +#### **7.2.1.2 Content delivery functions (CDF)** + +The content delivery functions (CDF) receive content from the application support functions and service support functions, store, process, and deliver it to the end-user functions using the capabilities of the transport functions, under control of the service control functions. + +### **7.2.2 Application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF)** + +The application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF) include functions such as the gateway, registration, authentication and authorization functions at the application level. These functions are available to the "applications" and "end-user" functional groups. The application support functions and service support functions work in conjunction with the service control functions to provide end users and applications with the NGN services they request. + +Through the UNI, the application support functions and service support functions provide reference points to the end-user functions. Application interactions with the application support functions and service support functions are handled through the ANI reference point. + +## **7.3 End-user functions** + +No assumptions are made about the diverse end-user interfaces and end-user networks that may be connected to the NGN access network. End-user equipment may be either mobile or fixed. + +## **7.4 Management functions** + +Support for management is fundamental to the operation of the NGN. These functions provide the capabilities to manage the NGN in order to provide NGN services with the expected quality, security, and reliability. + +These functions are allocated in a distributed manner to each functional entity (FE), and they interact with network element (NE) management, network management, and service management FEs. Further details of the management functions, including their division into administrative domains, can be found in [ITU-T M.3060]. + +Management functions apply to the NGN service and transport strata. For each of these strata, they cover the following areas: + +- a) Fault management; +- b) Configuration management; +- c) Accounting management; +- d) Performance management including what is specified in [ITU-T Y.2173]; +- e) Security management. + +The accounting management functions also include charging and accounting functions (CAF). These interact with each other in the NGN to collect accounting information, in order to provide the NGN operator with appropriate resource utilization data, enabling the NGN operator to properly bill the users of the system. + +A detailed description of the CAF functions can be found in clause 8.5. + +## **7.5 Identity management (IdM) functions** + +### **7.5.1 Overview** + +[ITU-T Y.2720] provides a framework for identity management (IdM). IdM functions and capabilities are used to assure the identity information, assure the identity of an entity and support business and security applications (e.g., access control and authorization) including identity-based services. An entity is considered to be anything that has separate and distinct existence that can be uniquely identified. In the context of IdM, examples of entities include subscribers, users, network elements, networks, software applications, services and devices. + +In the NGN environment, a single entity may be associated with multiple types of identity information which can be grouped as follows: + +- Identifiers, e.g., UserID, email addresses, telephone numbers, URI and IP addresses; +- Credentials, e.g., digital certificates, tokens and biometrics; +- Attributes, e.g., roles, claims, privileges, patterns and location. + +IdM is a set of functions and capabilities (e.g., administration, management and maintenance, discovery, communication exchanges, correlation and binding, policy enforcement, authentication and assertions) used for: + +- assurance of identity information, +- assurance of the identity of an entity, and +- enabling and supporting business and security applications. + +IdM services and capabilities also allow users/subscriber entities to control how their identity information is stored, used and disseminated. IdM also allows federated identity information to be shared and used by members of a federation (e.g., business partners) to support federated services (e.g., single sign-on and sign-off services). + +### **7.5.2 IdM framework** + +[ITU-T Y.2720] provides a framework for IdM summarized as follows: + +- Identity lifecycle management; +- Identity management (IdM) operation, administration, maintenance and provisioning (OAMP) functions; +- Identity management (IdM) signalling and control functions; +- Identity management (IdM) federated identity functions; +- Identity management (IdM) user and subscriber functions; +- Identity management (IdM) performance, reliability, and scalability; +- Identity management (IdM) security; +- Identity management (IdM) legal and regulatory rules; + +NOTE – Legal and regulatory regulations are not within the scope of [ITU-T Y.2720] and this Recommendation. It is mentioned here only for completeness. + +### **7.5.3 Architectural model** + +In the context of the NGN reference architecture model, it is possible for IdM related functions to reside in the different planes (e.g., user, control and management) and different strata of the distributed architecture (e.g., service stratum and transport stratum). From a realization or implementation perspective, support of IdM services and capabilities could involve the use of existing network elements or it could involve the use of additional network elements (e.g., specialized application servers) in a NGN. + +Figure 7-1 illustrates the general concepts that the support of IdM services and capabilities may involve interaction with specific functional entities (FEs) to enable and support applications and services including identity services. This may include interactions with FEs in the following functional blocks, depending on the specific IdM service or capability being supported and the implementation design: + +- applications; +- service stratum: application support functions and service support functions, service control functions and content delivery functions; +- transport stratum: transport control functions and transport functions; +- end-user functions; +- management functions. + +# **8 NGN concepts** + +## **8.1 Mobility levels in the NGN architecture** + +The NGN architecture supports the capability to provide mobility within and between its various access network types and mobility technologies. This mobility may be supported at various levels in the NGN architecture. MMCF provides support for IP-based mobility in the transport stratum. Mobility in the service stratum is for further study. + +Details are given in mobility management requirements for NGN [ITU-T Q.1706], while details of the functional architecture for MMCF are provided in [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +## **8.2 NGN service architecture** + +The service aspect of the NGN architecture, as shown in Figure 7-1, consists of three distinct functional areas: + +- a) "Applications"; +- b) "Application support functions and service support functions" in the service stratum of the NGN; +- c) NGN resources and capabilities, including those in the transport stratum, capabilities such as presence, location information, charging function, security schemes, etc. + +The "applications" functional area consists of two categories: those trusted by NGN operators, and those that are not. The former consists of applications provided by the NGN operators themselves and subordinate organizations or partners, while the latter may consist of applications provided by other independent service providers (also referred to as application providers), whose access to southbound resources is required to be authenticated, controlled and filtered by the functions in the service enablers. + +As shown in Figure 7-1, through the ANI, the functional area of "application support functions and service support functions" offers service-enabling resources to the "applications" area, independently of the underlying network technologies. Through the ANI, the "applications" area benefits from the capabilities and resources of the "NGN infrastructure" functional area. + +Specifically, the NGN service architecture has the following three main functional characteristics: + +- a) Agnosticism: application support and service support functions areas consist of functions that are agnostic with respect to their underlying NGN infrastructure. +- b) Support for legacy capabilities and features: there are no limiting impacts on the NGN as a result of this NGN service architecture. On the contrary, the use of NGN capabilities such as session management, authentication, location information, charging is supported. For example, the legacy-IN-influenced features of the IMS, such as triggers, filter criteria, and + +the service capability interaction manager, are available through the abstraction of the IMS AS (application server) in the "application support functions and service support functions" area. + +- c) Support for open service interface: The NGN service platform is recommended to provide an open service interface, which provides an abstract of the network capabilities (i.e., the interface is network agnostic). This interface is recommended to provide access to such functions as authentication, authorization, and security to ensure that other service providers can make use of the network capabilities. + +Based upon these main characteristics, [ITU-T Y.2234] further specifies functional requirements of the NGN open service environment (OSE) capabilities, as well as a service architecture for the support of the OSE in the NGN. + +## **8.3 Network topology hiding functions and NAPT traversal functions** + +### **8.3.1 Service stratum topology hiding** + +Service stratum topology hiding is achieved by removing or modifying any topological information carried in application signalling packets to the peering network. + +NOTE – For example, in SIP-based applications, topology information is present in SIP headers, like the via and Record Route headers. + +### **8.3.2 Transport stratum topology hiding** + +Transport stratum topology hiding is achieved by modifying any topological information in media packets, or by blocking network control packets including any topological information. + +Examples of transport stratum topology hiding are as follows: + +- Change the IP addresses and/or port numbers of media packets that pass through the border between access and core transport network and/or the border between two core transport networks. +- Block the network control packet at the border of access/core transport networks, such as STP, ICMP and routing protocol. + +### **8.3.3 Remote NAPT traversal** + +The network address and port translation (NAPT) traversal copes with the traversal of the far-end (remote) NAPT in access networks. The owner of the far-end NAPT is different from the owner of the service control functional entities (e.g., P-CSC-FE), i.e., the far-end NAPT cannot be controlled by the NAPT application level gateway (ALG) or other service control functional entities affiliated with the NGN operator domain. + +## **8.4 Overload control** + +To defend session control functional entities such as S-CSC-FE, against the concentration of malicious or unexpected requests, the following functions are necessary at each boundary between access and/or core networks: + +- Detection of the concentration of requests to an S-CSC-FE at each FE; +- Detection of the concentration of requests to an S-CSC-FE by gathering information from two or more FEs; +- Transmission of the detected information on the concentration of requests to other FEs; +- Traffic control according to the information on the concentration of requests. + +More globally, the NGN architecture is required to allow for functions and mechanisms available to control overload that: + +- automatically maximize effective throughput (i.e., admitted service requests/s) at an overloaded resource; +- achieve this throughout the duration of an overload event, and irrespective of the overloaded resource's capacity or of the number of sources of overload; +- are configurable so that, under processing overload, a high proportion of response times at overloaded resources are low enough so as not to cause customers to prematurely abandon service requests; +- are recommended to be applied within a NGN and between NGNs; +- are recommended to be applied within an NGN component (e.g., IP multimedia service component, PSTN/ISDN emulation service component, see clause 9) and between different NGN components. + +NOTE – As a general rule, a NGN's call, session and command processing resources can experience prolonged processing overload under the appropriate circumstances (e.g., partial, or full, server failure, high rates of incoming service requests). Consequently, it needs to be equipped with some form of overload detection and control (including expansive controls such as load balancing and resource replication), in order to keep response times just low enough under such processing overload to preclude customers abandoning their service requests prematurely. + +## **8.5 Charging and accounting functions (CAF)** + +The charging and accounting functions (CAF) are meant to represent a generalized architecture to support an NGN provider's need to collect and process information, such that customers can be charged for the services provided. + +The CAF provide accounting data to the NGN provider regarding the utilization of resources in the network. They support the collection of data for later processing (offline charging), as well as near-real-time interactions with applications, such as for pre-paid services (online charging). + +The CAF include a charging trigger function (CTF), an online charging function (OCF), a charging collection function (CCF), a rating function (RF), an account balance management function (ABMF), a charging gateway function (CGF) and an inter-provider charging gateway function (IPCGF). + +Figure 8-1 shows a high-level view of the CAF. + + + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph CAF [Charging and Accounting Functions CAF] + subgraph OfflineCharging [Offline Charging] + CC[Charging Collection Function] + end + subgraph OnlineCharging [Online Charging] + OC[Online Charging Function] + RF[Rating Function] + ABM[Account Balance Management Function] + end + CGF[Charging Gateway Function] + IPCGF[Inter-Provider Charging Gateway Function] + end + + CC --> CGF + CGF --> CC + CGF --> OC + OC --> CGF + CGF --> IPCGF + IPCGF --> CGF + OC <--> RF + OC <--> ABM + + subgraph NGN_FE [NGN Functional Entity] + CTF[Charging Trigger Function] + end + + CTF --> CC + CTF --> OC + +``` + +Figure 8-1: Charging and accounting functions architecture diagram. The diagram shows the internal structure of the Charging and Accounting Functions (CAF) and its interactions with external systems. The CAF is a large yellow box containing three main sections: Offline Charging (blue), Online Charging (pink), and a central Charging Gateway Function (white). The Offline Charging section includes a Charging Collection Function. The Online Charging section includes an Online Charging Function, a Rating Function, and an Account Balance Management Function. A Charging Trigger Function (CTF) is shown as a purple box labeled 'NGN Functional Entity' that interacts with both the Charging Collection Function and the Online Charging Function. The Charging Gateway Function interacts with the Charging Collection Function, the Online Charging Function, and two external systems: 'Billing Domain and Backend Systems' and 'Other NGN Charging and Accounting Functions'. An Inter-Provider Charging Gateway Function also interacts with the Online Charging Function and the external systems. + +**Figure 8-1 – Charging and accounting functions** + +The following provides a description of the charging and accounting functions shown in Figure 8-1. For further details regarding the CAF functional architecture, related functions and corresponding reference points, please refer to [ITU-T Y.2233]. + +### 8.5.1 Charging trigger function (CTF) + +The CTF generates charging events based on the observation of network resource usage. In every network and service element that provides charging information, the CTF is the focal point for collecting information pertaining to chargeable events within the network element, assembling this information into matching charging events, and sending these charging events to the charging collection function. The CTF is therefore a necessary component in all network elements that provide offline-charging functionality. + +The CTF also creates the charging events used for online charging. The charging events are forwarded to the online charging function (OCF), in order to obtain authorization for the chargeable event or network resource usage requested by the user. It must be possible to delay the actual resource usage until permission has been granted by the OCF. The CTF must be able to track the availability of the resource usage permissions (i.e., quota supervision) during the network resource usage. It must also be able to enforce termination of the end user's network resource usage, when permission by the OCF is not granted or expires. + +NOTE – The specific entities that contain charging trigger functionality are not defined in this Recommendation. + +### **8.5.2 Charging collection function (CCF)** + +The CCF receives charging events from the CTF. It then uses the information contained in the charging events to construct charging information records (CIRs). The results of the CCF tasks are CIRs with well-defined content and format. The CIRs are later transferred to the billing domain. + +### **8.5.3 Online charging function (OCF)** + +The OCF receives charging events from the CTF and executes them in near real time to provide authorization for the chargeable event or network resource usage requested by the user. The CTF must be able to delay the actual resource usage until permission has been granted by the OCF. The OCF provides a quota for resource usage, which must be tracked by the CTF. Subsequent interactions may result in an additional quota being provided according to the subscriber's account balance, or they may result in no additional quota being provided, in which case the CTF must enforce termination of the end user's network resource usage. + +The OCF allows more than one user to share the same subscriber's account simultaneously. The OCF responds to the charging requests from various users at the same time and provides a certain quota to each user. The quota is determined by default or by certain policies. Users can resend requests for larger quotas during the same session. The maximum available quota, however, will not exceed the subscriber's account balance. + +### **8.5.4 Rating function (RF)** + +The RF works with the online charging module. The RF determines the value of the network resource usage (described in the charging event received by the OCF from the network) on behalf of the OCF. To this end, the OCF furnishes the necessary information to the RF and receives the rating output. + +### **8.5.5 Account balance management function (ABMF)** + +The ABMF stores the subscriber's account balance within the online charging system. + +The subscriber's account balance could be represented by the remaining available traffic volume (e.g., bytes), time (e.g., minutes for calling), or content (e.g., a movie), as well as money. + +Security and robustness should be emphasized by encrypting key data, providing backup and failure alarm capabilities, keeping detailed logs, and so forth. + +### **8.5.6 Charging gateway function (CGF)** + +The CGF plays a gateway role between the NGN network and the billing domain or another NGN CGF. The CGF performs validation, consolidation, correlation, formatting, and error handling of CIRs. It also performs lifecycle management for CIR file creation, modification, and deletion. + +When applicable, the CGF selects CIRs for inter-provider charging settlement per NGN provider and transfers them to the inter-provider charging gateway function (IPCGF). + +### **8.5.7 Inter-provider charging gateway function (IPCGF)** + +The IPCGF constructs and transfers CIRs for inter-provider charging settlement. It determines the type of CIR (duration-based, volume-based, event-based, etc.) depending on the settlement policy between the involved NGN providers. + +The IPCGF allows NGN providers to exchange CIRs in real-time over standardized interfaces. + +# **9 Generalized NGN functional architecture** + +This clause describes the generalized functional architecture for the NGN, including the definitions of the generalized functional entities. This architecture is a general service- and technology-independent architecture that can be later instantiated in customized architectures that can respond to specific contexts in terms of the services offered and the technologies used. + +## **9.1 NGN functional architecture framework** + +The NGN functional architecture framework shown in Figure 9-1 is based on the NGN architecture overview provided in clause 7. In particular, the functional groups identified in Figure 7-1 are used to structure the general layout of Figure 9-1. The functional groups shown in Figure 9-1 are groups of NGN functional entities which are further described in clause 9.3. Figure 9-1 also identifies NGN reference points between these functional groups, reference points which are also described later in this Recommendation. + +As already mentioned in clause 7, the NGN architecture and, as a consequence, the generalized functional architecture described in this clause, are expected to provide functionality for all envisaged services over packet-based networks. More specifically, the NGN architecture described in this Recommendation is consistent with [b-ITU-T Y.2000-Sup.1] and [b-ITU-T Y.2000-Sup.7] that outline the scope of NGN and provides general support for the requirements and capabilities of the NGN identified in [ITU-T Y.2201]. + +In this sense, in line with the [ITU-T Y.2011] principles, most of the NGN transport stratum functions (such as RACF or NACF) are able to support different types of NGN services in a common way. NGN implementations do not, however, have to implement certain transport stratum functions, such as gateway functions with respect to PSTN/ISDN or MMCF functions with respect to mobility, if they do not require support for such capabilities. + + + +The diagram illustrates the NGN functional architecture framework, showing the interaction between various functional entities across different strata. + +**Applications** (top) connect to the **NGN service stratum** via the **ANI** interface. + +The **NGN service stratum** (green box) contains: + +- Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions** (top layer). +- Service Control Functions** (middle layer, including S-C1, S-C2, S-C3, S-C4). +- Content Delivery Functions** (middle layer, including S-ON1, S-ON2). + +The **NGN transport stratum** (yellow box) contains: + +- Transport Control Functions** (middle layer, including NACF, MMCF, RACF). +- Transport Processing Functions** (bottom layer). + +**Management Functions** (pink box) are connected to the NGN service stratum via **Note 1** and to the NGN transport stratum via **Note 1**. + +**End-User Functions** (white box) are connected to the NGN service stratum via **Note 1** and to the NGN transport stratum via **Note 1**. + +**Other NGNs** (white box) are connected to the NGN service stratum via **TC-ON1**. + +**IP Multimedia Networks** (white box) are connected to the NGN transport stratum via **T-ON2**. + +**PSTN/ISDN** (white box) are connected to the NGN transport stratum via **T-ON1** and **T-ON3**. + +Figure 9-1 – NGN functional architecture framework. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a Next-Generation Network (NGN). It is organized into three main strata: the NGN service stratum (top, green), the NGN transport stratum (bottom, yellow), and Management Functions (left, pink). The Applications layer at the top connects to the NGN service stratum via the ANI interface. The NGN service stratum contains Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions, which are further divided into Service Control Functions and Content Delivery Functions. The NGN transport stratum contains Transport Control Functions (NACF, MMCF, RACF) and Transport Processing Functions. Management Functions are connected to the NGN service stratum via Note 1 and to the NGN transport stratum via Note 1. The diagram also shows connections to Content Provider Functions, Other NGNs, IP Multimedia Networks, and PSTN/ISDN. + +NOTE 1 – This link corresponds to the multiple reference points that may exist between the management functions and the corresponding NGN stratum. + +**Figure 9-1 – NGN functional architecture framework** + +## 9.2 NGN functional entities (FEs) + +In general, a FE is characterized by functions identified as sufficiently unique with respect to other FEs. In the case of the generalized NGN architecture, the functional entities, called NGN FEs, are to be understood as generic FEs to allow for their possible instantiation in more specific technology-oriented contexts. It is therefore possible that when NGN FEs are instantiated, they can be used and can behave in a slightly different manner depending on the context. For example, this may lead to the case where, at a given reference point (between the same NGN FEs), the interface and the associated protocols are different depending on the instantiation. This means that interfaces, as well as protocol descriptions, can only be provided on the basis of a specific instantiation of the generalized functional architecture. + +In the NGN functional architecture, a given FE in a given NGN stratum is not necessarily constrained to a given layer in that stratum. For example, an FE in the NGN transport stratum may support functions involving different layers such as IP, TCP/UDP or transport layers used below the IP layer. + +## 9.3 Functional entity descriptions + +This clause provides a description of the NGN functional entities (FEs). The functional entities described are: + +- Transport processing functional entities (covering access and core); +- Transport control functional entities; +- Service control and content delivery functional entities; +- Functional entities within the application support functions and service support functions; +- Functional entities within end-user functions; +- Functional entities within IdM functions. + +### 9.3.1 Transport processing functional entities + +Figure 9-2 shows the transport processing FEs. Since the generalized NGN functional architecture described in this Recommendation has a much broader sense, in particular, at the transport functions, distinction of access and core aspects is applied in Figure 9-2 regarding transport processing functional entities. + + + +The diagram shows the following functional entities and their connections: + +- Access Transport Processing:** + - T-4: Access Relay FE (connected to T-U1) + - T-1: Access Media Gateway FE (connected to T-U2) + - T-22: Layer 2 Handover Execution FE (connected to T-1 and T-3) + - T-2: Access Node FE (connected to T-U3) + - Access Transport Functions (connected to T-2 and T-3) + - T-3: Edge Node FE (connected to T-22 and T-5) +- Core Transport Processing:** + - T-5: Access Border Gateway FE (connected to T-3 and Core Transport Functions) + - Core Transport Functions (central hub in the core section) + - T-8: Media Resource Processing FE (connected to C-T1) + - T-9: Signalling Gateway FE (connected to T-9) + - T-6: Interconnection Border Gateway FE (connected to Core Transport Functions and T-ON2) + - T-7: Trunking Media Gateway FE (connected to Core Transport Functions and T-ON3) + +Reference points and control entities are indicated at the top: TC-T1, TC-T2 (Note 2), TC-T3, S-T2, TC-T7, TC-T5 (Note 2), TC-T6 (Note 2), C-T2 (Note 4), C-T1 (Note 4), S-T1, TC-T4, S-T3, A-T1, TC-T9 (Note 2), S-T5, S-T4. Reference points I-Tn (Note 5), T-U1, T-U2, T-U3, and T-U4 (Note 1) are on the left. External reference points T-ON1, T-ON2, and T-ON3 are on the right. + +Figure 9-2: Transport processing FEs. This diagram illustrates the functional entities within transport processing, divided into Access Transport Processing and Core Transport Processing. The diagram is organized into a grid with reference points (I-Tn, T-U1, T-U2, T-U3, T-U4) on the left and functional entities (T-1 to T-9) in the center. A vertical dashed line separates the Access and Core sections. Reference points TC-T1 through TC-T9 are positioned above the entities. Connections show the flow of data and control between entities and reference points. + +NOTE 1 – T-U4 is a reference point between end-user functions and the transport processing functions that is used for multicast control. Depending on the network configuration, the T-U4 reference point can terminate in either the AN-FE, or the EN-FE, or the ABG-FE or within the access or core transport functions. The entity terminating the T-U4 reference point includes EC-FE and EF-FE that are multicast capable, i.e., the EC-FE includes a multicast control point function (see [ITU-T Y.2017]), while the EF-FE includes a multicast replication function (see [ITU-T Y.2017]). + +NOTE 2 – When used, the entity terminating the corresponding reference point includes a PE-FE. + +NOTE 3 – When used, the entity terminating the corresponding reference point includes a Layer 3 handover execution function (L3HEF) as per [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +NOTE 4 – Although not shown in Figure 9-2 and depending on the network configuration, both C-T1 and C-T2 reference points can be connected to the access transport functions instead of the core transport functions. + +NOTE 5 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-Tn reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant transport functional entities (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +**Figure 9-2 – Transport processing FEs** + +NOTE – Although the scope of this Recommendation is targeted primarily at a NGN architecture, it is clear that the accommodation of legacy PSTN/ISDN terminals and/or interworking with the PSTN/ISDN is an important consideration with respect to NGN deployment. Thus, to provide a more comprehensive view, AMG-FE required to accommodate PSTN/ISDN terminals is shown, even though it is not strictly part of the NGN architecture itself. + +#### **9.3.1.1 T-1: Access media gateway functional entity (AMG-FE)** + +The access media gateway functional entity (AMG-FE) provides interworking between the packet-based transport used in the NGN and analogue lines or ISDN access. + +- 1) It provides bidirectional media processing functions for user plane traffic between PSTN/ISDN and the NGN under the control of the AGC-FE (see clause 9.3.3.1.8). +- 2) It provides adequate transfer functions for PSTN/ISDN user call control signalling to the AGC-FE for processing. +- 3) It optionally supports payload processing functions (e.g., codecs and echo cancellers). +- 4) It optionally provides the TDM/IP interworking function (refer to [ITU-T Y.1453]) to support ISDN emulation service in cases where an ISDN unrestricted bearer is needed. + +#### **9.3.1.2 T-2: Access node functional entity (AN-FE)** + +The access node functional entity (AN-FE) in IP access network directly connects to end-user functions and terminates the first/last mile link signals at the network side. Generally, it is a layer 2 device that can optionally be IP capable. + +As one key injection node for support of dynamic QoS control, the AN-FE may perform packet filtering, traffic classification, marking, policing and shaping at flow level or user level under the control of the RACF. + +When the AN-FE is IP capable, it is required to support the functions of elementary control functional entity (EC-FE) and elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE). In addition, it is recommended to support the functions of policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) and the transport resource enforcement functional entity (TRE-FE), which are controlled by the RACF as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **9.3.1.3 T-3: Edge node functional entity (EN-FE)** + +The edge node functional entity (EN-FE) in the access packet transport functions connects to core packet transport functions and terminates the layer 2 access session with the end-user functions. In case of connection to IP-based core transport functions, it is required to be a layer 3 device with IP forwarding capabilities. + +The EN-FE performs QoS mechanisms dealing with the user traffic directly, including buffer management, queuing and scheduling, packet filtering, traffic classification, marking, policing, shaping, and forwarding. + +As one key injection node for support of dynamic QoS control, the EN-FE performs packet filtering, traffic classification, marking, policing and shaping at flow level or user level under the control of the RACF. + +Since the EN-FE is IP capable, it is required to support the functions of elementary control functional entity (EC-FE) and elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE). It is recommended to support the policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) and the transport resource enforcement functional entity (TRE-FE), which are controlled by the RACF as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +In addition to the functions listed above, a layer 3 handover execution function (L3HEF) [ITU-T Y.2018] can optionally be embedded in the EN-FE for support of mobility. + +#### **9.3.1.4 T-4: Access relay functional entity (AR-FE)** + +The access relay functional entity (AR-FE) acts as a relay between the CPE and the NACF. It receives network access requests from the CPE and forwards them to the NACF. Before forwarding a request, the AR-FE can optionally insert local configuration information. + +NOTE 1 – When using PPP [b-IETF RFC 1661], the AR-FE can optionally act as a PPPoE relay. When using DHCP [b-IETF RFC 2131], the AR-FE acts as a DHCP relay agent. + +NOTE 2 – For example, when using DHCP, the AR-FE acts as a DHCP relay agent and can optionally add information before forwarding a message, e.g., insertion of the identifier of the ATM virtual channel carrying IP traffic in a DHCP request. + +#### **9.3.1.5 T-5: Access border gateway functional entity (ABG-FE)** + +The access border gateway functional entity (ABG-FE) is a packet gateway between an access network and a core transport network used to mask a service provider's network from access networks, through which end-user functions are accessing packet-based services. + +The functions of the ABG-FE include opening and closing gate, packet-filtering-based firewall, traffic classification and marking, traffic policing and shaping, network address and port translation, media relay (i.e., media latching) for NAPT traversal, and collecting and reporting resource usage information (e.g., start-time, end-time, octets of sent data). + +As one key injection node for support of dynamic QoS control, NAPT/FW control and NAPT traversal, the ABG-FE is required to support the functions of PE-FE and TRE-FE which are controlled by the RACF as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. In addition, it is recommended to support the functions of elementary control functional entity (EC-FE) and elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE). + +The ABG-FE can optionally support IPv4/IPv6 conversion. + +In addition to the functions listed above, a layer 3 handover execution function (L3HEF) [ITU-T Y.2018] can optionally be embedded in the ABG-FE for support of mobility. + +#### **9.3.1.6 T-6: Interconnection border gateway functional entity (IBG-FE)** + +The interconnection border gateway functional entity (IBG-FE) is a packet gateway used to interconnect the core transport network of a NGN operator with that of another NGN operator. There may be one or multiple IBG-FEs in a core transport network. + +The functions of the IBG-FE may be the same as that of the ABG-FE. + +As one key injection node for support of dynamic QoS control, NAPT/FW control, the IBG-FE is required to support the functions of PE-FE (except for remote NAPT traversal) and TRE-FE which are controlled by the RACF as defined in [ITU-T Y.2111]. In addition, the IBG-FE is recommended to support the functions of elementary control functional entity (EC-FE) and elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE). + +Alternative means of control, such as direct control by IBC-FE, need further study. + +In addition, the IBG-FE can optionally support the following functions: + +- a) Media conversion (e.g., ITU-T G.711 and ITU-T T.38, ITU-T G.711 and AMR); +- b) Inter-domain IPv4/IPv6 conversion; +- c) Media encryption; +- d) Fax/modem processing. + +NOTE – Allocation of the above functions to the IBG-FE needs further study: the IBG-FE can optionally perform media conversion under the control of the IBC-FE. The direct link between the IBG-FE and the IBC-FE is for further study. + +In addition to the functions listed above, a layer 3 handover execution function (L3HEF) [ITU-T Y.2018] can optionally be embedded in the IBG-FE for support of mobility. + +#### **9.3.1.7 T-7: Trunking media gateway functional entity (TMG-FE)** + +The trunking media gateway functional entity (TMG-FE) provides interworking between the packet-based transport used in the NGN and trunk lines from the circuit-switched network. It is under the control of the MGC-FE. + +- a) It can optionally support payload processing (e.g., codecs, echo cancellers, and conference bridges). +- b) It can optionally provide the TDM/IP interworking function (refer to [ITU-T Y.1453]), in order to support the ISDN emulation service in case ISDN unrestricted bearer is needed. + +#### **9.3.1.8 T-8: Media resource processing functional entity (MRP-FE)** + +The media resource processing functional entity (MRP-FE) provides payload processing of packets used in the NGN. + +- a) It allocates specialized resources (such as announcement server, notification tone, and voice recognition resources, and voice menu and conference resources). +- b) It provides media mixing functions under the control of the MRC-FE. +- c) It receives and generates DTMF signals. +- d) It generates tone signals (e.g., ring back). +- e) It generates announcements. +- f) It provides trans-coding, text-to-speech, video mixing, conference bridge, data conference, fax, voice and video recording, and voice recognition capabilities. + +#### **9.3.1.9 T-9: Signalling gateway functional entity (SG-FE)** + +The signalling gateway functional entity (SG-FE) is responsible for signalling transport interworking between the NGN and the existing networks, such as PSTN, ISDN, IN networks and signalling system No. 7. + +#### **9.3.1.10 Policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE)** + +The policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) in the transport stratum enforces the network policy rules instructed by the PD-FE on a per-subscriber and per-IP flow basis. The PE-FE is typically included in packet-to-packet gateways at the boundary of different packet networks and/or between the CPE and the access network. It is the key injection node to enforce dynamic QoS and resource control, NAPT control and NAT traversal. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **9.3.1.11 Transport resource enforcement functional entity (TRE-FE)** + +The transport resource enforcement functional entity (TRE-FE) in the transport stratum enforces the transport resource policy rules instructed by the TRC-FE at the technology-dependent aggregate level. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **9.3.1.12 Elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE)** + +An elementary forwarding functional entity (EF-FE) forwards traffic data received on one flow point "In-FP" (flow point is used here similar to [ITU-T G.8010]) to one flow point "Out-FP" or optionally more flow point(s) "Out-FP(i)", $i = 0..n$ of a transport element; where "In-FP" is not contained within the set of "Out-FP(i), $i = 0..n$ ". Consequently, for a unicast type of operation, there is exactly one Out-FP (i.e., $i = 1$ ), while for multicast type of operation, the set of "Out-FP(i)" can contain any + +number of flow points (including the case where "Out-FP(i)" equals the empty set). In the latter case, the EF-FE supports the multicast replication function (see [ITU-T Y.2017]). + +#### **9.3.1.13 Elementary control functional entity (EC-FE)** + +An elementary control functional entity (EC-FE) processes control protocol data (e.g., routing protocol data) for unicast, as well as multicast, data received on one flow point. As a result of this processing, the EC-FE might decide to: + +- a) send control protocol data (including events to trigger policy evaluation) to another EC-FE; +- b) interact with one or more instances of EF-FE to establish new or modify existing forwarding behaviour of the EF-FE; +- c) interact with one or more instances of TRE-FE and/or PE-FE. This includes the ability to create events to trigger policy evaluation in TRE-FE and/or PE-FE. + +The EC-FE may also receive requests from PE-FE and/or TRE-FE to perform policy enforcement (e.g., trigger transport control protocol actions) and reply back to PE-FE and/or TRE-FE, indicating the result of the requested operation. + +In case of multicast control, the EC-FE provides the multicast control point function [ITU-T Y.2017]. + +#### **9.3.1.14 T-22: Layer 2 handover execution functional entity (L2HE-FE)** + +The layer 2 handover execution functional entity (L2HE-FE) resides in the access part of transport processing functions. It acts on commands from the HDC-FE to: + +- take access-technology-specific action as required to preserve flow continuity during handover; +- complete handover execution in the direction towards the UE when it has determined that the UE has executed handover. + +In support of media independent handover [b-IEEE 802.21], it also reports link layer events to the HDC-FE. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +### **9.3.2 Transport control functional entities** + +Figure 9-3 shows the functional entities related to transport control. + +Given that RACF [ITU-T Y.2111] does not make explicit distinction between access and core, the control of access and core transport processing entities described in clause 9.3.1 by RACF may vary. + +At least one PD-FE is required to be deployed in each network administrative domain (e.g., access network domain and/or core network domain) with associated PE-FEs and TRC-FEs. Depending on the business model and the implementation choices, the RACF may be present in an access network domain or core network domain, or may be present in both access and core network domains. The implementation and physical configuration of the PD-FE and the TRC-FE are therefore flexible; they can be distributed or centralized, and may be a stand-alone device or part of an integrated device. Appendix I of [ITU-T Y.2111] depicts some implementation examples. + + + +Figure 9-3: Transport-control-related functional entities. This block diagram illustrates the functional entities and their interactions within a transport control system. The system is divided into three main functional blocks: NACF (Network Access Configuration Function), RACF (Resource Access Control Function), and MMCF (Mobile Management Control Function). NACF contains T-10 (Network Access Configuration FE), T-11 (Transport Authentication & Authorization FE), T-12 (Transport User Profile FE), T-13 (Transport Location Management FE), T-14 (Access Management FE), and T-15 (Home Gateway Configuration FE). RACF contains T-16 (Policy Decision FE) and T-17 (Transport Resource Control FE). MMCF contains T-18 (Mobile Location Management FE), T-19 (Handover Decision and Control FE), T-20 (Network Information Distribution FE), and T-21 (Network Information Repository FE). External reference points include S-TC1 through S-TC5, TC-U1 through TC-U5, TC-Ux, I-TCn (Note 5), TC-ON1, TC-T1, TC-T2, TC-T3, TC-T4, TC-T5, TC-T6, TC-T7, TC-T8, TC-T9, and TC-T10. Internal reference points include TC-TC1 through TC-TC5. The diagram is labeled 'Transport Control Functions' at the bottom right. + +NOTE 1 – This reference point is applicable when TRC-FE operates in the access network domain. + +NOTE 2 – This reference point is applicable when TRC-FE operates in the core network domain. + +NOTE 3 – This reference point is applicable when PD-FE operates in the access network domain. + +NOTE 4 – This reference point is applicable when PD-FE operates in the core network domain. + +NOTE 5 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-TCn reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant transport control functional entities (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +**Figure 9-3 – Transport-control-related functional entities** + +#### 9.3.2.1 T-10: Network access configuration functional entity (NAC-FE) + +The NAC-FE is responsible for the IP address allocation to the CPE. It can optionally distribute other network configuration parameters, such as address of DNS server(s), address of signalling proxies for specific service stratum components (e.g., address of the P-CSC-FE when accessing to the IMS component [ITU-T Y.2021]). + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +NOTE – The T-10 network access configuration FE may reside in a visited network or a home network. It depends on the administrative domain and the business scenario. + +#### **9.3.2.2 T-11: Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE)** + +The TAA-FE performs user authentication, as well as authorization checking, based on transport subscription profiles, for network access. For each user, the TAA-FE retrieves authentication data and access authorization information from the transport subscription profile information contained in the TUP-FE. The TAA-FE can optionally perform the collection of accounting data for each user authenticated by the NACF. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **9.3.2.3 T-12: Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE)** + +The TUP-FE is the functional entity that contains subscription authentication data (transport subscriber identifier, list of supported authentication methods, key materials, etc.) and information related to the required network access configuration: this data is called "transport subscription profile". + +For further details, refer to clause 7.2.5 of [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **9.3.2.4 T-13: Transport location management functional entity (TLM-FE)** + +The TLM-FE registers the association between the IP address allocated to the CPE and the related network location information provided by the NAC-FE, e.g., access transport equipment characteristics, logical connection identifier, identification of the edge PE-FE device, etc. The TLM-FE registers the association between transport location information received from the NAC-FE and geographical location information. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **9.3.2.5 T-14: Access management functional entity (AM-FE)** + +The AM-FE terminates the layer 2 transport connection between the CPE and the NACF for registration and initialization of the CPE. The layer 2 connection may be used for detecting the network attachment at the network layer. In this case, the layer 2 connection between the CPE and the AM-FE can constitute a unified framework to the higher layer entities across the heterogeneous network environment to facilitate discovery and selection of multiple types of access networks existing within a geographical area. It is important to note that each of the communication relationships between the CPE and the AM-FE does not imply a particular transport mechanism. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **9.3.2.6 T-15: Home gateway configuration functional entity (HGWC-FE)** + +The HGWC-FE is used during initialization and update of the HGW (also called CPN gateway, see clause 9.3.6). It provides the HGW with additional configuration information (e.g., configuration of a firewall internally in the HGW, QoS marking of IP packets, etc.). These data differ from the network configuration data provided by the NAC-FE. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +#### **9.3.2.7 T-16: Policy decision functional entity (PD-FE)** + +The PD-FE provides a single contact point to the SCF and hides the details of transport network to the SCF. The PD-FE makes the final decision regarding network resource and admission control based on network policy rules, SLAs, service information provided by the SCF, transport subscription information provided by the NACF in access networks, and resource-based admission decision results provided by the TRC-FE. The PD-FE controls the gates in the PE-FEs at a per flow level. The PD-FE consists of transport technology-independent resource control functions and is independent of the SCF as well. The policy rules used by the PD-FE are service-based and are assumed to be provided by the NGN operators. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **9.3.2.8 T-17: Transport resource control functional entity (TRC-FE)** + +The TRC-FE deals with the diversity of underlying transport technologies and provides the resource-based admission control decision results to the PD-FE. The TRC-FE is service-independent and consists of transport technology-dependent resource control functions. The PD-FE requests the TRC-FE instances in the involved transport networks to detect and determine the requested QoS resource along the media flow path. The TRC-FE may collect and maintain the transport network topology and the transport resource status information. It may also authorize resource admission control of a transport network based on network information, such as topology and/or connectivity, network and element resource availability, as well as the transport subscription information in access networks. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +#### **9.3.2.9 T-18: Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE)** + +The mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE) has the following responsibilities: + +- in the case of network-based mobility, initiating location registration on behalf of the UE; +- processing location registration messages sent from or on behalf of the UE; +- optionally, maintaining the binding between the mobility service user ID and the persistent IP address assigned to the UE; +- management of the binding between the persistent IP address assigned to the UE and its temporary address, in the case of host-based mobility, or the address of the lower tunnel-end point, in the case of network-based mobility; +- optionally, holding two location bindings for the mobile UE by marking the binding for the serving network as active state and marking the binding for the target network as standby state; +- supporting separation of control and data plane by allowing the MLMF address and the data forwarding end point address (i.e., tunnelling end point address) to be different; +- indication of a new mobility location binding and distribution of binding information to the HDC-FE. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +#### **9.3.2.10 T-19: Handover decision and control functional entity (HDC-FE)** + +The handover decision and control functional entity (HDC-FE) has three sub-functions: handover decision (HDF), layer 2 handover control (L2HCF) and layer 3 handover control (L3HCF). + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +#### **9.3.2.11 T-20: Network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE)** + +The network information distribution functional entity (NID-FE) has the following responsibilities: + +- distributing handover policy, which is a set of NGN operator-defined rules and preferences that affect the handover decisions taken by the UE or the HDC-FE; +For example, a handover policy can indicate that vertical handover from E-UTRAN access to WLAN access is not allowed. It can also indicate e.g., that WiMAX access is preferable to WLAN access; +- distributing other information provided by the NIR-FE. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +#### 9.3.2.12 T-21: Network information repository functional entity (NIR-FE) + +The network information repository functional entity (NIR-FE) provides static information on neighbouring networks to the NID-FE to assist the access network discovery and selection decision. For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +### 9.3.3 Service control and content delivery functional entities + +#### 9.3.3.1 Service control functional entities + +Figure 9-4 shows the functional entities related to service control. + + + +Figure 9-4: Service control functional entities. A block diagram showing various functional entities (FEs) and their interconnections. The diagram is organized into a grid with vertical axes labeled A-S1 through A-S6 and I-Sn (Note 1), and horizontal axes labeled S-TC1 through S-T5. Functional entities include: S-14: Media Resource Broker FE, S-15: General Services Control FE, S-6: Service Authentication & Authorization FE, S-5: Service User Profile FE, S-4: Subscription Locator FE, S-1: Service Call Session Control FE, S-3: Interrogating Call Session Control FE, S-12: Network Signaling Interworking FE, S-11: User Signaling Interworking FE, S-2: Proxy Call Session Control FE, S-7: Interconnection Border Gateway Control FE, S-10: Breakout Gateway Control FE, S-8: Access Gateway Control FE, S-9: Media Gateway Control FE, and S-13: Media Resource Control FE. Connections are shown as lines between these entities, some terminating at dotted boxes around S-4 and S-5. + +NOTE 1 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-Sn reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant service control functional entities (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +**Figure 9-4 – Service control functional entities** + +NOTE 1 – It is for further study whether functions not currently in S-1: S-CSC-FE, S-2: P-CSC-FE and S-3: I-CSC-FE should be added to them or accommodated by S-15: GSC-FE. Depending on the outcome of this study, S-15: GSC-FE may be revisited in the future. + +NOTE 2 – Any line terminating on the dotted box around S-4 and S-5 implies an implicit connection to either S-4 or S-5 or both. Inclusion of these two FEs in the dotted box does not imply that they are co-located. + +NOTE 3 – Although it is located in the service control functions, the MRB-FE could be viewed as a part of application support functions and service support functions. + +##### 9.3.3.1.1 S-1: Serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE) + +The serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE) handles functionality related to session control, e.g., registration, origination of sessions (session setup, modification and teardown), and routing of session messages. It performs the following functions: + +- a) **Registration:** It can learn that a particular user and/or terminal identifier is currently in service and can interact with the SUP-FE (possibly via the SL-FE) to obtain relevant service profile and address information which will act as an input to the service triggering and routing functions of the S-CSC-FE. +- b) **Service triggering:** Based on an analysis of the session control messages, it can route session control messages to appropriate application support and service support functions. +- c) **Determination of routing of session control messages:** It can determine the routing for session control messages based on routing (location) information available to it in appropriate databases, NGN operator routing policy and address information obtained from SUP-FE via the "registration" function. + +The S-CSC-FE maintains a session-related state as needed by the NGN operator for support of services. Within the network of a NGN operator, different S-CSC-FEs may have different functionalities. + +For mediated session, the S-CSC-FE: + +- 1) Is required to have the capability to accept session control requests and service them internally or forward them on, possibly after translation. +- 2) Is required to have the capability to terminate and independently generate session control messages. +- 3) Interacts with the AS-FE to support services and third-party applications. +- 4) Performs as follows for an originating endpoint (i.e., the originating user/UE or originating AS-FE): + - a) It obtains from a database the address of the contact point for the NGN operator serving the destination user from the destination name (e.g., a dialled phone number or SIP URI), when the destination user is a customer of a different network operator, and it forwards the request or response to that contact point. + - b) When the destination name of the destination user (e.g., a dialled phone number or SIP URI) and the originating user belong to the same NGN operator, it forwards the session control request or response to an I-CSC-FE within the NGN operator's network. + - c) It forwards the session control request or response to a BGC-FE for call routing to the PSTN. + - d) In case the request is an originating request from an AS-FE: + - It verifies that the request coming from the AS-FE is an originating request and applies procedures accordingly (e.g., it invokes interaction with the service platforms for the originating services, etc.). + - It processes and proceeds with the request even if the user on whose behalf the AS-FE had generated the request is unregistered. + - It processes and proceeds with other requests to and from the user on whose behalf the AS-FE had generated the request. + - It reflects in the charging information that an AS-FE had initiated the session on behalf of the user. +- 5) Performs as follows for a destination endpoint (i.e., the terminating user/UE). + +This item identifies the procedures related to the destination endpoint. In the case that roaming is not deployed as a network capability, only those procedures in a) or b) related to terminating a session for a "home user" within a "home network" shall be mandated capabilities. Technology-specific functional architectures instantiating this FE are required to identify if roaming is supported in the technology. + +- a) It forwards the session control request or response to a P-CSC-FE or AGC-FE for a terminating session procedure for a home user within the home network, or for a user roaming within a visited network where the home network operator has chosen not to have an I-CSC-FE in the path. +- b) It forwards the session control request or response to an I-CSC-FE for a terminating session procedure for a roaming user within a visited network where the home network operator has chosen to have an I-CSC-FE in the path. +- c) It forwards the session control request or response to a BGC-FE for call routing to the PSTN. +- d) If the session control request contains preferences for the characteristics of the destination endpoint, it performs preference and capability matching. + +##### **9.3.3.1.2 S-2: Proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE)** + +The proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE) acts as the contact point to the user terminal for session-based services. Its address is discovered by terminals using mechanisms, such as static provisioning, a NACF, or other access-specific techniques. The P-CSC-FE has the capability to accept requests and services them internally or forward them on. It is required to have the capability to terminate and independently generate session control messages. However, as the key function of the P-CSC-FE is to proxy session control requests, this capability will likely only be used under abnormal conditions. The functions performed by the P-CSC-FE include the following: + +- a) It is required to have the capability of forwarding session control requests related to registration to an appropriate I-CSC-FE. +- b) It is required to have the capability of forwarding session control requests received from the terminal to the S-CSC-FE. +- c) It is required to have the capability of forwarding session control requests or responses to the terminal. +- d) It is required to have the capability of detecting and handling emergency session establishment requests. +- e) It is required to be able to maintain a security association between itself and each terminal. +- f) It is required to have the capability of performing message compression/decompression. +- g) It can optionally perform inter-domain topology hiding. +- h) It can optionally perform inter-domain protocol repair (for further study). + +In addition, the P-CSC-FE controls the access border gateway functional entities (ABG-FEs) via the RACF to accommodate access transport functions and end-user functions. The P-CSC-FE also controls access node functional entities (AN-FE) and edge node functional entities (EN-FEs) via the RACF to support access transport functions. The functions performed by the P-CSC-FE include the following: + +- i) It is required to have the capability of participating in the authorization of media resources and QoS management, e.g., by interacting with resource control when no explicit signalling (i.e., QoS signalling) is available. Application-specific intelligence is required to derive resource control commands from the application signalling. +- j) It is required to support an NAPT proxy function (NPF) for network address hiding and remote NAPT traversal. It requests address mapping information and modifies the addresses + +and/or ports contained in the message bodies of application signalling messages, according to the address binding information provided by the RACF at the border of the access and core transport networks. + +As an option, this FE interacts with MRC-FE in support of invoking transcoding. + +##### **9.3.3.1.3 S-3: Interrogating call session control functional entity (I-CSC-FE)** + +The interrogating call session control functional entity (I-CSC-FE) is the contact point within an NGN operator's network for all service connections destined to a user of that NGN operator. There may be multiple I-CSC-FEs within a NGN operator's network. The functions performed by the I-CSC-FE are as follows: + +- a) Registration + - Assigning a S-CSC-FE to a user. +- b) Session-related and session-unrelated flows + - Obtaining from the SUP-FE the address of the currently assigned S-CSC-FE; + - Forwarding a session control request or response to the S-CSC-FE determined by the above step for incoming sessions. + +In performing the above functions, the NGN operator can optionally use the topology hiding function in the I-CSC-FE or other techniques to hide the configuration, capacity, and topology of the network from the outside. When an I-CSC-FE is chosen to meet the hiding requirement, for sessions traversing different network operators' domains, the I-CSC-FE may restrict the following information from being passed outside a NGN operator's network: the exact number of S-CSC-FEs, the capabilities of the S-CSC-FEs, and the capacity of the network. + +##### **9.3.3.1.4 S-4: Subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE)** + +The subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE) may be queried by the S-CSC-FE, the I-CSC-FE, or the AS-FE to obtain the address of the SUP-FE for the required subscriber. The SL-FE is used to find the address of the physical entity that holds the subscriber data for a given user identifier when multiple, separately addressable SUP-FEs have been deployed by the NGN operator. This resolution mechanism is not required in networks that utilize a single logical SUP-FE element. + +##### **9.3.3.1.5 S-5: Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE)** + +The service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE) is responsible for storing user profiles, subscriber-related location data, and presence status data in the service stratum. + +- 1) The SUP-FE performs basic data management and maintenance functions. + - User profile management functions + +These functions require access to certain data, either "user subscription data" or "network data" (e.g., the current network access point and network location). The storage and update of this data are handled by the user profile management functions. + +A user profile is required to be provided in support of: + + - authentication + - authorization + - service subscription information + - subscriber mobility + - location + - presence (e.g., online/offline status) + - charging + +The user profile is stored in one database or separated into several databases. + +2) The SUP-FE is responsible for responses to queries for user profiles. + +a) It provides access to user data. + +Other network functions require some user data in order to be appropriately customized. This data can be either "user subscription data" or "network data". This function provides filtered access to the user data, which is restricted to certain interrogating entities (i.e., restricted rights to access user data), in order to guarantee user data privacy. + +b) It can optionally be used for support of commonly used AAA and security schemes. + +##### **9.3.3.1.6 S-6: Service authentication and authorization functional entity (SAA-FE)** + +The service authentication and authorization functional entity (SAA-FE) provides authentication and authorization in the service stratum. + +1) It ensures that the end-user has valid utilization rights for the requested service. + +2) It performs policy control at the service level by using policy rules contained in a user profile database. + +3) It works as the first step in the mobility management process and is used for authentication, authorization, and accounting of users/terminals. + +4) The result of the authorization function is a yes/no response to a user connection request. + +##### **9.3.3.1.7 S-7: Interconnection border gateway control functional entity (IBC-FE)** + +The interconnection border gateway control functional entity (IBC-FE) controls interconnection border gateway functional entities (IBG-FEs) via the RACF to interwork with other packet-based networks. Alternative means of control, such as direct control of IBG-FE by IBC-FE, need further study. + +The functions of the IBC-FE can optionally include: + +1) Inter-domain network topology hiding; + +2) Control of IBG-FEs to implement session-based processing (e.g., media conversion and NA(P)T) (This is for further study.); + +3) Inter-domain protocol repair (This is for further study.); + +4) Interaction with PD-FE for resource reservation, resource allocation and/or other resource related information (e.g., the available resource parameters if the required resources are not available, QoS label, etc.); + +5) As an option, this FE interacts with MRC-FE in support of invoking transcoding. + +NOTE – Information screening functions are for further study. + +##### **9.3.3.1.8 S-8: Access gateway control functional entity (AGC-FE)** + +The access gateway control functional entity (AGC-FE) controls one or more AMG-FEs to access PSTN or ISDN users and handles registration, authentication, and security for the user. The AGC-FE performs registration, authentication, and security for the AMG-FE. + +a) It originates and terminates session control signalling. + +b) It originates and terminates gateway control flows to control the AMG-FE. + +c) It can optionally initiate and terminate UNI control flows, in order to provide ISDN (supplementary) services. + +d) It forwards the session control flow to the S-CSC-FE. + +e) It processes and forwards requests from the AMG-FE to the S-CSC-FE. + +f) It can optionally process and forward service requests from the AMG-FE to the AS-FE through the S-CSC-FE. For example, a POTS user can request and use a multimedia 800 service provided by the AS-FE with media restrictions. + +- g) It can optionally participate in the authorization of media resources and QoS management, e.g., by interacting with resource control when no explicit signalling (i.e., QoS signalling) is available and application-specific intelligence is required to derive resource control commands from the application signalling. +- h) It supports a NAPT proxy function (NPF) for network address hiding and remote NAPT traversal. This is done by requesting address mapping information and modifying the addresses and/or ports contained in the message bodies of application signalling messages, according to the address binding information provided by the RACF at the border of the access and the core transport networks. +- i) Optionally, it ensures the transparent data transport between ISDN user side and IP side from the control level in media negotiation process, in order to support ISDN emulation service in case ISDN unrestricted bearer is needed. + +##### **9.3.3.1.9 S-9: Media gateway control functional entity (MGC-FE)** + +The media gateway control functional entity (MGC-FE) controls the TMG-FE to interwork with PSTN/ISDN. + +- a) It processes and forwards requests from the SG-FE to the S-CSC-FE through the I-CSC-FE; +- b) It can optionally process and forward service requests from PSTN/ISDN to the AS-FE through the BGC-FE and the S-CSC-FE. For example, a PSTN user can request and use a multimedia 800 service provided by the NGN AS-FE with media restrictions. +- c) Optionally, it ensures the transparent data transport between TDM side and IP side from the control level in media negotiation process, in order to support ISDN emulation service in cases where an ISDN unrestricted bearer is needed. + +As an option, this FE interacts with the MRC-FE in support of invoking transcoding. + +##### **9.3.3.1.10 S-10: Breakout gateway control functional entity (BGC-FE)** + +The breakout gateway control functional entity (BGC-FE) selects the network in which PSTN breakout is to occur and selects the MGC-FE. + +As an option, this FE interacts with the MRC-FE in support of invoking transcoding. + +##### **9.3.3.1.11 S-11: User signalling interworking functional entity (USIW-FE)** + +The user signalling interworking functional entity (USIW-FE) has the responsibility for the interworking and the information screening functions for different types of application signalling at the subscriber side (access-to-core), which can be located at the border of the access and core networks for subscriber-side signalling interworking. + +##### **9.3.3.1.12 S-12: Network signalling interworking functional entity (NSIW-FE)** + +The network signalling interworking functional entity (NSIW-FE) has the responsibility for the interworking for different types and profiles of application signalling at the trunking side (inter-network operator), which can be located at the border of the core networks for trunking-side signalling interworking. + +NOTE – Information screening functions are for further study. + +##### **9.3.3.1.13 S-13: Media resource control functional entity (MRC-FE)** + +The media resource control functional entity (MRC-FE) controls the media resource processing functional entity (MRP-FE) by operating as a media resource control function. + +The MRC-FE allocates/assigns MRP-FE resources that are needed for services such as streaming, announcements, and interactive voice response (IVR) support. + +NOTE – As an option, P-CSC-FE, IBC-FE, BGC-FE, and MGC-FE interact with MRC-FE in support of invoking transcoding. + +##### **9.3.3.1.14 S-14: Media resource broker functional entity (MRB-FE)** + +The media resource broker functional entity (MRB-FE) does the following: + +- a) It assigns specific media server resources (i.e., MRC-FE and MRP-FE) to incoming calls at the request of service applications (i.e., an AS-FE); this happens in real time as calls come into the network. +- b) It acquires knowledge of media server resource utilization that it can use to help decide which media server resources to assign to resource requests from applications. +- c) It employs methods/algorithms to determine media server resource assignment. +- d) It acquires knowledge of media server resource status related to in-service and out-of-service status and reservations via an operational type of reference point. + +NOTE – Although it is located in the service control functions, the MRB-FE could be viewed as a part of application support functions and service support functions. + +##### **9.3.3.1.15 S-15: General services control functional entity (GSC-FE)** + +The NGN functional architecture also provides support for services that do not require initial network-mediated session establishment procedures using a proxy call session control functional entity, since it is expected to provide a platform for all envisaged services over packet-based networks. + +The general services control functional entity (GSC-FE) acts as a contact point for application support and service support functional entities, as well as user terminals. The GSC-FE authenticates communications from these, and based on those communications, and optionally doing some processing functions, such as translating domain name to explicit the IP address for the end user's convenience, the GSC-FE authorizes and provides information on session flows and their required QoS characteristics to the PD-FE (either directly or via S-13, the media resource control FE), as well as to the IBC-FE when appropriate. The GSC-FE maintains session-related state as needed to assist in policy actions. + +Communication from the terminal or application support and service support functions must include information to identify the targeted session flows (for example, source and destination IP address) plus the requested treatments. Depending on the service and implementation, it can optionally include: + +- service priority information (to use, for example, if pre-emption is needed); +- a request for resource usage information. + +The GSC-FE will respond to those communications and requests as appropriate and as information is available. + +The GSC-FE can optionally obtain information from service user profiles and invoke service applications. + +Communication from the GSC-FE to the PD-FE, and to the IBC-FE where applicable, will include at least session flow identification information and the requested treatments. Depending on the service and implementation, it can optionally include: + +- an indication of when resources are to be committed (immediately or later); +- a request for resource usage information; +- a request to be notified when resources are reserved, modified and released. + +The PD-FE will respond to those communications and requests as appropriate and as information is available. + +Invocation of the MRC-FE and the MRP-FE, for transcoding, announcements, and so on, is for further study. + +### 9.3.4 Content delivery functional entities + +The content delivery functions (CDF) perform cache and storage functionalities and deliver the content according to the request from the end-user functions. The content delivery functions (CDF) can optionally process the content. + +Multiple instances of storage and delivery functionalities can optionally exist. The content delivery functions select the suitable one(s). To maintain the same content at the multiple instances, the content delivery functions control the distribution of the content to multiple instances of storage and delivery functionalities. + +The content is distributed to the content delivery functions before or during the service offering process. + +The content delivery functions interact with end-user functions (e.g., trick mode play functionality). + +The content delivery functions support unicast, multicast or both mechanisms. + +Figure 9-5 shows the content delivery FEs. + + + +Figure 9-5: Content delivery functional entities. The diagram shows a large orange rectangle representing the 'Content Delivery Functions' block. Inside this block are three white rectangular boxes: 'C-1: Content Distribution & Location Control FE' at the top, 'C-2: Content Delivery Control FE' in the middle, and 'C-3: Content Delivery Processing FE' at the bottom. Curved arrows indicate a flow from C-1 to C-2, and from C-2 to C-3. On the left side, reference points are listed: 'I-Cn (Note 1)' at the top, followed by 'S-C1' and 'S-C3' connected to C-1; 'S-C2', 'S-C4', and 'C-U1' connected to C-2; and 'C-U2' connected to C-3. On the top right, 'A-C1', 'A-C2', and 'A-C3' are labeled with lines pointing to the top edge of the orange block. On the bottom, 'C-T1' and 'C-T2' are labeled with lines pointing to the bottom edge of the orange block. A blue vertical line is positioned between C-T1 and C-T2. + +NOTE 1 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-C $n$ reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant content delivery functional entities (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +NOTE 2 – Reference points S-C1 and S-C2 are meant to be used for the IMS IPTV case (i.e., connected to S-CSC-FE), while S-C3 and S-C4 reference points apply for the non-IMS IPTV cases (i.e., connected to GSC-FE). See Annex B for further details. + +**Figure 9-5 – Content delivery functional entities** + +#### **9.3.4.1 C-1: Content distribution & location control functional entity (CD&LC-FE)** + +The content distribution & location control functional entity includes the following functions but is not limited to: + +- Handling interactions with the service control functional entities; +- Controlling the distribution of content from the content preparation functional entity (CPR-FE) in the application support and service support functions to the content delivery processing functional entities (CDP-FEs); +- Gathering the information regarding content delivery processing functional entities (CDP-FEs), e.g., resource utilization, resources status (e.g., in-service and out-of-service), content distribution information and load status; +- Performing the selection of suitable content delivery processing functional entities (CDP-FEs) to serve end-user functions according to some criteria, e.g., the gathered information and the terminal capability. + +NOTE – This selection request can optionally be triggered by the service control functions or the application support functions and service support functions. + +#### **9.3.4.2 C-2: Content delivery control functional entity (CDC-FE)** + +The content delivery control functional entity (CDC-FE) handles control functions related to the content delivery processing functional entity (CDP-FE). + +The CDC-FE includes but is not limited to: + +- Control of the media resources delivery; +- Handling of recoding commands such as for video cassette recorder (VCR); +- Reporting status (e.g., load status and availability) to the content distribution and location control functional entity; +- Generating charging information. + +#### **9.3.4.3 C-3: Content delivery processing functional entity (CDP-FE)** + +The content delivery processing functional entity (CDP-FE) stores and caches the content, processes it under the control of the content preparation functional entity and the content delivery control functional entity. The CDP-FE distributes the content among instances of content delivery processing functional entities based on the policy of the content distribution & location control functional entity (CD&LC-FE). + +The CDP-FE is responsible for delivering content to the end-user functions using the transport functions (e.g., unicast and/or multicast mechanisms). + +The CDP-FE includes but is not limited to: + +- Handling interaction with the service control functions; +- Handling content delivery to end-user functions; +- Caching and storing content and associated information; +- Insertion, transcoding and encryption of the content; +- Distributing content among content delivery processing functional entities; +- Managing interaction with the end-user functions (e.g., trick mode commands). + +### **9.3.5 Application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF)** + +The application support functions and service support functions (ASF&SSF) provide control for services accessed by interacting with the S-CSC-FE, the GSC-FE, or the end-user directly. Application support functions and service support functions may reside either in the end-user's home network or in a third party location. The application support functions and service support functions + +include the following functional entities: application support FE, application gateway FE, application service coordination manager FE, service switching FE, application support user profile FE, application provisioning FE, content preparation FE and service and content protection FE. + +The application support functions and service support functions can influence and impact the session on behalf of services through its interface with the S-CSC-FE. + +It shall be possible for application support functions and service support functions to generate session control requests and dialogs on behalf of users. Such requests are forwarded to the S-CSC-FE serving the user, and the S-CSC-FE is required to perform regular originating procedures for these requests. Residing either as a trusted entity in the user's home network or as an un-trusted entity in a third-party location (requiring certain level of authentication), the application support functions and service support functions interact with other entities in the network, as shown in Figure 9-6. + +The application support functions and service support functions do the following: + +- a) Execute service logic based on the subscriber's service profile and/or on the terminal capability (device profile); +- b) Act via four session interaction models with respect to the S-CSC-FE: + - as a terminating user agent; + - as an originating user agent; + - as a proxy; + - as a third-party call control (back-to-back user agent); +- c) Interact with the AGC-FE through the S-CSC-FE to provide access to the applications required to support the legacy terminal users; +- d) Interact with the MRC-FE directly or via the S-CSC-FE in order to control MRP-FE; +- e) Optionally, interact with the MRB-FE in order to attain an MRC-FE resource; +- f) Interact with the end-user functions (via UNI A-U1 reference point) to allow the end-users to securely manage and configure data for their services and applications; +- g) Interact with the end-user functions (via UNI A-U2 reference point) for delivering security information (e.g., rights object or keys) from the SCP-FE to the end-user functions; +- h) Interact with the content delivery functions to transfer content from CPR-FE to CDP-FEs (via A-C3 reference point), as well as to facilitate CPR-FE to configure policies such as content distribution rules, selection criteria, etc., in the CD&LC-FE (via the A-C2 reference point); +- i) Interact with the content delivery functions (via the A-C1 reference point) to allow the AS-FE and/or the APL-GW-FE to request the CD&LC-FE to request the selection of a suitable CDP-FE for content delivery or to request other information such as service parameters to the CD&LC-FE. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of application and service support functions. It is organized into several layers and functional blocks: + +- Top Layer:** Applications, IdM Functions, and Content Provider Functions. +- Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions (Green Box):** Contains functional entities A-1 to A-8. A-1 (AS-FE\*) is a multi-instance entity. A-2 (APL-GW-FE\*), A-3 (APL-SCM-FE\*), and A-4 (SS-FE) are connected to Applications via ANI. A-5 (ASUP-FE) and A-6 (APP-FE) are connected to IdM Functions via I-An (Note 1). A-7 (CPR-FE) and A-8 (SCP-FE) are connected to Content Provider Functions via A-ON1. +- Service Control Functions (Light Green Box):** Contains functional entities S-1 to S-15. S-1 (S-CSC-FE), S-3 (I-CSC-FE), S-6 (SAA-FE), S-13 (MRC-FE), S-14 (MRB-FE), and S-15 (GSC-FE) are connected to Applications via ANI. S-4 (SL-FE) and S-5 (SUP-FE) are connected to IdM Functions via I-An (Note 1). S-2 (A-S2) and S-7 (A-S7) are connected to Content Provider Functions via A-ON1. +- Content Delivery Functions (Orange Box):** Contains functional entities C-1 (CD&LC-FE) and C-2 (CDP-FE). C-1 and C-2 are connected to Content Provider Functions via A-ON1. +- Transport Processing Functions (Yellow Box):** Contains functional entity T-9 (SG-FE), which is connected to End-User Functions via UNI. +- End-User Functions:** Represented by a box on the left, connected to the Service Control Functions and Transport Processing Functions via UNI. + +Figure 9-6: Application/service support functions architecture diagram. The diagram shows the interaction between Applications, IdM Functions, and Content Provider Functions through various support functions. Applications connect via ANI to Application Support Functions (A-1 to A-8) and Service Support Functions (S-1 to S-15). IdM Functions connect via I-An (Note 1) to Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions. Content Provider Functions connect via A-ON1 to Content Delivery Functions (C-1, C-2). End-User Functions connect via UNI to Service Control Functions (S-1 to S-15) and Transport Processing Functions (T-9). The diagram is divided into three main horizontal sections: Application Support Functions and Service Support Functions (green), Service Control Functions (light green), and Content Delivery Functions (orange). Transport Processing Functions (yellow) are at the bottom. + +NOTE 1 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-An reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant functional entities within application support functions and service support functions (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +**Figure 9-6 – Application/service support functions** + +NOTE 1 – Although the MRB-FE is located in the service control functions, it could be viewed as a part of the application support functions and the service support functions. + +NOTE 2 – Note that content delivery functions may reside outside of the NGN (see Annex B), ASF&SSF FEs may also reside outside of the NGN, e.g., ASUP-FE, APP-FE, SCP-FE and CPR-FE. + +#### 9.3.5.1 A-1: Application support functional entity (AS-FE) + +The application support functional entity (AS-FE) supports generic application server functions, including hosting and executing services. The examples of AS-FE are call feature application support servers, presence servers, various messaging servers, conferences servers, home application support servers, IPTV application support servers, service selection servers, service discovery servers, as well as charging and accounting servers. + +#### 9.3.5.2 A-2: Application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE) + +The application gateway functional entity (APL-GW-FE) serves as an interworking entity between the applications and the S-CSC-FE of the service stratum. Appearing to the S-CSC-FE as if it were an AS-FE, the APL-GW-FE provides a secure open interface for the applications to use the capabilities and the resources of the NGN. Specifically, the APL-GW-FE is the interworking entity + +between various functions of NGN and all external application servers and service enablers. The applications connected to the APL-GW-FE are usually realized by OSA application servers. + +#### **9.3.5.3 A-3: Application service coordination manager functional entity (APL-SCM-FE)** + +The application service coordination manager functional entity (APL-SCM-FE) manages interactions between multiple applications and services. The functional entities of ASF&SSF might interwork with each other via the APL-SCM-FE to provide convergent services to the end users. + +#### **9.3.5.4 A-4: Service switching functional entity (SS-FE)** + +The service switching functional entity (SS-FE) provides access and interworking to a legacy IN SCP. For the IN services, the S-CSC-FE is connected through the SS-FE to the SG-FE to interact with a legacy IN SCP. The SS-FE provides IN service switching functions, including service trigger detection, service filtering, call state management, etc., and the protocol adaptation function between INAP and SIP, for example. + +#### **9.3.5.5 A-5: Application support user profile functional entity (ASUP-FE)** + +The application support user profile functional entity (ASUP-FE) can optionally include: + +- End-user settings which include information related to the capabilities of the end-user's terminal devices. An end user may be associated with one or more terminals with different capabilities; +- Global settings (e.g., language preference); +- Application of specific settings (e.g., parental control level for VoD application); +- List of subscribed service packages; +- Service actions data which encompasses information related to the actions the user can optionally have taken while accessing services/applications, e.g., for IPTV, list of linear TV services (or programmes) that the user has paused and is hence likely to resume later, list of VoDs that the user has ordered and associated status, list of PVR contents that the user has asked to be recorded. + +#### **9.3.5.6 A-6: Application provisioning functional entity (APP-FE)** + +The application provisioning functional entity (APP-FE) adds or withdraws application support functional entities (AS-FEs) and manages the life-cycle of the applications supported by the AS-FEs. + +#### **9.3.5.7 A-7: Content preparation functional entity (CPR-FE)** + +The content preparation functional entity (CPR-FE) controls the preparation and aggregation of the contents such as VoD programs, TV channel streams, metadata, and EPG data, as received from the content provider functions. The content preparation functional entity can optionally pre-process (e.g., transcode or edit) the content in advance of passing it to the content delivery functions, associated application support functional entities and service protection and/or content protection functional entities. + +The CPR-FE is comprised of content management, metadata processing, content processing control and content pre-processing functions. These functions can optionally be used to control the preparation and/or combination of the content, as delivered by the content owner(s), into the required delivery format. + +The functions of the CPR-FE may be subject to commercial agreements with content owners. Note that not all contents are subject to the functions described below. + +The metadata and rights information are delivered to the metadata processing function. Content can optionally be transcoded and encrypted by the content pre-processing function, before being delivered to the content delivery functions. The program related metadata is delivered to the + +corresponding application support functional entity. If the original content from the content owner is modified or transcoded in any way, it may be necessary to also edit the program related metadata. + +#### **9.3.5.8 A-8: Service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE)** + +The service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE) controls the protection of the services and content. Content protection includes control of accessing the content and the protection of content using methods such as encryption. Service protection includes authentication and authorization to access the services and, optionally, protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +The service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE) includes a content protection function and a service protection function. + +The content protection function controls the protection of the content and is responsible for the management of the content rights and the keys used to encrypt and decrypt the content. It acquires the content rights (or content license, originated from the content provider) indication from the content preparation functional entity, generates and distributes this security information (rights object or keys) to the end-user functions. It can optionally provide keys for content encryption. + +For example, when it receives a request for security information from end-user functions, it interacts with the application support user profile functional entity for user related security subscription information (e.g., in case of IPTV, time limited, whether fast forward/fast rewind are allowed), generates the rights object and delivers it to the end-user functions. + +It also provides keys for service and content protection to the associated application support functional entity, which then deliver the keys to relevant functions, e.g., end-user functions and the content preparation functional entity. + +The service protection function controls the protection of services. Service protection includes authentication and authorization to access the services and protection of the services using methods such as encryption. + +#### **9.3.5.9 Guidelines for selecting functions as the AS-FE** + +The following guidelines for selecting functions as the AS-FE apply: + +- A function that is used in common in two or more applications is recommended to be included in the AS-FE; +- From the viewpoint of personal information and privacy protection, a function that handles the user profile managed within NGN is recommended to be included in the AS-FE; +- From the viewpoint of security, a function that handles the inside network signal information is recommended to be included in the AS-FE; +- A function that can be located in application support functions and service support functions to provide an efficient service is recommended to be included in the AS-FE to improve QoE. + +### **9.3.6 End-user functions** + +End-user functions include CPN gateway functions. Other functions, such as terminal functions, are not described in this Recommendation. + +#### **9.3.6.1 CPN gateway functions** + +CPN gateway functions (CGF) in this Recommendation concern CPN gateway's impact to the NGN, e.g., the impacts related to NACF, RACF, and functions inside the NGN service stratum. + +CPN gateway functions are decomposed in a similar way than the NGN, i.e., in CPN gateway service stratum functions and CPN gateway transport stratum functions. + + + +Figure 9-7: End-user functional entities. This diagram illustrates the functional architecture of end-user functions, organized into nested boxes. The outermost pink box is labeled 'End-User Functions'. Inside it is a white box labeled 'CPN Gateway Functions'. Within this, there are two main sections: 'CPN Gateway Service Stratum Functions' and 'CPN Gateway Transport Stratum Functions'. The 'Service Stratum' section contains a box for 'CPN Gateway Service Control Functions', which includes 'U-1: CPN Gateway Service Control FE'. This is linked to reference points I-Un (Note 1), S-U1, S-U2, and S-U3. The 'Transport Stratum' section contains two boxes: 'CPN Gateway Transport Control Functions' and 'CPN Gateway Transport Functions'. The 'Control Functions' box includes 'U-3: CPN Gateway Configuration & Management FE' (linked to TC-Ux), 'U-2: CPN Gateway Network Attachment FE' (linked to T-U1), and 'U-4: CPN Gateway Policy Decision FE' (linked to TC-U4). The 'Transport Functions' box includes 'U-5: CPN Gateway Policy Enforcement FE' (linked to TC-U5) and is linked to T-U3 (indicated by a blue line). + +NOTE 1 – This is to be understood as referring to the different I-Un reference points that may exist between IdM functions and relevant functional entities within end-user functions (see clause 9.3.7 for further information). + +**Figure 9-7 – End-user functional entities** + +Note that Figure 9-7 does not show reference points A-U1, A-U2 and T-U4. Further study is required regarding the termination of these reference points in the end-user functions. Regarding T-U2, this reference point is not applicable since used to connect PSTN/ISDN terminals to the AMG-FE. C-U1 and C-U2 reference points do not terminate in CPN-GW but in NGN terminals connected to the CPN-GW (e.g., IPTV terminal function in the case of IPTV services provided by NGN, see [ITU-T Y.1910]). TC-U1, TC-U2 and TC-U3 reference points terminate in NGN mobile capable UEs according to [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +##### 9.3.6.1.1 U-1: CPN gateway service control functional entity (CGSC-FE) + +The use of this functional entity is optional. Depending on the services supported, a CPN gateway may include one or more service control functional entities (CGSC-FE), such as a SIP based controlling entity acting as an outbound SIP proxy, a SIP access point to the NGN P-CSC-FE. + +##### **9.3.6.1.2 U-2: CPN gateway network attachment functional entity (CGNA-FE)** + +The CPN gateway network attachment functional entity (CGNA-FE) handles the allocation of IP address to the CPN gateway from the NAC-FE via the AR-FE. + +##### **9.3.6.1.3 U-3: CPN gateway configuration and management functional entity (CGCM-FE)** + +The CPN gateway configuration and management functional entity (CGCM-FE) enables the CPN gateway configuration and firmware upgrade. It also manages a mutual authentication between the HGWC-FE and the CPN gateway. + +Through the TC-Ux reference point, it is possible to support a variety of functionalities to manage a collection of user equipments (CPN gateway and end-user devices). + +##### **9.3.6.1.4 U-4: CPN gateway policy decision functional entity (CGPD-FE)** + +The CPN gateway policy decision functional entity (PD-FE) makes decisions in the CPN gateway regarding network resource and admission control. + +In particular, the CGPD-FE provides gate control functionality, i.e., dynamic NAT and firewall functions at the boundary between the CPN gateway and the NGN. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +##### **9.3.6.1.5 U-5: CPN gateway policy enforcement functional entity (CGPE-FE)** + +The CPN gateway policy enforcement functional entity (CGPE-FE) in the end-user functions enforces the transport policy rules for upstream traffic instructed by the RACF PD-FE. + +For further details, refer to [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +### **9.3.7 Identity management functions** + +The IdM functions provide the coordination and the control of the identity information and data (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) for identity assurance purposes, enabling and supporting business, social networking and security services, and applications, including identity and federated identity services and applications. + + + +The diagram illustrates the functional entities of Identity Management (IdM). A large yellow rectangle is labeled "IdM Functions" in the top-left corner. Centered within this rectangle is a white box labeled "I-1: IdM Coordination and Control Functional Entity (IdMCC-FE)". A curved arrow points from the top edge of the white box to the top edge of the yellow rectangle. Surrounding the white box are six labels, each connected to the box by a thin line: "I-An" at the top, "I-Sn" at the top-right, "I-Cn" at the bottom-right, "I-TCn" at the bottom, "I-Tn" at the bottom-left, and "I-Un" at the top-left. + +Diagram of IdM functional entities showing the IdMCC-FE at the center of IdM Functions. + +**Figure 9-8 – IdM functional entities** + +Appendix IV provides an example illustrative deployment scenario for IdM in NGN. + +#### **9.3.7.1 I-1: IdM coordination and control functional entity (IdMCC-FE)** + +The IdM coordination and control functional entity (IdMCC-FE) supports coordination and control functions and interactions with other FEs as appropriate to provide assurance of identity information (e.g., identifiers, credentials and attributes) associated to an entity such as user/subscriber, device, network element, data, object, service provider, or application process. Example of specific functions and capabilities provided by the IdMCC-FE include, but is not limited to: + +- discovery of identity information within an NGN provider domain, among other networks (i.e., via NNI) and among other service providers (i.e., via SNI); +- correlation and binding of identity information (e.g., identity data from application support functions, service support functions, service control functions, content delivery functions, transport control functions, transport functions and end-user functions); +- communicate and exchange identity information and assertions (i.e., across UNI, ANI, NNI and SNI) to support IdM services and capabilities (e.g., single sign-on/single sign-off among multiple services and applications, and federated identity services among multiple service providers); +- enforcement of applicable policies and rules for IdM (e.g., protection of personally identifiable information (PII) and national regulatory rules); +- authentication assurance (e.g., functions and operational processes to provide confidence in authentication); +- bridging and interworking functions to facilitate interoperability between different types of IdM systems and federations that are using different semantics, schemas, mechanisms and technologies; + +- end user/subscriber indications of preferences about the use and dissemination of their identity information. + +Figure 9-8 illustrates the general concept that the IdMCC-FE may interact with specific functional entities (FEs) to enable and support services and applications including identity and federated identity services and applications. This may include interactions with FEs in the following functional blocks, depending on the specific IdM service or capability being supported and the implementation design: + +- a) Application support functions and service support functions: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following functional entities via appropriate I- $A_n$ reference points: + - A-1: Application support functional entity (AS-FE); + - A-2: Application gateway functional entity – interfaces to external applications (APL-GW-FE); + - A-3: Application service coordination manager functional entity (APL-SCM-FE); + - A-5: Application support user profile functional entity (ASUP-FE); + - A-8: Service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE). +- b) Service control functional entities: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following service control functional entities via appropriate I- $S_n$ reference points: + - S-1: Serving call session control functional entity (S-CSC-FE); + - S-2: Proxy call session control functional entity (P-CSC-FE); + - S-3: Interrogating call session control functional entity (I-CSC-FE); + - S-4: Subscription locator functional entity (SL-FE); + - S-5: Service user profile functional entity (SUP-FE); + - S-6: Service authentication and authorization functional entity (SAA-FE); + - S-7: Interconnection border gateway control functional entity (IBGC-FE); + - S-8: Access gateway control functional entity (AGC-FE); + - S-15: General services control functional entity (GSC-FE). +- c) Content delivery functional entities: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following content delivery functional entities via appropriate I- $C_n$ reference points: + - C-1 Content distribution & location control functional entity (CD&LC-FE); + - C-2 Content delivery control functional entity (CDC-FE). +- d) Transport functional entities: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following transport functional entities via an appropriate I- $T_n$ reference point: + - T-5 Access border gateway functional entity (ABG-FE); + - T-6 Interconnection border gateway functional entity (IBG-FE); + - Policy enforcement functional entity (PE-FE) (see Figure 9-2). +- e) Transport control functional entities: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following transport control functional entities via an appropriate I- $TC_n$ reference point: + - T-10: Network access configuration functional entity (NAC-FE); + - T-11: Transport authentication and authorization functional entity (TAA-FE); + - T-12: Transport user profile functional entity (TUP-FE); + - T-13: Transport location management functional entity (TLM-FE); + - T-14: Access management functional entity (AM-FE); + - T-16: Policy decision functional entity (PD-FE); + +- T-18: Mobile location management functional entity (MLM-FE); + - T-21: Network information repository functional entity (NIR-FE). +- f) End user functional entities: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the following functional entities via an appropriate I-*Un* reference point: +- U-1: CPN gateway service control functional entity (CGSC-FE); + - U-2: CPN gateway network attachment functional entity (CGNA-FE); + - U-3: CPN gateway configuration and management functional entity (CGCM-FE); + - U-4: CPN gateway policy decision functional entity (CGPD-FE); + - U-5: CPN gateway policy enforcement functional entity (CGPE-FE). +- g) Management functions: The IdMCC-FE may interact with the management functions for OAMP via appropriate I-*Mn* reference points. + +## 9.4 Reference points + +This clause provides the list of reference points defined in the NGN functional architecture. For each reference point, the involved functional entities are identified. + +### 9.4.1 Reference points to/from ASF&SSF + +#### 9.4.1.1 Reference points between ASF&SSF and SC&CDF + +##### 9.4.1.1.1 Reference points between ASF&SSF and SCF + +The reference points between ASF&SSF and SCF are as follows: + +- Reference point A-S1 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and S-14 MRB-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S2 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and S-15 GSC-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S3 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and S-13 MRC-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S4 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and S-1 S-CSC-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S5 between the functional entities in ASF&SSF and S-6 SAA-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S6 between the functional entities in ASF&SSF and S-5 SUP-FE/S-4 SL-FE in SCF; +- Reference point A-S7 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and S-3 I-CSC-FE in SCF. + +##### 9.4.1.1.2 Reference points between ASF&SSF and CDF + +The reference points between ASF&SSF and CDF are as follows: + +- Reference point A-C1 between A-1 AS-FE and A-2 APL-GW-FE in ASF&SSF and C-1 CD&LC-FE in CDF; +- Reference point A-C2 between A-7 CPR-FE in ASF&SSF and C-1 CD&LC-FE in CDF; +- Reference point A-C3 between A-7 CPR-FE in ASF&SSF and C-2 CDP-FE in CDF. + +#### **9.4.1.2 Reference points between ASF&SSF and end-user functions** + +The reference points between ASF&SSF and end-user functions are as follows: + +- Reference point A-U1 between A-1 AS-FE, A-2 APL-GW-FE, A-3 APL-SCM-FE and A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and end-user functions; +- Reference point A-U2 between A-8 SCP-FE in ASF&SSF and end-user functions. + +#### **9.4.1.3 Reference points between ASF&SSF and content provider functions** + +The reference point between ASF&SSF and content provider functions is as follows: + +- Reference point A-ON1 between A-7 CPR-FE and content provider functions. + +#### **9.4.1.4 Reference points between ASF&SSF and transport processing functions** + +The reference point between ASF&SSF and transport processing functions is as follows: + +- Reference point A-T1 between A-4 SS-FE in ASF&SSF and T-9 SG-FE in the transport processing functions. + +#### **9.4.1.5 Reference points internal to ASF&SSF** + +The reference points within ASF&SSF are as follows: + +- Reference point between A-1 AS-FE and A-3 APL-SCM-FE. Multiple A-1 AS-FEs can interwork with each other via APL-SCM-FE (application service coordination manager functional entity) to provide coordinated services to the end users; +- Reference point between A-1 AS-FE and A-6 APP-FE. With this reference point, the application provisioning functional entity (APP-FE) adds or withdraws application support functional entities (AS-FEs) and manages the life-cycle of the applications supported by the AS-FEs; +- Reference point between A-2 APL-GW-FE and A-5 ASUP-FE. This reference point allows the APL-GW-FE to interact with the ASUP-FE in order that APL-GW-FE provides a secure open interface for the applications to use the capabilities and resources of the ASUP-FE; +- Reference point between A-1 AS-FE and A-5 ASUP-FE. With this reference point, the AS-FE can access the profiles contained in the ASUP-FE; +- Reference point between A-5 ASUP-FE and A-8 SCP-FE. With this reference point, the service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE) can interact with the application support user profile functional entity (ASUP-FE) to retrieve user related security subscription information; +- Reference point between A-7 CPR-FE and A-8 SCP-FE. With this reference point, the content preparation functional entity (CPR-FE) can optionally pre-process (e.g., transcode or edit) the content before passing it to the content delivery functions, associated with service and content protection functional entity (SCP-FE). + +### **9.4.2 Reference points to/from SC&CDF** + +#### **9.4.2.1 Reference points between SCF and end-user functions** + +The reference points between SCF and end-user functions are as follows: + +- Reference point S-U1 between S-2 P-CSC-FE in SCF and end-user functions; +- Reference point S-U2 between S-11 USIW-FE in SCF and end-user functions; +- Reference point S-U3 between S-15 GSC-FE in SCF and end-user functions. + +#### **9.4.2.2 Reference points between SCF and transport processing functions** + +The reference points between SCF and transport processing functions are as follows: + +- Reference point S-T1 between S-13 MRC-FE in SCF and T-8 MRP-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point S-T2 between S-8 AGC-FE in SCF and T-1 AMG-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point S-T3 between S-9 MGC-FE in SCF and T-9 SG-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point S-T4 between S-9 MGC-FE in SCF and T-7 TMG-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point S-T5 between S-7 IBG-FE in SCF and T-6 IBG-FE in transport processing functions. + +#### **9.4.2.3 Reference points between SCF and transport control functions** + +##### **9.4.2.3.1 Reference points between SCF and NACF** + +The reference point between SCF and NACF is as follows: + +- Reference point S-TC1 between S2 P-CSC-FE and GSC-FE in SCF and T-13 location management FE in NACF. + +##### **9.4.2.3.2 Reference points between SCF and MMCF** + +None identified in this Recommendation. + +##### **9.4.2.3.3 Reference points between SCF and RACF** + +The reference points between SCF and RACF are as follows: + +- Reference point S-TC2 between S-2 P-CSC-FE/S-15 GSC-FE in SCF and T-16 PD-FE in RACF; +- Reference point S-TC3 between S-8 AGC-FE in SCF and T-16 PD-FE in RACF; +- Reference point S-TC4 between S-9 MGC-FE in SCF and T-16 PD-FE in RACF; +- Reference point S-TC5 between S-7 IBG-FE in SCF and T-16 PD-FE in RACF. + +#### **9.4.2.4 Reference points between SCF and other networks** + +The reference points between SCF and other networks are as follows: + +- Reference point S-ON1 between S-12 NSIW-FE and other networks; +- Reference point S-ON2 between S-7 IBG-FE and other networks. + +#### **9.4.2.5 Reference points between CDF and transport processing functions** + +The reference points between CDF and transport processing functions are as follows: + +- Reference point C-T1 between C-3 CDP-FE in CDF and transport processing functions. This reference point is used for multicast control; +- Reference point C-T2 between C-3 CDP-FE and transport processing functions. This reference point is used for both the transport of unicast and multicast. + +#### **9.4.2.6 Reference points between CDF and end-user functions** + +The reference points between CDF and end-user functions are as follows: + +- Reference point C-U1 between C-2 CDC-FE in CDF and end-user functions; + +- Reference point C-U2 between C-3 CDP-FE in CDF and end-user functions. This reference point is used for the support of error recovery mechanisms between the end-user functions and CDF. + +#### **9.4.2.7 Reference points between SC&CDF and ASF&SSF** + +Refer to clause 9.4.1.1. + +#### **9.4.2.8 Reference points internal to SC&CDF** + +The reference points between SCF and CDF are as follows: + +- Reference point S-C1 between S-1 S-CSC-FE in SCF and C1 CD&LC-FE in CDF; +- Reference point S-C2 between S-1 S-CSC-FE in SCF and C2 CDC-FE in CDF; +- Reference point S-C3 between S-15 GSC-FE in SCF and C-1 CD&LC-FE in CDF; +- Reference point S-C4 between S-15 GSC-FE in SCF and C-2 CDC-FE in CDF. + +NOTE – In the case of IPTV services, S-C1 and S-C2 are meant to be used for the IMS IPTV case (i.e., connected to S-CSC-FE), while S-C3 and S-C4 are meant to be used for the non-IMS IPTV (i.e., connected to GSC-FE). + +### **9.4.3 Reference points to/from transport control functions** + +#### **9.4.3.1 Reference points between transport control functions and end-user functions** + +The reference points between transport control functions and end-user functions are as follows: + +- Reference point TC-Ux between T-15 HGWC-FE in NACF and end-user functions; +- Reference point TC-U1 between T-18 MLM-FE in MMCF and end-user functions; +- Reference point TC-U2 between T-19 HDC-FE in MMCF and end-user functions; +- Reference point TC-U3 between T-20 NID-FE in MMCF and end-user functions; +- Reference point TC-U4 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and U-4 CGPD-FE in end-user functions. +- Reference point TC-U5 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and U-5 CGPE-FE in end-user functions. + +#### **9.4.3.2 Reference points between transport control functions and transport processing functions** + +##### **9.4.3.2.1 Reference points between NACF and transport processing functions** + +The reference point between NACF and transport processing functions is as follows: + +- Reference point TC-T1 between T-14 AM-FE in NACF and T-4 AR-FE in transport processing functions. + +##### **9.4.3.2.2 Reference points between MMCF and transport processing functions** + +The reference points between MMCF and transport processing functions are as follows: + +- Reference point TC-T7 between T-19 HDC-FE in MMCF and T-22 L2HE-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point TC-T8 between T-19 HDC-FE in MMCF and T-3 EN-FE, T-5 ABG-FE and T-6 IBG-FE in transport processing functions. + +##### **9.4.3.2.3 Reference points between RACF and transport processing functions** + +The reference points between RACF and transport processing functions are as follows: + +- Reference point TC-T2 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and T-2 AN-FE in transport processing functions; + +- Reference point TC-T3 between T-17 TRC-FE in RACF and access transport processing functions; +- Reference point TC-T4 between T-17 TRC-FE in RACF and core transport processing functions; +- Reference point TC-T5 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and T-3 EN-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point TC-T6 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and T-5 ABG-FE in transport processing functions; +- Reference point TC-T9 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and T-6 IBG-FE in transport processing functions. + +#### **9.4.3.3 Reference points between transport control functions and other NGNs** + +The reference point between transport control functions and other NGNs is as follows: + +- Reference point TC-ON1 between T-16 PD-FE and other NGNs. + +#### **9.4.3.4 Reference points between transport control functions and other IP multimedia networks** + +The reference point between transport control functions and other IP multimedia networks is as follows: + +- Reference point TC-ON1 between T-16 PD-FE and other IP multimedia networks. It is the same reference point as the one between T-16 PD-FE and other NGNs. + +#### **9.4.3.5 Reference points internal to transport control functions** + +The reference points internal to transport control functions are as follows: + +- Reference point TC-TC1 between T-13 TLM-FE in NACF and T-16 PD-FE in RACF; +- Reference point TC-TC2 between T-13 TLM-FE in NACF and T-18 MLM-FE in MMCF; +- Reference point TC-TC3 between T-13 TLM-FE in NACF and T-19 HDC-FE in MMCF; +- Reference point TC-TC4 between T-13 TLM-FE in NACF and T-20 NID-FE in MMCF; +- Reference point TC-TC5 between T-16 PD-FE in RACF and T-19 HDC-FE in MMCF; +- Reference points inside NACF. These are described in [ITU-T Y.2014]; +- Reference points inside RACF. These are described in [ITU-T Y.2111]; +- Reference points inside MMCF. These are described in [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +#### **9.4.3.6 Reference points to/from transport processing functions** + +##### **9.4.3.6.1 Reference points between transport processing functions and end-user functions** + +The reference points between transport processing functions and end-user functions are as follows: + +- Reference point T-U1 between T-4 AR-FE in transport processing functions and end-user functions; +- Reference point T-U2 between T-1 AMG-FE in transport processing functions and end-user functions; +- Reference point T-U3 between T-2 AN-FE in transport processing functions and end-user functions; +- Reference point T-U4 between AN-FE or EN-FE or any relevant FE in transport processing functions (which includes a multicast control point function [ITU-T Y.2017]) and end-user functions. + +##### **9.4.3.6.2 Reference points between transport processing functions and PSTN/ISDN** + +The reference points between transport processing functions and PSTN/ISDN are as follows: + +- Reference point T-ON1 is between T-9 SG-FE in transport processing functions and PSTN/ISDN; +- Reference point T-ON3 is between T-7 TMG-FE in transport processing functions and PSTN/ISDN. + +##### **9.4.3.6.3 Reference points between transport processing functions and another NGN** + +The reference point between transport processing functions and another NGN is as follows: + +- Reference point T-ON2 is between T-6 IBG-FE in transport processing functions and another NGN. + +##### **9.4.3.6.4 Reference points between transport processing functions and another IP multimedia network** + +The reference point between transport processing functions and another multimedia network is as follows: + +- Reference point T-ON2 is between T-6 IBG-FE in transport processing functions and another IP multimedia network. + +# **10 NGN components** + +This clause introduces the concept of NGN components, derived from the generalized NGN functional architecture specified in clause 9. + +Figure 10-1 shows a representation of NGN including these components. The components shown overlap and may share functionality. + +The exact functionality and interface associated with each FE and the reference points in these components are described in other documents specifically covering each component. + + + +NOTE – Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport stratum or end-user functions. + +Y.2012(2010)\_F10-1 + +Figure 10.1 – NGN components diagram. The diagram illustrates the architecture of Next-Generation Networks (NGN) divided into two main strata: the Service stratum (top) and the Transport stratum (bottom). The Service stratum includes Applications, Management functions, Application support functions and service support functions, S. user profile functions, Other NGN service components, IPTV service component, PSTN/ISDN emulation service component, IP multimedia service component, and Service control and content delivery functions. The Transport stratum includes T. user profile functions, Network attachment control functions (NACF), Mobility management and control functions (MMCF), Resource and admission control functions (RACF), Access network functions, Edge functions, and Core transport functions. End-user functions on the left include Legacy terminals, Customer networks, and NGN terminals, connected via Gateways (GW). Other networks are shown on the right. A note states: 'NOTE – Gateway (GW) may exist in either Transport stratum or end-user functions.' Reference: Y.2012(2010)\_F10-1. + +**Figure 10.1 – NGN components** + +For the sake of easy understanding, the representation shown in Figure 10-1 makes use of shading in a supplementary manner, to group and collate components in service control functions which are related. + +The components are related to each other and may contain common or shared functionality. No assumptions should be made concerning their representation as separate components in the figure. + +Three components are identified in the service stratum: + +- The IP multimedia service component provides mediated services, including the control and delivery of real-time conversational services based on the use of the IMS. The IMS is extended in NGN to support additional access network types, such as xDSL and WLAN. PSTN/ISDN simulation service is also provided by this component. +- The PSTN/ISDN emulation service component provides all of the network functionality associated with supporting existing services for legacy end-user interfaces and equipment. +- The IPTV service component provides all of the network functionality associated with supporting IPTV services. + +Other NGN service components (shown as a dotted box) will be defined in the future to address other services. + +Three components are identified in the transport stratum: the network attachment control functions (NACF) component, the resource and admission control functions (RACF) component and the mobility management and control functions (MMCF) component. + +Physical transport networks provide the connectivity for all components and physically separated functions within the NGN. Transport is divided into access transport networks and the core transport network, with a border gateway linking the two transport network categories. + +IP connectivity is provided to the NGN end-user equipment by the transport functions, under the control of the NACF, the RACF and the MMCF components. + +In the transport stratum, multiple configurations regarding access transport functions are possible. Figure 10-1 also represents the compilation of user information and other control-related data into two functions: "service user profile" and "transport user profile" functions. These functions may be specified and realized as a set of cooperating databases with functionality residing in any part of the NGN. + +End-user interfaces are supported by both physical and functional (control) interfaces, and both are shown in the figure. No assumptions are made about the diverse end-user interfaces and end-user networks that may be connected to the NGN access network. End-user equipment may be either mobile or fixed. + +The NGN interface(s) to other networks includes many existing networks, such as PSTN/ISDN and the public Internet. The NGN interfaces other networks both at the service stratum level and at the transport stratum level, by using border gateways. The border gateways can optionally involve media transcoding and bearer adaptation. Interactions between the service stratum and the transport stratum may take place, either directly or through the RACF. + +## **10.1 NGN service-specific components** + +### **10.1.1 IP multimedia service component** + +The IP multimedia service component supports mediated multimedia services. These services may include multimedia session services, such as voice or video telephony or PSTN/ISDN simulation, and some non-session services, such as subscribe/notify for presence information and the message method for message exchange. In contrast to the emulation service described in clause 10.1.2 below, the PSTN/ISDN simulation service refers to the provision of PSTN/ISDN-like services to advanced terminals such as IP phones. + +The IP multimedia service component is specified further in [ITU-T Y.2021]. + +### **10.1.2 PSTN/ISDN emulation service component** + +The PSTN/ISDN emulation refers to the provision of PSTN/ISDN service capabilities and interfaces using adaptation to an IP infrastructure. The PSTN/ISDN emulation service component enables the support of legacy terminals connected through a gateway to an IP network. All PSTN/ISDN services remain available and identical (i.e., with the same operating characteristics), such that end users are unaware that they are not connected to a TDM-based PSTN/ISDN. Not all service capabilities and interfaces have to be present to provide PSTN/ISDN emulation. + +By contrast, PSTN/ISDN simulation refers to the provision of PSTN/ISDN-like services to advanced terminals such as IP phones. The IP multimedia service component described in clause 10.1.1 may provide such simulation services. + +The PSTN/ISDN emulation service component is specified further in [ITU-T Y.2031]. + +### **10.1.3 IPTV service component** + +The IPTV service component is described in Annex B. + +### **10.1.4 Other NGN service components** + +The definition of other NGN service-specific components is for further study. Service specific components may be required in order for the NGN to support services such as push services, data retrieval applications, data communication services, online applications, sensor network services, remote control services, and over-the-network device management. + +## **10.2 NGN transport-specific components** + +### **10.2.1 NACF component** + +The NACF component is specified in [ITU-T Y.2014]. + +### **10.2.2 RACF component** + +The RACF component is specified in [ITU-T Y.2111]. + +### **10.2.3 MMCF component** + +The MMCF component is specified in [ITU-T Y.2018]. + +### **10.2.4 Other NGN transport components** + +Because the NGN supports several types of access networks, specific components for access transport functions exist in the transport stratum. These include fixed access with a wire line, fixed access with a wireless LAN, and cellular access. Note that Appendix II identifies further transport stratum access network scenarios. + +The definition of access specific transport components is for further study. + +## **10.3 Management functions** + +Five different types of functions are included in this component, i.e., functions related to fault management, configuration management, accounting management, security management and performance management. + +The MPM function as defined in [ITU-T Y.2173] provides functions within the performance management functions. + +The charging and accounting functions defined in [ITU-T Y.2233] provide functions within the accounting management functions. + +# **11 Security considerations** + +The security requirements within the functional requirements and architecture of the NGN are addressed by the security requirements for NGN in [ITU-T Y.2701]. + +# **Annex A** + +## **Differences between this edition and the 2006 edition of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012** + +(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation) + +This annex identifies the main differences between this edition and the 2006 edition of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012. + +This Recommendation provides the following additional functional features as compared to the 2006 edition of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012: + +- Introduction of the SNI reference point in the NGN architecture; +- Support for mobility in the transport stratum via the introduction of the MMCF component in the NGN architecture and related functional entities HDC-FE, MLM-FE, NID-FE and NIR-FE defined in [ITU-T Y.2018]; +- Introduction of content delivery functions and related functional entities described in clause 9.3.4, i.e., CDP-FE, CDC-FE and CD&LC-FE; +- Introduction of new functional entities in the ASF&SSF (clause 9.3.5), i.e., CPR-FE, ASUP-FE, APP-FE and SCP-FE that can be used for the support of IPTV services; +- Details of CPN gateway functions and related functional entities as per clause 9.3.6; +- Introduction of identity management functions and related functional entities (i.e., IdMCC-FE) in the NGN architecture; a new appendix shows an example illustration of IdM in NGN; +- Introduction of a new annex regarding the support of IPTV services in NGN. This annex provides the mapping between functions and functional blocks defined in [ITU-T Y.1910] and NGN functions and functional entities defined in this Recommendation; +- Introduction of functional entities regarding forwarding in the transport functions, i.e., EF-FE and EC-FE. This Recommendation describes the use of these functional entities for the support of multicast in the NGN transport stratum and its relationship with [ITU-T Y.2017]; +- Addition of the management of performance measurement (MPM) in the management functions. MPM functions are described in [ITU-T Y.2173]. + +# Annex B + +## Support of IPTV services + +(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation) + +This annex describes the correspondence between the NGN functional architecture, as described in this Recommendation, and the NGN-based IPTV functional architectures, as described in [ITU-T Y.1910]. The NGN-based IPTV functional architectures considered in this annex are the IMS-based IPTV architecture and the non-IMS-based IPTV architecture. As a result, this annex provides an overall view of the IPTV service component as shown in Figure 10-1. + +The IPTV functional architectures described in [ITU-T Y.1910] identify functions and functional blocks for the support of IPTV services, while this Recommendation describes NGN functions and functional entities. + +## B.1 Overall functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN architectures + +The NGN-based IPTV architectures defined in [ITU-T Y.1910] are in accordance with this Recommendation for providing IPTV services. Therefore, the functionalities defined in [ITU-T Y.1910] have a corresponding relationship with the NGN architecture. + +Application functions in NGN-based IPTV architecture [ITU-T Y.1910] are included in application support functions and service support functions of NGN shown in Figure 7-1. Service control functions and content delivery functions defined in [ITU-T Y.1910] are included in the NGN service control and content delivery functions as shown in Figure 7-1. Thus, application functions, service control functions, and content delivery functions are included in the service stratum of the NGN architecture. Although this Recommendation assumes that content delivery functions are located inside the NGN, content delivery functions can optionally reside outside of the NGN. + +Table B.1 provides the relationship between the functions of NGN-based IPTV functional architecture [ITU-T Y.1910] and the NGN functional architecture described in this Recommendation. + +**Table B.1 – Functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV and NGN functional architectures** + +| No. | NGN-based IPTV functional architectures [ITU-T Y.1910] | NGN functional architecture | Remarks | +|-----|--------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | Network functions | Transport stratum | These correspond to each other. | +| 2 | End-user functions | End-user functions | These correspond to each other. | +| 3 | Management functions | Management functions | These correspond to each other. | +| 4 | Service control functions | Service control functions (in-service stratum) | IPTV service control functional block [ITU-T Y.1910] corresponds to NGN service control functions. However, NGN service control functions can optionally include other functionalities. | + +**Table B.1 – Functional mapping between NGN-based IPTV +and NGN functional architectures** + +| No. | NGN-based
IPTV functional
architectures
[ITU-T Y.1910] | NGN functional architecture | Remarks | +|------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 5 | Content delivery functions | Content delivery functions (in-service stratum) | Content delivery functions can optionally reside outside the NGN. | +| 6 | Application functions | Application support functions & service support functions (in-service stratum) | Application functions can optionally reside outside the NGN. | +| 7 | Content provider functions | Content provider functions | Content provider functions reside outside the NGN. | + +## **B.2 IMS-based IPTV functional architecture** + +### **B.2.1 Functional mapping** + +Table B.2 describes the functional mapping between the functional blocks and the functions defined in [ITU-T Y.1910], and the NGN functional entities or functions defined in this Recommendation for the support of the IMS-based IPTV functional architecture. + +**Table B.2 – IMS-based architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910] | NGN Functional Entity (FE) | +|-----------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Linear TV Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Linear TV | +| On Demand Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for On Demand Application | +| Other Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Other IPTV Application | +| Service and Application Discovery and Selection FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Service and Application Discovery and Selection | +| Application Profile FB | A-5: Application Support User Profile FE | +| Application Provisioning FB | A-6: Application Provisioning-FE | +| Content Preparation Functions | A-7: Content Preparation FE | +| Service and Content Protection Functions | A-8: Service and Content Protection FE | +| Content Distribution and Location Control Functions | C-1: Content Distribution and Location Control FE | +| Content Delivery and Storage Functions | C-2: Content Delivery Control FE
C-3: Content Delivery Processing FE | +| Core IMS Functions | Supported by the following:
S-1: Serving Call Session Control FE
S-2: Proxy Call Session Control FE
S-3: Interrogating Call Session Control FE | +| Service User Profile FB | S-5: Service User Profile FE | + +**Table B.2 – IMS-based architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910] | NGN Functional Entity (FE) | +|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| NACF | NACF | +| RACF | RACF | +| Multicast Replication FB | Multicast capable EF-FE in transport processing FEs | +| Multicast Control Point FB | Multicast capable EC-FE in transport processing FEs | +| Delivery Network Gateway FB | CPN Gateway Functions | + +### **B.2.2 Reference points** + +Table B.3 describes the mapping between reference points in [ITU-T Y.1910] and NGN reference points defined in this Recommendation for the support of the IMS-based IPTV architecture. + +**Table B.3 – Reference points – IMS based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910]
reference point | NGN reference point | +|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| E0 | A-U1 reference point between instantiated AS-FE for SADS and end-user functions | +| E1 | A-U1 reference point between instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) and end-user functions | +| E2 | A-U2 reference point between SCP-FE and end-user functions | +| E3 | S-U1 reference point between P-CSC-FE and end-user functions | +| E4 | C-U2 reference point between CDP-FE and end-user functions | +| E5 | T-U4 reference point between relevant FE (e.g., AN-FE, EN-FE, etc.) in transport processing functions and end-user functions | +| E6 | C-U1 reference point between CDC-FE and end-user functions | +| A0 | A-S4 reference point between S-CSC-FE and instantiated AS-FE for SADS | +| A1 | A-S4 reference point between S-CSC-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-2 | AC-1 reference point between CD&LC-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., linear TV) | +| A-3 | Reference point between CPR-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-4 | Reference point between APP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for SADS | +| A-5 | Reference point between APP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-6 | Reference point between SCP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| C-1 | A-C2 reference point between CPR-FE and CD&LC-FE | +| C-2 | A-C3 reference point between CPR-FE and CDP-FE | +| C-3 | Reference point between CPR-FE and SCP-FE | +| D-1 | Reference point between CD&LC-FE and CDC-FE | +| H-1 | T-U1 reference point between end-user functions and AR-FE | +| H-2 | T-U3 reference point between AN-FE and end-user functions (to transport multicast flows) | + +**Table B.3 – Reference points – IMS based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910]
reference point | NGN reference point | +|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| H-3 | T-U3 reference point between AN-FE and end-user functions (to transport unicast flows) | +| M-1 | Reference point between SCP-FE and APP-FE | +| Mc | C-T1 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | +| Md | C-T2 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | +| S-1 | S-C1 reference point between core IMS and CD&LC-FE | +| S-2 | Reference point between S-CSC-FE and SAA-FE (Cx reference point) | +| S-3 | Rs reference point between P-CSC-FE and RACF | +| S-4 | S-TC1 reference point between P-CSC-FE and NACF | +| S-5 | S-C2 reference point between core IMS and CDC-FE | +| T-1 | TC-T1 reference point between P-CSC-FE and NACF | +| Ud | C-T2 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | + +## **B.3 Non-IMS-based IPTV architecture** + +### **B.3.1 Functional mapping** + +Table B.4 describes the functional mapping between the functional blocks and the functions defined in [ITU-T Y.1910], and the NGN functional entities or functions defined in this Recommendation for the support of the non-IMS-based IPTV architecture. + +**Table B.4 – Non-IMS-based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910] Functional Block or Functions | NGN functional entity (FE) or NGN functions | +|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Linear TV Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Linear TV | +| On Demand Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for On Demand Application | +| Other Application FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Other IPTV Application | +| Service and Application Discovery and Selection FB | Instantiation of A-1: Application Support FE for Service and Application Discovery and Selection | +| Application Profile FB | A-5: Application Support User Profile FE | +| Application Provisioning FB | A-6: Application Provisioning-FE | +| Content Preparation Functions | A-7: Content Preparation FE | +| Service and Content Protection Functions | A-8: Service and Content Protection FE | +| Content Distribution and Location Control Functions | C-1: Content Distribution and Location Control FE | +| Content Delivery and Storage Functions | C-2: Content Delivery Control FE
C-3: Content Delivery Processing FE | +| IPTV Service Control FB | Instantiation of S-15: General Services Control FE for IPTV service control | +| Service User Profile FB | S-5: Service User Profile FE | + +**Table B.4 – Non-IMS-based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910] Functional Block or Functions | NGN functional entity (FE) or NGN functions | +|-----------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------| +| NACF | NACF | +| RACF | RACF | +| Multicast Replication FB | Multicast capable EF-FE in transport processing FEs | +| Multicast Control Point FB | Multicast capable EC-FE in transport processing FEs | +| Delivery Network Gateway FB | CPN Gateway Functions | + +### B.3.2 Reference points + +Table B.5 describes the mapping between reference points defined in [ITU-T Y.1910] and NGN reference points defined in this Recommendation for the support of the non-IMS-based IPTV architecture. + +**Table B.5 – Reference points – non-IMS-based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T Y.1910]
reference point | NGN reference point | +|-------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| E0 | A-U1 reference point between instantiated AS-FE for SADS and end-user functions | +| E1 | A-U1 reference point between instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) and end-user functions | +| E2 | A-U2 reference point between SCP-FE and end-user functions | +| E3 | S-U3 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE for IPTV service control and end-user functions | +| E4 | C-U2 reference point between CDP-FE and end-user functions | +| E5 | T-U4 reference point between relevant FE (e.g., AN-FE, EN-FE, etc.) in transport processing functions and end-user functions | +| E6 | C-U1 reference point between CDC-FE and end-user functions | +| A1 | A-S4 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE for IPTV service control and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-2 | AC-1 reference point between CD&LC-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-3 | Reference point between CPR-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-4 | Reference point between APP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for SADS | +| A-5 | Reference point between APP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| A-6 | Reference point between SCP-FE and instantiated AS-FE for IPTV application (e.g., Linear TV) | +| C-1 | A-C2 reference point between CPR-FE and CD&LC-FE | +| C-2 | A-C3 reference point between CPR-FE and CDP-FE | +| C-3 | Reference point between CPR-FE and SCP-FE | +| D-1 | Reference point between CD&LC-FE and CDC-FE | +| H-1 | T-U1 reference point between end-user functions and AR-FE | +| H-2 | T-U3 reference point between AN-FE and end-user functions (to transport multicast | + +**Table B.5 – Reference points – non-IMS-based IPTV architecture** + +| [ITU-T
Y.1910]
reference point | NGN reference point | +|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | flows) | +| H-3 | T-U3 reference point between AN-FE and end-user functions (to transport unicast flows) | +| M-1 | Reference point between SCP-FE and APP-FE | +| Mc | C-T1 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | +| Md | C-T2 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | +| S-1 | S-C3 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and CD&LC-FE | +| S-2 | Reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and SAA-FE | +| S-3 | Rs reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and RACF | +| S-4 | S-TC1 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and NACF | +| S-5 | S-C4 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and CDC-FE | +| T-1 | TC-T1 reference point between instantiated GSC-FE and NACF | +| Ud | C-T2 reference point between CDP-FE and transport functions | + +# Appendix I + +## Examples of NGN network configurations + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +NOTE – In this appendix, the terms "NGN core" and "NGN access" are used only for convenience and are not intended to define functional architecture of the NGN. + +## I.1 Configurations and topology of the NGN + +Along with new architecture and services, the NGN brings an additional level of complexity over existing fixed networks. The addition of support for multiple access technologies and for mobility results in the need to support a wide variety of network configurations. Figure I.1 shows an NGN core network with a set of example access networks. In this figure, the core network is that part of the NGN that provides the telecommunications and/or multimedia services of the NGN to the user. It is distinguished from the access network(s) in that it provides common functions shared across one or more access networks. The NGN core network may be distinguished from other NGN core networks based on administrative needs or ownership. The access networks are distinguished from the core in that they do not provide end-user services directly (other than transport). The access networks may be distinguished from each other based on aspects such as technology, ownership, or administrative needs. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of an NGN (Next-Generation Network). At the center is an oval labeled "NGN Core". Surrounding this core are several access networks, each represented by a circle: "Internet", "Legacy Networks (ISDN/PSTN etc.)", "Mobile Networks (2G, 3G etc)", "Other NGN Networks", "Fixed Access (e.g DSL) Network", "Cellular radio Access Network", and "WLAN Access Network". Lines connect the "NGN Core" to each of these access networks. Below the access networks is a rectangle labeled "Mobile Object". A line connects the "Mobile Object" to the "Cellular radio Access Network". A lightning bolt symbol is placed between the "Mobile Object" and the "Cellular radio Access Network", indicating a wireless connection. Additionally, a line connects the "Mobile Object" to the "Fixed Access (e.g DSL) Network". + +Diagram of NGN core and access networks + +Figure I.1 – NGN core and access networks + +In addition to the need to distinguish between the NGN core and the access networks, the NGN support for roaming introduces another configuration aspect, that of a home network reached from a visited (sometimes called serving) network. Figure I.2 shows a configuration involving an end-to-end NGN session. In this example, user 1 is roaming outside his home network domain, viz. Home core NGN-1 and, thus, there is a need to distinguish between the home network and the visited network. User 2 in this case is in her home network, viz. Home core NGN-2. + +It should be noted that the concept of a home network is not necessarily tied to the geographic location of a user's residence or workplace. Rather, it is based on the principle that a network operator holds a subscription for the service being offered to the user. This network operator is responsible for authorizing the user's access to the service and billing the user for this access. It is possible for an entire service to be provided by the visited network, for example, while still having a separate home network operator that authorizes the service through an appropriate business arrangement with the visited network operator. More typically in the NGN, the home network operator will provide the service control for the user while the visited network operator will provide only access-related capabilities, such as support for authentication, support for authorization, data integrity services, and QoS support. + + + +``` + +graph TD + HCN1((Home Core NGN-1)) --- HCN2((Home Core NGN-2)) + HCN1 --- VA((Visited Access)) + VA --- U1[User-1] + HCN2 --- U2[User-2] + +``` + +Diagram illustrating NGN example of home and visited networks. It shows two home core networks, Home Core NGN-1 and Home Core NGN-2, connected by a line. Home Core NGN-1 is connected to a Visited Access network, which is then connected to User-1. Home Core NGN-2 is connected to User-2. + +**Figure I.2 – NGN example of home and visited networks** + +Figure I.2 also introduces the notion that multiple NGN core networks may interoperate to provide an end-to-end service to the user. In a simple case, an end-to-end session will have originating and terminating core networks. Depending on the network operator's particular configuration and whether or not roaming is involved, one or more separate access networks might be involved. In a more complex case, some visited core network capabilities may be used in a roaming situation. Figure I.3 shows such an example, where user 1 is roaming outside his home network and support for services such as location information or media transcoding, for example, is provided by the core network of the visited NGN operator. + + + +Diagram illustrating the NGN example of visited NGN core network support. It shows three cloud-like shapes representing network components. On the left, a cloud labeled 'Visited Access' is connected by a line to a cloud labeled 'Visited Core NGN' above it. 'Visited Core NGN' is further connected by a line to a cloud labeled 'Home Core NGN-1' on the right. A double-headed arrow is shown on the right side of the 'Home Core NGN-1' cloud. Below the 'Visited Access' cloud, the label 'User-1' is connected to it by a line. + +**Figure I.3 – NGN example of visited NGN core network support** + +Since, in many cases, the specific division of functionality between the core and the access networks, between the home and the visited networks, and between the originating and the terminating networks is based on the network operators' business decisions, it is difficult to precisely define the attributes that make up each of these configuration elements. Rather than hard points of separation in the architecture, these aspects should be thought of as configurable topology elements that may be mixed and matched in many different ways. The specification of the NGN architecture should not place any limitations on the network operator's freedom to deploy capabilities or to use the capabilities of other business partners. + +## **I.2 Relationship between the NGN and administrative domains** + +The NGN network can be logically decomposed into different sub-networks, as shown in Figure I.4. The emphasis on logical decomposition instead of physical decomposition is based on the fact that, in the future, physical equipment may have features of both the access network and the core network. A pure physical decomposition will encounter difficulties when such features are combined into a single network element. + + + +The diagram illustrates the major components of the NGN at the network level. It shows a hierarchical structure with three main layers: NGN Core Network, NGN Access Network, and Customer Networks. The NGN Core Network is divided into Network Domain A (pink) and Network Domain B (yellow). The NGN Access Network is divided into Network Domain A (pink) and Network Domain C (blue). Each domain contains a hierarchical structure of Network Elements (NE) connected by Internal Network-Network Interfaces (INNI). The NGN Core Network is connected to the NGN Access Network via Network-Network Interfaces (NNI). The NGN Access Network is connected to four Customer Networks via User-to-Network Interfaces (UNI). + +Diagram illustrating the major components of the NGN at the network level. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure with three main layers: NGN Core Network, NGN Access Network, and Customer Networks. The NGN Core Network is divided into Network Domain A (pink) and Network Domain B (yellow). The NGN Access Network is divided into Network Domain A (pink) and Network Domain C (blue). Each domain contains a hierarchical structure of Network Elements (NE) connected by Internal Network-Network Interfaces (INNI). The NGN Core Network is connected to the NGN Access Network via Network-Network Interfaces (NNI). The NGN Access Network is connected to four Customer Networks via User-to-Network Interfaces (UNI). + +**Figure I.4 – Major components of the NGN at the network level** + +The major components of an NGN network are as follows: + +- Customer network: A customer network can be a network within a home or an enterprise network. It is connected to the NGN provider's network via a UNI (user-to-network interface). The UNI is also the demarcation point between the NGN provider and the user. A customer network may obtain its content service from: + - the core network, + - another instance of the customer network providing public services, or + - another instance of the customer network providing private services, possibly with a private addressing scheme. +- Access network: An access network collects end-user traffic from the end-user network to the core network. The access network provider is responsible for the access network. The access network can be further partitioned into different domains, with the intra-domain interface being termed an INNI (internal network-network interface) and the inter-domain interface being termed a NNI (network-network interface). The access network belongs to the transport stratum. +- Core network: The core network belongs to both the transport stratum and the service stratum. The core network provider is responsible for the core network. The interface between the core network and the access network or between core networks can be an INNI (in the case of partitioning as a single domain) or a NNI. + +The concept of an NGN domain is introduced to outline the administrative boundaries. Detailed topology information may or may not be shared across the NNI, but may be shared if available for + +INNI links. As depicted in Figure I.4, the access network and the core network may or may not belong to the same NGN domain. + +## I.3 Relationship between the NGN and service domains + +The NGN provides access to a wide variety of services. The specific services offered by any NGN operator are determined by business needs and customer needs. Figure I.5 shows an example of an NGN configuration to illustrate multiple domains within which services may be accessed. + + + +Figure I.5: NGN example of service domains. The diagram illustrates a network architecture for two NGN operators, Operator A and Operator B, connected to the Internet. Operator A's domain includes an Access Network (blue cloud) connected to a Core Network (green cloud). The Core Network contains two service domains: Non-SIP Services (yellow oval) and IMS Services (yellow oval). A Firewall (brick wall) separates Operator A's Core Network from the Internet (purple cloud). The Internet contains Internet Services (two laptop icons). Operator B's domain includes a Core Network (green cloud) connected to an Access Network (blue cloud). The Core Network contains IMS Services (yellow oval). A Transit Network (green cloud) connects Operator A's Core Network to Operator B's Core Network. Below the diagram, a horizontal bar labels the components: IP Connectivity Access Network, Core Transport Network, Transit Network, Core Transport Network, and IP Connectivity Access Network. + +**Figure I.5 – NGN example of service domains** + +In this example, NGN operator A supports a single access network technology that provides access to three service domains via its core network. + +One service domain is that provided by the IMS services bubble. These services may be completely within NGN operator A's domain or may support end-to-end services to other network operators. In this example, NGN operator A supports end-to-end IMS services along with NGN operator B's IMS. They are interconnected through a trusted transit network. Other transit network configurations are of course allowed, and the transit network may be null in the case where NGN operator A is directly connected to the other endpoint network. In some cases, firewalls or other gateway elements might be used to protect the NGN operator from the transit network. It should also be noted that the network on the other side of the transit network might be another type of external network, such as the PSTN. + +A second service domain in this example is the non-SIP services bubble of NGN operator A. This would provide services such as streaming video. These service entities may be attached directly to the core network of NGN operator A, or may be provided by third parties through trusted security arrangements. + +NOTE – Streaming video is chosen as an example of the non-SIP services. Streaming video may be provided either as non-SIP or SIP services. + +A third service domain shown here is access to Internet-based services. These services are neither part of NGN operator A's domain, nor are they provided by business arrangements with NGN operator A. These services are accessed by NGN operator A providing a transport connection to the Internet. Such a connection by NGN operator A may only be allowed via firewall techniques. + +As mentioned earlier, this example shows only a small set of the possible configurations that might be supported by NGN operators. It illustrates the three basic domains of service access that are provided by the NGN. + +## I.4 Enterprise role model + +The primary purpose of an enterprise model is to identify interfaces that are likely to be of general commercial importance. To do this, a number of roles are identified, which describe reasonably well-defined business activities that are unlikely to be subdivided between a number of players [b-ITU-T Y.110]. The players may aggregate roles as they see fit. Therefore an enterprise model does not limit players in anyway, but it does identify the roles that the architecture should enable. + +A basic role model for NGN is shown in Figure I.6. The model itself is taken from [b-ETSI TS 122 101], but we have modified the names to better align it with the current NGN terminology. It identifies the following roles: + +- *Customer*: The role denoting a person or other entity that has a contractual relationship with a service provider on behalf of one or more users. +- *User*: The role in which a person or other entity authorized by a customer uses services subscribed to by the customer. +- *Retailing service provider*: The role that has overall responsibility for the provision of a service or set of services to users associated with a subscription as a result of commercial agreements established with the users (i.e., subscription relationships). The user profile is maintained by the retailing service provider. Service provision is the result of combining wholesale network services and service provider service capabilities. +- *Wholesale service provider*: The role that combines a retailing service provider's service capabilities with its own network service capabilities to enable users to obtain services. +- *Value added service provider*: The role that provides services other than basic telecommunications service (e.g., content provision or information services) for which additional charges may be incurred. These may be billed via the customer's service provider or directly to the customer. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Basic NGN roles and their relationships. The roles are represented as boxes: customer, user, retailing service provider, wholesale service provider, and value added service provider. Relationships are shown as lines with reference points (dots). Solid lines with dots represent technical relations, while dashed lines represent commercial relations. The diagram shows a complex network of these relationships, including a looped line between the retailing and wholesale service providers. + +Legend: + +- technical relation and reference point +- - - commercial relation + +Diagram illustrating the Basic NGN roles and their relationships. The roles are represented as boxes: customer, user, retailing service provider, wholesale service provider, and value added service provider. Relationships are shown as lines with reference points (dots). Solid lines with dots represent technical relations, while dashed lines represent commercial relations. The diagram shows a complex network of these relationships, including a looped line between the retailing and wholesale service providers. + +**Figure I.6 – Basic NGN roles** + +This basic model provides a kind of superclass for roles and their relations. Wholesale service provider players may need to combine their services to provision an end-to-end service. This is illustrated by the looped line and reference point in the figure. The figure further illustrates whether a relationship between roles is technical or commercial. In the latter case, the relationship may or may not be supported by a technical reference point. Such a reference point would be in the management plane, which is not detailed in this Recommendation. We have therefore limited further elaboration of the model to the technical relationships and the roles that have at least one technical relationship. Hence, the customer role is not shown in the following figures. + +The basic model can be extended to reflect the types of specialization that are already visible in the marketplace. To date, we mainly see specialization for the wholesale service provider role, and this is the only one we will consider in the following description. Specialization of the retailing and value-added service provider roles may be considered at a later stage. + +The first specialization step is based on the domains as they have been defined by 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project) in [b-ETSI TS 123 101]. Unfortunately, it is not possible to reuse the terminology, as the distinction between serving and home network domains is functional, rather than an enterprise role distinction. The same player will support both functions, depending on the subscription of the user. For lack of a better term, we have used the term "core" for the server/home network role. The access and transit service provider roles map directly to the respective domains in [b-ETSI TS 123 101]. Note that 3GPP uses the term "core network domain" for the combination of server, home, and transit network domains. + +At this point it is also worth noting that [b-ETSI TS 123 228] defines an IP connectivity access network (IP-CAN) as the non-IMS part of a complete network solution, excluding terminals. It is neither an access network domain as defined in [b-ETSI TS 123 101], nor does it map to the access service provider role. + +The first step in wholesale provider specialization (sub-classing) is shown in Figure I.7. + + + +``` + +graph LR + User[user] --- Retail[retail service provider] + User --- Core[core service provider] + User --- Access[access transport provider] + Core --- VAS[value added service provider] + Core --- Transit[transit transport provider] + +``` + +Figure I.7 – NGN roles: first level of specialization. The diagram shows a 'user' block on the left connected to three blocks: 'retail service provider', 'core service provider', and 'access transport provider'. The 'core service provider' block is further connected to 'value added service provider' and 'transit transport provider'. + +**Figure I.7 – NGN roles: first level of specialization** + +A basic tenet of the NGN architecture is the separation of transport and service stratum functions. The main motivation for this is the requirement for the transport stratum to support different types of service control systems, not just IMS. This will be a functional requirement from any player, including cases where the transport and service stratum functions are combined in the core service provider role. This can be taken one step further by specializing the core service provider into a "core transport" and a "service control and integration" provider role. The implication is that the reference points between functions in the transport stratum and the service stratum become trust boundaries and will have to support inter-network operator security requirements. + +For completeness, the service control and integration provider role has been split into separate service control provider and integration service provider roles. Virtual network operators are players who perform this role, and these are so well established that it is deemed appropriate to reflect this in the second level of specialization. The resulting role model is depicted in Figure I.8. + + + +``` + +graph LR + User[user] --- Retail[retail service provider] + User --- Integrating[integrating service provider] + User --- ServiceControl[service control provider] + User --- AccessTransport[access transport provider] + User --- CoreTransport[core transport provider] + + Retail --- Integrating + Integrating --- ServiceControl + + ServiceControl --- AccessTransport + ServiceControl --- CoreTransport + + AccessTransport --- CoreTransport + + CoreTransport --- ValueAdded[value added service provider] + CoreTransport --- TransitTransport[transit transport provider] + + ValueAdded --- TransitTransport + +``` + +Figure I.8 – NGN roles: second level of specialization. The diagram shows a 'user' box on the left connected to a vertical stack of boxes: 'retail service provider', 'integrating service provider', 'service control provider', 'access transport provider', and 'core transport provider'. The 'retail service provider' is also connected to 'integrating service provider' and 'service control provider'. The 'integrating service provider' is connected to 'service control provider'. The 'service control provider' is connected to 'access transport provider' and 'core transport provider'. The 'access transport provider' is connected to 'core transport provider'. The 'core transport provider' is connected to 'value added service provider' and 'transit transport provider'. The 'value added service provider' is connected to 'transit transport provider'. + +**Figure I.8 – NGN roles: second level of specialization** + +Each of the new roles has a relationship with the retailing service provider role that holds the user profile database. A retailing role player may hold the user information for all three roles, or a user may have a relationship with multiple retailing role players. This cannot be derived from the figure, because it does not show the cardinality of these relationships. + +In summary, the second level of specialization of the NGN enterprise model defines the following roles: + +- *User*: The role in which a person or other entity authorized by a customer uses services subscribed to by the customer. +- *Retailing service provider*: The role that has overall responsibility for the provision of a service or set of services to users. The user profile is maintained by the retailing service provider. Service provision is the result of combining retailing service provider services with wholesale services from, at least, the access and core transport provider roles and, at most, from all other provider roles. +- *Integrating service provider*: The role that creates unique new service offerings from the wholesale services provided by other roles. +- *Service control provider*: The role that provides session and call control and related services, such as registration, presence, and location, wholesale to retailing and integrating service providers. +- *Value added service provider*: The role that provides value added services (e.g., content provision or information services) on top of the basic telecommunications service provided by the service control provider role. It does not provide a complete service on its own. +- *Core transport provider*: The role that provides connectivity either end-to-end or in part, and related services such as registration for connectivity service, by combining its own services with those of the access transport provider and transit provider roles as necessary. +- *Access transport provider*: The role that provides a wholesale connectivity service between the user and a core transport provider. +- *Transit transport provider*: The role that provides a wholesale connectivity service between core transport providers, in conjunction with other transit transport providers as necessary. It also provides related DNS services. + +## **I.5 Functional roles** + +Clause I.4 suggests that the core service provider role shown in Figure I.7 will, in general, support both home network as well as serving network functionality. If a strict separation between the transport and the service stratum functions is applied as represented in the functional requirements and architecture model, and implied by the NGN enterprise model shown in Figure I.8, both the + +service control provider and the core transport provider have to independently support home and serving network functions. + +The requirement to support user networks with nomadic terminals is another reason why the home network function of the user terminal in the service stratum may need to be supported by a different player than the one that supports the home network function for the user network gateway (UNG) in the transport stratum. The UNG is connected to a fixed network, which means that the access network will connect it directly to the core transport provider that provides the home network functionality. For moving networks this is no longer the case, and the UNG may roam as well. + +The wide range of possibilities this creates is illustrated in Figure I.9. The UNG may be at a location where it has potential access to more than one access transport provider. Each access network may in turn be connected to multiple core transport providers. This scenario is already recognized and supported for WLAN interworking [b-ETSI TS 124 234]. The additional complexity that is introduced by transport and service stratum independence significantly increases the number of routing possibilities, and it still needs to be verified whether this is fully supported by the current architecture. + +The need to provide this flexibility should not be questioned, since it will be required to support moving networks anyway. It will, however, undoubtedly increase the complexity, if it has to support the business model shown in Figure I.8, as opposed to the simpler one shown in Figure I.7. + + + +Key: + +- SCPr: Service control provider +- CTP: Core transport provider +- UNG: User-network gateway +- UT: User terminal + +Figure I.9: Home and visited network functional roles. This diagram illustrates a complex network architecture with multiple layers of functional roles. At the top, there are four Home entities: two Home SCPr (Service Control Providers) and two Home CTP (Core Transport Providers). These are connected to a central Transit network. Below the Transit network are two Visited entities: two Visited SCPr and two Visited CTP. These are connected to two Access networks. At the bottom, there are two User Network Gateways (UNG), each containing two User Terminals (UT). The diagram shows a highly interconnected network where multiple paths exist between the Home and Visited layers, and between the Access networks and the User Terminals. + +Y.2012(2010)\_FI-9 + +**Figure I.9 – Home and visited network functional roles** + +# Appendix II + +## Transport-stratum access network scenarios + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +## II.1 Introduction + +This appendix describes some transport-layer access network deployment scenarios that show user equipment accessing the NGN. The figures used to illustrate these scenarios show physical devices and indicate high-level functionality but do not indicate business models, enterprise roles, or network operator domain boundaries. In general, many different business models may be used with each functional scenario. Some of the text used to describe the figures contains examples of such business model considerations. + +Also, note that the term "policy enforcement" as used here covers generalized transport-layer user-plane policy enforcement actions, such as QoS traffic conditioning, packet filtering, NAPT binding manipulation, usage metering, flow-based charging, and policy-based forwarding, which may in some cases be broader in scope than NGN. In this discussion, the terms "link layer" and "layer 2" are used synonymously. In the diagrams, some link-layer segments are shown with a specific type (e.g., VLAN (Virtual LAN)), but in general any type of link layer can be used (e.g., SDH (synchronous digital hierarchy), ATM, MPLS (multi protocol label switching)). + +## II.2 Scenario 1: Multi-layered transport stratum + + + +The diagram illustrates a multi-layered transport stratum architecture. It is divided into two main layers: the Service Layer and the Transport Layer. + +**Service Layer:** Contains two application entities, 'App' on Host-1 and Host-2, connected by a red dashed line representing Application Protocols (e.g., SIP). + +**Transport Layer:** Contains multiple IP nodes and networks. Host-1 has IP-C, IP-B, and IP-A. Host-2 has IP-C. The network path includes Node-1 (WLAN Access Controller), Node-2 (IPSEC GW), and Node-3 (Home Agent). There are also IP networks A, B, and C, and a Host-2 IP network. Connections are shown as follows: + +- IP-C (Host-1) connects to IP-C (Host-2) via Mobile IP (using co-located CoA). +- IP-B (Host-1) connects to IP-B (Host-2) via IPsec Tunnel. +- IP-A (Host-1) connects to IP-A (Node-1) via IP. +- IP-A (Node-1) connects to IP-A (Node-2) via IP. +- IP-B (Node-2) connects to IP-B (Node-3) via IP. +- IP-C (Node-3) connects to IP-C (Host-2) via IP. + +**Legend:** + +- Nodes connected with a long-dashed line (red) are adjacent at the application layer (e.g. client/server or peer-to-peer application entities) +- Nodes connected with a solid line (blue) are layer-3 adjacent +- Nodes connected with a short-dashed line (black) are layer-2 adjacent +- Solid arrow (green) indicates AAA & DHCP flows +- Represents a routed IP network + +Figure II.1 – Multi-layered transport stratum diagram showing a multi-layered network architecture with Service Layer and Transport Layer. + +Figure II.1 – Multi-layered transport stratum + +The transport stratum may be multi-layered, with a number of different access technologies layered on top of each other. For example, IP can run over a stack of link-layer technologies, such as IP/Ethernet/ATM/SDH/WDM (wavelength division multiplexing). IP itself can also be used as a link-layer technology via IP tunnelling, and these IP tunnels can form part of a stack of link layers. + +Figure II.1 shows a host running a stack of mobile IP/IPsec/WLAN. For example, a terminal could connect to a public WLAN hotspot, establish an IPsec tunnel to an IPsec gateway located in a service provider domain, and then perform a mobile IP registration with a home agent also in the service provider domain. In this example, a co-located care-of address is used, so there is no foreign agent. Here, the terminal has three IP addresses, one for each layer. The first IP address is assigned when the terminal connects to the WLAN network; the second, when the terminal connects to the IPsec gateway; and the third, when the mobile IP registration is performed. Also, an AAA request may be issued independently at each layer for the purposes of user authentication and authorization. + +The terminal may send all application traffic over mobile IP, or it can bypass one or more layers in the stack and send application traffic via a lower layer. For example, split IPsec tunnelling could be used, whereby only traffic destined to the service provider domain is sent via IPsec, with general Internet traffic bypassing IPsec. + +Transport-layer user-plane policy enforcement may be performed at each layer. For example, when a user connects to the WLAN, a packet filter for that user may be installed in the WLAN access controller that restricts traffic to a set of IPsec gateways. In turn, the IPsec gateways may have a packet filter for that user that restricts traffic to a set of mobile IP home agents, such that the user is required to run mobile IP. In turn, the home agents may have packet filters that allow the user to access some service platforms but not others. + +When this scenario is mapped to a 3GPP WLAN IP access environment, the WLAN access gateway (WAG) functionality is located in Node-1, and the packet data gateway (PDG) functionality is located in Node-2. + +### Mappings onto NGN functional architecture + +In this scenario, Node-1 acts as an EN-FE (e.g., handling QoS enforcement for the WLAN network). Node-1 may also act as an ABG-FE (e.g., performing NAPT). Node-2 and Node-3 act as ABG-FEs, handling policy enforcement for their respective IP layers. This scenario illustrates that ABG-FE and EN-FE functionality may be performed independently at each IP layer in a transport stratum which contains multiple IP layers. Node-2 and Node-3 may also act as EN-FEs, handling QoS enforcement for the IP tunnels for which they are performing a layer-2 termination function. This scenario illustrates that ABG-FE and EN-FE functionality may be performed independently at each IP layer in a transport stratum which contains multiple IP layers. + +## II.3 Scenario 2: Access aggregation using layer-2 + + + +``` + +graph LR + Host1[Host-1] --- PPPoE/DSL --- Node1[Node-1 +BRAS acting as LAC] + Node1 --- L2TP --- Node2[Node-2 +BRAS acting as L2TP Tunnel Switch] + Node2 --- L2TP --- IPNetwork((IP Network)) + Node1 -- AAA for tunnel attributes --> AAA1[AAA for tunnel attributes] + Node2 -- AAA for tunnel attributes --> AAA2[AAA for tunnel attributes] + IPNetwork -- AAA for user auth --> AAA3[AAA for user auth] + +``` + +Diagram illustrating Access aggregation using layer-2. Host-1 connects to Node-1 (BRAS acting as LAC) via PPPoE/DSL. Node-1 connects to Node-2 (BRAS acting as L2TP Tunnel Switch) via L2TP. Node-2 connects to an IP Network via L2TP. AAA (for tunnel attributes) is shown for both Node-1 and Node-2. AAA (for user auth) is shown for the IP Network. + +Figure II.2 – Access aggregation using layer-2 + +Within a single layer of the transport stratum, there may be multiple points where access traffic is aggregated. Traffic forwarding between different aggregation segments may be done at layer-2 or layer-3. + +Figure II.2 shows a host running PPPoE connected over DSL (digital subscriber line) to a BRAS (broadband remote access server). This BRAS acts as a LAC (L2TP access concentrator) and forwards the traffic by using L2TP to a second BRAS acting as an LNS (L2TP network server). Node-1 may issue a RADIUS request to obtain attributes for the tunnel to be established (e.g., + +[b-IETF RFC 2868]). The second BRAS performs L2TP tunnel switching and, in turn, acts as a LAC and forwards the traffic to a third BRAS acting as an LNS. Node-2 may also issue a RADIUS request to obtain attributes for the tunnel to be established. The third BRAS terminates the PPP state machine and may issue a RADIUS request to perform user authentication. Forwarding at Nodes-1 and 2 is done at layer-2, with traffic being switched between two link-layer segments: IP header information is not examined in making forwarding decisions. Policy enforcement (e.g., traffic conditioning, packet filtering, NAPT, etc.) is generally only done in Node-3, though there are cases where some policy enforcement may be done at Nodes-1 or 2. For example, a similar scenario can be used in a mobile environment with a mobile network operator providing a network-based VPN service and backhauling traffic to a corporate LNS. If a pre-paid charging model is used, service termination upon reaching a zero-balance condition may be enforced at Nodes-1 or 2. + +The scenario shown here may be used in a wholesale business model, where one party owns the physical DSL lines and aggregates traffic to a second party acting as a wholesaler, who in turn aggregates traffic to a third party acting as a service provider (e.g., an ISP). By introducing a wholesale intermediary, the party dealing with the physical lines (or more generally, the party operating the access-technology-specific equipment) does not need to maintain a business relationship with all the service providers, and a party acting as a service provider does not need to maintain a business relationship with multiple network operators each handling some specific access technology, such as DSL, 2G/3G, or WiMax (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access). + +### Mappings onto NGN functional architecture + +In this scenario, Node-1 acts as an EN-FE (e.g., handling QoS enforcement for the DSL aggregation network). Node-3 acts as an ABG-FE (e.g., performing traffic conditioning, packet filtering, NAPT, etc.) Node-3 may also act as an EN-FE, handling QoS enforcement for the L2TP tunnels it terminates. Typically Node-2 is acting as a pure layer-2 relay and is not playing either an EN-FE or an ABG-FE role. Node-2 acts as an ABG-FE if it is performing IP-level policy enforcement (e.g., accounting). + +## II.4 Scenario 3: Access aggregation using layer-3 + + + +Diagram of Access aggregation using layer-3. The diagram shows a sequence of components connected by a blue line representing a network path. From left to right: Host-1, Node-1 BRAS (PPP termination), Node-2 Aggregation Router using VRs/VRFs, and Node-3 Edge Router. Host-1 is connected to Node-1 via a dashed line labeled 'PPPoE/DSL'. Node-1 is connected to Node-2 via a dashed line labeled 'VLAN'. Node-2 is connected to Node-3 via a dashed line labeled 'VLAN'. Node-3 is connected to an 'IP Network' (represented by a cloud icon) via a dashed line labeled 'VLAN'. A green arrow labeled 'AAA' points from Node-1 to the right. The IP Network is represented by a cloud icon with several small squares inside. + +Figure II.3 – Access aggregation using layer-3 + +This is similar to scenario 2, except that forwarding between different aggregation segments is done at layer-3. Node-1 terminates PPP and associates the traffic for a PPP session with a particular domain (e.g., using the realm part of the PPP username to identify the domain). In the upstream direction, policy-based forwarding is used, so that traffic for different domains is segregated and the correct IP next-hop for each domain is chosen. In the downstream direction, Node-1 performs regular IP forwarding based on the longest match prefix. Node-2 implements multiple virtual routers, one for each domain. Again, policy-based forwarding is done in the upstream direction, such that all traffic for a given user is sent upstream to Node-3, and regular IP forwarding is done in the downstream direction. In this example, Nodes-1, 2, and 3 see all the traffic for a given subscriber. Node-1 may issue a RADIUS request to perform user authentication. This request may be sent via a RADIUS proxy, or directly over the virtual routed network itself, thus avoiding the need for a RADIUS proxy. + +Aggregation at layer-3 may simplify Node-3, since it does not need to terminate large numbers of L2TP tunnels and associated PPP state machines, but it instead receives an aggregated traffic stream delivered over a single VLAN. Note that Node-3 can still identify individual subscriber traffic flows for the purposes of performing subscriber-specific policy enforcement actions, but on the user plane this is done using layer-3 information (e.g., the source IP address), rather than by maintaining an individual link-layer connection for each subscriber. Policy enforcement actions (e.g., traffic conditioning, packet filtering, NAPT, etc.) may be carried out in all nodes, and this may be done at the subscriber-flow level or at coarser granularities, such as at the virtual router level (e.g., some VRs may have a higher level of QoS than others). + +### Mappings onto NGN functional architecture + +In this scenario, Node-1 acts as an EN-FE (e.g., handling QoS enforcement for the DSL aggregation network). Node-3 acts as an ABG-FE (e.g., performing traffic conditioning, packet filtering, NAPT, etc.). Node-1 and Node-2 act as ABG-FEs if they are performing IP-level policy enforcement (e.g., NAPT or support of different QoS classes). Node-2 and Node-3 may also act as EN-FEs, handling QoS enforcement for the VLANs they terminate. + +## II.5 Scenario 4: Multistage policy enforcement + + + +The diagram shows a network topology for multistage policy enforcement. It consists of a sequence of devices connected by VLANs. On the left, 'Host-1' is connected to 'Node-1' via a link labeled 'DSL, 3G etc'. 'Node-1' is connected to 'Node-2' via a 'VLAN' link. 'Node-2' is connected to 'Node-3' via another 'VLAN' link. Finally, 'Node-3' is connected to an 'IP Network' (represented by a cloud icon) via a 'VLAN' link. Below each device box, its function is specified: 'Node-1 Performs QoS', 'Node-2 Performs QoS & Usage metering', and 'Node-3 Performs NAT'. A green arrow labeled 'AAA' points to 'Node-1'. + +Diagram illustrating Multistage policy enforcement. A sequence of devices (Host-1, Node-1, Node-2, Node-3) are connected by VLANs. Host-1 is connected to Node-1 via 'DSL, 3G etc'. Node-1 is connected to Node-2 via 'VLAN'. Node-2 is connected to Node-3 via 'VLAN'. Node-3 is connected to an 'IP Network' via 'VLAN'. Node-1 performs QoS, Node-2 performs QoS & Usage metering, and Node-3 performs NAT. A green arrow labeled 'AAA' points to Node-1. + +**Figure II.4 – Multistage policy enforcement** + +Within a single layer of the transport stratum, the set of policy enforcement actions carried out for traffic for a given subscriber may be distributed across a sequence of devices, with each device doing a subset of the total work. This may reflect a network deployment strategy where there is a set of access-technology-specific edge devices (e.g., GGSNs or BRASs) and one or more devices behind these that perform policy enforcement in an access-technology-independent manner. Different devices may have different capabilities or be optimized for a certain type of policy enforcement action. + +Figure II.4 shows an example where policy enforcement is distributed across a sequence of devices. Here, Node-1 terminates some access technologies and performs QoS functions that require visibility of link-layer technology-specific parameters, such as the mapping of DiffServ codepoints to 802.1p priorities or GPRS traffic classes. Node-2 performs QoS functions that operate at layer-3 and above and also performs usage metering. Node-3 is used as a NAPT traversal gateway. Node-3 could either be layer-3 adjacent to Node-2, or it could be used as a user-plane/media relay and located anywhere in the IP network. In the relay case, packets from Host-1 are explicitly addressed to Node-3, and when Node-3 forwards the traffic onwards, it re-originates the traffic with an IP address belonging to Node-3. Similarly in the reverse direction, packets are explicitly addressed to Node-3 and re-originated with a Node-3 IP address. + +### Mappings onto NGN functional architecture + +In this scenario, Node-1 acts as an EN-FE (e.g., handling QoS enforcement for the access network). Node-2 and Node-3 are acting as ABG-FEs, handling IP-level policy enforcement. Node-2 and Node-3 may also act as EN-FEs, handling QoS enforcement for the VLANs they terminate. + +## II.6 Scenario 5: Partitioning into transport-layer traffic subdomains + + + +The diagram illustrates a network architecture for partitioning traffic into subdomains. Host-1 (DSL, 3G etc) connects to Node-1. Node-1 is connected to AAA and splits traffic into two paths. One path goes to Node-2, which then splits into Node-4 (policy enforcement for IPTV subdomain) and Node-5 (policy enforcement for VOIP subdomain). Node-4 connects to IP Network-2 and Server-2 (IPTV/Streaming Server). Node-5 connects to IP Network-3 and Server-3 (VOIP/SIP Server). The other path from Node-1 goes to Node-3 (policy enforcement for web subdomain), which connects to IP Network-1 and Server-1 (Web Server). + +Figure II.5: Partitioning into transport-layer traffic subdomains. The diagram shows a network topology where traffic from Host-1 (DSL, 3G etc) enters Node-1. Node-1 is connected to AAA and splits traffic into two paths. One path goes to Node-2, which then splits into Node-4 (policy enforcement for IPTV subdomain) and Node-5 (policy enforcement for VOIP subdomain). Node-4 connects to IP Network-2 and Server-2 (IPTV/Streaming Server). Node-5 connects to IP Network-3 and Server-3 (VOIP/SIP Server). The other path from Node-1 goes to Node-3 (policy enforcement for web subdomain), which connects to IP Network-1 and Server-1 (Web Server). + +**Figure II.5 – Partitioning into transport-layer traffic subdomains** + +Within a single layer of the transport stratum, traffic may be partitioned into multiple subdomains, such that policy enforcement may be carried out separately in each subdomain. Certain nodes act as branch points, whereby traffic for a given subdomain is identified and then subjected to a certain traffic treatment, such as being forwarded to a next-hop node through policy-based forwarding. A transport-layer-traffic sub-domain may be associated with a specific set of service-layer services and applications (e.g., IPTV (IP television), VoIP (voice over IP), or Internet traffic). A transport-layer-traffic subdomain could also be associated with peer-to-peer traffic, with the NGN providers only supplying transport-layer services, such as a QoS-enabled path between two customer hosts. + +Figure II.5 shows such an example where traffic for a given user is split at Node-1 into two subdomains: one for web or non-real-time traffic, and the other for real-time traffic. The real-time traffic in turn is split at Node-2 into an IPTV/streaming subdomain and a communications subdomain used for VoIP, video telephony, and so forth. This could map to a business model where one service provider is used for internet traffic, another for IPTV, and another for communications services, and each independently performs policy enforcement on its respective traffic subdomain. Note that many variants of this scenario are possible; for example, Nodes-1 and 2 could be collapsed so that there is a 3-way split at Node-1. Also, Nodes-2 and 5 could be collapsed so that both the branching of traffic between domains (IPTV and VoIP) and the policy enforcement for a specific domain (VoIP) occur at the same node. + +### **Mappings onto NGN functional architecture** + +In this scenario, Node-1 acts as an EN-FE (e.g., handling QoS enforcement for the access network). Node-1 also acts as an ABG-FE, steering upstream traffic to the right subdomain. Node-2, Node-3, Node-4 and Node-5 are acting as ABG-FEs, handling traffic steering and/or IP-level policy enforcement. Node-2, Node-3, Node-4 and Node-5 may also act as EN-FEs, handling QoS enforcement for the link layers they terminate. + +# **Appendix III** + +## **Instantiation of NGN reference points** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +## **III.1 Introduction** + +Figure 7-1 shows an overview of the NGN functional architecture that allows the support of NGN services. Since Figure 7-1 is drawn from a high-level conceptual point of view, instantiation of the NGN reference points is useful to clarify the specific role of the different NGN reference points in terms of service offering and the physical implementation entailed. + +## **III.2 Scope** + +The purpose of this appendix is to help understand the four reference points contained in Figure 7-1, i.e., UNI, NNI, ANI and SNI reference points. + +In particular, this appendix also describes the service-network interface (SNI) which is a new reference point in this Recommendation as compared to the previous edition of this Recommendation. This instantiation of the SNI is effective only when a service partner is classified separately from ordinary customers. The SNI does not preclude any use of UNI, NNI and ANI, when such classification is not considered as relevant. + +## **III.3 Rationale to consider SNI** + +In comparison to an ordinary customer connected at a UNI, this clause identifies support service partners connected at the SNI. Service partners include content providers, data information providers, and other service providers different from the NGN operator. + +The following requirements apply regarding service partners connected at the SNI: + +- 1) Larger capacity than ordinary customers in terms of transport and signalling resources, such as physical transmission capacity, maximum number of simultaneous sessions, and maximum session establishment/release rate. +- 2) Media flow injection that should be multicast in the network; this injection allows a connected entity to play the role of a multicasting source (root) in addition to an ordinary sink (leaf) role. +- 3) Customized policy different from that for ordinary customers; this includes the level of trust which is derived from different physical configurations (hosting, connection with dedicated and secured lines, and so on). +- 4) Unrestricted server role in terms of client/server model; for instance, SIP is modelled by the client/server model. An ordinary customer does not need or must not play the role of a server for specific functions, such as registrar and presence server, whereas a server residing in a service partner should be allowed to do so. + +## **III.4 Instantiation of NGN reference points** + +Figure III.1 describes an illustrative instantiation of NGN reference points, which are derived from the overview architecture in Figure 7-1. + + + +Figure III.1 – Instantiation of NGN reference points. The diagram illustrates the architecture of an NGN (Next-Generation Network) showing various functional blocks and their interconnections. At the top, 'Applications' boxes are connected to 'Service' blocks via 'ANI' (Application-to-Network Interface). The 'Service' blocks are stacked on top of 'Transport' blocks. The 'Transport' blocks are connected to 'Service termination' and 'Transport termination' blocks. The 'Service termination' blocks are connected to 'Service' blocks via 'SNI' (Service-to-Network Interface). The 'Transport termination' blocks are connected to 'Transport' blocks via 'UNI' (User-to-Network Interface). The 'Service' blocks are also connected to 'Functions from other service providers' via 'SNI'. The 'Transport' blocks are connected to 'Functions from other networks' via 'NNI' (Network-to-Network Interface). The diagram shows a central 'Service' block connected to 'Transport' blocks, which are then connected to 'Service termination' and 'Transport termination' blocks. The 'Service termination' blocks are connected to 'Service' blocks via 'SNI'. The 'Transport termination' blocks are connected to 'Transport' blocks via 'UNI'. The 'Service' blocks are also connected to 'Functions from other service providers' via 'SNI'. The 'Transport' blocks are connected to 'Functions from other networks' via 'NNI'. The diagram shows a central 'Service' block connected to 'Transport' blocks, which are then connected to 'Service termination' and 'Transport termination' blocks. The 'Service termination' blocks are connected to 'Service' blocks via 'SNI'. The 'Transport termination' blocks are connected to 'Transport' blocks via 'UNI'. The 'Service' blocks are also connected to 'Functions from other service providers' via 'SNI'. The 'Transport' blocks are connected to 'Functions from other networks' via 'NNI'. + +**Figure III.1 – Instantiation of NGN reference points** + +NOTE 1 – In Figure III.1, boxes labelled "Service" correspond to boxes that include "NGN service stratum" functions, while boxes labelled "Transport" correspond to boxes that include "NGN transport stratum" functions. + +NOTE 2 – In Figure III.1, "termination" at "End-user functions" and at "Functions from other service providers" highlight the specific nature of these functions, which is the absolute source or sink of the media stream. + +### III.4.1 Instantiation of UNI reference point + +The NGN supports a reference point to the end-user functions called the "user-to-network interface (UNI)", which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between end-user functions and NGN elements. + +In this instantiation, UNI is assumed to support enterprise customers as well, which requires aggregation of multiple end users. Further instantiation of UNI dedicated for enterprise customers is under study. + +### III.4.2 Instantiation of NNI reference point + +The NGN supports another reference point to other networks called the "network-to-network interface (NNI)", which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between the NGN and other networks. + +### III.4.3 Instantiation of SNI reference point + +In addition to UNI and NNI, the NGN can support a reference point called the "service-to-network interface (SNI)", which provides a channel for transport-level media exchange and service-level signalling interaction between functions of other service providers and NGN elements. The functions of other service providers include a content-generating function, which is an ultimate source or sink of multimedia content, such as a server device that acts as a content source, data storage, or application. + +The SNI is a realization of a service provider access interface (SPAI), which is specified in [b-ITU-T Y.140]. In particular, the SNI corresponds to the SPAI for Class 2 service providers and brokers. + +The SNI has the following characteristics at least: + +- It allows the connected entities to exchange media flows. +- It allows the connected entities to exchange signalling flows at the service control level. +- It accommodates content source as a connected entity, which expects the network to multicast the injected media flow. +- It allows flexible and customizable configurations and policy rules to meet a wide range of requirements of service providers connected to the NGN, in terms of resource capacity, signalling profile, and operational rules, including security. +- It allows the connected entities to play full server roles in a client/server model, in particular in signalling interaction. + +The way to implement the SNI at the detailed functional entity level needs further study. + +### **III.4.4 Instantiation of ANI reference point** + +Clause 6.2 defines the application network interface (ANI) as follows: + +"Application network interface: Interface which provides a channel for interactions and exchanges between applications and NGN elements. The ANI offers capabilities and resources needed for realization of applications." + +Since Figure 7-1 shows no media flow across the ANI, the ANI is interpreted as a control-level interaction without media interactions such as voice and video. The ANI should be interpreted as a point of vertical interactions between different layers, which allows media injection. On the other hand, UNI, NNI, and SNI are a point of horizontal interactions between different entities consisting of a couple of layers. + +# Appendix IV + +## Example illustrative deployment scenario for IdM in NGN + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +NGN may deploy IdM infrastructure with capabilities supporting identity-based services to its users leveraging web services capabilities and specifications defined by the Liberty Alliance Project and OpenID. For example, IdM capabilities to allow its users to access services among different service and application providers including federated services and applications. Also, NGN may support IdM capabilities to offer Identity Provider (IdP) services to other applications and service providers (e.g., assertion of user device identity and authentication, location and other relation identity information). + +Support of IdM capabilities to offer IdP services and or partner with other application and service providers that are using different types of IdM systems based on different semantics, schemas, mechanisms and technologies, would require appropriate bridging and interworking functions to facilitate interoperability. For example, to support IdM services and capabilities with other applications and service providers (e.g., web services and content providers), NGN could support capabilities for the following: + +- 3GPP GBA interworking with Liberty Alliance Framework; +- 3GPP GBA interworking with OpenID. + + + +Figure IV.1 – Example IdM deployment in NGN + +Figure IV.1 – Example IdM deployment in NGN. This diagram illustrates the architecture of an Identity Management (IdM) system within a Next-Generation Network (NGN). At the center is the 'IdM CC - FE' (Identity Management Core - Front End), represented by a yellow triangle. It is connected to various components: 'LS (AS-FE)' (Location Server - Application Server Front End) and 'PS (AS-FE)' (Presence Server - Application Server Front End) are connected via yellow lines (IdM interfaces). 'WS' (Web Server) is connected via a black line. 'SUP-FE/SAA-FE (or HSS)' (Service User Front End / Service Authorization Front End or Home Subscriber System) is connected via a black line. 'P-CSC-FE' (Proxy Call Session Control Front End) and 'S-CSC-FE' (Serving Call Session Control Front End) are connected via black lines. 'IBGC-FE' (Inter-Backhaul Gateway Control Front End) is connected via a black line. 'EAG' (External Application Gateway) is connected via a black line. 'WSG' (Web Services Gateway) is connected via a black line. 'UE' (User Equipment) is connected via a black line. 'Access Network (NACF, RACF, etc..)' is connected via a black line. 'Internet' is connected via a black line. 'Other Application Provider' is connected via a black line. 'Other Service Provider' is connected via a black line. The diagram also shows connections to 'ANI or SNI', 'SNI', 'UNI', 'NNI', and 'ISC'. A legend at the bottom identifies the components: WSG: Web Services Gateway, EAG: External Application GW, WS: Web Server, LS: Location Server, PS: Presence Server. A yellow line indicates 'Interfaces to IdM server'. + +Figure IV.1 illustrates an example of IdM deployment for NGN. This example shows the use of an IdM server which may be a standalone box, or a set of functions that are distributed, and/or located in the HSS. The IdM server interfaces and interacts with network elements support functional entities defined for the NGN. For example, the IdM server may interface with: + +- service enabling application servers (ASs), such as a location server (LS) or a presence server (PS), or other applications in order to provide a higher level of authentication assurance and to support identity based services and applications; +- policy and network attachment and control servers for authentication assurance and policy management. + +In order to support certain IdM services for users/subscribers and to offer IdP services or partner with other application providers and/or other service providers, the NGN would need to support specific capabilities to control access and IdM exchanges with other application providers and/or other service providers (e.g., web services providers and content providers). This illustrative example shows the use of a web services gateway (WSG) and an external application gateway (EAG) to support certain IdM services leveraging or partnering with other application providers and/or other service providers. Specifically, Figure IV.1 shows the IdM server interfacing with the user via a web services gateway (WSG) which authenticates the user and provides the user with an interface to manage his/her identity profile. The IdM server also interfaces with an external application gateway (EAG) that allows the user to access web-based services in the NGN or from other application providers and/or other service providers. + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.2000-Sup.1] ITU-T Y-2000 series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2006), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on NGN release 1 scope*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.2000-Sup7] ITU-T Y-2000 series Recommendations – Supplement 7 (2008), *ITU-T Y.2000 series – Supplement on NGN release 2 scope*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.110] Recommendation ITU-T Y.110 (1998), *Global Information Infrastructure principles and framework architecture*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.140] Recommendation ITU-T Y.140 (2000), *Global Information Infrastructure (GII): Reference points for interconnection framework*. +- [b-ETSI TS 122 101] ETSI TS 122 101 V9.6.0 (2010), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Service aspects, Service principles (3GPP TS 22.101 version 9.6.0 Release 9)*. +- [b-ETSI TS 123 101] ETSI TS 123 101 V8.0.0 (2009), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; General UMTS Architecture (3GPP TS 23.101 version 8.0.0 Release 8)*. +- [b-ETSI TS 123 228] ETSI TS 123 228 V8.10.0 (2009), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.228 version 8.10.0 Release 8)*. +- [b-ETSI TS 124 234] ETSI TS 124 234 V8.3.0 (2009), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking; WLAN User Equipment (WLAN UE) to network protocols; Stage 3 (3GPP TS 24.234 version 8.3.0 Release 8)*. +- [b-IEEE 802.11] IEEE Std 802.11-2007, *IEEE Standard for Information technology-Telecommunications and information exchange between systems-Local and metropolitan area networks-Specific requirements – Part II: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications*. +- [b-IEEE 802.16] IEEE Std 802.16-2009, *IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks – Part 16: Air Interface for Broadband Wireless Access Systems*. +- [b-IEEE 802.21] IEEE Std 802.21-2008, *IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks – Part 21: Media Independent Handover Services*. +- [b-IETF RFC 1661] IETF RFC 1661 (1994), *The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2131] IETF RFC 2131 (1997), *Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2868] IETF RFC 2868 (2000), *RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support*. + + + + + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| 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requirements and architecture for the next generation network multimedia communication centre service** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.2023 + + + +The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text "ITU" is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words "International Telecommunication Union" are written in a smaller, blue font. + +ITU logo: A globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union' + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +# GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.2023** + +# **Functional requirements and architecture for the next generation network multimedia communication centre service** + +## **Summary** + +The multimedia communication centre (MCC) provides a set of advanced services beyond traditional communication services. The MCC enables a service provider to deliver communication services to individual and enterprise customers. The objective of Recommendation ITU-T Y.2023 is to identify and describe the functional requirements, architecture and key procedures of the MCC. + +## **History** + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2023 | 2012-04-22 | 13 | + +## **Keywords** + +Functional architecture, master agent, MCC service, mobile agent, multimedia communication centre (MCC), NGN, RTWG, subagent. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +## NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database at
network ..... | 4 | +| | 7.5 Requirements to support end-to-end orchestration ..... | 5 | +| 8 | Capabilities of orchestration in next generation network evolution ..... | 6 | +| | 8.1 Capabilities of service orchestration ..... | 6 | +| | 8.2 Capabilities of resource orchestration ..... | 6 | +| 9 | Interface requirement of orchestration in next generation network evolution ..... | 7 | +| | 9.1 Interface requirement with the network management system ..... | 7 | +| | 9.2 Interface requirement with software-defined networking orchestrators..... | 7 | +| | 9.3 Interface requirement with network function virtualization orchestrators ..... | 7 | +| 10 | Security considerations ..... | 8 | +| | Appendix I – Scenarios for orchestration in next generation network evolution ..... | 9 | +| | I.1 Scenario of Internet protocol and optical orchestration..... | 9 | +| | I.2 Scenario of end-to-end orchestration for the network management system
and software-defined networking orchestrator ..... | 10 | +| | I.3 Scenario of end-to-end traffic-steering orchestration ..... | 10 | + + + +## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2323 + +# Requirements and capabilities of orchestration in next generation network evolution + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation provides orchestration scenarios in next generation network evolution (NGNe), specifies the general requirements of NGNe orchestration and defines the capabilities of NGNe orchestration. The orchestration in NGNe supports NGN and also incorporates new technologies including software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV), especially from the network evolution perspective. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- | | | +|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| [ITU-T Y.2001] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.2001 (2004), General overview of NGN . | +| [ITU-T Y.3321] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3321 (2015), Requirements and capability framework for NICE implementation making use of software-defined networking technologies . | +| [ITU-T Y.3322] | Recommendation ITU-T Y.3322 (2016), Functional architecture for NICE implementation making use of software-defined networking technologies . | + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 next generation network (NGN)** [ITU-T Y.2001]: A packet-based network able to provide telecommunication services and able to make use of multiple broadband, QoS-enabled transport technologies and in which service-related functions are independent from underlying transport-related technologies. It enables unfettered access for users to networks and to competing service providers and/or services of their choice. It supports generalized mobility which will allow consistent and ubiquitous provision of services to users. + +## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +None. + +# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +- | | | +|-----|-------------------------| +| BSS | Business Support System | +| DC | Data Centre | + +| | | +|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------| +| E2E | End-to-End | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IPRAN | Internet Protocol Radio Access Network | +| IPSec | Internet Protocol Security | +| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switch | +| NFV | Network Function Virtualization | +| NFVI | Network Function Virtualization Infrastructure | +| NFV-O | Network Function Virtualization Orchestrator | +| NGN | Next Generation Network | +| NGNe | Next Generation Network evolution | +| NGNe-O | Next Generation Network evolution Orchestrator | +| NMS | Network Management System | +| NS | Network Service | +| NSD | Network Service Descriptor | +| OSS | Operation Support System | +| OTT | Over-The-Top | +| PNF | Physical Network Function | +| PNFD | Physical Network Function Descriptor | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| SDN | Software-Defined Networking | +| SDN-O | Software-Defined Networking Orchestrator | +| S-NICE | Software-defined Network Intelligence Capability Enhancement | +| vCPE | virtual Customer Premises Equipment | +| VIP | Very Important Person | +| VL | Virtual Link | +| VLD | Virtual Link Descriptor | +| VNF | Virtual Network Function | +| VNFD | Virtual Network Function Descriptor | +| VNFFGD | Virtual Network Function Forwarding Graph Descriptor | +| VxLAN | Virtual extensible Local Area Network | + +# 5 Conventions + +In this Recommendation: + +The phrase "is required to" indicates a requirement that must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed. + +The phrase "is recommended" indicates a requirement that is recommended, but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be satisfied to claim conformance. + +The phrase "is not recommended" indicates a requirement that is not recommended, but which is not specifically prohibited. Thus, conformance with this Recommendation can still be claimed even if this requirement is satisfied. + +# 6 Background and motivations + +Traditional operator networks, such as NGNs, lack agility, self-maintenance, on demand deployment and so on. As innovative technologies such as SDN and NFV develop, NGNs need to adopt their advantages to achieve end-to-end (E2E) automatic provisioning and connection, unified management of multi-vendor devices, centralized network service (NS) and network resource control, establishment of connection in combined networks that may include NGNs and SDN/NFV implemented networks. + +To provide the features in the previous paragraph, orchestration in NGNe is introduced. Orchestration in NGNe covers not only new networks that are implemented by innovative technologies such as SDN and NFV, but also existing networks (NGNs) that include devices supporting traditional protocols and interfaces. Orchestration in NGNe shall establish connections among NGNs and SDN/NFV-enabled networks based on the high-level view of entire networks, thus E2E connection of the network can be obtained. + +Furthermore, orchestration in NGNe is of great significance for network evolution, because it takes into consideration the coexistence and corporation of traditional networks, such as NGNs and SDN/NFV-implemented networks. + +# 7 Requirements of orchestration in next generation network evolution + +## 7.1 Overview + +There exist three main types of network, including NGNs, SDN technology-implemented networks and NFV technology-implemented networks. The orchestration in NGNe supports NGN and incorporates new technologies including SDN and NFV, especially from the network evolution perspective. To achieve E2E orchestration, orchestration in NGNe is required to corporate NGNs and networks that are implemented by appropriate SDN and NFV technologies. + +Figure 1 illustrates the framework of orchestration in NGNe. + + + +``` +graph TD + Portal[Portal] --- Orchestration[Orchestration in NGNe] + BSS[BSS] --- Orchestration + subgraph Orchestration [Orchestration in NGNe] + NGN[NGN] + SDN[SDN] + NFV[NFV] + end + NGN --- NMS[NMS] + SDN --- SDN_O[SDN-O] + NFV --- NFV_O[NFV-O] +``` + +Figure 1: Framework of orchestration in next generation network evolution. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure. At the top are 'Portal' and 'BSS' boxes. Below them is a large orange box labeled 'Orchestration in NGNe'. Inside this orange box, there are three dashed-line boxes labeled 'NGN', 'SDN', and 'NFV'. Below these dashed boxes are three solid-line boxes labeled 'NMS', 'SDN-O', and 'NFV-O'. The 'NMS' box is connected to the 'NGN' dashed box, 'SDN-O' to 'SDN', and 'NFV-O' to 'NFV'. The entire structure is labeled 'Y.2323 (18)\_F01' at the bottom right. + +**Figure 1 – Framework of orchestration in next generation network evolution** + +## 7.2 Requirements to support next generation networks + +In the initial stage of network evolution, most services still run on traditional networks, such as NGNs, and the network management system (NMS) is responsible for managing and operating traditional network elements in NGNs. + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to include the following aspects to support NGNs: + +- interfaces with NMS for NGN service provisioning and activation; + +- awareness of corresponding service component to be fulfilled in NGNs; +- receipt of network topology information from NMS; +- high-level understanding of service, network topology and resources of NGNs; +- assignment of resources necessary to establish connectivity services; +- validation or testing of NS functionality in NGNs; +- establishment of collaborations of NGNs with SDN-enabled networks and NFV-enabled networks; +- detection of all flow information and obtaining devices status from NMS; +- management of an abstract view of service, network topology and resources of NGNs. + +## **7.3 Requirements to support an SDN-enabled network** + +An SDN-enabled network can be a newly designed or established network, or a re-architected network that does not support SDN before enablement with SDN technology, including a separate control and data plan, and programmatic control of resources and service. + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to include the following aspects to support SDN technology-enabled networks: + +- interfaces with the software-defined networking orchestrator (SDN-O) to request connectivity through the SDN domain; +- awareness of corresponding service components to be fulfilled in the SDN domain; +- determination of the service components and service access point in the SDN domain; +- receipt of network topology information from SDN-O; +- acquisition of device and control nodes status from the SDN-O; +- detection of all flow information from the SDN-O; +- management of an abstract view of service, network topology and resources of the SDN domain; +- assignment of resources necessary to establish connectivity services based on the view in the previous entry; +- validation or testing of NS functionality in the SDN domain; +- identification of manual service activities and progress tracking in the SDN domain; +- management of multiple SDN-Os and selection of appropriate SDN-Os to interact with, if multiple SDO-Os are deployed. + +## **7.4 Requirements to support a network function virtualization-enabled network** + +The network function virtualization orchestrator (NFV-O) is responsible for lifecycle management of the NFV NS. An NS consists of one or multiple virtual network functions (VNFs), and the connections between the VNFs or physical network functions (PNFs). + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to include the following aspects to support NFV technology-enabled networks: + +- interfaces with the NFV-O to allocate/upgrade/release network function virtualization infrastructure (NFVI) resources; +- interfaces with the NFV-O to request instantiation of VNFs; +- interfaces with the NFV-O for service provisioning and activation; +- lifecycle management of VNFs and NSs; +- management of VNF forwarding graphs; + +- discovery and awareness of the NFVI hardware/software resources and capabilities/features; +- awareness of corresponding service components to be fulfilled in the NFV domain; +- determination of the service components and service access point in the NFV domain; +- receipt of virtual and physical network topology information from the NFV-O; +- acquisition of VNF and PNF status from the NFV-O; +- management of an abstract view of service, network topology and resources of the NFV domain; +- assignment of resources necessary to establish connectivity services based on the view in the previous entry; +- validation or testing NS functionality in NFV domain; +- management of multiple NFV-Os and selection of appropriate NFV-Os to interact with, if multiple NFV-Os are deployed; +- receipt of performance and fault information of VNFs and virtual resource from NFV-Os. + +## **7.5 Requirements to support end-to-end orchestration** + +Traditional network, such as NGN, services are managed through an operation support system/business support system (OSS/BSS) and configuration of network elements may go through NMS. SDN and NFV technologies significantly change the way operators design, create and deliver products and services to end users. With standardization of protocols and models, NMS will be replaced by an SDN/NFV orchestrator. However, the existing network and system will not be replaced immediately, and the service will be introduced to run on the SDN/NFV-enabled network step by step. + +Orchestration in NGNe manages E2E NSs, including connectivity among NGNs, the SDN-enabled network and NFV-enabled network. The orchestration in NGNe allocates resources, instantiates VNFs and configures network connectivities to activate E2E services. + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to include the following aspects to support E2E orchestration: + +- receipt and execution of customer or services requests from northbound systems (BSS or Portal); +- request modification before or during request execution; +- request cancellation before or during request execution; +- identification and decomposition of a service request into one or multiple service components, and distribution of these service components into the corresponding domains to fulfil the service; +- interfaces with traditional NMSs, SDN-Os and NFV-Os for E2E orchestration; +- interfaces to modify the workflow and shift a service component from one domain to another; +- interfaces with service assurance-related applications; +- management of an abstract view of static or dynamic resources and network topology of multi-domains; +- lifecycle management of E2E NSs; +- resource allocation and orchestration; +- global topology management; +- network configuration and service activation; +- identification of manual service activities and tracking the progress; +- establishment of collaborations among different network domains; + +- establishment of collaborations among networks that are in different evolving phases (e.g., one network is a traditional NGN and another network is a NGN that adopts SDN and NFV technologies). + +# **8 Capabilities of orchestration in next generation network evolution** + +## **8.1 Capabilities of service orchestration** + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to support the E2E services provided by the NGNe provider among combined networks, which include NGNs and networks implemented by SDN and NFV technologies. From the service perspective, orchestration in NGNe shall have the following capabilities, including service decomposition capability, service status checking or querying capability, service catalogue management capability and service lifecycle management capability. + +- Service decomposition capability: orchestration in NGNe can receive service requests from BSS or Portal, and calculate the correct sub-services sequence according to every incoming service request, then the orchestration in NGNe shall dispatch sub-services to the SDN-O, NFV-O and NGN NMS, respectively. +- Service status checking or querying capability: orchestration in NGNe can query the status of a service instance, update the status of a service instance and process the status of a service instance. If the status of a service instance become abnormal, orchestration in NGNe shall alarm the status of the service instance to the BSS or Portal. +- Service catalogue management capability: orchestration in NGNe can provide a service catalogue to BSS or Portal and provide a service description for each service in the service catalogue. Orchestration in NGNe allows users and administrators to select services from the catalogue, and also supports updating services in the catalogue including adding new services to the catalogue, removing existing services from the catalogue and updating some parameters of services in the catalogue. +- Service lifecycle management capability: orchestration in NGNe can design a cross-domain service to adapt and meet service requirements from users and administrators. Orchestration in NGNe shall manage the service instance including creating a new service instance, activating a created service instance, deactivating an activated service instance and deleting a deactivated service instance. + +## **8.2 Capabilities of resource orchestration** + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to support global network resources management and optimization in the combined networks, which include traditional NGNs and networks implemented by SDN and NFV. From the resource perspective, orchestration in NGNe shall provide the following aspects: + +- acquisition of a global view of network resources among different networks; +- performance of global resources optimization according to user and administrator requests; +- translation of a service instance into resources requirements; +- allocation and release of network resources; +- adjustment of network resources priority according to quality of service (QoS) requirements from service requests; +- instantiation/scaling/healing/upgrading and deletion of VNFs; +- initiation of a rollback for unsuccessful resources allocation; +- performance of resource pre-occupying request; +- link/route/Internet protocol (IP) address assignment or allocation; +- creation/deletion/updating network connectivity resources; + +- enquiry and tracking of resources status; +- monitoring of real-time network resource consumption; +- reporting of alarm messages if resource usage exceeds threshold. + +# **9 Interface requirement of orchestration in next generation network evolution** + +## **9.1 Interface requirement with the network management system** + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to exchange information with the NMS for network management, including a combination of various networks and devices information, such as: + +- device status information for device monitoring; +- device interface and flow information for service provisioning and link activation; +- routing information for routing table adjustment; +- service policy information for QoS configuration; +- NGN topology information for global network management; +- NGN device and link usage information for resource management. + +## **9.2 Interface requirement with software-defined networking orchestrators** + +Orchestration in NGNe is required to exchange information with SDN-Os for connectivity management, including a combination of various networks and devices information, such as: + +- SDN device identity information for device registration and recording; +- SDN device interface information for device interface configuration; +- connection information for tunnel establishment [e.g., virtual extensible local area network (VxLAN) or Internet protocol security (IPSec)]; +- routing information of SDN domains for routing path management; +- service policy information for QoS configuration; +- SDN network topology information for global network management; +- SDN device and link usage information for resource management. + +## **9.3 Interface requirement with network function virtualization orchestrators** + +Orchestration in NGNe needs to exchange information with NFV-Os for NS lifecycle management, including a combination of various pieces of virtual network information, such as: + +- virtual network function descriptor (VNFD) for initiating or deleting a VNF; +- virtual link descriptor (VLD) for deploying a virtual link (VL); +- physical network function descriptor (PNFD), which is used to determine the connection between PNF and VL; +- virtual network function forwarding graph descriptor (VNFFGD), which is used to determine the forwarding path between different VNFs; +- virtual resource usage information for monitoring and optimization purposes. + +This information will be used to form a network service descriptor (NSD), which is used to describe the behaviour requirements of VNF deployment and operation, and also includes connection, interface and virtual resource requirements. + +# **10 Security considerations** + +The main aspects of security considerations of orchestration in NGNe shall be aligned with software-defined network intelligence capability enhancement (S-NICE) [ITU-T Y.3321] and [ITU-T Y.3322]. + +Furthermore, to consider the centralized structure of orchestration in NGNe, system is required to ensure a more secure environment. In consequence, orchestration in NGNe is required to support the following features: + +- enhanced single point failure protection, because orchestration in NGNe can interact with the SDN-O, the NVF-O and the NMS, therefore any problems of orchestration in NGNe might become a widespread network failure that could affect millions of users; +- secure mechanisms to ensure any configurations sent to orchestration in NGNe can only be generated by authorized parties to prevent malicious attacks; +- detailed log analysis system to provide the history of all configurations and operations conducted by orchestration in NGNe in order to record and detect any unusual actions; +- usage monitoring of the whole network, including SDN-enabled networks, NFV-enabled networks and NGNs, so that the network resource can be assigned and adjusted on demand to avoid overload. + +# Appendix I + +## Scenarios for orchestration in next generation network evolution + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +### I.1 Scenario of Internet protocol and optical orchestration + + + +Y.2323(18)\_FI.1 + +Diagram illustrating the scenario of Internet protocol and optical orchestration. The diagram shows a central NGNe-O block at the top, connected to SDN-O and NFV-O blocks. NGNe-O is also connected to an IP network cloud and an OPTICAL network cloud. Arrows indicate interactions: NGNe-O to SDN-O (IP + Optical coordination for VIP traffic), SDN-O to NGNe-O (Extend IP link bandwidth/establish a new IP link), SDN-O to OPTICAL (Extend optical link bandwidth), and NFV-O to NGNe-O (Create VNFs for special VIPs). The IP network cloud contains server icons, and the OPTICAL network cloud contains server icons. A dashed line connects the IP and OPTICAL clouds. A traffic burst/sudden growth arrow points to NGNe-O. The label Y.2323(18)\_FI.1 is at the bottom right. + +**Figure I.1 – Scenario of Internet protocol and optical orchestration** + +Orchestration in NGNe is able to manage the IP network and the optical network simultaneously. In some special period, a traffic burst or sudden growth may occur in the network. In this scenario, orchestration in NGNe will extend the optical link bandwidth in the optical layer and the IP bandwidth in the IP layer at the same time; as a result, a specific tunnel for very important person (VIP) traffic can be built on demand. In addition, orchestration in NGNe needs to interact with SDN-O and NFV-O to achieve the following features: + +- 1) SDN-O: support for IP and optical coordination for VIP traffic; +- 2) NFV-O: creation of VNFs for special VIPs (like a firewall). + +Furthermore, after connection has been established, orchestration in NGNe monitors the flow status of the IP network; when the flow exceeds the preset threshold value, orchestration in NGNe can establish a new IP link or adjust the bandwidth of the existing IP link in the transmission network. + +### I.2 Scenario of end-to-end orchestration for the network management system and software-defined networking orchestrator + + + +Y.2323(18)\_FI.2 + +Figure I.2: Scenario of end-to-end orchestration for the network management system and software-defined networking orchestrator. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure where NGNe-O at the top coordinates multi-domain networks. It branches into NMS and SDN-O. NMS manages CPEs (Customer Premises Equipment) and IPRAN (Internet Protocol Radio Access Network). SDN-O manages the MPLS backbone and the DATA CENTRE (which includes an Ethernet network). VxLAN is used for connectivity between CPEs and the IPRAN, and between the MPLS backbone and the DATA CENTRE. The diagram is labeled Y.2323(18)\_FI.2. + +**Figure I.2 – Scenario of end-to-end orchestration for the network management system and software-defined networking orchestrator** + +Orchestration in NGNe is capable of establishing the E2E connection from enterprise virtual customer premises equipment (vCPE) to data centre (DC). In this scenario, multi-segments of VxLAN are needed, not only to access the network and core network, but also the internal network of the DC. For example, when the access network is the Internet protocol radio access network (IPRAN), the core network is the multi-protocol label switch (MPLS) backbone and the internal network of DC is the Ethernet; the provisioning and coordination of vCPE/IPRAN/MPLS backbone/Ethernet are the responsibility of the orchestration in NGNe. Orchestration in NGNe can coordinate a multi-domain network resource (e.g., links, connections, bandwidth, VNFs) to perform operations such as creation, retrieval, updating or deletion in different networks in order to provide an E2E service to customers. + +### I.3 Scenario of end-to-end traffic-steering orchestration + + + +Y.2323(18)\_FI.3 + +Figure I.3: Scenario of end-to-end traffic-steering orchestration. The diagram shows NGNe-O at the top, which adapts service flow, steers traffic, and balances load. It branches into NMS and SDN-O. NMS and SDN-O are connected to a CPE (Customer Premises Equipment) and a DATA CENTRE. A yellow arrow labeled 'Flow congestion' points from the DATA CENTRE to the CPE. A green curved arrow labeled '2' points from the CPE to the DATA CENTRE. A blue dashed arrow labeled '1' points from the DATA CENTRE to the CPE. The diagram is labeled Y.2323(18)\_FI.3. + +**Figure I.3 – Scenario of end-to-end traffic-steering orchestration** + +With the development of the Internet and cloud technology, the net flow and changing trends in the backbone network present the characteristics of unpredictability and fluctuation. Without + +orchestration in NGNe, the telecom operator network lacks coordinated planning, even if the SDN and NFV technologies have been widely implemented in the operator network. + +It is very reasonable that the over-the-top (OTT) service flow has the character of fluctuation. For instance, various e-shopping website promotional campaigns will cause surges in traffic to the websites. The traditional planning expansion of the backbone network according to website peak usage, may cause backbone network resources to be idle at normal times. Furthermore, the characteristics of a distributed cloud DC introduce east-west flows between DCs, which raise bandwidth and QoS backbone network requirements, and also cause unpredictable changes in flow. + +Therefore, E2E traffic steering orchestration is essential by the orchestration in NGNe, including sensing of the network topology, bandwidth and backbone network traffic, while adapting the service flow from a global perspective of resources, making traffic steering and load balancing automatic. + + + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph 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a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2360-202409-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2360-202409-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0c693eb43a79697d5cc20c33f2ec0dff3b560ad8 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2360-202409-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,613 @@ + + +# Recommendation + +## **ITU-T Y.2360 (09/2024)** + +SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +Next Generation Networks – Enhancements to NGN + +--- + +**Requirements for integrating demographic data +for new and emerging technologies in +developing countries** + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 | +| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 | +| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 | +| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 | +| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2360 + +# Requirements for integrating demographic data for new and emerging technologies in developing countries + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.2360 provides an overview of the problem of not including demographic data (DD) in the development of new and emerging technological systems. The scope of this Recommendation includes a reference model for integrating DD and an architecture for collecting, storing and transforming such DD. + +## History\* + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2360 | 2024-09-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/16096 | + +## Keywords + +Artificial intelligence, data handling, demographic data, machine learning. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
domain ..... | 24 | +| 8.4 Requirements for TE border elements in the "un-trusted" domain ..... | 26 | +| 8.5 Security recommendations for terminal equipment in the "un-trusted"
domain ..... | 26 | +| Appendix I – Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of emergency
telecommunications services ..... | 27 | +| I.1 Background..... | 27 | +| I.2 Scope/purpose..... | 27 | +| I.3 General objectives ..... | 27 | +| I.4 General security capabilities..... | 29 | +| I.5 Authentication, authorization and access control ..... | 29 | +| I.6 Confidentiality and privacy ..... | 29 | + +| | Page | +|--------------------------|-------------| +| I.7 Data integrity ..... | 30 | +| I.8 Communication ..... | 30 | +| I.9 Availability ..... | 30 | +| Bibliography..... | 31 | + +# ITU-T Recommendation Y.2701 + +## Security requirements for NGN release 1 + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation provides security requirements for next generation networks (NGNs) against security threats. It is achieved by applying the principles of [ITU-T X.805], *Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications* to [ITU-T Y.2201], *NGN release 1 requirements* and [ITU-T Y.2012], *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*. + +The requirements are to protect the following in a multi-network environment: + +- network and service provider infrastructure and its assets (e.g., NGN assets and resources such as network elements, systems, components, interfaces, and data and information), its resources, its communications (i.e., signalling, management and data/bearer traffic) and its services; +- NGN services and capabilities (e.g., voice, video and data services); +- end user communication and information (e.g., private information). + +The requirements are to provide network-based security of end user communications across multiple-network administrative domains. Security of customer assets and information in the customer domain (e.g., user network), and the use of peer-to-peer application capabilities on customer equipment are not within the scope of this Recommendation. + +The requirements specified in this Recommendation are applicable to an NGN, including user-to-network interfaces (UNIs), network-to-network interfaces (NNIs) and application-to-network interfaces (ANIs) in a multi-network environment. + +NGN service providers will be deploying "network elements" that support the functional entities defined in [ITU-T Y.2012]. The bundling of these functional entities to a given network element will vary, depending on the vendor. Therefore, this Recommendation will not attempt to show a strict and fixed bundling between logical functional entities and physical network elements. + +The requirements in this Recommendation should be treated as a minimum set of requirements for NGN security and should not be considered to be exhaustive. Therefore, an NGN provider may need to take additional measures beyond those specified in Recommendations for NGN security. + +In addition, the requirements in this Recommendation cover some of the technical aspects of what is generally known as IdM ("identity management"). A working definition of IdM is "management by NGN providers of trusted attributes of an entity such as: a subscriber, a device or a provider". This is not intended to indicate positive validation of a person. + +Administrations may require NGN providers to take into account national regulatory and national policy requirements in implementing this Recommendation. + +## 1.1 X.805 principles + +[ITU-T X.805] defines the following security dimensions: + +access control; +authentication; +non-repudiation; +data confidentiality; +communication security; +data integrity; + +availability; +privacy. + +It also identifies the following security threats. + + + +Figure 1 – Security architecture of X.805. The diagram illustrates the security architecture of X.805. On the left, a large red arrow labeled 'VULNERABILITIES' points towards a central stack of three boxes representing 'Security layers': 'Applications security' (top, green), 'Services security' (middle, yellow), and 'Infrastructure security' (bottom, blue). Below these layers are three horizontal planes: 'End-user plane', 'Control plane', and 'Management plane'. To the right of the security layers is a vertical stack of eight green bars representing '8 Security dimensions': 'Access control', 'Authentication', 'Non-repudiation', 'Data confidentiality', 'Communication security', 'Data integrity', 'Availability', and 'Privacy'. Further to the right, a red arrow labeled 'THREATS' points towards a list of threats: 'Destruction', 'Corruption', 'Removal', 'Disclosure', and 'Interruption'. Below this list is a red arrow labeled 'ATTACKS'. The entire diagram is labeled '8 Security dimensions' at the bottom. + +**Figure 1 – Security architecture of X.805 (Figure 3/X.805)** + +These security dimensions and security threats stated above are considered as the base of this Recommendation. + +This Recommendation does not further define or distinguish the use of the X.805 security layers (applications, services, or infrastructure) and compliance with this standard does not require such a distinction. This Recommendation does make reference to a distinction between management, control, and user plane traffic, but cautions the reader that the utilization of that classification varies depending on the layer in a protocol stack that is under consideration. Therefore, additional standards will need to be referenced to determine compliance with such distinctions. This standard provides recommendations concerning application of the security dimensions, but does not infer completeness for use as a security assessment for NGN networks. + +## 1.2 Assumptions + +This Recommendation is based on the following assumptions: + +- 1) The bundling of functional entities, as defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], to a given network element will vary, depending on the vendor. +- 2) Each NGN provider has specific responsibilities within its domain for security. For example, implementing applicable security services and practices to: + - a) protect itself; + - b) assure end-to-end security is not compromised within its network; and + - c) assure high availability of NGN communications. +- 3) Each network domain will establish and enforce policies for service level agreements (SLAs) to assure the security of its domain and the security of the network interconnections. It is assumed that the SLAs would specify security services, mechanisms and practices to be implemented to protect the interconnected networks and the communications (signalling/control traffic, bearer traffic and management traffic) across UNIs, ANIs and NNIs. + +- 4) This Recommendation addresses network-based security, which is a layered architecture, consisting of perimeter security to trusted domains, physical security of provider equipment, and potentially the use of encryption. + +## 1.3 Overview + +This Recommendation is organized as follows: + +- Clause 2 (References) – This clause provides normative references. +- Clause 3 (Definitions and abbreviations) – This clause provides definitions and abbreviations used in this Recommendation. +- Clause 4 (Security threats and risks) – This clause highlights security threats and risks assumed for the NGN environment. Assumed security threats and risks are used as guidance to develop requirements for security and to identify security capabilities and procedures to be supported. +- Clause 5 (Security trust model) – This clause describes a trust model for NGN security. The trust model can be used to develop trust relations for UNI, ANI and NNI connectivity and design of security architecture. +- Clause 6 (Security architecture) – This clause describes the relationship between the functional NGN architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] and composite security architectures. +- Clause 7 (Objectives and requirements) – This clause describes security objectives and general requirements for NGNs to be used as the basis to define security requirements for NGNs. +- Clause 8 (Specific security requirements) – This clause provides specific security requirements as defined in clause 7. +- Appendix I – Security objectives and requirements for emergency telecommunications services (ETS). +- Bibliography. + +This Recommendation is defined to provide a base for NGN security. Various companion Recommendations for specific security areas, e.g., authentication and authorization, certificate management, identity management, among others, are to be provided in the future. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T M.3016.0] ITU-T Recommendation M.3016.0 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Overview*. +- [ITU-T M.3016.1] ITU-T Recommendation M.3016.1 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Security requirements*. +- [ITU-T X.800] ITU-T Recommendation X.800 (1991), *Security architecture for Open Systems Interconnection for CCITT applications*. + +- [ITU-T X.805] ITU-T Recommendation X.805 (2003), *Security architecture for systems providing end-to-end communications*. +- [ITU-T Y.2012] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2012 (2006), *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*. +- [ITU-T Y.2201] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2201 (2007), *NGN release 1 requirements*. + +# 3 Definitions and abbreviations + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 emergency telecommunications service (ETS):** National service, providing authorized priority communications to facilitate the work of emergency personnel in times of disaster. (See ITU-T Rec. E.107.) + +**3.1.2 user:** A user includes end user (ITU-T Rec. Y.2091), person, subscriber, system, equipment, terminal (e.g., FAX, PC), (functional) entity, process, application, provider, or corporate network. + +## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 asset:** Anything that has value to the organization, its business, its operations and its continuity. + +**3.2.2 border element:** Network element providing functions connecting different security and administrative domains. + +**3.2.3 corporate network:** A private network that supports multiple users and may be in multiple locations (e.g., an enterprise, a campus). + +**3.2.4 domain border element:** Border element under sole control of the provider, providing security functions with other network domains. + +**3.2.5 network border element:** Border element under sole control of the provider, providing security functions with terminal equipment. + +**3.2.6 security domain:** A set of elements, a security policy, a security authority and a set of security-relevant activities in which the elements are managed in accordance with the security policy. The policy will be administered by the security authority. A given security domain may span multiple security zones. + +**3.2.7 security zone:** This Recommendation defines 3 security zones: + +- 1) trusted; +- 2) trusted but vulnerable; and +- 3) un-trusted. + +A security zone is defined by operational control, location, and connectivity to other device/network elements. + +**3.2.8 terminal equipment border element:** Border element providing security functions between customer premises equipment and service provider network. + +**3.2.9 trust:** Entity X is said to trust entity Y for a set of activities if and only if entity X relies upon entity Y behaving in a particular way with respect to the activities. + +**3.2.10 trusted but vulnerable zone:** From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a security zone where the network elements/devices are operated (provisioned and maintained) by the NGN provider. The equipment may be under the control by either the customer/subscriber or the NGN provider. In addition, the equipment may be located within or outside the NGN provider's domain. They communicate with elements both in the trusted zone and with elements in the un-trusted zone, which is why they are "vulnerable". Their major security function is to protect the NEs in the trusted zone from the security attacks originated in the un-trusted zone in a fail-safe manner. + +**3.2.11 trusted zone:** From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a security domain where a NGN provider's network elements and systems reside and never communicate directly with customer equipment. The common characteristics of NGN network elements in this domain are that they are under the full control of the related NGN provider, are located in the NGN provider premises (which provides physical security), and they communicate only with elements in the "trusted" domain and with elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" domain. + +**3.2.12 un-trusted zone:** From the viewpoint of a NGN provider, a zone that includes all network elements of customer networks or possibly peer networks or other NGN provider zones outside of the original domain, which are connected to the NGN provider's border elements. + +**3.2.13 user network:** A private network consisting of terminal equipment that may have multiple users. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms. + +| | | +|----------|------------------------------------------------------| +| 3G | 3rd Generation | +| AGW | Access Gateway | +| ANI | Application-to-Network Interface | +| B2BUA | Back-to-Back User Agent | +| BE | Border Element | +| CSC-FE | Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| DBE | Domain Border Element | +| DNS | Domain Name System | +| ETS | Emergency Telecommunications Service | +| FE | Functional Entity | +| GW | Gateway | +| I-CSC-FE | Interrogating Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| IMS | IP Multimedia Subsystem | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| ISDN | Integrated Services Digital Network | +| LAN | Local Area Network | +| MPLS | Multi Protocol Label Switching | +| MRP-FE | Media Resource Processing Functional Entity | +| NAC-FE | Network Access Control Functional Entity | +| NAPT | Network Address and Port Translation | +| NAT | Network Address Translation | + +| | | +|----------|--------------------------------------------------------------| +| NBE | Network Border Element | +| NE | Network Element | +| NGN | Next Generation Network | +| NNI | Network-to-Network Interface | +| OAMP | Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning | +| P-CSC-FE | Proxy Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| POTS | Plain Old Telephone Service | +| PSTN | Public Switched Telephone Network | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RAC-FE | Resource and Admission Control Functional Entity | +| RAN | Radio Access Network | +| RTSP | Real Time Streaming Protocol | +| SAA-FE | Service Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity | +| S-CSC-FE | Serving Call Session Control Functional Entity | +| SIM | Subscriber Identity Module | +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SLA | Service Level Agreement | +| SL-FE | Subscription Locator Functional Entity | +| TAA-FE | Transport Authentication and Authorization Functional Entity | +| TE | Terminal Equipment | +| TE-BE | Terminal Equipment Border Element | +| TMN | Telecommunication Management Network | +| UA | User Agent | +| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card | +| UNI | User-to-Network Interface | +| VLAN | Virtual LAN | +| W-CDMA | Wideband Code Division Multiple Access | +| WLAN | Wireless LAN | +| xDSL | x Digital Subscriber Line | + +# **4 Security threats and risks** + +This Recommendation assumes that the systems, components, interfaces, information, resources, communications (i.e., signalling, management and data/bearer traffic) and services that make up an NGN will be exposed to a variety of security threats and risks. Those threats and risks will depend on a variety of factors. In addition, end users will also be exposed to certain threats (e.g., unauthorized access to private information). + +### Threats to the NGN: + +- unauthorized reconnaissance, such as the remote analysis of the system to determine points of weakness (these may include scans, sweeps, port interrogation, route tables, etc.); +- break-in/device takeover resulting in loss of control of the device, anomalies and errors in the configuration audits; +- destruction of information and/or other resources; +- corruption or modification of information; +- theft, removal or loss of information and/or other resources; +- disclosure of information; and +- interruption of services and denial of services. + +Further, it is clear that NGNs will be operating in an environment different from the PSTN environment and may therefore be exposed to different types of threats and attacks from within or externally. NGNs will have direct or indirect connectivity to un-trusted and trusted networks and terminal equipment, and therefore will be exposed to security risks and threats associated with connectivity to un-secure networks and customer premises equipment. For example, a provider's NGN may have direct or indirect (i.e., through another network) connectivity to the following as shown in Figure 2: + +- other service providers, and their applications; +- other NGNs; +- other IP-based networks; +- public switched telephone network (PSTN); +- corporate networks; +- user networks; +- terminal equipment; +- other NGN transport domains. + + + +The diagram illustrates the connectivity of a Next Generation Network (NGN) to various external entities. The central NGN is represented as a large light-blue rounded rectangle containing two main strata: + 1. **Service stratum** (orange cloud): Contains 'Application servers', 'Softswitch', and 'CSCF' (Call Session Control Function). + 2. **Transport** (yellow cloud): Contains network router icons. + + The NGN connects to external entities via three types of interfaces: + - **UNI (User Network Interface)**: On the left, connecting to 'Terminal equipment', 'User networks', and 'Corporate networks'. These are grouped under the label 'Connectivity to un-trusted customer equipment'. + - **NNI (Network Network Interface)**: On the right, connecting to 'Other service providers', 'Other NGNs', 'Other IP-based networks', and 'PSTN'. These are grouped under the label 'Connectivity to trusted and un-trusted networks'. + - **ANI (Application Network Interface)**: A vertical dashed line connecting the Service stratum to 'Other service providers'. + +Diagram of NGN connectivity showing internal layers and external interfaces. + +**Figure 2 – Connectivity to networks and users** + +In the evolving environment, security across multiple network provider domains relies on the aggregation of what all providers elect to do for securing their networks. Unauthorized network access into one provider's network can easily lead to exploitation of an interconnected network and its associated services. This is an example of the exploitation of the weakest link that can threaten a provider network's integrity and service continuity along with a host of various types of attacks. + +Each NGN provider is responsible for security within its domain. Each NGN provider is responsible for designing and implementing security solutions using network specific policy for trust relations (clause 5), to meet its own network-specific needs and to support global end-to-end security objectives across multiple network provider domains. + +# 5 Security trust model + +This clause defines the NGN security trust model. + +The NGN functional reference architecture defines functional entities (FEs). However, since network security aspects depend heavily on the way that FEs are bundled together, the NGN security architecture is based on physical network elements (NEs), i.e., tangible boxes that contain one or more FEs. The way these FEs are bundled into NEs will vary, depending on the vendor. + +## 5.1 Single network trust model + +This subclause defines three security zones: + +- 1) trusted; +- 2) trusted but vulnerable; +- 3) un-trusted, + +that are dependent on operational control, location, and connectivity to other device/network elements. These three zones are illustrated in the security trust model shown in Figure 3. + + + +Figure 3 – Security trust model diagram. The diagram is divided into two main sections by a vertical line. The left section is labeled 'Network elements not always controlled by the NGN provider' and contains an 'Untrusted zone' with red vertical stripes. It includes 'TE' (Terminal Equipment) boxes connected to 'TE-BE' (Terminal Equipment - Border Element) boxes, which are connected to 'Provider-controlled equipment'. The right section is labeled 'Network elements controlled by the NGN provider' and contains two zones: a 'Trusted but vulnerable zone' with yellow horizontal stripes, containing 'Network border elements (NBE)', and a 'Trusted zone' with green diagonal stripes, containing 'NGN network elements'. Arrows indicate connections from the Untrusted zone through the NBE into the Trusted zone. + +**Figure 3 – Security trust model** + +A "trusted network security zone" or "trusted zone" in short is a zone where a NGN provider's network elements and systems reside and never communicate directly with customer equipment or other domains. The common characteristics of NGN network elements in this zone are that they are under the full control of the NGN provider, are located in the NGN provider domain, and they communicate only with elements in the "trusted" zone and with elements in the + +"trusted-but-vulnerable" zone. It should not be assumed that because it is in a trusted zone it is secure *per se*. + +The "trusted zone" will be protected by a combination of various methods. Some examples are physical security of the NGN network elements, general hardening of the systems, use of secure signalling, security for OAMP messages separate VPN within the (MPLS)/IP network for communication within the "trusted" zone and with NGN network elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone. See clause 8 for more details. + +A "trusted but vulnerable network security zone", or "trusted but vulnerable zone" in short, is a zone where the network elements/devices are operated (provisioned and maintained) by the NGN provider. The equipment may be under the control by either the customer/subscriber or the NGN provider. In addition, the equipment may be located within or outside the NGN provider's premises. They communicate with elements both in the trusted zone and with elements in the un-trusted zone, which is why they are "vulnerable". Their major security function is to protect the NEs in the trusted zone from the security attacks originated in the un-trusted zone. + +Elements that are located on the NGN provider's domain with connectivity to elements outside the trusted zone are referred to as network border elements (NBEs). Examples of these are the: + +- Network border elements (NBE) at the UNI that interface with the service control or transport elements of the NGN provider in the trusted zone in order to provide the user/subscriber access to the NGN provider's network for services and/or transport. +- Domain border element (DBE) that is the same kind of equipment with network border element except that it resides at the border of domains. +- Device configuration & bootstrap NBE (DCB-NBE) that interface with the NGN provider's device configuration system in the trusted zone in order to configure the user's/subscriber's device and NGN provider's equipment in the outside plant. +- OAMP-NBE interfaces with the NGN provider's OAMP systems in the trusted zone in order to provide and maintain the user's/subscriber's device and NGN provider's equipment in the outside plant. +- Application server/web server NBE (AS/WS-NBE) that interfaces with the NGN provider's AS/WS-NBE in the trusted zone in order to provide the user/subscriber access to web-based services. + +Examples of devices/elements that are operated by an NGN provider but are not located on the NGN provider's premises, and that may or may not be under the control of the NGN provider, are: + +- outside plant equipment in the access network/technology; +- base station router (BSR), a network element that integrates the base station, radio network controller and router functionalities; +- optical units (ONUs) within a user/subscriber's residence. + +The "trusted-but-vulnerable" zone, comprised of NBEs, will be protected by a combination of various methods. Some examples are physical security of the NGN network elements, general hardening of the systems, use of secure signalling for all signalling messages sent to NGN network elements in the "trusted" zone, security for OAMP messages and packet filters and firewalls as appropriate. See clause 8 for more details. + +An "un-trusted zone" includes all network elements of customer networks or possibly peer networks or other NGN provider domains outside of the original domain, which are connected to the NGN provider's network border elements. In the "un-trusted zone", comprised of terminal equipment, equipment may not be under the control of NGN providers and it may be impossible to enforce provider's security policy on user. It is still desirable to try to apply some security measures and, to that end, it is recommended that signalling, media, and OAM&P be secured and the TE-BE located + +in the "un-trusted zone" be hardened. However, due to the lack of physical security, these measures cannot be considered absolutely safe. See clause 8 for more details. + +## 5.2 Peering network trust model + +When an NGN is connected to another network, the trust depends on: + +- physical interconnection, where the interconnection can range from a direct connection in a secure building to via shared facilities; +- peering model, where the traffic can be exchanged directly between the two NGN service providers, or via one or more NGN transport providers; +- business relationships, where there may be penalty clauses in the SLA agreements, and/or a trust in the other NGN provider's security policy; +- in general, NGN providers should view other providers as un-trusted. + +Figure 4 shows an example when a connected network is judged un-trusted. + + + +The diagram illustrates the peering trust model between two providers, Provider A and Provider B, from Provider A's perspective. Provider A's network is divided into three zones: a green hatched 'Trusted Zone' containing 'NGN network Elements', a yellow hatched 'Trusted but Vulnerable Zone' containing 'Domain Border Elements (DBE)', and a red vertically striped 'Untrusted Zone'. Provider B's network, viewed from Provider A's point of view, is entirely within the 'Untrusted Zone' and contains 'Domain Border Elements (DBE)' and 'NGN network Elements'. A connection line links the 'DBE' of Provider A to the 'DBE' of Provider B. + +Diagram of the Peering trust model showing Provider A's zones and Provider B's view. + +Figure 4 – Peering trust model + +# 6 Security architecture + +## 6.1 Functional NGN architecture reference + +The NGN architecture that realizes [ITU-T Y.2201], *NGN release 1 requirements* is defined in [ITU-T Y.2012], *Functional requirements and architecture of the NGN release 1*. + +Figure 5 shows a functional view of the NGN architecture. + + + +Figure 5 – NGN architecture overview. The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of a Next-Generation Network (NGN). At the top, 'Applications' connect to the 'ANI' (Application-to-Network Interface). The core is divided into two main strata: the 'Service stratum' (green) and the 'Transport stratum' (yellow). The 'Service stratum' contains 'Application support functions & service support functions' and 'Service control functions' (which includes 'Service user profiles'). The 'Transport stratum' contains 'Transport control functions' (including 'Network attachment control functions' and 'Resource and admission control functions', with 'Transport user profiles') and 'Transport functions'. To the left, 'Management functions' (pink bar) connect to 'End-user functions' (white box) via a 'UNI' (User-to-Network Interface). To the right, 'Other networks' (white box) connect via an 'NNI' (Network-to-Network Interface). A legend at the bottom indicates: dotted lines for Control, hatched lines for Media, and green dashed lines for Management. + +**Figure 5 – NGN architecture overview (Figure 1/Y.2012)** + +The NGN supports a reference point to the end-user functions called user-to-network interface (UNI), and to other networks called network-to-network interface (NNI). It also supports a reference point to the applications functional group called application-to-network interface (ANI), enabling application of NGN capabilities to create and provision applications for NGN users. + +The NGN Release 1 transport stratum provides IP connectivity services to NGN users under the control of transport control functions, including the network attachment control functions (NACF) and resource and admission control functions (RACF). + +The service stratum delivers services and applications to the end-user by utilizing the application support functions and service support functions and related control functions. + +The end-user functions are functions connected to the NGN access networks and no assumptions are made about the diverse end-user interfaces and end-user networks. + +The management functions provide the ability to manage the NGN in order to provide NGN services with the expected quality, security and reliability. + +For further details, see [ITU-T Y.2012]. + +## 6.2 Mapping to NGN functional architecture + +This Recommendation describes the method to achieve security by using the trust model shown in clause 5, that is, an NGN composed of trusted domain (green zone), un-trusted domain (red zone), and trusted but vulnerable domain (yellow zone) in-between. + +One of the key issues to achieve security with this model is the method to transmit signalling, media, OAMP traffic from the un-trusted domain to the trusted domain. There are various methods to achieve this, and NGN provider decides the method considering its policy. Below are examples of these methods. + +- a) Install NEs to terminate traffic (e.g., B2BUA for SIP signalling) between the green zone and the red zone. It receives a packet from the red zone, examines it, discards it if inappropriate, and if appropriate copies the necessary part to reconstruct a packet appropriate for the green zone. In this case, NEs to terminate traffic become the yellow zone NEs. +- b) Controls the traffic in media layer (e.g., by opening and closing a particular port (pinhole) at the firewall, and guarantees that only authorized NEs (and users) can send traffic to the equipment in the green zone). In this case, NEs that control traffic become the yellow zone NEs. +- c) End to end encryption between the sender and the receiver. + +In the functional architecture shown in [ITU-T Y.2012] (Figure 6 of this Recommendation), SIP signalling generated by the end-user function (it is usually un-trusted because the NGN provider cannot confirm that the function is not forged) is transmitted to S-2, P-CSC-FE. NEs that contain P-CSC-FE therefore are considered as yellow zone NEs, or as green zone NEs due to the firewall functions. If NEs that contain S-1 (S-CSC-FE) are separated from NEs that contain P-CSC-FE, they are considered as green zone NEs. + + + +The diagram illustrates the generalized functional architecture of a Next-Generation Network (NGN), organized into several key layers and functional blocks: + +- Management functions:** A vertical block on the left that interfaces with various components across the network. +- Applications:** The top layer, including: + - Applications (top):** The user-facing application layer. + - Application support functions & service support functions:** A layer below applications that may include own authentication, authorization, and accounting. +- Service control:** A central layer containing numerous functional elements: + - S-1:** Serving call FE session control + - S-2:** Proxy call session control FE + - S-3:** Interrogating call session control FE + - S-4:** Subscription locator FE + - S-5:** S. user profile FE + - S-6:** S. authentication & authorization FE + - S-7:** Interconnection border gateway control FE + - S-8:** Access GW control FE + - S-9:** Media GW control FE + - S-10:** Breakout gateway control FE + - S-11:** User signalling interworking FE + - S-12:** Network signalling interworking FE + - S-13:** Media resource control FE + - S-14:** Media resource broker FE + - S-15:** General services control FE +- Core transport:** The central transport layer, including: + - T-1:** Access media gateway FE + - T-2:** Access node FE + - T-3:** Edge node FE + - T-4:** Access relay FE + - T-5:** Access border gateway FE + - T-6:** Interconnection border gateway FE + - T-7:** Trunking media gateway FE + - T-8:** Media resource processing FE + - T-9:** Signalling gateway FE + - T-10:** Network access configuration FE + - T-11:** T. authentication & authorization FE + - T-12:** T. user profile FE + - T-13:** T. location management FE + - T-14:** Access management FE + - T-15:** Home gateway configuration FE + - T-16:** Policy decision FE + - T-17:** Transport Resource control FE +- Access transport:** The bottom layer, including: + - Access packet transport functions:** The underlying transport mechanism for access. +- External Networks:** + - Other NGN:** Connected to the top right. + - IP multimedia networks:** Connected to the middle right. + - PSTN/ISDN:** Connected to the bottom right. +- End-user Function:** Located on the left, showing: + - Legacy terminal** and **NGN terminal** connected via **RGW** (Relay Gateway) to the **Customer network**. +- Scope of NGN:** A large yellow double-headed arrow at the bottom indicates the scope of the network, spanning from the end-user function to the external networks. + +Generalized functional architecture diagram for NGN showing Management functions, Applications, Service control, Core transport, and Access transport layers. + +Y.2701(07)\_F06 + +Figure 6 – Generalized functional architecture (Figure 3/Y.2012) + +## 6.3 Identification of NGN resources for security protection + +Each network provider is required to identify assets, resources, information and interfaces within its network to be protected, and the threats that need to be mitigated. For example, network elements, interfaces (UNI, ANI and NNI), management systems, and signalling, management and media/bearer communications. In identifying NGN resources for security protection against threats, the theoretical layered architecture defined in [ITU-T Y.2012] is to be considered together with practical realization of the functional entities. + +The following tables provide example NGN assets, resources and interfaces for security protection against threats, organized as follows: + +- Table 1 – Example UNI related assets, resources and information. +- Table 2 – Example transport stratum related assets, resources, information and interfaces. +- Table 3 – Example service stratum related assets, resources, information and interfaces. +- Table 4 – Example management related assets, resources, information and interfaces. + +The examples in Tables 1 to 4 are not exhaustive. + +**Table 1 – Example UNI related assets, resources and information** + +| Examples | Objectives and goals | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| End user resources:
- • User devices
- • User network gateways
- • Corporate network gateways
b) Protect against interruption of services (e.g., denial of service attacks) and assurance of service availability.
c) Protect the network from unauthorized access (e.g., unauthorized users and user devices). | +| End-user information:
- • Subscription information
- • Identity information
- • Location information
b) Protect against theft, removal or loss (e.g., identity theft).
c) Protect against disclosure (e.g., unauthorized access to location information). | +| NGN provider information
- • Identity information
b) Protect against theft, removal or loss (e.g., identity theft).
c) Protect against disclosure (e.g., unauthorized access to location information). | +| UNI interfaces | a) Transport stratum – Provide security protection of media/bearer traffic across UNI interfaces.
b) Service stratum (service control) – Provide security protection of signalling and management across UNI interfaces (e.g., SIP, HTTPs, ISDN, and H.248).
c) Service stratum (application and service support) – Provide security protection of application and service control functions across UNI interfaces (e.g., in-band signalling). | + +**Table 2 – Example transport stratum related assets, resources, information and interfaces** + +| Examples | Goals and objectives | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Transport stratum resources:
- • Transport network elements (e.g., IP routers, MPLS nodes)
- • Transmission links
- • Routing information (e.g., DNS servers)
- • Transport user profile information (e.g., transport databases and data repository)
- a) Protect all transport network elements, components and functions against unauthorized access.
- b) Protect the integrity of transport network elements, components and functions.
- c) Protect availability of transport network elements, components and functions. Protection against interruption of services (i.e., against denial of service attacks).
- d) Protect against disclosure of any user or network private information.
- a) Provide security protection of media/bearer traffic between systems within a provider network.
- b) Provide security protection of transport control (e.g., OSPF) signalling and management within a provider network.
- c) Provide security of signalling between systems in the service stratum (e.g., application servers) and systems in the transport stratum (e.g., IP routers).
- a) Provide security protection of media/bearer traffic across transport UNI, NNI and ANI interfaces.
- b) Provide security protection of transport control signalling (e.g., OSPF) and management across transport UNI, NNI and ANI interfaces.
Service stratum – Service control resources
- • Service control network elements (e.g., CSC-FEs, SL-FE, MRP-FE, Gateways, S/BCs)
a) Protect all service control network elements, components and functions against unauthorized access.
b) Protect the integrity of service control network elements, components and functions, including protection against corruption or modification of information.
c) Protect availability of service control network elements, components and functions. Protect against interruption of services (i.e., against denial of service attacks).
| +| |Service stratum – Service control information
- • Subscriber information (e.g., databases and data repository containing user profiles and service profiles)
- • NGN provider information (e.g., databases and data repository containing routing, numbering and addressing information)
a) Protect against corruption or modification of data and information.
b) Protect against theft, removal or loss (e.g., identity theft).
c) Protect against disclosure (e.g., unauthorized access to user and network private information).
| +| | Service stratum – Service control inter-system communication | Provide security protection of inter-system signalling (e.g., SIP, RADIUS, Diameter) within a network provider network (e.g., CSCF to HSS signalling). | +| | Interfaces and communications | Provide security protection of signalling and management across UNI, NNI and ANI interfaces. | + +**Table 3 – Example service stratum related assets, resources, information and interfaces** + +| | Examples | Goals and objectives | +|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Service stratum – Application and service support |Service stratum – Application and service support resources:
- • Application and service support network elements and platforms (e.g., application servers, databases, web portals)
a) Protect all service support network elements, components and functions against unauthorized access.
b) Protect the integrity of service support network elements, components and functions, including protection against corruption or modification of information.
c) Protect availability of service support network elements, components and functions.
d) Protect against interruption of services (i.e., against denial of service attacks).
| +| |Service stratum – Application and service support information:
- • Application and service information
- • Subscription information
a) Protect against corruption or modification of data and information.
b) Protect against theft, removal or loss (e.g., identity theft).
c) Protect against disclosure (e.g., unauthorized access to user and network private information).
| +| | Interfaces |a) Provide security protection of network elements and resources for other application provider access (e.g., Parlay and Open Mobile Alliance gateways).
b) Provide security protection of UNI, NNI and ANI interfaces.
c) Provide security protection of signalling and management traffic across ANI interfaces.
| + +**Table 4 – Example management related assets, resources, information and interfaces** + +| Example | Goals and objectives | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Management resources- • Transport stratum management systems (e.g., network element management, network management and service management systems)
- • Service stratum management systems (e.g., network element management, network management and service management systems)
b) Protect the integrity of management network elements, components, functions and interfaces. This includes protection against corruption or modification of information.
c) Protect availability of management network elements, components, functions and interfaces. Protection against interruption of services (i.e., against denial of service attacks). | +| Inter-system communications within a network provider network | a) Provide security protection of management traffic between management systems within a network (e.g., service stratum).
b) Provide security protection of management traffic between user network, and network provider transport stratum and service stratum | +| Interfaces and inter-system communications | a) Provide security of internal network management interfaces and any UNI, NNI and ANI management interfaces.
b) Provide security protection of management traffic across UNI, ANI, NNI interfaces. | + +# 7 Objectives and requirements + +## 7.1 General security objectives + +The following is a list of general security objectives used to guide the requirements in this Recommendation. + +- NGN security features should be extensible, and flexible enough to satisfy various needs. +- Security requirements should take the performance, usability, scalability and cost constraints of NGN into account. +- Security methods should be based on existing and well-understood security standards as appropriate. +- The NGN security architecture should be globally scalable (within network provider domains, across multiple network provider domains, in security provisioning). +- The NGN security architecture should respect the logical or physical separation of signalling and control traffic, user traffic, and management traffic. +- NGN security should be securely provisioned and securely managed. +- An NGN should provide security from all perspectives: service, network provider and subscriber. +- Security methods should not generally affect the quality of provided services. +- Security should provide simple, secure provisioning and configuration for subscribers and providers (plug & play). +- Appropriate security levels should be maintained even when multicast functionality is used. + +- The service discovery capabilities should support a variety of scoping criteria (e.g., location, cost, etc.) to provide appropriate scaling, with appropriate mechanisms to ensure security and privacy. +- The address resolution system should be a special system used only by this network, and certain security measures are required to be in place. This system may use databases that are internal or external of a domain. +- The principles and general security objectives for secure TMN management as outlined in clause 7 of [ITU-T M.3016.0] should be followed. + +## 7.2 Objectives for security across multiple network provider domains + +The general objective is to provide network-based security for end-to-end communications across multiple provider domains. This is achieved by providing security of the end-to-end communication on a hop-by-hop basis across the different provider's domains. Figure 7 shows the general concept of network provided security for end-to-end communications between end users. Each network segment has specific security responsibilities within its security zone to facilitate security and availability of NGN communications across multiple networks. + + + +Figure 7: Security of communications across multiple networks. The diagram illustrates a multi-domain network architecture for end-to-end communications. It shows two main network domains connected via an 'Other Provider' domain. Each domain contains a 'Service Stratum' with 'Application Servers', 'Softswitch', and 'CSCF'. The domains are interconnected through 'Transport' and 'Transit' layers. The diagram also shows 'Access' networks (xDSL, Cable, FTTP, WIFI, WiMAX) and 'User networks' (TEs, Corporate Networks). The interfaces are labeled: UNI (User Network Interface), NNI (Network Network Interface), and ANI (Access Network Interface). A legend indicates that dashed lines represent 'Signalling' and solid lines represent 'Media/bearer'. A large arrow at the bottom points from left to right, labeled 'Network Provided Security on Network Domain by Network Domain Basis for End-to-End Communications'. + +Figure 7 – Security of communications across multiple networks + +As described in clause 5.2, the trust model between interconnected NGNs depends on several aspects such as the physical interconnections, peering models and business relationships. + +## 7.3 Requirements specific for security dimensions + +The objectives described here are specific to particular security dimensions, such as authentication. They are common to all interfaces. + +### 7.3.1 Access control + +NGN providers are required to restrict access to authorized subscribers. Authorization may be given by the provider providing the access or by other providers after validation by an authentication and access control processes. + +The NGN is required to prevent unauthorized access, such as by intruders masquerading as authorized users. + +### **7.3.2 Authentication** + +NGN providers are required to support capabilities for authenticating subscribers, equipment, network elements and other providers. This includes support of, but is not limited to, the following: + +- 1) Capabilities to authenticate users for transport network access (e.g., authentication and authorization of an end user device, a user-network gateway, or a corporate network gateway to obtain access or attachment to the transport network access). +- 2) Capabilities to authenticate users for access to services at the start of, and during, service delivery (e.g., authentication of a user, a device or a combined user/device where the authentication applies to NGN service/application access). +- 3) Capabilities for a NGN user to authenticate the NGN provider on each stratum (e.g., user authenticating the identity of the connected NGN provider or of the service provider) if required by security policy. +- 4) Capabilities to allow user peer-to-peer authentication (e.g., authentication of the called user, the originating entity, or data origin) as network services or features. +- 5) Capabilities to allow bilateral authentication between two NGN providers on each stratum for exchange of signalling, management and media/bearer traffic (e.g., authentication of directly interconnected and remote networks across NNI interfaces). +- 6) Capabilities to allow authentication of other service providers across ANI interfaces. SIM-based and/or non-SIM-based approaches are to be supported. + +NOTE – Authentication of an entity is not intended to indicate positive validation of a person. + +### **7.3.3 Non-repudiation** + +This Recommendation does not specify any non-repudiation security requirements. + +### **7.3.4 Data confidentiality** + +NGN providers are required to protect the confidentiality of subscriber traffic by cryptographic or other means. + +NGN providers are required to protect confidentiality of control messages by cryptographic or other means if security policy requests it. + +NGN providers are required to protect the confidentiality of management traffic by cryptographic or other means. + +### **7.3.5 Communication security** + +NGN providers are required to provide mechanisms for ensuring that information is not unlawfully diverted or intercepted. + +### **7.3.6 Data integrity** + +NGN providers are required to protect the integrity of subscriber traffic by cryptographic or other means. + +NGN providers are required to protect integrity of control messages by cryptographic or other means if security policy requests it. + +NGN providers are required to protect the integrity of management traffic by cryptographic or other means. + +### **7.3.7 Availability** + +NGN is required to provide security capabilities to enable NGN providers to prevent or terminate communications with the non-compliant end-user equipment: e.g., to mitigate DoS attacks, spreading of viruses or worms and other attacks. These capabilities may be suspended to allow emergency communications. NGN internal network elements may also be susceptible to viruses, worms and other attacks. Similar measures to quarantine network components are also required. + +An NGN should provide provision of security capabilities to enable a NGN provider to filter out packets and traffic that is considered harmful by the respective security policy. + +NGN is required to provide capabilities for the support of disaster recovery functions and procedures. The specific requirements are outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +### **7.3.8 Privacy** + +NGN is required to provide capabilities to protect the subscriber's private information such as location of data, identities, phone numbers, network addresses or call-accounting data according to national regulations and laws. Specific requirements for privacy are a national matter and are outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +# **8 Specific security requirements** + +This clause deals with the specific requirements for security for each of the network elements within the NGN infrastructure. However, since many of the security needs will be the same for the various types of network elements, the overall security requirements are specified first, in clause 8.1. + +Border elements can be integrated or separated according to implementation. + +## **8.1 Common security requirements for NGN elements** + +These requirements apply to the NGN network elements in trusted zone and in trusted but vulnerable zone. It is desirable that devices in the un-trusted zone follow these requirements. + +The following is a list of general security requirements: + +Interoperability is required to be supported by the different NGN network elements, in particular among the various NGN security mechanisms. Minimum standardized security features are required to be available worldwide. + +Authentication and authorization is required to be performed at both service and transport strata (user-to-network, network-to-user, network-to-network). This should be possible also in presence of NAPT transversal. + +A NGN element is required to provide security measures against unauthorized access to network resources, devices, services and subscriber data (profile), for example, to block unauthorized traffic. + +The NGN infrastructure is required to allow providers to limit the visibility of the network topology and resources to authorized entities. + +The NGN infrastructure is required to support multiple security zones. Isolation in security terms may be required between different security zones. + +The NGN infrastructure is required to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the signalling/control flows and management flows transported on it. + +The NGN infrastructure should ensure the confidentiality, the integrity of the media flows transported on it. + +NGN is required to carefully ensure the security of network elements linking to management resources (OSS, database, etc.) and service resources. + +The security requirements for secure TMN management are to follow those stated in clause 10.1 of [ITU-T M.3016.0] and as further detailed in clause 6 of [ITU-T M.3016.1]. + +Security functionality is required to be enforced on the network border elements (NBE or TE-BE, i.e., the NEs in trusted but vulnerable zone). This includes functions such as access control on data packets and signalling information according to the policies specified, e.g., refusal of traffic from particular applications or users. + +The sensitive NGN elements, especially for network border elements, may perform the logical and/or physical separation of transport paths according to the security policies in place, e.g., the separation of the control and/or managements flows from the media flows using logically different interfaces or different address plans, and using physically different real or virtual transport network (virtual such as VPNs and VLANs). + +NGN is required to provide safe storage for security-related data (e.g., identity and credentials data). Such storage is required to be separate from the general data repository that contains subscribers' services-related information. The NGN is required to provide security policy, which includes a set of rules that determine which traffic has to be protected based on, e.g., contracts, what kind of protection is used, how often session keys are changed, and the rules that determine security compliance of a device. + +The NGN is required to support the capability to monitor network traffic and establish a baseline of what should be considered normal network events. + +The NGN is required to be capable of detecting, reporting, and mitigating occurrences of the abnormal network events. + +### **8.1.1 Security policy** + +Security policy is a set of rules laid down by the security authority governing the use and provision of security services and facilities. NGN providers shall prepare appropriate security policy and shall be responsible for applying it to all NEs and devices under its control. + +### **8.1.2 Hardening and service disablement** + +All NGN elements are required to be capable of being configured to support the minimum services needed to support the NGN provider NGN infrastructure. Any service or transport layer port that is not required for the correct operation of the NGN element is required to be disabled on all systems and network elements. In addition, applications are required to run under minimum privileges (e.g., on "UNIX/Linux" platforms applications should not run as root if root privileges are not indispensable). The base operating system (OS) supporting any NGN element is required to be capable of being specifically configured for security and appropriately hardened. No "backdoors" are permitted (software access which would circumvent usual access control mechanisms) into any NGN element. + +In addition to hardening, physical and logical access controls are required to be put in place to meet industry best-practices. + +### **8.1.3 Audit trail, trapping and logging** + +All NGN elements are required to be capable of creating an audit trail that maintains a record of security related events in accordance with NGN provider's security policy. Mechanisms to prevent unauthorized or undetected modification are required. + +The audit trail is required to be capable of being managed and is required to allow old data in the audit trail to be placed on other media, e.g., removable media, for long-term storage. This interface is required to allow authorized administrators to move old data out of the audit trail onto removable media. This ability is required to be protected by a specific authorization to manage the audit trail. + +Clause 10.1.2.6.3 of [ITU-T M.3016.0] and clauses 6.6, 6.7 of [ITU-T M.3016.1] further detail the security requirements for security logging and audit. + +### **8.1.4 Time stamping and time source** + +The NGN element is required to support the use of a trusted time source for both system clock and audit trail item stamping. A trusted time source in this case means a time source that can be verified to be resistant to unauthorized modification. Transitive trust is acceptable, i.e., a time source that relies on a trusted time source is itself an acceptable trusted time source. + +### **8.1.5 Resource allocation and exception handling** + +Each NGN element is required to provide the capability to limit the amount of its own important resources (e.g., memory allocation) it allocates to servicing requests. Such limits can minimize negative effects of denial of service attacks. Resources used to service requests compete with other resource utilization requests on the system. In addition, each specific NGN application is required to have the ability to limit its own usage of important resources that it allocates for satisfying requests. + +The purpose of this requirement is to limit the effect of bursts of activity so that they do not affect other service requests. This will also allow/leave the application (and OS) capability to signal monitoring systems that the application and/or its platform may be under DoS attack. The NGN element is required to provide an interface to monitor resource utilization. + +The NGN element is required to silently discard any packets that do not conform to the expected protocol or format and, based on security policy, be capable of generating a log entry for each of these events. "Silent discard" is to trap and log the received packet, and discard the received packet while not responding with an indication of the discard (e.g., error response). + +The purpose is to limit potential attacks from malicious or incorrect packets. Clearly, if the resource utilization of the logging operation is so large that it is interfering with other operations of the element, the obvious heuristic to apply is that logging will stop until resource utilization returns to an acceptable level. + +NOTE – This is part of managing internal resources as mentioned above. + +### **8.1.6 Code and system integrity and monitoring** + +The network element is required to be capable of monitoring 1) its configuration and software and 2) any changes to detect unauthorized changes, both based on the security policy. Any unauthorized changes are required to create a log entry and cause an alarm to be generated. Based on the security policy, the network element is required to do the following. The element is required to be capable of periodically scanning its resources and software for malicious software, e.g., a virus. The element is required to generate an alarm if malicious software is discovered during a scan. + +Monitoring is required to be controlled so that it does not impact the performance of delay-sensitive real-time communications or unnecessarily cause connections to be torn down. + +Clause 10.1.2.6.4 of [ITU-T M.3016.0] further details the security requirement for system integrity. + +### **8.1.7 Patches, hotfixes and supplementary code** + +To trust signals generated by NGN provider NGN elements within un-trusted networks, say terminal. It is a requirement that software on the system is not compromised. This ensures that "Trojans"1 (that phone home), "worms" (that generate useless traffic or turn systems into + +--- + +1 Many Trojan horses act as a remote-control software device for the hacker who sends them out. When they are safely installed on the target system, they initiate a connection back to the hacker to inform him/her that they are ready for use. + +"zombies") and other viruses are not downloaded onto NGN elements or underlying OS. Such viruses would compromise system integrity, confidentiality and/or availability of data. + +NGN provider network elements and systems are required to provide a capability to verify and audit all their software. The audit results are to be accessible to an OSS. This would allow for an analysis of the security posture of the NGN provider NGN infrastructure and provide guidance to administrators and providers with respect to where mitigation is necessary. + +Security patches are to be obtained from the equipment vendors and installed in a timely fashion, once the NGN provider has certified them. + +Clause I.5.2 of [ITU-T M.3016.1] provides further considerations on a patching process; while clause I.5.3.9 of [ITU-T M.3016.1] gives considerations on security assumptions of the operating system. + +### **8.1.8 Access to OAMP functions in devices** + +In order to safeguard the OAMP infrastructure, each internal NGN network element is required to be managed through a separate IP address allocated from a separate address block. Each internal NGN network element should have a physically or logically separate interface for the exclusive use of this OAMP traffic. When a separate interface is used, the NGN network element is required to silently discard all packets received on the OAMP interface with source addresses other than the OAMP address. The NGN network element is required to silently discard all packets received over the non-OAMP interface with source addresses assigned to OAMP traffic. + +Access to OAMP functions is required to be capable of being controlled by authentication. Once a user has authenticated to a system, the internal NGN element is required to track all changes that they make, and provide the opportunity to roll them back. + +All security relevant use of authorization is required to be logged in the audit trail for a specified time. In particular, all access attempts, successful or not, to the element are required to be logged in the audit trail. + +OAMP traffic is required to be securely protected. If OAMP traffic (including SNMP and NTP) travels over an un-trusted network, then it is required to be securely protected (e.g., IPsec or an MPLS, etc.). + +## **8.2 Requirements for NGN elements in the trusted zone** + +The NGN Release 1 element in the "trusted" zone is to be assigned an IP address in the block reserved for internal NGN elements. All signalling is required to use this address. The NGN Release 1 element is also required to be assigned an IP address in the block reserved for OAMP, and all OAMPs are required to use this address. + +In order to preserve the confidentiality and integrity of customer communication, signalling and media traffic is to be protected, either with transport encryption or assurance that the traffic only travels over a protected domain. + +## **8.3 Requirements for NGN border elements in the "trusted-but-vulnerable" domain** + +Network border elements are the main defence against external attacks, i.e., attacks from devices/network elements in the un-trusted zone. All traffic from devices/network elements in the "un-trusted" zone is sent first to a network border element, where it is validated before it is transmitted to its destination in the "trusted" domain. The capabilities of providing physical/logical separation of networks are utilized to prohibit traffic from a device/network element in the un-trusted zone from reaching any element in the "trusted" domain. + +Network border elements (NBE) are the main defence against signalling attacks. All signalling traffic from TE or TE-BE in un-trusted zone is processed at its assigned NBE, which retransmits the + +signalling to the network equipments in the trusted zone. The capabilities of providing physical/logical separation of networks at the NBE are utilized to prohibit a TE/TE-BE in un-trusted zone from reaching any network element in trusted zone except its assigned NBE(s). + +As with signalling, the network border elements (NBE) are also the main defence against media attacks. All media traffic from TE/TE-BE is processed at a NBE, and the NBE relays the media. NBE routes media packets, towards the destination and through the trusted domain, only if media packet can be associated with an authorized session in progress. Media packets that are not associated with a session request are not valid, have no place to go and are discarded. Furthermore, the NBE verifies the source of the media stream, and verifies the packet rate is consistent with the session established. The media is transferred within the NGN provider facilities to either a PSTN gateway (for a PSTN connection) or to another NBE. At the second NBE, the media is processed and retransmitted to a TE destination. + +NOTE – The term "session" is used to mean any type of media flow, independent of the convention used to establish the session. + +The network border element is required to support multiple IP addresses, or multiple network interfaces. One IP address (the "internal" address) is to be assigned from the block reserved for internal NGN Release 1 elements. All signalling and media to and from other internal NGN Release 1 elements is required to use this address (or this interface). One IP address (the "external" address) is to be assigned; it is to be accessible from the TE equipment. All signalling and media to and from the TE is required to use this address (or this interface). One IP address (the "OAMP address") is required to be assigned from the block reserved for OAMP, which is accessible from the OAMP servers. + +In order to preserve the confidentiality of customer communication against eavesdropping on the signalling traffic, the signalling transport of all signalling messages is required to be secured to NGN elements in the "trusted" or "trusted-but-vulnerable" zones. All connections initiated by a NBE used for transfer of signalling information to such NGN elements is to be established using secure channels with authentication. All signalling messages received by a NBE at its "internal" NGN address over un-secure channels are to be silently discarded. + +Media streams are to be protected either with transport encryption or assurance that the traffic only travels over a protected network. In addition, source address assurance at the edge of the network will guarantee that packets from outside will not claim to be from the internal NGN address block. + +Media packets received by the NBE at its external address are to be checked for an active session (based on the signalling exchange), and against the expected source address (based on the session description contained in the signalling exchange). The NBE is required to silently discard any media packets received that do not correspond to an active session. The NBE is also required to verify that the packet rate is consistent with the negotiated session parameters. The NBE may verify the packet size is consistent with the session established. Media packets received from a source IP address that is not a valid originator of media to this NBE are to be silently discarded. + +The NBE is required to authenticate all requests if required by the service agreement with the customer. When a request is received over a non-encrypted connection, each individual request is to be authenticated. When a request is received over an encrypted connection that was created without a client authentication, the first request over that connection is to be authenticated. When a request is received over an encrypted connection that was created with authentication, no further authentication is required. Note that requests that are sent through a TE-BE will not be challenged for device authentication, since the TE-BE will be using an encrypted connection to the NBE. If the request comes from a source IP address that is not a valid originator of requests to this NBE, it is to be silently discarded. Requests for secure channel from a source IP address that is not a valid originator of requests to this NBE are also to be silently discarded. + +## **8.4 Requirements for TE border elements in the "un-trusted" domain** + +Physical security is a challenge for equipment placed on customer site. Ultimately, it must be accepted that, to a large extent, the security of these devices is dependent on the customer. That said, each device is required to provide reasonable precautions against being attacked, compromised or otherwise tampered with. In order to preserve the confidentiality of customer communication against eavesdropping on the signalling traffic, signalling messages are required to use a secure signalling connection between the TE-BE and the NBE. The TE-BE may perform a media-relay function. + +### **8.4.1 OAMP functions** + +All OAMP functions between TE-BE and the NGN provider are required to be protected against determined eavesdropping. Since OAMP can be provided both in-band and out-of-band, these are dealt with separately. + +## **8.5 Security recommendations for terminal equipment in the "un-trusted" domain** + +The terminal equipment (TE) is often outside the control of the NGN provider. Therefore it is not required for the NGN provider to place requirements on its security features or policies, rather it is the function of the various network border elements to adapt to whatever policies are chosen by the customer and to provide the best service under those conditions. + +The actual security functionalities of the NGN provider border elements are for further study. + +Media traffic should be protected from eavesdropping or modification. + +# **Appendix I** + +## **Security objectives and guidelines for interconnection of emergency telecommunications services** + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation) + +### **I.1 Background** + +Emergency telecommunications service (ETS) is a national service, providing priority telecommunications services to ETS authorized users in times of disaster and emergencies. ETS implementation is a national matter. However, disasters/emergencies can transcend geographic boundaries, and thus there is a potential that countries/administrations may enter into bilateral and/or multilateral agreements to link their respective ETS systems. This would allow priority telecommunications services (e.g., voice, messaging, video and data) under the umbrella of ETS to be supported between different national networks with bilateral and/or multilateral agreements in times of disaster and emergencies. + +ETS telecommunications services between different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations) need to be protected against security threats. To allow network provided security of end-to-end ETS telecommunications services between different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations) implementation of ETS, guidance and common security objectives and requirements are needed. Security and availability of ETS telecommunications services will depend on the security of each network involved in an end-to-end communication. + +### **I.2 Scope/purpose** + +This appendix provides common security objectives and requirements, and provides guidance to allow support of network provided security for ETS telecommunications services across different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations) implementations of ETS. + +End-user peer-to-peer security function using special end-user equipment security functions is not included in the scope of this appendix. The scope of this appendix is limited to network provided security for ETS telecommunications services across multiple networks on a hop-by-hop basis. However, the NGN should be capable of transparently supporting such peer-to-peer functions. + +This appendix is not intended to impose conditions on national implementations of ETS. Its primary purpose is to allow network provided security for ETS telecommunications services (i.e., secure priority voice, video, data and messaging communications). + +### **I.3 General objectives** + +The general objective is for networks to be capable of providing security of ETS telecommunications services (e.g., secure priority voice, video, data, and messaging communications) across different national networks (i.e., countries/administrations) and protecting availability of ETS. This would involve security of the end-to-end communication that may traverse different network provider domains of national and international networks (i.e., countries/administrations) where each network is responsible for security within its domain. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of end-to-end secure communications across multiple national ETS (End-to-end Telecommunications Security) implementations. It is divided into three main sections: the Originating national network (ETS), the International network, and the Terminating national network (ETS). The communication path involves several network segments: an Access network, an Originating network, an ETS provider network, an International provider network, an Intermediate network, and a Terminating network. The flow of signalling and control (service and control stratum) is indicated by red dashed arrows, while the flow of bearer or data traffic (transport stratum) is indicated by a solid black line. A legend at the bottom left clarifies these symbols. A note at the bottom states: 'NOTE – Management plane is not shown.' + +Diagram illustrating end-to-end communication across different national ETS implementations. The diagram shows a sequence of network segments: Access network, Originating network, ETS provider network, International provider network, Intermediate network, and Terminating network. The communication is divided into three main sections: Originating national network (ETS), International network, and Terminating national network (ETS). The diagram also shows the flow of signalling and control (service and control stratum) and bearer or data traffic (transport stratum). + +**Figure I.1 – Example of end-to-end communication across different national ETS implementations** + +Figure I.1 illustrates end-to-end ETS telecommunications services (e.g., priority voice, video, data or messaging communication) between two different national networks. The example illustrates that the end-to-end priority communication for ETS may involve multiple network segments and administrative domains (e.g., access network, originating network, ETS provider network, international provider network, intermediate network and terminating network). + +Each network segment will have specific security responsibilities within its domain to facilitate end-to-end security and availability of ETS telecommunications services. + +The following is a minimal set of general guidelines and security planning to protect signalling, bearer and data, and management-related data and information (e.g., user profile information) for ETS: + +- Each network domain should establish and enforce security policies and implement mitigation capabilities for ETS within its domain. Specifically, it is recommended that mitigation capabilities and security practices beyond those needed for general application services should be identified and enforced for ETS priority communications. For example, these capabilities and practices should be designed to prevent use of ETS resources by unauthorized users, and to prevent denial of service and other types of attacks. +- Each network domain should establish trust relations, methods and procedures for identifying ETS telecommunications services, and for identity management and authentication of end-users and networks across multiple network administration domains. For example, service level agreements (SLAs) should establish security policy for authenticating each domain when handing off and receiving ETS telecommunications services. +- Each network administrative domain should establish and enforce security policies to protect ETS management-related data and information (e.g., user profile information). + +### **I.4 General security capabilities** + +It is recommended that the following be supported for ETS: + +- Security capabilities to protect end-to-end ETS telecommunications services across multiple network domains. +- Security capabilities to protect availability of ETS telecommunications services across multiple network domains. +- Security capabilities to provide identity management and authentication of end-users and networks across multiple network administration domains. It is highly desirable that the end-user interact with the ETS service only once and that the security mechanisms pass the end-user's credentials from administrative domain to domain. + +### **I.5 Authentication, authorization and access control** + +It is recommended that the following minimum set of authentication, authorization and access control capabilities be supported for ETS: + +- Security capabilities to protect mechanisms used to authenticate and authorize ETS end-users and devices. +- Security capabilities to protect mechanisms used to bind ETS end-user with associated devices. +- Security capabilities to protect mechanisms used to share authentication information (e.g., confirm that an end-user has been authenticated) across multiple network domains. +- Security capabilities to protect mechanisms used for bilateral authentication of end-user and entities. This includes mechanisms for an ETS end-user to authenticate the called party or communicating entities (e.g., website, content server, etc.). +- Security capabilities to protect mechanisms used by one network to authenticate another network. This includes mechanisms used to authenticate the network handing off an ETS telecommunications services (e.g., originating network) and to authenticate the network receiving the ETS telecommunications services (e.g., intermediate or terminating networks). +- Security capabilities to protect against unauthorized access to ETS information and resources (e.g., user information in authentication servers and management systems). + +### **I.6 Confidentiality and privacy** + +It is recommended that the following minimum set of confidential capabilities be supported: + +- Security capabilities to provide confidentiality protection of ETS signalling and control. +- Security capabilities to provide confidentiality protection of ETS bearer and data traffic (e.g., voice, video or data). +- Security capabilities to provide confidentiality protection of ETS end-user and communicating entities identities and subscription information. +- Security capabilities to provide confidentiality protection of ETS end-user location. + +It is recommended that the following minimum set of privacy capabilities be supported: + +- Security capabilities to provide privacy protection of ETS information (e.g., information derived from the observation of network activities such as web-sites that an end-user has visited, a end-user's geographic location, and the IP addresses and DNS names of devices in a service provider network). + +- Security capabilities to provide privacy protection against unauthorized observation of ETS usage information (e.g., usage patterns such as ETS traffic volume, locations, time, frequency, etc.). + +### **I.7 Data integrity** + +It is recommended that the following minimum set of data integrity capabilities be supported: + +- Security mechanisms to provide integrity protection of ETS telecommunications services (e.g., protection against unauthorized modification, deletion, creation, or replay). This includes mechanisms to provide notification of information tampering or modification. +- Security mechanisms to provide integrity protection of ETS information (e.g., priority marking, voice, data and video). +- Security mechanisms to provide integrity protection of ETS specific configuration data (e.g., priority information stored in policy decision functions, user priority level, etc.). + +### **I.8 Communication** + +It is recommended that the following minimum capability be supported: + +- Security mechanisms to protect ETS telecommunications services from an authorized ETS end-user against intrusions (e.g., mechanisms to prevent unlawful interception, hijacking or replay of ETS signalling or bearer/data traffic). + +### **I.9 Availability** + +It is recommended that the following minimum set of capabilities be supported: + +- Security mechanisms to protect the availability of ETS telecommunications services (e.g., protection of ETS signalling and control, and bearer/data traffic against denial of service (DoS) and other forms of attacks). +- Security mechanisms to protect the availability of ETS specific resources and information (e.g., authentication/authorization databases, priority information stored in policy decision function, and dedicated network resources against denial of service (DoS) and other forms of attacks). + +## Bibliography + +## ITU-T Recommendations + +- [b-ITU-T E.106] ITU-T Recommendation E.106 (2003), *International Emergency Preference Scheme (IEPS) for disaster relief operations*. +- [b-ITU-T E.107] ITU-T Recommendation E.107 (2007), *Emergency Telecommunications Service (ETS) and interconnection framework for national implementations of ETS*. +- [b-ITU-T E.115] ITU-T Recommendation E.115 (2007), *Computerized directory assistance*. +- [b-ITU-T M.3016.2] ITU-T Recommendation M.3016.2 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Security services*. +- [b-ITU-T M.3016.3] ITU-T Recommendation M.3016.3 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Security mechanism*. +- [b-ITU-T M.3016.4] ITU-T Recommendation M.3016.4 (2005), *Security for the management plane: Profile proforma*. +- [b-ITU-T M.3060] ITU-T Recommendation M.3060/Y.2401 (2006), *Principles for the management of Next Generation Networks*. +- [b-ITU-T X.1121] ITU-T Recommendation X.1121 (2004), *Framework of security technologies for mobile end-to-end data communications*. +- [b-ITU-T X.1122] ITU-T Recommendation X.1122 (2004), *Guideline for implementing secure mobile systems based on PKI*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.1271] ITU-T Recommendation Y.1271 (2004), *Framework(s) on network requirements and capabilities to support emergency telecommunications over evolving circuit-switched and packet-switched networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.2000-Sup.1] ITU-T Y.2000-series Recommendations – Supplement 1 (2006), *NGN release 1 scope*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.2111] ITU-T Recommendation Y.2111 (2006), *Resource and admission control functions in Next Generation Networks*. + +### ETSI TISPAN documents + +- [b-ETSI TR 187.002] ETSI TR 187 002 V.1.1.1 (2006), *Telecommunications and Internet converged services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); TISPAN NGN Security (NGN\_SEC); Threat and Risk Analysis*. +- [b-ETSI TS 187.001] ETSI TS 187 001 V.1.1.1 (2006), *Telecommunications and Internet converged services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN SECurity (SEC); Requirements*. +- [b-ETSI TS 187.003] ETSI TS 187 003 V.1.1.1 (2006), *Telecommunications and Internet converged services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Security Architecture*. + +### ETSI/3GPP documents + +| | | +|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| [b-3GPP TS 33.102] | 3GPP TS 33.102 (2007), 3G security; Security architecture. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.103] | 3GPP TS 33.103 (2001), 3G security; Integration guidelines. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.110] | 3GPP TS 33.110 (2007), Key establishment between a UICC and a terminal. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.120] | 3GPP TS 33.120 (2001), Security Objectives and Principles. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.200] | 3GPP TS 33.200 (2004), 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); Mobile Application Part (MAP) application layer security. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.203] | 3GPP TS 33.203 (2007), 3G security; Access security for IP-based services. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.204] | 3GPP TS 33.204 (2007), 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS); TCAP user security. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.210] | 3GPP TS 33.210 (2007), 3G security; Network Domain Security; IP network layer security. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.220] | 3GPP TS 33.220 (2007), Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture. | +| [b-3GPP TS 33.310] | 3GPP TS 33.310 (2007), Network Domain Security (DNS); Authentication Framework (AF). | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.901] | 3GPP TR 33.901 (2001), Criteria for cryptographic algorithm design process. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.902] | 3GPP TR 33.902 (2001), Formal Analysis of the 3G Authentication Protocol. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.908] | 3GPP TR 33.908 (2001), 3G Security; General report on the design, specification and evaluation of 3GPP standard confidentiality and integrity algorithms. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.909] | 3GPP TR 33.909 (2001), 3G Security; Report on the design and evaluation of the MILENAGE algorithm set; Deliverable 5: An example algorithm for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.918] | 3GPP TR 33.918 (2007), Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Early implementation of Hypertext Transfer Protocol over Transport Layer Security (HTTPS) connection between a Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) and a Network Application Function (NAF). | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.919] | 3GPP TR 33.919 (2007), 3G Security; Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.920] | 3GPP TR 33.920 (2007), SIM card based Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA); Early implementation feature. | +| [b-3GPP TR 33.980] | 3GPP TR 33.980 (2007), Liberty Alliance and 3GPP security interworking; Interworking of Liberty Alliance Identity Federation Framework (ID-FF), Identity Web Services Framework (ID-WSF) and Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA). | +| [b-ETSI TR 133.901] | ETSI TR 133.901 V4.0.0 (2001), Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security – Criteria for cryptographic Algorithm design process. | + +- [b-ETSI TR 133.902] ETSI TR 133.902 V4.0.0 (2001), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Formal Analysis of the 3G Authentication Protocol.* +- [b-ETSI TR 133.908] ETSI TR 133.908 (2001), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Security Algorithms Group of Experts (SAGE); General report on the design, specification and evaluation of 3GPP standard confidentiality and integrity algorithms.* +- [b-ETSI TR 133.909] ETSI TR 133.909 (2001), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security; Report on the design and evaluation of the MILENAGE algorithm set; Deliverable 5: An example algorithm for the 3GPP authentication and key generation functions.* +- [b-ETSI TR 133.919] ETSI TR 133.919 V6.2.0 (2005), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); System description.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.102] ETSI TS 133 102 V7.1.0 (2006), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Security architecture.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.103] ETSI TS 133 103 V4.2.0 (2001), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security; Integration Guidelines.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.120] ETSI TS 133 120 V4.0.0 (2001), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security; Security Principles and Objectives.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.200] ETSI TS 133 200 V6.1.0 (2005), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G Security; Network Domain Security (NDS); Mobile Application Part (MAP) application layer security.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.203] ETSI TS 133 203 V6.10.0 (2006), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Access security for IP-based services.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.210] ETSI TS 133 210 V7.2.0 (2006), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); 3G security; Network Domain Security (NDS).* +- [b-GPP TS 133.220] ETSI TS 133 220 V7.8.0 (2007), *Digital cellular telecommunications system; (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic bootstrapping architecture.* +- [b-ETSI TS 133.310] ETSI TS 133 310 V7.1.0 (2006), *Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); Network domain security; Authentication framework (NDS/AF).* +- ATIS/3GPP2 documents** +- [b-GPP2 S.S0086] 3GPP2 S.S0086 (2004), *IMS Security Framework.* + +### IPsec related IETF RFCs + +- [b-IETF RFC 2085] IETF RFC 2085 (1997), *HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2403] IETF RFC 2403 (1998), *The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2404] IETF RFC 2404 (1998), *The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2405] IETF RFC 2405 (1998), *The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2410] IETF RFC 2410 (1998), *The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2411] IETF RFC 2411 (1998), *IP Security Document Roadmap*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2451] IETF RFC 2451 (1998), *ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2709] IETF RFC 2709 (1999), *Security Model with Tunnel-mode IPsec for NAT Domains*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2857] IETF RFC 2857 (2000), *The Use of HMAC-RIPEMD-160-96 within ESP and AH*. +- [b-IETF RFC 3526] IETF RFC 3526 (2003), *More Modular Exponential (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 3602] IETF RFC 3602 (2003), *The AES-CBC Cipher Algorithm and Its Use with IPsec*. +- [b-IETF RFC 3664] IETF RFC 3664 (2004), *The AES-XCBC-PRF-128 Algorithm for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4109] IETF RFC 4109 (2005), *Algorithms for Internet Key Exchange version 1 (IKEv1)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4301] IETF RFC 4301 (2005), *Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4302] IETF RFC 4302 (2005), *IP Authentication Header*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4303] IETF RFC 4303 (2005), *IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4304] IETF RFC 4304 (2005), *Extended Sequence Number (ESN) Addendum to IPsec Domain of Interpretation (DOI) for Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4305] IETF RFC 4305 (2005), *Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4306] IETF RFC 4306 (2005), *Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4307] IETF RFC 4307 (2005), *Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4308] IETF RFC 4308 (2005), *Cryptographic Suites for IPsec*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4309] IETF RFC 4309 (2005), *Using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) CCM Mode with IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 4312] IETF RFC 4312 (2005), *The Camellia Cipher Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec*. + +### **S/MIME related IETF RFCs** + +[b-IETF RFC 2311] IETF RFC 2311 (1998), *S/MIME Version 2 Message Specification*. + +[b-IETF RFC 2312] IETF RFC 2312 (1998), *S/MIME Version 2 Certificate Handling*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3565] IETF RFC 3565 (2003), *Use of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3657] IETF RFC 3657 (2004), *Use of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3850] IETF RFC 3850 (2004), *Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Certificate Handling*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3851] IETF RFC 3851 (2004), *Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3852] IETF RFC 3852 (2004), *Cryptographic Message Syntax*. + +[b-IETFB RFC 4134] IETF RFC 4134 (2005), *Examples of S/MIME Messages*. + +### **TLS related IETF RFCs** + +[b-IETF RFC 2246] IETF RFC 2246 (1999), *The TLS Protocol Version 1.0*. + +[b-IETF RFC 2817] IETF RFC 2817 (2000), *Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1*. + +[b-IETF RFC 2818] IETF RFC 2818 (2000), *HTTP Over TLS*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3268] IETF RFC 3268 (2002), *Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3546] IETF RFC 3546 (2003), *Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions*. + +[b-IETF RFC 4132] IETF RFC 4132 (2005), *Addition of Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)*. + +### **Miscellaneous IETF security related RFC** + +[b-IETF i-d.SIPUAP] IETF internet-draft work in progress, draft-ietf-sipping-config-framework-08.txt (March 6, 2006), *A Framework for Session Initiation Protocol User Agent Profile Delivery*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3489] IETF RFC 3489 (2003), *STUN – Simple Traversal of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Through Network Address Translators (NATs)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3711] IETF RFC 3711 (2004), *The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3715] IETF RFC 3715 (2004), *IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3847] IETF RFC 3847 (2004), *Restart Signaling for Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS)*. + +[b-IETF RFC 3948] IETF RFC 3948 (2005), *UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets*. + +### **DNS related IETF RFCs** + +[b-IETF RFC 4033] IETF RFC 4033 (2005), *DNS Security Introduction and Requirements*. + +- [b-IETF RFC 4034] IETF RFC 4034 (2005), *Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4035] IETF RFC 4035 (2005), *Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions*. + +### **TIA documents** + +- [b-TIA-683-D] TIA Standard TIA-683-D (2006), *Over-the-Air Service Provisioning of Mobile Stations in Spread Spectrum Systems*. +- [b-TIA-1053] TIA Standard TIA-1053 (2005), *Broadcast/Multicast Security Framework*. +- [b-TIA-1091] TIA Standard TIA-1091 (2006), *IMS Security Framework*. + +### **ARIB documents** + +- [b-ARIB-SS0078] ARIB STD-T64 S.S0078-0 v1.0 (2002), *Common Security Algorithms*. + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2702-200809-I_PDF-E/052543d8c9c0643b05b3ce45c6decca1_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2702-200809-I_PDF-E/052543d8c9c0643b05b3ce45c6decca1_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ada3502168196c177da9b5a7eb98023b2ce2f440 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2702-200809-I_PDF-E/052543d8c9c0643b05b3ce45c6decca1_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:76f4bbed5c1bce75486e6e01d67de808c40712f8ad384567601456668cdb512d +size 18901 diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.2702-200809-I_PDF-E/1e8c50ad4fca7f315a407347dd5091cc_img.jpg 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ITU-T Y.2771 + + + +The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font. + +ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'. + +# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +## Recommendation ITU-T Y.2771 + +# Framework for deep packet inspection + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.2771 provides a framework for deep packet inspection (DPI). The primary purpose of this framework is to describe a structured approach for designing, defining and implementing DPI solutions in support of service/application awareness for facilitating interoperability in the evolving networks. It serves to identify and assist in understanding the network issues, from primarily an architectural viewpoint. This Recommendation also provides DPI framework aspects from modelling and performance. + +The purpose of such frameworks is especially to outline possible relationships between a DPI function and other network functions, to assist in identifying requirements for DPI functions (which would be the subject of other ITU-T Recommendations like, e.g., Recommendation ITU-T Y.2770) and to help for terminology work (e.g., when a definition would be related to a functional model). + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.2771 | 2014-07-18 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/12178 | + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
example network applications ..... | 8 | +| 7 | Modelling framework ..... | 16 | +| | 7.1 Functional models ..... | 16 | +| | 7.2 Information and data models ..... | 30 | +| | 7.3 Traffic models ..... | 31 | +| | 7.4 Identification of possible DPI-FE subcomponents..... | 37 | +| | 7.5 Fault tolerance models..... | 38 | +| 8 | Performance framework ..... | 43 | +| | 8.1 Purpose and scope of performance considerations..... | 43 | +| | 8.2 Performance metrics..... | 44 | +| | 8.3 Performance of policy enforcement points, estimation of qualitative
performance behaviour ..... | 52 | +| 9 | Categorization of DPI functional entities ..... | 55 | +| | 9.1 Categorization principles..... | 55 | +| | 9.2 Capabilities in terms of conditions processing..... | 55 | +| | 9.3 Capabilities in terms of actions processing ..... | 55 | +| | 9.4 DPI-FE types ..... | 55 | +| 10 | Security considerations..... | 56 | +| | Appendix I Example functional architecture of probabilistic DPI based on the bloom
filter ..... | 57 | +| | I.1 Introduction..... | 57 | +| | I.2 Functional model of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI..... | 58 | +| | Bibliography..... | 59 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.2771 + +# Framework for deep packet inspection + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation provides a framework for deep packet inspection (DPI) in packet-based networks. The primary purpose of this Recommendation is to describe the fundamental concepts, functional components and capabilities of DPI that can be used to identify information flows in packet-based networks by DPI entities, to support the specification of DPI requirements and to guide structured solutions for packet-based networks (such as NGNs). + +This Recommendation provides high-level system information with regard to some fundamental concepts as typically relevant when realizing DPI entities. However, it is not expected to present all-inclusive detailed specifications for the DPI. Rather, this Recommendation provides an high-level information (i.e., a framework) and is intended to be used as background material for use by ITU Study Groups and other expert groups outside the ITU, e.g., as input for their development of detailed standards for DPI functionalities. + +The scope of this Recommendation includes: + +- a) basic architectural principles that will be encountered in combining DPI in various network architectures; +- b) protocol architectural aspects from the perspective of DPI; +- c) example functional models and their application to DPI use case scenarios; and +- d) performance frameworks in order to assist in DPI performance discussions like the identification of key performance indicators related to DPI. + +Implementers and users of this ITU-T Recommendation shall comply with all applicable national and regional laws, regulations and policies. The mechanism described in this Recommendation may not be applicable to international correspondence in order to ensure the secrecy and sovereign national legal requirements placed upon telecommunications providers, as well as the ITU Constitution and Convention. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- | | | +|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| [ITU-T E.800] | Recommendation ITU-T E.800 (2008), Definitions of terms related to quality of service. | +| [ITU-T G.602] | Recommendation ITU-T G.602 (1988), Reliability and availability of analogue cable transmission systems and associated equipments. | +| [ITU-T H.248.86] | Recommendation ITU-T H.248.86 (2014), Gateway control protocol: H.248 Support for deep packet inspection. | +| [ITU-T X.200] | Recommendation ITU-T X.200 (1994), Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Basic Reference Model: The basic model. | + +- [ITU-T X.731] Recommendation ITU-T X.731 (1992), *Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Systems management: State management function.* +- [ITU-T Y.2704] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN.* +- [ITU-T Y.2770] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2770 (2012), *Requirements for deep packet inspection in next generation networks.* +- [ETSI TS 132 410] ETSI TS 132 410 (2012), *Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; Telecommunication management; Key Performance Indicators (KPI) for UMTS and GSM (3GPP TS 32.410 version 11.0.0 Release 11.* +- [IETF RFC 791] IETF RFC 791 (1981), *Internet Protocol – DARPA Internet Program Protocol Specification.* +- [IETF RFC 2460] IETF RFC 2460 (1998), *Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification.* +- [IETF RFC 5101] IETF RFC 5101 (2008), *Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of IP Traffic Flow Information.* + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 application** [ITU-T Y.2770]: A designation of one of the following: + +- An *application protocol type* (e.g., IP application protocols ITU-T H.264 video, or session initiation protocol (SIP)); +- A *served user instance* (e.g., VoIP, VoLTE, VoIMS, VoNGN, and VoP2P) of an application type, e.g., "voice-over-Packet application"; +- A "*provider specific application*" for voice-over-Packet, (e.g., 3GPP provider VoIP, Skype VoIP); and +- an application embedded in another application (e.g., application content in a body element of a SIP or an HTTP message). + +An application is identifiable by a particular identifier (e.g., via a bit field, pattern, signature, or regular expression as "application level conditions", see also clause 3.2.2 of [ITU-T Y.2770]), as a common characteristic of all the above listed levels of applications. + +**3.1.2 availability** [ITU-T E.800]: Availability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function at a given instant of time or at any instant of time within a given time interval, assuming that the external resources, if required, are provided. + +**3.1.3 application-descriptor (also known as application-level conditions)** [ITU-T Y.2770]: A set of rule conditions that identify the application (according to clause 3.2.1 of [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +This Recommendation addresses the application descriptor as an object in general, which is synonymous with application-level conditions. It does not deal with its detailed structure, e.g., syntax, encoding and data type. + +**3.1.4 deep packet inspection (DPI)** [ITU-T Y.2770]: Analysis, according to the layered protocol architecture OSI-BRM [ITU-T X.200], of: + +- payload and/or packet properties (see list of potential properties in clause 3.2.11 of [ITU-T Y.2770]) deeper than protocol layer 2, 3 or 4 (L2/L3/L4) header information, and +- other packet properties + +in order to identify the application unambiguously. + +NOTE – The output of the DPI function, along with some extra information such as the flow information is typically used in subsequent functions such as reporting or actions on the packet. + +**3.1.5 DPI engine** [ITU-T Y.2770]: A subcomponent and central part of the DPI functional entity which performs all packet path processing functions (e.g., packet identification and other packet processing functions in Figure 6-1 of [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +**3.1.6 DPI policy condition (also known as DPI signature)** [ITU-T Y.2770]: A representation of the necessary state and/or prerequisites that identify an application and define whether a policy rule's actions should be performed. The set of DPI policy conditions associated with a policy rule specifies when the policy rule is applicable (see also [b-IETF RFC 3198]). + +A DPI policy condition must contain application level conditions and may contain other options such as state conditions and/or flow level conditions: + +- 1) State condition (optional): + - a) network grade of service conditions (e.g., experienced congestion in packet paths); or + - b) network element status (e.g., local overload condition of the DPI-FE). +- 2) Flow descriptor/Flow level conditions (optional): + - a) packet content (header fields); + - b) characteristics of a packet (e.g., number# of MPLS labels); + - c) packet treatment (e.g., output interface of the DPI-FE). +- 3) Application descriptor/application level conditions: + - a) Packet content (application header fields and application payload). + +NOTE – The condition relates to the "simple condition" in the formal descriptions of flow level conditions and application level conditions. + +**3.1.7 DPI policy decision functional entity (DPI-PDFE)** [ITU-T Y.2770]: The function remote to the DPI-FE that decides the signature-based rules to be enforced in the DPI-FE. Some control and/or management functions may not necessarily be remote from the DPI-FE. + +**3.1.8 flow descriptor (also known as flow level conditions)** [ITU-T Y.2770]: A set of rule conditions that is used to identify a specific type of flow (according to clause 3.1.3 of [ITU-T Y.2770]) from inspected traffic. + +NOTE 1 – This definition of flow descriptor extends the definition in [b-ITU-T Y.2121] with additional elements as described in clause 3 of [ITU-T Y.2770]. + +NOTE 2 – For further normative discussion of the flow descriptor as used in [ITU-T Y.2770], see Annex A of [ITU-T Y.2770]. + +**3.1.9 reliability** [ITU-T E.800]: The probability that an item can perform a required function under stated conditions for a given time interval. + +## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation** + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 DPI analyser:** A subsequent entity in the DPI processing path (within a DPI policy enforcement function) with focus on comparison functions between the particular packet headers and payloads of preselected packet flows. The primary scope of the DPI analyser is related to the evaluation of DPI policy *conditions* against *preselected* incoming packets. + +NOTE – The DPI analyser may be located after a DPI scanner (see clause 3.2.6). The DPI analyser may provide the functionality of an intrusion detection system (IDS) analyser. + +**3.2.2 DPI node:** A network element or device that realizes the DPI related functions. It is thus a generic term used to designate the realization of a DPI physical entity. + +NOTE – Functional perspective: the DPI node function (DPI-NF) comprises the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) and the (optional) local policy decision function (L-PDF); hence, the DPI-NF is functionally equal to the DPI functional entity. + +**3.2.3 DPI policy action (action in short):** Definition of what is to be done to enforce a policy rule, when the conditions of the rule are met. Policy actions may result in the execution of one or more operations to affect and/or configure network traffic and network resources; see also [b-IETF RFC 3198]. + +**3.2.4 DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF):** A logical entity that enforces policy decisions, given by DPI policy rules. + +**3.2.5 DPI scanner (also used as "DPI scan function"):** The first entity in the DPI processing path (within a DPI policy enforcement function) which provides a pre-selection (related to the subsequent DPI analyser, see clause 3.2.1) by checking *all* DPI policy *conditions* against *all* incoming packets. + +**3.2.6 DPI "1+N" redundancy group:** The collection of DPI functional components (e.g., DPI node, DPI-PIB, DPI engine, etc.) following a "1+N" redundancy architecture (and $N \geq 1$ ), given by a single working component and N protection components. + +NOTE – The above collection is used to provide extra reliability and improve availability for a DPI node or network deployed with one or DPI nodes. + +# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +## 4.1 General abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|---------------------------|---------------------------------------| +| $A_{\text{DPI}}$ | DPI policy action | +| BRM | Basic Reference Model | +| CAM | Content Addressable Memory | +| $C_{\text{DPI}}$ | DPI policy condition | +| DAI | Deep Application Identification | +| DHI | Deep Header Inspection | +| DiffServ | Differential Service | +| DPI | Deep Packet Inspection | +| DPI-AcEF | DPI Action Execution Function | +| DPI-AnF | DPI Analyser Function | +| DPI-FE | DPI Functional Entity | +| $\text{DPI}_{\text{InP}}$ | In-Path DPI | +| DPI-NF | DPI Node Function | +| $\text{DPI}_{\text{OoP}}$ | Out-of-Path DPI | +| DPI-PDFE | DPI Policy Decision Functional Entity | +| DPI-PE | DPI Physical Entity | +| DPI-PEF | DPI Policy Enforcement Function | + +| | | +|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DPI-PIB | DPI Policy Information Base | +| DPI-PIF | DPI Packet Identification Function | +| DPI-ScF | DPI Scan Function | +| DNNF | Determining Next Node Function | +| FIB | Forwarding Information Base | +| FTP | File Transfer Protocol | +| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol | +| HW | Hardware | +| IDS | Intrusion Detection System | +| IP | Internet Protocol | +| IPFIX | IP Flow Information Export | +| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | +| KPI DPI | Key performance indicators for DPI entities | +| L-PDF | Local PDF | +| L2VPN | Layer 2 Virtual Private Network | +| L X HI | Header Inspection of protocol Layer X | +| L X PI | Payload Inspection of protocol Layer X | +| LX | (Protocol) Layer X | +| LX+ | Higher (Protocol) Layer than LX | +| MIB | Management Information Base | +| MPI | Medium depth Packet Inspection | +| MPLS | Multi-Protocol Label Switch | +| MTBF | Mean Time Between Failures | +| MTTR | Mean Time To Repair | +| NA(P)T | Network Address (and Port) Translation | +| NGN | Next Generation Network | +| OSI-BRM | Open System Interconnection-Basic Reference Model | +| PDF | Policy Decision Function | +| PEP | Policy Enforcement Point | +| PFF | Packet Forwarding Function | +| PIB | Policy Information Base | +| QoS | Quality of Service | +| RACF | Resource and Admission Control Functions | +| R DPI | DPI policy rule | +| R-PDF | Remote PDF (i.e., PDF remotely located from DPI node perspective) | +| RTSP | Real Time Streaming Protocol | +| SDU | Service Data Unit | + +| | | +|---------------------|------------------------------------| +| SIP | Session Initiation Protocol | +| SPI | Shallow Packet Inspection | +| S D -PDF | Session-dependent PDF | +| S I -PDF | Session-independent PDF | +| SW | Software | +| TCAM | Ternary Content Addressable Memory | +| TCP | Transmission Control Protocol | +| TOS | Type of Service | +| VoIP | Voice over IP | +| VoLTE | Voice over Long Term Evolution | +| VoIMS | Voice over Integrated Media System | +| VoNGN | Voice over Next Generation Network | +| VoP2P | Voice over Peer to Peer | + +## 4.2 Mathematical symbols + +This Recommendation uses the following symbols (with name, unit and brief description): + +| | | | +|------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------| +| $\epsilon_{\text{DPI}}$ | (DPI) error rate | — | +| $\epsilon_{\text{f-n}}$ | (DPI) false-negative error rate | — | +| $\epsilon_{\text{f-p}}$ | (DPI) false-positive error rate | — | +| $\phi_{\text{P,In}}$ | (DPI) processing rate of incoming packets | [s -1 ] | +| $\phi_{\text{P,Out}}$ | (DPI) packet rate in outgoing direction | [s -1 ] | +| $\phi_{\text{P,Node,Out}}$ | Packet node throughput | — | +| $\phi_{\text{P,Identified}}$ | Rate of successfully identified packets | — | +| $P_{\text{Hit,BloomFilter}}$ | Estimated information certainty of probability | — | +| $N_{\text{db}}$ | The number of DPI policy rules | — | +| $S_{\text{p}}$ | The packet size | — | +| $N_{\text{DPIeng}}$ | The number of DPI engines | — | +| $\tau_{\text{TD}}$ | Node-internal transfer delay (of DPI node) | [ns] | +| A | Set of (DPI policy) rule actions | — | +| C | Set of (DPI policy) rule conditions | — | +| R | Set of (DPI policy) rules | — | + +# 5 Conventions + +None. + +# 6 Architectural framework + +## 6.1 Network architecture framework – High-level network scenarios + +This framework outlines the major boundary conditions of a DPI deployment in a network infrastructure. Some principle DPI framework scenarios may be identified by consideration of criteria like: + +- **Network location level** (i.e., the location of a DPI entity in a packet network domain) + - at the edge ("**border DPI**"); or + - within the network ("**core DPI**"); + - between peering networks ("**peering DPI**"). +- **Network packet (path) types** (i.e., the kind of packet types are inspected)1 + - user plane (or transport stratum; e.g., IP data-path, IP media-path, IP bearer-path, tunnel, MPLS LSR, pseudo wire, etc.); or + - control plane (or service stratum; e.g., IP signalling-path); or + - management plane; or + - combinations. +- **Alignment level with other network architectures** (i.e., the level how a DPI entity is coupled with the underlying packet network architecture) + - **isolated DPI** entity (i.e., the DPI entity is hidden from the packet network), +Examples: + - a very few DPI entities located on selected points in the network (without the goal of "full coverage"; something like a probe-style in-path DPI); + - Out-of-path DPI entities. + - **overlay DPI** network (i.e., there is a dedicated DPI network infrastructure, overlayed to the underlying packet network; both network infrastructures are separated from an operational perspective), +Examples: + - generic example: a network of in-path DPI entities which share, e.g., the user plane paths, but use separate control and/or management interfaces; + - specific example: e.g., a DPI function with the purpose of intrusion detection. + - **embedded DPI** entity (i.e., the DPI functional entity is embedded in a physical network element together with other functional entities with regard to non-DPI packet processing; such a physical entity should provide, e.g., a single OAM interface from a cost-effective operational perspective, which implies consequently a harmonized management model across all functional entities), +Examples: + - generic example: a DPI entity with a management information base which is aligned with the management base of the other, non-DPI functional entities of the same physical network element; + - specific example: a DPI functional entity within RACF and a common management capability, but without sharing any RACF control interfaces. + - **integral DPI** (i.e., a DPI entity "fully integrated" in "the packet network"), + +--- + +1 The notion of "packet type" could be made specific by referring to a dedicated "protocol" or a "protocol stack". Though, that level of detail is not required here. + +Examples: + +- generic example: an SDO-defined network reference model (architecture) which takes into account DPI entities; +- specific example: ITU-T RACF extended by DPI entities which may use existing reference points (e.g., "Rw-controlled DPI" or an ITU-T H.248-based Rw extended by support of [ITU-T H.248.86]) or may introduce new reference points). + +There are consequently numerous use cases from the perspective of the network integration scenario of a DPI entity. + +## **6.2 Protocol architectural framework – Packet inspection level for some example network applications** + +### **6.2.1 Principle** + +There are various packet inspection levels. Table 6-1 provides an overview of typical network applications with respect to required involvement of "packet inspection levels". The packet inspection level may be denoted either: + +- 1) according to a basic reference model (BRM) for layered protocol architectures, here columns $L_{xHI}$ and $L_{yPI}$ ; or +- 2) using "old" colloquial terms (which are described in clause 8.1 of [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23]), here columns shallow packet inspection (SPI), medium packet inspection (MPI), deep header inspection (DHI) and deep application inspection (DAI). + +See also clause 8 in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23] on the aspect of DPI in layered protocol architectures. + +### **6.2.2 Distinction of cases DPI and non-DPI** + +The concept of DPI, from the perspective of layered protocol architectures, is fairly wide and includes even all protocol layers above layer 1 (see clause 3.2.5 of [ITU-T Y.2770]). However, the scope of packet inspection could be basically limited in case of specific network application, such as primarily related on link, network and/or transport layers only. + +Such a limitation is/was typically motivated by service-, historical- or/and implementation-related aspects, for instance, economical trade-off decisions with respect to an achievable DPI service versus state-of-the-art technique. Such a kind of limited packet inspection is/was also known as shallow packet inspection, and medium depth packet inspection (SPI, MPI; see also clause 8.1 in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23]). + +The coarse granular distinction between DPI and non-DPI according to [ITU-T Y.2770] is sufficient and also followed by this Recommendation. The notion of 'DPI' here means (loosely) policy inspection rules as supported by this Recommendation, and 'non DPI' relates more to legacy packet inspection at protocol layers 2, 3 and/or 4 (i.e., SPI, MPI). + +### **6.2.3 Examples** + +Table 6-1 provides a list of example network applications versus packet inspection levels, as typically part of such network applications. It should be noted that the indications by Table 6-1 are only exemplary and not necessarily exhaustive. + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application
(example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application
identification"
(DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow
packet
inspection"
(SPI) | "Inspection"
(MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header
inspection
(L 2 HI) | L3,4 header
inspection
(L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header
inspection
(L 4+ HI) | L7 payload
inspection
(L 7 PI) | | | +| Security: | | | | | | | | +| 1.1 | Network intrusion
detection | – | X | X | X | There are different ID methods,
a) anomaly detection
b) misuse detection (here) | | +| 1.2 | Security protection of
network resources
(network intrusion
prevention, security
attack prevention) | – | X | X | X | | | +| 1.3 | Other security-related
functions | | | | | | | + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application
(example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application
identification"
(DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow
packet
inspection"
(SPI) | "Inspection"
(MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header
inspection
(L 2 HI) | L3,4 header
inspection
(L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header
inspection
(L 4+ HI) | L7 payload
inspection
(L 7 PI) | | | +| Identification: | | | | | | | | +| 2.1 | Subscriber, user | – | X | – | – | Identified by ...? (e.g., network address) | | +| 2.2 | Application type | – | – | X | X | Identified by ...? (e.g., application layer protocol type) | | +| 2.3 | Session | – | X | – | – | Identified by ...? (e.g., IP connection, IP transport connection). See also clause 7 in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23] | | +| 2.4 | Application control protocol (e.g., SIP, RTSP, HTTP, FTP...) | – | X
(dependent on well-known port) | X | X | | | +| Application data characteristics: | | | | | | | | +| 2.5 | Content | – | – | X | X | For example, illegal content | | + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application
(example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application identification" (DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow packet inspection" (SPI) | "Inspection" (MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header inspection (L 2 HI) | L3,4 header inspection (L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header inspection (L 4+ HI) | L7 payload inspection (L 7 PI) | | | +| 2.6 | Media type
(Application data type) | – | – | X | X | | | +| 2.7 | Media format | – | – | X | X | | | +| Modification (of protocol data units): | | | | | | | | +| 3.1 | Modification 'content':
Removing of viruses | – | – | – | X | | | +| 3.2 | Modification 'header':
QoS marking | – | X | X | – | | | +| 3.3 | Modification 'header & content':
"ALG function" | – | X | X | – | Local NA(P)T function on L3 (& L4) and application layer | | + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application (example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application identification" (DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow packet inspection" (SPI) | "Inspection" (MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header inspection (L 2 HI) | L3,4 header inspection (L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header inspection (L 4+ HI) | L7 payload inspection (L 7 PI) | | | +| Usage parameter monitoring: | | | | | | | | +| 4.1 | Service level agreements | – | X | X | X | | | +| 4.2 | Traffic parameter control
Examples: | – | X | X | X | Dependent on traffic parameter type | | +| | L3 byte rate policing (peak rate, sustainable rate) | – | X | – | – | | | +| | L3 PDU size (min, max) policing | – | X | – | – | | | +| | L3 burst size policing | – | X | – | – | | | +| | L7 SDU size policing ("application payload") | – | X | X | – | | | +| | L7 byte rate policing | – | X | X | – | | | + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application
(example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|----------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application
identification"
(DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow
packet
inspection"
(SPI) | "Inspection"
(MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header
inspection
(L 2 HI) | L3,4 header
inspection
(L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header
inspection
(L 4+ HI) | L7 payload
inspection
(L 7 PI) | | | +| | ("application volume") | | | | | | | +| | | | | | | | | +| Quality of Service support: | | | | | | | | +| 5.1 | Traffic shaping | – | X | – | – | See e.g., [b-ITU-T Y.1221] or
[b-ITU-T H.248.53] | | +| | L3 byte rate shaping | – | X | – | – | | | +| | | | | | | | | +| Network analysis: | | | | | | | | +| 6.1 | User behaviour | – | X | X | X | | | +| 6.2 | Usage patterns | – | X | X | X | | | + +Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications + +| Network application (example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application identification" (DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow packet inspection" (SPI) | | | | | +| | | | "Inspection" (MPI) | | | | | +| | | L2 header inspection (L 2 HI) | L3,4 header inspection (L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header inspection (L 4+ HI) | L7 payload inspection (L 7 PI) | | | +| Performance measurements ("key performance indicators" (KPIs)): | | | | | | | | +| 7.1 | Collection of remote measurements | – | X | X | X | | | +| 7.2 | Generation of local measurements | – | X | X | X | | | +| | | | | | | | | +| Charging/billing support: | | | | | | | | +| 8.1 | Time-based information | – | X | – | – | | | +| 8.2 | Traffic volume-based information | – | X | – | X | Traffic volume related to IP byte rate (L3) or/and application data | | +| 8.3 | Event-based information | – | X | X | X | Dependent on event type (e.g., event may be associated to content) | | + +**Table 6-1 – Packet inspection level for some example network applications** + +| Network application
(example) | | Packet inspection level | | | | Comments | | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------|--| +| | | "Deep packet inspection" (DPI) | | | | | | +| | | (Note) | "Deep header inspection" (DHI) | "Deep application
identification"
(DAI) | | | | +| | | | "Medium depth packet" | | | | | +| | | | "Shallow
packet
inspection"
(SPI) | "Inspection"
(MPI) | | | | +| | | L2 header
inspection
(L 2 HI) | L3,4 header
inspection
(L 3,4 HI) | L4+ header
inspection
(L 4+ HI) | L7 payload
inspection
(L 7 PI) | | | +| | | | | | | | | +| Link-oriented DPI: | | | | | | | | +| 9.1 | DPI applications with possible layer 2-related policy conditions | X | X | X | X | See Note | | +| NOTE – There is a principal distinction between link-oriented DPI and network-oriented DPI. Link-oriented DPI is limited to a L2 network domain, and network-oriented DPI is related to DPI signatures which cover protocol information on network layer (L3) and higher. | | | | | | | | + +# 7 Modelling framework + +## 7.1 Functional models + +Multiple functional models are presented, illustrating the spectrum of a packet forwarding path without any DPI (clause 7.1.2), unidirectional DPI (clause 7.1.3) till a bidirectional DPI model (clause 7.1.4). + +All functional models in this clause are example functional models. + +### 7.1.1 In-path DPI versus out-of-path DPI + +There are two principle deployment scenarios of a DPI node function (DPI-NF), from the perspective of the end-to-end packet path: + +- In-path DPI (DPIInP): the DPI-NF is located in the end-to-end packet path, the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) executes DPI policy rules directly on the packet traffic (also known as Online DPI); or +- Out-of-path DPI (DPIOutP): the DPI-NF is *not* located in the end-to-end packet path, rather it is centralized in a packet network; the DPI-PEF thus executes DPI policy rules indirectly, e.g., on sampled packet traffic (also known as bypass DPI, offline DPI). + +Both DPI modes are different from the physical node perspective, housing the DPI-NF: the DPIInP may be located in a packet node, and the DPIOutP would be in a node *without* any packet forwarding function (PFF; see next clause). + +### 7.1.2 Generic packet forwarding + +A packet node in a packet-based network may be abstracted (on a high-level) by a packet forwarding function (PFF) according to Figure 7-1. The PFF may be e.g., a switching function in case of MPLS label switching routers (LSRs) or Ethernet switches or bridges2, or a forwarding/routing function in case of IPv4 [IETF RFC 791] and IPv6 [IETF RFC 2460] routers. The PFF must determine the next node (e.g., the next hop in IP networks) for each ingress packet sent in egress direction for unicast communications. + +NOTE 1 – Multicasting would lead to the determination of multiple next nodes. + +The information used by the determining next node function (DNNF) for that function is stored in a collocated database called forwarding information base (FIB), for instance, the IP forwarding table MIB according to [b-IETF RFC 4292] in case of IPv4 routers as defined by [b-IETF RFC 1812]. + +--- + +2 NOTE – The term “packet” would then be synonymous to the (L2) “frame”. + + + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph PFF [Packet forwarding function PFF] + FIB[Forwarding information base FIB] + DNNF[Determining next node function DNNF] + FIB <--> DNNF + end + Ingress[Ingress packet flows] --> DNNF + DNNF --> Egress[Egress packet flows] + +``` + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-1 + +Figure 7-1: Functional models 'Generic packet forwarding'. The diagram shows a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' block containing a 'Forwarding information base (FIB)' and a 'Determining next node function (DNNF)'. An arrow labeled 'Ingress packet flows' points into the DNNF, and an arrow labeled 'Egress packet flows' points out from the DNNF. A vertical double-headed arrow connects the FIB and the DNNF. The reference 'Y.2771(14)\_F7-1' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-1 – Functional models "Generic packet forwarding"** + +It may be noted that the PFF is a unidirectional model. The DPI function (if present) is located in the packet path (i.e., the In-path DPI (DPIInP) mode), typically before the PFF; see clause 7.1.3. + +Any details and requirements for the PFF are outside the scope of this Recommendation, however the PFF is indicated in some functional models due to: + +- designation of a possible DPI node behaviour without any enforced DPI policy rule (e.g., a temporary condition of an empty DPI-policy information base (DPI-PIB)); +- showing that particular policy actions, like 'forward packet', would still include the involvement of the PFF; and +- an unambiguous specification baseline for some DPI node-related performance metrics (see clause 8). + +It should be noted that the PFF may be void if there were just a single (egress) packet path (Note 2). + +NOTE 2 – Example scenario: an in-path DPI node located between two L2 or L3 packet nodes, or an in-path DPI node in front of user equipment. + +### **7.1.3 Unidirectional DPI** + +#### **7.1.3.1 Components of the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function** + +###### **7.1.3.1.1 General, high-level functional model** + +Figure 7-2 provides the top-level functional model, based on the example architecture of a DPI function entity (DPI-FE) according to clause 6.2 of [ITU-T Y.2770]. + + + +Figure 7-2: General, high-level functional model. The diagram shows a 'Packet node' containing two main functional blocks. The left block is the 'DPI node function (DPI-NF)', which includes a 'Local policy decision function (L-PDF)' and a 'DPI policy enforcement function (L-PEF)'. The L-PEF contains a 'DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)' and two stages: 'Stage 1: Evaluation of policy conditions' and 'Stage 2: Evaluation of policy actions'. A 'Packet flow' arrow enters Stage 1. A 'Packet identification function' arrow points to Stage 1. The right block is the 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)', which includes a 'Forwarding information base (FIB)' and a 'Determining next node function (DNMF)'. An arrow connects Stage 2 to DNMF. The diagram is labeled Y.2771(14)\_F7-2 in the bottom right corner. + +**Figure 7-2 – General, high-level functional model** + +The unidirectional packet path is modelled as a staged process. The 1st stage represents the packet identification function (see also clause 7.3.2.1). That capability is a crucial function in the context of DPI, hence, further detailed (exemplified by functional decomposition models) in subsequent clauses. + +###### **7.1.3.1.2 Basic components in a serial processing topology** + +Figure 7-3 depicts an example of an unidirectional model (as a possible derivation from the top-level model of Figure 7-2). The DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) is located before the PFF: any incoming packet is firstly processed by the DPI-PEF and handled by the PFF. The DPI-PEF may be also structured in packet path functions plus an associated table as storage for the applied policy rules, called the DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) or DPI signature library. In this example, the enforcement of DPI specific policy rules is the subject of: + +- the DPI scan function (DPI-ScF); +- the DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF); and +- the DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). + +These functional components are introduced and motivated in the next clause. + + + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-3 + +Figure 7-3: Components of the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function. The diagram shows two main functional blocks: the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) and the Packet forwarding function (PFF). The DPI-PEF block contains a DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) at the top, which provides 'Condition(s)' to the DPI scan function (DPI-ScF) and 'Conditions and actions' to the DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). The DPI-ScF, DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF), and DPI-AcEF are connected in a sequence by solid arrows, with dashed arrows indicating 'Control information' flow between them. Ingress packet flows enter the DPI-ScF. The output of the DPI-AcEF connects to the Determining next node function (DNNF) within the PFF block. The PFF block also contains a Forwarding information base (FIB) which provides input to the DNNF. Egress packet flows exit from the DNNF. A legend indicates that dashed arrows represent 'Control information'. A note '(Note 1)' is placed below the PFF block. + +NOTE 1 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 2 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-3 – DPI models "Components of the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function"** + +##### 7.1.3.1.3 Additional components + +###### 7.1.3.1.3.1 Within the DPI-PEF + +Additional components within the DPI-PEF are not yet described and left for further study. + +###### 7.1.3.1.3.2 Within the PFF + +The packet forwarding function may include sub-FEs such as queuing, encapsulation, shaping, policing, marking, switching and DNNF as well. These are, however, outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +###### 7.1.3.1.4 Structural aspects of packet processing path + +Instead of a serial execution of packet processing functions (as illustrated in Figure 7-3) DPI node architectures with parallelism might exist also, e.g., the PFF could be also processed in parallel to the DPI-PEF. + +In Figure 7-4, a packet processing path model with parallel packet processing is shown. Here the policing function monitors the packets coming into a certain ingress port, or packets with pre-defined criteria (i.e., a dedicated policy rule condition), such as an IPv4 TOS field marked with high priority (i.e., SPI-based policy rules). If those incoming packets or flows violate a bandwidth agreement, all or some of the packets may be marked accordingly and sent directly to the DNNF. + +![Figure 7-4: DPI model for the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function with parallel packet processing. The diagram shows the flow of ingress packet flows through a Packet forwarding function (PFF) containing a Policing function and a Marking function. The Policing function connects to the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) [unidirectional], which consists of a DPI scan function (DPI-ScF), a DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF), and a DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). Control information flows from DPI-ScF to DPI-AnF and from DPI-AnF to DPI-AcEF. The Marking function connects to a Determining next node function (DNNF) within another PFF block. The DNNF block also contains a Packet forwarding function (PFF). The output is egress packet flows. A note indicates that the PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation.](cbdfdade780e677eb1c1aef3081ce9ef_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph PFF1 [Packet forwarding function - PFF] + PF[Policing function] + MF[Marking function] + PF --> MF + end + + subgraph DPI_PEF [DPI policy enforcement function - DPI-PEF unidirectional] + ScF[DPI scan function - DPI-ScF] + AnF[DPI analyser function - DPI-AnF] + AcEF[DPI action execution function - DPI-AcEF] + ScF -.-> AnF + AnF -.-> AcEF + end + + subgraph PFF2 [Packet forwarding function - PFF] + DNNF[Determining next node function - DNNF] + PFF_inner[Packet forwarding function - PFF] + end + + Ingress((Ingress packet flows)) --> PF + PF --> ScF + MF --> DNNF + AcEF --> DNNF + DNNF --> Egress((Egress packet flows)) + +``` + +(Note) + +■- - -> Control information + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-4 + +Figure 7-4: DPI model for the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function with parallel packet processing. The diagram shows the flow of ingress packet flows through a Packet forwarding function (PFF) containing a Policing function and a Marking function. The Policing function connects to the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) [unidirectional], which consists of a DPI scan function (DPI-ScF), a DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF), and a DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). Control information flows from DPI-ScF to DPI-AnF and from DPI-AnF to DPI-AcEF. The Marking function connects to a Determining next node function (DNNF) within another PFF block. The DNNF block also contains a Packet forwarding function (PFF). The output is egress packet flows. A note indicates that the PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 7-4 – DPI model for the unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function +with parallel packet processing** + +It should be noted that the examples in Figures 7-3 and 7-4 represent logical topologies, not physical ones. The actual implementation, however, should reflect the fact that the packet processing path a packet or a flow takes might be different even in a single DPI instance. + +#### 7.1.3.2 Structure of the DPI policy information base (DPI signature library) + +More details and further structure of the DPI policy information base are provided by Figure 7-5, which is functionally adequate to Figure 7-3. The policy rule ( $R$ ) relates to a binding of a set of actions ( $A$ ) to a set of conditions ( $C$ ). The conditions are evaluated to determine whether the actions are performed. The generic term 'policy rule' is also known as (specific) filter rule in case of actions related to packet filtering activities (see also clauses 7.3 and 7.6 in [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23]). + + + +(Note 1) + +Figure 7-5: DPI models 'structure of the DPI policy information base'. The diagram shows the interaction between the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) and the Packet forwarding function (PFF). The DPI-PEF contains a DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) with rules R\_DPI,i and R\_DPI,z. Each rule has a condition C\_DPI,i and an action A\_DPI,k. Ingress packet flows enter the DPI-PEF, passing through a DPI scan function (DPI-ScF) which checks conditions against the policy base. Control information is then passed to a DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF) for further analysis, and then to a DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF) to apply actions. The PFF contains a forwarding information base (FIB) with rules R\_FOR,i and R\_FOR,p. The DPI-AcEF sends data to the PFF's determining next node function (DNMF), which uses the FIB to determine the next node. Egress packet flows then exit the PFF. A legend indicates that dashed arrows represent control information. + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-5 + +NOTE 1 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 2 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-5 – DPI models "structure of the DPI policy information base"** + +Processing model for DPI policy rules $R_{DPI}$ : + +- 1) The DPI scan function (DPI-ScF) checks *all* (Note 1) DPI policy conditions $C_{DPI}$ against an incoming packet; + +NOTE 1 – The scope of a DPI policy rule may cover the entire packet traffic forwarded by the node or be limited to a particular flow (see [ITU-T Y.2770]), given by a flow descriptor (see [ITU-T Y.2770]). The packet flow may be e.g., the subject of an end-to-end *session* (see clause 6.7 of [ITU-T Y.2770]) between application instances (e.g., in case of IP applications the end-to-end sessions could be sessions on HTTP, RTSP, SIP, FTP, etc. identified). The enforcement of session-specific policy rules is often called session-dependent policing, as opposed to session-independent policing (related to policy rules for the entire traffic aggregate of a policy enforcement node). The concept of flow and session is not further elaborated in this clause, because it is not relevant to the (high-level) functional models shown. + +- 2) The DPI analysis function (DPI-AnF) is for further verification of policy conditions. The DPI-AnF is operated in the pipelined manner with the DPI-ScF, after the DPI-ScF initially screens every packet (Note 2). The DPI-AnF aims for performance enhancement. + +NOTE 2 – For instance, the scan function may correlate an incoming packet to a specific (e.g., IP) application, and the analysis function may then provide an application-specific evaluation of the packet. The general principle behind the partitioning in DPI-ScF and DPI-AnF is related to a serial and/or hierarchical policy enforcement concept (e.g., in order to meet performance objectives). More detailed information about the DPI-AnF is for further study. + +- 3) The DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF) applies DPI policy actions $A_{DPI}$ against the scanned and analysed packet. + +Every packet that successfully passed the DPI-PEF will be then handled by the regular PFF (see also clause 7.1.2) in case of the in-path DPI mode. + +#### 7.1.3.3 Policy decisions: modifying the DPI policy information base + +The DPI-PIB provides a set of DPI policy rules $R_{DPI,i}$ , which are determining the actual behaviour of the DPI-PEF. The DPI policy rules are created by a policy decision functional entity (DPI-PDFE). Figure 7-6 illustrates the example of remote PDFs, located in the control plane and management plane (Figure 7-7 depicts another example scenario, without any (direct) access from the control pane). The control plane PDF may be responsible for a session-dependent DPI policy decision ( $S_D$ -PDF). A possible session concept is mentioned in Note 1 of clause 7.1.3.2. [ITU-T H.248.86] defines such a policy control interface. The management plane PDF may be responsible for a session-independent DPI policy decision ( $S_I$ -PDF) in Figure 7-6. The policy management may principally define session-dependent and session-independent policy rules (as in the example of Figure 7-7). + +NOTE 1 – Session-dependent policing may be e.g., specific to a particular application, user, media type, etc., and session-independent policing may cover general security rules, e.g., updating on a daily basis. The (DPI) policy rules from the $S_D$ -PDF and $S_I$ -PDF are complementary. Figure 7-4 provides an example of just such a network configuration. + +DPI policy management is typically part of a general policy management entity, responsible also for non-DPI policy rules like "legacy" shallow packet inspection (SPI) or medium depth packet inspection (MPI). + + + +*Control plane* + +*Management plane* + +User +plane + +(Session-dependent) policy decision +function (Sp-PDF) + +**General policy management** + +**(DPI) policy management** + +(Session-independent) policy +decision function (Si-PDF) + +Policy control +interface + +Configuration +(of DPI policy rules) + +Alerts + +**DPI node function** + +**Local policy decision function (L\_PDF)** + +**DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF)** + +**DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)** + +Update + +Condition(s) + +Conditions +and actions + +Result + +**DPI scan +function +(DPI-ScF)** + +**DPI analyser +function +(DPI-AnF)** + +**DPI action +execution +function +(DPI-AcEF)** + +*Ingress +packet +flows* + +**Packet forwarding +function (PFF)** + +**Forwarding +information +base (FIB)** + +**Determining +next node +function (DNNF)** + +*Egress +packet +flows* + +(Note 1) + +█ - - - > *Control information* + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-6 + +Figure 7-6: DPI models 'modifying the DPI policy information base via the control and management plane'. The diagram is divided into three main planes: Control plane, Management plane, and User plane. In the Control plane, there is a '(Session-dependent) policy decision function (S\_p-PDF)'. In the Management plane, there is a 'General policy management' block containing '(DPI) policy management' and a '(Session-independent) policy decision function (S\_i-PDF)'. In the User plane, the 'DPI node function' contains a 'Local policy decision function (L\_PDF)' and a 'DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF)'. The L\_PDF is connected to the S\_p-PDF via a 'Policy control interface' and receives 'Configuration (of DPI policy rules)' and 'Alerts' from the S\_i-PDF. The DPI-PEF contains a 'DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)' and three sub-functions: 'DPI scan function (DPI-ScF)', 'DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF)', and 'DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF)'. 'Ingress packet flows' enter the DPI-ScF, which sends 'Condition(s)' to the DPI-AnF. The DPI-AnF sends 'Conditions and actions' to the DPI-AcEF, which sends a 'Result' back to the DPI-PIB. The DPI-PIB sends an 'Update' to the L\_PDF. The DPI-AcEF is connected to a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' in the User plane, which contains a 'Forwarding information base (FIB)' and a 'Determining next node function (DNNF)'. The PFF outputs 'Egress packet flows'. A legend indicates that dashed arrows represent 'Control information'. A note '(Note 1)' is placed below the PFF block. + +NOTE 1 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. +NOTE 2 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-6 – DPI models "modifying the DPI policy information base via +the control and management plane"** + + + +Figure 7-7: DPI models 'modifying the DPI policy information base via the management plane only'. The diagram shows the interaction between the Management plane and the User plane. In the Management plane, there is a hierarchy: General policy management, (DPI) policy management, and (Session-independent and session-dependent) policy decision function (SI-PDF and SD-PDF). In the User plane, the DPI node function contains a Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) and the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF). The DPI-PEF contains the DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) and three sub-functions: DPI scan function (DPI-ScF), DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF), and DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). Ingress packet flows enter the DPI-ScF, which sends control information to DPI-AnF, which in turn sends control information to DPI-AcEF. DPI-AcEF sends a Result to DPI-PIB, which updates the L\_PDF. The L\_PDF sends Configuration (of DPI policy rules) to the (DPI) policy management and Alerts to the (Session-independent and session-dependent) policy decision function. The DPI-AcEF also interacts with the Packet forwarding function (PFF), which contains a Forwarding information base (FIB) and a Determining next node function (DNNF). The PFF outputs Egress packet flows. Note 1 is associated with the PFF, and Note 2 is associated with the control information flow. + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-7 + +NOTE 1 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 2 – The DPI node might not be connected to any other network element of the control plane. + +NOTE 3 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-7 – DPI models "modifying the DPI policy information base via the management plane only"** + +The PDF(s) are typically located in geographically remote network elements, as indicated in Figure 7-6 (and also Figure 7-7) by the policy control interface for the SD-PDF and policy management interface for the SI-PDF. Any remote PDF may be temporarily out-of-service, motivating an additional, optional local PDF (L-PDF) in order to optimize DPI service availability in a network. + +The L-PDF together with the DPI-PEF represents the DPI node function. + +NOTE 2 – It relates to the local policy decision path in Figure 7-1 of clause 7.2.1 of [ITU-T Y.2770]. + +The L-PDF (if available) provides the external communication with remote PDF(s) and the internal interface to the DPI-PEF for updating the DPI-PIB and processing possible results from the DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF). The L-PDF may be also responsible for resolving possible rule interaction problems between the set of DPI policy rules. + +NOTE 3 – The detection and resolution of rule interactions is a fundamental function for PDFs. + +The feedback from the DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF) may lead to alerts towards policy management (e.g., the notification of a new security threat). + +The fundamental policy enforcement model is unidirectional, but may be extended for bidirectional communication paths; see the following clause. + +### 7.1.4 Bidirectional DPI + +Figure 7-8 provides an example of the bidirectional DPI model (definition see clause 3.2.4 in [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +A bidirectional packet connection consists of two unidirectional packet flows. The DPI-PIB is the binding element between both traffic directions from the DPI policy enforcement perspective. A "bidirectional" DPI policy rule would provide DPI policy conditions or/and actions relevant for both traffic directions. + + + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph Packet_node_function [Packet node (function)] + subgraph DPI_NF [DPI node function (DPI-NF)] + L_PDF[Local policy decision function (L_PDF)] + subgraph DPI_PEF [DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) [bidirectional]] + DPI_PIB[DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)] + subgraph Ingress_Path [Ingress Path] + DPI_ScF1[DPI scan function (DPI-ScF)] --> DPI_AnF1[DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF)] + DPI_AnF1 --> DPI_AcEF1[DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF)] + end + subgraph Egress_Path [Egress Path] + DPI_AcEF2[DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF)] --> DPI_AnF2[DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF)] + DPI_AnF2 --> DPI_ScF2[DPI scan function (DPI-ScF)] + end + end + end + subgraph PFF_Left [Packet forwarding function (PFF)] + FIB1[Forwarding information base (FIB)] + DNMF1[Determining next node function (DNNF)] + end + subgraph PFF_Right [Packet forwarding function (PFF)] + FIB2[Forwarding information base (FIB)] + DNMF2[Determining next node function (DNNF)] + end + end + + L_PDF <-->|Update Result| DPI_PIB + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s)| DPI_ScF1 + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s) and action(s)| DPI_AnF1 + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s)| DPI_AcEF1 + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s) and action(s)| DPI_AnF2 + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s)| DPI_AcEF2 + DPI_PIB -->|Condition(s)| DPI_ScF2 + DPI_AcEF1 -->|Result (Note 1)| DPI_PIB + DPI_AcEF2 -->|Result (Note 1)| DPI_PIB + + DomainX("from/to (domain)X") --> Ingress_Flows[Ingress packet flows (unidirectional)] + Ingress_Flows --> PFF_Left + PFF_Left --> DPI_ScF1 + DPI_AcEF1 --> DNMF2 + DNMF2 --> Egress_Flows_Y[Egress packet flows (unidirectional)] + Egress_Flows_Y --> DomainY("To/from (domain)Y") + + DomainY --> Ingress_Flows_Y[Ingress packet flows (unidirectional)] + Ingress_Flows_Y --> PFF_Right + PFF_Right --> DPI_ScF2 + DPI_AcEF2 --> DNMF1 + DNMF1 --> Egress_Flows_X[Egress packet flows (unidirectional)] + Egress_Flows_X --> DomainX + +``` + +Figure 7-8: DPI models 'bidirectional DPI'. A block diagram showing the internal architecture of a Packet node (function) for bidirectional DPI. It includes a DPI node function (DPI-NF) with a Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) and a DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF). The DPI-PEF contains a DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) and two sets of processing functions (DPI-ScF, DPI-AnF, DPI-AcEF) for ingress and egress flows. Packet forwarding functions (PFF) with FIBs and DNMFs are on either side. Ingress and egress flows are shown between domain X and domain Y. + +NOTE 1 – The DPI-PIB may be internally organized in direction-dependent DPI-PIBs, e.g., DPIx → y-PIB and DPIy → x-PIB. + +NOTE 2 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 3 – The PFFs are only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-8 – DPI models "bidirectional DPI"** + +The L-PDF is responsible for the bidirectional DPI-PEF and provides a "mediation function" by post-processing possible results from the unidirectional analyser functions (DPI-AnF), which may then trigger the update of (local) policy rules or/and the notification of remote PDF(s). + +### 7.1.5 Stateless and statefull DPI + +Stateless DPI relates to DPI policy rules which are enforced on each packet individually, without any correlation to other packets of a unidirectional packet flow or the bidirectional packet connection (see "state condition" in clause 3.2.11 in [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +Statefull DPI implies such a correlation (Note), which may be modelled by a (finite) state machine. Such a functional model would be specific to concrete DPI policy rules and is thus outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE – For instance, an IP application with TCP-based transport of application data. There might be dedicated policy conditions for the TCP connection establishment phase and other policy conditions for the subsequent active communication phase. + +### 7.1.6 Impact of DPI on packet forwarding + +The DPI node function may impact the subsequent packet forwarding function (PFF), under the condition that a PFF is available or is a "non-empty" PFF (see clause 7.1.2). However, the DPI-NF shall not be authorized for local packet node PFF modifications. This is rather an option, driven by external packet node remote network elements (see Figure 7-9). The specific impact is subject to policy decisions and/or dedicated DPI policy rules, and thus outside the scope of this Recommendation. + + + +*"DPI-NF may influence PFF, +but not packet node internally"* + +**DPI node function (DPI-NF)** + +Local policy decision function (L-PDF) + +**DPI policy enforcement function (L-PEF)** + +DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) + +DPI-ScF DPI-AnF DPI-AcEF + +**Packet forwarding function (PFF)** + +Forwarding information base (FIB) + +Determining next node function (DNMF) + +Packet flow + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +(Note) Y.2771(14)\_F7-9 + +Figure 7-9: Possible impact of DPI on packet forwarding via a remote network entity. The diagram shows a 'DPI node function (DPI-NF)' block on the left and a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' block on the right. A cloud at the top represents a remote network entity. A dashed red arrow points from the cloud to the PFF block, with the text 'DPI-NF may influence PFF, but not packet node internally' above it. Inside the DPI-NF block, there is a 'Local policy decision function (L-PDF)' at the top. Below it is a dashed box labeled 'DPI policy enforcement function (L-PEF)'. Inside the L-PEF box is a cylinder labeled 'DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)'. Below the L-PEF box are three dashed boxes: 'DPI-ScF', 'DPI-AnF', and 'DPI-AcEF'. A solid arrow labeled 'Packet flow' enters from the left, passes through these three boxes, and then enters the PFF block. Inside the PFF block, there is a cylinder labeled 'Forwarding information base (FIB)' and a dashed box labeled 'Determining next node function (DNMF)'. A solid arrow exits the PFF block to the right. A note at the bottom right says '(Note) Y.2771(14)\_F7-9'. + +NOTE 1 – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 2 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 7-9 – Possible impact of DPI on packet forwarding via a remote network entity** + +Examples: + +- Update of FIB (network route information; see also Figure 7-5) due to observed network performance related to network topology; +- Update of FIB by blocking certain network routes (e.g., in reverse direction in case of bidirectional DPI). + +It should be noted that any local modification of the PFF, driven by the DPI-NF and ordered by external network elements, must be in concert with the underlying network-wide framework with respect to packet forwarding, switching or/and routing concepts (e.g., given by an IPv6 DiffServ domain, an MPLS domain, a L2VPN topology, etc.). + +### 7.1.7 DPI within packet-based networks and NGN environments + +The DPI node function is embedded in a functional, physical or virtual packet node, which may interact with other functions in a packet-based network. Figure 7-10 provides an example environment. [ITU-T H.248.86] defines a DPI control technology when the DPI-PDFE and DPI-FE are mapped onto a decomposed gateway model. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of a DPI node function within a packet-based network. At the center is a large rectangular block labeled 'DPI node function'. Inside this block is a smaller rectangle labeled 'DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF)'. Surrounding the central block are five ovals, each representing a different functional component: 'Security function', 'Resource and admission control function (RACF)', 'Charging function', 'Management function', and 'Others'. Bidirectional arrows connect the central 'DPI node function' block to each of these five external functions, indicating a two-way interaction between the DPI node and these network functions. + +Figure 7-10: DPI within packet-based networks and NGN environments. The diagram shows a central 'DPI node function' block containing a 'DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF)'. This block is connected via bidirectional arrows to five external functions: 'Security function', 'Resource and admission control function (RACF)', 'Charging function', 'Management function', and 'Others'. + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-10 + +**Figure 7-10 – DPI within packet-based networks and NGN environments** + +### 7.1.8 Functional models for support of IETF flow metering + +#### 7.1.8.1 Characteristics of IETF IPFIX flow metering function + +The IETF IPFIX flow metering function is defined in [IETF RFC 5101] (see also clause 6.3.3.2 in [ITU-T Y.2770]). The notion of "flow" refers to a packet flow according to clause 3.1.3 of [ITU-T Y.2770] and "metering" to the measurement of performance metrics. The IPFIX flow metering function incorporates therefore a part with policy rule conditions for packet flow identification (based on the IPFIX flow identifier (see clause 3.2.17 in [ITU-T Y.2770])) and a part related to policy rule actions for measurements and reporting actions. + +#### 7.1.8.2 Embedded flow metering function + +The IETF IPFIX flow process may be abstracted and described as a DPI policy rule, therefore directly mapped onto a DPI-FE. Figure 7-11 illustrates such an embedded flow metering function. The reporting of measurement results could be communicated across external interfaces e2 or e1. + + + +Figure 7-11: Embedded flow metering function. This block diagram shows a 'DPI policy decision functional entity (DPI-PDFE)' at the top, connected to a 'DPI functional entity (DPI-FE) realizing a "Flow metering function"' below it. A solid line labeled 'e1' connects them, crossing a dashed line representing the 'Control or management plane'. A diagonal solid line labeled 'e2' also connects them, staying above the dashed line. The DPI-FE has two horizontal lines labeled 'User plane p1' entering and exiting. A legend at the bottom left states: 'Legend: e ... external, p ... packet'. The reference 'Y.2771(14)\_F7-11' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-11 – Embedded flow metering function** + +#### 7.1.8.3 Remote flow metering function + +A flow metering function could be also remotely located in the packet path p1, before (see Figure 7-12) or after a DPI-FE. The network configuration with a remote flow metering function could be e.g., motivated when an existing network provides a physical entity with flow metering support and a DPI-PE is additionally deployed. + + + +Figure 7-12: Remote flow metering function. This block diagram shows a 'DPI policy decision functional entity (DPI-PDFE)' at the top, connected to a 'DPI functional entity (DPI-FE)' below it. A solid line labeled 'e1' connects them, crossing a dashed line representing the 'Control or management plane'. A diagonal solid line labeled 'e2' also connects them, staying above the dashed line. The DPI-FE has two horizontal lines labeled 'User plane p1' entering and exiting. To the left of the DPI-FE, a separate box labeled 'Flow metering function' is connected to the DPI-FE by a horizontal line labeled 'User plane p1'. A legend at the bottom left states: 'Legend: e ... external, p ... packet'. The reference 'Y.2771(14)\_F7-12' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-12 – Remote flow metering function** + +The DPI-FE and the remote flow metering function may be considered as a distributed architecture with two variants: + +- 1) Decoupled architecture: both functional entities are only connected via p1, thus are fully decoupled in the control and management plane. +- 2) Coupled architecture: e.g., results of the flow metering function could be also reported via e2 of a DPI-FE. Such a functional sharing model would imply an additional, new interface (besides p1) between both functional entities. + +Use cases for both variants are for further study. + +### 7.1.9 Probabilistic DPI + +#### 7.1.9.1 Probabilistic DPI in general + +The packet identification process may be inherently of a statistical nature (as opposed to deterministic packet identification), i.e., the identification result (such as a match criteria) is associated to a probability. This kind of packet inspection is called probabilistic DPI, also known as uncertain DPI. + +Probabilistic DPI relates to DPI policy rules whose conditions are for instance: + +- A signature set 'S' contains signatures 'S1', 'S2', ..., 'SN'. The signature set 'S' represents a compound policy condition according to a Boolean disjunctive normal form (DNF), i.e., signatures 'Si' (i=1, 2...N) are combined as an OR-based list. The two DPI steps have the following characteristics: +step 1: the generation of the policy conditions is based on a probabilistic process; and +step 2: the execution of the policy conditions leads to deterministic match results, thus leading overall to probabilistic DPI. + +The primary objective of probabilistic DPI is to determine quickly and efficiently whether a packet matches signature set 'S'. The concrete match information, i.e., which specific signature 'Si' was identified, is secondary. Signature set 'S' represents in general an identification option for a particular application. The associated application tag, e.g., 'Packet with signature in Set S', might be the subject of reporting. + +#### 7.1.9.2 Bloom filter based probabilistic DPI + +A bloom filter-based DPI is a well-known representative of probabilistic DPI, due to the inherent error rate $\epsilon_{\text{DPI}}$ , in terms of false positives $\epsilon_{f-p}$ (see clause 8.2.3.3.1), of the underlying packet inspection approach. + +An application-specific example realized as a bloom filter is considered: + +- The DPI application is a detection of "application x traffic". The traffic of application x is characterized by a signature set $S = \{\text{'application x v1'}, \text{'application x v2'}, \dots, \text{'application x vk'}\}$ , i.e., individual signatures concerning application-specific characteristics. There might be then an example DPI policy rule to detect whether a packet contains "application x", using the above signature set as compound DPI policy rule condition, and just discard the packet when a match happens without the need to know what the exact application x version is. + +The primary motivation of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI is a kind of trade-off between identification accuracy and identification resource consumption (e.g., in terms of CPU time or/and memory). Such an approach allows simplification of DPI processing significantly. + +The probabilistic characteristic of a bloom filter based DPI is given by following process: + +- Any arriving packet 'P' is compared against the bloom filter which represent the entire signature set 'S' in parallel; if a packet 'P' matches one or multiple signatures of set 'S', then the result would be a hit with an estimated information certainty of probability $P_{\text{Hit,BloomFilter},S}$ , according to following equation: + +$$P_{\text{Hit,BloomFilter},S} = 1 - \epsilon_{f-p} = 1 - \left(1 - e^{-kN/m}\right)^k \quad (7-1)$$ + +with parameter values: + +$m$ = size of bloom filter in bits + +$N$ = number of signatures in set $S$ + +$k$ = number of hash functions used for the creation of the bloom filter. + +The notion of "probabilistic" is related to the "identification accuracy" of a DPI-FE concerning the identification of a packet, flow, application etc., and tightly coupled with performance metrics of the area of error rates (see clause 8.2). For probabilistic DPI realized by bloom filters, see Appendix I; the performance indicator "(DPI) false-positive error rate" $\epsilon_{f-p}$ and performance indicator "(DPI) false-negative error rate" $\epsilon_{f-n}$ is equal to zero. + +## 7.2 Information and data models + +The staged development process of communication services [b-ITU-T I.130] differentiates the abstraction levels of "information" and "data" (such as protocol data units). Information models are used at a very high level in order to describe for instance the information flow between network entities (see e.g., [b-ITU-T I.130], [b-ITU-T X.1036]). Data models are at a lower level in order to describe e.g., an information element from a syntactical viewpoint (see e.g., [b-ITU-T J.380.1]). + +### 7.2.1 Information model (example framework) + +Any kind of detailed specification for modelling DPI policy rule related information and information flows are outside the scope of a "framework" type of Recommendation. However, DPI policy rule information modelling [b-IETF RFC 3060] may be considered as an example as a baseline. Table 7-1 indicates some example information elements in order to provide some guidelines (how a concrete model could be developed): + +**Table 7-1 – Example information model, based on [b-IETF RFC 3060]** + +| Information element (this Recommendation and [ITU-T Y.2770]) | Generic policy core information model according to [b-IETF RFC 3060] | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DPI policy rule | Could be based on class "PolicyRule" | +| DPI policy rule (compound) condition | Could be based on abstract class "PolicyCondition" | +| DPI policy rule (single) condition | Could be based on abstract class "PolicyCondition" | +| DPI policy rule action | Could be based on abstract class "PolicyAction" | +| And so on, such as grouping and prioritizing DPI policy rules, and characteristics such as validity period of rules, etc. | ... | + +### 7.2.2 Data model (example framework) + +Any kind of detailed specification for modelling DPI policy rule related data objects are outside the scope of a "framework" type of Recommendation (because then the area of protocol syntax development would be opened). + +However, DPI policy rule data modelling [b-IETF RFC 4011] may serve as an example of a baseline. Table 7-2 indicates some example data objects in order to provide some guidelines (how a concrete model could be developed): + +**Table 7-2 – Example data model, based on [b-IETF RFC 4011]** + +| Information element (this Recommendation and [ITU-T Y.2770]) | Generic data object, using the policy based management MIB according to [b-IETF RFC 4011] as an example | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DPI-PIB | Could be based on object "pmPolicyTable", which is again linked with object "pmPolicyCodeTable" (Note 1) | +| DPI policy rule, i.e., entry of a DPI-PIB | Could be based on object "pmPolicyEntry" | +| DPI policy rule condition | Could be based on object "pmPolicyCodeEntry" (Note 2) | +| DPI policy rule action | Could be based on object "pmPolicyCodeEntry" (Note 2) | +| Etc. | Etc. | +| NOTE 1 – The abstraction and separation of "rule description" and "rule code" in two associated tables allows the definition of an efficient "DPI-PIB". | | +| NOTE 2 – That is, rule condition and rule action could finally use the same data object model (in this example). | | + +Network plane perspective: it may be noted that a generic data object could be visible as a: + +- managed object from the DPI management plane perspective (see interface e2 in clause 8 of [ITU-T Y.2770]); or/and as +- controlled object from the DPI control plane perspective (see interface e1 in clause 8 of [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +For example, a particular DPI policy rule could be signalled (via e1) by the DPI PD-FE, or provisioned (via e2) by a DPI management system, but leading to the same data object "DPI policy rule" entry in the DPI-PIB. + +## **7.3 Traffic models** + +### **7.3.1 Introduction** + +The purpose of this clause is the description of some interesting characteristics of DPI entities (definition see clause 3.2.7 in [ITU-T Y.2770]) from the perspective of traffic theory. The derived aspects may assist in the subsequent definition of e.g., functional, performance and availability requirements, the indication of architectural aspects, or performance evaluations. + +The described traffic models are just examples and not necessarily representative for a particular DPI component (such as a DPI-PE, DPI-FE, DPI engine, DPI signature library, etc.). + +### **7.3.2 Basic traffic models for packet path processing** + +Traffic handling is at the granularity of packets, the main functions of a DPI-FE, and it is mainly realized by the embedded DPI engine (for the definition see clause 3.2.6 in [ITU-T Y.2770]). + +A DPI engine is the core component of a DPI-FE and plays an important role in the DPI-FE. DPI traffic is processed by the DPI engine. When a DPI engine would be realized as a physical component, parallel processing may help to improve the performance of the DPI engine. There might be consequently more than one processing unit within the physical component corresponding to a DPI engine. + +#### **7.3.2.1 Basic traffic model of a DPI-FE with scope on the DPI engine** + +Figure 7-13 uses the example functional model of a DPI-FE according to Figure 6-1 of [ITU-T Y.2770] in order to derive a typical traffic model. The traffic model focuses on the packet path only, and thus provides a model for a DPI engine. + + + +Figure 7-13: Basic traffic model of a DPI-FE with scope on a DPI engine. The diagram shows a functional model at the top and a packet path model at the bottom. The functional model includes a Database of 'Flow descriptors', a DPI signature library, and a Local management function. The DPI engine is shown as a green box containing a Packet identification function and Other packet processing functions. Packet flow (ingress) enters the DPI engine, and Packet flow (egress) exits. Results are sent from the DPI engine to the Local management function. The DPI functional entity (DPI-FE) is shown as a dashed box containing the DPI engine. The packet path model shows a packet p1 entering the DPI-FE, passing through the DPI engine, and exiting as p1. + +**Figure 7-13 – Basic traffic model of a DPI-FE with scope on a DPI engine** + +The model is characterized by a single server and a finite waiting queue. The server processes therefore all packet path functions. The 1-stage server model represents a traffic model for an unidirectional packet flow. + +#### 7.3.2.2 DPI engine: extension to multi-stage packet path processing + +##### 7.3.2.2.1 DPI engine based on dual-stage server + +Figure 7-14 provides an example of a dual stage traffic model of a DPI engine. + + + +Figure 7-14: Traffic model DPI engine: extension to dual-stage packet path. The diagram shows a packet p1 entering a DPI engine, which is divided into Stage 1 and Stage 2. Stage 1 is labeled 'Packet identification process' and Stage 2 is labeled 'Process for other packet functions'. The packet path is shown as p1 entering, passing through Stage 1, then Stage 2, and exiting as p1. The packet arrival process is shown as a dashed box around Stage 1, and the packet departure process is shown as a dashed box around Stage 2. + +**Figure 7-14 – Traffic model DPI engine: extension to dual-stage packet path** + +The first server is responsible for the processing of DPI rule conditions in this example. + +##### 7.3.2.2.2 DPI engine based on a 3-stage server + +- A DPI engine could be internally realized as a distributed system, e.g., as a series of concatenated processing elements. For instance, the example functional model according to Figure 7-3 represents three processing stages, called "DPI scanning", "DPI analysing" and "DPI action execution", abbreviated as DPI-ScF, DPI-AnF and DPI-AcEF, respectively. + +Figure 7-15 provides an example of a correspondent traffic model. + + + +Figure 7-15: Traffic model DPI engine: extension to 3-stage packet path. The diagram shows a packet 'p1' entering a 'DPI engine' box. Inside the box, the packet passes through three stages: Stage 1 (DPI scanning process), Stage 2 (DPI analysing process), and Stage 3 (DPI action execution process). The packet then exits the box as 'p1'. The entire process is labeled 'Packet arrival process' and 'Packet departure process'. The reference Y.2771(14)\_F7-15 is noted at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-15 – Traffic model DPI engine: extension to 3-stage packet path** + +### 7.3.3 Extended traffic models for DPI engines + +#### 7.3.3.1 Single external interface and internal parallelism + +Example: there might be an out-of-path DPI entity (see clause 6.1) which is connected via a single network route to the packet network. The purpose of such a DPI entity might be the off-line processing of a large number of selected packet flows, i.e., a high processing capacity may be required. Parallelism might be an option for achieving high processing capacity. Figure 7-16 provides an example traffic model, at the level of multiple parallel DPI engines. + + + +Figure 7-16: DPI engines – Single external interface and internal parallelism. The diagram shows 'Ingress packet traffic' (p1) entering a 'DPI-FE (packet path only)' box. Inside, a 'Packet scheduler' distributes traffic to multiple parallel 'DPI engine' blocks (DPI engine 1, DPI engine 2, ..., DPI engine K). Each engine contains a scanning process and an analysing process. The output of all engines is 'Egress packet traffic' (p1). The reference Y.2771(14)\_F7-16 is noted at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-16 – DPI engines – Single external interface and internal parallelism** + +The traffic model implies a packet scheduler function for assignment of an incoming packet to a DPI engine (server). Such a function is outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE – For instance, the packet scheduler could be: + +- simply a load balancing algorithm (i.e., scheduling based only on the estimated load state of the DPI engine servers), which actually only makes sense for a stateless DPI; +- based on flow descriptor information (in order to address a statefull DPI), but then there would be at least a 2-stage server model from a traffic modelling viewpoint; or +- any other kind of scheduling method. + +#### 7.3.3.2 Multiple external interfaces and internal parallelism + +An in-path DPI entity located at the network core level (see clause 6.1) typically provides multiple physical p1 interfaces. Multiple DPI engines may serve in parallel all ingress packet flows (see + +Figure 7-17). There is usually the requirement that all DPI engines (e.g., $K$ ) should be connected to *all* ingress packet interfaces $p1$ (e.g., $N$ ). Thus, a $N$ -to- $K$ packet switching fabric function would be required for that purpose. Such a function is outside the scope of this Recommendation. + + + +Diagram of Figure 7-17: Multiple external interfaces and internal parallelism. The diagram shows two 'Packet network domain' clouds connected by a central 'DPI-FE (packet path only)' block. On the left, multiple 'p1' interfaces from the left domain enter the DPI-FE block, labeled 'ingress packet traffic'. These interfaces connect to an 'N-to-K packet switching fabric' (dashed box). This fabric routes traffic to multiple parallel 'DPI engine' blocks (DPI engine 1, DPI engine 2, ..., DPI engine K). Each engine block contains a small rectangle with three vertical lines and a circle. On the right, the traffic exits the DPI-FE block through 'p1' interfaces to the right domain, labeled 'egress packet traffic'. The entire DPI-FE block is enclosed in a green dashed border. A reference code 'Y.2771(14)\_F7-17' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-17 – Multiple external interfaces and internal parallelism** + +#### 7.3.3.3 Parallel DPI engines based on 3-stage server models + +Figures 7-18 and 7-19 illustrating an extended model, based on the combination of 3-stage DPI engine models (clause 7.3.2.2.2) and parallelism at the level of DPI engines (clause 7.3.3.1). + + + +The diagram illustrates the packet path within a **DPI-FE (packet path only)** block. On the left, **Ingress packet traffic** enters through a port labeled **p1**. This traffic is directed to a **Packet scheduler**, represented by a dashed oval. From the scheduler, the traffic is distributed to multiple parallel **DPI engines**, labeled **DPI engine 1**, **DPI engine 2**, and **DPI engine K**. Each engine follows a 3-stage server model: + +- Stage 1:** A queue (rectangle with vertical lines) followed by a process circle labeled **Process "DPI-ScF"**. +- Stage 2:** A queue followed by a process circle labeled **Process "DPI-AnF"**. +- Stage 3:** A queue followed by a process circle labeled **Process "DPI-AcEF"**. + +After processing in Stage 3, the traffic from all engines is combined and exits the DPI-FE block as **Egress packet traffic** through a port labeled **p1**. The label **Y.2771(14)\_F7-18** is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Diagram of Parallel DPI engines based on 3-stage server models (single external interface). + +**Figure 7-18 – Parallel DPI engines based on 3-stage server models (single external interface)** + + + +The diagram illustrates a parallel DPI architecture. On the left, a 'Packet network domain' is represented by a cloud shape. Multiple 'Ingress packet traffic' flows, each labeled 'p1', enter from the left. These flows pass through an 'N-to-K packet switching fabric', depicted as a vertical dashed rectangle. The traffic then enters a large green-bordered box labeled 'DPI-FE (packet path only)'. Inside this box, there are multiple parallel DPI engines, labeled 'DPI engine 1', 'DPI engine 2', and 'DPI engine K'. Each engine consists of three stages: 'Stage 1', 'Stage 2', and 'Stage 3'. Each stage is represented by a rectangle with three vertical bars, followed by a circle labeled 'Process "DPI-ScF"', 'Process "DPI-AnF"', and 'Process "DPI-AcEF"' respectively. The output of each engine is labeled 'p1' and exits the green box as 'Egress packet traffic'. Vertical ellipses between the engines indicate that there are more than three engines in total. + +Diagram of Parallel DPI engines based on 3-stage server models (multiple external interfaces). + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-19 + +**Figure 7-19 – Parallel DPI engines based on 3-stage server models +(multiple external interfaces)** + +The traffic models are characterized by parallel DPI engines running fully concurrently, i.e., there are no dependencies between DPI engines. The maximum performance of such a DPI-PE architecture would be achieved when all servers would be "optimally loaded" (i.e., no server is overloaded or underloaded), which implies a homogeneous load distribution in both dimensions of the traffic model. The engineering of such architecture is fairly challenging, perhaps possible only for some specific traffic distributions concerning offered packet load. + +Such a background may lead to different architectures, as e.g., considered in the subsequent clause. + +#### 7.3.3.4 Single DPI engine based on three stages and internal parallelism + +Figures 7-20 and 7-21 illustrate an example of a single DPI engine, based on three processing stages and parallelism per stage. The level of parallelism may differ per stage, i.e., there might be a different number of servers per stage (i.e., different values of K1, K2 and K3). + + + +The diagram illustrates a single DPI engine within a DPI-FE (packet path only) block. It features three stages of parallel servers connected by packet switching fabrics. Stage 1 consists of $K_1$ parallel servers for "DPI-ScF", Stage 2 consists of $K_2$ parallel servers for "DPI-ScF", and Stage 3 consists of $K_3$ parallel servers for "DPI-AcEF". Ingress packet traffic enters from the left, passes through a packet scheduler, and is distributed to the servers in Stage 1. The traffic then flows through the $K_1$ -to- $K_2$ packet switching fabric, then through the servers in Stage 2, through the $K_2$ -to- $K_3$ packet switching fabric, and finally through the servers in Stage 3. The egress packet traffic exits to the right. The entire engine is labeled "Single DPI engine". + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-20 + +Figure 7-20: Single DPI engine based on three stages and internal parallelism (single external interface). + +**Figure 7-20 – Single DPI engine based on three stages and internal parallelism (single external interface)** + + + +The diagram illustrates a single DPI engine within a DPI-FE (packet path only) block, similar to Figure 7-20 but with multiple external interfaces. It features three stages of parallel servers connected by packet switching fabrics. Stage 1 consists of $K_1$ parallel servers for "DPI-ScF", Stage 2 consists of $K_2$ parallel servers for "DPI-ScF", and Stage 3 consists of $K_3$ parallel servers for "DPI-AcEF". Ingress packet traffic enters from the left through an $N$ -to- $K$ packet switching fabric and is distributed to the servers in Stage 1. The traffic then flows through the $K_1$ -to- $K_2$ packet switching fabric, then through the servers in Stage 2, through the $K_2$ -to- $K_3$ packet switching fabric, and finally through the servers in Stage 3. The egress packet traffic exits to the right. The entire engine is labeled "Single DPI engine". + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-21 + +Figure 7-21: Single DPI engine based on three stages and internal parallelism (multiple external interfaces). + +**Figure 7-21 – Single DPI engine based on three stages and internal parallelism (multiple external interfaces)** + +When the DPI engine has to support a statefull DPI, then *all* packets of the *same flow* may need to be routed across the same path of servers due to local "state information". This aspect is outside the scope of the above traffic model. + +## 7.4 Identification of possible DPI-FE subcomponents + +A DPI-FE may be partitioned in functional subcomponents, as already illustrated by the example functional models in the previous clauses. Table 7-3 provides an overview of typical functional + +subcomponents within a DPI-FE. The components are partially referred to by subsequent clauses (e.g., in the case of the discussion of performance aspects, possible functional or operational requirements, etc.). + +**Table 7-3 – Typical DPI-FE subcomponents** + +| Component | Description | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF): | A functional element concerning the enforcement of DPI policy rules, which contains at least a DPI policy information base, a DPI packet identification function and a DPI action execution function | +| Further detailing the DPI-PEF:
1) Packet processing path | | +| 1.1) DPI packet identification function (DPI-PIF)
Example functional decomposition: | Functional element responsible for the processing of DPI policy conditions against incoming packet traffic | +| 1.1.1) DPI scan function (DPI-ScF): | A functional element (as part of the DPI-PIF) to perform initial comparison functions, which are determined by DPI policy rule conditions | +| 1.1.2) DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF): | A functional element (part of the DPI-PIF) to perform subsequent comparison functions, which are also determined by DPI policy rule conditions (e.g., related to packet header elements or the contents (in packet payloads)) | +| 1.2) DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF): | A functional element to perform operations on considered packets, according to identified DPI policy rule actions | +| 2) DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB; Note 1) function: | A functional element representing a database, which contains a set of one or multiple DPI policy rule entries (see below) | +| a) DPI policy rule entry: | The entry in a table which contains a DPI policy rule (Note 2) | +| i) DPI policy rule condition (briefly 'rule condition'): | An expression (typically of type Boolean). A condition is also known as a match criterion (e.g., due to condition types representing a partial match, full match, prefix match, longest prefix match, etc.) | +| ii) DPI policy rule action (briefly 'rule action'): | An action performed after the evaluation of all rule-specific policy conditions and the conclusion for executing that action | +| NOTE 1 – Also known as rules table , policy signature library or just signature library .
NOTE 2 – There might be one or multiple rules enforced. Such rules may be statically predefined (via configuration management of the packet node, called DPI policy management), or signalled (via a policy control interface) or dynamically, locally generated (via a local PDF). DPI policy rules are used to compare protocol control information (PCI, i.e., packet header elements) or the payload/contents of the packet flows with a set of conditions to determine if the string matching is successful or not. | | + +## 7.5 Fault tolerance models + +Reliability and availability of a network node (e.g., DPI node) are very important to the network in which the network node is deployed. When the network node is out of service (see e.g., the operational state model in [ITU-T X.731]), this could result in a network disaster, where it could be possible that all network users are forced offline. This would result in a massive loss of valuable + +information. So it is critical to pursue high reliability and availability of a network node. As a kind of network node, a DPI node should also support high reliability and availability. + +By using the fault tolerance method, the DPI "1+N" redundancy group aims at improving reliability and availability of the network deployed with DPI nodes. + +Reliability of the DPI "1+N" redundancy group can be calculated by the follow parameters: + +- 1) MTBF: mean time between failures is the average time between failure of a DPI "1+N" redundancy group. +- 2) MTTR: mean time to repair is the time taken to make the failed DPI "1+N" redundancy group work normally again. + +Availability of a DPI "1+N" redundancy group can be calculated by the follow formulas (see [ITU-T G.602]): + +- 3) $\text{Availability} = \text{uptime} / (\text{downtime} + \text{uptime})$ or +- 4) $\text{Availability} = \text{MTBF} / (\text{MTBF} + \text{MTTR})$ . +- 5) Within a DPI "1+N" redundancy group, the number of redundancy functional components is dependent on a special realization, and it is outside the scope of this Recommendation. Functional components within a redundancy group work in active/backup mode, and only one functional component works as an active functional component, while the other functional components work as backup functional components. When the active functional components are out of service, one and only one of the backup functional components will become the new active functional component and the former active functional component will change to a backup functional component. +- 6) The interface between the active functional component and a backup functional component, which is used for a switchover between active and backup functional components is DPI-independent and implementation specific, thus outside the scope of this Recommendation. +- 7) Multiple fault tolerance models are presented, illustrating the DPI node level fault tolerance model (clause 7.5.1), DPI PEF level fault tolerance model (clause 7.5.2), DPI PIB level fault tolerance model (clause 7.5.3) and DPI engine level fault tolerance model (clause 7.5.4). +- 8) All fault tolerance models are based on a DPI "1+N" redundancy group (in other words, redundancy of the functional components, e.g., DPI nodes in Figure 7-22). +- 9) The active functional components and the backup functional components should keep totally identical information such as PIB through a data synchronization method. The data synchronization method depends on a special realization and it is outside the scope of this recommendation. + +### 7.5.1 DPI node level fault tolerance model + +Figure 7-22 depicts a DPI model with DPI node level reliability guaranteeing that two or more DPI nodes are deployed together to form a DPI node group (a DPI "1+N" redundancy group of which the DPI nodes are the functional components), and one DPI node works as the active DPI node while the others work as backup DPI nodes. Moreover, the active and backup DPI nodes have to duplicate internal information as required for normal operation. Once the active DPI node is out of service, one of the backup DPI nodes will automatically become the active DPI node. + +Although only two DPI nodes are depicted in Figure 7-22, the fault tolerance model is similar when there are more than two DPI nodes (due to the "1+N" redundancy concept). + + + +Figure 7-22: DPI model with DPI node level reliability guaranteeing. The diagram is divided into three planes: Control plane, Management plane, and User plane. In the Control plane, there is a box for '(Session-dependent) policy decision function (SD-PDF)'. In the Management plane, there is a nested box structure: 'General policy management' containing '(DPI) policy management' which contains '(Session-independent) policy decision function (SI-PDF)'. In the User plane, there is a 'DPI node group' containing two 'DPI node A' boxes connected by a 'Master/slave communication and control interface'. To the right of the DPI node group is a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' box containing a 'Forwarding information base (FIB)' and a 'Determining next node function (DNMF)'. Arrows show 'Ingress packet flows' entering the DPI node group, and 'Egress packet flows' exiting from the DNMF. A 'Policy control interface' connects the SD-PDF to the DPI node group. 'Configuration (of DPI policy rules)' and 'Alerts' are sent from the DPI node group to the SI-PDF. A note at the bottom right states '(Note) Y.2771(14)\_F7-22'. + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 7-22 – DPI model with DPI node level reliability guaranteeing** + +### 7.5.2 DPI PEF level fault tolerance model + +Figure 7-23 depicts a DPI model with DPI PEF level reliability support, two or more DPI PEF components (in other words, a DPI "1+N" redundancy group of which the DPI PEF components are the functional components) are designed within a DPI node, and one DPI PEF component works as the active component while the other DPI PEF components operate as backup components. The switchover procedures in failure situations are similar to those at node level reliability support (see clause 7.5.1). + +Although only two PEF components are depicted in Figure 7-23, the fault tolerance model is similar when there are more than two PEF components. + + + +Control plane + +Management plane + +User plane + +(Session-dependent) policy decision function (SD-PDF) + +(Session-independent) policy decision function (SI-PDF) + +(DPI) policy management + +General policy management + +Configuration (of DPI policy rules) + +Alerts + +Policy control interface + +DPI node function + +Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) + +DPI PEF group + +DPI PEF B + +DPI PEF A + +Master slave communication and control interface + +Ingress packet flows + +Packet forwarding function (PFF) + +Forwarding information base (FIB) + +Determining next node function (DNMF) + +Egress packet flows + +(Note) + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-23 + +Figure 7-23: DPI model with DPI PEF level reliability support. The diagram is divided into three planes: Control plane, Management plane, and User plane. In the Management plane, there is a hierarchy of policy management boxes: General policy management, (DPI) policy management, and (Session-independent) policy decision function (SI-PDF). In the Control plane, there is a (Session-dependent) policy decision function (SD-PDF). In the User plane, there is a DPI node function containing a Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) and a DPI PEF group. The DPI PEF group contains DPI PEF A and DPI PEF B, connected by a Master slave communication and control interface. Ingress packet flows enter DPI PEF A. The L\_PDF receives configuration from the SI-PDF and alerts from the SD-PDF. The L\_PDF sends configuration to the SI-PDF and alerts to the SD-PDF. The DPI PEF group sends data to the Packet forwarding function (PFF). The PFF contains a Forwarding information base (FIB) and a Determining next node function (DNMF). Egress packet flows exit the DNMF. A note indicates the PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 7-23 – DPI model with DPI PEF level reliability support** + +### 7.5.3 DPI-PIB level fault tolerance model + +Figure 7-24 depicts a DPI model with DPI PIB level reliability support, two or more copies of DPI PIB (in other words, two or more copies of the DPI PIB constitute a DPI "1+N" redundancy group) are located in a DPI node, and all DPI PIBs are synchronized, and thus contain identical information. One DPI-PIB is assigned the active role, and the other PIBs realize backup roles. Once the active PIB is out of service, one of the backup PIBs will automatically become the active one. + +Although only two DPI PIBs are depicted in Figure 7-24, the fault tolerance model is similar when there are more than two DPI PIBs. + + + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-24 + +Figure 7-24: DPI model with DPI PIB level reliability guaranteeing. The diagram shows the interaction between the Control plane, Management plane, and User plane. In the Management plane, General policy management contains (DPI) policy management, which contains a (Session-independent) policy decision function (SI-PDF). In the Control plane, a (Session-dependent) policy decision function (SD-PDF) is connected to a Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) in the User plane via a Policy control interface. The L\_PDF sends Configuration (of DPI policy rules) to the SI-PDF and receives Alerts. The L\_PDF also sends an Update to the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF). The DPI-PEF contains two DPI policy information bases (DPI-PIB). One PIB sends Condition(s) to the DPI scan function (DPI-ScF), and the other sends Conditions and actions to the DPI analyser function (DPI-AnF). The DPI-ScF sends control information to the DPI-AnF, which in turn sends control information to the DPI action execution function (DPI-AcEF). The DPI-AnF sends a Result back to the L\_PDF. The DPI-AcEF sends data to the Packet forwarding function (PFF), which contains a Forwarding information base (FIB) and a Determining next node function (DNNF). The PFF sends Egress packet flows. A Note indicates the PFF is out of scope. A legend shows a dashed arrow with a square head for Control information. + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 7-24 – DPI model with DPI PIB level reliability guaranteeing** + +### 7.5.4 DPI engine level fault tolerance model + +Figure 7-25 depicts a DPI model with DPI engine level reliability support. The fault tolerance principles are the same as in previous models at higher levels. + +Although only two DPI engine components are depicted in Figure 7-25, the fault tolerance model is similar when there are more than two DPI engine components. + + + +Figure 7-25: DPI model with DPI engine level reliability guaranteeing. The diagram illustrates the architecture of a DPI model across three planes: Control plane, Management plane, and User plane. In the Control plane, a (Session-dependent) policy decision function (Sp-PDF) is connected to a Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) in the User plane via a Policy control interface. In the Management plane, General policy management contains (DPI) policy management, which in turn contains a (Session-independent) policy decision function (Si-PDF). Configuration (of DPI policy rules) flows from the Management plane to the L\_PDF, and Alerts flow from the L\_PDF to the Management plane. The User plane contains the DPI node function, which includes the Local policy decision function (L\_PDF) and the DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF). The DPI-PEF contains a DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB) and a DPI engine group. The DPI-PIB sends Condition(s) to the DPI engine group and receives Conditions and actions back. The L\_PDF sends an Update to the DPI-PIB and receives a Result back. The DPI engine group consists of two DPI engine components. Ingress packet flows enter the DPI engine group, which then connects to a Packet forwarding function (PFF). The PFF contains a Forwarding information base (FIB) and a Determining next node function (DNMF). The FIB sends data to the DNMF, which outputs Egress packet flows. A note indicates that the PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. A legend shows that dashed arrows represent Control information. + +Y.2771(14)\_F7-25 + +NOTE – The PFF is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 7-25 – DPI model with DPI engine level reliability guaranteeing** + +# 8 Performance framework + +## 8.1 Purpose and scope of performance considerations + +This clause describes a framework and proceeding for identifying and developing performance metrics related to DPI. These metrics can be used to characterize the behaviour of DPI entities. + +The performance framework covers basically the areas of: + +#### 1) performance metrics: + +The capacity, availability and performance of a DPI entity may be characterized by performance metrics. The prime purpose is: + +- a) to clarify whether existing, non-DPI performance metrics could be reused; + +- b) to recognize DPI-specific performance metrics, which are already introduced by other organizations working on DPI; + - c) to identify new DPI-specific performance metrics, which implies the definition of such a metric; and + - d) to classify the set of metrics into key performance indicators (KPIs) and other metrics. +- 2) performance requirements: +- Such kinds of DPI requirements are associated to particular performance metrics. Implementation dependent performance requirements are outside the scope of this Recommendation. Thus, it is possible to derive qualitative or relative performance requirements. The specification of additional quantitative or absolute performance requirements is only possible for some limited areas (e.g., if the maximum node transfer delay budget would be subject to an overall end-to-end network consideration...). +- 3) performance benchmarks: +- Benchmarking is a fairly challenging area with respect to the identification and specification of well-recognized and meaningful benchmark scenarios. The definition of DPI performance benchmarks is basically outside the scope of this Recommendation. However, this Recommendation could provide information and guidance on aspects of consideration when trying to specify a performance benchmark for DPI entities. + +The definition of new performance metric types (also known as performance indicator) should basically follow the guidelines of [b-IETF RFC 6390], and therefore principally incorporate at least: + +- metric name and metric description; +- method of measurement or calculation; +- measurement unit; and +- a performance metric definition shall not be tied to a statistical parameter like min, max, mean, PDF, variance, etc. Such aspects are rather subject to a requirements specification. + +## 8.2 Performance metrics + +### 8.2.1 Overview – Performance indicators for DPI nodes + +Performance requirements are related to performance metrics. The crucial metric types are called key performance indicators (KPIs), which represent a subset of the overall set of metrics. + +#### 8.2.1.1 Guidelines for classifying DPI-related performance metrics as KPIs + +This Recommendation uses the following KPI definition (NOTE 1 – derived from [ETSI TS 132 410]): + +- **Key performance indicators (KPIs) in general:** +Are the primary metrics to evaluate process performance as indicators of the core function of the network element. +- **Key performance indicators for DPI entities (KPIDPI):** +A KPIDPI – as in the scope of this Recommendation – does therefore characterize the performance of the DPI engine (see clause 3.2.6 of [ITU-T Y.2770]; also known as DPI packet processing path). + +NOTE 2 – The notion of performance indicator (PI) is synonym to performance metric in this Recommendation. + +In order to classify DPI performance metrics as KPIs or non-KPIs, the following criteria should be considered. A KPI for DPI entities should fulfil the following conditions: + +- 1) Performance metric should be tied to the packet processing path itself, where DPI policy rules are enforced on packet objects (hence, not any other DPI functions outside the DPI packet path); and +- 2) Performance metric should be DPI use case independent (hence, not application-specific to particular DPI services); and +- 3) Performance metric should be independent of specific protocols below and above the IP layer (hence, e.g., not specific to a particular IP transport protocol (such as TCP), IP application protocol, etc.); and +- 4) Performance metric should be independent of physical realizations of DPI entities (hence, not related to implementation specific aspects such as energy consumption, power dissipation, state-of-the-art processing components, etc.). + +#### 8.2.1.2 Typical key performance indicators for DPI nodes + +Figure 8-1 illustrates some well-known example KPIs for DPI nodes (the list of $KPI_{DPI}$ is not exhaustive). The $KPI_{DPI}$ types are listed below the diagram. Correspondent performance requirements (if any) are outlined in separate clauses. + + + +Figure 8-1: Overview – Key performance indicators for DPI nodes. The diagram shows a 'Packet node' containing a 'DPI node function (DPI-NF)' and a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)'. The DPI-NF includes a 'DPI policy enforcement function (L-PEF)' which contains a 'DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)' and three sub-functions: 'DPI-ScF', 'DPI-AnF', and 'DPI-AcEF'. An 'unidirectional packet flow' enters from the left, passing through the DPI-NF and then the PFF before exiting to the right. Performance metrics are indicated: Φ\_{P,In} at the input, τ\_{TD} (DPI node-internal transfer delay) across the DPI-NF, Φ\_{P,Out} at the output, and ε\_{f-n} and ε\_{f-p} (error rates) associated with the DPI-PIB. A reference 'Y.2771(14)\_F8-1' is noted at the bottom right. + +NOTE 1 – The packet node and PFF are shown with respect to an unambiguous specification of performance metrics, but both entities as such are out of scope of this Recommendation. + +NOTE 2 – The PFF is only present for the in-path DPI mode. + +**Figure 8-1 – Overview – Key performance indicators for DPI nodes** + +The major performance metrics are typically: + +- KPI "(DPI) **node-internal transfer delay**" $\tau_{TD}$ [ $\mu\text{s}$ ]: see clause 8.2.3.1. +- KPI "(DPI) **packet processing rate**" $\phi_{P,In}[\text{s}^{-1}]$ : see clause 8.2.3.2. +- KPI "(DPI) **error rate**" $\epsilon_{DPI}$ : see clause 8.2.3.3. + - KPI "(DPI) false-positive error rate" $\epsilon_{f-p}$ . + - KPI "(DPI) false-negative error rate" $\epsilon_{f-n}$ . +- KPI "(DPI) **rate of successfully identified packets**" $\phi_{P,Identified}[\text{s}^{-1}]$ : see clause 8.2.3.4. + +### 8.2.2 Formal template for performance metric definitions + +Performance metric definitions in this Recommendation use the template according to Table 8-1, which itself is derived from the IETF template according to clause 5.4.4 of [b-IETF RFC 6390] "Performance Metric Definition Template". + +**Table 8-1 – Formal template for performance metric definitions** + +| | | | +|----------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | | +| Symbol: | I | | +| Metric description: | N | | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N | | +| Units of measurement: | N | | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | | +| Measurement timing: | N | | +| Implementation: | I | | +| Verification: | I | | +| Use and applications: | I | For example, "realtime DPI", "non-realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | That is, "KPI", "non-KPI" or "unclassified" | +| NOTE – Normative (N) and informative (I) description elements. | | | + +The template is used in order to ensure a certain minimum of specification quality for the introduced metrics by this Recommendation. However, primarily the *normative* description elements are provided due to the "framework character" of this Recommendation. Empty (*informative*) description elements are an indicator that the usage of such a metric in a real performance specification would firstly need further specification work in order to get complete, applicable metrics. For instance, item "implementation" description is outside the scope of a "framework" Recommendation, or a metric definition without item "verification" information is useless (because required e.g., for the calibration of the measurement function). + +### **8.2.3 General performance metric definitions for DPI entities** + +#### **8.2.3.1 DPI metric "node-internal transfer delay"** + +DPI related policy rules are applied to each individual packet of a particular packet flow. Such a kind of policy enforcement introduces basically an additional service and waiting time in the packet forwarding path of a packet node (e.g., an IP hop) with "DPI engine" support (i.e., a policy enforcement point (PEP) providing DPI). The performance metric node-internal transfer delay represents the packet transfer delay by the network element itself. + +Table 8-2 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-2 – DPI metric "node-internal transfer delay"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | Node-internal transfer delay | +| Symbol: | I | $\tau_{TD}$ | +| Metric description: | N | The accumulated waiting and service times of a packet through a DPI node | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N |
This value is calculated by measuring the entry and exit times ( and ) of individual packets at the packet interfaces of a physical or logical representation of a DPI node function.
Precondition: the measurement entity must be able to identify individual packets.
Warning: this metric is typically load-dependent because the node-internal transfer delay is composed of node-internal service and waiting times. Load, or more precisely the DPI offered load , is given by the incoming packet rate and the mean service time per packet according to:
$A_{DPI-NF} = \phi_{P,In} \cdot T_{H,Packet}$Principal load dependency (see also clause 8.3):
$\tau_{TD} = f(A_{DPI-NF})$ | +| Units of measurement: | N | ns | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | This metric can be used over a wide range of time intervals | +| Implementation: | I | – | +| Verification: | I | – | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | "KPI" | +| NOTE – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element. | | | + +##### 8.2.3.1.1 Further discussion + +###### a) DPI versus non-DPI nodes: + +Example of IP node: the transfer delay of a DPI node may be fundamentally greater than the transfer delay of a legacy IP node (i.e., an IP hop or router according to [b-IETF RFC 1812]) due to the additional service function on top of native IP forwarding functionality. + +###### b) Typical relationships: + +The node-internal transfer delay $\tau_{TD}$ could be dependent (because it is implementation specific) also on the following parameters: + +- the number of DPI policy rules $N_{db}$ (e.g., increased service time when multiple DPI policy rules are processed in series); +- the packet size $Sp$ [bit] (e.g., increased search or comparison time as part of DPI policy condition verification), the packet size $Sp$ could be related to the L2 frame size value given by [b-IETF RFC 2544]; and + +- the number of DPI engines $N_{DPIeng}$ (e.g., consideration of internal parallelism; see clause 7.3.3). + +Thus, in this example, $\tau_{TD}$ would be a function of parameters $N_{db}$ , $S_p$ and $N_{DPIeng}$ i.e., + +$$\tau_{TD} = f(N_{db}, S_p, N_{DPIeng}).$$ + +The three parameters influence consequently the mean service time per packet $T_{H,Packet}$ (as introduced in Table 8-3): the first two parameters are increasing factors, whereas the third parameter leads to a reduction in the mean service time. + +###### c) Qualitative performance requirement: + +The transfer delay (inclusive of the additional service time due to DPI processing) should not exceed any end-to-end real-time requirements related to the overall communication service. + +NOTE 1 – Such a packet forwarding capability is also colloquially known as "wire speed processing". + +NOTE 2 – Such a performance objective may limit the number of enforced policy rules per packet (just due to the limited budget of service time). + +#### 8.2.3.2 DPI metric "packet processing rate" + +Table 8-3 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-3 – DPI metric "packet processing rate"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | Packet processing rate | +| Symbol: | I | $\phi_{P,In}$ | +| Metric description: | N |The rate of packets, processed by the DPI-PEF. This is the ingress packet rate because DPI policy rules are performed for every incoming packet. The egress rate is equal or smaller than the ingress rate (due to possible packet discard actions),
$\phi_{P,In} \leq \phi_{P,Out}$ | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N | Counting all packets observed at ingress interface p1 over a time period. The value is then calculated by dividing the observed number by the time period | +| Units of measurement: | N | $s^{-1}$ | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | This metric can principally be used over a wide range of time intervals. Typically time scale is at the level of seconds | +| Implementation: | I | – | +| Verification: | I | – | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | "KPI" | +| NOTE – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element. | | | + +The DPI packet processing rate $\phi_P$ , is dependent on many parameters e.g., the combination of: + +- the number of DPI policy rules, or DPI PIB size, $N_{db}$ ; + +- the packet size, $S_p$ . The packet size $S_p$ could be related to the L2 frame size values given by [b-IETF RFC 2544]; and +- possible other parameters. + +Example: When $(\phi_p, N_{db}, S_p) = (200, 1000, 64)$ , the processing rate is at least 200 packets/sec when the number of policy rules is less than 1000 and the packet size is 64. + +The qualitative behaviour is described in clause 8.3. The upgrade of the DPI-PIB by adding new, modifying existent or deleting DPI policy rules, should not impact the nominal DPI packet processing rate $\phi_p$ (with $\phi_p$ equal to $\phi_{p,In}$ ). + +#### 8.2.3.3 DPI metric "error rate" + +The sum of false-negative and false-positive results relates to the error rate of a DPI node. These performance metrics are only related to statistical decisions (if any at all) of a DPI node. The DPI-PEF will provide a deterministic behaviour for the majority of DPI policy rules, however, there might be DPI policy rules with statistical policy conditions or packet flows with statistical traffic information which may lead to incorrect DPI-PEF decisions. + +Table 8-4 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-4 – DPI metric "error rate"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | Error rate | +| Symbol: | I | $\epsilon_{DPI}$ | +| Metric description: | N | The sum of false-negative (see clause 8.2.3.3.2) and false-positive (see clause 8.2.3.3.1) results of the DPI node | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N | Direct measurement: not possible (Note 2).Indirect measurement (calculation):
$\epsilon_{DPI} = \epsilon_{f-n} + \epsilon_{f-p}$ | +| Units of measurement: | N | – | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | The measurement interval is dependent on the time scale from the perspective of the served user instance (Note 3) | +| Implementation: | I | – | +| Verification: | I | – | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | "KPI" | +|
NOTE 1 – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element.
NOTE 2 – This performance metric is a so-called composed metric, i.e., it may not be measured directly, but can be composed from base metrics that have been measured (see clause 5.3.1 of [b-IETF RFC 6390]).
NOTE 3 – The served user instance in general represents a remote entity ("the user"), interested in the measurements. Examples: performance management system, DPI PD-FE.
| | | + +##### 8.2.3.3.1 DPI metric "false-positive error rate" + +Table 8-5 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-5 – DPI metric "false-positive error rate"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | False-positive error rate | +| Symbol: | I | $\epsilon_{f-p}$ | +| Metric description: | N | The proportion of negative instances that were erroneously reported as being positive | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N | Measurements of this metric are inherently challenging, hence, only indications may be given by this Recommendation:Typically a well-known pattern of a sufficiently large series of packets would be sent to the DPI entity. The expected result (as given by the applied DPI policy rules) is compared against the measured results from the DPI process.
The measurement may be done in intrusive or non-intrusive test types | +| Units of measurement: | N | – | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | The measurement interval is dependent on the time scale from the perspective of the served user instance | +| Implementation: | I | – | +| Verification: | I | – | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | Yes | +| NOTE – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element. | | | + +Example 1: + +A DPI policy condition $C_i$ implies the identification of "application type $X$ " and the packet identification function (DPI-PIF) concluded "application type $X$ " for a packet of "application type $Y$ ", which is a false-positive result. + +Example 2: + +The calculation of this metric is possible for bloom filter-based probabilistic DPI (see Appendix I) with the following parameter values: + +- $m$ = Size of bloom filter in bits +- $n$ = Number of signatures in set $S$ +- $k$ = Number of hash functions used for the generation of the bloom filter. + +The false positive rate, $\epsilon_{f-p}$ , is given by equation: + +$$\epsilon_{f-p} = \left(1 - e^{-kn/m}\right)^k$$ + +The calculated and expected result can be then verified by measurements. + +##### 8.2.3.3.2 DPI metric "false-negative error rate" + +Table 8-6 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-6 – DPI metric "false-negative error rate"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | False-negative error rate | +| Symbol: | I | $\epsilon_{f-n}$ | +| Metric description: | N | The proportion of positive instances that were erroneously reported as negative | +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N | See correspondent entry in Table 8-5 | +| Units of measurement: | N | - | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | The measurement interval is dependent on the time scale from the perspective of the served user instance | +| Implementation: | I | - | +| Verification: | I | - | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | Yes | +| NOTE – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element. | | | + +Example: + +A DPI policy condition $C_i$ implies the identification of "application type $X$ " and the DPI packet identification function (DPI-PIF) does not identify an "application type $X$ " packet as "application type $X$ ", which is a false-negative result. + +##### 8.2.3.3.3 Relation to run-time errors + +The DPI engine as run-time environment for the execution of DPI policy rules is inherently not error free. However, the run-time error rate and DPI metric "error rate" represent different performance indicators. + +Background information: + +For example, the run-time exception event according to clause 4.1 of [b-IETF RFC 4011] provides information about the concept of run-time errors: + +"[...] Run-Time Exception (RTE) – A run-time exception is a fatal error caused in language or function processing. If, during the invocation of a script, a run-time exception occurs, execution of that script is immediately terminated. If a policyCondition experiences a run-time exception while processing an element, the element is not matched by the condition and the associated action will not be run on that element. [...]" + +#### 8.2.3.4 DPI metric "rate of successfully identified packets" + +Table 8-7 provides the metric definition. + +**Table 8-7 – DPI metric "rate of successfully identified packets"** + +| | | | +|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Metric name: | N | Rate of successfully identified packets | +| Symbol: | I | $\phi_{P,Identified}$ | +| Metric description: | N |
An incoming packet is "successfully identified" (by the packet identification function) when the DPI policy rule conditions (from at least one DPI policy rule) "match" the inspected packet.
The type of "match" (such as full, partial, deterministic, with probability ..., etc.) is not further qualified.
The "rate" relates to the number of successfully identified packets per time unit
| +| Method of measurement or calculation: | N |1. Direct measurement:
For instance: enforcement of a known DPI policy rule and the generation of a packet flow with known characteristics (i.e., the ratio of traffic which should match (or not) is known in advance). The measured value is then compared against the nominal value
2. Indirect measurement (calculation):
$\phi_{P,Identified} = \phi_{P,In} \cdot (1 - \varepsilon_{DPI})$ | +| Units of measurement: | N | s -1 | +| Measurement point(s) with potential measurement domain: | N | See Figure 8-1 (traffic model) | +| Measurement timing: | N | The measurement interval is dependent on the time scale from the perspective of the served user instance | +| Implementation: | I | - | +| Verification: | I | See above method "direct measurement" | +| Use and applications: | I | "realtime DPI" | +| Reporting model: | I | Typically as part of performance management | +| Type "KPI": yes/no? | I | "KPI" | +| NOTE – N: Normative description element; I: Informative description element. | | | + +## 8.3 Performance of policy enforcement points, estimation of qualitative performance behaviour + +The purpose of this clause is to provide complementary information concerning qualitative performance estimations for protocol layer dependent policy enforcement. Figure 8-2 shows a packet node (a) with a DPI node function and (b) without any enforced DPI. The considered key performance indicator here is the packet node throughput, $\phi_{P,Node,Out}$ . + + + +a) Packet node with DPI + +b) Packet node without DPI + +Diagram of a packet node with DPI. It shows a 'Packet node' box containing a 'DPI node function (DPI-NF)' box and a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' box. The 'DPI node function' contains a 'DPI policy enforcement function (L-PEF)' box, which in turn contains a 'DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB)' cylinder and three sub-functions: 'DPI-ScF', 'DPI-AnF', and 'DPI-AcEF'. An 'Active rule set R' points to the 'DPI-PIB'. A 'unidirectional packet flow' enters from the left, passing through the DPI-NF and then the PFF. The flow is labeled with ΦP,In at the input and ΦP,Out at the output. A horizontal line with a double slash indicates a delay τTD (Note). Diagram of a packet node without DPI. It shows a 'Packet node' box containing a 'Packet forwarding function (PFF)' box. A 'unidirectional packet flow' enters from the left and passes through the PFF. The flow is labeled with ΦP, Node, In at the input and ΦP, Node, Out at the output. + +NOTE – The packet node and PFF are shown with respect to an unambiguous specification of performance metrics, but both entities as such are out of scope of this Recommendation. + +**Figure 8-2 – Policy enforcement performance – Packet node throughput $\phi_{P,Node,Out}$ as a function of the set of enforced policy rules $\underline{R}$ per packet** + +Figure 8-3 illustrates some principal throughput curves. A specific policy enforcement function (y-axis) is characterized by the number of policy rules $\underline{R}$ per packet as well as aspects of rules interaction. Performing a particular policy rule consumes a certain amount of packet path resources in terms of processing time, packet memory, TCAM/CAM memory, policy database, etc. + +Simplified rule of thumb: the more rules per packet, the more resources required for policy enforcement. + +![Figure 8-3: Policy enforcement performance – Qualitative throughput behaviour. A graph showing the trade-off between policy enforcement complexity (R) and performance (Φ). The y-axis is labeled 'Policy enforcement function [Number of policy rules per packet (and rules interaction complexity)]' with levels (1) Native forwarding, (2) Basic policy rules, (3) Few, selected policy rules in addition, and (4) Deep packet inspection. The x-axis is labeled 'Performance [Packets pro time unit] e.g., SIP messages per second' with 'Max. capacity Φ_P,N ode,O ut'. Three curves are shown: A (linear), B (curved), and C (steepest). A box labeled 'Qualitative throughput behaviour' points to the area under the curves. Reference Y.2771(14)_F8-3.](6f047db5bd9eab2d3c1a0d2ac59103db_img.jpg) + +Figure 8-3: Policy enforcement performance – Qualitative throughput behaviour. A graph showing the trade-off between policy enforcement complexity (R) and performance (Φ). The y-axis is labeled 'Policy enforcement function [Number of policy rules per packet (and rules interaction complexity)]' with levels (1) Native forwarding, (2) Basic policy rules, (3) Few, selected policy rules in addition, and (4) Deep packet inspection. The x-axis is labeled 'Performance [Packets pro time unit] e.g., SIP messages per second' with 'Max. capacity Φ\_P,N ode,O ut'. Three curves are shown: A (linear), B (curved), and C (steepest). A box labeled 'Qualitative throughput behaviour' points to the area under the curves. Reference Y.2771(14)\_F8-3. + +**Figure 8-3 – Policy enforcement performance – Qualitative throughput behaviour** + +An ideal implementation may achieve a "linear" behaviour like *A*. A more realistic and cost effective model would rather follow curve *C*. + +The technical (and commercial) challenge with behaviour *C* is the fairly non-linear relationship, see Figure 8-4, which makes it not trivial to engineer a nominal load point or/and to achieve the required trade-off for limiting the set of enforced policy rules. + +![Figure 8-4: Policy enforcement performance – Example of use case C as a worst-case scenario. A graph showing 'Extreme' non-linear throughput behaviour. The y-axis is 'Policy enforcement function' and the x-axis is 'Performance [Packets pro time unit]'. A steep curve shows a 'Working point engineered nominal load' and a 'Drastic decline of capacity thus number of sessions ... i.e., increase of cost per session'. A shaded 'Uncertainty range' is shown on both axes, with a note 'e.g., unknown policy requirements or/and potential range of enforced policy rule sets'. The resulting achievable throughput is shown on the x-axis. Reference Y.2771(14)_F8-4.](a03f88e0ac174f2614e86f19e75f7b1d_img.jpg) + +Figure 8-4: Policy enforcement performance – Example of use case C as a worst-case scenario. A graph showing 'Extreme' non-linear throughput behaviour. The y-axis is 'Policy enforcement function' and the x-axis is 'Performance [Packets pro time unit]'. A steep curve shows a 'Working point engineered nominal load' and a 'Drastic decline of capacity thus number of sessions ... i.e., increase of cost per session'. A shaded 'Uncertainty range' is shown on both axes, with a note 'e.g., unknown policy requirements or/and potential range of enforced policy rule sets'. The resulting achievable throughput is shown on the x-axis. Reference Y.2771(14)\_F8-4. + +**Figure 8-4 – Policy enforcement performance – Example of use case *C* as a worst-case scenario** + +# 9 Categorization of DPI functional entities + +A DPI entity is typically not supporting the entire set of DPI requirements according to [ITU-T Y.2770], rather just a subset given by the aimed use cases. There might be consequently different types of DPI-FEs identified. + +## 9.1 Categorization principles + +Every identifiable capability of a DPI entity could be basically associated with DPI requirement(s) as specified by [ITU-T Y.2770]. There are at high level: + +- capabilities in terms of conditions processing; +- capabilities in terms of actions processing; and +- possibly other capabilities. + +Typical criteria for the identification of particular DPI-FE types are deployment scenarios (DPI use case), complexity of processing logic, cost factors, etc. + +## 9.2 Capabilities in terms of conditions processing + +Capabilities of conditions processing can be divided into two classes: L4 PI (L4 payload inspection enabled) and non-L4 PI (payload inspection disabled). + +## 9.3 Capabilities in terms of actions processing + +See clause 6.3.3.1 in [ITU-T Y.2770] concerning hierarchical levels of actions and examples. + +## 9.4 DPI-FE types + +Table 9-1 uses the classification principles from clauses 9.2 and 9.3 and provides an overview with regard to three relevant types: + +**Table 9-1 – Categories of DPI-FE types** + +| Type of DPI-FE | | | Capabilities in terms of actions processing | | +|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----|----------------------------------------------------|--------| +| | | | Support of DPI-AcEF: | | +| | | | No | Yes | +| Capabilities in terms of conditions processing | Support of L4 Payload Inspection: | No | Type 1 | | +| | | Yes | Type 2 | Type 3 | + +According to the DPI functional capabilities of a DPI-FE, the DPI-FE can be categorized as follows (Table 9-2): + +**Table 9-2 – The three types in detail** + +| Type | Rule processing | +|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1 | A FE without the capability of L4 payload inspection ( $L_4PI = L_{4+HI} \cup L_7PI$ ), i.e., a type of non-DPI-FE (e.g., a SPI-FE) | +| 2 | DPI-FE without the capability of action execution (DPI-AcFE), but with L4 payload inspection ( $L_4PI = L_{4+HI} \cup L_7PI$ ) | +| 3 | DPI-FE with the capability of action execution (DPI-AcFE) plus L4 payload inspection ( $L_4PI = L_{4+HI} \cup L_7PI$ ) | + +The type of a DPI FE could be the result of factors such as: + +- 1) amount of available resources: capabilities of a specific DPI physical entity (DPI-PE) (like hardware (HW) or software (SW) components) or +- 2) amount of allocated/enabled resources for DPI processing: via configuration management (e.g., via policy management entities (see clause 7) by provisioning a dedicated capability set). + +Note that a particular type $n$ DIP FE can be configured as a type $m$ ( $n > m$ ) by its management entity (due to the fact that e.g., the "type 3 DPI capability set" is a superset with regard to the other types). + +The DPI FE should be able to report its type to related functional entities (e.g., RACF). + +According to the DPI functional capabilities of a DPI-FE, the type 3 DPI-FE may be further subdivided as follows (Table 9-3): + +**Table 9-3 – Sub-variants of type 3** + +| Type | Rule processing | +|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 3.1 | DPI-FE with the capability of information gathering and reporting | +| 3.2 | Type 3.1 plus the ability of traffic control, but without the capability of modifying packet contents | +| 3.3 | Type 3.2 plus the capability of modifying packet contents | + +# 10 Security considerations + +Regulation, privacy and security application aspects of DPI are outside the scope of this Recommendation. Vendors, operators and service providers are required to take into account national regulatory and policy requirements when implementing this Recommendation. + +According to [ITU-Y.2770], the DPI-FE and the information pertaining to DPI operations should be under protection against threats. The mechanisms specified in [ITU T Y.2704] address the security requirements of [ITU-T Y.2770]. + +# Appendix I + +## Example functional architecture of probabilistic DPI based on the bloom filter + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +## I.1 Introduction + +Bloom filter is described in [b-Bloomfilter]: + +Bloom filters use a randomized technique to test membership queries on a set of strings. Given a string, the Bloom filter computes $k$ hash functions on it producing hash values ranging from 1 to $m$ (see Figure I.1). It then sets $k$ bits in a $m$ -bit long vector at the addresses corresponding to the $k$ hash values, where $k$ is not greater than $m$ (see also Equation 7-1). The same procedure is repeated for all the members of the set. This process is called "programming" of the filter. The query process is similar to programming, where a string whose membership is to be verified is input to the filter. The Bloom filter generates $k$ hash values using the same hash functions it used to program the filter. The bits in the $m$ -bit long vector at the locations corresponding to the $k$ hash values are looked up. If at least one of these bits is found not set then the string is declared to be a non-member of the set. If all the bits are found to be set then the string is said to belong to the set with a certain probability. This uncertainty in the membership comes from the fact that those $k$ bits in the $m$ -bit vector can be set by any of the members. Thus finding a bit set does not necessarily imply that it was set by the particular string being queried. However, finding a bit not set certainly implies that the string does not belong to the set, since if it did then all the $k$ bits would definitely have been set when the Bloom filter was programmed with that string. This explains the presence of false positives in this scheme, and the absence of any false negatives. + +For example, in Figure I.1, the bloom filter BF ( $B[0..m-1]$ ) is generated by 3 hash functions, $h_1$ , $h_2$ and $h_3$ , on string $x_1$ and $x_2$ , where in the bloom filter-based DPI strings $x_1$ and $x_2$ are the DPI signatures. String $y_1$ and $y_2$ are verified by 3 hash functions $h_1$ , $h_2$ and $h_3$ on string $y_1$ and $y_2$ against the bloom filter BF (given by bit vector $B[0..m-1]$ ), where in the bloom filter based DPI, strings $y_1$ and $y_2$ represent the inspected data structures, given e.g., by the payload of incoming packets. + +![Diagram illustrating the programming and query of a Bloom filter. A bit vector B[0..m-1] of length 11 is shown with bits at indices 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 set to 1. Two strings, x1 and x2, are programmed into the filter. String x1 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to set bits at indices 1, 3, and 5. String x2 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to set bits at indices 3, 6, and 8. Two strings, y1 and y2, are queried. String y1 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to point to bits at indices 1, 3, and 5, all of which are set. String y2 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to point to bits at indices 1, 6, and 8, all of which are set.](9d49325b5cb2d7a1431cb30637b5a7c9_img.jpg) + +Y.2771(14)\_F1.1 + +Diagram illustrating the programming and query of a Bloom filter. A bit vector B[0..m-1] of length 11 is shown with bits at indices 1, 3, 5, 6, and 8 set to 1. Two strings, x1 and x2, are programmed into the filter. String x1 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to set bits at indices 1, 3, and 5. String x2 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to set bits at indices 3, 6, and 8. Two strings, y1 and y2, are queried. String y1 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to point to bits at indices 1, 3, and 5, all of which are set. String y2 is hashed by h1, h2, and h3 to point to bits at indices 1, 6, and 8, all of which are set. + +**Figure I.1 – Programming and query of bloom filter (BF equal to bit vector $B[0..m-1]$ )** + +The false positive rate, $\epsilon_{f-p}$ , is expressed by Equation I-1: + +$$\epsilon_{f-p} = \left(1 - e^{-kn/m}\right)^k \quad (\text{I-1})$$ + +where, $n$ is the number of strings programmed into the bloom filter. The value of $\epsilon_{f-p}$ can be reduced by choosing appropriate values of $m$ and $k$ for a given size of the member set, $n$ . + +## I.2 Functional model of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI + +The functional model of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI is illustrated in Figure I.2. The policy rule for probabilistic DPI may be: + +If packet 'P' contains signatures from a DPI signature set ' $S'$ ' (as policy condition), where the signature set is given by $S' = \{'S1', 'S2', \dots, 'Sm'\}$ , then discard the packet (as policy action). + +The bloom filter $BF_S$ for signature set S is generated by the set of hash functions $H_1, H_2, \dots, H_k$ . The policy rule is converted to: + +If $H_1(P), H_2(P), \dots, H_k(P)$ match $BF_S$ , then discard. + +Before the DPI analyser compares the arriving packet against this DPI policy rule condition, the DPI scanner needs to determine the offset and length in the arriving packet which is used to match against the DPI policy rule conditions. + +There are two principle options: + +- 1) For the protocol-stack aware DPI rule condition, the offset and signature length in the set ' $S'$ ' is known, and the scanner reports the offset and length information to the DPI analyser directly. +- 2) For the protocol-agnostic DPI rule condition, the DPI scanner needs to scan and determine the offset and length. The DPI scanner reports that information to the DPI analyser. + +The DPI analyser generates the hash result of packet P using $H_1, H_2, \dots, H_k$ , matches the results with the $BF_S$ and reports the match result to the DPI action execution function. The DPI action execution function reports the matching result ("True" or "False") and discards the packet when the match result is estimated to be True, or else passes the packet to the packet forwarding function. If the generated match result does not match the $BF_S$ , the DPI scanner needs to scan from the 'offset+1' byte (offset = offset + 1), and the process will continue until the end of the packet. + + + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph DPI_PEF [DPI policy enforcement function DPI-PEF unidirectional] + subgraph DPI_PIB [DPI policy information base DPI-PIB] + Condition["Condition: if H1(P), H2(P), ..., Hk(P) +match BF_S then report and discard"] + end + DPI_Scanner["DPI scanner +(Scan packet according to the condition, +determine the packet offset and length)"] + DPI_Analyser["DPI analyser +(H1(P), H2(P), ..., Hk(P) = BF_S?)"] + DPI_Action["DPI action execution function"] + + Condition -- "Condition(s)" --> DPI_Scanner + Condition -- "Conditions and actions" --> DPI_Analyser + DPI_Scanner -- "Offset, length" --> DPI_Analyser + DPI_Analyser -- "Match result true or false" --> DPI_Action + end + + Ingress_P["Ingress packet P"] --> DPI_Scanner + DPI_Analyser -- "Packet P" --> DPI_Action + DPI_Action -- "True report and discard" --> Discard[" "] + DPI_Action -- "False: Pass" --> Egress_P["Egress packet flows"] + + Control["Control information"] -.-> DPI_PEF + +``` + +Figure I.2: Functional model of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI. The diagram shows a unidirectional DPI policy enforcement function (DPI-PEF) containing three main components: DPI policy information base (DPI-PIB), DPI scanner, and DPI analyser. The DPI-PIB contains a condition: 'if H1(P), H2(P), ..., Hk(P) match BF\_S then report and discard'. The DPI scanner scans the ingress packet P and reports offset and length to the DPI analyser. The DPI analyser generates hash results H1(P), H2(P), ..., Hk(P) and compares them with BF\_S. The result is passed to the DPI action execution function, which either discards the packet (True report) or passes it (False: Pass). + +**Figure I.2 – Functional model of bloom filter based probabilistic DPI** + +It may be noted that the match result of the DPI analyser is of type Boolean, i.e., True or False, hence not any probability value such as a "*positive match with probability p* (and p between 0% and 100%)". However, the entire DPI packet processing path stages as such are leading to probabilistic DPI results due to the inherent false positive rate $\epsilon_{f-p}$ , as part of the DPI policy condition. + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T H.248.53] Recommendation ITU-T H.248.53 (2009), *Gateway control protocol: Traffic management packages*. +- [b-ITU-T I.130] Recommendation ITU-T I.130 (1988), *Method for the characterization of telecommunication services supported by an ISDN and network capabilities of an ISDN*. +- [b-ITU-T J.380.1] Recommendation ITU-T J.380.1 (2011), *Digital program insertion – Advertising systems interfaces – Advertising systems overview*. +- [b-ITU-T X.1036] Recommendation ITU-T X.1036 (2007), *Framework for creation, storage, distribution and enforcement of policies for network security*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.1221] Recommendation ITU-T Y.1221 (2010), *Traffic control and congestion control in IP-based networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.2121] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2121 (2008), *Requirements for the support of flow-state-aware transport technology in NGN*. +- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup.23] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 23 (2013), *ITU-T Y.2770-series - Supplement on DPI terminology*. +- [b-IETF RFC 1812] IETF RFC 1812 (1995), *Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers*. +- [b-IETF RFC 2544] IETF RFC 2544 (1999), *Benchmarking Methodology for Network Interconnect Devices*. +- [b-IETF RFC 3060] IETF RFC 3060 (2001), *Policy Core Information Model – Version 1 Specification*. +- [b-IETF RFC 3198] IETF RFC 3198 (2001), *Terminology for Policy-Based Management*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4011] IETF RFC 4011 (2005), *Policy Based Management MIB*. +- [b-IETF RFC 4292] IETF RFC 4292 (2006), *IP Forwarding Table MIB*. +- [b-IETF RFC 6390] IETF RFC 6390 (2011), *Guidelines for Considering New Performance Metric Development*. +- [b-Bloomfilter] Dharmapurikar, S. et al., (2003), *Implementation of a Deep Packet Inspection Circuit using Parallel Bloom Filters in Reconfigurable Hardware*. IEEE Proceedings of 11th Symposium on High Performance Interconnects. Stanford University, Wiley, John & Sons, Inc. +- [b-CRTC] Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission(2009), *ISP Traffic Management Technologies: The State of the Art*. + + + + + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git 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a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3031-201205-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3031-201205-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..800794bd2bb2870ad63eb16309df1e395995ba99 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3031-201205-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,578 @@ + + +I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +# Y.3031 + +(05/2012) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION +INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS +AND NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS + +Next Generation Networks – Future networks + +# --- Identification framework in future networks + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031 + + + +The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with a red lightning bolt striking it, and the text "ITU" in blue, with "International Telecommunication Union" in smaller blue text below it. + +ITU logo + +# ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS AND NEXT- GENERATION NETWORKS** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Numbering, naming and addressing | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Smart ubiquitous networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| Future networks | Y.3000–Y.3099 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# **Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031** + +# **Identification framework in future networks** + +## **Summary** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031 deals with potential identifiers pertinent to networks envisioned in Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001. It presents a review analysis of user, data, service, node and location identifiers being used in current networks and projects related to future networks (FNs). Details of the review are in the appendix. It then specifies the identification framework and general requirements of these identifiers in future networks. + +## **History** + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3031 | 2012-05-07 | 13 | + +## **Keywords** + +Future network, identification framework, identifier. + +## FOREWORD + +The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations specialized agency in the field of telecommunications, information and communication technologies (ICTs). The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is a permanent organ of ITU. ITU-T is responsible for studying technical, operating and tariff questions and issuing Recommendations on them with a view to standardizing telecommunications on a worldwide basis. + +The World Telecommunication Standardization Assembly (WTSA), which meets every four years, establishes the topics for study by the ITU-T study groups which, in turn, produce Recommendations on these topics. + +The approval of ITU-T Recommendations is covered by the procedure laid down in WTSA Resolution 1. + +In some areas of information technology which fall within ITU-T's purview, the necessary standards are prepared on a collaborative basis with ISO and IEC. + +## NOTE + +In this Recommendation, the expression "Administration" is used for conciseness to indicate both a telecommunication administration and a recognized operating agency. + +Compliance with this Recommendation is voluntary. However, the Recommendation may contain certain mandatory provisions (to ensure, e.g., interoperability or applicability) and compliance with the Recommendation is achieved when all of these mandatory provisions are met. The words "shall" or some other obligatory language such as "must" and the negative equivalents are used to express requirements. The use of such words does not suggest that compliance with the Recommendation is required of any party. + +## INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS + +ITU draws attention to the possibility that the practice or implementation of this Recommendation may involve the use of a claimed Intellectual Property Right. ITU takes no position concerning the evidence, validity or applicability of claimed Intellectual Property Rights, whether asserted by ITU members or others outside of the Recommendation development process. + +As of the date of approval of this Recommendation, ITU had not received notice of intellectual property, protected by patents, which may be required to implement this Recommendation. However, implementers are cautioned that this may not represent the latest information and are therefore strongly urged to consult the TSB patent database atdata processing for low latency ..... | 11 | +| | Appendix II – Examples of function-initiation models ..... | 13 | +| | II.1 An example of consumer-initiated model ..... | 13 | +| | II.2 An example of producer-initiated model..... | 13 | +| | II.3 A publish/subscribe example of producer-initiated model..... | 13 | +| | Appendix III – Examples of message format..... | 15 | +| | III.1 An example message format for function request..... | 15 | +| | III.2 Another example of message format for function request ..... | 15 | +| | Bibliography..... | 17 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3073 + +## Framework for service function chaining in information-centric networking + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation specifies the framework including communication models and scenarios, and messages and their content to be exchanged in executing functions, in applying information-centric networking to edge computing and service function chaining. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T Y.3001] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3001 (2011), *Future networks: Objectives and design goals*. +- [ITU-T Y.3011] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3011 (2012), *Framework of network virtualization for future networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.3031] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3031 (2012), *Identification framework in future networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.3032] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3032 (2014), *Configurations of node identifiers and their mapping with locators in future networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.3033] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3033 (2014), *Framework of data aware networking for future networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.3071] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3071 (2017), *Data aware networking (information centric networking) – Requirements and capabilities*. + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 DAN element** [ITU-T Y.3071]: A network component that forwards messages to producers, consumers, and other data aware networking (DAN) elements. + +**3.1.2 DAN realm** [ITU-T Y.3071]: A set of data aware networking (DAN) elements operated under one DAN realization and managed by an organization. Different DAN realms may adopt different DAN realizations such as naming convention, communication models including push and pull models and name resolution mechanisms. + +**3.1.3 identifier** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: An identifier is a series of digits, characters and symbols or any other form of data used to identify subscriber(s), user(s), network element(s), function(s), network entity(ies) providing services/applications, or other entities (e.g., physical or logical objects). Identifiers can be used for registration or authorization. They can be either public to all networks, shared between a limited number of networks or private to a specific network (private IDs are normally not disclosed to third parties). + +**3.1.4 IMT-2020** [ITU-T Y.3100]: Systems, system components, and related aspects that provide far more enhanced capabilities than those described in [b-ITU-R M.1645]. + +NOTE – [b-ITU-R M.1645] defines the framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000 for the radio access network. + +**3.1.5 name** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A name is the identifier of an entity (e.g., subscriber, network element) that may be resolved/translated into an address. + +**3.1.6 named data object (NDO)** [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35]: A data object that is identifiable by a name. + +**3.1.7 NDO consumer** [ITU-T Y.3071]: A component that makes requests on named data objects (NDOs). + +**3.1.8 NDO producer** [ITU-T Y.3071]: A component holding named data objects (NDOs) and make them reachable by corresponding requests. An NDO producer may be an actual owner of the NDO or a delegate of the actual owner. + +## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation** + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 data-aware networking** [based on ITU-T Y.3001]: This refers to an architecture of future networks optimized to handle large amounts of data in a distributed environment, and to enable users to access desired data safely, easily, quickly and accurately, regardless of their location. + +**3.2.2 edge computing**: This refers to a strategy to deploy processing capability at network edge where end terminals are connected, and to perform the processing of data which is derived from and fed to the end terminals. + +**3.2.3 explicit processing allocation function** [based on ITU-T Y.3071]: This is a capability to allocate data processing function to a specified location. + +**3.2.4 ICN service function**: This refers to the execution of a computer program that implements a unit of functionality initiated and utilized by the protocol of ICN. + +**3.2.5 information-centric networking** [based on ITU-T Y.3033]: Information-centric networking is equivalent to data-aware networking. + +**3.2.6 in-network processing**: This refers to executing computer programs in network nodes such as routers instead of in-host computers connected at the end of the network. + +**3.2.7 ISF provider**: This is a component that prepares an ISF description, registers the ISF description to the system, and manages the chain of ISFs made of a series of ISF descriptions. + +**3.2.8 NDO and processing description retrieval function** [based on ITU-T Y.3071]: This is a capability to retrieve data processing descriptions and the NDOs to be processed by the requested processing. + +**3.2.9 processing function** [based on ITU-T Y.3071]: This is the capability to process NDOs before transmitting them in order to adapt the NDOs to the capability of the receiving consumer or to aggregate information. + +**3.2.10 process registration function** [based on ITU-T Y.3071]: This is a mechanism to register the description of the processing function. + +**3.2.11 process scheduling and coordination function** [based on ITU-T Y.3071]: This is a capability to recognize data processing requests, coordinate the requested processing placed at appropriate DAN elements and schedule the processing. + +**3.2.12 publish/subscribe**: This refers to a communication model between information sources and information-requesting parties. The information-requesting parties express their interest to receive information which is characterized with features. The feature may be described in terms of keywords, + +identifiers, names, etc. The information source transmits information accompanied with its features and the system supporting the publish/subscribe communication model delivers the information to all the information-requesting parties expressing matching features. The function to implement publish/subscribe is called the publish/subscribe function. + +**3.2.13 service function chaining:** This is the placing execution of ICN service functions in a sequence so that the sequence of ICN service functions is executed one after another to form a network service or an application as a whole. + +NOTE – Service function chaining, as defined in this Recommendation, covers only ICN service functions. + +**3.2.14 linear service function chaining structure:** A service function chaining structure whose functions are aligned in a straight line, which may split out into linear branches of service function chaining. + +**3.2.15 non-linear service function chaining structure:** A service function chaining structure that can split into two or more branches as well as two or more branches may merge into one service function chaining. + +# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|-------|---------------------------------------------------| +| DAN | Data Aware Networking | +| EPAF | Explicit Processing Allocation Function | +| ICN | Information-centric Networking | +| IoT | Internet of Things | +| ISF | ICN Service Function | +| NPDRF | NDO and Processing Description Retrieval Function | +| PRF | Process Registration Function | +| PSCF | Process Scheduling and Coordination Function | + +# 5 Conventions + +This Recommendation uses "is required" to indicate the main points to be taken into account in the framework for service function chaining in ICN. + +# 6 Justification + +IMT-2020 networks are expected to connect a large number of terminals and devices. Also, in some applications of IMT-2020 networks, a short response time is required. Edge computing and in-network processing technology which equips network nodes, such as routers and switches, data processing capability, is considered to be an effective solution to handle the data from a large number of terminals and devices, and to provide short response times. + +On the other hand, information-centric networking (ICN) technology is expected to be incorporated into IMT-2020 networks. Name-based routing is effective to handle the large number of terminals and devices. Combining ICN and service function chaining is essential to providing the IMT-2020 capability to handle a large number of devices and a short response time. + +This Recommendation specifies the framework utilizing edge computing and service function chaining in conjunction with ICN. + +# **7 Communication and in-network processing models and scenarios** + +## **7.1 Service function chaining scenarios** + +This clause describes the linear service function chaining structure scenarios assumed in this Recommendation (clause 7.1.1), as well as an example of a non-linear service function chaining structure scenario (clause 7.1.2). Using the linear service function chaining structure as a basis, clause 7.1.2 describes additional non-linear service function chaining structure aspects that allow the system to cover a wider range of application scenarios that require several types of function chaining structures. The non-linear service function chaining structure also covers the situation where the same service function is located in a plural number of nodes, one node serves the same service function to more than one user, and the consumer's requested function chain is established by autonomous name-based routing. + +#### **7.1.1 Linear service function chaining structure** + +Service function chaining may potentially be used in a variety of scenarios. In the context of this Recommendation, the following three scenarios are assumed: + +- A user initiates the collection of data. The request is propagated to many producers of the corresponding data. On the way back to the requesting user, the collected data is preprocessed and delivered to the requesting user. +- Sensor readings are pushed to a nearby computer to detect certain information from the readings. The processing result initiates additional processing and eventually results in controlling an actuator. This communication is necessary for the applications with low latency in control loop. +- Sensor readings are pushed to an intermediate repository. Pushing is necessary to save energy consumption of sensors. The readings are later requested by users or application programs. + +Use cases of the scenarios described above can be found in clauses I.1, I.2 and I.3. + +#### **7.1.2 Non-linear service function chaining structure** + +In addition to the scenarios shown in clause 7.1.1, an additional chaining scenario is assumed which has a service function chaining structure different from than the linear structure. An example of non-linear service function chaining can be described as follows. A user sends a request to create a service function chaining structure through ICN for a suspicious person detection service. The requested chaining structure has chain split points that send out the processed results to more than one branch path for different kinds of processing services, and the branch paths merge into some points that collect various information from the different service function chaining branch paths and carry out further processing. This scenario enables the wide variety of parallel processing configurations and helps to achieve low latency processing and efficient resource utilization. An example of the non-linear service function chaining scenario use case is given in clause I.4. + +## **7.2 Architecture for ICN service function chaining** + +[ITU-T Y.3071] defines the components of ICN and also required functions for in-network processing. Those components and functions are almost sufficient to support ICN service function chaining and make up the basis of the architecture for ICN service function chaining as shown in Figure 1. + + + +Figure 1 – Architecture for ICN service function chaining. The diagram illustrates a multi-realm architecture for ICN service function chaining. It features two main realms, DAN realm 1 and DAN realm 2, each containing several DAN elements. These elements are interconnected with ISF processing elements and ISF providers. Key functional blocks include: Process scheduling and coordination function (PSCF), Process registration function (PRF), NDO and processing description retrieval function (NPDRF), and Explicit processing allocation function (EPAF). External components include ISF providers, NDO consumers, and NDO producers. The diagram shows how these components interact to provide ICN services across different realms. + +Y.3073(19)\_F01 + +**Figure 1 – Architecture for ICN service function chaining** + +To define communication models and interaction among components and functions in ICN service function chaining in the following clauses two additional components are defined in addition to what is defined in [ITU-T Y.3071]. The two additional components are: + +- ISF and +- ISF provider. + +When a DAN realm provides ISF chaining as its capability, the process scheduling and coordination function (PSCF), process registration function (PRF), NDO and processing description retrieval function (NPDRF), and explicit processing allocation functions (EPAF), as well as the ISF processing element (processing function in [ITU-T Y.3071]) are required and are supported by the DAN realm as defined in [ITU-T Y.3071]. The PSCF chooses the appropriate ISF processing elements and instructs them to retrieve specified ISF descriptions from the PRF by means of the NPDRF, and execute the ISF descriptions. The PSCF also instructs ISF processing elements where to send the outcome of the execution of ISF descriptions. ISF providers define ISF descriptions and register them at PRF. + +The EPAF may explicitly deploy the registered ISF descriptions at certain ISF processing elements specified by the ISF providers or the organization managing the DAN realm. ISF processing elements either retrieve ISF descriptions from the PRF according to the instruction provided by the PSCF or the EPAF, and execute the ISF descriptions. + +## 7.3 Function-initiation models + +In ICN, NDOs are typically requested by NDO consumers sending request messages. In this context, functions provided by the network is initiated by the NDO consumer. Initiation of functions may be triggered by both request message reception and reply message reception. In some cases, retrieving + +information may be required to execute certain functions. In other cases, retrieved data carried by response messages is processed by a chain of functions. + +Edge computing for IoT networks is one of the application areas for service function chaining. IoT devices are energy constrained. Keeping their power on consumes their precious energy while it is necessary if IoT devices need to wait for request arrival. It is preferable for sensor devices to send their readings to the nearby DAN elements while their power is on and to go to sleep after sending the data to save energy. In turn, the DAN elements accumulating readings from surrounding IoT devices aggregate the readings after accumulating enough readings. In this case, a chain of functions is triggered by delivery of data from IoT devices or NDO producers. + +From the above discussion, both consumer-initiated and producer-initiated models are required for ICN service function chaining. + +The following function-initiation models are required to be supported by ICN: + +- Consumer-initiated model: + +A chain of functions is initiated by the NDO consumer's request. The chain is specified by a name or names. The name can be the name of a predefined service, which is composed of a sequence of ISFs, or a series of ISF names and NDO names. The ISF execution order can be in both the order of request traversal and the order of response traversal. In order to execute ISFs, some NDOs may be retrieved to provide parameter values for the ISF execution or values directly taken from arguments fields. Both NDO names and values can appear in argument fields. An argument field can be either ISF specific or global. ISF specific arguments are only applicable to an ISF identified by an associated ISF name. Global arguments are applicable to all ISFs invoked by the request message. + +An example is given in Appendix II. + +- Producer-initiated model: + +A chain of functions is initiated by the NDO producer's request. The NDO producer autonomously transmits NDOs without the NDO consumers' requests. The destination of the request may not be NDO consumers in this case and can be other DAN elements. The DAN elements may implement the publish/subscribe function or cache the NDOs and/or the NDOs derived from the transmitted NDOs. + +Examples are given in Appendix II. + +# **8 Messages exchanged for in-network processing** + +## **8.1 Specification scheme for in-network functions** + +#### **8.1.1 Linear service function chaining structure** + +Messages are delivered to the destinations addressed by names in ICN. Functions to which request messages are to be delivered are specified by names as well. Service chaining of the ISF is specified either by a sequence of names of ISFs or by ISF description. The latter case simply means one ISF calls another ISF from the program of the ISF or ISF description. + +### **8.1.2 Non-linear service function chaining structure** + +In addition to the linear service function chaining structure described in clause 8.1.1, a special operation process request to each serving node is indicated in the argument field of the request message sent to the node. Special operation processes are mainly requested to enable the operation of split and merge of service function chaining structure. + +## **8.2 Message content in-function request** + +#### **8.2.1 Linear service function chaining structure** + +It is required that the messages to be used to request ISFs are equipped with the field to specify a sequence of ISF names or an ISF name to accommodate the function-initiation models described in clause 7.3. In addition, the request messages for ISFs may have fields to specify arguments to the ISFs. The specification of the arguments may be expressed by names of NDOs. The values of named NDOs can be derived from the network. Otherwise, argument values can be provided directly in the argument field. Consequently, the request messages to initiate the execution of ISFs include the following message fields to implement the function-initiation models described in clause 7.3. Examples of the message format are given in Appendix III: + +- a sequence of ISF names or an ISF name (mandatory) +- arguments to ISF(s) which may be either NDO names or values (optional) + +### **8.2.2 Non-linear service function chaining structure** + +In addition to the description provided in clause 8.2.1, the following contents are required to be included in the arguments: + +- Description of the service function chain branches to be launched from the node that handles a merge or split function. +- Conditional launch of a service function chaining branch with condition information. +- Requests for information exchange among the service function processing nodes involved in the same service request. +- Conditional information exchange launch request among the processing nodes with condition information. +- Node ID information notification of split nodes, merge nodes, and those nodes that request the special node-to-node communication. + +A few examples of the message format are given in clause III.2. + +## **8.3 Message content in response** + +The response messages may contain the field to specify a sequence of ISF names to accommodate the consumer-initiated model described in clause 7.3 where some ISFs are executed on the arrival of response messages. It is required, therefore, for the response messages to be equipped with the field to specify a sequence of ISF names or an ISF name. In addition, the response messages with ISF names may have fields to specify arguments to the ISFs like function request messages. The response messages to execute ISFs include the following message fields: + +- a sequence of ISF names or an ISF name (mandatory) +- arguments to ISF(s) which may be either NDO names or values (optional) + +## **8.4 Requirements for name-based routing** + +The following are the requirements for maintaining a scalable flow table that stores the return path information: + +- It is recommended to have a mechanism to cope with the time out issue. +- It is recommended to avoid the overflow by reducing contents length in the table. + +The following is a requirement for the request aggregation mechanism: + +- It is recommended to introduce a mechanism to separate requests to the same ISF on the different service function chaining requests. + +In non-linear service function chaining structures, inter node communication becomes important. The following requirements are to be met: + +- It is recommended to assign a unique node ID to each node. +- It is recommended to enable node ID-based routing using the node ID as a name. +- It is recommended to have a mechanism to inform about the processing node IDs on the same service function chaining request. + +# **9 Service function chaining mechanisms** + +## **9.1 Service creation mechanisms** + +#### **9.1.1 Linear service function chaining structure** + +ICN service function chaining has four stakeholders (Figure 2): DAN realm, ISF provider, NDO producer and NDO consumer. In the following description, the numbers of items correspond with the numbers of the message flows in Figure 2. + +- 1) An ISF provider, who intends to provide a certain network service, creates ISF descriptions and registers them to the PRF. The registration may be accompanied with the description of precedence relations among ISFs. +- 2) The PRF stores the registered ISF descriptions and +- 3) asks the PSCF to properly allocate ISFs to certain ISF processing elements. +- 4) The PSCF informs the allocation to the corresponding ISF processing elements. +- 5) The informed ISF processing element retrieves the corresponding ISF description by asking the NPDRF and executes it. The PSCF additionally configures the routing of service function chaining. + +#### **9.1.2 Non-linear service function chaining structure** + +The non-linear service function chaining structure cases include the service functions located on the nodes that are open for use to other new NDO consumers too. In this case, it is possible that the PSCF operation is skipped, and the consumer's requested service function chain is established by the autonomous name-based routing scheme. + +## **9.2 Service usage mechanism** + +An NDO consumer transmits a request message with ISF names to use the service function chaining in consumer-initiated mode as expressed with red arrows in Figure 2. The request message is forwarded following the route established by the PSCF and goes through the ISFs specified by their names. When the request message reaches to the specified NDO producer the message is changed to a response message with the appropriate NDO in it. The ISFs apply their execution on the contents carried by the request and response messages. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Service function chaining mechanism within a DAN realm. It shows the following components and interactions: + + +- ISF provider:** Sends an 'ISF description' (step 1) to the 'Process registration function (PRF)' within the DAN realm. +- DAN realm:** Contains several functional blocks: + - Process registration function (PRF):** Receives ISF descriptions and stores them in a **Repository** (step 2). + - Process scheduling and coordination function (PSCF):** Interacts with PRF (step 3) and coordinates with **DAN elements**. + - NDO and processing description retrieval function (NPDRF):** Retrieves descriptions from the Repository (step 5). + - Repository:** Stores ISF descriptions. + - DAN elements:** Contain 'ISF processing elements' which execute 'ISF' (Information-centric Service Function). +- NDO consumer:** Initiates requests that flow through the DAN elements. +- NDO producer:** Provides 'NDO' (Named Data Object) which flows back through the DAN elements to the consumer. +- Flows:** Red arrows indicate the data path between NDO consumer, DAN elements (ISF processing), and NDO producer. Purple arrows indicate control and registration flows (steps 1-5). + +**Figure 2 – Service function chaining mechanism** + +Figure 2 – Service function chaining mechanism + +In the case of the producer-initiated mode, the producer generates a request message carrying NDOs in addition to ISF names. The request message is routed through the network following the specified in the sequence of ISF names. The routes are preconfigured by the PSCF. + +### 10 Security considerations + +ICN provides mechanisms to guarantee secrecy, integrity and availability of NDOs, as well as verifying the owners of NDOs. To operate the mechanisms properly, an additional mechanism to distribute cryptographic keys may be required. + +Revealing the NDO access history by NDO consumers is an intrinsic problem in ICN where NDO names are expected to be long-lived. Even if the name itself does not reveal the content of the NDO, the name can be used to retrieve the NDO and the content may be known. + +The capability for ISF providers to create their designed ISF descriptions and embed them into the network poses a serious security risk. The process registration function is required to impose access control on the registration of ISF descriptions. The process registration function may be required to perform a sanity test on the registered ISF descriptions. + +Also, the capability to perform ISFs with requests from NDO consumers and NDO producers poses security risk. It is required to place an access control mechanism at every DAN node where ISFs are performed. An access control mechanism requires the identification of the requesting party, either the NDO consumer or NDO producer. + +### 11 Environmental considerations + +The environmental considerations in this Recommendation are mainly subject to those provided by DAN, or ICN, as specified in [ITU-T Y.3033]. Additional energy reduction by ICN may come from the processing capability provided by ISFs. ISFs can be used to reduce the amount of data and the number of messages to be transferred over ICN. Although the processing increases energy consumption at one DAN element, a reduction in the number of messages being exchanged lowers energy consumption in the other DAN elements, which results in energy reduction in the entire ICN network. + +**Rec. ITU-T Y.3073 (04/2024)** 9 + +## Appendix I + +## Use cases of service function chaining + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of the Recommendation.) + +### I.1 User-initiated data collection + +A user sends a request containing a keyword or keywords to the network and receives NDOs relevant to the specified keyword(s). The nodes in the network gather relevant NDOs by forwarding the request and sending back a response message to originating nodes. This use case is further described in [b-Kurita]. ICN service functions can be used to realize this use case. + +NDO producers advertise keywords that represent characteristics of the NDO to the routers. The keywords are stored in a dedicated forward information base in the service function in each router. More than one NDO can advertise the same keywords. + +Each router provides a service function that forwards a request it received to all nodes listed in the forwarding information base and aggregates all data it receives from those nodes to compose a response data. The request message specifies a keyword or keywords as a parameter to the service function. + +If a request contains "X" as the keyword parameter, all NDOs associated with the keyword "X" receive the request and response data (NDOs) is aggregated at each router as one response data. + +The service function can also perform elementary AND / OR operations as shown in Figure I.1. If a request contains "X&Y" as the keyword parameter, the service function composes of an intersection of X and Y. + + + +The diagram illustrates the ISF forwarding requests and aggregating data process. It shows two routers, each with an ISF (Inter-Segment Function) component. The left router receives a request from an NDO consumer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'a + b + c'. The right router receives a request from an NDO producer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'a (kwd:X&Y)' and 'b (kwd:X&Y)'. The left router also receives a request from an NDO producer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'c (kwd:X&Y)'. The routers aggregate the data and return 'a + b' to the NDO consumer. + +Y.3073(19)\_Fl.1 + +Diagram illustrating ISF forwarding requests and aggregating data. It shows two routers, each with an ISF (Inter-Segment Function) component. The left router receives a request from an NDO consumer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'a + b + c'. The right router receives a request from an NDO producer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'a (kwd:X&Y)' and 'b (kwd:X&Y)'. The left router also receives a request from an NDO producer with keyword 'X&Y' and forwards it to an NDO producer, which returns 'c (kwd:X&Y)'. The routers aggregate the data and return 'a + b' to the NDO consumer. + +Figure I.1 – ISF forwarding requests and aggregating data + +### I.2 Sensor-initiated data transmission for low latency (Figure I.2) + +An infrared sensor or a motion detector initiates the operation of a wildlife management system. Such a sensor transmits the NDO of detected information to a nearby computer whose names are known by the sensor. The computer analyses the NDO to detect the existence of wildlife. The computer may request additional data from other sensors to come to the final decision. Once the decision is made on the existence of a certain wild animal, the system may respond with closing a cage door or simply operating a robot to expel the wild animal depending on the type of animal. + +To implement the real-time response to wild animals, the chain of functions needs to be triggered right after the creation of the initial NDO by one of the sensors. + + + +The diagram illustrates a wildlife management system architecture. On the left, there are three icons: a cage, a robot labeled 'Robot to expel monkey', and a 'Closing cage door' button. In the center, there are three sensors: a camera, an 'Infrared sensor', and a 'Motion detector'. Each sensor is connected to an 'NDO producer' block. The 'Infrared sensor' and 'Motion detector' NDO producers are connected to an 'NDO' block, which then feeds into an 'Object detection' block. The 'Object detection' block is connected to an 'Animal type identification' block. The 'Animal type identification' block is connected to the 'Closing cage door' button. There are also direct connections from the camera NDO producer to the 'Animal type identification' block and from the 'Animal type identification' block to the 'Closing cage door' button. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3073(19)\_FI.2'. + +Figure I.2 – Wildlife management system diagram + +Figure I.2 – Wildlife management system + +### I.3 Publish/subscribe communication for energy saving (Figure I.3) + +A farmland management system may involve thermometers, hygrometers, anemometers, surveillance cameras, etc. These devices are battery powered and their power consumption must be suppressed to prolong battery life. Devices should be kept at sleep state as much as possible to save energy. For this purpose, it is preferable for devices to wake up with a certain interval, perform their tasks such as retrieving sensor readings, and transmit the readings, and go to sleep immediately. + +In order for devices to go to sleep immediately, the data derived at the devices must be stored in the system to make it ready to be used by applications while the devices are sleeping. In addition, some of the applications may be ready for processing the device data. The device data is to be delivered to these applications immediately. For example, all readings from thermometers, hygrometers, and anemometers may be stored by a server in the farmland management system for later analysis of the effect of control factors to the production level and also for the real-time control of the temperature, humidity, etc. + + + +The diagram illustrates a farmland management system architecture. On the left, there is a photograph of a field with three icons overlaid: a thermometer, a wind turbine, and a battery. Red arrows from these icons point to a central 'ISF (publish/subscribe function)' block. The 'ISF' block is connected to a 'Farmland management system' block, which consists of a server and a database. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3073(19)\_FI.3'. + +Figure I.3 – Farmland management system diagram + +Figure I.3 – Farmland management system + +### I.4 Use case scenario of non-linear ICN service function chaining – Parallel data processing for low latency + +An intelligent security camera system can improve safety in public facilities such as airports and train stations. The system must collect evidence by performing related data processing tasks and take a decision based on the evidence to increase robustness and reliability of the system. The data processing tasks are typical image processing, such as human detection, face recognition, behaviour detection, and suspicious object detection. System latency is also an essential requirement. The system must complete a series of data processing functions at the same speed as the camera frame rate for streaming. The system must have the capability of parallel data processing as well as + +pipelining to meet the requirements. Non-linear ICN service function chaining can be suitable to realize this use case. + +Figure I.4 shows an intelligent security camera system designed by non-linear service function chaining. As shown in the figure, the three tasks, face recognition, behaviour detection, and suspicious object detection, should be called when the system detects a human. This "event-driven" data processing can avoid unnecessary data processing overload. In addition, these three tasks can be called in parallel by re-using the same input data. Pipelining and parallel data processing can significantly reduce the end-to-end system latency and improve system response. + +To implement the system with non-linear service function chaining, name-based service and data retrieving are helpful for system developers. The NDO consumer sends a request message by writing an appropriate service order and including related data. Then, ICN routers automatically transfer the request messages to an appropriate NDO producer or ICN router, execute the series of data processing functions, and return the result to the NDO consumer. + + + +``` + +graph LR + NDO_Producer[NDO producer] --> Router1[Router] + Router1 --> Human_detection[Human detection] + Router1 --> Face_recognition[Face recognition] + Router1 --> Behaviour_detection[Behaviour detection] + Router1 --> Suspicious_object_detection[Suspicious object detection] + Human_detection --> Router2[Router] + Face_recognition --> Router2 + Behaviour_detection --> Router2 + Suspicious_object_detection --> Router2 + Router2 -- "Result" --> Decision_making[Decision making] + Decision_making --> Router3[Router] + Router3 -- "Alert + [Icon]" --> NDO_Consumer[NDO consumer] + +``` + +Y.3073(19)-Amd.1(24) + +Diagram of a smart security camera system using non-linear ICN service function chaining. The system starts with an NDO producer at an airport/train station. Data is sent to a Router, which then branches to three parallel processing paths: Face recognition, Behaviour detection, and Suspicious object detection. Each path uses a Router to connect to its respective service function. The results from these three paths are sent to a central Router, which then sends an Alert to the NDO consumer. + +**Figure I.4 – Smart security camera system designed by non-linear ICN service function chaining structure** + +## Appendix II + +## Examples of function-initiation models + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of the Recommendation.) + +This appendix is intended to help readers better understand the function-initial models. The communications explained in this appendix are just examples and are not meant to indicate any particular protocol. + +### II.1 An example of consumer-initiated model + +In the example shown in Figure II.1, the NDO consumer sends a request to initiate a service. The request passes through Router 1 and execute ISF 2 at Router 2. To execute ISF 2, NDO 1 is derived. Then the request is further forwarded to Router 3 where ISF 3 is executed with another NDO 2 as its parameter. After executing ISF 3 a response is returned with the value calculated by ISF 3. The response passed through Router 2 and at Router 1, ISF 1 is executed with the value carried by the response. The result of ISF 1 is finally returned to the NDO consumer. + + + +The diagram illustrates a consumer-initiated model. It shows an NDO consumer on the left, followed by Router 1, Router 2, Router 3, and an NDO producer on the right. Above Router 2 is NDO 1, and above Router 3 is NDO 2. The flow is as follows: 1. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from the NDO consumer to Router 1. 2. A blue arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 1 on response' goes from Router 1 to the NDO consumer. 3. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from Router 1 to Router 2. 4. A blue arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 2 on request' goes from Router 2 to NDO 1. 5. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from Router 2 to Router 3. 6. A blue arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 3 on request and return response' goes from Router 3 to NDO 2. 7. A blue arrow labeled 'Response' goes from Router 3 to Router 2. 8. A blue arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 1 on response' goes from Router 2 to the NDO consumer. 9. An orange arrow labeled 'Derive NDO' goes from Router 2 to NDO 1. 10. An orange arrow labeled 'Derive NDO' goes from Router 3 to NDO 2. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3073(19)\_FII.1' at the bottom right. + +Figure II.1 – Consumer-initiated model diagram + +Figure II.1 – Consumer-initiated model + +### II.2 An example of producer-initiated model + +In the producer-initiated model, only request messages trigger execution of the ISFs as shown in Figure II.2. Three ISFs: ISF 1, ISF 2 and ISF 3 are specified in the request message in that order and they are executed in sequence on the NDO provided by the NDO producer. The response from the NDO consumer is used only for acknowledgement purposes. + + + +The diagram illustrates a producer-initiated model. It shows an NDO consumer on the left, followed by three Routers, and an NDO producer on the right. Above the first Router is ISF 3, above the second Router is ISF 2, and above the third Router is ISF 1. The flow is as follows: 1. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from the NDO producer to the third Router (ISF 1). 2. A red arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 1 on request' goes from the third Router to ISF 1. 3. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from the third Router to the second Router (ISF 2). 4. A red arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 2 on request' goes from the second Router to ISF 2. 5. A red arrow labeled 'Request' goes from the second Router to the first Router (ISF 3). 6. A red arrow labeled 'Execute ISF 3 on request' goes from the first Router to ISF 3. 7. A blue arrow labeled 'Response' goes from the first Router to the NDO consumer. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3073(19)\_FII.2' at the bottom right. + +Figure II.2 – Producer-initiated model diagram + +Figure II.2 – Producer-initiated model + +### II.3 A publish/subscribe example of producer-initiated model + +Figure II.3 shows an example of the publish/subscribe function. Here the publish/subscribe function is one of the ISFs. NDO consumers register their intention to subscribe NDOs at the publish/subscribe function in advance (orange arrow). Upon creation of NDOs, the NDO producer transmits a request (publish) with the NDOs to Router 3 where the NDO is used to perform ISF 1. The result NDO of + +ISF 1 is further forwarded to the publish/subscribe function. If the request (publish) matches the preregistered subscription, the NDO is forwarded to the registered NDO consumers. + + + +The diagram illustrates the Producer-initiated model (publish/subscribe) across a network topology consisting of three routers (Router 1, Router 2, Router 3) and two functional blocks (ISF and ISF 1). The NDO consumer is connected to Router 1, and the NDO producer is connected to Router 3. The ISF block is located between Router 2 and Router 3, and the ISF 1 block is located between Router 3 and the NDO producer. The flow of data and control is as follows: + +- Subscribe:** An orange arrow labeled "Subscribe" points from the NDO consumer to Router 1. +- Subscribed data delivery:** A purple arrow labeled "Subscribed data delivery" points from Router 1 to the ISF block. +- ISF (publish/subscribe function):** The ISF block is labeled "ISF (publish/subscribe function)". +- Response:** A blue arrow labeled "Response" points from the ISF block to Router 2. +- Execute ISF 1 on request:** A red arrow labeled "Execute ISF 1 on request" points from Router 3 to the ISF 1 block. +- Resquest (publish):** A red arrow labeled "Resquest (publish)" points from the NDO producer to Router 3. + +Y.3073(19)\_F11.3 + +Diagram of the Producer-initiated model (publish/subscribe) showing the flow of data and control between an NDO consumer, ISF, ISF 1, and an NDO producer across three routers. + +**Figure II.3 – Producer-initiated model (publish/subscribe)** + +## Appendix III + +### Examples of message format + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of the Recommendation.) + +### III.1 An example message format for function request + +A function request message can contain both a sequence of ISF names and arguments to ISF(s). Argument fields can be either local or global. The local argument fields are used by specific functions while the global argument field is shared among all the ISFs specified in the function request messages. Figure III.1 shows an example of request message fields. + +| | | | | | | | +|------------------|----------|-----------|-----|----------|-----------|--------------| +| Global arguments | ISF name | Arguments | ... | ISF name | Arguments | Other fields | +|------------------|----------|-----------|-----|----------|-----------|--------------| + +Y.3073(19)\_FIII.1 + +Figure III.1 – Example request message fields + +### III.2 Another example of message format for function request + +The example message format depicted in Figure III.2 is suitable to the ISF chaining link with a non-linear service function chaining structure, and is also suitable for eliminating the issue of overflow of return path table. + +| | | | +|------------|----------------|---------------------------| +| Name field | Argument field | General information field | +|------------|----------------|---------------------------| + +Figure III.2 – Another example of request message fields + +### Name field + +This field indicates the sequence of ISF chain. For some ICN systems in which the name is used for backward link information, contents of this field are stored in the backward link table. + +(Structure) + +ISFn/ISFn+1/ISFn+2/...../ISFx + +ISFn: is the service function the request is seeking for as the next service chain component. The data contents name is a class of ISF. When the node to carry out the ISFn is found, it reserves the execution of ISFn, then discards the ISFn description from the Name field and sends out a new request with the new Name field beginning with ISFn+1. + +### Argument field + +This field indicates the operation requests other than ISF and the necessary information to each node which will provide the ISF. + +(Structure) + +ARGn/ARGn+1/ARGn+2/...../ARGx + +ARGn: is the dedicated request to the node that will carry out the ISFn in addition to ISFn indicated in the Name field. When the node to carry out the ISFn is found, the node reserves the execution of ISFn, carries out the requested functions described in ARGn, then discards the ARGn from the ARG field and sends out a new request with the new ARG field beginning with ARGn+1. + +(Contents example in each ARG) + +- Merge operation assignment with branch paths' set-up request information. +- Conditional branch request with branch paths' set-up request information. +- Split operation assignment and Node ID feedback requests to corresponding merge nodes. +- Message send out request with message contents. + +### **General information field** + +This field indicates general information necessary for inter node communication. + +## Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.Sup. 35] ITU-T Y-series Recommendations – Supplement 35 (2016), *ITU-T Y.3033 – Data aware networking – scenarios and use cases*. +- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (06/2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*. +- [b-Kurita] T. Kurita, I. Sato, K. Fukuda and T. Tsuda, *An extension of Information-Centric Networking for IoT applications*, 2017 International Conference on Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), Santa Clara, CA, 2017, pp. 237-243. + + + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global 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NETWORKS, INTERNET OF +THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +Future networks + +# --- **Framework for directory service management of large numbers of heterogeneously-named objects in IMT-2020** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3074 + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | | +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | | +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500–Y.3999 | +| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | | +| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3074 + +# Framework for directory service management of large numbers of heterogeneously-named objects in IMT-2020 + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3074 introduces a directory service function in the IMT-2020 architecture. It describes the components of the directory service function that can store a large volume of records associated with heterogeneous types of names of objects (i.e., devices and data), and that can provide a very low latency look-up service. It describes the general procedure of the directory service function to register, cache, look up, update and delete records. + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3074 | 2019-08-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13985 | + +## Keywords + +Directory service, ICN, IMT-2020, information-centric networking. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
Task2: Intent translation | Task1: Network resource collection | Task1: Network resource analysis
Task2: Network slicing estimation | Task1: Network resource orchestration | Task1: Network slice template generation | +| Commissioning | Task1: Intent collection
Task2: Intent translation | Task1: Network resource collection | Task1: Network capability analysis
Task2: SLA analysis | Task1: Deployment strategy generation | Task1: Network slice creation and commissioning | +| Maintenance | Task1: Intent translation | Task1: Network slice state monitoring | Task1: Network slice state analysis | Task1: Maintenance strategy generation | Task1: Maintenance operation | +| Optimization | Task1: Intent translation | Task1: Network slice state monitoring | Task1: Network slice state prediction | Task1: Optimization strategy generation | Task1: Network slice optimization execution | +| Decommissioning | Task1: Intent translation | Task1: Network slice state monitoring | Task1: Network slice state analysis
Task2: Network slice state prediction | Task1: Decommissioning strategy generation | Task1: Decommissioning execution | + +### 8.2 Grading method and procedure for the preparation phase + +#### 8.2.1 Task + + + +``` +graph TD; Customer([Customer]) --> DM[Demand mapping]; DM --> Customer; subgraph System [ ]; DM --> DC[Data collection]; DC --> AN[Analysis]; AN --> DEC[Decision]; DEC --> AI[Action implementation]; AI --> DM; end; subgraph DC_Box [ ]; DC; end; subgraph AN_Box [ ]; AN; end; subgraph DEC_Box [ ]; DEC; end; subgraph AI_Box [ ]; AI; end; +``` + +Y.3162(24) + +Figure 4: Generic flow for the preparation phase. The diagram shows a flow starting from a 'Customer' entity (rounded rectangle) at the top. A dashed box encloses the main process. Inside, a 'Demand mapping' block (rectangle) receives input from the Customer and sends output back. Below 'Demand mapping' is another dashed box containing four sequential blocks: 'Data collection', 'Analysis', 'Decision', and 'Action implementation'. Arrows show a flow from 'Demand mapping' to 'Data collection', then through 'Analysis', 'Decision', and 'Action implementation', and finally back to 'Demand mapping'. Each block contains specific tasks: 'Demand mapping' has 'Task1: Intent collection' and 'Task2: Intent translation'; 'Data collection' has 'Task1: Network resource collection'; 'Analysis' has 'Task1: Network resource analysis' and 'Task2: Network slicing estimation'; 'Decision' has 'Task1: Network resource orchestration'; and 'Action implementation' has 'Task1: Network slice template generation'. The identifier 'Y.3162(24)' is at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure 4 – Generic flow for the preparation phase** + +The generic flow and tasks in dimensions for the preparation phase are shown in Figure 4. The detailed description of tasks classified by dimensions is as follows: + +- Tasks of demand mapping. + - 1) Intent collection: Collect the intent of customers to network slice in various application scenarios through comprehensive communication with them and finally form an intent set of network slice. + - 2) Intent translation: Convert the intent of customers for network slicing into requirements of network slice, including network slicing performance, network slicing function and customer's category. +- Tasks of data collection. + - 1) Network resource collection: Collect the information of network resources, network configuration and network operation in order to obtain the information of network infrastructure. +- Tasks of analysis. + - 1) Network resource analysis: Make an analysis on the data of network resources and obtain network capabilities to support network slices. + - 2) Network slicing estimation: Estimate the range of network slicing capabilities with customer's requirements and network resources. +- Tasks of decision. + - 1) Network resource orchestration: Orchestrate the underlying network resources for different network slices and classify network slices. +- Tasks of action implementation. + - 1) Network slice template generation: Generate generic network slice templates with different network slice capabilities. In addition, generate a specific network slice template for requirements of customer that cannot satisfied by the generic network slice template. + +#### 8.2.2 Grading method + +| | Action
implementation | Data collection | Analysis | | Decision | Demand mapping | | +|----|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------| +| L0 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L1 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L2 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L3 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L4 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L5 | Network slice
template generation | Network resource
collection | Network resource
analysis | Network slicing
estimation | Network resource
orchestration | Intent collection | Intent translation | + +Human + Hybrid + SMOS + +Y.3162(24) + +**Figure 5 – Grading method for the preparation phase** + +The general grading method for the preparation phase, which is consistent with Table 1, is shown in Figure 5, and the detailed descriptions are as follows: + +- L0 (Manual network operation): All tasks are performed by a human. +- L1 (Assisted network operation): Network slice template generation task and network resource collection task are performed by a human and SMOS while other tasks are performed by a human. +- L2 (Preliminary intelligence): Network slice template generation task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides network resource collection task, network resource analysis task and network slicing estimation task are performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L3 (Intermediate intelligence): Besides the network slice template generation task, the network resource collection task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network resource analysis task, the network slicing estimation task and network resource orchestration task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L4 (Advanced intelligence): Intent collection tasks and intent translation tasks are performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are fully performed by a SMOS. +- L5 (Full intelligence): All tasks are fully performed by a SMOS. + +### 8.3 Grading method and procedure for the commissioning phase + +#### 8.3.1 Task + + + +``` +graph TD; Customer([Customer]) <--> DM[Demand mapping]; subgraph Process [ ]; DM --> DC[Data collection]; DC --> AN[Analysis]; AN --> DEC[Decision]; DEC --> AI[Action implementation]; AI --> DM; end; +``` + +Y.3162(24) + +Figure 6: Generic flow for the commissioning phase. The diagram shows a flow starting from a 'Customer' entity (rounded rectangle) which interacts with a 'Demand mapping' block (rectangle). The 'Demand mapping' block contains 'Task1: Intent collection' and 'Task2: Intent translation'. Below this is a large dashed box containing four sequential blocks: 'Data collection' (Task1: Network resource collection), 'Analysis' (Task1: Network capability analysis, Task2: SLA analysis), 'Decision' (Task1: Deployment strategy generation), and 'Action implementation' (Task1: Network slice creation and commissioning). Arrows indicate a downward flow from 'Demand mapping' to 'Data collection', and an upward flow from 'Action implementation' back to 'Demand mapping'. A reference code 'Y.3162(24)' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 6 – Generic flow for the commissioning phase** + +The generic flow and tasks in dimensions for commissioning phase are shown in Figure 6. The detailed description of tasks classified by dimensions is as follows: + +- Tasks of demand mapping. + - 1) Intent collection: Collect specific requirements of customers for network slicing. + - 2) Intent translation: Select a suitable network slice template for the requirements of customers. +- Tasks of data collection. + - 1) Network resource collection: Collect the data of network resources status, network configuration and network operation, etc. +- Tasks of analysis. + - 1) Network capability analysis: Make a comprehensive analysis with current network resource information and obtain the network capabilities. + - 2) SLA analysis: Compare SLA requirements of network slices to network capabilities and analyse the possibility to create a network slice with the selected network slice template. +- Tasks of decision. + - 1) Deployment strategy generation: Generate a deployment strategy with the above analysis results. +- Tasks of action implementation. + - 1) Network slice creation and commissioning: Create a new network slice with the selected network slice template and deploy it for customers with specified strategy. + +#### 8.3.2 Grading method + +| | Action implementation | Data collection | Analysis | | Decision | Demand mapping | | +|----|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------| +| L0 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L1 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L2 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L3 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L4 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | +| L5 | Network slice creation and commissioning | Network resource collection | Network resource analysis | SLA analysis | Deployment strategy generation | Intent collection | Intent translation | + +Human + Hybrid + SMOS + +Y.3162(24) + +**Figure 7 – Grading method for the commissioning phase** + +The general grading method for the commissioning phase, which is consistent with Table 1, is shown in Figure 7, and the detailed descriptions are as follows: + +- L0 (Manual network operation): All tasks are performed by a human. +- L1 (Assisted network operation): Network slice creation and the commissioning task and network resource collection task are performed by a human and SMOS while other tasks are performed by a human. +- L2 (Preliminary intelligence): The network slice creation and commissioning task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network resource collection task, the network capability analysis task and SLA analysis task are performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L3 (Intermediate intelligence): Besides network slice creation and commissioning task, the network resource collection task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network capability analysis task and SLA analysis task, the deployment strategy generation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L4 (Advanced intelligence): Intent collection tasks and intent translation tasks are performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are fully performed by SMOS. +- L5 (Full intelligence): All tasks are fully performed by SMOS. + +### 8.4 Grading method and procedure for the maintenance phase + +#### 8.4.1 Task + + + +``` +graph TD; Customer([Customer]) <--> DM; subgraph System; DM["Demand mapping
Task1: Intent translation"] <--> DC["Data collection
Task1: Network slice state monitoring"]; subgraph Process; DC --> AN["Analysis
Task1: Network slice state analysis"]; AN --> DEC["Decision
Task1: Maintenance strategy generation"]; DEC --> AI["Action implementation
Task1: Maintenance generation"]; end; end; +``` + +Figure 8: Generic flow for the maintenance phase. The diagram shows a hierarchical flow starting from a 'Customer' entity at the top. A dashed box contains a 'Demand mapping' block, which includes 'Task1: Intent translation'. This block has bidirectional arrows connecting it to the 'Customer' and to a lower dashed box. The lower dashed box contains four sequential blocks: 'Data collection' (Task1: Network slice state monitoring), 'Analysis' (Task1: Network slice state analysis), 'Decision' (Task1: Maintenance strategy generation), and 'Action implementation' (Task1: Maintenance generation). Arrows indicate a sequential flow from left to right between these four blocks. + +**Figure 8 – Generic flow for the maintenance phase** + +The generic flow and tasks in dimensions for the maintenance phase are shown in Figure 8. The detailed description of tasks classified by dimensions is as follows: + +- Tasks of demand mapping. + - 1) Intent translation: Convert requirements of SLA into requirements of network slice maintenance. +- Tasks of data collection. + - 1) Network slice state monitoring: Monitor running state of network slice and network infrastructure and collect their running data, including network slice configuration, slice topology, network slice performance, network configuration, network topology and network performance. +- Tasks of analysis. + - 1) Network slice state analysis: Analysis on the data of network slice and network infrastructure and judgement on whether they meet the requirements of network slice maintenance. This task also includes recognition of abnormal behaviour or failure of the network slices and network infrastructure. +- Tasks of decision. + - 1) Maintenance strategy generation: Generate a maintenance strategy according to the requirements of network slice maintenance and the running state of network slices and network infrastructure. In particular, generate a solution for any failure. +- Tasks of action implementation. + - 1) Maintenance operation: Execute maintenance operations with the generated strategy including trouble shooting if an error occurs. + +#### 8.4.2 Grading method + + + +| | Action
implementation | Data collection | Analysis | Decision | Demand mapping | +|----|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------| +| L0 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L1 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L2 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L3 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L4 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L5 | Maintenance operation | Network slice state monitoring | Network slice state analysis | Maintenance strategy generation | Intent translation | + +Human + Hybrid + SMOS + +Y.3162(24) + +**Figure 9 – Grading method for the maintenance phase** + +The general grading method for the maintenance phase, which is consistent with Table 1, is shown in Figure 9, and the detailed descriptions are as follows: + +- L0 (Manual network operation): All tasks are performed by a human. +- L1 (Assisted network operation): Maintenance operation task and network slice state monitoring task are performed by a human and SMOS while other tasks are performed by a human. +- L2 (Preliminary intelligence): Maintenance operation task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides network slice state monitoring task, network slice state analysis task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L3 (Intermediate intelligence): Besides the maintenance operation task, the network slice state monitoring task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides network slice state analysis task, the maintenance strategy generation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L4 (Advanced intelligence): The intent translation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are fully performed by SMOS. +- L5 (Full intelligence): All tasks are fully performed by SMOS. + +### 8.5 Grading method and procedure for the optimization phase + +#### 8.5.1 Task + + + +``` +graph TD; Customer([Customer]) --> DM[Demand mapping
Task1: Intent translation]; subgraph Optimization_Phase [ ]; DC[Data collection
Task1: Network slice state monitoring] --> AN[Analysis
Task1: Network slice state prediction]; AN --> DEC[Decision
Task1: Optimization strategy generation]; DEC --> AI[Action implementation
Task1: Optimization execution]; end; DM --> DC; AI --> DM; DM --> Customer; +``` + +Figure 10: Generic flow for the optimization phase. The diagram shows a flow starting from a 'Customer' entity (rounded rectangle) which sends a request to a 'Demand mapping' block (blue rectangle). The 'Demand mapping' block contains 'Task1: Intent translation'. Below this is a dashed box containing four sequential blocks: 'Data collection' (Task1: Network slice state monitoring), 'Analysis' (Task1: Network slice state prediction), 'Decision' (Task1: Optimization strategy generation), and 'Action implementation' (Task1: Optimization execution). Arrows show the flow from 'Demand mapping' to 'Data collection', then through 'Analysis' and 'Decision' to 'Action implementation', and finally from 'Action implementation' back to 'Demand mapping'. A feedback arrow also goes from 'Demand mapping' back to the 'Customer'. The label 'Y.3162(24)' is at the bottom right of the dashed box. + +**Figure 10 – Generic flow for the optimization phase** + +The generic flow and tasks in dimensions for the optimization phase is shown in Figure 10. The detailed description of tasks classified by dimensions is as follows: + +- Tasks of demand mapping. + - 1) Intent translation: Convert requirements of SLA into requirements of network slice optimization. +- Tasks of data collection. + - 1) Network slice state monitoring: Monitor the running state of the network slice and network infrastructure, and collect their running data, including network slice configuration, network slice topology, network slice performance, network configuration, network topology and network performance. +- Tasks of analysis. + - 1) Network slice state prediction: Analyse the running data of the network slice and network infrastructure and make a prediction for the future performance of the network slice. +- Tasks of decision. + - 1) Optimization strategy generation: Generate an optimization strategy for network slices according to the prediction for network slices. +- Tasks of action implementation. + - 1) Optimization execution: Implement an optimization strategy for network slices, in order to guarantee SLA requirements all the time. + +#### 8.5.2 Grading method + +| | Action
implementation | Data collection | Analysis | Decision | Demand mapping | +|----|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------| +| L0 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L1 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L2 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L3 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L4 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L5 | Optimization
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
prediction | Optimization
strategy generation | Intent translation | + +Human + Hybrid + SMOS + +Y.3162(24) + +**Figure 11 – Grading method for the optimization phase** + +The general grading method for the optimization phase, which is consistent with Table 1, is shown in Figure 11, and the detailed descriptions are as follows: + +- L0 (Manual network operation): All tasks are performed by a human. +- L1 (Assisted network operation): Optimization execution task and network slice state monitoring task are performed by a human and SMOS while other tasks are performed by a human. +- L2 (Preliminary intelligence): The optimization execution task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network slice state monitoring task, the network slice state prediction task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L3 (Intermediate intelligence): Besides the optimization execution task, the network slice state monitoring task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network slice state prediction task, optimization strategy generation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L4 (Advanced intelligence): The intent translation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are fully performed by SMOS. +- L5 (Full intelligence): All tasks are fully performed by SMOS. + +### 8.6 Grading method and procedure for the decommissioning phase + +#### 8.6.1 Task + + + +Figure 12 illustrates the generic flow for the decommissioning phase. The process begins with a **Customer** (represented by an oval) sending a request to the **Demand mapping** block (a light blue rectangle). The **Demand mapping** block contains **Task1: Intent translation**. This block then sends a request to a sequence of four blocks: **Data collection**, **Analysis**, **Decision**, and **Action implementation**. Each block contains specific tasks: **Data collection** (Task1: Network slice state monitoring), **Analysis** (Task1: Network slice state analysis and Task2: Network slice state prediction), **Decision** (Task1: Decommissioning strategy generation), and **Action implementation** (Task1: Decommissioning execution). The flow continues from **Data collection** to **Analysis**, then to **Decision**, and finally to **Action implementation**. An upward arrow returns from the bottom of the sequence of blocks to the **Demand mapping** block, and another upward arrow returns from the bottom of the sequence of blocks to the **Customer**. + +Y.3162(24) + +Figure 12: Generic flow for the decommissioning phase. The diagram shows a flow from a Customer to a Demand mapping block, which then interacts with a sequence of four blocks: Data collection, Analysis, Decision, and Action implementation. The Demand mapping block contains Task1: Intent translation. The Data collection block contains Task1: Network slice state monitoring. The Analysis block contains Task1: Network slice state analysis and Task2: Network slice state prediction. The Decision block contains Task1: Decommissioning strategy generation. The Action implementation block contains Task1: Decommissioning execution. Arrows indicate a downward flow from Customer to Demand mapping, and then a downward flow from Demand mapping to the sequence of blocks. An upward arrow returns from the bottom of the sequence of blocks to the Demand mapping block, and another upward arrow returns from the bottom of the sequence of blocks to the Customer. + +**Figure 12 – Generic flow for the decommissioning phase** + +The generic flow and tasks in dimensions for the decommissioning phase are shown in Figure 12. The detailed description of tasks classified by dimensions is as follows: + +- Tasks of demand mapping. + - 1) Intent translation: Convert requests of decommissioning from customers for unused network slice or from the system for inactive network slice into decommissioning requirements. +- Tasks of data collection. + - 1) Network slice state monitoring: Monitor the running state of the network slice and collect data including operation and service data. +- Tasks of analysis. + - 1) Network slice state analysis: Analyse the data to find inactive network slice. + - 2) Network slice state prediction: Make a prediction for the trend of network slice usage. +- Tasks of decision. + - 1) Decommissioning strategy generation: Determine the network slice that will be decommissioned and generate a corresponding decommissioning strategy. +- Tasks of action implementation. + - 1) Decommissioning execution: Execute decommissioning command for selected network slice with the strategy. + +#### 8.6.2 Grading method + +| | Action
implementation | Data collection | Analysis | | Decision | Demand mapping | +|----|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------| +| L0 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L1 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L2 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L3 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L4 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | +| L5 | Decommissioning
execution | Network slice state
monitoring | Network slice state
analysis | Network slice state
prediction | Decommissioning
strategy generation | Intent translation | + +Human + Hybrid + SMOS + Y.3162(24) + +**Figure 13 – Grading method for the decommissioning phase** + +The general grading method for the decommissioning phase, which is consistent with Table 1, is shown in Figure 13, and the detailed descriptions are as follows: + +- L0 (Manual network operation): All tasks are performed by a human. +- L1 (Assisted network operation): Decommissioning execution task and network slice state monitoring task are performed by a human and SMOS while other tasks are performed by a human. +- L2 (Preliminary intelligence): The decommissioning execution task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network slice state monitoring task, the network slice state analysis task and network slice state prediction task are performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L3 (Intermediate intelligence): Besides the decommissioning execution task, the network slice state monitoring task is fully performed by SMOS. Besides the network slice state analysis task and network slice state prediction task, the decommissioning strategy task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are performed by a human. +- L4 (Advanced intelligence): The intent translation task is performed by a human and SMOS. Other tasks are fully performed by SMOS. +- L5 (Full intelligence): All tasks are performed by SMOS. + +## 9 Security considerations + +This Recommendation describes the methods to evaluate the intelligence levels of network slice management and orchestration. Thus, the security considerations in [ITU-T Y.3156] and [ITU-T Y.3173] are applicable to this Recommendation. + +## Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.3100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3100 (2017), *Terms and definitions for IMT-2020 network*. +- [b-ITU-R M.1645] Recommendation ITU-R M.1645 (2003), *Framework and overall objectives of the future development of IMT-2000 and systems beyond IMT-2000*. +- [b-3GPP TS28.530] Technical Specification 3GPP TS28.530 v17.4.0 (2023), *Management and orchestration; Concepts, use cases and requirements*. + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3176-202009-I_PDF-E/14a22f23ced8ba1d63ece69861dbaacc_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3176-202009-I_PDF-E/14a22f23ced8ba1d63ece69861dbaacc_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b251589cf40ace6dacc78699abda475ccc29cb4a --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3176-202009-I_PDF-E/14a22f23ced8ba1d63ece69861dbaacc_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version 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status** + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +# Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 | +| General | Y.100-Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700-Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 | +| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 | +| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 | +| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 | +| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 | +| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 | +| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 | + +For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations. + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3184 + +# Mechanism for intelligent awareness of network status + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3184 specifies a mechanism for intelligent awareness of network status. The scope of this Recommendation includes: introduction of intelligent awareness of network status; overview of the mechanism for intelligent awareness of network status; mechanism for intelligent awareness of network fault; mechanism for intelligent awareness of network performance; mechanism for intelligent awareness of network resource; mechanism for intelligent awareness of network load; and mechanism for intelligent awareness of other aspects of network status and security consideration. + +## History \* + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3184 | 2023-05-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15534 | + +## Keywords + +Intelligence awareness, mechanism, network status. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides virtualization instruction set as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server is designed to use Intel Xeon Processor D-2191 utilizing the performance and advanced Intelligence of Intel Xeon processors packaged into a dense, lowpower SoC' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP BS] provides virtualization instruction set as 'Intel Xeon Haswell/Broadwell-EP' in clause 2 table 2-1.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides virtualization instruction set as 'The motherboard is designed to support dual Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 and v4 series processors and up to 2048GB LRDIMM 3DS/1024GB LRDIMM/ 512GB RDIMM DDR4 memory. Leveraging advanced technology from Intel, the motherboard is capable of offering scalable 32- and 64- bit computing, high-bandwidth memory design and lightning-fast PCI-E bus implementation' in clause 7.
- – [b- OCP IMBH] provides virtualization instruction set as 'The Efficiency Performance motherboard, built with the Intel Xeon E5-2600 processor, was originally was code-named the Sandy Bridge-EP motherboard' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides virtualization instruction set as 'CPU: AMD EPYC processors' in clause 5.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides virtualization instruction set as 'Intel Motherboard V3.1 (also referred to "motherboard" or "the motherboard" in this document, unless noted otherwise) is based on Intel Xeon Processor E5-2600 v3 (formerly code-named Haswell-EP processor) product family CPU architecture' in clause 4.1
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides CPU replacement as 'The motherboard supports all Intel Xeon Scalable processor family (aka Skylake-SP) processors with TDP up to 165W. The motherboard shall provision the support of all future CPUs in Intel Xeon Scalable processor Family Platform and the Next gen Intel Xeon Scalable processor Family Platform unless noted otherwise' in clause 5.3.1.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides CPU replacement as 'The motherboard is designed to support dual Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 and v4 series processors and up to 2048GB LRDIMM 3DS/1024GB LRDIMM/ 512GB RDIMM DDR4 memory. Leveraging advanced technology from Intel, the motherboard is capable of offering scalable 32- and 64-bit computing, high-bandwidth memory design and lightning-fast PCI-E bus implementation' in clause 7.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides CPU replacement as 'The motherboard uses Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors with TDP up to 145W. The features listed below must be supported by the motherboard: Support two Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors up to 145W TDP and vendors should engage with Intel to ensure the design ready for future processors; Two full-width Intel QPI links up to 9.6 GT/s/direction; Up to 18 cores per CPU (up to 36 threads with Hyper-Threading Technology). Up to 45MB last level cache; Single Processor mode is supported' in clause 5.3.1.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides multiple CPUs as 'Support two Intel Xeon Scalable processor family (aka Skylake-SP) processors up to 165W TDP and vendors should engage with Intel to ensure the design ready for future processors' in clause 5.3.1.
- – [b- OCP AMBH] provides multiple CPUs as 'The motherboard supports two AMD G34 Magny Cours or Interlagos CPUs with a TDP (thermal design power) of 115W' in clause 4.3.
- – [b- OCP DSBS] provides multiple CPUs as 'Support up to two processors with a thermal design point (TDP) of up to 135 W' in clause 4.
- – [b- OCP DSBS] provides multiple CPUs as 'Support up to two processors using LGA2011-3 (socket type R3) and VRD 12.5 and a thermal design point (TDP) of up to 145W' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides multiple CPUs as 'The motherboard is designed to support dual Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 and v4 series processors and up to 2048GB LRDIMM 3DS/1024GB LRDIMM/ 512GB RDIMM DDR4 memory. Leveraging advanced technology from Intel, the motherboard is capable of offering scalable 32- and 64- bit computing, high-bandwidth memory design and lightning-fast PCI-E bus implementation' in clause 7.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides multiple CPUs as '2 Intel Xeon E5-2600 (LGA2011) series processors up to 115W' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides multiple CPUs as 'Sockets: Dual socket operation' in clause 5.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides multiple CPUs as 'The motherboard uses Intel
Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors with TDP up to 145W. The features listed below must be supported by the motherboard: Support two Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors up to 145W TDP and vendors should engage with Intel to ensure the design ready for future processors; Two full-width Intel QPI links up to 9.6 GT/s/direction; Up to 18 cores per CPU (up to 36 threads with Hyper-Threading Technology). Up to 45MB last level cache; Single Processor mode is supported' in clause 5.3.1.
| +| 4 | Low power consumption of CPU |- – [b-OCP 2S] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'Tuning CPU/Chipset settings to reach minimized power consumption and best performance in a data centre environment' in clause 6.3.1.
- – [b- OCP 2S] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The vendor should implement BMC firmware to support platform power monitoring. To enable power limiting for processor, memory and platform, Intel Server Platform Services-NM is required' in clause 9.8.
- – [b- OCP 2S] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'CPU VR optimizations shall be implemented to remove cost and increase the efficiency of the power conversion system' in clause 15.3.2.
- – [b-OCP G1] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The motherboard shall be designed to handle a processor with a maximum TDP of 190W CPU' in clause 7.3.1
- – [b- OCP DSBS] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'Support up to two processors with a thermal design point (TDP) of up to 135 W' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The CPU VRM is optimized to reduce cost and increase the efficiency of the power conversion system' in clause 9.1.5.
- – [b- OCP DSBS] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'Support up to two processors using LGA2011-3 (socket type R3) and VRD 12.5 and a thermal design point (TDP) of up to 145W' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The motherboard uses next generation Intel Xeon processor E5-2600 product family CPUs with a TDP (thermal design power) up to 115W' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'Two to monitor temperatures for CPU0 and CPU1, retrieved through the CPU's temperature sensor interface (PECI)' in clause 6.1.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The motherboard uses Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors with TDP up to 145W. The features listed below must be supported by the motherboard: Support two Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 (LGA2011-3) Product Family processors up to 145W TDP and vendors should engage with Intel to ensure the design ready for future processors; Two full-width Intel QPI links up to 9.6 GT/s/direction; Up to 18 cores per CPU (up to 36 threads with Hyper-Threading Technology). Up to 45MB last level cache; Single Processor mode is supported' in clause 5.3.1.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides Low power consumption of CPU as 'The BIOS
should be tuned to minimize system power consumption and maximize performance. This includes: Disable any unused devices, such as unused PCI, PCIe ports, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, clock generator and buffer ports. Tuning CPU/Chipset settings to reach minimized power consumption and best performance in a data centre environment' in clause 6.3.1.
| +| 5 | Hardware-assisted memory virtualization |- – [b-OCP 2S] provides hardware-assisted memory virtualization as 'Setting for the watchdog timer: The default setting for EVT/DVT/PVT is disabled. The default setting for MP is enabled. The timeout value is 15 minutes and reset the system after the timer expires. The watchdog timer is always disabled after POST' in clause 6.3.2.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides hardware-assisted memory virtualization as 'The motherboard is designed to support dual Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 and v4 series processors and up to 2048GB LRDIMM 3DS/1024GB LRDIMM/ 512GB RDIMM DDR4 memory. Leveraging advanced technology from Intel, the motherboard is capable of offering scalable 32- and 64- bit computing, high-bandwidth memory design and lightning-fast PCI-E bus implementation' in clause 7.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides hardware-assisted memory virtualization as 'The Efficiency Performance motherboard, built with the Intel Xeon E5-2600 processor, was originally was code-named the Sandy Bridge-EP motherboard' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides hardware-assisted memory virtualization as 'AMD EPYC platform' in clause 5.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides hardware-assisted memory virtualization as 'Intel Motherboard V3.1 (also referred to "motherboard" or "the motherboard" in this document, unless noted otherwise) is based on Intel Xeon Processor E5-2600 v3 (formerly code-named Haswell-EP processor) product family CPU architecture' in clause 4.1.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides memory replacement as 'Besides traditional DDR4 DIMM, the motherboard shall support Non-Volatile DIMM (NVDIMM) on all DIMM slots' in clause 5.3.3.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides memory replacement as 'Memory Expansion :16 sockets for un-buffered DDR3 and registered DDR3 DIMMS' and 'Provide 16 sockets for DDR4 DIMMS' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP G1] provides memory replacement as '4 DDR3 Memory channels per memory buffer; total 32 DDR3 RDIMMs, 1333 MHz (1DPC), 8/16/32GB' in clause 6.1.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides memory replacement as 'The motherboard is designed to support dual Intel Xeon E5-2600 v3 and v4 series processors and up to 2048GB LRDIMM 3DS/1024GB LRDIMM/ 512GB RDIMM DDR4 memory. Leveraging advanced technology from Intel, the motherboard is capable of offering scalable 32- and 64- bit computing, high-bandwidth memory design and lightning-fast PCI-E bus implementation' in clause 7.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides memory replacement as 'The motherboard has DIMM subsystem designed as below: DDR4 direct attach memory
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides memory reliability as 'Setting for ECC error threshold: Available settings are 1, 4, 10 and 1000. The default setting is 1 for EVT, DVT and PVT and 1000 for MP. Setting for ECC error event log threshold: Available settings are disabled, 10, 50, 100. The default setting is 10' in clause 6.3.2.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides memory reliability as 'Both correctable ECC and uncorrectable ECC errors should be logged into SEL. Each log entry should indicate location of DIMM by CPU socket#, Channel # and slot #. Memory error reporting need to be tested by both XDP injection and reworked ECC DIMM' in clause 9.11.1.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides memory reliability as 'Setting for ECC error threshold, available settings are 1, 4, 10 and 1000' in clause 5.5.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides memory reliability as 'CPU/memory errors: Both correctable ECC and uncorrectable ECC errors should be logged into event log. Error categories include DRAM, HyperTransport Link and L3 Cache' in clause 5.10.1.
- [b-OCP HSCH] provides memory reliability as 'Memory Correctable ECC: The threshold value is 1000. When the threshold is reached, the BIOS logs the event and includes the physical DIMM location.' in clause 8.5.10.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides memory reliability as 'DDR3 direct attached memory support on cpu0 and cpu1 with: 4 channel DDR3 registered memory interface on processors 0 and 1; 2 DDR3 slots per channel per processor (total of 16 DIMMs on the motherboard); RDIMM/LV-RDIMM (1.5V/1.35V), LRDIMM and ECC UDIMM/LV-UDIMM(1.5V/1.35V); Single, dual and quad rank DIMMs ; DDR3 speeds of 800/1066/1333/1600 MHz; Up to maximum 512 GB memory with 32GB RDIMM DIMMs' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides memory reliability as 'CPU/Memory errors: Both correctable ECC and un-correctable ECC errors should be logged into the event log. Error categories include DRAM, Link and L3 cache' in clause 5.9.1.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides memory reliability as 'Memory Correctable ECC: The threshold value is 1000. When the threshold is reached, the BIOS should log the event including DIMM location information and output DIMM location code through the debug card' in clause 5.9.2.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides supporting of various types of memory as 'Besides traditional DDR4 DIMM, the motherboard shall support Non-Volatile DIMM (NVDIMM) on all DIMM slots' in clause 5.3.3.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides supporting of various types of memory as 'DDR3 direct attached memory support on cpu0 and cpu1 with: o 4
channels DDR3 registered memory interface on each CPU; 2 DDR3 slots per channel per processor (total of 16 DIMMs on the motherboard); RDIMM/LV-RDIMM (1.35V/1.25V), LRDIMM and UDIMM/LV-UDIMM (1.35V/1.25V); SR, DR and QR DIMMs; DDR3 speeds of 800/1066/1333/1600; Up to maximum 512GB memory with 32GB RDIMMs' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides supporting of various types of memory as 'DIMM Type: RDIMM DDR4, LRDIMM 3DS DDR4, LRDIMM DDR4' in clause 8.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides Supporting various types of memory as 'DDR3 direct attached memory support on cpu0 and cpu1 with: 4 channel DDR3 registered memory interface on processors 0 and 1; 2 DDR3 slots per channel per processor (total of 16 DIMMs on the motherboard); RDIMM/LV-RDIMM (1.5V/1.35V), LRDIMM and ECC UDIMM/LV-UDIMM(1.5V/1.35V); Single, dual and quad rank DIMMs ; DDR3 speeds of 800/1066/1333/1600 MHz; Up to maximum 512 GB memory with 32GB RDIMM DIMMs' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides supporting of various types of memory as 'DIMM Type Double data rate fourth generation (DDR4) Registered DIMM (RDIMM) with Error-Correcting Code (ECC)' in clause 5.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides supporting of various types of memory as 'The motherboard has DIMM subsystem designed as below: DDR4 direct attach memory support on CPU0 and CPU1; 4x channels DDR4 registered memory interface on each CPU; 2x DDR4 slots per channel (total 16 DIMM); Support RDIMM, LRDIMM; Support SR, DR and QR DIMM; Support DDR4 speeds of 1600/1866/2133; Up to maximum 1024 GB with 64GB DIMMs; Follow updated JEDEC DDR4 specification with 288 pin DIMM socket' in clause 5.3.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server implements primary and extension x16 PCIe edge connectors as defined in the 1S server specification. The primary x16 PCIe edge connector supports: • PCIe Gen3 ports • A 10GBase-KR • A SATA port • A USB 2.0 port • A Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server supports three on-card Solid State Drives (SSDs) in the 2280 or 22110 M.2 form factor' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server supports three M.2 solid-state drives in 2280 or 22110 form factors. Boot M.2 slot is only available in 2280 form factor and it can be configured as either SATA or PCIe interface through BOM options, but not both. A minimum 256GB M.2 SATA or NVMe SSD is required as a boot device and for logging purpose. Two additional SSD drives are designed in to support applications that require high disk performance. These two M.2 slots only support PCIe X4 links but both support SSD drives in 2280 or 22110 form factors' in clause 9.4.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'Following internal connectors should be placed as close as possible to front of
the board in order to have easy front access: 1x vertical combo SATA signal and power connector; 1x 14-pin Debug card header; 1X right angle USB3 Type A connector; 1X SMD switch to enable/disable Intel Intel At Scale Debug; 1x M.2 connector with 2280 and 22110 support; 1x RJ45; 1x USB type C; 1X customized VGA connector' in clause 5.2.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The motherboard uses Intel PCH chipset, which supports following features: 4x USB 3.0/2.0 ports: one type A for front connector; one type C for front connector; one for BMC in-band firmware update; one to X32 riser connector; 1x M.2 connector; 1x individual SATA 6Gps port; 1x miniSAS HD x8 port or 1x miniSAS HD x4 port; 1x PCIe x4 ports to M.2 connector, colayout with SATA port to M.2 connector; SPI interface, mux with BMC to enable BMC the capability to perform BIOS upgrade and recovery; SPI interface for TPM header' in clause 5.4.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The motherboard has Intel PCH on board. Intel PCH has a SATA controller support 8x SATA3 ports and an sSATA controller support 6x SATA3 ports' in clause 11.6.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'PCI-E x16 Slot/Riser Card; PCI-E Mezzanine Card; PCI-E External Connector; SATA' in clauses 10.1,10.2,10.3, 10.7.
- – [b-OCP BS] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'PCIe Expansion Slot; SATA hot-plug drives' in clause 2, Table 2-1.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'Storage: Two single port AHCI SATA connectors capable of supporting up to 6 Gb/sec; Two SCU 4-port mini-SAS connectors capable of supporting up to 3 Gb/sec SATA/SAS; Two 4-port mini HD connectors capable of supporting up to 6 Gb/sec SATA' and 'Support for PCI Express* 225W/300W High Power Card Electromechanical Specification 1.0' in clause 4, Tables 1 and 2.
- – [b-OCP G1] provides multiple interfaces for storage as '15x 12Gb/s SAS or 6Gb/s SATA 2.5' drive slots, up to 15mm thickness, connected via SEB, to an onboard HBA. One M.2 SATA slot, also on board.' and '1 x 16 Gen3 FH/FL, 2 x8 Gen3 LP/HL, 1 x8 OCP Mez with front Panel access, 1 x8 PCIe OCP Mez in a non-front-accessible internal slot to support SAS HBA or Raid-on-Chip with SuperCap' in clause 6.1.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides multiple interfaces for storage as '▪ Intel C612 Controller;▪ (2) discrete SATA 7pin for SATA4 and SATA5;▪ (2) MiniSAS SFF-8087 for SATA0~SATA3, sSATA0~sSATA3;▪ 6.0Gb/s speed;▪ SATA SGPIO supported;▪ RAID 0/1/10/5 (Intel RST);▪ (4) Internal MiniSASHD SFF-8643 connectors (Optional)' in clause 8.
- – [b- OCP HSCH] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The SATA connections are a minimum of SATA2.0 (3Gb/s) and may be SATA3.0 (6Gb/s).The PCIe connection is a minimum of PCIe 2.0 and may be PCIe 3.0' in clauses 6.4 and 6.5.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'SATA,
and PCI-Express Expansion' in clause 5.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides multiple interfaces for storage as 'The motherboard uses Intel C610 series chipset, which supports following features: 3x USB 3.0/2.0 ports: one for front connector; one for optional vertical on board connector; one for BMC in-band firmware update; 1x mSATA connector from SATA port 4 co-layout with M.2 connector; 1x individual SATA 6Gps ports from SATA port 5; 1x miniSAS port from SATA port 0/1/2/3, 1x miniSAS port from sSATA0/1/2/3; 1x PCIe x4 ports to M.2 connector; SPI interface, connect to BMC to enable BMC the capability to perform BIOS upgrade and recovery; SMBUS interface (master and slave); Intel Server Platform Services (SPS) 3.0 Firmware with Intel Node Manager' in clause 5.4.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides storage replacement as 'The carrier assembly includes 2x ejectors which are used for card injection/ejection into the PCIe connectors' in clause 5.1.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides storage replacement as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server supports three M.2 solid-state drives in 2280 or 22110 form factors. Boot M.2 slot is only available in 2280 form factor and it can be configured as either SATA or PCIe interface through BOM options, but not both. A minimum 256GB M.2 SATA or NVMe SSD is required as a boot device and for logging purpose. Two additional SSD drives are designed in to support applications that require high disk performance. These two M.2 slots only support PCIe X4 links but both support SSD drives in 2280 or 22110 form factors' in clause 9.4.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides storage replacement as 'The motherboard uses Intel PCH chipset, which supports following features: 4x USB 3.0/2.0 ports: one type A for front connector; one type C for front connector; one for BMC in-band firmware update; one to X32 riser connector; 1x M.2 connector; 1x individual SATA 6Gps port; 1x miniSAS HD x8 port or 1x miniSAS HD x4 port; 1x PCIe x4 ports to M.2 connector, colayout with SATA port to M.2 connector; SPI interface, mux with BMC to enable BMC the capability to perform BIOS upgrade and recovery; SPI interface for TPM header' in clause 5.4.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides storage replacement as 'PCI-E x16 Slot/Riser Card; PCI-E Mezzanine Card; PCI-E External Connector; SATA' in clauses 10.1,10.2,10.3 and 10.7.
- – [b-OCP BS] provides storage replacement as 'PCIe Expansion Slot; SATA hot-plug drives' in clause 2, Table 2-1.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides storage replacement as 'Storage: Two single port AHCI SATA connectors capable of supporting up to 6 Gb/sec; Two SCU 4-port mini-SAS connectors capable of supporting up to 3 Gb/sec SATA/SAS; Two 4-port mini HD connectors capable of supporting up to 6 Gb/sec SATA' and 'Support for PCI Express* 225W/300W High Power Card Electromechanical Specification 1.0' in clause 4, Tables 1 and 2.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides storage replacement as '▪ Intel C612
Controller;▪ (2) discrete SATA 7pin for SATA4 and SATA5;▪ (2) MiniSAS SFF-8087 for SATA0~SATA3, sSATA0~sSATA3;▪ 6.0Gb/s speed;▪ SATA SGPIO supported;▪ RAID 0/1/10/5 (Intel RST);▪ (4) Internal MiniSASHD SFF-8643 connectors (Optional)' in clause 8.
- – [b-OCP HSCH] provides storage replacement as 'The BIOS is tuned to minimize card power consumption. It has the following features: • Unused devices are disabled including PCIe* lanes, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, etc;• BIOS setup menu;• SOC settings are provided to allow tuning to achieve the optimal combination of performance and power consumption' in clause 8.5.2.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides storage replacement as 'The motherboard uses Intel C610 series chipset, which supports following features: 3x USB 3.0/2.0 ports: one for front connector; one for optional vertical onboard connector; one for BMC in-band firmware update; 1x mSATA connector from SATA port 4 co-layout with M.2 connector; 1x individual SATA 6Gps ports from SATA port 5; 1x miniSAS port from SATA port 0/1/2/3, 1x miniSAS port from sSATA0/1/2/3; 1x PCIe x4 ports to M.2 connector; SPI interface, connect to BMC to enable BMC the capability to perform BIOS upgrade and recovery; SMBUS interface (master and slave); Intel Server Platform Services (SPS) 3.0 Firmware with Intel Node Manager' in clause 5.4.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides storage redundancy hardware as 'Storage: RAID 0/1/10/5 (Intel RST)' in clause 8.
- – [b-OCP SJ] provides Storage redundancy hardware as 'SATA RAID KEY: 1x4' in clause 6.12.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides storage hibernation as 'Disable any unused devices, such as unused PCI, PCIe ports, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, clock generator and buffer ports' in clause 6.3.1.
- – [b-OCP HSCH] provides storage hibernation as 'The BIOS is tuned to minimize card power consumption. It has the following features: • Unused devices are disabled including PCIe* lanes, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, etc.; • BIOS setup menu; • SOC settings are provided to allow tuning to achieve the optimal combination of performance and power consumption' in clause 8.5.2.
- – [b-OCP MB] provides storage hibernation as 'The BIOS should be tuned to minimize system power consumption and maximize performance. This includes: Disable any unused devices, such as unused PCI, PCIe ports, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, clock generator and buffer ports. Tuning CPU/Chipset settings to reach minimized power consumption and best performance in a data centre environment' in clause 6.3.1.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] describes how Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT) must be supported via platform BIOS policy variable, in clause 4.8.
- – [b-OCP 25GDual] describes how QL41202 shall support single root I/O virtualization (SR-IOV), in clause .12.
- – [b-OCP 25GDual] describes how QL41202 shall support offload traffic types RDMA over Converged Ethernet (RoCE) on each of the ports and also support Internet wide area RDMA protocol (iWARP), in clause 12.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] describes key features for WCS Intel Xeon Scalable Platform, support 2 GP-GPU+1 PCIe card in 2U, in clause 2.2.
- – [b-OCP BS] describes QCT Grantley platform will be 16 DIMMs and support 8 GPGPU cards and Max. 8x 2.5"HDDs' in clause 1.
- – [b-OCP OCSSSD] describes how OCS v2.0 servers shall support drives with volatile write caches by leveraging the server backup power supply in clause 11.3 Power-Loss Protection.
- – [b-OCP OCTAM] Indicates that when PSU ALERT# signal occurs, the Olympus PSU has transitioned its power source from AC to battery backup, in clause 7.4.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide power redundancy as 'Power supply redundancy may be achieved by installing more than one power supply unit' in clause 5.3.3.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] require platform designers to provide adequate power and cooling to properly handle the SoC's power and thermal requirements, in clause 3 overview.
- – [b-OCP 1S] require Twin Lakes 1S Server to provide a standby 3.3V_AUX power rail on the card to power the Bridge IC at all power states, in clause 8.1.2.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] describe that the Hyve Solutions Ambient Series-E servers support single or redundant power supply, in clause 11.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provides minimum energy consumption as 'different forms of processors would be utilized for different types of services to improve power efficiency' in clause 5.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] describes that the Twin Lakes 1S server recommend a power-capping implementation to reduce the server's power consumption (cut off power in certain time) in clause 8.4.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] describe that the motherboard supports Emergency Power Reduction mechanism (PWRBRK#) for the x16 PCIe slots in clause 7.5.
- – [b-OCP OCTAM] describes how the motherboard supports Emergency Power Reduction mechanism (PWRBRK#) for the x16 and x32 PCIe slots in clause 7.5.
- – [b-OCP OMB] describes how the motherboard supports Emergency Power Reduction mechanism (PWRBRK#) for the x16 PCIe slots in clause 6.5, the main purpose is to provide a power reduction mechanism for GPGPU cards as part of the throttle and power capping strategy.
- – [b-OCP HSCH] describes how the BIOS is tuned to minimize card power consumption. It has the following features: • Unused devices are disabled including PCIe* lanes, USB ports, SATA/SAS ports, etc.;
- • BIOS setup menu; • SOC settings are provided to allow tuning to achieve the optimal combination of performance and power consumption' in clause 8.5.2.
- – [b-OCP HSCH] describes how each card must provide temperature sensors for the SOC, the SO-DIMM(s) (if they are used) and one ambient temperature sensor. All temperature readings for each sensor must be readable via the management sideband interface to the baseboard. Additionally, over-temperature thresholds are configurable and an alert mechanism is provided to enable thermal shutdown and/or an increase in airflow. The sensors are accurate to +/-3C' in clause 5.4.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provides interface for monitoring power as 'Each power supply unit should be capable of measuring and remotely reporting the following operational parameters' in clause 5.3.4.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] describes how the Twin Lakes 1S server shall uses power sensor to measure Card and SoC power consumption. The power data can be used by the platform for power management purposes. The Twin Lakes 1S server supports an Advanced Configuration Power Interface (ACPI)-compliant power button and reset signals from the platform, in clause 3 overview and clause 6.5.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] describes how to use BMC to monitor power in clause 7.2 and use PMBUS interface to enable the BMC to report server input power in clause 8.6.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] describes how Decathlete Server Board shall support power supply redundancy monitoring and support in clause 8.1.2.
- – [b-OCP TP] requires vendors to implement BMC firmware to support remote system power on/off/cycle and warm reboot through In-Band or Out-of-Band IPMI commands in clause 8.4 and support platform power monitoring in clause 8.8.
- – [b-OCP 2S] describes that if and only if one rotor in server fan fails, the negative or positive DC pressurization can be considered in the thermal solution in the hot aisle or in cold aisle respectively in clause 10.2.4.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides a description of fan redundancy which is one implementation of cooling redundancy – as 'the server fans at N+1 redundancy should be sufficient for cooling server components to temperatures below their maximum spec to prevent server shut down or to prevent either CPU or memory throttling' in clause 10.2.5.
- – [b-OCP O1USM] requires fans to be N+2 redundant to optimize fan efficiency and server availability while eliminating the need for hot swap capability in clause 4.4.
- – [b-OCP O2USM] requires fans to be N+2 redundant to optimize fan efficiency and server availability while eliminating the need for hot swap capability in clause 4.4.
- – [b-OCP TP] describe how server fans should be N+1 redundancy to be sufficient for cooling server components to temperatures below their maximum spec to prevent server shut down or to prevent either
- – [b-OCP 2S] requires vendors to enable fan speed control (FSC) on BMC. The FSC algorithm processes sensor data and drives two PWM outputs to optimized speed, in clause 9.12.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] requires ODM to provide system access interface to retrieve hardware sensor readings and control fan speed, in clause 6.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] describes how Decathlete Server Board shall support ACPI to control power and fan speed in clause 8.2.
- – [b-OCP SFCI] describes how server management controller like BMC use standard IPMI commands to manage SFC in whole document.
- – [b-OCP OCSPS] describes that the PSU shall adjust internal fan speed based upon internal temperature sensor(s) in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP TP] requires vendors to enable FSC on the BMC in clause 8.12.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides monitoring status set as 'There is also a blinking amber heartbeat LED on the Twin Lakes 1S server to indicate that the Bridge IC is in operating mode' in clause 9.8.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides system state monitor set as 'There are 4 states of Power/system identification LED depending on system power state and chassis identify status' in clause 9.6.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides monitor status set as 'On the Adapter Card of a Yosemite V2 sled, there is a power button, a reset button, an OCP debug card and a USB port attached to the current selected 1S server. There are four blue LEDs placed on the baseboard in the same order as 1S server slots to indicate server status' in clause 9.4.
- – [b-OCP O1USM] provides visual indication set as 'A 3D mechanical drawing of the Front Panel is shown in Figure 2. The Front Panel supports the following mechanical features. Status LEDs o UID, Attention, Power Status' in clause 4.1.
- – [b-OCP JBOG] provides system event log (SEL) set as 'The BMC needs to support SEL capabilities. The following items are to be logged in the SEL' in clause 7.1.
- – [b-OCP SJ] provides silk screen colour set as 'The colour of silk screen is white and the labels for the components are listed as below' in clause 13.4.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides visual feedback set as 'The LED associated with the active 1S server blinks as visual feedback to the user. When a BMC is selected, all four LEDs blink as visual feedback to the user' in clause 9.4.1.
- – [b-OCP OAPM] provides visual indication set as 'The motherboard supports a blue UID (unit ID) LED used to help visually locate a specific server within a data centre' in clause 6.11.1.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides easy to remove set as 'The air baffle must be easy to service with the goal of requiring no tooling to remove' in clause 6.6.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides removal set as 'It is installed on a sheet metal panel with tool-less install and removal' in clause 12.2.5.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provides mounting and removal set as 'In order to remove and install one board without affecting the other board, the following internal connectors are placed as close as possible to front of the board in order to have easy frontal access' in clause 4.2 and "The PCIe* x4 connector can be hot inserted and removed" in clause 10.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides air flow set as 'The card level air baffle must be designed to help maintain temperatures of all major components on the server card by reducing bypass air and increasing airflow through key components' in clause 6.6.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides airflow set as 'The unit of airflow (or volumetric flow) used for this spec is CFM (cubic feet per minute). The maximum allowable airflow per watt in the system must be 0.107' in clause 10.2.26.
- – [b-OCP JBOG] provides system airflow set as 'The unit of airflow (or volumetric flow) used for this spec is CFM (cubic feet per minute). The maximum allowable airflow per watt in the system must be 0.14 at sea level' in clause 8.2.3.
- – [b-OCP SJ] provides cooling set as 'To meet thermal reliability requirement, the thermal and cooling solution should dissipate heat from the components when system operating at its maximum thermal power' in clause 11.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides airflow set as 'The unit of airflow (or volumetric flow) used for this spec is cubic feet per minute (CFM)' in clause 8.2.5.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide interconnect network supports as 'support links of types other than Ethernet' in clause 5.4.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides interconnect set as 'When the SoC's integrated network controller is used as a shared NIC, its SMBus is routed to Connector A as the sideband interface' in clause 7.9.1.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides interconnect set as 'High speed mid-plane is mid-plane with power delivery, plus high speed interconnect on mid-plane' in clause 12.3.
- – [b-OCP JBOG] provides interconnect set as 'For JBOG with 8x GPUs in SXM2 form factor, it shall support NVLINK interconnection shown below' in clause 4.3.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides share SPI bus set as 'A secondary identical BIOS chip is designed in sharing the same SPI bus with multiplexed CS pin' in clause 6.1.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] provides share io set as 'ATA controllers running in native mode use their PCI interrupt for both channels and can share
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides configuration set as 'Set Bridge IC configuration' in clause 9.7.10, Table 6.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides configuration set as 'Vendor should provide utility under CentOS to perform VR configuration change. Configuration change should take effect without AC cycling node' in clause 15.3.4.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] provides multi process configuration set as 'The Intel Xeon Scalable processor is implemented with 1 or more cores with each core capable of supporting Intel HT Technology. The result is multiple logical processors in a physical package' in clause 4.13.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides temperature and power sensors set as 'Each card must provide following sensors: Temperature sensors for SOC, DIMM, voltage regulators and other critical chips' in clause 6.5.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides running monitor set as 'The vendor should implement BMC FW to support thermal monitoring, including processor, memory, chipset, VRs, PCIe card, Mezzanine cards, Inlet/outlet air temperature and airflow sensor' in clause 9.8.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides memory reliability as 'Hardware health monitoring display' in clause 5.5.
- – [b-OCP JBOG ] provides monitor set as 'The BMC implemented is to have access to all analog sensors placed in the system and ensure that they are displayed in a sensor data record repository' in clause 7.9.1.1.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides monitor set as 'During the entire hot-service process, the BMC shall monitor the thermal condition closely' in clause 5.2.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides monitor set as 'The BMC can be used to monitor hardware and control fan speed' in clause 6.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] provides multi process configuration set as 'BIOS requirements for Intel NM enabled firmware NM5 BIOS should implement processor utilization notifications support in ACPI tables' in clause 9.2.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides power operation set as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server can throttle itself down to lowest possible power state as quickly as possible when the platform asserts the FAST_THROTTLE_N signal or it receives request from BMC, or over power event reported by on-card power monitor' in clause 8.4, and 'The BMC controls power on, off and reset directly via the signals defined in the pin-out' in clause 9.7.13.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides auto power on set as 'Motherboard should be set to restore last power state during AC on/off. This means that, when AC does on/off cycle, motherboard should power on automatically
without requiring power button' in clause 15.9.
- – [b-OCP JBOG] provides power operation set as 'Support power on policy to be last-state, always-on and always-off upon recovery from an AC power loss event. T' in clause 7.7.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides auto power set as 'Now the user can replace the failed unit with a new one, BMC would automatically resume power and boot the new card' in clause 5.2.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] provides power controller set as 'The following actions are available on expiration of the Watchdog Timer: • System Reset• System Power Off• System Power Cycle• Pre-timeout Interrupt (OPTIONAL)' in clause 9.2.2.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides get selftest result set as 'Get Selftest Results (0x04) in clause 9.13.
- – [b-OCP TP] provides selftest set as 'During system boot-up, POST (Power-On-SelfTest ) codes will be send to port 80 and decoded by the BMC to drive the LED display as described in section 8.5. P' in clause 8.2.
- – [b-OCP OBIOS] provides selftest set as 'Built-In Self-Test (BIST) The BIST_ENABLE can be controlled by a BMC, GPO, strap or other mechanism. BIOS shall implement a platform policy to control BIST execution' in clause 4.12.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides 'The primary x16 PCIe edge connector supports: USB 2.0 port' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides 'support of GUI and KVM on hardware level to accommodate the OCP customers whose environment requires using of VGA and KVM' in clause 9.3.
- – [b-OCP SJ] provides 'USB and VGA' in clause 4.2.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides 'supports a VGA interface' in clause 9.5.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides keyboard interface as 'Bridge IC provides ways to transfer messages between them via KCS interfaces. For in-band management, the Bridge IC can forward the SoC's Keyboard Controller Style (KCS) request to the BMC' in clause 9.7.3.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides USB interface as 'The motherboard has two external USB ports located in the front of the motherboard. The BIOS supports the following USB devices: Keyboard and mouse' in clause 10.6.
- – [b-OCP TP] provides USB interface as 'The motherboard has one external Type-A, right angle USB 2.0/3.0 port and one USB 3.0. Type-C port located in front of the motherboard. The BIOS should support the following USB devices: USB keyboard and mouse' in clause 10.5.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides VGA support as 'The Yosemite V2 Platform supports a VGA interface. The original SATA interface on 1S server
interface has been repurposed to be a x1 PCIe link' in clause 9.5.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides USB support as 'The server board SHALL provide two external USB ports and the BIOS SHALL support the following USB devices: Keyboard and mouse ,Bootable USB flash drive, Bootable USB hard disk, Bootable USB optical disk' in clause 6.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides interface to external storage as 'Boot M.2 slot is only available in 2280 form factor and it can be configured as either SATA or PCIe interface through BOM options' in clause 9.4.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides SATA port as 'The motherboard has SP5100 interfaces on board, which support up to six SATA ports' in clause 10.7.
- – [b-OCP TP] provides SATA port as 'SATA port 0~7 can be connected to one vertical mini-SAS HD 8 ports connector. sSATA ports 2~5 can be connected to one mini-SAS HD 4 ports connector' in clause 10.6.
- – [b-OCP O2USM] provides SATA port as 'Supports up to 12 SATA devices' in clause 4.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides SATA port as 'The server board SHALL have support up to six SATA ports' in clause 6.3.
- – [b-OCP 25GDual] provides network virtualization as 'Support receive side scaling (RSS), single root I/O virtualization (SR-IOV), VLAN tagging, Layer 2 priority encoding, link aggregation and full-duplex flow control 802.3 functions in the MAC' in Table 1.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide device driver and API supports as 'the network interface should be configurable to service either a management or production network' in clause 5.6.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides device driver support as 'The Twin Lakes 1S server supports three M.2 solid-state drives in 2280 or 22110 form factors' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides device driver support as 'All data network and management network should have this capability. This includes, but not limit to: DHCP and static IP setting, PXE booting capability, NIC and BMC firmware support, OS driver and utility in both IPv4 and IPv6' in clause 11.4.3.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides device driver support as 'The x4 connector can be hot inserted and removed. A PCI-E re-driver is used for PCI-E external links and supports a miniSAS cable up to 2 meters long' in clause 10.3.
- – [b-OCP TP] provides device driver support as 'It is recommended that PCB is planned with three vendors at EVT. EVT and DVT build plan should cover all possible combinations of key components of DC-DC VR including output inductor, MOSFETs and driver' in clause 18.9.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides power operation as 'server shall have the power monitoring capability to read power consumption reliably and accurately and can report a one-second average power reading with 3% accuracy' in clause 8.4.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides monitoring information as 'BMC should implement thermal monitoring feature for PCIe card on riser and Mezzanine card. BMC reads the temperature of key components of PCIe and Mezzanine cards through its SMBus ports in the format as TMP421 temperature sensor. BMC' in clause 9.18.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides monitoring information as 'The ODM needs to provide a system access interface and application to retrieve hardware monitoring sensor readings, including at minimum, lm_sensors, a Linux application for the CentOS operating system and its driver' in clause 6.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides power operation as 'The motherboard includes a power switch, reset switch, power LED, HDD activity LED and beep error LED' in clause 10.9.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides monitoring information as 'The BMC firmware shall support platform power monitoring. The BMC firmware shall support thermal monitoring' in clause 6.13.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides monitoring information as 'The management controller SHALL support the following IPMI features: Sensor device and sensor scanning/monitoring' in clause 8.11.
- – [b-OCP NIC] provides monitoring information as 'When the temperature sensor reporting function is implemented, the OCP NIC 3.0 card shall support PLDM for Platform Monitoring and Control (DSP0248 1.1 compliant) for temperature reporting' in Table 49: Temperature Reporting Requirements.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide Remote management as 'The BMC/service processor shall be accessible remotely via Ethernet network' in clause 5.6.2.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provides remote BIOS update as 'The BIOS can be updated remotely under these scenarios' in clause 9.6.8.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides remote BIOS update as 'Vendors should provide tool(s) to implement remote BIOS update function' in clause 6.3.6.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides remote BIOS firmware update as 'The motherboard has SP5100 interfaces on board, which support up to six SATA ports' in clause 7.6.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides remote power control as 'The BMC supports remote system power on/off and reboot through LAN or IPMB' in clause 7.4.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides remote BMC firmware update as 'Vendors should provide tool(s) to implement a remote BMC firmware update, which will not require any physical input' in clause 6.17.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides remote machine management as 'A Revision 1.0 Decathlete server board SHALL implement the requirements of the OCP Open Hardware Management Specification for Remote Machine Management (Version 0.93)' in clause 10.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide diagnostic of physical machine as 'the rack power subsystem should provide a means to report power system fault
events' in clause 5.3.2.3.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides error log as 'Error to be logged' in clause 9.11.1.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provides system log as 'The BIOS logs system events through the baseboard management controller (BMC)' in clause 5.10.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides event log as 'The vendor should implement the BMC to support storing events/logs from each 1S server baseboard, device carrier card and mezzanine card' in clause 6.15.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides log as 'The Decathlete server board standard will define a minimal set of error handling and alerts. These features may become a section of this standard, or may be a standalone specification authored by the OCP Hardware Management project' in clause 9.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides network connectivity as 'The network controller vendors offer Network Interface Cards (NICs) that support multi-host functions. These multi-host NICs provide network connectivity to multiple servers through a PCIe interface' in clause 5.7.6.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides network connectors as 'The server board SHALL have one LAN device to support the RJ-45 network interface connectors' in clause 6.1.
- – [b-OCP NIC] provides network interconnect as 'NC-SI over RBT capable OCP NIC 3.0 cards shall use a unique Package ID per ASIC when multiple ASICs share the single NC-SI physical interconnect to ensure there are no addressing conflicts' in clause 4.8.1.
- – [b-OCP OCSB] provides I/O interface for device extensions as 'High-Speed Interface Topologies' in clause 7.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provides I/O interface for device extensions as 'PCIe x32 Slot/Riser Card' in clause 11.1.
- – [b-OCP JBOG] provides I/O interface for device extensions as '8 x16 PCIe Gen3 slots for GPU' in clause 4.1.
- – [b-OCP HSAS] provides I/O interface for device extensions as 'PCIe Port Assignments' in clause 8.
- – [b-OCP QGD] provides I/O interface for device extensions as 'PCIe expansion slot' in clause 2.
- – [b-OCP DSBS] provides I/O interface for device extensions as 'The server board SHALL provide support for one riser card and MAY provide support for two riser cards. The riser card slots can be configured to meet any range of usage models' in clause 6.4.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provides processing unit replacement as 'The USB connections from all 1S servers are connected to the BMC's virtual hub port through a USB multiplexer so that a user could upgrade the BMC firmware via a USB interface from a 1S server. This method is much faster than going through the OOB' in clause 5.2.
- – [b-OCP NIC] provides processing unit replacement as 'A multi-host capable OCP NIC 3.0 card shall gracefully handle concurrent in-band queries from multiple hosts and out-of-band access from the BMC for firmware component versions, device model and device ID'
information' in clause 4.7.3.
- – [b-OCP OCSB] provide processing unit replacement as 'Tray Backplane Interface' in clause 9.1.
- – [b-OCP OCSTRAY] provide Processing unit replacement as 'The connector interfaces between the tray mezzanine card and the tray backplane use the Samtec SEARAY solution' in clause 2.
- – [b-OCP OCSC] provide adding processing units as 'support trays that house up to 24 individual OCS blades' as clause 2.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provide adding processing units as 'support multi-host functions' in clause 5.7.6.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provide adding memory of processing units as '2x DDR4 slots per channel' In clause 5.3.2.
- – [b-OCP IMBH] provide adding sub-components of processing units as 'two PCIe* x4 external connectors on the motherboard' in clause 10.2.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provide adding sub-components of processing units as 'motherboard's I/O features' in clause 10.
- – [b-OCP OCSC] provide adding power supply as 'PDU placement' in clause 3.1.3.
- – [b-OCP AMBH] provide adding sub-components of processing units as 'The motherboard includes a full server management solution and supports interfaces to an integrated or a set of rear-access 12V Power Supply Units (PSUs)' in clause 3.
- – [b-OCP OCSC] provide adding cooling component as 'Fan tray (includes six 140 x 140 mm fans in parallel)' in clause 4.2.
- – [b-OCP O2USM] provide adding cooling component as 'A maximum of six 40mm fans may be used to cool the components in a single U, with a maximum of twelve 40mm fans* in a 2U server configuration.' in clause 4.4.
- – [b-DMTF RedfishAPI] provide authorized access as support both 'Basic Authentication' and 'Redfish Session Login Authentication' in clause 9.2.
- – [b-DMTF RedfishHI] provide authorized access as 'Opening a Redfish session on the Host Interface may be accomplished by use of any authorized Redfish credentials' in clause 9.
- – [b-SNIA Swordfish] provide authorized access as 'Implement TLS version 1.2 or greater' in clause 8.1.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide fault location support as 'hardware with fast failure detection' in clause 5.11.
- – [b-OCP 1S] provide fault location as 'these errors must include the date, time and location information so that failing components can be easily identified' in clause 9.6.10.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provide fault location as 'A power failure detection circuit needs to be implemented to initiate 3x actions related to data
transferring' in clause 5.3.3.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provide fault location as 'All POST errors, which are detected by BIOS during POST, should be logged into Event Log' in clause 9.11.1.
- – [b-OCP Yose] provide fault location as 'Fan failure errors should be logged if the fan speed reading is outside expected ranges between the lower and upper critical thresholds. The Error log should also identify which fan fails' in clause 6.15.1.7.
- – [b-ETSI EVE007] provide hot-plug support as 'Supporting hot-plug for vulnerable components, including hard drive and optical modules' in clause 5.11.
- – [b-OCP OCSPPS] provide hot-plug support as 'The power supply shall be hot pluggable' in clause 1.
- – [b-OCP OCSB] provide hot-plug support as 'The blade contains a NIC mezzanine card to provide small form-factor pluggable (SFP+) and Quad SFP (QSFP+) cable connectivity' in clause 7.2.
- – [b-OCP 2S] provide hot-plug support as 'the x32 PCIe in riser slot shall support Standard PCIe signal hot swap' in clause 5.5.2.
- – [b-OCP TP] provide hot-plug support as 'PCIe Hot Plug' in clause 5.5.1.
Infrastructure capabilities type, especially for providing VM, which is resided on a physical machine. The virtual machine provides a virtualized and isolated computing environment for each guest operating system (OS) with processing, storage, networking and other hardware resources. Usually a physical machine would carry more than one virtual machine and needs to provide more virtual CPU than physical CPU, so as the memory and I/O devices. Furthermore, the physical machine usually provides a management function for the CSP to manage and monitor the physical machines. The loading information would help the CSP to select which host to deploy the VMs and the fault location information could help the CSP easily replace the failure component. As more applications run in one physical machine, the reliability is required so that it could continue to run and bear the services without migrating when there are few failures. As some applications may require some other hardware components with special features, the physical machine would have to reserve one or more extended interfaces for adding cloud resources. To improve the VM's performance, the physical machines usually use CPUs with virtualization instruction set support. For situations with a lot of network traffic processing, physical machines can offload traffic processing to I/O devices to improve performance and reduce the load of CPUs.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager | +| Figure |Image: Diagram illustrating the use case of providing IaaS service with processing resource. The diagram shows a 'Cloud service operations manager' (represented by three people icons) interacting with a physical server and a resource pool. On the left, a physical server is shown with components: 'Storage devices', 'Processing devices', 'Memory devices', and 'Networking devices' connected to an 'Enclosure'. Above the enclosure is a 'Service hypervisor' layer, which supports three 'Virtual machine' instances under the heading 'Provide VM service'. On the right, a 'Resource pool' is shown, consisting of multiple server racks, with the text 'Constructing a resource pool with several physical machines'. Arrows indicate the flow of management and resource allocation from the CSP to the physical infrastructure and the resource pool. A green triangle highlights the connection between the physical server and the resource pool.
Y.3507(18)_FII.Tab1
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | The virtual machine resides on the physical machine. | + +**Table II.1 – Providing IaaS service with processing resource – use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Post-conditions (optional) | CSP: cloud service operations manager wants to build or expand a resource pool to provide VM service. | +| Derived requirements |- – Virtualization instruction set (see clause 7.1.1.1)
- – Hardware-assisted I/O virtualization (see clause 7.1.1.4)
- – Hardware-assisted memory virtualization (see clause 7.1.1.2)
- – Supporting various types of memory (see clause 7.1.1.2)
- – Network interface virtualization (see clause 7.2)
- – Provide I/O interface to administrator (see clause 7.2)
- – Provide I/O interface to external storage device (see clause 7.2)
- – I/O devices direct accessing (see clause 7.1.1.4)
- – Monitoring status of physical machine (see clause 7.1.4)
- – Automatically power operation (see clause 7.1.6)
- – Processing unit operation (see clause 7.3)
- – Remote management (see clause 7.3)
- – Support fault location (see clause 7.6)
- – Hot-plug support (see clause 7.6)
- – Workload offload (see clause 7.1.1.4)
- – Hardware acceleration (see clause 7.1.1.4)
- – Interface for monitoring power (see clause 7.1.2)
A cloud service operations manager installs multiple processing units on the backplane of an enclosure to increase the computing resources of a physical machine. He or she also installs more than one storage device per CPU in a processing unit through standard storage interfaces.
To connect all multiple processing units together, a cloud service operations manager mounts a switch device which is responsible for system interconnects and network topology to the backplane of the enclosure.
In addition, the enclosure is equipped with a power supply to provide power to an entire physical machine and a cooling device to reduce heating. A cloud service operations manager should be able to check whether each device is installed in a physical machine correctly through a console panel on the enclosure.
System software and operating systems are installed on corresponding devices or rebooted and consequently a physical machine completes to set up its operations.
Based on the above steps to construct a physical machine, several physical machines are connected with each other by their external interfaces and can be installed in a standard rack.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager. | + +**Table II.2 – Preparing a physical machine – use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Figure |Image: Diagram illustrating the preparation of a physical machine. A Cloud service operations manager (represented by a person icon) is shown at the top, with arrows pointing down to two main stages: 'Constructing a physical machine' and 'Constructing a rack with several physical machines'. The 'Constructing a physical machine' stage shows a detailed view of a server enclosure with components labeled: Cooling device, Power supply, Processing unit, Storage device, Switch device, Enclosure, Console panel, and Backplane. The 'Constructing a rack with several physical machines' stage shows a stack of server racks. A red dashed line connects the two stages, indicating the flow from individual machine construction to rack assembly. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3507(18)_Fil.Tab2' in the bottom right corner.
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSP: cloud service operations manager wants to modify or expand the resources in a physical machine. | +| Post-conditions (optional) | A physical machine provides a cloud service. | +| Derived requirements |- – Hot-plug support (see clause 7.6)
- – Configuration of multiple processing units (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Monitoring status of physical machine (see clause 7.1.4)
Cold data means data that is stored but almost never read again. The cloud storage service for cold data provides almost no limit storage capacity at a very low cost and the physical machine for cold data storage requires the highest capacity and the lowest cost. The typical use case is a series of sequential writes, but random reads. As the physical machine is recommended to provide as much storage capacity as possible, it would have many large-capacity disks. To provide a highly durable storage service, the physical machine is recommended to provide management function for the CSP to manage and monitor the physical machine cluster and then the CSP can rebuild the data in time when some failures happen, also the hot plug function is needed. Physical machines usually support storage of different media to balance between cost and performance for different situations.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager | + +**Table II.3 – Cold data storage resource – use case** + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Figure
|Image: Diagram illustrating the cold data storage resource use case. The diagram shows the interaction between a CSP (Cloud service operations manager) and CSU (Cloud service user). The CSP provides a cold data storage service through a server storage software system, which includes data copies and a server network. The CSU requests the service and uses it. The physical server construction is shown with components like processing devices, memory devices, storage devices, networking devices, and an enclosure.
The diagram illustrates the cold data storage resource use case. It shows the interaction between a CSP (Cloud service operations manager) and a CSU (Cloud service user). The CSP provides a cold data storage service through a server storage software system, which includes data copies and a server network. The CSU requests the service and uses it. The physical server construction is shown with components like processing devices, memory devices, storage devices, networking devices, and an enclosure.
Y.3507(18)_FII.Tab3
| +|Pre-conditions (optional)
|The cloud storage service resides on the physical machine.
| +|Post-conditions (optional)
|CSP: cloud service operations manager wants to build or expand a resource pool to provide cloud storage service for cold data.
| +|Derived requirements
|- – Hot-plug support (see clause 7.6)
- – Low power consumption of CPU (see clause 7.1.1.1)
- – Supporting various types of memory (see clause 7.1.1.2)
- – Provide I/O interface to administrator (see clause 7.2)
- – Provide I/O interface to external storage device (see clause 7.2)
- – Storage hibernation (see clause 7.1.1.3 )
- – Remote management (see clause 7.3)
- – Diagnostic of physical machine (see clause 7.3)
- – Multiple interfaces for storage (see clause 7.1.1.3)
- – I/O interface for device extensions
When a cloud service user requests a high performance computing service (e.g., parallel processing, Big data processing, etc.), a cloud service operations manager is responsible for setting up an interconnection network among processing units, because multiple computing resources are required to perform such a service.
Ethernet is a widely used protocol for the interconnection network but the cloud service operations manager may provide other protocols. Therefore, depending on the protocols, the performance of the interconnect network is determined and the cloud service operations manager can select and provide the appropriate interconnect network to the cloud service user.
For utilizing this interconnect network system, a cloud service user can employ socket based applications in the case of using Ethernet protocol. For other networks, a cloud service user is provided with applications per application program interfaces (API) from a cloud service operations manager. This is due to the fact that, a cloud operations manager also has a responsibility to provide a device driver and API for utilizing the propriety network.
Occasionally, a cloud service user may request multiple physical machines for such a service. In this case, a cloud operations manager has a responsibility to support multiple shared resources through the network. Since the physical machines are independent of network devices, this network would be arranged as cabling in an interconnect network.
When a cloud service operations manager makes this cabled network, it is constructed to support various topologies (e.g., ring, mesh, tree) to meet the different performance levels of the service requested from a cloud service user.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSC: Cloud service user and CSP: Cloud service operations manager | +| Figure |Image: Diagram illustrating the interconnect network setup for high-performance computing. It shows a Cloud Service User (CSC) requesting a service from a Cloud Service Operations Manager (CSP). The CSP sets up a network consisting of multiple servers (Proprietary network (Cabling) and Ethernet network (Cabling)) connected to a central Computing node. The CSP then uses the system, and the CSC utilizes the network. The network is also connected to a Proprietary network (backplane) and an Ethernet network (backplane).
The diagram illustrates the interconnect network setup for high-performance computing. It shows a Cloud Service User (CSC) requesting a service from a Cloud Service Operations Manager (CSP). The CSP sets up a network consisting of multiple servers (Proprietary network (Cabling) and Ethernet network (Cabling)) connected to a central Computing node. The CSP then uses the system, and the CSC utilizes the network. The network is also connected to a Proprietary network (backplane) and an Ethernet network (backplane).
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSC: Cloud service user wants to use a high performance computing application. | + +Y.3507(18)\_FII.Tab4 + +**Table II.4 – Using an interconnect network for high-performance service – use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Post-conditions (optional) | Physical machines can run a high performance computing application through a system interconnect network and cabled network. | +| Derived requirements |- – Sharing process unit component (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Interconnect network supports (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Device driver and API supports (see clause 7.2)
- – Expansion of interconnect network (see clause 7.4)
- – Network topology (see clause 7.1.5)
| In this type of deployment, physical machines are constructed for deployment in high-density racks specifically designed for the purpose. Each rack provides all the infrastructure required to support the machines, including power, network connectivity and ventilation/cooling. Individual physical machines are automatically initialised and provisioned with necessary software when plugged into an active rack. Once running, each machine is made available for the deployment of VMs or other functions requested by CSCs or CSP administrators. Fault tolerance is often provided by software across multiple machines, so an individual machine can fail without adverse effect on the overall system. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSP: The CSP wishes to deploy many physical machines in two or more locations, using minimal staffing. | |
+
+**Table II.5 – Physical machine for hyper-scale deployment – use case**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Post-conditions (optional) | A physical machine is plugged into a rack, configures itself to the local network and is automatically provisioned with all necessary software including the host operating system, network stacks and hypervisor. The data centre management system is then able to deploy workloads to the machine. In the event of failure, the machine can be removed from the rack and a replacement plugged in with minimal impact on deployed cloud services.
A data centre can be left unmanned for several days or weeks at a time. When visited, the failed machines can be quickly removed and replaced by new or refurbished machines, which configure and provision themselves automatically.
| +| Derived requirements |- – Minimum energy consumption (see clause 7.1.2)
- – No additional ports (see clause 7.5)
- – Authorized access (see clause 7.5)
- – Hot-plug support (see clause 7.6)
- – Visual indications (see clause 7.1.4)
| In this type of deployment, physical machines are constructed for deployment in locations where physical access is very tightly constrained. These will typically be inside some form of self-contained "capsule" rather than a normal building. Examples are systems deployed in underwater containers for positioning close to coastal urban centres. |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSP: The CSP wishes to deploy physical machines in locations where human access will not be possible for the majority or operational time. | |
+
+**Table II.6 – Physical machine for unmanned deployment – use case**
+
+| | |
+|----------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Post-conditions (optional) | The physical machines are left running without human access for periods of six months or more.
The data centre management system can deploy workloads to the machine. In the event of failure, the machine can be taken off line, remote diagnostics can be run and the machine either returned to service or taken permanently offline.
| +| Derived requirements |- – Minimum energy consumption (see clause 7.1.2)
- – Cooling component replacement (see clause 7.1.3)
- – Cooling component redundancy (see clause 7.1.3)
- – Interface for controlling fan speed (see clause 7.1.3)
- – Self-checking mechanism (see clause 7.1.6)
- – Remote management (see clause 7.3)
- – Diagnostic of physical machine (see clause 7.3)
This use case covers the situation where physical machines will be in network edge locations such as at 5G cell towers, telephone exchanges and cable TV head-end multiplexers. This is one use of the term "micro data centre". The primary reason for this is to minimise network latency between end users and the cloud services running at the network edge, or to concentrate network traffic at the edge to manage load on core network servers (e.g., for massive IoT telemetry applications).
| | +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager. | | +| Figure |
| In this type of deployment, physical machines are constructed for deployment at the edge of the network, usually co-located with access network transmission and/or multiplexing equipment.
Examples of such locations include:
- • Local telephone exchanges
- • Street multiplexers (e.g., FTTC)
- • Cellular towers
- • Cable TV head-ends
- • Airliner WiFi/Cellular network equipment.
The physical machine(s) run co-located with other network equipment at the edge of the network. The CSP can deploy cloud services or service components to these network edge micro data centres.
CSUs can access the cloud service within minimal network latency.
The CSP can process large amounts of data from CSUs, without imposing heavy loads on the backhaul network or the core network cloud services.
| +| Derived requirements |- – Supporting power redundancy (see clause 7.1.2)
- – Adding power supply (see clause 7.4)
- – Adding cooling component (see clause 7.4)
- – Authorized access (see clause 7.5)
- – Hot-plug support (see clause 7.6)
- – Visual indications (see clause 7.1.4)
- – Monitoring environment condition (see clause 7.1.6)
When a CSC: cloud service user requests a cloud service, a CSP: cloud service operations manager is responsible for providing computing resources, which can run the cloud service. In this case, based on the multiple processing units in the physical machine, it is possible for the CSP: cloud operations manager to configure a clustering system which can distribute the computational loads among the multiple processing resources.
Therefore, in order to utilize highly integrated computing resources efficiently, the CSP: cloud operations manager has a responsibility to configure the clustered processing units. The configuration can be changed dynamically and elastically according to the cloud service's requirements from the CSC: cloud service user. In other words, according to the required cloud service's characteristics (e.g., network usage ratio, computing capability, the proportion of memory intensive computation, an efficiency of distributed computing), the configuration of the cluster system can vary.
In case of a cloud service based on distributed processing clustering configuration is suitable because data analysis work load can be divided into several processing units. On the other hand, when a CSC: cloud service user requests a cloud service, where data communications occur intensively among processing units, minimum numbers of processing units are recommended as a clustered resources.
In addition, the networking between each processing unit for clustering can be basically based on a legacy network such as Ethernet. For a cloud service that is clustering-favourable but has high proportion of network usage among processing units, a proprietary network for clustering environment can be provided to eliminate the overhead of network communications.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager, CSC: cloud service user | + +**Table II.8 – Configurations of clustering processing units – use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Figure |Image: Diagram illustrating the configuration of clustering processing units for cloud services. It shows a CSP (Cloud service operations manager) and a CSC (Cloud service user) interacting. The CSP performs 'System set-up' and the CSC 'Use the system'. Three services are shown: Service 1 (Legacy network), Service 2, and Service 3 (Proprietary network). A Physical machine is shown with Processing units.
The diagram illustrates the configuration of clustering processing units for cloud services. It shows a CSP (Cloud service operations manager) and a CSC (Cloud service user) interacting. The CSP performs 'System set-up' and the CSC 'Use the system'. Three services are shown: Service 1 (Legacy network), Service 2, and Service 3 (Proprietary network). A Physical machine is shown with Processing units.
Y.3507(18)_FII.Tab8
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSC: cloud service user wants to use a cloud service. | +| Post-conditions (optional) | Physical machines can run a cloud service efficiently and elastically according to the desired performance. | +| Derived requirements |- – Configuration of multiple processing units (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Multiple CPUs (see clause 7.1.1.1)
- – Adding processing units (see clause 7.4)
- – Adding sub-components of processing units (see clause 7.4)
- – Network topology (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Interconnect network supports (see clause 7.1.5)
- – Device driver and API supports (see clause 7.2)
This use case covers the situation where components of physical machine be replaced. After deployment and operation, a component of physical machine may need to be replaced with another new one due to component failure. In addition, a component could be replaced with component of other model to upgrade the performance.
Typically, physical machine should support replacement of the main components, including CPU, memory, storage, power supply and cooling component.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager | +| Figure |
To support replacement, the components are not coupled to the physical machine so that the components can be installed or uninstalled dynamically. Typically, the components are designed to follow certain specifications to ensure compatible interface and shape.
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSP wishes to replace some components of physical machines to fix components failure or upgrade components. | +| Post-conditions (optional) | Physical machine can runs normally with the new components. | +| Derived requirements |- – CPU replacement (see clause 7.1.1.1)
- – Memory replacement (see clause 7.1.1.2)
- – Storage replacement (see clause 7.1.1.3)
- – Processing unit replacement (see clause 7.4)
- – Equipment for mounting and removal (see clause 7.1.4)
- – Power supply replacement (see clause 7.1.2)
- – Cooling component replacement (see clause 7.1.3)
This use case covers the situation where physical machine will be deployed with high reliability. To achieve high reliability, physical machine needs to be deployed with redundant main components, such as CPU, power supply and cooling component. In addition, physical machine needs to support technology to reduce data errors and data loss at work, such as memory error correction and RAID.
Trough RAID technology, data of physical machine is distributed across multiple drives in different ways, referred to as RAID levels, depending on the required level of redundancy and performance. Take RAID1 as an example, as shown in below figure, RAID 1 consists of an exact copy (or mirror) of a set of data on two or more disks. The data of physical machine will not loss so long as at least one member drive is operational.
| +| Roles/sub-roles | CSP: cloud service operations manager | +| Figure |
Y.3507(18)_FII.Tab10
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSP wishes to deploy physical machines with high reliability. | +| Post-conditions (optional) | Physical machines can still work when some components fail. The physical machine can reduce data errors and losses due to memory and storage failures. | +| Derived requirements |- – Multiple CPUs (see clause 7.1.1.1)
- – Memory reliability (see clause 7.1.1.2)
- – Storage redundancy hardware (see clause 7.1.1.3)
- – Supporting power redundancy (see clause 7.1.2)
- – Cooling component redundancy(see clause 7.1.3)
Image: Diagram of Model 0: A dashed box labeled 'CSC' contains an 'End device' circle. A dashed box labeled 'CSP' contains a 'Core cloud' circle. A solid line connects the 'End device' and 'Core cloud'.
Model 0 is a shape of cloud computing.
| + +**Table 6-1 – Distributed cloud configuration model** + +| Model | Description | +|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Model 1
(Regional – Core)
Model 1 is a shape of a distributed cloud in which the core cloud and the regional cloud are configured together. Cloud services are provided from one or more clouds among the regional cloud and the core cloud.
The regional cloud is hosted for a cloud service from the core cloud to a particular region to support localization of cloud services. The regional cloud assists the core cloud by mitigating traffic of cloud service.
| +|Model 2
(Edge – Core)
Model 2 is a shape of a distributed cloud in which the edge cloud and the core cloud are configured together. A cloud service is functionally reconfigured and is executed on both edge and core clouds by interworking.
The edge cloud is configured for real-time service delivery. The edge cloud assists end devices by offloading cloud services or caching the data of cloud services.
| +|Model 3
(Edge – Regional – Core)
Model 3 is a shape of a distributed cloud in which edge, regional and core clouds are configured together. A cloud service is reconfigured and deployed to edge, regional and core clouds and is executed by interworking.
This model is a combination of model 1 and model 2. This model provides cloud services efficiently by mitigating the traffic of the cloud service, caching data of the cloud service and by offloading cloud services for the CSC's end devices.
| + +### 6.4 Deployment considerations of distributed cloud + +This clause provides consideration aspects for the deployment of cloud services on a distributed cloud. These consideration aspects include: + +- infrastructure considerations of distributed cloud; +- network considerations of distributed cloud; +- service considerations of distributed cloud; +- management considerations of distributed cloud; and +- security considerations of distributed cloud. + +#### 6.4.1 Infrastructure considerations of distributed cloud + +Infrastructure in a distributed cloud is heterogeneous and geographically distributed. Thus, consideration aspects are as follows: + +- variety of physical resources, which have different hardware structure and instruction, for pooling the resources and deploying cloud services execution efficiently; +- energy efficient resources and power consumption control for edge cloud with small resource capacity; and +- infrastructure automatic provision, configuration and updating, as well as monitoring functionalities for providing a single system view to CSCs. + +#### **6.4.2 Network considerations of distributed cloud** + +The network in a distributed cloud supports connecting distributed cloud resources in broad areas among core, regional and edge clouds and is aware of cloud service. Thus, network considerations are as follows: + +- broad network connectivity of distributed cloud resources among edge, regional and core clouds for managing resources and providing cloud service efficiently; and +- deployment of virtual network functions to edge cloud for controlling network on-demand and being aware context of cloud service. + +#### **6.4.3 Service considerations of distributed cloud** + +Services in a distributed cloud have various types based on the resource capacity of core, regional and edge clouds and on the CSC's demands. Thus, service considerations are as follows: + +- the scale of a cloud service for deploying cloud services in different-scale edge, regional and core clouds; and +- automatic cloud service delivery for supporting the mobility of CSC's rapidly. + +#### **6.4.4 Management considerations of distributed cloud** + +Management in a distributed cloud has a global view and a local view of operations, and administration for distributed cloud resources and services. Thus, management considerations are as follows: + +- global management of both distributed cloud resources and cloud services for interworking among core, regional and edge clouds; and +- provisioning, operation and administration of distributed cloud resources and cloud services. + +#### **6.4.5 Security considerations of distributed cloud** + +Security in a distributed cloud has adaptive security control for core, regional and edge clouds. Thus, security considerations are as follows: + +- identification and authentication of CSCs using multiple distributed cloud infrastructures at any distributed cloud; +- different scales of security functions, such as availability and data integrity, based on the resource capacity of core, regional and edge clouds; and +- different security suites for confidentiality, policy and key management appropriate to heterogeneous distributed cloud resources. + +# **7 High-level requirements for distributed cloud** + +### **7.1 Infrastructure requirements for distributed cloud** + +- **high scalability:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide distributed cloud resources with scale-out to edge, regional and core clouds to satisfy a large number of demands for cloud services; + +- **high reliability:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide redundant deployment of cloud services among edge, regional and core clouds against catastrophic events; +- **low power consumption:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide energy-efficient distributed cloud resources for low power consumption at an edge cloud in order to save power of the edge cloud; +- **adaptive resource composition:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide adaptive resource composition of the distributed cloud among edge, regional and core clouds; +NOTE 1 – Adaptive resource composition refers to preparation of distributed cloud resources appropriately to support changes of a CSC's condition, such as environmental changes by the CSC's mobility. +- **automatic infrastructure provision:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide automatic setup of infrastructure, including hardware initiation, network configuration and software installation; +- **heterogeneous devices access:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide heterogeneous access mechanisms for end devices to enrich cloud services. +NOTE 2 – Examples of heterogeneous access mechanisms are Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, wireless sensor network (WSN) and radio access network (RAN). + +### 7.2 Network requirements for distributed cloud + +- **low latency:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide network resources to support low latency for cloud services in edge clouds; +NOTE 1 – Examples of network resources are access point, switch, router and gateway. +- **on-demand network traffic control:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide on-demand network traffic control to mitigate congested network links among core, regional and edge clouds by reallocating routing paths and allocating bandwidth; +NOTE 2 – The network bandwidth utilization inside a distributed cloud is substantially reduced with on-demand network traffic control. +- **service routing:** It is required that a distributed cloud support service routing for provisioning cloud service flowing to CSCs; +NOTE 3 – Service routing is a unified service supporting platforms built on the distributed service networking (DSN). It supplies the service registration, publication, discovery, triggering and access mechanisms, and enhanced capabilities to optimize the service. [b-ITU-T Y.2085] +- **context awareness:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide discovery of context information for deploying and delivering cloud service requests to the best location among core, regional and edge clouds; +NOTE 4 – Discovery of context information is enabled by network functions. +- **high-speed network connectivity:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide high-speed network connectivity to satisfy significantly higher data rates and data transportation among core, regional and edge clouds; +- **reliable network connectivity:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide reliable network connectivity for seamless network links with low error rates and fast connection recovery from failures among core, regional and edge clouds; +- **network virtualization:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud support network virtualization for dynamic network deployment; +NOTE 5 – Network virtualization is a technology that enables the creation of logically isolated network partitions over shared physical networks so that heterogeneous collections of multiple virtual networks can simultaneously coexist over the shared networks. This includes the aggregation of multiple resources in a provider and appearing as a single resource. [b-ITU-T Y.3011] + +- **network services delivery:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide network services delivery wherever CSC's use cloud services. + +NOTE 6 – Network service delivery includes virtualized network functions of switching, tunnelling, traffic analysis, and security such as load balancer, firewall and intrusion detection. + +### 7.3 Service requirements for distributed cloud + +- **service mobility:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide service mobility for supporting service level agreements (SLAs); + +NOTE 1 – For service mobility, the CSCs' location detection and delivery of corresponding cloud services to the suitable distributed cloud resource automatically are needed for fast response time. + +- **lightweight service:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide lightweight cloud services for low power consumption resources at edge clouds; + +- **context information update:** It is required a distributed cloud support the updating of the associated context information periodically or aperiodically; + +NOTE 2 – See clause 6.2 for context information. + +- **caching of cloud service image:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide caching of cloud service images; + +NOTE 3 – Frequently used cloud service images need to be cached in a regional cloud to deploy cloud service quickly to an edge cloud. + +- **service migration:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide service migration from one distributed cloud resource to another one; + +NOTE 4 – Service migration refers to running cloud services reallocated to another distributed cloud resource by taking a snapshot. + +- **agile service:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide rapid development and delivery of cloud services to distributed cloud resources to support various CSC's requests; + +- **automatic service displacement:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide cloud service displacement to deploy, maintain and upgrade automatically based on SLAs; + +- **autonomous cloud service provisioning:** It is required a distributed cloud provide autonomous cloud service provisioning to initially launch the cloud service by using context information for fast provisioning of distributed cloud resources; + +NOTE 5 – Autonomous cloud service provisioning refers to deploying and providing cloud services on edge clouds without intervention of global management in the core cloud by using context information in edge or regional clouds. + +- **massive data handling on edge cloud:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide massive data handling on edge clouds to reduce the interaction between core/regional clouds and edge clouds. + +NOTE 6 – Data handling on edge clouds includes filtering and delivery process to prevent noise from multiple end devices, and batched data delivery to core or regional clouds, respectively. + +### 7.4 Management requirements for distributed cloud + +- **global management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide global management of distributed cloud resources collected from core, regional and edge clouds; + +NOTE 1 – Core cloud aggregates information of distributed cloud resources, has global knowledge and provides cloud services appropriately to meet CSC's requirements. + +- **real-time service management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide management for real-time cloud services by finding feasible distributed cloud resources, predicting cloud service latency and scheduling cloud services; + +- **heterogeneous resource management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide management of heterogeneous distributed cloud resources to accommodate and utilize distributed cloud resources easily and efficiently; +NOTE 2 – Examples of heterogeneous distributed cloud resources includes different capacity servers, different types (block, object, file) of storages and different speeds of network devices. +- **end-device connectivity management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide management of network connectivity to end devices supporting various access protocols to control network latency and bandwidth; +- **context information management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide management of context information to support service routing and context awareness of the distributed cloud; +- **synchronization management:** It is required that a distributed cloud provide synchronization management for the status of cloud services and distributed cloud resources to perform global management accurately. + +### 7.5 Security requirements for distributed cloud + +- **resource isolation and protection:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide isolation and protection of distributed cloud resources and cloud services for tenants to guarantee security; +- **adaptive security function control:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide adaptive security functions to meet a CSC's requirements with different resource capacity among core, regional and edge clouds; +NOTE 1 – Examples of security function include encryption, decryption, key management, authentication and policy management. +- **adaptive security suites control:** It is recommended that a distributed cloud provide adaptive security suites to apply the suites on different resource capacities among core, regional and edge clouds. +NOTE 2 – Examples of security suites in case of encryption include data encryption standard (DES), advanced encryption standard (AES), international data encryption algorithm (IDEA) and Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA). + +# 8 Security considerations related to ITU-T Recommendations + +It is recommended that the security framework for cloud computing described in [b-ITU-T X.1601] be considered for the distributed cloud. [b-ITU-T X.1601] analyses security threats and challenges in the cloud computing environment and describes security capabilities that could mitigate these threats and meet security challenges. + +It is recommended that the guidelines for the operational security of cloud computing described in [b-ITU-T X.1642] be considered for the distributed cloud. [b-ITU-T X.1642] clarifies the security responsibilities between CSPs and CSCs, and analyses the requirements and categories of security metrics of operational security for cloud computing. + +It is recommended that the security framework for the IoT based on the gateway model described in [b-ITU-T X.1361] be considered for edge clouds in the distributed cloud. In particular, [b-ITU-T X.1361] analyses security threats to the IoT gateway and to the network and describes security capabilities for gateways and the network that address and mitigate these security threats and challenges. + +# Appendix I + +## General use cases for distributed cloud + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This appendix identifies use cases of distributed cloud. The table below shows the template used for the description of the use cases. + +### I.1 Use case template + +**Table I.1 – Template for the description of a use case** + +| Use case | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Name | Title of use case. | +| Abstract | Overview and features of use case. | +| Figure | Figure to present the use case.(A unified modeling language (UML)-like diagram is suggested for clarifying relations between roles). | +| Pre-conditions (optional) | Pre-conditions represent the necessary conditions or use cases that should be achieved before starting the described use case. (Note) | +| Post-conditions (optional) | As the same for pre-condition, the post-condition describes conditions or use cases that will be carried out after the termination of a currently described use case. | +| Requirements | The title of requirements derived from the use case. For example:
– Large-scale migration. | +| NOTE – As dependency may exist among different use cases, pre-conditions and post-conditions are introduced to help understand the relationships among use cases. | | + +### I.2 General use case + +**Table I.2 – General use case of distributed cloud** + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Name | General use case of distributed cloud. | +| Description |
The use case describes the scenarios for the CSC to use a published cloud service.
The cloud service has already been published by a CSP and can be browsed through the product catalogue provided by the CSP.
The CSC subscribes the cloud service with various requirements, for example, different requirements for service capacity and network latency.
The distributed cloud realizes service provisioning to provide cloud service on appropriate core, regional, or edge cloud, according to the CSC's subscription.
| +| Figure |Image: Diagram of the General use case of distributed cloud. A CSC (Cloud Service Consumer) is shown at the top, connected via a red double-headed arrow to a 'Distributed cloud' block. The 'Distributed cloud' block is a green rectangle containing a grey box with five colored squares (yellow, red, cyan, magenta, green). Below this, a network of cloud types is shown: a central 'Core cloud' (blue cloud with four colored squares) connected to two 'Regional cloud' (blue clouds with two colored squares) and four 'Edge cloud' (blue clouds with two colored squares). Dashed lines connect the 'Distributed cloud' block to each of the 'Core cloud', 'Regional cloud', and 'Edge cloud' instances. A legend at the bottom right shows the colored squares and the text 'Various cloud services'. The reference 'Y.3508(19)_FI-Tab2' is at the bottom right.
Y.3508(19)_FI-Tab2
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) |- – The used service should be kept available during the whole invocation.
- – The SLA should be met for CSC.
- – High scalability (See clause 7.1)
- – High reliability (See clause 7.1)
- – Low power consumption (See clause 7.1)
- – Low latency (See clause 7.2)
- – On-demand network traffic control (See clause 7.2)
This use case describes the autonomous feature for provisioning a cloud service on distributed cloud.
The distributed cloud supports dynamic service provisioning by utilizing core cloud (CC), regional cloud (RC) and edge cloud (EC). EC mainly supports low latency to provide a cloud service. For EC, it is sometimes hard to provide the cloud service due to various reasons (e.g., limited capacity of EC, initially requested service, energy saving). In the case where EC is not ready to provide the corresponding cloud service, EC is required to make a decision to provide the service to the CSC as rapidly as possible. For fast decisions required by time sensitive services in EC, a request to a centralized point (e.g., core cloud and regional cloud) is not appropriate due to network traversal time; the request should be handled in the EC itself. To support autonomous cloud service provisioning on EC, associated context information is required. Associated context information is necessary to be updated on EC periodically and aperiodically. To avoid synchronization burden, associated context information is summarized and updated (e.g., calculating average, grouping value, choosing representative value). To avoid frequent transfer data to the core/regional cloud by edge cloud, the edge cloud filters and deliver to prevent noise from multiple end devices and deliver batched data to core or regional cloud.
In conclusion, autonomous provisioning is a main feature that differentiates conventional cloud and distributed cloud. Through the feature, CC, RC and EC on distributed cloud are loosely coupled. The feature also supports fast cloud service provisioning on the distributed cloud. Autonomous provisioning is done by associated context information updated periodically and aperiodically.
NOTE – Examples of decision: 1) Deploying the cloud service and provide the cloud service on the EC, 2) Delivering the request to neighbour EC, 3) Delivering the request to the CC, etc.
| + +**Table II.1 – Autonomous cloud service provisioning on distributed cloud** + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Figure |Image: Diagram of autonomous cloud service provisioning on distributed cloud. The diagram shows a flow starting with 'Update context (periodically or aperiodically)' leading to 'Context information'. This leads to 'Analyze context', then a decision diamond 'Make a decision'. From the decision, three options emerge: 'Option 1. deploy and provide service', 'Option 2. deliver to neighbor EC', and 'Option 3. deliver to CC'. These options lead to a network diagram showing 'Core cloud (CC)', 'Regional cloud (RC)', 'Edge cloud (EC)', and 'End device (ED (CSC))'. Arrows indicate service delivery paths: Option 1 from CC to CC, Option 2 from EC to EC, and Option 3 from EC to CC. A dashed box labeled 'No cloud service' is shown near the ED (CSC). A legend at the bottom left defines the abbreviations: CC: Core cloud, RC: Regional cloud, EC: Edge cloud, ED: End device. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab1'.
CC: Core cloud
RC: Regional cloud
EC: Edge cloud
ED: End device
- – Adaptive resource composition (See clause 7.1)
- – Context information update (See clause 7.3)
- – Autonomous cloud service provisioning (See clause 7.3)
- – Massive data handling on edge cloud (See clause 7.3)
- – Context information management (See clause 7.4)
This use case describes customer-oriented service deployment on distributed cloud. A main benefit of distributed cloud is provisioning of a cloud service in close proximity to CSC. For the provisioning, methods to support customer-oriented cloud service provisioning on distributed cloud are needed and is called service routing. The service routing includes packet routing, service awareness, etc. By service awareness on distributed cloud, a cloud service is deployed on a cloud in close proximity to the CSC or the request of a cloud service is delivered to another cloud. Accordingly, the service routing on distributed cloud enables:
- – scaling or migrating a cloud service for supporting mobility as shown in figure <An example of scaling or migrating a cloud service for supporting mobility>;
- – deploying and providing a cloud service for low response time as shown in figure <An example of deploying and providing a cloud service for low response time>; and
- – delivering request of a cloud service to neighbour edge cloud as shown in figure <An example of delivering a cloud service to neighbour edge cloud>.
Finally, customer-oriented service provisioning (i.e., service routing) method is highly required on distributed cloud in order to improve cloud service QoS (e.g., response time, network bandwidth, mobility).
NOTE – Provisioning of a cloud service in close proximity to cloud service customer depends on condition of CSC (e.g., location, QoS level) and condition of surrounding CSC (e.g., availability of edge cloud, capacity of edge cloud, network congestion).
| + +**Table II.2 – Customer-oriented cloud service provisioning on distributed cloud** + + + +| Figure | Use case | +|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |Diagram 1: An example of scaling or migrating a cloud service for supporting mobility
This diagram shows a hierarchical cloud architecture across three layers. The top layer (Core cloud) contains a 'CC' node and a 'Cloud service' box. The middle layer (Regional cloud) contains an 'RC' node. The bottom layer (Edge cloud) contains two 'EC' nodes, each with a 'Cloud service' box, and an 'ED' (End device) node. Arrows indicate the flow: 'Use cloud service' from 'ED' to 'EC', and 'Move' between 'ED' nodes. A horizontal arrow connects the 'Cloud service' boxes of the two 'EC' nodes, representing migration or scaling. Ellipses (...) indicate additional components in each layer.
CC: Core cloud
RC: Regional cloud
EC: Edge cloud
ED: End device
Diagram 2: An example of deploying or providing a cloud service for low response time
This diagram shows a hierarchical cloud architecture across three layers. The top layer (Core cloud) contains a 'CC' node and a 'Cloud service' box. The middle layer (Regional cloud) contains an 'RC' node. The bottom layer (Edge cloud) contains an 'EC' node and an 'ED' (End device) node. An arrow labeled 'Use cloud service' points from 'ED' to 'EC'. A dashed box labeled 'No cloud service' is shown next to the 'EC' node, indicating that the service is not currently deployed at the edge. An arrow labeled 'Deploy and provide service' points from the 'Cloud service' box in the Core cloud layer down to the 'EC' node. Ellipses (...) indicate additional components in each layer.
CC: Core cloud
RC: Regional cloud
EC: Edge cloud
ED: End device
Diagram 3: An example of delivering a cloud service to neighbour edge cloud
This diagram shows a hierarchical cloud architecture across three layers. The top layer (Core cloud) contains a 'CC' node and a 'Cloud service' box. The middle layer (Regional cloud) contains two 'RC' nodes. The bottom layer (Edge cloud) contains three 'EC' nodes, each with a 'Cloud service' box, and an 'ED' (End device) node. An arrow labeled 'Use cloud service' points from 'ED' to the leftmost 'EC' node. A dashed box labeled 'No cloud service' is shown next to this 'EC' node. An arrow labeled 'Deliver to neighbor EC' points from the 'Cloud service' box of the leftmost 'EC' node to the 'Cloud service' box of the middle 'EC' node. A box labeled 'Aware the service' is connected to the leftmost 'EC' node. Ellipses (...) indicate additional components in each layer.
CC: Core cloud
RC: Regional cloud
EC: Edge cloud
ED: End device
Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab2
*An example of delivering a cloud service to neighbour edge cloud
| + +Three diagrams illustrating cloud service provisioning use cases: mobility, low response time, and service delivery to neighbor edge cloud. + +**Table II.2 – Customer-oriented cloud service provisioning on distributed cloud** + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) | | +| Requirements |- – Adaptive resource composition (See clause 7.1)
- – Service routing (See clause 7.2)
- – Network services delivery (See clause 7.2)
- – Context awareness (See clause 7.2)
- – Context information management (See clause 7.4)
This use case describes the distributed cloud infrastructure and service management. Distributed cloud infrastructure includes processing, storage, networking and other hardware resources as well as software assets. Distributed cloud infrastructure management is the management of hardware resources and software assets of distributed cloud.
Distributed cloud includes core, regional and edge clouds, which are different in size, hardware types and software. For example, a distributed cloud resource may use a graphics processing unit (GPU) or field-programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware for AR/VR scenarios and microprocessor-based server instead of x86 server for some specified application. These resources are distributed across various environments. Thus, resources need to be isolated and protected in secure manner.
Distributed cloud provides flexible and agility network connectivity for core, regional and edge clouds. The network connection can be changed on demand or based on policy, such as active-standby policy.
The ultimate objective of distributed cloud is to provide distributed cloud services for the customers. The distributed cloud encapsulates the capabilities of distributed cloud infrastructure into various cloud services for the end customers.
Distributed cloud is a hierarchical system, in which each core cloud, regional cloud and edge cloud could manage its local infrastructure and service, and the infrastructure and service of the whole distributed cloud could be unified managed and coordinated by the distributed cloud management.
| + +**Table II.3 – Distributed cloud infrastructure and service management** + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Figure |Image: Diagram of distributed cloud infrastructure and service management. It shows a hierarchical structure with a Global level (Global management and Distributed cloud) and a Local level (Core cloud, Regional cloud, and Edge cloud). A red dashed arrow indicates 'Application migration' between two edge clouds. A legend identifies the components: Management of local infrastructure and service (green), Global management (light green), and Various cloud services (yellow, red, purple, orange).
The diagram illustrates a distributed cloud architecture. At the top is the 'Global level' containing 'Global management' (light green bar) and 'Distributed cloud' (blue bar with colored squares). Below is the 'Local level' featuring a 'Core cloud' (blue cloud with colored squares) connected to two 'Regional cloud' (blue clouds with colored squares). Each regional cloud is connected to two 'Edge cloud' (blue clouds with colored squares). A red dashed arrow labeled 'Application migration' points from one edge cloud to another. A legend in the bottom right identifies the components: green for 'Management of local infrastructure and service', light green for 'Global management', and yellow, red, purple, and orange for 'Various cloud services'. The text 'Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab3' is in the bottom right corner.
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) | | +| Requirements |- – Heterogeneous device access (See clause 7.1)
- – Global management (See clause 7.4)
- – Heterogeneous resource management (See clause 7.4)
- – End device connectivity management (See clause 7.4)
- – Resource isolation and protection (See clause 7.5)
This use case describes the distributed cloud infrastructure and service provisioning. Distributed cloud can provision infrastructure and deliver service among core, regional and edge cloud.
The distributed cloud infrastructure contains various hardware and software, including servers, storage, network devices and software. The edge cloud especially is resource-constrained due to space and power. The infrastructure provision process includes hardware initiation, network configuration and software installation. After provisioning, the services including security functions and suites can be provided based on the infrastructure. Also, if a cloud service needs to use an edge cloud resource, it is reconfigured or developed to run on the edge cloud with small capacity and heterogeneous resources.
The distributed cloud infrastructure can be maintained and upgraded by distributed cloud management. The provisioning is a policy-based process so it can be done automatically on distributed cloud resources.
Once the distributed cloud infrastructure has been provisioned, the cloud service should be deployed and delivered rapidly to the suitable distributed cloud resource by high-speed and reliable network connectivity based on service's SLA, such as required resources, maximum latency, required or useful services, etc. The deployed service can be maintained and upgraded based on global management. For accurate global management, status information of cloud service and distributed cloud resource are synchronized from edge/regional cloud to core cloud.
| + +**Table II.4 – Distributed cloud infrastructure and service provisioning** + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Figure |Image: Diagram of distributed cloud infrastructure and service provisioning. It shows a hierarchical structure with Global management at the top, divided into Infrastructure provisioning and Service delivery. Below this are Regional clouds, each containing Edge clouds and a Core cloud. Red dashed arrows indicate the flow of infrastructure provisioning from the Core cloud to Edge clouds, and service delivery from the Core cloud to Edge clouds. A legend indicates that the colored blocks represent various cloud services.
The diagram illustrates a distributed cloud architecture. At the top, a 'Global management' block is split into 'Infrastructure provisioning' and 'Service delivery'. Below this, a 'Core cloud' is connected to multiple 'Regional clouds'. Each 'Regional cloud' contains several 'Edge clouds'. Red dashed arrows show 'Infrastructure provisioning' flowing from the Core cloud to the Edge clouds, and 'Service delivery' flowing from the Core cloud to the Edge clouds. A legend indicates that the colored blocks represent 'Various cloud services'. The text 'Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab4' is visible in the bottom right corner of the diagram area.
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) | | +| Requirements |- – Automatic infrastructure provision (See clause 7.1)
- – High speed network connectivity (See clause 7.2)
- – Reliable network connectivity (See clause 7.2)
- – Network virtualization (See clause 7.2)
- – Network services delivery (See clause 7.2)
- – Agile service (See clause 7.3)
- – Lightweight service (See clause 7.3)
- – Automatic service displacement (See clause 7.3)
- – Synchronization management (See clause 7.4)
- – Adaptive security function control (See clause 7.5)
- – Adaptive security suites control (See clause 7.5)
This use case shows an example of hierarchical caching of cloud service images. The core cloud mainly manages cloud service images; the size of a cloud service image varies from tens of megabytes to hundreds of gigabytes. A cloud service image is needed to run a cloud service. For example, when a cloud service is run on the edge cloud, the image is copied from the core cloud by request. Thus, depending on the number of requests, the core cloud can be overloaded. In addition, copying a cloud service image from the core cloud to the edge cloud is inefficient.
Also, the edge cloud has relatively lower storage capacity than the core cloud or the regional cloud. It is inefficient for the edge cloud to maintain all cloud service images.
| + +**Table II.5 – Hierarchical caching of cloud service images** + +| Use case | | +|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| |Therefore, hierarchical caching is needed. Cloud service images are cached on the regional cloud according to the initial request or frequency. It is helpful to reduce the load on the core cloud because multiple regional clouds handle the requests respectively. It also mitigates the capacity issue on the edge cloud, and it provides fast service deployment to support real-time performance by reducing latency than from the core cloud.
| +|Figure
|Image: Diagram illustrating hierarchical caching of cloud service images. At the top is the 'Storage for cloud service images' (Core Cloud, CC) containing images for Service A (10G), Service B (300M), Service C (100M), and Service D (1G). Below it are two 'Cache for cloud service images' (Regional Clouds, RC). The left RC contains Service A (10G) and Service B (300M). The right RC contains Service A (10G) and Service C (100M). At the bottom are three 'Edge Clouds' (EC). The left EC is linked to the left RC and provides 'Cloud service A (temporal use)'. The middle EC is linked to both RCs and provides 'Cloud service B'. The right EC is linked to the right RC and provides 'Cloud service A (long-term use)' and 'Cloud service C'. Arrows show the flow of images from CC to RCs and from RCs to ECs. A legend defines CC as Core cloud, RC as Regional cloud, and EC as Edge cloud. A small cloud icon represents 'An image of cloud service'. Three benefits are listed: Benefit 1: Load reduction on the core cloud; Benefit 2: Mitigation of low capacity issue on the edge cloud; Benefit 3: Fast service deployment on the edge cloud. The reference Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab5 is at the bottom right.
Storage for cloud service images
10G Service A, 300M Service B, 100M Service C, 1G Service D, ...
Cache for cloud service images
10G Service A, 300M Service B, ...
10G Service A, 100M Service C, ...
Deploying a cloud service
Cloud service A (temporal use), Cloud service B, Cloud service A (long-term use), Cloud service C
Benefit 1: Load reduction on the core cloud
Benefit 2: Mitigation of low capacity issue on the edge cloud
Benefit 3: Fast service deployment on the edge cloud
Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab5
| +|Pre-conditions (optional)
| | +|Post-conditions (optional)
| | +|Requirements
|- – High speed network connectivity (See clause 7.2)
- – Caching of cloud service image (See clause 7.3)
- – Real-time service management (See clause 7.4)
This use case illustrates an example of high mobility support on distributed cloud.
A typical mobility support environment follows a method of modifying the packet routing path while the location of the service is fixed. On the distributed cloud, the location of the service is different from the conventional cloud and is located near the user. Accordingly, the distributed cloud needs high mobility.
As an example, the below figure shows two ways of mobility while an end device moves with different type of access. One way is that the regional cloud routes the packet to the previous edge cloud as shown in step 3 in the figure below. (It is also possible to route the cloud service to the current edge cloud.) Another way is that the core cloud routes the cloud service to the edge cloud near the end device by scaling or migrating the cloud service with high-speed and reliable network connectivity as shown in step 5 and 6. The cloud service is from the previous edge cloud or the core cloud. Therefore, to efficiently support high mobility on the distributed cloud, both ways are selected based on service level agreement (SLA) for the cloud service. SLA includes latency, quality of service, etc.
| +| Figure |Image: Diagram illustrating high mobility support on distributed cloud. The diagram shows three layers: Core Cloud (CC), Regional Cloud (RC), and Edge Cloud (EC). End Devices (ED) move between ECs. Step 1: ED uses cloud service from EC. Step 2: ED moves to a new EC. Step 3: ED uses cloud service from the new EC. Step 4: ED moves to a third EC. Step 5: CC scales/migrates the cloud service to the new EC. Step 6: ED uses cloud service from the new EC. A legend defines CC as Core cloud, RC as Regional cloud, EC as Edge cloud, and ED as End device. The diagram is labeled Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab6.
CC: Core cloud
RC: Regional cloud
EC: Edge cloud
ED: End device
Y.3508(19)_FII-Tab6
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) | | +| Requirements |- – Heterogeneous device access (See clause 7.1)
- – High speed network connectivity (See clause 7.2)
- – Reliable network connectivity (See clause 7.2)
- – Context awareness (See clause 7.2)
- – Service mobility (See clause 7.3)
- – Service migration (See clause 7.3)
- – Context information management (See clause 7.4)
CSP1 and CSP 2 established an inter-cloud relationship. Each of them has their own E2E cloud service lifecycle management system inside.
CSP1 defines a software enabled service and provides the corresponding service management interface (SMI).
CSN makes use of the SMI capabilities provided by CSP1 and develops a new implementation of cloud service a1.
CSN registers the developed cloud service a1.
The status, availability, performance and/or delay time of a service a1 can be collected through SMI.
The CSP1 provides his cloud service a1 to CSP2.
CSC requests a composite service c1 to CSP2. This composite service includes the a1 service offered by CSP1 which provides a service and management to CSC.
The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 provisions and operates service a1 through its SMI.
The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 collects (according to local laws and regulations) service health condition, performance, security, geo-location and events results of the service a1 through its SMI.
The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 reports (according to local laws and regulations) service health condition, performance, security, geo-location of the service a1 events results internally to CSP1.
The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 can report the service health condition of service a1 externally to CSP2 through SMI between CSPs .
| +| Roles | CSP, CSC, CSN | + + + +| | | +|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|Figure
(optional)
The diagram illustrates the E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 and CSP2. It shows the following components and steps:
- CSP1: E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1. It contains an SMI (Service Management Interface) and Service a1.
- CSP2: E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP2.
- CSN: Cloud Service Network.
- CSC: Cloud Service Catalog.
The steps are as follows:
- 1. Define software enabled service a1 and corresponding SMI.
- 2. Implement and register cloud service a1.
- 3. Request a composite service c1.
- 4. Provision and operate cloud service a1 through corresponding service management interface.
- 5. Collect service health condition, performance, security, geo-location of cloud service a1 through corresponding service management interface.
- 6. Report internally service health condition, performance, security, geo-location of cloud service a1 through corresponding service management interface.
- 7. Report externally health condition of cloud service a1 through service management interface between CSPs.
The interactions are as follows:
- CSN is connected to steps 1 and 2.
- CSC is connected to step 3.
- CSP1 is connected to steps 4, 5, and 6.
- CSP2 is connected to step 7.
- SMI between CSPs connects CSP1 and CSP2.
Y.3522(16)_F1.1
| +|Pre-conditions
(optional)
Post-conditions
(optional)
- – The status, availability, performance and/or delay time of cloud service can be collected through SMI.
- – The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 reports internally service health condition, performance, security, geo-location of cloud service a1 through corresponding SMI.
- – The E2E cloud service lifecycle management system of CSP1 reports externally service health condition of cloud service a1 to CSP2 through SMI between CSPs.
Derived requirements
|- – Service management interface (refer to clause 7.1)
- – Service Management Interface between CSPs (refer to clause 7.1)
- – Reporting (refer to clause 7.4)
CSP1 builds a composite service c1 as composite apps or mash-ups from service1 and service2
Image: Diagram illustrating the composite applications or mash-ups use case. It shows two cloud environments. The left cloud, labeled 'CSP1', contains 'Service1' and 'Service c1'. The right cloud, labeled 'CSP2 (peer cloud service provider)', contains 'Service2 (peer cloud service)'. Arrows indicate that 'Service c1' is composed of 'Service1' and 'Service2'. A text box above the diagram states: 'CSP1 builds a composite service c1 as composite apps or mash-ups from service1 and service2'.
Y.3522(16)_FI.2
| + +| | | +|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Pre-conditions (optional) |- – Service1 delivered by CSP1.
- – Service2 delivered by CSP2.
- – A composite service c1 is built from service1 and service2.
- – Composite applications or mash-ups (refer to clause 7.5)
CSP1 can provide functions to supports the application of traditional business processes associated with administration, provisioning/configuration, service assurance and charging/billing/settlement for service c1
Image: Diagram showing CSP1 and CSP2 (peer cloud service provider) interacting. CSP1 contains Service1 and Service c1. CSP2 contains Service2 (peer cloud service). Arrows indicate data flow from Service1 and Service2 to Service c1.
Y.3522(16)_FI.3
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) |- – CSP1 builds a composite service c1 from service1 delivered by CSP1 and service2 delivered by CSP2.
- – CSP1 can provide functions to support the application of traditional business processes associated with administration, provisioning/configuration, service assurance and charging /billing/settlement for service c1.
- – Traditional business processes (refer to clause 7.6)
- – An original service request passes its expiration date or a user decommission request initiated while the service is running.
- – The service resources have been decommissioned automatically.
- – Decommissioning (refer to clause 7.7)
Y.3522(16)_FI.4
| +| Pre-conditions (optional) | CSC can set policies on the service. | +| Post-conditions (optional) | The policies of the service have been set successfully. | +| Derived requirements | – Policy (refer to clause 7.8) | + +### I.8 Lifecycle stage management use case + +| | | +|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Title | Lifecycle stage management use case | +| Description | A CSP provides some kind of cloud services to the market. For a better management for its services, the CSP is required to provide the ability to run the given service through its lifecycle stages and offers the needed functionality at every step of the process. | +| Roles | CSP | +| Figure (optional) | / | +| Pre-conditions (optional) | / | +| Post-conditions (optional) | / | +| Derived requirements | – Lifecycle stage management (refer to clause 7.9) | + +### **I.9 Service automation and continuous delivery use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Title | Service automation and continuous delivery use case | +| Description | A CSP provides cloud services to the market. Because of the continuous changing of the market and CSC's requirements, the design of the cloud service should be an iterative process. By monitoring the service during its operation, the demand variations should be responded to automatically and the necessary feedback to effect changes should be offered to the service designer. | +| Roles | CSP, CSC | +| Figure (optional) | / | +| Pre-conditions (optional) | / | +| Post-conditions (optional) | / | +| Derived requirements | – Service automation and continuous delivery (refer to clause 7.10) | + +### **I.10 Metadata management use case** + +| | | +|----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Title | Metadata management use case | +| Description | A CSP provides cloud services to the market. According to market requirement changes, it is needed to adjust the already existing cloud services. Therefore, a robust schema like metadata which can be distributed in each stage needs to be provided. | +| Roles | CSP | +| Figure (optional) | / | +| Pre-conditions (optional) | / | +| Post-conditions (optional) | CSP can support new cloud service creation with minimal modifications. | +| Derived requirements | – Metadata management (refer to clause 7.11) | + +# Bibliography + +- [b-TMF TR198] TM Forum TR198, *Multi-Cloud Service Management Pack – Simple Management API (SMI) Developer Primer and Code Pack, Release 2.2.* +computing reference architecture ..... | 18 | +| | Bibliography..... | 20 | + + + +## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3536 + +# Cloud computing – Functional architecture for cloud service brokerage + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation specifies the functional architecture for cloud service brokerage (CSB) based on the functional requirements defined in [ITU-T Y.3506]. It addresses the following subjects: + +- Functions of cloud service brokerage; +- Functional architecture of cloud service brokerage; +- Relationship between the CSB functional architecture and the cloud computing reference architecture. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T X.1601] Recommendation ITU-T X.1601 (2015), *Security framework for cloud computing*. +- [ITU-T Y.3502] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3502 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Reference architecture*. +- [ITU-T Y.3506] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3506 (2018), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Functional requirements for cloud service brokerage*. + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 cloud service customer** [b-ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which is in a business relationship for the purpose of using cloud services. + +**3.1.2 cloud service provider** [b-ITU-T Y.3500]: Party which makes cloud services available. + +**3.1.3 cloud service broker** [b-ITU-T Y.3500]: Cloud service partner that negotiates relationships between cloud service customers and cloud service providers. + +**3.1.4 product catalogue** [ITU-T Y.3502]: A listing of all the cloud service products which cloud service providers make available to cloud service customers. + +**3.1.5 cloud service agreement** [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1]: Documented agreement between the cloud service provider and cloud service customer that governs the covered service(s). + +NOTE – A cloud service agreement can consist of one or more parts recorded in one or more documents. + +**3.1.6 cloud service brokerage** [ITU-T Y.3506]: A service that arbitrates, delivers, and manages cloud services provided by cloud service providers (CSPs) for cloud service customers (CSCs). + +NOTE – Cloud service brokerage is realized by cloud service broker with new activities. The new activities are (i) assist CSC for accessing service and (ii) check and control service status. + +**3.1.7 cloud service level agreement** [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1]: Part of the cloud service agreement (clause 3.1.5) that includes cloud service level objectives (clause 3.1.8) and cloud service qualitative objectives (clause 3.1.9) for the covered cloud service(s). + +**3.1.8 cloud service level objective** [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1]: Commitment a cloud service provider makes for a specific, quantitative characteristic of a cloud service, where the value follows the interval scale or ratio scale. + +NOTE – A cloud service level objective commitment may be expressed as a range. + +**3.1.9 cloud service qualitative objective** [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1]: Commitment a cloud service provider makes for a specific, qualitative characteristic of a cloud service, where the value follows the nominal scale or ordinal scale. + +NOTE 1 – A cloud service qualitative objective may be expressed as an enumerated list. + +NOTE 2 – Qualitative characteristics typically require human interpretation. + +NOTE 3 – The ordinal scale allows for existence/non-existence. + +## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation** + +None. + +# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|---------|------------------------------------------------------| +| API | Application Programming Interface | +| BM-F | Business Management Function | +| CSAM-F | Cloud Service Access information Management Function | +| CSAM-FG | Cloud Service Agreement Management Function Group | +| CSB | Cloud Service Brokerage | +| CSC | Cloud Service Customer | +| CSC-F | Cloud Service Configuration Function | +| CSD-F | Cloud Service Deregistration Function | +| CSM-F | Cloud Service Monitoring Function | +| CSN | Cloud Service Partner | +| CSP | Cloud Service Provider | +| CSR-F | Cloud Service Registration Function | +| CSRM-F | Cloud Service Requirement Management Function | +| CSS-F | Cloud Service Search Function | +| OS | Operating System | +| PCM-FG | Product Catalogue Management Function Group | +| RD-F | Request Delivering Function | +| RV-F | Request Validation Function | +| SC-FG | Service Control Function Group | +| SDM-F | SLA Document Management Function | + +| | | +|---------|------------------------------------------------| +| SLA | Service Level Agreement | +| SLO | Service Level Objectives | +| SM-F | SLA Management Function | +| SQO | Service Qualitative Objectives | +| UAM-F | User Account Management Function | +| UAUTH-F | User Authentication and authorization Function | +| UIM-F | User Interface Management Function | +| UM-FG | User access Management Function Group | +| URL | Uniform Resource Locator | + +# 5 Conventions + +Throughout this Recommendation, the term "CSB user" stands for "CSP and CSC". + +# 6 Relationship between CSB logical components and CSB functions + +A cloud service broker described in [ITU-T Y.3506] is a sub-role of cloud service partner (CSN) that negotiates relationships between cloud service customers (CSCs) and cloud service providers (CSPs). A cloud service brokerage (CSB) as described in [ITU-T Y.3506] is a service between CSCs and CSPs, in which the cloud service broker arbitrates, delivers, and manages the cloud services from the CSPs to the CSCs. The objectives of cloud service brokerage (CSB) are to provide a single access, easily managed and value-added service to CSCs from multiple CSPs. There are five CSB logical components in [ITU-T Y.3506]: + +- workspace; +- product catalogue management; +- contract management; +- service access management; +- service management. + +These CSB logical components are realized by the following CSB function groups: + +- user access management function group: provides authentication of CSB users and grants authorization to access other CSB functions; +- product catalogue management function group: supports registering, deregistering, searching cloud services within the CSB product catalogue, and allowing CSCs to select cloud services; +- cloud service agreement management function group: manages contracts between CSPs and CSCs including cloud service level agreements (SLAs); +- service control function group: requests CSPs to initiate contracted cloud services accompanied by access information and, also, requests service controls (such as initiate, resume/suspend, create, and stop) and monitors the status of running cloud services. + +Table 6-1 shows the relationship between CSB logical components and CSB function groups in this Recommendation. The mapping between the functional requirements of each of the CSB logical components in [ITU-T Y.3506] and CSB functions in clause 7 of this Recommendation is described in Appendix I. + +**Table 6-1 – Relationship between CSB logical components and CSB function groups** + +| CSB logical components in [ITU-T Y.3506] | CSB function groups in this Recommendation | +|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| workspace | user access management function group
(see clause 7.1) | +| product catalogue management | product catalogue management function group
(see clause 7.2) | +| contract management | cloud service agreement management function group
(see clause 7.3) | +| service access management | service control function group (see clause 7.4) | +| service management | service control function group (see clause 7.4) | + +# 7 CSB functions + +Figure 7-1 shows the CSB function groups and corresponding CSB functions. + + + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph PCMG [Product catalogue management] + CSR[Cloud service registration] + CSD[Cloud service deregistration] + CSR[Cloud service requirement management] + CSS[Cloud service search] + end + + subgraph UAM [User access management] + UAM1[User account management] + UAM2[User authentication and authorization] + UIM[User interface management] + end + + subgraph CSAM [Cloud service agreement management] + CSAM1[SLA document management] + CSAM2[SLA management] + CSAM3[Business management] + CSAM4[Cloud service configuration] + end + + subgraph SC [Service control] + CSAIM[Cloud service access information management] + RD[Request delivering] + CSM[Cloud service monitoring] + RV[Request validation] + end + + style PCMG fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:2px + style UAM fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:2px + style CSAM fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:2px + style SC fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:2px + style CSR fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSD fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSR fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSS fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style UAM1 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style UAM2 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style UIM fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSAM1 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSAM2 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSAM3 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSAM4 fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSAIM fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style RD fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style CSM fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + style RV fill:none,stroke:#000,stroke-width:1px + +``` + +Legend: Function group Function + +Y.3536(22) + +Figure 7-1: CSB function groups and CSB functions. The diagram shows three main function groups: Product catalogue management, User access management, and Service control. Product catalogue management includes Cloud service registration, Cloud service deregistration, Cloud service requirement management, and Cloud service search. User access management includes User account management, User authentication and authorization, and User interface management. Cloud service agreement management includes SLA document management, SLA management, Business management, and Cloud service configuration. Service control includes Cloud service access information management, Request delivering, Cloud service monitoring, and Request validation. A legend indicates that rounded rectangles represent function groups and rectangles represent functions. + +**Figure 7-1 – CSB function groups and CSB functions** + +## 7.1 User access management function group + +The user access management function group manages user accounts including user authentication and authorization in CSB and provides user interfaces for CSPs and CSCs. + +### 7.1.1 User authentication and authorization + +The user authentication and authorization function supports CSB user's authentication and authorization. This function supports the following: + +- confirming CSB user's identity to allow or deny access to the user interface for user authentication; +- determining whether the authenticated CSB user has access rights to the particular CSB functions and services for user authorization; +- performing authentication/authorization for CSCs and CSPs by using user account information maintained in the user account management function. + +NOTE – User account information is a collection of data associated with a particular CSB user. Each user account information comprises identities (e.g., a username and password), and defines access levels, storage space, etc. + +### **7.1.2 User account management** + +The user account management function supports the following: + +- maintaining accounts of CSB users; +- supporting creation, modification, and deletion of user accounts; +- providing user account information to the user authentication and authorization function. + +#### **7.1.3 User interface management** + +The user interface management function supports the following: + +- providing interfaces of CSB functions to authenticated and authorized CSPs and CSCs. + +NOTE 1 – A user interface is an access point to CSB functions. CSPs and CSCs perform their operations through this function. + +NOTE 2 – CSPs operate registration/deregistration and CSCs search, select, and order cloud services by using interfaces provided by this function. + +This function provides CSP's interface for: + +- registering cloud services to the CSB product catalogue by delivering registration information (see clause 7.2.1) to the cloud service registration function; +- deregistering cloud services from the CSB product catalogue by transferring deregistration control actions (see clause 7.2.2) to the cloud service deregistration function; +- providing subscription and billing information (see clause 7.3.4) to the business management function; +- supporting the adaptation of the different cloud services application programming interfaces (APIs) of multiple CSPs. + +NOTE – The format of the cloud service API provided by the CSPs is transformed into the CSB's API format. + +This function provides the CSC's interface for: + +- receiving a cloud SLA document (see clause 7.3.3) from the SLA document management function; +- receiving an invoice and performing subscription management from the business management function (see clause 7.3.4); +- obtaining access information (see clause 7.4.1) from the access information management function; +- requesting searching or deploying of cloud services with associated CSC's requirements (see clause 7.2.3) to cloud service requirement management function; +- requesting control actions for cloud services (see clause 7.4) to the request delivering function (see clause 7.4.3); +- monitoring the status of running cloud services by delivering monitoring information (see clause 7.4.2) from the cloud service monitoring function. + +## **7.2 Product catalogue management function group** + +The product catalogue management function group provides registering and deregistering for CSPs, managing cloud service requirements, and searching the best matched cloud service for CSCs. + +#### 7.2.1 Cloud service registration + +The cloud service registration function supports the following: + +- registering CSP's cloud services to the CSB product catalogue by using registration information; + +NOTE – The registration information for a CSP delivered from the user interface management function includes an identity, uniform resource locator (URL), access account of the CSP, and so on. + +- collecting multiple cloud services registered in the CSB product catalogue and orchestrating the cloud services to make them work together for the cloud service integration model, so as to provide value-added cloud services to the CSCs according to requirements from a cloud service broker defined in clause 8.4.1.3 of [ITU-T Y.3502]; +- performing customized development on existing multiple cloud services in the CSB product catalogue on demand for the cloud service customization model; +- sending the new integrated value-added or customized cloud services to the CSPs after the cloud service integration and customization registration, to check that the new cloud services are correct and available. + +### 7.2.2 Cloud service deregistration + +The cloud service deregistration function supports the following: + +- disabling the cloud service from the CSB product catalogue; +- notifying deregistration of the cloud service to related CSCs; +- requesting the related CSCs to stop all running cloud services; +- deleting the cloud service from the CSB product catalogue; +- notifying the service deregistration to all CSCs not to use the deregistered service; +- requesting the related CSPs to maintain the deregistered service until the CSCs finish using the cloud service. + +NOTE – Deregistration control actions regarding notifications and requests to related CSCs and CSPs are performed through the user access management function group. + +#### 7.2.3 Cloud service requirement management + +The cloud service requirement management function supports the following: + +- managing CSC's requirements based on a cloud service requirement template; +- validating CSC's requirements from the contents using the cloud service requirement template; +- managing cloud SLA information of the cloud service and delivering the information to the SLA management function for a contract. + +NOTE 1 – The CSC's requirement includes cloud SLA information for the cloud service such as cloud service qualitative objectives (SQC), price of the requested cloud service, remedies for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA, and so on. The CSC's requirement also includes information about specifications of the cloud service such as virtual machine, OS type, applications, etc. + +NOTE 2 – The cloud SLA ordinarily contains a collection of cloud service level objectives (SLOs) and cloud SQOs relating to the cloud service. This might include availability, reliability, performance, security, data protection, compliance and data handling defined in [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1]. + +#### 7.2.4 Cloud service search + +The cloud service search function supports the following: + +- supporting searching of cloud services in the CSB product catalogue to match with CSC's requirements received from the cloud service requirement management function; +- providing priorities of cloud services for CSCs to easily select, if there exist multiple cloud services matched with CSC's requirements; +- initiating integration and/or configuration of registered cloud services from CSPs if it fails to find a matching cloud service for the cloud service customization; + +NOTE – The initiations of cloud service integration and configuration are delivered to the cloud service registration function. + +### **7.3 Cloud service agreement management function group** + +The cloud service agreement management function group provides the cloud SLA and cloud SLA document management, cloud service configuration management, and business management between CSPs and CSCs. + +The cloud service agreement management function group establishes a contract in terms of the cloud service agreement which includes the cloud SLA and manages the contracted service level by monitoring cloud services for cloud SLO and performing actions to remedy failures to meet the contracted service level. + +This function group creates a cloud SLA document based on the CSC's cloud service requirements and the corresponding CSP's cloud SLA and notifies it to the contracted CSC. This function group also registers an agreed service level to the service control function group to guarantee the contracted service quality. If the cloud service fails to meet the service level, this function group enforces remedies for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA. + +NOTE – The cloud SLA includes agreements such as specification of cloud services, service level in terms of quality, price of cloud service, remedies for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA, and so on. + +#### **7.3.1 SLA management** + +The SLA management function is involved during the establishment of a cloud service agreement and manages cloud SLA by monitoring cloud services for cloud SLO to verify the service level, by detecting failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA through monitoring, and by providing agreed remedies for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA. + +NOTE 1 – Monitoring includes one or more measurable information such as storage speeds, memory capacity and performance, computing speeds, network speeds, service response time, etc. + +NOTE 2 – Examples of a remedy are migration, scale up, performance extension and so on. If a failure to meet the terms of the cloud SLA is found in the integrated cloud service, the SLA management function identifies the cloud service that caused the failure. + +This function supports the following: + +- receiving CSC's requirements to establish cloud SLA of the cloud service from the cloud service requirement management function of the product catalogue management function group; +- delivering CSC's requirements to the cloud service configuration function to configure the cloud service according to the CSC's requirements; +- providing selection of cloud SLOs to the CSC according to business requirements of the CSC; +- delivering the service specifications and cloud SLO to the SLA document management function after the configuration is finished and the CSC confirms the cloud service with detail configurations and cloud SLO so that the SLA document management function generates a cloud SLA document; + +- establishing cloud SLA with the CSC based on the cloud SLA document by sharing it with the CSC through the user interface management function; + +NOTE 3 – The cloud SLA document includes selection of cloud SLO from a CSC according to business requirements of the CSC. + +- delivering a request for initiating the cloud service to the request delivering function in the service control function group after the cloud service agreement is established; +- checking cloud services for cloud SLO to verify the service level by receiving monitoring data from the cloud service monitoring function after service control function group initiates the cloud service; +- detecting failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA; +- providing agreed remedies for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA; +- notifying failures and remedies regarding the cloud SLA to the CSC through the user interface management function. + +#### **7.3.2 Cloud service configuration** + +The cloud service configuration function supports the following: + +- configuring a cloud service by specifying elements of the cloud service selected by a CSC; +- receiving specification for elements of the cloud service, from the SLA management function; +- returning a service manifest, which is used by the service control function group to initiate the cloud service with the specified elements, to the SLA management function. + +NOTE – Examples for configurable elements of a cloud service include virtual machine specifications, OS types, applications, etc. + +#### **7.3.3 SLA document management** + +The SLA document management function supports the following: + +- providing the cloud SLA description model to describe terms and conditions for a CSC; +- generating a cloud SLA document according to the agreement to share the cloud SLA document with the related CSC; +- receiving a request from the SLA management function to generate a cloud SLA document along with information for the service specifications and cloud SLO which the CSC selects; +- returning a cloud SLA document which complies with the cloud SLA description model to describe terms and conditions. + +#### **7.3.4 Business management** + +The business management function supports the following: + +- gathering billing information from related CSPs; +- generating an invoice for the usage of a cloud service by reorganizing the billing information gathered from related CSPs; +- providing the generated invoices to CSCs through the user interface management function; + +NOTE 1 – The billing information is used to generate invoices for the usage of a cloud service. The billing information includes business information related to payment, such as methods for payment and costs for the usage of the cloud service based on price and metering. + +- handling the subscriptions of the CSCs of the cloud services provided by multiple CSPs through the user interface management function, allowing for managing (e.g., creating, modifying, updating, deleting and querying) the subscriptions. + +NOTE 2 – the subscription provides a complete view of CSCs' cloud service ordering records information of the cloud services from multiple CSPs, including cloud service ordering type (e.g., new purchase, renewal, upgrading, refunding, cancelling, etc.), ordering time, billing information, discount information, payment status, related CSPs information, detailed cloud services information, etc. + +### **7.4 Service control function group** + +The service control function group provides cloud service delivering, validation, monitoring and cloud service access information management between CSCs and CSPs, so as to satisfy the requirements of the cloud service control actions of the CSCs. + +The service control function group requests to deploy a cloud service to a CSP and provides the access information to a CSC so that the CSC is able to use the cloud service after the contract phase. In addition, this function group requests service control actions for running cloud services from CSCs to CSPs and monitors the status of the cloud services to check for failure of the services such as cloud SLA violation. + +This function group receives service control requests from the cloud service agreement management function group or the user access management function group. The request delivering function in this function group achieves service controls by delivering the CSC's request to the corresponding CSP. This function group validates the status of a cloud service whether the status is changed correctly or not in accordance with the delivered request for a control action of the cloud service. + +NOTE – The control actions for cloud services vary according to each cloud service. Examples of a control actions for a cloud service include create, initiate, suspend/resume, and stop of the cloud service. + +#### **7.4.1 Cloud service access information management** + +The cloud service access information management function supports the following: + +- managing the access information of the cloud services received from the CSP through the request delivering function; +- forwarding the access information of the cloud service from the CSP to the contracted CSC. + +NOTE – The access information is required for a CSC to access a cloud service. The access information includes an access point such as an Internet protocol address or URL of the cloud service and authentication methods such as a certificate or identification and password to access the cloud service. + +#### **7.4.2 Cloud service monitoring** + +The cloud service monitoring function supports the following: + +- gathering monitoring information periodically or aperiodically at runtime to check the status of cloud services; +- delivering monitoring information to the SLA management function, business management function, and the user interface management function to notify monitoring information to a CSC. + +NOTE – The monitoring information includes measured data for metrics of service levels in the cloud SLA, resource utilization, and the status of logical resources (e.g., virtual machine) of cloud services. + +#### **7.4.3 Request delivering** + +The request delivering function supports the following: + +- delivering provisioning requests to CSPs as requested by the CSC; + +- delivering requests for control actions (see Note in clause 7.4) for a cloud service from a CSC to a CSP; +- delivering the CSC's request for resources to a CSP when a CSC needs more cloud resources of a cloud service; +- receiving an acknowledgement for the cloud service control request from the CSP; +- delivering the cloud service identification, target status, and the acknowledgement to the request validation function to validate the status of a cloud service whether the status is changed correctly or not in accordance with the delivered request for a control action of the cloud service; +- receiving cloud service status verification information from the request validation function after the control action of the cloud service is verified by the request validation function; +- notifying the result of cloud service control to a CSC; +- initiating monitoring of the cloud service by invoking the cloud service monitoring function; +- delivering the access information of the initiated cloud service to the access information management function so that an authorized CSC can use the cloud service. + +#### **7.4.4 Request validation** + +The request validation function validates the status of a cloud service whether the status is changed correctly or not in accordance with the delivered request for a control action of the cloud service by a CSC. Since changing the status of the cloud service takes time according to the circumstance of a CSP, a cloud service broker does not know the result of the control request instantly. Therefore, to validate the status of cloud service, the request validation function needs to check periodically the current status of the cloud service by communicating with the CSP until the validation is finished. This function supports the following: + +- initiating service control status validation after the request delivering function delivers a control request to a CSP and receives an acknowledgement from the CSP to inform of receipt of a request for the service control; +- checking periodically the current status of a cloud service by communicating with the CSP until the operation for the service control is finished; +- updating the current status of the cloud service according to a result of the communication with the CSP for checking status on a service control request; +- predicting a completion time of the cloud service control to reduce communication overhead between the cloud service broker and the CSP; + +NOTE 1 – To predict the completion time of a cloud service control, statistical methods, such as moving average and variance, are applied to history information of completion time of previous control requests for the same or similar services. Using the statistical methods, the request validation function calculates a probability distribution for completion of service control at a given time. + +- generating a service control checking period which is the duration of time of one cycle for checking status of the service; + +NOTE 2 – The service control checking periods are determined by a probability distribution. The request validation function sets the number of checking for completion of a service controls for each time interval based on the probability distribution, and the number of checks is converted into the service control status checking period. Therefore, the request validation function increases the frequency of checking status of service when the probability of service control completion is high and decreases the frequency when the probability of service control completion is low. + +- storing the history information of required time for completing cloud service controls and cloud service control status validation results. + +# 8 CSB functional architecture + +Figure 8-1 shows the CSB functional architecture. + + + +Y.3536(22) + +| | | | | +|----------|------------------------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------------------------| +| UM-FG: | User access management function group | CSAM-FG: | Cloud service agreement management function group | +| UIM-F: | User interface management function | SM-F: | SLA management function | +| UAM-F: | User account management function | SDM-F: | SLA document management function | +| UAUTH-F: | User authentication and authorization function | BM-F: | Business management function | +| PCM-FG: | Product catalogue management function group | CSC-F: | Cloud service configuration function | +| CSR-F: | Cloud service registration function | SC-FG: | Service control function group | +| CSD-F: | Cloud service deregistration function | RD-F: | Request delivering function | +| CSS-F: | Cloud service search function | RV-F: | Request validation function | +| CSRM-F: | Cloud service requirement management function | CSAM-F: | Cloud service access information management function | +| | | CSM-F: | Cloud service monitoring function | + +Figure 8-1: CSB functional architecture diagram. The diagram shows four main function groups: PCM-FG, UM-FG, CSAM-FG, and SC-FG. PCM-FG contains CSR-F, CSD-F, CSRM-F, and CSS-F. UM-FG contains UAM-F, UAUTH-F, and UIM-F. CSAM-FG contains SDM-F, SM-F, BM-F, and CSC-F. SC-FG contains CSAM-F, RD-F, CSM-F, and RV-F. Interactions are shown with labeled arrows: I\_UAM\_UAUTH, I\_UIM\_CSR, I\_UIM\_CSD, I\_UIM\_CSRM, I\_UIM\_RD, I\_CSAM\_UIM, I\_RD\_CSAM, I\_BM\_UIM, I\_SM\_UIM, I\_CSM\_UIM, I\_CSM\_SM, I\_CSM\_BM, I\_CSRM\_SM, I\_CSRM\_CCS, I\_SM\_RD, I\_SDM\_BM, I\_SDM\_SM, I\_SM\_CSC, and I\_RD\_RV. A legend at the bottom defines the function groups and individual functions. + +**Figure 8-1 – CSB functional architecture** + +The CSB functional architecture comprises four function groups of user access management function group (UM-FG), product catalogue management function group (PCM-FG), cloud service agreement management function group (CSAM-FG), and service control function group (SC-FG), which correspond with clause 7.1 to clause 7.4, respectively. + +The CSB functions within each function group are defined in clause 7. The CSB functions have the relationships (see Appendix II) and interact with each other by the reference points depicted in the Figure 8-1. + +### 8.1 CSB function groups + +The UM-FG comprises three functions: user interface management function (UIM-F), user account management function (UAM-F), and user authentication and authorization function (UAUTH-F). The UM-FG interacts with PCM-FG, CSAM-FG, and SC-FG. + +The PCM-FG comprises four functions: cloud service registration function (CSR-F), cloud service deregistration function (CSD-F), cloud service search function (CSS-F), and cloud service requirement management function (CSRM-F). The PCM-FG interacts with UM-FG and CSAM-FG. + +The CSAM-FG comprises four functions: SLA management function (SM-F), SLA document management function (SDM-F), business management function (BM-F), and cloud service configuration function (CSC-F). The CSAM-FG interacts with UM-FG, FCM-FG and SC-FG. + +The SC-FG comprises four functions: request delivering function (FD-F), request validation function (RV-F), cloud service access information management function (CSAM-F), and cloud service monitoring function (CSM-F). The SC-FG interacts with UM-FG and CSAM-FG. + +## **8.2 Reference points** + +### **8.2.1 Reference points between PCM-FG and UM-FG** + +The reference points between PCM-FG and UM-FG are summarized as follows: + +- I\_UIM\_CSR reference point between UIM-F and CSR-F. Registration information for registering CSP's cloud services to the CSB product catalogue is delivered through this reference point. +- I\_UIM\_CSD reference point between UIM-F and CSD-F. Through this reference point, UIM-F requests deregistering cloud services from the CSB product catalogue by transferring deregistration control actions. +- I\_UIM\_CSRM reference point between UIM-F and CSRM-F. Through this reference point, UIM-F requests searching or deploying cloud services with the associated CSC's requirements. + +### **8.2.2 Reference points between CSAM-FG and UM-FG** + +The reference points between CSAM-FG and UM-FG are summarized as follows: + +- I\_BM\_UIM reference point between BM-F and UIM-F. Subscription information for a cloud service is delivered through this reference point. Invoice for the usage of a cloud service is also delivered from BM-F to UIM-F through this reference point. +- I\_SM\_UIM reference point between SM-F and UIM-F. Notifications for failures to meet the terms of the cloud SLA and remedies regarding the cloud SLA are delivered from SM-F to UIM-F through this reference point. + +### **8.2.3 Reference points between SC-FG and UM-FG** + +The reference points between SC-FG and UM-FG are summarized as follows: + +- I\_UIM\_RD reference point between UIM-F and request delivering function (RD-F). Through this reference point, UIM-F requests control actions for cloud services. +- I\_CSM\_UIM reference point between CSM-F and UIM-F. Monitoring information is delivered from CSM-F to UIM-F through this reference point. +- I\_CSAM\_UIM reference point between CSAM-F and UIM-F. Access information of the cloud services is delivered from CSAM-F to UIM-F through this reference point. + +#### **8.2.4 Reference points between PCM-FG and CSAM-FG** + +The reference point between PCM-FG and CSAM-FG is summarized as follows: + +- I\_CSRM\_SM reference point between CSRM-F and SM-F. CSC's requirement with cloud SLA information of the cloud service is delivered through this reference point. + +#### **8.2.5 Reference points between SC-FG and CSAM-FG** + +The reference points between SC-FG and CSAM-FG are summarized as follows: + +- I\_CSM\_SM reference point between CSM-F and SM-F. Monitoring information is delivered from CSM-F to SM-F through this reference point. +- I\_CSM\_BM reference point between CSM-F and BM-F. Monitoring information is delivered from CSM-F to BM-F through this reference point. + +I\_SM\_RD reference point between SM-F and RD-F. cloud service initiation and control requests are delivered from SM-F to RD-F through this reference point. + +#### 8.2.6 Reference points within UM-FG + +The reference point within UM-FG is summarized as follows: + +I\_UAM\_UAUTH reference point between UAM-F and UAUTH-F. Through this reference point, UAM-F sends user access information for CSB user authentication and authorization. + +#### 8.2.7 Reference points within PCM-FG + +The reference point within PCM-FG is summarized as follows: + +I\_CSRM\_CCS reference point between CSRM-F and CSS-F. Through this reference point, CSRM-F sends CSC's requirement for searching cloud services in the CSB product catalogue. + +#### 8.2.8 Reference points within CSAM-FG + +The reference points within CSAM-FG are summarized as follows: + +I\_SDM\_SM reference point between SDM-F and SM-F. Requests to generate cloud SLA documents along with information for the service specifications and cloud SLO are delivered from SM-F to SDM-F through this reference point. Generated cloud SLA documents are delivered from SDM-F to SM-F through this reference point. + +I\_SDM\_BM reference point between SDM-F and BM-F. Information for agreed service price is delivered from SDM-F to BM-F through this reference point. + +I\_SM\_CSC reference point between SM-F and CSC-F. Information for a selected cloud service and its specification is delivered from SM-F to CSC-F through this reference point. Service manifests configured with specified elements are delivered from CSC-F to SM-F through this reference point. + +#### 8.2.9 Reference points within SC-FG + +The reference points within SC-FG are summarized as follows: + +I\_RD\_CSAM reference point between RD-F and CSAM-F. Access information of cloud services is delivered from RD-F to CSAM-F through this reference point. + +I\_RD\_CSM reference point between RD-F and CSM-F. Cloud service identifications and access information of cloud services for monitoring the services are delivered from RD-F to CSM-F through this reference point. + +I\_RD\_RV reference point between RD-F and RV-F. Identification, control request, target status, and the acknowledgement of cloud services for request validation are delivered from RD-F to RV-F through this reference point. Information for cloud service status verification is delivered from RV-F to RD-F through this reference point. + +# 9 Security considerations + +Security aspects for consideration within the cloud computing environment, are addressed by security challenges for the CSPs as described in [ITU-T X.1601]. In particular, [ITU-T X.1601] analyses security threats and challenges and describes security capabilities that could mitigate these threats and meet the security challenges. + +# Appendix I + +### Relationship between functional requirements and CSB functions + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +[ITU-T Y.3506] defines a total of 36 functional requirements. Table I.1 shows analysis of the key phrases and related CSB functions for each requirement in [ITU-T Y.3506]. + +**Table I.1 – Relationship between functional requirements and CSB functions** + +| CSB local component in Y.3506 | CSB functional Req. in ITU-T Y.3506 | Key phrases | Related functions in this Recommendation | +|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| +| Workspace | Authentication and authorization for workspace | authentication and authorization | User authentication and authorization | +| | Account management | accounts of CSCs and CSPs | User account management | +| | User interface for CSCs | user interface for CSCs to search, select, request, launch, monitor, manage, and pay | User interface management | +| | User interface for CSPs | user interface for CSPs to register information | User interface management | +| Product catalogue management | Registration of cloud service | registration of cloud services in the product catalogue | Cloud service registration | +| | Cloud service deregistration | deregister the cloud services in a product catalogue | Cloud service deregistration | +| | Automation of service deregistration | automatic cloud service deregistration | Cloud service deregistration | +| | Notification of service deregistration | notification of the service deregistration to CSCs | Cloud service deregistration | +| | Request for maintaining cloud service | request the related CSP to maintain the deregistered service | Cloud service deregistration | +| | Providing cloud service requirement template | template for service requirement | Cloud service requirement management | +| | Cloud service requirement validation | validation of the contents in cloud service requirement template | Cloud service requirement management | +| | Cloud service search | searching a cloud service in the product catalogue | Cloud service search | +| | Providing the best matched cloud service | best matched cloud services and information about the CSPs | Cloud service search | +| | Cloud service alteration | alter registered services for cloud service | Cloud service registration | + +**Table I.1 – Relationship between functional requirements and CSB functions** + +| CSB local component in Y.3506 | CSB functional Req. in ITU-T Y.3506 | Key phrases | Related functions in this Recommendation | +|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| +| | | customization | | +| | Cloud service substitution for integrated cloud service | provide alternative cloud services | Cloud service search | +| | Equivalent cloud service selection | migrate to keep service equivalence after migration | Cloud service search | +| Contract management | Cloud service charging | billing information to CSCs | Business management | +| | Configuration of cloud service for contract | configure a cloud service through selecting elements | Cloud service configuration | +| | Service level objectives (SLO) selection | selection of service level objectives to a CSC | SLA document management | +| | SLA document management | generation of a SLA document according to the agreement to share the SLA document | SLA document management | +| | SLA description model | SLA description model to describe terms and conditions | SLA document management | +| | Remedies for failures to meet the terms of the SLA | agreed remedies for failures to meet the terms of the SLA | SLA management | +| Cloud service access management | Delivering cloud service provision request | deliver the provisioning request to CSPs as requested by the CSC | Request delivering | +| | Delivering cloud resource request | deliver the CSC's request for resources to a CSP | Request delivering | +| | Access information forwarding | forward the access information | Cloud service access information management | +| | Prohibiting access information storing | prohibiting of the access information for a cloud service not to open or store | Cloud service access information management | +| Cloud service management | Cloud service SLA management | SLA management of running cloud service | SLA management | +| | Cloud service monitoring | monitor the status of cloud services by using gathered monitoring information | Cloud service monitoring | +| | Delivering request of cloud service control | deliver requests of control actions for a cloud service from a CSC to a CSP | Request delivering | +| | Validation of result for request of cloud service control | validate the status of cloud service whether the status is changed correctly or not in accordance with the delivered request for a control action | Request validation | + +**Table I.1 – Relationship between functional requirements and CSB functions** + +| CSB local component in Y.3506 | CSB functional Req. in ITU-T Y.3506 | Key phrases | Related functions in this Recommendation | +|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------| +| | Initiation of validation | initiate cloud service control status validation only after the broker receives an acknowledgement | Request validation | +| | Status checking period for validation | checking periods in service control status validation | Request validation | +| | History of cloud service control status validation | manage history of validation results as well as required time for completing cloud service controls | Request validation | +| | Notification of result for request of cloud service control | notification of the result of cloud service control to a CSC | Request validation | +| | Detection of failures to meet the terms of the SLA | detect failures to meet the terms of the SLA through monitoring and to verify the service level | SLA management | +| | Prevention of service termination during migration | postponing the termination of running cloud service until the broker verifies ready status of a new service | SLA management | + +## Appendix II + +### Relationship among CSB functions + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +Figure II.1 depicts the summary of the relationships among the CSB functions described in clause 7.1 through clause 7.4. The interaction with related information between two functions is represented as each link. + + + +The diagram illustrates the relationships among four main functional groups of the Cloud Service Broker (CSB): + +- User access management** (top group): + - Functions: User account management, User authentication and authorization, User interface management. + - Information flows: User access information to User authentication and authorization; Invoice, subscription from User authentication and authorization to User interface management; SLA documents/SLA notification from User interface management to User account management. +- Product catalogue management** (middle group): + - Functions: Cloud service requirement management, Cloud service search, Cloud service registration, Cloud service deregistration. + - Information flows: Deploy request with CSC's requirement from Cloud service requirement management to Cloud service search; CSC's requirement from Cloud service search to Cloud service registration; Registration information from Cloud service registration to User interface management; Deregistration control action from Cloud service deregistration to User interface management. +- Cloud service agreement management** (bottom-left group): + - Functions: SLA management, Cloud service configuration, SLA document management, Business management. + - Information flows: CSC's requirement from Cloud service requirement management to SLA management; Service configuration from SLA management to Cloud service configuration; Service spec/SLO from SLA management to SLA document management; SLA document from SLA document management to SLA management; Service price from SLA document management to Business management; Monitoring information from Cloud service monitoring to Business management. +- Service control** (bottom-right group): + - Functions: Cloud service access information management, Request delivering, Request validation, Cloud service monitoring. + - Information flows: Access information from Cloud service access information management to Request delivering; Service ID/access information from Request delivering to Cloud service monitoring; Request for control action/resource from Cloud service access information management to Request validation; Service ID target status, ACK from Request validation to Request delivering; Service status verification information from Request validation to Cloud service monitoring; Monitoring information from Cloud service monitoring to Request validation. + +**Legend:** + +- Group of functions: Represented by a rounded rectangle. +- Function: Represented by a rectangle. +- Information flow: Represented by an arrow. + +Y.3536(22) + +Figure II.1: Relationship among CSB functions. A complex flowchart showing four main functional groups: User access management, Product catalogue management, Cloud service agreement management, and Service control. Each group contains several sub-functions with interconnecting information flows. + +Figure II.1 – Relationship among CSB functions + +## Appendix III + +### Relationship between CSB functions and functional components of cloud computing reference architecture + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +The cloud computing reference architecture [ITU-T Y.3502] provides an architectural framework that is effective for describing the cloud computing roles, sub-roles, cloud computing activities, cross-cutting aspects, as well as functional components of cloud computing. + +The functional architecture for cloud service brokerage follows the architectural framework of [ITU-T Y.3502], and in the meantime, extends the functions and functional components of [ITU-T Y.3502] to satisfy the functional requirements of CSB [ITU-T Y.3506]. The mapping relationship between functions in CSB and functional components in cloud computing reference architecture is shown in Figure III.1. + + + +The diagram illustrates the relationship between CSB functions and functional components of the cloud computing reference architecture. It is organized into four layers on the left and a large block of Multi-layer functions on the right. + +**Layers (Left):** + +- User layer:** Contains User function, Business function, and Administrator function, each with a corresponding User interface management component. +- Access layer:** Contains Access control and Connection management. +- Service layer:** Contains Service capabilities, Business capabilities, and Administration capabilities, with a Service orchestration component. +- Resource layer:** Contains Resource abstraction and control and Physical resources. + +**Multi-layer functions (Right):** + +- Integration:** Security integration, Monitoring integration, Service integration, Peer service integration. +- Security systems:** Authentication and identity management (with User authentication and authorization), Authorization and security policy management (with User authentication and authorization), Encryption management. +- OSS:** Service catalogue, Monitoring and reporting, Cloud service monitoring, Service automation, Incident and problem management, Platform and virtualization management, Provisioning (Request delivering, Request validation), Service policy management, Service level management (SLA management, SLA document management), Peer service management, Cloud service configuration management, Cloud service access information management. +- BSS:** Product catalogue (Cloud service registration, Cloud service deregistration, Cloud service search, Cloud service requirement management), Account management (User account management), Subscription management, Billing (Business management), Accounts. +- Development function:** Developer environment, Build management, Test management. + +**Legend (Bottom):** + +- Functional component in ITU-T Y.3502 (Grey) +- User access management functions (Blue) +- Product catalogue management functions (Yellow) +- Cloud service agreement management functions (Pink) +- Service control functions (Purple) + +Y.3536(22) + +Figure III.1: Relationship between functions in cloud service brokerage and functional components in cloud computing reference architecture. The diagram shows four layers on the left (User, Access, Service, Resource) and a large block of Multi-layer functions on the right, categorized into Integration, Security systems, OSS, BSS, and Development function. A legend at the bottom maps colors to functional components in ITU-T Y.3502. + +**Figure III.1 – Relationship between functions in cloud service brokerage and functional components in cloud computing reference architecture** + +The user access management functions of CSB correspond to and extend the user layer, security systems, and account management functional component of cloud computing reference architecture. + +The product catalogue management functions of CSB correspond to and extend the product catalogue functional component of cloud computing reference architecture. + +The cloud service agreement management functions of CSB correspond to and extend the service level management, peer service management, and billing functional component of cloud computing reference architecture. + +The service control functions of CSB correspond to and extend the provisioning, monitoring and report, and peer service management functional component of cloud computing reference architecture. + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.3500] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3500 (2014), *Information technology – Cloud computing – Overview and vocabulary*. +- [b-ISO/IEC 19086-1] ISO/IEC 19086-1:2016, *Information technology – Cloud computing – Service Level Agreement (SLA) framework – Part 1: Overview and concepts*. + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone 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0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..612634b41c9c743d810874fbe9cacec744cf36c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3651-201812-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,718 @@ + + +I n t e r n a t i o n a l T e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n U n i o n + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +# Y.3651 + +(12/2018) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION +INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, +NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF +THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +Cloud Computing + +# --- **Big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3651 + + + +The logo of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is located in the bottom right corner. It features a blue globe with two red lightning bolts striking it. To the right of the globe, the text 'ITU' is written in a large, bold, blue font, and below it, the words 'International Telecommunication Union' are written in a smaller, blue font. + +ITU logo: A blue globe with red lightning bolts and the text 'ITU International Telecommunication Union'. + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000–Y.3499 | + +## **CLOUD COMPUTING** + +**Y.3500–Y.3999** + +## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +## Recommendation ITU-T Y.3651 + +# Big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning + +## Summary + +In a mobile network, a great deal of traffic data which reflects the real status of the mobile network and customers' actual experience is generated all the time. Based on the big data generated from the mobile network more efficient management and reasonable planning of mobile networks can be achieved. + +In order to study related content, Recommendation ITU-T Y.3651 specifies some technology aspects related to big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning. The scope of this Recommendation includes: requirements, framework, reference points, performance aspects and security considerations of big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning. + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3651 | 2018-12-14 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/13818 | + +## Keywords + +bDDN, mobile network traffic management, mobile network planning + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
Application | Mobile network planing | Other applications | | +| Layer III
Data analysis | Real-time task | Off-line task | | +| Layer II
Data pre-processing and storage | Data extraction | Data transformation | Data storage | +| Layer I
Data collecting | Users' behaviour data | Signal data | Common parameter data | + +Y.3651(18)\_F9-1 + +**Figure 9-1 – Framework of big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning** + +## Layer I – Data collecting + +The data collecting layer collects the signal data both in RAN and CN, the users' behaviour data and the common parameter data. + +## Layer II – Data pre-processing + +The data pre-processing layer extracts, transforms and then loads the data to data warehouses for storage. + +## Layer III – Data analysis + +The data analysis layer has two main tasks, the real-time task and the off-line task. The real-time task computes data items for multiple dimensions as long as the data from the mobile network is collected. The off-line task computes data items for multiple dimensions at regular intervals. Besides the real-time and the off-line task, the QoS sensing task senses the experience of mobile network users based on the result data of the real-time and off-line task. + +## Layer IV – Application + +Many applications can be generated based on the result data of the data analysis layer. The big-data-driven networking - mobile network planning is one of these applications. + +# 10 Reference points of big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning + + + +``` +graph LR; DC[Data collecting] --> DPP[Data pre-processing]; DPP -- C1 --> DT[real-time task]; DPP -- C2 --> DS[Data storage]; DS -- C3 --> DT; DS -- C4 --> OT[Off-line task]; DS -- C5 --> App[Application]; subgraph DA [Data analysis]; DT; OT; end +``` + +Y.3651(18)\_F10-1 + +Figure 10-1: The main reference points of big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning. The diagram shows a data flow from Data collecting to Data pre-processing, then to Data storage, and finally to Application. Data pre-processing also feeds into Data analysis (real-time task and Off-line task). Data storage feeds into Data analysis (Off-line task) and Application. Reference points C1, C2, C3, C4, and C5 are marked at various stages. + +**Figure 10-1 – The main reference points of big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning** + +The main reference points of the big-data-driven networking – mobile network traffic management and planning system are shown in Figure 10-1, the details about the reference points are presented as follows: + +- Reference point C1: After been pre-processed, the collected data is sent to message queues to compute a set of items for multiple dimensions in real time. +- Reference point C2: The pre-processed data is stored in a distributed file system for off-line computing and further operations. +- Reference point C3: The pre-processed data stored in distributed file system is sent to an off-line batch processing module to be analysed for multiple dimensions at regular intervals. +- Reference point C4: The result data of both the real-time task and the off-line task is sent to the distributed file system for storage and further operations. +- Reference point C5: The interface between the stored traffic data and applications. One of the applications, the base station management system, can detect and fulfil the loss of base station information automatically via C5. + +# 11 Performance considerations + +It is required to consider performance in the stages of data collecting, data transmission, data pre-processing, data storage and real-time data processing. + +In the data collecting stage, there are some performance requirements: + +- It is recommended to guarantee the completeness and accuracy rate in parsing the signal data and the users' behaviour data. +- It is recommended to guarantee the filling rate parsed records of the signal data and the users' behaviour data. +- It is recommended to guarantee the accuracy rate for users' service using information through parsing the users' behaviour data. + +In the data transmission stage, there are some performance requirements. + +- It is recommended to reduce the losing rate of the signal data and the users' behaviour data which is transferred from data collecting equipment to the centralized system. +- It is recommended to guarantee the timeliness for transferring data from data collecting equipment to the centralized system. + +In the data pre-processing and real-time data processing stage, it is required to maintain high-throughput. + +In the data storage stage, it is recommended to control the time of loading into a dataset and the number of data replications. + +In the real-time data processing stage, it is recommended to consider the efficiency. + +# **12 Security considerations** + +When using big-data-driven networking - mobile network traffic management and planning, security best practices should be adopted such as authentication, authorization and access control. + +# Appendix I + +## Use cases and scenarios + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This clause describes use cases and scenarios. + +### I.1 Customer journey analysis + +| Use case | | +|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Name | Customer journey analysis | +| Description | Based on big data collected from mobile network traffic, it can support customer journey analysis. Real-time analytics that map the user journey and generates actionable insights that can allow operators to respond quickly with a "next-best offer" and convert interested prospects into customers. Data such as customer demographics and clickstreams are being combined with attributes such as location and content preferences for next best offers. This also enables commerce service providers to map specific customer's interactions with the network at various stages of the lifecycle to promote tailored offerings and campaigns. | +| Roles | | +| Figure | | +| Pre-conditions (optional) | | +| Post-conditions (optional) | | +| Requirements |
- – Users' behaviour data (refer to clause 7.2)
- – Real-time processing (refer to clause 7.5)
- – Users' behaviour data (refer to clause 7.2)
- – Off-line data process (refer to clause 7.5)
The U2100 base stations are 3G base stations deployed in the 2100MHz band and the U900 are base stations deployed in the 900MHz band. The 900 can provide superior coverage compared to U2100. To evaluate the effect of the U900 in the real scenes, the MR data before and after the deployment of the U900 base stations in one particular area are collected. Figure I.1 shows the received signal code power (RSCP) before and after the deployment of the U900 base stations. In this figure, the coverage levels are distinguished by different colours. We can see that through the deployment of the U900 base stations, the coverage of the mobile network has apparently been improved. In the future construction of the mobile network, the U900 can be used to improve the coverage.
| +| Roles | | +| Figure | |
+| Pre-conditions (optional) | |
+| Post-conditions (optional) | |
+| Requirements | - – MR data (refer to clause 7.1 and 7.2)
- – Information illustration (refer to clause 8.1)
- – Base station evaluating (refer to clause 8.3)
COINO ..... | 9 | +| 8 Mechanism for COINO based on bDDN..... | 10 | +| 8.1 The capabilities of COINO..... | 10 | +| 8.2 The methods used in COINO based on bDDN ..... | 12 | +| 9 The interface abilities for COINO based on bDDN ..... | 14 | +| 9.1 External interface..... | 14 | +| 9.2 The interfaces between planes in bDDN ..... | 15 | +| 9.3 The interfaces between layers in big data plane..... | 15 | +| 10 Security considerations ..... | 16 | +| Bibliography..... | 17 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3661 + +# Big data driven networking – Architecture and mechanism for customer-oriented intelligent network operation + +## 1 Scope + +This Recommendation specifies big data driven networking (bDDN) – the architecture and mechanism for customer-oriented intelligent network operation (COINO). The scope of the Recommendation includes: + +- 1) Overview of the architecture and mechanism for COINO based on bDDN; +- 2) Architecture for COINO based on bDDN; +- 3) Mechanism for COINO based on bDDN; +- 4) The interface abilities for COINO based on bDDN. + +NOTE – Multiple customer requirements management is out of the scope of this Recommendation. + +## 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a standalone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +[[ITU-T Y.3650](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3650 (2018), *Framework of big-data-driven networking*. + +[[ITU-T Y.3653](#)] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3653 (2021), *Big data driven networking – functional architecture*. + +## 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following term defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 big-data-driven networking (bDDN)** [ITU-T Y.3650]: Big-data-driven networking (bDDN) is a type of future network framework that collects big data from networks and applications, and generates big data intelligence based on the big data; it then provides big data intelligence to facilitate smarter and autonomous network management, operation, control, optimization and security, etc. + +## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +None. + +## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|-----|-----------------------------------| +| AI | Artificial Intelligence | +| API | Application Programming Interface | + +| | | +|---------|-------------------------------------------------| +| bDDN | Big-Data-Driven Networking | +| COINO | Customer-Oriented Intelligent Network Operation | +| DIM | Dimension | +| ETL | Extract, Transform, Load | +| HTTP | Hypertext Transfer Protocol | +| IoT | Internet of Things | +| KPI | Key Performance Indicator | +| MEC | Multi-access Edge Computing | +| NFV | Network Functions Virtualization | +| NLP | Natural Language Processing | +| NoSQL | Not Only Structured Query Language | +| OAM | Operation, Administration and Maintenance | +| RDMA | Remote Direct Memory Access | +| RESTful | Representational State Transfer | +| RPC | Remote Procedure Call | +| SDN | Software-Defined Networking | +| SMS | Short Message Service | +| SQL | Structured Query Language | +| VNF | Virtualized Network Function | +| WAN | Wide Area Network | + +# **5 Conventions** + +None. + +# **6 Overview of COINO based on bDDN** + +## **6.1 Introduction of COINO** + +The rapid evolution of market conditions and operational models has significantly increased demands on intelligent network operations. With the advancements of new technologies such as IMT-2020, network slicing, multi-access edge computing (MEC) and the Internet of things (IoT), novel demands are emerging, driving profound transformations in networks. These changes encompass shifts in service targets, scenarios and business applications. + +The target groups of the network have become diversified, expanding from individual users to encompass IoT applications, the MEC industry and other emerging domains. The service scenarios now cover personal, family convergence, IoT, telematics and smart factory applications. Meanwhile, network applications are transitioning from traditional personal services (e.g., phone calls, SMS and Internet access) to advanced services, such as virtual reality, augmented reality cloud games and drones. + +In this context, COINO emerges as a critical solution. It leverages advanced technologies such as big data analytics, artificial intelligence (AI), and network automation to enable real-time, intelligent and dynamic optimization of network resources and service delivery. It represents the shift from network-oriented operation to customer-oriented operation. COINO relies on key enablers including software- + +defined networking (SDN), network functions virtualization (NFV), bDDN and other technologies. These technologies facilitate the collection, analysis and utilization of massive operational data, supporting closed-loop control and intelligent decision-making across heterogeneous networks. + +By implementing COINO, telecom operators can enhance customer satisfaction, improve service agility, boost operational efficiency, and unlock new business opportunities. In an increasingly competitive and digitalized market, COINO embodies a strategic evolution toward smarter, more adaptive, and customer-oriented network operations. + +## 6.2 Overview of COINO based on bDDN + +Figure 6-1 illustrates the high-level framework of COINO based on bDDN. COINO has four kinds of capabilities, which are then rapidly deployed on bDDN to enable COINO functionality. + + + +The diagram illustrates the high-level framework of COINO based on bDDN. It is structured as follows: + +- Capabilities of COINO (Top Layer):** A dashed box containing four main capabilities: + - Network monitoring** and **Service tracking** are connected by a rightward arrow. + - Both lead into a branching structure that connects to **Demand matching** and **Technical value enhancement**, which are connected by a vertical double-headed arrow. +- bDDN (Center):** A central block labeled 'bDDN' is connected via dashed double-headed arrows to the 'Capabilities of COINO' box above and the 'Network plane' on the left. +- Three-Plane Architecture (Main Body):** + - Network plane (Left):** Contains 'Application' and 'Network controller' blocks. A downward arrow points from this plane to the 'Network infrastructure' layer. + - Big data plane (Center):** A vertical stack of four layers: 'Data intelligence and service layer', 'Network big data analyser layer', 'Network big data repository layer', and 'Network big data sensing layer'. It has bidirectional arrows connecting it to the 'Network plane' and the 'Management plane'. + - Management plane (Right):** Contains 'Network marketing and operation', 'Network administration', and 'Network maintenance' blocks. A downward arrow points from this plane to the 'Network infrastructure' layer. +- Network infrastructure (Bottom):** A wide green bar at the base of the architecture, receiving input from the Network and Management planes and providing a foundation for the Big data plane. + +Y.3661(25) + +Figure 6-1: High-level framework of COINO based on bDDN. The diagram shows a three-plane architecture (Network plane, Big data plane, Management plane) interacting with a central bDDN block and a bottom Network infrastructure layer. Above the bDDN block is a dashed box labeled 'Capabilities of COINO' containing 'Network monitoring', 'Service tracking', 'Demand matching', and 'Technical value enhancement'. + +**Figure 6-1 – High-level framework of COINO based on bDDN [ITU-T Y.3650]** + +Based on the three-plane architecture of bDDN, customer-oriented application acquires the network status and customer requirements through the big data plane, while the network plane and management plane employ AI and other algorithms to optimize the network and fulfil customer needs. + +COINO includes the following four kinds of capabilities [b-ITU-T Y.Sup50]: + +- **Network monitoring:** By building a real-time network operation situation-sensing system for equipment, networks, users and services, it provides real-time dynamic insight into network operation conditions from multiple dimensions; +- **Service tracking:** By aggregating data sources, it captures service object information and customer experience. Through correlation analysis and model mining, it explores the personalized demands of service recipients across different spatial and temporal scenarios; + +- Demand matching: By leveraging network situation awareness and service object insight, AI can precisely evaluate network status and customers' requirements. This facilitates intelligent matching between network capabilities and customer demands through network self-adjustment, self-optimization and self-healing autonomy; +- Technical value enhancement: Driven by advancements in big data and AI, COINO develops hierarchical intelligent capability-spanning connectivity, data processing and analytical tools, to deliver dynamic personalized services to further promote technical value enhancement. + +These capabilities can be implemented in bDDN and mapped to three planes, each of which will take over part of the business functions for accurate and efficient decision-making. + +# 7 Architecture of COINO based on bDDN + +Generally, COINO based on bDDN can be thought of as a class of services provided by bDDN. bDDN consists of the network plane, big data plane and management plane [ITU-T Y.3650]. In this Recommendation, COINO can provide four kinds of capabilities, according to capability characteristics. There are three kinds of implementation modes for COINO in bDDN, as follows: + +- Independent mode: COINO is implemented independent from bDDN. Figure 7-1 illustrates the architecture for the independent mode of COINO, COINO interaction with bDDN by the interface of bDDN. For the existing bDDN that add intelligent operation mechanism, using independent mode can reduce the modification to the original system and improve the deployment efficiency; + + + +Y.3661(25) + +Figure 7-1: Independent mode of COINO architecture diagram. The diagram shows COINO at the top, interacting with the bDDN block below it. The bDDN block is divided into three main planes: Management plane, Network plane, and Big data plane. The Management plane contains three aspects: Operation aspect (highlighted in blue), Administration aspect, and Maintenance aspect. The Network plane contains three layers: Application layer, Control layer, and Infrastructure layer. The Big data plane contains four layers: Intelligence and service layer, Network big data analyser layer, Network big data repository layer, and Network big data sensing layer. Bidirectional arrows indicate interactions between COINO and the Management plane, between the Management plane and both the Network and Big data planes, and between the Network and Big data planes. + +**Figure 7-1 – Independent mode of COINO** + +- Embedded mode: COINO is implemented within the management plane of bDDN. Figure 7-2 illustrates the architecture for the embedded mode. There are three aspects in the management plane, with COINO as a part of the operation aspect. This implementation mode is suitable for systems with high security requirements. Implementing COINO in the management plane can effectively control security risks; + + + +Figure 7-2: Embedded mode of COINO. This diagram shows the bDDN architecture with COINO embedded in the Management plane. The bDDN is enclosed in a dashed box and contains three main planes: Management, Network, and Big data. The Management plane includes 'Operation aspect', 'Administration aspect', and 'Maintenance aspect'. COINO is represented as a blue box within the 'Operation aspect'. The Network plane consists of 'Application layer', 'Control layer', and 'Infrastructure layer'. The Big data plane consists of 'Intelligence and service layer', 'Network big data analyser layer', 'Network big data repository layer', and 'Network big data sensing layer'. Bidirectional arrows connect the Management plane to both the Network and Big data planes. A bidirectional arrow also connects the Control layer to the Network big data analyser layer. The reference Y.3661(25) is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-2 – Embedded mode of COINO** + +- Parallel mode: COINO is implemented parallel to the management plane. Figure 7-3 illustrates the architecture for the parallel mode of COINO, which interacts with each plane in bDDN by interfaces of each plane. This deployment mode is suitable for systems with high decoupling requirements and realizes COINO by using relevant interfaces. + + + +Figure 7-3: Parallel mode of COINO. This diagram shows the bDDN architecture with COINO implemented parallel to the Management plane. The bDDN is enclosed in a dashed box and contains the same three main planes as Figure 7-2: Management, Network, and Big data. The Management plane includes 'Operation aspect', 'Administration aspect', and 'Maintenance aspect'. COINO is represented as a large blue box outside the bDDN dashed box. Bidirectional arrows connect the Management plane to COINO. Additionally, dashed bidirectional arrows connect COINO to each of the three planes (Management, Network, and Big data). The Network and Big data planes have the same internal structure as in Figure 7-2. A bidirectional arrow also connects the Control layer to the Network big data analyser layer. The reference Y.3661(25) is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 7-3 – Parallel mode of COINO** + +## 7.1 Architecture of the big data plane based on bDDN to realize COINO + +The big data plane is the core part of the bDDN architecture. It consists of four layers: the network big data sensing layer, the network big data repository layer, the network big data analyser layer and the data intelligence and service layer [ITU-T Y.3650]. + +To achieve COINO, the additional components need to be attached to the original architecture. + +### 7.1.1 Network big data repository layer + +The network big data sensing layer collects complete datasets and transmits them to the repository layer. In the COINO, the encountered data scenarios exhibit highly complex hierarchies, necessitating systematic approaches to data organization, management and processing, for establishing structured data hierarchy [b-ITU-T Y.3651]. + +As shown in Figure 7-4, the data in the warehouse is logically divided into three sub-layers: basic detailed sub-layer, data aggregation sub-layer and data mart sub-layer. Upper layer data processing depends on the lower layers' data outputs. These three sub-layers rely on structured data warehouse, semi-structured data repository and unstructured data repository. The hierarchical implementation enhances data organization, management and processing efficiency, ensuring the data system's orderliness. + + + +Figure 7-4: The architecture of network big data repository layer. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure within a box labeled 'Network big data repository layer'. At the top are three boxes: 'Structured data warehouse', 'Semi-structured data repository', and 'Unstructured data repository'. Below these is the 'Data mart sub-layer' (dashed red border) containing 'App label', 'Terminal label', 'User label', 'Network label', and an ellipsis. Below that is the 'Data aggregation sub-layer' (dashed red border) containing 'Fact table', 'DIM table', and 'Other tables'. Below that is the 'Data detailed sub-layer' (dashed red border), which is empty. At the bottom are two solid boxes: 'Big data resource pool' and 'Big data cache and queue'. Arrows point upwards from the 'Data detailed sub-layer' to the 'Data aggregation sub-layer', and from the 'Data aggregation sub-layer' to the 'Data mart sub-layer'. The 'Data mart sub-layer' also has arrows pointing up to the three top-level data repositories. + +Y.3661(25) + +Figure 7-4 – The architecture of network big data repository layer + +##### 7.1.1.1 Data detailed sub-layer + +The data sources in the data detailed sub-layer are extracted from business repositories, logs and other systems, and entered into this sub-layer after the extract, transform, load (ETL) process. This sub-layer provides raw data to subsequent sub-layers, reducing the impact of data analysis work on business systems. When the source data is loaded into this sub-layer, a series of operations such as denoising, de-duplication and field naming specification are performed. In order to consider the possible subsequent need for retroactive data issues, it is not recommended to do too much data cleansing work for this layer, according to the specific needs of the business. + +##### 7.1.1.2 Data aggregation sub-layer + +The data aggregation sub-layer performs advanced cleansing and normalization on data from the basic detailed sub-layer. In order to improve usability, this sub-layer usually adopts some dimension degradation methods to degrade dimensions to the fact table and reduce the association between the fact table and the dimension table. Aggregation operations are performed on the data, to generate some intermediate result tables to improve the reusability of the public indicators and reduce the duplication of the processing work. + +The data aggregation sub-layer contains various kinds of tables: + +- The fact table is the results table generated by data aggregation based on a certain dimension, in which a large amount of business metrics is stored. Usually, the data in the fact table is not allowed to be modified and new data is simply added to the fact table; +- The dimension table, sometimes called the lookup table, is a kind of table corresponding to the fact table; it keeps the attribute values of dimensions and can be associated with the fact table, which is equivalent to extracting and standardizing the frequently recurring attributes on the fact table and managing them in one table; +- Other tables. + +##### 7.1.1.3 Data mart sub-layer + +The data mart sub-layer implements multidimensional storage to serve specific functions or customer needs, including the definition of dimensions, indicators to be calculated, and the hierarchy of dimensions, to generate data cubes oriented to the needs of decision analysis. The data mart is the access layer of the data storage environment, which is used to provide data to the upper sub-layer applications. + +#### 7.1.1.4 Advantages of use in the hierarchical architecture + +- Clear data structure: each data layer has its role and responsibilities, which makes it easier to use and understand when maintaining; +- Simplify complex problems: break down a complex task into multiple steps to complete it in steps, with each layer solving only a specific problem; +- Uniform data calibre: through data layering, provide uniform data export and uniform output calibre; +- Reduce duplicate development: standardizing data layering and developing a common middle layer can greatly reduce the duplicate computation work. + +#### 7.1.2 Network big data analyser layer + +The network big data analyser layer specified in [ITU-T Y.3653] comprises two parts: big data processing and management. Within COINO architecture, big data processing requires refinement to improve its capability in addressing customer demands. As shown in Figure 7-5, this part consists of three integrated service modules: the data access service module, the computing service module and the algorithm service module. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of the network big data analyser layer. It is structured as a large container labeled 'Network big data processing part' on the left. Inside this container, there are three stacked service modules: + +- Algorithm service module**: Contains 'Pre-built algorithm library' and 'Model repositories'. +- Computing service module**: Contains 'Batch processing engine', 'Stream processing engine', and 'Graph computing engine'. +- Data access service module**: Contains 'Multi-source data adapters', 'Streaming and batch access interface', and 'Data quality inspection'. + +Y.3661(25) + +Architecture diagram of the network big data analyser layer showing three service modules: Algorithm, Computing, and Data access. + +**Figure 7-5 – The architecture of the network big data analyser layer** + +- Data access service module: this implements a multi-source adapter design that efficiently extracts data across all warehouse layers. It supports both streaming and batch access, through unified interfaces that integrate modern message-queuing technologies with traditional database connection protocols. The module also performs data quality validation, including schema verification, null value detection and outlier filtering, to ensure the delivery of clean, high-quality data for subsequent processing; +- Computing service module: this operates through a comprehensive framework with specified processing engines. The batch processing engine enables offline analysis and model training, while the stream processing engine supports real-time computation with advanced event stream handling capabilities [b-ITU-T Y.3651]. Additionally, the graph computing engine facilitates complex analyses, such as network topology modelling and user relationship mapping, thereby enhancing the system's analytical depth and flexibility; +- Algorithm service module: this offers a pre-built algorithm library spanning statistical analysis, machine learning and deep learning implementations. It maintains specialized model repositories for both network operations (supporting configuration management, predictive maintenance and performance optimization) and business services (enabling dynamic monitoring, intelligent resource allocation and customized industry solutions). + +This structure ensures agile adaption to diverse customer requirements for network resource allocation and service scenario customization. + +### 7.1.3 Data intelligence and service layer + +Figure 7-6 illustrates the architecture of the big data intelligence and service layer. This incorporates enhanced functionality within its service management module, introducing data heat analysis and model rationalization evaluation capabilities. Data heat analysis dynamically tracks the usage value of data assets, enabling optimized storage strategies and intelligent tagging logic. Model rationalization ensures a balanced trade-off between model performance, resource efficiency and regulatory compliance. These additions enable real-time monitoring of data utilization patterns across the system, facilitating workflow optimization for data tagging processes and supporting iterative improvements to tagging models. This integrated approach significantly improves both data utilization efficiency and the logical structuring of data tags. + + + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph BigDataIntelligenceServiceLayer [Big data intelligence and service layer] + RequestManagement[Request management] + AccessControl[Access control] + ServiceManagement[Service management] + + subgraph AutonomousActionPolicy [Autonomous action and policy] + DataHeatAssessment[Data heat and model rationalization assessment] + DataLabelingOptimization[Data labeling model iterative optimization] + end + + LoadBalance[Load balance] + end + +``` + +Y.3661(25) + +Architecture diagram of the big data intelligence and service layer. The diagram shows a central box labeled 'Big data intelligence and service layer'. Inside this box, there are three main components: 'Request management', 'Access control', and 'Service management' at the top. Below these is a large box labeled 'Autonomous action and policy', which contains two sub-boxes: 'Data heat and model rationalization assessment' and 'Data labeling model iterative optimization'. At the bottom of the main box is a box labeled 'Load balance'. The reference 'Y.3661(25)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure 7-6 – The architecture of the big data intelligence and service layer** + +## 7.2 Architecture of the network plane based on bDDN to realize COINO + +The network plane architecture, as shown in Figure 7-7, supports the capabilities required for COINO. It consists of three layers: the infrastructure layer, the control layer and the application layer. + +In the infrastructure layer, cloud-enabled infrastructure can better support diverse and emerging businesses and meet the different needs of customers. In the control layer, network control and orchestration enable the flexible allocation of network resources and dynamic control on demand; in + +the application layer, it is required that the network is able to be programmed by the application flexibly. + +It is required to maintain the normal operation of the entire network while being adjustable, to meet individual user requirements in terms of resource allocation and service prioritization. + + + +Figure 7-7: The architecture of the network plane. This diagram illustrates a three-layer architecture: Application layer, Control layer, and Infrastructure layer, all interacting with a Big data plane on the right. The Application layer contains three 'Business application' boxes. The Control layer contains 'Service management', 'Multi-domain multi-network orchestration', and four controllers: 'WAN controller', 'Core network controller', 'Metro network controller', and 'Access network controller'. The Infrastructure layer contains 'Forwarding' devices and 'VNF' (Virtual Network Functions). Bidirectional arrows connect the layers. The Big data plane receives 'Computing and analytical requirement' and 'Intelligent service' from the Control layer, and 'Data collection interface' from the Infrastructure layer. + +**Figure 7-7 – The architecture of the network plane** + +## **7.3 Architecture of the network management plane based on bDDN to realize COINO** + +Figure 7-8 shows the architecture of the network management plane. The network operation in the network management plane undertakes external application service requests, which include network monitoring requests, service tracking requests, and demand matching requests. This layer can build relevant application services according to business requirements, and an application service can be translated into several functions and sent to the corresponding data intelligence and service layer. + + + +Figure 7-8: The architecture of the network management plane. This diagram shows a three-tier structure. The top tier is 'Network operation', which includes 'Network monitoring requests', 'Service tracking requests', 'Demand matching requests', and an ellipsis. The middle tier is 'Network administration'. The bottom tier is 'Network maintenance'. + +**Figure 7-8 – The architecture of the network management plane** + +- Network monitoring provides flexible filtering, matching, classification and traceability of network operation data, rapid diagnosis of network faults, precise positioning of faults and root cause analysis with corresponding communication service models and network topology, and fault prediction through continuous self-learning of historical data to improve processing efficiency and accuracy. Based on the knowledge graph for deep feature mining and learning, an intelligent optimization engine is built, based on the large language model, + +to drive the network to actively make decisions in real time, with active optimization and adjustment, enabling the network to be in the best working condition at all times. + +- Service tracking refers to the capability to continuously monitor and analyse user requirements, service usage patterns, and network interactions across the entire service lifecycle. Leveraging the comprehensiveness, multi-dimensionality, neutrality and completeness of telecommunications operators' big data, service tracking enables the deep profiling and multi-dimensional insight of users, by cross-correlating data across various domains. +- Demand matching begins with service tracking, which enables the continuous capture of user requirements and service states to support the identification and prediction of user intentions. These insights are further refined and enriched into an intention library through intention learning. During the prediction process, multi-dimensional features are extracted and used as the input for data mining and AI modelling, enabling accurate expression of potential service demands and network capabilities. + +## 8 Mechanism for COINO based on bDDN + +## 8.1 The capabilities of COINO + +Figure 8-1 illustrates the modular capabilities of COINO and depicts the relationship between the four functional components. + +The four capabilities form an interdependent framework. Network monitoring serves as the foundational layer, providing real-time data on network status and performance. Service tracking builds upon this by capturing user behaviours and service usage patterns across the service lifecycle. These data inputs are then processed and interpreted by the demand matching capability which identifies and predicts user intentions, transforming raw data into meaningful service insights. Finally, technical value enhancement synthesizes all prior insights into intelligent actions that improve network efficiency, user satisfaction and operational agility. + +In summary, the four capabilities operate forming a closed-loop system that enables COINO. + + + +``` + +graph LR + subgraph NM [Network monitoring] + NM1[System-wide] + NM2[Scenario-based] + NM3[Business-oriented] + NM4[...] + end + subgraph ST [Service tracking] + ST1[Continuous service perception] + ST2[Lifecycle management] + ST3[Endpoints] + ST4[...] + end + subgraph DM [Demand matching] + DM1[Planning] + DM2[Maintenance] + DM3[Optimization] + DM4[...] + end + subgraph TE [Technical value enhancement] + TE1[Complaint semantic understanding] + TE2[User intent recognition] + TE3[End-to-end real-time analytics] + TE4[...] + end + NM --> ST + ST --> DM + ST --> TE + DM --> TE + +``` + +Y.3661(25) + +Figure 8-1: The capabilities of COINO. The diagram shows a flow from Network monitoring to Service tracking, then to Demand matching and Technical value enhancement. Network monitoring includes System-wide, Scenario-based, Business-oriented, and ... Service tracking includes Continuous service perception, Lifecycle management, Endpoints, and ... Demand matching includes Planning, Maintenance, Optimization, and ... Technical value enhancement includes Complaint semantic understanding, User intent recognition, End-to-end real-time analytics, and ... + +**Figure 8-1 – The capabilities of COINO** + +### 8.1.1 Network monitoring + +- This supports multi-dimensional real-time sensing of equipment status, performance indicators, engineering parameters and other operating conditions of various networks, providing real-time insight into network operating conditions; +- It supports network monitoring for over 10 key scenarios, such as campus, residential, high-speed railway and station environments. Each scenario follows specific performance + +indicators and monitoring methods. All data sources are collected into the big data layer through bDDN, providing strong support for the real-time control of the network status; + +- It supports network state perception in many new application scenarios, such as large bandwidth, low latency and multi-connection. + +### **8.1.2 Service tracking** + +- This supports 24/7 user-level business monitoring. Based on the algorithm model, through the understanding and prediction of user intentions, the next actions or behaviours of the customer can be learned, so as to plan the network capability set for customers to enable differentiated business experiences; +- It manages the whole life cycle of the customer, such as network access, business changes, package upgrades, complaints and satisfaction feedback, and makes targeted package signings and transfers, off-grid warnings, and business value-added strategies through service target intention mining and prediction, to improve user perception experience and market operation efficiency and promote operators' business form and market space diversification development; +- It not only supports the business perception of "people", but also supports the user-level business perception of various IoT. Through correlation analysis and model mining, the service perception evaluation under the multi-mode scenario is realized. + +### **8.1.3 Demand matching** + +- Through network monitoring and service tracking, customer needs can be satisfied from the perspective of planning, construction and maintenance, the matching between limited investment budget and numerous network construction needs can be realized, as well as the matching of excellent key performance indicators (KPIs) and excellent business perception; +- With the continuous enrichment of various new business data, the limitations of traditional means in creating value and solving dynamic problems of new business are becoming more and more obvious. By introducing AI and automation, the ability of data analysis and decision-making is enhanced, the visibility and insight of business and operations are improved as well as business efficiency, performance quality is guaranteed, and the needs of multiple scenarios, such as multiform network coverage, interference, rate, capacity and parameters, are realized; +- With the continuous improvement of the network, the application scenarios are more diversified and the service objects are changing from individual customers to business customers. The products are not limited to individuals but can also provide reliable network services according to the business needs of industries and enterprises, and subdivision industry solutions, such as intelligent factory, intelligent power, intelligent steel and intelligent port, are launched for vertical industries. + +### **8.1.4 Technical values enhancement** + +- Complaint semantic understanding refers to the use of natural language processing (NLP) techniques to deeply analyse and interpret the meaning behind user complaints. It aims to extract structured information, such as issue type, sentiment and affected service or product, enabling organizations to respond more effectively and identify systemic problems. +- User intent recognition is a critical component in conversational AI systems. It involves identifying the underlying goal or purpose of a user's input, such as making a reservation, asking for help or requesting information. Accurate intent detection enables systems to provide more relevant and personalized responses. +- End-to-end real-time analytics refers to an analytics system where data is processed, analysed and turned into actionable insights in real time, from ingestion to decision-making. This + +enables organizations to respond instantly to changing conditions, detect anomalies and optimize operations dynamically. + +## 8.2 The methods used in COINO based on bDDN + +### 8.2.1 Network monitoring method + +The service requests of COINO are received by the operation layer of the management plane and the tasks are issued by this layer. Figure 8-2 illustrates the comprehensive method of network monitoring, encompassing various stages and components that ensure effective management and analysis of network data. Network monitoring tasks are finally distributed to the network infrastructure layer and the network controller layer of the network plane, and network administration and network maintenance of the management plane, through the network big data analyser layer, network big data repository layer and network big data sensing layer in the big data plane. The network big data sensing layer collects the data of network status, performance and capacity, and other data of full system, full scenario and full business, which comes from the network infrastructure layer and the network controller layer in the network plane, and the network administration and network maintenance in the management plane. According to the business requirements, for rapid and convenient data visualization or data analysis, the collected data will be stored in layers. The network big data analyser layer predicts and extrapolates the operational situation of each part of the network through AI modelling, and provides proactive prediction, rapid sensing and early prevention of network failures. + + + +Figure 8-2: The network monitoring method. This diagram illustrates the flow of network monitoring tasks and data. On the left, a dashed box labeled 'Task confirmation' points to a large grey box labeled 'Task distribution'. Below this, two dashed boxes labeled 'Big data plane' and 'Management plane' are shown. In the center, a vertical stack of boxes represents the data processing layers: 'Management plane (Network operation)', 'Big data plane (Network big data analyser layer)', 'Big data plane (Network big data repository layer)', and 'Big data plane (Network big data sensing layer)'. These are connected by bidirectional arrows. At the bottom, a box labeled 'Management plane (Network administration) (Network maintenance)' and 'Network plane (Network infrastructure) (Network controller)' is shown. On the right, a dashed box labeled 'Result feedback' points to a dashed box labeled 'Data analysis', which points to a dashed box labeled 'Data storage', which points to a dashed box labeled 'Data acquisition'. A dashed line connects the 'Data acquisition' box to the 'Task distribution' box. The reference 'Y.3661(25)' is at the bottom right. + +Figure 8-2 – The network monitoring method + +### 8.2.2 Service tracking method + +Figure 8-3 illustrates the comprehensive method of service tracking within bDDN, focusing on how continuous monitoring and lifecycle management are implemented to ensure high levels of service quality and operational efficiency. The service tracking class task collects customer-related data through the network big data sensing layer and constructs a fused database by integrating data from the business domain, operation domain and other relevant domains. This enables the system to obtain the attributes and service experience of various types of service objects. Additionally, the task obtains customer-related application information currently in use through the application layer of the network plane. Through correlation analysis and model mining, the service perception evaluation is realized + +under the multi-mode scenario. The relationship description, intention inference and decision prediction are carried out for different entities, and the personalized demands of service objects in various spatial and temporal scenarios are explored in depth. + + + +Figure 8-3: The service tracking method. This diagram illustrates a multi-layered service tracking architecture. On the left, a vertical dashed box labeled 'Task distribution' receives input from 'Task confirmation' (dashed box) and sends output to 'Task distribution' (solid box). Below this, a dashed box contains 'Big data plane' and 'Management plane'. In the center, a stack of five solid boxes represents the network layers: 'Management plane (Network operation)', 'Big data plane (Network big data analyser layer)', 'Big data plane (Network big data repository layer)', 'Big data plane (Network big data sensing layer)', and 'Network plane (Network infrastructure) (Application)'. These layers are interconnected by bidirectional arrows. On the right, a vertical dashed box labeled 'Result feedback' receives input from 'Data analysis' (dashed box), which in turn receives input from 'Data storage' (dashed box), which receives input from 'Data acquisition' (dashed box). A dashed line connects the 'Task distribution' box to the 'Data acquisition' box. The reference 'Y.3661(25)' is located at the bottom right. + +**Figure 8-3 – The service tracking method** + +### 8.2.3 Demand matching method + +Figure 8-4 provides a detailed overview of the method of demand matching within bDDN. This figure illustrates how various components and processes work together to ensure that network resources are effectively allocated and managed in response to user demands [b-ITU-T Y.3656]. The demand matching is completed on top of the network monitoring and service tracking. Based on the existing tasks to obtain data, models, analysis results, etc., it is supplemented with relevant data and analysis means of application scenarios to automatically translate, the business intent of service objects into network language. This process generates hierarchical network parameters and configuration adjustment strategies, which are then sent to the management plane. Through the operation, administration and maintenance (OAM) interface, the management plane schedules and controls the network plane, ultimately realizing reasonable resource scheduling, problem effective demarcation, driving network self-adjustment, self-optimization and self-healing autonomy, and achieving intelligent matching of network capacity and customer demands. + + + +A complex architectural diagram illustrating the demand matching method across three planes: Network plane, Big data plane, and Management plane. The central flow shows a vertical stack of Big data plane layers: sensing, repository, and analyser, flanked by 'Task distribution' on the left and a data processing pipeline (acquisition, storage, analysis) on the right. The top of the diagram features Network plane components (infrastructure, controller, application) and Management plane components (operation, administration, maintenance). Control flows are indicated by solid and dashed arrows, showing a closed-loop system from task distribution to result feedback and self-healing network orchestration. + +**Figure 8-4 – The demand matching method** + +Figure 8-4 – The demand matching method + +### 9 The interface abilities for COINO based on bDDN + +The interface of the COINO mechanism mainly involves three parts: external interface, interfaces between planes and interfaces between layers. + +#### 9.1 External interface + +The external interface serves as the core hub for interactions between the bDDN system and external business environments, establishing a multi-layered protocol support framework through the *iBE* interface, as shown in Figure 9-1. + + + +A simple block diagram showing 'bDDN' at the top connected to 'External business system' at the bottom via a vertical line labeled 'iBE'. + +**Figure 9-1 – The interface between bDDN and external business systems** + +Figure 9-1 – The interface between bDDN and external business systems + +The system supports both traditional lightweight protocols, such as hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP)/representational state transfer (RESTful), which are suitable for low-frequency, small-payload request reception scenarios, and high-throughput communication mechanisms designed for high-frequency, large-data-volume result delivery. It also supports modern protocol stacks: HTTP/2 + +14 Rec. ITU-T Y.3661 (08/2025) + +significantly enhances transmission efficiency through connection multiplexing and flow control mechanisms; the high-performance remote procedure call (RPC) framework enables cross-language high-performance service calls via Protocol Buffers serialization; WebSocket establishes full-duplex communication channels, providing infrastructure for real-time data. + +For data formats, the system adopts standardized specifications to ensure interoperability: structured data undergoes rigorous validation; semi-structured data is encoded in optimized binary formats that support efficient serialization and storage compression; time-series data is processed using a dedicated line-based protocol designed for high-precision temporal handling. This comprehensive protocol and data format support enables the system to flexibly adapt to diverse business interaction scenarios. + +## 9.2 The interfaces between planes in bDDN + +The interfaces between planes in bDDN are *iBN*, *iBM*, *iNM* [ITU-T Y.3650], as shown in Figure 9-2. + + + +``` + +graph TD + BDP[Big data plane] ---|iBN| NP[Network plane] + BDP ---|iBM| MP[Management plane] + NP ---|iNM| MP + +``` + +Y.3661(25) + +Diagram showing the interfaces between planes in bDDN. The Big data plane is at the top, connected to the Network plane (left) and the Management plane (right) by lines labeled iBN and iBM respectively. The Network plane and the Management plane are connected to each other by a line labeled iNM. + +**Figure 9-2 – The interfaces between planes in bDDN** + +The system architecture shall incorporate high-performance data transfer protocols, to maximize operational efficiency, including support for columnar storage formats with advanced compression and encoding schemes to optimize data transfer and memory utilization. For network communications, the implementation shall support high-speed protocols, such as remote direct memory access (RDMA) and InfiniBand, particularly in high-performance computing environments, to enable low-latency, memory-to-memory data transfers, while minimizing communication overhead. This integrated approach of optimized storage formats and high-performance networking ensures efficient data processing with minimal resource consumption. + +## 9.3 The interfaces between layers in big data plane + +Within the big data plane, the interface between the network big data repository layer and the network big data analyser layer is represented by *iAS*, as shown in Figure 9-3. + + + +``` + +graph TD + NBDAL[Network big data analyser layer] ---|iAS| NBDRL[Network big data repository layer] + +``` + +Y.3661(25) + +Diagram showing the interface between layers in the big data plane. The Network big data analyser layer is at the top, connected to the Network big data repository layer below it by a vertical line labeled iAS. + +**Figure 9-3 – The interface between the network big data analyser layer and the network big data repository layer** + +The interface follows widely recognized communication methods, such as structured query language (SQL) and not only structured query language (NoSQL), RESTful application programming interfaces (APIs) and RPC frameworks. It is designed to efficiently transfer, process and format data for different analysis needs. The interface needs to be flexible and efficient to accommodate different + +types, sizes and sources of data, and to be able to seamlessly integrate into different learning modes, both online and offline. + +- Offline learning typically involves working with large static datasets. The interface to the data needs to support batch data loading, pre-processing and formatting capabilities, to transform the data into the form of inputs required by the model. The interface may include access to big data storage systems and support for dataset partitioning. +- Online learning requires the ability to process incoming data in real time. The interface to the data needs to have low-latency, real-time access and support streaming data processing. This may involve access to real-time data streams. + +# **10 Security considerations** + +When applying COINO in bDDN, security best practices should be adopted, such as authentication, authorization and access control, as described in [b-ITU-T Y.2704]. + +This Recommendation involves base station data, network performance data, service quality data, and application KPIs, to support customer-oriented decision-making and dynamic resource optimization. Customer data is neither accessed nor inspected. In addition, the big data used to implement requirements related to the COINO mechanism in bDDN should be protected in order to avoid it leaking and being destroyed. + +## Bibliography + +- [\[b-ITU-T Y.2704\]](#) Recommendation ITU-T Y.2704 (2010), *Security mechanisms and procedures for NGN*. +- [\[b-ITU-T Y.3651\]](#) Recommendation ITU-T Y.3651 (2018), *Big-data-driven networking - mobile network traffic management and planning*. +- [\[b-ITU-T Y.3656\]](#) Recommendation ITU-T Y.3656 (2023), *Big data driven networking-mechanism of network service provisioning*. +- [\[b-ITU-T Y.Sup50\]](#) Supplement 50 (2018), ITU-T Y.3650-series, *Use case and application scenario for big-data-driven networking*. + + + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3701-202508-I_PDF-E/0b87abe67b21a93777287649c33e755d_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3701-202508-I_PDF-E/0b87abe67b21a93777287649c33e755d_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 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+1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:fab3fdcc8512391e1ee97ab1729d870be9b0ea05482809bc37052fce9f6b3b95 +size 43734 diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3809-202202-I_PDF-E/raw.md b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3809-202202-I_PDF-E/raw.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9321d8dccf4c86dcc05d08649696be916dcde30c --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3809-202202-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,616 @@ + + +# ITU-T + +TELECOMMUNICATION +STANDARDIZATION SECTOR +OF ITU + +## Y.3809 + +(02/2022) + +SERIES Y: GLOBAL INFORMATION +INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, +NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF +THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +Quantum key distribution networks + +# --- **A role-based model in quantum key distribution networks deployment** + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3809 + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | + +## FUTURE NETWORKS + +### CLOUD COMPUTING + +### BIG DATA + +### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS + +Y.3800–Y.3999 + +### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 | + +For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations. + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3809 + +# A role-based model in quantum key distribution networks deployment + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3809 describes roles, a role-based model and service scenarios in quantum key distribution networks (QKDN) from different deployment and operation perspectives within existing user networks for supporting security applications services. + +This Recommendation can be used as a guideline for applying QKDN from a role point of view as well as for deployment and operation of QKDN from a telecom operators' point of view. + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3809 | 2022-02-13 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/14866 | + +## Keywords + +QKDN, role-based model, service scenarios. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
performance prediction..... | 11 | +| Bibliography..... | 13 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3814 + +# Quantum key distribution networks – functional requirements and architecture for machine learning enablement + +## 1 Scope + +This Recommendation specifies one possible set of functional requirements and a possible architecture for ML-enabled QKDN (QKDNml). + +In particular, the Recommendation includes: + +- Overview of QKDNml; +- Functional requirements of QKDNml; +- Functional architecture of QKDNml; +- Operational procedures of QKDNml. + +This Recommendation specifies requirements for generic data collection. It does not specify the requirements for specific data related to personally identifiable information (PII). + +## 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T Y.3170] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3170 (2018), *Requirements for machine learning-based quality of service assurance for the IMT-2020 network*. +- [ITU-T Y.3172] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3172 (2019), *Architectural framework for machine learning in future networks including IMT-2020*. +- [ITU-T Y.3800] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3800 (2019), *Overview on networks supporting quantum key distribution*. +- [ITU-T Y.3801] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3801 (2020), *Functional requirements for quantum key distribution networks*. +- [ITU-T Y.3802] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3802 (2020), *Quantum key distribution networks - Functional architecture*. + +## 3 Definitions + +### 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 key manager (KM)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) node to perform key management in the key management layer. + +**3.1.2 machine learning (ML)** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Processes that enable computational systems to understand data and gain knowledge from it without necessarily being explicitly programmed. + +NOTE – Definition adapted from [b-ETSI GR ENI 004]. + +**3.1.3 machine learning function orchestrator (MLFO)** [ITU-T Y.3172]: A logical node with functionalities that manage and orchestrate the nodes in a machine learning pipeline. + +**3.1.4 machine learning model** [ITU-T Y.3172]: Model created by applying machine learning techniques to data to learn from. + +NOTE 1 – A machine learning model is used to generate predictions (e.g., regression, classification, clustering) on new (untrained) data. + +NOTE 2 – A machine learning model may be encapsulated in a deployable fashion in the form of a software (e.g., virtual machine, container) or hardware component (e.g., IoT device). + +NOTE 3 – Machine learning techniques include learning algorithms (e.g., learning the function that maps input data attributes to output data). + +**3.1.5 machine learning pipeline** [ITU-T Y.3172]: A set of logical nodes, each with specific functionalities, that can be combined to form a machine learning application in a telecommunication network. + +NOTE – The nodes of a machine learning pipeline are entities that are managed in a standard manner and can be hosted in a variety of network functions. + +**3.1.6 machine learning sandbox** [ITU-T Y.3172]: An environment in which machine learning models can be trained, verified and their effects on the network analysed. + +NOTE – A machine learning sandbox is designed to prevent a machine learning application from affecting the network, or to restrict the usage of certain machine learning functionalities. + +**3.1.7 quantum key distribution (QKD)** [b-ETSI GR QKD 007]: Procedure or method for generating and distributing symmetrical cryptographic keys with information theoretical security based on quantum information theory. + +**3.1.8 quantum key distribution link (QKD link)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A communication link between two quantum key distribution (QKD) modules to operate the QKD. + +NOTE – A QKD link consists of a quantum channel for the transmission of quantum signals, and a classical channel used to exchange information for synchronization and key distillation. + +**3.1.9 quantum key distribution module (QKD module)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A set of hardware and software components that implements cryptographic functions and quantum optical processes, including quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, synchronization, distillation for key generation, and is contained within a defined cryptographic boundary. + +NOTE – A QKD module is connected to a QKD link, acting as an endpoint module in which a key is generated. These are two types of QKD modules, namely, the transmitters (QKD-Tx) and the receivers (QKD-Rx). + +**3.1.10 quantum key distribution network (QKDN)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A network comprised of two or more quantum key distribution (QKD) nodes connected through QKD links. + +NOTE – A QKDN allows sharing keys between the QKD nodes by key relay when they are not directly connected by a QKD link. + +**3.1.11 quantum key distribution network controller (QKDN controller)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) network control layer to control a QKD network. + +**3.1.12 quantum key distribution network manager (QKDN manager)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A functional module, which is located in a quantum key distribution (QKD) network management layer to monitor and manage a QKD network. + +**3.1.13 quantum key distribution node (QKD node)** [ITU-T Y.3800]: A node that contains one or more quantum key distribution (QKD) modules protected against intrusion and attacks by unauthorized parties. + +NOTE – A QKD node can contain a key manager (KM). + +### 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +This Recommendation defines the following term: + +**3.2.1 Machine learning-enabled quantum key distribution network (ML-enabled QKDN):** A quantum key distribution network (QKDN) that extends or enhances its functionalities enabled by machine learning (ML) capabilities to achieve different objectives. + +NOTE 1 – ML is an optional functionality for QKDN. + +NOTE 2 – Examples of different objectives are specified in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]. + +## 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|--------|------------------------------------------------------------| +| C | Collector (machine learning pipeline) | +| D | Distribution (machine learning pipeline) | +| FCAPS | Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance and Security | +| KM | Key Manager | +| M | Model (machine learning pipeline) | +| ML | Machine Learning | +| MLFO | Machine Learning Function Orchestrator | +| P | Policy (machine learning pipeline) | +| PII | Personally Identifiable Information | +| PP | Pre-Processor (machine learning pipeline) | +| QKD | Quantum Key Distribution | +| QKDN | Quantum Key Distribution Network | +| QKDNml | ML-enabled Quantum Key Distribution Network | +| RUL | Remaining Use Life | +| SINK | Sink node | +| SRC | Source node | +| XLMO | Cross-Layer Management and Orchestration | + +## 5 Conventions + +In this Recommendation: + +The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed. + +The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance. + +## 6 Overview + +QKDN is a technology that extends the reachability and availability of QKD, as stated in [ITU-T Y.3800]. A QKDN comprises two or more QKD nodes connected through QKD links. In a QKDN, two or more designated parties in a user network can share the keys for various cryptographic applications. A QKDN is expected to maintain stable operations and meet the requirements of various cryptographic applications in an efficient way. However, when the QKDN becomes large scale and + +complex, QKDN performance optimization in the quantum layer, key management layer, QKDN control and management layer can be challenging. + +In detail, to improve its performance, a QKDN faces the following important challenges: + +- 1) Without awareness of sudden QKDN performance deterioration in advance, the cost (e.g., time cost, labour cost) and instability of a QKDN will increase. +- 2) For the large amount of heterogenous data in a QKDN, there is difficulty to accurately perceive the needed and valuable information for use, which will affect QKDN performance. +- 3) Since the requirements of cryptographic applications vary (e.g., different security requirements) and a large number of cryptographic applications arrive and leave dynamically, it is difficult to schedule the QKDN resources for cryptographic applications given the limited resources available. + +To overcome the above challenges, applying machine learning (ML) technology to QKDN is a promising solution. ML can extract implicit relationships between input and output data, and use this learned mapping to analyse new data. It has been applied to the networking field, which can intelligently learn various network environments and react to dynamic situations ([ITU-T Y.3170]). In recent years, ML technologies based on neural networks have seen many developments in both hardware and software, and they have attracted attention from both academia and industry. An increasing number of new low-power devices are also implementing on-board acceleration chips for neural networks. + +There can be many benefits of enabling ML in QKDN. Application use cases of enabling ML to achieve different objectives in a QKDN have been specified in [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]. In the quantum layer of a QKDN, ML can be applied to realize quantum channel performance prediction, QKD system parameter optimization and RUL prediction of components in a QKD system; in the key management layer of a QKDN, ML can be applied to realize intelligent key formatting, key storage management, and suspicious behaviour detection; in the control and management layers of a QKDN, ML can be applied in key relay routing and fault prediction to improve control and management efficiency. + +With the advantages of ML and particularly those related to autonomous learning, ML can support overcoming the challenges of QKDN performance optimization in the quantum layer, key management layer, and QKDN control and management layer. Thus, an ML-enabled QKDN (QKDNml) can accelerate the optimization of a QKDN by extending or enhancing QKDN functionalities. Note, however, that ML is an optional functionality for the QKDN according to the functional requirements and architecture of the QKDN stated in [ITU-T Y.3801] and [ITU-T Y.3802]. To enable ML for a QKDN, this Recommendation specifies one possible set of functional requirements and a possible architecture for QKDNml, including an overview and the functional requirements, architecture and operational procedures of QKDNml. + +## **7 Functional requirements of QKDNml** + +The additional high-level and functional requirements related to ML are specified in this subclause to extend the high-level requirements defined in [ITU-T Y.3801]. + +### **7.1 High-level requirements of QKDNml** + +The high-level requirements of QKDNml are as follows: + +- It is required to support configuration, management and orchestration for ML-related functional components; +- It is required to support data collection, data pre-processing, data repository, modelling and training functions; +- It is required to support ML models for different objectives in QKDNml; + +- It is recommended to use the existing reference points defined in [ITU-T Y.3802] and extend them with reference points specific to ML capabilities; +- It is recommended to use declarative specifications for specifying different objectives in QKDNml. + +### 7.2 Functional requirements of QKDNml data collection + +QKDN data can be collected from the quantum layer, key management layer, QKDN control layer, QKDN management layer, service layer and user network management layer either passively or actively. The functional requirements of QKDNml data collection are as follows: + +- It is required to be able to collect both static and dynamic QKDN data from the quantum layer, key management layer, QKDN control layer and QKDN management layer. + NOTE 1 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the quantum layer, for example, parameters of QKD modules and history status information of QKD modules; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the quantum layer, for example, quantum bit error rates, key generation rates and performance information of QKD modules. + NOTE 2 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the key management layer, for example, history key management layer data set; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the key management layer, for example, status of key storage and status of key authentication. + NOTE 3 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the QKDN control layer, for example, parameters of QKD modules and history status information of QKD modules; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the QKDN control layer, for example, routing and rerouting information and status of resource allocation. + NOTE 4 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the QKDN management layer, for example, history data of fault management, history data of configuration and history data of security management; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the QKDN management layer, for example, multilayer resource usage data and multilayer performance data. +- It is recommended to collect both static and dynamic QKDN data from the service layer and user network management layer. + NOTE 1 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the service layer, for example, history cryptographic application information; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the service layer, for example, current cryptographic applications information. + NOTE 2 – Static QKDN data can be collected from the user network management layer, for example, history user requirements; dynamic QKDN data can be collected from the user network management layer, for example, current user requirements. + +### 7.3 Functional requirements for QKDNml data pre-processing and repository + +The functional requirements of QKDNml data pre-processing and repository are as follows: + +- It is required to perform extract-transform-load and transform the collected multisource, heterogeneous QKDN raw data into understandable, unified and easy-to-use structures. +- It is required to clean and filter noisy data from the collected heterogeneous QKDN raw data. +- It is recommended to normalize and unify the data format of the collected heterogeneous QKDN raw data for further storage and analysis. +- It is recommended to store the heterogeneous QKDN pre-processed data. +- It is recommended to store catalogues and data sets for ML models. + +### 7.4 Functional requirements for QKDNml modelling and training + +The functional requirements of QKDNml modelling and training are as follows: + +- It is required to support ML models based on the pre-processed QKDN data and the specified objective. + +- It is required to support ML model training and model updates while preventing impact on QKDNml. +- It is recommended to train ML models based on the available pre-processed QKDN data for the specified objective in QKDNml. + +## 8 Functional architecture of QKDNml + + + +Figure 8-1: Functional architecture model of QKDNml. The diagram shows a multi-layered architecture. At the top is the 'Service layer' containing a 'Cryptographic application' with an external interface 'Ax'. This connects via 'Ma' to the 'User network management layer' containing a 'User network manager'. Below these is the 'QKDN ML layer' (shaded), which includes 'QKDN ML functions', 'QKDN ML repository', 'QKDN ML sandbox', and 'QKDN ML management'. This layer connects via 'Mu' to the 'QKDN control layer' and 'QKDN management layer'. The 'QKDN control layer' contains a 'QKDN controller' with sub-components: 'Access control', 'Policy based control', 'Routing control', 'Session control', 'Configuration control', and 'QKDN controller control and management'. It has an external interface 'Cx' and connects via 'Ck' to the 'Key management layer'. The 'Key management layer' contains 'Key manager (KM)', 'KSA', 'KMA', and 'KM control and management'. It connects via 'Mk' to the 'QKDN management layer'. The 'QKDN management layer' contains a 'QKDN manager' with 'FCAPS functions' (Control layer management, Key management layer management, Quantum layer management) and 'ML SRC/SINK' blocks for each. A vertical bar on the right is labeled 'Cross-layer management orchestration'. The 'QKDN management layer' connects via 'Mml' to the 'QKDN ML layer'. The 'QKDN management layer' also connects via 'Mc', 'Cqrp', 'Cops', 'Mq', 'Mops', and 'Mqrp' to the 'Quantum layer'. The 'Quantum layer' contains a 'QKD module' and a 'QKD link'. The 'QKD module' connects via 'Kq-1' and 'Kq-2' to the 'QKD link'. The 'QKD link' connects via 'Mqrp' to the 'QKDN management layer'. The diagram is labeled 'Y.3814(23)' at the bottom right. + +**Figure 8-1 – Functional architecture model of QKDNml** + +To enable ML capabilities for QKDN, a new QKDN ML layer is introduced with QKDN layer specific ML capabilities. The QKDN ML layer consists of QKDN ML functions, a QKDN ML repository, a QKDN ML sandbox and QKDN ML management. The QKDN management layer also specifies QKDN layer specific ML source nodes (SRCs) and SINKs. ML pipelines in QKDNml can be constructed to realize ML applications for different objectives. The interaction between QKDN ML layer and QKDN management layer is made through a newly introduced reference point Mml between QKDN ML management in the QKDN ML layer and the cross-layer management orchestration in the QKDN management layer. The functional architecture model of QKDNml is specified in Figure 8-1. + +### 8.1 QKDN ML layer in QKDNml + +There are QKDN ML functions, QKDN ML repository, QKDN ML sandbox ([ITU-T Y.3172]), and QKDN ML management in the QKDN ML layer, which are responsible for configuration, management and orchestration for ML-related functional components in QKDNml. + +#### 8.1.1 QKDN ML functions + +The QKDN ML functions support a set of functional elements in a ML pipeline subsystem including collector (C), pre-processor (PP), model (M), policy (P) and distributor (D). + +- **C:** responsible for collecting QKDN data from one or more SRC(s). The C may have the capability to configure SRC nodes. Such configurations may be used to control the nature of data, its granularity and periodicity while it is generated from SRCs. +- **PP:** responsible for cleaning, aggregating, normalizing and performing any other PP of heterogeneous data that should be in a suitable form so that the M can consume it. +- **M:** responsible for deploying the trained ML models for different objectives in QKDNml. +- **P:** responsible for making P decisions in QKDNml based on the results of the M. +- **D:** responsible for identifying the SINK(s) and distributing the P decisions to the corresponding SINK(s) in QKDNml. + +#### 8.1.2 QKDN ML repository + +The ML repository's function is to store various data sets collected from ML SRCs, pre-processed by PP, generated by ML models and catalogues of ML models, and so on. It can be used by QKDN ML management, ML functions and the ML sandbox. + +#### 8.1.3 QKDN ML sandbox + +A QKDN ML sandbox is an isolated domain that allows the hosting of separate ML pipelines to train, test and evaluate them before deploying them in a QKDN. The QKDN ML sandbox subsystem allows network operators to study the effect of ML outputs before deploying them on live QKDNs. For training or testing, the QKDN ML sandbox can use data generated from a simulated ML underlay QKDN. + +#### 8.1.4 QKDN ML management + +This QKDN ML management includes intent and a machine learning function orchestrator (MLFO). + +- **Intent in QKDNml:** Intent is a declarative description ([ITU-T Y.3172]) in QKDNml. The intent provides a basis for mapping ML use cases to different QKDN layers. + +NOTE 1 – Intent is a declarative description which is used to specify a ML application. Intent does not specify any technology-specific network functions to be used in the ML application and provides a basis for mapping ML use cases to diverse technology-specific instantiations. Intent can use a meta language specific for machine learning to define ML applications. ([ITU-T Y.3172]) + +- **MLFO in QKDNml:** MLFO has functionalities that manage and orchestrate the nodes of the ML pipelines and ML sandbox based on the intent or dynamic conditions in QKDNml. The MLFO provides chaining functionality, i.e., connecting ML nodes together to form an ML pipeline. It also supports ML model selection for different objectives. + +NOTE 2 – For example, chaining can be used to connect an SRC specific to the quantum layer with the ML functions in the QKDN ML layer. The MLFO determines the chaining considering the constraints (e.g., timing constraints for prediction). ([ITU-T Y.3172]) + +### 8.2 ML pipeline SRC/SINK in QKDNml + +An ML pipeline in QKDNml is a set of logical nodes, each with specific functionalities that can be combined to form an ML application in QKDNml. The ML pipeline in QKDNml has three parts including SRCs, ML functions and SINKs. The ML functions are able to collect input data from SRCs + +([ITU-T Y.3172]) in different QKDN layers. The SINK, as the target of the ML output ([ITU-T Y.3172]), can be the elements in quantum layer, key management layer and QKDN control and management layers. The ML pipeline SRCs and SINKs are managed in fault, configuration, accounting, performance and security (FCAPS) function in the QKDN management layer. More details related to the ML pipeline can be found in [ITU-T Y.3172]. + +#### 8.2.1 SRCs in QKDNml + +The SRCs in QKDNml are the source nodes of QKDN data that can be used as input to the ML functions in QKDNml. The types of SRCs include: + +- **Quantum layer ML SRC:** responsible for reporting the data (static, dynamic) from QKD modules and links in the quantum layer to QKDN ML functions; +- **Key management layer ML SRC:** responsible for reporting the data (static, dynamic) from the key manager in the key management layer to QKDN ML functions; +- **Control layer ML SRC:** responsible for reporting the data (static, dynamic) from the QKDN controller in the QKDN control layer to QKDN ML functions. + +#### 8.2.2 SINKs in QKDNml + +The SINKs are the targets of the ML output in QKDNml on which actions are taken. The types of SINKs can include: + +- **Quantum layer ML SINK:** represents that the QKD module or the QKD link is the target of configurations (as a result of ML pipeline execution) in the quantum layer; +NOTE 1 – ML output is applied to QKD modules or QKD links to optimize quantum layer performances of QKDN. The use cases can include ML-based QKD system parameter optimization, ML-based quantum channel performance prediction and ML-based RUL prediction of components in a QKD system ([b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]). +- **Key management layer ML SINK:** represents that the key manager is the target of configurations in the key management layer; +NOTE 2 – ML output is applied to the key manager in the key management layer to optimize key management efficiency and stability. Three use cases are ML-based key formatting, ML-based key storage management and ML-based suspicious behaviour detection in the key management layer ([b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]). +- **Control layer ML SINK:** represents that the QKDN controller is the target of configurations in the QKDN control layer. +NOTE 3 – ML output is applied to the QKDN controller in the QKDN control layer to improve QKDN control efficiency. Two use cases are ML-based data collection and data pre-processing and ML-based routing ([b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]). + +### 8.3 Reference points + +Most of the reference points in Figure 8-1 have been defined in [ITU-T Y.3802]. This Recommendation defines the newly added one and presents the existing ones related to ML functionalities. + +NOTE – The new, extended ML-enabled functions are implemented by extending the interaction information of reference points. + +The newly added reference point is: + +- **Mml:** a reference point connecting QKDN ML management and the QKDN manager. It is responsible for exchanging the intent information and the management and orchestration information of MLFO between the QKDN ML management and the QKDN manager. + +The existing reference points in [ITU-T Y.3802] related to ML include: + +- **Mc**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and a QKDN controller control and management function in a QKDN controller. It is responsible for the QKDN manager's collecting the data from the QKDN controller for ML functions and applying ML output on the QKDN controller. +- **Mk**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager and a KM control and management function in a KM. It is responsible for the QKDN manager's collecting the data from KM for ML functions and applying ML output on the KM. +- **Mq**: a reference point connecting the QKDN manager with a QKD module control and management function in a QKD module. It is responsible for the QKDN manager's collecting the data from QKD modules for ML functions and applying ML output on QKD modules. +- **Mqrp, Mops**: reference points connecting the QKDN manager and the QKD link. They are responsible for the QKDN manager's collecting the data from QKD links for ML functions and applying ML output on QKD links. + +## 9 Operational procedures of QKDNml + +In QKDNml, QKDN functionalities are extended or enhanced by enabling ML capabilities for different objectives. Figure 9-1 shows a general operational procedure of QKDNml for a specific objective. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant QKDN_ML_management as QKDN ML management + participant XLMO as XLMO + participant QKDN_ML_SRC as QKDN ML SRC + participant QKDN_ML_functions as QKDN ML functions + participant QKDN_ML_SINK as QKDN ML SINK + + QKDN_ML_management->>QKDN_ML_management: 1. Translate the objective into QKDNml intent and obtain management and orchestration information + QKDN_ML_management->>XLMO: 2. Input the management and orchestration information of MLFO + XLMO->>XLMO: 3. Manage and orchestrate the ML pipeline nodes + XLMO->>QKDN_ML_SRC: 4-1. Configure QKDN ML SRCs + XLMO->>QKDN_ML_functions: 4-2. Configure QKDN ML functions + XLMO->>QKDN_ML_SINK: 4-3. Configure QKDN ML SINKs + XLMO->>QKDN_ML_SRC: 5. Collect the needed QKDN data + QKDN_ML_SRC->>QKDN_ML_functions: 6. Report the collected data to ML functions + QKDN_ML_functions->>QKDN_ML_functions: 7. Perform the ML functions + QKDN_ML_functions->>QKDN_ML_SINK: 8. Distribute the ML output to QKDN ML SINK + QKDN_ML_SINK->>QKDN_ML_SINK: 9. Take actions on the target QKDN functional element + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the operational procedure of QKDNml across four layers: QKDN ML layer (management), QKDN management layer (XLMO, SRC), QKDN ML layer (functions), and QKDN management layer (SINK). The steps are as follows: + +1. Translate the objective into QKDNml intent and obtain management and orchestration information (QKDN ML management). +2. Input the management and orchestration information of MLFO (QKDN ML management to XLMO). +3. Manage and orchestrate the ML pipeline nodes (XLMO). +- 4-1. Configure QKDN ML SRCs (XLMO to QKDN ML SRC). +- 4-2. Configure QKDN ML functions (XLMO to QKDN ML functions). +- 4-3. Configure QKDN ML SINKs (XLMO to QKDN ML SINK). +5. Collect the needed QKDN data (XLMO to QKDN ML SRC). +6. Report the collected data to ML functions (QKDN ML SRC to QKDN ML functions). +7. Perform the ML functions (QKDN ML functions). +8. Distribute the ML output to QKDN ML SINK (QKDN ML functions to QKDN ML SINK). +9. Take actions on the target QKDN functional element (QKDN ML SINK). + +Figure 9-1: A general operational procedure of QKDNml. The diagram shows a sequence of steps across four layers: QKDN ML layer (management), QKDN management layer (XLMO, SRC), QKDN ML layer (functions), and QKDN management layer (SINK). + +**Figure 9-1 – A general operational procedure of QKDNml** + +- 1) QKDN ML management translates the objective of the ML application in QKDNml into QKDNml intent, which is a declarative description used to specify the objectives of extending + +or enhancing the QKDN functionalities using ML. The intent is the information for technology-specific implementation. + +- 2) QKDN ML management inputs the management and orchestration information of MLFO to cross-layer management orchestration (XLMO) in the QKDN manager using the reference point Mml. +- 3) XLMO manages and orchestrates the ML pipeline nodes based on the intent or dynamic network conditions. +- 4) XLMO configures QKDN ML SRCs and ML SINKs using the reference points among Mc, Mk, Mq, Mqrp, Mops and Mu; XLMO configures QKDN ML functions using the reference point Mml. +- 5) QKDN ML SRCs collect the needed QKDN data from QKDN layers. +- 6) QKDN ML SRCs report the collected QKDN data to the QKDN ML functions. +- 7) QKDN ML functions in the QKDN ML layer are performed. + +NOTE – In the ML functions, the C collects the data reported from SRCs to PP. PP cleans the collected QKDN data by removing noisy data and transforms the cleaned data into a unified data format. The pre-processed QKDN data is transferred to M. The intent is performed by the deployed M selected by the MLFO. The outputs of the ML model are transferred to the P. Given ML output of M, a QKDN policy decision can be made by P. The policy decision results are transferred to D. + +- 8) D distributes the ML output to the QKDN ML SINKs instantiated by the components in QKDN layers corresponding to the intent in QKDNml. +- 9) QKDN ML pipeline SINK takes actions on the target QKDN functional element. + +## Appendix I + +### Use case of the operational procedures for ML-enabled quantum channel performance prediction + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +During the QKD process, the noise in the quantum channel will reduce the quality of the quantum channel and cause a low key rate. The use case of ML-enabled quantum channel performance prediction ([b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70]) is shown. Firstly, the quantum channel related data and the corresponding quantum channel performance are collected through quantum channel measurement for ML model training and testing. Then, with the trained ML model, the quantum channel performance can be predicted based on the current input quantum channel related data. Lastly, according to the predicted channel performance, feedback and adjustment can be finished in advance to improve the channel environment and reduce unnecessary loss caused by key rate decreases. The detailed operational procedures are as follows: + +- 1) The intent translated by QKDN ML management is used to specify the quantum channel performance prediction, and is then input into the MLFO to obtain management and orchestration information. The quantum channel performance prediction forecasts the future quantum channel performance under different channel noise environments, so that measures can be taken in advance based on the predictions to improve the channel environment and leave the quantum channel in an optimal performance state. +- 2) QKDN ML management inputs the management and orchestration information of MLFO to XLMO in the QKDN manager using the reference point Mml. The information specifies managing and orchestrating the ML pipeline subsystems to realize ML-based quantum channel performance prediction. The information can include the need to configure the quantum layer ML SRC, QKDN ML functions and quantum layer ML SINK. +- 3) XLMO manages and orchestrates the ML pipeline nodes for connecting ML pipeline nodes together to form an ML pipeline including quantum layer ML SRC, QKDN ML functions and quantum layer ML SINK. +- 4) XLMO configures quantum layer ML SRC and quantum layer ML SINK using the reference points Mq; XLMO configures QKDN ML functions using the reference point Mml. +- 5) Quantum layer ML SRC collects the quantum channel parameters in the quantum layer. +- 6) Quantum layer ML SRC reports the collected QKDN data to the QKDN ML functions. +- 7) QKDN ML functions in the QKDN ML layer are performed. + +NOTE 1 – C transfers the collected data to the PP, which includes the quantum-channel-performance-related parameters, such as the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of quantum channel, the single photon detection output counter and code formation rates under different noise environments. + +NOTE 2 – PP cleans the collected QKDN data by removing noisy data and transforms the cleaned data into a unified data format. The pre-processed QKDN data is transferred to M after intelligent analysis. + +NOTE 3 – Quantum channel performance prediction is performed by the ML models in the M. The outputs of the ML model are the predicted quantum channel performance values, which are transferred to the P. + +NOTE 4 – Given the predicted quantum channel performance, a Q policy decision is made by the P to minimize impacts when the output of ML is applied to a live network. The policy decision results are transferred to the D. + +- 8) Distributes the ML output related to the predicted channel performance to the quantum layer ML SINK instantiated by the QKD modules in the quantum layer. + +- 9) According to the predicted channel performance, feedback and adjustment can be finished by quantum layer ML SINK to improve the channel environment and reduce unnecessary loss caused by key rate decreases. + +## Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y-Suppl.70] Supplement 70 to ITU-T Y.3800-series Recommendations (2021), *Quantum key distribution networks – Applications of machine learning*. +- [b-ETSI GR ENI 004] ETSI GR ENI 004 V1.1.1 (2018), *Experiential networked intelligence (ENI); Terminology for main concepts in ENI*. +- [b-ETSI GR QKD 007] ETSI GR QKD 007 (2018), *Quantum key distribution (QKD); Vocabulary*. + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git 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b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.3815-202309-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,371 @@ + + +# Recommendation**ITU-T Y.3815 (09/2023)** + +SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +Quantum key distribution networks + +# --- **Quantum key distribution networks – Overview of resilience** + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +# **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES** + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 | +| General | Y.100-Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200-Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300-Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400-Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500-Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600-Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700-Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800-Y.899 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 | +| General | Y.1000-Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100-Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200-Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300-Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400-Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500-Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600-Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700-Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800-Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900-Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 | +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000-Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100-Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200-Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250-Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300-Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400-Y.2499 | +| Computing power networks | Y.2500-Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600-Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700-Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800-Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900-Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 | +| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 | +| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 | +| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 | +| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.3815 + +# Quantum key distribution networks – Overview of resilience + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.3815 gives an overview of resilience and conceptual models of protection and recovery for quantum key distribution networks for seamless key supply even in the case of network failure. + +## History \* + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.3815 | 2023-09-29 | 13 | 11.1002/1000/15643 | + +## Keywords + +Conceptual model, overview, QKD network (QKDN), quantum key distribution (QKD), resilience. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
monitoring system and associated sites ..... | 3 | +| 7 Requirements of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring
system ..... | 6 | +| 7.1 Generic requirements ..... | 6 | +| 7.2 Sensor device requirements ..... | 7 | +| 7.3 Gateway device requirements ..... | 7 | +| 7.4 Monitoring platform requirements ..... | 8 | +| 7.5 Network requirements ..... | 8 | +| Appendix I – Use cases of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring ..... | 9 | +| Bibliography ..... | 14 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4214 + +## Requirements of Internet of things based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring systems + +# 1 Scope + +The term "civil infrastructure" is used to refer to an artificially constructed structure built to support human activities in cities and communities. The term "civil engineering infrastructure" used in this Recommendation specifically refers to the large-scale structures that make up roads, bridges and tunnels. + +The maintenance of civil engineering infrastructures is mainly based on periodic visual inspections and diagnoses by specialists to maintain the safety and integrity of the infrastructure. These specialists need a high degree of experience and technical know-how, as maintenance requires relevant human resource allocation and specific education and qualifications. Utilization of objective data collected from the civil engineering infrastructure using Internet of things (IoT) capabilities leads to advanced and more efficient maintenance, while enhancing and rationalizing the human inspections and diagnostic work. In this Recommendation, an IoT-based system for this purpose is called a civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system. + +This Recommendation addresses IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring systems specifying the following: + +- A reference model of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring systems; +- Requirements specific to IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring systems. + +# 2 Reference + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a stand-alone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +- [ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*. +- [ITU-T Y.4100] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4100/Y.2066 (2014), *Common requirements of the Internet of things*. +- [ITU-T Y.4113] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4113 (2016), *Requirements of the network for the Internet of things*. + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 Internet of things (IoT)** [ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies. + +NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication capabilities, the IoT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled. + +NOTE 2 – From a broader perspective, the IoT can be perceived as a vision with technological and societal implications. + +**3.1.2 IoT area network** [ITU-T Y.4113]: A network of devices for the IoT and gateways interconnected through local connections. + +NOTE – This definition is based on "Overview of the Internet of things" [ITU-T Y.4000], where clause 6.2 states "devices can communicate with other devices using direct communication through a local network (i.e., a network providing local connectivity between devices and between devices and a gateway, such as an ad-hoc network)". + +## **3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation** + +None. + +# **4 Abbreviations and acronyms** + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|------|------------------------------| +| 3D | Three Dimensions | +| IAN | IoT Area Network | +| IoT | Internet of Things | +| SC&C | Smart Cities and Communities | +| WAN | Wide Area Network | + +# **5 Conventions** + +In this Recommendation: + +The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this document is to be claimed. + +The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance. + +The keywords "can optionally" and "may" indicate an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. These terms are not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification. + +# **6 Overview of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system** + +## **6.1 Necessity of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring** + +The maintenance of civil engineering infrastructures is mainly based on periodic visual inspections and diagnoses made by specialists. If any deterioration or damage is found during the inspections, proper diagnoses and appropriate measures are taken to keep the infrastructure sound and minimize the cost of maintenance. This requires a high degree of experience and technical know-how and requires allocating and training human resources. + +Civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring is the act of measuring the state of these infrastructures, acquiring and comparing the data to understand the occurrence and progress of deterioration over time. IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring is an effective + +means to obtain the information necessary for the inspection and diagnosis of infrastructures, and it is expected that streamlining for infrastructure maintenance and management work would be a method to supplement inspection and investigation work. + +## 6.2 Reference model of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system and associated sites + +The IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system (hereafter "the system") collects, accumulates and processes objective data on civil engineering infrastructures subject to health monitoring, and provides the data to applications that support the maintenance and operation of the infrastructure. The system has two specific characteristics compared with other IoT systems. + +The first characteristic is that the data measured by a sensor alone is meaningless unless the information of the structure being monitored is associated with the measured data. The second characteristic is that civil engineering infrastructures are operated over a very long term, usually up to several decades. During this long-term operation, the system is required to accumulate data continuously. + +A reference model of the IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system and associated sites is shown in Figure 1. + + + +Figure 1: Reference model of the IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system and associated sites. The diagram is organized into three horizontal sections separated by solid lines. The top section, labeled 'Storage and utilization site' on the left, contains a box labeled 'Applications' under the heading 'Reference model'. The middle section, labeled 'Monitoring site' on the left, contains a dashed-line box labeled 'IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system' which includes a 'Monitoring platform' box. Below this is a cloud shape labeled 'Wide area network (WAN)'. The bottom section, labeled 'Sensing site' on the left, contains a 'Gateway device' box, followed by another dashed-line box containing an 'IoT area network (IAN)' cloud and a 'Sensor device' box. At the very bottom is a box labeled 'Civil engineering infrastructure'. The label 'Y.4214(22)' is at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure 1 – Reference model of the IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system and associated sites** + +#### 6.2.1 Reference model + +The reference model of the IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system is composed of five components, a sensor device, gateway device, monitoring platform and the networks connecting these components, i.e., the IoT area network (IAN) and the wide area network (WAN). The dotted line shown in Figure 1 demarcates the reference model of the IoT-based civil + +engineering infrastructure health monitoring system. Civil engineering infrastructure(s) and applications are outside the system. + +- Civil engineering infrastructure: Represents large-scale structures such as roads, bridges and tunnels that are subject to health monitoring. +- Sensor device: Represents a device that measures health monitoring indicators (including original data that can be converted into indicators). The sensor device is not only a sensor but also includes assisting devices for communication, temporary storage of data, data processing, and position measurement (e.g., a physical marker or a laser irradiation equipment for calculating an absolute position from a relative position in image data). +- Gateway device: Represents a communication device that aggregates the data measured by one or more sensor devices and transmits them to the monitoring platform. A gateway device is not always permanently at the sensing site. There are cases where a vehicle with a gateway device patrols the sensing site, and cases where the inspector hand-carries the data temporarily stored in the sensor device offline. +- Monitoring platform: Represents servers that accumulate the data measured at the sensing site, search and display the accumulated data, perform simple alert detection such as threshold crossing and convert this to data that can be analysed by applications. +- Applications: Represents servers that compare/analyse data collected in chronological order at a sensing site based on available reference data (e.g., data collected at other sensing sites under similar conditions) to predict deterioration and/or to evaluate the repair method. + +NOTE – Digital twin technology may be used to support these goals. + +- IAN: Represents a network composed of a gateway device and multiple sensor devices. Which technology is used for transmission within the IAN is outside the scope of this Recommendation. +- WAN: Represents a network for transmitting the data measured at the sensing site to the monitoring site. Which technology is used for transmission within the WAN is outside the scope of this Recommendation. + +This reference model complies with the IoT basic model specified in [ITU-T Y.4113]. The sensor device, gateway device, monitoring platform, applications and WAN in this Recommendation can be mapped to the device, gateway, IoT platform, IoT application server and the combination of core and access network in [ITU-T Y.4113]. + +#### **6.2.2 Sites associated with the reference model** + +The locations of operative responsibility for a part of the system are called "sites" and can be categorized into the following three types: the sensing site, monitoring site and storage and utilization site. + +- Sensing site: This manages one or more parts of the civil engineering infrastructure(s) and measures objective data for infrastructure health monitoring by sensor devices. It transmits measured data as appropriate to a corresponding monitoring site. A sensing site has one or more civil engineering infrastructures under its control. Figure 2 shows the aggregation relationship between a sensing site and the civil engineering infrastructure. + + + +**A sensing site has one or more civil engineering infrastructures** + +``` + +graph TD + SS[Sensing site] --- CEI[Civil engineering infrastructure] + style CEI fill:none,stroke:none + subgraph Stack + CEI1[ ] + CEI2[ ] + CEI3[ ] + end + style Stack fill:none,stroke:none + +``` + +Y.4214(22) + +Diagram showing an aggregation relationship between a Sensing site and Civil engineering infrastructure. A box labeled 'Sensing site' is connected by a vertical line to a stack of three boxes labeled 'Civil engineering infrastructure'. The stack is indicated by overlapping rectangles. The reference 'Y.4214(22)' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 2 – Aggregation relationship between sensing site and civil engineering infrastructure** + +- Monitoring site: This administers one or more sensing sites and maintains the parts of infrastructures subject to monitoring. A monitoring site has one or more sensing sites under its observation. Figure 3 shows the aggregation relationship between the monitoring site and sensing site. + + + +**A monitoring site has one or more sensing sites** + +``` + +graph TD + MS[Monitoring site] --- SS[Sensing site] + style SS fill:none,stroke:none + subgraph Stack + SS1[ ] + SS2[ ] + SS3[ ] + end + style Stack fill:none,stroke:none + +``` + +Y.4214(22) + +Diagram showing an aggregation relationship between a Monitoring site and Sensing site. A box labeled 'Monitoring site' is connected by a vertical line to a stack of three boxes labeled 'Sensing site'. The stack is indicated by overlapping rectangles. The reference 'Y.4214(22)' is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 3 – Aggregation relationship between monitoring site and sensing site** + +- Storage and utilization site: This provides the data to applications and ensures long-term storage of the data as appropriate. A storage and utilization site collects data from one or more monitoring sites under its control. A monitoring site may not be required to be connected to any storage and utilization site (e.g., when functionalities implemented in the monitoring site are sufficient for users) or can be referred from one or more storage and utilization sites. Figure 4 shows the aggregation relationship between a storage and utilization site and monitoring sites. + + + +(1) A storage and utilization site has one or more monitoring sites + +(2) A monitoring site is not connected to any storage and utilization site + +(3) A monitoring site can be referred from one or more storage and utilization sites + +Y.4214(22) + +Figure 4: Aggregation relationship between storage and utilization site and monitoring sites. The diagram shows three scenarios: (1) A storage and utilization site connected to multiple monitoring sites. (2) A monitoring site not connected to any storage and utilization site. (3) A monitoring site connected to multiple storage and utilization sites. + +**Figure 4 – Aggregation relationship between storage and utilization site and monitoring sites** + +# 7 Requirements of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system + +High-level requirements of IoT are identified in [ITU-T Y.4000]. Common requirements of IoT are identified in [ITU-T Y.4100]. Requirements of the network for the IoT are identified in [ITU-T Y.4113]. + +In this Recommendation, requirements specific to the IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system are identified. + +## 7.1 Generic requirements + +### 7.1.1 Long-term operation + +- It is recommended that the system be designed for long-term use. +NOTE – Civil engineering infrastructures such as roads, bridges and tunnels have been used for more than 50 years, and it is recommended that the operational life of the monitoring system also be significantly longer than general IoT systems. +- It is recommended that the semantics of data not depend on a particular technology, a platform architecture, a manufacturer, etc. +- Data continuity is required to be maintained in the case of replacements or model changes of sensor devices during the operational period. + +#### 7.1.2 Measured data + +- The system is required to have features to collect and store data used for infrastructure health monitoring, such as length, frequency, tilt angle, brightness, infrared, radiation, image, voice, weather data, etc. +- The system is required to collect and store not only the raw data collected by the sensor device but also the processed data calculated or converted from the raw data by the sensor device, the gateway device or the monitoring platform. +- The data measured for the same purpose is required to be handled in the same way even if the measuring method is different. There are various methods for measuring data used in health monitoring, but the data measured by any method should be handled as (or converted to) the same data. For example, the displacement can be measured by using a displacement gauge or calculating from a laser, an image, an accelerometer, etc. This equipment should produce the same type of data using the same measurement units and with the same precision. + +- The measured data is required to be handled in the same way even if the transmission technology or platform technology is different. Data should be handled in the same way whether the sensor device installed at the sensing site sends data to the monitoring platform via a network or a storage medium containing data is manually carried. +- The system is required to associate data sets as related to the same event if the target data is composed of data elements measured by multiple devices. For example, in the case of using an auxiliary device to specify relative position information when installing a sensor device, relationship information between the device and the position should be stored. + +#### **7.1.3 Information model** + +- The specifications of the information model used for processing and storing data are recommended to be followed, in order to enable data continuity and data sharing with the applications or different systems. + +NOTE – The information model used is not specified in this Recommendation, and the data formats and communication protocols are left to the implementation of each system. + +#### **7.1.4 Location and installation** + +- The system is required to record installation information, such as the position, direction and installation method of the sensor device. +- The system is required to record the association between a sensor device and an element of civil engineering infrastructure. +- It is recommended that the system record the association between a sensor device and an element of civil engineering infrastructure by using the 3D model representation created during the construction of the civil engineering infrastructure. + +## **7.2 Sensor device requirements** + +- The sensor device is required to measure data used for health monitoring. For example, data used for infrastructure monitoring is commonly classified as the following types: + - Physical quantity: length, frequency, tilt angle, etc. + - Electromagnetic quantity: brightness, image, infrared, radiation, etc. + - Electrical quantity: current, voltage, etc. + - Media data: voice, image, video, etc. +- The sensor device can optionally have features for communication, temporary data storing, data processing and primary analysis such as conversion of sensor data. + +NOTE – The sensor device may implement all the above features in one or more physical devices. + +## **7.3 Gateway device requirements** + +- The gateway device is required to aggregate data measured by the sensor device installed at the sensing site via the IAN and is required to transmit these data to the monitoring platform via the WAN. + +NOTE 1 – The gateway device may not be used if the sensor device communicates directly with the WAN or if the data temporarily stored in the sensor device are collected manually. + +- The gateway device is required to receive instructions from the monitoring platform and is required to perform management of the IAN and the sensor devices. +- The gateway device can optionally have mobility features. + +NOTE 2 – The gateway device is generally installed in a fixed location at a sensing site. However, it may be moved to other locations in some scenarios, e.g., when it moves across sensing sites via a vehicle which patrols the sensing sites. + +- The gateway device can optionally have features for temporary data storing, data processing and primary analysis such as conversion of sensor data. + +## **7.4 Monitoring platform requirements** + +- The monitoring platform is required to have a feature to store data in a specified format. +- The monitoring platform is required to have a feature to search data by any key. +- The monitoring platform can optionally have a feature to view data on a display or on paper in a human-readable format such as graphs or tables. +- The monitoring platform is required to manage the sensor device, the gateway device and the IAN in the sensing site and is required to send instructions to the gateway device and/or notifications to the administrator as needed. +- The monitoring platform can optionally have features to perform simple alert detection such as exceeding a specific threshold and notifying the administrator. +- The monitoring platform can optionally have features to convert the data collected at the sensing site into a specific format that can be analysed by the application. + +## **7.5 Network requirements** + +- The IAN and the WAN are required to provide the functions needed by the system and operate in a reliable way. + +NOTE – The IAN and the WAN may be a private network, a public network or a combination of both. + +## Appendix I + +### Use cases of IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +Clause 8.9 of [b-ITU-T Y-Sup56] introduces the following four examples of civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring as smart cities and communities (SC&C) use cases. + +- 1) Crack monitoring with camera images; +- 2) Crack monitoring with a displacement meter; +- 3) Crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres; +- 4) Deformation monitoring with accelerometers. + +This appendix shows system configuration examples when the reference model in this Recommendation is applied to these use cases. + +- 1) Crack monitoring with camera images + +In crack monitoring using camera images, the bottom surface of the floor slab of the road is captured from the ground under the bridge with a camera, and the state of crack(s) on the bottom surface of the floor slab is recorded. The system can monitor the progress of cracks and evaluate the damage status by comparing multiple shots taken at intervals. + +- A digital camera is used as the sensor device to capture a picture of the bottom of the road floor slab from the ground under the bridge. +- Since the size of the crack is very small compared with the civil engineering infrastructure, dozens or hundreds of images are taken for one infrastructure element. +- Each captured image contains distortion and must be converted to an orthographic projection image for quantitative monitoring. Auxiliary devices such as physical markers, structural feature points and laser irradiators are used as reference points for this conversion. These auxiliary devices are handled as sensor devices. +- The monitoring platform proceeds to apply the orthographic projection conversion to each captured image as described above, and merges these overlapping images into a single image. +- The monitoring platform reads and stores the shape and width of the crack from the merged image of the bottom of the floor slab. +- The application can utilize and analyse the crack information stored in the monitoring platform to detect damage, calculate the degree of damage, predict future damage progress and share data with other systems. + +Figure I.1 illustrates crack monitoring with camera images. + + + +The diagram illustrates a three-tier architecture for crack monitoring with camera images: + +- Storage and utilization site:** Contains 'Applications' (under 'Reference model') and processing blocks for 'Damage detection', 'Damage level calculation', 'Deterioration prediction', and 'Data sharing' (under 'Crack monitoring with camera images'). +- Monitoring site:** Features a 'Monitoring platform' and a flow from 'Image regularization' to 'Crack recognition'. +- Sensing site:** Includes a 'Gateway device', an 'IoT area network (IAN)', and a 'Sensor device'. A 'Wide area network (WAN)' connects the monitoring and sensing sites. +- Infrastructure:** The sensor device is linked to a 'Camera' and a 'Marker/laser projector'. + +Dashed lines indicate data flow between the processing blocks and the monitoring/sensing components. + +Y.4214(22) + +Figure I.1 – Crack monitoring with camera images. This diagram illustrates a three-tier architecture for crack monitoring. The top tier, 'Storage and utilization site', contains 'Applications' (under 'Reference model') and processing blocks for 'Damage detection', 'Damage level calculation', 'Deterioration prediction', and 'Data sharing' (under 'Crack monitoring with camera images'). The middle tier, 'Monitoring site', features a 'Monitoring platform' and a flow from 'Image regularization' to 'Crack recognition'. The bottom tier, 'Sensing site', includes a 'Gateway device', an 'IoT area network (IAN)', and a 'Sensor device'. A 'Wide area network (WAN)' connects the monitoring and sensing sites. The sensor device is linked to a 'Camera' and a 'Marker/laser projector' at the infrastructure level. Dashed lines indicate data flow between the processing blocks and the monitoring/sensing components. + +**Figure I.1 – Crack monitoring with camera images** + +### 2) Crack monitoring with a displacement meter + +Crack monitoring with a displacement meter measures the displacement between the floor slab where damage is found, and the immovable beam installed under the bridge. This monitoring indicates the damage state of the floor slab by determining the threshold to prevent accidents. + +- A displacement meter is used as the sensor device to measure the displacement between the floor slab and the immovable beam. +- The monitoring platform can store time-series displacement data and alert when displacement exceeds a certain threshold. To detect changes in structural performance, the monitoring platform may perform natural frequency analysis from the displacement data. +- The application can utilize and analyse the displacement data stored in the monitoring platform to predict future damage progress, determine alert thresholds and share data with other systems. + +Figure I.2 illustrates crack monitoring with a displacement meter. + + + +**Sites Reference model Crack monitoring with a displacement meter** + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of a crack monitoring system across three sites: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. + +- Storage and utilization site:** Contains Applications, Threshold determination, Deterioration prediction, and Data sharing. +- Monitoring site:** Contains a Monitoring platform (within an IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system), Threshold exceed alert, and Natural frequency analysis (Optional). +- Sensing site:** Contains a Gateway device, IoT area network (IAN), Sensor device, and Civil engineering infrastructure. + +A Wide area network (WAN) connects the Monitoring site and Sensing site. A Gateway connects the Sensing site to the Monitoring site. A Displacement meter is connected to the Gateway. + +Y.4214(22) + +Figure I.2 – Crack monitoring with a displacement meter. This diagram illustrates the architecture of a crack monitoring system across three sites: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. The Storage and utilization site contains Applications, Threshold determination, Deterioration prediction, and Data sharing. The Monitoring site contains a Monitoring platform (part of an IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system), Threshold exceed alert, and Natural frequency analysis (Optional). The Sensing site contains a Gateway device, IoT area network (IAN), Sensor device, and Civil engineering infrastructure. A Wide area network (WAN) connects the Monitoring site and Sensing site. A Gateway connects the Sensing site to the Monitoring site. A Displacement meter is connected to the Gateway. Dashed lines show vertical logical connections between the functional blocks across the different sites. + +**Figure I.2 – Crack monitoring with a displacement meter** + +### 3) Crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres + +Crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres detects deterioration and distortion from changes in the transmitted light amount measured by optical fibres comprehensively installed on the underside of the floor slab. + +- The sensor device is an optical measuring device that transmits pulses of light over an optical fibre at regular intervals to measure the diffuse reflection return time. +- The monitoring platform converts the measurement results to physical quantities (displacement, strain, etc.) and stores the data. +- The application can utilize and analyse the data stored in the monitoring platform to predict future damage progress, determine alert thresholds and share data with other systems. + +Figure I.3 illustrates crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture of a monitoring system across three sites: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. + +- Storage and utilization site:** Contains Applications, Threshold determination, Deterioration prediction, and Data sharing. +- Monitoring site:** Contains a Monitoring platform and Physical quantity conversion. +- Sensing site:** Contains a Gateway device, IoT area network (IAN), Sensor device, and Civil engineering infrastructure. + +A Wide area network (WAN) connects the Monitoring and Sensing sites. A Gateway connects the Sensing site to the Monitoring site. Optical fibre and Measurement equipment are connected to the Gateway. + +Y.4214(22) + +Figure I.3 – Crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres. This diagram illustrates the architecture of a monitoring system across three sites: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. The Storage and utilization site contains Applications, Threshold determination, Deterioration prediction, and Data sharing. The Monitoring site contains a Monitoring platform and Physical quantity conversion. The Sensing site contains a Gateway device, IoT area network (IAN), Sensor device, and Civil engineering infrastructure. A Wide area network (WAN) connects the Monitoring and Sensing sites. A Gateway connects the Sensing site to the Monitoring site. Optical fibre and Measurement equipment are connected to the Gateway. + +**Figure I.3 – Crack or strain monitoring with optical fibres** + +### 4) Deformation monitoring with accelerometers + +Deformation monitoring with accelerometers monitors changes in structural performance by the natural frequency or vibration mode of the structure measured by accelerometers installed in the structure. + +- One or more accelerometers are used as the sensor device. +- The monitoring platform analyses the acceleration data measured by the accelerometer and performs natural frequency analysis or vibration mode analysis. +- The application can utilize and analyse the data stored in the monitoring platform, predict future damage progress and share data with other systems. + +Figure I.4 illustrates deformation monitoring with accelerometers. + + + +The diagram illustrates the architecture for deformation monitoring with accelerometers, organized into three horizontal layers: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. + +- Storage and utilization site:** + - Sites:** Storage and utilization site + - Reference model:** Applications + - Deformation monitoring with accelerometers:** Deterioration prediction, Data sharing +- Monitoring site:** + - Sites:** Monitoring site + - Reference model:** IoT-based civil engineering infrastructure health monitoring system (dashed box), Monitoring platform + - Deformation monitoring with accelerometers:** Vibration mode analysis, Natural frequency analysis +- Sensing site:** + - Sites:** Sensing site + - Reference model:** Wide area network (WAN) (cloud), Gateway device, IoT area network (IAN) (cloud), Sensor device, Civil engineering infrastructure + - Deformation monitoring with accelerometers:** Gateway, Accelerometer + +Connections are shown as follows: + +- Dashed lines connect **Deterioration prediction** and **Data sharing** to **Vibration mode analysis** and **Natural frequency analysis** respectively. +- A dashed line connects **Vibration mode analysis** and **Natural frequency analysis** to the **Gateway**. +- A dashed line connects the **Gateway** to the **Accelerometer**. + +Architecture diagram for deformation monitoring with accelerometers, showing Sites, Reference model, and Deformation monitoring components across three layers: Storage and utilization site, Monitoring site, and Sensing site. + +Y.4214(22) + +**Figure I.4 – Deformation monitoring with accelerometers** + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.4213] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4213 (2021), *IoT requirements and capability framework for monitoring physical city assets*. +- [b-ITU-T Y-Sup56] Supplement 56 (2019) to ITU-T Y-series Recommendations, *Supplement on use cases of smart cities and communities*. + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4215-202202-I_PDF-E/14a22f23ced8ba1d63ece69861dbaacc_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4215-202202-I_PDF-E/14a22f23ced8ba1d63ece69861dbaacc_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 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b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4219-202303-I_PDF-E/raw.md @@ -0,0 +1,615 @@ + + +# Recommendation + +## **ITU-T Y.4219 (03/2023)** + +SERIES Y: Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +Internet of things and smart cities and communities – +Requirements and use cases + +--- + +**Accessibility requirements for the user +interface of smart applications supporting +Internet of things** + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## **GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES** + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Computing power networks | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | + +## FUTURE NETWORKS + +Y.3000–Y.3499 + +### CLOUD COMPUTING + +Y.3500–Y.3599 + +### BIG DATA + +Y.3600–Y.3799 + +### QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS + +Y.3800–Y.3999 + +### INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4219 + +# Accessibility requirements for the user interface of smart applications supporting Internet of things + +## Summary + +When accessibility is properly designed the use of Internet of things (IoT) can increase the quality of life among persons with disabilities, persons with age-related disabilities and those with specific needs. There are many possible IoT services in various environments that provide accessibility services as well. The IoT also can be used to create tools for persons with many types of disabilities and specific needs, including physical, visual, hearing and cognitive disabilities. IoT services interact with a user through the user interface. To ensure an IoT service is accessible, the user interface must be accessible. An accessible user interface must take into account a user's physical, audio and visual capabilities and consider compatibility with any assistive technology used by the user. Recommendation ITU-T Y.4219 outlines essential requirements for a user interface that must be considered in order to secure the accessibility of smart applications. + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4219 | 2023-03-28 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15482 | + +## Keywords + +Accessibility, persons with disabilities, smart applications, universal design, user interface. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
User and system requirements corresponding to the PID are extracted. | PID of a running application. | Character string including the requirement. | + +**Table 8-1 – Functionality for application monitoring manager function** + +| Functionality | Description | Parameters | Return value | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Registration of adaptive IoT applications in the system information manager function | Adaptive IoT applications are registered into the system information manager function if a network connection is established. | Character string of information extracted in user and system requirements. | Message identifier generated to communicate between the adaptive IoT applications and the system information manager function | +| Transmission of adaptive IoT application's status information to the system information manager function | Status information generated in adaptive IoT applications is transferred to the system information manager function. | Process ID,
Communication ID,
QoS ID,
Window QoS rate,
Instant QoS rate,
Global QoS rate,
Timestamp (nanoseconds). | None | +| Adaptive IoT application receiving control result of the system information manager function | An adaptive IoT application receives a control result transmitting in the system information manager function. | QoS information. | Index of function point | +| Control of an adaptive IoT application | An adaptive IoT application performs a proper function by using received control results. | QoS information,
Point of registered functions. | Return value regarding success or failure | +| Disconnection of an adaptive IoT application and the application monitoring manager function | An adaptive IoT application and the system information manager function cease network communication. | PID | None | + +## 8.2 System information manager function + +The system information manager function, shown in Figure 8-3, gathers the system's static/dynamic information necessary for policy decision-making and transfers the relevant information to the policy manager function. It also includes a light-weight system information managing module for diverse IoT devices. This function includes the hardware's static information and can decide on the possible adaptive IoT application's execution and it allows the adaptive IoT application to decide compatibility and optimization. + +The system information manager function is used to collect and manage system information in order to raise the execution efficiency of the adaptive IoT applications. The collected information is a criterion used to decide on the workflow of the adaptive IoT applications. In addition, the manager helps the applications to execute optimally by managing system information as well as process and QoS information. + + + +Y.4453(16)\_F8-3 + +Figure 8-3: System information manager function in ASF. The diagram shows a layered architecture. At the top is the 'Adaptive IoT application' layer containing 'Application logics' and 'Monitoring interfaces'. Below this is the 'Adaptive software framework' layer, which contains the 'System information manager function'. This function is composed of three sub-functions: 'Data coordination FE', 'Information collection FE' (which lists 'Applications', 'System', and 'Third party'), and 'Data provision FE'. Above the 'System information manager function' are the 'Application monitoring manager function' and the 'Policy manager function'. Arrows indicate data flow: 'Application static/dynamic Info. and application PID' flows from the 'Application monitoring manager function' to the 'System information manager function'; 'Application/system Info.' flows from the 'System information manager function' to the 'Policy manager function'; and 'System static/dynamic Info.' flows from the 'System and resources' layer to the 'System information manager function'. The 'System and resources' layer at the bottom contains three components: 'CPU/GPU', 'Memory', and 'Network'. + +**Figure 8-3 – System information manager function in ASF** + +The system information manager function consists of three FEs: data coordination FE, information collection FE and data provision FE. The system information manager function has two information inputs and one information output. The information is of two types: system static/dynamic information and application static/dynamic information. Static information is updated just once whenever the system information manager function is executed and dynamic information is updated periodically. + +### 8.2.1 Data coordination FE + +The data coordination FE reorganizes information acquired from systems (e.g., system static/dynamic information) and the application monitoring manager function (e.g., application static/dynamic information). Static information has one data structure corresponding to instant data. These data are classified as application, system and third-party type in real-time. Dynamic information is divided into two data structures: instant data and calculation data. The instant data (e.g., CPU activity) can be used in other modules immediately, while the calculation data (e.g., utilization) can be used with additional operations. + +### 8.2.2 Information collection FE + +The information collection FE gathers static and dynamic information in real-time for applications, systems and third parties. The system information also includes third party information collected by external modules or devices. System static information refers to fixed values regarding hardware resources (e.g., CPU, memory, network) and this information is set just once when a system begins. In general, system static information has a unique value in the system as long as hardware specific resources are not changed. This value is managed through one-time collection. System dynamic information refers to changeable values according to the system's status. Most of these values are different according to system overhead and they are updated periodically at every setup time for information collection. + +#### 8.2.2.1 System information + +The system static information, shown in Table 8-2, is in regard to CPU core, CPU frequency, memory and network. The system static information is fixed information about the hardware. If the hardware capabilities are changed, system static information is also updated. This information includes the data structure corresponding to each hardware system. The system static information is updated once whenever the system information manager function is executed. + +**Table 8-2 – System static information** + +| Information | Description | +|---------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| +| The number of cores | The number of CPU cores of a current system. | +| Max freq. of core | Maximum frequency by CPU core. | +| Min freq. of core | Minimum frequency by CPU core. | +| Core MIPS | Core performance presented with MIPS. | +| Core cluster | Core cluster in CPU environment (e.g., big.LITTLE Core). | +| Available freq. | The number of available frequency and frequency lists by core. | +| System memory | Memory usage of system. | +| Network interface | Network interface list to use in system. | + +The system dynamic information, shown in Table 8-3, is in regard to a CPU core's current state, CPU utilization, memory and network. The dynamic information can be changed according to the system's current state or users change system's resource values so that dynamic information is changed in real-time. + +**Table 8-3 – System dynamic information** + +| Information | Description | +|-------------------------|---------------------------------------------| +| Core activity status | Activity or inactivity of current core. | +| Core current freq. | Frequency configured in each core. | +| The number of threads | The number of threads to work on cores. | +| The number of processes | The number of processes to work on cores. | +| Core utilization | Core utilization allocated in current core. | +| Core time | Core usage time by core managing in OS. | +| System memory | Memory usage used in systems. | +| Network packet | Network Tx and Rx used in systems. | + +#### 8.2.2.2 Application information + +The ASF uses the application information to decide on and find optimal solutions. For supporting the framework, the information collection FE collects and manages information regarding adaptive IoT applications registered in the framework. The application information can be static or dynamic. + +The adaptive IoT application's static information, shown in Table 8-4, is collected through the system information manager function. The static information consists of fixed information allocated from the OS during the adaptive IoT application's execution. This information corresponds to user requirements regarding an adaptive IoT application. The system information manager function can recognize the start and termination of an adaptive IoT application so that the function can find out exactly the period of time for which to get static information for the application. The information value manages QoS of adaptive IoT applications and the configuration information is used for tuning-up current QoS of the adaptive IoT applications. This information is set by users before the applications are executed and it is not changed until they are terminated. + +**Table 8-4 – Adaptive IoT application static information** + +| Information | Description | +|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------| +| Application program ID | Application program ID allocated by OS. | +| Program name | Execution name of application. | +| Program path | Absolute path of a running program. | +| Parent process ID | Parent ID for existing parent process. | +| Message queue ID | Message queue ID generated for information transmission. | +| Application process type | Application type of internal or external. | +| Max QoS | Maximum QoS available for application. | +| Min QoS | Minimum QoS available for application. | +| Target QoS | Target QoS to achieve in application. | +| Application window size | Window size in QoS framework. | +| Application sampling time | Sampling time to generate QoS. | +| Log file | File name of logging data. | +| Heartbeat buffer length | Buffer length of QoS record. | + +The adaptive IoT application's dynamic information, shown in Table 8-5, is collected through the system information manager function. The dynamic information is divided into information of the adaptive IoT application itself and the dynamic QoS of the adaptive IoT applications. The former information is updated by the OS or user configuration and the latter information is dependent on the application. The adaptive IoT application dynamic information consists of CPU, core, memory, network and QoS corresponding to the running applications. + +**Table 8-5 – Adaptive IoT application dynamic information** + +| Information | Description | +|-----------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Allocated core | Core allocated in application program. | +| The number of threads | The number of threads allocated in application program. | +| Thread list | Thread ID list of application program. | +| Program status | Current status of application program. | +| Priority | Application program's priority allocated through OS. | +| Program time | Total time used in application program. | +| Program utilization | Utilization regarding core allocated in application program. | +| Memory utilization | Memory utilization used in application program. | +| Network information | Network usage used in application program. | +| QoS timestamp | Generation time of heartbeat in application program. | +| QoS window rate | QoS rate per time within window size allocated in application program. | +| QoS instant rate | QoS rate per time. | +| QoS global rate | QoS rate per time between start and current. | + +#### 8.2.2.3 Third-party information + +The third-party information, shown in Table 8-6, is provided by external modules or external devices. For example, a system's power is measured by an external device power-measuring system and the measured power-consumption data is transferred to the ASF. Besides these, other third-party information can be included whenever the information is needed by the ASF. + +**Table 8-6 – Example of third-party information** + +| Information | Description | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Power | Power consumption used in system. | +| Program characteristic | Program model analysed by program analyser. | +| Kernel inside information | Kernel information such as CPU scheduler and network stack provided by kernel module program. | + +### 8.2.3 Data provision FE + +The data provision FE gets static/dynamic information regarding systems and applications from the information collection module. The data provision FE has communication facilities that efficiently transfer information gathered by the information collection module to the policy manager function. These facilities are implemented with various methods (e.g., message queue, shared memory, socket). The system information manager function should communicate with the policy manager function because the system information manager function plays an important role in deciding the optimal policy regarding adaptive IoT applications. The application/system information must be accurate in the aspect of time synchronization; this also provides information to the policy manager function for adaptive IoT applications. + +### 8.2.4 Functionality of system information manager function + +The resource monitoring interface transfers collected information to external modules, e.g., the policy manager, effectively by the system information manager. It includes two types of interfaces: system interfaces and application interface. Table 8-7 shows the functionality of the system information manager function. + +**Table 8-7 – Functionality of system information manager function** + +| Functionality | Description | Parameters | Return value | +|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|---------------------------------| +| Transmission of system static information | This functionality reads system static information and returns the information. | None | System static information. | +| Supply of system utilization | This functionality provides total system utilization or core utilization. | Core number | System utilization. | +| Supply of system frequency | This functionality provides core frequency. | Core number | Frequency. | +| Supply of application static information | This functionality reads application static information and returns the information. | PID | Application static information. | +| Supply of application utilization | This functionality provides total application utilization or core utilization. | PID | Application utilization. | +| Supply of application QoS | This functionality provides application QoS. | PID | Application QoS. | + +## 8.3 Policy manager function + +The policy manager function, shown in Figure 8-4, provides the features of resource estimation, performance profiling for applications and systems and policy actuation. The policy manager function supports the application for optimal system resource allocation in IoT devices. It monitors the system state in real-time and controls optimal system resource allocation. + +The policy manager function performs optimal utilization of system resources based on the requests of the adaptive IoT applications and system information manager function. Specifically, it analyses static and/or dynamic performance and power consumption in resources to guarantee high-performance and low power consumption through application monitoring information. It keeps the operational balance between the high-performance requirement and low-power consumption from the adaptive IoT application. Also, according to the application pattern, it predicts the amounts of power utilization and allocates the computing resource. In addition, it considers the information of available resources and details system performance information from the system information manager function. + + + +Y.4453(16)\_F8-4 + +Figure 8-4 – Policy manager function in ASF. The diagram shows a three-layer architecture. The top layer is the 'Adaptive IoT application' containing 'Application logics' and 'Monitoring interfaces'. The middle layer is the 'Adaptive software framework' containing an 'Application monitoring manager function' and a 'System information manager function'. Below these is a 'Policy manager function' block (highlighted in yellow) which includes a 'Performance profiling FE' (listing Applications and Systems), a 'Resource estimation FE', and a 'Policy actuation FE'. The bottom layer is 'System and resources' containing 'CPU/GPU', 'Memory', and 'Network'. Arrows show data flow: 'Application/system Info.' from the top manager functions to the Policy manager function; 'System resources (CPU, core, Freq., ...)' from the Policy manager function to the System and resources layer; and a feedback loop from the Policy actuation FE back to the Monitoring interfaces labeled 'Flow change and value change and function change'. + +**Figure 8-4 – Policy manager function in ASF** + +### 8.3.1 Performance profiling FE + +The performance profiling FE provides the adaptive IoT application's optimization. The performance profiling is categorized into two types: adaptive IoT application profiling and system profiling. These two types of profiling are necessary, operating in parallel, to perform the adaptive IoT application's optimization. The two profiling types gather information regularly from the system information manager function. + +NOTE – The information includes: + +- application profiling information: PID, MAX QoS, MIN QoS, TARGET QoS, QoS rate, program ID; +- system profiling information: System total CPU throughput, CPU, memory, network packet rate (Tx, Rx), power consumption, PID information (core number, CPU frequency, memory, network packet Tx, Rx, power consumption). + +In addition, the performance profiling FE detects various errors, such as race condition and energy bugs occurring in the adaptive IoT applications. It analyses these applications and provides optimal monitoring location candidates on their source code in order to measure QoS of the adaptive IoT applications. + +- for detecting these errors, the performance profiling FE consists of two components: scalable race detection is configured to inspect the likelihood of a race of an access event with respect to a shared variable generated in a parallel program to select an access event that is likely to race. Power measuring is configured to measure power consumption when the parallel program is executed, to analyse whether an energy bug has been generated; +- for analysing monitoring location candidate, the performance profiling FE consists of four components: monitoring location analysis which detects monitoring location candidates in an input application ; monitoring range configuration which generates an analytical application using the application and the candidates; monitoring range analysis which + +detects monitoring range of each of the candidates through the analytical application; and monitoring environment configuration which determines which candidate has the greatest execution load (e.g., CPU utilization) as an optimal monitoring location for measuring QoS. + +### 8.3.2 Resource estimation FE + +The resource estimation FE predicts performance estimation for system resources and external estimation with external modules or third-party information. Performance estimation predicts CPU, memory and network performance. External estimation predicts power consumption from external modules. Resource estimation prediction occurs under the condition of no satisfaction regarding user requirement performance/power and system requirement performance/power. + +### 8.3.3 Policy actuation FE + +The policy actuation FE provides control for application and/or system resources through the resource estimation to guarantee the QoS performance and power. + +The policy actuation FE controls application resources including: program logic flow control, program parameter change and program function change. + +The policy actuation FE controls system resources including: CPU core on/off, core frequency, CPU dynamic voltage/frequency scaling (DVFS), memory swap and network bandwidth. + +### 8.3.4 Functionality of policy manager function + +This functionality supports the control of CPU, memory, network, etc. Table 8-8 shows the functionality of the policy manager function. + +**Table 8-8 – Functionality of policy manager function** + +| Functionality | Description | Parameters | Return value | +|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|-----------------| +| CPU resource control | Performs control operation regarding CPU core operation state, frequency according to user requirement | Core number, User requirement value | Success or Fail | +| Memory resource control | Performs memory utilization and size | Memory size, utilization rate | Success or Fail | +| Network resource control | Performs control operation regarding window size change according to user requirement | Running program's process ID, socket information | Success or Fail | + +# Appendix I + +## An example use case and workflow for ASF + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This appendix explains how the ASF manages and controls adaptive IoT applications. Figure I.1 shows an adaptive IoT application's transition of video quality, according to the application's resource policy and hardware resource conditions. The ASF is supporting, monitoring and controlling the adaptive IoT application's optimal performance. To guarantee the adaptive IoT application's optimal performance, the ASF works with the adaptive IoT application and IoT hardware resource information in real-time and in a dynamic way. + + + +Adaptive IoT applications + +Before + +Low quality + +ASF API running + +After + +High quality + +ASF API running + +Basic profile: fps 102 +Middle profile: fps 150 +Advanced profile: fps 202 + +Basic profile: fps 102 +Middle profile: fps 150 +Advanced profile: fps 202 + +Adaptive software framework + +Application monitoring manager function + +System information manager function + +Policy manager function + +IoT device + +CPU ... Power + +Y.4453(16)\_FI.1 + +Figure I.1: ASF for IoT devices. The diagram illustrates the workflow of the Adaptive Software Framework (ASF) for IoT devices. At the top, 'Adaptive IoT applications' are shown in two states: 'Before' (Low quality) and 'After' (High quality). Both states show 'ASF API running'. To the left of the 'Before' state, the profiles are: Basic profile: fps 102, Middle profile: fps 150, Advanced profile: fps 202. To the right of the 'After' state, the profiles are: Basic profile: fps 102, Middle profile: fps 150, Advanced profile: fps 202. Below the application states is the 'Adaptive software framework' (ASF), which contains three main functions: Application monitoring manager function, System information manager function, and Policy manager function. Below the ASF is the 'IoT device', which includes CPU, ..., and Power. Two line graphs show CPU and Power usage over time, with the 'After' state showing higher usage than the 'Before' state. The diagram is labeled Y.4453(16)\_FI.1. + +Figure I.1 – ASF for IoT devices + +Figure I.2 shows a general model for an IoT service. The user is running an adaptive IoT application on a device and the device connects with the ASF. The IoT home gateway supports ASF functionality. + + + +User + +IoT devices + +ASF + +Adaptive SW framework + +IoT home gateway + +Y.4453(16)\_FI.2 + +Figure I.2: Conceptual model for IoT service. The diagram shows a User (represented by a person with a cane) connected to IoT devices (represented by a smartphone and a circuit board). The IoT devices are connected to the ASF (Adaptive Software Framework) via an IoT home gateway. The ASF is represented by a box with 'Adaptive SW framework' and a graph. The IoT home gateway is represented by a box with 'IoT home gateway'. The diagram is labeled Y.4453(16)\_FI.2. + +Figure I.2 - Conceptual model for IoT service + +Figure I.3 shows when main ASF functionality is working and how the ASF is activated. + +First, a user sends a service request to an adaptive IoT application and receives a video streaming service from the gateway. The gateway sends high quality video service to the user. However, if the + +A/V QoS in the device is down, then the gateway detects heartbeat signals and the application module sends transfer heartbeat signals to the ASF engine in the gateway. Then the gateway transfers the higher-quality video streaming data to the IoT device according to the status information. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant User + participant IoT as IoT devices +Applications | Resource (CPU, power) + participant Gateway as Home gateway +ASF + + User->>IoT: Initial setting + Note over IoT, Gateway: [Red dashed box] + IoT->>Gateway: Application static/dynamic information, PID, etc. + IoT->>Gateway: System resource information + IoT->>Gateway: Monitoring_status_detection + Note over IoT: Low quality + Gateway->>IoT: System resources control (CPU) + Gateway->>IoT: Application logics change + Note over IoT: High quality + IoT->>User: A/V (QoS) + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the ASF procedure across three lifelines: User, IoT devices, and Home gateway. The IoT devices lifeline is divided into 'Applications' and 'Resource (CPU, power)'. The Home gateway lifeline contains the 'ASF' component. The process begins with 'Initial setting' from the User to the IoT devices. A red dashed box encloses the core ASF logic: the IoT devices send 'Application static/dynamic information, PID, etc.' and 'System resource information' to the ASF engine, followed by a 'Monitoring\_status\_detection' (marked with a red heart icon). Upon detecting 'Low quality', the ASF engine sends 'System resources control (CPU)' and 'Application logics change' back to the IoT devices, which then switches to 'High quality' status. Finally, the IoT devices deliver 'A/V (QoS)' data to the User. + +Sequence diagram showing the procedure example of ASF between User, IoT devices, and Home gateway. + +Y.4453(16)\_F1.3 + +Figure I.3 – A procedure example of ASF + +# **Bibliography** + +- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.4414] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4414/H.623 (2015), *Web of things service architecture*. + + + + + +# SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | General tariff principles | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Terminals and subjective and objective assessment methods | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects and next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4466-202001-I_PDF-E/33ed1f9b27c7c21c797aa928b0f06851_img.jpg b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4466-202001-I_PDF-E/33ed1f9b27c7c21c797aa928b0f06851_img.jpg new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3d6f9a761114928eee05aeeedfe5cb835c9d81b --- /dev/null +++ b/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4466-202001-I_PDF-E/33ed1f9b27c7c21c797aa928b0f06851_img.jpg @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +version https://git-lfs.github.com/spec/v1 +oid sha256:33879d3cc5265389c598b9c2821f0e9fd43a6c6c81283f41b1b0f1ea09b108a0 +size 92739 diff --git a/marked/Y/T-REC-Y.4466-202001-I_PDF-E/8fa679f79a1bb1f527cba9f29e784e89_img.jpg 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ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS, NEXT-GENERATION NETWORKS, INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES + +## GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------|-------------| +| General | Y.100–Y.199 | +| Services, applications and middleware | Y.200–Y.299 | +| Network aspects | Y.300–Y.399 | +| Interfaces and protocols | Y.400–Y.499 | +| Numbering, addressing and naming | Y.500–Y.599 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.600–Y.699 | +| Security | Y.700–Y.799 | +| Performances | Y.800–Y.899 | + +## INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS + +| | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| General | Y.1000–Y.1099 | +| Services and applications | Y.1100–Y.1199 | +| Architecture, access, network capabilities and resource management | Y.1200–Y.1299 | +| Transport | Y.1300–Y.1399 | +| Interworking | Y.1400–Y.1499 | +| Quality of service and network performance | Y.1500–Y.1599 | +| Signalling | Y.1600–Y.1699 | +| Operation, administration and maintenance | Y.1700–Y.1799 | +| Charging | Y.1800–Y.1899 | +| IPTV over NGN | Y.1900–Y.1999 | + +## NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS + +| | | +|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------| +| Frameworks and functional architecture models | Y.2000–Y.2099 | +| Quality of Service and performance | Y.2100–Y.2199 | +| Service aspects: Service capabilities and service architecture | Y.2200–Y.2249 | +| Service aspects: Interoperability of services and networks in NGN | Y.2250–Y.2299 | +| Enhancements to NGN | Y.2300–Y.2399 | +| Network management | Y.2400–Y.2499 | +| Network control architectures and protocols | Y.2500–Y.2599 | +| Packet-based Networks | Y.2600–Y.2699 | +| Security | Y.2700–Y.2799 | +| Generalized mobility | Y.2800–Y.2899 | +| Carrier grade open environment | Y.2900–Y.2999 | + +## FUTURE NETWORKS + +| | | +|-----------------|---------------| +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3000–Y.3499 | +|-----------------|---------------| + +| | | +|----------|---------------| +| BIG DATA | Y.3500–Y.3599 | +|----------|---------------| + +| | | +|-----------------------------------|---------------| +| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3600–Y.3799 | +|-----------------------------------|---------------| + +## INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| General | Y.4000–Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050–Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100–Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250–Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400–Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550–Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700–Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800–Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900–Y.4999 | + +For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations. + +# Open data application programming interfaces (APIs) for IoT data in smart cities and communities + +## Summary + +A growing number of smart cities and administrations are inclined to collaborate and mutualize their efforts and resources for IoT deployments and open data sharing. This Recommendation studies the concept and potential of developing a secure open and interoperable API in the context of IoT deployment and open data management in smart cities. It analyses current solutions implemented by administrations around the world, where applicable, including those adopted by smart cities, to share their data through open and interoperable interfaces. It subsequently specifies an open and interoperable API for secure open data architecture, as well as for supporting IoT data interoperability for smart cities. + +This Recommendation presents a complete set of Open APIs dedicated to smart cities offering different features covering the needs of interoperable smart city framework development. In order to achieve interoperability between heterogeneous platforms and the development of smart cities, the Recommendation has proposed "interoperability points" in southbound and northbound interfaces in a smart city framework. + +It provides a list of core API sets focusing on data interoperability, including context data management APIs, data transactions APIs, data storage APIs and security APIs. Through the mechanism of subscriptions, it is possible to get a performant and scalable context data management. The data storage APIs allow a granular management of the saved data for all cases, in particular both for open data and private data. The data transaction APIs facilitate exposure and access to the data through a data marketplace. In addition, security and privacy APIs are seriously taken into account to provide secure data exchange. + +It should be noted that data interoperability with open APIs can be completed by using common data models, which is briefly discussed. Common data models built upon the collaboration with several standard fora and European projects are open for public use. + +The development of an interoperable framework makes smart city platforms cost efficient, flexible and extendable. Interoperability is not a choice but a must in smart city systems that embed multiple verticals. + +## History + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID* | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4472 | 2020-08-29 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/14374 | + +## Keywords + +API, interoperable, IoT, open data. + +--- + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
Get the results of a search.
For example, a search with the query "q=open+street+map" returns these results:
{ "count": 5, "results": ["open-street-map-sample-file", "transport-the-18th-century-cassini-roads-and-cities-dataset", "transport-exports-by-mode-of-transport-1966", "transport-traffic-commissioners-local-bus-service-registration", "food-hygiene-rating-scheme-camden"] } [b-CKAN]
|The query composed by words separated by the "+" character
Respond "403 Unauthenticated" to inform that this is a private data set.
| +| authenticate | Post the credentials of the user. | User's credentials. | + +In most cases, authentication is needed to access private data sets; however, data owners may give access to anyone without any technical barriers or identity control. + +Authentication is handled typically by API Proxy using OAuth standards. Generally, OAuth in its actual version 2.0 provides clients with a "secure delegated access" to server resources on behalf of a resource owner. + +In the standard case, the server exchanges the authorization code for an access token by making a POST request to the authorization server's token end point: `grant_type=authorization_code`. + +#### 8.2.2 Open data set API + +Data sets are *public* [b-CKAN]. Table 6 describes the Open data set API. + +**Table 6 – Open data set API** + +| Interface | Operation | Parameters | +|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Search |Get the results of a search.
For example, a search with the query "q=open+street+map" returns these results:
{ "count": 5, "results": ["open-street-map-sample-file", "transport-the-18th-century-cassini-roads-and-cities-dataset", | The query composed by words separated by the "+" character
| + +**Table 6 – Open data set API** + +| Interface | Operation | Parameters | +|---------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------| +| |"transport-exports-by-mode-of-transport-1966", "transport-traffic-commissioners-local-bus-service-registration", "food-hygiene-rating-scheme-camden"]
}
[b-CKAN]
| | +| Get |Get the data from a specific data set.
For example, the results of the operation are:
{ "count": 32, "display_name": "test-date", "name": "test-date" } [b-CKAN]
| The name of the data set | +| Update |Update the data of a specific data set.
For example, if a modification is done through this operation, the results are:
{ "count": 32, "display_name": "test-date-updated", "name": "test-date-updated" } [b-CKAN]
| The name of the data set | +| View |View the content of a specific data set.
For example, this operation displays these results:
{ "count": 32, "display_name": "test-date-updated", "name": "test-date-updated", "tags": "education" } [b-CKAN]
| The name of the data set | + +CKAN is in use by numerous governments, organizations and communities around the world; currently the majority of open data sets globally are available and can be exposed via CKAN standards (ckan.org), originally from OKF (okf.org). + +The data management via CKAN is described in the Data Management API (REF); in using the API you will be performing HTTP requests to URLs like: /api/rest/dataset with this returning data in the JSON format. + +### **8.3 IoT data transaction management API** + +The IoT data transaction management API provides visibility and accessibility to data sets and streams gathered in urban environments and published on a data marketplace, which acts as a catalogue for easy sharing and trading. Data available on data transaction systems such as marketplaces adheres to standardized data formats, thus making it easy for application developers, which are data consumers, to move their services across different cities. On top of that, data providers can specify data license agreements and service level agreements when offering their data, which gives data consumers a guarantee of what their rights to use and redistribute data are, as well as what they can expect from the quality of data delivery, improving their trust and confidence to commit to subscribe to data sources. + +The conceptual model of a marketplace for IoT data is shown in Figure 4. It captures the core abstractions of its architecture which provide the key concepts enabling interaction with the platform. The figure also includes optional conceptual elements represented in dashed lines: even if not compulsory, their implementation would enrich the basic functionality of the marketplace with features that may be required by a subset of users/stakeholders. At the core of the model is the notion of data offering. A data offering is related to a single data source, a digital asset registered into the marketplace by a data provider. A data source has an end point used to access it. When a data offering is published on the marketplace by a data provider, it becomes discoverable by data consumers, who may acquire access to the end point of the data source that a data offering is related to. Optionally, external data sources (e.g., data sets already published in open data portals) can be imported into the marketplace by data providers which can then publish related offerings. Several data offerings may refer to the same data source and provide different data license agreements and price plans. Optionally, a service level agreement could be defined which gives data consumers a guarantee of what they can expect from data delivery (e.g., number of data messages over a given period, data completeness). The marketplace could optionally provide a reputation feature that allows data consumers to set a rating score to a data offering they acquired access to or update a previous rating score. + + + +Y.4472(20)\_F04 + +Figure 4: Conceptual model of the marketplace for IoT data. The diagram shows entities and their relationships: Data provider (1) Has (0..\*) Data source (0..1) and Publishes (0..\*) Data offering (0..\*). External data source (0..\*) Imports (0..\*) Data source. Data source (0..1) Has (0..\*) End point (1). Data offering (0..\*) Has (0..\*) Price plan (1) and (0..\*) Licence (1). Price plan (1) Has (0..\*) Licence (1). Licence (1) Has (0..\*) Data consumer (0..\*). Data offering (0..\*) Discovers (0..\*) Rating (0..\*). Rating (0..\*) Set/update (0..\*) Data consumer (0..\*). Data consumer (0..\*) Access (0..\*) End point (1). Price plan (1) Has (0..\*) Pay per use, Recurring (Subscription), One time, and Free of charge. Service level agreement (0..1) Has (0..\*) Licence (1). Licence (1) is a generalization of Standard licence and Personalized licence. + +**Figure 4 – Conceptual model of the marketplace for IoT data.** +**Optional conceptual elements are represented in dashed lines.** +**[b-SynchronicityMarketplace]** + +The marketplace may be accessible through the IoT Data Transaction Management API which can also expose a web portal where data providers and data consumers can interact with the platform (e.g., publish offerings, discover and acquire offerings). Identity management, authentication, authorization and accounting functionalities are ensured by a security component integrated with the marketplace and discussed in the next section. The main functionalities exposed by the IoT data transaction management API are listed in Table 7. + +**Table 7 – Main functionalities exposed by the IoT Data Transaction Management API** + +| API | Functionality exposed | Description | +|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| IoT Data Transaction Management API | publishDataOffering() | Create a new data offering in the marketplace catalogue. License agreement and price plan is attached to the offering. Optionally, SLA can be set. | +| | searchDataOffering() | Look up data offerings in the catalogue. Filters (e.g., data type, location) can be applied. | +| | acquireDataOffering() | Acquire access to a specific data offering by receiving an access token. | + +Figure 5 shows two sequence diagrams that illustrate the main interactions of two different types of users, data providers and data consumers, with the IoT Data Transaction Management API. + + + +The figure contains two sequence diagrams. The left diagram shows a 'Data provider' (actor) interacting with the 'IoT data transaction management API' (boundary). The provider sends a 'publishDataOffering()' message to the API, and the API returns a dashed message: 'Data offering added to the data provider stock/catalogue'. The right diagram shows a 'Data consumer' (actor) interacting with the 'IoT data transaction management API' (boundary). The consumer sends 'searchDataOfferings()' and 'acquireDataOffering()' messages to the API. The API returns dashed messages: 'Available data offerings' and 'Data offering added to the data consumer inventory'. Lifelines for the actors and the API are shown as vertical bars with dashed lines extending downwards. + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + actor DP as Data provider + participant API as IoT data transaction management API + DP->>API: publishDataOffering() + API-->>DP: Data offering added to the data provider stock/catalogue + + actor DC as Data consumer + participant API2 as IoT data transaction management API + DC->>API2: searchDataOfferings() + API2-->>DC: Available data offerings + DC->>API2: acquireDataOffering() + API2-->>DC: Data offering added to the data consumer inventory + +``` + +Y.4472(20)\_F05 + +Figure 5: Sequence diagrams showing interactions of a data provider (left) and a data consumer (right) with the IoT Data Transaction Management API. + +**Figure 5 – Sequence diagrams showing the interactions of a data provider (left) and a data consumer (right) with the IoT Data Transaction Management API** + +### 8.4 Security API + +The security interface provides a unified approach for the management of security policies as a viable and scalable means to define and enforce security rules consistently among the large variety of accessible resources (e.g., IoT devices, data and services). + +With respect to the standard identity management, authentication, authorization and accounting components which reflect the OASIS security standard (e.g., XACML, oneM2M, GSMA, and ENISA) policy management is decoupled from devices and services. Policy can be managed independently, thus focusing on providing business value and compliance to data protection regulations. Key management, encryption, digital signature and data anonymization functionalities are directly linked to resources and governed by the policy management so that implementation of changes and enforcement are simplified by deploying policies on the fly affecting each point of use immediately. The main APIs that constitute the security interface are described next. + +**Identity and Authentication Management API:** allows the registration, import and management of users and roles and to perform authentication. Upon successful registration an identifier is assigned to the users. The latter can also be registered by importing information from an external source. The API allows authentication to be performed by receiving user credentials, interacting with the authorization component and issuing authentication tokens. Users with admin privileges can retrieve, update and delete users required to pass the user identifier to the API, specifying which operation has to be performed and the respective additional information. In this case the API will return the outcome of the operation (e.g., success, fail). + +**Authorization and Accounting Management API:** grants or denies permission to access resources and to log access requests by communicating with the identity and authentication management and the policy management API. + +**Policy Management API:** allows the creation, retrieval, update and deletion of authorization policies. Policies might be simply based on the roles that users have in the system or embed more complex rules specified in a standard mark-up language (e.g., XACML). + +**Data Protection and Privacy Management API** provides functionality to ensure confidentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, data minimization, data retention and consent capabilities around the collection and dissemination of data. It provides methods to encrypt/decrypt data, digitally sign data (and verify signatures), and anonymize data using specific algorithms opportunistically selected. Figure 6 illustrates the sequence diagram of the interactions between the APIs of the security interface in a data access request. A description of such interactions which highlights specific components of the APIs is detailed next. + +The data consumer (e.g., a service developer that has acquired access to a specific data source via the marketplace) sends an authentication request (login) to the Identity and Authentication Management API, which then responds with an access token that the user will need to use to access the resource (data source). When the user wants to access a data source, he sends an access request to the authorization and accounting management API. If XACML is used, the request is intercepted by the authorization PEP proxy sub-component which gets authorization info from the token (i.e., the user role) and checks the validity and status of the token through the Identity and Authentication Management API. Eventually, the authorization PDP sub-component evaluates the access request after retrieving the authorization policy from the Policy Management API. Depending on this decision, the PEP proxy blocks or forwards access to the resource (through the context data management API). To track the amount of resources accessed, access information is logged into the accounting sub-component of the Authorization and Accounting API. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant DC as Data consumer + participant IAM as Identity and authentication management API + participant AAM as Authorization and accounting management API + participant PM as Policy management API + participant R as Resource + + DC->>IAM: authenticate() + IAM-->>DC: Access token + DC->>AAM: accessRequest() + AAM->>IAM: checkAccessToken() + IAM-->>AAM: Response: OK + AAM->>PM: retrievePolicy() + PM-->>AAM: Policy + AAM->>AAM: evaluateAccessRequest() + AAM->>R: accessRequest() + R-->>DC: Data + AAM->>AAM: logAccess() + +``` + +Y.4472(20)\_F06 + +Sequence diagram showing interactions between APIs of the security interface in a data access request. The diagram involves five lifelines: Data consumer, Identity and authentication management API, Authorization and accounting management API, Policy management API, and Resource. The sequence of interactions is: 1. Data consumer calls authenticate() on Identity and authentication management API. 2. Identity and authentication management API returns Access token to Data consumer. 3. Data consumer calls accessRequest() on Authorization and accounting management API. 4. Authorization and accounting management API calls checkAccessToken() on Identity and authentication management API. 5. Identity and authentication management API returns Response: OK to Authorization and accounting management API. 6. Authorization and accounting management API calls retrievePolicy() on Policy management API. 7. Policy management API returns Policy to Authorization and accounting management API. 8. Authorization and accounting management API performs a self-call evaluateAccessRequest(). 9. Authorization and accounting management API calls accessRequest() on Resource. 10. Resource returns Data to Data consumer. 11. Authorization and accounting management API performs a self-call logAccess(). + +**Figure 6 – Sequence diagram showing the interactions between the APIs of the security interface in a data access request** + +The sequence diagram in Figure 7 shows the interactions between the APIs of the security interface for creating and retrieving a security and privacy policy. The data protection and privacy management API enforces security and privacy measures previously defined, such as encryption and anonymization, defined by a policy admin through the Policy Management API, directly on the resource (e.g., data). + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant Client as Policy admin. +REST client + participant PMAPI as Policy +management +API + participant DPMAPI as Data protection +and privacy +management API + + Client->>PMAPI: createPolicy() + PMAPI-->>Client: Response: OK + DPMAPI->>PMAPI: retrievePolicy() + PMAPI-->>DPMAPI: Policy + +``` + +Y.4472(20)\_F07 + +Sequence diagram showing interactions between Policy admin. REST client, Policy management API, and Data protection and privacy management API. The client calls createPolicy() on the Policy management API, which returns Response: OK. Then, the Data protection and privacy management API calls retrievePolicy() on the Policy management API, which returns Policy. + +**Figure 7 – Sequence diagram showing the interactions between the APIs of the security interface for creating and retrieving a security policy** + +The main functionalities exposed by the APIs of the security interface are listed in Table 8. + +**Table 8 – Main functionalities exposed by the APIs of the security interface** + +| API | Functionality exposed | Description | +|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Identity and Authentication Management API | register() | Sign up new user | +| | authenticate() | Sign in user | +| | checkAccessToken() | Check the validity and status of the access token | +| Authorization and Accounting Management API | accessRequest() | Handle resource (data) access requests from users | +| | logAccess() | Log access information | +| | evaluateAccessRequest() | Evaluate the access request against a specified policy | +| Policy Management API | createPolicy() | Define authorization policies (e.g., role based) as well as security and privacy measures | +| | updatePolicy() | Update an authorization policy | +| | retrievePolicy() | Get a particular authorization policy | +| | deletePolicy() | Erase an authorization policy | +| Data Protection and Privacy Management API | encrypt() / decrypt() | Encrypt / decrypt data | +| | sign() | Digitally sign data | +| | verify() | Verify signature | +| | anonymize() | Anonymize data using a specified algorithm | + +### 8.5 Common data models + +One of the core elements in this Recommendation refers to the adoption of common data models for representing the information linked to the observations. When considering the interoperability as a means for breaking the vertical silos that have been characterizing the urban ecosystems, it is mandatory to adopt homogeneous data models agreed by the different stakeholders. In this way the synergies between services can be put into practice. Just as an example, a waste management company can share real-time information related to the positions of the trucks along the city streets. Sharing that information with the traffic management department allows car drivers to have access, in real time, to information related to those streets which should be avoided due to potential traffic congestion. Further to this, when data is provided with the corresponding ontologies, the closer we are to implementing true autonomic cities. This means that thanks to data interoperability between services, knowledge acquisition is faster and more reliable fostering decision making without human intervention. + +In terms of design and implementation, data models have to be conceived to gather most of the usual needs linked to the urban services. Furthermore, they have to be easily scaled according to new requirements imposed by the evolution of the technology and the urban ecosystems' own characteristics. + +Last but not least, in the same way that infrastructure federation is becoming a reality, data federation will become a key enabler in optimizing intercity interactions. Thus, providing an optimization opportunity which will go beyond the legacy local approaches. + +### 8.6 IoT device management API suite + +From a smart city point of view, one of the most fundamental issues is setting up the management of IoT devices. These APIs are managing IoT devices and IoT agents, which are collections or federations of IoT devices. What is important is that the suite provides a normalized interface to configure and manage the IoT device, get alarms, configure and monitor IoT devices, and provide secure access to them. The same set of open APIs can be deployed in the silicon of the IoT device or used by an agent. + +It includes APIs for: + +- IoT device inventory +- IoT device onboarding +- IoT device discovery +- IoT device type management +- IoT state management +- IoT alarm management +- Streaming of IoT data events +- Streaming of IoT management events +- IoT configuration management +- IoT data multi-protocol data access MQTT and NGSI-LD +- IoT API authorization + +An example of such a suite is the TMF IoT Device Management Suite of APIs. [b-TMF908] + +### **8.7 IoT service management API suite** + +The ability to create services around all the IoT device data that is collected within the smart city is essential. + +The TMF IoT Service Management API allows the building of services based on the data provided by the IoT devices through the IoT device management APIs. + +It includes APIs for: + +- IoT service inventory +- IoT service onboarding +- IoT service discovery +- IoT service type management +- IoT service state management +- IoT service problem management +- Streaming of IoT service data events +- Streaming of IoT service management events +- IoT service configuration management +- IoT service data multi-protocol data access MQTT and NGSI-LD +- IoT service test management +- IoT service API authorization + +An example of such a suite is the TMF IoT Service Management Suite of APIs [b-TMF914]. + +# Appendix I + +### Instruction for open API implementation + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This appendix explains implementation guidelines. The technical activities of each smart city platform compliance can vary in terms of both complexity and duration but it is possible to define some milestones: Figure 1 describes this approach presenting four progressive steps with different levels of compliance with the open APIs that can be reached by cities indicating different degrees of interoperability with the platform: + + + +``` +graph LR; A[Asset identification] --> B[Adaptation of open APIs]; B --> C[Applying common data models]; C --> D[Data services with IoT data transaction]; +``` + +A horizontal flow diagram showing four progressive steps in blue chevron-shaped boxes: 'Asset identification', 'Adaptation of open APIs', 'Applying common data models', and 'Data services with IoT data transaction'. The boxes are connected by white chevrons pointing to the right. The text 'Y.4472(20)\_FI.1' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure I.1 – Compliance levels of the open API framework** + +In the following section are described in detail the different phases and potential activities to perform in order to reach the specific compliance level. + +| Level 0 – Initial situation: proprietary/specific systems/API | +|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| The existing smart city platform is made and not compliant with open APIs. The IoT infrastructure and software platforms are managed/owned by the municipality of external providers. The IoT devices communicate with the infrastructure using specific/proprietary protocols. The data is accessible through specific/proprietary API. The data models are specific, not aligned with open standards. All the systems and applications are strictly tailored by the specific municipalities. | +| Level 1 – Entering interoperability process: asset identification | +| The cities want to achieve data interoperability with the open APIs and defined a technical interoperability architecture in order to make the existing IoT infrastructure compliant with the specifications of this Recommendation (interoperability points). The cities identified which data sets and services can be brought for the work. | +| Activities to be performed to achieve the level | +| The technical activities in this stage should be focused on two different tracks: the identification of the possible interactions between the IoT infrastructure of the city and the open API framework, estimating the minimum technical requirements needed to implement the "interoperability points". In this phase, it should be identified which components (hardware and software) of the existing city infrastructure have to be adapted using specific connectors or data injectors to convert native interfaces (e.g., REST API) to the open APIs. In parallel, it is necessary to investigate and identify which data sets should be exposed following the open API specifications: these data sets can include, for instance, real-time data coming from IoT devices, historical and open data, micro-services data. | +| Mandatory requirements | +| Knowledge of the open APIs framework and interoperability points specifications | +| Optional requirements | +| N/A | + +| | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Level 2 – Implementation of the open APIs | +| A city implemented the open APIs: city data sets are accessible through open and standard interfaces that represent the main interoperability points with the open APIs framework. | +| Activities to be performed to achieve the level | +| The activities inside the city are devoted to the provisioning of the data using open and standard APIs: the city should work together with the technical partners to adapt the existing interfaces to the open APIs, in particular to the context management one. The city can use existing software components or can develop a specific software adapter to inject data into the context data management component. This can be considered the first step to share the city data with the open APIs and be part of the ecosystem. | +| Mandatory requirements | +|- • Implementation context management APIs for real-time data provisioning (Interoperability points)
- • Implementation of security APIs to be compliant with the open APIs authentication and authorization (Interoperability points)
- • Implementation of data storage API to give access to the city's historical data (Interoperability points) and open data repositories
The city has to map its own legacy data models with common data models in order to select the most suitable ones for the specific smart city domains. The common data model can be extended or new ones can be created to represent new entities or attributes which are not covered by the current ones. The ones identified and mapped to the correct data model specific adapters should be implemented to convert the original data in the new format.
As a reference, EU H2020 SynchroniCity project provides tools and guidelines to speed up the mapping and conversion of the city data.
| +| Mandatory requirements | +|- • Adoption of common data models (Interoperability points)
From a technical point of view, a city, being compliant with the previous levels, is ready to be part of a marketplace built upon the open APIs. The city can also decide to access an existing data marketplace or to install a specific version customized for the city's local ecosystem. If the city already has a marketplace supporting the open APIs, it could be federated to the other marketplaces using the same open APIs. In this case, limited technical activities will be necessary to implement the federation.
In addition to that, the city will be involved in other business and strategic decisions to define the terms and approaches to be part of the other marketplace (e.g., proper handling of ownership, service access terms, data licenses etc.). It will be possible to have different levels of integration starting from the simple participation to the marketplace catalogue, to promote specific data assets, up to supporting all the other functionalities, such as revenue sharing, feedback collection, SLA management etc.
| +| Mandatory requirements | +|- • Compliance with data transaction APIs (Interoperability points)
- • Deployment of a local marketplace instance
service..... | 13 | +| I.1 SSB user rental flow ..... | 13 | +| I.2 SSB user payment flow ..... | 14 | +| I.3 Flow for SSB platform operation management..... | 15 | +| Bibliography..... | 17 | + + + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4497 + +## Requirements and functional architecture of smart sharing bicycle service + +# 1 Scope + +This Recommendation specifies the requirements and functional architecture of the smart sharing bicycle (SSB) service, to effectively promote operation management, enhance customer experience and achieve large-scale deployment. + +The scope of this Recommendation includes: + +- Introduction of SSB service; +- Functional requirements of SSB service; +- Functional architecture of SSB service. + +# 2 References + +The following ITU-T Recommendations and other references contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of this Recommendation. At the time of publication, the editions indicated were valid. All Recommendations and other references are subject to revision; users of this Recommendation are therefore encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the most recent edition of the Recommendations and other references listed below. A list of the currently valid ITU-T Recommendations is regularly published. The reference to a document within this Recommendation does not give it, as a standalone document, the status of a Recommendation. + +None. + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +This Recommendation uses the following terms defined elsewhere: + +**3.1.1 application** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A structured set of capabilities, which provide value-added functionality supported by one or more services, which may be supported by an API interface. + +**3.1.2 capability** [b-ITU-R M.1224-1]: The ability of an item to meet a service demand of given quantitative characteristics under given internal conditions. + +**3.1.3 device** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: With regard to the Internet of things, this is a piece of equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing. + +**3.1.4 functional entity** [b-ITU-T Y.2012]: An entity that comprises an indivisible set of specific functions. Functional entities are logical concepts, while groupings of functional entities are used to describe practical, physical implementations. + +**3.1.5 Internet of things** [b-ITU-T Y.4000]: A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving, interoperable information and communication technologies. + +**3.1.6 service** [b-ITU-T Y.2091]: A set of functions and facilities offered to a user by a provider. + +## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 smart sharing bicycle (SSB) user:** A person that uses a smart sharing bicycle (SSB) user device to make use of the SSB service. + +**3.2.2 smart sharing bicycle (SSB) user device:** A device such as a smartphone or a tablet that can be used to access a smart sharing bicycle service. + +**3.2.3 smart sharing bicycle (SSB) device:** Shared bicycle equipped with an Internet of things device used by the smart sharing bicycle service. + +# 4 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|------|------------------------------------| +| FE | Functional Entity | +| GIS | Geographic Information System | +| GNSS | Global Navigation Satellite System | +| IoT | Internet of Things | +| NFC | Near-Field Communication | +| QR | Quick Response | +| SSB | Smart Sharing Bicycle | + +# 5 Conventions + +In this Recommendation: + +The keywords "is required to" indicate a requirement which must be strictly followed and from which no deviation is permitted if conformance to this Recommendation is to be claimed. + +The keywords "is recommended" indicate a requirement which is recommended but which is not absolutely required. Thus, this requirement need not be present to claim conformance. + +The keyword "may" indicates an optional requirement which is permissible, without implying any sense of being recommended. This term is not intended to imply that the vendor's implementation must provide the option, and the feature can be optionally enabled by the network operator/service provider. Rather, it means the vendor may optionally provide the feature and still claim conformance with the specification. + +# 6 Introduction to the SSB service + +The development of telecommunication technology has provided a suitable environment for SSB service. Compared with traditional public bicycle rental services, SSB service can better meet people's daily travel needs, provide a positive user experience, and create huge market opportunities. + +## 1) Convenient service procedure + +With the improvements in business automation, the opening, exchange and cancellation of SSB service can be achieved online. + +### 2) Positive user experience + +When using SSB service, people can easily find a nearby SSB as well as a suitable place around their destination to park it. This greatly optimizes the user experience. + +### 3) Achieving large-scale deployment + +The SSB service platform can collect the status information and riding information from SSBs. Using big data service analysis, the target delivery of SSBs and the identification of faulty bicycles can be easily realized. Therefore, SSB service is conducive to the large-scale development of SSB service and effectively resolves the last kilometre problem. + +As shown in Figure 1, the framework of SSB service consists of the following parts: + +- the application part, where an SSB user uses the SSB application installed in the SSB user device to enjoy the service; +- the platform part, where the SSB platform supplies the SSB service; +- the Internet of things (IoT) device part, i.e., the SSB device. + +These parts are composed of the following layers: either the application or the service layer; either the application support layer or the service support layer; and the device layer. Communication networks and third-party platforms are out of the scope of this Recommendation. + + + +The diagram illustrates the framework of SSB service, organized into three main parts: Application part, Platform part, and IoT device part, connected via communication networks. + +- Application part:** Contains three layers: Application layer, Application support layer, and Device layer. +- Platform part:** Contains three layers: Service layer, Service support layer, and Device layer. +- IoT device part:** Contains three layers: Application layer, Application support layer, and Device layer. + +The parts are connected as follows: + +- The Application part and Platform part are connected by a bidirectional arrow. +- The Platform part and IoT device part are connected by a bidirectional arrow. +- The Application part and Platform part are connected to a central Communication network (cloud icon) via dashed lines. +- The Platform part and IoT device part are connected to a central Communication network (cloud icon) via dashed lines. +- The SSB application (mobile phone icon) is connected to the top Communication network. +- The SSB device (bicycle icon) is connected to the bottom Communication network. +- The SSB platform is connected to the top Communication network. +- The Third-party platform is connected to the SSB platform. + +Y.4497(24) + +Figure 1 – Framework of SSB service. The diagram illustrates the architecture of the SSB service framework, divided into three main parts: Application part, Platform part, and IoT device part, connected via communication networks. + +**Figure 1 – Framework of SSB service** + +# 7 Functional requirements of SSB service + +## 7.1 Application part requirements + +The following are the generic capability requirements for the application part: + +- 1) User registration requirements: + - The application part is required to support user registration. +- 2) User deregistration requirements: + - The application part is required to support user deregistration. +- 3) User login requirements: + - The application part is required to support user login. +- 4) User logout requirements: + - The application part is required to support user logout. +- 5) Shared bicycle rental requirements: + - The application part is required to obtain the identity information of the SSB device. + - The application part is required to request the permission of the SSB platform to unlock the SSB device automatically. + +NOTE 1 – The identity information of SSB devices may be acquired manually or obtained by a quick response (QR) code, Bluetooth, or near-field communication (NFC). + +- 6) Finding nearby bicycles requirements: + - It is recommended that the application part be able to send the position of the SSB user device when receiving a request to search for nearby SSB devices. + - It is recommended that the application part display the physical distribution and status information of nearby SSB devices on the geographic information system (GIS)-based map. +- 7) User account management requirements: + - The application part is required to create a user account based on the user registration request. + - The application part is required to delete a user account based on the user deregistration request. +- 8) User feedback requirements: + - It is recommended that the application part supports the sending of the SSB user feedback to the SSB platform. +- 9) Parking guidance requirements: + - It is recommended that the application part shows nearby parking areas based on the geographic location of the SSB user device. + - It is recommended that the application part indicates the unavailability of parking space based on the geographic location of the SSB user device. +- 10) Payment interface requirements: + - The application part is required to support charging for the use of SSB devices through a payment interface. + +NOTE 2 – Payment interface may be supplied by SSB service vendors or a third party. + +## **7.2 Platform part requirements** + +The following are the capability requirements for the platform part: + +- 1) User account management requirements: + - The platform part is required to support the addition, modification or deletion of an SSB user account. + - The platform part is required to support updating the SSB user status if it is changed. + +- 2) Bicycle management requirements: + - The platform part is required to support the addition, modification or deletion of an SSB device. + - The platform part is required to monitor the status information of the SSB device, such as working state, battery level, geographic location, etc. + - The platform part is required to monitor the abnormal working status of the SSB device, such as equipment failure, dismantling alarms, insufficient voltage, etc. + - The platform part is required to identify and confirm the alarm report from the SSB device. + - The platform part is required to create, modify and delete the status report policies, the alarm report policies, and the fault report policies remotely. + - The platform part is required to send the updated firmware to the relevant SSB device. +- 3) Accounting management requirements: + - The platform part is required to support the payment interface to charge for the use of an SSB device. + - The platform part is required to provide the detailed information of the SSB user account when the SSB user queries his/her account. +- 4) Parking management requirements: + - It is recommended that the platform part provide information on nearby parking areas based on the geographic location of the SSB application. + - It is recommended that the platform part provide information on the unavailability of parking space based on the geographic location of the SSB application. + - The platform part may monitor the status information of the electronic fence in the parking area. +- 5) Customer service management requirements: + - It is recommended that the platform part obtain user feedback. + - The platform part may provide an interface for manual customer service. +- 6) Operation management requirements: + - The platform part is required to support an interface to send to maintenance personnel the operation and maintenance requirements of SSB devices, such as SSB device recycling and rebalancing in different areas, etc. +- 7) Statistics and analysis requirements: + - It is recommended that the platform part support an interface to analyse the physical distribution information, the working status information, and the fault and alarm information, for better maintenance and improved service. +- 8) External platform access requirements: + - It is recommended that the platform part provide the interfaces with external platforms. + +## **7.3 IoT device part requirements** + +The following are the capability requirements for the IoT device part: + +- 1) Status reporting requirements: + - The device part is required to collect the status information of the SSB device, such as SSB device position information, remaining battery power, network signal strength, etc. + +- The device part is required to regularly send the status information of the SSB device, according to the period configured by the SSB platform. +- The device part is required to send the status information of the SSB device, in response to the query from the SSB platform. + +### 2) Alarm reporting requirements: + +- The device part is required to monitor the movement of the SSB device when the SSB device is locked. +- The device part is required to automatically trigger an alarm once the pre-set movement conditions are reached. +- The device part is required to send an alarm to the SSB platform once the pre-set movement conditions are reached. + +### 3) Fault reporting requirements: + +- The device part is required to collect the abnormal working status of an SSB device, such as equipment failure, dismantling alarms, insufficient voltage, etc. +- The device part is required to send fault reports to the SSB platform. + +### 4) Identity requirements: + +- The device part is required to have unique identity information. + +NOTE – The identity information, which can be acquired by QR code, Bluetooth or NFC, may be printed on the SSB device directly or it may be embedded in the SSB device. + +### 5) Unlock requirements: + +- The device part is required to receive the unlock command from the SSB platform to unlock itself automatically. + +### 6) Lock requirements: + +- The device part is required to send lock status reports and geographic location information to the SSB platform. + +### 7) Power management requirements: + +- The device part is required to monitor the battery power, charge and discharge information of the SSB device. +- The device part may take a low-power communication mechanism based on the SSB platform command or existing policies. + +### 8) Positioning requirements: + +- The device part is required to supply the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) positioning information or base station positioning information. + +### 9) Online remote update requirements: + +- The device part is required to receive the status report policies, the alarm report policies, and the fault report policies from the SSB platform. +- The device part is required to receive the firmware image from the SSB platform and update the system. + +# 8 Functional architecture of the SSB service + +As shown in Figure 2, the functional architecture of the SSB service also consists of the following parts: + +- The application part, which consists of capabilities that the SSB application is required to satisfy. + +- The platform part, which consists of capabilities that the SSB platform is required to satisfy. +- The IoT device part, which consists of capabilities that the SSB devices are required to satisfy. +- The network part is out of the scope of this Recommendation. + + + +``` + +graph TD + subgraph Application_part [Application part] + A1[User registration FE] --- A2[User deregistration FE] --- A3[User login FE] --- A4[User logout FE] + A5[Sharing bicycle rental FE] --- A6[Finding nearby bicycles FE] --- A7[User account management FE] --- A8[User feedback FE] + A9[Parking guidance FE] --- A10[Payment interface FE] + end + + subgraph Network_part_1 [Network part] + end + + subgraph Platform_part [Platform part] + P1[User account management FE] --- P2[Bicycle management FE] --- P3[Accounting management FE] --- P4[Parking management FE] + P5[Customer service management FE] --- P6[Operation management FE] --- P7[Statistics and analysis FE] --- P8[External platform access FE] + end + + subgraph Network_part_2 [Network part] + end + + subgraph IoT_device_part [IoT device part] + I1[Status reporting FE] --- I2[Alarm reporting FE] --- I3[Fault reporting FE] --- I4[Identity FE] + I5[Unlock FE] --- I6[Lock FE] --- I7[Power management FE] --- I8[Positioning FE] + I9[Online remote update FE] + end + + Application_part --- Network_part_1 --- Platform_part --- Network_part_2 --- IoT_device_part + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the functional architecture of the SSB service, organized into three main sections: Application part, Platform part, and IoT device part, each separated by a Network part (indicated by dashed lines). + +**Application part:** + +- User registration FE +- User deregistration FE +- User login FE +- User logout FE +- Sharing bicycle rental FE +- Finding nearby bicycles FE +- User account management FE +- User feedback FE +- Parking guidance FE +- Payment interface FE + +**Platform part:** + +- User account management FE +- Bicycle management FE +- Accounting management FE +- Parking management FE +- Customer service management FE +- Operation management FE +- Statistics and analysis FE +- External platform access FE + +**IoT device part:** + +- Status reporting FE +- Alarm reporting FE +- Fault reporting FE +- Identity FE +- Unlock FE +- Lock FE +- Power management FE +- Positioning FE +- Online remote update FE + +Functional architecture of the SSB service diagram showing Application, Platform, and IoT device parts separated by Network parts. + +Y.4497(24) + +**Figure 2 – Functional architecture of the SSB service** + +NOTE – The main functions of the identity functional entity (FE) are to provide the SSB device identity information to the SSB application, so the SSB application can send this information to the SSB platform to operate this SSB device. + +## **8.1 Application part** + +The application part includes a user registration FE, user deregistration FE, user login FE, user logout FE, sharing bicycle rental FE, finding nearby bicycles FE, user account management FE, user feedback FE, parking guidance FE and payment interface FE. + +#### **8.1.1 User registration FE** + +The main functions of the user registration FE are as follows: + +- Obtain SSB username and password to initiate user registration. +- Receive the result of user registration from the SSB platform and show it to the user. + +NOTE – User registration may need deposit. + +#### **8.1.2 User deregistration FE** + +The main functions of the user deregistration FE are as follows: + +- Trigger user deregistration based on the SSB user operation. +- Trigger the refund of the SSB user deposit procedure. +- Receive the result of user deregistration from the SSB platform and show it to the SSB user. + +#### **8.1.3 User login FE** + +The main functions of the user login FE are as follows: + +- Obtain SSB username and password to initiate user login. +- Receive the result of the user login from the SSB platform and show it to the SSB user. + +#### **8.1.4 User logout FE** + +The main functions of the user logout FE are as follows: + +- Trigger user logout based on the SSB user operation. +- Receive the result of the user logout from the SSB platform and show it to the SSB user. + +#### **8.1.5 Sharing bicycle rental FE** + +The main functions of the sharing bicycle rental FE are as follows: + +- Show the position and state of SSB devices on the map in the SSB application. +- Use a camera, Bluetooth or NFC to obtain the identity information of the SSB device and unlock it automatically. +- Obtain the identity information of the SSB device, input by the SSB user manually, and unlock it. + +#### **8.1.6 Finding nearby bicycles FE** + +The main function of the finding nearby bicycles FE is as follows: + +- Show on the map the number and the position of nearby bicycles around the current position. + +#### **8.1.7 User account management FE** + +The main functions of the user account management FE are as follows: + +- Query the details of the SSB user account. +- Recharge the balance of the SSB user account. +- Refund the deposit of the SSB user account. + +#### **8.1.8 User feedback FE** + +The main functions of the user feedback FE are to collect and classify the SSB user feedback and send it to the SSB platform. + +NOTE – User feedback may be classified as the SSB device fault, SSB device unlock/lock failed, SSB device long unlock/lock time, and so on. + +#### **8.1.9 Parking guidance FE** + +The main functions of parking guidance management FE are as follows: + +- Show the recommended nearby parking areas. +- Show no parking area. + +#### **8.1.10 Payment interface FE** + +The main functions of payment interface FE are to supply payment functions, as follows: + +- Use prepayment service or the balance in the SSB user account to pay for the use of the SSB device. +- Notify the SSB user to choose other payment methods to continue the payment when the traditional payment method fails. + +### **8.2 Platform part** + +The platform part includes the user account management FE, bicycle management FE, accounting management FE, parking management FE, customer service management FE, operation management FE, statistics and analysis FE, and external platform access FE. + +#### **8.2.1 User account management FE** + +The main functions of the user account management FE are to provide user account management of SSB users, as follows: + +- Add, modify or delete the SSB user account. +- Update SSB user status. + +#### **8.2.2 Bicycle management FE** + +The main functions of bicycle management FE are as follows: + +- Add, modify or delete the SSB device. +- Monitor the status information of the SSB device, such as working state, battery level, and geographic location. +- Monitor the abnormal working status of the SSB device, such as equipment failure, dismantling alarms, and insufficient voltage. +- Identify and confirm the alarm report from the SSB device. +- Update the configuration profile of SSB devices. +- Create, modify and delete the status report policies, the alarm report policies, and the fault report policies. +- Send the commands or policies to the relevant SSB device. +- Send the updated firmware to the relevant SSB device. +- Provide the statistics and analysis FE and operation management FE with the status and alarm information. + +#### **8.2.3 Accounting management FE** + +The main functions of the accounting management FE are as follows: + +- Charge for the use of the SSB device. +- Provide detailed information on the SSB user account. +- Handle the balance recharge of the SSB user account. +- Handle the deposit refund of the SSB user account. + +#### **8.2.4 Parking management FE** + +The main functions of the parking management FE are as follows: + +- Provide information on parking areas. +- Provide information on no parking area. +- Monitor the status information of the electronic fence in the parking area. +- Provide the statistics and analysis FE with the parking information of SSB users. + +#### **8.2.5 Customer service management FE** + +The main functions of the customer service management FE are as follows: + +- Obtain the classified user feedback, such as the SSB device fault, SSB device unlock/lock failed, and SSB device long unlock/lock time. +- Reply to the user feedback. +- Provide manual customer service. +- Provide the statistics and analysis FE with information from the user feedback. + +#### **8.2.6 Operation management FE** + +The main function of the operation management FE is: + +- Send the operation and maintenance requirements of SSB devices, such as the SSB device recycling and rebalancing in different areas, to the maintenance personnel. + +#### **8.2.7 Statistics and analysis FE** + +The main functions of the statistics and analysis FE are to provide relevant reports for better maintenance and service improvement, as follows: + +- Obtain real-time data from the bicycle management FE, accounting management FE, parking management FE, and customer service management FE. +- Analyse statistics for better maintenance and service improvement. +- Provide reports according to big data analysis. + +#### **8.2.8 External platform access FE** + +The main functions of the external platform access FE are as follows: + +- Connect with third-party platforms via interfaces. +- Exchange the relevant information or content with third-party platforms. + +## **8.3 IoT device part** + +The IoT device part includes the status reporting FE, alarm reporting FE, fault reporting FE, identity FE, unlock FE, lock FE, power management FE, positioning FE and online remote update FE. + +#### **8.3.1 Status reporting FE** + +The main functions of the status reporting FE are to send the status information of SSB devices to the SSB platform, as follows: + +- Collect the status information of the SSB device, such as SSB device position information, remaining battery power, network signal strength, etc. +- Regularly send the status information of the SSB device to the SSB platform, according to the period configured by the platform. +- Send the status information of the SSB device to the SSB platform, in response to the query from the platform. + +#### **8.3.2 Alarm reporting FE** + +The main functions of the alarm reporting FE are to provide an alarm to the SSB platform, as follows: + +- Monitor the movement of the SSB device when the SSB device is locked. +- Automatically trigger an alarm on the buzzer once the pre-set movement conditions are reached. +- Send an alarm to the SSB platform once the pre-set movement conditions are reached. + +#### **8.3.3 Fault reporting FE** + +The main functions of the fault reporting FE are to send the fault information to the SSB platform, as follows: + +- Collect the abnormal working status of the SSB device, such as equipment failure, dismantling alarm, and insufficient voltage. +- Send fault reports to the SSB platform. + +#### **8.3.4 Identity FE** + +The main function of the identity FE is to provide the identity information to the SSB application, as follows: + +- Supply identity information based on QR code, NFC, Bluetooth, or other technologies. + +#### **8.3.5 Unlock FE** + +The main functions of the unlock FE are to support remote automatic unlocking or user manual unlocking, as follows: + +- Receive the unlock command from the SSB platform to unlock the SSB device automatically. +- Acquire the unlock password input by a user to unlock the SSB device manually. + +#### **8.3.6 Lock FE** + +The main function of the lock FE is to send a lock status report and SSB device position information to the SSB platform to indicate whether the SSB device is successfully locked after the SSB user has locked the SSB device. + +#### **8.3.7 Power management FE** + +The main functions of the power management FE are to manage the power, as follows: + +- Monitor the battery power, charge, and discharge information of the SSB device. +- Provide the battery power information to the status reporting FE and fault reporting FE. +- Implement a low-power communication mechanism based on the SSB platform command or the existing policies. + +#### **8.3.8 Positioning FE** + +The main function of the positioning FE is to acquire GNSS positioning information or base station positioning information for the SSB devices. + +#### **8.3.9 Online remote update FE** + +The main functions of the online remote update FE are as follows: + +- Receive the configuration profile from the SSB platform and replace the existing configuration profile inside the SSB device. +- Receive the reporting policies from the SSB platform and replace the existing policies inside the SSB device. +- Receive the firmware image from the SSB platform and update the system. + +# Appendix I + +## Implementation and deployment model of a smart sharing bicycle (SSB) service + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +This appendix provides an implementation and deployment model for an SSB service as illustrated in Figure I.1. + + + +Hot-spot areas + +Community Mall School Warehouse Subway station + +SSB device + +SSB user device SSB user + +SSB platform + +Maintenance personnel + +Y.4497(24) + +Figure I.1 – Implementation and deployment model of SSB service. The diagram illustrates the system architecture. At the top, a box labeled 'Hot-spot areas' contains icons for Community, Mall, School, Warehouse, and Subway station. Below this, SSB devices (bicycles) are shown connected to an SSB platform (cloud icon). The SSB platform is also connected to SSB user devices (smartphones) and SSB users (person icons). Maintenance personnel (person icon with a cap) are shown connected to the SSB platform and a damaged SSB device (bicycle with an 'x' on the wheel). A reference code 'Y.4497(24)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +**Figure I.1 – Implementation and deployment model of SSB service** + +In this model, SSB devices can be connected to the SSB platform via a wired or wireless communication network. They can be deployed in many hot-spot areas, e.g., communities, malls, schools, warehouses and subway stations, and the deployment of the SSB devices may be adjusted by the SSB platform based on the number of SSB users. SSB users can use an SSB user device to enjoy sharing the bicycle rental service conveniently, as shown in Figure I.2 and Figure I.3. SSB devices can obtain the status/alarm/fault information and send it to the SSB platform, and the damaged SSB devices can be recycled by maintenance personnel through the SSB platform, as shown in Figure I.4. To ensure that this model works well, such service flows have been outlined in clauses I.1 to I.3. + +## I.1 SSB user rental flow + +When an SSB user wants to use the SSB service, the rental flow outlined here can be referenced. The SSB user rental flow is shown in Figure I.2, and the main steps are outlined below: + +Step 1: SSB application logs in to the SSB platform. + +Step 2: SSB application establishes a direct connection to obtain the identity information of the SSB device. + +NOTE 1 – The SSB application may use the camera to recognize the QR code of the SSB device to obtain the identity information of the SSB device. + +Step 3: The SSB application sends a request to the SSB platform to unlock the SSB device, including the SSB device identity information. + +Step 4: After the SSB platform validates the SSB user and the SSB device identity information, it sends an unlock command to the SSB device. + +NOTE 2 – This command may be sent to the SSB device via the SSB application. + +Step 5: After the SSB device receives an unlock command from the SSB platform, it performs the unlock operation and sends a reply with an "SSB device unlocked" indication to the SSB platform. + +NOTE 3 – This indication may be sent to the SSB platform via the SSB application. + +Step 6: The SSB platform sends an "SSB device unlocked" indication to the SSB application. + + + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant SSB_device as SSB device + participant SSB_application as SSB application + participant SSB_platform as SSB platform + + SSB_application->>SSB_platform: 1. Login successfully + SSB_device->>SSB_application: 2. Establish a direct connection to obtain the identity information of SSB device + SSB_application->>SSB_platform: 3. Request to unlock SSB device + Note right of SSB_platform: SSB user and SSB device identity information validated + SSB_platform->>SSB_device: 4. Unlock SSB device command + SSB_device->>SSB_device: SSB device unlock + SSB_device->>SSB_platform: 5. SSB device unlock indication + SSB_platform->>SSB_application: 6. SSB device unlocked success indication +``` + +Y.4497(24) + +Sequence diagram showing the flow for an SSB user rental between SSB device, SSB application, and SSB platform. + +**Figure I.2 – Flow for an SSB user rental** + +## **I.2 SSB user payment flow** + +When an SSB user wants to lock the SSB and finish the SSB service, the following payment flow can be referenced: + +The SSB user payment flow is shown in Figure I.3, and the main steps are outlined below: + +Step 1: SSB application logs in to the SSB platform. + +Step 2: After the SSB user performs the lock operation, the SSB device sends a lock status report to the SSB platform, including geographic position information, remaining battery power and network signal strength. + +NOTE – The status report may be sent to the SSB platform via an SSB application. + +Step 3: After the SSB platform validates the SSB device locked status report and the SSB user account, the SSB platform performs the payment operation, then it sends the SSB device locked status report and payment result to the SSB application. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SSB_device as SSB device + participant SSB_application as SSB application + participant SSB_platform as SSB platform + + SSB_device->>SSB_device: SSB user perform lock operation + SSB_device->>SSB_platform: 2. SSB device locked status report upload + SSB_platform->>SSB_application: 1. Login successfully + SSB_platform->>SSB_application: 3. Reply SSB device locked status and payment result + SSB_platform->>SSB_platform: SSB device locked status report and SSB user account validation, and perform payment operation + +``` + +Y.4497(24) + +Sequence diagram showing the flow for SSB user payment between SSB device, SSB application, and SSB platform. + +**Figure I.3 – Flow for SSB user payment** + +## **I.3 Flow for SSB platform operation management** + +When an SSB device obtains status/alarm/fault information, it sends this information to the SSB platform, and the damaged SSB devices can be recycled by maintenance personnel through the SSB platform. This procedure is shown in Figure I.4, and the main steps are outlined below: + +Step 1: SSB device sends status/alarm/fault report to the SSB platform. + +Step 2: If the SSB platform has detected an abnormal SSB device, it then sends a recovery command to the maintenance personnel. + +Step 3: Based on the recovery command, the abnormal SSB device is checked and recycled by the maintenance personnel. + + + +``` + +sequenceDiagram + participant SSB_device as SSB device + participant SSB_platform as SSB platform + participant Maintenance_personnel as Maintenance personnel + + SSB_device->>SSB_platform: 1. Status/alarm/fault information upload + activate SSB_platform + SSB_platform->>SSB_platform: The abnormal SSB device is detected + SSB_platform->>Maintenance_personnel: 2. Recovery command + activate Maintenance_personnel + Maintenance_personnel->>SSB_device: 3. SSB device has been recycled + deactivate Maintenance_personnel + deactivate SSB_platform + +``` + +The diagram illustrates the flow for SSB platform operation management. It involves three main entities: SSB device, SSB platform, and Maintenance personnel. The process begins with the SSB device uploading status, alarm, or fault information to the SSB platform. Upon receiving this information, the SSB platform detects an abnormal SSB device. It then issues a recovery command to the maintenance personnel. Finally, the maintenance personnel confirm that the SSB device has been recycled, and this information is communicated back to the SSB device. + +Sequence diagram for SSB platform operation management showing interactions between SSB device, SSB platform, and Maintenance personnel. + +Y.4497(24) + +**Figure I.4 – Flow for SSB platform operation management** + +# Bibliography + +- [b-ITU-T Y.2012] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2012 (2010), *Functional requirements and architecture of next generation networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.2091] Recommendation ITU-T Y.2091 (2011), *Terms and definitions for next generation networks*. +- [b-ITU-T Y.4000] Recommendation ITU-T Y.4000/Y.2060 (2012), *Overview of the Internet of things*. +- [b-ITU-R M.1224-1] Recommendation ITU-R M.1224-1 (2012), *Vocabulary of terms for International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT)*. + + + + + +## SERIES OF ITU-T RECOMMENDATIONS + +| | | +|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Series A | Organization of the work of ITU-T | +| Series D | Tariff and accounting principles and international telecommunication/ICT economic and policy issues | +| Series E | Overall network operation, telephone service, service operation and human factors | +| Series F | Non-telephone telecommunication services | +| Series G | Transmission systems and media, digital systems and networks | +| Series H | Audiovisual and multimedia systems | +| Series I | Integrated services digital network | +| Series J | Cable networks and transmission of television, sound programme and other multimedia signals | +| Series K | Protection against interference | +| Series L | Environment and ICTs, climate change, e-waste, energy efficiency; construction, installation and protection of cables and other elements of outside plant | +| Series M | Telecommunication management, including TMN and network maintenance | +| Series N | Maintenance: international sound programme and television transmission circuits | +| Series O | Specifications of measuring equipment | +| Series P | Telephone transmission quality, telephone installations, local line networks | +| Series Q | Switching and signalling, and associated measurements and tests | +| Series R | Telegraph transmission | +| Series S | Telegraph services terminal equipment | +| Series T | Terminals for telematic services | +| Series U | Telegraph switching | +| Series V | Data communication over the telephone network | +| Series X | Data networks, open system communications and security | +| Series Y | Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities | +| Series Z | Languages and general software aspects for telecommunication systems | \ No newline at end of file diff --git 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architectures and protocols + +--- + +## **Framework of city-level energy data sharing and analytics among buildings** + +## ITU-T Y-SERIES RECOMMENDATIONS + +## Global information infrastructure, Internet protocol aspects, next-generation networks, Internet of Things and smart cities + +| | | +|---------------------------------------------------------|----------------------| +| GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE | Y.100-Y.999 | +| INTERNET PROTOCOL ASPECTS | Y.1000-Y.1999 | +| NEXT GENERATION NETWORKS | Y.2000-Y.2999 | +| FUTURE NETWORKS | Y.3000-Y.3499 | +| CLOUD COMPUTING | Y.3500-Y.3599 | +| BIG DATA | Y.3600-Y.3799 | +| QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS | Y.3800-Y.3999 | +| INTERNET OF THINGS AND SMART CITIES AND COMMUNITIES | Y.4000-Y.4999 | +| General | Y.4000-Y.4049 | +| Definitions and terminologies | Y.4050-Y.4099 | +| Requirements and use cases | Y.4100-Y.4249 | +| Infrastructure, connectivity and networks | Y.4250-Y.4399 | +| Frameworks, architectures and protocols | Y.4400-Y.4549 | +| Services, applications, computation and data processing | Y.4550-Y.4699 | +| Management, control and performance | Y.4700-Y.4799 | +| Identification and security | Y.4800-Y.4899 | +| Evaluation and assessment | Y.4900-Y.4999 | + +*For further details, please refer to the list of ITU-T Recommendations.* + +# Recommendation ITU-T Y.4498 + +## Framework of city-level energy data sharing and analytics among buildings + +## Summary + +Recommendation ITU-T Y.4498 specifies requirements and architectural models for city-level energy management that facilitates data exchange, sharing and analytics among buildings in smart cities. Recommendation ITU-T Y.4498 also provides use cases to support energy planning, management and energy data sharing through city energy services for smart sustainable cities. + +As the sector accounts for a significant portion of total energy consumption, efforts are being made to increase energy efficiency in the built environment through smart solutions in homes, office and commercial premises, and factories. To effectively support energy efficiency in smart cities, it is crucial to have city-level data sharing and analytics for services and intelligent applications. This allows information to be shared among buildings with different consumption patterns or renewable production to increase energy efficiency. To enable city-level data sharing and analytics, standardized specifications for energy data types and exchange methods are essential. + +## History\* + +| Edition | Recommendation | Approval | Study Group | Unique ID | +|---------|----------------|------------|-------------|--------------------| +| 1.0 | ITU-T Y.4498 | 2024-07-10 | 20 | 11.1002/1000/15791 | + +## Keywords + +Data sharing and analytics, energy, energy management, smart building. + +\* To access the Recommendation, type the URL
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/documents/dss/NISTReCur.pdf | +| [OIDF CC] | OpenID Foundation (2014), OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating errata set 1 . | +| [TIA-1098-A] | TIA-1098-A (2008), Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Framework , (3GPP2 S.S0109-A) | +| [Unicode] | Unicode 5.1.0 (2008), Unicode Standard Annex #15; Unicode Normalization Forms .
http://www.unicode.org | +| [W3C XMLSIG] | W3C Recommendation (2013), XML Signature Syntax and Processing v1.1 .
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlsig-core1/ | +| [W3C XMLENC] | W3C Recommendation (2013), XML Encryption Syntax and Processing v1.1 .
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core1/ | + +# 3 Definitions + +## 3.1 Terms defined elsewhere + +For the purposes of this Recommendation the terms and definitions given in [ITU Y.4500.11] and the following apply: + +**3.1.1 additional authenticated data** [TIA-1098-A]: Refers to data that is authenticated, but not encrypted by an authenticated encryption with associated data algorithm. + +**3.1.2 authenticated encryption with associated data** [TIA-1098-A]: Algorithm providing confidentiality for the plaintext and a way to check its integrity and authenticity while providing the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some additional authenticated data. In this context plaintext refers to data that is authenticated and encrypted. + +**3.1.3 bootstrap server function (BSF)** [ETSI TS 133 220]: BSF is hosted in a network element under the control of a mobile network operator. BSF, home subscriber system (HSS), and user equipment (UEs) participate in generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA) in which a shared secret is established between the network and a UE by running the bootstrapping procedure. + +NOTE – The shared secret can be used between NAFs and UEs, for example, for authentication purposes. + +**3.1.4 bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID)** [ETSI TS 133 220]: Bootstrapping transaction identifier (B-TID) is used to bind the subscriber identity to the keying material in GBA reference points Ua, Ub and Zn. + +**3.1.5 CA-Certificate** [b-Menezes]: Certificate created by one certification authority (CA) certifying the public key of another CA. + +**3.1.6 digital signature** [b-ITU-T X.510]: The result of a cryptographic transformation of data that, when properly implemented, provides a mechanism for origin authentication, data integrity and signatory non-repudiation. + +NOTE – The summary is produced by means of a one-way hash function, while the enciphering is carried out using the private key of the signer. + +**3.1.7 personally identifiable information** [ETSI TS 133 220]: Any information about an individual maintained by an agency, including any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, or biometric records; and any other information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, educational, financial, and employment information. + +**3.1.8 policy decision point** [b-OASIS XACML]: System entity that evaluates applicable policy and renders an authorization decision. + +**3.1.9 policy enforcement point** [b-OASIS XACML]: System entity that performs access control, by making decision requests and enforcing authorization decisions. + +**3.1.10 policy information point** [b-OASIS XACML]: System entity that acts as a source of attribute values. + +## 3.2 Terms defined in this Recommendation + +This Recommendation defines the following terms: + +**3.2.1 AE-ID certificate:** Certificate with a certificate chain to a trust anchor certificate and containing an AE-ID in the subjectAltName extension. + +NOTE – An AE\_ID certificate can be used to verify that an entity has been assigned the AE-ID in the certificate. + +**3.2.2 association configuration:** Phase of a security association establishment framework in which the entity establishing the Security Association (and the Central Key Distribution Server, in + +the case of Centralized Security Frameworks), are provided with identities (and any other relevant credentials) to ensure that the security association is established between the intended entities. + +**3.2.3 association security handshake:** Phase of a security association establishment framework in which the security association endpoints perform mutual authentication. + +**3.2.4 bootstrap credential:** Pre-provisioned credential enabling mutual authentication of the Enrollee and the M2M Enrolment function. + +**3.2.5 bootstrap credential configuration:** Phase of a remote security provisioning framework in which the bootstrap credentials are pre-provisioned to the enrollee and the M2M enrolment function. + +**3.2.6 bootstrap enrolment handshake:** Phase of a remote security provisioning framework in which the enrollee and M2M enrolment function perform mutual authentication. + +**3.2.7 bootstrap instruction configuration:** Phase of a remote security provisioning framework in which the enrollee and M2M enrolment function are provided with identities (and any other relevant credentials) to enable the M2M Enrolment function to establish a master credential between the intended enrollee and M2M Authentication function. + +**3.2.8 certificate:** See public key certificate. + +**3.2.9 certificate authority:** Certification Authority. + +**3.2.10 certificate chain:** Sequence of one or more CA-certificates, where: the public verification key in each CA-certificate is certified in the previous CA-certificate; and the public key of the first CA-Certificate is trusted *a priori*. + +NOTE – Trust in the public key in each CA-certificate can be based on trust in the previous CA-Certificate. + +**3.2.11 certificate name:** Unique identifier in a name field of a Certificate (e.g., in the ITU-T X.509 "Subject" or "Subject Alternative Name" attribute) + +**3.2.12 certificate provisioning (procedure):** Procedure performed by a security principal and a MEF for provisioning the security principal with an MEF-provisioned certificate and certificate(s) of the MEF certificate authority. + +NOTE – Additional certificate authority certificates can also be provisioned via other means such as pre-provisioning or [ITU-T Y.4500.22]. + +**3.2.13 certificate re-provisioning (procedure):** Certificate Provisioning procedure performed when the Security Principal can authenticate itself with a valid Enrolled Certificate. + +**3.2.14 certificate signing request:** Message used to request a Public Key Certificate. + +**3.2.15 certificate verification:** Process necessary to trust an entity's Certificate. + +**3.2.16 certification authority [b-Menezes]:** Authority responsible for establishing and vouching for the authenticity of public keys. + +NOTE – This includes binding public keys to distinguished names through signed certificates, managing certificate serial numbers, and certificate revocation. + +**3.2.17 content encryption key:** Symmetric key used to encrypt plaintext to produce the ciphertext and generate a message integrity check (MIC). + +NOTE – In Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD), the content encryption key is used directly, while in other algorithms the content encryption key is used to generate distinct keys for the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm. + +**3.2.18 credential configuration:** Phase of a security association establishment framework in which the credentials necessary for the security association establishment framework are configured to the relevant entities and functions. + +**3.2.19 Credential-ID type-ID:** Portion of a Credential-ID indicating the type of credential being identified. + +**3.2.20 CSE-ID certificate:** Certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing a CSE-ID in the subjectAltName extension. + +NOTE – A CSE\_ID certificate can be used to verify that an entity has been assigned the CSE-ID in the certificate. + +**3.2.21 device certificate:** Certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing at least one globally unique hardware instance identifier in the subjectAltName extension. + +NOTE – A device certificate can be used to verify that an entity is executing on the identified hardware instance. + +**3.2.22 ESCertKE initiating end-point:** ESCertKE end-point which initiates the ESCertKE procedure. + +**3.2.23 ESCertKE Messages:** Messages exchanged between the ESCertKE initiating end-point and ESCertKE terminating end-point as part of end-to-end certificate-based key establishment. + +**3.2.24 ESCertKE procedure:** Sequence of exchanged ESCertKE Messages and processing based on those ESCertKE messages, for the purposes of end-to-end certificate-based key establishment. + +**3.2.25 ESCertKE terminating end-point:** ESCertKE end-point with which the ESCertKE Initiating End-Point intends to perform the ESCertKE procedure. + +**3.2.26 end-to-end certificate-based key establishment:** Interoperable framework for two end-points to use certificates for establishing end-to-end secret symmetric keys for use in other end-to-end security frameworks such as end-to-end security of data (ESData) or end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim). + +**3.2.27 end-to-end security of data:** Interoperable framework for protecting data that ends up transported using oneM2M reference points, in order that transited common service entities (CSEs) do not need to be trusted with that data. + +**3.2.28 end-to-end security of primitives:** Interoperable framework for securing the exchange of oneM2M primitives so that CSEs do not need to be trusted with the confidentiality and integrity of the primitives. + +**3.2.29 enrollee:** Application entity (AE) or common service entity (CSE) that requires remote provisioning of a symmetric key to be shared with an enrolment target. + +**3.2.30 enrolment key:** Symmetric key established between an Enrollee and M2M Enrolment Function following successful mutual authentication. + +NOTE – A symmetric key to be shared by the Enrollee and an Enrolment Target may be derived (at the Enrollee and M2M Enrolment Function) from the currently valid Enrolment Key, and the M2M Enrolment Function subsequently securely delivers the symmetric key to the Enrolment Target. + +**3.2.31 enrolment key generation:** Phase of remote security provisioning framework in which the enrollee and M2M enrolment function establish an enrolment key and enrolment key identifier. + +**3.2.32 enrolment phase:** Step in the lifecycle of an M2M equipment where it becomes provisioned for operation with a specific M2M service provider. + +**3.2.33 enrolment target:** M2M authentication function, CSE, or AE with whom an enrollee wishes to establish a symmetric key (master credential or pre-provisioned secure connection key) using remote security provisioning. + +**3.2.34 entity identifier:** CSE-ID (or AE-ID respectively) of a CSE (or AE respectively). + +**3.2.35 ESData envelope:** Data object containing the result of protecting an end-to-end security of data (ESData) payload using the ESData procedures. + +**3.2.36 ESData payload:** Data to be protected using end-to-end security of data (ESData). + +**3.2.37 FQDN certificate:** Certificate with a certificate chain to a root of trust and containing a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). + +**3.2.38 generic bootstrap architecture:** Set of 3GPP and 3GPP2 specifications providing security features and a mechanism to bootstrap authentication and key agreement for application security from the 3GPP and 3GPP2 underlying network authentication mechanisms. + +**3.2.39 initial certificate provisioning (procedure):** Certificate provisioning procedure performed when the security principal cannot authenticate itself with a valid enrolled certificate. + +**3.2.40 inner request primitive:** Request primitive to be protected by end-to-end Security of Primitives (ESPrim). + +**3.2.41 inner response primitive:** Response primitive to be protected by end-to-end Security of Primitives (ESPrim). + +**3.2.42 message integrity code:** Tag computed from a message and a symmetric key, and attached to a message. + +NOTE 1 – The purpose of a message integrity code is to facilitate, without the use of any additional mechanisms, assurances regarding both the source of a message and its integrity. + +NOTE 2 – A message integrity code is sometimes called a "Message Authentication Code" – "Message Integrity Code" has been used since the abbreviation of "Message Authentication Code" (MAC) might be misunderstood to refer to "Media Access Control". The definition is based on text from [b-Menezes] (p323). + +**3.2.43 M2M secure connection key:** Symmetric key established between two entities (CSEs or AEs), by an of M2M Authentication Function, in order to secure the communication between those two entities. + +NOTE – This M2M secure connection key results from a successful M2M Security Association Establishment procedure. + +**3.2.44 M2M trust enabler:** A stakeholder trusted with enabling authentication of CSEs/AEs to other CSEs/AEs. + +**3.2.45 MAF client:** CSE or AE configured to use the services of an M2M authentication function. + +**3.2.46 MAF Credential Configuration procedure:** A MAF security framework procedure used for enrolment phase of an end-point by establishing credentials for mutual authentication between an end-point and an MAF. + +**3.2.47 MAF handshake procedure:** An M2M authentication function (MAF) security framework procedure in which an entity and the MAF perform mutual authentication and generate a symmetric key which can then be used in the association security handshake for mutual authentication between that entity and other entities. + +**3.2.48 MAF key registration procedure:** An M2M authentication function (MAF) security framework procedure in which a Source end-point and the MAF generate a symmetric key which can then be used for mutual authentication between the source end-point and one or more other target end-points. + +**3.2.49 MAF key retrieval procedure:** An M2M authentication function (MAF) security framework procedure in which a target end-point retrieves the symmetric key previously generated by the MAF and a source end-point, to enable mutual authentication between the source end-point and the target end-point. + +**3.2.50 master credentials:** Credentials used to mutually authenticate between an ASN/MN-CSE and the M2M authentication function (MAF). This is done to secure access to the infrastructure of an M2M service provider. + +NOTE – The master credentials are either pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned (without relying on those credentials). + +**3.2.51 MEF certificate authority:** Role of a certificate authority which issues MEF-provisioned certificates to a security principal through the M2M enrolment function (MEF). + +NOTE – The term is relative to the MEF, so an MEF certificate authority with respect to one MEF is not an MEF certificate authority with respect to another MEF. + +**3.2.52 MEF client:** functionality for performing M2M Enrolment Function (MEF) procedures on behalf of an associated CSE or AE, or on behalf of CSE or AE(s) present on an associated node, or an associated M2M authentication function (MAF). + +**3.2.53 MEF-provisioned certificate:** Certificate issued by a certificate authority, via an MEF, for authenticating the security principal. + +NOTE – The term is relative to the MEF, so a MEF-provisioned certificate with respect to one MEF is not a MEF-provisioned certificate with respect to another MEF. + +**3.2.54 (oneM2M) security principal:** CSE or AE or Node or M2M Device which can be authenticated. + +NOTE – When the Security Principal is a Node or M2M Device, then Node or M2M Device is acting on behalf of the CSE and/or AE executing on the Node or M2M Device. + +**3.2.55 online Certificate Status protocol:** A protocol for requesting a report on the status of one or more ITU-T X.509 certificates [IETF RFC 6960]. + +**3.2.56 operational phase:** Period in the lifecycle of an M2M equipment where it is actually used for providing M2M services. + +**3.2.57 outer request primitive:** Request primitive used to transport the data object containing an inner request primitive to which end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) has been applied. + +**3.2.58 outer response primitive:** Response primitive used to transport the data object containing an inner response primitive to which end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) has been applied. + +**3.2.59 policy retrieval point:** System entity that retrieves applicable policy or policy set. + +**3.2.60 pre-provisioned secure connection key:** Symmetric key that is pre-provisioned to two entities (which may be AEs or CSEs) to be used for mutual authentication of those entities in Security Association Establishment. + +**3.2.61 pre-provisioned secure connection key identifier:** Identifier for a pre-provisioned secure connection key. + +**3.2.62 pre-provisioned symmetric enrollee key:** Symmetric key that is pre-provisioned to the Enrollee and M2M Enrolment Function + +**3.2.63 pre-provisioned symmetric enrollee key identifier:** Identifier for a pre-provisioned symmetric enrollee key. + +**3.2.64 private signing key:** Secret key that can generate signatures that can be verified using a corresponding public verification key. + +**3.2.65 public key certificate:** Electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key with an identity. + +NOTE – [b-Menezes] A *public-key certificate* is a data structure consisting of a data part and a signature part. The data part contains cleartext data including, as a minimum, a public [verification] key and a string identifying the part (subject entity) to be associated therewith. The signature part consists of the digital signature of a certification authority over the data part, thereby binding the subject entity's identity to the specified public key. + +**3.2.66 public key certificate flavour:** Name describing the usage of a public key certificate within the scope of oneM2M. + +**3.2.67 public key infrastructure:** Set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke public key certificates. For more details, see [b-Menezes]. + +**3.2.68 public verification key:** Credential that can verify digital signatures generated by a corresponding private signing key, but which cannot be used to generate digital signatures. + +**3.2.69 raw public key certificate:** Certificate comprising only the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure of an ITU-T X.509 certificate that carries the parameters necessary to describe the public key [IETF RFC 7250]. + +**3.2.70 registration authority:** Functional entity responsible for verifying certificate signing requests and authorizing a certification authority to issue a corresponding certificate. + +**3.2.71 relative enrolment key identifier:** Part of the enrolment key identifier that is unique within the context of a M2M Enrolment Function. + +**3.2.72 security association establishment:** Sequential processing of credential configuration, association configuration and association security handshake between two entities. + +**3.2.73 security association establishment framework:** Security framework for security association establishment. + +**3.2.74 security bootstrap framework or remote security provisioning framework:** A mechanism for remotely provisioning a master credential and master credential identifier to an enrollee and an M2M authentication function. + +**3.2.75 secure environment:** A logical entity that protects sensitive data and sensitive functions from tampering, unauthorized monitoring or execution and that provides access to these sensitive data and sensitive functions to authorized oneM2M entities. + +**3.2.76 security framework:** Set of procedures providing security association establishment or remote security provisioning. + +**3.2.77 security usage identifier:** Identifies a security feature (e.g., security association establishment framework, end-to-end security of primitives or end-to-end security of data), a protocol used for that security feature, and (where applicable) an option within a single protocol. + +NOTE – The security usage identifier is used to limit how a credential may be used. + +**3.2.78 sensitive function:** Function processed within the secure environment requiring protection from unauthorized monitoring, tampering or execution and that is operating on sensitive data, i, derivation of keys from M2M long-term service-layer keys and cryptographic algorithms. + +**3.2.79 self-signed certificate:** Public key certificate that is signed by the same entity whose identity it certifies. + +**3.2.80 source ESData end-point:** Entity producing an end-to-end security data (ESData) envelope from an ESData Payload. + +**3.2.81 symmetric key:** Secret key that is shared between two entities. + +**3.2.82 target ESData end-point:** Entity producing the verified end-to-end security of data (ESData) payload from an ESData envelope. + +**3.2.83 trust anchor certificate:** Certificate that is trusted a priori. + +## 3.3 Abbreviations and acronyms + +This Recommendation uses the following abbreviations and acronyms: + +| | | +|-------------|---------------------------------------------------| +| (D)TLS-PSK | (D)TLS Pre-Shared Key (ciphersuites) | +| AAA | Authentication, Authorization and Accounting | +| ABAC | Attribute Based Access Control | +| ACP | AccessControlPolicy Instance | +| AE | Application Entity | +| AEAD | Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data | +| AE-ID | Application Entity Identifier | +| API | Application Programming Interface | +| App-ID | Application Identifier | +| ASN-CSE | CSE which resides in the Application Service Node | +| BSF | Bootstrapping Server Function | +| B-TID | Bootstrapping Transaction Identifier | +| CA | Certification Authority or Certificate Authority | +| CIDR | Classless Inter-Domain Routing | +| CoAP | Constrained Application Protocol | +| CSE | Common Service Entity | +| CSE-ID | Common Service Entity Identifier | +| CSR | Certificate Signing Request | +| DAS | Dynamic Authorization System | +| DTLS | Datagram Transport Layer Security (Protocol) | +| EKU | Extended Key Usage | +| Enrollee-ID | Enrollee Identity | +| ESCertKE | End-to-End Certificate-based Key Establishment | +| ESData | End-to-End Security of Data | +| ESF | End-to-End Security Function | +| ESPrim | End-to-end Security of Primitives | +| EST | Enrolment over Secure Transport | +| FQDN | Fully Qualified Domain Name | +| GBA_ME | ME-based GBA | +| GBA_U | GBA with UICC-based enhancements | +| GUSS | GBA User Security Settings | +| HLR | Home Location Register | +| HSS | Home Subscriber System | +| HTTP | HyperText Transfer Protocol | +| HW | Hardware | + +| | | +|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ID | Identifier | +| IdA | Identifier for entity A | +| IdB | Identifier for entity B | +| IN | Infrastructure Node | +| IN-CSE | CSE which resides in the Infrastructure Node | +| IPv4 | Internet Protocol version 4 | +| IPv6 | Internet Protocol version 6 | +| IV | Initialization Vector | +| JWE | JSON Web Encryption | +| JWS | JSON Web Signature | +| JWT | JSON Web Token | +| Kc | M2M Secure Connection Key | +| KcID | M2M Secure Connection Key Identifier | +| Ke | Enrolment Key | +| KeID | Enrolment Key Identifier | +| Ker | Enrolment Re-Authentication Key | +| Km | Master Credential | +| KmID | Master Credential Identifier | +| Kpm | pre-provisioned credential for Master Credential provisioning | +| KpmID | pre-provisioned credential for Master Credential provisioning Identifier | +| Kpsa | provisioned credential for M2M Security Association Establishment | +| KpsaID | provisioned credential for M2M Security Association Establishment Identifier | +| Ks | temporary Key material referred to in GBA | +| Ks. NAF | Abbreviation of Ks_(int/ext)_NAF | +| Ks_(ext/int)_NAF | Derived key in GBA_ME or Derived key in GBA_U which remains on UICC | +| Ks_ext_NAF | Derived key in GBA_U sent to the ME | +| Ks_int_NAF | Derived key in GBA_U which remains on UICC | +| Ks_NAF | Derived key in the ME | +| M2M | Machine to Machine | +| M2M-SP | M2M Service Provider | +| MAF | M2M Authentication Function | +| MAF-ID | M2M Authentication Function Identifier | +| Mca | Reference Point for M2M Communication with AE | +| Mcc | Reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE | +| Mcc' | Reference Point for M2M Communication with CSE of different M2M Service Provider | +| Mcn | Reference Point for M2M Communication with NSE | + +| | | +|--------|----------------------------------------------| +| MEF | M2M Enrolment Function | +| MIC | Message Integrity Code | +| MN-CSE | CSE which resides in the Middle Node | +| MTE | M2M Trust Enabler | +| NAF | Network Application Function | +| OCSP | Online Certificate Status Protocol | +| OTA | Over The Air | +| PDP | Policy Decision Point | +| PEP | Policy Enforcement Point | +| PII | Personally Identifiable Information | +| PIP | Policy Information Point | +| PKI | Public Key Infrastructure | +| PRP | Policy Retrieval Point | +| RA | Registration Authority | +| RSPF | Remote Security Provisioning Framework | +| SAEF | Security Association Establishment Framework | +| SCEP | Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol | +| SE | Secure Environment | +| SUID | Security Usage Identifier | +| SW | Software | +| T&C | Terms and Conditions | +| TEE | Trusted Execution Environment | +| TEF | Trust Enabling Function | +| TLS | Transport Layer Security (Protocol) | +| UE | (3GPP) User Equipment | +| UICC | Universal Integrated Circuit Card | +| UNSP | Underlying Network Service Provider | +| URI | Uniform Resource Identifier | +| USS | User Security Settings | +| XACM | extensible Access Control Markup language | + +## 3.4 Symbols + +For the purposes of this Recommendation, the following symbol applies: + +|| Concatenation + +# 4 Conventions + +The key words "Shall", "Shall not", "May", "Need not", "Should", "Should not" in this Recommendation are to be interpreted as described: + +Shall/Should not: + +## **Requirements** + +- 1) effect on Standard: Standard needs to describe the required feature (i.e., specify a technical solution for the Requirement); +- 2) effect on products: every implementation (M2M solution that complies to this Recommendation) must support it; and +- 3) effect on deployments: Every deployment (M2M service based on this Recommendation) must use the Standardized feature where applicable – otherwise, e.g., interoperability problems with other services could arise. + +Should/Should not: + +## **Recommendation** + +- 1) effect on Standard: Standard needs to describe a solution that allows the presence and the absence of the feature; +- 2) effect on products: an implementation may or may not support it, however support is recommended; +- 3) effect on deployments: a deployment may or may not use it, however usage is recommended. + +May/Need not: + +## **Permission/Option** + +- 1) effect on Standard: Standard needs to describe a solution that allows the presence and the absence of the required feature; +- 2) effect on products: an implementation may or may not support it; +- 3) effect on deployments: A deployment may or may not use it. + +# **5 Security architecture** + +## **5.1 Overview** + +### **5.1.0 Introduction** + +Figure 5.1.0-1 provides a high level overview of the Security architecture. + +The architecture consists of following layers: + +#### **Security Functions layer** + +This layer contains a set of security functions that are exposed at reference point Mca and Mcc. These security functions can be classified into six categories; they are Identification, authentication, authorization, security association, sensitive data handling and security administration. + +#### **Security environment abstraction layer** + +This layer implements various security capabilities such as key derivation, data encryption/decryption, signature generation/verification, security credential read/write from/to the secure environments, and so on. The security functions in the security functions layer invoke these functions in order to protect the operations in the secure environments. In addition, this layer also provides physical access to the secure environments. Implementation of this is out of scope of this Recommendation. This layer is not specified in the present release but is expected to be considered in future releases. + +#### Secure environments layer + +This layer contains one or multiple secure environments that provide various security services providing adequate protection to sensitive data storage and sensitive function execution. The sensitive data includes secure environment (SE) capability, security keys such as long term symmetric keys and asymmetric private keys, local credentials, security policies, identity information, subscription information, and so on. The sensitive functions include data encryption, data decryption, and so on. Though implementation of secure environments is out of scope of this Recommendation, a reference framework to interface M2M entities with UICCs is provided in Annex D. + +Security services: e.g., secure environment abstraction API\* + + + +The diagram illustrates the high-level overview of the security architecture, organized into three main layers within a large container box: + +- Security functions layer** (top section): + - Access management** (dashed box): Includes Identification and authentication, Authorization, and Identity management. + - Trust enabling security functions** (dashed box): Includes M2M enrolment function (MEF), M2M authentication function (MAF), Dynamic authorization system (DAS), and Privacy policy manager (PPM). + - Other components: Security administration, Identity protection, Sensitive data handling, and Security association establishment. +- Secure environment abstraction layer** (middle section): + - Contains a box labeled **Secure environment abstraction\***. +- Secure environments layer** (bottom section): + - Contains multiple stacked boxes representing **Secure environment n**. + - Each **Secure environment n** box contains two sub-components: **Sensitive data** and **Sensitive functions**. + +Y.4500.3(23) + +High level overview of the security architecture diagram + +**Figure 5.1.0-1 – High level overview of the security architecture** + +#### Design principles + +Security services are modular and configurable according to the needs of the hosting common service entity (CSE), its supported reference points and its purpose. + +The architecture is split into several components and sub-components providing a modular design. With this design, mapping of the architecture to different nodes and entities is enabled. + +Depending on the requirements of each entity, Security consists of components relevant to fulfil the requirements of the respective node or entity and the intended use case. + +The architecture needs to be adapted to be suitable for implementation in different entities. For example, the architecture can be mapped to different device classes. + +The security administration component is supposed to enable administration of all sensitive resources (data and functions) and also allow configuration and extension of security services itself. + +The secure environment within the CSE is accessed via the secure environment abstraction layer and is expected to provide an adequate level of protection to the sensitive information listed in clause 6.2.3.2. + +#### **Access management** + +The following three components are part of access management layer. Further details are provided in clause 6.2. + +### **5.1.1 Identification and authentication** + +The identification and authentication function is in charge of identification and mutual authentication of CSEs and application entities (AEs). + +Identification is the process of checking if the identity provided for authentication is valid. How to perform an identification process will depend on the purpose of authentication. For example, in the case of resource access, the authentication function can require the identification to check if the AE or CSE has registered with the local CSE; in the case of AE or CSE registration, the authentication function can require the identification to check if the identity provided by an AE or CSE fits a certificate. Once passing this checking process, the AE or CSE is identified, and the identified identity will be supplied to authentication process. + +Authentication is the process of validating if the identity supplied in the identification step is associated with a trustworthy credential. How to perform an authentication process will depend on which mutual authentication mechanism is used. For example, in the case of using a certificate based authentication mechanism, the authentication function can require the authentication to verify a digital signature; in the case of using a symmetric key based authentication mechanism, the authentication function can require the authentication to verify a message integrity code (MIC). When this validating process has been completed, the AE or CSE is authenticated. + +### **5.1.2 Authorization** + +The authorization function is responsible for authorizing services and data access to authenticated entities according to provisioned access control policies (ACPs) and assigned roles. + +Access control policy is defined as sets of conditions that define whether entities are permitted access to a protected resource. The authorization function can support different authorization mechanisms, such as access control list (ACL), role based access control (RBAC), etc. The authorization function could need to evaluate multiple access control policies in an authorization process in order to get a final access control decision. This process is further described in clause 7 "Authorization". + +Authorization evaluation process is based on the service subscription resource which specifies what M2M services and M2M service roles the authenticated entity has subscribed to and the access control policies associated with the protected resource. The authorization evaluation process can also consider contextual attributes such as time or geographic location. + +Prior to authorization mutual authentication between the Originator CSE or AE and hosting CSE can be performed as specified in clause 8. Clause 6.1.2.2.1 describes the conditions under which mutual authentication is mandatory. An access control rule can also include an indicator that the access control rule applies only when mutual authentication has been performed successfully and the result of mutual authentication is still current; see clause 7.1.3 for details. + +### **5.1.3 Identity management** + +The identity management function provides oneM2M identities/identifiers to the requesting entity in case those identities are stored within the secure environment. oneM2M identifiers as defined in the oneM2M Architecture ([ITU-T Y.4500.1]) can also be treated as sensitive data that are accessible to AEs or CSEs and used independently of authentication or authorization functions. + +## **5.2 Security layers** + +### **5.2.1 Security functions layer** + +This layer provides the following services: + +- Access management + - Identification and authorization. + - Authentication. + - Access control. +- Sensitive data handling: + - Sensitive functions protection. + - Secure storage. +- Trust enabling security functions: + - MEF (M2M enrolment function). + - MAF (M2M authentication function) + - DAS (dynamic authorization system) + - PPM (privacy policy manager). +- Security association establishment + - Secure connection via secure session establishment. + - Secure connection via object security. +- Security administration (including remote security provisioning). +- Identity protection. + +Each of these services provides functions and resources on the Security Service and Administration application programming interface (API). + +### **5.2.2 Secure environment abstraction layer** + +The secure environment abstraction layer (not specified in this Recommendation) provides access to the secure environment via a general security transport API. A plug-in associated to the type of secure environment provides physical/logical connectivity to the secure environment. The secure environment abstraction layer also has to be accessible on the service layer. + +## 5.3 Integration within overall oneM2M architecture + +Security services are provided within the following architectural components and interact on the different reference points as described in [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. Figure 5.3-1 shows oneM2M functional architecture. + + + +Figure 5.3-1: oneM2M functional architecture diagram. The diagram is divided into two domains by a vertical dashed line: 'Field domain' on the left and 'Infrastructure domain' on the right. In the Field domain, there is a stack of three boxes: 'AE' (Application Entity) at the top, 'CSE' (Common Services Entity) in the middle, and 'NSE' (Network Service Entity) at the bottom. They are connected by vertical lines labeled 'Mca' (between AE and CSE) and 'McN' (between CSE and NSE). In the Infrastructure domain, there is a similar stack: 'AE' at the top, 'CSE' in the middle, and 'NSE' at the bottom, connected by 'Mca' and 'McN' respectively. A horizontal line labeled 'Mcc' connects the 'CSE' box in the Field domain to the 'CSE' box in the Infrastructure domain. Another horizontal line labeled 'Mcc'' connects the 'CSE' box in the Infrastructure domain to a cloud shape labeled 'To infrastructure domain of other service provider'. A diagonal line labeled 'Mca' also connects the 'AE' box in the Field domain to the 'CSE' box in the Infrastructure domain. The reference 'Y.4500.3(23)' is located at the bottom right of the diagram. + +Figure 5.3-1 – oneM2M functional architecture + +# 6 Security services and interactions + +## 6.1 Security integration in oneM2M flow of events + +### 6.1.1 Interactions between layers + +Before any M2M common services layer procedure can take place, connectivity has to be established in the underlying network services layer, which may involve independent provisioning and service registration procedures specified by the underlying network. + +The service layer security provisioning (security pre-provisioning or security bootstrapping) and security association establishment procedures specified in this Recommendation can take place independently (and generally consecutively) from any required network service layer connectivity establishment procedures. + +Finally, the security provisioning and security association establishment requirements imposed by M2M application service providers have to be accounted for. At the service layer level, the security association establishment results in a transport layer security (TLS) or datagram transport layer security (DTLS) session which protects messages being exchanged between adjacent AE/CSE, i.e., hop-by-hop. AEs that need to preserve the privacy of their information exchange from untrusted intermediate associations enable the content of resources exchanged between AEs to be encrypted through the service layer. In some scenarios (see clause 8.2.1), security association establishment between adjacent AE/CSE requires separate TLS or DTLS sessions for each transmission direction, i.e., a pair of security associations nodes can be provisioned to support a direct security association between them. Direct security association interactions between layers is detailed in clause 8.5. + +### 6.1.2 High level sequence of events + +#### 6.1.2.1 Enrolment phase + +M2M equipment typically require provisioning and configuration phases before being put in actual operation. This can be performed by a pre-provisioning that can be integrated in the manufacturing or product deployment phase, or by means of a security bootstrapping procedure (i.e., remote security provisioning) that takes place before the equipment starts actual operation. + +At the service layer level, such provisioning and configuration requires selection of the stakeholder that will provide services through the equipment, especially the M2M service provider. This enrolment phase requires agreements between the stakeholders. + +An enrolment phase may occur several times during the lifecycle of an M2M equipment, but is only repeated when a change in the service provider affects the provisioning or configuration of the equipment. + +The security provisioning phase for the different layers can be combined using a common method of security pre-provisioning. + +Remote security provisioning frameworks (RSPF) provide post-provisioning of the essential information to establish a security association between a field domain entity and the M2M authentication function of a chosen M2M service provider. The essential security information includes the security credentials and identifiers. Remote security provisioning procedures rely on an M2M enrolment function which can be external to the M2M service provider to establish appropriate credentials. + +**Pre-provisioned symmetric Enrollee key remote security provisioning framework:** A symmetric key is pre-provisioned to the enrollee and M2M enrolment function for the mutual authentication of those entities. For more details, see clause 8.3.2.1. + +**Certificate-based remote security provisioning framework:** The enrollee and M2M enrolment function are each issued and authenticate themselves with private signing keys and certificates containing the corresponding public verification key. For more details see clause 8.3.2.2. + +**GBA-based remote security provisioning framework:** This method of remote provisioning is applicable only to 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) devices. + +In this case, the M2M enrolment function includes the functionality of a GBA bootstrap server function. This framework uses 3GPP or 3rd generation partnership project 2 (3GPP2) symmetric keys to authenticate the Enrollee and the M2M enrolment function (which is also a GBA BSF). The details are specified by 3GPP TS 33.220 [ETSI TS 133 220] and 3GPP2 S.S0109-A [TIA-1098-A]. For more details see clause 8.3.2.3. + +NOTE 1 – The use of GBA is intended only to be used in the enrollment phase. It derives a number of symmetric credentials that can be used for any purpose at the application layer, not necessarily for authentication. The oneM2M specifications then use these to further derive a number of symmetric credentials as input to the pre-shared key (PSK) authentication and confidentiality and integrity protection security protocols, specifically (D)TLS-PSK and PSK-based SAEF, ESPrim and ESData as described in clause 8.3.2.3. + +NOTE 2 – TS 33.221 "Support for subscriber certificates (SSC)" is not supported in the specification as there are now many other globally recognized ways of deploying certificate in devices since TS33.221 was published. oneM2M supports simple certificate enrolment protocol (SCEP) in clause 8.3.6.3 certificate provisioning procedures using SCEP and enrolment over secure transport (EST) in clause 8.3.6.2 certificate provisioning procedures using EST. For more details see clause 8.3.2.3. + +Figure 6.1.2.1-1 illustrates the different remote security provisioning frameworks. Note there is no communication between M2M entities A and B in the remote security provisioning procedure. After successful completion of the remote security provisioning procedure, a security association establishment procedure is applied. + + + +Figure 6.1.2.1-1: Entities involved in remote security provisioning. The diagram shows four domains: Field domain, UN-SP domain, Third-party domain or M2M-SP infrastructure domain, and M2M-SP infrastructure domain. In the Field domain is an M2M entity. In the UN-SP domain is a GBA BSF. In the Third-party domain is a MEF. In the M2M-SP infrastructure domain is a MAF. Arrows indicate security provisioning flows: GBA-based RSFP from BSF to M2M entity; Certificate-based and PMSCK RSFP from BSF to MEF; Common to all RSFP from BSF to MAF; SAEF after GBA RSFP from BSF to M2M entity; SAEF after RSFP from MAF to M2M entity; and SAEF after RSFP from MAF to M2M entity. A dashed arrow also points from MEF to M2M entity. The reference Y.4500.3(23) is noted at the bottom right. + +**Figure 6.1.2.1-1 – Entities involved in remote security provisioning** + +#### 6.1.2.2 Operational phase + +##### 6.1.2.2.1 M2M service access + +M2M services are offered by CSEs to AEs and/or other CSEs. To be able to use M2M services offered by one CSE, the AEs and/or CSEs need to be mutually identified and authenticated with that CSE, in order to provide protection from unauthorized access and denial of service (DoS) attacks. This mutual authentication enables the additional provision of encryption and integrity protection for the exchange of messages across a single Mca, Mcc or Mcc' reference point. In addition, communicating AEs that require similar protection for their own information exchanges can be provisioned to apply the same security method to their communications. + +This is the purpose of the security association establishment procedure, which needs to be executed before the service related procedures specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.1] for the corresponding reference point. + +On the Mca and Mcc reference points, security association establishment between a field domain AE or CSE respectively, and an IN-CSE is mandatory. + +On the Mcc' reference point, security association establishment between IN-CSE and IN-CSE is mandatory. + +On the Mca reference point, security association establishment between AE and the CSE in the field domain is strongly recommended. + +NOTE 1 – Security association establishment on the Mca interface in a local domain is optional depending on risk assessment, for instance in scenarios where unauthorized access can be prevented by other security measures out of scope of this specification. This includes the following use cases: + +AE and CSE (i.e., Mca end-points) are securely integrated on the same physical device (i.e., an ASN). + +Secure communication is guaranteed by the underlying network (e.g., WLAN or VPN). + +Mca communication takes place on a wire (e.g., Ethernet) in a safe physical environment. + +The security association establishment phase of the M2M service layer and M2M application layer are generally independent from similar procedures possibly required by the network layer, though they can rely on the security services provided by the network layer. + +The oneM2M system supports the following authentication mechanisms for security association establishment, described in more detail in clause 8.2.1 "Overview on security association establishment frameworks": + +**Provisioned symmetric key security association establishment framework:** A symmetric key is pre-provisioned to the security association end-points. For more details see clause 8.2.2.1. + +**Certificate-based security association establishment framework:** Security association end-points authenticate themselves using private signing keys and certificates containing the corresponding public verification key. For more details see clause 8.2.2.2. + +**M2M authentication function (MAF) security association establishment framework:** For MAF-based SAEF, the centralized key distribution server is a MAF hosted either by a third-party service provider which has a service relationship with the M2M service provider (M2M-SP), or hosted by the M2M-SP itself. The MAF authenticates a field domain entity on behalf of an IN-CSE using a symmetric key. For more details see clause 8.2.2.3. + +NOTE 2 – The use of GBA is intended only to be used in the enrollment phase. It derives a number of symmetric credentials that can be used for any purpose at the application layer, not necessarily for authentication. The oneM2M specifications then use these to further derive a number of symmetric credentials as input to the pre-shared key (PSK) authentication and confidentiality and integrity protection security protocols, specifically (D)TLS-PSK and PSK-based SAEF, ESPrim and ESData as described in clause 8.3.2.3. + +Figure 6.1.2.2.1-1 illustrates the different use cases and entities involved in the various security association establishment frameworks (SAEF) considered in this Recommendation. + + + +The diagram illustrates the entities involved in security association establishment (SAEF) across four domains: Field domain, UN-SP domain, Third-party domain or M2M-SP infrastructure domain, and M2M-SP infrastructure domain. The diagram shows two M2M entities in the Field domain and one M2M entity in the M2M-SP infrastructure domain. A MAF (M2M Authentication Function) is located in the Third-party domain or M2M-SP infrastructure domain. Arrows indicate the flow of MAF-based SAEF and Provisioned symmetric key and certificate-based SAEF between the entities and the MAF. + +Diagram illustrating the entities involved in security association establishment (SAEF) across four domains: Field domain, UN-SP domain, Third-party domain or M2M-SP infrastructure domain, and M2M-SP infrastructure domain. The diagram shows two M2M entities in the Field domain and one M2M entity in the M2M-SP infrastructure domain. A MAF (M2M Authentication Function) is located in the Third-party domain or M2M-SP infrastructure domain. Arrows indicate the flow of MAF-based SAEF and Provisioned symmetric key and certificate-based SAEF between the entities and the MAF. + +**Figure 6.1.2.2.1-1 – Entities involved in security association establishment** + +##### 6.1.2.2.2 Authorization to access M2M resources + +Once an AE or CSE has been granted access to M2M services, the access control decision procedure specified in clause 7.1.5 of this Recommendation is executed before accessing an M2M resource, as specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. + +## 6.2 Security functions layer + +### 6.2.1 Access management + +This component provides authentication services to the application layer. Annex B provides a general description of authentication mechanisms. oneM2M mutual authentication schemes allow oneM2M + +entities to prove that they know related credentials such as master credentials, without having to exchange value of those credentials, and sensitive data such as security identities and security identifiers. To prevent reading and copying of credentials, a secure environment within the security CSF provides protection against tampering of those credentials and related processed information. + +#### **6.2.1.1 Considerations for long term key storage** + +Long term provisioned secure connection keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason long term provisioned secure connection keys are recommended to be stored in secure environments. + +Long term pre-provisioned symmetric enrollee keys can pose a security risk if not adequately secured, and for this reason it is recommended that long term pre-provisioned symmetric enrollee keys are stored in secure environments. + +Since by definition, there will be a very wide range of non-3GPP based devices with many different implementations. As these are not likely to be standardised, this is not in the scope of oneM2M or 3GPP. However, security best practice guides are available in [b-ETSI TS 103 645], [b-IoTSF SD-BP], and [b-GSMA IoT-SGA]. + +### **6.2.2 Authorization** + +Figure 6.2.2-1 provides a high level overview of a generic authorization function. This architecture comprises four subcomponents that are described as follows: + +Policy enforcement point (PEP): + +PEP intercepts resource access requests, makes access control decision requests, and enforces access control decisions. The PEP coexists with the entity that needs authorization services. + +Policy decision point (PDP): + +PDP interacts with the policy retrieval point (PRP) and policy information point (PIP) to get applicable authorization policies and attributes needed for evaluating authorization policies respectively, and then evaluates the access request using authorization policies for rendering an access control decision. The PDP is located in the authorization service. + +Policy retrieval point (PRP): + +PRP obtains applicable authorization policies according to an access control decision request. These applicable policies should be combined in order to get a final access control decision. The PRP is located in the authorization service. + +Policy information point (PIP): + +PIP provides attributes that are needed for evaluating authorization policies, for example the IP address of the requester, creation time of the resource, current time or location information of the requester. The PIP is located in the authorization service. + +The authorization service can comprise any of the subcomponents: PDP, PRP and/or PIP. This means that the subcomponents PEP, PRP, PDP and PIP could be distributed across different nodes. For example, the PEP is located in an ASN/MN and the PDP is located in the IN. + +The present release does not support separation of PRP and PIP on different CSE from PDP. The generic procedure described below is provided for information and to support further extensions, while clause 7 provides the details of authorization mechanisms in the current release. + + + +Figure 6.2.2-1: Overview of the authorization function. This block diagram shows the interaction between an Access requester, Policy enforcement point (PEP), Policy decision point (PDP), Policy retrieval point (PRP), and Policy information point (PIP). The Access requester sends an 'Access request' to the PEP, which then grants 'Access' to the Resource. The PEP sends a 'Decision request' to the PDP and receives a 'Decision response' back. The PDP sends a 'Policy request' to the PRP and receives a 'Policy response' back. The PDP sends an 'Attribute request' to the PIP and receives an 'Attribute response' back. The diagram is labeled Y.4500.3(23) at the bottom right. + +**Figure 6.2.2-1 – Overview of the authorization function** + +The generic authorization procedure is shown in Figure 6.2.2-2. + + + +Figure 6.2.2-2: Authorization procedure. This sequence diagram shows the steps between a Requester and a Hosting entity (which contains PEP, PDP, PRP, and PIP). Step 1: Mutual authentication between Requester and Hosting entity. Step 2: Access request from Requester to PEP. Step 3: Decision request from PEP to PDP. Step 4: Policy request from PDP to PRP. Step 5: Policy response from PRP to PDP. Step 6: Attribute request from PDP to PIP. Step 7: Attribute response from PIP to PDP. Step 8: Making access control decision (local to PDP). Step 9: Decision response from PDP to PEP. Step 10: Enforcing access control decision (local to PEP). Step 11: Access response from PEP to Requester. The diagram is labeled Y.4500.3(23) at the bottom right. + +**Figure 6.2.2-2 – Authorization procedure** + +Step 001: Mutual authentication (Pre-requisite). + +Step 002: Access requester sends an access request to the PEP. + +Step 003: PEP makes an access control decision request according to the requester's access request, and sends the access control decision request to the PDP. + +Step 004: PDP sends an access control policy request that is generated based on the access control decision request to the PRP. + +Step 005: PRP finds all applicable access control policies to the access request and sends them back to the PDP. When multiple access control policies are involved, the PRP also provides a policy combination algorithm for combining multiple evaluation results into one final result. + +Step 006: PDP sends an attribute request to the PIP if any attributes are required for evaluating these access control policies. + +Step 007: PIP gets required attributes and sends them back to the PDP. + +Step 008: PDP evaluates the access request using access control policies. When there are multiple applicable access control policies, the PEP needs to calculate a final access control decision using the policy combination algorithm. + +Step 009: PDP returns the access control decision back to the PEP. + +Step 010: PEP enforces the access control decision, i.e., either forwards the access request to the resource or denies this access. + +Step 011: PEP returns the access result back to the access requester. + +### **6.2.3 Security administration** + +#### **6.2.3.0 Introduction** + +The security administration service provides the capability to manage the security functions, resources and attributes. This includes management of resources provided via the secure environment. In addition, it can provide functions to manage sensitive data with their associated identifiers and subscriptions on behalf of other entities. Security administration is therefore dependent upon the type of secure environment being used (independent hardware module, integrated trusted execution environment or software protection). Depending on the type of secure environment, distinct existing standards can be used for remote administration of those SEs. + +#### **6.2.3.1 Security pre-provisioning of SE** + +Several sensitive data and associated objects are often configured by pre-provisioning of a secure environment (see clause 6.3.1 "Secure environment") prior to deploying the M2M device it is associated with. + +UICCs specified in [ETSI TS 102 671] and [ETSI TS 102 221] are commonly used for such purpose because their use is required to access some underlying networks, they provide a high security level, and they offer an interoperable transport interface specified in [ETSI TS 102 221]. UICC-based oneM2M pre-provisioning shall follow the framework specified in Annex D to ensure interoperability. + +#### **6.2.3.2 Remote security administration of SE** + +Security sensitive data and functions that are protected and isolated within the SE may remain remotely accessible to legitimate security administrators after deployment. Remote security administration differs from standard device management by the expectation that a secure channel is intended to be established between the administration server and the secure environment of the M2M node (i.e., the secret used to secure the connection is not available in the M2M node outside of the secure environment). Applicable remote security administration protocols are dependent on the risk level of each M2M application and not just on the underlying network technologies. Widespread technologies that enable remote security administration for the different security levels distinguished in oneM2M TR-0008 [b-oneM2M TR0008] are considered in Annex C. + +Since remote security administration requires the target sensitive information to be remotely modifiable, protection of such sensitive information from remote software hacking of the device is particularly critical. In case the secure environment relies on software protection only, remote security administration of the following data should be allowed only where remote access by potential attackers can be mitigated: + +Private key and associated identifiers. + +Long-term shared symmetric key (compared to expected lifetime of the M2M node) and associated identifiers. + +Any process and parameters thereof that manipulates the above information, i.e., security functions. + +### **6.2.4 Identity protection** + +Identity protection provides services to the application layer such as pseudonyms and protecting the anonymity of transactions. + +### **6.2.5 Sensitive data handling** + +#### **6.2.5.0 Introduction** + +The sensitive data handling service provides certain sensitive functions to the application layer. + +Sensitive functions comprise the following functions: + +Secure storage. + +Cryptographic operations. + +Methods for bootstrapping initial secrets (e.g., GBA). + +#### **6.2.5.1 Sensitive functions** + +This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to sensitive functions of the SE. + +#### **6.2.5.2 Secure storage** + +This service provides AEs and CSEs with access to the secure storage capability of the SE. Data securely stored by the AE or CSE is intended to be accessible only through the security API and by authorized entities. Secure storage should be managed by the secure environment. Securely stored data is intended to remain under the control of the stakeholder owning the data, i.e., the entity that requested the data to be stored within the secure storage, independently of other stakeholders. + +### **6.2.6 Trust enabling security functions** + +oneM2M trust enabling architecture may require the presence of security functionalities within the infrastructure domain: an M2M authentication function (MAF) and an M2M enrolment function (MEF), both classified as trust enabling functions (TEF) and serving authentication and end-to-end security purposes, as well as dynamic authorization system (DAS) server or role authorities serving authorization purposes. The M2M authentication function and the M2M enrolment functions shall incorporate the ability to provide for end-to-end credential registration and provisioning. In addition, a privacy policy manager functionality (PPM) may be implemented to protect user's privacy. All of these functions can be either under M2M service provider control or delegated to a M2M trust Enabler (i.e., a party trusted by all involved M2M ecosystem stakeholders). + +M2M enrolment function (MEF): + +The MEF is used during the enrolment phase and supports the security bootstrap procedure enabling the provisioning of the master credentials to be used to mutually authenticate entities accessing the infrastructure of an M2M service provider. The MEF relies on an initial credential pre-provisioned in the M2M node (e.g., during manufacturing). + +The credentials provisioned by an MEF can be used for authentication with an M2M authentication function in the MAF-based security association establishment framework (SAEF), end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) or end-to-end security of data (ESData). Alternatively, the provisioned credentials may be used directly in the SAEF, ESPrim or ESData. + +M2M authentication function (MAF), used during the operational phase of M2M services: + +Master credentials, used to mutually authenticate CSEs/AEs during the operation phase, are securely stored in a specific infrastructure functionality named M2M authentication function (MAF). + +The MAF securely contains the set of master credentials that are used for authenticating CSEs/AEs that have been enrolled through the M2M SP or M2M trust enabler. The MAF stores the master credentials and possibly the identifiers of the associated CSE/AE. + +A single MAF may support all communication security services (SAEF, ESPrim and ESData) or only a selection of them. An MAF providing MAF-based SAEF is operated by the M2M SP, or by an M2M trust enabler on behalf of the M2M SP. Other MAF can be operated by M2M trust enabler or M2M SP, and there is no assumption of a trust relationship existing between the M2M trust enabler and M2M SP in those cases. + +The MAF is also in charge of all security operations involving the usage of the master credentials. + +Dynamic authorization system (DAS) server and role authorities: These functionalities manage authorization privileges to access resources that may be assigned during operation and are described in clauses 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. + +Privacy policy manager (PPM): This functionality assists in the management of privacy preferences expressed by data subject with respect to service requirements and applicable regulations, and is described in clause 11. + +## 6.3 Secure environment and secure environment abstraction + +### 6.3.1 Secure environment + +The secure environment is a logical entity that provides sensitive functions operating on sensitive data, secure storage and other resources/functions. + +The security sensitive data and security functions contained in M2M field domain nodes are intended to be protected from unauthorized access or alteration, as determined by risk analysis. Sensitive data and functions include security credentials and algorithms that manipulate them. The purpose of a secure environment is to provide the required protection level (see Table 6.3.1-1) to sensitive data during storage and usage, including primarily any long term symmetric or asymmetric cryptographic secret used during operation. Additionally, isolation of security sensitive data and functions controlled by different stakeholders within an M2M node can be ensured by distinct secure environments. This is especially critical for M2M nodes that can be remotely or physically accessed by potential attackers. + +The choice of a secure environment is guided by a risk analysis considering all layers of an M2M application, though it should leverage where possible on capabilities provided by the M2M service layer or the underlying network, e.g., universal integrated circuit card (UICC) in 3GPP and 3GPP2 networks, or trusted execution environment requirements. + +There is no assumption made on the particular implementation of the secure environment. A SE may be implemented as an independent HW security element or as an integrated SW function. Each secure environment can be associated with one certain security level depending on the particular implementation of the SE. Different secure environments provide different security levels and protection levels as indicated in Table 6.3.1-1. + +**Table 6.3.1-1 – Classification of protection levels** + +| Protection level | Description | +|------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| 0 | No protection. The data are exposed even without active attacks. | +| 1 | Low protection, data are protected from passive observers but could be exposed by active attacks, be they local or remote.
E.g., software solutions exist that rely on general purpose processing hardware of the supporting equipment. | +| 2 | Medium protection, protection of the data from remote attacks is addressed, but local attacks, especially physical attacks, remain possible, i.e., Medium protection provides countermeasures against software attacks only | + +**Table 6.3.1-1 – Classification of protection levels** + +| Protection level | Description | +|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | E.g., Software solutions to protect data and sensitive functions rely on specific processing providing enforced isolation and enables sensitive code and data to be kept away from an unprotected operating environment, software and memory. The code running in the protected environment is cryptographically verified for integrity assurance. | +| 3 | High protection, addressing both remote and local attacks to access the data, including attacks involving physical access. This includes strong counter measures against software and hardware attacks, such as detection of abnormal operating conditions and scrambling plus hardware masking of the memory and side channel analysis of operations involving sensitive data. | + +There is intended to be at least one secure environment in each M2M node providing secure storage to the local CSEs and AEs, however there could be multiple. + +### **6.3.2 SE plug-in** + +The SE plug-in enables physical access to the respective secure environment. Depending on the type of secure environment, the SE plug-in can be implemented differently for each secure environment. + +NOTE – Specification of the SE plug-in is out of scope of this Recommendation. + +### **6.3.3 Secure environment abstraction** + +This is not specified in this Recommendation. + +# **7 Authorization** + +## **7.1 Access control mechanism** + +### **7.1.1 General description** + +The M2M authorization procedure controls access to resources and services hosted by CSEs and AEs. The authorization procedure requires that the Originator of the resource access request message has been identified to the authentication function, and Originator and Receiver are mutually authenticated with each other. + +The resource addressed in a request message has an associated *accessControlPolicyIDs* attribute (either included explicitly as an attribute of the resource addressed in the request message, implied from the parent of the resource, or set fixed by the system, see clause 9.6.1 of [ITU-T Y.4500.1]). The *accessControlPolicyIDs* attribute contains a list of identifiers of *
Optional | Usage in access control mechanism | +|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| To | URI of target resource | M | Selection of accessControlPolicy associated with the target resource | +| From | Identifier representing the Originator of the request | M (Note 1) | Evaluated against accessControlOriginators in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes | +| Role IDs | Role IDs of the Originator | O | Evaluated against accessControlOriginators in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes | +| Operation | Requested operation | M | Evaluated against accessControlOperations in privileges and selfPrivileges attributes | +| Resource type | Type of the target resource | O (Note 2) | Evaluated against accessControlObjectDetails in privileges attributes. Applicable to Create operations only. | +| Filter criteria | filterUsage condition tag in Filter criteria | O | Differentiation between Retrieve and Discovery operations | +| Tokens | ESData-protected Tokens | O | Contains authorization information (e.g., Role-IDs) to be used in the decision for the request | +| Token IDs | tokenIDs or Local-Token-ID | O | Identifies Tokens containing authorization information (e.g., Role-IDs) to be used in the decision for the request | + +NOTE 1 – The **From** primitive parameter is Mandatory in all requests except for AE registration procedure where it is optional, as specified in [ITU-T Y. 4500.1]. + +NOTE 2 – The **resource Type** primitive parameter is present in Create request primitives only. + +Table 7.1.2-2 lists the context parameters associated with a request message which are evaluated by the access control mechanism. These parameters are not explicitly included in a request message but can be obtained at the receiver and validated against the context policy parameters as given in Table 7.1.2-2. + +**Table 7.1.2-2 – Context parameters associated with a request message** + +| Parameter | Description | Usage in access control mechanism | +|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| rq_time | Time stamp when the request message was received at the hosting CSE. Obtained by the hosting CSE's system time clock. | Validated against accessControlTimeWindow parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3 | +| rq_loc | Location information about the originator of the request. Obtained over the Mcn reference point. | Validated against accessControlLocationRegion parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3 | +| rq_ip | IP source address associated with the IP packets that carry the request message. Obtained over the Mcn reference point. | Validated against accessControlIpAddress parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3 | + +Tokens, as defined in clause 7.3.3.1 "Token structure", may be associated with a request message. A token may be associated with a request as a result of being included in the **Tokens** primitive parameter of the request message or identified in the **Token IDs** primitive parameter of the request message. If + +the Hosting CSE obtained a token from the dynamic authorization system (DAS) server using direct dynamic authorization, then this token shall be associated with a request if the holder parameter in the token matches the absolute AE-ID or CSE-ID of the Originator of the request. Dynamic authorization is specified in clause 7.3. + +Table 7.1.2-3 lists the security context parameters associated with a request message. + +**Table 7.1.2-3 – Security context parameters associated with a request message** + +| Parameter | Description | Mandatory/Optional | Usage in access control mechanism | +|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| rq_authn | Boolean value (TRUE/FALSE) indicating if the Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE, and the From parameter matched the authenticated identity of the Originator. | M | Validated against accessControlAuthenticationFlag parameter in an access control rule, see clause 7.1.3 | + +The following criteria shall be applied to determine if an Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. + +If the Originator is an AE registered to the Hosting CSE, then the criteria for deciding whether the Originator is considered authenticated is deployment and/or implementation specific and depends on the trust guaranteed by the field device's physical and logical embodiment bearing the AE(s) and Hosting CSE (e.g., secure boot and tamper resistance). In many cases it is appropriate to expect a secure channel implying authentication (e.g., a TLS or DTLS session) to be used to protect primitives on the Mca interface, in which case the authentication shall be considered valid for the duration of the TLS session. When this is not the case, e.g., because the physical and logical design is trusted, authentication may be considered to be permanently valid unless it is detected that the device is compromised. + +If the Originator is a CSE registered with the Hosting CSE, then the Originator shall be considered authenticated for the duration of a (D)TLS session because the Mcc is always required to be protected by TLS or DTLS according to a security association establishment framework (SAEF) as described in clause 8.2. The other CSE may be the Registrar or Registree with respect to the Hosting CSE. + +If the Originator is an AE or CSE registered with a CSE other than the Hosting CSE, then the Originator is considered authenticated by the Hosting CSE if and only if the request primitive is protected using end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) as described in clause 8.4. + +### 7.1.3 Format of *privileges* and *selfPrivileges* attributes + +The *privileges* and *selfPrivileges* attributes exhibit the same data type format which is specified as follows. + +Each *privileges* or *selfPrivileges* attribute comprises a set of access control rules. In the following, the set of access control rules is denoted as *acrs* and an individual access control rule in this set as *acr*. The access control rules in *acrs* are indexed with the letter *k*. The number of access control rules in the set is denoted with the letter *K*: + +$$acrs = \{ acr(1), acr(2), \dots, acr(k), \dots, acr(K) \}$$ + +Each access control rule *acr(k)* is comprised of three type of components, denoted accessControlOriginators, accessControlOperations and accessControlContexts. The accessControlContext component is an optional parameter. + +Hence, an access control rule $acr(k)$ is either represented as a pair: + +$$acr(k) = \{acr(k)\_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)\_accessControlOperations\}$$ + +or as a 3-tuple: + +$$acr(k) = \{acr(k)\_accessControlOriginators, acr(k)\_accessControlOperations, acr(k)\_accessControlContexts\}$$ + +The generic term "access-control-rule-tuple" is used when referring to a rule $acr(k)$ . + +A set $acrs$ of access control rules may consist of a mix of pairs and 3-tuples. For pairs, any context parameters associated with a request message are admissible. + +The three component parameters of an access-control-rule-tuple supported in this Recommendation are shown in Table 7.1.3-1. + +**Table 7.1.3-1 – Parameters of an access-control-rule-tuple** + +| Parameter | Usage description | Mandatory/Optional | Format | +|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| accessControlOriginators | Set of Originators that can be authorized | M | List of CSE-IDs and/or AE-IDs, or keyword "all" to grant access to all Originators | +| accessControlOperations | Set of Operations that can be authorized | M | Enumerated list of operations Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, Discover, Notify | +| accessControlContexts | See Table 7.1.3-3 | O | See Table 7.1.3-3 | +| accessControlObjectDetails | See Table 7.1.3-4 | O | See Table 7.1.3-4 | +| accessControlAuthentication Flag | Indicates whether the rule applies only to Originators which are considered to be authenticated by the Hosting CSE | O | Boolean | + +The accessControlOriginators parameter comprises a list of SP domain names, CSE-IDs, AE-IDs, resource-IDs of
//*/myCSEID
//*/myCSE* | Any CSE whose ID matches the wild cards | +| | SP-relative | /myCSEID
/myCSE* | Any matching CSE from the SP that is hosting the target resource | +| AE-ID | Absolute | //m2msp.org/S988
//*/myCSEID/C9886
//*/myCSE*/C9886 | Any AE whose ID matches the wild cards | +| | SP-relative | /myCSEID/C9886
/myCSEID/C98*
/myCSE*/C98*
/SmyAE* | Any matching AE from the SP that is hosting the target resource | + +The data type applicable to accessControlOriginators is defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. + +The accessControlOperations parameter comprises a list of admissible operations which can be any subset of the following elements: create, retrieve, update, delete, discover, and notify. While create, retrieve, update, delete, and notify operations are explicitly indicated in the *op* parameter of a request message, the discovery operation is indicated by *op* = Retrieve in combination with the provisioning of *fc* and *Disrestype* parameters in the request message. + +The data type applicable to accessControlOperations is defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. + +The accessControlContexts parameters are listed in Table 7.1.3-3. + +**Table 7.1.3-3 – Parameters of accessControlContexts** + +| Parameter | Usage Description | Mandatory/Optional | Formats | +|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| accessControlTimeWindow | Set of Time Windows that can be authorized | O | List of time intervals where access can be granted in extended crontab format | +| accessControlLocationRegion | Set of Location Regions that can be authorized | O | 1) Latitude/longitude coordinates, and a radius defining a circular region around the coordinates
2) Country code | +| accessControlIpAddress | Set of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that can be authorized | O | IPv4: dotted-decimal notation with CIDR suffix
IPv6: colon separated groups of hexadecimal digits with CIDR suffix | + +The accessControlTimeWindow parameter represents a list of elements that comply with the extended crontab syntax as defined in clause 7.3.8 of [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. It allows definition of periodically recurring time intervals at which access can be granted, when the *rq\_time* parameter associated with the access request message falls into such interval. + +For the elements of accessControlLocationRegion there are two representation choices. These can be represented by a 2-letter country code or a circle with radius *R* centred at a point defined in terms of longitude and latitude parameters. Refer to Annex F for detailed information. Each element of + +`accessControlLocationRegion` defines an admissible location region, which is compared with the *`rq_loc`* parameter associated with the access request message. + +The data types applicable to `accessControlLocationRegion` and *`rq_loc`* are defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. + +The `accessControlIpAddress` parameter represents a list of IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in dotted-decimal notation with CIDR suffix or colon separated groups of hexadecimal digits with CIDR suffix, respectively. If the *`rq_loc`* parameter associated with the access request message matches one of these addresses, access may be granted with regard to this criterion. + +The data types applicable to `accessControlIpAddress` and *`rq_ip`* are defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. + +The `accessControlAuthenticationFlag` parameter is a Boolean value. If the `accessControlAuthenticationFlag` parameter is not present, then the value is assumed to be FALSE. If the `accessControlAuthenticationFlag` parameter is TRUE, then this indicates that the access control rule applies only to Originators considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. Clause 7.1.2 specifies the criteria used to decide whether or not the Originator is considered to have been authenticated by the Hosting CSE. + +The `accessControlObjectDetails` parameters are listed in Table 7.1.3-4. + +**Table 7.1.3-4 – Parameters of `accessControlObjectDetails`** + +| Parameter | Usage description | Mandatory/Optional | Formats | +|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +|
resourceType | Resource type on which access control rule applies | O | Resource type identifier |
+| specializationID | Identifier of mgmtDefinition or containerDefinition | O | SmgmtDefinition or containerDefinition represented as a string. |
+| childResourceType | Set of resource type identifiers that can be created under the parent resource. | O | Resource type list. |
+
+The `accessControlObjectDetails` attribute specifies a subset of child resource types of the targeted resource to which the access control rule applies. If an access control rule includes *`accessControlObjectDetails`*, then *`childResourceType`* is specified. An access control rule which does not include any *`accessControlObjectDetails`* parameters applies to all child resource types of the target resource. The *`accessControlObjectDetails`* parameter is described in Table 9.6.2.4-1 of [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. Child resource types listed in the *`childResourceType`* component are subject of access control for the Create operation only. Once a child resource is created, the access control policies assigned directly to it apply. The *`resourceType`* and *`specializationID`* elements are optional. If either the *`resourceType`* or *`specializationID`* element is present in *`accessControlObjectDetails`*, the CSE matches the type of resource or specialization of the targeted resource with the value specified in the *`resourceType`* or *`specializationID`* element. Further checking of *`childResourceType`* is done only if the *`resourceType`* or *`specializationID`* match occurs. However, if the *`resourceType`* and *`specializationID`* elements are not provided, then only *`childResourceType`* match is performed.
+
+### 7.1.4 Access control decision
+
+The access decision is derived by comparing the parameters associated with a resource access request message as described in clause 7.1.2 with the access control rules included in the *`privileges`* or *`selfPrivileges`* attributes of all ACP sets assigned to the protected resource by means of the *`accessControlPolicyIDs`*, see Figure 7.1.1-1.
+
+The result of the access decision algorithm, i.e., the access decision, is the overall result of evaluating the applicable set of access control rules, *acrs*, against the parameters associated with the access request message. This access decision can be represented by a value of binary data type. The overall result of the access decision algorithm is denoted here with the variable name *res\_acrs*:
+
+$$res\_acrs = \begin{cases} \text{TRUE or 1} & \text{if the request matches the access control rules} \\ \text{FALSE or 0} & \text{else} \end{cases}$$
+
+The reference access decision algorithm is specified in clause 7.1.5. For any given sets of inputs, an implementation of the access decision processing shall return the same result as the reference access decision algorithm would return for those inputs.
+
+If the access decision algorithm yields the result *res\_acrs* = TRUE, then the access decision for the requested resource shall be "Permit".
+
+If the access decision algorithm yields the result *res\_acrs* = FALSE, or the access decision algorithm is not capable of deriving a final result (e.g., due to indeterminate parameters), then the access decision for the requested resource shall be "Deny".
+
+### 7.1.5 Description of the access decision algorithm
+
+The reference access decision algorithm specified in this clause combines partial access control results obtained for each of the individual access control rules contained in a *privileges* or *selfPrivileges* attribute. Further, if multiple ACP instances are assigned to the protected resource, the reference access decision algorithm combines the partial access control results obtained for the individual ACPs of an ACP set.
+
+The algorithm specified in this clause adopts a "Permit-overrides" combining algorithm with respect to access control rules and ACPs as defined in XACML [b-OASIS XACML]. This algorithm has the following behaviour:
+
+If a decision is "Permit" for only a single access control rule included in the *privileges* (or *selfPrivileges*) attribute of a single ACP, the result is "Permit".
+
+Otherwise, the result is "Deny".
+
+The logic for evaluating a request against a privilege can be described mathematically as follows. A *privileges* or *selfPrivileges* attribute included in an *In B: Kpsa, KpsaID | In A: A's Private Key, A's Certificate + (O)Chain
In B: B's Private Key, B's Certificate + (O)Chain | In A: MAF URIs, credential for MAF authn
* Km, KmID or
* as for cert-based + MAF trust anchors
In B: As for A, but with its own credentials
In MAF: Credentials for A/B authn
* Km & KmID for A/B (retrieved in MAF Client Registration if remotely provisioned).
* MAF private key, MAF cert+chain, trust anchors | +| Identity Configuration | Entity B is configured with IdB (CSE-ID) | |
A
B
MAF
(Optional) MAF Client Registration
(D)TLS Handshake with KmID & Km
KmID
B may also perform MAF Client Registration
|
+| Association Configuration | In A: IdB | In A: IdB, B's Certificate Info(D)TLS Handshake with KmID & Km
KmID
B may also perform MAF Client Registration
In B: A's Certificate Info |
(o) IdB
IdB
MAF Key Registration
MAF Handshake
(D) TLS Handshake with KmID and Km
IdB
Kc, KcID
|
+| Association Security Handshake | MAF Handshake
(D) TLS Handshake with KmID and Km
IdB
Kc, KcID
A
B
KpsaID
| A
B
CertA+ (O) ChainA
CertB+ (O) ChainB
| KcID
MAF Key Retrieval
MAF Handshake
(D) TLS Handshake with KmID and Km
KcID
Kc, IdA or KmID
|
+| Key | MAF Handshake
(D) TLS Handshake with KmID and Km
KcID
Kc, IdA or KmID
[parameters]
→ Communication of [parameters] [parameters]
Internal generation of [parameters] ↔ Mutual authentication
| | |
+
+Y.4500.3(23)
+
+**Figure 8.2.1-1 – Overview of the security association establishment frameworks supported by oneM2M**
+
+### 8.2.2 Detailed security association establishment frameworks
+
+#### 8.2.2.1 Provisioned symmetric key security association establishment frameworks
+
+This clause describes the provisioned symmetric key security association establishment framework. This framework enables mutual authentication of two entities corresponding to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE. The Credential for this framework is a long-term symmetric key that has been
+
+provisioned into the entities to be authenticated. This key is called a provisioned secure connection key and is denoted *Kpsa*. The provisioning of *Kpsa* could be a pre-provisioning or a remote provisioning thanks to remote security provisioning frameworks, as described in clause 8.3. The entities authenticate each other by verifying message authentication codes in the association security handshake which were generated using the provisioned secure connection key.
+
+Figure 8.2.2.1-1 illustrates the sequence of events when using the provisioned symmetric key security association establishment framework. In this description, "Entity A" and "Entity B" correspond to either two CSEs or a CSE and an AE or an AE and a CSE (respectively).
+
+
+
+The diagram illustrates the sequence of events for security association establishment between Entity A and Entity B. The process is divided into four main phases, each represented by a colored box with a dashed border:
+
+- Credential Configuration (Pink box):** A dashed box inside contains the text: *Kpsa & KpsaID are provisioned to A and B using one of:*
+ - Pre-provisioning or
+ - Remote Provisioning Framework
+- Identity Configuration (Yellow box):** A dashed box on the right side contains the text: *B is configured with IdB*.
+- Association Configuration (Yellow box):** A dashed box on the left side contains the text: *A configured with IdB*. A dashed box on the right side contains the text: *None*.
+- Association Security Handshake: (D)TLS Handshake (Light Blue box):**
+ - Text inside: *A initiates TLS with B using a TLS\_PSK ciphersuite. TLS pski\_identity is set to KpsaID. TLS psk parameter is set to Kpsa*
+ - A dashed box contains two bullet points:
+ - *A generates MIC for session information using Kpsa. B verifies MIC using Kpsa.*
+ - *B generates MIC for session information using Kpsa. A verifies MIC using Kpsa.*
+ - Below the handshake, two dashed boxes contain red text:
+ - Left: *A associates this security context with IdB*
+ - Right: *B determines IdA to associate w/this security context by forming Credential-ID from KpsaID, and applying mapping from Credential-ID to IdA*
+
+Vertical dashed lines connect the entities A and B through all phases. The identifier Y.4500.3(23) is located at the bottom right of the diagram.
+
+Sequence diagram showing the steps of security association establishment between Entity A and Entity B. The steps are: Credential Configuration, Identity Configuration, Association Configuration, and Association Security Handshake. Each step contains specific actions and configurations for both entities.
+
+NOTE – The following font colours differentiate the general topic that the text relates to:
+Blue italic text highlights details specific to this particular security association establishment framework.
+Purple italic text highlights technical actions that may include steps not specified by oneM2M.
+Red italic text highlights security-related properties.
+
+**Figure 8.2.2.1-1 – Sequence of events when using the provisioned symmetric key security association establishment framework**
+
+**Credential configuration:** The provisioned secure connection key (*Kpsa*) and the corresponding provisioned secure connection key identifier, denoted *KpsaID*, are provisioned to both entities either with pre-provisioning or remote provisioning. The format of *KpsaID* is defined in clause 10.5 "KpsaID format". If Entity A is a CSE, then Entity A shall also be configured with its CSE-ID (not shown in the figure).
+
+**Identity configuration:** See clause 8.2.1.
+
+**Association configuration:** Entity A shall be configured with Entity B identity (IdB) prior to performing the association security handshake. Entity A shall use this identity for Entity B authenticating using the above arguments. This identity is also used to route the (D)TLS exchange. Entity A shall associate Entity B's identity with messages secured within Security Contexts established using the provisioned secure connection key Kpsa associated with the provisioned secure connection key identifier KpsaID.
+
+If Entity A is a CSE, then Entity B shall be configured with Entity A's CSE-ID prior to performing the Association Security Handshake. If Entity A is an AE, then Entity B may either be configured with Entity A's identity (IdA) prior to performing the association security handshake, or may determine IdA during registration (Creation of the DEV_CFG,
MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.8 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_SERVER_ERROR | MEF Client | CERT_PROV | 8.3.9.5.9 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_CERT_PROV_CLIENT_ERROR | MEF Client | CERT_PROV | 8.3.9.5.10 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_SERVER_ERROR | MEF Client | DEV_CFG | 8.3.9.5.11 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_DEV_CFG_CLIENT_ERROR | MEF Client | DEV_CFG | 8.3.9.5.12 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_NOT_FOUND | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.13 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_TYPE_CONFLICT | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.14 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_BAD_ARGS | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.15 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_UNACCEPTABLE_ARGS | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.16 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_INCONSISTENT_CONFIG | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.17 | +| MEF_CLIENT_CMD_MO_NODE_PROCESSING_FAILED | MEF Client | MO_NODE | 8.3.9.5.18 | +| NOTE – In normal circumstances, an MEF Client should not provide this cmdStatusCode when the issued command has cmdClass indicating NO_MORE_COMMANDS. | | | | + +##### **8.3.9.5.2 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_ISSUED** + +The MEF is issuing the command, and the MEF expects that this is the first time that the MEF Client is receiving the command. + +##### **8.3.9.5.3 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_REISSUED** + +The MEF previously issued the command, and did not receive a corresponding MEF Client command Update from the MEF Client (in particular, providing the status of the executed command), and consequently the MEF is reissuing the command. + +If the MEF Client already performed the command, then it reports the status, otherwise the MEF Client performs the command. + +##### **8.3.9.5.4 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK** + +The MEF Client successfully performed the command. + +##### **8.3.9.5.5 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_REPEATED\_CMD\_ID** + +The *cmdID* in the MEF Client command Response message matches the *cmdID* sent in the most recent MEF Client command Update procedure. This would indicate some processing error on the MEF. + +##### **8.3.9.5.6 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_CLASS\_NOT\_SUPPORTED** + +The MEF Client does not support the requested *cmdClass*. + +##### **8.3.9.5.7 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_BAD\_ARGUMENTS** + +The MEF Client supports the *cmdClass*, but the MEF Client could not parse *cmdArgs*. + +##### **8.3.9.5.8 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_UNACCEPTABLE\_ARGUMENTS** + +The MEF Client supports the *cmdClass*, and the MEF Client parsed *cmdArgs* element, but at least one of the elements of *cmdArgs* which could be processed by the MEF Client had an unacceptable value. + +##### **8.3.9.5.9 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_CERT\_PROV\_SERVER\_ERROR** + +The MEF Client supports the CERT\_PROV *cmdClass*, and the MEF Client parsed the *cmdArgs* element, but was unable to perform the command due to some error regarding communicating with the Certificate Provisioning server or an error internal to the Certificate Provisioning server. + +##### **8.3.9.5.10 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_CERT\_PROV\_CLIENT\_ERROR** + +The MEF Client supports the CERT\_PROV *cmdClass*, and the MEF Client parsed the *cmdArgs* element, but was unable to perform the command due to a processing error on the MEF Client. + +##### **8.3.9.5.11 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_DEV\_CFG\_SERVER\_ERROR** + +The MEF Client supports the DEV\_CFG *cmdClass*, and the MEF Client parsed the *cmdArgs* element, but was unable to perform the command due to some error regarding communicating with the device configuration server or an error internal to the device configuration server. + +##### **8.3.9.5.12 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_DEV\_CFG\_CLIENT\_ERROR** + +The MEF Client supports the DEV\_CFG *cmdClass*, and the MEF Client parsed the *cmdArgs* element, but was unable to perform the command due to some issue a processing error on the MEF Client. + +##### **8.3.9.5.13 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_NOT\_FOUND** + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, and parsed the *cmdArgs* element, but could not find the MO node at the *objectPath* element in the MEF Client command arguments. + +##### **8.3.9.5.14 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_TYPE\_CONFLICT** + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, parsed the *cmdArgs* element, and found the MO node at the *objectPath* element, but the type of the MO Node does not match the *objectType* element in the MEF Client command arguments. + +##### **8.3.9.5.15 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_BAD\_ARGS** + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, parsed the *cmdArgs* element, and found the MO node at the *objectPath* element, and the type of the MO Node matches the *objectTypeID* element, but the MEF Client could not parse the *objectTypeSpecificArgs* element. + +##### **8.3.9.5.16 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_UNACCEPTABLE\_ARGS** + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, parsed the *cmdArgs* element, and found the MO node at the *objectPath* element, and the type of the MO Node matches the *objectType* element, and the MEF Client could not parse the *objectTypeSpecificArgs* element but the remaining MO-type-specific arguments in MEF Client command arguments are unacceptable to the MEF Client. + +##### **8.3.9.5.17 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_INCONSISTENT\_CONFIG** + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, parsed the *cmdArgs* element, and found the MO node at the *objectPath* element, and the type of the MO Node matches the *objectTypeID* element, and + +the remaining MO-type-specific arguments in MEF Client command arguments are acceptable, but the configuration of the MO nodes is inconsistent and preventing MO Node processing. + +##### 8.3.9.5.18 *cmdStatusCode* MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED + +The MEF Client supports the MO\_Node *cmdClass*, parsed the *cmdArgs* element, and found the MO node at the *objectPath* element, and the type of the MO Node matches the *objectType* element, and the remaining MO-type-specific arguments in MEF Client command arguments are acceptable, but there has been some other error in executing the MO Node processing. + +#### 8.3.9.6 NO\_MORE\_COMMANDS MEF Client command class-specific processes + +**Purpose:** When *cmdClassID* indicates NO\_MORE\_COMMANDS, then the MEF is indicating that it has no more MEF Client commands for the MEF Client. + +**Elements of *cmdArgs*:** If *cmdDescription* contains *cmdClassID* indicating NO\_MORE\_COMMANDS, then *cmdArgs* shall contain the *noMoreCmdArgs* element of data type sec:noMoreCmdArgs which includes the following elements: + +*retryDuration*: indicating a time duration, after which the MEF Client is expected to attempt MEF Client command Retrieve. The *retryDuration* is cancelled if the MEF Client successfully performs another MEF Client command procedure, within the scope of the MEF Client Registration, before the *retryDuration* completes. See clause 8.3.4.6 for other mechanisms which can trigger MEF Client command procedures. + +**Forming *cmdDescription*:** The MEF shall form *cmdArgs* containing the elements described in "Elements of *cmdArgs*" above: + +*retryDuration*: set to the time duration before the MEF wishes the MEF Client to attempt the next MEF Client command Retrieve, with the understanding that the *retryDuration* is cancelled if the MEF Client successfully performs another MEF Client command procedure. + +The MEF shall form *cmdDescription* with *cmdClassID* indicating NO\_MORE\_COMMANDS and *cmdArgs* formed in step 1. + +**Parsing and executing *cmdArgs*:** The MEF Client shall attempt to parse *cmdArgs* into the elements described in "Elements of *cmdArgs*". If the parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 4. If parsing fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_BAD\_ARGUMENTS. + +The MEF Client MEF Client command will not perform a MEF Client command Retrieve procedure or MEF Client command Update procedure unless triggered. + +The MEF Client shall set a timer based on *retryDuration*. + +The timer shall be cancelled if, by some other mechanism as described in clause 8.3.4.6, the MEF Client is triggered to perform an MEF Client command Retrieve procedure or MEF Client command Update procedure before the timer expires. + +If the time expires, then the MEF Client shall perform an MEF Client command Retrieve procedure, (clause 8.3.9.2), at some time selected by the MEF Client. + +#### 8.3.9.7 CERT\_PROV MEF Client command class-specific processes + +**Purpose:** When *cmdClassID* indicates CERT\_PROV, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to perform a certificate provisioning procedure with the MEF. + +**Elements of *cmdArgs*:** If *cmdDescription* contains *cmdClassID* indicating CERT\_PROV, then the *cmdArgs* shall contain the *certProvArgs* element of data type sec:certProvArgs which includes the following elements: + +*certProvProtocol*: Indicating the certificate provisioning protocol (EST or SCEP) that the MEF Client is to use. + +*URI*: Indicating the base URI to be used for the indicated certificate provisioning protocol. + +*certSubjectType*: Indicating if the subject of the provisioned certificate will be a Node, CSE or AE. + +*certSubjectID*: The Node-ID or CSE-ID or AE-ID of the subject of the certificate. + +**Forming *cmdDescription***: The MEF shall form *cmdArgs* containing the elements described in "Elements of *cmdArgs*" above: + +*certProvProtocol*: The MEF shall assign this element to indicate the protocol (EST or SCEP) that the MEF Client is to use for certificate provisioning. + +*URI*: The MEF shall assign this element to base URI to be used for the indicated certificate provisioning protocol. The FQDN of the base URI shall match the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client command. + +*certSubjectType*: The MEF Client shall assign this element to indicate if the subject of the provisioned certificate will be a Node, CSE or AE. + +*certSubjectID*: The MEF shall assign this element to be the Node-ID or CSE-ID or AE-ID of the subject of the certificate. + +The MEF shall form *cmdDescription* with *cmdClassID* indicating CERT\_PROV and *cmdArgs* formed in step 1. + +**Parsing and executing *cmdArgs***: See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. + +The MEF Client shall verify that the *cmdArgs* elements are acceptable: + +*certProvProtocol*: Verification of this element succeeds only if the indicated protocol (EST or SCEP) is supported by the MEF Client. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client selects the certificate provisioning protocol indicated by the element. + +*URI*: Verification of this element succeeds only if the FQDN of the base URI matches the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client command. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client set the base URI to the value in this element. + +*certSubjectType*: If the MEF Client is in a Node acting on behalf of a CSE and/or multiple AE then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a Node, CSE or AE. + +If the MEF Client is in a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a CSE. + +If the MEF Client is in a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value indicates a CSE. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client records the *certSubjectType* as the certificate subject type. + +*certSubjectID*: Verification of this element depends on the value of *certSubjectType*: + +If *subjectType* indicates a Node, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a Node-ID. + +If *certSubjectType* indicates a CSE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a AE-ID. + +If *certSubjectID* indicates a AE, then verification of this element succeeds only if the value is a CSE-ID. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client records the *certSubjectID* as the certificate subject identity. + +If the verification of any argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_UNACCEPTABLE\_ARGUMENTS. + +The MEF Client shall attempt executing the selected certificate provisioning procedure (EST specified in clause 8.3.6.2 or SCEP specified in clause 8.3.6.3), with base URI, certificate subject type and certificate subject identity as determined in step 4. The certificate subject identity shall be provided in the SubjectAltName extension of the certificate signing request. + +Following the attempt to execute the selected certificate provisioning procedure, the MEF Client shall perform the MEF Client command Update procedure with *cmdID* assigned to the *cmdID* of the received command and *cmdStatusCode* assigned as follows: + +If the certificate provisioning procedure completed successfully, then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If the certificate provisioning procedure did not complete successfully due to an error regarding communicating with the certificate provisioning server or an error internal to the certificate provisioning server, then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_CERT\_PROV\_SERVER\_ERROR. + +If the certificate provisioning procedure did not complete successfully due to an error occurring in the certificate provisioning Client (in the MEF Client), then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_CERT\_PROV\_CLIENT\_ERROR. + +#### 8.3.9.8 DEV\_CFG MEF Client command class-specific processes + +**Purpose:** When *cmdClassID* indicates DEV\_CFG, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to perform a device configuration ([ITU-T Y.4500.22]) with the MEF Client acting as the DM Client and the MEF acting as the DM server. + +**Elements of *cmdArgs*:** If *cmdDescription* contains *cmdClassID* indicating DEV\_CFG, then the *cmdArgs* shall contain the *devCfgArgs* element which includes the following elements: + +*devMgmtID*: Indicating the DM protocol (e.g., OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069) that the MEF Client is to use for device configuration. + +*URI*: URI of the DM server. + +**Forming *cmdDescription*:** The MEF shall form *cmdArgs* containing the elements described in "Elements of *cmdArgs*" above: + +*devMgmtID*: The MEF shall assign this element to indicate the protocol (e.g., OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069) that the MEF Client is to use for device configuration. + +*URI*: The MEF shall assign this element to the URI of the DM server. The FQDN of the base URI shall match the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client command. + +The MEF shall form *cmdDescription* with *cmdClassID* indicating DEV\_CFG and *cmdArgs* formed in step 1. + +**Parsing and executing *cmdArgs*:** See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. + +The MEF Client shall verify that the *cmdArgs* elements are acceptable: + +*devMgmtID*: Verification of this element succeeds only if the indicated protocol (e.g., OMA DMv1.3, OMA DMv2.0, OMA LwM2M, BBF TR-069) is supported by the MEF Client. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client selects the DM protocol indicated by the element. + +*URI*: Verification of this element succeeds only if the FQDN of the base URI matches the FQDN of the MEF issuing the MEF Client command. If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client set the DM server URI to the value in this element. + +If the verification of any argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_UNACCEPTABLE\_ARGUMENTS. + +The MEF Client shall attempt executing device configuration per [ITU-T Y.4500.22] using the DM protocol and DM server URI determined in step 4. + +Following the attempt to execute device configuration, the MEF Client shall perform the MEF Client command Update procedure with *cmdID* assigned to the *cmdID* of the received command and *cmdStatusCode* assigned as follows: + +If the device configuration procedure completed successfully, then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If the device configuration procedure did not complete successfully due to an error regarding communicating with the DM server or an error internal to the DM server, then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_DEV\_CFG\_SERVER\_ERROR. + +If the device configuration procedure did not complete successfully due to an error occurring in the DM Client (in the MEF Client), then the MEF Client shall set *cmdStatusCode* to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_DEV\_CFG\_CLIENT\_ERROR. + +#### 8.3.9.9 MO\_NODE MEF Client command class-specific processes + +##### 8.3.9.9.1 Generic MO\_NODE processes + +**Purpose:** When *cmdClassID* indicates MO\_NODE, then the MEF is indicating that the MEF Client is to process an MO\_NODE that has been already configured to the DM Client of the MEF Client (e.g., using device configuration in [ITU-T Y.4500.22]). + +**Elements of *cmdArgs*:** If *cmdDescription* contains *cmdClassID* indicating MO\_NODE, then the *cmdArgs* shall contain the *MONodeCmdArgs* element which includes the following elements: + +*objectPath*: the path of the MO node to be processed. + +*objectTypeID*: indicating the type of the specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource which provides the data model for the MO node to be processed. + +(Optional) *objectTypeSpecificArgs*: additional arguments dependent on type of the specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource (see *objectTypeID*): + +If *objectTypeID* matches the [*authenticationProfile*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*>resource, then *objectTypeSpecificArgs* is present, and is defined in clause 8.3.9.9.2. + +For all other specializations, this element is not present. + +**Forming *cmdDescription*:** The MEF shall form *cmdArgs* containing the elements described in "Elements of *cmdArgs*" above: + +*objectPath*: The MEF shall assign this element to the path of the MO node to be processed. + +*objectTypeID*: The MEF shall assign this element to the identifier of the type of MO node to be processed. + +(Optional) *objectTypeSpecificArgs*: If *objectTypeID* matches the [*authenticationProfile*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*>resource, then *objectTypeSpecificArgs* is formed as specified in "Forming *objectTypeSpecificArgs*" in clause 8.3.9.9.2. + +For all other specializations, this element is not present. + +The MEF shall form *cmdDescription* with *cmdClassID* indicating MO\_NODE and *cmdArgs* formed in step 1. + +**Parsing and executing *cmdArgs*:** See step 3 in clause 8.3.9.6. + +The MEF Client shall verify that the *cmdArgs* elements are acceptable: + +*objectPath*: Verification of these elements succeeds only if there is an MO node addressed by the *objectPath*. If verification succeeds the MEF Client proceeds to step 4b. If the verification of this argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_NOT\_FOUND. + +*objectTypeID*: Verification of these elements succeeds only if *objectTypeID* matches the type MO node addressed by the *objectPath* (see step 4a). If verification succeeds the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If the verification of this argument fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_TYPE\_CONFLICT. + +The MEF Client applies the processing specific to the *objectTypeID*: + +If *objectTypeID* matches the [*authenticationProfile*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource, then the MEF Client shall perform "Processing an [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.2. + +If *objectTypeID* matches the [*trustAnchorCred*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource, then the MEF Client shall perform "Processing a [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.7. + +If *objectTypeID* matches the [*MAFClientCfgReg*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource, then the MEF Client perform "Processing a [*MAFClientCfgReg*] MO Node" in clause 8.3.9.9.8. + +##### **8.3.9.9.2 [*authenticationProfile*]-specific processes** + +**Purpose:** Processing an [*authenticationProfile*] MO node ensures that the MEF Client has been able to establish the credentials needed to use that [*authenticationProfile*] MO node for mutual authentication. + +**Elements of *objectTypeSpecificArgs*:** when *objectTypeID* matches the [*authenticationProfile*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource, then the *objectTypeSpecificArgs* element shall be present and shall contain the *authProfileMONodeArgs* element which includes the following elements: + +*SUID*: this value matches the SUID in the addressed MO Node. + +**Forming *objectTypeSpecificArgs*:** The MEF shall form *objectTypeSpecificArgs* containing *authProfileMONodeArgs* with the elements described in "Elements of *objectTypeSpecificArgs*" above: + +*SUID*: The MEF shall assign this element to the value in the *SUID* element expected to be in the MO node located at the *objectPath* on the MEF Client. + +**Processing an [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node:** The MEF Client shall attempt to parse *objectTypeSpecificArgs* into the elements described in "Elements of *objectTypeSpecificArgs*". If the parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 3. If parsing fails, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MN\_NODE\_BAD\_ARGS. + +The MEF Client shall verify that the *objectTypeSpecificArgs* elements are acceptable: + +*SUID*: Verification succeeds if the SUID in *objectTypeSpecificArgs* matches the *SUID* in the addressed MO\_NODE. + +If *objectTypeSpecificArgs* elements verification succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If *objectTypeSpecificArgs* elements verification fails for any element, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_UNACCEPTABLE\_ARGS. + +The MEF Client shall verify that the *SUID* matches the configuration of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node and its parent and child MO Nodes: + +If the *SUID* is in the set {11, 21, 31, 41}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node does not correspond to the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {12, 22, 32, 42}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node does not correspond to the [*registration*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {13, 23, 33, 43}, then verification shall fail if the parent MO Node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node does not correspond to the [*dataCollection*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {11,12,13}, then verification shall fail if the *symmKeyID* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {21,22,23}, then verification shall fail if: + +The *keyRegDuration* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node, or + +The child MO Node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node does not correspond to the [*MEFClientRegCfg*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {31,32,33}, then verification shall fail if: + +The *keyRegDuration* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node, or + +The child MO Node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node does not correspond to the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {11, 12, 21, 22, 31, 32}, then verification shall fail if: + +The *TLSCiphersuites* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node, or + +The *TLSCiphersuites* attribute is present but does not include the mandatory DTLS or TLS Ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-Based security frameworks in clause 10.2.2. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {41, 42, 43}, then verification shall fail if: + +The *myCertFingerprint* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node, or + +The *TLSCiphersuites* attribute is not present in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node or the *TLSCiphersuites* attribute is present but does not include the mandatory DTLS or TLS Ciphersuites for Certificate-Based security frameworks in clause 10.2.3, or + +The [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node has one or more child MO nodes corresponding to the [*trustAnchorCred*] specialization of the <*mgmtObj*> resource. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 5. If the verification of this argument fails for any element, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_INCONSISTENT\_CONFIG. + +The MEF Client applies the processing specific to the *SUID*: + +If the *SUID* is in the set {11,12,13}, corresponding to a pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node with pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.3. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {21,22,23}, corresponding to a MEF-established symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.4. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {31,32,33}, corresponding to a MAF-established symmetric key SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MAF-established symmetric key SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.5. + +If the *SUID* is in the set {41,42,43}, corresponding to a certificate SUID, then the MEF Client performs "Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with certificate SUID" in clause 8.3.9.9.6. + +##### **8.3.9.9.3 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with pre-provisioned symmetric key** + +**Purpose:** Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with pre-provisioned symmetric key SUID (in the set {11, 12, 13}) ensures that the MEF Client has access to a local copy of the pre-provisioned symmetric key, for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. + +**Preconditions:** This procedure will succeed only if there is a local copy of the pre-provisioned symmetric key value which can be accessed by the MEF. + +**Procedure:** The MEF Client shall determine if the *symmKeyValue* attribute is present in the [authenticationProfile] MO node. + +If the attribute is not present, then the MEF Client shall proceed to step 2. + +If the attribute is present, then the MEF Client has access to the pre-provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +The MEF Client obtains the value of the *symmKeyID* attribute of the [authenticationProfile] MO node. The MEF Client determines if the MEF Client has a local copy of the symmetric key value with identifier matching the *symmKeyID* attribute. + +If a local copy of the symmetric key value is not present, then the MEF Client does not have access to the pre-provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +If a local copy of the symmetric key value is present, then the MEF Client has access to the pre-provisioned symmetric key value. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +##### **8.3.9.9.4 Process [authenticationProfile] MO Node with MEF-established symmetric key** + +**Purpose:** Processing an [authenticationProfile] MO node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID (in the set {21, 22, 23}) ensures that the MEF Client establishes a symmetric key with the MEF for subsequent use with the [authenticationProfile] MO node. + +**Preconditions:** This procedure will succeed only if the [authenticationProfile] MO node has a child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node and a parent MO Node which may be of type [MAFClientRegCfg], [registration] or [dataCollection]. + +This procedure assumes that the MEF Client has a currently-valid MEF Client Registration with the MEF and administrating stakeholder identified in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node. + +**Procedure:** The MEF Client shall attempt the MEF Key registration procedure as described in clause 8.3.5.2.7, with the MEF Client acting as the source MEF Client and with following clarifications: + +At step 4 in clause 8.3.5.2.7, the MEF Client shall form the MEF key registration request (see Table 8.3.5.2.7-1) as follows: + +*MEFFQDN*: Shall be set to the value of the *fqdn* attribute in the child [MEFClientRegCfg] MO node; + +*expirationTime*: Shall be computed by adding the current time to the value of the *keyRegDuration* in the [authenticationProfile] MO node; + +*labels*: Shall be assigned the value of the *keyRegLabels* attribute in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node; + +*adminFQDN*: Shall be assigned to the value of the *adminFQDN* attribute in the child [*MEFClientRegCfg*] MO node; + +*SUID*: Shall be assigned to the value of the *SUID* attribute in the child [*authenticationProfile*] MO node; + +*targetIDs*: Shall be assigned according to the parent MO node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. + +In the case of a parent [*registration*] MO node, the *targetIDs* shall be assigned the CSE-ID of the Registrar CSE. + +In the case of a parent [*dataCollection*] MO node, the *targetIDs* shall be assigned the CSE-ID determined from the *containerPath* attribute of the [*dataCollection*] MO node. + +In the case of a parent [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node, the *targetIDs* shall be assigned the *fqdn* attribute of the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +*keyValue*: Shall not be present. + +The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MEF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MEF as indicated by the presence of the *httpPort*, *coapPort* and *websocketPort* in the child [*MEFClientRegCfg*] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate *httpPort*, *coapPort* or *websocketPort* attribute of the child [*MEFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +At step 10 in clause 8.3.5.2.7, if the MEF Client receives a successful MEF key registration response (see Table 8.3.5.2.7-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MEF key registration response: + +*expirationTime*: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. + +*Source MEF Client ID*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. + +*adminFQDN*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. + +*SUID*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. + +*targetIDs*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.3.5.2.7. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF key registration response and associate this information with the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If verification fails, or if procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +##### **8.3.9.9.5 Process [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node with MAF-established symmetric key** + +**Purpose:** Processing an [*authenticationProfile*] MO node with MEF-established symmetric key SUID (in the set {31,32,33}) ensures that the MEF Client, acting as a source MAF Client, establishes a symmetric key with the MAF for subsequent use with the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. + +**Preconditions:** This procedure will succeed only if the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node has a child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node and a parent MO Node which may be of type [*registration*] or [*dataCollection*]. + +This procedure assumes that the MEF Client, acting as an MAF Client, has a currently-valid MAF Client Registration with the MAF and administrating stakeholder identified in the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +**Procedure:** The MEF Client shall attempt the MAF Key registration procedure as described in clause 8.8.2.7, with the MAF Client acting as the source MAF Client and with following clarifications: + +At step 4 in clause 8.8.2.7, the MEF Client shall form the MAF key registration request (see Table 8.8.2.7-1) as follows: + +*MAF-FQDN*: Shall be set to the value of the *fqdn* attribute in the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node; + +*expirationTime*: Shall be computed by adding the current time to the value of the *keyRegDuration* in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node; + +*labels*: Shall be assigned the value of the *keyRegLabels* attribute in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node; + +*adminFQDN*: Shall be assigned to the value of the *adminFQDN* attribute in the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node; + +*SUID*: Shall be assigned to the value of the *SUID* attribute in the child [*authenticationProfile*] MO node; + +*targetIDs*: Shall be assigned according to the parent MO node of the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. + +In the case of a parent [*registration*] MO node, the *targetIDs* shall be assigned the CSE-ID of the Registrar CSE. + +In the case of a parent [*dataCollection*] MO node, the *targetIDs* shall be assigned the CSE-ID determined from the *containerPath* attribute of the [*dataCollection*] MO node. + +*keyValue*: Shall not be present. + +The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MAF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MAF is indicated by the presence of the *httpPort*, *coapPort* and *websocketPort* in the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate *httpPort*, *coapPort* or *websocketPort* attribute of the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +At step 10 in clause 8.8.2.7, if the MEF Client receives a successful MAF key registration response (see Table 8.8.2.7-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MAF key registration response: + +*expirationTime*: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. + +*Source MEF Client ID*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. + +*adminFQDN*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. + +*SUID*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. + +*targetIDs*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 4 of clause 8.8.2.7. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF key registration response and associate this information with the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If verification fails, or if procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +##### 8.3.9.9.6 Process [*authenticationProfile*] MO Node with certificate + +**Purpose:** Processing an [*authenticationProfile*] MO node with certificate SUID (in the set {41,42,43}) ensures that the MEF Client has access to a local copy of the MEF Client's certificate and corresponding private key, for subsequent use with the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. + +**Preconditions:** This procedure will succeed only if the Node has been provisioned with the certificate matching the *myCertFingerprint* attribute in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. + +**Procedure:** The MEF Client obtains the value of the *myCertFingerprint* attribute in the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node. The MEF Client determines if it has a local copy of a certificate corresponding private key with the certificate matching the *myCertFingerprint* attribute corresponding private key. + +If a local copy of the certificate and corresponding private key are not present, then the MEF Client associates the certificate and corresponding private key with the [*authenticationProfile*] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +If a local copy of the certificate and corresponding private key are present, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +##### 8.3.9.9.7 [*trustAnchorCred*]-specific processes + +**Purpose:** Processing a [*trustAnchorCred*] MO node ensures that the MEF Client has a local copy of the trust anchor CA certificate identified by the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO node. + +**Elements of *objectTypeSpecificArgs*:** The *objectTypeSpecificArgs* element is not present for the [*trustAnchorCred*] specialization. + +**Processing a [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node:** The MEF Client retrieves the value of the *certFingerprint* attribute of the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node. The MEF Client determines if the MEF Client has a local copy of a certificate matching the *certFingerprint* attribute. + +If a local copy of the certificate is present, then the MEF Client associates the certificate with the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If a local copy of the certificate is not present, then the MEF Client proceeds to step 2. The MEF Client obtains the value of the *URI* attribute of the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node. The MEF Client attempts to retrieve the trust anchor certificate by performing a HTTPS GET procedure towards the *URI*. + +If the HTTPS GET procedure is not successful, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +If the HTTPS GET procedure is successful, then the MEF Client extracts the payload. The MEF Client parses the payload to determine if it is a certificate, and if parsing succeeds, then the MEF Client verifies that the received certificate matches the *certFingerprint* attribute of the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node. + +If parsing succeeds and the received certificate matches the *certFingerprint* attribute of the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO Node, then the MEF Client associates the certificate with the [*trustAnchorCred*] MO node for subsequent use. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +Otherwise, the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +##### 8.3.9.9.8 [*MAFClientRegCfg*]-specific processes + +**Purpose:** Processing an [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node ensures that the MEF Client, acting as an MAF Client, has successfully registered with the MAF using the attributes in the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +**Elements of *objectTypeSpecificArgs*:** The *objectTypeSpecificArgs* element is not present for the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] specialization. + +**Processing an [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO Node:** The MEF Client shall attempt the MAF Client registration procedure as described in clause 8.8.2.3, with the MAF Client acting as the source MAF Client and with following clarifications: + +At step 2 in clause 8.8.2.3, the MEF Client shall form the MAF Client Registration Request (see Table 8.8.2.3-1) from the attributes of the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node as follows: + +*MAF-FQDN*: Shall be set to the value of the *fqdn* attribute; + +*expirationTime*: Shall be assigned to the value of *expirationTime* attribute; + +*labels*: Shall be assigned the value of the *labels* attribute; + +*adminFQDN*: shall be assigned to the value of the *adminFQDN* attribute. + +The MEF Client shall select a protocol (HTTP, CoAP, WebSocket) based on the protocol(s) supported by the MAF Client, and the protocol(s) supported by the MAF is indicated by the presence of the *httpPort*, *coapPort* and *websocketPort* in the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. The MEF Client shall use the port number provided in the appropriate *httpPort*, *coapPort* or *websocketPort* attribute of the child [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. + +At step 3 in clause 8.8.2.3, If the MEF Client receives a successful MEF key registration response (see Table 8.8.2.3-2) then the MEF Client shall verify the following information received in the MEF key registration response: + +*expirationTime*: Verification fails if this value is prior to the time when verification is performed. + +*MAF Client ID*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the identifier of the MEF Client. + +*adminFQDN*: Verification fails if this value is distinct from the corresponding value sent in the MEF key registration request in step 2 of clause 8.8.2.3. + +If verification succeeds, then the MEF Client shall store the information in the MEF key registration response and associate this information with the [*MAFClientRegCfg*] MO node. The MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_OK. + +If verification fails, or if the procedure fails for any other reason, then the MEF Client exits the procedure, triggering the MEF Client command Update procedure for this *cmdID* with *cmdStatusCode* set to the value for MEF\_CLIENT\_CMD\_MO\_NODE\_PROCESSING\_FAILED. + +## **8.4 End-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim)** + +### **8.4.1 Purpose of E2E security of primitives (ESPrim)** + +End-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) provides an interoperable framework for securing oneM2M primitives so CSEs (forwarding the primitive) do not need to be trusted with the confidentiality and integrity of the primitive. ESPrim provides mutual authentication, confidentiality, integrity protection and a freshness guarantee (bounding the age of ESPrim Objects). + +Applicable use cases and requirements are discussed in oneM2M TR-0012 [b-oneM2M TR0012]. + +This Recommendation assumes that the ESPrim end-points are the Originator and Receiver of the primitive. + +This Recommendation specifies credential management aspects and data protection aspects for ESPrim. Transport of ESPrim Objects is described in [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. + +### **8.4.2 End-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim) architecture** + +The credential management aspects and data protection aspects for ESPrim are specified in the present clause. Clause 11.3.2 of [ITU-T Y.4500.1] specifies the transport of ESPrim objects. + +The primitive to be secured is called the *inner primitive*, and the primitive which is used to transport a secured inner primitive is called the *outer primitive*. The inner primitive is protected using encryption and integrity protection which takes a symmetric key *sessionESPrimPrimKey* as input. The *sessionESPrimKey* is derived from a *pairwiseESPrimKey*, established between the Originator and Receiver, and a *receiverESPrimRandObject* and *originatorESPrimRandObject*. + +Sequence of events for ESPrim consists of three main phases: + +Establishing *pairwiseESPrimKey*. + +Establishing *sessionESPrimKey* at the Originator. + +Securing a primitive exchange. + +Figure 8.4.2-1 shows the ESPrim message flow for establishing *pairwiseESPrimKey* and *sessionESPrimKey* at the Originator. Figure 8.4.2-2 shows the ESPrim message flow for securing a primitive exchange. + + + +Originator CSE2 registered with Receiver Receiver + +**A. Establishing *pairwiseESPrimKey*** + +**B. Establishing *sessionESPrimKey*** + +(pre-gen option) B.1a. Generate *receiverESPrimRandObject* + +B.2a. Request *receiverESPrimRandObject* (pre-gen option) B.1b. *receiverESPrimRandObject* + +B.2b. (pre-gen option) *receiverESPrimRandObject* or (non-pre-gen option) nothing + +B.2c. if *receiverESPrimRandObject* is returned then jump to step B.2g + +B.2d. Request *receiverESPrimRandObject* B.2e. Generate *receiverESPrimRandObject* + +B.2f. *receiverESPrimRandObject* + +B.2g. Generate *originatorESPrimRandObject* + +B.2h. Generate *sessionESPrimKey* from *pairwiseESPrimKey*, *originatorESPrimRandObject* and *sharedReceiverESPrimRandObject*. Cache *sessionESPrimKey* + +**C. Securing Primitive Exchange** +Shown in separate figure + +How often? + +Once only, or more often if desired + +Periodically. Typically multiple times per *pairwiseESPrimKey*. Typically less often than per exchange of inner request and response primitives + +Per exchange of inner request and response primitives + +Y.4500.3(23) + +Sequence diagram showing message flow for establishing pairwiseESPrimKey and sessionESPrimKey between Originator, CSE2 registered with Receiver, and Receiver. The diagram is divided into three main sections: A. Establishing pairwiseESPrimKey, B. Establishing sessionESPrimKey, and C. Securing Primitive Exchange. Section B includes steps B.1a through B.2h. A 'How often?' column on the right indicates frequency: 'Once only, or more often if desired' for step A, 'Periodically. Typically multiple times per pairwiseESPrimKey. Typically less often than per exchange of inner request and response primitives' for steps B.1a through B.2f, and 'Per exchange of inner request and response primitives' for step C. The reference Y.4500.3(23) is at the bottom right. + +**Figure 8.4.2-1 – Message flow for establishing *pairwiseESPrimKey* and establishing *sessionESPrimKey* at the Originator in the End-to-End Security of Primitives (ESPrim) Procedure** + +**A. Establishing *pairwiseESPrimKey*:** The *pairwiseESPrimKey* may be established using either of the following frameworks: + +**Provisioned *pairwiseESPrimKey* Framework:** The Originator and Receiver shall be provisioned with *pairwiseESPrimKey*. This credential shall be provisioned via one of: + +pre-provisioning; + +a remote security provisioning frameworks (RSPF), specified in clause 8.3; or + +End-to-end security certificate based key establishment (ESCertKE) between the Originator and Receiver, specified in clause 8.7 "End-to-end security certificate based key establishment (ESCertKE)". + +The Originator and Receiver also establish *pairwiseESPrimKeyID* and optionally *pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime* during this process. If no *pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime* is provided, then then *pairwiseESPrimKey* never expires. The Originator and Receiver cache the (*pairwiseESPrimKeyID*, *pairwiseESPrimKey*, (optional) *pairwiseESPrimKeyLifetime*) object to use for processing subsequent primitives. + +**MAF ESPrim framework:** The Originator and M2M authentication function (MAF) authenticate each other using symmetric keys (which may be pre-provisioned or remotely provisioned) and derive a M2M secure connection key (Kc) and corresponding key identifier (KcID). The Originator generates *pairwiseESPrimKey* from Kc and a reserved string. The value of KcID is used in phase C as the *pairwiseESPrimKeyID* in the JWE/XML-ENC object. The Originator caches the (*pairwiseESPrimKeyID*, *pairwiseESPrimKey*) pair to use for processing subsequent primitives. The + +Receiver retrieves Kc and a credential lifetime from the MAF after it receives an inner request primitive secured using the corresponding *pairwiseESPrimKey*' see step C.6.a. + +When *pairwiseESPrimKey* is established using the MAF option, then it typically has a shorter lifetime than the former option. + +**Receiver indicates support for ESPrim:** If Receiver supports ESPrim, the Receiver shall ensure the following for the Receiver's *
.." | +|----------------|----------------------------------|---------|---------------| +| HMAC | SHA-256 | | HS256 | +| | SHA-384 | | HS384 | +| | SHA-512 | | HS512 | +| RSA | RSA PKCS1-v1.5
and MGF1 with: | SHA-256 | RS256 | +| | | SHA-384 | RS384 | +| | | SHA-512 | RS512 | +| ECDSA | P-256 and SHA-256 | | ES256 | +| | P-384 and SHA-384 | | ES384 | +| | P-512 and SHA-512 | | ES512 | + +The output generated by JWS conforms to either the JWS JSON Serialization or a URI-safe JWS compact serialization. The JWS JSON Serialization may be transported "plain" – with no encoding, or may be encoded in base64. [ITU-T Y.4500.4] defines the datatype m2m:e2eCompactJWS for the JWS compact serialization. + +#### **8.5.3.4 Nested-Sign-then-Encrypt ESData security class protocol details** + +The high level steps for the Nested-Sign-then-Encrypt ESData security class are described in clause 8.5.2.4. The inner envelope shall be generated and processed according to one or more RSA or ECDSA signature types specified in clause 8.5.3.3. The inner Envelope shall be generated and processed according to any combination of one or more key management algorithms specified in clause 8.5.3.2. + +## **8.6 Remote security frameworks for end-to-end security** + +### **8.6.1 Overview on remote provisioning and registration of credentials for end-to-end security** + +#### **8.6.1.1 Introduction** + +The remote provisioning framework for end-to-end security shall involve the ability for an entity to register and provision end-to-end credentials by means of a trust enabling function for end-to-end security. An M2M enrolment function, M2M authentication function or a MN-CSE that is equipped with the ability to register and provision end-to-end security credentials may act as a trust enabling function for end-to-end security. + +The end-to-end security credentials derived may be used for providing the following security protection mechanisms: + +Message (primitive) integrity and authenticity using a message integrity code (MIC). + +Message (primitive) confidentiality. + +Integrity and authenticity of the data (attributes) using data integrity tag (DIT). + +Confidentiality of data (attributes). + +Security protected messages and data (attributes) may be enveloped using ESPrim and ESData respectively using mechanisms described in clause 8.4 "End-to-end security of primitives" and 8.5 "End-to-end security of data". Message authenticity/integrity and confidentiality are provided using ESPrim, while integrity and confidentiality of application data (attributes) are provided by using ESData objects. + +End-to-End security may be provided using: + +Leveraging remote security provisioning process based on clause 8.3 and described in clause 8.6.2. + +Using source-generated credentials described in clause 8.6.3. + +#### 8.6.1.2 Overall description of registration and remote provisioning for end-to-end security + +This clause provides description of mechanisms that may be employed for generation, registration and provisioning of credential(s) that shall be used for end-to-end security. Based on security requirements or security profile associated with an Entity (e.g., AE) and indicated within the *
(Enrolee B's AE-ID or CSE-ID, or MAF-ID) | + +Table 9.2.2.1-2 lists the remote security provisioning framework-specific parameters configured an Enrolee in the bootstrap instruction configuration phase of the remote security provisioning framework. + +**Table 9.2.2.1-2 – remote security provisioning framework – specific parameters configured to an Enrolee during the Instruction Configuration phase of the remote security provisioning framework** + +| remote security provisioning framework | remote security provisioning framework-specific Parameters | +|-----------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| +| Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolment Key | Enrolment Expiry | +| Certificate Based | MEF URI | +| | MEF Trust Anchor Information | +| GBA-Based | None | + +Mechanisms for bootstrap Instruction configuration of Enrolees shall authenticate the configuration source and shall provide at least integrity protection of the configured information communicated from the configuration source to the Enrolee. + +#### **9.2.2.2 This clause intentionally left blank** + +#### **9.2.2.3 Bootstrap instruction configuration of M2M enrolment functions** + +Table 9.2.2.3-1 lists the parameters configured to an M2M enrolment function during the bootstrap instruction configuration phase which are common to the pre-provisioned symmetric Enrolee key remote security provisioning framework and certificate-based remote security provisioning framework. + +**Table 9.2.2.3-1 – Parameters configured to M2M enrolment functions during the bootstrap instruction configuration phase which are common to the pre-provisioned symmetric Enrolee key remote security provisioning framework and Certificate-Based remote security provisioning framework** + +| Parameter common to all remote security provisioning frameworks | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Enrolment target Identity
(Enrolee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID, or MAF-ID) | + +Table 9.2.2.3-2 lists the remote security provisioning framework-specific parameters configured to an M2M enrolment functions in the bootstrap instruction configuration phase of the pre-provisioned symmetric Enrolee key remote security provisioning framework and certificate-based remote security provisioning framework. + +**Table 9.2.2.3-2 – remote security provisioning framework-specific parameters configured to an M2M enrolment function during the instruction configuration phase of the pre-provisioned symmetric Enrolee key remote security provisioning framework and certificate-based remote security provisioning framework** + +| remote security provisioning framework | | remote security provisioning framework-specific Parameters | +|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------| +| Pre-Provisioned Symmetric Enrolment Key | | Enrolment Expiry | +| Certificate Based | Enrolee is authenticated using a raw public key certificate | Enrolee's Public key identifier | +| | Enrolee is authenticated using a device certificate | Enrolee's M2M Device ID | +| | | Enrolee's Trust Anchor Information | +| | Enrolee is authenticated using a CSE-ID or AE-ID certificate | Enrolee's Trust Anchor Information | + +This Recommendation assumes that bootstrap instruction configuration of the M2M enrolment functions utilizes business logic of the stakeholder that operates the M2M enrolment function, and the details are not described in the Recommendation. + +#### **9.2.2.4 Bootstrap instruction configuration of UNSP authentication server** + +Table 9.2.2.4-1 lists the parameters configured to an underlying network service provider authentication server (e.g., HLR, HSS or AAA) during the bootstrap instruction configuration phase of the GBA-Based remote security provisioning framework. + +**Table 9.2.2.4-1 – Parameters configured to M2M enrolment functions during the bootstrap instruction configuration phase of the GBA-based remote security provisioning framework** + +| Parameter | Mandatory/Optional for all remote security provisioning frameworks | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Enrolment target Identifier
(Enrollee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID, or MAF-ID) | Mandatory | + +The bootstrap instruction configuration of the underlying network service provider authentication server is achieved by updating the GBA user security settings (GUSS) (3GPP TS 33.220 [ETSI TS 133 220]) of the user equipment (UE) upon which the Enrollee is executed. This Recommendation assumes that this bootstrap instruction configuration utilizes business logic of the underlying network service provider, and the details are not described in the Recommendation. + +### 9.2.3 End-to-end credential configuration procedures and parameters + +#### 9.2.3.0 Introduction + +The following end-to-end credential configuration procedures are described in this clause: + +End-to-end credential configuration of source ESF end-points and target ESF end-points, see clause 9.2.3.1. + +End-to-end credential configuration of trust enabling functions, see clause 9.2.3.2. + +Configuration parameters for enabling end-to-end security at source ESF end-points and target ESF end-points, see clause 9.2.3.3. + +#### 9.2.3.1 End-to-end credential configuration of source esf end-points and target ESF end-points + +It is assumed that the source ESF end-point and the target ESF end-points are configured with the URI of the trust enabling function and have been configured with the appropriate parameters specific to the remote security provisioning frameworks as described in clause 9.2. In addition, the end-to-end credentials are provisioned and appropriate security parameters are provisioned to the target ESF end-points while the source ESF end-point can derive the end-to-end credentials on its own using the relevant security parameters that have been provisioned. Table 9.2.3.1-1 provides a list of the parameters. + +**Table 9.2.3.1-1 – Security credentials and parameters provisioned to the target ESF end-points and source ESF end-points** + +| Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| End-to-End Security Credentials | KpsaID | This is the provisioned credential-Id of the M2M provisioned symmetric Key. | +| | Kpsa | This is the M2M provisioned symmetric Key. This is used to derive the end-to-end master secret, Ke2e_master as described in clause 10.3.6. | +| | TEF URI | The URI of the trusted-third-party (TEF) entity that is used as the credential generator/registry and enables the registration and generation of end-to-end security credentials. | + +**Table 9.2.3.1-1 – Security credentials and parameters provisioned to the target ESF end-points and source ESF end-points** + +| Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|----------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Cryptographic Parameters | Salt | The salt used for generating the end-to-end credentials. Optional parameter. | +| | Key Extraction Algorithm: HMAC-Hash | The Key extraction algorithm that is used for generating the various keys shall follow the mechanisms described in [IETF RFC 5869]. | +| | Cryptographic Labels | The labels that are used by the cryptographic algorithms. The labels shall be used according to clause 10.3.6.1. | +| Types of Credentials | Message Authenticity (Primitive) | The key used for message authentication and integrity of oneM2M primitives. If the keying material is provided, then it is generated by the ESF target end-point. | +| | Message Confidentiality (Primitive) | The key that is used for message confidentiality of oneM2M primitives. If the keying material is provided, then it is generated by the target ESF end-point. | +| | Integrity of Data (Attribute) | Key used for providing integrity of data/attribute. If the keying material is provided, then it is generated by the target ESF end-point. | +| | Confidentiality of Data (Attribute) | Key used for providing confidentiality of data/attributes. If the keying material is provided, then it is generated by the target ESF end-point. | + +#### 9.2.3.2 End-to-end credential configuration at the M2M trust enabling functions + +It is assumed that the trust enabling function is configured with the identities of the entities (ESF source and target end-points) and appropriate parameters specific to the remote security provisioning frameworks as described in clause 9.2. + +In addition, the trust enabling function is provisioned with the appropriate security parameters, so that the end-to-end security credentials can be derived and the set of the cryptographic parameters can be provisioned to the target ESF end-points once the target ESF end-point has been authenticated. Table 9.2.3.2-1 provides a list of the parameters. + +**Table 9.2.3.2-1 – Security parameters provisioned at the M2M enrolment or trust enabling function and source ESF end-point** + +| End-to-End Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| End-to-End Security Credentials | Kpm | Pre-provisioned credentials between the source ESF end-point and TEF | +| | KpmID | The credential identity of the pre-provisioned credentials | +| | Source ESF end-point identity (AE-ID/CSE-ID) | The entity identity that is pre-provisioned with the end-to-end security credentials | + +**Table 9.2.3.2-1 – Security parameters provisioned at the M2M enrolment or trust enabling function and source ESF end-point** + +| End-to-End Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|---------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | target ESF end-point identity (CSE-ID) | | +| List of required Security Protection and Strength | Message Authentication: (Low – High) | Provides a level of the required strength of the message authentication mechanism | +| | Message Confidentiality: (Low – High) | Provides a level of the required strength for providing message confidentiality mechanism | +| | Attribute Integrity: (Low – High) | Provides a level of the required strength for providing attribute integrity | +| | Attribute Confidentiality: (Low – High) | Provides a level of the required strength for providing attribute confidentiality | + +#### 9.2.3.3 Configuration parameters for enabling end-to-end security at source ESF end-points and target ESF end-points + +The source ESF end-points and the target ESF end-points are provisioned with the cryptographic parameters that are used to enable and verify end-to-end security protection. In the case of the target ESF end-point, the trust enabling function provisions the parameters to it after a successful authentication and derivation of the secure connection key (Kpsa). In the case of the source ESF end-point, the parameters may have been pre-configured or provisioned in a similar manner as the target ESF end-point, that is, once the derivation of the secure connection key (Kpsa) is done, and shared between the source ESF end-point and the target ESF end-point. Table 9.2.3.3-1 provides a list of the parameters. + +**Table 9.2.3.3-1 – Security parameters provisioned to the target ESF end-point and the source ESF end-point** + +| End-to-End Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| End-to-End Security Credentials | e2e_master | The End-to-End master credential | +| | E2EKeyId | End-to-End Master credential identity | +| | target ESF end-point Identity (CSE-ID)
Source ESF end-point Id (AE-ID/CSE-ID) | The identity of the end entity with which the end-to-end credential is associated with | +| Cryptographic Parameters | Protocol: JWS/JWE, XML Sec | The type of encoding and representation that is used | +| | Class of cryptographic algorithms: AEAD (single key) or non-AEAD | Defines the class of cryptographic algorithms that shall be used | +| | Message Authenticity Algorithm/Size: HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512 | Indicates the message authentication algorithm and key size | + +**Table 9.2.3.3-1 – Security parameters provisioned to the target ESF end-point +and the source ESF end-point** + +| End-to-End Security Protection | End-to-End Security Provisioning Framework Parameters | Description | +|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | Message Confidentiality Algorithm/Size: AES-192/256 | Indicates the message confidentiality algorithm and key size | +| | Attribute Confidentiality Algorithm: AES-192/256 | Attribute confidentiality algorithm and key size | +| | Attribute Authenticity Algorithm/Size: HMAC-SHA-256 | Attribute authenticity and integrity algorithm and key size | +| Cryptographic Usage | Message/Attribute Authenticity: Nonce | The random value that was used for providing freshness. This is only stored temporarily associated with an expiration time and communicated to the other end | +| | Message/Attribute Confidentiality: Initialization Vector | This random value that is used as the initialization vector for the confidentiality algorithm | + +NOTE – For AEAD class of algorithms where only a single key is used, then only a single key would be generated and an associated cryptographic algorithm (e.g., AES-GCM or AES-CCM) identified. In addition, for AEAD class of algorithms, both an IV and a Nonce would not be generated, rather only a single random value, Nonce, would be generated. + +# **10 Protocol and algorithm details** + +## **10.1 Certificate-based security framework details** + +### **10.1.1 Certificate profiles** + +The RFCs in this section which identify crypto algorithms are for illustrative purposes only. They are not intended to be an exclusive or definitive list. They do not form a normative part of this Recommendation. + +#### **10.1.1.0 General** + +NOTE – These certificate profiles are compliant with the CoAP specification [b-IETF RFC 7252]. + +#### **10.1.1.1 Common certificate details** + +All certificates shall conform to the following profile: + +Certificates shall conform to [IETF RFC 5280]. + +The certificate shall include a SubjectPublicKeyInfo that indicates an algorithm of id-ecPublicKey with namedCurves secp256r1 [IETF RFC 5280]; this curve is equivalent to the NIST P-256 curve [NIST EC]. + +The public key format shall be uncompressed [IETF RFC 5480]. + +The hash algorithm shall be SHA-256. + +The key usage extension shall be included and shall indicate at least digitalSignature. + +#### **10.1.1.2 Raw public key certificate profile** + +Raw public key certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.1 "Common certificate details" and [IETF RFC 7250]. + +#### **10.1.1.3 Details common to certificates with certificate chains** + +Certificates with certificate chains shall conform to the following description: + +These certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.1 "Common certificate details". + +Certificates shall be signed with ECDSA using secp256r1, and the signature shall use SHA-256. + +Certificate chains should limit the number of intermediate CA certificates to avoid having a negative impact in constrained environments. + +#### **10.1.1.4 Profile for device certificates and their certificate chains** + +#### **10.1.1.4.1 Profile for device certificates** + +Device certificates shall conform to the following description: + +Device certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to the certificates with certificate chains". + +The subjectAltName extension of device certificates shall include one or more globally unique hardware instance identifiers. + +EXAMPLE: Annex H "Object identifier based M2M device identifier" [ITU-T Y.4500.1] defines an object identifier-based M2M device ID that can be used for providing a one or more globally unique hardware instance identifier. An object identifier-based M2M device ID can be representing in an otherName field in the subjectAltName extension, where: + +otherName "type-ID" component is set to the M2M device indication ID (clause H.2.1 "M2M device indication ID" [ITU-T Y.4500.1]) arc of the object identifier M2M Device ID; and + +the otherName "value" component is set to the remainder of the object identifier M2M device ID: manufacturer ID arc, model ID arc, serial number ID arc and optional expanded ID arc (see Annex H.2 "OID based M2M device identifier" [ITU-T Y.4500.1]). + +NOTE – Providing the Model ID as part of the M2M Device ID can have privacy implications in some scenarios. + +#### **10.1.1.4.2 Profile for certificate authority certificates for device certificates** + +Certificate authority certificates in the certificate chain for a device certificate shall conform to the following description: + +These certificates shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to the certificates with certificate chains". + +Certificate authority certificates for device certificates are recommended to use the name constraints extension (see clause 4.2.1.10 "Name constraints" of [IETF RFC 5280]) to constrain the globally unique hardware instance identifiers in subsequent device certificates in a certification path. + +EXAMPLE: Name constraints are defined in terms of permitted or excluded name subtrees. Subtrees of an object identifier based M2M device ID name space are represented by an otherName field with: + +"type-ID" set to the M2M device indication ID (clause H.2.1 "M2M device indication ID" [ITU-T Y.4500.1]) arc of the applicable object identifier M2M device ID name space; and + +"value" set to set to the remainder of the object identifier identifying the subtree. + +#### **10.1.1.5 Profile for AE-ID certificates and their certificate chains** + +AE-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to certificates with certificate chains". + +The full URI representation of the AE-ID shall be included in the subjectAltName extension. + +The certificate used to sign the AE-ID certificate shall include nameConstraints satisfied by the hostname part of the full URI representation of the AE-ID. + +AE-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. + +#### **10.1.1.6 Profile for FQDN certificates and their certificate chains** + +FQDN certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to certificates with certificate chains". + +An FQDN Certificate shall include the FQDN of the subject M2M enrolment function in the subjectAltName extension. + +FQDN Certificates shall not include wildcards. + +#### **10.1.1.7 Profile for CSE-ID certificates and their certificate chains** + +CSE-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to certificates with certificate chains". + +The subjectAltName extension shall include the public domain name representation of the CSE-ID as defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. + +CSE-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. + +#### **10.1.1.8 Profile for Node-ID certificates and their certificate chains** + +Node-ID certificates and all other certificates in the corresponding certificate chain shall conform to clause 10.1.1.3 "Details common to certificates with Certificate Chains". + +The subjectAltName extension shall include the Node-ID as defined in [ITU-T Y.4500.1]. + +Node-ID certificates shall not include wildcards. + +### **10.1.2 Public key identifiers** + +The public key identifier for a raw public key certificate shall be calculated as described in [IETF RFC 7507] [IETF RFC 6920] using the SHA-256 hash algorithm. The public key identifier shall be generated using one of the sha-256-120, sha-256-128 or sha-256 hash algorithms specified in [IETF RFC 6920]. + +It is recommended that the public key identifier be as long as practical within the deployment constraints. + +The trusted public key identifier (received during association configuration or bootstrap instruction configuration) is matched against the raw public key certificate (received during the security handshake) using the following procedure: + +A check digest value is computed according to section 2 of [IETF RFC 6920] using the hash algorithm identified in the trusted public key identifier. + +The check digest value is compared against the digest value encoded in the trusted public key identifier. If the values are identical then the raw public key certificate matches the trusted public key identifier. Otherwise, the raw public key certificate does not match the trusted public key identifier. + +### 10.1.3 Support requirements for each public key certificate flavour + +Table 10.1.3 lists, for each of the various types of entity (Field domain CSE, field domain AE, IN-CSE, IN-AE, M2M authentication function and M2M enrolment function), the flavour of certificate that may be issued to the entity and the flavour of other entity's certificates that the entity is required to be able to process. In this table "O" indicates optional, "M" indicates mandatory, "CA" indicates that the option is required if the entity supports the certificate-based security association establishment framework, "CB" indicates conditional on the entity supporting certificate-based remote security provisioning framework. + +**Table 10.1.3-1 – Applicability of certificate flavours issued to an entity and flavours of other entity's certificates that the entity is required to be able to process** + +| Entity | Flavour of certificate may be issued to entity | | | | | Flavour of other entity's certificates that the entity is recommended to be able to process. | | | | | +|------------------|------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|--------|-------|------| +| | Raw | Device | CSE-ID | AE-ID | FQDN | Raw | Device | CSE-ID | AE-ID | FQDN | +| Field Domain CSE | O | O | O | – | – | CA | CA | CA | CA | CB | +| Field Domain AE | O | O | – | O | – | CA | CA | CA | – | CB | +| IN-CSE | O | – | O | – | – | CA | CA | CA | CA | – | +| IN-AE | O | – | – | O | – | CA | – | CA | – | – | +| MAF | – | – | – | – | M | – | – | – | – | M | +| MEF | – | – | – | – | M | CB | CB | – | – | M | + +Mutual authentication between remote management servers and remote management Clients is not considered in this Recommendation. Where supported, remote security administration may be used to provision the certificates. + +### 10.1.4 Certificate signing request profile + +A certificate signing request (CSR) is a signed object provided to the certificate provisioning server (EST server or SCEP server) to request the issuing of a certificate. certificate provisioning as specified in clause 8.3.6 may be used to issue a certificate to a Node, CSE or AE. The certificate signing request shall include the subjectPublicKeyInfo: the public key and the algorithm with which the key is used. + +subjectAltName: This field shall contain the AE-ID, CSE-ID or Node-ID using the name type defined for each type of certificate in clauses 10.1.1.5, 10.1.1.7 and 10.1.1.8. + +The certificate signing request may include additional fields and extensions provided by the certificate provisioning server, for example using the EST certificate signing request (CSR) attributes request described in section 2.6 of [IETF RFC 7030]. + +## 10.2 TLS and DTLS details + +### 10.2.1 TLS and DTLS versions + +Where TCP payloads are to be secured, TLS v1.2 [IETF RFC 5246] shall be used. + +Where UDP payloads are to be secured, DTLS v1.2 [IETF RFC 6347] shall be used, noting that the DTLS v1.2 ciphersuites are identical to the TLS v1.2 ciphersuites. + +All implementations shall support the server name indication (SNI) to indicate their authority in the SNI HostName field as defined in section 3 of [IETF RFC 6066]. This is needed so that when a host that acts as a virtual server for multiple Authorities receives a new TLS or DTLS connection, it knows which keys to use for the TLS or DTLS session. + +(D)TLS Clients on any Node and (D)TLS servers on MNs shall support at least one of the TLS ciphersuites indicated in clause 10.2.2. "TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-Based security frameworks" or clause 10.2.3 "TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for certificate-Based security frameworks". + +NOTE – (D)TLS Servers on MN need to support the TLS ciphersuites for those (D)TLS Clients they are expected to interact with. + +(D)TLS Servers on INs shall support all of the TLS ciphersuites indicated in clause 10.2.2. "TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-Based security frameworks" and 10.2.3 "TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for certificate-based security frameworks". + +### **10.2.2 TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for TLS-PSK-based security frameworks** + +The following security frameworks: + +Provisioned symmetric Key security association establishment framework; + +MAF-Based security association establishment framework; + +Pre-Shared Key remote security provisioning framework; + +GBA-Based remote security provisioning framework; + +shall use one of the key exchange algorithms defined in [IETF RFC 4279]. + +TLS implementations in entities supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following TLS ciphersuite: + +TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256 ([IETF RFC 5487]). + +DTLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following ciphersuites: + +TLS\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8 ([IETF RFC 6655]). + +The security considerations of section 7 of [IETF RFC 4279] apply. In particular, applications should carefully weigh whether or not they need perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and select an appropriate ciphersuite (section 7.1 of [IETF RFC 4279]). + +### **10.2.3 TLS and DTLS ciphersuites for certificate-based security frameworks** + +The following security frameworks: + +certificate-based security association establishment framework; + +Certificate-based security bootstrap framework; + +shall use the standard TLS handshake ([IETF RFC 5246]) with the ECDHE\_ECDSA key exchange ([IETF RFC 4492]). + +TLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following ciphersuite: + +TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CBC\_SHA256, [IETF RFC 5289]. + +DTLS implementations supporting these security frameworks shall implement at least the following TLS ciphersuite: + +TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_CCM\_8, [IETF RFC 7251]. + +Implementations supporting these security frameworks shall support authenticating other entities using all available public key certificate flavours (see clause 8.1.2.1 "Public key certificate flavours"): + +Raw public key certificate: using the mechanism specified in [IETF RFC 7250], Implementation shall support receiving and processing raw public keys compliant with section 9.1.3.2 "Raw public key certificates" in [b-IETF RFC 7252]. + +All other certificates: ITU-T X.509 certificates including device hardware identifier. Implementation shall support receiving and processing raw public keys compliant with section 9.1.3.3 "X.509 certificates" in [b-IETF RFC 7252]. + +### **10.3 Key export and key derivation details** + +#### **10.3.1 TLS key export details** + +##### **TLS key export details for enrolment key** + +Following successful TLS authentication between the Enrollee and M2M enrolment function, see clause 8.3.1.2, the enrolment key (Ke) and RelativeKeID are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Enrollee and M2M enrolment function by applying TLS Key Export ([IETF RFC 5705]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M-Bootstrap" and length 48. The enrolment key (Ke) is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while RelativeKeID is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. + +##### **TLS Key export details for M2M secure connection key** + +Following successful TLS authentication between the Entity A and the M2M authentication function (MAF), see clause 8.8.2.7, the M2M secure connection key (Kc) and the M2M secure connection key Identifier (KcID) are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Entity A and the MAF by applying TLS Key Export ([IETF RFC 5705]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M-Connection" and length 48. The M2M secure connection key (Kc) is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while M2M secure connection key identifier (KcID) is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. + +##### **TLS key export details for pairwiseE2EKey** + +Following successful TLS authentication between the ESCertKE Initiating end-point and ESCertKE Terminating end-point, see clause 8.7.2.2, the pairwiseE2EKey and pairwiseE2EKeyID are generated from the (D)TLS session secrets by the Enrollee and M2M enrolment function by applying TLS key export ([IETF RFC 5705]) using the label "EXPORTER-oneM2M-ESCertKE" and length 48. The pairwiseE2EKey is set to the value of the 32 least significant bytes, while pairwiseE2EKeyID is set to the value of the 16 most significant bytes. + +#### **10.3.2 Derivation of master credential from enrolment key** + +This clause describes the details when generating a master credential (Km) from an enrolment key (Ke) in security bootstrap frameworks. + +The following information shall be used when generating Km from Ke: + +the value of the enrolment Key (Ke); + +the M2M authentication function identifier (MAF-ID) shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629] and apply normalization form KC (NFKC) as specified in [Unicode]. + +The value of Km shall be generated as: + +$$Km = \text{HMAC-SHA-256}(Ke, \text{"oneM2M Enrolment Key to master credential derivation"} \parallel \text{MAF-ID}),$$ +where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in [IETF RFC 2104]. + +### 10.3.3 Derivation of provisioned secure connection key from enrolment key + +This clause describes the details when generating a provisioned secure connection key (Kpsa) from an enrolment key (Ke) in remote provisioning frameworks. + +The following information shall be used when generating Kpsa from Ke: + +The value of the enrolment key (Ke). + +Enrollee B's CSE-ID or AE-ID (Enrollee-B-ID), which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629] and apply normalization form KC (NFKC) as specified in [Unicode]. + +The value of Kpsa shall be generated as: + +$$\text{Kpsa} = \text{HMAC-SHA-256}(\text{Ke}, \text{"oneM2M enrolment key to provisioned secure connection key derivation"} \parallel \text{Enrollee-B-ID})$$ + +where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in [IETF RFC 2104]. + +### 10.3.4 Generating KeID + +The KeID value shall be formed as: + +$$\text{KeID} = \text{base64encode}(\text{RelativeKeID})@ \text{MEF\_FQDN}$$ + +where: + +base64encode(RelativeKeID) denotes the base64 encoding ([IETF RFC 3548]) of the value of RelativeKeID; and + +MEF\_FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M enrolment function. + +### 10.3.5 Generating key identifier for the MAF security framework + +The key identifier value shall be formed as: + +$$\text{Key Identifier} = \text{base64encode}(\text{RelativeKeyID})@ \text{MAF\_FQDN}$$ + +where: + +base64encode(RelativeKeyID) denotes the base64 encoding ([IETF RFC 3548]) of the value of RelativeKeyID; and + +MAF\_FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M authentication function. + +### 10.3.6 Derivation of end-to-end master key from provisioned secure connection key + +#### 10.3.6.1 Introduction + +This clause describes the details when generating an end-to-end master key (Ke2e\_master) based on a successful establishment of security association between a source ESF end-point and target ESF end-point using a remote security provisioning framework as described in clause 8.3. The mechanisms to generate the end-to-end master key then uses a key extraction process using the provisioned secure connection key, (Kpsa). + +The following information shall be used when generating Ke2e from Kpsa: + +The value of the provisioned secure connection key (Kpsa). + +Source ESF end-point B's CSE-ID or AE-ID (Source ESF end-point-B-ID), which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629] and applying normalization form KC (NFKC) as specified in [Unicode]. + +The value of Ke2e\_master shall be generated as: + +$$\text{Ke2e\_master} = \text{HMAC-Hash}(\text{Salt}, \text{Kpsa}).$$ + +NOTE – In the case of source-generated credentials, a random value generated by the source ESF end-point is used instead of the Kpsa in order to generate the Ke2e\_master. + +### 10.3.6.2 Key extraction and expansion of end-to-end master key + +The end-to-end master key (Ke2e\_master) is used to generate the security protection-specific keys. The key extraction and expansion parameters along with the scope are used to generate the various keys. The key extraction and expansion is performed according to the specifications defined in [IETF RFC 5869]. A list of possible end-to-end keys are shown in Table 10.3.6.2-1. + +**Table 10.3.6.2-1 – End-to-end security keys** + +| Security Protection | Symmetric Keys Generated | +|-------------------------------------|--------------------------| +| Message Authenticity (Primitive) | Ke2e_msg_auth | +| Message Confidentiality (Primitive) | Ke2e_msg_conf | +| Integrity of Data (Attribute) | Ke2e_att_auth | +| Confidentiality of Data (Attribute) | Ke2e_att_conf | + +The end-to-end security protection keys that are generated by performing a key expansion of the Ke2e\_master using mechanisms specified in [IETF RFC 5869]. Using the generated end-to-end master key, the associated end-to-end message authentication and or end-to-end message confidentiality keys and attribute keys are generated in the following manner: + +$T(0)$ = empty string (zero length) + +End-to-End Message Authenticity Key (Ke2e\_msg\_auth) = $T(1)$ = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e\_master, $T(0)$ | "E2E Message Authentication Key" | 0x01) + +End-to-End Message Confidentiality Key (Ke2e\_msg\_conf) = $T(2)$ = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e\_master, $T(1)$ | "E2E Message Confidentiality Key" | 0x02) + +End-to-End Attribute Authenticity Key (Ke2e\_att\_auth) = $T(3)$ = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e\_master, $T(2)$ | "E2E Attribute Authenticity Key" | 0x03) + +End-to-End Attribute Confidentiality Key (Ke2e\_att\_conf) = $T(4)$ = HMAC-Hash (Ke2e\_master, $T(3)$ | "E2E Attribute Confidentiality Key" | 0x04) + +NOTE 1 – If AEAD algorithms are used, where only a single key is used, then either the Ke2e\_msg\_auth or the Ke2e\_msg\_conf key may be derived and used for both message authenticity as well as message confidentiality. + +NOTE 2 – The target ESF end-point can be provisioned with all the required keys or can be provisioned only with the Master End-to-End key (Ke2e\_master) and the associated cryptographic parameters (e.g., labels, random values) which are then used by the target ESF end-point in order to generate the keys required for ESPrim and ESData. + +### 10.3.7 Derivation of usage-constrained symmetric keys from enrolment key + +This clause describes the details when generating a usage-constrained symmetric key from an enrolment key (Ke) in remote security provisioning frameworks. + +The following information shall be used: + +The value of the enrolment key (Ke). + +The security usage identifier (SUID) applicable for the usage of the symmetric key. + +Enrollee target's identifier (Enrolment-Target-ID), which is an FQDN which shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629] and apply normalization form KC (NFKC) as specified in [Unicode]. + +If the enrolment target is a CSE or AE, then the FQDN representation of the absolute CSE-ID or absolute AE-ID shall be used. + +The value of the usage-constrained symmetric key shall be generated as: + +HMAC-SHA-256(Ke, "oneM2M enrolment key to usage-constrained symmetric key derivation" || SUID || Enrolment-Target-ID); + +where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in [IETF RFC 2104]. + +### 10.3.8 sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithms + +#### 10.3.8.1 Introduction + +The sessionESPrimKey is used in end-to-end security of primitives (ESPrim), and derived from pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject, originatorESPrimRandObject, see clause 8.4.2. + +Clause 10.3.8 specifies the algorithms used for derivation of the sessionESPrimKey used in ESPrim. The available algorithms are listed in Table 10.3.8.1-1. + +**Table 10.3.8.1-1 – sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithms** + +| Algorithm | Mandatory/Optional | Clause | +|-------------|--------------------|----------| +| HMAC-SHA256 | M | 10.3.8.2 | + +#### 10.3.8.2 HMAC-SHA256 sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithm + +The sessionESPrimkey is derived as: + +sessionESPrimKey = HMAC-SHA256 (pairwiseESPrimKey, receiverESPrimRandObject || originatorESPrimRandObject || "oneM2M HMAC-SHA256 sessionESPrimKey derivation algorithm"), + +where HMAC-SHA-256 is defined in [IETF RFC 2104]. + +### 10.4 Credential-ID details + +The Credential-ID has two parts: + +A type-ID part. The type-ID part is a positive integer defined by datatype sec:credIDTypeID. + +A value part which contains a globally-unique identifier for the entity's credential. The value part may use the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '\_', '-', and '@'. + +The Credential-ID is formed by concatenating the type part, the character '-' and the value part. + +NOTE – A Credential-ID is a globally unique identifier used to identify *serviceSubscribedAppRule* resources ([ITU-T Y.4500.1]) and identify credentials in security configuration information. + +### 10.5 KpsaID + +The KpsaID shall be of the form: + +KpsaID = Issuer\_Relative\_KpsaID@Issuer\_FQDN; + +where: + +Issuer\_Relative\_KpsaID is composed of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '\_' and '-' characters. The issuer of KpsaID shall ensure that no two Kpsa have identical Issuer\_Relative\_KpsaID. + +Issuer\_FQDN is an FQDN representing the stakeholder that provisioned Kpsa. + +NOTE – This format for KpsaID allows the identity of the Issuer to be extracted from KpsaID. + +## 10.6 KmID format + +The KmID shall be of the form: + +$\text{KmID} = \text{MAF\_RELATIVE\_KmID}@\text{MAF\_FQDN}$ ; + +where: + +MAF\_RELATIVE\_KmID is composed of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '.', '\_' and '-' characters. The MAF\_RELATIVE\_KmID is not case sensitive. The MAF shall ensure that no two Km have identical MAF\_RELATIVE\_KmID. + +MAF\_FQDN denotes the FQDN of the M2M authentication function. + +NOTE – This format for KmID allows the identity of the M2M authentication function to be extracted from KmID. + +## 10.7 Enrolment expiry + +Enrolment expiry is the life time to be applied for the key generated, i.e., Ke as part of the pre-provisioned symmetric Key remote security provisioning. Keys that are generated for establishing security associations between Enrolees and the enrolment targets (i.e., Km or Kpsa) based upon the enrolment key Ke will not be valid after the lifetime expiration of the enrolment credential Ke. Therefore, at the maximum, the lifetime of Km or Kpsa should be set to the lifetime associated with Ke. Once the enrolment expiry is exceeded, the Enrolee has to re-initiate remote provisioning to re-generate keys as described in the remote security provisioning frameworks as described in clause 8.3.2.1. + +# 11 Privacy protection architecture using privacy policy manager (PPM) + +## 11.1 Introduction + +This clause provides an architecture for the privacy policy manager (PPM). PPM is a distributed authorization privacy protection architecture using user's privacy preference. + +The PPM is a personal data management framework based on the user's privacy preferences. The PPM creates access control policies from the user's privacy preference and protects the user's Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from unauthorized parties. It may be operated by an M2M Service Provider or another stakeholder acting as trusted third party. If the Service Provider or other stakeholder provides the user's personally identifiable information to third party, the service provider or other stakeholder needs the user's acceptance. In case that the user accepted a privacy policy which indicates provision to third party, the service provider may provide the personally identifiable information to third party. However, if the privacy policy did not include provision to third party, the service provider needs to update the privacy policy and get the user's consent to it. + +## 11.2 Relationship between components of PPM and oneM2M + +The PPM shall have the following components. Detail of each component is explained in oneM2M TR-0001-Use\_Cases\_Collection [b-oneM2M TR0002]. This clause provides the relationship between the components and components of oneM2M: + +Sophisticated consent mechanism for privacy policy: + +When an end user subscribes to a service which uses an application provided by an IN-AE, the end user becomes a data subject, and the data subject creates a privacy preference and registers it on the PPM. + +This function is described in clause 11.4.1.2. + +Functions of the policy decision point (PDP) and policy retrieval point (PRP): + +PDP: + +When an application requests personal data from an IN-CSE, the PPM replies with an access decision that is decided from access control policies based on the user's privacy preference. + +PRP: + +When an application requests personal data from an IN-CSE, PDP requests access control policies to the PPM. The PPM replies with the access control policies based on the user's privacy preference. + +Components of PDP and PRP are defined in clauses 6.2.2 Authorization; and 7.1 Access Control Mechanism. + +Traceability of personal data usage: + +PPM shall store the access log that records which IN-AE accessed which kind of collected data. + +This function is for further study of oneM2M, but this function can be implemented using components that are defined in oneM2M. + +### **11.3 Privacy policy management in oneM2M architecture** + +#### **11.3.1 Introduction** + +There are four procedures in the use of PPM. This clause explains relationships between steps in the PPM scenario and components of oneM2M: + +A data subject joins an IN-CSE such as an M2M Platform. + +A data subject subscribes to a service offered by an IN-AE. + +An IN-AE requests personal data that are stored in an ASN-CSE, MN-CSE or IN-CSE. + +The data subject checks the access log of his/her own personal data and requests the deletion to the IN-AE. + +#### **11.3.2 Involved entities** + +Data subject: + +An end user can make use of services on an IN-CSE by subscribing to a service of an IN-AE which provides functions that control access to information in the IN-CSE. + +When an end user subscribes to a service by an IN-AE, the end user becomes a data subject. + +AE: + +An AE collects various kinds of data, such as sensor inputs. + +An AE sends the data to an ASN-CSE, MN-CSE or IN-CSE. + +ASN-CSE or MN-CSE: + +Policy enforcement point (PEP): + +PEP is one of the functions in the CSE. + +Policy decision point (PDP): + +PDP is one of the functions in the CSE. + +Personal data: + +Personal data are information that can be used on its own or with other information to identify an individual to form personally identifiable information (PII). + +A field domain CSE collects and stores personal data. + +Examples of personal data: sensor data, electrical power consumption, operating state of air conditioner, etc. + +IN-AE: + +An IN-AE provides services to an end user who joins the IN-CSE. + +An IN-AE requests personal data from an IN-CSE in order to provide services. + +IN-CSE: + +M2M portal: + +An M2M portal is a kind of Web site or Web application managing services provided by an M2M platform (IN-CSE and related IN-AEs). + +An end user accesses a portal to join an IN-CSE. A data subject accesses the portal to subscribe to a service offered by an IN-AE. + +PPM: + +The PPM shall store access control policies based on user's privacy preference. + +A MN-CSE uses the PPM as PDP or PRP, so the PPM shall support both PDP and PRP functionalities: + +A PPM portal is a kind of Web site or Web application in the PPM. + +An end user accesses a PPM portal to configure the end user's privacy preference. + +### **11.3.3 Management flow in PPM architecture** + +#### **11.3.3.0 Introduction** + +This clause describes the case where an ASN-CSE or MN-CSE stores personal data. + +#### **11.3.3.1 Joining an IN-CSE** + +When a data subject joins an IN-CSE, the data subject configures a privacy preference using the PPM. A privacy preference explains what kind of data are allowed to be accessed by IN-AEs. Figure 11.3.3.1-1 illustrates the overview of this process. + + + +The diagram shows the architecture for a data subject joining an IN-CSE. + - On the left, 'ASP's application' contains 'ASP1-AE' and 'ASPn-AE' connected via 'Mca' interfaces to the 'M2M platform'. + - The 'M2M platform' contains an 'IN-CSE' (with '
my-key_name,
firstname.lastname | Any combination of the Roman alphabet, numerals, '!', '_' and '-' characters | +| sec:credentialID | Credential Identifier | 10-thiskey@mymef.com | A sec:credIDTypeID and a xs:anyURI separated by the '-' character. See clause 10.4. The xs:anyURI is the value part of the credential-ID | +| sec:device ConfigURI | deviceConfigURI attribute of the
Certificate provisioning is specified in clause 8.3.6 | +| 2 | DEV_CFG | The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.8
Device configuration is specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.22] | +| 3 | MO_NODE | The command class is specified in clause 8.3.9.9 | + +### 12.3.2.4 sec:cmdStatusCode + +The sec:cmdStatusCode enumeration type is used by the *cmdStatusCode* element to indicate the status of an MEF Client command. The *cmdStatus* is an attribute of the *
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 | Services n°1 to n°8 | | | M | 1 byte | | | +| 2 | Services n°9 to n°16 | | | O | 1 byte | | | +| 3 | Services n°17 to n°24 | | | O | 1 byte | | | +| 4 | Services n°25 to n°32 | | | O | 1 byte | | | +| etc. | | | | | | | | +| X | Services n°(8X-7) to n°(8X) | | | O | 1 byte | | | +| -Services
Contents: Service n°1: Local CSE-ID provisioning
Service n°2 IN-CSE-ID list provisioning
Service n°3 MAF FQDN provisioning
Service n°4 Local M2M AE-ID list provisioning
Service n°5 Bootstrapping: MEF address provisioning
Service n°6 M2M-Node-ID information
Service n°7 GBA Secure Provisioning (see note)
Service n°8 GBA Secure Connection (see note) | | | | | | | | +| NOTE – Services n°7 and 8 can only be available in a oneM2M Service Table located in a DF 1M2M hosted in the ADF of the Network Access Application from which the M2M Service Layer credentials are expected to be derived. | | | | | | | | + +The EF shall contain at least one byte. Further bytes may be included, but if the EF includes an optional byte, then it is mandatory for the EF to also contain all bytes before that byte. Other services are possible in the future and will be coded on further bytes in the EF. Coding: + +- 1 bit is used to code each service: +- bit = 1: service available; +- bit = 0: service not available. + +Service available means that the M2M Service Subscription provisioned in the current DF or ADF has the capability to support the service and that the service is available for the user of the M2M service subscription. + +Service not available means that the service shall not be used by the M2M service subscription user, even if the M2M service subscription has the capability to support the service. + +First byte: + + + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°1 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°2 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°3 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°4 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°5 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°6 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°7 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°8 | + +Diagram showing the bit fields of the first byte. The byte is divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Lines connect these bits to labels on the right: b1 to Service n°1, b2 to Service n°2, b3 to Service n°3, b4 to Service n°4, b5 to Service n°5, b6 to Service n°6, b7 to Service n°7, and b8 to Service n°8. + +Second byte: + + + +| | | | | | | | | +|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|--------------| +| b8 | b7 | b6 | b5 | b4 | b3 | b2 | b1 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°9 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°10 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°11 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°12 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°13 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°14 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°15 | +| | | | | | | | Service n°16 | + +Diagram showing the bit fields of the second byte. The byte is divided into 8 bits: b8, b7, b6, b5, b4, b3, b2, b1. Lines connect these bits to labels on the right: b1 to Service n°9, b2 to Service n°10, b3 to Service n°11, b4 to Service n°12, b5 to Service n°13, b6 to Service n°14, b7 to Service n°15, and b8 to Service n°16. + +etc. + +**D.1.3.2 EF1M2MSID (oneM2M subscription identifier)** + +This EF contains the oneM2M subscription identifier, M2M-Sub-ID. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. + +| | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----|-----------| +| Identifier: '6F02' | | Structure: transparent | | Mandatory | +| SFI: '02' | | | | | +| File size: X bytes | | Update activity: low | | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | M/O | Length | +| 1 | M2M Subscription Identifier TLV data object | | M | X bytes | + +The M2M subscription identifier value field shall contain the M2M-Sub-ID encoded as specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. The tag value of the oneM2M subscription identifier TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### D.1.3.3 EF1M2MSPID (oneM2M service provider identifier) + +This EF contains the oneM2M Service Provider Identifier, M2M-SP-ID, of the M2M Service Provider related to the subscription in EF1M2MSID. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------| +| Identifier: '6F03' | Structure: transparent | Mandatory | +| SFI: '03' | | | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O Length | +| 1 | M2M-SP-ID TLV data object | M X bytes | + +The M2M-SP-ID Value field shall contain the M2M-SP-ID encoded as specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. The tag value of the M2M-SP-ID TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### D.1.3.4 EFM2MNID (M2M node identifier) + +This EF contains the M2M-Node-ID supporting the local CSE. It may be used to logically bind a UICC to a specific M2M Node. If service n°6 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------| +| Identifier: '6F04' | Structure: transparent | Optional | +| SFI: '04' | | | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O Length | +| 1 to X | M2M-Node-ID TLV object | M X bytes | + +The M2M-Node-ID value field shall contain the M2M-Node-ID encoded as specified in [ITU-T Y.4500.4]. + +### D.1.3.5 EFCSEID (local CSE Identifier) + +This EF contains the local CSE identifier, CSE-ID, for the M2M field node associated to the subscription in EF1M2MSID. If present, this file is used by the M2M field node to pre-provision the CSE-ID. If service n°1 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|------------| +| Identifier: '6F05' | Structure: transparent | Optional | +| SFI: '05' | | | +| File size: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O Length | +| 1 | CSE-ID TLV data object | M X bytes | + +### CSE-ID TLV + +Contents: + +The CSE-ID Value field shall contain the local CSE-ID formatted as a URI. + +Coding: + +The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629]. The tag value of the URI TLV data object shall be '80'. + +#### D.1.3.6 EFM2MAE-ID (M2M application identifiers list) + +This EF contains the list of M2M Application Identifiers (AE-IDs) for the local M2M applications supported by the subscription in EFIM2MSID. If service n°4 is "available", this file shall be present. + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------| +| Identifier: '6F06' | Structure: Linear fixed | Optional | +| SFI: '06' | | | +| Record length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O Length | +| 1 to X | M2M AE-ID LV data object | M X bytes | + +#### M2M AE-ID LV + +Contents: + +The Value field shall contain the M2M AE-ID formatted as a URI. + +Coding: + +The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629]. + +#### D.1.3.7 EFINCSEIDS (M2M IN-CSE IDs list) + +This EF contains a list of pre-provisioned IN-CSE-ID used to determine the next point of contact after provisioning or M2M service bootstrapping. If service n°2 is "available", this file shall be present. + +| | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------| +| Identifier: '6F08' | Structure: Linear fixed | Optional | +| Record length: X bytes | Update activity: low | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | +| Bytes | Description | M/O Length | +| 1 to X | IN-CSE-ID LV data object | M X bytes | + +#### IN-CSE-ID LV + +Contents: + +The value field shall contain the IN-CSE-ID formatted as a URI. + +Coding: + +The URI shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629]. + +#### D.1.3.8 EFMAFFQDN (MAF-FQDN) + +This EF is used to pre-provision the FQDN of the MAF to be used for M2M service connection after M2M service bootstrapping. If service n°3 is "available", this file shall be present. There shall be only one TLV object within this EF. + +| | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|--|----------------------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F09' | | Structure: Transparent | | Optional | | | | +| Length: X bytes | | | | Update activity: low | | | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 | MAF FQDN TLV data object | | | M | X bytes | | | + +## MAF FQDN + +Contents: + +The FQDN address of the MAF. + +Coding: + +The MAF-FQDN shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629]. The tag value of the MAF FQDN TLV data object shall be '80'. + +### D.1.3.9 EFMEFID (M2M enrolment function identifier) + +This EF contains one or more M2M enrolment function addresses. The first record in the EF shall be considered to be of the highest priority. The last record in the EF shall be considered to be the lowest priority. If service n°5 is "available", this file shall be present. + +| | | | | | | | | +|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|--|----------------------|---------|--|--| +| Identifier: '6F07' | | Structure: linear fixed | | Optional | | | | +| Record length: X bytes | | | | Update activity: low | | | | +| Access Conditions:
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ACTIVATE ADM | | | | | | | | +| Bytes | Description | | | M/O | Length | | | +| 1 to X | MEF Address LV data object | | | M | X bytes | | | + +## MEF address LV data object + +Contents: + +Address of MEF, in the format of a FQDN, an IPv4 address, or an IPv6 address. + +Coding: + +The format of the data object is as follows: + +| Field | Length (bytes) | +|--------------|----------------| +| Length | 1 | +| Address Type | 1 | +| MEF Address | Address Length | + +Address Type: Type of the MEF address. + +This field shall be set to the type of the MEF address according to the following: + +| Value | Name | +|-------------------------------|------| +| 0x00 | FQDN | +| 0x01 | IPv4 | +| 0x02 | IPv6 | +| All other values are reserved | | + +MEF address: Address of the M2M service bootstrap function. + +This field shall be set to the address of the M2M enrolment function. When the MEF type is set to 0x00, the corresponding MEF address shall be encoded to an octet string according to UTF-8 encoding rules as specified in [IETF RFC 3629]. + +Unused bytes shall be set to 'FF'. + +## **D.2 oneM2M service module application for symmetric credentials on UICC (1M2MSM)** + +### **D.2.0 Introduction** + +This clause defines the oneM2M service module (1M2MSM), an application used for oneM2M service layer security functionalities and subscription provisioning based on symmetric credentials. This application resides on the UICC, an IC card specified in [ETSI TS 102 221]. In particular, [ETSI TS 102 221] specifies the application independent properties of the UICC/terminal interface such as the physical characteristics and the logical structure. There may be several 1M2MSM ADFs on a single UICC, corresponding to independent oneM2M service subscriptions. + +### **D.2.1 oneM2M service module application file structure** + +This clause specifies the EFs for the oneM2M service layer defining access conditions, data items and coding. A data item is a part of an EF which represents a complete logical entity. + +#### **D.2.1.1 Content of UICC files at the master file (MF) level** + +Files at the UICC MF level are application independent as specified in [ETSI TS 102 221]. Only the EFDIR and EFICCID files are mandatory on UICC for the purpose of 1M2MSM applications. In any case all files shall be as specified in [ETSI TS 102 221]. + +#### **D.2.1.2 Content of files at the 1M2MSM ADF (application DF) level** + +The EFs in the 1M2MSM ADF contain oneM2M subscription related information that is required for M2M field nodes operating in an oneM2M environment. This ADF shall be selected using its AID and information in EFDIR. The AID for 1M2MSM applications shall be constructed as specified in [ETSI TS 101 220]. + +NOTE – The ETSI RID can be used for oneM2M pending assignment of a oneM2M dedicated RID in [b-ISO/IEC 7816-5]. + +The File IDs '6F1X' (for EFs), '5F1X' and '5F2X' (for DFs) with X ranging from '0' to 'F' are reserved under the 1M2MSM ADF for administrative use by the card issuer. + +The DF1M2M substructure used to isolate the provisioning of network access dependent M2M service related information in a network access application ADF is not needed for access network independent provisioning of an M2M service subscription in a 1M2MSM ADF. Therefore, all the EFs specified in clause D.1.3 shall be present at the 1M2MSM ADF level. The file structure of the ADF1M2MSM is illustrated in Figure D.2. + + + +``` + +graph TD + ADF1M2MSM[ADF1M2MSM] --> EF1M2MST["EF1M2MST +'6F0A'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MSID["EF1M2MSID +'6F02'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MSPID["EF1M2MSPID +'6F03'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MNID["EF1M2MNID +'6F04'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EFCSEID["EFCSEID +'6F05'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MAEID["EF1M2MAEID +'6F06'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2NCSEIDS["EF1M2NCSEIDS +'6F08'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MAFFQDN["EF1M2MAFFQDN +'6F09'"] + ADF1M2MSM --> EF1M2MEFID["EF1M2MEFID +'6F07'"] + +``` + +Figure D.2 – File identifiers and directory structures of ADF1M2MSM. The diagram shows a hierarchical structure starting with ADF1M2MSM at the top. It branches into two main levels. The first level contains four boxes: EF1M2MST '6F0A', EF1M2MSID '6F02', EF1M2MSPID '6F03', and EF1M2MNID '6F04'. The second level contains four boxes: EFCSEID '6F05', EF1M2MAEID '6F06', EF1M2NCSEIDS '6F08', and EF1M2MAFFQDN '6F09'. A third level contains one box: EF1M2MEFID '6F07'. + +**Figure D.2 – File identifiers and directory structures of ADF1M2MSM** + +## **D.2.2 oneM2M subscription related procedures for M2M service** + +### **D.2.2.0 Introduction** + +This clause specifies the procedures that shall be executed by M2M field nodes to interact with a oneM2M service subscription on UICC. They are applicable independently of the file structure supporting the oneM2M service subscription (1M2MSM ADF or DF1M2M under a network access application ADF), unless otherwise indicated. + +#### **D.2.2.1 Initialization – 1M2MSM application selection** + +This procedure only applies to an M2M subscription supported in a 1M2MSM ADF. + +If the M2M field node wants to engage in M2M operation, then after UICC activation (see [ETSI TS 102 221]), the M2M field node shall select a 1M2MSM application, if a 1M2MSM application is listed in the EFDIR file, using the SELECT by DF name as defined in [ETSI TS 102 221]. + +After a successful oneM2M application selection, the selected oneM2M AID is stored on the UICC. This application is referred to as the last selected 1M2MSM application. The last selected 1M2MSM application shall be available on the UICC after a deactivation followed by an activation of the UICC. + +If a oneM2M application is selected using partial DF name, the partial DF name supplied in the command shall uniquely identify a 1M2MSM application. Furthermore, if a 1M2M application is selected using a partial DF name as specified in [ETSI TS 102 221] indicating in the SELECT command the last occurrence, the UICC shall select the oneM2M application stored as the last oneM2M application. If, in the SELECT command, the options first, next/previous are indicated, they have no meaning if an application has not been previously selected in the same session and shall return an appropriate error code. + +#### **D.2.2.2 1M2MSM session termination** + +This procedure only applies to a oneM2M subscription supported in a 1M2MSM ADF. + +The oneM2M UICC session is terminated by the M2M field node as follows: + +The M2M field node shall indicate to the oneM2M UICC application that the termination procedure is starting, by sending a particular STATUS command. + +Finally, the M2M field node deletes all the M2M subscription related information elements from its memory. + +To actually terminate the session, the M2M field node shall then use one of the mechanisms described in [ETSI TS 102 221]. + +#### **D.2.2.3 oneM2M service discovery procedure** + +This procedure is used to discover the oneM2M related services offered by a oneM2M UICC. + +The M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EF1M2MST. If no oneM2M related service is indicated as available, the M2M field node shall assume that only the provisioning of mandatory parameters is available in this ADF. + +#### **D.2.2.4 oneM2M service provisioning procedures** + +These procedures are used by an M2M field node in order to bootstrap an M2M service subscription provisioned on the UICC. + +The M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EF1M2MSID and EF1M2MSPID, and EFCSEID, EFM2MNID, EFINCSEID, EFMAFFQDN according to available services indicated in EF1M2MST. + +#### **D.2.2.5 oneM2M application identifiers provisioning procedure** + +This procedure provisions a list of M2M application identifiers that may be enabled on the M2M node in relation with the oneM2M service subscription. + +Condition: Service number 4 shall be available in the oneM2M service table. + +Under this condition, the M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EFM2MAEID. + +#### **D.2.2.6 oneM2M secure provisioning related procedures** + +These procedures are used by the M2M field node to perform M2M secure provisioning with the assistance of the UICC, depending on available services in EF1M2MST and the supported AUTHENTICATE commands contexts (e.g., GBA support by a network access application) indicated for the hosting ADF. + +Secure provisioning: MEF address provisioning: + +Condition: Service number 5 shall be available in the oneM2M service table. + +Under this condition, the M2M field node shall perform the reading procedure with EFMEFID, if the related service is available. + +GBA secure provisioning: + +This procedure is dependent on the authentication framework supported by the UICC and indicated in the service table of the hosting ADF. + +After identifying the supported authentication framework, the M2M field node shall check availability of Service number 7 in EF1M2MST. If the service is available, the D/G M2M node shall perform GBA-related procedures with AUTHENTICATE – GBA security context (Bootstrapping mode and derivation mode) with the parameters for GBA secure provisioning. + +#### **D.2.2.7 oneM2M security association related procedures** + +GBA secure connection: + +This procedure is dependent on the authentication framework supported by the UICC and indicated in the service table of the hosting ADF. + +After identifying the supported authentication framework, the M2M field node shall check availability of service number 12 in EF1M2MST: If the service is available, the M2M field node shall perform a GBA-related procedures with AUTHENTICATE – GBA security context (bootstrapping mode and derivation Mode) with the parameters for GBA security association. + +## **Annex E** + +### **Blank annex** + +This annex is intentionally left blank. + +## Annex F + +### Acquisition of location information for location based access control + +(This annex forms an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +#### F.0 Introduction + +When a request (resource access) is evaluated by a hosting CSE and an accessControlLocationRegions parameter is defined in the privileges attribute of the
Country authorities for different countries can be used as an aid to check the authenticity of the company asking to use the data and how much trust to place in it | | +| 1.1 | ID | | | | Options for how applications and devices are uniquely identified | | +| | | | Txt | Model number | These are the mobile number(s) of the device(s) if included in the ASP's service | | +| | | | Txt | Version | These are the version number(s) of the device(s) if included in the ASP's service | | +| | | | oneM2M Defined format | Registered App ID | These are the Registered App ID of the apps if included in the ASP's service | | +| | | | Country codes | Country codes where approval has been granted if needed | Device or app accreditation may only be valid in certain countries | | +| 2.0 | What | | | Data Classification Type | What is the type of data that the device/service will access? With the higher the value the more sensitive the data are | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|----------|-------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| +| | | No data collected | Yes/No | No data collected | the device does not collect any data, this could be output device, such as a light switch, that only receives instructions | | +| | | Non personal data | Yes/No | Data not linked to a person | The data cannot be linked to a person, this could be applicable if the device was a door sensor that can only report when it was opened or closed | | +| | | Anonymized data | Yes/No | Data are collected about a person but anonymized | Data are collected about a person but anonymized to remove or summarize any data that would allow an individual to the identified/profiled | | +| | | Personal data | Yes/No | Data that can be directly linked to an identify | The data gather can be linked to an identifier that is unique to an individual or small group (e.g., family members in the same home) | | +| | | Sensitive personal data | Yes/No | Data that can be linked to identify, of a more sensitive nature. | The EU DPA defines certain types of sensitive person data. Additional types such as banking should also be considered to see if they fall within this area | | +| | | Medical data | Yes/No | Data related to an individual's health/fitness, etc. | Data about illnesses, treatments or general wellbeing | | +| 3.0 | When | Null | null | When the data are collected | How often data are sent | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Event based | Yes/No | Triggered by an event | Device only gathers data when triggered, such as a door sensor triggering a camera | | +| | | Variable Monthly | 1 to 12 | Data are sent monthly | The device/services only gathers the data as a monthly transfer. For example, a smart fridge, sending a routine operational status report | | +| | | Weekly | Yes/No | Data are sent weekly | The device/service only gathers the data as a weekly transfer. For example, a diagnostic status report from your fire detection system, including sensor test results, predicted remaining battery life | | +| | | Daily | Yes/No | Data are sent daily | The device/service only gathers the data on a daily transfer. For example, a smart fridge sending the items that have run out as a Grocery list to the users preferred retailer so the retailer can short list them for inclusion in the users shopping basket | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|----------------|------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| +| | | hourly | 1 to 24 | Data are sent every X hours | The device/service only gathers the data on an hourly transfer. For example, a house alarm reporting it is armed and all sensors have reported they are active. So, user alarm app/alarm monitoring service knows that system is still operational and someone has not been able to disable the alarm ability to send an alert | | +| | | minutes | 1 to 60 | Data are sent every X minutes | The device/service only gathers the data every 15th minutes. For example, smart meters reporting back their usage figures | | +| | | Real time-triggered | Yes/No | The data are sent continuously then triggered. | The data are sent in real time, when a specific event triggers it. E.g., The house alarm reports an internal door opening while alarm it set, this triggers the streaming of security cameras | | +| | | Real time-full | Yes/No | The data are sent continuously at all times | The data are sent in real time for the duration of the device being active. For example, CCTV data being sent to offsite storage | | +| 3.1 | Time period | Null | | time period of data. | When data are sent, does it cover a time period | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected. | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | summary/current status | Yes/No | The device sends its current status | The Device sends the current status data, with no history, e.g., the current status of a door sensor (open/closed) and not the log of when the door was opened and closed | | +| | | Sample | Yes/No | The data covers a short period of time. | The data covers a sample of data from a short period of time, such a periodic sampling of heart rhythm being sampled several times a day | | +| | | full history | Yes/No | The full data captured by the device is provided | The full data captured by the device is provided, either sent in real time (3.0) or history uploaded retrospectively | | +| 3.2 | Sample rate | Null | | the time period between data sampling | How long in seconds between samples been taken | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Variable | | value is seconds between data capture points | How long between readings that the device takes measured in seconds | | +| | | Streamed data | Yes/No | Data are captured continuously | Data are captured continuously, such as a smart security camera able to stream the feed to the user | | +| 4.0 | Where - stored | Null | | Where the data are stored | Were the data created by the device or used by the service is stored | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|-------------------|----------------------|-----------|------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Local | Yes/No | The data are only stored locally | The data are stored within the network of smart devices (e.g., within the home) | | +| | | variable | | Country /bloc | The country where the data stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) | | +| 4.1 | Where - collected | | | Where the data are collected from. | Where the data are collected from -note this may be redundant for consumer, but could be used for external feeds such as weather reports. May also be relevant to services so they can state the tries of devices they will pull data from, as they may not want access to all smart devices in the location | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Device | Yes/No | Data are collected just the specific device covered by T&C | The terms & conditions (also well as users privacy settings) are only be evaluated against the data collected by the specific device | | +| | | Smart device network | Yes/No | Data are collected from all devices on the users network | The data are collected from all the devices* that form the users smart device network | | +| | | variable | | External feed | Data comes from an external feed, and is combined with data gather. E.g., Weather forecasts combined with users building utilization patens to predict, then to turn heating up so the building is at the desired temperature when the user arrives | This would be descriptive, and the user would have two options. Disable or substitute (e.g., they have their own compatible weather station, instead of getting a feed from the meteorological office | +| 4.2 | Where - Processed | Null | | Where is the data processed | Where (physical location) the data are processed. This may be different from the storage location | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Local | Yes/No | The data are only processed locally | The data in only processed on the device, or with the user's network of smart devices | | +| | | Variable | | Country /bloc | The country ere the data stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) | | +| 4.3 | Where - Accessed | Hull | | Where the data are accessible from | Where the supplier/vendor/ Policy Precedence restrictions allow the data stored to be accessed from | | +| | | No data collected | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Local | Yes/No | The data are only processed locally | The data are only processed on the device, or with the user's network of smart devices | | +| | | Variable | | Country /bloc | The country where the data are stored, or if part of a wider framework (such as the EU) | | +| 5.0 | Why | Null | | | The prime reason why personal data are being collected and to allow any change of use to be notified to the user | | +| | | Yes/No | Yes/No | For Direct Delivery of the service | The ASP collects information for the direct delivery of the service | E.g., using location for paging from a base station that the user is currently registered at | +| | | Yes/No | Yes/No | To improve ASP's and their partners products and services | The ASP collects information to improve ASP's and their partners products and services | | +| | | Yes/No | Yes/No | To personalize services | The ASP collects information to personalize ASP's and their partners products and services | "our customers that selected this also selected these" | +| | | Yes/No | Yes/No | A Policy Precedence - requirement | The ASP collects information to meet a Policy Precedence -requirement | E.g., Minimum age of intended user used to determine access to resources | +| 6.0 | Retention | Null | | How long is data retained | How long the data (defined above) is kept in its current level of detail | | +| | | Data not collected. | Yes/No | No data collected | The device/service does not collect data, e.g., an end device such as a light | | +| | | Zero retention | Yes/No | Zero data retention | After processing data, its immediately deleted | | +| | | Minutes | 1 to 60 | Data are kept for X minutes | Data are kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g., the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes | | +| | | Hour | 1 to 24 | Data are kept for X hours | Data are kept for X hours | | +| | | Day | 1 to 7 | Data are kept for X days | | | +| | | week | 1 to 4 | Data are kept for X weeks | | | +| | | Month | 1 to 12 | Data are kept for X months | | | +| | | Year | 1 to 10 | Data are kept for X years | | | +| | | forever | | The data will be kept for ever | The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy | | +| 6.1 | retention - anonymized | Null | | how long anonymized data are kept | How long any anonymized or other derived data that is not directly linked to a unique identify is kept. E.g., stats on power usage by geo location | | +| | | Zero retention | Yes/No | Zero data retention | After processing data, its immediately deleted | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|---------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Minutes | 1 to 60 | Data are kept for X minutes | Data are kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g., the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes | | +| | | hour | 1 to 24 | Data are kept for X hours | Data are kept for X hours | | +| | | Day | 1 to 7 | data are kept for X days | | | +| | | week | 1 to 4 | Data are kept for X weeks | | | +| | | Month | 1 to 12 | Data are kept for X months | | | +| | | Year | 1 to 10 | data are kept for X years | | | +| | | forever | | The data will be kept for ever | The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy | | +| 6.2 | retention - summary | Null | | how long summary data are kept | How long summary data are kept, e.g., how much total power was used per month based on meter readings taken every 15 minutes | | +| | | Zero retention | Yes/No | Zero data retention | After processing data, its immediately deleted | | +| | | Minutes | 1 to 60 | Data are kept for X minutes | Data are kept for 15 minutes before being deleted. E.g., the device only holds the last set of readings and collects new ones every 15 minutes | | +| | | hour | 1 to 24 | Data are kept for X hours | Data are kept for X hours | | +| | | Day | 1 to 7 | Data are kept for X days | | | +| | | week | 1 to 4 | Data are kept for X weeks | | | +| | | Month | 1 to 12 | Data are kept for X months | | | +| | | Year | 1 to 10 | data are kept for X years | | | +| | | forever | | The data will be kept for ever | The data will be stored without a defined retention/deletion policy | | +| 7.0 | Sharing -full | Null | | Who the full data are shared with. | Who outside the company has access to the full data by type | | +| | | Data not sharerd. | Yes/No | Data are not shared outside the company | Data are not shared outside the company providing the device/service with not processing contracted out | | +| | | Group | No/scope and reason | Data are only shared with companies in the same group | Data are only shared within other companies in the same group | | +| | | Infrastructure provider | Yes/No | Data are stored on third-party infrastructure | The data are stored on a separate company's servers, e.g., the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing | Note: the answers for where reflect the third party as well as the company offering the service/device. | +| | | Subcontractor | Yes/No | Data are shared with subcontractor(s) | Data are shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service | Note: the answers about location, etc., reflect all subcontractors used. | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------| +| | | Other contracted parties' ancillary functions | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other parties under contract | Data are shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. | | +| | | Affiliate | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other private entities | Data are shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g., device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns | | +| | | Public bodies | No/scope, reason, bodies | Data are shared with key public bodies | Data are shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g., on triggering of an alarm, data for your security devices is shared with police so they can respond in a suitable fashion. Or if a medical alarm goes off the ambulance service/hospital, etc., are sent details so they can respond | | +| 7.1 | Sharing - anonymized | Null | | Who the data are shared with. | Who outside the company has access to anonymized data by type of user | | +| | | Data not shared. | Yes/No | Data are not shared outside the company | Data are not shared outside the company providing the device/service with no processing contracted out | | +| | | Group | No/scope and reason | Data are only shared with companies in the same group | Data are only shared within other companies in the same group | | +| | | Infrastructure provider | Yes/No | Data are stored on third-party infrastructure | The data are stored on a separate company's servers. E.g., the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing | | +| | | Subcontractor | Yes/No | Data are shared with subcontractor(s) | Data are shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service | | +| | | Other contracted parties' ancillary functions | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other parties under contract | Data are shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. | | +| | | Affiliate | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other private entities | Data are shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g., device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Public bodies | No/scope, reason, bodies | Data are shared with key public bodies | Data are shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g., on triggering of an alarm, data for your security devices is shared with police so they can respond in a suitable fashion. Or if a medical alarm goes off the ambulance service/hospital, etc., are sent details so they can respond | | +| 7.2 | Sharing summary | - Null | | Who the data are shared with. | Who outside the company has access to summary data by type of user | | +| | | Data not shared. | Yes/No | Data are not shared outside the company | Data are not shared outside the company providing the device/service with no processing contracted out | | +| | | Group | No/scope and reason | Data are only shared with companies in the same group | Data are only shared within other companies in the same group | | +| | | Infrastructure provider | Yes/No | Data are stored on third-party infrastructure | The data are stored on a separate company's servers. E.g., the company providing the device/service uses a cloud provider for storage or processing | | +| | | Subcontractor | Yes/No | Data are shared with subcontractor(s) | Data are shared with one or more subcontractors who provide part of the service | | +| | | Other contracted parties' ancillary functions | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other parties under contract | Data are shared with other parties under contract that provide additional (non-core) functions to use/operation of device. Such as providing newsletters, marketing offers, etc. Local warranty repair places, etc. | | +| | | Affiliate | No/scope and reason | Data are shared with other private entities | Data are shared with other parties who have no direct or indirect involvement in the device/service. E.g., device suppliers sharing data with channel partners so they can target campaigns | | +| | | Public bodies | No/scope, reason, bodies | Data are shared with key public bodies | Data are shared then certain conditions with certain bodies. E.g., local councils gathering average water usage by geo-location | | +| 8.0 | informing | Null | | | | | +| | | Y/N | Y/N | T&Cs sent to email address registered by the end user | The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an email address registered by the end user | | +| | | URL | ACME.com/English/device type/model/T&C | T&Cs by displayed URL | The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available at a URL | Could be automatically processed by the PPM portal | +| | | URL | ACME.com/English/device type/model/T&C | T&Cs by URL stored in device | The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available at a URL stored in the device | Could be automatically processed by the PPM portal and or device | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Y/N | Y/N | T&Cs on local Screen
(if present ) | The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available on the device screen (if present) | | +| | | Y/N | Y/N | On remote screen associated with user | The device vendor application providers make their tag values in this table available on remote screen associated with user | | +| | | Y/N | Y/N | By post | The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an postal address registered by the end user | | +| | | Y/N | Y/N | SMS (txt) | The device vendor application providers send their tag values in this table to an SMS number registered by the end user | | +| 9.0 | Obtaining consent | Null | | | | | +| | | | Y/N | Consent by In app default | User has to accept default by a single click in the app | | +| | | | Y/N | Consent by End user signed document | Summary XML signed with end users private key, e.g., digital signature | | +| | | | Y/N | Consent by oneM2M recommended method | A oneM2M recommended method {TBA} | If this is defined in the future | +| 10.0 | Protection | Null | | | Five levels to describe how well that the end user privacy and security is protected are defined. Level 1 is the lowest and Level 5 the highest. Each of these levels provides requirements expected for a claim at that level | These levels align with those already proposed by oneM2M WG4 | +| | | Protection level claimed | 1 | Protection level claimed = 1 | Level 1: lowest level with minimal claims that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is used when minimum risk is associated with a breach of end user security and privacy | | +| | | Protection level claimed | 2 | Protection level claimed = 2 | Level 2: provides some level of confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. Entities prove, through a secure authentication protocol, that the entity has control of the sensitive data/credentials. Controls are in place to protect against attacks on stored sensitive data/credentials | | + +**Table J.1 – Privacy attributes** + +| Tag ID | Tag Name | Value | Parameter | Tag description (short form) | full Tag description | Notes | +|--------|----------|----------------------------------|-----------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| | | Protection level claimed | 3 | Protection level claimed = 3 | Level 3: provides high confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is needed when substantial risk is associated with breach of end user security and privacy. Multi-factor authentication is used. Any sensitive data or information exchanged in authentication protocols is cryptographically protected in transit and at rest | | +| | | Protection level claimed | 4 | Protection level claimed = 4 | Level 4: provides very high confidence that the end user privacy and security is protected. This level is used when high risk is associated with a breach of end user security and privacy. This level provides the highest level of end user security and privacy. In addition to Level 3 this level requires the usage of tamper resistant hardware devices for the storage of all sensitive data such as cryptographic keys | | +| | | Protection level claimed | 5 | Protection level claimed = 5 | As level 4 but evidence of external accreditation/assurance available | May depend on work of oneM2M on device certification | +| 11.0 | Age | Null | | | When relevant to privacy settings options for how the end users age can be determined, e.g., DOB age range, etc. | | +| | | DD/MM/YYYY | | Date Of Birth | Claimed Date Of Birth of the end user to determine access to resources | | +| | | Numeric value or range of values | | Minimum age of intended user | Minimum age of intended user used to determine access to resources | | +| | | DD/MM/YYYY | | Maximum age of device (shelf life) | Maximum age of device (shelf life) used to determine access to resources | For devices with embedded batteries that have a shelf life or chemicals in medical devices, etc. | + +## Appendix I + +### Mapping of 3GPP GBA terminology + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +Table I.1 provides a mapping of terminology and abbreviations used in GBA according to 3GPP specification [ETSI TS 133 220] to corresponding oneM2M terminology and abbreviations as used within this Recommendation. + +**Table I.1 – Mapping of terminology and abbreviations used in GBA** + +| GBA entities, keys and processes | oneM2M Security Bootstrap entities, keys & processes | +|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| UE | Enrollee | +| BSF | MEF | +| NAF | MAF | +| Bootstrapping Procedure | Bootstrap Security Handshake + Temporary Enrolment Key Generation | +| Ks | Ke | +| B-TID | KeID | +| Bootstrapping Usage Procedure | Usage in MAF Handshake | +| NAF FQDN | MAF-ID | +| Ks_(ext/int)_NAF | Km (master credential) | + +## Appendix II + +### General mutual authentication mechanism + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +#### II.0 Introduction + +oneM2M mutual authentication schemes allow oneM2M entities to prove that they know related credentials such as master credentials, without having to exchange the values of those credentials, and sensitive data such as security identities and security identifiers. To prevent reading and copying of credentials, a secure environment within the security CSF provides protection against tampering of those credentials and related processed information. + +A general mutual authentication protocol is applied to both symmetric and asymmetric key based schemes. Precise protocol messages and parameters depend on the chosen scheme and the security parameters selected. Typically, it consists of following steps as shown in Figure II.1. + + + +``` +sequenceDiagram + participant A as Entity A + participant B as Entity B + A->>B: 1. Initial triggering command (entity A identifier, security capabilities, etc.) + B->>A: 2. Auth. Challenge (e.g., random challenge, AUTN derived from Master credentials, etc.) + A->>B: 3. Auth. Response + B->>A: 4. Authentication OK/NOK +``` + +Y.4500.3(23) + +Sequence diagram showing the mutual authentication process between Entity A and Entity B. Step 1: Entity A sends an initial triggering command to Entity B. Step 2: Entity B sends an authentication challenge to Entity A. Step 3: Entity A sends an authentication response to Entity B. Step 4: Entity B sends an authentication OK/NOK result to Entity A. + +**Figure II.1 – Mutual authentication** + +1. An initial step where an entity A is securely identified to an entity B with whom previous or no previous contact has been made. In this step entity A identifies itself to an entity B protected against eavesdropping, i.e., no exchange of key materials (master credentials). +2. In the second step entity B sends a challenge to entity A. The Authentication Challenge consists of a challenge, the authentication token (AUTN) of entity B derived from master credentials, etc. The authentication challenge, which may be random or not, depends on the chosen authentication scheme and the security parameters selected for symmetric and asymmetric key based schemes. +3. Entity A replies with an Authentication Response that contains an authentication token (AUTN) derived from its known master credentials and the received Authentication Challenge. This Authentication Response is sent if entity B has been successfully authenticated by entity A. +4. Entity B then verifies the relation between entity A's identity and the response received in step 3. If the verification is positive, entity B is assured that the response has been created by entity A using a secret associated with entity A's identity provided in step 1. + +#### II.1 Group authentication + +The oneM2M transactions may naturally involve groups of M2M entities rather than individual ones. A number of entities are classified as a group due to their proximate locations, having the same features, belonging to the same owner, or any other reasons. To get services, all entities in such a group should be authenticated first. The traditional authentication mechanism has two main solutions, the first authentication mechanism is that the service provider authenticates each entity in the group + +one by one; the second authentication mechanism is that each entity makes mutual authentication with a group agent, then the group agent makes mutual authentication with the service provider. If the first authentication mechanism is used, the resulting authentication overheads of computation and communication may be too high to afford. If the second authentication mechanism is used, it has the following security weaknesses: + +1. It may be subject to a man-in-the-middle attack by the group agent: The group agent would be placed in an unsecure place or owned by different provider than the service provider. If the group agent is compromised or lies to the service provider, the group agent would act as a middle attacker to make fake authentication to entities and report fake identities to the service provider since there is no direct authentication from service provider to each M2M entity. +2. Privacy concern: All information from M2M entities is transferred through the group agent, and the group agent knows all information generated by each entity. Based on security considerations, if the group agent is owned by a different owner other than the entities' and service providers' owner, the group agent should not get the message. + +Hence, the M2M entities (e.g., ASN or ADN) with the same feature can utilize group authentication to the service provider (e.g., infrastructure node) in order to provide an end-to-end secure tunnel as well as reducing the communication overhead. + +## **Appendix III** + +### **Blank appendix** + +*This appendix is intentionally left blank.* + +## **Appendix IV** + +### **Blank appendix** + +*This appendix is intentionally left blank.* + +## Appendix V + +### Precisions for the UICC framework to support M2M services + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +#### V.0 Introduction + +This appendix provides further practical information related to the UICC framework for oneM2M described in Annex D. + +#### V.1 Suggested content of the EFs at pre-personalization + +If EFs have an unassigned value, it may not be clear from the main text what this value should be. This appendix suggests values in these cases as listed in Table V.1. + +**Table V.1 – Pre-personalized EF values** + +| File Identification | Description | Value | +|---------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| '6F02' | 1M2M Service Subscription Identifier | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F03' | 1M2M Service Provider Identifier | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F04' | M2M Node Identifier | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F05' | Local CSE Identifier | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F06' | M2M Application Identifiers list | '00FF...FF' for each record | +| '6F07' | MEF Identifier | '00FF...FF' for each record | +| '6F08' | IN-CSE Identifiers list | '00FF...FF' for each record | +| '6F09' | MAF FQDN | '8000FF...FF' | +| '6F0A' | 1M2M Service Table | Operator/Service Provider dependant | + +#### V.2 EF changes via data download or CAT applications + +This clause defines if changing the content of an EF by the UICC OTA protocol or by a CAT application is advisable. Updating of certain EFs "over the air" or "over the Internet" could result in unpredictable behaviour of the UE; these are marked "Caution" in Table V.2. Certain EFs are marked "No"; under no circumstances should "over the air/over the internet" changes of these EFs be considered. + +**Table V.2 – EF update behaviour** + +| File identification | Description | Change advised | +|---------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------| +| '6F02' | 1M2M Service Subscription Identifier | No | +| '6F03' | 1M2M Service Provider Identifier | No | +| '6F04' | M2M Node Identifier | Caution | +| '6F05' | Local CSE Identifier | Caution | +| '6F06' | M2M Application Identifiers list | Caution | +| '6F07' | MEF Identifier | Caution | +| '6F08' | IN-CSE Identifiers list | Caution | +| '6F09' | MAF FQDN | Caution | +| '6F0A' | 1M2M Service Table | Caution | + +### V.3 List of SFI values at the ADFM2MSM or DFM2M level + +**Table V.3 – SFI values** + +| File Identification | SFI | Description | +|---------------------|------|-------------------------------------| +| '6F02' | '02' | M2M Service Subscription Identifier | +| '6F03' | '03' | M2M Service Provider Identifier | +| '6F04' | '04' | M2M Node Identifier | +| '6F05' | '05' | Local CSE Identifier | +| '6F06' | '06' | M2M Application Identifiers list | +| '6F0A' | '0A' | 1M2M Service Table | + +All other SFI values are reserved for future use. + +### V.4 UICC related tags defined in Annex J + +**Table V.4 – UICC tags** + +| Tag | Name of Data Element | Usage | +|------|---------------------------------------------|------------------------| +| '80' | MAF FQDN TLV data object | EF MAFFQDN | +| '80' | M2M-Node-ID TLV Data Object | EF M2MNID | +| '80' | Local CSE-ID TLV data object | EF CSEID | +| '80' | M2M-SP-ID TLV data object | EF 1M2MSPID | +| '80' | M2M Subscription Identifier TLV data object | EF 1M2MSID | + +NOTE – The value 'FF' is an invalid tag value. + +## Appendix VI + +### Access control decision request + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +An access control decision request as introduced in clause 6.2.2 is generated by a PEP according to an Originator's access request and extra information provided by the hosting CSE using the format specified by the PDP. The PEP can send the access control decision request to a PDP for an access control decision. + +The PDP asks the PRP to retrieve all applicable access control policies according to the access control decision request, and then uses the access control decision request to evaluate the retrieved access control policies for an access control decision. An access control decision request from PEP to PDP can contain the following information: + +- An Originator: It represents the ID of the Originator that sends an access request to the target resource. +- A Resource: It represents the URI of the target resource which the Originator wants to access. +- An Operation: It represents the operation which the Originator wants to perform on the target resource. +- An AccessTime: It represents the time of access. +- A LocationRegion: It represents the location of the Originator. +- An IPAddress: It represents the IP Address of the Originator. + +The URI of the target resource is used to locate the target resource and then find the associated access control policies. + +The ID of Originator is used to compare with the rule component subjects in order to check if a rule is applicable to the access control decision request. + +The operation is used to compare with the rule component operations in order to check if the operation is permitted by the rule. + +The AccessTime, LocationRegion and/or LocationRegion are used to check the rule component contexts in order to ensure some extra conditions are satisfied to using the rule for making an access control decision. + +## Appendix VII + +### Implementation guidance and index of solutions + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +The use of this Recommendation involves a context-specific risk assessment process from which relevant security solutions are identified. + +Clause 6 provides an overview of oneM2M security procedures. Clause 6.1.1 presents the interactions between layers, clause 6.1.2 introduces the sequence of events, and clause 6.2 provides further background especially for authorization (clause 6.2.2). + +Clause 7 on authorization and access control applies regardless of the type of credentials used. Clause 7.1 describes the general oneM2M access control policy management framework, which can be further enhanced by supporting frameworks for role-based access control (clause 7.4), dynamic authorization (clause 7.3). In addition, clause 11 leverages on the above to provide a privacy protection architecture that facilitates the setting and management of user's privacy profiles. + +The present appendix provides Table VII.1 to assist implementers in identifying which clauses of this Recommendation are relevant for a given type of credential. Specific clauses that apply for supporting end-to-end security are listed in italic characters. + +**Table VII.1 – Index of clauses specifying procedures per credential types** + +| Procedure/Solution | PSK | Certificates | TEF (GBA, MEF, MAF) | +|------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------| +| Remote security provisioning | 8.3.2.1 | 8.3.2.2, 8.7 | 8.3.2.3 (GBA) | +| | 9.2.1.1 | | 9.2.1.2, 9.2.2.3, 9.2.2.4 (GBA), 9.2.3 | +| Security Association Establishment | 8.2.1, 8.4 ( ESPrim ), 8.5.2.3 ( ESData Sign ), 8.5.2.4 ( ESData Sign+Encrypt ) | | | +| | 9.1.1.1, 9.1.2.1 | | 9.1.1.2, 9.1.2.2 (MAF) | +| | 8.1.1, 8.2.2.1, 8.5.2.2.2 ( ESData Encrypt ) | 8.1.2, 8.2.2.2, 8.5.2.2.4 ( ESData Encrypt ) | 8.1.3, 8.2.2.3 (MAF), 8.8, 8.5.2.2.3 ( ESData Encrypt ) | +| Algorithm details | 10.2.1, 10.3.6 | | | +| | 10.2.2, 10.3 | 10.1, 10.2.3, 10.3 | | + +## **Appendix VIII** + +### **Blank appendix** + +*This appendix is intentionally left blank.* + +## **Appendix IX** + +### **Blank appendix** + +*This appendix is intentionally left blank.* + +## Appendix X + +### Terms and conditions markup language implementation rules + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +Typical implementation rules are shown below and in Figure X.1 and are repeated for each row. + +Note on conventions: {} identifies the answers to earlier if statement, [] identifies the filter frame and () contain comments. The logic has been shown with indents to better show the nesting of the statements. The logic works by checking the same rows on the filter frames being checked. + +To generate the summary value for each row the following logic is used: + +If [Current filter frame] Value, is not equal to 'no data collected' or 'No data shared', etc = No preference or limit set)? + + {Yes} Is [Current filter frame] value equal to [Previous filter frame] summary value (compound value) of? + + {Yes} [Current filter frame] Summary value equals Value set. + + {No} is [current filter frame] Value set ="Yes"? + + {Yes} [Current filter frame] Summary value set as [Previous filter frame] Summary value + + {No} [Current filter frame] Summary value set as [Current filter frame] Summary value. + + {No} [Current filter frame] summary value set as [Previous filter frame] Summary value + +To generate the T&C acceptable symbol the following logic is used: + +If [Current filter frame] Value equals "Yes"? + + {Yes} [Current filter frame] T&C Acceptable set as "☺" (the smiley is used so the result displayed to the user is language agnostic as well as only requiring a small amount of screen space). + + {No} [Current filter frame] Value equal [Previous filter frame]? + + {Yes} [Current filter frame] T&C acceptable set as "☺" + + {No} [Current filter frame] T&C Acceptable set as "☹" + +![Flowchart illustrating Markup language implementation rules. The process starts with a 'Start' node, leading to a decision diamond '1. [Current Filter Frame]'. If 'No', it goes to '3. [Current Filter Frame] summary set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value' and then to a 'Stop' node. If 'Yes', it goes to decision diamond '5. Is [Current Filter Frame] value = [Previous Filter Frame] value'. If 'Yes', it goes to '6. [Current Filter Frame] summary value equals value set'. If 'No', it goes to decision diamond '4. Is [Current Filter frame] value set = "Yes"'. From '4', if 'Yes', it goes to '7. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value'. If 'No', it goes to '8. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Current Filter Frame] Summary value'. Both '7' and '8' lead to a final 'Stop' node.](09da3f926780c5e1a7db91a5abfaa3d0_img.jpg) + +``` + +graph TD + Start((Start)) --> D1{1. [Current Filter Frame]} + D1 -- N/A --> B2[2. Not applicable, No preference of limit set] + B2 --> Stop1((Stop)) + D1 -- No --> B3[3. [Current Filter Frame] summary set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value] + B3 --> Stop2((Stop)) + D1 -- Yes --> D5{5. Is [Current Filter Frame] value = [Previous Filter Frame] value} + D5 -- Yes --> B6[6. [Current Filter Frame] summary value equals value set] + D5 -- No --> D4{4. Is [Current Filter frame] value set = "Yes"} + D4 -- Yes --> B7[7. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value] + D4 -- No --> B8[8. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Current Filter Frame] Summary value] + B7 --> Stop3((Stop)) + B8 --> Stop3 + +``` + +Flowchart illustrating Markup language implementation rules. The process starts with a 'Start' node, leading to a decision diamond '1. [Current Filter Frame]'. If 'No', it goes to '3. [Current Filter Frame] summary set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value' and then to a 'Stop' node. If 'Yes', it goes to decision diamond '5. Is [Current Filter Frame] value = [Previous Filter Frame] value'. If 'Yes', it goes to '6. [Current Filter Frame] summary value equals value set'. If 'No', it goes to decision diamond '4. Is [Current Filter frame] value set = "Yes"'. From '4', if 'Yes', it goes to '7. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Previous Filter Frame] Summary value'. If 'No', it goes to '8. [Current Filter Frame] summary value set as [Current Filter Frame] Summary value'. Both '7' and '8' lead to a final 'Stop' node. + +Y.4500.3(23) + +**Figure X.1 – Markup language implementation rules** + +## Appendix XI + +### Example SCEP implementation + +(This appendix does not form an integral part of this Recommendation.) + +#### XI.1 Introduction + +This appendix provides a description of an implementation of the simple certificate enrolment protocol (SCEP). A script which performs the procedures described here can be found in the oneM2M Gitlab repository