An attacker penetrates the Non-RT RIC through A1 interface or from external sources through SMO and attempts to trigger a Denial of Service or degrade the performance of non-RT RIC so that non-RT RIC would not be liable for ensuring:
rApps in the Non-RT RIC can be provided by different vendors. For example, one vendor can provide the rApp for Carrier license scheduling and another vendor provide the rApp for energy saving, etc.
This creates the risk that different rApps will take conflicting decisions at the same instance in time for the same user. Such conflicts between rApps include:
These conflicts are difficult to mitigate since dependencies are impossible to observe.
| +| Threat type | Denial of Service | +| Impact type | Availability | +| Affected Asset | rApps | + +| | | +|---------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-rAPP-02 | +| Threat title | An attacker exploits rApp vulnerabilities | +| Threat description |Vulnerabilities can potentially exist in any rApp. If attackers can find exploitable rApp, they can disrupt the offered network service and potentially take over another rApp or the non-RT RIC.
The actual consequences may vary. For example, an attacker may gain the ability to alter data transmitted over A1 interface, extract sensitive information, etc.
| +| Threat type | Tampering, Denial of Service | +| Impact type | Integrity, Availability | +| Affected Asset | rApps | + +| | | +|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-rAPP-03 | +| Threat title | An attacker exploits rApps misconfiguration | +| Threat description |Security misconfiguration, such as open ports or enabled unused protocols, can potentially exist in an rApp. If attackers can find exploitable rApp, they can disrupt the offered network service and potentially take over another rApp or the whole non-RT RIC.
The actual consequences may vary. For example, an attacker may gain the ability to alter data transmitted over A1 interface, extract sensitive information, etc.
| +| Threat type | Information Disclosure, Tampering, Denial of Service | + +| | | +|-----------------------|------------------------------------------| +| Impact type | Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability | +| Affected Asset | rApps | + +1 + +| | | +|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-rAPP-04 | +| Threat title | An attacker bypasses authentication and authorization | +| Threat description | An Attacker can exploit an rApp that has weak or misconfigured authentication and authorization to gain access to the rApp and pose as a tenant. | +| Threat type | Elevation of Privilege | +| Impact type | Authenticity, Authorization | +| Affected Asset | rApps | + +2 + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-rAPP-05 | +| Threat title | An attacker exploits malicious rApp | +| Threat description | An untrusted source may intentionally provide a malicious rApp. A trusted source may have a backdoor intentionally inserted in the rApp. If attackers can find exploitable rApp, they can disrupt the offered network service and potentially take over another rApp or the whole non-RT RIC.Data delivery messages relate to a particular data request or subscription. The data can be delivered to the Data Consumer in different ways, including:
An attacker can perform snooping, injection, or modification attacks in the Delivery of Data process.
| +| Threat type | Information Disclosure and Tampering | +| Impact type | Confidentiality, Integrity | +| Affected Asset | R1, rApps | + +4 + +## 4.4 A1 Threats + +The purpose of the A1 interface is to enable the Non-RT RIC function to provide policy-based guidance, ML model management and enrichment information to the Near-RT RIC function for RAN can optimization. The Non-RT RIC can provide enrichment information over the A1 interface to support the policy enforcement in the Near-RT RIC. The A1 interface is used for discovery, request and delivery of A1 Enrichment Information and discovery of External Enrichment Information. + + + +``` + +graph TD + Non-RT-RIC[Non-RT-RIC] <--> |A1| Near-RT-RIC[Near-RT-RIC] + +``` + +Diagram showing the A1 interface between Non-RT-RIC and Near-RT-RIC. A double-headed arrow labeled 'A1' connects the two boxes. + +Figure. A1 interface between the Non-RT RIC and the Near-RT RIC. + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-A1-01 | +| Threat title | Untrusted peering between Non-RT-RIC and Near-RT-RIC | +| Threat description | Malicious Non-RT-RIC peers with a Near-RT-RIC over the A1 interface, or a malicious Near-RT-RIC peers with a Non-RT-RIC over the A1 interface, due to weak mutual authentication. | +| Threat type | Spoofing | +| Impact type | Authenticity | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-A1-02 | +| Threat title | Malicious function or application monitors messaging across A1 interface | +| Threat description | Internal threat actor can gain access to the messaging across the A1 interface for a MiTM attack to read policy. | +| Threat type | Information Disclosure | +| Impact type | Confidentiality | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-A1-03 | +| Threat title | Malicious function or application modifies messaging across A1 interface | +| Threat description | Internal threat actor can gain access to the messaging across the A1 interface for a MiTM attack to modify or inject policy. This can result in the Near-RT RIC receiving malicious policy. | +| Threat type | Tampering | +| Impact type | Integrity | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +## 4.5 Protocol Stack Threats + +The A1 and R1 interfaces use the REST protocol stack shown in the figure below. The transport network layer is built on IP transport. TCP provides the communication service at the transport layer. HTTP is the application-level protocol used providing reliable transport of messages. TLS provides secure HTTP connections for secure transport of messages. The application layer protocol is based on a RESTful approach with transfer of JSON formatted policy statements. Each of these protocols has known vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a malicious actor. + +| | | +|------------------|------| +| Data Interchange | JSON | +| Application | HTTP | +| Security | TLS | +| Transport Layer | TCP | +| Network layer | IP | +| Data Link Layer | L2 | +| Physical Layer | L1 | + +Figure. REST Protocol Stack for the A1 and R1 Interfaces + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-ProtocolStack-01 | +| Threat title | REST API Exploits | +| Threat description | The A1 and R1 interfaces use the REST API. REST API common attacks include injection, cross site scripting, and DoS attacks that can exploit common vulnerabilities if proper controls are not used to protect against vulnerabilities. | +| Threat type | Spoofing, Tampering, Information Disclosure | +| Impact type | Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-ProtocolStack-02 | +| Threat title | REST API – Broken Object Level Authorization | +| Threat description | The A1 and R1 interfaces use the REST API, which could expose object identifiers without proper authorization checks. | +| Threat type | Information Disclosure | + +| | | +|-----------------------|---------------------------------------| +| Impact type | Authorization | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-ProtocolStack-03 | +| Threat title | JSON Exploits | +| Threat description | The A1 and R1 interfaces use JSON formatted policy statements. JSON attacks include injection, deserialization, web token, and cross site scripting attacks that can exploit common vulnerabilities if proper controls are not used to protect against vulnerabilities. | +| Threat type | Spoofing, Tampering, Information Disclosure | +| Impact type | Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-ProtocolStack-04 | +| Threat title | HTTP Exploits | +| Threat description | The A1 and R1 interfaces use HTTPS. DDoS attacks include HTTP GET Flood, Garbage Flood, and Reverse Bandwidth Floods. Other well known HTTP attacks include injection attacks, such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) and SQL injection. | +| Threat type | Spoofing, Tampering, Information Disclosure, DDoS | +| Impact type | Confidentiality, Integrity, Authenticity, Availability | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +| | | +|---------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Threat ID | T-ProtocolStack-05 | +| Threat title | TCP Volumetric DDoS | +| Threat description | The A1 and R1 interfaces use TCP. TCP DDoS attacks include TCP SYN Flood, ACK Flood, and RST Flood. | +| Threat type | DDoS | +| Impact type | Availability | +| Affected Asset | Non-RT-RIC, Near-RT-RIC, A1 interface | + +## 4.6 Machine Learning (ML) Threats + +ML threats in this subsection should be specific to the Non-RT-RIC. General ML Threats applicable to the O-RAN architecture should be addressed in a separate work item. + +For Further Study (FFS). + +# 5 Security Controls + +Industry recommendations for strong security controls are provided from sources such as the OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls [15], Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) [17], ISO/IEC 27001:2013 Information Security Management System (ISMS) [18], NIST SP 800-53r5 Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations [19], and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Security Guidance for 5G Cloud Infrastructures [20]. + +With consideration of these external sources, the following security controls should be considered for the Non-RT-RIC risk analysis: + +Control-1: TLS with PKI and X.509 certificates + +Control-2: OAuth 2.0 + +Control-3: IAM (using RBAC, ABAC, PBAC, TBAC) + +Control-4: Encryption for Data at Rest + +Control-5: Integrity Protection for Data at Rest + +Control-6: Certificate Management + +Control-7: Message Authentication + +Control-8: Message Integrity Protection + +Control-9: Digital Signatures + +Control-10: Logging + +Control-11: Configuration Validation + +Control-12: Conflict detection and resolution + +Control-13: Encryption for Data in Motion + +Control-14: Integrity Protection for Data in Motion + +# 6 Risk Assessment + +This section provides risk assessment tables for each of the identified assets: Non-RT RIC, R1 interface, A1 interface, and rApps. These tables list the assets, threats, impacts, and possible security controls. + +A malicious actor may be a nation-state adversary, cybercriminal, or employee. Risk scoring includes Likelihood and Impact. + +Likelihood scoring is based upon current security controls. Likelihood scoring does not consider security controls that may be potentially specified in the future. + +Likelihood scoring considers a zero trust architecture which protects against internal threat actors. Likelihood scores are higher for a zero trust architecture (ZTA) because internal threats must be considered in addition to external threats. In a ZTA it cannot be assumed that perimeter defenses are sufficient. As a result, scored Likelihood = Medium, at a minimum. Reconnaissance type attacks can be scored Likelihood = High while damaging/availability attacks can be scored Likelihood = Medium. The reason is that threat actors are less likely to perform damaging attacks that are quickly and easily detected. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) typically move laterally in anonymous fashion to prevent detection while providing reconnaissance. + +Zero trust architecture removes the ability to assume perimeter security is sufficient. The Non-RT RIC must be protected from untrusted external sources attempting to have access, while also assuming the adversary is already inside the network with access to its functions. As a result, the Non-RT RIC cannot have its security posture founded on the assumption the SMO is secure. + +## 6.1 Risk Assessment for Non-RT-RIC + +| Asset-Id | Asset Name | Threat-Id | Threat Description (Brief) | Impact/ Likelihood Raw Score | Possible Security Controls | Security Control-Id | Comments | +|------------|------------|---------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| ASSET-C-11 | Non-RT-RIC | T-NONRTRIC-01 | An attacker gains access to the Non-RT RIC through the SMO to cause a denial of service or degrade the performance of the Non-RT-RIC | Impact = HighIntegrated or Separated.
In the case if the O-DU and O-RU are integrated, OFH is not available for testing.
In the case if the O-DU and O-RU are implemented as separate nodes and they can either be co-located in the same or distributed locations – WG4: OFH.
| +| Management Plane (WG4 M Plane Hierarchical, Hybrid mode, O1) | WG4: M-Plane specification; WG1: O1 | | | | | +| PNF, VNF, CNF | PNF | | | | | +| Location | Cell Site | | | | | + +**Table A-3: Operator #1 inputs – Subsystem FHGW** + +| FHGW | NSA Opt. 3x (FR1) | NSA Opt. 7x (FR1) | SA Opt. 5 (FR1) | SA Opt. 2 (FR1) | SA Opt. 2 (FR2) | +|------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------------------------------| +| 7-2x <-> 7-2x;Integrated or Separated.
In the case if the O-DU and O-RU are integrated, OFH is not available for testing.
In the case if the O-DU and O-RU are implemented as separate nodes and they can either be co-located in the same or distributed locations – WG4: OFH.
| + +| O-DU | NSA Opt. 3x (FR1) | NSA Opt. 7x (FR1) | SA Opt. 5 (FR1) | SA Opt. 2 (FR1) | SA Opt. 2 (FR2) | +|-----------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------| +| Separated / Integrated O-DU and O-CU-CP/O-CU-UP | SeparatedImplemented CRs
apply the latest TR template O-RAN.WGn.descriptor.0-v02.00-TR-template
Editorial corrections
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of the IPR Policy will apply, except that the previous requirement for Adopters (as defined in the earlier IPR Policy) to agree to an O-RAN Adopter License Agreement to access and use Final Specifications shall no longer apply or be required for these Final Specifications after 1st July 2022. + +The copying or incorporation into any other work of part or all of the material available in this specification in any form without the prior written permission of O-RAN ALLIANCE e.V. is prohibited, save that you may print or download extracts of the material on this site for your personal use, or copy the material on this site for the purpose of sending to individual third parties for their information provided that you acknowledge O-RAN ALLIANCE as the source of the material and that you inform the third party that these conditions apply to them and that they must comply with them. + +# **O-RAN Information Model and Data Models Specification** --- + +# Contents + +| | | | +|-------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----| +| Chapter 1. | Introductory Material..... | 3 | +| 1.1 | Scope ..... | 3 | +| 1.2 | References..... | 3 | +| 1.2.1 | Definitions and Abbreviations..... | 5 | +| 1.2.2 | Definitions..... | 5 | +| 1.2.3 | Abbreviations and acronyms ..... | 5 | +| Chapter 2. | Overview and Philosophy..... | 7 | +| 2.1 | “Prosumer” relationship between O-RAN and Standards Development Organizations ..... | 7 | +| 2.2 | Information and Data Models as a Modeling Continuum..... | 8 | +| 2.3 | Information and Data Modeling Co-Evolution ..... | 9 | +| 2.4 | Model and Use Case Development (process) ..... | 10 | +| 2.5 | O-RAN components reflected within O-RAN Information Model and Data Model(s)..... | 10 | +| 2.6 | Open Issues and Future Considerations ..... | 11 | +| Chapter 3. | O-RAN Information Model ..... | 12 | +| 3.1 | A general view of an Information Model..... | 12 | +| 3.2 | Modeling approach, Unified Modeling Language (UML)..... | 12 | +| 3.3 | IISOMI (Informal Inter-SDO Open Model Initiative) guidelines..... | 12 | +| 3.4 | General Information on the UML Model..... | 13 | +| 3.5 | O-RAN Information Model ..... | 13 | +| 3.6 | Classes/components and interfaces that comprise the O-RAN Information Model and Data Models..... | 13 | +| 3.7 | Installing and using Papyrus ..... | 14 | +| Chapter 4. | O-RAN Data Models ..... | 15 | +| 4.1 | Repositories; current conventions to distinguish between models under development versus models that are approved for use..... | 15 | +| 4.2 | Formal relationship (traceability) between O-RAN Data Models and the O-RAN Information Model..... | 16 | +| 4.3 | Usage of 3GPP Data Models ..... | 17 | +| 4.4 | Usage of non-3GPP data models ..... | 18 | +| 4.5 | YANG Conventions..... | 21 | +| 4.5.1 | Naming..... | 21 | +| 4.5.2 | Revision Statement..... | 21 | +| 4.5.3 | Indents..... | 22 | +| 4.5.4 | YANG Language Usage..... | 22 | +| 4.5.5 | Cross Working Group Co-ordination ..... | 22 | +| Annex A: | Link to Information Model source (under development; not approved for use) ..... | 23 | +| Annex B: | Installing and using Eclipse Papyrus [refer to O-RAN wiki for the most up-to-date guidelines] ..... | 24 | +| Annex C: | Links to Data Models approved for use..... | 28 | +| Annex ZZZ : | O-RAN Adopter License Agreement..... | 29 | +| Section 1: | DEFINITIONS ..... | 29 | +| Section 2: | COPYRIGHT LICENSE ..... | 29 | +| Section 3: | FRAND LICENSE ..... | 29 | +| Section 4: | TERM AND TERMINATION ..... | 30 | +| Section 5: | CONFIDENTIALITY ..... | 30 | +| Section 6: | INDEMNIFICATION ..... | 30 | +| Section 7: | LIMITATIONS ON LIABILITY; NO WARRANTY ..... | 30 | +| Section 8: | ASSIGNMENT ..... | 31 | +| Section 9: | THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY RIGHTS ..... | 31 | +| Section 10: | BINDING ON AFFILIATES ..... | 31 | +| Section 11: | GENERAL..... | 31 | + +# Chapter 1. Introductory Material + +## 1.1 Scope + +This Technical Specification has been produced by the O-RAN.org. + +The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within O-RAN WG1 and may change following formal O-RAN approval. Should the O-RAN.org modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by O-RAN Alliance with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows: + +Release x.y.z + +where: + +- x the first digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc. (the initial approved document will have x=01). +- y the second digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document. +- z the third digit included only in working versions of the document indicating incremental changes during the editing process. + +**This document is both a Specification and an Informational Report in that it specifies the Information Model (not yet approved for use) and the Data Models (approved for use) that are foundational for O-RAN's model-driven architecture and for the functions carried out over O-RAN interfaces, e.g., management functions, procedures, operations and corresponding solutions.** + +**In addition, this document includes information about existing standards and industry work that serve as a basis for work items in O-RAN. There is a "prosumer" relationship evolving between O-RAN and 3GPP, as each makes its model available and provides model feedback to the other.** + +**Lastly, this document describes the de facto methods and procedures with respect to a "modeling continuum" that aims to establish and evolve an O-RAN Information Model from which O-RAN Data Models may be generated manually or with a set of tools.** + +## 1.2 References + +The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document. + +- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific. +- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply. +- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document in Release 16 + +- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications +- [2] 3GPP TR 28.890: Management and orchestration; Study on integration of Open Network Automation Platform (ONAP) and 3GPP management for 5G networks +- [3] 3GPP TS 28.530: "Management and orchestration; Concepts, use cases and requirements" +- [4] 3GPP TS 28.531: Management and orchestration; Provisioning +- [5] 3GPP TS 28.532: Management and orchestration; Generic management services +- [6] 3GPP TS 28.533: Management and orchestration: Architecture framework +- [7] 3GPP TS 28.540: Management and orchestration; 5G Network Resource Model (NRM); Stage 1 +- [8] 3GPP TS 28.541: Management and orchestration; 5G Network Resource Model (NRM); Stage 2 and stage 3 +- [9] 3GPP TS 28.545: Management and orchestration; Fault Supervision (FS) + +- [10] 3GPP TS 28.550: Management and orchestration; Performance assurance +- [11] 3GPP TS 28.552: Management and orchestration; 5G performance measurements +- [12] 3GPP TS 28.554: Management and orchestration; 5G end to end Key Performance Indicators (KPI) +- [13] 3GPP TS 28.621: Telecommunication management; Generic Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements +- [14] 3GPP TS 28.622: Telecommunication management; Generic Network Resource Model (NRM) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS) +- [15] 3GPP TS 32.341: Telecommunication management; File Transfer (FT) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Requirements +- [16] 3GPP TS 32.342: Telecommunication management; File Transfer (FT) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Information Service (IS) +- [17] 3GPP TS 32.346: Telecommunication management; File Transfer (FT) Integration Reference Point (IRP); Solution Set (SS) definitions +- [18] 3GPP TS 32.421: Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace concepts and requirements +- [19] 3GPP TS 32.422: Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace control and configuration management +- [20] 3GPP TS 32.423: Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace; Trace data definition and management +- [21] 3GPP TS 32.508: Telecommunication management; Procedure flows for multi-vendor plug-and-play eNode B connection to the network +- [22] 3GPP TS 32.509: Telecommunication management; Data formats for multi-vendor plug and play eNode B connection to the network +- [23] 3GPP TS 38.401: NG-RAN; Architecture description +- [24] O-RAN-WG4.MP.0-v05.00: O-RAN Alliance Working Group 4 Management Plane Specification +- [25] O-RAN WG1 OAM Architecture v03.00 +- [26] RFC 6241, “Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)”, IETF, June 2011 +- [27] RFC 7950, “The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language”, IETF, August 2016 +- [28] 3GPP TS 32.156: Telecommunication management; Fixed Mobile Convergence (FMC) Model repertoire +- [29] 3GPP TS 32.160: Management and orchestration; Management service template +- [30] ONF TR-514: UML Modeling Guidelines +- [31] ONF TR-515: Papyrus Guidelines +- [32] ONF TR-531: UML to YANG Mapping Guidelines +- [33] O-RAN Information Model (from Eclipse/Papyrus);Support of LTE energy saving by cell/carrier off/on switching. The switch-off decision might be taken by the capacity booster cell autonomously or may be centrally controlled by OAM. The eNB may initiate handover with appropriate root cause values and thereby inform its neighbour cells about the future switch off. The load of the neighbour cells may also be monitored by load information exchange over X2. Before switching off, all peer eNBs can be informed about the switch off over the X2 interface. For the switch off a Deactivation Indication was added to the ENB CONFIGURATION UPDATE procedure.
For switch on a CELL ACTIVATION REQUEST/RESPONSE procedure was introduced in LTE Rel.10. The autonomous switch on decision is more difficult to realize particularly for small cells. Even with high load on the coverage cell, it is not obvious if there are UEs in the vicinity of such small cells.
| +| TS 36.300 and other specs | LTE Rel.11 | E-UTRAN; Overall description; Stage 2 | LTE Rel.11 defined respective S1 messages for Inter-RAT (i.e. GERAN, UMTS) support. | +| TR 36.887 | LTE Rel.12 | Study on energy saving enhancement for E-UTRAN | Study on energy saving enhancements for E-UTRAN. | +| TS 36.300 and other specs | LTE Rel.15 | E-UTRAN; Overall description; Stage 2 | EN-DC CONFIGURATION UPDATE procedure was specified to support LTE-NR Dual Connectivity in the Non-Standalone Configurations. | +| TS 38.300 and other specs | 5G Rel.15 | NR and NG-RAN Overall description; Stage-2 | Support of 5G energy saving by cell/carrier off/on switching. Similar functionality as defined for LTE. E-UTRA or NR cell providing additional capacity via single or dual connectivity. | + +### 5.4.2 Ongoing Work in 3GPP Rel.18 RAN + +The following study is conducted in 3GPP Rel.18 in RAN. This includes: + +- Definition of a base station energy consumption model +- Definition of an evaluation methodology and KPIs +- Study and identify techniques on the gNB and UE side to improve network energy savings in terms of both BS transmission and reception + +| Reference | Release | Title | Documentation and impact on Specifications | +|-------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------| +| FS_Netw_Energy_NR | 5G Rel.18 | Study on network energy savings for NR | Results will be captured in 3GPP TR 38.864 [19]. | + +While 3GPP RAN WG1 is leading this study item, RAN WG3 will study aspects of information exchange/coordination over network interfaces such as X2/Xn. For this purpose, RAN WG3 also considers Enhanced Carrier/Cell Switch Off/On mechanisms. + +### 5.4.3 Impact on 3GPP RAN Specifications + +Non-RT or Near-RT RIC controlled Cell Switch Off/On is not considered to have any impact on 3GPP RAN specifications. + +### 5.4.4 Relation to 3GPP System Architecture Specifications + +| Specs | Release | Title | Description | +|----------------------------------|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| TR 36.927 | LTE Rel.10 | Study on Energy Savings Management | Study on Energy Savings Management | +| TS 32.551 and other specs | LTE Rel.10 | Energy Saving Management (ESM); Concepts and requirements | Concepts and requirements for ESM. According to 3GPP TS 32.551, the energy saving procedure initiating capacity booster cell, to enter or exit “energySaving” state, should be able to initiate energy saving compensation activation and/or deactivation on one or multiple cells or network elements. 3GPP TS 32.425 [13] defines the measurements and 3GPP TS 32.451 [14] defines the KPIs. | +| TR 32.834 | LTE Rel.11 | Study on OAM aspects of inter-RAT Energy Saving | Inter-RAT aspects of Energy Saving. The following RATs are considered in this study: GSM, UMTS, LTE, CDMA. | +| TR 23.866 | LTE Rel.12 | Study on System Enhancements for Energy Efficiency | Study on System Enhancements for Energy Efficiency | +| TR 32.856 | 5G Rel.15 | Study on OAM support for assessment of energy efficiency in mobile access networks | Support for ETSI metrics and methods for energy efficiency assessment and related measurements. Principles for monitoring equipment power, energy and environmental parameters. 2G, 3G and 4G have been covered. | +| TS 28.310 and other specs | 5G Rel.16 | Energy efficiency of 5G |This TS defines solutions and requirements for
The Energy Saving use case defines the scenario of energy saving by switching off capacity booster cells when the traffic demand is low and re-activate them on a need basis. The energy saving consists of two scenarios where the capacity booster cell gNB is fully or partially overlaid by the candidate cell(s).
The configuration of energy saving policies for these solutions is defined in 3GPP TS 28.541 [11]. The measurements related to data volume and PEE measurements are defined in 3GPP TS 28.552 [12]. The Energy Efficiency related KPIs are defined in TS 28.554 [7].
| + +### 5.4.5 Ongoing Work in 3GPP Rel.18 System Architecture + +Energy saving compensation activation and deactivation procedures for LTE are defined in 3GPP TS 32.551 [15] as: + +- Energy saving compensation activation: procedure to increase the coverage area for the candidate cell(s). +- Energy saving compensation deactivation: procedure to decrease a previously increased coverage area. + +This procedure is not defined yet for energy saving procedures for 5G, and hence 3GPP TS 28.310 [8] needs to be enhanced to introduce this procedure for 5G networks. Related study and work items are existing. + +| Reference | Release | Title | Documentation and impact on Specifications | +|---------------------|-----------|----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| FS_EE5G_Ph2 | 5G Rel.18 | Study on new aspects of EE for 5G networks Phase 2 | Results will be captured in 3GPP TR 28.913 Study on new aspects of EE for 5G networks phase 2. | +| EE5GPLUS_Ph2 | 5G Rel.18 | Enhancements of EE for 5G Phase 2 | Specification enhancements are expected for the following 3GPP specifications: TS 28.310 [8], TS 28.552 [12], TS 28.554 [7] and TS 28.541 [11]. | + +### 5.4.6 Impact on 3GPP System Architecture Specifications + +Non-RT or Near-RT RIC controlled Cell Switch Off/On is not considered to have any impact on 3GPP System Architecture specifications. + +## 5.5 Gain Analysis + +An operator can expect strong energy savings, and thus OPEX savings, by using Carrier/Cell Switching in a network with multiple frequency layers. The exact power saving strongly depends on network deployment details, cell configuration (e.g., configured bandwidth, common channels etc.), used hardware, and network load. Multiple frequency layers may or may not use the same power amplifier in the RF module. Major power savings are naturally obtained when some power amplifiers can be switched off completely. + +Numerical analysis based on an estimated power saving per carrier / cell to be switched off might provide a good estimate of the expected savings. O-RU power consumption might be categorized into power consumption related to: + +1. user channels' load (e.g., traffic on uplink/downlink shared channels), +2. common signals and channels' load (e.g., SSB transmissions, Reference Signals, broadcast channel, paging channel etc.), +3. regular PA operational power (i.e., the required energy to power up the power amplifier), +4. regular operational power (i.e., the required energy to power up the radio module). + +Power consumption related to (1), (2) and (3) scales with the number of transmission paths as illustrated in Figure 5.5-1. + + + +Figure 5.5-1: O-RU power saving for a 4TX4RX sector configuration. The figure consists of two side-by-side bar charts. The left chart, titled 'Transmitted Power (Normal Mode)', shows four stacked bars representing power consumption in Watts (W). Each bar is divided into four segments labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4 from top to bottom. Segment 1 is the top-most, followed by 2, 3, and 4 at the base. An arrow labeled 'TX path' points to the top of the first bar. The right chart, titled 'Transmitted Power (Power Saving Mode)', shows a single bar with segment 4 at the base, indicating that only the power consumption of segment 4 remains during power saving mode. + +**Figure 5.5-1: O-RU power saving for a 4TX4RX sector configuration** + +Considering that the requested traffic (1) needs to be transmitted in one of the remaining carriers/cells and that regular operational power (4) will be required after carrier/cell switch off, the power savings of the Carrier/Cell Switch algorithm is mainly related to the power consumption of (2) and (3). + +The yearly energy savings might be calculated as follows: + +$$YearlyPowerSaving[MWh] = \frac{O-RU\ PowerSaving[W]}{1.000.000} * \frac{PowerSavingHours[h]}{day} * \#days * \#O-RUs$$ + +Two example calculations, simplifying the factors as cited above and ignoring deployment, cell configuration, hardware specifics and load dependencies, are provided in the table below: + +**Table 5.5-1: Simplified power savings calculation examples** + +| Factor | Value | Value | +|---------------------------------------|-------|-------| +| O-RU power savings during switch off | 100 W | 200 W | +| Number of hours of switch off per day | 2 | 4 | +| Number of O-RUs | 10000 | 20000 | +| Yearly energy saving [MWh] | 730 | 5840 | + +To be more specific considering deployment, cell configuration, antenna type, hardware and load dependencies of the O-RU power consumption, computational analysis results for two example scenarios are provided. The calculations are based on the load profile and the power consumption categorization of O-RU functional blocks as outlined in Annex B. + +Energy savings gain from Carrier and Cell Switch Off/On would be equivalent to power consumption of the O-RU hardware components that can be shut down or put into energy savings mode during low traffic load. As illustrated in Figure 5.5-2, major energy savings gain would be derived from shutting down RF Processing Unit and Digital Processing Unit (depending on the antenna configuration), while FH Processing Unit, Power Unit and other components would still be fully or partially functioning, and the power consumption would stay more or less consistent during the switching off period. + + + +Figure 5.5-2: Energy savings for O-RU. The diagram shows the internal components of an O-RU7-2. It includes an O-RAN FH block, an eCPRI block, a Digital Processing Unit, and an RF Processing Unit. These are connected to a Timing Unit and a Power Unit. The Timing Unit receives local timing from CDR and GNSS (optional). The Power Unit provides power to the Timing Unit and the RF Processing Unit. The O-RAN FH block is connected to To/From O-DU7-2. The eCPRI block is connected to the Digital Processing Unit. The Digital Processing Unit is connected to the RF Processing Unit. The Timing Unit is connected to the eCPRI block, the Digital Processing Unit, and the Power Unit. The Power Unit is connected to the Timing Unit and the RF Processing Unit. + +**Figure 5.5-2: Energy savings for O-RU** + +### 5.5.1 Cell and Carrier Switch Off/On Energy Saving for 4T4R O-RU + +The energy saving gain from Carrier and Cell Switch Off/On is analyzed based on the system parameters in Table 5.5.1-1 and the example power profile considering power consumption from operational experience provided in Table 5.5.1-2. + +**Table 5.5.1-1: O-RU Configuration for ES gain analysis** + +| | | +|-----------------------------|---------| +| No. of antennas | 4T4R | +| No. of layers | 4 | +| Bandwidth | 100 MHz | +| Carrier frequency | 3.5 GHz | +| Tx power per antenna | 30 W | +| Technology | 5G NR | + +**Table 5.5.1-2: Example power profile for 4T4R O-RU** + +| Operating Load (Traffic) | Total O-RU (W) | ORAN Fronthaul Processing Unit (W) | Digital Processing Unit (W) | RF Processing Unit (W) | Power Unit & other components (W) | +|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------------------| +| Busy hour load | 550 | 10 | 25 | 495 | 20 | +| Low load | 200 | 10 | 25 | 145 | 20 | +| Sleep (Energy Savings State) | 50 | 5~10 | 0~5 | 0~15 | 15~20 | +| Energy saving gain | 150~180 | 0~5 | 20~25 | 130~145 | 0~5 | + +Compared to the low load scenario, energy savings of up to 150~180 W per O-RU can be achieved in the energy saving state. An example calculation for yearly energy saving potential considering a shutdown of 10000 O-RUs during 3 hours per day is provided in Table 5.5.1-3. + +**Table 5.5.1-3: Power saving calculation example for 4T4R O-RU** + +| Factor | Value | +|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| O-RU power savings during switch off (low load) [W] | 150~180 | +| Number of hours of switch off per day (50% of low load period) | 3 | +| Number of O-RUs | 10000 | +| Yearly energy saving [MWh] | 1643~1971 | + +### 5.5.2 Cell and Carrier Switch Off/On Energy Saving for 64T64R O-RU + +The energy saving gain from Carrier and Cell Switch Off/On is analyzed based on the system parameters in Table 5.5.2-1 and the example power profile considering power consumption from operational experience provided in Table 5.5.2-2. + +**Table 5.5.2-1: O-RU Configuration for ES gain analysis** + +| | | +|----------------------|---------| +| No. of antennas | 64T64R | +| No. of layers | 16 | +| Bandwidth | 100 MHz | +| Carrier frequency | 3.5 GHz | +| Tx power per antenna | 30 W | +| Technology | 5G NR | + +**Table 5.5.2-2: Example power profile for 64T64R O-RU** + +| Operating Load (Traffic) | Total O-RU (W) | ORAN Fronthaul Processing Unit (W) | Digital Processing Unit (W) | RF Processing Unit (W) | Power Supply & other components (W) | +|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------| +| Busy hour load | 1100 | 50 | 200 | 800 | 50 | +| Low load | 400 | 50 | 200 | 100 | 50 | +| Sleep (Energy Savings State) | 60~140 | 30~50 | 0~20 | 0~20 | 30~50 | +| Energy saving gain | 260~340 | 0~20 | 180~200 | 80~100 | 0~20 | + +Compared to the low load scenario, energy savings of 260-340 W per O-RU can be achieved in the energy saving state. Example calculations for yearly energy saving potential considering a shutdown of 10000 O-RUs during 3 hours per day are provided in Table 5.5.2-3. + +**Table 5.5.2-3: Power saving calculation examples for 64T64R O-RU** + +| Factor | Value | +|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------| +| O-RU power savings during switch off (low load) [W] | 260~340 | +| Number of hours of switch off per day (50% of low load period) | 3 | +| Number of O-Rus | 10000 | +| Yearly energy saving [MWh] | 2847~3723 | + +## 5.6 Feasibility Analysis + +No challenges concerning feasibility have been identified during the pre-normative phase. + +# 6 RF Channel Reconfiguration + +## 6.1 Problem Statement, Solution and Value Proposition + +In mobile networks mMIMO antennas are used for beamforming techniques to enhance cell capacity and throughput. In order to achieve beamforming, O-RUs need to concentrate the power amplifiers at the radome by combining radiating elements. At low load, i.e., when the expected traffic volume or number of connected users are lower than the configured threshold, ES can be achieved by reducing the power consumption of O-RUs by switching off certain Tx/Rx arrays. For example, 32 out of 64 Tx/Rx Arrays of an O-RU can be switched off in a digital mMIMO architecture and correspondingly the number of spatial layers and SSBs can be reduced. The procedure (involvement of respective O-RAN interfaces) of the RF Channel Reconfiguration depends on the management architecture model (hybrid or hierarchical) and the deployment option. The reconfiguration decision can be made by an AI/ML model within the inference host deployed at the Non-RT RIC (denoted as deployment Option 1), or at the Near-RT RIC (denoted as deployment option 2). Among others the AI/ML models may include prediction of future traffic, user mobility, and resource usage and may also predict expected energy efficiency enhancements, resource usage, and network performance for different ES optimization states. + +The main aim of RF Channel Reconfiguration is to perform O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection. However, Tx/Rx Array reselection may require modifying the maximum number of spatial streams, the number of SSB Beams or the O-RU Antenna transmit power. Hence the overall scope of RF Channel Reconfiguration includes the actions listed in Table 6.1-1. + +**Table 6.1-1: Actions in the context of RF Channel Reconfiguration** + +| Action Name | Explanation | Possible Implementation Method | +|---------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection |O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection means switching off certain Tx/Rx Arrays or Array elements to reduce power consumption of O-RU.
Reselecting Rx/Tx Arrays may impact cell coverage.
|The maximum number of spatial streams may depend on the O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection, and it may be necessary to be modified along with a new Tx/Rx Array selection.
A reduction of the number of spatial streams without Tx/Rx Array selection is not excluded as in certain scenarios the energy consumption of O-RU and/or O-DU may be reduced by turning off certain processing units of FPGA/GPUs, by running at a lower clock speed or turning off CPU/GPU cores along with reduced processing requirements.
|The number of SSB beams may depend on the O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection and the number of spatial streams. Hence it may be necessary to adapt the number of SSB beams.
|The maximum O-RU total transmit power may depend upon the O-RU Tx/Rx Array selection; hence it may need to be modified along with Tx/Rx Array selection to compensate for reduced coverage in the downlink.
|New Definition required in O-RAN.WG5.MP
o-ran-uplane-conf.yang module
o-ran-beamforming.yang module
| +| O-FH (M-Plane) | O-RU / O-DU | O-RU reports all offered Tx/Rx Arrays | values in IE | Initialization |New Definition required in O-RAN.WG4.MP
o-ran-uplane-conf.yang module
o-ran-beamforming.yang module
| + +###### AI/ML Model Training: + +**Table 6.2.1.3-2: AI/ML Model Training** + +| Input Data | | | | | | +|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| +| Interface | Source / Target | Name/Description | Units | Reporting Period | Existing / New Definitions | +| O1, R1 | E2 Node (O-CU) / SMO / rApp | DL PDCP SDU Data Volume per interface (Data Volume in DL delivered from O-CU-UP to O-DU, per PLMN, per QoS level, per slice, per Interface (F1-U, Xn-U, X2-U)) | Mbit | (non-real time for training) | Measurement: