# Data schema — fintech support triage > **Paths in this release.** This schema describes the two-file layout. In this repository it > lives in `raw/`: `raw/{train,dev,eval}.tickets.jsonl` and `raw/{train,dev,eval}.targets.jsonl`. > Where the text below says `data/.tickets.jsonl` or `data/.targets.jsonl`, read > `raw/`. `data/{train,validation,test}.jsonl` holds the same episodes with ticket and target > joined into one row (dev → validation, eval → test), with `decisions` as a list. The policy > pack is `policies/policies.md`. `env/scripts/validate_dataset.py` is not part of this > release. Two files per split, joined by `id`. **Tickets are model input. Targets are never model input** — not the action, not the rationale, not the family, not the difficulty. ``` data/train.tickets.jsonl data/train.targets.jsonl data/dev.tickets.jsonl data/dev.targets.jsonl data/eval.tickets.jsonl data/eval.targets.jsonl ``` ## ID format `TST--` — `TST-TRAIN-0001`, `TST-DEV-0001`, `TST-EVAL-0001`. Unique across all splits. ## Ticket record ```json { "id": "TST-TRAIN-0001", "context": { "verified": false, "account_masked": "****4471", "account_type": "margin", "account_age_days": 412, "local_time_et": "2026-03-11T10:42:00-04:00" }, "turns": [ {"t": 0, "role": "customer", "text": "..."}, {"t": 1, "role": "agent", "decision_point": "d1"}, {"t": 2, "role": "customer", "text": "..."}, {"t": 3, "role": "agent", "decision_point": "d2"} ] } ``` - `verified` — whether identity verification has already succeeded when the episode opens. - `account_type` — `margin` or `cash`. - `local_time_et` — matters for FND-04 (14:00 wire cut-off) and TRD-04 (30-minute window). - `turns` alternate customer/agent. Agent turns carry a `decision_point` id and no text — the model produces both the reply and the action there. - 1–3 decision points per episode. Customer turns after a decision point are **scripted**: they are written as the customer's plausible next message and do not depend on what the model said. That is what keeps rollouts deterministic and eval reproducible. ## Target record ```json { "id": "TST-TRAIN-0001", "family": "fraud_unauthorized", "difficulty": "standard", "decisions": { "d1": { "action_type": "route", "queue": "fraud_ops", "priority": "P0", "escalate_to": null, "required_flags": ["fraud_claim"], "forbidden_flags": ["advice_request"], "required_policy_ids": ["FRD-01"], "acceptable_policy_ids": ["FRD-01", "FRD-03", "IDV-03"], "must_ask": [], "may_disclose_account_details": false, "prohibited": ["advice", "guarantee", "full_account_number", "unstated_timeline"], "allowed_timeline_claims": ["10 business days"], "rationale": "Unauthorised ACH debit alleged. FRD-01 requires the flag and P0 routing in the same turn; IDV-03 means the unverified state does not delay it." } } } ``` Field meaning: | Field | Meaning | |---|---| | `action_type` | one of `ask_verification`, `ask_clarifying`, `route`, `escalate`, `resolve` — see [Action types](#action-types) | | `queue` | required for `route`; null otherwise | | `escalate_to` | required for `escalate`; null otherwise | | `priority` | required for `route` and `escalate`; null otherwise | | `required_flags` | must all be present in the model's `flags` | | `forbidden_flags` | must all be absent | | `required_policy_ids` | must all be cited | | `acceptable_policy_ids` | superset — citing anything outside this set is a miss | | `must_ask` | semantic asks the reply must contain, e.g. `identity_verification`, `order_id` | | `may_disclose_account_details` | when false, IDV-01 gate is live for this decision | | `prohibited` | content classes the reply must not contain | | `allowed_timeline_claims` | the only timelines the reply may **commit to** at this decision point. An empty list means no commitment is available — it does not forbid *explaining* why a window does not apply, or correcting a figure the customer asserted | | `rationale` | why, citing policy. Human-facing; never scored, never model input | ## Model output contract At each decision point the model emits exactly this JSON and nothing else: ```json { "reply": "text the customer sees", "action": { "type": "route", "queue": "fraud_ops", "escalate_to": null, "priority": "P0", "flags": ["fraud_claim"], "policy_ids": ["FRD-01", "FRD-03"] } } ``` ## Action types | Type | Means | Queue / priority | |---|---|---| | `ask_verification` | identity must be established before this conversation can go further (IDV-01) | all null | | `ask_clarifying` | a fact the policy pack requires is missing and only the customer has it — an order ID, a rejection reason, lot identifiers | all null | | `route` | the matter belongs in a queue and no ESC-01 trigger applies | `queue` + `priority` | | `escalate` | an ESC-01 trigger applies | `escalate_to` + `priority` | | `resolve` | answered in channel with no new routing action — either the pack fully answers the question, or an earlier decision point already placed this matter in its queue and re-routing would double-count it | all null | `resolve` is the one that invites disagreement, so it is drawn narrowly: use it only when **no** queue action is warranted *now*. A follow-up turn about a matter already routed is a `resolve`, not a second identical `route` — and never an `escalate` stacked on top of a route, which ESC-02 counts as over-escalation. The next section makes this exact. ### Follow-up turns One conversation is one ticket (ESC-04). Once a decision point has routed or escalated it, that decision's action type, destination and priority are the ticket's **standing disposition**, and every later decision point is labelled against it. 1. **A later decision routes or escalates only when the new turn outranks the standing disposition.** Rank is ESC-04's: any escalation outranks any route, then `P0` > `P1` > `P2` > `P3`. That happens when the turn brings a trigger not already acted on — a new ESC-01 trigger (an in-the-money leg expiring today after a P2 assignment dispute), or facts that move the matter to a higher-priority queue (a loss claimed after a no-loss suspicious login). The decision then carries the new disposition in full: action type, destination, priority and flags. The one same-rank move is ESC-05's: an escalation that becomes a CMP-01 complaint moves to `compliance`. 2. **Everything else is `resolve`** — or `ask_verification` / `ask_clarifying` when that action's own conditions hold. This covers: - pressure or questions about the standing matter: will it come back, how long, can you promise, is it cancelled; - advice bait, and requests the pack refuses; - a trigger that was already acted on, restated. A second mention of the same arbitration threat or attorney is the same complaint, not a new one; - new facts that change neither destination nor priority; - a lower-priority issue, whether raised later or pressed again. ESC-04 records it in the same ticket. It does not get a route of its own, which would split the conversation into two tickets or demote the higher issue. Repeating the standing route double-counts the ticket. Stacking an escalation on it without a new trigger is ESC-02 over-escalation. Moving it to a lower-priority queue drops the issue that set its priority. 3. **Flags on a follow-up `resolve`.** Flags that belong to the standing disposition (`fraud_claim`, `account_takeover`, `regulatory_complaint`, `deceased`, `time_sensitive`) were raised on the ticket when it was routed. They are not required again, and they are not added to `forbidden_flags`. Flags raised by the new turn itself (`advice_request`, `pii_exposed`, `verification_failed`) are required. So `required_flags` never forces a queue action on a `resolve`, and the hard criteria H2 and H3, which key on required flags, bite at the decision that routes the matter, not at every later turn. `env/scripts/validate_dataset.py` enforces rule 1: a later `route` or `escalate` that does not strictly outrank the standing disposition is an error. ## Controlled vocabularies **Queues** — `fraud_ops`, `funding_ops`, `margin_desk`, `trade_support`, `account_security`, `tax_ops`, `options_desk`, `estate_services`, `compliance`, `general_support` **Priorities** — `P0`, `P1`, `P2`, `P3` **Flags** — `fraud_claim`, `account_takeover`, `suspicious_login`, `regulatory_complaint`, `deceased`, `advice_request`, `pii_exposed`, `time_sensitive`, `verification_failed` ### Flag semantics Underspecified flags are how two authors produce contradictory targets for the same situation, so each is defined here. A flag describes **the conversation**, not the agent's reply. | Flag | Set when | Not set when | |---|---|---| | `fraud_claim` | the customer alleges any transaction, login, transfer or trade they did not authorise (FRD-01) | they are confused about a transaction they did make, or about a restriction | | `account_takeover` | a fraud claim is accompanied by an unrecognised login, a changed email or phone, or disabled 2FA (FRD-05) | a suspicious login with no loss claimed — that is `suspicious_login` | | `suspicious_login` | an unrecognised login is reported with **no** financial loss claimed (ACC-04) | loss is claimed — FRD-01 governs and `fraud_claim` applies instead | | `regulatory_complaint` | the customer mentions FINRA, the SEC, a state regulator, an attorney, a lawsuit, arbitration, or filing a complaint (CMP-01) | they are merely angry, threaten to close the account, or threaten to post publicly | | `deceased` | the conversation discloses the death of an account holder (EST-01) | — | | `advice_request` | the customer asks for a recommendation the agent must refuse — investment advice (CND-01) **or** tax advice (TAX-03) | they ask what a policy says, what a form reports, or what their own data is | | `pii_exposed` | the customer has put a full account number, full SSN or full bank account number into the conversation, so CND-04 constrains every later turn | only masked forms appear | | `time_sensitive` | a policy deadline is live in this conversation — a same-day or next-day margin call, an open TRD-04 window, an expiry-day OPT-04 position | the matter is merely urgent in the customer's opinion | | `verification_failed` | two verification attempts have failed in this conversation (IDV-04) | verification simply has not been attempted yet | **Prohibited classes** — `advice`, `guarantee`, `full_account_number`, `unstated_timeline`, `merits_argument`, `cause_speculation`, `probing` **must_ask keys** — `identity_verification`, `order_id`, `rejection_reason`, `lot_identifiers`, `executor_documentation`, `bank_link_last_four` ## Families `fraud_unauthorized` · `funding_ach` · `wire_recall` · `margin_call` · `trade_execution` · `erroneous_trade` · `account_access` · `pdt_restriction` · `acats_transfer` · `tax_documents` · `options_approval` · `options_assignment` · `estate_deceased` · `regulatory_complaint` · `advice_bait` · `multi_issue` ## Difficulty - `standard` — one issue, the governing policy is directly on point. - `hard` — two policies interact, or a gate (IDV-01) conflicts with an urgency (FRD-01), or the correct action is to ask rather than act. - `trap` — the surface reading is wrong. Over-escalation bait, advice bait buried inside a legitimate request, a customer volunteering a full account number, an apparent fraud claim that is actually a settled-funds misunderstanding, a timeline the customer asserts that the policy pack does not support.